[JPRT 107-32]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




   107th Congress                                      S. Prt.
                         JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT         
   1st Session                                         107-32
_______________________________________________________________________
                                    

 
                    COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
                           PRACTICES FOR 2000

                               VOLUME II

                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                            SUBMITTED TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              U.S. SENATE

                                AND THE

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                 BY THE

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

     IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN 
                   ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

                                     


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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr, Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Isdland
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    Virginia
                     Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
            Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                   HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         TOM LANTOS, California
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 
DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California           DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York              BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado         BARBARA LEE, California
RON PAUL, Texas                      JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
NICK SMITH, Michigan                 JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania        EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
DARRELL E. ISSA, California          SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia                GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana              DIANE E. WATSON, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
         Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
               Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
      Kristin Gilley, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

                                  (ii)

  


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................   vii

Letter of Transmittal............................................    ix

Preface..........................................................    xi

Overview and Acknowledgments.....................................  xiii

Introduction.....................................................  xvii

                                Volume I

Africa:
    Angola.......................................................     1
    Benin........................................................    16
    Botswana.....................................................    25
    Burkina Faso.................................................    36
    Burundi......................................................    46
    Cameroon.....................................................    59
    Cape Verde...................................................    85
    Central African Republic.....................................    91
    Chad.........................................................   103
    Comoros......................................................   115
    Congo, Democratic Republic of................................   122
    Congo, Republic of...........................................   156
    Cote d'Ivoire................................................   166
    Djibouti.....................................................   193
    Equatorial Guinea............................................   204
    Eritrea......................................................   215
    Ethiopia.....................................................   228
    Gabon........................................................   253
    Gambia, The..................................................   262
    Ghana........................................................   272
    Guinea.......................................................   294
    Guinea-Bissau................................................   310
    Kenya........................................................   317
    Lesotho......................................................   345
    Liberia......................................................   353
    Madagascar...................................................   367
    Malawi.......................................................   374
    Mali.........................................................   382
    Mauritania...................................................   391
    Mauritius....................................................   407
    Mozambique...................................................   415
    Namibia......................................................   433
    Niger........................................................   446
    Nigeria......................................................   455
    Rwanda.......................................................   479
    Sao Tome and Principe........................................   493
    Senegal......................................................   496
    Seychelles...................................................   507
    Sierra Leone.................................................   513
    Somalia......................................................   524
    South Africa.................................................   537
    Sudan........................................................   557
    Swaziland....................................................   579
    Tanzania.....................................................   588
    Togo.........................................................   608
    Uganda.......................................................   622
    Zambia.......................................................   642
    Zimbabwe.....................................................   656

East Asia and the Pacific:
    Australia....................................................   683
    Brunei.......................................................   693
    Burma........................................................   700
    Cambodia.....................................................   723
    China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).........................   736
    China (Taiwan only)..........................................   824
    East Timor...................................................   836
    Fiji.........................................................   846
    Indonesia....................................................   858
    Japan........................................................   899
    Kiribati.....................................................   912
    Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................   914
    Korea, Republic of...........................................   927
    Laos.........................................................   938
    Malaysia.....................................................   950
    Marshall Islands.............................................   985
    Micronesia, Federated States of..............................   989
    Mongolia.....................................................   992
    Nauru........................................................   999
    New Zealand..................................................  1002
    Palau........................................................  1008
    Papua New Guinea.............................................  1012
    Philippines..................................................  1017
    Samoa........................................................  1036
    Singapore....................................................  1040
    Solomon Islands..............................................  1054
    Thailand.....................................................  1062
    Tonga........................................................  1076
    Tuvalu.......................................................  1079
    Vanuatu......................................................  1082
    Vietnam......................................................  1085

                               Volume II

Europe:
    Albania......................................................  1107
    Andorra......................................................  1118
    Armenia......................................................  1121
    Austria......................................................  1137
    Azerbaijan...................................................  1147
    Belarus......................................................  1164
    Belgium......................................................  1192
    Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................  1200
    Bulgaria.....................................................  1223
    Croatia......................................................  1241
    Cyprus.......................................................  1260
    Czech Republic...............................................  1271
    Denmark......................................................  1290
    Estonia......................................................  1294
    Finland......................................................  1302
    France.......................................................  1306
    Georgia......................................................  1318
    Germany......................................................  1341
    Greece.......................................................  1355
    Hungary......................................................  1371
    Iceland......................................................  1383
    Ireland......................................................  1390
    Italy........................................................  1399
    Kazakhstan...................................................  1407
    Kyrgyzstan...................................................  1434
    Latvia.......................................................  1450
    Liechtenstein................................................  1457
    Lithuania....................................................  1462
    Luxembourg...................................................  1471
    Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of.......................  1474
    Malta........................................................  1485
    Moldova......................................................  1489
    Monaco.......................................................  1503
    Netherlands, The.............................................  1506
    Norway.......................................................  1513
    Poland.......................................................  1517
    Portugal.....................................................  1535
    Romania......................................................  1542
    Russia.......................................................  1555
    San Marino...................................................  1605
    Slovak Republic..............................................  1608
    Slovenia.....................................................  1621
    Spain........................................................  1626
    Sweden.......................................................  1637
    Switzerland..................................................  1645
    Tajikistan...................................................  1656
    Turkey.......................................................  1670
    Turkmenistan.................................................  1707
    Ukraine......................................................  1718
    United Kingdom...............................................  1742
    Uzbekistan...................................................  1760
    Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of..............................  1780

Near East and North Africa:
    Algeria......................................................  1823
    Bahrain......................................................  1836
    Egypt........................................................  1848
    Iran.........................................................  1869
    Iraq.........................................................  1890
    Israel and the occupied territories..........................  1908
    Jordan.......................................................  1950
    Kuwait.......................................................  1968
    Lebanon......................................................  1983
    Libya........................................................  1998
    Morocco......................................................  2007
    The Western Sahara...........................................  2050
    Oman.........................................................  2055
    Qatar........................................................  2064
    Saudi Arabia.................................................  2071
    Syria........................................................  2087
    Tunisia......................................................  2100
    United Arab Emirates.........................................  2120
    Yemen........................................................  2131

South Asia:
    Afghanistan..................................................  2157
    Bangladesh...................................................  2175
    Bhutan.......................................................  2201
    India........................................................  2212
    Maldives.....................................................  2263
    Nepal........................................................  2271
    Pakistan.....................................................  2286
    Sri Lanka....................................................  2325

Western Hemisphere
    Antigua and Barbuda..........................................  2351
    Argentina....................................................  2356
    Bahamas......................................................  2371
    Barbados.....................................................  2377
    Belize.......................................................  2383
    Bolivia......................................................  2390
    Brazil.......................................................  2403
    Canada.......................................................  2431
    Chile........................................................  2440
    Colombia.....................................................  2453
    Costa Rica...................................................  2498
    Cuba.........................................................  2506
    Dominica.....................................................  2526
    Dominican Republic...........................................  2530
    Ecuador......................................................  2551
    El Salvador..................................................  2563
    Grenada......................................................  2577
    Guatemala....................................................  2581
    Guyana.......................................................  2615
    Haiti........................................................  2625
    Honduras.....................................................  2642
    Jamaica......................................................  2662
    Mexico.......................................................  2671
    Nicaragua....................................................  2701
    Panama.......................................................  2719
    Paraguay.....................................................  2734
    Peru.........................................................  2745
    St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................  2776
    Saint Lucia..................................................  2779
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines...............................  2784
    Suriname.....................................................  2789
    Trinidad and Tobago..........................................  2796
    Uruguay......................................................  2802
    Venezuela....................................................  2809

Appendixes:
    A. Notes on preparation of the reports.......................  2829
    B. Reporting on worker rights................................  2831
    C. Selected international human rights conventions...........  2833
    D. Explanation of chart in Appendix C........................  2836
    E. FY 2000 U.S. economic and military assistance--actual 
      obligations................................................  2837
    F. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting 
      record.....................................................  2849
    G. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting 
      table......................................................  2851
    H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights......  2854




                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    The country reports on human rights practices contained 
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance 
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative 
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations 
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not. 
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the 
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance 
legislation.

                                       Jesse Helms,
                          Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

                                      Henry J. Hyde
                    Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

                                 (vii)

                                     
?



                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                 Washington, DC, February 25, 2001.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I 
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2000, prepared in compliance with sections 
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we 
can provide any further information.
            Sincerely,
                                    Barbara Larkin,
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosure.

                                  (ix)

                                     
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              


                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

    I am pleased to transmit to the United States Congress this 
25th edition of the Department of State's Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices.
    For the past quarter of a century, these reports have grown 
in breadth and stature every year. As such they reflect our 
country's deep and abiding commitment to universal human rights 
and the unprecedented growth in democracy, freedom, and human 
rights throughout the world.
    The year 2000 saw many improvements in human rights--from 
the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana to the 
defeat of an entrenched dictator in Serbia and the election of 
a new president in Mexico. At the same time, the continued 
deterioration of conditions in China and Cuba and the abusive 
policies pursued by the regimes in Iraq and Sudan and a number 
of other countries offer proof that the battle to promote 
universal human rights is far from finished. We who believe in 
human freedom and the rule of law must not lose sight of the 
challenges that lie before us.
    This year's report covers 195 countries. No country, our 
own included, can claim a perfect human rights record; nor 
should any seek exemption from international scrutiny. Each 
nation must be accountable for the way it treats its citizens. 
The purpose of these reports, therefore, is to provide to the 
best of our ability a comprehensive and accurate report on the 
human rights conditions in every country.
    The interest in these annual Country Reports can be seen in 
the hundreds of thousands of hits our web site at www.state.gov 
will receive from every part of the world over the next few 
days, and in the countless discussions, both public and 
private, that will follow. The Report for the year 2000 thus 
takes its place within the context of a new and revolutionary 
era of global human discourse. It is my deepest hope, 
therefore, that these reports can stimulate new dialogue and 
provide new encouragement for all countries to strengthen their 
commitments to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
    I would like to thank all those who had a hand in preparing 
this year's Country Reports--whether overseas or in the 
Department of State. Without their dedication and hard work, a 
report of this quality and scope would simply be impossible.
                                           Colin L. Powell,
                                                Secretary of State.
                      OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

                              ----------                              


                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

Why The Reports Are Prepared
    This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department 
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section 
504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law 
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and 
complete report regarding the status of internationally 
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) 
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) 
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United 
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human 
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports 
on several countries that do not fall into the categories 
established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by 
the congressional requirement.
    The responsibility of the United States to speak out on 
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized 
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation 
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of 
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In 
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for 
Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal 
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into 
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance 
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an 
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only 
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 195 
reports are submitted.
How The Reports are Prepared
    In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen 
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections 
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to 
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts 
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of 
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a 
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking 
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2000 
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by 
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S. 
Government employees.
    Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the 
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a 
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including 
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists, 
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This 
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign 
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying 
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of 
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of 
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human 
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their 
governments.
    After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were 
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other 
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate, 
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on 
their own sources of information. These included reports 
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign 
government officials, representatives from the United Nations 
and other international and regional organizations and 
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers 
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee 
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal 
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant 
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly 
as possible.
    The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for 
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, 
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve 
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private 
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized 
human rights.
    The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover 
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and 
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or 
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of 
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
    Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human 
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons 
have the inalienable right to change their government by 
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of 
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a 
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the 
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights, 
including the right of association; the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age 
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
    Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: 
Editor in Chief--William E. Dilday; Editor in Chief Ex 
Officio--Marc J. Susser; Senior Advisor--Leslie A. Gerson; 
Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical Editor--Larry 
Arthur; Senior Editors--Frank B. Crump, Susan F. Kovalik, 
Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. Perry-Elby, Rachel D. Settlage; 
Editors--Sara M. Allinder, Stefanie R. Altman, Liana Brooks, 
Cynthia R. Bunton, Michelle Eyrich Day, Claire Ehmann, Imogen 
Fua, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, Amy E. 
McKee, Martine K. Miller, Donald E. Parker, Jennifer M. 
Pekkinen, Yvette Saint-Andre, John J. Sheerin, Jolynn M. 
Shoemaker, James C. Todd, William J. Tomlyanovich, Stephen W. 
Worrel; Assistant Editors--Eric M. Barboriak, Melanne A. Civic, 
George T. Constantine, Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr, 
Carol G. Finerty, Stephen M. Epstein, Nancy Hewett, Peter 
Higgins, Alden H. Irons, Herman Keizer, Susan E. Keogh, Richard 
Marshall, Janet L. Mayland, Edmund McWilliams, Susan 
O'Sullivan, Maria B. Pica, Tamara J. Resler, Daniel J. Schuman, 
Christopher Sibilla, Wendy B. Silverman, Danika Walters, James 
D. Wulff; Editorial Assistants--Phillip L. Antweiler, Timothy 
Brittingham, Paige E. Chabora, Andrew Chen, Lewis K. Elbinger, 
Charles W. Evans, Dr. Sudha Haley, Rashid U. Haq, Kristy L. 
Hofkens, Adrienne Lauson, David G. Leyden, Coleman Mehta, 
Philip A. Mirrer-Singer, Mark N. Templeton, Steven A. 
Wagenseil, Melissa A. Waters, Gerri L. Williams, Anne Zollner; 
Technical Support--Mitchell R. Brown.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE 
                               YEAR 2000

                              ----------                              


               I. The 25th Edition of the Country Reports

    For the past quarter of a century, the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices have chronicled the ebb and flow of 
human rights, bearing witness to the conditions that affect 
people's lives in every nation of the world. Yet despite all 
the suffering--or perhaps because of it--the cause of human 
rights is stronger now than ever.
    The expansion of democracy and human freedom that the world 
has experienced over the past 25 years has many causes. This 
expansion rests on the fundamental belief that there are rights 
and freedoms to which every human is entitled no matter where 
he or she resides. This idea is so powerful and so universal 
that it gains strength with every passing year.
    The primary focus of the Country Reports always has been 
events in the countries that the reports cover. If newspapers 
are the first drafts of history, the reports are surely the 
second drafts, carefully researched cross-sections of the good 
and bad that transpire around the world every year. But the 
reports are not just history. They are documents backed by the 
full weight of the U.S. people and Government. They speak for 
those who have no voice, bearing witness for those who have not 
had access to free trials, nor have enjoyed other fundamental 
human rights and protections. As the reports have done since 
their first appearance in March 1977, they represent the 
nation's commitment to respect for universal human rights and 
its interest in promoting these rights in every country of the 
world. The reports are a tangible manifestation of the 
Department of State's intense focus on human rights issues.

                         II. The Year in Review

    The year saw a number of advances in human rights, 
democracy, and fundamental freedoms. The Yugoslav people voted 
Slobodan Milosevic out of office in September, ending more than 
a decade of authoritarian rule and offering hope for a new, 
more tolerant and democratic era in Yugoslavia. Nigeria 
continued to make progress in its transition to democracy, 
while a peaceful transfer of authority took place in Ghana 
following generally free and fair elections. Ethiopia and 
Eritrea signed a peace accord in December, ending a conflict 
that created at least a million internally displaced civilians 
in both countries. The election of Vicente Fox marked the first 
time in modern Mexican history that a member of an opposition 
party was elected President. Peru's decision to renew its 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights appeared to represent a renewed 
commitment to the rule of law. And South Korean President Kim 
Dae Jung's engagement policy led to some easing of tensions 
with North Korea.
    U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated the United 
Nation's support for the promotion of human rights and 
instructed its agencies to place emphasis on both reporting and 
programming initiatives that strengthened respect for human 
rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia continued to try alleged war criminals, including a 
war crimes trial based on charges of rape and other sexual 
violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also 
continued to try persons for genocide-related crimes. At the 
regional level, a number of institutions continued to work to 
strengthen democratic norms and practices. The Organization of 
African Unity denied a seat at its summit to Cote d'Ivoire due 
to its 1999 coup. The Organization of American States (OAS) 
sent a mission to Peru in the wake of elections that 
international and domestic observers deemed to be seriously 
flawed. The Government subsequently announced new elections 
that are scheduled to take place in April 2001. The OAS mission 
also sponsored a dialog among government, opposition 
politicians, and civil society representatives aimed at 
reforming the country's beleaguered democratic institutions. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe engaged 
in active and public human rights reporting in Kosovo and 
monitored elections in a number of countries. A number of 
member states of the Council of Europe began to publish reports 
of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
    At the international level, the global spread of democracy 
was affirmed in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas. 
The Governments of over 100 countries that have chosen a 
democratic path and that represent every region of the world, 
level of development, and various historical experiences, 
convened a June ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, under 
the rubric of a Community of Democracies. Participants endorsed 
the Warsaw Declaration, which committed their Governments to 
uphold democratic principles and practices. The Community of 
Democracies meeting sought to enhance cooperation among 
participating Governments through several avenues, including an 
informal caucus at the U.N. General Assembly to share 
information and support democracy-related issues and 
resolutions within the U.N. system.
    At the same time these positive trends took place, China's 
poor human rights record worsened during the year, as the 
authorities intensified their harsh measures against 
underground Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists, destroyed 
many houses of worship, and stepped up their campaign against 
the Falun Gong movement. China also sharply suppressed 
organized dissent. In Burma the military continued its severe 
repression, holding Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 
much of the year, detaining her supporters, imprisoning many 
religious believers, and coercing numerous persons, including 
children, into forced labor. North Korea's situation remained 
among the worst in the world: The Government stifled all 
dissent and widely curtailed freedom of religion, political 
prisoners were held in forced labor camps, and malnutrition 
remained widespread. In Afghanistan the Taliban continued to be 
a major violator of human rights, severely restricting women's 
and girls' access to education, medical facilities, and 
employment. Iraq remained under the complete domination of one 
of the world's most repressive regimes, as security forces 
routinely executed, tortured, beat, raped, or otherwise 
intimidated and abused any perceived political opponents. 
Cuba's overall human rights record remained poor, as the 
Government retained tight surveillance over anyone considered a 
potential opponent. The human rights situation in Belarus 
worsened in a number of areas, as the Lukashenko regime took 
severe measures to neutralize political opponents and repressed 
all calls for democracy. Turkmenistan remained one of the most 
totalitarian countries in the world, as the Committee on 
National Security maintained tight control over the country, 
and a personality cult centered around President Saparmurat 
Niyazov continued. In Israel and the occupied territories, 
following the outbreak of violence in September, Israeli 
security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention 
of their own rules of engagement, killing approximately 300 
Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to violent 
demonstrations and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza. Palestinian security forces and members of Fatah's Tanzim 
killed numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians in the cycle of 
violence.
    Continuing internal conflict marred the human rights 
situation in a number of countries. In Colombia both 
paramilitary and guerrilla groups continued to commit acts of 
violence and other serious abuses in many parts of the country, 
with numerous massacres of civilians and the murder, kidnaping, 
and intimidation of human rights defenders, trade unionists, 
journalists, and other targeted groups. War, exacerbated by 
external intervention, continued to wrack the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, enabling perpetrators of human rights 
violations to enjoy virtual impunity in large portions of the 
country. The Government of Sudan continued its bombing of 
civilian population centers, support for slave taking, and 
forced religious conversions, while preventing international 
humanitarian assistance from reaching large portions of the 
country. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by 
Russian forces in Chechnya, which included extrajudicial 
killings, torture, and rape, provoked widespread condemnation 
and calls for accountability; the Chechens committed numerous 
abuses as well, such as the execution of prisoners. In 
Indonesia security forces were responsible for numerous 
instances of indiscriminate shootings of civilians, torture, 
beatings, and other abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere, 
and the Government was ineffective in deterring social, 
interethnic, and interreligious violence in the Moluccas and 
Sulawesi.

        III. Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor

    Global Democratic Trends: The year witnessed new strides 
towards the globalization of democracy. Many, if not most, 
governments, civil society leaders, and multilateral 
institutions now pursue and promote open economies and freer 
societies. A majority of people in the world now live in 
democratic countries or countries that have begun to implement 
some democratic and political reforms. The overall trend 
remains one of positive, incremental change, despite some 
reversals.
    Elections bolstered democratic transitions in Croatia, 
Ghana, Mexico, Suriname, and Yugoslavia during the year. An 
active civil society and increasingly independent media helped 
to ensure the success and transparency of these elections. 
Setbacks included continuing conflict in the Middle East and 
Africa, a coup in Fiji, and a breakdown of the Government and 
law and order in the Solomon Islands. In China, despite 
widespread Government abuses, important aspects of civil 
society continued to develop. Seriously flawed elections took 
place in other countries, most notably in Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti.
    On the nongovernmental side, increased global networking 
among organizations and private citizens mirrored the growth of 
active civil societies at the national level. The World Forum 
on Democracy, held jointly with the Warsaw Community of 
Democracies Ministerial in June, brought together an 
unprecedented international gathering of scholars, civic, 
religious, labor, and business leaders to assess the challenges 
to democracy. The Forum provided to the ministerial assembly 
recommendations that included convening the informal caucus of 
democracies that was launched at the United Nations in the 
fall. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
from over 80 countries also met in Sao Paulo during November to 
consider how to meet the challenges to democracy. They 
developed a list of practical steps NGO's could take in their 
own countries to support the democratic process.
    Integrity of the Person: In Algeria reports of abuses such 
as torture and arbitrary detention continued to decrease during 
the year; however, extrajudicial killings by security forces 
and terrorist groups claimed the lives of many hundreds of 
persons. The torture of political opponents is widespread in 
Uzbekistan. Cameroon's security forces reportedly killed many 
dozens of persons over a 6-month period in the city of Douala, 
and the abuse of detainees throughout the country remained 
endemic. The brutality associated with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone abated somewhat; however, there 
continued to be reports of serious abuses, such as 
extrajudicial killings, rapes, and beatings in the 60 percent 
of the country that the Government does not control. The RUF 
also committed human rights abuses in Guinea. The Libyan 
government resorted to intimidation to control the political 
opposition, as security forces arbitrarily arrested and 
detained individuals who frequently were held incommunicado or 
tortured.
    Press Freedom: Freedom of the press remains nonexistent in 
such countries as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Turkmenistan. There 
were severe restrictions on the press in Sudan, Uzbekistan, and 
China, except in Hong Kong. The disappearance of Ukrainian 
Georhiy Gongadze, whose alleged remains were found late in the 
year, raised serious concern about press freedom in Ukraine. In 
Russia Kremlin efforts to gain control over a major independent 
television network posed a threat to hard-won press freedom as 
well. In Iran dozens of newspaper offices were closed, and a 
number of Iran's most prominent journalists and editors were 
arrested or harassed as hard-line elements within the 
Government sought to silence their critics. However, there was 
some easing of press restrictions in Syria, and the press in a 
number of countries in North Africa continued to demonstrate 
more freedom.
    Religious Freedom: The year saw the continuation of 
religious repression and discrimination in every region of the 
world. Based on the Department's Annual Report on International 
Religious Freedom 2000 (issued in September and covering the 
period July 1999 through June 2000), all five countries 
designated as ``countries of particular concern'' by the 
Secretary of State in 1999--Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and 
Sudan--were redesignated. This designation reflects the 
particularly severe violations of religious freedom by the 
Governments of those countries. In each the situation remained 
serious; in some--notably China--religious repression 
increased.
    In Uzbekistan, despite the release of some religious 
prisoners, the Government continued to incarcerate and abuse 
others because of their religious beliefs and practices. In 
particular some Muslims were vulnerable to mistreatment because 
of their alleged association with terrorists. The Government of 
Turkmenistan failed to allow non-Sunni Muslims and non-Russian 
Orthodox Christian believers to register, despite earlier 
promises to do so, and continued its crackdown on Protestant 
worshipers and its suppression of practitioners of other faiths 
for not being registered. In Russia there were concerns about 
the uniform implementation by local officials of federal 
regulations requiring the reregistration of religious groups 
and organizations. In Georgia there was increased 
discrimination against some religious minorities, including 
Jehovah's Witnesses. In Laos some religious prisoners were 
released, but the practice by certain local officials of 
forcing Christians to sign renunciations of their faith 
continued, as did the harsh treatment of Christians in prison.
    In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim public worship is prohibited, 
and the Government detained and subsequently deported several 
persons whom it considered to have violated the prohibition. 
The Government supports the Sunni Muslim majority, and 
discrimination against members of the Shi'a minority persists. 
Pakistan's blasphemy law continued to be abused and directed 
against the country's religious minorities, in particular the 
Ahmadiya and Christian communities. In Europe some states have 
adopted or are considering discriminatory legislation or 
policies that tend to stigmatize expressions of religious faith 
by certain groups by wrongfully associating them with dangerous 
``sects'' or ``cults.''
    On a more positive note, religious life in a number of 
countries of the New Independent States continued to progress 
during the year, as some governments tried with varying degrees 
of success to bring local and regional officials into line with 
national policy. In Azerbaijan the treatment of religious 
groups continued to improve, as it has since President Aliyev's 
public commitment to religious liberty in 1999.
    Women: The year saw women's human rights attract more 
international attention than in the past, but actual gains 
worldwide were limited. In Egypt women were granted the right 
to divorce on grounds of incompatibility. In Rwanda a law was 
passed that improves women's rights in inheritance, family 
matters, and credit. Despite some progress made in these and 
other areas, serious problems remain. In many parts of Africa, 
female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and 
psychological health of women and girls. Societal 
discrimination prevented women in many countries from taking 
advantage of economic opportunities. In Afghanistan the 
Taliban's restrictions on education and work continued to 
confine women to the home. Traditional patriarchal societies 
continued to devalue women and girls. In China coercive family 
planning practices continued to harm women and female children, 
despite some government experimentation with noncoercive 
practices. In a number of countries in the Middle East and 
South Asia, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued 
to be major problems.
    Violence against women remained a pervasive problem, 
cutting across social and economic lines. Domestic and sexual 
violence against women is found on every continent. While 
governments publicly condemned violence against women, too few 
took concrete steps to address it.
    Children: Children are among the most vulnerable of any 
group in society and face particular threats to their human 
rights. Around the world, children face dangerous and unhealthy 
conditions, working in factories, fields, and sweatshops, as 
domestic servants, or, in some cases, as prostitutes. The 
trafficking of children for forced labor, prostitution, and 
pornography is a growing and lucrative business for criminals. 
In many cities large numbers of street children lack shelter, 
food, education, and support and are vulnerable to many forms 
of abuse, despite the best efforts of governments and NGO's. In 
countries such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda, armed rebels force children to serve as soldiers or 
recruit them with promises or threats. In many countries, 
children are denied access to education--in some cases because 
they cannot afford the fees for books and uniforms, in others 
because they must work to support their families--thereby 
severely reducing their chances for a better life. Many 
governments deny girls the opportunity to attend school or 
complete their schooling.
    Some improvements in the lives of children took place 
during the year, as some governments took steps to aid children 
and strengthen protection of their rights. For example, in 
Venezuela some 500,000 children attended school for the first 
time when the Government prohibited registration fees. The 
Government of Tunisia sponsors an immunization program that 
targets preschool age children and reports that over 95 percent 
of children are vaccinated. At the end of the year, the 
Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the National Observatory of 
Children's Rights began a human rights awareness campaign 
regarding the plight of child maids that received widespread 
media exposure. The Minister of Justice in Benin established a 
National Commission for Children's Rights, which held its 
initial session in July; the Benin Government also has made 
serious efforts to combat child abuse and trafficking in 
children. In March several government agencies in the 
Philippines signed a memorandum of agreement on the handling 
and treatment of children involved in armed conflict, which 
treats child insurgents as victims to be rescued and 
rehabilitated, rather than as enemies to be neutralized and 
prosecuted. The United Nations opened two important documents 
for signature during the year: the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Children in 
Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child Concerning the Sale of the Child. NGO's 
also are extremely active in the field of children's rights 
throughout the world, advocating legal reform and providing 
services.
    Worker Rights: During the year, there were countervailing 
negative and positive trends affecting worker rights. Among the 
positive developments, over 50 countries ratified the 
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182), the most rapid 
international approval for any convention in the organization's 
81-year history. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000 
encouraged international community ratification of the 
convention by linking ratification to continued eligibility for 
Generalized System of Preferences status. The act also 
incorporated worker rights criteria into trade preference 
eligibility for African and Caribbean Basin programs.
    For the first time, the ILO adopted a resolution that 
called for measures to secure compliance with fundamental 
worker rights. In November the ILO's Governing Body judged that 
the Government of Burma had not taken effective action to deal 
with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced labor. It 
called on all ILO member states to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that Burma does not perpetuate or extend its system of 
forced or compulsory labor.
    Among negative trends during the year was the impunity with 
which a dramatically increasing number of trade unionists were 
killed, tortured, and intimidated in Colombia. Elsewhere a 
growing trend toward the negotiation of individual contracts 
between companies and workers and the resort to the formation 
of ``cooperatives'' in place of trade unions deprived workers 
of the protection afforded by union representation and of 
protection under national labor legislation.
    Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in persons poses a 
serious challenge to human rights. This rapidly growing global 
problem affects countries and families on every continent. 
Traffickers prey upon women, children, and men from all walks 
of life, and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers 
particularly exploit women and children who suffer from poverty 
and are marginalized within their own societies--the most 
vulnerable segments of the population. Trafficking has grown 
significantly in recent years and serves as one of the leading 
sources of revenue for international criminal organizations--in 
part because it is low-risk and high-profit. In some countries, 
local police and immigration and customs officials are involved 
or complicit in trafficking. Traffickers deprive their victims 
of their basic human dignity, subject them to inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and treat them as chattel that can be 
bought and sold into forced and bonded labor across 
international and within national borders. Victims often find 
themselves in a strange country, unable to speak the language, 
and without identification or documentation. Many are subject 
to violent and brutal treatment by their captors. Some come 
from countries in which the police and other authorities are a 
source of repression rather than a source of help, and they are 
reluctant to seek assistance. Many are threatened with 
retribution against themselves or their families should they 
try to escape. Many victims face additional risks from 
dangerous working conditions, including the threat of harm from 
exposure to dangerous pesticides or sexually transmitted 
diseases.
    The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to 
quantify. Reliable estimates range from 700,000 to 2 million 
persons trafficked globally each year. Victims are trafficked 
into sweatshop labor, prostitution, domestic servitude, unsafe 
agricultural labor, construction work, restaurant work, and 
various forms of modern-day slavery. Governments around the 
world have taken steps to combat these heinous practices, 
enacting legislation to criminalize trafficking and strengthen 
penalties against it, and taking steps to aid victims. In 
December 81 countries signed the Trafficking in Persons 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the U.N. 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. More 
countries are expected to sign the Trafficking Protocol in the 
coming months. NGO's are especially active in the 
antitrafficking field; their efforts globally include awareness 
campaigns, the provision of medical and psychological support 
and shelter for victims, as well as job training.
    Corporate Responsibility: In recent years, partnerships 
among governments, businesses, and civil society to promote 
human rights, support civil society, and address corporate 
responsibility needs have expanded. Two of the best-known 
examples are the Sullivan Principles and the U.N. Global 
Compact, which encourage corporations, on a voluntary basis, to 
recognize international human rights, labor, and environmental 
standards. During the year, a group of major oil, mining, and 
energy companies; human rights and corporate responsibility 
organizations; and an international trade union federation 
worked with the U.S. and British Governments to forge a set of 
voluntary principles on security and human rights. The 
principles provide a mechanism for a continuing dialog on 
important security and human rights issues.

                IV. History of the Human Rights Reports

    The first edition of the Country Reports was a product of 
its times. While the United States had been at the forefront of 
the international human rights movement since the end of World 
War II and the creation of the United Nations, the Cold War and 
the gradual ending of colonialism dominated the first decades 
of that movement. However, the early 1970s gave rise in the 
Congress and throughout the country to new concepts and 
measures of accountability. An important force behind this 
changing environment was an ever-growing community of NGO's 
whose global outlook, commitment to human rights, and access to 
the media helped shape public opinion and government 
decisionmaking.
    In 1973 Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human 
rights in the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
International Organizations. That same year, a sense of 
Congress resolution was passed urging the Nixon Administration 
to link U.S. foreign assistance programs to respect for human 
rights within those recipient countries. The Congress amended 
the Foreign Assistance Act 3 years later to require the 
Secretary of State to transmit to Congress ``a full and 
complete report'' every year concerning ``respect for 
internationally recognized human rights in each country 
proposed as a recipient of security assistance.''
    Thus in March 1977, the first volume of Country Reports was 
submitted to Congress. The report covered 82 countries. Because 
it focused on nations with whom the United States had formal 
security assistance programs, most of them were longstanding 
allies and friends. The initial report was brief--only 143 
pages--and at the end of each entry was a rating, taken from 
Freedom House, judging whether the country was free, partly 
free, or not free.
    Like any innovation, the new report had its critics. To 
some the very existence of such a document harmed relations 
with the very nations with which the United States had 
established the best ties. To others the report fell short of 
full disclosure. Such criticism has helped improve the reports 
ever since. They now cover virtually every country of the world 
and include a level of detail that would have stunned earlier 
readers.
    For the 1978 report, 33 additional countries that received 
U.S. economic assistance were added to the original 82. The 
next year, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended again to 
require an entry on each member of the United Nations. The 1979 
report thus expanded to 854 pages and covered 154 countries, 
including for the first time discussions of Cuba, the Soviet 
Union, and the People's Republic of China.
    By then the basic format of the report had been 
established, although it would undergo many modifications over 
time. The first section was Respect for the Integrity of the 
Person, and it included, as it still does, subsections on 
torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; 
and invasion of the home. The second section was entitled 
Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of such Vital 
Needs as Food, Shelter, and Health Care. Third was Respect for 
Civil and Political Liberties. This section included separate 
subsections on freedom of speech, press, religion, and 
assembly; freedom of movement within the country for travel and 
immigration; and freedom to participate in the political 
process. Fourth was Government Attitude and Record Regarding 
International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged 
Violations of Human Rights.
    In 1980 a subsection was added on disappearances. The 
following year's report saw a recasting of the section on 
fulfillment of vital needs as Economic and Social 
Circumstances. The 1982 report added subsections on political 
and extrajudicial killing and disappearances and expanded the 
discussions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful 
assembly, religion, movement, and the political process. The 
following year, the right of citizens to change their 
government was added. In 1986 a new section entitled 
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or 
Social Status was introduced, along with another section on the 
Status of Labor.
    In 1989 a subsection was added on the use of excessive 
force and violations of human rights in internal conflicts. The 
labor section was revised to include specific discussions of 
the right of association, the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, minimum age for employment of children, and 
acceptable conditions of labor. The 1993 report saw an 
expansion of the discrimination section to include specific 
discussions of the rights of women, children, the indigenous, 
people with disabilities, and national, racial, and ethnic 
minorities. In 1993 the reports appeared on the Department of 
State's web site for the first time, an event that dramatically 
increased the number of individuals who had immediate access to 
them. Additional coverage on refugees and asylum was added 3 
years later. In 1997 the subsection on forced and bonded child 
labor was upgraded substantially. In 1998 the report was 
published for the first time in two volumes.
    Later in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious 
Freedom Act, which mandated annual reports on the state of 
international religious freedom in every country. The first of 
these reports appeared in September 1999, the same year that 
Congress requested that a new section be added to the reports 
on trafficking in persons. The reports that year also included 
a new focus on access to political prisoners and genocide.
                                 Michael E. Parmly,
                       Acting Assistant Secretary of State,
                      Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
					  
                                EUROPE

                              ----------                              


                                ALBANIA

    Albania is a republic with a multiparty parliament, a Prime 
Minister, Ilir Meta, and a President, Rexhep Meidani, elected by the 
Parliament. The Prime Minister heads the Government; the presidency is 
a largely ceremonial position with limited executive power. The 
Socialist Party (SP) and its allies won 121 of 155 parliamentary seats 
in 1997 general elections held after a 5-month period of chaos and 
anarchy due to the collapse of pyramid schemes. Observers deemed the 
elections to be acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances. 
Local elections were held in October and, despite some procedural 
shortcomings and some irregularities, were conducted in a tense but 
generally peaceful atmosphere and were judged by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have showed ``significant 
progress'' toward meeting international standards. The Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, continued political 
instability, limited resources, political pressure, inexperienced and 
untrained personnel, and widespread corruption weaken the judiciary's 
ability to function independently and efficiently.
    Local police units that report to the Minister of Public Order are 
responsible principally for internal security. One of the most serious 
problems involving public order and internal security is the fact that 
the police officers largely are untrained and often unreliable. The 
international community continued to provide training, advice, and 
equipment to improve the quality of the police forces; however, 
unprofessional behavior and corruption remained a major impediment to 
the development of an effective, civilian police force. The Ministry 
also has a small force of well-trained and effective police officers 
organized into special forces units to combat organized crime. The 
Government further consolidated public order throughout the country 
during the year, building on the progress that had been made in the 
previous year; however, serious problems remain in the area of 
policing. The police are affected by, and are sometimes part of, the 
country's widespread corruption. The National Intelligence Service 
(SHIK) is responsible for both internal and external intelligence 
gathering and counterintelligence. The military has a special 120-man 
``commando'' unit, which operates in an antiterrorist role under the 
Minister of Defense. During times of domestic crisis, the law allows 
the Minister of Public Order to request authority over this unit; this 
was done as a precautionary measure during the October local elections. 
The police committed human rights abuses.
    Albania is a poor country in transition from central economic 
planning to a free market system, and many questions related to 
privatization, property ownership claims, and the appropriate 
regulation of business remain unresolved. More than 20 percent of the 
rural population lives under the official poverty line; in urban areas 
the figure is 11 percent. Overall, 17 percent of the country's 
population lives below the official poverty line. The country continued 
to experience slow but stable economic progress. Inflation was 
negligible during the year. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 
about 7 percent to an estimated $3.8 billion (532 billion lek). The 
official unemployment rate was 17.5 percent, a slight decrease from the 
18 percent of the previous year. With two-thirds of all workers 
employed in agriculture--mostly at the subsistence level--remittances 
from citizens working abroad are extremely important, as is foreign 
assistance. The GDP may be underestimated because considerable income 
is thought to be derived from various organized and semiorganized 
criminal activities. A variety of other unreported, noncriminal gray 
and black market activities, such as unlicensed small businesses, along 
with the Government's inability to collect fully accurate statistics, 
also contribute to the GDP's underestimation.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in some areas; however, numerous, serious problems remained. The 
opposition Democratic Party (DP) alleged that the Government was 
responsible for the killing of one of its members during the year. 
Police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP members attacked the 
police station and other public buildings in Tropoja. The police beat 
and otherwise abused suspects and prisoners. The DP often credibly 
complained about incidents of police harassment of its members and of 
the dismissal of some of its members from official positions for 
political reasons. The police at times arbitrarily arrested and 
detained persons, and prolonged pretrial detention is a problem. The 
judiciary is inefficient, and subject to corruption. Executive pressure 
on the judiciary remains, but decreased slightly. There were complaints 
of unqualified and unprofessional judges and credible accounts of 
judges who were intimidated or bribed by powerful criminals. The 
Government occasionally infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
Government respect for freedom of speech and of the press improved 
slightly; however, police at times beat and detained journalists, and 
academic freedom was constrained. Violence and discrimination against 
women and child abuse were serious problems. The Government took some 
steps to improve the treatment of ethnic minorities; however, societal 
discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, particularly 
against Roma, persisted. Child labor was a problem. Vigilante action, 
mostly related to traditional blood feuds, resulted in many killings. 
Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed cases of political killings by the Government, despite 
repeated claims by the DP that its members were harassed, beaten, and 
sometimes killed by government agents.
    In May a DP activist in Vlore was killed by unidentified persons 
immediately following a party rally. The DP claimed that government 
agents were responsible; however, the Government claimed it was a 
revenge killing by criminals. The Albanian Helsinki Committee expressed 
concern over the killing and appealed to government authorities to make 
all efforts to solve the case. There were no reports concerning a 
governmental response in this case.
    In November police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP 
members attacked the police station, courthouse, and other public 
buildings in Tropoja.
    The public prosecutor in Gjokastra investigated the cases of 
Kastriot Brega and Bardhyul Balliu, who died while in police custody 
and found insufficient evidence to justify prosecuting the officers 
involved. In 1999 the DP claimed that over 21 members, supporters, 
local government officials, and former national party officials were 
killed during 1997-99. The DP claimed that at least three of its 
members were killed during 1998: The chairman of the local branch of 
the Democratic Party of Kish-Arra village of Shkoder, the deputy 
chairman of the polling station in the Gjinar commune of the Elbasan 
district, and the chairman of the DP branch of Boric village in Malesia 
e Madhe. The DP accused the Government of failing to investigate these 
crimes, noting that no suspects were tried for the murders. The 
Democrats asked for the creation of an independent investigatory group 
that would oversee the investigation of these crimes (which the DP 
considers to be political). The Government did not create such a group 
but an investigation was continuing at year's end.
    The Council of Europe continued to express concern over the 
Government's lack of progress in investigating the 1998 assassination 
of senior DP Member Azem Hajdari. A police investigation was launched 
in December 1999 and some progress was reported, but the case had not 
been resolved as of year's end.
    The country continued to experience high levels of violent crime. 
Many killings occurred throughout the country as the result of 
individual or clan vigilante actions sometimes connected to traditional 
``blood feuds,'' or in conflicts involving various criminal gangs.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution stipulates that ``no one can be subject 
to torture, or cruel and brutal treatment;'' however, the police often 
beat suspects in the process of arresting them, and the Albanian 
Helsinki Committee reported that the police beat or otherwise 
mistreated prisoners. The Penal Code makes the use of torture a crime 
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. According to the Albanian 
Helsinki Committee, major police stations were the sites of the worst 
abuses of detainees, and all stations were overcrowded.
    There were a number of reports of police violence. Four DP 
activists from the Lezhe region were pulled over and beaten by masked 
special police forces on a road north of Tirana in March. In April the 
daily Gazeta Shqiptare reported a number of police abuse cases in 
Elbasan, Lushnja, and Fieri, where more than 20 persons were taken into 
custody and subjected to beatings and maltreatment. In May the daily 
Albania reported the serious maltreatment of a number of persons 
arrested on charges of theft of public property. While police generally 
handled the DP demonstrations following the October elections in a 
restrained manner, there were instances where police beat and 
mistreated DP supporters (see Section 2.b.).
    In November Amnesty International (AI) reported that police 
arrested DP supporter Besnik Papa and held him at a police station in 
Tirana, where allegedly he was beaten so severely that he required 
hospital treatment.
    Several credible sources cited the police station at Elbasan as a 
source of a number of physical abuse cases. There are at least five 
cases of abuse pending against police officers; however, none of these 
cases had been prosecuted successfully by year's end.
    Police at times beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    There were no reports of investigation nor action taken against 
police who beat multiple persons in the towns of Spotalte and Cerrick 
in 1999.
    There were no reports of investigation nor action taken in the 
December 1998 case in which Besnik Jak, the leader of the Tirana 
University student hunger strike, was beaten while in police custody, 
nor in the 1999 case of Besim Biberaj, who suffered multiple broken 
bones as a result of beatings while in custody at a Tirana police 
station.
    Police receive some training and equipment, but there is a 
continuing need for further training and for improving investigative 
skills. Foreign governments continued police training programs that 
aimed at improving technical expertise, operational procedures, and 
respect for human rights, but the overall performance of law 
enforcement remained weak. In preparation for the October local 
elections, training was provided to police on how to deal with election 
security and how to respond to the needs of election observers. 
According to the Ministry of Public Order, more than 1,300 policemen 
received some training during the year, and 116 policemen received 
training abroad.
    Police corruption remains widespread. Sources in the Ministry of 
Public Order stated that more than 190 police officers were fired from 
their jobs during the year because of incompetence, lack of discipline, 
or violations of the law.
    Prison conditions remained poor and most prisons are overcrowded; 
however, efforts were made to improve the situation during the year. 
While the Government financed most improvements, it also has received 
international assistance. During the year, construction began on a new 
prison in Peqin, financed by the Italian government, which will house 
250 to 300 inmates.
    Overcrowding in prisons resulted in poor living conditions. In 
addition, because of overcrowding, prisoners are also held in prisons 
in Greece and Italy. According to Greek Ministry of Justice sources, 
more than 3,500 Albanians are in pre-detention centers and more than 
1,500 are serving sentences in Greece, 120 of whom are juveniles. Over 
1,500 prisoners are serving sentences in Italian prisons. Juveniles 
sometimes share cells with adults are a result of the shortage of cell 
space. Women are held separately from men.
    The country has no juvenile justice system. Children's cases go 
before judges who have not received any education in juvenile justice, 
and juveniles live in detention facilities with adults. Over 100 
children are serving sentences in adult prisons. In September an 8-year 
school for juveniles who are serving prison terms was opened. This is 
the first school of its kind in the country. Family visitation is 
allowed in prisons.
    The Government cooperated with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and with other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There 
were no reports of refusal to permit access for prison inspections by 
either domestic or international groups.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Article 27 paragraph 1 
of the Constitution forbids arbitrary arrest and detention. However, 
police at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 1995 
Penal Procedures Code sets out the rights of detained and arrested 
persons. By law a police officer or prosecutor may order a suspect into 
custody. Detained persons must be informed immediately of the charges 
against them and of their rights. A prosecutor must be notified 
immediately after a suspect is detained by the police. Within 48 hours 
of the arrest or detention a court must decide, in the presence of the 
prosecutor, the suspect, and the suspect's lawyer the type of detention 
to be imposed. Legal counsel must be provided free of charge if the 
defendant cannot afford a private attorney; however, this right to 
legal counsel is not known widely and police often fail to inform 
suspects of it. As a result of a lack of resources, access to legal 
information remains difficult for citizens, including legal 
professionals and, sometimes, judges.
    There have been numerous cases in which persons have been 
unlawfully detained longer than the Penal Code's 48 hour limit. For 
example, two persons, Hysen and Valbona Ymeri, were detained in 
Lushnja, but their paperwork was not sent to the prosecutor's office 
until 6 days later.
    International organizations claim that prostitutes and trafficked 
women have been kept in detention for more than 2 days without charges 
being brought against them (see Section 6.f.).
    In September 1999, a DP newspaper alleged that three persons from 
the northern city of Kukes were held in police custody for more than 16 
months without trial. No further information on this case was available 
at year's end.
    Bail in the form of money or property may be required if the judge 
believes that the accused otherwise may not appear for trial. 
Alternatively a suspect may be placed under house arrest. The court may 
order pretrial confinement in cases where there is reason to believe 
that the accused may leave the country or is a danger to society.
    The Penal Procedures Code requires completion of pretrial 
investigations within 3 months. The prosecutor may extend this period 
by 3-month intervals in especially difficult cases. The accused and the 
injured party have the right to appeal these extensions to the district 
court. In practice lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Delayed 
investigations also are a serious problem, and many persons are 
detained for periods that exceed the time limits set by law.
    There were no clear cases of detainees being held for strictly 
political reasons. However, the DP continued to claim that the Chairman 
of the Legality Party (the Monarchists), Ekrem Spahia, and 12 
supporters were being tried unfairly for participation in the events of 
September 14, 1998, which followed the assassination of the DP 
parliamentarian, Azem Hajdari, by unknown persons (see Section 1.a.). 
Spahia and the others were released during the year; however, their 
trials still were pending at year's end.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, continued political instability, 
limited resources, political pressure, and endemic corruption weaken 
the judiciary's ability to function independently and efficiently. 
Corruption remains a serious and widespread problem, especially with 
the growth of organized crime, and judges are subjected to both bribery 
attempts and intimidation. In May the High Council of Justice removed 
two judges from Tirana for disciplinary violations. International legal 
experts commented that the judges' removal was characterized by greater 
respect for due process and legal procedures than past similar 
instances.
    Many court buildings were destroyed in the civil unrest in 1997, 
and although all have reopened, important records and legal materials 
were lost permanently. Long case backlogs are typical. The removal of 
court budgets from the control of the Ministry of Justice to a 
separate, independent body, the Judicial Budget Office, and the 
establishment of a school for magistrates in 1999 were useful steps 
towards strengthening the independence of the judiciary. A board 
chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court runs the Judicial 
Budget Office. All other board members are judges.
    The judicial system is composed of district courts of the first 
instance, military courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. 
There also is a separate and independent Constitutional Court. The 
Supreme Court hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal, while the 
Constitutional Court reviews those cases requiring constitutional 
interpretation.
    The President heads the High Council of Justice, which has 
authority to appoint, discipline, and dismiss judges of the courts of 
first instance and of the courts of appeal. Judges who are dismissed 
have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition to the 
President, the Council consists of the Minister of Justice, the head of 
the Supreme Court, six judges (chosen by sitting judges), two 
prosecutors (selected by the prosecutors), and four independent lawyers 
named by the Parliament.
    The President of the Republic nominates the President and Vice 
President of the Supreme Court, and the Parliament elects all of the 
Supreme Court's justices. The President selects four of the nine 
members of the Constitutional Court; five are elected by the 
Parliament. Parliament has the authority to approve and dismiss the 
judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the Supreme 
Court. According to the law, dismissal only may be ordered after 
conviction for a serious crime or for mental incompetence. There were 
no new developments in the 1999 appeal of the former Chief Judge of the 
Supreme Court, who was dismissed from his position 3 years before the 
expiration of his mandate.
    Constitutional Court justices serve, in theory, maximum 9-year 
terms, with three justices rotating every 3 years. Justices of the 
Supreme Court serve for 7 years.
    Under the 1998 Constitution, the President appoints the prosecutor 
general with the consent of the Parliament. The President appoints and 
dismisses other prosecutors on the recommendation of the prosecutor 
general. The prosecutor general restructured his office in December 
1999 into divisions that focus on specific crimes.
    Parliament approves the courts' budgets and allocates funds. Each 
court may decide how to spend the money allocated to it. The Ministry 
of Justice provides and approves administrative personnel. The Ministry 
of Justice also supervises bailiffs' offices.
    Due to limited material resources, in many instances the court 
system is unable to process cases in a timely fashion. Public opinion 
holds the judiciary, in particular, responsible for the Government's 
failure to stop criminal activity. Tension continued between the police 
and the judiciary, despite some improvement in relations between police 
and prosecutors, especially outside Tirana. Each side cites the 
failures of the other as the reason criminals avoid imprisonment. The 
courts accuse the police of failing to provide the solid investigation 
and evidence necessary to prosecute successfully, and the police allege 
that corruption and bribery taint the courts.
    The Constitution provides that all citizens enjoy the right to a 
fair, speedy, and public trial, except in cases where the necessities 
of public order, national security, or the interests of minors or other 
private parties mandate restrictions. Defendants, witnesses, and others 
who do not speak Albanian are entitled to the services of a translator. 
If convicted the accused has the right to appeal the decision within 5 
days to the Court of Appeals.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms 
provides for the inviolability of the individual person, of dwellings, 
and for the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government 
sometimes infringed on these rights. During the year, a number of 
persons complained to the Albanian Helsinki Committee that police, 
during their weapons collection campaign, did not use proper legal 
procedures to conduct house searches. Citizens also complained to the 
Committee that many of these searches were conducted late at night 
without any authorization. At least one individual complained to the 
Ombudsman that he was not adequately compensated for some land taken 
for public use. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Constitutional 
Court.
    There were no reports of wiretapping by Government authorities 
during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Law on Fundamental Human 
Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of speech and of the press, 
and the Government generally respected these rights; however, police at 
times beat journalists. The media are active and unrestrained but have 
developed little sense of journalistic responsibility or professional 
integrity. With few exceptions, the print media lacks a mature, trained 
professional staff.
    Sensationalism is the norm in the newspapers, and the political 
party-oriented newspapers in particular print gossip, unsubstantiated 
accusations, and outright fabrications. Some publications appear to be 
making efforts to improve professional standards and to provide more 
balanced and accurate reporting.
    Attacks on journalists continued--both beatings by the police and 
attacks by unknown assailants. In March according to the daily 
Shekulli, a policeman in Korca beat a journalist from the independent 
radio station ABc. The journalist claimed he was beaten because the 
policeman considered him to be a spokesman for the opposition. In April 
while taping a fight between a group of citizens and members of the 
National Guard, a cameraman and journalists were spotted and beaten by 
Guard members. In May two journalists from TV ATN 1 were detained 
illegally by police officers and beaten while in detention.
    Political parties, trade unions, and various societies and groups 
publish their own newspapers or magazines, and competition with 
commercial publications is very keen. An estimated 200 publications are 
available, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, 
newsletters, and pamphlets. Five newspapers and two magazines are 
published in Greek in the south (see Section 5). The difficult economic 
situation and readers' distrust of the press again resulted in a 
significant drop in newspaper sales during the year. The total daily 
circulation of all newspapers dropped from about 65,000 copies to less 
than 50,000 copies. This came after a drop in 1999 from 75,000 to 
65,000 copies. According to a recent survey of the Albanian Media 
Institute, 60 percent of the persons interviewed believed that media 
stirred up trouble in the country; only 23 percent said that the media 
played a positive role. The opening of many new private radio and 
television stations is another reason for the drastic drop in 
circulation. According to the same survey, 65 percent of the public 
prefers to get its news from the private electronic media.
    Albanian Radio and Television (RTVSh) is the sole public 
broadcaster in the country. RTVSh is composed of national television 
and national radio. National television broadcasts 17 hours a day and 
covers over 91 percent of the population. Public television broadcasts 
2 hours a day via satellite. National radio broadcasts in two channels 
for 18 hours a day. Its signal covers 90 percent of the country's 
territory. Broadcasting issues are governed by the National Council of 
Radio and Television, a 15-member body elected by the Parliament. Radio 
Gjirokastra broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community in 
the country every day (see Section 5). The Albanian Media Institute 
survey found that 58 percent of those questioned believed that 
regardless of the improvement in the programming of the public 
television channel, it still is regarded as a mouthpiece for the 
Government.
    Over 75 private television stations and 30 private radio stations 
operate. The National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasters 
(NCRT) awarded broadcasting licenses, but several broadcasters failed 
to pay for their licenses or abide by the regulations governing the 
licenses. In 1999 the Government established new licensing and 
oversight procedures to promote a more stable broadcasting environment. 
The NCRT made licenses available to existing local television 
broadcasters that were operating previously in an unregulated climate. 
In December the NCRT licensed 2 national television stations, 45 local 
television stations, 31 local radio stations, and 1 national radio 
station. The wide availability of satellite dishes provides citizens 
with easy access to international programming.
    The broadcast media exceed the print media in influence, audience 
penetration, and caliber of news reporting and public affairs 
programming. However, political affiliation is pervasive in 
programming. The OSCE reported that one new nationwide television 
station, TVArberia, provided for balanced and fair election reporting 
during the local elections in October. However, the majority of 
stations were blatantly one-sided in their political coverage.
    Academic freedom continues to be limited. University professors 
complain that some faculty members are hired or fired for political 
reasons and that students who have the right political connections get 
preferential treatment regardless of their personal qualifications.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on 
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the right of 
peaceful assembly and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice. According to the law, organizers must obtain permits for 
gatherings in public places, which the police may refuse to issue for 
reasons such as security and traffic. In practice rallies and 
demonstrations were very common, the Government made no concerted 
efforts to prevent them, and the police generally maintained order with 
due respect for citizens' rights; however, during DP demonstrations 
before the October elections, the police beat and mistreated some DP 
supporters (see Section 1.c.). Police killed a demonstrator in November 
when a group of DP members attacked the police station, courthouse, and 
other public buildings in Tropoja. In some cases, individuals claimed 
that the police or secret agents of the SHIK intimidated them because 
of their participation in opposition rallies, while others claimed that 
they were fired from their jobs because they participated in opposition 
rallies.
    The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the 
right of association, and the Government generally respected this 
right. A political party must apply to the Ministry of Justice for 
official certification. It must declare an aim or purpose that is not 
anticonstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, describe its 
organizational structure, and account for all public and private funds 
it receives. Such certification is granted routinely.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
According to the 1998 Constitution, there is no official religion and 
all religions are equal. However, the predominant religious communities 
(Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) enjoy de facto recognition by 
the authorities that gives them the legal right to hold bank accounts, 
own property and buildings, and to function as legal entities based on 
their historical presence in the country.
    Religious movements--with the exception of the three de facto 
recognized religions--can acquire the official status of a legal entity 
only by registering under the Law on Associations, which recognizes the 
status of a nonprofit association irrespective of whether the 
organization has a cultural, recreational, religious, or humanitarian 
character.
    The Religious Council of the State Secretariat has been replaced by 
the State Committee on Cults, which is not composed of representatives 
of religious groups. The Government does not require registration or 
licensing of religious groups; however, the State Committee on Cults 
maintains a working knowledge, but not official records, of foreign 
religious organizations. The chairman of the committee has the status 
of a deputy minister.
    Foreign clergy, including Muslim clerics, Christian and Baha'i 
missionaries, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and many others freely carry out 
religious activities. The State recognizes the de facto existence of 
the Bektashis but they did not have the right to their own 
representative in the former State Secretariat of Religions. There is 
no indication of Bektashis' activities being placed under the 
supervision of the Sunni community.
    According to official figures, there are 29 religious schools in 
the country with some 2,745 students. The State Committee has the right 
to approve the curricula of religious schools.
    The Government has not yet returned all the properties and 
religious objects under its control that were confiscated under the 
Communist regime in 1967. In cases where religious buildings were 
returned, the Government often failed to return the land surrounding 
the buildings. The Government also is unable to compensate the churches 
adequately for the extensive damage that many religious properties 
suffered. The Orthodox Church has complained that it has had difficulty 
in recovering some religious icons for restoration and safekeeping.
    The Albanian Evangelical Alliance, an association of more than 100 
Protestant Churches, has complained that it has encountered 
administrative obstacles to building churches, accessing the media, and 
receiving exemptions from customs duties. The growing evangelical 
community continues to seek official recognition and participation in 
the religious affairs section of the Council of Ministers.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and 
Freedoms provides for freedom of movement within the country and for 
freedom to leave the country and return, and the Government respects 
these rights in practice.
    A problem that arose as a result of uncontrolled internal migration 
is local registration and status. As a result of such internal 
migration, thousands of citizens are denied access to certain basic 
services such as education and medical care. In many educational 
institutions, students must have, among other documents, an official 
document from the district authorities that acknowledges that they are 
inhabitants of the district. The lack of such documents prevents many 
students from attending school. The effects of uncontrolled internal 
migration became apparent during the October local elections when tens 
of thousands of inhabitants were registered in more than one place, 
resulting in many inaccuracies in the voter lists.
    Citizens who fled the country during or after the Communist regime 
are able to return, and if they lost their citizenship, they are able 
to have it restored. Citizens born in the country who emigrate may hold 
dual citizenship.
    The Constitution gives foreigners the right of refuge in the 
country, and a 1998 asylum law includes provisions for the granting of 
refugee status, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1961 Protocol. The Government accepts 
the entry of refugees, does not expel those with valid claims to 
refugee status, and works with the international community to provide 
housing and support for them. The Government provides for first asylum, 
but no appeals procedure mechanism was in place at year's end.
    The country hosted approximately 4,000 registered refugees during 
the year. The refugee population overwhelmingly is Kosovar; only 28 
refugees identified themselves as coming from outside the borders of 
the former Yugoslavia. Humanitarian relief organizations provided 
social service support for the refugee community and coordinated 
further assistance through a network of NGO's that provide health care 
coverage, insurance, and limited training. The Government continued to 
play a key role in facilitating and coordinating the work of these 
groups. The vast majority of refugees continued to live with host 
families. There were approximately 500 registered Kosovar refugees and 
a small number of other refugees left in the country at year's end.
    Organized criminal gangs have made the smuggling of illegal 
immigrants--Albanians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Chinese, Turks, and others 
from the Middle East and Asia--a lucrative business. Italy is the most 
common destination. The Government has taken a number of measures to 
stop the flow, but a lack of resources and corruption among law 
enforcement forces, hinders its efforts. Italian military and border 
patrol squads operate in various coastal zones in Albania in an effort 
to stop the flow of illegal immigrants. In September following an 
incident in which two Italian Guardia di Finanza police were killed 
while combating traffickers, Parliament enacted a new, stronger law 
that, if implemented, should make it easier for police to seize the 
speedboats used primarily for illegal smuggling of persons. It enables 
the police to confiscate speedboats, on land or water, that are used in 
illegal activities and those that are unregistered. Individuals who 
have become stranded in Albania while trying to use this illegal 
pipeline are eligible for a ``care and maintenance'' program run by the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Albanian Red Cross 
and can have their cases evaluated by UNHCR officials. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution states that ``Governance is based on a system of 
elections that are free, equal, general, and periodic;'' citizens 
elected a government in 1997 in what international observers considered 
to be a satisfactory process, given the proceeding months of chaos and 
anarchy.
    In October despite procedural shortcomings and some irregularities 
in a few localities, citizens took part in local elections in a tense 
but generally peaceful atmosphere that were judged by the OSCE to have 
shown ``significant progress'' toward meeting international standards. 
International monitors considered the second round of voting ``less 
transparent and inclusive'' due to the failure to address inaccuracies 
in the voter lists, invalid ballots, and election complaints. Serious 
irregularities, including intimidation of election commission members, 
the destruction of one ballot box, and fraud in three other voting 
centers were reported in Himara.
    The Constitution prohibits the formation of any party or 
organization that is totalitarian; incites and supports racial, 
religious, or ethnic hatred; uses violence to take power or influence 
state policies; or is nontransparent or secretive in character.
    No legal impediments hinder the full participation of women and 
minorities in government, and the major political parties have women's 
organizations and have women serving on their central committees; 
however, women continue to be underrepresented in politics and 
government. In the Parliament, 10 of 155 members are female (1 of whom 
serves as deputy prime minister). In the current Government two 
ministers are female. Ethnic Greeks constitute the largest minority. 
They are represented in the current Government and participate actively 
in various political parties.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally permitted human rights and related 
organizations to function freely. The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the 
Albanian Human Rights Group, the Society for Democratic Culture, the 
Albanian Media Institute, the Albanian Institute for Contemporary 
Studies, and the Women's Center were among the most active domestic 
NGO's involved in human rights activities. Despite the assistance of 
international donors, the work of all of these organizations is 
hampered by a shortage of funds and equipment; the Government 
cooperated only minimally with these local groups.
    A wide variety of international human rights NGO's visited or 
operated within the country with the cooperation of the Government and 
generally without restriction. These organizations are free to publish 
and disseminate their findings, including criticisms of the Government.
    In February Parliament elected the country's first national 
People's Advocate (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman's office, with the support 
of western governments and the OSCE, has already reviewed over 250 
cases of alleged human rights abuses. These include citizen complaints 
of police and military abuse of power, lack of enforcement of court 
judgments in civil cases, wrongful governmental dismissal, and land 
disputes (see Sections 1.c. , 1.e. , and 1.f.). The Ombudsman's office 
has had some success in cases, but it still is too early to judge 
whether it will genuinely be effective.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions prohibits discrimination 
based on sex, race, ethnicity, language, or religion; however, women 
and some minority groups complain that discrimination continues in 
practice.
    Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse are serious 
problems. In the country's traditionally male-dominated society, 
cultural acceptance and lax police response result in most abuse going 
unreported. Rape is punishable by law, as is spousal rape; however, in 
practice spousal rape is not reported or prosecuted. The concepts of 
spousal rape and sexual harassment are not well established, and, 
consequently, such acts often are not considered crimes. No government-
sponsored program protects the rights of women. An NGO maintains a 
shelter in Tirana for abused women, but the facility has the capacity 
to house only a few victims at a time. The same NGO also operates a 
hotline that women and girls can call for advice and counseling. The 
line received thousands of calls during the year. In 1999 the Advice 
Center for Women and Girls, an NGO, conducted a poll that showed that 
as many as 64 percent of females claimed to be victims of domestic 
violence.
    Many men, especially those from the northeastern part of the 
country, still follow the traditional code known as the ``kanun,'' in 
which women are considered and treated as chattel. Also under the 
kanun, it is acceptable to kidnap young women for brides. This practice 
continues in some areas of the northeast.
    Women are not excluded, by law or in practice, from any occupation; 
however, they are not well represented at the highest levels of their 
fields. The Labor Code mandates equal pay for equal work, but no data 
are available on how well this principle is implemented in practice. 
Women enjoy equal access to higher education, but they are not accorded 
full and equal opportunity in their careers, and it is common for well-
educated women to be underemployed or to work outside the field of 
their training. An increasing number of women are beginning to venture 
out on their own, opening shops and small businesses. Many are 
migrating along with men to Greece and Italy to seek employment.
    Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution is a 
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government's commitment to children's rights and 
welfare is codified in domestic law and through international 
agreements. The law provides for the right to at least 8 years of free 
education and also authorizes private schools. School attendance is 
mandatory through the eighth grade (or until age 18, whichever comes 
first). However, in practice many children leave school earlier than 
allowed by law in order to work with their families, especially in 
rural areas. According to recent statistics issued by the Ministry of 
Public Order and the Commission for Reconciliation of Blood Feuds, more 
than 2,000 children are endangered by blood feuds involving their 
families.
    Child sexual abuse rarely is reported, but authorities and NGO's 
believe that it exists. According to the Ministry of Public Order, more 
than 300 cases of child sexual abuse were reported during the year. 
According to the Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CRCA), 
more than 2,000 children between the ages of 13 and 18 are involved in 
prostitution rings. According to the same organization, a large number 
of children (as many as 4,000) work as child prostitutes in Greece, and 
trafficking in children is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). 
Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to be sold to 
prostitution or pedophilia rings abroad. Within the country, Roma 
children often work as beggars and the police generally ignore the 
practice. In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children 
selling cigarettes and other items on the street.
    People with Disabilities.--Widespread poverty, unregulated working 
conditions, and poor medical care pose significant problems for many 
disabled persons. The disabled are eligible for various forms of public 
assistance, but budgetary constraints mean that the amounts that they 
receive are very low. No law mandates accessibility to public buildings 
for people with disabilities, and little has been done in this regard.
    Religious Minorities.--Relations among the various religious groups 
are generally amicable, and tolerance is widespread. Society largely is 
secular. Intermarriage among religious groups is extremely common.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that Orthodox 
churches were the targets of vandals.
    The Archbishop of the Orthodox Church concluded that attacks on 
church property in the past were a result of vandalism rather than 
religious repression.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government played a 
constructive role in maintaining the nation's generally positive record 
on the treatment of minorities. While no recent official statistics 
exist regarding the size of the various ethnic communities, ethnic 
Greeks are the most organized and receive the most attention and 
assistance from abroad. There also are small groups of Macedonians, 
Vlachs, and Roma.
    Greek-language public elementary schools are common in much of the 
southern part of the country, where almost all ethnic Greeks live. 
However, there are no Greek-language high schools. There is a Greek 
chair at the University of Gjirokaster. The Greek minority association, 
Omonia, continued to press the authorities for more measures to protect 
the rights of the Greek minority, including the creation of additional 
Greek-language classes in some parts of the south. In May a fact-
finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki Committee visited the ethnic 
Greek area of Dropulli. Every village in this zone has its own 
elementary-middle (8-year) school in the Greek language, regardless of 
the number of students. Five newspapers are published in the Greek 
language in this area, in addition to 15 Greek papers and magazines 
distributed throughout the southern Albanian region. Radio Gjirokastra 
broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community. Every teacher 
who teaches in the schools of the Greek minority zone receives, in 
addition to the salary given by the Albanian Government, a substantial 
monthly compensation of about $140 (50,000 drachmas) from the Greek 
Government. Likewise retirees who belong to this community, in addition 
to the pension received from the Albanian Government, get substantial 
monthly compensation from the Greek Government.
    Classes in the Macedonian language are available to students in the 
districts of Pogradeci and Devolli, on the border with the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian Government provides 
texts for these classes free of charge. A considerable number of 
students from this area study at the universities of Skopje and Bitola. 
A small group of ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs live in the northern 
part of the country. A fact-finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki 
Committee visited the area in April and found that these communities 
have decreased in number because many of their members emigrated to 
Montenegro. This minority is not subject to any discrimination. People 
from this area receive scholarships from the Montenegrin Government for 
their children to study in Montenegro. No discrimination was reported 
against the Vlachs, who speak their own Romanian-related language as 
well as Albanian, or against the Cams, non-Orthodox ethnic Albanians 
who were exiled from Greece in 1944. Both groups live mainly in the 
south.
    Two distinct groups of Roma, the Jevg and the Arrixhi (Gabel), are 
established in the country. The Jevg tend to be settled in urban areas 
and generally are more integrated into the economy than the Arrixhi. 
Roma are the most neglected minority group. Broadly speaking they 
suffer from high illiteracy, poor public health conditions, and marked 
economic disadvantages. Roma encounter much societal discrimination.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form 
independent trade unions. The 1993 Labor Code established procedures 
for the protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining 
agreements. Two major federations act as umbrella organizations for 
most of the country's unions: The Independent Confederation of Trade 
Unions of Albania (membership around 118,000) and the Albanian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (membership around 100,000). Both 
organizations again experienced a drop in membership during the year. 
Some unions chose not to join either of the federations. No union has 
an official political affiliation, and the Government does not provide 
any financial support for unions.
    The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions and other legislation 
provides that all workers, except the uniformed military, the police, 
and some court officials have the right to strike. The law forbids 
strikes that are declared openly to be political or that are judged by 
the courts to be political.
    Unions are free to join and maintain ties with international 
organizations, and many did so during the year.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizens in all 
fields of employment, except uniformed members of the armed forces, 
police officers, and some court employees, have the constitutional 
right to organize and bargain collectively. In practice unions 
representing public sector employees negotiate directly with the 
Government.
    Labor unions do not operate from a position of strength, given the 
country's very high level of unemployment. Effective collective 
bargaining in these circumstances is difficult, and agreements are hard 
to enforce.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Law on Major 
Constitutional Provisions and the Labor Code prohibit forced or 
compulsory labor; however, trafficking in women for purposes of 
prostitution is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also 
forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however, there were reports 
that children are trafficked and forced to work abroad as prostitutes 
or beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age of employment at 16 
years and limits the amount and type of labor that can be performed by 
persons under the age of 18. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 
legally may work in part-time jobs during summer vacation. Primary 
school education is compulsory and free through age 18 or the eighth 
grade, whichever comes first; however, in rural areas, children 
continue to assist families in farm work.
    The Ministry of Labor may enforce minimum age requirements through 
the courts, but no recent cases of this actually occurring were known. 
In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children selling 
cigarettes and other items on the street. The Government has not yet 
signed ILO Convention 182.
    The law forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however, 
trafficking in children is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for all 
workers over the age of 16 is approximately $50 (6,380 lek) per month, 
which is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Many workers look for second jobs, which are 
difficult to find. Remittances from those working abroad are very 
important for many families. The law provides for social assistance 
(income support) and unemployment compensation, but these are very 
limited, both in terms of the amounts received and the number of 
persons actually covered. The average wage for workers in the public 
sector is approximately $100 (13,201 lek) per month.
    The difference between the monthly average wage of persons who live 
in the rural and urban areas is considerable: Persons who work and live 
in urban areas earn almost 50 percent more than those who live and work 
in rural areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics 
indicated that in rural areas more than 20 percent of persons live 
under the official poverty line, while in urban areas the figure is 11 
percent. Nationwide over 17 percent of the population live under the 
official poverty line. No data are available for private sector wages, 
but they are believed to be considerably higher than in the public 
sector.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although in practice hours 
typically are set by individual or collective agreement. Many persons 
work 6 days a week.
    The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, but 
it has limited funds to make improvements in the remaining state-owned 
enterprises and a limited ability to enforce standards in the private 
sector. Actual conditions in the workplace generally are very poor and 
often dangerous. In 1999 there were five deaths recorded in the 
construction industry; the victims' families did not receive any 
financial support from the state social security administration because 
the workers were not insured. The Labor Code lists the safety 
obligations of employers and employees but does not provide specific 
protection for workers who choose to leave a workplace because of 
hazardous conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not criminalize 
trafficking in persons, although anti-kidnaping laws may be used to 
prosecute such cases; however, trafficking in women for the purpose of 
prostitution and trafficking in children are serious problems. While 
the exact number of Albanian women that are trafficked is unknown, an 
Albanian NGO estimates that there were about 30,000 working abroad as 
prostitutes, in Turkey and other countries during the year. The country 
also is one of the major transit countries for the trafficking of women 
from Moldova and Romania in particular, and from Bulgaria, Russia, and 
Ukraine. These women are brought into the country, mainly through 
Montenegro, then clandestinely transported to neighboring countries 
such as Italy and Greece. Trafficking in children also is a serious 
problem. Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to 
be sold to pedophilia rings abroad.
    Police treatment of women trafficked from Albania and third 
countries remains a problem. There is a lack of appropriate facilities 
for such women, and trafficked women often are detained in police 
stations for extended periods of time (see section 1.d).
    Trafficked women periodically are arrested and prosecuted for 
prostitution. The Italian Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police), which 
patrols the Adriatic for traffickers, claims to turn back between five 
and eight scafis (rubber boats used by traffickers) each night, 
although not all of these necessarily involved trafficked women.
    The Government has begun to initiate limited law enforcement and 
legal reforms to combat the problem; however, porous borders, poorly 
trained and corrupt law enforcement and judiciary officials, legal 
loopholes, and lack of government will have hampered these efforts. The 
Prosecutor General's Office confirmed that very few cases against 
traffickers were presented during the year.
    Several NGO's address the problem of trafficking on case-by-case 
basis; however, given the scope of the trafficking problem and limited 
resources to address individual reintegration, most victims of 
trafficking receive little or no assistance. The reintegration of 
trafficked women to their homes sometimes is problematic. In some 
cases, women simply are returned to the family members who sold them to 
traffickers in the first place, or to the same situation from which 
they were trafficked, which often leads to these women being re-
trafficked. In addition victims of trafficking often are forced or 
deceived into bonded labor and live in violent and abusive conditions, 
which leaves them with physical and mental scars. As a result, 
sheltering, counseling, and reintegrating victims is a difficult 
undertaking.
    The International Organization for Migration and the International 
Catholic Migration Commission have established an inter-agency referral 
system that enables a group of organizations to jointly provide return 
and reintegration assistance to women who are victims of trafficking. 
From January through June, 65 women were returned through the program. 
This system also provides a framework to assist with temporary shelter 
and return assistance for trafficking victims from other countries that 
want to return from Albania to their home countries.
                               __________

                                ANDORRA

    The Principality of Andorra is a constitutional parliamentary 
democracy. Two Princes with joint authority, representing secular and 
religious authorities, have headed the Principality since 1278. Under 
the 1993 Constitution, the two Princes--the President of France and the 
Catholic Bishop of Seu d'Urgell, Spain--serve equally as heads of 
state, and are represented each in Andorra by a delegate. Elections 
were held in 1997 to choose members of the ``Consell General'' (the 
Parliament), which selects the head of government. The judiciary 
functions independently.
    Andorra has no defense force and depends on neighboring Spain and 
France for external defense. The national police, under effective 
civilian control, have sole responsibility for internal security.
    The market-based economy is influenced significantly by those of 
its neighbors France and Spain. After some years of a serious 
recession, the economy is undergoing a period of economic expansion. 
Commerce and tourism are the main sources of income. Because of banking 
secrecy laws, the financial services sector is growing in importance.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    In June an attorney filed a complaint against the director of the 
police, 2 police commissioners and 11 members of the police force, 
alleging he was arrested illegally. This case was still pending at 
year's end.
    In spite of the request of the Council of Europe's Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture, the Government has declined thus far to 
modify the law to provide arrested individuals access to an attorney 
from the moment of arrest. Legislation now provides legal assistance 
only 24 hours after the time of arrest.
    In May the country became part of a network of 47 states with 
prisoner transfer arrangements permitting qualifying prisoners to serve 
their sentences in their own country.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The highest judicial body is the five-member Superior Council of 
Justice. One member each is appointed by: The two Princes; the head of 
government; the President of the Parliament; and, collectively, members 
of the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are appointed for 6-year 
terms.
    The judiciary provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides citizens with safeguards 
against arbitrary interference with their ``privacy, honor, and 
reputation,'' and government authorities generally respect these 
prohibitions. Private dwellings are considered inviolable. No searches 
of private premises may be conducted without a judicially issued 
warrant. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction. The law 
also protects private communications.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system, combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice. Since adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the Government has 
registered various parties; some of them have dissolved.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Constitution acknowledges a special relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the State, ``in accordance with Andorran 
tradition.'' The Catholic Church receives no direct subsidies from the 
Government, although some payment is provided to the church for 
maintenance of birth and death records. Catholic religious instruction 
is available to students in public schools on an optional basis, 
outside of both regular school hours and during the time frame set 
aside for elective school activities, such as civics or ethics. The 
Catholic Church provides teachers for these classes, and the Government 
pays their salaries. The Government professes willingness to provide 
instruction in other religions on the same basis, if parents so 
request; however, at years end no parent's requested instruction in any 
religions other than the Catholic religion.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It 
is government policy not to expel persons having valid claims to 
refugee status, and there were no reports of such expulsions. The issue 
of first asylum did not arise during the year.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although 
progress has been made and there are no formal barriers, few women have 
run for office. One out of 28 Members of Parliament is a woman, and 1 
woman holds a cabinet level position.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government accepts international and nongovernmental 
investigations of allegations of human rights abuses. Approximately 10 
human rights associations exist in the country, the most active being 
the Association of Immigrants in Andorra (AIA) and the Association of 
Andorran Women (AAW). The first defends the rights of foreign 
residents. The second actively supports women's rights. The latter 
collaborates with the Department of Public Health and Social Welfare to 
help battered women, single parent families, and others in need. In 
spite of demands from the two organizations, the Government has 
declined to create a department specifically for women's issues.
    In one case, a citizen filed a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights when the judge in his case disallowed his appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. The appeal contended that his trial was not 
sufficiently impartial. However, the court, after studying the case, 
did not accept the complaint and stated that no violation of human 
rights had occurred.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution declares that all persons are equal before the law 
and prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, race, sex, origin, 
religion, opinions, or any other personal or social condition, although 
the law grants many rights and privileges exclusively to citizens. The 
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
    Women.--There is no specific legislation regarding violence against 
women. Article 8.2 of the Constitution is applied in such cases. The 
AIA and the AAW received more than 60 complaints of physical and 
psychological violence against women, as compared with 4 in 1999. The 
associates maintained that the number is increasing. They also asserted 
that such domestic violence existed at all levels of society. Women 
suffering from domestic violence requested help from Women's 
Associations, but very rarely filed a complaint with the police. No 
complaints are known to have been filed with the police by year's end.
    In theory there is no legal discrimination against women, privately 
or professionally; however, the AAW reported that in practice, there 
have been many cases of women dismissed from employment due to 
pregnancy. Discriminatory wage differentials were reportedly common, 
with some women's wages an average of 32 percent lower than their male 
counterparts' earnings. The Association actively promoted women's 
issues through information exchanges and limited direct support to 
those in need.
    Children.--The Government's commitment to children's welfare is 
demonstrated by its systems of health care and education. Free public 
education begins at age 4 and is compulsory until age 16. The 
Government provides free nursery schools, although the existing number 
falls short of the need.
    On September 7, the Government signed an optional protocol of the 
Convention of the Rights of Children related to selling of children, 
child prostitution, and child pornography.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to new buildings for people 
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in 
practice.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Spanish nationals are the 
largest group of foreign residents, accounting for approximately 43 
percent of the population. Other sizable foreign groups are Portuguese, 
French, and British. A small but fast growing group of immigrants, 
especially from North Africa, work mostly in agriculture and 
construction.
    Although the Constitution states that foreign legal residents enjoy 
the same rights and freedoms as citizens, some immigrant workers 
believed that they did not have the same rights and security. Recent 
legislation has improved the quality of life for immigrant workers. 
Nevertheless, many immigrant workers hold only ``temporary work 
authorizations.'' These permits are valid only as long as the job 
exists for which the permit was obtained. When job contracts expire, 
temporary workers must leave the country. The Government prohibits the 
issuance of work permits, unless workers can demonstrate that they have 
a fixed address with minimally satisfactory living conditions.
    More than 4,000 immigrants do not have work permits or residence 
permits because the quota for immigration is not as high as the number 
of workers needed and employed in the country.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the right 
of all persons to form and maintain managerial, professional, and trade 
union associations without prejudice. In accordance with constitutional 
provisions, a registry of associations was established in 1996 and is 
being maintained. Strikes were illegal under the old system, and the 
new Constitution does not state explicitly that strikes are permitted.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution states that both ``workers and employers have the right to 
defend their own economic and social interests.'' Parliament is charged 
with adopting legislation to regulate this right in order to guarantee 
the provision of essential services, such as the vital services of 
doctors, nurses, and police. Antiunion discrimination is not prohibited 
under the law. Approximately 600 associations exist in the country and 
have registered within the Government's Register of Association by 
year's end, this figure includes cultural associations, workers 
associations, foreign associations, colleges and attorney's, colleges 
of physicians, and a police trade union. No unions have emerged among 
workers in the private sector. No figure is available regarding the 
percentage of unionized labor. A partial reason for this circumstance 
is that no statue regarding labor relations and unionization has been 
elaborated. Even the police union functions more as a professional 
association than as a syndicate.
    In November the Government signed the European Social Charter.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not 
prohibit forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children 
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children under the age of 18 normally are prohibited from 
working, although in exceptional circumstances children ages 16 and 17 
may be allowed to work. The Labor Inspection Office in the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Public Health, and Labor enforces child labor 
regulations. The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children specifically; however, such practices are not known to occur 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The workweek is limited to 40 
hours, although employers may require overtime from workers. The legal 
maximums for overtime hours are 66 hours per month and 426 hours per 
year. An official minimum wage is set by government regulations. Other, 
higher wages are established by contract. The minimum wage is 
approximately $3.45 (674 pesetas) per hour and approximately $599 
(116,827 pesetas) per month. The minimum wage barely provides a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The Labor Inspection Office 
enforces minimum wage observance. Workers can be dismissed with 15 
days' to 6 months' notice, depending on how long they have been working 
for the company. A minimal indemnification of 1 month's salary per year 
worked is paid if a worker is fired without justification.
    A dismissed worker receives unemployment and health benefits for 
only 25 days. A board composed of Andorran nationals, although they 
represent only a small portion of the work force, controls retirement 
benefits. The Labor Inspection Service hears labor complaints.
    The Labor Inspection Service sets occupational health and safety 
standards and takes the necessary steps to see that they are enforced. 
During the past year, the Labor Inspection Service filed 145 complaints 
against companies for violating labor regulations, and it has the 
authority to levy sanctions and fines against such companies. The law 
authorizes employees to refuse certain tasks if their employers do not 
provide the customary level of protection. No legislation grants 
workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, from, or within the country. Nor is the country a transit point 
for traffic in persons. However, the law does provide punishment for 
traffickers of illegal workers.
                               __________

                                ARMENIA

    Armenia has a Constitution that provides for the separation of 
powers; however, the directly elected President has extensive powers of 
appointment and decree that are not balanced by the legislature or an 
independent judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who 
is in charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President in 
a multi-candidate election in 1998 after former President Levon Ter-
Petrossian was forced to resign by his former political allies in the 
Government and Parliament. There were flaws in both rounds of the 1998 
presidential elections. Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) observers witnessed very substantial irregularities and 
concluded that the elections seriously challenged international 
democratic norms in regard to most key criteria. These irregularities 
inflated the number of votes for Kocharian. Nonetheless, the 1998 
elections, the May 1999 Parliamentary and October 1999 municipal 
elections, and several 2000 by-elections showed continued improvement 
over past elections with respect to voting practice and vote-counting, 
as well as the ability of a pluralistic group of candidates to campaign 
freely. Although irregularities marred both the parliamentary and local 
elections in 1999, OSCE observers categorized the former as a relevant 
step toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but stated that they 
still failed to meet international standards, with problems in many 
precincts such as inaccurate or obsolete voting lists, the presence of 
unauthorized personnel during the voting and counting processes, and 
possible irregularities involving voting of military personnel. Some 
local observers reported that 1999 municipal elections and by-elections 
in 2000 also were flawed by poor voter lists and by disappearance or 
non-distribution of unmarked ballots. The Parliament differs from 
previous ones in two important ways: First, members are required to 
serve full-time and not to hold jobs outside the legislature, and 
second, the number of seats was reduced from 190 to 131. The current 
majority, made up of a coalition called Unity, includes the two largest 
parties, the Republican Party and the Peoples' Party. Unity is assisted 
by a group of loosely organized independents who call themselves the 
Stability Bloc. This Bloc split in December with a minority faction 
renaming itself the ``Democrats.'' Some deputies from Unity left the 
group during the year over policy differences and formed a bloc called 
Hayastan, which opposes the Government on some issues, and reduced but 
not eliminated Unity's majority. The legislature approves new laws, 
must confirm the Prime Minister's program, and can remove the Prime 
Minister by a vote of no confidence. Both the Government and the 
legislature can propose legislation. The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, judges are subject to 
pressure from the executive branch and corruption.
    The Ministries of Internal Affairs and of National Security, 
formerly one ministry which split in 1999, are jointly responsible for 
domestic security, intelligence activities, border controls, and the 
national police force. Members of the security forces committed human 
rights abuses.
    The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a market 
economy continued to move forward, although the industrial sector still 
is not functioning at peak capacity and its output remains low. 
Unemployment remains high, resulting in a high degree of income 
inequality, but the exact figure is difficult to quantify. This is 
because a significant amount of economic activity, perhaps as much as 
40 percent, is not captured by government accounting or taxation; 
unemployment is approximately 12.1 percent according to the Government; 
however, other services estimate the unemployment rate to be 
approximately 50 percent. Women form a disproportionately large number 
of the unemployed. Most small and medium-sized enterprises have been 
privatized, as has most agricultural land. All landowners now have 
received titles to their land, which are protected by the Constitution. 
The passage of a bill establishing a strict and transparent system for 
bidding on privatization of the electrical distribution network in 
August, was seen as a major step forward in establishing a system for 
fair and transparent privatization of state enterprises. Out-migration 
remains a serious problem. The gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
about 2.5 percent, to about $600 per capita. Inflation fell to below 1 
percent for the year. Foreign assistance and remittances from Armenians 
abroad play a major role in sustaining the economy, although the 
financial crisis in Russia, where many Armenians have gone to look for 
work, cut deeply into the flow of remittances. The Government is 
working to resolve its current budget deficit through increasing the 
tax collection rate, as well as by continuing cuts in most areas of 
government spending.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in several important 
areas, and although there were improvements in a few areas, problems 
persist in numerous areas. Substantial intervention by local power 
structures in the election process continues to restrict citizens' 
ability to change their Government peacefully. There were no reports 
that members of the security forces committed extrajudical killings due 
to severe beatings and mistreatment in detention. However, there were 
no reports of government action against individuals who may have been 
responsible for the reported 54 deaths in custody in 1999. Members of 
the security forces routinely beat detainees during arrest and 
interrogation, arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without 
warrants, and did not respect constitutional protections regarding 
privacy and due process. Impunity remains a problem, and the Government 
rarely investigates abuses by members of the security forces. Prison 
conditions did improve; however, they still are harsh and life-
threatening. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. During the year, 
parliamentary commissions were allowed to visit military camps and hear 
complaints about abuses from recruits. The judiciary is subject to 
political pressure and does not enforce constitutional protections 
effectively. There are some limits on press freedom, and many 
journalists practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains 
from criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news 
for most of the population, but independent television and newspapers, 
along with private radio stations, offer substantial competition. The 
nongovernmental media often criticize the country's leadership and 
policies. Burdensome registration requirements hinder freedom of 
association. The law places some restrictions on religious freedom, 
including a prohibition against proselytizing by religions other than 
the Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for religious 
groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from operating legally, and 41 
Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for refusing military service. The 
Government places some restrictions on freedom of movement. 
Discrimination against women, the disabled, and minorities remains a 
problem. The plight of street children is a significant problem. 
Trafficking in women and girls also is a problem.
    After President Kocharian's election in 1998, a number of 
commissions were established, and a constitutional referendum was 
proposed, with the goal of improving human rights and reforming the 
judiciary. By year's end, none of the proposed recommendations had been 
implemented, and no referendum had been held.
    In October 1999, five terrorists entered the National Assembly and 
killed the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, six 
other deputies or members of the Government, and wounded at least five 
more persons. An investigation of the killings, conducted by the Deputy 
Prosecutor General, resulted in the detention of 19 persons, including 
a deputy of the National Assembly, the then presidential chief of 
staff, and the deputy chief of state television. Five persons 
subsequently were released after spending several months in jail when 
evidence proved insufficient to charge them. Another detainee died in 
prison in September, apparently of accidental electrocution. The trial 
of the remaining accused was scheduled to begin in late October but was 
postponed at the request of defense attorneys and is scheduled to begin 
in February 2001.
    Defense attorneys and the press accused the Deputy Prosecutor 
General of using coercion, including physical abuse of the accused, to 
extract evidence, and President Kocharian expressed concern that the 
rights of the accused be respected.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings. The Government took no action by year's 
end regarding 54 cases of deaths in custody in 1999, which the 
International Helsinki Federation had asked it to investigate. The 
cases of Stepan Gevorgian and Arsen Stepanian were closed during the 
year due to lack of evidence.
    There were a significant number of deaths of military servicemen 
reportedly due to mistreatment and training related accidents (see 
Section 1.c.).
    According to an August announcement by the prosecutor general's 
office, in 1999 there were 54 deaths in custody due to beatings and 
mistreatment in detention. No information on such incidents were 
available by year's end. Norayr Yeghiazarian, a detainee awaiting trial 
in connection with the October 1999 shootings in Parliament (see 
below), was found dead in his cell in September. The Ministry of 
National Security announced, and other prisoners in his cell confirmed, 
that he was accidentally electrocuted through improper handling of an 
electrical appliance.
    Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening, and medical 
treatment is inadequate. There were a number of deaths in prison due to 
disease (see Section 1.c.). The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) signed an agreement with the Government in June to open a 
tuberculosis facility for inmates.
    Former Minister of Interior and Mayor of Yerevan Vano Siradeghian 
was charged with 10 counts of murder and plotting to commit murder and 
his trial began on January 10. On April 1, the National Assembly voted 
to strip Siradeghian, a National Assembly deputy, of his parliamentary 
immunity. Siradeghian disappeared on April 3 and is believed to have 
fled the country. In a court case related to Siradeghian, an armed gang 
led by Armen Ter-Sahakian went on trial in May. All of the gang members 
were former Interior Ministry employees and confessed to various 
misdeeds prior to the trial. In their confessions, the nine accused, 
claimed to have been members of a hit squad that carried out several 
murders on Siradeghian's orders, including the murder of Armenian 
Railroads Director Hambartzum Ghandilian, Ashtarak district executive 
committee chairman Hovhannes Sukiasian, and the attempted murder of 
Vladimir Grigorian, Head of the Prosecutor General's investigative 
department. They also confessed to extortion, robbery, and illegal 
possession of weapons. All were found guilty in August. Ter-Sahakian 
and Alik Grigoryan were sentenced to death, while the remaining six 
accused received prison terms from 4 to 11 years. The death penalty 
currently is in abeyance and is expected to be abolished soon, in such 
a case it is expected that the two death sentences would be commuted to 
lengthy imprisonment.
    Another court case related to Siradeghian involved the trial of a 
group of 11 persons led by Vahan Harutyunian, former Deputy Minister of 
Interior and ex-Commander of Internal Troops. All of 11 were found 
guilty of murder, attempted murder, abuse of power, and complicity in 
murder. The prison terms for six of them varied from 6 to 15 years, 
while five subsequently were released under the terms of two amnesties 
passed by the National Assembly in 1997 and 1998. Several of those 
convicted announced that they would appeal.
    On October 27, 1999, five terrorists opened fire on a session of 
Parliament with automatic weapons. They killed the Prime Minister, the 
Speaker of Parliament, the two Deputy Speakers, the Minister for 
Special Projects, and three deputies, and wounded the Minister of 
Privatization and four other deputies, some critically. According to 
reported statements by the gunmen both before and after they 
surrendered to security forces, their motives appeared to be both 
political and personal.
    The Deputy Prosecutor General (who is also the military prosecutor) 
was placed in charge of the investigation of the shootings. By the end 
of 1999, 19 persons, including a National Assembly deputy (who was 
stripped of his immunity by a vote of that body), the then-presidential 
chief of staff and advisor, and the deputy chief of state television, 
had been imprisoned under legal provisions permitting the detention of 
criminal suspects whether or not they had been accused legally. The 
investigation was criticized by attorneys for the accused, by the 
media, and by representatives of human rights organizations for alleged 
human rights abuses, including physical and mental coercion of the 
detainees. Gagik Jahangiran, the military prosecutor investigating the 
case, repeatedly rejected calls for the creation of a special 
Parliamentary investigation to ensure an impartial investigation. 
During the year, four of the accused, including the presidential 
advisor, the Parliamentarian, and the deputy chief of state television, 
were released, and charges against them dropped. The military 
prosecutor admitted that the evidence was insufficient to hold them. 
One detainee was released on bail for health reasons, and another 
prisoner was found dead in his cell in September (see above). The 
trials of the 13 accused are scheduled to begin in February 2001 due to 
requests by the attorneys for the accused that they have time to 
evaluate the evidence.
    No progress was announced in the investigation of the December 1998 
killing of Deputy Minister of Defense Vahram Khorkhoruni. In September 
1999, the death of Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security 
and Head of Internal Troops Artsrun Margarian, who was found shot in 
February 1999, officially was ruled a suicide. In March a guilty 
verdict was reached in the case of Dr. Hrant Papikian, who was held in 
connection with an alleged previous attack on Margaryan; Papikian 
appealed to the Court of Cassation, which reduced his sentence to 10 
months; and since he already had served that amount of time, he was 
released on March 22.
    Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In July the Government unilaterally released five Azeri prisoners 
of war (POW's) under OSCE/ICRC auspices; Azerbaijan reciprocated by 
unilaterally releasing two Armenian POW's. In August Armenia released 
another recently captured POW, and announced that it now held only one 
Azeri soldier, who did not wish to be repatriated (which the OSCE 
verified), and one Azeri civilian, who was believed to be a criminal 
fleeing Azeri police.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and laws prohibit torture; however, the 
practice of security personnel beating pretrial detainees during arrest 
and interrogation remains a routine part of criminal investigations, 
and prosecutors rely on such confessions to secure convictions. Most 
cases of police brutality go unreported, due to fear of police 
retribution. Impunity remains a problem.
    In 1999, there were 54 cases of death in custody due to beatings 
and other abuse (see Section 1.a.).
    Attorneys for the 19 detainees held in the October 1999 killings in 
Parliament claimed in the media that the accused were being held in 
inhuman conditions and were beaten during interrogations. 
Representatives of the government-appointed Commission on Human Rights, 
after several attempts, were able to see the detainees and were told by 
the men that they had been coerced physically and mentally into 
confessions. The Commission reported no obvious evidence of physical 
abuse. A parliamentary commission was allowed to see imprisoned Deputy 
Mushegh Movsesian and confirmed that he showed signs of having been 
abused physically. The four detainees released in mid-year told media 
that they had been mistreated. Former presidential Chief of Staff 
Alexan Harutyunian said that as part of his release agreements, he had 
promised not to talk to the media about the details of his case.
    Although defense lawyers may present evidence of torture in an 
effort to overturn improperly obtained confessions, and according to 
law all such charges must be investigated, judges and prosecutors 
routinely ignore such complaints even when the perpetrator can be 
identified.
    The Government has not conducted investigations of abuse by 
security services except in rare cases where death has resulted and 
under pressure from human rights groups. The number of deaths of 
conscripts from training accidents and physical abuse decreased by 18 
percent compared with 1999, according to government figures. While this 
number cannot be verified, based on information from a human rights 
group, the figure of 16 to 20 noncombat deaths per month from all 
causes during the year appears to be accurate. Amnesty International 
stated that a conscript arrested for being absent without leave was 
beaten so badly in August 1998 that he subsequently died. The case 
currently is pending in the Echmiatsin regional court. There are no 
separate military courts (see Section 1.e.). Military cases, many of 
which are settled administratively, that do go to trial in civilian 
courts are handled by the military prosecutor's office.
    The Ministry of Defense cites reasons of ``national security'' in 
declining to provide exact details on some cases, citing the fact that 
the country remains technically in a state of war with Azerbaijan.
    During the year members of the Yezidi ethnic-religious minority 
continued to complain that ``hazing'' and beating of conscripts, common 
throughout the former Soviet Union, especially are severe for Yezidi 
conscripts (see Section 5). In July parents of recruits killed or 
injured during the training process held demonstrations for several 
days near the presidential palace and met with officials of the 
presidency (but not with the President himself) to discuss their 
complaints.
    In April police reportedly did not intervene to prevent harassment 
and abuse of members of Jehovah's Witnesses by local hoodlums (see 
Section 5.). Yezidis complain that police fail to respond to crimes 
committed against Yezidis.
    Homosexuals complain that police physically and mentally abuse 
them, especially if they have no means to pay police extortion. Persons 
accused of homosexuality in the military generally are believed to 
suffer beatings and other physical abuse above and beyond that 
inflicted on other recruits.
    There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities 
confine persons in mental institutions as a form of detention (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Facilities are 
often overcrowded, and food is inadequate to preserve health unless 
supplemented by assistance from families. Medical and sanitary 
facilities in prisons are inadequate. Tuberculosis and other 
communicable diseases are common, and there were a number of deaths 
from such diseases during the year. Although, in principle, an 
agreement has been reached to transfer responsibility for prisons from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice with a goal 
of improved oversight, no formal action to that effect was taken by 
year's end. Physical abuse by guards and other prisoners is a problem. 
In August the Prosecutor General's office announced that 54 prisoners 
had died in prison of in 1999, the highest count for any year since 
independence in 1991. The Government's Human Rights Commission visited 
the main prison in Gyumri in October and reported that it found 
conditions there to be ``shocking'' with the prison filthy, cold, and 
in poor repair. Officials were indifferent to the welfare of the 
prisoners. The Commission reported that complaints mailed to them by 
prisoners were intercepted and given instead to the prison's warden.
    According to his lawyer, the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff 
continued to physically abuse former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan 
while he awaited trial on corruption charges (see Section 1.d.). While 
Bleyan's appeal that his case be dropped was refused, in July the 
Presidential Human Rights Commission recommended that Bleyan be 
detained under more humane conditions.
    The ICRC had free access to detention facilities run by the 
Ministry of Interior. In these facilities, the ICRC is able to visit, 
according to its standard modalities, any prisoner in whom it has an 
interest, whether in prisons or in local police stations. The ICRC also 
had free and regular access to remaining POW's from the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict in the prison of the Ministry of National Security 
and in military police stations. The ICRC also had access to POW's in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In July and August, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged 
POW's under OSCE and ICRC auspices (see Section 1.b.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Authorities continued to 
arrest and detain criminal suspects without legal warrants, often on 
the pretext that they were material witnesses. The police frequently 
imprisoned detainees without notification of their family members. 
Often several days pass before family members obtain information about 
an arrest and the person's location. Security agencies often restrict 
access of lawyers and family members to prisoners until the preliminary 
investigation phase is complete, a process that can last weeks. During 
the investigation of the October 1999 shootings, five persons were 
arrested and held for a period of approximately 5 months in the 
Ministry of National Security's special detainment facilities. They 
then were released and charges against them were dropped (see Section 
1.a.).
    The Government allowed ICRC representatives and a parliamentary 
investigating committee to visit those detained in relation with the 
October 1999 shootings. The detainees also were permitted contact with 
lawyers, although their attorneys complained that this contact was 
insufficient and restricted. However, requests by a local human rights 
monitoring group to visit the men to check allegations of physical and 
mental abuse against the prisoners were denied.
    The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that 
Soviet-era procedures for searches and arrests were to continue until 
the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code came into effect in 
January 1999. Although the Criminal Procedure Code entered into force, 
the Criminal Code remains under consideration in Parliament (see 
Section 1.e.). A suspect may be detained for no more than 12 months 
pending trial, after which the suspect must be released or tried; 
however, this latter provision is not always enforced. There is no 
provision for bail, although detainees may sign a document and remain 
at liberty under their own recognizance pending trial.
    Former Education Minister Ashot Bleyan was held by law enforcement 
officials for several months after being charged in 1999 with 
embezzlement of public funds intended for the purchase of textbooks 
(see Section 1.c.). Bleyan's lawyer charged, both in 1999 and during 
the year, that his client has been abused physically and kept in harsh 
conditions in an attempt to force a confession. Bleyan's July appeal to 
have his case dropped was denied, but the Presidential Commission on 
Human Rights recommended in July that his conditions of imprisonment be 
eased. After an 8 month trial, Bleyan was sentenced to 8 years in 
prison in October for embezzlement of state property. Bleyan has 
claimed that the charges against him were fabricated for political 
reasons (see Section 1.e.).
    On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan a Moscow-based Armenian businessmen 
who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of 
approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government. 
After the demonstration, Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced 
to 11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a 
demonstration but not a march (see Section 2.b.). After 11 days, 
Vardanyan was not released; however, one of his attorneys that was 
arrested with him was released. The Prosecutor General's office 
announced that Vardanyan was being charged with seeking and advocating 
the overthrow of the Government by violence. A trial date has not been 
set. Russian consular officers are allowed access to Vardanyan in 
prison in order to ensure that his rights are respected.
    At year's end, 41 Jehovah's Witnesses were in detention for refusal 
to serve in the military services (see Section 2.c.).
    Armed forces recruiters sometimes take hostages to compel the 
surrender of draft-evading or deserting relatives (see Section 1.f.).
    A local human rights group has made unsubstantiated allegations 
that there are cases in which security authorities use confinement in 
mental institutions as an alternative form of detention.
    The ICRC reported that civilian and military personnel on all sides 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still occasionally may engage in 
cross-border hostage-taking, sometimes to win release of a friend or 
relative held on the other side but more often for financial gain. The 
ICRC, in coordination with the OSCE, has facilitated a number of 
prisoner exchanges, most recently in August, but has no access to 
undeclared hostages.
    There were no reports of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution nominally 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, courts are 
subject to pressure from the executive branch and to corruption. The 
Constitution's provisions do not insulate the courts fully from 
political pressure. Other legal and constitutional provisions make 
judges and prosecutors dependent on the executive branch for their 
employment. The inherited Soviet system views the court largely as a 
rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens' rights. 
Though legislation passed in 1998 reduced significantly prosecutor's 
supervision of civil cases, prosecutors still greatly overshadow 
defense lawyers and judges during trials. Under the Constitution, the 
Council of Justice, headed by the President, the Prosecutor General, 
and the Justice Minister, appoints and disciplines judges for the 
tribunal courts of first instance, review courts, and the Court of 
Appeals. The President appoints the other 14 members of the Justice 
Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges. This authority 
gives the President dominant influence in appointing and dismissing 
judges at all levels. Judges are subject to review by the President 
through the Council of Justice after 3 years, unless they are found 
guilty of malfeasance.
    The 1995 Constitution required a new three-level court system. The 
highest court, the Court of Cassation, began functioning in the summer 
of 1998. Judges for the two lower-level courts, the appellate court and 
courts of the first instance, began functioning in January 1999. First 
instance courts try most cases, with a right of appeal to the Court of 
Appeals and then to the Court of Cassation. The Constitutional Court 
rules on the conformity of legislation with the Constitution, approves 
international agreements, and decides election-related legal questions. 
It can accept only cases proposed by the President, by two-thirds of 
all parliamentary deputies, or election-related cases brought by 
candidates for Parliament or the presidency. Due to these limitations, 
the Constitutional Court cannot ensure effectively constitutional human 
rights safeguards.
    The selection of judges was based on: Their scores on a multiple 
choice test to determine their fitness to be judges under the new 
system based on previously published information regarding the new 
legal codes, and their interviews with the Minister of Justice. Next, 
the list of nominations was approved by the Council of Justice and, 
finally, by the President. About 55 percent of the appointed judges in 
1999 had been judges under the old structure. Based on the results of 
this 4-stage selection, 123 judges were appointed to the new courts in 
January 1999. Unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, their tenure 
is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
    The judicial system continued to be in transition. As part of the 
package of judicial reform legislation mandated by the Constitution, in 
1999 both prosecutors and defense counsels began a process of 
retraining and recertification in order to retain their positions, 
which still is occurring.
    A proposed new Criminal Code, which is intended to clarify 
contradictory provisions of the law and create a more unitary, modern, 
and workable legal system has not yet been approved. The new draft 
Criminal Code consists of general and special parts; the general part 
passed second reading in Parliament in November 1997, but the special 
part, presented for a second reading in November 1998, failed to obtain 
a quorum and had not been reconsidered by year's end. Two other new 
codes, the Civil Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, were passed in 
the summer of 1998.
    The new criminal procedure code does not allow detainees to file a 
complaint in court prior to trial to redress abuses by the procuracy, 
police, or other security forces during criminal investigations. Under 
the new code, the police may detain individuals for up to 12 hours 
before notifying family members, witnesses have no right to legal 
counsel during questioning while in police custody--even though failure 
to testify is a criminal offense--and detainees must seek permission 
from the police or procuracy to obtain a forensic medical examination 
to substantiate a report of torture.
    Under the proposed new judicial code, prosecutors are expected to 
continue to have more influence than judges do.
    A commission to amend the Constitution's chapter on the judiciary, 
the second such body to undertake this task, reportedly is working on 
measures to increase judicial independence that are critical to the 
success of judicial reform. In July the President discharged by decree 
old members and appointed new members to the commission. Such 
constitutional revisions must pass both Parliament and a national 
referendum.
    The military legal system operates essentially as it did during the 
Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving 
military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled 
by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same 
functions as their civilian counterparts; pending the passage of the 
new Criminal Code, they operate in accordance with the Soviet-era 
Criminal Code. In 1998 the military prosecutor abolished military ranks 
for the prosecutors in his service. In November 1999, the military 
prosecutor was named deputy prosecutor general and placed in charge of 
the investigation into the October 1999 shootings in Parliament.
    All trials are public except when government secrets are at issue. 
Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have been 
accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment. Defendants 
have access to a lawyer of their own choosing. The court appoints an 
attorney for any defendant who needs one. Defendants may confront 
witnesses and present evidence. The Constitution provides that those 
accused of crimes shall be informed of charges against them; however, 
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is ineffective, 
and acquittals are rare once a case comes to trial. Defendants and 
prosecutors have the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners; however, supporters 
of both Ashot Bleyan and Arkady Vardanyan claimed that the two were 
political prisoners. Bleyan was imprisoned on charges of embezzlement, 
and Vardanyan was detained on charges of attempting to overthrow the 
Government by force.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unauthorized searches and 
provides for citizens' rights to privacy and confidentiality of 
correspondence, conversations, and other messages. The security 
ministries must petition a judge for permission to wiretap a telephone 
or intercept correspondence. The judge acting alone must find a 
compelling need for the wiretap before granting the agency permission 
to proceed. No evidence of illegal wiretapping came to public attention 
during the year.
    The law requires security forces to obtain a search warrant from a 
judge before conducting a search. Security forces were refused warrant 
issuance due to lack of evidence in several cases; however, in practice 
there were charges that searches continued to be made without a 
warrant, both in regard to the October 1999 killings in parliament and 
in the arrest of Arkady Vardanyan (see Section 2.b.). The Constitution 
provides that the judiciary must exclude evidence obtained without a 
warrant. Legislation passed in 1997 to improve security of bank 
deposits has been enforced.
    There continued to be violations of the right to privacy during 
army conscription drives. Armed forces recruiters sometimes take 
hostages to compel the surrender of draft-evading or deserting 
relatives. There are credible reports of improper, forced conscription 
of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who by law are exempt from 
military service. The parents of such refugees are reluctant to 
complain because they fear reprisals against their sons. There were no 
reported cases of punitive conscription of males who offended local 
officials. Sweep operations for draft-age men have ceased to be carried 
out, although police sometimes maintain surveillance of draft-age men 
to prevent them from fleeing the country.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government 
generally respects freedom of speech, there are some limits on freedom 
of the press, and journalists practice self-censorship. There is no 
official censorship, publications present a variety of views, and the 
opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders, 
including the President, on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process and privatization.
    However, to avoid retribution experienced in years past on the part 
of powerful officials and other individuals, most journalists practice 
self-censorship, particularly in reporting on major corruption or 
national security issues. Journalists remain cautious in their 
reporting, and the range of subjects the Government considers sensitive 
for national security reasons is relatively large. Some members of the 
press, but not all, have access to army facilities and places of 
detention. Even in cases where they do have such access, permission for 
media to visit them involves a prolonged and cumbersome bureaucratic 
process.
    Newspapers, with the exception of Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (a joint 
venture between Parliament and its staff) and Respublica Armenia (which 
ceased publication in June), are privately owned. The state printing 
house and distribution agency both now function as commercial 
enterprises, with no visible government intervention.
    The editor of the sensationalist political tabloid Oragir and its 
successor Haykakan Zhamanak, Nikol Pashinian, was found guilty in 1999 
of libel, slander, libeling a public official, and contempt of court 
(for not publishing a retraction demanded by a court) and sentenced to 
1 year of corrective labor and ordered to pay a fine of $25,000 (13.5 
million drams). Pashinian appealed the judgement and did not pay the 
fine; other Armenian journalists, who up to then had been largely 
nonsupportive of his case, passed a resolution denouncing the 
punishment as unduly harsh and for several weeks rallied almost daily 
in front of the President's office demanding a more lenient sentence. 
In January Pashinian's sentence was reduced to a 1-year suspended 
sentence by an appeals judge who said the original sentence in fact was 
too harsh.
    No legal actions were announced during the year regarding the 
beatings of the Haykakan Zhamanak staff on December 23, 1999. The 
offices of Haykakan Zhamanak were invaded by approximately a dozen men 
who beat and kicked Pashinian and other male members of the staff. The 
gang reportedly was led by a local businessman who was angered by an 
article in Haykakan Zhamanak that accused him of corruption. Pashinian 
afterwards announced that he would not file charges against his 
assailants, but that he expected them to apologize to all journalists 
for the attack. No legal action was taken in the case of arson at the 
Yerevan office of the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya in December 1999. 
A police investigation was unable to reach any conclusions, and the 
case was closed during the year.
    Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and none are 
completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest 
groups or individuals. Due to prevailing economic conditions, total 
newspaper circulation is small (40,000 copies, by the Department of 
Information's estimates, or about 1 copy per 100 persons). The state-
owned newspaper printing and distribution companies have been 
privatized, except for a small government stake.
    State institutions that previously had tended to exert control over 
the media have lost most of their functions. The Department of 
Information, created in 1997 to replace the disbanded Ministry of 
Information, continued to exist, but with no clear purpose beyond 
allocating small government subsidies to newspapers and occasionally 
interceding with the state-owned newspaper distribution agency to 
forward a share of its receipts to the newspapers. A board created in 
late 1997 with representatives from the President's Office, Government, 
and Parliament, to supervise the transformation of the state-owned 
press agency, printing, and newspaper distribution into commercial 
enterprises, has not been active during the past 3 years.
    There were no complaints of official government pressure on 
independent news media; however, the President's office continued to 
influence state television news coverage significantly. In March 
opposition parties demanded that the President remove the Chief of 
State Television for allegedly slanting coverage of the investigation 
into the October 1999 attack on Parliament, but the President's office 
refused to concur. The most widely available of the two state-owned 
television channels takes policy guidance from the Government; it 
presents mostly factual reporting but avoids editorial commentary or 
criticism of official actions. During elections the coverage of 
political parties on state television and other media generally was 
balanced and largely neutral. Singlemandate candidates were not 
entitled to free programming, but there were no restrictions on paid 
time. In Yerevan and major regional media markets, private television 
stations now offer independent news coverage of good technical quality. 
Most radio stations are private. Opposition parties and politicians 
receive adequate news coverage and access on these channels. 
Legislation has not been passed yet to regulate the current arbitrary 
and nontransparent process of license issuance.
    Draft broadcast and media laws, the subject of intensive discussion 
among journalists, were revised extensively, and the draft of a new 
media law passed in Parliament in October was later signed by the 
President with reservations. While the new media law meets many 
previously expressed demands by media and human rights groups about 
assuring freedom of the media, it still contains loopholes that could 
be used to impose greater control of the media by government bodies. In 
response to media and the human rights group's concerns about these 
areas, the President announced that he would submit those chapters of 
the law to the Constitutional Court so that the possible loopholes 
could be closed. One new measure announced in October 1998, a 25-fold 
increase in licensing fees for television broadcasters, was expected to 
have a serious effect on struggling private stations; at the time of 
this announcement, these stations appealed for the measure's 
cancellation. After the President's intervention, the overall increase 
in licensing fees was significantly lowered to five-fold. The few 
international newspapers and imported magazines are not censored. There 
are no restrictions on reception of satellite television and other 
foreign media, and this material is not censored.
    The Government partially respects academic freedom. There are more 
than 80 private institutions of higher education. The curriculum 
committee of the Ministry of Education must approve the curriculum of 
all schools that grant degrees recognized by the State, seriously 
limiting the freedom of individual schools and teachers in their choice 
of textbooks and course material; according to the Ministry, only 15 
schools have applied for such licensing.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there 
are some important exceptions. There are cumbersome registration 
requirements for all political parties, associations, and 
organizations. The process of registering an organization is time-
consuming, and some human rights or political organizations have been 
compelled by the Government to revise their bylaws several times in 
order to have their registrations accepted. No human rights or 
political organizations reported problems with registration during the 
year. During the period of political turmoil after the October 1999 
shootings, several opposition groups held antigovernment demonstrations 
without government intervention. During the July demonstrations by 
parents of killed or injured military recruits (see Section 1.c.), 
three demonstrators were detained for allegedly assaulting a security 
officer, but were released in a few hours.
    On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan, a Moscow-based Armenian 
businessmen who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of 
approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government. 
Some of these persons subsequently marched to the President's office. 
Prior to the demonstration, Vardanyan was detained at his home, taken 
for questioning, and later released. Vardanyan's family and lawyers 
charged that security forces forced their way into the house and 
ransacked it. After the demonstration, the house again was searched by 
security forces and Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced to 
11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a 
demonstration but not a march (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the law specifies some restrictions on the religious 
freedom of adherents of faiths other than the Armenian Apostolic 
Church, which has formal legal status as the national church.
    The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience, which was amended in 1997, 
establishes the separation of church and state, but grants the Armenian 
Apostolic Church special status. The law forbids ``proselytizing'' 
(undefined in the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic Church and 
requires all religious denominations and organizations to register with 
the State Council on Religious Affairs. Petitioning organizations must 
``be free from materialism and of a purely spiritual nature,'' and must 
subscribe to a doctrine based on ``historically recognized holy 
scriptures.''
    A Presidential decree issued in 1993 supplemented the 1991 law and 
strengthened the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The decree 
enjoins the Council on Religious Affairs to investigate the activities 
of the representatives of registered religious organizations and to ban 
missionaries who engage in activities contrary to their status. The 
Council on Religious Affairs took no action against missionaries during 
the year, and even members of Jehovah's Witnesses, which are not 
registered, were allowed to engage fairly openly in missionary 
activity.
    In 1996 Parliament passed legislation tightening registration 
requirements by raising the minimum number of members required for 
registration from 50 to 200 adults. The law banned foreign funding for 
churches whose centers are outside the country. The 1996 legislation 
also mandated that religious organizations, except the Armenian 
Apostolic Church, need prior permission from the State Council on 
Religious Affairs to engage in religious activities in public places, 
travel abroad, or to invite foreign guests to the country. Despite 
these mandated restrictions, in practice there is no restriction on 
travel by the religious personnel of any denomination, including those 
that are unregistered. Members of unregistered minority religious 
organizations are allowed to bring in small quantities of religious 
literature for their own use, but large shipments by unregistered 
groups are prohibited.
    One group of Russian ``old believers'' and some congregations of 
Yezidis remain unregistered, according to the State Council on 
Religions, because they do not wish to register; these groups have not 
complained of religious discrimination.
    As of year's end, registered religious groups had reported no 
adverse consequences from the 1996 law. The ban on foreign funding has 
not been enforced and is considered unenforceable by the Council on 
Religious Affairs. The Council has such limited resources that it has 
not performed any acts except the annual reregistering of religious 
groups. No registered religious group was denied reregistration under 
the amended law. All existing registered denominations have been 
reregistered annually except the Hare Krishnas, whose members by 1998 
had dropped below even the previous membership threshold of 50.
    However, the Council on Religious Affairs continued to deny 
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, no longer on the grounds that the 
group does not permit military service, but because its ``illegal 
proselytism'' allegedly is integral to its activity and because of the 
dissatisfaction and tension caused in some communities by its public 
preaching. The State Council on Religions and Jehovah's Witnesses 
continued to negotiate changes in the group's charter that would bring 
it into compliance with the law, but in May the State Council again 
refused to register the group, and a June statement by the head of the 
council accused Jehovah's Witnesses of continuing to practice ``illegal 
preaching. ``
    Forty-one members of Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention, 
charged with draft evasion or, if forcibly drafted, with desertion. A 
regional Jehovah's Witnesses official said that this higher number was 
because Jehovah's Witnesses receiving draft notices now are reporting 
directly to police and turning themselves in as draft evaders, rather 
then being inducted and then claiming conscientious objector status. 
Around 41 members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were in hiding from 
the draft. Alternative nonmilitary service is not available under 
current law to members of Jehovah's Witnesses. The President's office 
stated in March 1999 that a law was being drafted that would regulate 
alternative service for Jehovah's Witnesses and other conscientious 
objectors, but no action has been taken by year's end.
    According to the law, a religious organization that has been 
refused registration may not publish newspapers or magazines, rent 
meeting places on government property, broadcast programs on television 
or radio, or officially sponsor the visas of visitors. Members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses continue to experience difficulty renting meeting 
places and report that private individuals who are willing to rent them 
facilities frequently are visited by police and warned not to do so. 
Lack of official visa sponsorship means that visitors of Jehovah's 
Witnesses must pay for a tourist visa. When shipped in bulk, 
publications of Jehovah's Witnesses are seized at the border. Although 
members supposedly are allowed to bring in small quantities of printed 
materials for their own use, officials of Jehovah's Witnesses reported 
that mail from one congregation to another, which they said was meant 
for internal purposes rather than for proselytizing, still was 
confiscated by overzealous customs officials. Despite these legal 
obstacles, members of Jehovah's Witnesses continue their missionary 
work fairly visibly and reported a gain in membership during 1999.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation; however, the Government places restrictions on some of 
these rights. The Constitution and laws require that passports be 
issued to all citizens except convicted felons; however, in cases of 
permanent residents who wish to relocate abroad permanently, an exit 
stamp may be denied to those persons who possess state secrets, to 
those subject to military service, to those who are involved in pending 
court cases, and to those whose relatives have lodged financial claims 
against them. The exit stamp is valid for up to 5 years and can be used 
as many times as an individual chooses to travel. Men of military age 
must overcome substantial bureaucratic obstacles to international 
travel. The Government does not restrict internal movement, and 
citizens have the right to change their residence or workplace freely. 
They must negotiate with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to 
register these changes, but this practice is now more of a nuisance 
than an impediment. In addition, registration of a residence is a 
difficult process, particularly for those who live in a rented 
dwelling.
    Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in 1988, ethnic minorities on both sides have been subject 
frequently to discrimination and intimidation, often accompanied by 
violence intended to drive them from the country. Almost all the ethnic 
Azeris living in Armenia at the time, some 185,000 persons, fled to 
Azerbaijan. Of the 400,000 ethnic Armenians then living in Azerbaijan, 
330,000 fled and gained refugee status in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
    The National Assembly passed a law on citizenship in 1996 that 
provides for refugees of Armenian ethnicity to gain citizenship, 
provided that they are stateless and have resided in the country for 
the past 3 years. In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for 
the law and began new efforts to encourage refugees to accept Armenian 
citizenship. Although around 25,000 have done so, most are reluctant to 
become citizens, fearing the loss of free housing, military service 
exemptions, and other benefits accorded refugees.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting ethnic Armenian refugees.
    The refugee law has no provisions in the law for granting refugee 
and asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
respects the right of first asylum in principle, but in the absence of 
a law specifying procedures for formal recognition of political asylum, 
the small number of Sudanese and other migrants not of Armenian 
ethnicity only rarely can obtain residence permits, and their legal 
status remains unclear.
    Border officials have no training on asylum issues. In some cases, 
persons denied permission for legal residence are subjected to fines 
for illegal residence when they attempt to depart the country. There 
were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Serious flaws in the 1998 presidential election continued to 
restrict the constitutional ability of citizens to change their 
government peacefully. Serious breaches of the election law and 
numerous irregularities in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and the 
1996 and 1998 presidential elections, resulted in a lack of public 
confidence in the integrity of the overall election process.
    In both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections, OSCE observers 
witnessed very substantial irregularities and concluded that the 
elections seriously challenged international democratic norms in regard 
to most key criteria. There were unusually high voter turnouts in 
certain areas, particularly in the second round, and these increases 
corresponded directly to high vote percentages for then Acting 
President Kocharian. Based on detailed analysis of the results tracked 
by observer reports in certain districts, it appears that ballot box 
stuffing, discrepancies in vote counts, a large number of unauthorized 
persons in polling stations, and other fraud perpetrated by local power 
structures inflated the number of votes for Kocharian by well over 
100,000 votes in the second round, which he won by approximately 
290,000 votes. Some military units were compelled to vote without 
exception for Kocharian, and officials used pressure to encourage a 
large turnout for the ``official'' candidate. Voters enjoyed a full 
spectrum of choices among candidates; all presidential candidates were 
provided opportunities to present themselves to the electorate through 
the provision of free and paid access to state media. However, state 
television provided coverage biased heavily in favor of the acting 
president. The electoral process fell far short of the authorities' 
commitments to their citizens. There were no legal consequences for 
electoral fraud. The Government pursued only minor violations, and no 
penalties were announced. There was no criminal investigation of the 
amply documented ballot box stuffing.
    The 1999 parliamentary and municipal elections and several by-
elections during the year represented a step toward compliance with 
OSCE commitments, but failed to meet international standards fully. For 
example, the May 1999 parliamentary elections showed continued 
improvement toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but still failed 
to meet international standards. Nonetheless, during the election 
observers from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) categorized the 1999 Parliamentary elections as a 
relevant step towards compliance with OSCE commitments and noted 
improvements in the electoral framework and the political environment 
of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression were 
respected during the campaign. The May 1999 elections took place under 
a new electoral code that represented an improvement compared with 
previous legislation and incorporated some recommendations of 
international organizations. For example, the code provides for the 
accreditation of domestic nonpartisan observers. It abolishes one level 
of election bureaucracy (the community election commissions), and 
provides for the courts to address electoral complaints during the 
campaign rather than after results are announced. However, the 
authorities never submitted the draft code to ODIHR for comments prior 
to its adoption as had been promised.
    Despite the provisions of the new code, election administration was 
uneven on election day. In many precincts, election officials, 
candidates' proxies, and domestic observers worked together to provide 
transparent voting and counting procedures. The areas of most concern 
witnessed by OSCE/ODIHR observers included the poor quality of the 
voter lists, which were often outdated or inaccurate, mistakes in 
registration and voting by military personnel, problems in the 
formation of the election commissions and the status of their members, 
and the presence of unauthorized personnel in precincts during voting 
and counting procedures. Thousands of voters had to appeal to local 
courts on election day in order to cast their votes, after finding that 
their names had been left off local voter lists. Opposition parties 
such as the National Democratic Union, the Self Determination Union, 
the Communist Party, Hayrenik, and Azatutuyun criticized the exclusion 
of numerous residents from the lists. The Central Election Commission 
blamed the omissions on the negligence of some civil servants. Twelve 
criminal cases related to parliamentary election fraud, involving 16 
persons, currently are under investigation by the Prosecutor General's 
office.
    In a July 1999 by-election in Yerevan's Achapniak district, 
violence erupted when armed supporters of one of the candidates beat 
and opened fire on supporters of another candidate. The Central 
Elections Commission suspended this vote and declared it invalid. A 
criminal investigation was started, resulting in the arrest of 12 
persons; the police still are seeking 10 more persons allegedly 
involved in the Achapniak violence. According to the Prosecutor 
General's office 12 persons eventually went to prison for the 
Achapianak disturbances. Of those, 8 were sentenced to 2 years each, 
while the remaining 4 got probationary terms of 16 to 20 months and 
were released on probation. The Achapniak by-election subsequently was 
held again with the two candidates involved in the altercation taken 
off the ballot and took place without incident.
    In the October 1999 municipal elections, the three major problems 
were: The politicization of election commissions, obsolete or incorrect 
voter lists, and the use of old seals (the election law mandates that 
new ones be provided by regional election commissions for each 
election, as a check on ballot box stuffing), presumably because the 
funds were lacking to buy new seals.
    Several Parliamentary by-elections and a mayoral election in the 
town of Goris were held during the year. Most of the byelections were 
carried out peacefully. After hearing extensive evidence about 
irregularities in Yerevan's Arabik district, the Constitutional court 
ordered the cancellation of the results in the July by-election. The 
election was held again, and a different candidate won. An appeal by 
the winner of the first election was considered but subsequently 
rejected by the Central Elections Commission.
    In Goris where the incumbent mayor had been removed by the 
provincial governor in June for alleged impropriety in the conduct of 
his office, the ousted incumbent, who lost the July election, claimed 
that there were significant irregularities, including ballot-box 
stuffing. The incumbent appealed the results; however, the appeal was 
denied in December.
    The Government has confirmed that a national census, previously 
suspended for budgetary reasons, is expected to take place in 2001. 
There is to be a test census in three regions in early 2001. This has 
raised political concerns about the integrity of the process that is to 
create new electoral districts, since existing voter rolls and other 
population records are outdated and seriously flawed throughout the 
country.
    Under the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister 
and plays a role in the final selection of qualified candidates for 
judgeships. The Constitution provides for independent legislative and 
judicial branches, but in practice these branches are not insulated 
from political pressure from the executive branch.
    The Government appoints the 10 regional governors (marzpets) and 
the mayor of Yerevan. The Constitution gives local communities the 
right to elect local authorities. However, local elected officials have 
limited powers and are overshadowed in practice by the appointed 
governors, who can remove them from office.
    The National Assembly consists of 131 deputies; 56 are elected on a 
proportional basis and 75 on a district-by-district majoritarian basis. 
Regular sessions are held twice a year: the first from mid-September to 
mid-December, and the second from early February until mid-June. Given 
the press of legislative business connected with the total reform of 
the legal system, special sessions frequently are called, but may not 
last more than 6 days.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and 
minorities in government and politics; however, due to traditional 
social attitudes, both groups are underrepresented in all branches of 
government. There are no female cabinet ministers, although there are 
several female deputy ministers. Only 4 of the 131 deputies in the 
Parliament are women. There are no minority representatives in the 
Cabinet or in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and 
        NonGovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several human rights NGO's organizations that are active 
and operate openly, criticize abuses publicly, and publish their 
findings on government human rights violations. In general public 
access to information on human rights cases usually is adequate, with 
extensive media coverage of significant court cases, but there was less 
openness after the October 1999 shootings by civilian and military 
prosecutors. However, nongovernmental human rights organizations often 
report funding difficulties, and at least one, the well-respected 
Helsinki Association, had to close its offices for part of the year due 
to lack of funds. The Helsinki Committee continued to operate and did 
receive permission to have access to detention facilities, and has made 
several visits.
    As part of the commitments it made in advance of joining the 
Council of Europe (COE), the Government permitted monitoring of its 
human rights practices by the COE and reaffirmed this right for the 
ICRC, which retains full access to civilian detention facilities.
    An office created by the prosecutor general in July 1997 to 
communicate with international observers was responsive to requests for 
information, although information about criminal cases stemming from 
elections remained relatively general and incomplete.
    Current electoral law allows local and international observer 
organizations to monitor all elections, and such organizations reported 
no impediments to being allowed to observe the 1999 elections and this 
year's by-elections.
    In 1998 President Kocharian appointed a prominent opposition 
politician to head a new human rights commission headed by Paruyr 
Hairikyan within the President's office. The commission exists 
essentially as a reference bureau and has no formal legal powers; 
however, it has had a modest impact in getting authorities to review 
official actions on issues ranging from apartment allocations to police 
behavior, in some cases winning official reconsideration. It refers 
such cases to the appropriate agency, but it does not follow up on 
specific issues. During the year, the commission visited those accused 
in the October 1999 killings, visited the Gyumri jail, and frequently 
visited military units to hear human rights complaints by soldiers. The 
Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Defense, and Interior, 
headed by Vahan Hovhanissian, has taken on a greater role this year by 
making regular visits to military units to hear complaints by soldiers 
as well.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, 
religion, disability, language, or social status; however, cultural and 
economic factors prevent women, ethnic and religious minorities, and 
persons with disabilities, from participating fully in public life. The 
religion law discriminates against some religious groups.
    Women.--There is no specific law banning violence against women, 
and few cases of rape, spousal abuse, or other violence against women 
were reported; however, their number likely is higher than the 
statistics indicate. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported 
to the police, and women are not protected from it. Several 
nongovernmental organizations exist in the Yerevan and Gyumri areas, 
which provide shelter and assistance to battered women.
    During the year, the Prosecutor's Office registered 15 cases of 
rape. The law (the old Soviet Criminal Code) cites specific punishments 
for rape, forced abortion, forbidding a woman from marrying, and 
discrimination in hiring due to pregnancy.
    Prostitution is not illegal, and according to anecdotal evidence, 
most prostitutes stopped by police for street-walking, simply are sent 
to a hospital or physician for a medical check-up. Although, the 
Criminal Code does not forbid prostitution itself, keeping brothels is 
prohibited. According to an investigation conducted by journalists, 
more than 1,600 prostitutes were registered by the police, around 800 
in the Yerevan area. A study of Yerevan prostitution done by an 
international NGO showed that while some operate by telephone, the vast 
majority are what is known as streetwalkers, with their ``class'' and 
desirability defined by the area of the city in which they operate.
    An international NGO reports that the problem of battered wives is 
much more widespread then the Government or local human rights groups 
will admit. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported to the 
police, and women are not protected from it. Many cases are not 
reported to police in some cases because women are afraid of physical 
harm if they do so, afraid that police will refuse to take action and 
instead return them to their husbands, and in others because they are 
embarrassed to make ``family matters'' public. Several NGO's in the 
Yerevan and Gyumri areas provide shelter and assistance to battered 
women; however, embarrassment and concerns for family honor make the 
problem particularly sensitive and difficult to quantify. Even women's 
groups and health professionals decline to offer specific figures, but 
do not indicate that such violence is especially common. At least four 
cases were reported in the press of women who died as a result of 
domestic violence. During the year, 13 persons were prosecuted for 
attempted rape.
    In view of the phenomenon of Armenian women working as prostitutes 
in Russia and the Middle East, it is likely that trafficking in women 
and girls (particulary from the country) is more of a problem than the 
Government and women's organizations have recognized openly. Twenty-six 
cases of trafficking in women or procuring are now in the courts (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Police authorities announced in 1999 that there were numerous cases 
of organized procuring under investigation, but since the main 
initiators lived abroad, mostly in the Middle East, police were unable 
to arrest them.
    Males often play a dominant role in many societal institutions. 
Although women have been present in the work force for several 
generations, tolerance for broadening gender roles and for any gender 
behavior is low especially in the regions. In the workplace, women 
receive equal pay for equal work, but generally are not afforded the 
same professional opportunities given to men and often are relegated to 
more menial or low-skill jobs. The 1972 Law on Employment prohibits 
discrimination in employment, but the extremely high unemployment rate 
makes it difficult to gauge how effectively the law has been 
implemented to prevent discrimination. Formerly, labor unions protected 
women's rights, in the workplace at least nominally, but the weakness 
of unions has rendered them less effective in this role (see Section 
6.a.). According to official statistics, women make up 63.8 percent of 
those officially registered as unemployed (approximately 181,000). 
Currently there are more women receiving university and postgraduate 
education than men. This may in part be accounted for by the Nagorno-
Karabakh situation, which necessitates a high number of males in 
military service, and in part by the economic situation, which has 
caused males to emigrate in search of employment.
    Children.--The Government does not have the economic means to 
provide fully for the welfare of children. Education is free, 
universal, and compulsory through age 14, then optional through age 16 
(complete secondary education). However, many facilities are 
impoverished and in poor condition, and teachers are forced to tutor 
pupils privately to supplement salaries that are low and irregularly 
paid. Some teachers are known to demand bribes from parents in return 
for good or passing grades for their children. Free children's health 
care is available for all children through the age of 8 for treatment 
of some diseases and for emergency cases, but is often of poor quality, 
with an increasing trend toward overt or concealed payment of fees for 
service.
    Girls and boys receive equal educational opportunities. The 
Government focuses its efforts regarding children's rights and welfare 
on measures to insulate large families--those with four or more 
children--from the effects of the country's current difficult 
circumstances. The Government similarly directs foreign humanitarian 
aid programs toward most socially vulnerable families and single parent 
families. Despite social programs, the problem of street children 
remains significant. However, the family tradition is strong, and child 
abuse does not appear to be a serious problem. Trafficking in girls is 
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to social security in the event of disability. The 1993 Law on Invalids 
provides for the social, political, and individual rights of the 
disabled, but does not mandate the provision of accessibility for the 
disabled. During the year, expenditures for the health sector increased 
to $3.2 million (1.7 billion drams) from the projected level, which 
affected persons with disabilities, who are supposed to be treated 
free. According to the former Minister of Social Security, the social 
sector budget was budgeted at $2.8 million (1.57 million drams). In the 
current economic circumstances, and in an effort to meet international 
financial institution guidelines on reduction of the budget deficit, 
the Government has had difficulty fulfilling its commitments in this 
area.
    The Government's enforcement of the rights of the disabled remains 
rudimentary. Legal safeguards for those with psychiatric problems are 
inadequate to protect patients' rights. There is societal 
discrimination against the disabled. Hospitals, residential care, and 
other facilities for the seriously disabled do not meet international 
norms. There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities 
used confinement in mental institutions as an alternative form of 
detention (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Religious Minorities.--There was no reported violence against 
minority religious groups. However, newer religious groups are viewed 
with suspicion, especially by some mid-level clergy in the Armenian 
Apostolic Church and their supporters in the bureaucracy.
    In April Jehovah's Witnesses returning from a religious service in 
Yerevan reported being verbally and physically abused by local thugs 
while police watched but did not intervene. In August the mayor and 
town council published a decree expelling two members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses from the town of Talin, near Yerevan, for alleged 
``agitation.''
    As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, anti-
Muslim feeling persists among the populace, and the few remaining 
Muslims keep a low profile. There is only one mosque open for prayers.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is approximately 
95 percent ethnic Armenian. The Government does not discriminate 
against the small, officially recognized ``national'' communities, 
although the economic and social situation of such groups has 
deteriorated substantially since independence in 1991. Groups that the 
Government includes in this category are Russians, Jews, Kurds, 
Yezidis, Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians. As a result of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is no significant Azeri minority (see Section 
2.d.). Several hundred Azeris or persons of mixed Azeri heritage still 
living in the country maintain a low profile in the face of societal 
discrimination.
    The Constitution grants national minorities the right to preserve 
their cultural traditions and language, and the 1992 Law on Language 
provides linguistic minorities with the right to publish and study in 
their native language. There are token publications in minority 
languages, but the Government has devoted minimal resources to 
maintaining minority language schools. The large network of Russian-
language schools has diminished significantly in recent years. In 
practice virtually all students, including members of the Yezidi and 
Greek communities, now attend Armenian-language schools, with very 
limited classes available in their native tongues. In the Yezidi 
community, a high percentage of pupils do not attend school, partly for 
family economic reasons and partly because of discrimination from 
ethnic Armenian students and teachers.
    Yezidi leaders continued to complain that police and local 
authorities subject their community to discrimination. The Yezidis, 
whose number is estimated at 54,000 by Yezidi leaders, speak a Kurdish 
dialect and practice a traditional, nonChristian, non-Muslim religion 
with elements derived from Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Animism. They 
cite numerous incidents of unfair adjudication of land, water, and 
grazing disputes, nonreceipt of privatized agricultural land, an 
unusually high number of beatings of Yezidi conscripts in the army (see 
Section 1.c.), and lack of police response to even serious crimes 
committed against Yezidis. The Yezidi complaints likely reflect 
societal discrimination as well as the more general problem of poorly 
functioning local Government bodies.
    In March the country's first Congress of National Minorities since 
1991 was held. At the conference human rights did not appear to be a 
major concern. Yezdis and Ukrainians complained of unfair treatment in 
regard to forced military service. Most representatives demanded more 
government aid for native-language newspapers and for broadcasting 
minority directed programs on television.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides employees 
with the right to form and join trade unions and the right to strike. 
The Constitution stipulates that the right to form associations--
including political parties and trade unions--may be limited with 
respect to persons serving in the armed services and law enforcement 
agencies. A 1993 Presidential decree prohibits the Government and other 
employers from retaliating against strikers and labor leaders, but 
workers have little confidence in this protection. In practice labor 
organization remains weak due to high unemployment and the weak 
economy. Workers have neither the financial resources to maintain a 
strike nor enforceable legal protection against retaliation, and 
existing unions play a relatively passive role. However, there were no 
reports of retaliation against strikers or labor leaders. The 
purportedly Independent Labor Federation created in December 1997 took 
no action during the year.
    The absence of active unions and of accurate employment data 
precludes a reliable estimate of the percentage of the workforce that 
is unionized.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations; 
however, none have done so to date.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is not practiced. The Constitution provides all citizens 
with the right to a just wage no lower than the minimum set by the 
Government. Although the 1992 Law on Employment provides for the right 
to organize and bargain collectively, voluntary and direct negotiations 
do not take place between unions and employers without the 
participation of the Government, because most large employers remain 
under state control. The near collapse of major industrial production 
has undercut the organization of labor unions.
    The Government encourages profitable factories to establish their 
own pay scales. Factory directorates generally set the pay scales 
without consultation with employees. The Arbitration Commission 
adjudicates wage and other labor disputes.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the 1992 Law on Employment prohibit forced and bonded labor, including 
that by children, and it generally is not known to occur; however, 
trafficking in women and girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to the 1992 Law on Employment, 16 years is the 
minimum age for employment. Children may work from the age of 14 with 
the permission of a medical commission and the relevant labor union 
board.
    The Law on Employment is enforced by local community councils, 
unemployment offices, and, as a final board of appeal, the arbitration 
commission. Children under the age of 18 are not allowed to work in 
difficult or dangerous jobs, night labor, or jobs that require over 6 
hours of work per day, although waivers in the latter two cases can be 
applied for by children 16 years or over.
    According to the Ministry of Social Welfare some children are 
involved in family businesses, as well as some other business 
activities, up to the age of 12 years, in sectors like agriculture 
where it is not forbidden by law. Children are forbidden specifically 
from engaging in arduous or dangerous employment, even if it is their 
families business without permission by the Ministry of Social Welfare 
which is granted only on a case by case basis. Forced or bonded labor 
by children is prohibited, and it generally is not known to occur; 
however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum 
wage by decree. In October 1998, Parliament quintupled the national 
minimum wage to less than $10 (5,000 drams) per month; however, the 
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and family. The majority of the population lives below the 
officially recognized poverty line as a result of economic dislocations 
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1988 earthquake, the 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the resulting blockade by Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, and disruptions in trade. However, a significant amount of 
economic activity takes place unrecorded and untaxed by local 
authorities. The extent to which this improves the overall economic 
situation is unknown.
    The majority of industrial enterprises are either idle or operating 
at a fraction of their capacity. Some furloughed workers still are 
receiving minimal partial compensation from their enterprises, but most 
are no longer receiving any payment if they are not working. The 
standard legal workweek is 40 hours; many persons work multiple jobs.
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to clean and safe 
work places, but Soviet-era occupational and safety standards remain in 
force. Labor legislation from 1988 places responsibility on the 
employer and the management of each firm to ensure ``healthy and 
normal'' labor conditions for employees, but it provides no definition 
of healthy and normal. The employment situation is such that workers 
are reluctant to complain or remove themselves from hazardous working 
conditions due to the risk of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons specifically, although it does prohibit exploitation by 
force of persons for financial gain, and trafficking in women and girls 
from the country is a problem. However, specific information on 
trafficking is difficult to obtain and there is little information 
about trafficking within the country. The Criminal Code specifically 
prohibits the keeping of what generally are considered to be brothels. 
Prostitution itself is legal. Armenian women work as prostitutes in the 
Middle East and Russia, and in the past there have been reports of 
trafficking in women and girls to these countries. It is likely that 
trafficking in women and girls is more of a problem than the Government 
and women's organizations have recognized openly. According to 
international NGO's, the Government appears to be focusing more on 
prostitution within the country then on trafficking. There were reports 
that older girls in local orphanages were approached with offers to 
engage in prostitution, either locally or abroad. Police officials 
announced the investigation of numerous cases of procuring but said 
that they were unable to arrest the main offenders because they resided 
in the Middle East rather than in Armenia (see Section 5). Cases of 
trafficking in women currently in court are being prosecuted under the 
Criminal Code prohibition on brothels.
                               __________

                                AUSTRIA

    Austria is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary 
form of government. Citizens choose their representatives in periodic, 
free, and fair multiparty elections. In February a new right-of-center 
coalition came to power, comprised of the conservative People's Party 
(OVP) and the far-right Freedom Party (FPO). The judiciary is 
independent.
    The police are subordinated to the executive and judicial 
authorities. The national police maintain internal security. The army 
is responsible for external security. The police are generally well 
trained and disciplined, although some members of the police were 
responsible for instances of human rights abuses.
    The country's highly developed, market-based economy, with its mix 
of technologically advanced industry, modern agriculture, and tourism, 
affords its citizens a high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. There were some reports of abuse by 
police, which involved occasional beatings but mainly involved verbal 
abuse and threats. Inclusion of the FPO in the Government was met with 
widespread, generally peaceful protests in Vienna and other large 
cities throughout the country. Many human rights organizations and 
minorities feared that the country's general climate of tolerance and 
respect for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. This resulted 
in a sharp increase in attention to and scrutiny of the country's human 
rights situation by foreign governments, the Council of Europe, other 
European Union (EU) member states, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's). A number of reports published by such observers expressed 
concern about ambiguous racist and/or xenophobic comments of senior FPO 
leaders, which it was feared would legitimize intolerance aimed at 
minority groups. In September a group of 3 human rights experts 
selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, as 
accepted by the other 14 members of the EU, released a report on the 
situation of minorities, refugees, and immigrants in the country, which 
concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for these 
groups. The new Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights 
bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the six 
officially recognized minorities. Violence against women is a problem, 
which the Government is taking steps to address. Trafficking in women 
for prostitution remains a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 					
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In May two drug-related deaths of foreign-born suspects while in 
pretrial custody temporarily revived a debate about police brutality. 
On May 3, a 26-year-old Nigerian asylum applicant, Richard Ibekwe, also 
known as Peter Weah Richard, died while in pretrial detention for 
suspected drug offenses. Witnesses reported that police officers beat 
Ibekwe in the course of his arrest 2 weeks prior to his death. On May 
5, a 40-year-old Slovakian also died while in police custody. Official 
autopsies confirmed that both men died of drug overdoses. Due to 
allegations of police brutality, an internal investigation into 
Ibekwe's death was begun. The results were still pending at year's end.
    In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while 
being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped 
shut to control his violent behavior (see Section 2.d.).
    In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted for killing 4 Roma in 1995 
and injuring 15 other persons in a letter bomb campaign conducted 
between 1993 and 1997 (see Section 5).
    A French appeals court is considering an Austrian government 
request for the extradition of the terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez 
(alias ``Carlos the Jackal''). Austria formally has sought the 
extradition of ``Carlos'' since French authorities captured him in 
1994. He is wanted on charges of manslaughter, kidnaping, and blackmail 
in connection with the terrorist attacks at Vienna's Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) headquarters in December 1975.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the Constitution prohibits such practices, 
government statistics for 1999 showed 365 complaints against federal 
police officials for ``unjustified use of force,'' compared with 356 in 
1998. Of the 365 complaints, 292 resulted in investigations, compared 
with 288 in 1998. Four officers were convicted of excessive use of 
force in 1999; one officer was convicted in 1998. Types of abuse ranged 
from slander to kicking and hitting, resulting mainly in bruising. Some 
of the violence appeared to be racially motivated. An Interior Ministry 
survey on the ``ethics of police conduct'' among policemen revealed 
that half of the 2,000 policemen interviewed stated that they would not 
report their colleagues in cases of misconduct.
    In January two U.S. citizens involved in a dispute with a Viennese 
nightclub alleged mistreatment by the police. Injuries included wrist 
nerve damage and slight bruising. One of the men is HIV positive and 
was denied access to his medication during his approximately 12-hour 
incarceration. The two alleged that such mistreatment was directed 
against them because of their homosexuality and nationality. 
Investigation into this case was suspended by the public prosecutor's 
office due to lack of evidence. In a separate case, a drug suspect who 
was allegedly beaten during arrest later died in custody (see Section 
1.a.).
    In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while 
being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped 
shut to control his violent behavior. Two of the three police officers 
who accompanied him were suspended, and a committee was created with 
the goal of ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human 
rights while carrying out their duties (see Section 2.d.).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In 
individual cases, investigating judges or prison directors have 
jurisdiction over questions of access to the defendant.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects 
this prohibition.
    In criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial 
detention for up to 48 hours; however, in cases of charges of 
``aggressive behavior,'' an investigative judge may decide within that 
period to grant a prosecution request for detention of up to 2 years 
pending completion of an investigation. The grounds required for such 
investigative detention are specified in the law, as are conditions for 
bail. The investigative judge is required to evaluate an investigative 
detention after 2 weeks, 1 month, and every 2 months after the arrest.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The Constitution provides that judges are independent in the 
exercise of their judicial office. Judges cannot be removed from office 
or transferred against their will. There are local, regional, and 
regional higher courts, as well as the Supreme Court as the court of 
highest instance. The system of judicial review provides for extensive 
possibilities for appeal. Trials have to be public, and have to be 
conducted orally. Persons charged with criminal offenses are to be 
considered innocent until proven guilty. While the Supreme Court is the 
court of highest instance for the judiciary, the Administrative Court 
acts as the supervisory body over the administrative branch, and the 
Constitutional Court presides over constitutional issues.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice; however, stringent slander laws tend to discourage reports 
of police brutality, and foreign observers--including the European 
Court of Human Rights--have concluded that the use of libel procedures 
to protect politicians may hamper freedom of speech and the press. A 
conviction for libel by a criminal court cannot be appealed to the 
Constitutional Court. In most cases, judgments are handed down by a 
court of appeals, which does not rely on case law. Several FPO 
politicians have been accused of paying police officers to obtain 
confidential information in order to discredit opponents of the FPO. An 
investigation is underway under the auspices of an independent 
committee. A number of officers have been suspended pending the 
completion of the investigation. Since 1986 Joerg Haider, the former 
FPO leader and current governor of Carinthia, has engaged in over 350 
libel suits against media outlets and individuals. Following the 
negative reaction to the FPO's inclusion in the Government, Haider 
called for the prosecution of deputies critical of the Government under 
a provision of the Criminal Code. Justice Minister Dieter Boehmdorfer 
(FPO) received extensive criticism for his initial support for this 
measure. Publications may be removed from circulation if they violate 
legal provisions concerning morality or public security, but such cases 
are extremely rare.
    The Government monopoly in national radio has been dismantled. A 
1993 law permitted licensing of regional private radio stations. There 
are currently 36 commercial and 9 community radio stations. By the end 
of 1999, 75.2 percent of citizens listened to state-run radio stations, 
and 17 percent listened to private stations. While a law establishing 
terrestrial frequencies for private television stations is expected to 
be passed in 2001, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) 
currently retains its monopoly on terrestrial television broadcasts.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, except for Nazi 
organizations and activities (an exception stipulated also in the 
Austrian State Treaty of 1955). The Law on the Formation of 
Associations states that permission to form an organization may be 
denied if it is apparent that the organization would pursue the illegal 
activities of a prohibited organization.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion of individuals and the Government generally respects this 
right in practice. However, the status of religious organizations is 
governed by the 1874 ``Law on Recognition'' of churches and by a 
January 1998 law establishing the status of ``confessional 
communities.'' Religious recognition under the 1874 law has wide-
ranging implications; for example, the authority to participate in the 
state-collected religious taxation program; to engage in religious 
education; and to import religious workers to act as ministers, 
missionaries, or teachers. Although in the past nonrecognized religious 
groups have had problems obtaining resident permits for foreign 
religious workers, administrative procedures adopted in 1997 have 
addressed this problem in part. Officially, 75.3 percent of the 
population are Roman Catholic, and there are 11 other recognized 
religious organizations.
    Religious organizations may be divided into three different legal 
categories (listed in descending order of status): Officially 
recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and 
associations.
    Under the law, religious societies have ``public corporation'' 
status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number 
of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to other religious 
organizations. The Constitution singles out religious societies for 
special recognition. State subsidies for religious teachers, at both 
public and private schools, constitute one of the benefits provided to 
religious societies that is not granted to other religious 
organizations.
    Previously some nonrecognized religious groups were able to 
organize as legal entities or associations, although this route has not 
been available universally. Some groups even have done so while 
applying for recognition as religious communities under the 1874 law. 
Many such applications for recognition were not handled expeditiously 
by the Ministry of Education and Culture; in some cases, years passed 
before a decision was made. Following years of bureaucratic delay and 
an administrative court order instructing the Education Ministry to 
render a decision, in 1997 the Ministry denied the request for 
recognition of Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this 
decision to the Constitutional Court.
    In January 1998, a law went into effect that allows nonrecognized 
religious groups to seek official status as confessional communities 
without the fiscal and educational privileges available to recognized 
religions. Religious confessional communities, once they are recognized 
officially as such by the Government, have juridical standing, which 
permits them to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in 
their own names and contracting for goods and services. To apply groups 
must have 300 members and submit to the Government their written 
statutes, describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members, 
membership regulations, officials, and financing. Groups also must 
submit a written version of their religious doctrine, which must differ 
from that of any existing religion recognized under the 1874 law or 
registered under the new law, for a determination that their basic 
beliefs do not violate public security, public order, health and 
morals, or the rights and freedoms of citizens. A religious 
organization that seeks to obtain this new status is subject to a 6-
month waiting period from the time of application to the Ministry of 
Education and Culture. The new law also sets out additional criteria 
for eventual recognition according to the 1874 law, such as a 20-year 
observation period (at least 10 of which must be as a group organized 
as a confessional community under the new law) and membership equaling 
at least two one-thousandths of the country's population. Many 
religious groups and independent congregations do not meet the 300-
member threshold for registration under the new law. Only Jehovah's 
Witnesses currently meet the higher membership requirement for 
recognition under the 1874 law.
    In a decision issued in March 1998, the Constitutional Court voided 
the Education Ministry's decision on Jehovah's Witnesses and ordered a 
new decision based on the January law on the Status of Confessional 
Communities. In July 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses received the status of a 
confessional community. According to the 1998 law, the group is now 
subject to a 10-year observation period before they are eligible for 
recognition.
    The nine religious groups that have constituted themselves as 
confessional communities according to the 1998 law are: Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the Baha'i Faith, the Baptists, the Evangelical Alliance, 
the Movement for Religious Renewal, the Pentecostalists, the Seventh-
Day Adventists, the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Hindu religious 
community. After initially filing for confessional community status, 
the Church of Scientology withdrew its application from consideration. 
The Ministry rejected the application of the Sahaja Yoga group; in 1998 
the group appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court. A decision 
was still pending on this case at year's end. Proponents of the law 
describe it as an opportunity for religious groups to become officially 
registered as religious organizations, providing them with a government 
``quality seal.'' However, numerous religious groups not recognized by 
the State, as well as some religious law experts dismiss the purported 
benefits of obtaining status under the law and have complained that the 
law's additional criteria for recognition under the 1874 law obstruct 
claims to recognition and formalize a second-class status for 
nonrecognized groups. Experts have questioned the law's 
constitutionality.
    After the Education Ministry granted Jehovah's Witnesses the status 
of Confessional Community, the group immediately in 1998 requested that 
it be recognized as a religious group under the 1874 law. The Education 
Ministry denied the application, on the basis that, as a confessional 
community, Jehovah's Witnesses would need to submit to the required 10-
year observation period. The group has appealed this decision to the 
Constitutional Court, arguing that a 10-year observation period is 
unconstitutional. A decision was still pending at year's end.
    Also in 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the 
European Court for Human Rights, arguing that the group has not yet 
been granted full status as a religious entity under the 1874 law, 
despite having made numerous attempts for more than 2 decades. A 
decision was still pending at year's end.
    Religious organizations that do not qualify for either religious 
society or confessional community status may apply to become 
associations. This status is granted relatively freely, although 
associations do not have legal standing and are unable to purchase 
property, churches, or engage in other activities permitted to the 
other two legal categories.
    The Government continued its information campaign against religious 
sects that it considered potentially harmful to the interests of 
individuals and society. In September 1999, the Ministry for Social 
Security and Generations issued a new edition of a controversial 
brochure that described numerous nonrecognized religious groups in 
negative terms, which many of the groups deemed offensive. This 
brochure includes information on Jehovah's Witnesses, despite its 
status as a confessional community. On April 6, the new Minster for 
Social Security and Generations, Elisabeth Sickl (FPO), announced plans 
to support the training of ``specialists'' among teachers and youth 
leaders in order to sensitize them to the dangers posed by some 
nonrecognized religious groups to the young. She also pledged to 
include representatives from provincial governments in an 
interministerial working group to decide on measures to ``protect 
citizens from the damaging influence of sects, cults, and esoteric 
movements.'' These statements were interpreted in some circles as 
evidence that the Freedom Party's participation in government may 
strengthen efforts to curb the role of nonrecognized religious groups. 
Sickl left office in October. Her successor has made no public 
statements on this issue. The federal office on sects continues to 
collect and distribute information on organizations considered sects. 
Under the law, this office has independent status, but its head is 
appointed and supervised by the Minister for Social Security and 
Generations.
    In April 1999, the Conservative People's Party (OVP) convention 
formally accepted a decision made by the party's executive board in 
1997 that party membership is incompatible with membership in a sect.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict 
movement, including emigration. Citizens who leave the country have the 
right to return at any time.
    The new coalition adopted the policy of the outgoing SPO-led 
cabinet that the Government needs to focus on integration prior to 
considering any new immigration. In June Economics Minister Martin 
Bartenstein (OVP) issued a decree liberalizing existing employment 
restrictions for certain groups of legal aliens, paving the way for 
their integration into the labor market. Also in June, the 
Constitutional Court rejected the current upper age limit of 14 for the 
visa category of family reunification as too restrictive. The 
Government did not decide on its response to this decision but is 
considering adopting the EU standard of age 16 as the cutoff for this 
category. In the first 6 months of the year, the number of illegal 
aliens seized by police was 20,606, an 18.4 percent increase over the 
same period in 1999.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government 
subscribes to the ``safe country'' concept, which requires asylum 
seekers who enter illegally to depart and seek refugee status from 
outside the country. In response to continuing criticism by the office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations, the Government passed an amendment to the 
1991 asylum law in 1997 designed to bring some improvements to the 
``safe country'' rule and the appellate procedure. The Government 
cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations 
generally approve of the 1997 asylum law, but there is still some 
dissatisfaction with its implementation. A January amendment to the 
1997 asylum law, which authorizes the Ministry of Interior to draw up a 
``white list'' of ``safe third countries,'' drew sharp criticism from 
human rights and refugee advocacy groups. There is widespread 
opposition to this concept based on the fear that it compromises the 
principle of individual investigation of claims. This principle was 
upheld in a February 1999 ruling of the administrative court and again 
in a March 2000 ruling. In both cases the High Court reversed a denial 
of asylum made on the basis of the ``safe third country'' rule.
    Making government care available to all needy asylum applicants 
until their claims are processed was a focal point of the year's agenda 
of the UNHCR regional office. In principle asylum applicants are 
entitled to federal assistance for food, shelter, and medical care. 
However, the Federal Care Provisions Act specifically states that there 
is no corresponding legal right for applicants. The result is that 
asylum applicants denied assistance have no legal recourse if denied 
these benefits. The Government grants assistance to only one-third of 
all asylum applicants who face financial hardship; one-third are forced 
to rely on charitable assistance, and the remaining applicants 
abandoned their applications and are believed to have left the country 
to apply for asylum elsewhere. Individuals found to be bona fide 
refugees by government authorities are not sent back to the countries 
from which they fled. Asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected by 
the Federal Asylum Office may appeal to the independent Federal Asylum 
Senate; the Administrative Court is the court of last instance.
    Of the estimated 95,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived between April 
1992 and July 1993, the Government provided temporary protected status 
(TPS), similar to first asylum, to 47,000, which made them eligible to 
receive government assistance without having to file asylum 
applications. Most of the other 48,000 refugees were deemed to have 
other means of support, either from families already present in Austria 
or from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The overwhelming number 
of all Bosnian refugees has been integrated into the labor market. They 
now hold ``gastarbeiter'' status, which means that their residency 
permit is evaluated each year on the basis of the country's overall 
labor demand. Many of the refugees have chosen voluntarily to return to 
their homeland, a process that still continues. The Government's 
program of assistance for Bosnian war refugees in TPS expired on July 
31. As of that date, approximately 300 Bosnian refugees formerly in TPS 
remained in the country and are now being supported by the social 
welfare system.
    During the Kosovo crisis, Austria accepted an estimated 10,000 to 
15,000 refugees. A total of 5,080 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated 
directly from Macedonia and admitted to Austria under cover of TPS. 
Also, the immigration law was modified to allow Kosovar Albanians 
already in the country in a variety of statuses to extend their stay. 
In December approximately 1,593 Kosovar Albanians of the total of 5,080 
refugees under TPS remained in the country. They receive public 
assistance under a care program similar to the one set up during the 
Bosnian crisis. The Interior Ministry has agreed to extend the July 
2000 deadline for the repatriation of approximately 1,200 Kosovar 
refugees in three categories: 1) those needing protection, 2) those 
supported financially by relatives residing legally in Austria, and 3) 
Kosovars who earlier were granted temporary protected status or asylum 
and already were integrated into the labor market. The Government has 
said that the 226 Kosovars in need of protection would be permitted to 
stay in the country for at least another year, whereas the other two 
categories are to be granted humanitarian residence status temporarily 
until new immigration quotas become formally available in 2001.
    Preliminary figures for asylum applications during the year 
indicate a decrease by almost 10 percent from 1999 figures to 18,290. 
In 1999 there were 20,096 asylum applications, a significant increase 
over the 1998 total of 13,805. In 1999 3,434 applications were accepted 
and 3,573 were denied, compared with 500 approvals and 3,491 denials in 
1998. The 1999 approval figure includes asylum seekers from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (2,953), Afghanistan (108), Iran (99), Iraq 
(80), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (26). The record 1999 
approval rate of 49 percent (compared with 11.5 percent in 1998) is 
attributed to the Kosovo conflict. Improved border controls resulting 
from the 1997 full implementation of the Schengen Agreement have led to 
an increase in asylum applications. Aliens who formerly used the 
country as a transit point increasingly are filing asylum applications 
upon arrival.
    In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant, Marcus 
Omofuma, died while being deported to Lagos via Sofia, Bulgaria (see 
Section 1.a.). Because of Omofuma's violent, uncooperative behavior, 
accompanying Austrian police physically restrained him, including 
taping his mouth shut to silence his loud outcries. Omofuma lost 
consciousness during the flight and was pronounced dead upon arrival in 
Sofia. The incident prompted a complete review of internal procedures 
regarding deportations. Two of the three police officers who 
accompanied Omofuma were suspended. The Interior Ministry created the 
Human Rights Advisory Council, composed of representatives from the 
Justice and Interior Ministries, as well as NGO's, to ensure that the 
police and gendarmerie respect human rights while carrying out their 
duties. In addition, the Ministry announced a new policy requiring that 
all potentially violent individuals be deported via chartered aircraft, 
rather than on commercial flights. The investigation into the Omofuma 
case is ongoing. Civil charges, filed on behalf of Omofuma's daughter 
stating that Omofuma's human rights were violated, are also pending.
    In August the Human Rights Advisory Council released a report 
criticizing the conditions of deportation detention for minors as not 
meeting minimum international standards. The council's report to the 
Ministry of Interior lists 43 recommendations aimed at correcting the 
implementation of current legal provisions or at amending the law.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully. Citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. National elections were held in October 1999, in which the 
Social Democrats (SPO) won 65 seats in Parliament; the Freedom party 
(FPO) 52; the People's Party (OVP) 52; and the Green Party 14. On 
February 4, the OVP and FPO formed a right-of-center coalition 
government, headed by the OVP.
    Women play an active role but are underrepresented in government 
and politics. Approximately 27 percent of the Members of Parliament and 
5 of 16 cabinet members are women.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. In some cases, they have been dissatisfied with the 
information that the authorities have supplied in response to specific 
complaints. There have been no reports of discrimination against 
organizations that report on human rights.
    Following the inclusion of the FPO in the Government, several NGO's 
expressed concern that the country's climate of tolerance and respect 
for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. During the summer, a 
group of 3 human rights experts, accepted by the other 14 EU member 
states, conducted a review of the rights of minorities, refugees, and 
immigrants in the country. Their report, published in September, 
concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for 
minorities.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law provides for protection against any of these kinds of 
discrimination in employment, provision of welfare benefits, and other 
matters, and the Government generally enforces its provisions 
effectively. There were allegations that police abused homosexuals (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. An estimated 
300,000 women are abused annually. Police and judges enforce laws 
against violence; however, less than 10 percent of abused women are 
estimated to file complaints. Overall, the Association of Houses for 
Battered Women estimates that one-fifth of the country's 1.5 million 
adult women has suffered from violence in a relationship. In July 1999, 
legislators passed an amendment to the 1997 Law on the Protection 
Against Violence in the Family, extending the period during which 
police can expel abusive family members from family homes. Between 
January and June, the injunction to prevent abusive family members from 
returning home was applied in 1,687 cases. The Government also sponsors 
shelters and help lines for women.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). While 
prostitution is legal, trafficking for the purposes of prostitution is 
illegal.
    Most legal restrictions on women's rights have been abolished. In 
1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that the country's law 
prohibiting women from working nights was not permissible and gave the 
Government until 2001 to adapt its legislation to gender-neutral EU 
regulations. Legislation went into effect in January 1998, requiring 
that collective bargaining units take action by 2001 to eliminate 
restrictions on nighttime work for women.
    In October the Freedom Party replaced Social Security and 
Generations Minister Elisabeth Sickl with FPO Member of Parliament 
Herbert Haupt. The Government received extensive criticism for 
replacing the head of this ministry, which oversees women's affairs, 
with a man. A Federal Equality Commission and a Federal Commissioner 
for Equal Treatment oversee laws prescribing equal treatment of men and 
women. Sixty percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 are in the 
labor force. Despite substantial gains, women's incomes continue to 
average 30 percent less than those of men.
    In September the U.N. Committee on Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women released a report criticizing the new Government's 
treatment of women, including its decision to abolish the Federal 
Women's Affairs Ministry and fold its portfolio into the newly created 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Generations. The Committee was 
especially concerned about immigrant women's access to employment.
    As of January 1, 1998, women were allowed to serve in the military 
voluntarily. On April 1, 1998, the first two women began training. On 
December 1, 1998, the first women, both doctors, were taken into the 
military. The long-term expectation is that women may make up about 5 
percent of the military. As of August, there were a total of 104 women 
serving in the military. This includes 6 officers, 2 of whom currently 
are serving in peacekeeping operations abroad, and 13 noncommissioned 
officers (NCO's). There are 7 women currently undergoing officer 
training and 52 training to be NCO's. The remaining 26 are training as 
high-level athletes. There are no restrictions on the type or location 
of assignments given to women.
    Although labor laws provide for equal treatment for women in the 
civil service, they remain underrepresented. To remedy this 
circumstance, a 1993 law requires hiring women of equivalent 
qualifications ahead of men in civil service areas in which less than 
40 percent of the employees are women; however, there are no penalties 
for failing to attain the 40 percent target. Critics of the Government 
raised the issue of sexual equality in a proposed ``objectivity law'' 
on personnel appointments in the civil service. They are asking for 
provisions that provide parity between men and women on personnel 
appointment panels.
    Women may be awarded compensation of up to 4 months' salary if 
discriminated against in promotions because of their sex. The Labor 
Court also can order employers to compensate victims of sexual 
harassment.
    Women's rights organizations are partly politically affiliated, and 
partly autonomous groups. In voicing their concerns, they receive wide 
public attention. Despite fears of women's rights groups, the new 
coalition asserted that these groups would continue to receive 
government subsidies.
    Children.--Laws protect the vast majority of children's rights 
established in international conventions and in some respects go beyond 
them. Each provincial government and the federal Ministry for Youth and 
Family Affairs has an ``Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents'' 
whose main function is to resolve complaints about violations of rights 
of children.
    While 9 years of education are mandatory for all children, 
beginning at age 6, the Government also provides free education through 
the level of technical or vocational programs or university. 
Educational opportunity is equal for girls and boys. Comprehensive, 
government-financed medical care is available for all children without 
regard to gender.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although 
heightened awareness of child abuse has led the Government to increase 
its efforts to monitor the issue and prosecute offenders. The growing 
number of reported incidences of child abuse is considered a result of 
increased public awareness of the problem. According to the Penal Code, 
sexual intercourse between an adult and a child (under 14 years of age) 
is punishable with a prison sentence of up to 10 years; in case of 
pregnancy of the victim, the sentence can be extended to up to 15 
years. In 1999 the Ministry of Justice reported 690 cases of child 
abuse involving either intercourse with a minor (paragraph 206 of the 
Penal Code) or attempted intercourse with a minor (paragraph 207). Of 
these, 519 cases were investigated. In 1998 there were 745 cases 
involving the same sections of the Penal Code, of which 554 were 
investigated, resulting in 252 convictions.
    Stricter regulations on child pornography went into effect in 1997. 
Under the new laws, any citizen engaging in child pornography in a 
foreign country becomes punishable under Austrian law even if the 
actions are not punishable in the country where this violation was 
committed. The laws also entail more severe provisions for the 
possession, trading, and private viewing of pornographic materials. For 
example, exchanging videos is now illegal even if done privately rather 
than as a business transaction.
    People with Disabilities.--The law protects disabled individuals 
from discrimination in housing, education, and employment. In July 
1997, Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution explicitly 
requiring the State to provide for equal rights for the disabled ``in 
all areas of everyday life. `` The law requires all private enterprises 
and state and federal government offices to employ 1 disabled person 
for every 25 to 45 employees, depending on the type of work. Employers 
who do not meet this requirement must pay a fee to the Government, and 
the proceeds help finance services for the disabled such as training 
programs, wage subsidies, and workplace adaptations. However, the law 
has received some criticism, since many observers believe that 
penalties are too low to discourage companies from bypassing the 
requirement. No federal law mandates access for the physically 
disabled; some public buildings are virtually inaccessible to those 
unable to climb stairs.
    Mentally retarded women can be sterilized involuntarily at the 
request of parents; in the case of minors; or, by request of the 
responsible family member or by court order, in the case of adults. One 
political party has called for restrictive legislation to make it more 
difficult to sterilize mentally retarded women; however, no legislative 
action has ever been taken on this proposal.
    Religious Minorities.--Members of various nonrecognized religious 
groups complained of discrimination and harassment by the public. The 
head of the Lutheran Church in Burgenland, Gertrude Knoll, who spoke 
out against intolerance and xenophobia at a February political 
demonstration, was subjected to hate mail and threats against herself 
and her family. It was widely assumed, but never proven, that FPO 
supporters were behind the hate campaign.
    The leader of the country's Jewish community reported that persons 
within the community who took a stand against racism and xenophobia 
(including himself) were subjected to verbal and written threats. The 
FPO's attitudes against foreigners and minorities reportedly led some 
members of the Jewish community to consider leaving the country.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--While statistics for the first 
half of the year showed a marked increase in the number of official 
complaints of neo-Nazi, right-wing extremist, or xenophobic incidents, 
the Interior Ministry estimates that figures for the calendar year 
indicate a slight overall decrease compared to 1999. In 1999 the 
Ministry recorded 311 rightwing incidents, 15 anti-Semitic incidents, 
and 52 xenophobic incidents, which led to a total of 25 convictions. In 
1998 there were 244 reported rightwing incidents, 31 anti-Semitic 
incidents, and 8 xenophobic incidents, with 41 convictions. The 
Government expressed concern over the activities of extreme-right 
skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, many with links to organizations in other 
countries. Despite ongoing budgetary austerity, the Government retained 
the previous year's funding levels for ethnic minorities in the 2000 
budget.
    In August the domestic media reported that the European Commission 
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) issued a confidential report to 
the Government recommending the swift implementation of additional 
measures against racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance. 
Members of the Commission reportedly expressed ``deep concern about the 
extensive use of racist and xenophobic remarks by Austrian 
politicians.''
    In July the Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights 
bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the country's 
six officially recognized minorities. In response to a longstanding 
demand by minority representatives, the governing coalition committed 
to ``honor and promote its historic minorities'' as a constitutionally 
anchored policy goal. In a related development, the Government approved 
the placement of bilingual town signs in Croat- and Hungarian-speaking 
areas of Burgenland province, an action pending since 1955. The 
Government also agreed to continue funding, albeit at lower levels, 
privately run minority radio stations. In Carinthia Governor Haider 
promised to fulfill a longstanding demand by the resident Slovene 
minority for a dedicated seat in the provincial assembly. Haider also 
promised to implement additional prominority measures in the province's 
preschool system. Minority representatives acknowledged all these 
measures, but some critics contend that the recent spate of prominority 
measures is clearly a result of EU sanctions.
    In October 1999, authorities arrested 69 suspected neo-Nazis in the 
province of Upper Austria. The group had contacts with neo-Nazis in 
several other countries. In a separate action in November 1999, 17 
skinheads in the same province were charged with violation of the law 
against neo-Nazi activities.
    In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted of conducting a 
xenophobic, deadly letter bomb campaign between 1993 and 1997. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment but committed suicide in February.
    During the national election campaign, the Freedom Party exploited 
the fears of many citizens that EU expansion and a continued influx of 
asylum seekers and refugees from the Balkans and other areas would 
result in uncontrolled immigration. The Vienna FPO chapter widely 
distributed placards carrying anti-immigrant slogans, including a call 
to stop ``overforeignization.''

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and 
join unions without prior authorization, under general constitutional 
provisions regarding freedom of association. In practice trade unions 
have an important and independent voice in the political, social, and 
economic life of the country. Fifty-two percent of the work force are 
organized into 13 national unions belonging to the Austrian Trade Union 
Federation (OGB), which has a highly centralized leadership structure. 
Association of national unions with the OGB is voluntary. Individual 
unions and the OGB are independent of government or political party 
control, although formal factions within these organizations are allied 
closely with political parties.
    Although the right to strike is not provided explicitly in the 
Constitution or in national legislation, it is universally recognized. 
Historically strikes have been comparatively few and usually of short 
duration. A major reason for the record of labor peace is the 
unofficial system of ``social partnership'' among labor, management, 
and government. At the center of the system is the Joint Parity 
Commission for Wages and Prices, which has an important voice on major 
economic questions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Almost all large companies, 
private or state-owned, are organized. Worker councils operate at the 
enterprise level, and workers are entitled by law to elect one-third of 
the members of the supervisory boards of major companies. Collective 
agreements covering wages, benefits, and working conditions are 
negotiated by the OGB with the National Chamber of Commerce and its 
associations, which represent the employers. The Joint Parity 
Commission sets wage and price policy guidelines. A 1973 law obliges 
employers in enterprises with more than five employees to prove that 
job dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. Employers 
found guilty of this offense are required to reinstate workers. Labor 
and business representatives remain in a longstanding disagreement over 
how to comply with the obligation under the International Labor 
Organization's Convention 98 to provide legal protection to employees 
against arbitrary dismissals in firms with five employees or fewer.
    Typically legal disputes between employers and employees regarding 
job-related matters are handled by a special arbitration court for 
social affairs. The OGB is exclusively responsible for collective 
bargaining. The leadership of the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the OGB are elected democratically.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is 
prohibited by law and generally is not practiced. Trafficking in women 
for the purpose of forced prostitution remains a problem (see Section 
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    Former forced laborers have filed suits against Austrian companies 
that used forced labor provided by the Nazi government. In October an 
agreement was signed between the Government, attorneys representing 
former forced and slave laborers, and representatives of foreign 
governments, providing for compensation for former forced and slave 
laborers. In July Parliament unanimously passed legislation authorizing 
the payment of $418 million (6 billion ATS) for victims of forced and 
slave labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum legal working age is 15 years. The Labor 
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs effectively enforces the 
law. The Government has adopted laws and policies to protect children 
from exploitation in the work place. The law prohibits forced and 
bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated national 
minimum wage. Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set 
minimums by job classification for each industry. The generally 
accepted unofficial minimum gross income is $11,200 (168,000 ATS) per 
year. Every worker is entitled to a variety of generous social 
benefits. The average citizen has a high standard of living, and even 
the minimum wages are sufficient to permit a decent living for workers 
and their families.
    Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours since 
1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force is covered by collective 
bargaining agreements that set the workweek at 38 or 38+ hours.
    Extensive legislation, regularly enforced by the Labor Inspectorate 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides for mandatory occupational 
health and safety standards. Workers may file complaints anonymously 
with the Labor Inspectorate, which may bring suit against the employer 
on behalf of the employee; however, this option is rarely exercised, as 
workers normally rely instead on the Chambers of Labor, which file 
suits on their behalf.
    The Labor Code provides that workers have the right to remove 
themselves from a job if they fear ``serious, immediate danger to life 
and health'' without incurring any prejudice to their job or career.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no single law covering 
trafficking in persons generally, but several laws contain provisions 
that apply to this problem. Trafficking for the purpose of prostitution 
is illegal, and the law provides for a jail sentence of up to 10 years 
for convicted traffickers. Prostitution itself is legal. Another law 
covers trafficking in persons for purposes other than prostitution. 
NGO's report that enforcement is weak and that convicted traffickers 
generally receive sentences of less than 3 years imprisonment. A 
leading domestic NGO reports that the country has shifted from being a 
transit country to a major final destination, primarily for women from 
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union who are 
trafficked into prostitution and other forms of forced dependency. 
Convictions for trafficking in women and children increased by 162 
percent. Police estimate that one-fourth of trafficking in women in the 
country is controlled by organized crime. Austria is particularly 
attractive to traffickers due to its geographic location and to the 
fact that citizens of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not 
require visas to enter the country. On March 24, the Interior Ministry 
announced draft legislation to enact stronger penalties against alien 
smuggling. The maximum penalty for the most serious offenses would 
increase from 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. In the first 6 months of the 
year, the authorities arrested 133 smugglers of persons.
    A witness protection program granting temporary resident status to 
women willing to testify against their traffickers went into effect on 
January 1, 1998. In the past, because so few witnesses agreed to 
testify against their traffickers, prosecution was difficult, and those 
trafficked often simply were expelled from the country. The witness 
protection plan is aimed at generating more support from witnesses; 
however, victims still rarely agree to testify, due to fear of 
retribution. The temporary resident status allows victims to stay in 
the country only during a trial; no provisions are made for them to 
stay in the country following their testimony. Virtually all victims 
are deported. Various NGO's, with the support of the Government, have 
begun to broaden their assistance and strong support for battered 
spouses to include those women seeking to flee from the prostitution 
traps created by criminal elements. There is one NGO center that 
provides comprehensive counseling, educational services, and emergency 
housing to victims of trafficking.
                               __________

                               AZERBAIJAN

    Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government. 
Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers after the overthrow of 
his democratically elected predecessor in 1993, was reelected in 
October 1998 in a controversial election marred by numerous, serious 
irregularities, violations of the election law, and lack of 
transparency in the vote counting process at the district and national 
levels. President Aliyev and his supporters continue to dominate the 
government and the multiparty 125-member Parliament. Parliamentary 
elections held in November showed some progress over the flawed 1995 
elections in that political pluralism was advanced; however, there were 
numerous serious flaws; and the elections did not meet international 
standards. Serious irregularities included the disqualification of half 
of the prospective candidates in the single mandate elections, a flawed 
appeals process, ballot box stuffing, manipulated turnout results, 
premarked ballots, severe restrictions on domestic nonpartisan 
observers, and a completely flawed vote counting process. The 
Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a system of 
government based on a division of powers among a strong presidency, a 
legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the 
President, and a nominally independent judiciary. The judiciary does 
not function independently of the executive branch and is corrupt and 
inefficient.
    The police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of 
National Security are responsible for internal security. Members of the 
police continue to commit numerous human rights abuses.
    Azerbaijan continued to affirm its commitment to an economic 
transition from central planning to a free market; however, reforms 
stagnated in practice. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial 
foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by 
widespread corruption and patronage. While government statistics 
pointed to continued economic growth during the year, the real economy 
continues to be affected by a low level of foreign business activity 
due largely to low oil prices in 1999, a lack of oil industry 
infrastructure, widespread corruption and a deteriorating business 
climate. Consistently high oil prices appear to be reversing that 
trend. The country has rich petroleum reserves and significant 
agricultural potential. Oil and oil products are the largest export, 
followed by cotton and tobacco. Other key industries are chemicals and 
oil field machinery. The government signed new oil production sharing 
agreements with foreign oil companies and a group of eight oil 
companies formed a sponsors group and began engineering studies for the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline. Agriculture employs 36 
percent of the labor force and makes up 22 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). The leading crops are wheat, fruit and 
vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and grapes. Privatization of industry was 
postponed while the government rewrote its privatization laws to bring 
them up to international standards. On August 10, President Aliyev 
issued a decree to implement the new privatization law adopted by the 
Parliament in May. Large enterprises remain almost exclusively under 
government control and operate at a fraction of their capacity. The 
accumulation of large wage arrears is common. Private retail 
enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are proliferating. More than 
90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in private hands, but new 
small farmers have poor access to credit and markets, and commercial 
agriculture remains weak. Per capita GDP is approximately $500 per 
year. Much of the labor force is employed in the state sector where 
wages are low. The overall economic situation of the average citizen 
remains tenuous, although in urban areas a growing moneyed class with 
trade and oil-related interests has emerged. According to official 
statistics, the economy now is only 60 percent of the size of the 
economy in 1991. According to the World Bank, 60 percent of the 
citizens live in poverty. Severe disparities of income have emerged 
that are attributed partly to patronage and corruption.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were improvements in a few significant areas, serious problems remain. 
The Government continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their 
government peacefully. Police tortured and beat persons in custody, 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and conducted searches and 
seizures without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no 
action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a 
handful of cases. Prison conditions remained harsh, and some prisoners 
died as a result of these conditions. Lengthy pretrial detention is 
still a problem. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and subject to 
executive influence. Corruption continued to pervade most government 
organs, and it is widely believed that most persons in appointed 
government positions and in state employment purchased their positions. 
During the year a total of five presidential pardons and amnesties 
resulted in the release of approximately 300 prisoners, including some 
political prisoners. The Government holds about 50 political prisoners. 
The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government 
continues to limit freedom of speech and of the press. Although the 
Government abolished censorship in August 1998, government officials 
throughout the year sought to intimidate independent and opposition 
newspapers by suing them for defamation. As a result, journalists 
practiced self-censorship. Nevertheless, scores of opposition and 
independent newspapers continue to publish and discuss a wide range of 
sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues. Criticism of the 
Government and of the Aliyev family is not uncommon; however, 
journalists were subject to violence on occasion by unknown assailants 
who sought to stop media criticism of the Government. The Government 
continued to deny broadcast licenses to all truly independent 
organizations that applied to open television and radio stations. The 
Government also tightly controls official radio and television, the 
primary source of information for most of the population.
    The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. 
Although local authorities in Baku permitted several demonstrations to 
take place, the locations negotiated with the city government were not 
those preferred by the opposition and were subject to heavy police 
surveillance. Baku authorities broke up unsanctioned demonstrations and 
pickets throughout the year. Opposition political parties tried to hold 
smaller-scale meetings and seminars throughout the country; although 
many do take place, local authorities refuse to sanction some. The 
Government continues to refuse to register some political parties. 
There are currently 38 registered political parties, 20 of which are 
considered to be opposition parties. The Government registered the 
opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party after a long delay in February. 
After a series of crackdowns on religious groups in the summer and fall 
of 1999, the Government improved its record on religious liberty 
following President Aliyev's public commitment to do so in November 
1999. The Government acted to redress earlier harassment by lower-level 
government and security officials, including arrests, deportation 
orders, and a failure to register religious groups. However, harassment 
of some non-traditional religious groups by lower-level and local 
government officials continued. The authorities broke up religious 
observances, and bureaucratic harassment, including lengthy delays in 
registration, continued for some religious organizations. The 
Government at times restricted freedom of movement. The Government 
controlled the electoral process. Although parliamentary elections held 
in November showed some improvement over the flawed 1995 elections, 
numerous serious irregularities marred the process. The Government 
criticized certain domestic human rights activists. Domestic human 
rights NGO's routinely experience problems with registration. Violence 
and discrimination against women and discrimination against certain 
religious minorities are problems. The Government limits some worker 
rights. Trafficking in persons, particularly women for the purpose of 
forced prostitution, is a problem.
    After years of interethnic conflict between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled ``Republic 
of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by any government) 
continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. A cease-fire 
was concluded in 1994, and the peace process continues. Beginning in 
1999, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a series of direct 
meetings to discuss a compromise resolution. These meetings have yet to 
yield concrete results. Exchanges of fire occurred sporadically along 
the Azerbaijan-Armenian border and along the line of contact with 
Nagorno-Karabakh, causing numerous casualties. Military operations of 
1989-94 continue to affect the civilian population to this day. There 
were four civilian and four military casualties during the year caused 
by landmines. In 1999 three persons were killed and five were wounded 
by landmines. These landmines were laid near the disputed area by the 
governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian 
authorities. There are approximately 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their homes 
in Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories and approximately 
300,000 Armenians who cannot return to Baku and other cities in 
Azerbaijan.
    The Government of Azerbaijan does not exercise any control over 
events inside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Little information is available on 
the human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh due to limited access to 
the region by foreign diplomatic officials. In March Nagorno-Karabakh 
``President'' Arkady Ghukasian was injured by gunfire while travelling 
from his office to his residence. Samuel Babayan, the former chief of 
the ``Nagorno-Karabakh Defense forces'' and former ``Minister of 
Defense'', his brother Karen (currently mayor of Stepankert), and 25 
others were taken into custody in connection with the shooting. On 
March 28, authorities arrested Vahram Aghajanian, a journalist who 
writes for an opposition newspaper in Nagorno-Karabakh, and accused him 
of slandering the ``Prime Minister.'' He was held without charge for 2 
weeks after his arrest, and then given a 1-year sentence for defamation 
of character. In April he was released from prison after an appeals 
court suspended his 1-year sentence. There were some reports that the 
Armenian Apostolic Church enjoys at least quasi-official status, and 
that the practice of some other religious faiths, such as evangelical 
Christianity, is discouraged.
    Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict continue. They result in injuries and deaths among combatants 
and occasionally civilians. The taking of prisoners, including 
civilians, occurs. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the occupied territories continued to prevent the return of 
hundreds of thousands of IDP's to their homes.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government officials.
    There were a few reports of deaths of prisoners due, at least in 
part to prison conditions while in official custody. Several prisoners 
were killed during a reported uprising at a prison in January 1999 (see 
Section 1.c.). The Government still has not released a report on the 
prison uprising.
    Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
    There were four civilian and four military casualties due to 
landmines during the year. In 1999 three persons were killed and five 
were wounded by landmines laid near the disputed area of Nagorno-
Karabakh. These mines were laid by the governments of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian authorities.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    During the year, 16 Azerbaijani and 2 Armenian POW's were released. 
The Government of Azerbaijan claims it has released all Armenian POW's. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) repeatedly asked 
the concerned parties for notification of any person captured in 
relation to the conflict, access to all places of detention connected 
with the conflict, and release of all such persons. The ICRC also urged 
the parties to provide information on the fate of persons reported as 
missing in action. Since 1997 the ICRC has collected from concerned 
family members the names of approximately 2,300 missing Azerbaijani 
nationals allegedly held by Armenia.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture is illegal; however, there are credible reports 
that prison guards tortured inmates, and that the police beat prisoners 
during arrest, interrogation, and pretrial detention. On September 1, 
the Government enacted a new criminal code that bans acts of torture 
and makes perpetrators liable for up to 10 years imprisonment. A 
definition of torture, in line with that contained in the U.N. 
Convention on Torture, was also adopted. The Government does not hold 
most members of the police accountable for their actions, and impunity 
continues to be a problem. In most instances, the Government took no 
action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a 
handful of cases. In a 1999 report, Human Rights Watch noted that the 
most severe and routine physical abuse of detainees takes place just 
prior to and during the preliminary investigation, as police and other 
investigators ``isolate detainees from all contact with the outside 
world, and beat and coerce confessions from suspects and statements 
from witnesses.''
    Prison conditions are harsh. The quality of food, housing, and 
medical care is poor. Prisoners must rely on their families to provide 
food and medicine. There are widespread and credible reports that 
authorities deny or give inadequate medical treatment to prisoners with 
serious medical conditions. Tuberculosis is a problem. Approximately 
2,000 prisoners have been treated for tuberculosis. Due to the absence 
of systematic screening of the prison population, patients often start 
treatment when they are already seriously ill and there is only a 55 
percent cure rate. Authorities severely limit opportunities for 
exercise and visits by lawyers and family members of prisoners in 
security prisons. Some prisoners are kept in ``separation cells'' often 
located in basements, in which prisoners reportedly are denied food and 
sleep in order to elicit confessions from them with no physical 
evidence of abuse. Men and women are housed in separate prison 
facilities. On March 20, President Aliyev signed two human rights 
decrees. One permitted the ICRC to begin prison visits, which allowed 
the ICRC access to all places and to all detainees within its mandates, 
both sentenced and unsentenced. The second decree provided for 
adherence to the U.N. Convention on Torture.
    The first visit of ICRC representatives took place on June 23 to 
Gobustan prison. ICRC visits to the Bailov Detention Center in Baku 
began on September 6. The ICRC also still had access to prisons where 
persons of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were detained. Local human 
rights organizations were able to continue their visits to prisons; 
however, one local organization has been denied access since July.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Authorities arbitrarily 
arrest and detain persons without legal warrants. Often authorities do 
not notify family members after arrests. Frequently it is days before 
family members are able to obtain information as to whether authorities 
have arrested someone, and where authorities are holding the detainee. 
Family members do not enjoy the right of visitation. Authorities 
generally deny bail to detained individuals and often do not inform 
detainees of the charges against them. While the situation appears to 
be improving gradually, lengthy pretrial detention is still a problem. 
In July 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that detainees could have 
access to a lawyer from the time of detention rather than only after 
they have been charged with a crime, but access to lawyers is often 
poor. In the past, police sometimes detained relatives of suspects 
being sought in an attempt to force the family to reveal a suspect's 
whereabouts (see Section 1.f.).
    Twenty-three members of opposition parties were still in custody at 
year's end for their alleged participation in an unsanctioned 
demonstration in Sheki on November 18. Some of these demonstrators 
violently attacked government buildings and law enforcement officials. 
Throughout the year, opposition members were detained for participating 
in unsanctioned demonstrations and later released by police without 
further charges.
    Members of opposition political parties were more likely to 
experience official harassment than other citizens. In response to 
publication of a series of articles insulting the residents of the 
autonomous republic of Nakhchivan published by Yeni Musavat in 
February, five opposition politicians and the author of the articles 
were detained by officials in Nakhchivan (see section 2.a.). All were 
subsequently released.
    In July police arrested four participants at an unsanctioned 
demonstration in support of opposition Azerbaijan National Independence 
Party leader, Etibar Mammedov. Two of the four were imprisoned while 
awaiting their trial, which was delayed numerous times. All eventually 
were fined and released.
    Police forcibly dispersed an unsanctioned demonstration on April 
29. The demonstrators made up of a cross-section of opposition party 
members attempted to assemble at a downtown Baku square to demand free 
and fair parliamentary elections in November. The Government refused to 
issue a permit for the demonstration and ordered police to break up the 
rally. A number of protesters and journalists covering the 
demonstration were injured; dozens were arrested and detained before 
being released without charges (See sections 2.a. and 2.b.). In 1999, 
police beat, harassed detained, and arrested members of evangelical 
Christian and other groups, and seized their documents and property. 
This year there were few reports of such incidents, and there has been 
substantial improvement in the treatment of evangelical Christian 
groups (see Section 2.c.).
    In July police arrested and detained worshippers of a Pentecostal 
church in Baku (see Section 2.c.).
    In August Ramiz Hasanov, head of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party's 
(ADP) Ganja Branch, was arrested for allegedly concealing knowledge of 
a coup d'etat planned by Ganja's ex-police chief Natiq Effendiyev. No 
trial date was set by year's end. There were credible reports that 
local authorities harassed ADP party members while they campaigned for 
the party in the period prior to parliamentary elections.
    In August a member of the Nakhchivan branch of the opposition 
Musavat Party-demanding free and fair parliamentary elections in 
November-attempted to hijack a domestic flight from Nakhchivan to Baku. 
He was subsequently disarmed and arrested after the plane landed safely 
in Baku. Days later, Yeni Musavat opposition journalist Rauf Arifoglu 
was arrested for allegedly concealing a weapon, which many believe may 
have been planted by police, and for concealing prior knowledge of the 
hijacking attempt. Arifoglu was detained for six weeks and later 
released in October. A trial date for Arifoglu was not set by year's 
end. Local police detained several members of the opposition Popular 
Front Party in Nakhchivan under suspicion for complicity in the 
hijacking. All later were released. Local police also arrested a Yeni 
Musavat reporter soon after his arrival in Nakhchivan to cover the 
hijacking. Police did not disseminate any information about the 
journalist's whereabouts until his release 2 days later (see Section 
2.a.).
    Rza Guliyev and Etibar Guliyev, nephews of exiled opposition 
politician Rasul Guliyev, were both convicted of large-scale 
embezzlement in 1999 and 2000, and are currently serving 7 year jail 
sentences. The actions taken against Guliyev's nephews appeared to be 
politically motivated. Rasul Guliyev was forced to resign as Speaker of 
the Parliament in 1996 and now is living abroad. He is accused by the 
government of large-scale embezzlement and an arrest warrant has been 
issued based on the results of an investigation by the Prosecutor 
General's office. Guliyev claims that he and his attorney are unable to 
see these charges.
    On September 1, the Government promulgated several new legal codes, 
replacing codes from the Soviet era. These included: a new criminal 
code, a family code, a civil code, a civil procedures code, and a code 
on administrative violations. Officials cooperated with foreign 
advisers to develop the new codes in accordance with Western European 
standards. However, the Government had not implemented completely some 
of these codes by year's end.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice judges do not function 
independently of the executive branch. The judicial system is subject 
to the influence of executive authorities. The President appoints 
Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, subject to confirmation by 
Parliament. The President directly appoints lower level judges with no 
requirement for confirmation. In April qualifying exams for judges were 
administered for the first time. Over half of the approximately 1,000 
test takers passed the written portion of the exam, which international 
legal observers say was conducted fairly. However, there were numerous 
reports of fraud during the oral portion of the test, where many 
positions were allegedly bought and sold. The judiciary is widely 
believed to be corrupt and inefficient.
    During the year, the Constitutional Court formed in 1998 made a 
number of decisions, which demonstrated a more independent body. In 
February it reregistered the opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party 
following a long and drawn-out appeal by the party. In August it also 
decided to declare unconstitutional the retroactive application of a 
clause in the election law that required parties to be registered 6 
months in advance of the announcement of the elections. In November it 
voided the results of the Parliamentary elections in four additional 
districts (the Central Election Commission (CEC) originally recommended 
the results in 7 districts be voided).
    Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and 
juvenile cases. District and municipal courts try the overwhelming 
majority of cases. The Supreme Court also may act as the court of first 
instance, depending on the nature ad seriousness of the crime.
    The Government organizes prosecutors into offices at the district, 
municipal, and republic level. They are ultimately responsible to the 
Minister of Justice, are appointed by the President, and are confirmed 
by Parliament. The Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors 
and defense attorneys before the courts. In practice, prosecutors' 
prerogatives outweigh those of defense attorneys. Investigations often 
rely on obtaining confessions rather than obtaining evidence against 
suspects. No judge has dismissed a case based on a prisoner's claim of 
having been beaten.
    Cases at the district court level are tried before a panel 
consisting of one judge and two lay assessors. The judge presides over 
and directs trials. Judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in 
convictions back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation.'' 
Such cases either may be dropped or closed, occasionally without 
informing either the court or the defendant. The Constitution provides 
for public trials except in cases involving state, commercial, or 
professional secrets, or matters involving confidentiality of personal 
or family matters.
    The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence in 
criminal cases and for numerous other rights, including an exclusionary 
rule barring the use of illegally obtained evidence and for a suspect's 
right to legal counsel and to be informed immediately of his legal 
rights, and of the charges against him. However, the Government has not 
made significant efforts to enforce these rights throughout the 
criminal justice system. Defendants may confront witnesses and present 
evidence. The court appoints an attorney for indigent defendants. 
Defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal. The Government 
generally has observed the constitutional provision for public trial. 
Foreign and domestic observers generally are able to attend trials.
    The Law on Advocates and Advocate Activity entered into force on 
January 27. It contains some useful features, such as rules on 
professionalism, and a call for people to pass a bar exam. Many legal 
observers find the law difficult to understand and question whether its 
implementation will improve the rule of law. The International League 
for Human Rights (ILHR) considers the law a step back, because they 
believe it restricts the independence of lawyers and the ability of 
independent lawyers to defend victims of human rights abuse by 
requiring defense lawyers in criminal cases and pre-trial detentions to 
belong to the collegium of advocates. The collegium remains the 
principal regulatory body of the legal profession under the new law.
    The Government held approximately 50 political prisoners at year's 
end. Some political prisoners were released following five presidential 
pardons and amnesties during the year. The Government continues to 
assert that it holds no political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for secrecy of 
correspondence and telephone conversations, subject to limits provided 
by law in criminal investigations or in prevention of a crime. The 
Government infringed on these rights. The Constitution allows searches 
of residences only with a court order or in cases provided by law. 
However, citizens widely believe that the Ministry of National Security 
monitors telephones and Internet traffic, especially those of 
foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police often 
conducted searches without a warrant, and investigations sometimes 
resulted in confining the individuals to their city of residence or a 
brief jail sentence for questioning. There were credible allegations 
that police continued to intimidate and harass family members of 
suspects (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    There were credible reports that individuals linked to opposition 
parties were fired from their jobs (see Section 2.d.). In September, 
the wife of an ADP leader in Khanlar province was fired from her job 
for collecting signatures for the party's proportional list candidates 
running in the November parliamentary elections. In Gabala two ADP 
members were summoned by local authorities and instructed to stop 
collecting signatures or they would be fired. In Sheki two ADP members 
were arrested while collecting signatures and then later released. Low-
level harassment of certain religious groups continued, despite an 
overall improvement in religious liberties (see Section 1.c. ,1.d. , 
and 2.c.).
    In June 1999 a court ruled in favor of a group of Muslim women who 
sued for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport photos. In 
September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling; 
the case remained on appeal in the prosecutor general's office at 
year's end (see Section 2.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press and specifically outlaws press 
censorship; however, the Government in some cases restricts these 
rights in practice. The Government did not take any overt measures to 
reinstitute press censorship, which was abolished in 1998; however, 
actions taken by several prominent government officials, including the 
ongoing series of libel suits resulting in large fines (which would 
immediately bankrupt any independent or opposition newspaper), created 
an atmosphere in which editors and journalists exercise self-
censorship. Most of the excessive fines were appealed; however, in 
those cases in which there were rulings, most appeals were denied. 
Prominent opposition politicians and independent newspapers criticized 
the government without reprisal.
    On February 11, President Aliyev signed a new law on media into 
effect. Although an improvement over the previous law, in many respects 
it falls short of international standards. In particular, one section 
of the law permits the Government to shut down any newspaper that has 
been convicted of a crime (mainly libel) three times within the period 
of one year. During the year, this part of the law was used in an 
attempt to shut down one newspaper, Uch Nogte. The paper continued to 
publish until it won an appeal, which overturned the verdict.
    While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics 
throughout the year, other factors restricted the public's ability to 
be informed about and discuss political issues. Editors complain that 
they feel under continuous and growing pressure to moderate criticism 
of the Government and of figures associated with the ruling circle. 
During the year, direct criticism of President Aliyev became less 
frequent. On May 8, Elmar Husseinov found the office to his weekly 
journal, Monitor Weekly (formerly Monitor), sealed by the Baku tax 
inspectorate, allegedly for printing articles critical of Aliyev. Most 
newspapers are printed in the Government's publishing house. The 
Government's near monopoly of publishing facilities and its control 
over the price of newsprint give it leverage over the press, a critical 
matter given the precarious finances of most opposition newspapers. 
Some editors complain about having their print runs limited by the 
state printing press, and many cite the threat of increases in paper 
and printing prices as a constraint on the freedom of the press.
    The spate of lawsuits by prominent government officials against 
opposition or independent media outlets also had a negative effect on 
freedom of the press in practice. Courts invariably ruled in favor of 
the government plaintiffs, while ruling against opposition plaintiffs 
pursuing similar charges against progovernment media outlets in most 
cases. It appears that the extremely high financial penalties levied by 
the courts were designed to repress criticism rather than to foster 
responsible journalism. The provision in the new media law that permits 
the Government to shut down a newspaper after it loses three lawsuits, 
adds a powerful weapon to the Government's arsenal of intimidation. 
Libel suit fines worsened the atmosphere for press freedom. Telescope 
and Alem Newspapers were fined about $1,000 (5 million and 4.5 million 
Manats respectively). Sara Television (which was shut down in the fall 
of 1999 on the grounds that Azerbaijani law prohibits foreign ownership 
of domestic television stations) was fined $55,000 (250 million 
Manats). The Minister of Culture brought suit against Hurriyet 
Newspaper and won a $220 (1 million Manats) fine. There were over 25 
legal actions taken against journalists and media outlets during the 
year, according to the Committee to Protect the Rights of Journalists. 
Media outlets were fined a total of $175,600 (803.5 million Manats). 
These sums are very high, given the country's poor economic situation; 
however, none have been paid. The chairman of Azeravtonagliyyat State 
Concern (a government-run enterprise) claimed his honor and dignity 
were offended and filed a lawsuit against the independent Avropa 
newspaper. During the appeals process, the fines against the newspaper 
were reduced. Avropa was subsequently charged with tax evasion--the 
second of three charges required to shut it down. Media outlets 
credibly claimed publicly and privately that the threat of fines and 
lawsuits forced them to exercise self-censorship.
    Journalists were subject to violence. More than 60 separate 
incidents of harassment or intimidation of journalists were reported 
during the year, according to local sources. Among the incidents 
reported were threatening telephone calls, assaults by unidentified 
persons, beatings by policemen during demonstrations or picketing, and 
attacks on premises and property. For example, in February a mob 
attacked the local headquarters of the opposition newspaper Yeni 
Musavat in the autonomous Nakhchivan Republic. The riot allegedly was 
triggered by an article highly critical of local authorities and 
residents of Nehram, hometown of former Parliament foreign affairs 
committee chairman, Rza Ibadov. Police did not intervene to halt the 
attack. However, several policemen including senior police officials 
responsible for that area, were later fired, and others were suspended 
or reprimanded. Also in February, an independent Sara Television's vice 
president was injured seriously in an assault by an unidentified 
person. Despite promises of rapid action, police did not determine the 
identity of any of the assailants. While the Government denies any 
relationship with the assailants, the incidents involved opposition 
journalists who were warned to stop criticizing government officials or 
policies. In a separate incident in November, a group of women from 
Mastaha village in Nakhchivan entered Yeni Musavat headquarters to 
protest an article that criticized a local official. The women 
subsequently filed a lawsuit against the newspaper claiming its staff 
had assaulted them during the confrontation. Yeni Musavat brought a 
countersuit against the women, to which the courts had responded by 
year's end.
    On April 29, police beat 17 journalists covering an unsanctioned 
opposition demonstration in Baku.
    On August 29 Rauf Arifoglu editor-in-chief of Yeni Musavat, was 
arrested on charges of attempted hijacking, terrorism, and illegal 
possession of arms (see Section 1.d.).
    Media outlets seek powerful patrons and align themselves with 
political parties and government factions to give themselves financial 
and legal protection. Current economic difficulties have contributed to 
the vulnerability of the media as former advertising revenues, 
primarily from foreign companies, have decreased. Most media have 
chosen to sacrifice their editorial independence to survive. However, a 
large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable source 
put the number of registered newspapers at 600, and the number actually 
publishing at least once a month at nearly 100. These included 
independent newspapers and newspapers with overt links to major and 
minor opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and 27 independent news 
distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers. A 
number of editors continued to complain that the government-run kiosks 
refuse to carry their newspapers or claim to have sold all received 
copies while, in fact, retaining many unsold copies in stock.
    The Government tightly controlled official radio and television, 
the source of information for much of the population because newspapers 
too expensive for most persons. Television and radio stations require a 
license to operate, and the Government used this requirement to prevent 
several independent stations from broadcasting. Since 1993 no truly 
independent broadcaster has received a frequency from the State 
Commission on Radio and Television frequencies and the Ministry of 
Communications. There are a limited number of private television 
stations, whose broadcasts can be received only in Baku or in local 
areas outside the capital. Only one of the private stations is not 
directly under the control of a government official, and it is believed 
widely that this station also has compromised its independence. 
Independent radio, preferred by the overwhelming majority of listeners, 
largely is oriented to entertainment, but one independent station 
broadcasts on political topics. Opposition parties had limited access 
to the official electronic media. The Government periodically used 
state television to conduct campaigns of denunciation and harassment 
against political parties and leaders critical of the Government. 
Various talk shows, such as ``Nezer Nugtasi'' and ``NEBZ'' broadcast by 
privately-run, independent television channels, aired views of both 
government and opposition officials. A series of spacebridge shows 
which linked Azerbaijani and Armenian officials to discuss the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict began in the fall. During the parliamentary election 
campaign in November, local broadcasters aired several western-style, 
political roundtables, which featured representatives from the 
government and opposition discussing various news issues of the day. 
The state television channel provided representatives of each 
participating political party in the election at least one late evening 
addition to time purchased from the independent television stations for 
short campaign slots by party leaders; however, these broadcasts were 
blocked in certain outlying areas of the country.
    On July 14, the Government cut electricity from the independent 
channel ANS for 15 minutes in order to censor an interview with Chechen 
field commander Shamil Basayev. The Government asserted that it 
censored the 15-minute interview because it contained terrorist 
propaganda.
    In late August and early September, the State Television and Radio 
Company, AzTV, conducted a campaign against the Musavat Party and its 
leader, Isa Gambar, following the hijacking by a Musavat party member 
of an Azeri airliner on a flight from Nakhchivan to Baku (see Section 
1.d.). The campaign featured coverage of meetings at collective farms, 
hospitals, clinics, and other state enterprises where the Musavat Party 
was criticized for its alleged complicity with terrorism.
    At year's end, there were eight independent television stations 
operating outside of Baku. Four additional independent stations that 
were closed in 1999 reopened during the year; however, their legal 
status remained unclear. The state commission on radio and television 
frequencies had not granted these stations frequencies by year's end, 
which are required for official registration with the Ministry of 
Justice. Without registration, these stations are subject to closure at 
any time by the local or national authorities.
    In October the Ministry of Communications shut down the privately 
run ABA Television for 10 days, in connection with allegations of tax 
evasion. The investigation was initiated one and a half years ago and 
continued at year's end.
    In November Yeni Musavat, the newspaper of the opposition Musavat 
Party was found guilty of publishing an article insulting the Saatly 
district electoral commission. The court fined the newspaper $200 (1 
million Manats). Yeni Musavat had claimed that the outcome of the 1995 
parliamentary poll in Saatly, in which President Aliyev's brother 
Djalal was elected, was falsified. The suit against the newspaper was 
brought by Ragim Azizov, who was appointed as the Saatly election 
commission chairman only after the 1995 election.
    Three Russian and three Turkish television stations and radio 
programs are rebroadcast locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are 
seen and heard in most parts of the country. Radio free Europe/Radio 
Liberty and the Voice of America broadcast without restriction. There 
are no restrictions on reception of foreign stations via satellite. 
There is one 24-hour French language radio station in Baku and a 
British Broadcasting Company station that offers news programs in 
Russian, English, and Azerbaijani. The Government granted new broadcast 
licenses to a few foreign radio stations, plus several regional 
television stations directly under the control of the local executive 
commission. The Government has not acted for more than a year on the 
applications to broadcast of more than 10 independent broadcasters.
    The Government allowed limited Internet access. There are 5 
Internet service providers and 4 vendors sell accounts. Both providers 
and vendors have formal links with the Ministry of Communications. In 
September the Ministry abruptly shut down one provider for unknown 
reasons. The shutdown allegedly involves the refusal to pay new, higher 
fees for the use of Ministry of Communications telephone lines, but it 
is widely believed that the real issue was the Ministry of 
Communication's desire for a monopoly over this market. The Ministry of 
Communications and certain individuals either in the Ministry or 
closely aligned with it apparently seek to maximize both government and 
personal revenues from this lucrative and growing source of income. 
Internet costs average $.30 (1,400 Manat) per hour (one-tenth the cost 
in 1998). Although few citizens can afford home computers or access 
fees, Internet cafes, which are widespread in Baku and other cities, 
offer affordable internet access. Many persons believe that the 
Government monitors Internet traffic, especially that of foreign 
businesses and opposition intellectuals and leaders (see Section 1.f.).
    Appointments to government-controlled academic positions are 
heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several 
professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were no 
complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books 
or academic journals.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right on occasion. Authorities frequently prevented political 
parties critical of the Government from conducting indoor meetings as 
well as outdoor gatherings. The Government did allow some opposition 
parties to organize so-called ``pickets'' (demonstrations with less 
than 50 participants) and to stage larger rallies far from the city 
center. Authorities cited security considerations repeatedly to ban any 
larger demonstrations in the center of town throughout the year. During 
the year, authorities cancelled numerous protests and rallies. At 
year's end, the Government held 23 persons who were detained during 
demonstrations which took place in Sheki on November 18.
    The Government detained persons at unauthorized rallies and 
meetings throughout the year, but most were released without charges 
after a brief period of detention. Police forcibly dispersed an 
unsanctioned demonstration on April 29. The Government allowed several 
opposition demonstrations to take place in Baku during the spring and 
summer. For example, Government sanctioned opposition rallies were held 
on August 5 and 12. In August and September, journalists and members of 
NGO's held unsanctioned rallies in Baku to protest the imprisonment of 
opposition newspaper editor Rauf Arifoglu (see Section 1.d.). Police in 
Baku intervened on October 28 to prevent 40 members of the Civil Unity 
Party, which supported former President Ayaz Mutalibov, from holding a 
protest demonstration in the city center. The party's leaders were 
warned earlier not to have the demonstration, which was intended to 
protest the refusal of the authorities to register the party. Several 
would-be demonstrators were beaten and injured. Opposition 
demonstrators were prevented from assembling in downtown Baku on 
November 25, because their rally had not been sanctioned by the local 
authorities. On November 18, demonstrations took place in several 
cities around the country including Baku, where approximately 4,000 
persons gathered to protest the flawed parliamentary elections. Outside 
Baku some rallies drew over 1,000 demonstrators, who protested not only 
the elections but energy shortages in the region. In the regions where 
protesters received permission from local authorities to demonstrate, 
the protests proceeded peacefully. However, protesters without permits 
were dispersed by government authorities, with some arrests in the 
regional capitals. Protests in Agdash and Sheki led to violence, as 
police and demonstrators clashed. There were also protests in the 
regions over the reintroduction of energy cutbacks that had been 
suspended before the elections.
    The Government repeatedly turned down requests for demonstrations 
in support of former Communist leader and President Ayaz Mutallibov, 
who now lives in Russia. Heads of local governments in several 
different sections of the country repeatedly refused the requests of 
opposition Members of Parliament, such as Popular Front first deputy 
chairman of the ``reformers'' faction Ali Kerimov, to hold organized 
meetings with constituents and interested citizens. On several 
occasions, central government authorities intervened to overrule the 
local authorities and allowed Kerimov and other opposition Members of 
Parliament to hold meetings.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, in 
practice the Government continued to restrict this right on occasion. 
The Government requires political parties to register. There are 
currently 38 registered political parties. Some of these are affiliated 
with or support the President's party. At least 20 registered parties 
are considered opposition parties. In February the Government 
registered the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, which is lead by former 
Parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev. Other unregistered parties have not 
met the legal requirements for registration. Nevertheless, unregistered 
political parties continued to function openly. Members of unregistered 
political parties can run for president but must be sponsored by a 
registered party or an independent ``voters initiative group.'' Members 
of unregistered parties may run for Parliament, but only as 
independents in a direct constituency, not on a party list. A party 
must be registered to run a list of candidates. Members of unregistered 
parties can run in municipal elections only as independents, or as 
nominees of a registered party or another voter initiatives group.
    Credible reports of acts of harassment (including beatings) of 
opposition political figures continued. There were credible reports 
that individuals linked to opposition parties (and their relatives) 
were fired from their jobs. Shahid Abbasov, chairman of the local 
branch of the Musavat Party in Nakhchivan, was abducted on October 19 
and beaten by masked men who demanded that he stop criticizing the 
chairman of Nakhchivan's parliament. The Government has not yet 
returned the Popular Front's headquarters nor many of its regional 
offices, which were seized in 1993.
    Explicitly ethnic or religious based parties have not been 
registered.
    The Government generally allowed private associations to function 
freely. The Ministry of Justice requires private organizations to 
register but does not always grant this registration freely and 
expeditiously. There are credible reports that the Government refuses 
to register many new human rights NGO's. Nevertheless, unregistered 
associations functioned openly. Many of the most active NGO's are 
affiliated with opposition political parties. The President signed a 
new law on ``public associations'' in October.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that persons of 
all faiths may choose and practice their religion without restrictions, 
and the Government generally respected these rights for most citizens; 
however, Government authorities continued to harass on occasion foreign 
and Azerbaijani members of nontraditional religious groups. Such 
harassment was less frequent than in the previous years. Until late in 
1999, the Government frequently used clauses in the Law on Religious 
Freedom and other laws to restrict religious activity by foreigners and 
nontraditional religious groups, particularly in the fall of 1999, when 
police and security officials disrupted a number of services, detained 
ministers, and ordered foreigners deported. Although President Aliyev 
has enunciated a clear policy of respect for religious freedom, lower 
level officials continued to attempt to restrict religious activity by 
local nontraditional groups.
    Following a spate of attacks on members of non-traditional 
Christian groups in the summer and fall of 1999, President Aliyev in 
November 1999 announced to the National Security Council, and later in 
a nationwide television broadcast, that the Government henceforth would 
abide by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
standards of religious liberty. In conformity with his directives, 
government officials subsequently took steps to rectify some past 
violations of these standards, including the registration of a number 
of religious organizations that previously had been denied 
registration, and the reinstatement of selected group members who had 
been fired from their jobs for their religious affiliation. However the 
Religious Affairs Department, the government office charged with 
implementing the country's laws on religion, continued to delay 
selectively the registration of a few groups and to intervene 
selectively in the importation of religious literature.
    The most common restriction on religious freedom results from the 
requirement in the Law on Religion that all religious organizations be 
registered by the Government in order to function legally. In principle 
a group obtains approval from the Department of Religious Affairs and 
then applyies for formal registration with the Ministry of Justice. The 
Government stated that by year's end it had registered 39 Muslim and 
``other'' religious groups. However, in practice, the process suffers 
from a lack of transparency, particularly within the Department of 
Religious Affairs. This office, an independent entity subordinated 
directly to the Council of Ministers, has been a bottleneck in the 
registration process. As a result, several Christian groups still 
experience problems with registration.
    Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank 
account, legally rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity. 
Lack of registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a 
religious group to function. Unregistered groups often continue to 
operate, but participants are subject to arrest, fines, and--for 
foreigners--deportation. Religious groups are permitted to appeal 
registration denials to the courts, but the only group to do so to 
date--the Pentecostal ``Word of Life'' Church--lost its case in May 
1998. In 1998 Human Rights Watch alleged that the officials responsible 
for registration took bribes to facilitate registration. The Catholic 
Church was registered in April 1999. Following the President's public 
commitment, the Government, specifically the Department of Religious 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice, took action on several 
applications by religious groups for registration that had been 
languishing, in some cases for years. The Evangelical Cathedral of 
Praise and the Nehemiah were registered in December 1999, as were the 
Jehovah's Witnesses. Prompted by the President's statements, some other 
religious groups that had been operating under continual low-level 
harassment because the Religious Affairs Department earlier had denied 
them registration were finally registered. In March the Community of 
Mountain Jews and the ``Love'' Baptist Community were registered. 
However, a small number of religious groups remain unregistered and 
continue to suffer from low-level government harassment.
    In July police broke up an officially registered Pentecostal church 
service at the home of a member. Worshippers were detained and harassed 
for several hours before being released. The next day, the police 
apologized for their actions; however, the woman owner of the home in 
which the service took place was subjected to harassment by court 
officials who ordered her to stand trial for violating outdated 
administrative codes. The judge dismissed the case as unconstitutional 
and inconsistent with the 1996 law on religious freedom.
    Some government bias against foreign missionary groups persisted. 
There were instances early in the year in which authorities harassed 
groups for disseminating religious materials without all the required 
permits. Since their registration in December 1999, Jehovah's Witnesses 
have been able to hold large gatherings for the first time in 3 years. 
However, on April 1, in what the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves refer 
to as an isolated incident, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was 
dispersed by police who claimed that they lacked permission from the 
mayor's office. The manager of the venue subsequently declined to 
permit them to use it again.
    The Law on Religion subordinates all Islamic religious 
organizations to the Azerbaijan-based spiritual directorate of Caucasus 
Muslims. In June 1999, a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim 
women who sued for the right to wear Islamic head scarves in passport 
photographs. In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower 
court ruling; the case was on appeal in the Prosecutor General's office 
at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
    The Law on Religion also permits the production and dissemination 
of religious literature with the approval of the Department of 
Religious Affairs and with the agreement of local government 
authorities. The Government interpreted this provision to mean that 
only religious groups can engage in such activity and argues that 
booksellers and other entrepreneurs are forbidden to import and sell 
religious materials. For example, in September customs officials at the 
Azerbaijan-Russian border confiscated a new shipment of religious books 
for the owner of a legally registered bookstore in Baku. Officials 
alleged that the bookseller did not have the right to ``import such 
books into the country.'' Only half of these books were released 
subsequently to the bookseller at year's end.
    There is official concern about ``foreign'' (mostly Iranian and 
``Wahhabist'') Muslim missionary activity, which in part is viewed as 
seeking to spread fundamentalist Islam, which is viewed as a threat to 
stability and civil peace.
    In those portions of Azerbaijan controlled by ethnic Armenians, all 
ethnic Azerbaijanis have fled and those mosques that have not been 
destroyed are not functioning. Animosity toward the Armenian population 
elsewhere in Azerbaijan forced most Armenians to depart, and all 
Armenian churches, many of which were damaged in ethnic riots that took 
place over a decade ago, remain closed (see Section 5). As a 
consequence, the estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Armenians who remain in 
Azerbaijan are unable to attend their traditional places of worship. 
The Jewish community has freedom to worship and conduct educational 
activities and, during the year, enjoyed the public support of the 
Government.
    Places of worship seized by the former Soviet Government during the 
Communist era from the Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Baptists have 
not been returned to those groups.
    Some government officials share the strong popular prejudice 
against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to Christianity and 
other religions (see section 5). For example, an ethnic Azerbaijani was 
subjected to administrative fines by local officials in Baku in July 
1999 for possessing Christian literature, and another ethnic 
Azerbaijani reported that he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned in 
August 1999 for changing his religious affiliation and becoming a 
member of Jehovah's Witnesses. No such incidents have been reported 
since the President's decree in October 1999.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of citizens to choose freely their place of domicile and to travel 
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these 
provisions; however, at times the Government restricted freedom of 
movement. At times it limited the movement of members of opposition 
parties. The internal residence regime (``propiska'') still is imposed 
on internally displaced persons, who are required to register their 
location with the authorities, and may reside only in approved 
locations. Residents of border areas in both Azerbaijan and Iran travel 
across the border in this restricted zone without visas. Foreigners and 
citizens require a visa to travel to the Autonomous Republic of 
Nakhchivan.
    The Government officially recognizes freedom of emigration. Jewish 
emigration to Israel and other countries is not restricted by the 
Government. The remaining Armenian population in Azerbaijan (other than 
Armenians residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) is 
approximately 10,000 to 30,000, almost exclusively persons of mixed 
descent or in mixed marriages. While official government policy is that 
ethnic Armenians are free to travel, low-level officials seeking bribes 
harassed Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin who sought to emigrate 
or obtain passports.
    There were no draft notifications that restricted movement during 
the year. Draft-age men must obtain documents from military officials 
before they can leave for international travel. Travel restrictions 
sometimes are placed on military personnel, or persons possessing 
sensitive national security information.
    The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) 
from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is approximately 800,000; 200,000 of 
these are refugees and over 600,000 are IDP's. Armenians have settled 
in parts of the occupied territories. However, Armenians have not 
allowed the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were forced out 
of the now-occupied territories to return to their homes. The 
Government provides little assistance to these persons, and 
international support to the refugees is declining. Most of these IDP's 
continue to live in camps and other temporary shelters, at below-
subsistence levels, without adequate food, housing, education, 
sanitation, or medical care. The parties to the conflict have cut 
normal trade and transportation links to the other side, causing severe 
hardship to civilians on all sides.
    The Constitution provides for political asylum consistent with 
international norms. The Government depends on international assistance 
for refugees and IDP's. It cooperates with international organizations 
to provide aid for them. The Government cooperates with the office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. These organizations 
report full and unrestricted access to the refugee population.
    The Government provides a minimal allowance to the IDP's themselves 
in the form of a bread allowance of $4 (18,000 Manats) per month per 
family as well as an additional $2 (9,000 Manats) per month for each 
child. Many of the IDP's complain of ``processing fees'' by local 
officials in the amount of approximately 10 percent, further reducing 
their already minimal allowances.
    The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. In May 
1999, the Parliament passed a new law on refugees; however, this has 
not yet been implemented. There are no procedures for granting first 
asylum. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a 
valid claim to refugee status.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution and election law allow citizens to change their 
government by peaceful means; however, the Government continues to 
restrict citizens' ability to change their government peacefully by 
interfering in elections. Azerbaijan is a republic with a strong 
presidency, and a legislature that the Constitution describes as 
independent. However, in practice the legislature's independence from 
the executive is marginal. The Parliament exercises little legislative 
initiative independent of the executive. Opposition parties continued 
to be active inside and outside the Parliament, agitating for their 
views in their newspapers and through public statements. As a result of 
the flawed November parliamentary elections, the New Azerbaijan Party 
led by President Aliyev, held the overwhelming majority of seats in the 
125-member Parliament (71 seats plus 25 seats belonging to nominally 
independent parties loyal to the president). Opposition members held 16 
seats in the newly elected parliament at year's end, according to 
official results. However, opposition members temporarily boycotted 
parliamentary sessions to protest election results and called for new 
nationwide elections. In response to international criticism, the 
authorities voided results in 11 disputed districts and announced 
repeat elections would take place in those districts in January 2001.
    The Government, with assistance from the OSCE's Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (ODIHR) drafted new 
legislation for the Central Election Commission (CEC), in advance of 
the parliamentary elections, which included a provision to provide a 
veto for opposition members on the CEc. The Government also drafted and 
passed a new election law incorporating most OSCE/ODIHR recommendations 
for reform into the final text. The omission of several important 
recommendations, however, sparked a temporary boycott by the opposition 
in the CEc. Shortcomings of the law included: signature requirements 
and verification procedures for candidates; absence of provisions for 
domestic non-partisan observers; and a lack of transparency of the vote 
tabulation procedures at the territorial election commission (TEC) 
level. In response to the boycott, the Government revoked the 
opposition's power to veto CEC decisions. Opposition members later 
resumed participation in the CEc.
    The November parliamentary elections showed some improvement over 
previous elections since 1993 in that political pluralism was advanced, 
but they did not meet international standards due to numerous serious 
irregularities. During the preelection period, parties and candidates 
had better opportunities to conduct campaigns. Opposition parties were 
represented on election commissions at all levels; however, opposition 
representatives were marginalized or bypassed from the decision making 
process on sensitive issues by the CEC majority. On several occasions 
the CEC adopted critical decisions outside official sessions and 
without the approval of the required two-thirds majority. The Central 
Election Commission originally disqualified the Musavat Party and the 
Azerbaijan Democratic Party claiming that their registration documents 
were falsified. However, on October 8, following international 
criticism and a letter from President Aliyev, the CEC reversed its 
initial ruling and issued a statement consenting to the registration of 
slates of candidates from eight opposition political groups, including 
these two opposition parties. All political parties that sought to 
actively contest the election were able to register for the 
proportional ballot, in which 25 out of 125 Members of Parliament were 
elected. In the single-mandate elections, in which 100 of 125 Members 
of Parliament were elected, half of the prospective candidates were 
disqualified from registering, and the appeals process was flawed. 
Individual candidates were harassed, and some were beaten up or 
detained. Potential candidates reported that individuals who signed 
their petitions were asked to remove their names by police.
    International observers reported that election day was marred by 
numerous instances of serious irregularities. These observed 
irregularities led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the 
officially recorded vote totals. Observers reported ballot stuffing, 
manipulated turnout results, and premarked ballots. The Party observers 
frequently suffered intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrest, 
while carrying out their legitimate activities. Unauthorized local 
officials often controlled the process and sought to influence voters. 
In several instances, international observers were denied access to 
polling stations and frequently were expelled from election commission 
premises. Observers from domestic NGO's and several opposition parties 
participated on election day. In a reversal of earlier practice, an 
October law on non-governmental organizations banned election 
monitoring by representatives of NGO's that received more then 30 
percent of their budget from foreign sources. This appeared targeted at 
preventing For The Sake of Civil Society, the only NGO capable of 
mounting a nation wide monitoring effort from doing so. Main opposition 
parties told international observers and journalists that their 
monitors reported widespread procedural violations and called for 
repeat nationwide elections. On November 7, the CEC announced that it 
would investigate and take immediate measures concerning all cases of 
violation of law and other shortcomings observed by the international 
and local observers on election day. At year's end, repeat elections 
were scheduled to occur in eleven districts.
    The 1998 presidential election was an improvement over the previous 
elections, especially in regard to reduced multiple voting and the 
presence of domestic observers. However, some domestic and 
international observers witnessed ballot stuffing and irregularities in 
vote counting, and some were barred from observing the vote counting. 
Neither domestic nor international observers were allowed to monitor 
the compilation of the national vote totals. Precinct vote totals were 
never reported. The observed irregularities and lack of transparency in 
vote counting led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the 76 
percent of the vote officially recorded for president Aliyev. In August 
1999, newspapers quoted the chairman of the CEC as admitting that 
Aliyev's vote total was overstated by 12 to 15 percent. International 
observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR, concluded that the election did 
not meet international standards.
    The 1995 Constitution required that the country's first ever 
municipal elections be held by November 1997. However, the elections 
were delayed repeatedly until December 1999. The municipal election 
process was deeply flawed and were criticized heavily by observers, 
including the Council of Europe, which noted numerous instances of 
ballotbox- stuffing, voter intimidation, and other violations. The 
legislation governing the elections reflected some recommendations of 
international observers, but several serious problems were not 
remedied. The process of selecting territorial and precinct electoral 
commissions to oversee the municipal elections and the process for 
registering candidates were marred by widespread irregularities 
favoring the ruling party.
    There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in 
politics; however, they are underrepresented in elective offices, since 
traditional social norms restrict women's roles in politics. The 
practice known of family voting, where men often cast the votes of 
their wives and other female members of their families exists but is 
declining in the country. There are 11 female Members of Parliament and 
2 women with ministerial rank.
    There are no restrictions on the participation of minorities in 
politics as individuals; however, explicitly ethnically or religiously 
based parties have not been registered. Members of indigenous ethnic 
minorities occupy some senior government positions.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several human rights organizations monitor the human rights 
situation in the country. For the most part, the Government posed no 
obstacles to the presence of international human rights groups. Some of 
these groups investigate human rights abuses and disseminate their 
findings through the media. However, the Government has been critical 
of certain domestic human rights activists who have raised politically 
sensitive issues.
    The Government has demonstrated some willingness to discuss human 
rights problems with international and domestic NGO's. The ICRC has had 
access to prisoners of war as well as civilians held in relation to the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In June the ICRC began its first visits 
to special security and other prisons (see Section 1.c.).
    Government officials occasionally criticize human rights activists. 
The Government registered the Azerbaijan Human Rights Center (AHRC) in 
November 1999 and until the summer of 2000; Eldar Zeynalov, Chairman of 
the AHRC, was routinely granted access to prisons. No official reason 
has been given for the recent denial of access. The center operates 
normally, and Zeynalov continues to publish articles regularly about 
the human rights situation in the country including lists of 
individuals he believes to be political prisoners, and he has faced no 
legal action. Zeynalov opened a new chapter of the organization in the 
western part of the country in August. At year's end the Government 
sharply criticized several human rights activists for allegedly 
providing inaccurate lists of political prisoners to visiting Council 
of Europe parliamentarians.
    The Ministry of Justice regularly denies registration to human 
rights NGO's, some of which are linked to opposition political parties, 
although it has not tried to halt their activities. Registration 
enables a human rights organization to maintain a bank account legally, 
rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity. Lack of 
registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a human rights 
group to function.
    The ICRC conducted education programs on international humanitarian 
law for officials of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and for 
university and secondary school students.
    In August 1999, the Government created the Commission on Human 
Rights, funded by a $400,000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) grant, 
which is headed by Justice Minister Fikret Mammedov. The Commission has 
not yet taken any significant actions. The Ministry of Justice also in 
August established a new human rights office within the ministry, but 
by year's end had not defined its agenda.
    A foreign NGO representative working on democracy promotion was 
murdered on November 30 in Baku. Local officials are cooperating with 
International law enforcement officials on the ongoing investigation.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to 
gender, race, nationality or national origin, religion, language, 
social status, or membership in political parties, trade unions, or 
other public organizations; however, in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is widespread anti-Armenian sentiment in 
society. Preventing discrimination is not a major Government priority.
    Women.--Discussion of violence against women is a taboo subject in 
Azerbaijan's patriarchal society, but it remains a problem. In rural 
areas, women have no real recourse against violence by their husbands, 
regardless of the law. Rape is severely punished, but, especially in 
rural areas, only a small fraction of offenses against women are 
reported or prosecuted. According to official statistics, there were 44 
reported rapes during the year; the Society for the Defense of Women's 
Rights (SDWR) claims that rape is on the increase and that the official 
number is underreported, especially from conservative rural areas. 
There are no government sponsored or funded programs for victims of 
violence. There are no specific laws concerning spousal abuse or 
spousal rape.
    Prostitution is a significant problem, particularly in the capital 
city of Baku. Most women become prostitutes in order to support their 
family members, and sometimes it even is encouraged by the family due 
to the large amount of money to be made. In February 1999, the Society 
for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) held a conference to highlight 
concerns over the growing incidents of prostitution and sexually 
transmitted diseases. At the conference, it was reported that there are 
more than 30 illegal houses of prostitution in Baku alone, the majority 
of which are allegedly run by high-ranking officials in government and 
frequented by members of the prosecutor's office and the police. Women 
engaged in prostitution are not liable to criminal charges since 
prostitution is considered a personal matter.
    Pornography is prohibited, and the age of sexual consent is 16.
    Trafficking in women is a problem, and the country is a source and 
transit point for trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
    Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including the 
right to participate in all aspects of economic and social life; 
however, societal discrimination is a problem. In general women have 
extensive opportunities for education and work. However, traditional 
social norms continue to restrict women's roles in the economy. 
Representation of women is sharply lower in higher levels of the work 
force. There are few women in executive positions in leading economic 
enterprises.
    Twenty-four women's NGO's are registered, compared with 18 in 1999. 
The Society for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) spends most of its 
time fighting unique post-Soviet problems. It has helped divorced 
women, widows, and wives whose husbands are in prison, all of whom have 
become socially and legally vulnerable since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It assisted widows whose landlords privatized their apartments 
and then evicted them. The SWDR also worked with divorced women who 
feel that they have been treated unfairly by divorce courts. Several of 
the 24 women's NGO's deal with the problems of prostitution and 
trafficking in women(see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Constitution and laws commit the Government to 
protect the rights of children to education and health; however, 
difficult economic circumstances limit the government's ability to 
carry out these commitments. Education is compulsory, free, and 
universal until the age of 17. The Constitution places children's 
rights on the same footing as those of adults. The Criminal Code 
prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children. The Government 
provides minimum standards of health care for children, although the 
quality of medical care overall is very low. The Government has 
authorized subsidies for children in an attempt to shield families 
against economic hardship in the wake of price liberalization, but 
these subsidies do not come close to covering the shortfall in family 
budgets. There are a large number of refugee and displaced children 
living in substandard conditions in refugee camps and public buildings. 
Children sometimes beg on the streets of Baku and other towns.
    There is no known societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Law on Support for the Disabled, 
enacted in 1993, prescribes priority for invalids and the disabled in 
obtaining housing, as well as discounts for public transport, and 
pension supplements. The Government does not have the means to fulfill 
its commitments. There are no special provisions in the law mandating 
accessibility to buildings for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There is considerable popular concern about 
the conversion of ethnic Azerbaijanis to faiths considered alien to 
Azerbaijani traditions. Proselytizing by foreigners is against the law; 
however it does occur and there is widespread popular hostility towards 
groups that proselytize (largely evangelical Christians, but also 
Muslim missionary groups), and toward Muslims who convert to other 
faiths. Opposition to proselytizing within the population thus far has 
been limited to verbal criticism and appears focused against two 
groups. The first consists of evangelical Christian and so-called 
``nontraditional'' religious groups. There is some evidence of 
widespread prejudice against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to 
Christianity. During the year, articles periodically appeared in pro-
government and independent newspapers and electronic media crudely 
depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the identity of 
the nation. The perceived threat from such groups is primarily cultural 
rather than religious. Often these articles attempt to associate 
evangelists with the foreign intelligence agencies, portraying them as 
part of a plot to undermine or control Muslim Azerbaijan.
    Occasionally popular reaction goes beyond verbal criticism. In 
August 1999, a crowd of Muslims reportedly broke into a Baptist summer 
camp in Nardaran, threatening inhabitants and causing significant 
property damage. Police made no attempt to intervene and said that they 
found no evidence of the incident.
    There has been significant improvement for the Jehovah's Witnesses 
this year. Since their registration in December 1999, church members 
have been able to conduct prayer services freely and proselytize with 
minimal interference by the authorities. In September 1999, several 
members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were subjected to humiliation 
and degradation when a factory manager assembled the plant's work force 
and berated the members of Jehovah's Witnesses for betraying their 
country by adopting a new religion. During the event, the father of one 
of the members of Jehovah's Witnesses publicly disowned her for 
adopting the new religion. In November 1999, the factory reinstated the 
members with full back pay (see Section 2.c.).
    There is societal hostility toward Muslim groups, mostly from Iran, 
which seek to spread political Islam. Newspaper articles appear 
periodically depicting certain foreign-backed Muslim missionaries as a 
threat to stability and civil peace, and in some cases, as part of an 
Iranian strategy to destabilize and ultimately establish control over 
the country.
    Reflecting the intense popular hostility toward Armenians that 
prevails in the country and the forced departure of most of the 
Armenian population, all Armenian churches, many of them damaged in 
ethnic riots which took place over a decade ago, remain closed. As a 
consequence, ethnic Armenians who remain in Azerbaijan, estimated to 
number between 10,000 and 30,000, are deprived of an opportunity for 
public worship. A similar situation exists in the Armenian-controlled 
portions of Azerbaijan, from which the Armenians forced approximately 
800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to flee their homes and where those mosques 
that have not been destroyed are not functioning.
    Jews generally do not suffer from societal discrimination; however, 
according to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, two Baku synagogues 
were desecrated in the fall of 1998. No arrests have been made.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The outbreak of hostilities, 
anti-Armenian riots, and economic collapse in the final years of the 
Soviet union led to the expulsion of almost all Armenians and the 
departure of Russians and others. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 
Armenians still live in Azerbaijan, mostly women with ethnic 
Azerbaijani or Russian husbands. Most seek to shield their national 
identity. Some have changed their nationality, as reported in their 
passports, to Azerbaijani. With the nearly complete departure of the 
Armenian population, the number of problems reported by this ethnic 
minority has decreased. Armenians have complained of discrimination in 
employment and harassment at schools and workplaces and of the refusal 
of local government authorities to pay pensions. Armenian widows have 
had permits to live in Baku revoked. However, some persons of mixed 
Armenian-Azerbaijani descent continue to occupy government positions.
    Indigenous ethnic minorities, such as the Talysh, Lezghis, Avars, 
and Georgians, do not suffer discrimination. However, Meskhetian Turks 
displaced from Central Asia, as well as Kurdish displaced persons from 
the Armenian-occupied Lachin region, complain of discrimination.
    In the area of the country controlled by insurgent (Armenian) 
forces, the Armenians forced approximately 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis 
to flee their homes. The regime that now controls these areas 
effectively has banned them from all spheres of civil, political, and 
economic life.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association, including the right to form labor unions; however, one 
or another sub-branch of the government-run Azerbaijani Labor 
Federation organizes most industrial and white-collar workers. The 
overwhelming majority of labor unions still operate as they did under 
the Soviet system and remain tightly linked to the Government. Most 
major industries remain state-owned.
    An independent Union of Oil Workers that was displaced by a pro-
government union in 1997 has not been revived. In 1997 the State Oil 
Company (SOCAR) formed a pro-government union, the Azerbaijan Union of 
Oil and Gas Industry Workers, which took over the former Independent 
Oil Workers Union without a vote of the union membership. It continues 
to operate without a vote of its rank and file workers. An independent 
group of oil workers, the Committee to Defend the Rights of Azerbaijani 
Oil Workers, operates outside of established trade union structures and 
promotes the interests of workers in the petroleum sector.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no 
legal restrictions on strikes or provisions for retribution against 
strikers.
    The Azerbaijan Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) has 1.5 million 
members, of which approximately 800,000 are active members. The 
Government-run Azerbaijan Labor Federation has 300,000 members. Trade 
unions are prohibited by law from engaging in political activity (even 
though, as individuals, members of trade unions can participate in 
political activities).
    Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate with 
international bodies; in November the ATUC became a member of the 
International Confederation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1996 law 
provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in state 
enterprises. A labor inspectorate was established in 1997. However, 
these laws have not produced an effective system of collective 
bargaining between unions and enterprise management. Government-
appointed boards and directors run the major enterprises and set wages. 
Unions effectively do not participate in determining wage levels. In a 
carryover from the Soviet system, both management and workers are 
considered members of the professional unions.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of emergency or 
martial law or as the result of a court decision affecting a condemned 
person, and the government has not invoked this clause; however, women 
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 
6.f.). Two departments in the General Prosecutor's office (the 
Department of Implementation of the Labor Code and the Department for 
Enforcement of the Law on Minors) enforce the prohibition on forced or 
compulsory labor. There are no constitutional provisions or laws 
specifically prohibiting forced and bonded labor by children; however, 
such practices are not known to occur. There were no reports during the 
year of compulsory cotton picking by children or adults.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Primary school 
education is compulsory, free, and universal. Children are normally in 
school until the age of 17. The law allows children between the ages of 
14 and 15 to work with the consent of their parents and limits the 
workweek of children between the ages of 14 and 16 to 24 hours per 
week. Children at the age of 15 may work if the workplace's labor union 
does not object. There is no explicit restriction on the kinds of labor 
that 15-year-old children may perform with union consent. The Labor and 
Social Security Ministry has primary enforcement responsibility for 
child labor laws. With high adult unemployment, there have been few, if 
any, complaints of abuses of child labor laws. The law does not 
prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children; however, 
such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the 
nationwide administrative minimum wage by decree. It is $3.00 (12,500 
manats) per month. This wage is not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The recommended monthly 
wage level to meet basic subsistence needs was estimated to be $50 
(215,000 manats) per person. Since practically all persons who work 
earn more than the minimum wage, enforcing its low level is not a major 
issue in labor or political debate.
    The disruption of economic links with the rest of the former Soviet 
Union continues to affect employment in many industries. Idle factory 
workers typically receive less than half of their former wage. Under 
these conditions, many workers rely on the safety net of the extended 
family. More workers and unemployed persons turn to second jobs and 
makeshift employment in the informal sector, such as operating the 
family car as a taxi, selling produce from private gardens, or 
operating small roadside shops. Until the Russian financial crisis many 
persons (estimates range from between 1 to 2 million) supported 
themselves on remittances from relatives working in Russia, primarily 
as street traders. This source of support was reduced severely during 
1999 and has not rebounded, although reliable statistics as to the 
precise amounts involved are not available. Combinations of these and 
other strategies are the only way for broad sectors of the urban 
population to reach a subsistence income level.
    The legal workweek is 40 hours. There is a 1-hour lunch break per 
day and shorter breaks in the morning and afternoon. The Government 
attempts to enforce this law in the formal sector, but does not enforce 
these rules in the informal sector where the majority of citizens work.
    Health and safety standards exist, but usually they are ignored in 
the workplace. Workers cannot leave dangerous work conditions without 
fear of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Azerbaijan is a source and a transit 
point for trafficked men, women, and children. Azerbaijanis themselves 
are trafficked into northern Europe, particularly to the Netherlands 
and Germany, where many unsuccessfully sought asylum. Women usually are 
sent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Western Europe, mainly 
Germany, to participate as workers in the sex industry (for example, in 
strip clubs) and as prostitutes. Women from Iran, Russia, and sometimes 
Iraq, are transported through Baku to the UAE, Europe, and occasionally 
the United States for the same purposes. Under the new criminal code, 
the act of forcing an individual into prostitution carries a 10 to 15 
year jail term, which is a harsher sentence than the previous code.
    A locally based international organization currently is promoting 
an awareness campaign about the exploitation of women. Several of the 
country's women's NGO's claim to deal with the problems of trafficking 
in women and prostitution. There is no mechanism to return trafficked 
women to Azerbaijan and no support services for female victims of 
trafficking.
                               __________

                                BELARUS

    Belarus has a form of governance in which nearly all power is 
concentrated in the hands of the President and a small circle of 
advisors. Since his election in July 1994 to a 5-year term as the 
country's first President, Alexsandr Lukashenko has consolidated power 
steadily in the executive branch through authoritarian means. He used a 
November 1996 referendum to amend the 1994 Constitution in order to 
broaden his powers and extend his term in office. Lukashenko ignored 
the then-Constitutional Court's ruling that the Constitution could not 
be amended by referendum. As a result, the current political system is 
based on the 1996 Constitution, which was adopted in an 
unconstitutional manner. Most members of the international community 
criticized the flawed referendum and do not recognize the legitimacy of 
the 1996 Constitution, legislature, or Alexsandr Lukashenko's 
continuation in office beyond the legal expiration of his term in July 
1999. Parliamentary elections were held in October, the first since the 
1996 referendum. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE)/Office of Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
concluded that the elections fell short of international standards and 
were neither free nor fair. Although the amended Constitution provides 
for a formal separation of powers, the President dominates all other 
branches of Government. The legislature that ended its work in November 
2000 was not elected directly, but was created out of the remnants of 
the former Parliament, which Lukashenko disbanded soon after the 1996 
referendum. The Constitution limits the legislature to meeting twice 
per year for no more than a total of 170 days. Presidential decrees 
made when the legislature is out of session have the force of law, 
except--in theory--in those cases restricted by the 1996 Constitution. 
The 1996 Constitution also allows the President to issue decrees having 
the force of law in circumstances of ``specific necessity and 
urgency,'' a provision that Lukashenko has interpreted broadly. The 
judiciary is not independent.
    Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are shared 
by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD), both of which answer directly to the President. Civilian 
authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces. 
Under Lukashenko's direction, the presidential guard--initially created 
to protect senior officials--continued to act against the Lukashenko's 
political enemies with no judicial or legislative oversight. On May 25, 
1999, the Law on the State Guard officially entered into force. The 
law, which had been operative on a de facto basis for a number of 
years, gives the President the right to subordinate all security bodies 
to his personal command. Members of the security forces have committed 
numerous human rights abuses.
    The country's political leadership opposes any significant economic 
reforms and remains committed ideologically to a planned economy. The 
authorities claimed that the gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 
percent, but most independent analysts doubted that figure and said 
that any growth that has occurred was the result of ``aggregate 
production'' fueled by continued massive credits to the debt-ridden 
state sector. Officials claimed that per capita GDP remained constant 
at approximately $1,400, but in real terms it was much lower. The 
majority of workers are employed in the state industrial and 
agricultural sectors, where wages are lower than the national average 
and wage arrears are chronic. Although the unreliability of official 
statistics makes it difficult to assess accurately economic conditions, 
living standards for many segments of society continued to decline. 
Authorities reported that average monthly wages were just over $70 a 
month by year-end, although independent analysts reported the figure 
was lower. Residents of small towns and rural areas, where incomes are 
particularly low, sustain themselves through unreported economic 
activity and small gardens.
    The Government's human rights record was very poor and worsened 
significantly in many areas. The authorities severely limit the right 
of citizens to change their government, and Lukashenko took severe 
measures to neutralize political opponents. The authorities did not 
undertake serious efforts to account for the disappearances that 
occurred in the previous year of well-known opposition political 
figures. Security forces continued to beat political opponents and 
detainees. There were reports of severe hazing in the military during 
the year. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces arbitrarily 
arrested and detained citizens, and the number of apparently 
politically motivated arrests increased, although many of those 
arrested soon were released. Prolonged detention and delays in trials 
were common and also occurred in a number of politically sensitive 
cases. The security services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and 
monitored closely the activities of opposition politicians and other 
segments of the population. Severe restrictions on freedom of speech, 
the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the authorities did not 
respect freedom of association. The authorities continued to impose 
limits on freedom of religion and restricted freedom of movement. 
Government security agents monitored closely human rights monitors and 
hindered their efforts. Domestic violence and discrimination against 
women remained significant problems. Pressures against the Roman 
Catholic and Protestant churches as well as societal anti-Semitism 
persist. Authorities continued to harshly restrict workers' rights to 
associate freely, organize, and bargain. Trafficking in women is a 
problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--here were no reports of 
political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were several cases of opposition figures who disappeared in 
recent years (see Section 1.b.). The opponents of the regime have been 
missing for such a long period of time, with no credible effort on the 
part of the Government to account for their whereabouts. Human rights 
monitors believe that they have been killed for their involvement in 
political activities.
    b. Disappearance.--There have been several cases of opposition 
figures who disappeared in recent years.
    On July 7, Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television 
network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting 
for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When 
Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was 
found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet 
were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the 
Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and 
Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences, 
respectively. Authorities accused the opposition of organizing 
Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and later 
threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an interview, 
published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed Lukashenko 
and security services for Zavadsky's disappearance. A criminal 
investigation of the disappearance was opened, but no progress had been 
reported by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In November ORT Journalist 
Pavel Sheremet reported that several current and former police 
officers, including members of the elite Almaz Unit of the Ministry of 
Interior, have been arrested as suspects in the Zavadsky case. The 
authorities have not confirmed that those arrested are suspects in the 
Zavadsky case, nor have they confirmed their identities. Lukashenko 
fired the head of the KGB and the Prosecutor General following the 
release of a letter, reportedly written by a KGB officer, alleging that 
Zavadsky was killed by a group of former and current security service 
officers. The letter also alleged that senior authorities prevented 
investigators from fully examining the case. Lukashenko claimed that 
the letter was a fabrication and promised to renew the investigations 
into the disappearances; however, no further progress was made at 
year's end.
    On May 7, 1999, former Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Zakharenko 
disappeared shortly after he told his family in a telephone 
conversation that he was on his way home. Zakharenko, a close associate 
of the then-detained former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir, disappeared 
after voting began in an opposition presidential election initiative, 
in which Chigir was one of the principal candidates. An investigation 
began 6 months later, and there is still no evidence that the 
authorities have taken concrete steps to resolve the case. The 
Government also failed to present any information on the investigation 
despite a request from the U.N. Working Group on Involuntary 
Disappearances. The authorities also have harassed and hindered the 
investigations of Zakharenko's disappearance by independent 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In December Zakharenko's wife 
and children received political asylum in a Western European country, 
where they had been residing since August, after accusing Lukashenko of 
direct involvement in Zakharenko's disappearance.
    On September 16, 1999, following a meeting earlier during that day 
broadcast on state television in which Lukashenko ordered the chiefs of 
his security services to crack down on ``opposition scum,'' 13th 
Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar disappeared, along with 
his local business associate Anatoliy Krasovsky. A high profile 
antigovernment politician, Gonchar was considered an active fundraiser 
for the opposition. Shortly before his disappearance, Gonchar 
telephoned his wife to inform her that he was on his way home. Broken 
glass and blood were discovered later at the site where relatives and 
friends of the men believe the vehicle in which the two were travelling 
may have been stopped. As with the disappearance of Zakharenko, there 
is no evidence of progress by official investigators to resolve these 
cases.
    In June Interpol officially notified Belarusian law enforcement 
agencies that former national bank Chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova, who 
disappeared in April 1999 from an apartment where she had been under 
house arrest since 1997, was located in a Western European country. 
Vinnikova reported in several interviews with the press that she went 
into hiding to escape suspected conspiracies against her life.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1996 Constitution provides for the inviolability of 
the person and specifically prohibits torture, as well as cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment; however, police and prison guards beat 
detainees and prisoners. Law enforcement and prison officials may use 
physical force against detainees and prisoners only if the latter are 
violent, have refused to obey the instructions of the prison 
administration, or have violated ``maliciously'' the terms of their 
sentences. However, human rights monitors have credibly reported that 
investigators coerce confessions through beatings and psychological 
pressure. Although such behavior is against the law, the authorities 
seldom, if ever, punishes those who commit such abuses. Guards use 
force against detainees to coerce confessions as well as during routine 
activities. Police also beat demonstrators (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.). On November 20, the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued 
conclusions and recommendations on the third periodic report on the 
country. The Committee cited concern over the deterioration in the 
human rights situation and noted numerous continuing allegations of 
torture and inhuman treatment or punishment committed by state 
officials or with their acquiescence. These violations appeared to have 
been committed against political opponents of the regime and peaceful 
demonstrators.
    On January 14, Oleg Volchek, a human rights monitor and chairman of 
a nongovernmental commission investigating the disappearance of former 
Internal Affairs Minister Yury Zakharenko, filed a complaint with the 
Minsk city prosecutor after a lower court refused to bring criminal 
charges against police who beat him following his arrest on July 21, 
1999. Volchek was so severely beaten that he was treated for the 
injuries he sustained. The police, who denied involvement in the 
beating, claimed that Volcheck attacked them and sustained his injuries 
when he fell and hit his head on a table. Volchek's attorney and other 
human rights monitors believe that the authorities attempted to cover 
up the beating. Volchek's appeal to the Minsk City Court also later was 
denied.
    On March 1, opposition activists Tsimafey Dranchuk, Leanid 
Malakhaw, and Filip Klikushyn were arrested for demonstrating in front 
of the Presidential Administration Building and, on March 3, were 
sentenced to 5 days imprisonment. While being transported from the 
courthouse to a detention facility, 18-year-old Dranchuk was beaten by 
militia officials which resulted in serious head injuries. On March 5, 
he was taken to a Minsk clinic, where his injuries were diagnosed as 
severe by doctors. Malakhaw and Klikushyn reportedly were beaten by the 
authorities at the same time as Dranchuk, although they did not sustain 
serious injuries. They went on a hunger strike to protest their 
sentences and abuse. Their hunger strike did not produce any result and 
they were released after 5 day's detention.
    On March 25, in a violent crackdown, uniformed and plainclothes 
security forces beat and detained demonstrators gathering on Yakub 
Kolas Square in downtown Minsk. According to human rights observers, 
over 300 demonstrators were arrested and detained. Many of them were 
beaten severely (see Section 2.b.). Yuri Belenky, deputy chair of the 
conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Popular Front, was 
severely beaten and later hospitalized. Security forces reportedly hit 
Belenky in the face with a truncheon, put his jacket over his head, 
knocked him off his feet, and continued to kick him. Belenky was 
detained for 3 days, after which time a government doctor diagnosed him 
with a concussion. Belenky's appeals to prosecutors and the courts to 
bring charges against the security forces responsible for the beating 
were denied.
    According to the Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) of the OSCE, 
in an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force'', five demonstrators 
who participated in the April 26 Chernobylsky Shlaykh (the Chernobyl 
Path) march were ``forcibly and violently'' detained by the militia 
(see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
    ``Dedovshchina,'' the practice of hazing new recruits through 
beatings and other forms of physical and psychological abuse, 
apparently has not abated. In the first 5 months of this year, 
according to government statistics, 30 cases were reported. Efforts by 
family members and human rights monitors to investigate these cases and 
other reports of Dedovshchina were blocked by government authorities.
    Prison conditions are poor and are marked by severe overcrowding, 
shortages of food and medicine, and the spread of diseases such as 
tuberculosis, syphilis, and HIV/AIDS. Conditions at prison hospitals 
are poor, according to human rights monitors. Detainees in pretrial 
detention facilities also reported poor conditions and denial of 
medical treatment, which contributed to their declining health while 
they awaited trial. Although official statistics on prison overcrowding 
are not available, OSCE AMG officers who visited a detention facility 
in Vitebsk during June 1999 noted that in 1 cell, 16 female prisoners 
shared 10 beds, while in another, 14 prisoners between the ages of 14 
and 17 shared 8 beds.
    In 1999 a government amnesty was announced for lesser offenders 
designed to decrease the prisoner population. Another amnesty was 
approved by the National Assembly on June 30. Acting Minister of 
Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov announced on June 9 that 9,700 
prisoners had received early release or a reduction in their sentences 
under the 1999 amnesty and that the amnesty could be applied to 10,700 
prisoners in jail and 2,400 on parole at that time under the new 
legislation. Prior to the new amnesty, there were approximately 61,000 
prisoners, according to Udovikov. It is unclear to what extent the new 
amnesty was implemented. According to Udovkiov, the amnesty only 
applied to war veterans, underage persons guilty of minor crimes, 
pensioners, and the disabled. Those guilty of economic crimes could 
only receive amnesty after payment of financial restitution.
    Male and female prisoners are housed separately. Following an 
inspection of a correctional facility for women in Gomel on June 1999, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov noted in an interview with 
the official press that, although it was intended to house only 1,350 
inmates, it then held 2,800. NGO's reported that prison conditions did 
not improve during the year.
    On March 1, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and political prisoner 
Vladimir Kudinov was transferred to solitary confinement in a 
punishment cell for 7 days for alleged misconduct, which included 
reportedly stopping morning exercises and having left a smoking area 
too early (see Section 1.d.). Kudinov previously was punished for 
participating in a chess tournament without prison approval and for 
other violations of ``internal routine.'' Kudinov also was denied, 
without explanation, visits by family and a priest. According to human 
rights monitors, these punishments were imposed to exclude Kudinov from 
the list of those eligible for amnesty or early parole.
    On July 11, Ivan Lemyashewski, the former head of a group of 
advisors to the Council of Ministers, issued an open letter to 
Lukashenko calling for an end to the politically motivated harassment 
of his family. On June 21, Lemyashewski's son, Ilya, was shot in the 
chest by a masked man. The shooting followed an earlier attempt by 
security forces to recruit Ilya to spy on his father. When he refused, 
Ilya reportedly was warned that ``grave consequences'' would follow. 
Lemyashewski's car was reportedly tampered with, resulting in an 
accident, and the family reported receiving numerous threatening 
telephone calls. The threats and attacks apparently were in retaliation 
for his resignation from the Government (see Section 2.a.)
    Human rights monitors sometimes were granted access to observe 
prison conditions, although the authorities did not honor some requests 
to meet with individual prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile.--The authorities have 
amended only slightly the Soviet-era law on detention, and during the 
year security forces continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain 
citizens, most often in connection with demonstrations, some of which 
were not authorized. Politically motivated arrests continued, although 
most of those arrested were released within a few days.
    The Criminal Procedure Code provides that police may detain a 
person suspected of a crime for 24 hours without a warrant, within 
which time the procurator is notified. The procurator then has 48 hours 
to review the legality of the detention. If the procurator deems the 
detention legal, a suspect can be held for a maximum of 10 days without 
formal charge. However, usually once the decision is made to hold a 
suspect, formal charges are filed. Once a suspect is charged, a trial 
must be initiated within 2 months, although in some cases the 
procurator general can extend pretrial detention to 18 months to allow 
for further investigation. Alternatively, a suspect who has been 
charged can be released on a written pledge not to flee, in which case 
there is no time limit on pretrial investigation. The law allows 
detainees the right to apply to the court (rather than the procurator) 
to determine the legality of their detentions. However, in practice 
suspects' appeals to have their detentions reviewed by the courts 
frequently are suppressed because detainees are at the mercy of 
investigators, and detention officials are unwilling to forward the 
appeals. There is no provision for bail under the current legal code.
    By law detainees may be allowed unlimited access to legal counsel, 
and, for those who cannot afford counsel, the court appoints a lawyer. 
However, investigators routinely fail to inform detainees of their 
rights and conduct preliminary interrogations without giving detainees 
an opportunity to consult counsel. The information gained then is used 
against the defendant in court. Even when appointed by the State, 
defense attorneys are subordinate to the executive branch. Access by 
family members to those detained is restricted severely in practice and 
they frequently are not notified when a family member, even a juvenile, 
has been detained.
    On January 19, Aleksandr Abramovich, leader of the Borisov branch 
of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested by police near the Minsk 
city court before the beginning of the trial of former Prime Minister 
Mikhail Chigir ( see Section 1.e.). Abramovich was holding a sign 
calling for an end to the prosecution of opposition leaders. Abramovich 
was sentenced to 7 days in jail. In February Abramovich again was 
arrested and sentenced to 35 days in jail for staging three 
unsanctioned demonstrations: One against the war in Chechnya, one 
against the trial of Chigir, and one against the trial of a local 
businessman. On April 25, Abramovich again was arrested during a rally 
held in Borisov to mark the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. 
At the rally, Abramovich criticized the Government and was arrested 
immediately after he ripped apart a picture of Lukashenko. Abramovich 
was sentenced to 5 days in jail for ``petty hooliganism.''
    On February 4, police in Grodno arrested Vladimir Sowtsa, a member 
of the United Civic Party and an activist in the local union of 
entrepreneurs, for spreading leaflets about a nationwide strike, which 
began on February 1. Sowtsa was detained for several hours and then 
taken to a court where he was fined $7.50 (6,600 rubles) and later 
released.
    On February 29, while collecting signatures on a petition against 
the country's union with Russia, two activists of the Belarusian 
Popular Front were detained for several hours by police and later 
charged with illegal distribution of printed materials.
    On March 1, Filipp Klikushin, Leonid Malakhov, and Timofei Dranchuk 
were arrested by police for staging an unsanctioned protest near the 
Presidential Administration in central Minsk in support of those who 
had disappeared (see Section 1.c.).
    On March 23, five youth activists, two of whom were under 18 years 
of age, were detained by police for distributing leaflets announcing 
the freedom day march on March 25 marking the 1918 founding of the 
Belarusian National Republic. One of the activists, Sergei Shevlakov, 
reported that his family was not notified of his detention until almost 
4 hours after the incident, in violation of the administrative offenses 
code. All five reportedly were verbally threatened and abused by police 
while in detention.
    On March 25, approximately 700 demonstrators gathered on Yakub 
Kolas Square in Minsk for the ``day of freedom'' march. On March 24, 
Minsk city authorities banned the demonstration, despite requests from 
foreign and domestic human rights observers to allow the demonstration 
to proceed peacefully. Shortly after the demonstrators gathered on the 
square, military and police special forces, dressed in riot gear, waded 
into the crowd using clubs and began to beat and detain demonstrators. 
According to local human rights lawyers, over 300 demonstrators were 
arrested and prosecuted for their participation in the event. Many 
leading opposition politicians were arrested in connection with the 
demonstration and sentenced to 5 to 7 days imprisonment (see Section 
2.b.).
    On March 25, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and independent journalist 
Valery Shchukin, was arrested by police in Vitebsk while covering an 
opposition rally marking the 1918 founding of the Belarusian National 
Republic. Shchukin was tried and sentenced to 10 days in jail for 
participating in an unsanctioned demonstration. At the same event, 
Vladimir Pleshchenko, a local opposition activist, was arrested and 
later sentenced to 10 days in jail. Roman Solovyan, also a local 
opposition activist, was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail.
    On April 26, Anatoly Fyodorov, a local leader of the Belarusian 
Popular Front, was arrested by police for organizing an unauthorized 
demonstration in Mogilev on the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl 
disaster. Also on April 26, opposition activists Yury Kuzmitsky, Denis 
Yeryomenko, and Sergei Terekhov were arrested while participating in 
the Chernobilski Shlyakh demonstration. Kuzmitsky, who severely was 
beaten by police, was sentenced to 5 days detention for participation 
in the demonstration. Yeryomenko was convicted of illegal use of flags, 
pennants, emblems, symbols, or placards for carrying a caricature of 
Lukashenko. Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' detention for ``speaking 
of the President in foul language'' (see Section 2.b.).
    On May 1, 14 opposition and human rights activists were detained by 
police in Mogilev during a May Day rally in the town's central square. 
The activists were carrying white-red-white flags and opposition signs 
and were taken to a police station where they were detained for several 
hours.
    On May 21, Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Tsylezhnikov, and Alesya 
Ysyuk were arrested by police in Borisov while demonstrating in support 
of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. Abramovich and Tsyalezhnikov 
were sentenced to 15 and 10 days' incarceration respectively, and Ysyuk 
was fined $404 (390,000 rubles).
    On June 20, United Civic Party activists Aleksei Radzivnow and 
Vladimir Romanovski were detained by police for staging a protest 
against restrictions on political activity near the Minsk Government 
Building in downtown Minsk; they were released later the same day.
    On June 29, Alexander Abramovich again was arrested and sentenced 
to 12 days in jail for a demonstration on June 19 in Borisov in which 
protestors chained themselves to a flagpole and demanded the 
resignation of the chairman of the Borisov City Executive Committee.
    On July 27, Katsyaryna Haravaya and Igar Paremski were arrested and 
sentenced to 5 and 7 days in jail, respectively, for staging an 
unsanctioned demonstration in Gomel in which they protested against the 
establishment of a ``fascist regime'' in Belarus.
    Unidentified, nonuniformed officials working for the security 
services regularly apprehend participants in antigovernment 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There are credible reports that 
plainclothes security officials sometimes infiltrate antigovernment 
demonstrations in order to either report on opposition protestors or 
provoke clashes between demonstrators and police. Security officers on 
occasion also preemptively have apprehended organizers and individuals 
considered to be potential participants prior to demonstrations, 
including those that had been sanctioned by theauthorities.
    On February 10, in an article in the independent newspaper 
Narodnaya Volya, Oleg Baturin, a senior official in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, reported that a clash between demonstrators and 
security officials at the freedom march I on October 17, 1999, was 
provoked by plainclothes security officers under orders from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following publication of the article, 
Baturin and his brother, fearing for their personal safety in Belarus, 
claimed political asylum in Poland. On July 19, Baturin sought refuge 
at a Western embassy in Minsk and claimed that he had been abducted by 
unknown assailants, who he later identified as Belarusian security 
service agents, and was returned forcibly to Belarus. On July 21, 
Baturin was granted safe passage out of Belarus, to take up political 
asylum in another country. While some of the facts of Baturin's 
kidnaping remain unclear, most independent human rights observers 
believe that his charges against the authorities were the reason for 
his mistreatment.
    Security force officials regularly detained journalists and NGO 
officials during the year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
    Following demonstrations security officials have held some 
detainees incommunicado. In addition to the hundreds of antigovernment 
protestors whom authorities held for several hours or days, there were 
several prominent political detainees whom the Lukashenko regime held 
for prolonged periods of time in pretrial detention, some for over a 
year.
    On November 11, 1997, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov 
was arrested on charges of large-scale embezzlement and bribery. Leonov 
was held for over 2 years in pretrial detention, during which he 
suffered two heart attacks. Leonov also went on a hunger strike to 
protest the refusal of prison authorities to provide him with medical 
supplies brought by his relatives. On January 14, Leonov was sentenced 
to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-scale 
embezzlement and bribery (see Section 1.e.).
    In February 1998, police arrested Andrei Klimov, a successful 
entrepreneur and member of the Parliament that was illegally dissolved 
in late 1996, on charges of embezzlement and other financial 
irregularities. Klimov's supporters and human rights observers believe 
that his arrest and prosecution was politically motivated because 
Klimov is an outspoken critic of President Lukashenko and had 
participated in a commission that examined violations of the law and 
the Constitution by the President. Klimov's period of pretrial 
detention was extended on several occasions. He was severely beaten by 
prison guards on December 13, 1999, following his refusal to leave his 
cell as a sign of protest. The presiding judge ordered that he be 
brought to the courtroom. He was beaten by guards and forcefully 
dragged into the courtroom in torn clothing and without any shoes. 
Although he was clearly in need of medical attention, an ambulance was 
not called until several hours later. On March 17, Klimov was convicted 
of large-scale embezzlement and forgery and sentenced to 6 years' 
imprisonment and loss of property (see Section 1.e.).
    Statistics on the current number of persons in pretrial detention 
and the average length of pretrial detention were not available. Acting 
Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov, in a speech to 
Parliament on June 9, said that approximately 100,000 people were in 
pretrial detention or under some form of punishment. In comparison in 
August 1998 there were approximately 11,000 persons in pretrial 
detention.
    The authorities do not use forced exile, although there were 
credible reports that the security services threatened opposition 
political activists and trade union leaders with criminal prosecution 
or physical harm if they did not cease their activities and depart the 
country.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not 
independent and is unable to act as a check on the executive branch and 
its agents. Reforms adopted to support the independence of the 
judiciary in 1995 remained unimplemented. The 1996 constitutional 
referendum further subordinated the judiciary to the executive branch 
by giving the President the power to appoint 6 of the 12 members of the 
Constitutional Court, including the chairman. The remaining six are 
appointed by the Council of the Republic, which itself is composed of 
individuals appointed by the President or elected by individuals 
influenced by the President. The President also appoints the chairmen 
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court. The President also 
has authority under the Constitution to appoint and dismiss all 
district and military judges.
    The criminal justice systems follows the former Soviet model and 
has three tiers: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme 
Court. Several modifications have been made, brought about by the new 
Constitution, including direct presidential appointments. The 
Constitutional Court was established in 1994 to adjudicate serious 
constitutional issues, but, dependent on the executive branch, it does 
not challenge presidential initiatives. In addition the Constitutional 
Court has no means to enforce its decisions.
    Judges adjudicate trials; only in capital offense trials in which 
the defendant pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial do juries 
determine innocence or guilt. Judges are dependent on the Ministry of 
Justice for sustaining court infrastructure and on local executive 
branch officials for providing their personal housing. In addition 
judges owe their positions to the President. Although the Procurator's 
Office denies it, there were widespread and credible reports that 
``telephone justice'' (the practice of executive and local authorities 
dictating to the courts the outcome of trials) continues.
    On May 18, in a speech to the Belarusian-Russian Union 
Parliamentary Assembly, covered by the media and widely criticized by 
human rights monitors as evidence of the absence of judicial 
independence, Lukashenko denied allegations of human rights abuses in 
Belarus and said they were ``far-fetched and overblown beyond reason in 
the West...We have no such violations.'' He acknowledged that a 
``number of once famous persons,'' such a former Prime Minister Chigir 
and others, had been prosecuted over the past few years. However, 
``they were caught stealing and got what they deserved...Everybody is 
equal before the law...Overseas politicians lack objectivity because 
they surround criminals, thieves, and hooligans with a halo of 
political martyrs.''
    Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the 
district, regional, and republic levels. They ultimately are 
responsible to and serve at the pleasure of the Procurator General who, 
according to the Constitution, is appointed by the Council of the 
Republic. Prosecutors are not independent and do not have authority to 
bring charges against the President or the presidential administration. 
On May 24, Constitutional Court Chairman Grigory Vasilevich told 
journalists that a local prosecutor had been correct in rejecting a 
complaint brought earlier against a presidential administration 
official. According to Vasilevich, Article 125 of the 1996 Constitution 
charges the Procurator General and other public prosecutors with the 
task of ``control over the compliance of the ministries, other agencies 
subordinate to the Council of Ministers, local representative and 
executive authorities, enterprises, institutions, nongovernmental 
organizations, officials, and private figures to laws, decrees, edicts, 
and other legal acts.'' Procurators do not have authority to bring 
charges against an official of the Presidential Administration, he 
said, because it is under the authority of the President, and not the 
Council of Ministers.
    In May 1997, Lukashenko issued presidential Decree No. 12, 
``Several Measures on Improving the Practice of Lawyers and Notaries,'' 
which, according to international legal experts and human rights 
monitors, seriously compromised the independence of lawyers from the 
authorities. The decree, which ostensibly was issued in response to 
allegedly exorbitant attorneys' fees, subordinated all lawyers to the 
Ministry of Justice, which controls the licensing of lawyers, and 
placed the bar association under much greater Ministry of Justice 
control.
    In August 1999, while on an inspection tour in the Brest oblast in 
the western part of the country, Lukashenko told local reporters that 
he personally exercised control over ``certain'' ongoing judicial 
cases, including that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader 
Mikhail Chigir. Lukashenko stated, ``I have them under control, I am 
not going to allow any injustice there myself.'' On August 30, 1999 
during a government interagency commission on crime covered by the 
official media, President Lukashenko reportedly stated, ``It is natural 
for the Head of State to exercise control over one criminal case or 
another...especially in our country, where the Head of State controls 
all the branches of power--legislative, executive, and judicial.''
    Human rights monitor and defense attorney Vera Stremkovskaya was 
threatened with disbarment following her public criticisms of the 
Lukashenko regime while on visits abroad in 1998 and during the year. 
In an attempt to hinder Stremkovskaya's activities, Ministry of Justice 
officials also have launched investigations and issued warnings to her 
human rights NGO (see Section 4).
    The Constitution provides for public trials, although exceptions 
can be made in cases established by law (for example, in cases of rape 
or on grounds of national security). Defendants have the legal right to 
attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence on their 
own behalf. However, these rights are not always respected in practice. 
The right to be represented by counsel also is not always respected in 
practice. While the 1996 Constitution establishes a presumption of 
innocence, in practice defendants frequently must prove their 
innocence. According to statistics from the Belarusian Helsinki 
Committee, in 1998, criminal charges were brought by prosecutors 
against 59,700 individuals. Of these, only 272, or less than one-half 
percent were found to be not guilty.
    Both defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal, and most 
criminal cases are appealed, according to legal sources. In appeals 
neither defendants nor witnesses appear before the court; the court 
merely reviews the protocol and other documents from the lower court's 
trial. Appeals rarely result in reversals of verdicts.
    Antigovernment protestors arrested after demonstrations were 
subjected to assembly line-style trials, often without the right to 
counsel or the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.
    On January 14, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov was 
sentenced to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-
scale embezzlement and bribery. Under the provisions of amnesty 
legislation, Leonov was released from prison on October 5 after nearly 
3 years imprisonment. Leonov allegedly accepted bribes of furniture 
worth approximately $52 (42,459 rubles) and foodstuffs worth $90 
(73,383 rubles). Leonov had been arrested on November 11, 1997; he 
arrest was videotaped and broadcast on national television. In the 
videotape, police officers were shown taking U.S. dollars out of 
Leonov's desk. The following day, referring to Leonov's arrest, 
Lukashenko said law enforcement agencies would ``root out corruption'' 
without respect for rank. Legal experts and human rights monitors noted 
that the trial was rife with abuse of legal procedure, including the 
use of evidence taken under duress and later recanted, in violation of 
the Criminal Code.
    On June 8, Mogilev regional authorities announced the sale of 
property belonging to Leonov, confiscated by the Government following 
his conviction. The house and accessory buildings were offered for sale 
at a total of $4,500 (approximately 4,320,000 rubles). According to the 
human rights organization Charter '97, the authorities published the 
announcement of the sale in state-run newspapers without waiting for a 
hearing on a lawsuit brought by family members to block the sale. 
Authorities also reportedly refused to let the Leonov family buy the 
property back.
    On March 17, a Minsk court sentenced 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy 
Andrei Klimov to 6 years in prison on fabricated charges of alleged 
malfeasance and large-scale embezzlement in the handling of government 
contracts at a property development firm which he had run. Klimov, 
whose trial began in July 1999, had been in pretrial detention since 
February 1998 (see Section 1.c.). International and local human rights 
observers believe that the trial and conviction were politically 
motivated to punish Klimov for his involvement in a 1996 impeachment 
drive against President Lukashenko. On August 22, Klimov's appeal was 
denied by another Minsk court without comment. Human rights monitors 
believe the appeals court overlooked numerous procedural violations in 
rejecting the appeal.
    On May 19, the political show trial of opposition leader and former 
Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir concluded with his conviction for 
exceeding his authority as Prime Minister in granting a delay in 
payment of customs duties to a company. The court sentenced Chigir to a 
3-year prison term suspended for 2 years. The court also ordered him to 
pay $220,000 in damages. The OSCE and other legal observers noted that 
the judgement involved irregularities in legal procedure and was 
designed to prevent Chigir from posing a challenge to the Government in 
presidential elections scheduled for 2001. Chigir had been arrested on 
March 30, 1999, just prior to a public ceremony to register his 
participation in an opposition-organized presidential election 
initiative aimed at drawing attention to the upcoming end of 
Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office. It also followed several 
warnings from government security officials to Chigir that he cease his 
political activities. Despite protests from the OSCE and a number of 
foreign governments, Chigir remained in pretrial detention from March 
30 until November 30, 1999.
    On May 30, speaking at a meeting of participants of a government-
organized ``social-political dialogue,'' Lukashenko said Chigir's 
sentence was lenient. Speaking to the head of the OSCE AMG, Lukashenko 
said ``on your instructions, if you want, as a result of your pressure, 
although I did not welcome it, your client (Chigir) was forgiven a lot 
... Were it not for the OSCE, Chigir would have to serve at least 5 
years first in a cell and then somewhere in a prison.'' Lukashenko's 
comments were condemned widely by local human rights monitors as 
further evidence that Chigir's trial was politically motivated because 
of his opposition to the Lukashenko regime. On August 18, the Supreme 
Court, following appeals from both Chigir and the procurator, returned 
the case to the city court for further investigation. In her appeal, 
Chigir's attorney, Yulia Chigir, cited numerous procedural 
irregularities, including the unlawful time limit placed on the defense 
to familiarize itself with the lower court protocol. On December 5, the 
Supreme Court vacated the sentence against Chigir and returned the case 
to the procurator's office for further investigation. The panel of 
judges ruled that the investigators and the judges in the previous 
trial failed to fully examine the facts of the case. At year's end, no 
trial date was set.
    On June 19, Nikolai Statkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Social 
Democratic Party, and 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Valery Shchukin were 
convicted of active participation in group actions disturbing the peace 
and were sentenced to 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences, 
respectively. Statkevich and Shchukin had been arrested immediately 
following the march for freedom on October 17, 1999, which resulted in 
clashes between protestors and riot police. Statkevich also was charged 
with active participation in group actions disturbing the peace for an 
unauthorized demonstration held on June 27, 1999. The trial, which 
began on April 24, was marked by violations of judicial procedure. In 
many cases, witnesses were unable to identify Statkevich or Shchukin 
and appeared to have been coached. Most human rights observers 
considered the trial to be politically motivated. On August 25, the 
Supreme Court, citing procedural and investigative irregularities, 
upheld an appeal brought by Statkevich and Shchukin, vacated their 
sentences and returned the case to the Minsk city court for 
investigation and a new trial.
    On July 12, 1999, Vladimir Ravkov, vice rector of the Gomel State 
Medical Institute, was arrested along with 17 other members of the 
institute, on corruption charges. Of the 18 arrested, only Ravkov 
remained in jail pending trial at year's end. Investigators have 
refused to allow Ravkov's wife, Natalya Ravkova, to defend him in 
court. Prison administrators reportedly denied Ravkov adequate medical 
treatment. Human rights monitors reported that this case appears to be 
politically motivated because of past criticism by the Gomel Medical 
Institute of government neglect of Chernobyl-related problems.
    On October 20, Julia Chigir, wife of Mikhail Cigir, was found 
guilty of violent resistance to a police officer and given a 2 year 
suspended sentence. On May 19, Julia Chigir bit the ear of a police 
officer when he forcibly attempted to block her entrance and that of 
her supporters, into a Minsk City courthouse on the day of Mr. Chigir's 
sentencing. The OSCE and human rights monitors noted that the court's 
ruling contradicted eyewitness accounts of the events on May 19 and 
that the ruling was politically motivated.
    Although the authorities have allowed representatives of the OSCE 
AMG to visit Supreme Soviet Deputies Klimov and Kudinov and former 
Agriculture Minister Leonov, authorities have refused permission to 
other foreign diplomatic and human rights observers to visit the same 
prisoners (see Section 1.d.). On July 5, the Procurator General's 
Office denied the OSCE AMG permission to visit Vladimir Ravkov, the 
jailed vice rector of the Gomel State Medical Institute, whose arrest 
appears to be politically motivated and who is reported to be in poor 
health.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against 
illegal interference in a citizen's personal life, including invasion 
of privacy, telephone, and other communications; however, the 
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Although the 
inviolability of the home also is provided for by the Constitution, 
which states that ``no one shall have the right to enter, without legal 
reason, the dwelling and other legal property of a citizen against such 
a citizen's will,'' in practice government monitoring of residences, 
telephones, and computers continued unabated. The KGB is believed 
widely to enter homes without warrants, conduct unauthorized searches, 
and read mail. Political, human rights, and other NGO's state that 
their conversations and correspondence are monitored routinely by the 
security services. Some opposition figures report a reluctance to visit 
some foreign embassies due to fear of reprisal.
    Nearly all opposition political figures assume that the authorities 
monitor their activities and conversations. The Lukashenko regime does 
nothing to refute these assumptions. Militia officers assigned to stand 
outside diplomatic missions are known to keep records of visits by 
political opposition leaders. In addition even regime officials do not 
appear to be exempt from monitoring.
    In June United Civic Party Chairman Anatoly Lebedko, a vocal 
opponent of the Lukashenko regime, discovered a listening device 
connected to a telephone in his apartment. Independent analysts believe 
that the device was made and planted in the apartment by the security 
services.
    Security officials routinely raided and searched the apartments of 
opposition politicians, often without a warrant. For example, on April 
19, police and KGB officers conducted an unlawful search of the 
apartment of Galina Yurina, an opposition activist, confiscated 
leaflets for an upcoming opposition-organized demonstration as well as 
personal items and detained Yurina for several hours. On August 23, 
Yurina was stopped by security officials, and leaflets advocating the 
boycott of parliamentary elections were seized from her car without a 
warrant.
    Security forces sought to recruit Ilya Lemyashewski, son of the 
former head of a group of advisors to the Council of Ministers, to spy 
on his father. On June 21, after his refusal to do so, Ilya was shot in 
the chest by a masked man (see Section 1.c).
    On July 31, 75-year-old Vasily Starovoitov, the former director of 
the Rassvet agro-industrial enterprise, appealed to police to file 
criminal charges against two men who attempted to enter his house and 
threatened him on July 28. Starovoitov had been released from a 
corrective labor camp in November 1999 after 2 years' imprisonment for 
allegedly embezzling state credits. Domestic human right groups believe 
that Starovoitov was arrested to draw attention away from a poor 
harvest on heavily subsidized state farms. Two men reportedly 
telephoned Starovoitov and said that they wanted to deliver a message 
from imprisoned former Agriculture Minister Leonov (see Section 1.e.). 
Shortly after the call, two men approached the door of Starovoitov's 
house and identified themselves as police and KGB investigators and 
threatened Starovoitov with violence if he did not let them in. The 
police were called and the intruders were arrested. The incident was 
under investigation at year's end.
    The KGB, the MVD, and certain border guard detachments have the 
right to use wiretaps, but under the law must obtain a prosecutor's 
permission before installation. The prosecutor's office exercised no 
independence and therefore the ``due process'' provision regarding 
wiretaps is effectively meaningless. The Presidential Guard (or 
security service) formed in 1995, reportedly continued to conduct 
surveillance activities of the President's political opponents. There 
is no judicial or legislative oversight of the Presidential Guard's 
budget or activities, and the executive branch repeatedly has thwarted 
attempts to exercise such oversight.
    In 1999 the National Assembly revised the administrative offenses 
code to increase the penalties for those who obstruct KGB officers. For 
example, an article of the legislation prohibits preventing KGB 
officers from entering the premises of a company, establishment or 
organization, and for failing to allow audits or checks to be made, as 
well as for unjustified restriction or refusal to provide information, 
including access to company information systems and databases. This 
revised code remains in effect.
    In 1997 the Ministry of Communications renegotiated contracts for 
supplying telephone service. The new contracts forbid subscribers from 
using telephone communications for purposes that run counter to state 
interests and public order. The Ministry has the right to terminate 
telephone service to those who breach this provision.
    Presidential Decree No. 218, issued in 1997, prohibits the import 
and export of printed, audio, and visual information that could 
``damage'' the economic and political interests of the country (see 
Section 2.a.). This decree remains in effect.
    On November 23, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 40, which allows 
the authorities to nationalize the property of any individual if the 
President determines that the individual has caused financial damage to 
the State. There were reports that this decree had been used, 
particularly against businessmen. Authorities also threatened to seize 
the property of former Central Bank Chair Tamara Vinnikova.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and 
disseminate information; however, the regime restricts these rights in 
practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom of 
speech. Despite the constitutional provisions, a 1998 government decree 
limited citizens' right to express their own opinions. Although 
independent media remain widely available in Minsk, as part of a 
continuing crackdown on opposition activity, the authorities stepped up 
its campaign of harassment against the independent media. The 
authorities continued to restrict severely the right to a free press 
through near-monopolies on the means of production of newsprint, means 
of distribution on national level broadcast media, such as television 
and radio, and by denying accreditation of journalists critical of the 
regime. The authorities also kept up economic pressure on the 
independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements, 
as well as by fines and other administrative harassment. Employees at 
some state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to 
independent newspapers and journals.
    In 1996 Lukashenko signed a decree ordering that all editors in 
chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be official state 
employees and would become members of the appropriate local level 
government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of Press the 
authority to assign graduates of state-supported journalism schools to 
work in state-owned media organizations as a means of payment for their 
schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
    Presidential Decree No.5, issued in 1997, prohibits a range of 
broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For 
example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or 
flags bearing emblems that are not registered officially with the 
state, as well as emblems, symbols, and posters ``whose content is 
intended to harm the state and public order, rights and legal interests 
of the citizens.'' The decree also bans activities that are 
``humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of 
state bodies.'' This decree has been used to prosecute and fine those 
carrying symbols emphasizing the country's independence, such as the 
red and white flag.
    The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public 
persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A 
public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office 
may ask the prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the criticism. 
In June 1998, the lower house of the National Assembly approved a bill 
that stipulated that public insults or libel against the President 
could be punished by up to 4 years in prison, 2 years in a labor camp, 
or a large fine. However, there were no reports that anyone was 
arrested or charged subsequently for this offense, and the bill 
apparently was devised principally as a means of intimidation. Its 
provisions remain in effect.
    In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree that prohibited 
and restricted the movement of certain goods across customs borders. 
The decree specifically prohibited the import and export of printed, 
audio, and video materials, or other news media containing information 
``that could damage the economic and political interests of the 
country.'' Some bulletins affiliated with the opposition published 
outside of the country appeared to be targeted by the decree. Although 
in previous years there were a number of incidents in which customs 
officials confiscated opposition materials at the country's borders, 
there were no recent reports of such incidents.
    In January 1998, more stringent regulatory provisions, introduced 
by amendments to the Law on Press and Other Mass Media that were 
adopted by the Council of the Republic in December 1997, went into 
effect. The new regulatory provisions grant greater authority to the 
authorities to ban and censor critical reporting. For example, the 
State Committee on the Press was given authority to suspend for 3 
months publication of periodicals or newspapers without a court ruling.
    On December 17, 1999, Lukashenko signed new amendments to the law 
``On Press and Other Media.'' The amendments ban the media from 
disseminating information on behalf of political parties, trade unions, 
and NGO's that are not registered with the Ministry of Justice.
    On April 7, a new presidential decree came into effect on ``the Use 
by Legal Entities of the Name of the Republic of Belarus.'' The decree 
allows only legal entities specially authorized by the President to use 
the name of the country in its title. According to the decree and 
independent legal experts, the independent press is barred from using 
the country name in its titles.
    Independent newspapers are available widely in Minsk, but outside 
of the capital most towns only carry local newspapers, only some of 
which are independent. On January 20, authorities forced the Orsha-
based Filon Kmita Center to stop publishing its daily newspaper, 
Kutseyna, after the paper was denied official registration. Kutseyna 
was known for its critical reports on the Government. Despite repeated 
appeals from foreign and domestic human rights observers, the paper was 
not registered and did not reopen.
    In February the editors in chief of the country's six largest 
independent newspapers sent an open letter to Prime Minister Uladzimir 
Yarmoshyn demanding the end to the discriminatory measures that the 
state uses against them. The letter noted that the state postal service 
recently raised distribution rates for independent papers by 400 to 600 
percent, while the State-owned publications received distribution 
discounts. It also stated that the large increases undermine the 
freedom of the press.
    On April 24, the Grodno City Executive Committee refused to 
register the independent newspaper Reporter, which often is critical of 
theauthorities, on the grounds that the editors could not prove that 
they were occupying legal office spaces. Later, a second application 
for registration also was rejected by the City Executive Committee 
without further explanation. On August 25, it was reported that the 
city executive denied registration for a third time. In its rejection 
notice, the city executive reportedly stated that there was ``a 
sufficiency of newspapers in Grodno and no need for another one.''
    On May 11, the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus rejected an appeal 
by the independent newspaper Nasha Niva of a warning issued by the 
State Press Committee in March. The newspaper was warned for publishing 
a reader's letter which the committee said expressed ``intolerance 
toward the Russians'' in violation of Article 5 of the Media Law, which 
bans the use of the media for inciting ethnic enmity or discord. The 
letter, entitled ``I Envy Chechnya,'' was critical of Russian 
atrocities in Chechnya and supported the defense of Belarusian language 
and culture. On May 15, Nasha Niva was warned for a second time for 
publishing an article entitled ``Infection of Fascism: Lukashenko is 
Copying Hitler'' by Semyon Sharetsky, the 13th Supreme Soviet chairman 
currently in self-imposed exile in Lithuania. The warning reportedly 
was issued under Article 5 of the Media Law for the ``inadmissibility 
of abusing the freedom of mass information.'' Article 16 of the media 
law states that a newspaper can be closed after receiving more than one 
warning within a year.
    On May 29, two leading independent newspapers critical of the 
Government, Narodnaya Volya and Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG), 
received warnings for alleged ``abuses of the freedom of mass 
information'' under Article 5 of the Law on Media. The BDG was warned 
for publishing an article on February 22 by Semen Bukchin entitled 
``Prayer in a Birkenau Concentration Camp.'' The State Press Committee 
alleged that the article created ``tensions in Polish-Jewish'' 
relations. A second warning was issued to BDG for publishing a response 
to Bukchin's article, which ``offended the citizens of the Russian 
Federation.''
    Narodnaya Volya was issued a warning for an article by Ivan 
Makalovich which contained the question ``Should we Ask NATO for 
Help?'' A second warning was issued for printing an article by Sergi 
Popkov, deputy head of the conservative Christian Party of the 
Belarusian Popular Front (CCP). According to the State Press Committee, 
the CCF was not registered with the Ministry of Justice, and therefore 
the article should not have been published.
    On June 2, the Mogilev-based independent newspaper De Facto was 
issued a warning by the State Press Committee for publishing the same 
article by Semyon Sharetsky entitled ``The Infection of Fascism: 
Lukashenko is Copying Hitler'' that Nasha Niva was warned for in May. 
According to the State Press Committee, Sharetksy's article ``incites 
ethnic hatred.''
    On September 5, authorities banned the first national nonstate 
press festival, scheduled to be held on September 8 and 9 in Vitebsk. 
No reason was given for the authorities' decision and festival 
organizers planned to reschedule the festival for late September in 
another city. The Belarusian Association of Journalists said the ban 
was part of a government effort to inhibit the work of the independent 
press.
    On September 13, the office of the Magic publishing house was 
raided, and the owner and President Yuri Budzko was charged with 
``propagandizing an electoral boycott.'' The Magic publishing house is 
the printing press for the country's leading nonstate newspapers. 
During the raid, copies of the independent newspaper Rabochy were 
seized and its editor Viktar Ivanshkevich was arrested. On October 11, 
Magic's bank accounts were frozen prior to a tax inspection. In 
September police seized 100,000 copies of a special edition of the 
Belorussian Free Trade Union newspaper Rabochy and arrested the 
newspaper's editor in chief Victor Ivashkevich, the newspaper's legal 
advisor Dmitry Kostyukevich, and Yuri Budko the owner of the Magic 
publishing house where the newspaper was being printed. The newspaper 
called on voters to boycott the October elections to the National 
Assembly. Ivashekvich and Kostyukevich were charded and later convicted 
and fined under Article 167 of the Administrative Code for publicly 
calling on an election boycott. The charges against Budko were 
dismissed by a separate court.
    On October 16, tax authorities raided the offices of Magic and 
seized the company's printing equipment. In connection with the 
investigation and seizure, the company's bank accounts were frozen on 
October 11. The equipment originally had been leased by Magic from the 
Belarus-Soros Foundation (BSF) and then later from the open society 
institute, which received ownership of the equipment when the BSF 
ceased its operations in 1997. The tax authorities seized the equipment 
to cover fines owed by the BSF for alleged tax violations. On December 
18, the Belarusian Supreme Economic Court upheld the seizure of the 
equipment. Most independent human rights monitors believe the 
authorities selectively enforced the law in this case to hinder the 
printing and distribution of independent media critical of the current 
authorities.
    Independent journalists were frequently barred by government 
authorities from covering events or arrested in the course of doing so.
    On March 1, officials of the presidential security service detained 
three journalists covering an unsanctioned opposition demonstration 
near Lukashenko's residence. The three journalists, reporters from 
Radio Liberty and the independent Belarusian news service Belapan and a 
Reuters photographer, were detained for several hours and later 
released.
    On March 16, six journalists from the satirical journal Navinky 
were detained by plainclothes police after participating in the Freedom 
March II demonstration in Minsk (see section 2.b.). The journalists 
were held for several hours without explanation and released the 
following morning.
    On March 25, in a violent crackdown on an opposition-organized 
rally to commemorate the 82nd anniversary of the Belarusian National 
Republic, 35 foreign and local independent journalists were beaten and 
detained. Journalists reported that they were not given an explanation 
as to why they were being detained, and, in some instances, the police 
used violent force to arrest the journalists. Journalists reportedly 
were searched, equipment was confiscated, and film exposed. The 
journalists were released later the same day.
    On April 28, Yahor Mayorchyk, a freelance reporter for Radio Free 
Europe/Radio liberty (RFE/RL) was summoned to a military enlistment 
office where he reportedly was interrogated by KGB officers for 90 
minutes. The KGB officers reportedly threatened that if Mayorchuk did 
not cooperate with the KGB, ``the same thing would happen as to 
Babitsky.'' The KGB officers were referring to RFE/RL journalist Andrei 
Babitsky, who was arrested by Russian authorities in Chechnya for his 
coverage of the war there, held captive for 40 days, and faced trumped 
up charges of treason.
    On May 1, two independent journalists were arrested while covering 
an opposition demonstration in Mogilev. Igor Irkho, a journalist with 
the De Facto newspaper, reportedly was assaulted physically by the 
police and had his camera damaged. He and Alexander Alexandrovich, a 
reporter for the Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta, were detained for several 
hours by local militia before being released.
    On May 2, five journalists from the Reporter newspaper gathered in 
Lenin Square in Grodno to protest the city government's refusal to 
register their paper. Minutes after gathering on the square, the 
journalists were arrested by local police and detained for several 
hours.
    On October 20, tax authorities launched an investigation into the 
accounts of the independent newspaper De-Fakto. On November 20, De-
Fakto was fined over $1,770 (2 million rubles) for alleged unpaid taxes 
and fines. On October 25, the State Committee on Press issued a warning 
to the Belarusian Language Society for an article that appeared in its 
newspaper, Nasha Slova, by an unregistered organization, the Grodno 
Association of Democratic Veterans of War and Labor. On November 21, 
the State Committee on press issued a fourth warning to the independent 
newspaper Pahonya, based in Grodno, for publishing a statement by an 
unregistered organization, the Grodno initiative, an association of 
local opposition organizations. After two warnings, legal proceedings 
can be initiated to close a newspaper. Also, under the administrative 
code, publishing materials on behalf of unregistered organizations is 
punishable by a fine and, if repeated, by up to 15 days imprisonment. 
On November 15, the bank accounts of Novaya Gazeta, in the town of 
Smorgon, were blocked. Human rights monitors said these incidents were 
part of a government-wide pattern aimed at restricting the activities 
of independent press.
    On December 12, police in Osipovichy, raided an apartment where 
Nikolai Tomashov, editor of the independent newspaper Panorama, and 
journalist Igor Simbirov were working on the next issue of the 
newspaper. Simbrov was beaten by police, a search was conducted and 
documents and a computer were seized. Simbirov and Tomashov were then 
taken to the procurator's office where they were charged with 
slandering government officials.
    Until government authorities shut it down during 1996, Radio 101.2 
had been the sole Belarusian-language independent station in the 
country. The Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, a government-
subsidized presidential youth organization, was permitted to take 
control of Radio 101.2. An independent Belarusian-language crossborder 
radio station, Radio Ratcija, based in Poland, began operation during 
the year. However, in April the Foreign Ministry's special commission 
for accrediting foreign journalists refused to register four of the 
radio station's journalists based in Belarus.
    State-controlled Belarusian Television and Radio (B-TR) maintained 
its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news 
programs regularly featured reporting that was biased heavily in favor 
of the current authorities, sharply critical of opposition politicians, 
and failed to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints. Local, 
independent television stations operated in some areas and relatively 
were unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, most of these 
stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on 
national-level issues or were subject to censorship.
    On March 10, Yaraslaw Beklyamishchaw, director and host of the 
``Krok-2'' talk show on B-TR, was dismissed from his position after 
inviting opponents of the Government to appear on his program. One of 
the guests on the program was Yury Khashchavtski, producer of a 
documentary film about Lukashenko entitled ``An Ordinary President.'' 
The official reason for his dismissal was ``a flagrant violation of the 
rules of presentation of the program on the air and its noncompliance 
with the cue sheet.'' Beklyamishchaw sued B-TR for unlawful dismissal, 
and on June 14, B-TR agreed to an out-of-court settlement of the case. 
In March 1998, the Presidential Administration issued an internal 
directive entitled ``On Strengthening Countermeasures Against Articles 
in the Opposition Press.'' The directive, which remains in effect, 
specifically lists 10 independent media organizations covered by these 
provisions and prohibits government officials from making comments or 
distributing documents to nonstate media. It also forbids state 
enterprises from advertising in nonstate media. Although the directive 
does not restrict directly independent media or impinge on the right of 
citizens to receive information, it does restrict government officials 
in speaking to the independent media and gives further advantages to 
the state press.
    In July Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television 
network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting 
for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When 
Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was 
found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet 
were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the 
Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and 
Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences, 
respectively. Government authorities accused the opposition of 
organizing Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and 
later threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an 
interview, published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed 
Lukashenko and Belarusian security services for Zavadsky's 
disappearance. A criminal investigation of the disappearance was 
opened, but no progress had been reported by year's end (see Section 
1.b.).
    A 1997 Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of 
all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to 
apply for accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the 
application form for accreditation requested biographic information, as 
well as a record of the applicant's journalistic activity. Journalists 
who were residents of Belarus also were required to register with the 
state tax authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has used its 
authority to deny accreditation to four journalists from Radio Ratcija, 
and there were reports that other journalists from foreign media 
outlets have been threatened with a loss of their accreditation for 
reporting on opposition-related activities.
    In January the authorities and the state-run media began a campaign 
of harassment against poet and writer Vasil Bykov. Bykov, a leading 
proponent of ``Glasnost'' in the 1980's and a literary prize winner, 
recently had returned to the country after several years. According to 
the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Bykov fled to Germany as a result of 
the harassment. On January 28, the OSCE representative on freedom of 
the media, Freimut Duve, wrote a letter to the Belarusian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs urging the Government to end its campaign of harassment 
against Bykov. In his letter, Duve said ``today in Belarus we have 
favorable conditions for the return of the ideology that dominated 
during Soviet times.''
    On August 11, 1999, the international NGO Reporters sans Frontiers 
described the Government as an enemy of the Internet. A public 
statement issued by the organization noted that citizens were not free 
to explore the Internet independently. Although there are several 
Internet service providers in the country, they are all state 
controlled. The Lukashenko regime's monopoly on Internet service 
results in high prices, poor quality, and limited service and allows 
for the monitoring of practically all e-mail. Although the authorities 
have full control, it does not appear to be cutting off access 
entirely, and those who do have access appear to be able to contact a 
full range of unfiltered web sites. A June survey by an independent 
polling organization found that less than 3 percent of the population 
has access to the Internet.
    The Lukashenko regime restricts academic freedom. A sharply 
critical Human Rights Watch report released in July 1999 detailed 
government restrictions on academic freedom. The report noted that the 
authorities had suppressed research on controversial topics, 
recentralized academic decisionmaking, and maintained a ban on 
political activity on campuses. At the same time, a ``systematic 
crackdown'' on political dissent on campuses had targeted outspoken 
students and lecturers who were threatened with expulsion, often for 
their off-campus political activity. The report also asserted that 
state university authorities issued reprimands and warnings to 
politically active lecturers, independent historians, and other 
academics. It stated that university employees who challenge the status 
quo are told to curtail political activities or change the focus of 
their academic inquiry. University administrators target research into 
politically sensitive issues, such as the Belarusian independence 
movement during the Soviet era, a theme that is seen to challenge the 
State's policy of integration with Russia and is discouraged heavily.
    In June four students of the Minsk State Linguistic University were 
prevented from taking final exams because they refused to become 
members of the Belarusian patriotic Youth Union, a pro-Lukashenko 
student association that has been connected to violent attacks on 
opposition activists in the past.
    The Lukashenko regime continued to harass students engaged in 
antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. Some students were 
expelled for their participation in demonstrations. In June the 
Belarusian State University initially rejected the graduation thesis of 
Pavel Severinets, the leader of the Malady Front, the youth branch of 
the Belarusian Popular Front. Severinets wrote and defended his thesis 
in the traditional version of the Belarusian language. After appeals 
from human rights groups, Severinets' dissertation was approved.
    Over 30 university students, who were expelled for their 
participation in street demonstrations, were assisted in continuing 
their studies in the Czech Republic by private NGO's. Sergei Martselev 
and Nikolai Privarnikov were expelled from the international relations 
faculty of the Belarusian State University for their participation in 
demonstrations in 1999. Vadim Kinopatsky was expelled from the 
Belarusian Agro-Technical University, also for his participation in 
demonstrations in late 1999.
    In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree, effective as of 
the 1997-98 academic year, requiring students who receive free 
university education from the state to accept jobs assigned by the 
authorities upon graduation. Although it remains unclear how 
universally this decree is enforced, there were reports that graduates 
in the medical and teaching professions were required to accept 
government jobs upon graduation. On April 11 and 12, approximately 20 
student activists from the National Association of Belarusian Students 
held a demonstration at the Minsk State Medical Institute to protest 
the assigning of graduates to jobs in areas contaminated by radiation 
from the Chernobyl disaster.
    On September 8, the Ministry of Justice issued a second warning to 
the National Association of Belarusian Students (NABS) for using 
unregistered symbols. According to the Ministry, the color and size of 
the association's letterhead was incorrect. On March 23, the NABS was 
warned by the Ministry of Justice for using the word ``Miensk,'' an 
older spelling of Minsk, in its documents. Two warnings in 1 year is 
sufficient for the authorities to initiate proceedings to close the 
organization down. The second warning was nullified by the Supreme 
Economic Court on September 22. Most human rights observers believe the 
warnings were part of a larger crackdown on independent NGO's (see 
Section 4).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Lukashenko 
regime severely restricts this right in practice. Organizers must apply 
at least 15 days in advance to local officials for permission to 
conduct a demonstration, rally, or meeting. The local government must 
respond with a decision not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled 
event.
    Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 5 in 1997 in part to 
regulate what he termed the ``orgy'' of street protests taking place. 
The decree further limits citizens' ability to assemble peacefully by 
restricting the locations where rallies may take place and allowing 
local authorities to put strict limits on the number of participants. 
The decree also prohibits the display of unregistered flags and 
symbols, as well as placards bearing messages deemed threatening to the 
State or public order (see Section 2.a.). The decree, along with 
subsequent amendments adopted by the acting legislature, imposes severe 
penalties on those who violate the law, particularly the organizers of 
events. The decree allows for either monetary fines or detention for up 
to 15 days, but courts frequently impose high fines that those 
convicted cannot pay. When individuals fail to pay fines, authorities 
threaten to confiscate their property. The courts punished organizers 
of rallies with fines of several times the average monthly wage.
    Public demonstrations occurred frequently in Minsk but were always 
under strict government control, including through open videotaping of 
the participants by the police and plainclothes security officers. 
Demonstrations also occurred in other parts of the country but were 
less frequent especially in areas in the east close to the border with 
Russia. Following some sanctioned and unsanctioned demonstrations, 
police and other security officials continued to round up, beat, 
detain, and try to coerce confessions from some demonstration 
participants (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On January 18, Yawhen Asinski was sentenced to 2 years of 
corrective labor for participating in an opposition organized march on 
October 17, 1999. Asinski initially was charged with participating in 
group actions disturbing the peace, a charge punishable by up to 2 
years in prison. That charge later was dismissed, and he was convicted 
of violent resistance to a police officer on duty when video evidence, 
displayed at the trial, showed that Asinski was not an active 
participant in the demonstration.
    On February 3, police in Minsk arrested five participants in an 
unsanctioned demonstration near the Russian Embassy against Russian 
atrocities in Chechnya. On February 5 and 9, seven participants in 
unsanctioned demonstrations against the Chechnya conflict also were 
arrested. Philip Klikushin and Leonid Malakov, who were arrested on 
February 9, reported that they were beaten by police.
    On March 1, three opposition activists were arrested by 
presidential security services while staging an unsanctioned 
demonstration near Lukashenko's residence on the anniversary of the 
arrest of Victor Gonchar (see Section 1.b.). As soon as the activists 
assembled, they were arrested along with three journalists covering the 
event (see Section 2.a.).
    On March 17, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators participated in the 
Freedom March II. While security services maintained a strong presence, 
the event proceeded peacefully. However, Minsk schools and universities 
reportedly required students to be present at evening school events, 
apparently in an effort to prevent them from participating in the 
demonstrations. Following the demonstration, President Lukashenko spoke 
to reporters while visiting Brest on March 16 and said that ``people 
holding a grudge'' against the Government, such as ``market 
speculators,'' dominated Freedom March II, which was billed as a youth 
demonstration against the Government. Following Lukashenko's remarks, 
the deputy chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee said that 
organizers of the demonstration failed to keep their promise not to 
block traffic and banned all further street demonstrations in Minsk. 
While the ban only was enforced selectively, Minsk City authorities 
frequently denied permission for demonstrators to march in the city, 
except to a park on the outskirts of the city.
    According to local human rights lawyers, more than 300 of some 700 
demonstrators, including 35 journalists were arrested and prosecuted 
for their participation in the March 25 Day of Freedom March (see 
Section 1.c., 2.a., and 1.d.). All the detainees were forced into 
police vehicles and taken to an Interior Ministry facility in Minsk. 
Some were searched illegally, and they were not allowed to contact 
colleagues, family, or friends. Film shot by press photographers 
reportedly was confiscated and exposed.
    On April 18, local authorities in Borisov banned an opposition-
organized demonstration scheduled for April 25, to commemorate the 14th 
anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe. On April 20, the Minsk City 
Executive Council followed the Borisov City Council's decision and 
banned opposition organizations from staging demonstrations or marches 
in downtown Minsk on April 26, known as the Chernobylsky Shlyakh 
(Chernobyl path). On April 25, 1 day before the scheduled event, Minsk 
authorities reversed their decision and approved the march route from a 
park near the city center to a park on the outskirts of the city. Over 
30,000 demonstrators participated in the march on April 26. According 
to the OSCE AMG, organizers of the march responsible for the sound 
equipment were detained for several hours following the conclusion of 
the demonstration.
    Also on April 26, a small group of demonstrators remained at the 
park after the initiation of the march. According to the OSCE AMG, in 
an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force,'' special units of the 
militia conducted a ``brutal raid'' on the group in which five 
demonstrators were detained forcibly and violently. The demonstrators 
were later released. On April 27, opposition activist Yury Kuzmitsky 
was sentenced to 5 days' imprisonment for his participation in the 
demonstration under charges of minor hooliganism. Denis Yeryomenko was 
convicted of ``illegal use of flags, pennants, emblems, symbols or 
placards'' for carrying a caricature of Lukashenko. On April 28, Sergei 
Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' imprisonment for ``speaking of the 
President in foul language'' at the demonstration.
    In Mogilev on April 26, over 100 demonstrators marched in an 
unsanctioned demonstration commemorating the Chernobyl disaster. 
Anatoly Fyodorov, the local leader of the Belarusian Popular Front, was 
arrested and charged with organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. On 
May 1, in Mogilyev, dozens of opposition activists and 13 journalists 
were arrested when they attempted to stage a counter-demonstration to 
the officially sanctioned pro-Lukashenko rally held in the town square. 
Four organizers of the demonstration were later prosecuted for 
organizing an unsanctioned demonstration.
    On April 28, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned all street 
demonstrations on May 1, Labor Day. The May 1 holiday has been a 
traditional day for pro- and antigovernment demonstrations. The 
opposition Social Democratic Party and the opposition Belarusian Party 
of Communists applied for permission to demonstrate in the center of 
Minsk but were denied. Later, the pro-Lukashenko Communist Party of 
Belarus, headed by the deputy head of the Minsk City Executive 
Committee, was given permission to hold a demonstration in the center 
of Minsk.
    On May 7, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned a rally at 
victory square in the city center, organized by the opposition 
conservative Christian Party to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the 
victory over the Nazis. On May 10, the Minsk City Executive banned the 
opposition Belarusian Social Democratic Party from holding poetry 
readings in Yanka Kupala Park in the city center.
    On May 19, Dimitry Marchuk and Yan Grib, two opposition activists, 
were arrested while demonstrating outside the court house at the 
sentencing of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. (see Section 1.e.). 
The demonstrators, who were chanting ``freedom to Chigir,'' were 
charged with using foul language, detained for several hours, and later 
fined. On May 21, local activists from the Belarusian Social Democratic 
Party demonstrated on the central square in Borisov in support of 
former Prime Minister Chigir. Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Telezhnikov, 
and Alesya Yasyuk were arrested by local militia and charged with 
organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. Abramovich was sentenced to 
15 days' imprisonment, Telezhnikvo to 10 days imprisonment, and Yasyuk 
was issued a $404 (390,000 rubles) fine (see Section 1.d.).
    On May 30, opposition activists Alexei Balashov and Sergei Garstuk 
were detained by police for hanging a white-red-white flag with a black 
mourning strip on Lenin Square in downtown Brest in commemoration of 
the 53 people killed in a stampede in a Minsk metro station in 1999. 
The activists were detained for several hours and charged with 
violating the law on mass gatherings and assemblies.
    On June 19, Aleksandr Abramovich again was sentenced to 12 days' 
imprisonment for staging an unsanctioned demonstration in Borisov on 
June 15, in which demonstrators chained themselves to a flagpole in 
front of the city government building and demanded the resignation of 
the city executive chairman.
    On June 20, United Civic Party activists Vladimir Romanovsky, 
Galina Goncharik, Lyudmila Bozhok, and Aleksei Rodionov were arrested 
for holding an unsanctioned rally near the Minsk city government 
building to protest the city government's repeated banning of 
opposition demonstrations. Romanovsky later was fined $400 (390,000 
rubles) for organizing the rally. Deputy Chairman of the Minsk City 
Executive Committee, Viktor Chikin, warned the trio that UCP activists 
needed to apply for permission to hold such demonstrations and further 
warned there would be harsher punishment if they continued to violate 
the laws on assembly.
    On July 10, Minsk city authorities banned an annual Catholic 
procession in the center of Minsk commemorating the feast of Corpus 
Christi. The march, which regularly attracted up to 5,000 participants, 
had been held annually since 1991. A second appeal by the organizers 
also was denied. The denial of the march was considered by many human 
rights observers to be part of a larger crackdown on non-Orthodox 
religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
    On July 18, three activists of the Belarusian popular front were 
convicted by a court in Zaslavl, in the Minsk region, and issued 
warnings for ``attempting to organize a meeting with the community'' 
and for ``violating street demonstration regulations'' on July 4. On 
July 4, the activists were attempting to organize an unsanctioned rally 
when they were arrested by police. On July 27, activists of the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party staged an unsanctioned protest in 
front of the Gomel regional executive committee offices against the 
establishment of a Fascist regime in Belarus. Yekaterina Gorovaya and 
Igor Romanov were arrested by local police and sentenced to 5 and 7 
days' imprisonment, respectively, for organizing an unsanctioned 
demonstration.
    On August 3, Alekandr Abramovich and local activists of the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party held a rally in the center of 
Borisov to protest authorities efforts to curb dissent and urge 
authorities to resume the supply of hot water in the city. Police 
arrested Abramovich and four others. Abramovich was sentenced to 15 
days' imprisonment for organizing an unsanctioned protest. In the first 
9 months of the year, Abramovich spent over 100 days in detention for 
allegedly violating regulations on assemblies and demonstrations.
    On August 6, local authorities in the town of Byarza, in the Brest 
region, banned the local branch of the Belarusian Popular Front from 
holding a public meeting with town residents. Authorities in nearby 
Belaazyorsk also banned a similar meeting the following day.
    On September 16, human rights and opposition activists staged a 
demonstration in Minsk on the anniversary of the disappearance of 
Victor Gonchar and Anatoly Krasovsky. The demonstrations was banned by 
the city authorities. At the conclusion of the demonstration, 
plainclothes men and uniformed police beat and detained several 
participants, including journalists monitoring the event. Charges 
against the participants later were dropped.
    Prior to the parliamentary elections on October 15, law enforcement 
authorities banned small and large demonstrations across the country 
advocating an election boycott and arrested and fined hundreds of 
activists promoting the boycott (see Section 3).
    The Belarusian authorities increased harassment of homosexuals. On 
February 21, Minsk police raided and closed, without explanation, a 
disco club known as a meeting place for homosexuals. On September 7, 
Minsk city authorities banned a Gay Pride-2000 parade in downtown 
Minsk, scheduled for September 9. On September 7, Minsk authorities 
also closed another night club where festivities were being held to 
mark the opening of the Gay Pride-2000 weekend. In 1999 the Ministry of 
Justice denied registration to country's only lesbian and gay rights 
NGO.
    Authorities provide for freedom of association; however, the 
authorities do not respect and severely restricts this right in 
practice. According to members of parties in opposition to the 
President, authorities frequently deny permission to opposition groups 
to meet in public buildings. Employees at state-run enterprises are 
discouraged from joining independent trade unions (see Section 6.a.). 
The authorities regularly harass members and supporters of opposition 
parties and confiscate leaflets and publications. Officials have warned 
alumni of foreign-sponsored education programs against continued 
affiliation with their programs' sponsoring agencies.
    On January 26, 1999, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 2, 
requiring all political parties, trade unions, and nongovernmental 
organizations to reregister with authorities by July 1. Such public 
associations completed a lengthy reregistration process in 1995. The 
timing of the decree, which increased the scope of operations and 
number of members that organizations would need to demonstrate to 
qualify for reregistration, apparently was intended as a method of 
political intimidation at a time of increased opposition activity. On 
July 1, 1999, regulations that prohibited private organizations from 
using private residences as their legal addresses were announced. In 
view of government control or ownership of many office buildings, the 
regulations had the effect of complicating the reregistration process.
    After the reregistration process had begun, the authorities 
announced that organizations would have to alter their charters to 
indicate recognition of the 1996 Constitution and that the words 
``popular'' or ``national'' could not be used in their titles. On 
December 17, 1999, an amendment to the Law on Public Associations went 
into effect that prohibits political and social organizations from 
using the words ``Belarus,'' ``Republic of Belarus,'' ``national'' or 
``popular'' in their titles. Also in December 1999, Lukashenko signed 
into law a bill on amendments to the Administrative Offenses Code that 
would make any work on behalf of an unregistered NGO punishable by 
fines. Although most of the major political parties and unions that 
applied were allowed to reregister, according to the Assembly of 
Belarusian Prodemocratic NGO's, only 1,268, or 57 percent of the NGO's 
in existence when the reregistration law went into effect were 
reregistered by the summer of 2000. A total of 202 NGO's were rejected 
by the Ministry of Justice for reregistration on various grounds, and 
31 were still in the process of reregistering at year's end.
    On April 11, the Gomel regional court ordered a local association 
for the unemployed, founded in 1992 by human rights monitor Yevgeny 
Murashko, to be closed for failure to comply with the January 1999 
decree on NGO reregistration. On May 16, Malady Front, the youth wing 
of the Belarusian Popular Front, applied for registration under the new 
legislation. On August 17, the Ministry of Justice notified the Malady 
Front that its application was still ``under consideration,'' the 
application later was rejected.
    On July 17, the Francisak Skaryna Belarusian language society (BLS) 
was issued a warning by the Ministry of Justice under Article 28 of the 
Law on Public Associations for misuse of the organization's seal.
    On July 19, the opposition United Civic Party received two written 
warnings from the Ministry of Justice also for misuse of blank forms 
and seals. One warning was issued because the party's e-mail address 
was printed too close to the seal on the party's letterhead. A third 
warning was issued on July 31 to the party for allegedly illegally 
establishing a party cell at a chemical factory. By September the party 
had been issued a total of five warnings. Although two warnings are 
sufficient for the Justice Ministry to close an organization, the 
warnings appeared to be attempts to intimidate and harass opposition 
political organizations, and no attempts had been made to close the 
organizations as a result of these warnings.
    Authorities continued to attempt to limit severely the activities 
of NGO's (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the authorities restrict this right in practice. 
Although Article 16 of the 1996 amended Constitution, which resulted 
from an illegal referendum, reaffirms the equality of religions and 
denominations before the law, it also contains restrictive language 
that stipulates that cooperation between the State and religious 
organizations ``is regulated with regard for their influence on the 
formation of spiritual, cultural, and country traditions of the 
Belarusian people.''
    Since his election as the country's president in July 1994, 
Lukashenko has pursued a policy of favoring the Orthodox Church as the 
country's chief religion and harassing other non-Orthodox religions. 
Lukashenko and the authorities encourage a greater role for the 
Orthodox Church. The President grants the Orthodox Church special 
financial advantages that other denominations do not enjoy and has 
declared the preservation and development of Orthodox Christianity a 
``moral necessity.'' On April 30, Lukashenko said on state radio that 
``nobody will disturb our Orthodoxy'' and pledged that the State ``will 
do everything for the Church to be a pillar of support for our State in 
the future.'' In December 1999, Lukashenko said that politicians and 
the Head of State bear responsibility for preserving Christian values, 
for maintaining religious peace in society, and for harmonious 
cooperation between the State and the Church. Lukashenko also said that 
the Church should be more active in promoting the unity of Slavic 
nations because Slavic integration is in the interests of both the 
State and the Church. In 1998 Lukashenko pledged state assistance to 
the Orthodox Church and stressed that Orthodoxy would remain the ``main 
religion.''
    The State Committee on Religious and National Affairs (SCRNA), 
which was established in 1997, categorizes religions and denominations. 
Some are viewed as ``traditional,'' including Russian Orthodoxy, Roman 
Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam (as practiced by a small community of 
ethnic Tatars with roots in the country dating back to the 11th 
century); some are viewed as ``nontraditional,'' including some 
Protestant and other faiths; and some are viewed as ``sects,'' 
including Eastern religions and other faiths. The authorities deny 
permission to register legally at the national level to some faiths 
considered to be nontraditional and to all considered to be sects. 
Without registration it is extremely difficult to rent or purchase 
property in order to hold religious services.
    The authorities deny some minority religious faiths permission to 
register officially and treats them as sects. In 1998 SCRNA official 
Vyacheslav Savitskiy announced that ``11 destructive religious 
organizations, which have been denied registration after expert 
examination, illegally function in the country.'' In April 1999, a 
conference organized by the Orthodox Church and the National Assembly 
discussed the need to introduce legislation to combat ``destructive 
sects'' that operate illegally in the country. More recently the 
authorities continued to deny repeated attempts by the Belarusian 
Orthodox Autocephalous Church (BOAC) to register. Following a raid by 
local police on a private house where a prayer service was being held, 
Ivan Spasyuk, a BOAC priest, went on a hunger strike on November 7, 
1999, in order to protest the authorities' refusal to register his 
parish in the Grodno region. On November 28, 1999, at the urging of his 
family and parishioners, Spasyuk called off the hunger strike. Local 
courts so far have refused to hear appeals made by the BOAC to overturn 
the Lukashenko regime's decision not to register their churches. 
Because of ongoing registration problems, including the inability to 
register a seminary, the BOAC is unable to train a sufficient number of 
priests to meet the growing needs of its parishioners.
    A number of Protestant faiths confront a situation in which they 
are refused registration because they do not have a legal address and 
are refused property that could qualify as a legal address because they 
are not registered. The Full Gospel Pentecostal churches regularly are 
refused registration in this way. Article 272 of the Civil Code states 
that property may only be used for religious services once it has been 
converted from residential use. However, the authorities decline to 
permit such conversion to unregistered religions. Religious groups that 
can not register often are forced to meet illegally or in the homes of 
individual members. Several charismatic and Pentecostal churches have 
been evicted from property they were renting because they were not 
registered as religious organizations. A number of nontraditional 
Protestant and other faiths have not attempted to register because they 
do not believe that their applications would be approved. The 
publication of religious literature for unregistered religions likely 
would be restricted in practice, especially at state-controlled 
publishing houses. However, there were no reports of restrictions on 
the importation of religious literature. State employees are not 
required to take any kind of religious oath or practice elements of a 
particular faith. However, the practice of a faith not viewed to be 
traditional, especially one not permitted to register, could 
disadvantage possible advancement within the bureaucracy or state 
sector.
    Citizens are not prohibited from proselytizing; however, the 
authorities enforce a July 1995 Council of Ministers decree that 
controls religious workers in an attempt to protect Orthodoxy and 
prevent the growth of evangelical religions. A 1997 Council of 
Ministers directive prohibits teaching religion at youth camps. In 
February 1999, the Council of Ministers passed Decree No. 280 which 
expanded upon these earlier regulations. The decree appears to 
stipulate, among other things, that among foreign religious workers, 
only male clergy may engage in religious work upon invitation from a 
religious organization already officially registered, a provision that 
could be invoked to prohibit female religious clergy, such as Catholic 
nuns, from engaging in religious activity. However, this provision has 
not been tested in the courts.
    During the year, the authorities stepped up its efforts to curb the 
role of foreign clergy. In April the Council of Ministers introduced 
changes to its regulations, that allow internal affairs agencies to 
expel foreign clergymen from the country by not extending their 
registration or by denying them a temporary stay permit. Under the new 
regulations, these authorities are allowed to make decisions on 
expulsion on their own or based on recommendations from religious 
affairs councils, regional executive committees, or from the religious 
affairs department of the Minsk City Executive Committee. Appeals to 
judicial bodies are not provided for.
    As part of efforts to curb the influence of foreign clergy, on 
March 18, two law enforcement officials entered the Roman Catholic 
church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross in Brest, during a church 
service, and arrested Catholic Priest Zbigniew Karolak, a Polish 
citizen, for allegedly violating visa regulations and charged that his 
religious work was ``illegal.'' Regional government officials had 
criticized publicly Karolak for his ``undermining views.'' In addition 
a court in Brest issued warnings to four supporters of Karoljak for 
staging an unauthorized demonstration following the priest's arrest. 
Karolak departed the country in June, following warnings from 
authorities that he would be removed by force if he did not depart the 
country. Subsequent to Karolak's departure, a Brest regional court in 
November overturned the legality of the deportation order and a police 
order barring Karoljack from entering the country for 10 years. In 
February the Belarusian pastor of a Pentecostal church was warned by 
SCRNA authorities that a public sermon was performed in his church by a 
citizen of Ukraine in violation of the law on religion and that a 
future violation of the law would lead to a revocation of his church's 
registration.
    Foreigners generally are prohibited from preaching or heading 
churches, at least with respect to what the authorities view as 
nontraditional faiths or sects, which include Protestant groups. 
Foreign missionaries may not engage in religious activities outside the 
institutions that invited them. One-year validity, multiple-entry, 
``spiritual activities'' visas, which are required officially of 
foreign missionaries, can be difficult to get, even for faiths that 
registered with the authorities and have a long history in the country. 
Foreign clergy or religious workers who do not register with the 
authorities or who have tried to preach without government approval or 
without an invitation from, and the permission of, a registered 
religious organization, have been expelled from the country. Approval 
often involves a difficult bureaucratic process.
    Officially sanctioned newspaper attacks on minority faiths 
increased. For example, on April 19, the Narodnaya Gazetta, a state-
owned and published newspaper, carried an article with the headline 
``The Prospect Looms for Belarus to Become a Protestant Republic, or We 
are Incessantly Being Urged to Deny the Faith of our Ancestors.'' The 
article stated that Protestant groups engage in fanatical rituals, 
including the ritual use of human blood and human sacrifice. The 
article claimed that Protestant groups present a threat to the country 
and urged the Government to take steps to protect Orthodoxy. In a 
similar article in January, state-owned Narodnaya Gazetta criticized 
the leader of the BOAC, Ivan Spasyuk, accusing him of criminal 
activities and characterized the church as the ``spiritual followers of 
Hitler.'' Attacks on Protestant faiths have also appeared on state-
owned television. In November and December, a documentary entitled 
``Expansion'' was aired on state television, which alleged that 
Protestant community carried out fanatical rituals. Protestant pastors 
appealed to the courts to stop the television programs, but they were 
denied.
    Societal anti-Semitism persists, and the Lukashenko regime has done 
little to counter the spread of anti-Semitic literature. In January the 
World Association of Belarusian Jewry and the Human Rights Center 
stated that Lukashenka was anti-Semitic and said that the government 
had refused to establish Jewish schools, help maintain Jewish 
cemeteries and historic monuments, or create memorials to Belarusian 
Holocaust victims. In May the Minsk city court refused to hear an 
appeal brought by Jewish organizations to stop the publishing and sale 
of the book ``War According to Mean Laws,'' published by the Orthodox 
printing house, which, among other anti-Semitic writings, included the 
``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and blamed Jews for societal and 
economic problems in the country (see Section 5). There has been a 
noticeable lack of government action in redressing instances of anti-
Semitic vandalism in previous years. In April tax inspectors prohibited 
the central synagogue in Minsk from distributing Matzoh for Passover 
among members of the Jewish community. The tax inspectors reported that 
the synagogue would need to obtain a special license, register as a 
taxpayer, and open a store that would meet certain additional 
requirements, thereby effectively making distribution during the 
Passover celebration impossible.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--According to the Constitution, citizens 
are free to travel within the country and to live and work where they 
wish; however, the authorities restrict these rights in practice. The 
authorities issues internal passports to all adults, which serve as 
primary identity documents and are required for travel, permanent 
housing, and hotel registration.
    In June 1999, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an 
article of the Administrative Code barring enterprises, establishments, 
and organizations from employing persons without a ``propiska'' (pass) 
or the compulsory registration of their residence address. Under 
article 182 of the Administrative Code, employers faced fines for 
giving jobs to persons who had no stamp in their passport indicating 
that their residence and their new place of employment were located in 
the same city or district. However, it remains unclear to what extent 
this court decision actually has affected local security officials. In 
practice the right to choose one's residence remains restricted. In 
November 1999, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced a three-stage 
program to replace the ``propiska'' system, but there were no reports 
that this program was implemented.
    Official regulations on entry and exit require citizens who wish to 
travel abroad to receive first a ``global'' exit visa in their 
passport, valid for between 1 and 5 years. Once the traveler has these 
documents, the law does not restrict travel. The authorities have 
delayed issuing ``global'' exit visas to some opposition activists in 
an effort to hinder their political activity abroad.
    Following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the 
Lukashenko regime took measures aimed at limiting the travel of 
opposition politicians who refused to submit to the legislature created 
by the November 1996 referendum. Parliamentarians who did not join the 
new legislature could no longer travel on their diplomatic passports, 
despite the fact that these individuals had been assured that they 
would retain their status as deputies until their terms of office 
expired. Although their diplomatic passports were not confiscated, the 
border guards reportedly had a blacklist of opposition members who were 
to be denied exit from the country if they used a diplomatic passport. 
Subsequent to the 1997 refusal by border guards to allow former Supreme 
Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Parliamentary Deputy Anatoly 
Lebdeko to travel abroad on their diplomatic passports, a number of 
members of the former Supreme Soviet have either acquired regular 
passports and have been allowed to travel abroad or have departed from 
Russia using their Belarusian diplomatic passports. The Government has 
delayed issuing passports to several opposition politicians, sometimes 
for several months, in an effort to restrict their travel abroad for 
political activities.
    According to official data, the State did not deny any citizen 
permission to emigrate. However, legislation restricting emigration by 
those with access to ``state secrets'' remained in effect, and any 
citizen involved in a criminal investigation also was ineligible to 
emigrate. Prospective emigrants who have been refused the right to 
emigrate may appeal to the courts.
    The Constitution gives aliens and stateless persons the same rights 
as citizens, except in cases established by law, international 
agreement, or the Constitution. The Constitution also allows the state 
to grant refugee status to persons who were being persecuted in other 
states for their political and religious convictions, or because of 
nationality. There is no law on first asylum, nor has it signed 
readmission agreements with any of its neighboring states.
    The authorities cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. In 1997 the authorities implemented for the first time the 
1995 law on refugees, granting refugee status to a group of Afghans. 
The UNHCR reported that throughout the year, 169 applications were 
submitted for refugee status and 219 applications were rejected at the 
registration stage. The Deputy Minister of Labour told journalists in 
July that 2,000 aliens applied for refugee status in Belarus since 1997 
and 385 applications were approved. Of the 385 applicants 294 were from 
Afghanistan. The Ministry reported that illegal aliens in the country 
were estimated to number between 150,000 and 200,000 during the year.
    The UNHCR noted in its July report that the Minsk city and Minsk 
region migration services regularly refuse to accept illegally arriving 
new refugee applicants and instruct such persons to apply with 
migration authorities in other regions. Regional migration services 
also continued to deny registration of refugee applications for refugee 
status of those asylum seekers who came though countries considered as 
safe (mainly Russia).
    The UNHCR had no reports of any case of bona fide refugees being 
forced to return to countries in which they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government.
    The Lukashenko regime severely limits the rights of citizens to 
change their government. In October parliamentary elections occurred 
for the first time since the disputed referendum of 1996. The elections 
followed a year of intense domestic and international activity that 
sought to create conditions for democratic elections. According to 
OSCE/ODIHR, these elections failed to meet international standards for 
democratic elections. In particular the elections fell far short of 
meeting the minimum commitments for free, fair, equal, accountable, and 
transparent elections. Despite some minor improvements since previous 
elections, the process remained seriously flawed.
    In the October election, 769 candidates were nominated for the 110 
seats. Of the 769, 551 were eventually registered by the District 
Election Commissions (DEC's). The Government severely restricted public 
participation on the electoral commissions. The Central Election 
Commission (CEC) accepted 23 more, who appealed their initial rejection 
by the DEC's and the Supreme Court accepted the appeals of 5 
individuals who were rejected by the CEC. A total of 578 candidates 
ultimately registered, 11 later withdrew, and one had his registration 
cancelled. Candidate registration procedures were abused systematically 
to prevent undesirable candidates, especially those opposed to the 
regime. Campaign activities were regulated excessively and heavily 
biased state-controlled media severely limited candidates access to the 
media and voter choice. Political coverage during the election period 
in both the electronic and print media was dominated by the president 
and executive branch. During the election, provisions for early voting, 
mobile ballot boxes, vote counting and the aggregation of results fell 
far short of minimum transparency requirements for independent 
verification. There were widespread reports of citizens employed in 
state enterprises, students and teachers, and those in the military 
being forced to vote or risk losing their position. Voter turnout in 
many constituencies fell below the required 50 percent threshold, but 
electoral authorities falsified and amended voter lists to raise 
turnout to the required minimum.
    Numerous rallies and boycotts were held throughout the campaign; 
some were peaceful, and others were disrupted by government authorities 
(see Section 2.b.). During the election campaign, coverage of politics, 
including the election was very limited. Political coverage in both the 
electronic and print media was dominated by the President and executive 
branch.
    The possibilities of electoral choice had been limited severely by 
earlier changes promulgated by Lukashenko in the country's initially 
democratic constitution. In November 1996, the executive branch 
conducted a controversial constitutional referendum that was neither 
free nor fair, according to credible international observers, including 
representatives of the European Union and the OSCE. Many members of 
Parliament and of the Constitutional Court actively opposed 
Lukashenko's proposals for both substantive and procedural reasons. The 
justices asserted that the referendum gave Lukashenko control over the 
legislative and judicial branches of Government and extended his term 
in office. They also criticized it on procedural grounds as an 
unconstitutional means to eliminate the Constitution's checks and 
balances and grant the President virtually unlimited powers.
    In the period leading up to the referendum, opponents of 
Lukashenko's proposals were denied access to the media, election 
officials failed to record the names of early voters, and no texts of 
the proposed Constitution were made available to voters until several 
days after citizens began voting. As a result of these irregularities, 
the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced prior to 
the event that he would not be able to certify the results of the 
referendum. Lukashenko promptly fired him, although the Constitution in 
force at the time gave the Parliament the exclusive authority to 
appoint and dismiss the CEC chairman. Members of the security forces 
forcibly removed the head of the CEC from his office. Shortly 
thereafter Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir resigned in protest at 
Lukashenko's refusal to cancel the widely criticized referendum.
    Most members of the international community chose not to send 
election monitors to observe the referendum because of the illegitimacy 
of the entire process. International human rights organizations 
protested the conduct of the referendum.
    The Constitutional Court formally ruled that the issues posed in 
Lukashenko's referendum could not be decided legally through a 
referendum and that its results should be purely advisory, consistent 
with the Constitution. However, after winning the referendum--according 
to the authorities' own official count--Lukashenko began to implement 
it immediately. The new Constitution established a bicameral 
legislature. Its 110 member house was formed out of the membership of 
the existing Supreme Soviet; deputies volunteered or were lured by 
promises of free housing and other benefits to serve in the body. The 
64-member upper house was created by a combination of presidential 
appointments and elections by the 6 regional or oblast councils and the 
Minsk city council. The transition left 86 electoral districts 
underrepresented because the new Constitution reduced the number of 
representatives, and also because a full Supreme Soviet had never been 
seated, largely due to the executive branch's restrictive intervention 
in the 1995 parliamentary elections.
    On August 31, 1999, legislative amendments to the 1996 Referendum 
Law, which the OSCE AMG declared were not in accordance with 
international standards, came into force. The amended law provides that 
referendums may be initiated by the President, the President's National 
Assembly, or 450,000 signatories of a petition--including a minimum of 
30,000 in the City of Minsk and in each of the country's six oblasts. 
The law makes 10 percent of all signatures subject to verification, and 
all signatures may be invalidated if the commission finds just 1 
percent (4,500 signatures) to be faulty. It also gave the President the 
prerogative to decide on the validity of referendum results.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
there are no legal restrictions on their participation. With the 
exception of the judiciary, social barriers to women are strong, and 
men hold virtually all of the leadership positions. In the legislature, 
women held 10 of 97 seats in the lower house and 19 of 62 in the upper 
house. The deputy chair of the upper house is a woman. The Minister of 
Social Security is the only female member of the Council of Ministers. 
The head of the Government's Central Election Commission also is a 
woman.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights.
    Several domestic human rights groups are active in the country; 
however, members of domestic human rights groups reported that the 
authorities hindered their attempts to investigate alleged human rights 
violations. The authorities monitored NGO correspondence and telephone 
conversations. It also attempted to limit severely the activities of 
NGO's through a time consuming reregistration process, denial of 
registration, questionable tax audits, and other means (see Section 
2.b.).
    On May 20, the Minsk office of the Association for Legal Assistance 
to the Population, a local NGO providing legal assistance to opposition 
activists and the families of persons who have disappeared, was robbed 
under suspicious circumstances. Computers with files related to the 
investigation of the disappearance of former Interior Minister Yury 
Zakharenko, among other items, were stolen (see Section 1.b.). Most 
human rights observers believed that the robbery was perpetrated by 
members of the security services. On May 29, in a similar incident, the 
offices of the Human Rights Center, headed by human rights lawyer Vera 
Stremkovskaya, was burglarized, and files of human rights violations 
stolen. There were no reports that authorities made credible efforts to 
investigate these incidents.
    On August 26, the Ministry of Justice issued a warning to the Human 
Rights Center for using unregistered symbols. It issued similar 
warnings to other influential local human rights organizations, 
including Viasna (Spring), the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, and 
Charter '97. On August 27, the Youth Organization Civic Forum was 
issued a warning for printing an article about poor living conditions 
at university dormitories in its newspaper. Civic Forum previously was 
issued two warnings for misuse of symbols. These warnings were part of 
an overall effort by authorities to hinder the work of human rights 
organizations critical of the Lukashenko regime.
    The country's poor human rights record continued to draw the 
attention of many international human rights organizations. In general 
the authorities have been willing to discuss human rights with 
international NGO's whose members have been allowed to visit the 
country; however, the authorities have increased its harassment of 
international NGO's working in the country. One way in which the 
authorities regularly harassed NGO's was through taxes. In February the 
International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Pro Media office, an 
international NGO working on freedom of media issues, reported a 
pattern of harassment from the tax police, involving independent media 
outlets with which it was working: Some organizations working with 
IREX/Pro Media were fined or had their bank accounts frozen. Tax 
authorities have seized the Foundation's Magic Printing Press as well 
(see Section 2.a.).
    On May 31, an employee of the Belarus office of a Western legal NGO 
foiled an attempted burglary of its Minsk office. When asked to provide 
identification, one of the three burglars claimed that they represented 
official law enforcement agencies. Although the local police were 
contacted, they refused to provide assistance, and no further 
investigation into the incident was made by the authorities. The NGO 
believes the burglary attempt was connected to their efforts to advise 
and support human rights and rule of law projects. In 1998 after 
protracted negotiations, the authorities approved the opening in Minsk 
of the OSCE's AMG office. Although the authorities often have 
disregarded OSCE intervention on human rights cases and its advice on 
draft legislation, the OSCE's presence in Minsk provides a potentially 
important forum for dialog on these issues. In September 1999, through 
OSCE-brokered meetings initiated by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's 
Belarus ad hoc committee Chairman Adrian Severin, government and 
opposition representatives began a dialog to try to resolve the 
country's ongoing constitutional and political crisis. By the end of 
1999, the process had been brought to a standstill and in February 1999 
the Lukashenko regime withdrew from the dialog and created a sham 
sociopolitical dialog with handpicked proregime NGO's. The new dialog 
likewise did not produce any results. On March 25, while observing an 
opposition demonstration in Minsk (see Section 2.b.), an officer of the 
OSCE AMG was arrested forcibly and detained for several hours, despite 
the fact that he clearly identified himself as a diplomatic observer 
and claimed diplomatic immunity.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status.
    The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law 
and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of 
their rights and legitimate interests. However, the Constitution does 
not prohibit specifically discrimination based on factors such as race, 
sex, or religion. The Law on Citizenship, grants citizenship to any 
person living permanently on the territory of the country as of October 
19, 1991. Those who arrived in the country after that date and wish to 
become citizens are required to submit an application for citizenship, 
take an oath to support the Constitution, have a legal source of 
income, and have lived in the country for 7 years.
    Women.--Although statistics are not available, domestic violence, 
including spousal abuse against women, is a significant problem, 
according to women's groups. However, spousal abuse is punishable under 
the Criminal and Administrative Codes.
    Non-severe beating is punishable by a fine or up to 15 days 
imprisonment. More serious offenses are punishable under the Criminal 
Code by up to 15 years in jail. Women's groups indicate that police 
generally are not hesitant to enforce the laws against domestic 
violence, and that the courts are not reluctant to impose sentences. 
The main problem is a general reluctance among women to report 
instances of domestic violence. Violence against women was not the 
subject of extensive media coverage, marches, or demonstrations during 
the year.
    Although the authorities and local human rights observers report 
that prostitution does not yet appear to be a significant problem in 
the country, there is much anecdotal evidence that it is growing. Local 
street prostitution appears to be growing as the economy deteriorates, 
and prostitution rings operate in state-owned hotels. Young women 
seeking to work or travel abroad also are vulnerable to sexual 
exploitation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs claims that very few 
women are deported back to the country for engaging in prostitution; 
however, it acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations may 
actively try to recruit and lure Belarusian women into serving as 
prostitutes in Western Europe and the Middle East. Trafficking in women 
is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment reportedly is widespread, but no specific laws 
deal with the problem other than laws against physical assault.
    The law requires equal wages for equal work; however, such is not 
always the case in practice. Women have significantly fewer 
opportunities for advancement to the upper ranks of management. Women 
report that managers frequently take into consideration whether a woman 
has children when considering potential job candidates. At a roundtable 
on April 20 on ``The Problem of the Trade in Women in Belarus,'' it was 
reported that the average length of unemployment for women was 18.4 
months versus 5 months for men. In 1999 the Government reported that 
approximately 64 percent of those considered to be long-term unemployed 
are single mothers.
    The level of education of women is higher than that of men. Women 
make up approximately 58 percent of workers with a higher education and 
approximately 66 percent of workers with a specialized secondary 
education. In these sectors, between two-thirds and three-fourths of 
employees (mostly women) live beneath the official poverty level. Women 
legally are equal to men with regard to property ownership and 
inheritance.
    Women's groups are active; most focus on issues such as child 
welfare, environmental concerns (in the aftermath of Chernobyl), and 
the preservation of the family. There is an active women's political 
party. A private university in Minsk established the country's first 
gender studies faculty in 1997.
    Children.--The authorities are committed to children's welfare and 
health, particularly as related to consequences of the nuclear accident 
at Chernobyl, and, with the help of foreign donors, tried to give them 
special attention. By law everyone is entitled to health care, 
including children. There does not appear to be any difference in the 
treatment of girls and boys. Children begin school at the age of 6 and 
are required to complete 9 years, although the authorities make 11 
years of education available at no cost and began to develop a 12-year 
education program. Higher education also is available at no cost on a 
competitive basis. Families with children receive token government 
benefits, such as discounted transportation. According to a 1999 World 
Bank study, the majority of those living in poverty are families with 
multiple children or single mothers.
    As part of the Lukashenko regime's efforts to promote a union with 
Russia and to reduce the influence of opposition movements, the 
authorities continued to discourage the promotion of, or the teaching 
of, students in the Belarusian language by limiting the availability of 
early childhood education in Belarusian. In its June report, the 
Belarusian Helsinki Committee reported that only 30 percent of students 
in primary schools are instructed in Belarusian. In Minsk only 11 of 
the 242 middle schools teach in the Belarusian language. In other 
regional cities, the numbers were significantly lower. The authorities 
continued to claim that the only schools that have been closed which 
taught in the Belarusian language are those that experienced 
diminishing enrollment.
    There does not appear to be a societal pattern of abuse of 
children.
    People with Disabilities.--A 1992 law mandates accessibility to 
transport, residences, businesses, and offices for the disabled; 
however, facilities, including transport and office buildings, often 
are not accessible to the disabled. The country's continued difficult 
financial condition makes it especially difficult for local governments 
to budget sufficient funds to implement the 1992 law. The central 
authorities continue to provide some minimal subsidies to the disabled. 
However, continued high inflation and sharp decline in the value of the 
ruble greatly reduced the real worth of those limited subsidies.
    Religious Minorities.--Societal anti-Semitism exists but usually is 
not manifested openly, although antiminority faith sentiments are 
rising (see Section 2.a.). In the past, Lukashenko and other officials 
have used coded anti-Semitic language in their attacks on perceived 
opponents.
    No arrests were reported in the April 1999 arson attack on the 
synagogue in Minsk or in a number of cases of desecration of Jewish 
cemeteries in 1997 and 1998. Some instances of vandalism appeared to be 
related to anti-Semitism. On May 11, the Minsk city court upheld the 
dismissal by an inferior court of a suit filed by Jewish organizations 
and individuals against the authors and publishers of the book ``The 
War According to Mean Laws.'' The book published by the Orthodox 
Initiative and distributed in Orthodox bookstores, includes the 
``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and other anti-Semitic articles and 
blames Belarusian Jews for social and economic problems in the country. 
A Minsk district court ruled in March that the book contained 
``scientific information'' and dismissed the suit. The Union of 
Belarusian Jewish Associations and Communities and the World 
Association of Belarusian Jews, both of which joined in the suit, 
consider the book anti-Semitic and punishable under the Criminal Code 
for inciting religious and ethnic hatred (see Section 2.c.). On 
December 27, unidentified assailants threw firebombs at a synagogue in 
Minsk. A security guard was able to extinguish the fire before serious 
damage occurred. No progress has been reported on the incident.
    Action by the authorities has been noticeably lacking in redressing 
instances of anti-Semitic vandalism in previous years. According to the 
Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress, a number of 
small, ultra-nationalist organizations operate on the fringes of 
society, and a number of newspapers regularly print anti-Semitic 
material. One of these newspapers, Slavianskaia Gazeta, although 
distributed locally, reportedly was published in Moscow. Anti-Semitic 
material from Russia also circulates widely.
    Many persons in the Jewish community remain concerned that the 
Lukashenko regime plans to promote greater unity with Russia may be 
accompanied by political appeals to groups in Russia that tolerate or 
promote anti-Semitism. Lukashenko's calls for ``Slavic solidarity'' are 
well received and supported by anti-Semitic, neo-Fascist organizations 
in Russia. For example, the organization, Russian National Unity, has 
an active local branch. Its literature is distributed in public places 
in Minsk. The concept of a ``greater Slavic union,'' the leadership of 
which Lukashenko seeks, is a source of concern to the Jewish community 
given the nature of support that it engenders.
    The country's small Muslim community, with roots in the country 
dating to the Middle Ages, does not report significant societal 
prejudice. However, on August 9, 1999, the Slonim mosque--the first 
mosque to open in the country during the last 60 years--was vandalized 
just prior to the holding of a Tatar youth convention in the city. The 
are no further developments on the investigation of the incident.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution upholds the right of 
workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join 
independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in 
defense of worker rights, including the right to strike; however, these 
rights are not respected in practice. The independent trade union 
movement still is in its infancy. The Belarusian Free Trade Union 
(BFTU) was established in 1991 and registered in 1992. Following the 
1995 Minsk metro workers strike, the President suspended its 
activities. In 1996 BFTU leaders formed a new umbrella organization, 
the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BCDTU), which 
encompasses 4 leading independent trade unions and is reported to have 
approximately 15,000 members.
    The authorities have taken numerous measures to suppress 
independent trade unions. Members of independent trade unions, were 
arrested for distributing union literature, had union material 
confiscated, were denied access to work sites, were subjected to 
excessive fines, and were pressured by their managers and state 
security services to resign from their jobs because of trade union 
activities. Although the BFTU later was registered, its local unions 
were denied registration by local authorities in many towns, including 
Bobruisk, Grodno, Mogilev, and Orsha among others. In the Brest Oblast, 
only 5 of 12 local unions of the BFTU were registered by June, and in 
numerous instances union activists and members were fired, without 
cause, for their union activities.
    On January 26, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 2 ``On certain 
Measures to Improve the Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions, 
and Other Public Associations Activities,'' which among other 
requirements, requires trade unions to have a minimum of 10 percent of 
the workers of an enterprise in order to form and register a local 
union. The Decree also obliged existing registered unions to reregister 
and meet the new requirements. Free trade union leaders reported that 
this decree has had the effect of making registration, and therefore 
union activities, nearly impossible in many of the larger state-owned 
enterprises. Some local unions have been denied registration under this 
decree.
    In February the management of the Mogilev Automobile Factory (MAZ) 
unilaterally suspended its collective bargaining agreement with the 
local union of the BFTU, evicted the organization from its office, and 
confiscated office equipment. Several BFTU activists were dismissed by 
MAZ management in connection with their union activities.
    The authorities continue to discourage employees at state-run 
enterprises from joining independent trade unions. In July 1999, 
Lukashenko signed Decree No. 29 on ``Tightening Labor Discipline.'' The 
decree, which has as one of its aims the placement of all workers on 
individual rather than collective contracts, was criticized heavily by 
both independent and official union leaders, who believe that it was 
designed principally to enable the Presidential Administration to 
increase its control over the labor sector.
    The Official Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), formerly 
the Belarusian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union Central Council 
of Trade Unions, consists of approximately 4.5 million workers 
(including retirees) and is by far the largest trade union 
organization. According to official union federation figures, 92 
percent of the workforce is unionized. Although wary in the past of 
challenging the regime seriously, some FTUB leaders have become 
increasingly vocal in their criticism of the policies of the Lukashenko 
regime. In retaliation the Government has subjected some FTUB officials 
to threats and harassment.
    On July 20, the Presidential Administration released a statement 
condemning ``attempts by some union leaders to thrust a groundless 
thesis that the Government violates unions' rights upon Belarusian 
public opinion and the international community.'' The statement accused 
unions of engaging in ``political activities . . . which cause direct 
damage to the labor movement and aggravates the socioeconomic problems 
of society.'' In a July 27 speech to an agriculture conference, 
Lukashenko criticized the trade unions, the FTUB, and FTUB President 
Goncharik personally, for a ``lack of constructive activity'' and 
blamed them for the loss of trade privileges with another country. On 
July 31, as part of the authorities' campaign of harassment of the 
FTUB, FTUB bank accounts were frozen following an unexplained 
investigation of the union's records by the state committee for 
financial investigations. FTUB accounts were frozen again on September 
28 by tax authorities conducting an unspecified investigation. The 
account later was released. In an October 11 speech to the FTUB 
Congress, Prime Minister Yermoshyn told trade union leaders to ``stop 
agitating people and get to work'' and accused the FTUB of engaging in 
politics rather than focusing on the needs of workers.
    During the year, members of the Independent Trade Union of Belarus 
faced continual pressure at their workplace to join state unions or 
lose their jobs. Typically members of the Union smuggled copies of the 
newspaper Rabochi into their workplace under their clothing. On 
December 16, police detained 7 members of the Interdependent Trade 
Union of Steel Workers and confiscated 3,000 copies of Rabochi outside 
the entrance to the Minsk Automobile Plant.
    On September 14, FTUB members reportedly were pressured by the 
management of Dzerzhinsky, a subsidiary of the state-owned electronics 
manufacturer Integral, to break with their union and join a management-
established and -run union. The FTUB reported that union members at 
other Integral plants have been similarly threatened. Under reported 
pressure from management and government authorities, employees at 
Tsvetotron, a state electrical equipment factory, voted to quit the 
union of electrical workers, a member of the FTUB.
    Tight control by the Lukashenko regime over public demonstrations 
(see Section 1.d. and 2.b.) makes it difficult for unions to strike or 
to hold public rallies to further their objectives. For example, a 
demonstration planned for November 15, organized by workers of the 
Minsk Tractor Works and the Minsk Engine Works to protest low pay and 
wage arrears was banned. Other demonstrations similarly were banned 
throughout the year. A strike organized by market vendors and 
entrepreneurs in February against new tax regulations, although 
ultimately successful, was marred by numerous arrests, confiscation of 
union literature, and anti-strike pressure from local officials. Market 
vendors staged a similar strike on November 23. Union members sometimes 
undertook work stoppages, usually in response to late payment of wages.
    On July 3, noting that the authorities failed to respect the rights 
of workers, suppressed trade union rights and harassed union leaders, 
and that the authorities had not taken sufficient steps to conform to 
internationally recognized labor rights, a foreign government suspended 
the country's trade benefits.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation 
dating from the Soviet era provides for the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. Some analysts believe that the presidential 
decree on labor discipline (see Section 6.a.), which aims at placing 
all workers on individual rather than collective contracts, could 
significantly threaten the principle of collective bargaining. Since 
the economy still is largely in the hands of the State, unions usually 
seek political redress for the economic problems. Workers and 
independent unions have recourse to the court system. The authorities 
and state-owned enterprises have hindered the ability of workers to 
bargain collectively and, in some instances, arbitrarily suspended 
collective bargaining agreements (see Section 6.a.).
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, except in cases when the work or service to be 
performed is fixed by a court's decision or in accordance with the law 
on the state of emergency or martial law; however, there were some 
reports of forced labor. For example, on July 12, town authorities in 
Ivatsevichy, in the Brest region, sent letters to local industrial 
enterprises and state institutions ordering them to increase the 
``voluntary'' participation of their employees in harvesting of 
livestock fodder by 20 percent. Workers who refused to ``volunteer'' 
for the harvest were ordered to pay a fine of $5 (5,000 rubles) or 
approximately 15 percent of their average monthly salary. The order had 
the effect of forcing local individuals to work in the fodder harvest. 
The constitutional provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies 
to all citizens, although its application to children is not specified. 
With the possible exception of juvenile prisoners, forced and bonded 
labor by children is not known to occur.
    d. State of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment.--
The law establishes 16 as the minimum age for employment. With the 
written consent of one parent (or legal guardian), a 14-year-old child 
may conclude a labor contract. The Prosecutor General's office 
reportedly enforces this law effectively. The constitutional provision 
prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although 
its application to children is not specified.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Real wages improved slightly 
over the last year to approximately $40 (48,000 rubles) to $60 (72,000 
rubles) a month. The minimum wage of $3 (3,600 rubles) a month does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and a family. 
Agriculture workers are paid approximately 39 percent less than the 
average monthly wage. The country's continuing economic problems make 
it difficult for the average worker to earn a decent living. Major wage 
arrears continued to grow, especially in the agricultural sector.
    The Constitution and Labor Code set a limit of 40 hours of work per 
week and provide for at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Because 
of the country's difficult economic situation, an increasing number of 
workers find themselves working considerably less than 40 hours per 
week. Factories reportedly often require workers to take unpaid 
furloughs due to shortages of raw materials and energy, and a lack of 
demand for factory output.
    The law establishes minimum conditions for workplace safety and 
worker health; however, these standards often are ignored. Workers at 
many heavy machinery plants do not wear even minimal safety gear, such 
as gloves, hard hats, or welding glasses. A State Labor Inspectorate 
exists but does not have the authority to enforce compliance, and 
violations often are ignored. The high accident rate is due to a lack 
of protective clothing, shoes, equipment, nonobservance of temperature 
regulations, the use of outdated machinery, and inebriation on the job.
    On January 4, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued a new decree, despite the 
protests of independent trade unions, lowering the level of disability 
allowances paid by the State or state enterprises in the result of 
workplace injuries. Under the decree, industrial injury suits also are 
to be covered by the Civil Code, rather than the Labor Code. 
Independent union leaders believe workplace injuries should be reviewed 
under the Labor Code, under which compensation is more generous. There 
is no provision in the law that allows workers to remove themselves 
from dangerous work situations without risking loss of their jobs.
    f. Trafficking In Persons.--There is no specific law against 
trafficking in women. The authorities are just beginning to recognize 
the problem of trafficking in women. In 1999 a Board of Morals and 
Illegal Distribution of Drugs was created by the Ministry of Interior, 
but the work has been hardly efficient. In partnership with the U.N. 
Development Program (UNDP), the Gender Information and Policy Center 
(GIPC) was established by the Ministry of Social Welfare which also 
deals with this issue. The country is both a source and transit point 
for women and girls being trafficked to Central and Western Europe for 
purposes of prostitution. Information from such scattered destinations 
as the Netherlands, Lithuania, and Bosnia, refer to Belarus among the 
source countries for women being trafficked to or through their 
countries, and other anecdotal evidence suggests that the Russian Mafia 
is active in trafficking young women, who end up as prostitutes in 
Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Western Europe. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations actively may 
try to recruit and lure women into serving as prostitutes in Western 
Europe and the Middle East.
    Women seldom report incidences of trafficking to police because of 
a generally negative public opinion about law enforcement authorities, 
shortcomings in legislation, and the insufficient protection of victims 
and witnesses.
    In April a seminar was held in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Interior and NGO's in which NGO's elaborated on programs devoted to 
warning the public about the problem. The Belarus Young Christians 
Women Association (BYCWO) implements a project aimed at informing women 
of the risks associated with employment abroad and the minimization of 
possible dangers for women. No information is available on state or 
non-governmental initiatives to help victims return to their countries. 
Crisis centers established by some NGO's do provide psychological 
assistance to victims of violence. Such centers, however, do not have 
specialists dealing with victims of trafficking.
                               __________

                                BELGIUM

    Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch 
who plays a mainly symbolic role. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet), 
led by the Prime Minister, holds office as long as it retains the 
confidence of the lower house of the bicameral Parliament. Belgium is a 
federal state with several levels of government, including national, 
regional (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and community (Flemish, 
Francophone, and German) levels. The judiciary is independent.
    The Government maintains effective control of all security forces. 
The Police Judiciaire and the Gendarmerie currently share 
responsibility for internal security with the municipal police, but the 
two organizations are to be merged at the federal level, and the 
Gendarmerie and municipal police are to be integrated at the local 
level under a reorganization plan scheduled to be implemented in 2001.
    The country is highly industrialized, with a vigorous private 
sector and limited government participation in industry. The primary 
exports are iron and steel. The economy provides a high standard of 
living for most citizens.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking 
steps to combat violence against women and trafficking in persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    In addition to the integration of the police forces, a 
reorganization plan calls for the creation of an independent oversight 
body for the federal police and also for the creation of a new 
anticorruption unit.
    Prison conditions vary. Newer prisons meet international standards. 
Older facilities meet or nearly meet minimum international standards 
despite their Spartan physical conditions and limited resources. In 
August the prison system, designed to hold some 7,500 prisoners, held 
8,395. The Government instituted a pilot project intended to reduce 
overcrowding in prisons by using electronic surveillance at home for 
prisoners near the end of their sentences.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these 
prohibitions. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge within 24 
hours. Pretrial confinement is subject to monthly review by a panel of 
judges, which may extend pretrial detention based on established 
criteria (e.g., whether, in the court's view, the arrested person would 
be likely to commit further crimes or attempt to flee if released). 
Bail exists in principle under the law but is granted rarely. The 
Government does not separate convicted criminals and pretrial 
detainees. Pretrial detainees receive different privileges from 
convicted criminals, such as the right to more frequent family visits. 
Approximately 40 percent of the prison population consists of pretrial 
detainees. Arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a lawyer of 
their choosing or, if they cannot afford one, to an attorney appointed 
by the State.
    In July the Government came under intense criticism for the 
detention of Fehriye Erdal, a Kurdish woman accused of involvement in a 
terrorist attack in Turkey in which a prominent businessman was killed. 
Erdal was arrested in Knokke in October 1999 and charged with weapons 
violations. The Government refused the Turkish Government's extradition 
request for Erdal because of the possibility that she could face the 
death penalty in Turkey. The Government also refused to try her on the 
terrorism charges in Belgium because of a technicality in the 
international agreement requiring such action. After a month-long 
hunger strike, Erdal was released from prison in August and placed 
under house arrest pending a trial on the weapons charges. The trial 
was not expected to begin until early 2001.
    In June over 800 British football fans were arrested for disturbing 
the peace during outbreaks of hooliganism at the Euro 2000 soccer 
championship. Most were deported immediately to the United Kingdom but 
five were held for trial under the new summary trial act (see Section 
1.e.). Credible reports indicate that some innocent bystanders were 
caught up in the police action and held incommunicado for as long as 36 
hours without adequate food or water.
    The law prohibits exile, and the Government does not employ it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is organized according to specialization and 
territorial jurisdiction, with 5 territorial levels: Canton (225), 
district (27), provinces and Brussels (11), courts of appeal (5), and 
for the whole Kingdom--the Cour de Cassation. The latter is the highest 
appeals court.
    Military tribunals try military personnel for common law as well as 
military crimes. All military tribunals consist of four officers and a 
civilian judge. At the appellate level, the civilian judge presides. 
The accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
    Each judicial district has a Labor Court, which deals with 
litigation between employers and employees regarding wages, notice, 
competition clauses, and social security benefits.
    The judiciary enforces the law's provision for the right to a fair 
trial. Charges are stated clearly and formally, and there is a 
presumption of innocence. All defendants have the right to be present, 
to have counsel (at public expense if needed), to confront witnesses, 
to present evidence, and to appeal.
    As part of an ongoing program of judicial reform, the Government's 
summary trial act became effective on April 1. This act, which covers 
crimes punishable by 1 to 10 years' imprisonment, allows a prosecutor 
to issue an arrest warrant for the immediate appearance in court of an 
offender caught in the act of committing a crime. The warrant expires 
after 7 days and the court must render its verdict within 5 days of the 
initial hearing. The first conviction under this act, against a British 
citizen accused of hooliganism during the Euro 2000 soccer championship 
(see Section 2.b.), was overturned on appeal, and the defendant was 
retried under regular procedures. Several human rights organizations 
claim that summary trial violates the presumption of innocence and 
jeopardizes the right to a full and fair defense. By year's end, the 
courts had not ruled on the legality of the summary trial act.
    In 1999 the Government created a High Council on Justice to 
supervise the appointment and promotion of magistrates. In early 2000, 
the Council formally was instituted, and members were elected. The 
Council is designed to serve as a permanent monitoring board for the 
entire judicial system and is empowered to hear complaints against 
individual magistrates.
    Following a review of the judicial system, the Government 
implemented several reforms that granted stronger rights to victims of 
crime. These measures allow victims to have more access to information 
during an investigation, as well as the right to appeal if an 
investigation does not result in a decision to bring charges. As part 
of its program of judicial reform, the Government undertook to open 
``justice houses'' in each of the 27 judicial districts. These 
facilities combine a variety of legal services under one roof, 
including legal aid, mediation, and victim's assistance. As of 
September, 14 of the proposed justice houses had opened. Personnel at 
some of the justice houses complained publicly about high workloads and 
staffing shortages.
    In 1999 Parliament enacted legislation that further defines crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and also imposes penalties 
for such crimes. In 2000, as a result of the new law, the courts became 
a forum for trying alleged human rights violations by high profile 
participants in past and present conflicts in Central Africa, the 
Middle East, and South America.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction. However, there were reports that Muslim women 
in traditional dress or headscarves in some cases were subjected to 
discrimination in admission to school (see Section 2.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these 
freedoms, and the Government respects these rights in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
    The Government operates several radio and television networks but 
does not control program content. Boards of directors that represent 
the main political, linguistic, and opinion groups supervise programs. 
A government representative sits on each board but has no veto power. 
Private radio and television stations operate with government licenses. 
Almost all homes have access by cable to television from other Western 
European countries and elsewhere. Satellite services are also 
available.
    There are restrictions on the press regarding libel, slander, and 
the advocacy of racial or ethnic discrimination, hate, or violence. A 
1999 law prevents political parties that espouse discrimination from 
receiving federal funds.
    In August in response to a request from the League for Human 
Rights, the Namur district court issued an injunction to halt 
distribution of a subscription-only newsletter that published the names 
of 50 convicted or accused pedophiles. The publisher also was ordered 
to remove the list from his Internet site and pay a fine of $22,200 
(BFr 1 million) for every copy distributed in any form. The court ruled 
that publication of the names constituted an invasion of privacy.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this provision in practice. Citizens are free to form 
organizations and establish ties to international bodies; however, the 
Antiracism Law (see Section 5) prohibits membership in organizations 
that practice discrimination overtly and repeatedly. In May the Ghent 
appeals court overturned a 1999 district court ruling that the ``Hells 
Angels'' are a private militia and should be disbanded. However, 
several members of the group were convicted of criminal offences.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Government does not hinder the practice of any faith. The law accords 
``recognized'' status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, 
Anglicanism, Islam, and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and these 
religions receive subsidies from general government revenues. Taxpayers 
who object to contributing to religious subsidies have no recourse. By 
law each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at 
government expense for religious instruction in schools, but not all 
avail themselves of this right. For recognized religions, the 
Government pays the salaries, retirement, and lodging expenses of 
ministers and also subsidizes the renovation of church buildings.
    The Government also supports the freedom to participate in 
nonconfessional philosophical organizations (laics). Laics serve as a 
seventh recognized ``religious'' group, and their organizing body 
receives funds and benefits similar to the six recognized religions.
    In spite of Islam's status as a recognized religion, spokesmen for 
the Council of Muslims report that women and girls in traditional dress 
or headscarves in some cases are subjected to discrimination in 
employment and school admissions.
    The lack of independent recognized status generally does not 
prevent religious groups from freely practicing their religions.
    In September 1999, 110 national police officers raided Church of 
Scientology facilities and the homes and businesses of about 20 members 
of the Church. One member's home in France was raided simultaneously by 
the French authorities. At year's end, an investigation continued, and 
no arrests had been made.
    In April the Belgian authorities began refusing visas to 
missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to 
enter the country for missionary work. Similar visas had been processed 
for decades without problems. In July the Ministry of Interior 
instituted temporary procedures designed to ensure the issuance of 
visas to these missionaries and undertook to establish permanent 
procedures by October 2000. At year's end, visas were being issued, 
albeit at a much slower pace than in the past. The Government still had 
not devised new permanent procedures for visa issuance but was 
continuing its talks with church leaders to solve the problem.
    The Evangelical Association (a group of evangelical Christian 
organizations) continued to claim discrimination due to the 
Government's refusal to grant it recognized status separate from the 
Protestant religion. Despite the Government's refusal, it is 
negotiating with the group in an effort to ensure that the Evangelical 
Association enjoys the same benefits as recognized religions. The 
Government is mediating discussions to enable the Evangelical 
Association to obtain representation in the leadership of the 
recognized Protestant church.
    In 1998 Parliament adopted recommendations from a 1997 commission's 
report on government policy toward sects, particularly sects deemed 
``harmful'' under the law. The report divided sects into two broadly 
defined categories: It characterized a ``sect'' as any religious-based 
organization, and a ``harmful sect'' as a group that may pose a threat 
to society or individuals. One of the primary recommendations was to 
create a government-sponsored Center for Information and Advice on 
Harmful Sectarian Organizations. The center began limited operations in 
October 1999 and is now fully operational and open to the public. The 
Government tasks the center with collecting publicly available 
information on a wide range of religious and philosophical groups and 
providing information and advice to the public regarding the legal 
rights of freedom of association, privacy, and freedom of religion. The 
center is authorized to share with the public any information it 
collects on religious sects but, despite its name, the regulations 
prohibit it from categorizing any particular group as harmful. In May 
the Government announced the composition of an interagency coordination 
group designed to work in conjunction with the center to coordinate 
government policy on sects. The coordination group's first meeting was 
held in October. The Government also named a national magistrate and 
one magistrate in each of the 27 judicial districts to monitor cases 
involving sects.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    In January (as a result of a December 1999 act of Parliament) the 
Government announced a ``regularization'' program for three categories 
of undocumented aliens: Those who had applied for asylum at least 4 
years earlier and had received no answer or a negative answer; those 
whose medical condition made a return to their country of origin 
inadvisable; and those who could not return to their country of origin 
for political reasons. Undocumented aliens who could demonstrate 
evidence of a lasting integration into their community also were 
allowed to apply. Successful applicants were to be granted legal 
residence status. During the application period, January 10 to 30, the 
Government received 32,662 applications representing 50,600 
individuals. Human rights groups criticized both the border controls 
that were imposed during the application period to prevent undocumented 
aliens living in other countries from applying and the slow pace of the 
approval process. The Government initially promised to complete the 
review of all applications by July 2001; however, by December it had 
processed only 1,570 of the 32,662 files.
    In March Parliament amended the nationality code to facilitate 
acquisition of Belgian citizenship. Under the terms of the amended 
code, foreigners can apply for naturalization after living legally in 
the country for 3 years. Stateless persons and refugees can apply after 
2 years. Moreover, foreigners who have maintained their residence in 
the country for 7 years may acquire citizenship simply by declaring 
their intent to their local municipal authorities. Adult foreigners 
living outside the country may declare their Belgian nationality as 
soon as one parent legally has acquired it.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum and reported receiving 42,691 new asylum 
applications during the year compared with 35,777 during 1999. Only 
about 10 percent of applications normally are approved. The number of 
asylum applications continued to rise dramatically throughout the year. 
For example, the Government received 5,300 applications in the month of 
October.
    The Government, in partnership with the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), provides relocation assistance to unsuccessful 
asylum applicants who agree to repatriate voluntarily to their country 
of origin. Unsuccessful applicants who do not leave voluntarily are 
subject to deportation. During the year, more than 10,000 unsuccessful 
asylum applicants were repatriated to their country of origin, either 
voluntarily (5,382) or through forced deportation (4,835). This total 
is double the number of repatriations in 1999. According to the 
Government, no unsuccessful applicants are repatriated forcibly to 
countries where they can demonstrate a credible fear of persecution.
    In response to complaints about slow processing time and the large 
backlog of asylum applications, the Government adopted a ``last in, 
first out'' policy in processing new applications. This policy is 
intended to reduce processing time for current applicants.
    The special asylum status granted to Kosovar refugees expired in 
September 1999. The Government, with the cooperation of the IOM, 
provided financial assistance to Kosovars who voluntarily returned to 
their homes. The rest were permitted to apply for asylum through the 
regular application process.
    Undocumented asylum seekers arriving by air whose claims do not 
appear legitimate are not allowed to enter but are held in a closed 
detention center at the airport for up to 5 months while awaiting 
deportation or voluntary repatriation. The children of such asylum 
seekers do not attend school. Those applicants whose claims appear to 
be legitimate are released to 1 of 27 open asylum centers for shelter 
and assistance. These centers have a total capacity of 5,000 beds. The 
centers, funded mainly by the Government and the Belgian Red Cross, 
have been overtaxed by the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, and 
the Government has solicited assistance from municipalities to handle 
the overflow. Municipal assistance commissions are expected to provide 
an additional 1,400 beds.
    In November a working group created by the Minister of Interior to 
reform the Government's immigration and asylum procedures issued its 
report. Its recommendations included: Ending financial aid to asylum 
seekers (only aid in kind--food and shelter--will be provided); 
increasing by 10,000 the number of beds available at open shelters; 
establishing 10 registration offices at the borders (applicants will 
have to apply immediately upon entering Belgium and also will have to 
supply information on the route they followed to get to Belgium); 
creating a ``fast track'' processing procedure for applicants whose 
claim appears on the surface to be noncredible; and increasing funding 
and manpower for the regularization effort. The Government's goal for 
implementation of the new procedures, many of which must be approved by 
Parliament, is January 1, 2002. Some human rights groups criticized the 
new policies as being ``repressive and restrictive.''

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens ages 18 and older exercise this right in 
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis 
of universal and compulsory (under penalty of fine) suffrage. Direct 
popular elections for parliamentary seats (excluding some Senators 
elected by community councils and others elected by Senate members) are 
held at least every 4 years. Opposition parties operate freely.
    In 1998 the European Court of Justice censured Belgium for its 
failure to comply with a European Council directive requiring member 
states to accord to all citizens of European Union (EU) countries 
resident in another EU country the right to vote in municipal 
elections. In 1998 Parliament amended the Constitution to extend that 
right to EU citizens and passed implementing legislation in January 
1999. By the July 31 closing date for registration, a total of 87,858 
non-Belgian European Union citizens had registered to vote in the 
October 2000 municipal elections.
    The Federal Government is responsible for such matters of state as 
security, justice, social security, and fiscal and monetary policy. The 
regional governments are charged with matters that directly affect the 
geographical regions and the material well-being of their residents, 
such as commerce and trade, public works, and environmental policy. The 
linguistic community councils handle matters more directly affecting 
the mental and cultural well-being of the individual, such as education 
and the administration of certain social welfare programs.
    Women are underrepresented in government but hold some senior 
positions. Of 18 federal ministers, 3 are women. In the Federal 
Parliament, 36 of 150 house members and 20 of 71 Senators are women. 
Federal law requires that one-third of all candidates in national and 
local elections be women.
    The existence of communities speaking Dutch, French, and German 
engenders significant complexities for the state. Most major 
institutions, including political parties, are divided along linguistic 
lines. National decisions often take into account the specific needs of 
each regional and linguistic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Numerous human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While the law already prohibits discrimination based on these 
factors, in December the Council of Ministers, in order to consolidate 
and clarify existing laws, voted to introduce legislation in Parliament 
to outlaw all forms of discrimination. The Government enforces 
antidiscrimination law. With Dutch, French, and German as official 
languages, the country has a complex linguistic regime, including 
language requirements for various elective and appointive positions. 
The law prohibits the official financing of any racist or xenophobic 
party or any party that does not respect human rights.
    Women.--A 1998 study commissioned by the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor (which is also responsible for equality issues) reported that the 
number of women who acknowledged suffering from repeated domestic 
physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives rose from 6.3 
percent in 1988 to 16.8 percent in 1998. The same study found that 
women between 30 and 39 years of age made more official complaints 
about physical violence in 1998 than their counterparts a decade 
earlier (although part of this increase was attributed to a greater 
willingness to come forward).
    A 1998 law defines and criminalizes domestic violence, with the aim 
of protecting married and unmarried partners. Women's groups believe 
that the 1998 law is an important step in recognizing domestic violence 
as constituting an offense distinct from other forms of aggression. The 
law allows social organizations to represent victims of domestic 
violence in court provided that they have the victim's consent. A 1999 
law allows police to enter a home without the consent of the head of 
household when investigating a domestic violence complaint. According 
to its proponents, the police do not use the law enough. The Government 
still has not implemented other provisions of the 1999 law that require 
it to establish and maintain a database of accurate statistics on 
domestic violence.
    A number of shelters and telephone help lines are available 
throughout the country. In addition to providing shelter and advice, 
many offer assistance on legal matters, job placement, and 
psychological counseling for both partners. Approximately 80 percent of 
these organizations' budgets are provided by one of the three regional 
governments.
    The law prohibits organizing prostitution or assisting immigration 
for the purpose of prostitution, but not prostitution itself. A 1995 
law defined and criminalized trafficking in persons, but cases of 
trafficking in women continued (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is illegal. The Government has implemented 
procedures to monitor sexual harassment claims. Victims of sexual 
harassment have the right to sue their harassers under existing law. 
According to a 1999 revision of the law on equal opportunity in the 
workplace, sexual harassment can be a form of sexual discrimination. 
The act outlaws discrimination in hiring, working conditions, 
promotion, wages, and contract termination. Despite these laws, most 
cases of sexual harassment are resolved informally. A study by the 
Ministry of Defense found that 54 percent of women in the armed forces 
had been subjected to abusive language, 36 percent had experienced 
unwelcome physical contact, and 4.6 percent reported being the victim 
of sexual harassment involving physical violence.
    Equal treatment of men and women is provided for in the 
Constitution, federal law, and treaties incorporated into law. The 
Government actively promotes a comprehensive approach to the 
integration of women at all levels of decisionmaking. The Division of 
Equal Opportunity, a part of the Ministry of Labor, focuses 
specifically on issues affecting women, including violence against 
women, sexual harassment, and the participation of women in the 
political process. At mid-year the unemployment rate was 10.1 percent 
for women compared with 7.2 percent for men. The net average salary for 
a woman is only 84 percent of the national net average salary. In 1996, 
the last year for which comparative statistics are available, women in 
blue collar jobs earned 79 percent of the salary of their male 
counterparts. The average salary for women in white collar jobs was 
only 70 percent of the salary of their male counterparts.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public 
education and health care. It provides compulsory education up to the 
age of 18. The Francophone and Flemish communities have agencies 
specifically dealing with children's needs.
    Government and private groups provide shelters for runaways and 
counseling for children who were abused physically or sexually.
    There are comprehensive child protection laws. Children have the 
right to a voice in court cases that affect them, such as divorce 
proceedings. The law states that a minor ``capable of understanding'' 
can request permission to be heard by a judge, or that a judge can 
request an interview with a child. The law is designed to combat child 
pornography by the use of high penalties for such crimes and for those 
in possession of pedophilic materials. The law permits the prosecution 
of Belgian residents who commit such crimes abroad and provides that 
criminals convicted of the sexual abuse of children cannot receive 
parole without first receiving specialized assistance and must continue 
counseling and treatment upon their release from prison.
    In March Parliament amended the Constitution to include an article 
on children's rights. The new article stipulates that every child has 
the right to respect for his or her moral, physical, mental, and sexual 
integrity.
    Belgium is both a transit point and a destination for trafficking 
in children (see Section 6.f.).
    Child Focus, the government-sponsored center for missing and 
exploited children, reported that it handled 1,503 cases in 1999 and 
722 cases in the first 4 months of 2000. Nearly 12 percent of the cases 
reported from January to April involved sexual exploitation.
    Child prostitution is of limited scope.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for the protection of 
disabled persons from discrimination in employment, education, and in 
the provision of other state services. The Government mandates that 
public buildings erected since 1970 be accessible to the disabled and 
offers subsidies to induce the owners of other buildings to make 
necessary modifications. However, many older buildings are not 
accessible.
    The Government provides financial assistance for the disabled. It 
gives special aid to parents of disabled children and to disabled 
parents. Regional and community programs provide other assistance, such 
as job training. Disabled persons are eligible to receive services in 
any of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, or Brussels), not just 
their region of residence.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Belgium is a pluralistic 
society in which individual differences in general are respected, and 
linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of 
citizens are native Dutch speakers, about 40 percent are French 
speakers, and fewer than 1 percent are German speakers.
    The Antiracism Law penalizes the incitement of discrimination, 
hate, or violence based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. It is 
illegal for providers of goods or services (including housing) to 
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors and for employers to 
consider these factors in their decisions to hire, train, or dismiss 
workers.
    In 1999 the Government-sponsored Center for Equal Opportunity and 
the Fight Against Racism, which is tasked with investigating complaints 
of discrimination based on race, handled 919 complaints, 18 of which 
led to court action. In March 2000, the Government extended the mandate 
of the center to include all forms of discrimination. In its 2000 
report, the center drew attention to discrimination against non-
Belgians in certain categories of public service jobs. The report also 
referred to a study on behalf of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), which revealed persistent discrimination against immigrants in 
private sector employment. However, the center reported that it found 
very little discrimination in eligibility for, and the payment of, 
social security benefits.

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers have 
the right to associate freely, which includes the freedom to organize 
and join unions of their own choosing. The Government does not hamper 
such activities, and workers fully and freely exercise their right of 
association. About 60 percent of workers are members of labor unions. 
This number includes employed and unemployed workers. Unions are 
independent of the Government but have important links with major 
political parties. The Government does not require unions to register.
    In its 1999 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations reiterated its criticism 
that the Government should adopt legislation establishing ``objective, 
predetermined, and detailed criteria'' to enable employers' 
organizations and trade unions to have access to the National Labor 
Council. Because of restrictive interpretation of the legislation in 
force, only the Christian, Socialist, and Liberal trade union 
confederations have access to the National Labor Council. This 
criticism was not repeated in the organization's 2000 report, although 
the Government took no action on the issue.
    Unions have the right to strike, and even strikes by civil servants 
and workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. However, seamen, 
the military, and magistrates have no right to strike. In 1999 the 
Gendarmerie obtained a limited right to strike as part of the police 
reform package; this provision is to be implemented by April 1, 2001.
    Even though many strikes begin as wildcat actions, strikers are not 
prosecuted for failure to observe strike procedures in collective 
bargaining agreements. Crimes committed during a strike action, such as 
causing bodily harm or damage to property, are clearly illegal strike 
methods, which the authorities prosecute.
    Federal police have the right to strike. The Government has the 
authority to order necessary forces back to work during a strike in 
order to maintain law and order.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in its 
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2000'' again 
mentioned that for several years employers made applications to civil 
courts to end strikes. The report added that, more recently, judges 
tended to rule that labor conflicts are not within their jurisdiction. 
This stance reinforced the widely accepted practice that any discussion 
of the right to strike is a subject for collective bargaining between 
workers and employers and not a legal matter. Although draft laws were 
submitted, no action has been taken by Parliament to end the legal 
confusion.
    Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and 
are free to affiliate with international labor bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected, and 
exercised freely. Every other year the employers' federation and the 
unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement, covering 
2.4 million private sector workers, that establishes the framework for 
negotiations at the plant and branch levels. In 1998 employers and 
unions agreed on a nationwide collective bargaining agreement that 
focused on collective bargaining at the branch and plant levels and 
limited compensation increases to 5.9 percent for the 1999-2000 period. 
The agreement covered cost of living adjustments, wage increases, and 
job creation measures.
    The law prohibits discrimination against organizers and members of 
unions and protects against the termination of contracts of members of 
workers' councils, members of health or safety committees, and shop 
stewards. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are 
required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Effective 
mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes 
between labor and management.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and generally it is not known to occur; 
however, trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15, but 
education is compulsory until age 18. Youths between the ages of 15 and 
18 may participate in part-time work/study programs and may work full 
time during school vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor 
compliance with national laws and standards. There are no industries 
where any significant child labor exists. The Government prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in children is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum 
wage for workers over 21 years of age is approximately $1,030 (BFr 
46,338): 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the minimum, 
19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent. The minimum wage, 
coupled with extensive social benefits, provides workers with a decent 
standard of living. Minimum wages in the private sector are set in 
biennial, nationwide collective bargaining meetings (see Section 6.b.), 
which lead to formal agreements signed in the National Labor Council 
and made mandatory by royal decree for the entire private sector. In 
the public sector, the minimum wage is determined in negotiations 
between the Government and the public service unions. The Ministry of 
Labor effectively enforces the law regarding minimum wages. By law the 
standard workweek cannot exceed 39 hours and must have at least one 24-
hour rest period. Many collective bargaining agreements set standard 
workweeks of 35 to 38 hours. The law requires overtime pay for hours 
worked in excess of the standard. Work done from the 9th to the 11th 
hour per day or from the 40th to the 50th hour per week is considered 
allowable overtime. Longer workdays are permitted only if agreed upon 
in a collective bargaining agreement. These laws and regulations are 
enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and the labor courts.
    The law calls for comprehensive provisions for worker safety. 
Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these laws. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their 
safety or health without jeopardy to their continued employment, and 
the law protects workers who file complaints about such situations. The 
Labor Ministry implements health and safety legislation through a team 
of inspectors and determines whether workers qualify for disability and 
medical benefits. The law mandates health and safety committees in 
companies with more than 50 employees. Labor courts effectively monitor 
compliance with national health and safety laws and standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law defines and criminalizes 
trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and children is a 
problem. Under the law, victims of trafficking who provide evidence 
against the trafficker are granted temporary residence permits and are 
eligible to receive aid from government-funded reception centers. Since 
1994 the majority of cases were victims of either sexual or economic 
exploitation. The victims of sexual exploitation increasingly are women 
under age 18. A magistrate is designated in each judicial district to 
supervise cases involving trafficking in persons. A national magistrate 
is in charge of coordinating the various antitrafficking initiatives. 
An antitrafficking unit also has been established in the Gendarmerie. 
In each of the three regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels), the 
Government has designated (and subsidizes) a nonprofit organization to 
provide assistance to victims of trafficking. The Center for Equal 
Opportunity and the Fight Against Racism (see Section 5), which is 
tasked with monitoring the treatment of trafficking victims, complained 
that the designated nonprofit organizations lack the funds and staff to 
assist properly the growing number of victims. The Government reported 
significant increases in witness testimony and the successful 
prosecution of traffickers. An average of 130 victims have taken 
advantage of the residency program in recent years.
    Belgium is both a transit point and destination for trafficking in 
women and children. In September 1999, the three government-designated 
nonprofit organizations involved in assisting victims of trafficking in 
persons reported 185 active cases of trafficking in women from over 30 
countries. The largest number of victims were Albanian. Cases on 28 
children from 7 different countries also were active; the largest 
number were from Albania and Macedonia. According to statistics 
compiled by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 2,000 
unaccompanied minors requested asylum in 1999, most from the former 
Yugoslavia and central Africa. Because of the difficulties involved in 
traveling to Belgium from those areas, the International Organization 
for Migration believes that many of these unaccompanied minors were 
brought in by traffickers or assisted by professional smugglers.
    In June 58 Chinese immigrants were found dead of suffocation in a 
truck at the British seaport of Dover. They apparently had boarded the 
truck in Belgium before it departed by ferry from the port of 
Zeebrugge. Police suspect that an organized smuggling ring was 
involved. The Government was criticized in Parliament for failing to 
provide effective immigration control at Belgium's seaports and 
airports. During the first 6 months of the year, 1,105 illegal aliens 
were apprehended as they attempted to transit the port of Zeebrugge, 
compared to 1,440 for all of 1999. In November the Government announced 
its program for reforming asylum and immigration procedures (see 
Section 2.d.).
    In an ongoing program began during the year, the Government, under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, dispatched attaches to 
several source countries to provide in-depth analysis of the 
trafficking situation in those countries. These attaches, whose stays 
can last anywhere from a few weeks up to 2 years, also are responsible 
for coordinating antitrafficking information campaigns to warn locals 
about the potential consequences of being the victim of a trafficking 
organization.
    The Government has worked closely with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) to develop innovative programs to 
combat human trafficking and to assist its victims. For example, the 
Government has provided funding for information campaigns in countries 
of origin to warn women of the dangers of trafficking. It also has 
provided funding to the IOM to assist the voluntary return of victims 
to their home countries and to assist them in readjusting once they 
have returned home.
    In 1996 the authorities uncovered a suspected pedophile/child 
pornography and trafficking ring. Five suspects remained under 
investigation, including the accused ringleader, Marc Dutroux. In 
December the Government announced that his trial would not begin until 
September 2002. Lengthy delays in bringing this case to trial have led 
to widespread public cynicism and suspicion about the investigation of 
this case in particular and about the judicial system in general.
                               __________

                         BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

    The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) ended the 1991-95 war and created the 
independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously one of the 
constituent republics of Yugoslavia. The agreement also created two 
multiethnic constituent entities within the state: The Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). 
The Federation, which has a postwar Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat 
majority, occupies 51 percent of the territory; the RS, which has a 
postwar Bosnian Serb majority, occupies 49 percent. The Constitution 
(Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords) establishes a statewide government with 
a bicameral legislature, a three-member presidency (consisting of a 
Bosniak, a Serb, and a Croat), a council of ministers, a constitutional 
court, and a central bank. The Accords also provided for the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR) to oversee implementation of civilian 
provisions. The High Representative also has the power to impose 
legislation and remove officials who obstruct the implementation of the 
Dayton Accords. The entities maintain separate armies, but under the 
Constitution, these are under the ultimate control of the presidency of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Municipal elections held in April and general 
elections conducted in November were generally free of violence, 
although there were some voting irregularities in both elections. 
Multiethnic parties committed to building on the foundation established 
at Dayton, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP), made inroads 
against the support for the nationalist, ethnically based parties in 
the November elections, resulting in a state House of Representatives 
almost evenly divided between the two groups. In the RS, the ethnically 
based Serb Democratic Party (SDS) maintained its dominant position, 
while the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (HDZ) remained strong in Croat-majority municipalities. The 
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) remained the largest nationalist 
Bosniak party. Although formally independent, the judiciary remains 
subject to influence by political parties and the executive branch and 
is unable to prosecute complex or even simple crimes fairly and 
effectively.
    One of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in March 1994 and 
transformed the government structure of the Bosnian territories under 
Bosniak and Croatian control. The President of the Federation appoints 
the Prime Minister subject to parliamentary approval. The Federation 
Parliament is bicameral. Federation structures continue to be 
implemented only gradually. Major steps were the creation of canton 
governments, the unification of Sarajevo under Federation control in 
spring 1996, and the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections of the Federation 
Parliament. However, serious ethnic and political rivalries continue to 
divide Croats and Bosniaks. Parallel Bosniak and Croat government 
structures continued to exist in practice.
    The Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the other entity 
that makes up Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997-98, most of the RS 
political and administrative agencies moved from Pale, a stronghold of 
former Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, 
to Banja Luka. The President and Vice President were elected in 
November for 4-year terms. The RS National Assembly is unicameral and 
elected on a proportional basis. The November general elections in the 
Republika Srpska were relatively free and fair, and resulted in the 
nationalist parties, led by the SDS, increasing their strength at the 
expense of the pro-Dayton moderates.
    Demilitarization of the city of Brcko, which was made a ``self-
governing neutral district'' in March, was completed in February. A 
districtwide multiethnic police force also was established. The 
internationally appointed supervisor is empowered to address such 
issues as taxation, law enforcement, district management, and 
composition of the district assembly.
    The State-level Constitutional Court declared during the year that 
a number of provisions of the entity constitutions were 
unconstitutional; they had been challenged in a lawsuit filed by 
Presidency member Alija Izetbegovic in 1998. The court ruled 
unconstitutional provisions in both entity constitutions that 
designated a specific ethnic group or groups as ``constituent'' in that 
entity, making clear that the three major ethnic groups--Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosniaks--as well as ``others,'' are constituent in both entities. 
The decision also invalidated parts of the entity constitutions that 
named an official language or script, or that called for government 
support for one church, among other provisions. The decisions 
established the principle of ethnic equality in the country; however, 
this decision of the court has not yet been implemented in practice.
    The Constitution gives the Government of each entity and the 
individual cantons within the Federation responsibility for law 
enforcement in accordance with internationally recognized standards. 
The Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO, continued to implement the 
military aspects of the Dayton Accords and to attempt to create a 
secure environment for implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the 
settlement, such as: Civilian reconstruction, the return of refugees 
and displaced persons, elections, and freedom of movement of the 
civilian population. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), which 
was established by the U. N. under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords, 
monitors, advises, and trains the local police. The IPTF also may 
investigate human rights abuses. Local police in both entities have 
violated international standards and discriminated on political, 
religious, and ethnic grounds; however, these cases decreased compared 
with 1999. During the year, police in both the Federation and the RS 
used internal affairs units to investigate and dismiss officers for 
committing abuses. Police continued to suffer from the legacy of a 
Communist system, with ``special'' or secret police operating in all 
areas. These forces operated outside the normal police chain of 
command, exceeding ethnic quotas and reporting directly to the senior 
political leadership. In addition to locally recruited police forces, 
each entity also maintains an army. Security forces committed human 
rights abuses, primarily police brutality, in many parts of the 
country.
    The economy remains weak and dependent upon international 
assistance. Gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $5 billion; 
per capita GDP doubled, at approximately $1,350. GDP continued to be 
lower in the RS than in the Federation. The entity governments have 
made only minor structural reforms in privatization, banking, and 
taxation. Official unemployment estimates range from 40 to 50 percent, 
and many individuals are forced into the informal economy for work. 
Workers in the ``gray'' market typically receive no benefits, but those 
with formal employment often are paid only partial salaries and months 
late. Pensions and other benefits are also paid only in part and are 
delayed 6 months or more due to a lack of government resources. The 
continued return of refugees from abroad is expected to compound the 
problem of job creation and to reduce remittances. International 
assistance provided loans to the manufacturing sector and guidance on 
structural reform.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The 
degree of respect for human rights continues to vary among areas with 
Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb majorities. There was one 
death in custody (a suicide), and isolated instances of political, 
ethnic, or religious killings continued. Killings due to bombs also 
continued. The police continued to commit human rights abuses during 
the year, and serious problems persisted. Police continued to commit 
abuses in many parts of the country, principally the physical abuse of 
detainees. Members of security forces also abused and physically 
mistreated other citizens. Police also used excessive force, or did not 
ensure security, to discourage minority resettlement in majority areas. 
Prison conditions met prisoner's basic minimum needs for hygiene and 
access to medical care; however, overcrowding and antiquated facilities 
continued to be a problem.
    In the RS, police detained suspects for long periods of time before 
filing charges; lengthy prearraignment detention was a problem in 
numerous cases in the Federation as well. However, there were fewer 
cases of arbitrary arrest and detention than in the previous year. 
Confusion over the rules governing local arrest, detention, and 
prosecution of suspects for The Hague-based International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) led in some instances to 
questionable detentions in both the Federation and the RS. The RS 
continued its de facto refusal to take action against any Serbs 
indicted by the ICTY. In contrast, RS authorities have made arrests of 
Serbs based solely on warrants issued by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia); however, in a recent case the authorities 
later released the suspects.
    The judiciary in both entities remained subject to influence by 
dominant political parties and by the executive branch. Overlapping and 
poorly defined layers of judicial responsibility and outdated 
procedures made the administration of justice sporadic and vulnerable 
to manipulation. In many areas, close ties exist between courts of law 
and the ruling parties, and those judges and prosecutors who show 
independence are subject to intimidation by the authorities. Even when 
independent decisions were rendered, local authorities often refused to 
carry them out. Authorities in all areas infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights.
    Authorities and dominant political parties exerted influence over 
the media, and freedom of speech and of the press was restricted to 
varying degrees in the different entities. Government threats against 
journalists increased during the year. Academic freedom was restricted. 
Authorities continued to impose some limits on freedom of assembly and 
association. Religious discrimination remained a problem. Both 
governments and private groups continued to restrict religious practice 
by minorities in majority areas. Although freedom of movement continued 
to improve, some restrictions remained in practice. At times, mobs 
blockaded roads, restricting freedom of movement.
    Discrimination against women persists, and violence against women, 
in particular domestic violence, is a persistent yet underreported 
problem. Severe discrimination continued in areas dominated by Serb and 
Croat ethnic groups, with some discrimination in Bosniak-majority 
areas, particularly regarding the treatment of refugees and displaced 
persons. The political leadership at all levels, in varying degrees but 
more so in the RS than in the Federation, continued to obstruct 
minority returns in certain localities. Local authorities and mobs (in 
most cases believed to be organized or approved by local authorities) 
harassed minorities and violently resisted their return. The 
destruction of minority-owned houses continued in some areas of the RS 
and in Croat-controlled areas of the Federation. Marginal economic 
conditions and discrimination in the educational system also 
complicated returns. Enactment of property legislation proceeded in 
both entities under pressure from the international community, but 
implementation was sporadic and slow. Mob violence was a serious 
problem in the eastern RS. In December, several returning Bosniaks were 
wounded and one killed by mine explosions, raising suspicions that the 
mines had been laid to deter return. There were several killings of 
Bosniaks in the northern RS in the fall that may have been ethnically 
motivated. Ethnic discrimination remains a serious problem. 
Prostitution is widespread, and trafficking in women and girls to and 
within the country is a serious problem.
    During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR 
to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more 
aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, 
which began in the summer of 1997, resulted in the apprehension of 5 
indictees out of the 96 publicly indicted by the Tribunal (one 
committed suicide rather than submit to arrest). This brought the total 
number of indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception 
to 48. At year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody either 
awaiting trial, involved in ongoing trials, released provisionally, or 
awaiting transfer to begin serving their sentences. Three indictees 
already are serving sentences. There were 27 public indictees still at 
large at year's end. ICTY trials during the year resulted in six 
convictions and one acquittal.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by police; however, there was one death 
in custody. Violent incidents continued throughout the year, many 
between members of different ethnic groups or political parties.
    A prisoner died in Mostar West prison where he was being held on 
charges of aggravated assault. An investigation by the IPTF's Human 
Rights Division determined the death a suicide and found no evidence to 
suggest police abuse or irregularities.
    Federation authorities made several arrests in connection with the 
March 1999 killing of Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar. 
In spite of ethnic divisions within the police and political 
interference from some quarters, the investigation, one of the most 
politically contentious in Bosnia, was continuing in cooperation with 
officials in third countries at year's end. By contrast, a series of 
attacks on Croat policemen in Travnik in 1999 remains unsolved, mainly 
due to political interference.
    Many, if not most, of the perpetrators of killings and other brutal 
acts committed in previous years remained unpunished, including war 
criminals indicted by the ICTY, individuals responsible for the up to 
8,000 persons killed by the Bosnian Serb Army after the fall of 
Srebrenica, and those responsible for up to 13,000 others still missing 
and presumed killed as a result of ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia. The 
local prosecution of war crimes cases has proceeded slowly due to 
political interference, but Bosnian authorities made some progress 
during the year with the arrest of several suspects that have been 
charged and are to be tried in the Bosnian courts.
    There was an increase in the number of arrests by Federation police 
of war crimes suspects for local prosecution, particularly in Croat 
areas of the Federation. Officers of the Federation Interior Ministry 
arrested suspected Croat war criminal Dominik Ilijasevic August 28 in 
Kiseljak. Erhad Poznic and Ivan Suljo, former Croat special police 
officers charged in connection with the disappearance and presumed 
execution of 13 Bosniak prisoners of war in Mostar in 1993, both 
surrendered voluntarily to cantonal authorities in September. In 
addition, Dragan Stankovic, a Bosnian Serb indicted for local 
prosecution for actions targeting the Bosniak civilian population in 
Foca in 1992, was arrested by cantonal police in Gorazde on September 
20, while crossing through Federation territory. A Croat police 
official in Travnik surrendered himself to a Sarajevo court in March 
following his reported indictment on war crimes charges. The court 
subsequently released the officer, ultimately explaining that he had 
been questioned as a witness in an ongoing war crimes investigation.
    During the year, there were continued efforts on the part of SFOR 
to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more 
aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, 
which began in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the 
apprehension of 5 indictees out of the 94 publicly indicted by the 
Tribunal. All were detained forcibly, and none voluntarily surrendered 
to NATO troops. On October 13, Janko Jancic committed suicide rather 
than submit to arrest by SFOR troops. This brought the total number of 
indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception to 48. At 
year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody.
    On January 25, SFOR troops detained Mitar Vasiljevic, allegedly a 
member of the paramilitary ``White Eagles,'' who is accused of killing 
over 100 Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Visegrad area. On March 5, 
SFOR arrested Dragoljub Prcac. Prcac is accused of being the deputy 
commander of the Omarska concentration camp, whose 3,000 Bosnian Muslim 
and Bosnian Croat captives were held in inhuman conditions. Momcilo 
Krajisnik, a senior Bosnian Serb politician before, during, and after 
the war, was arrested on April 3. Krajisnik is charged with genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and other war crimes for his direction of 
efforts to ethnically cleanse the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. SFOR arrested Dragan Nikolic on April 21; he is charged 
with crimes against humanity and other violations committed while he 
was in command of the Susica concentration camp and for participating 
in inhuman acts against more than 500 civilians. The alleged commander 
of the ``Keraterm'' concentration camp, Dusko Sikirica, was arrested by 
SFOR on June 25. Keraterm camp held over 3,000 Bosnian Muslim and 
Bosnian Croat captives in inhuman conditions. Of the 27 publicly 
indicted persons still at large at the end of the year who remain in 
the country, the majority reportedly live in the RS. Although RS 
cooperation with the ICTY has improved, RS authorities made no effort 
to arrest indictees. The ICTY during the year issued 6 convictions and 
1 acquittal. This brings the total number of convictions to 13 since 
the ICTY's inception.
    In January, Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as ``Arkan,'' a 
notorious paramilitary commander from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who 
was indicted by the ICTY, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in 
the lobby of a hotel in Belgrade. In Prnjavor in the RS, a Bosniak man 
was killed in March in a hand grenade explosion on his property (see 
Section 1.c.). An unknown assailant shot and killed Ljubisa Savic, also 
known as Mauser, the former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed 
Police, on June 7 in Bijeljina. Savic was indicted for alleged unlawful 
conduct during a murder investigation by the Sokolac prosecutor in 
March (see Section 1.c.). His death was seen by many as the result of 
conflicts between Serb political factions and criminal elements. In 
mid-December, in Glogova, near the Serb hard-line town of Bratunac, a 
Bosniak was killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his 
property. After an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the 
mines were recently placed as a booby trap to prevent return (see 
Section 1.c.).
    There were no developments in the IPTF investigation of the death 
in police custody of a Bosniak returnee who had killed the leader of an 
Orthodox religious association in 1999.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year. There still are an estimated 20,000 to 
30,000 persons missing from the wars in 1991-95.
    The OHR in late 1997 negotiated an agreement among the Bosniak, 
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb commissions for missing persons to 
expedite exhumations across the interentity boundary line (IEBL). The 
OHR reported that the remains of 1,308 persons had been recovered 
during the year. These numbers were significantly lower that the 
previous year because the Government did not provide promised funds for 
exhumation until May. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) reported that since 1995 it received requests from family 
members to trace 20,484 people missing from the war years, including 
16,979 Muslims, 719 Croats, 2,537 Serbs, and 249 others. A total of 
2,231 of these persons were accounted for (292 of whom were found 
alive). The ICRC noted that the Working Group for Tracing Missing 
Persons, which serves as a channel for passing tracing requests to 
local authorities, had ceased functioning in July, due to lack of 
cooperation from local authorities and a dispute over the rotating 
chairmanship among the Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat 
representatives. The group had not resumed work by year's end and 
negotiations currently are underway to reform the working group.
    In August the Missing Persons Institute (MPI) was inaugurated to 
coordinate the recovery and identification of remains, provide support 
to families of the missing, and apply political pressure to Bosnian 
officials to provide information on missing persons. MPI is a state 
institution that assumed many of the functions previously carried out 
by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), which 
continues to conduct regional identification activities in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia. In August MPI began the first 
systematic in-country DNA identification program and began collecting 
blood samples from living family members of missing persons to assist 
in the identification of recovered remains. In its first month of 
operation, the DNA program tested 28 presumptive identifications, which 
were based on circumstantial evidence such as clothing and personal 
items found on the body. The testing confirmed 19 identities and 
excluded 9.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the right to freedom from 
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; however, in all 
areas of the country, police and prison officials abused and physically 
mistreated persons at the time of arrest and during detention.
    A pattern of poor police protection and of violence against 
minority communities continued in several areas. Police in Stolac, 
Drvar, Gacko, and Srebrenica proved unwilling or unable to contain the 
numerous instances of arson designed to intimidate returnees. While 
there was some improvement in the behavior of local police in the RS 
and the Federation toward returning minorities, there still were 
numerous instances of poor police protection in several areas. In 
February the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) called for 
increased police patrols after an attempted arson attack on a Bosniak 
home in the settlement of Ilici in southwest Mostar. In March the OHR 
suspended the deputy police chief and three policemen in Kopaci, a 
suburb of Gorazde in the eastern RS, who, despite being stationed 
around a Bosniak house, failed to prevent a Serb from throwing a 
grenade at it. In Srebrenica, police failed to apprehend anyone 
responsible for more than 12 burnings of houses occupied by minority 
families in June and July. In July in Janja police stood by and watched 
as rioters burned three houses and damaged 15 others during a protest 
against Bosniak returns that was sparked by the scheduled eviction of 
three Serb families. The subsequent police investigation was marked by 
significant omissions, and police refused to identify suspects during 
court hearings. In the Federation, returning Serbs in Drvar were 
subjected to physical attacks and intimidation during attempts to evict 
temporary Croatian occupants.
    At times some police officers impeded the enforcement of the law by 
their unwillingness to carry out eviction orders for persons illegally 
occupying homes of internally displaced persons (IDP's). Government 
leaders in both the RS and the Federation often used a variety of 
tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the return of IDP's 
(see Section 2.d.).
    The IPTF made significant progress in its efforts to restructure 
and increase professionalism in the police forces. The IPTF completed 
its programs to provide human dignity and basic skills training to all 
Federation police officers and neared completion of officer training in 
the RS. The IPTF continued its certification of Federation and RS 
police and also decertified officers on a variety of charges. This 
process involved written and psychological examinations, as well as 
background investigations. In addition, an IPTF unit in The Hague 
checks the names of all police officials through the ICTY database. In 
August the RS police academy graduated its third multiethnic class. 
Minority officers are beginning to be deployed in areas where minority 
returns are occurring. All Federation canton governments have agreed to 
an ethnically mixed police force in principle; however, many cantonal 
governments continue to resist integration in practice. In the 
Federation police include Croat, Bosniak, and Serb officers and 
generally reflect the appropriate ethnic mix within each canton. 
However, Bosniak and Croat police in the Federation often operate under 
separate, parallel budget and command structures, divided along ethnic 
lines. Police in the RS generally do not meet target standards of 
ethnic representation, as mandated by various agreements. Cooperation 
between the RS and the Federation Interior Ministries often is better 
than cooperation between federation cantons. The integration of women 
into the police forces is uneven but improving, with substantial female 
representation in the Brcko district and in recent police academy 
classes in both the RS and the Federation.
    IPTF certification of officers proceeded more slowly in the RS, but 
there was progress on significant law enforcement reforms. An 
interentity agreement negotiated under U.N. auspices allows the 
voluntary redeployment of officers across entity lines to redress 
ethnic imbalances. By year's end, 33 officers had volunteered for 
redeployment (22 from the Federation and 11 from the RS). Police 
officials attempted to recruit more minority candidates; individual 
cantons in the Federation held positions open for minority candidates. 
Since 1999 international monitors have been establishing an IPTF 
physical presence within police facilities to ensure proper IPTF 
monitoring of police reforms. Authorities in the RS are implementing a 
policies and procedures manual that institutes, among other reforms, a 
public information bureau and internal affairs unit. Under these 
reforms, the RS authorities continue to remove officers accused of 
graft or brutality. Professional standards units have reviewed over 
1,000 cases, substantiating approximately 35 percent of complaints 
received and administering punishments ranging from fines to 
suspensions. A total of 20 officers were removed and 16 cases were 
registered for criminal prosecution.
    On January 14, the IPTF Commissioner removed the provisional 
authorization to exercise police powers from seven police officers in 
the Federation. The removals were enforced for violations ranging from 
illegal deprivation of liberty to assault on civilians in custody and 
assault while off duty. In one case, an officer shot and injured a 
civilian while intoxicated. There were scattered reports of police 
brutality throughout the country, although local professional standards 
units were increasingly active in holding law enforcement officers, 
including senior officials, accountable for their actions.
    In June the Human Rights Chamber ruled that the Federation army had 
violated the human rights of two Serbs who were shot and detained while 
driving near Sarajevo in 1996. The two were detained at various 
locations for over a month before appearing before a judge and were 
released 15 days later by the then-Higher Court of Sarajevo. A month 
after their detention, the Army launched an investigation a month after 
their detention into whether they had committed war crimes. The Chamber 
ruled that the treatment of one of the two men during detention 
constituted torture and that both men suffered inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment because they were Serbs. During the year, 
there were no reports of the Army detaining civilians.
    On March 1, the Sokolac prosecutor indicted nine former RS police 
officers for their alleged unlawful conduct during the investigation 
into the murder of the Deputy Chief of the Pale Public Security Center 
(PSC), Srdan Knezevic, in August 1998. Among those indicted were the 
former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed Police (who was shot 
to death by unknown persons in June), Head of the Pale PSC Crime Unit, 
and the Chief of Staff of the Pale PSC. The charges included unlawful 
deprivation of freedom, extraction of statements by duress, 
maltreatment during the discharge of duty, illegal search, failure to 
render aid, and unauthorized photography. Several of the indictees had 
been cited by the IPTF for illegal deprivation of liberty, torture, and 
ill-treatment of 14 suspects and witnesses, as well as coercing several 
detainees into confessing and into signing incriminating statements.
    Sporadic violence against international community representatives 
continued throughout the year. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown 
at the IPTF police station in Pale in the RS, damaging three vehicles. 
On April 3, a hand grenade was thrown at a SFOR patrol near Modrica in 
the RS. Two cars and a shop were damaged. On June 21, a landmine 
damaged an SFOR armored personnel carrier near Gacko in the RS. Three 
SFOR soldiers were wounded in the incident, which followed protests 
against minority refugee returns to the area. On July 24, six rocket-
propelled hand grenades were fired at the living quarters of the Joint 
Commission Observer in Zvornik. The attack was similar to one carried 
out in May 1998. The attack damaged the house, but did not result in 
any casualties. RS police arrested two suspects, and still are 
searching for another. On August 3, a false bomb threat was made 
against offices in Zenica that house international community 
organizations, local government, media, and NGO's. In August, an IPTF 
monitor was assaulted and slightly injured in the Zvornik area by 
unknown assailants.
    Federation and RS government officials also were attacked. The 
private business premises of Mostar mayor Safet Orucevic were damaged 
in a rock throwing incident on May 15. An improvised explosive device 
detonated in a Travnik municipal office in June, injuring one employee. 
An official vehicle used by the RS Minister of Information was 
destroyed by an explosion in Banja Luka on June 15. In July municipal 
officials in Maglaj complained of death threats during the eviction of 
foreign-born Islamists who illegally were occupying homes owned by 
displaced persons. A car belonging to the head of the local refugee 
government department in Modrica in the RS was heavily damaged by a 
hand grenade on August 7. Early in the year, a cantonal judge in 
Sarajevo received death threats during the deportation proceedings of a 
naturalized Bosnian citizen who was wanted on international terrorism 
charges. In August the interior minister of Central Bosnia canton 
received threats following the arrest of a Croat war-crimes suspect. 
There was no progress reported by year's end in the Foca police chief's 
investigation of the attack of the Foca IPTF station. There was no 
progress reported by year's end by the RS police on the investigation 
of the death of municipal council member Munib Hasanovic.
    A number of housing authorities responsible for implementing 
property law were threatened or assaulted. The head of the Banja Luka 
housing authority resigned after receiving death threats. He had been 
under pressure not to carry out evictions of Croatian Serbs and war 
veterans illegally occupying property owned by displaced persons. On 
April 10, the head of the housing authority in Bijeljina was stabbed 
and seriously wounded. Police determined that the assailant was a 
displaced person who was dissatisfied with the manner in which his case 
had been handled. The perpetrator was arrested and sentenced to 60 days 
in prison. On April 29, the head of the Stolac Housing Board was beaten 
by an alleged illegal occupant, who also attempted to stab him. Local 
police did not respond adequately and the IPTF subsequently issued two 
noncompliance reports against local police and continued to monitor the 
investigation. On December 7, the head of housing in Pale resigned 
after receiving threats for implementing property laws.
    A few violent incidents marred the municipal elections on April 8. 
Two such incidents were directed against the international community, 
while others resulted from intraethnic conflict between political 
parties within ethnic communities (see Section 3). There were no 
violent incidents involving international community representatives 
during the November elections, as had been the case in past elections.
    Individual and societal violence motivated by ethnic conflict 
continued to be a serious problem, and numerous bombings, shootings, 
and assaults caused deaths, injuries, and significant material damage; 
however, violence decreased compared with 1999. Such violence often was 
connected to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their 
prewar homes in areas where the returnees are now a minority. A growing 
level of violence associated with criminal activity compounded the 
problem.
    There continued to be numerous violent incidents directed at 
returning refugees. In Posavina, a Croat returnee's windows were broken 
by Croat HDZ hard-liners. There have been reports of intimidation 
against Serbs in Drvar. On January 18, the newly renovated house of a 
returning Bosniak refugee in Aladinici, near Stolac (currently a Croat 
majority area), was burned. The next night another Bosniak house, still 
under construction, was destroyed. In early March, three Bosniak houses 
in Janja were set on fire and three of the inhabitants injured. In 
March a group of Serbs in Vlasenica in the RS beat a number of Roma who 
had been deported from refugee camps in Italy. On March 11, a group of 
Serbs threw a hand grenade at a house holding more than a dozen Bosniak 
heads of families in Kopaci, the Serb suburb of Gorazde. The Bosniaks 
were the first returnees to the suburb and previously had been camped 
nearby in tents for more than 5 months, waiting for Serb authorities to 
evict illegal Serb occupants from their property.
    Also in March, there were several attacks against returning 
Bosniaks near the RS town of Prnjavor. On March 21, a hand grenade 
severely injured a Bosniak male who had returned with his family to the 
settlement of Babanovac only 1 week earlier. On March 23, another 
Bosniak family physically was threatened and told to leave the area. On 
March 24, a hand grenade exploded and killed a Bosniak returnee who was 
burning trash on his property in the Prjnavor settlement of Lisnja (it 
remains unclear whether the grenade was placed deliberately in the fire 
to harm the Bosniak or merely was there by accident).
    In April a group of approximately 100 Bosnian Serbs stoned 6 
Bosniaks who were rebuilding their houses in Brcko. On April 26, a mine 
exploded in the house of a Croat returnee in the Modrica area of the 
RS, damaging the dwelling but injuring no one. On May 11, several buses 
carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark the 8th 
anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by an angry 
mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were injured slightly by broken 
glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the peace several 
days later (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In late May there were minor 
attacks on Bosniak returnees and Croat IDP's outside of Stolac. The 
next day the governor of the canton visited the return site to 
criticize the incidents.
    On June 21, an unidentified person fired at the office of the 
Association of Refugees from Derventa in Bijelo Brdo. On June 25, a 
hand grenade exploded under the truck of a Bosniak returnee to Janja in 
Bijeljina municipality. The explosion damaged the house and garage.
    Arsonists set fire to more than a dozen Bosniak returnee homes in 
and around Srebrenica in the summer in an effort to intimidate 
returnees. No one was injured but property was significantly damaged 
and, in some instances, destroyed. One fire was timed to coincide with 
the July 12 ceremony at Potocari marking the 5th anniversary of the 
Srebrenica massacre. Several of the homes had been renovated recently. 
None of the perpetrators were arrested.
    On July 24 a crowd of 250 Serbs, protesting against the eviction of 
Serbs in Janja, rioted in a Bosniak neighborhood of the town, burning 2 
Bosniak houses, destroying several vehicles, and stoning 6 other 
dwellings. Two hand grenades exploded during the incident, injuring 
several people. Local police and SFOR looked on without intervening. 
Approximately 11,000 Bosniaks lived in Janja before the war; only 700 
had returned by July.
    In mid-August a bomb destroyed a cafe in downtown Glamoc that was 
owned by a Bosniak returnee. Three days later the owner's father's 
rebuilt home was set on fire. The OHR dismissed the Croat mayor of 
Glamoc on September 8, partly due to his inaction regarding these two 
incidents.
    On August 23, a group of Serb IDP's angry over their displaced 
circumstances blocked the Zvornik-Vlasenica road for several hours. 
When police broke up the blockade, they were assaulted by the crowd and 
12 police officers were injured.
    On September 9, a Bosniak house in Srebrenica, which had been empty 
after a Serb had vacated it, was set on fire.
    On September 12, the vehicle used by the head of the Banja Luka 
branch of the RS Ministry for Refugees was destroyed in an explosion. 
The explosion appeared to have been an attempt to intimidate the 
official, who is in charge of evicting illegal occupants and returning 
refugees to Banja Luka.
    In mid-December, there were two mine incidents that may have been 
deliberate attempts to deter Bosniaks from returning. In the destroyed 
village of Glogova, near the Serb town of Bratunac, a Bosniak was 
killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his property. After 
an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the mines were recently 
placed as a booby trap to prevent return. In southern Bosnia, outside 
the Serb town of Gacko, a landmine exploded under a car carrying 
Bosniaks to the refugee village of Fazlagica Kula. The occupants were 
severely wounded, but survived. The OHR suspects that the mine was set 
recently. These landmine incidents prompted OHR to make a statement 
criticizing what appeared to be increasing violence against returnees.
    There was no progress in the local authorities' investigation of a 
car bomb that injured a Bosnian Croat police officer in Travnik in 
1999. There was no investigation into 1999 incidents of arson of homes 
of Bosniak returnees in Borovnica. There was no progress in the 
investigation by canton and Federation antiterrorism officers into a 
bomb explosion at the home of Ivan Saric, former middle Bosnia canton 
governor, in a village outside Gornje Vakuf in 1999.
    While prison standards for hygiene and access to medical care meet 
prisoners' basic needs, overcrowding and poor, antiquated facilities 
are chronic problems. There was one report of a death in custody in 
Mostar West prison (see Section 1.a.).
    International community representatives were given widespread and 
for the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and 
prisoners in the RS as well as in the Federation.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were fewer cases 
of arbitrary arrest and detention in both the Federation and the RS 
compared with 1999. In prior years, police in both entities enjoyed 
great latitude based on Communist-era criminal procedure laws that 
permitted them to detain persons for up to 6 months without bringing 
formal charges against them. The Federation revised these laws in 1998, 
removing this power from police and vesting it solely in the 
investigative judge. The Communist-era detention laws remain in force 
in the RS.
    Federation law permits prearraignment detention of up to 24 hours; 
in the RS prearraignment detention may extend for 3 days. International 
monitors report numerous instances in which these deadlines have been 
violated. In one case, a detainee was held for 11 days in the 
Federation before appearing before a judge. Some accused persons have 
been in detention for several years while awaiting a final action by 
the appellate court. The absence of psychiatric facilities in the 
Federation and RS has led to persons being detained rather than 
properly treated.
    Human rights NGO's contend that there are cases in which persons 
who ostensibly are detained on criminal charges actually are 
incarcerated for political reasons. For example, Ibrahim Djedovic, a 
parliamentary deputy for the Democratic National Union (DNZ), which the 
ruling Bosniak SDA views as a renegade party due to its activities 
during the war, was arrested and jailed in May 1997 for war crimes, 
after he arrived in Sarajevo to take up his parliamentary seat. The 
ICTY investigated Djedovic and decided not to arrest him for his 
alleged activities. Most local and international observers believe that 
Djedovic was arrested due to his political affiliation and not because 
of alleged war crimes. Although the Sarajevo cantonal court convicted 
and sentenced Djedovic to 10 years in 1998, he was released in March 
after winning an appeal and returned to his seat in the Federation 
Parliament.
    There were no reports that forced exile generally was used as a 
legal punishment. There were no reports during the year of attempts by 
local Croat authorities to expel returning Serbs in some Croat-
dominated areas of the Federation, as had been the case in the past. 
However, Croat hard-liners in Capljina continued to intimidate Serb 
returnees. The Croatian Government also continued to deny electricity 
to Serb returnees in Ivanica, a small town in Bosnia near Dubrovnik.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the Federation and RS 
Constitutions provide for an independent judiciary; however, the 
executive and the ruling nationalist political parties continue to 
influence the judicial system. Party affiliation and political 
connections weighed heavily in the appointment of prosecutors and 
judges. The legal system is unable to adequately protect the rights of 
either victims or criminal defendants because of its inefficient 
criminal procedure codes and complicated trial procedures.
    The judicial hierarchy in the Federation varies among its different 
constituent cantons. In the seven mixed or Bosniak cantons, original 
court jurisdiction exists in both municipal and cantonal courts, with 
more serious offenses typically tried in the cantonal courts. Appeals 
are taken to the Federation Supreme Court. However, in the three Croat-
dominated cantons, the municipal courts have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over all offenses, and appeals are heard by the cantonal 
courts. The Croat-dominated cantons refuse to recognize the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Federation Supreme Court; however, no litigant has 
attempted to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court yet. The differing 
judicial practices in the cantons of the Federation present obstacles 
to prosecutors, criminal defendants, defense attorneys, and civil 
litigants and their attorneys.
    In August 1999, the OHR imposed a law allowing the Federation 
Supreme Court to claim immediate jurisdiction as the ``court of first 
instance'' in cases involving terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, 
and intercantonal crime, which would be difficult for lower courts to 
try because of pressure from political parties. However, no such cases 
had been tried in the Supreme Court by year's end.
    The Federation Constitution provides for the appointment of judges 
by the President, with the concurrence of the Vice President and the 
approval of the Assembly, to an initial term of 5 years. Judges may be 
reappointed following this initial term to serve until the age of 70.
    The RS judicial hierarchy includes a Supreme Court to provide for 
the unified enforcement of the law and a Constitutional Court to assure 
conformity of laws, regulations, and general enactments with the 
Constitution. The RS has both municipal and district courts, with the 
district courts having appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed and 
recalled by the National Assembly and have life tenure.
    In June 1999, judicial associations in both entities adopted 
identical codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. In August 1999, 
the OHR imposed laws strengthening the Federation prosecutor's office 
and protecting the identity of witnesses in sensitive cases in the 
Federation. There have been no test cases to date, however. The 
international community continued training programs in the Federation 
to familiarize judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police 
with the Federation's reformed Criminal Code, which entered into effect 
in November 1998. The RS has not adopted similar criminal law reforms 
yet. Some NGO's expressed concern over the judicial selection process 
in eight federation cantons, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Legal 
experts argued that the laws on judicial selection in those two cantons 
were inconsistent with the canton and Federation Constitutions.
    Both the Federation and RS Constitutions provide for open and 
public trials and give the accused the right to legal counsel.
    The Dayton Peace Accords also created the Human Rights Commission 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of the Human Rights Chamber 
and the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Chamber may consider alleged 
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights if the matter is 
within the responsibility of one of the parties to the Dayton Agreement 
and occurred after its signing. Decisions of the Chamber are final and 
may not be appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Ombudsman may 
investigate allegations of human rights abuses either on his or her own 
initiative or in response to any party, or may refer matters to the 
Chamber.
    Human rights organizations reported that judicial institutions in 
both entities were controlled or influenced by the ruling parties. 
Likewise, the various prosecutorial offices throughout the two entities 
remained subject to political pressure. There were numerous anecdotal 
reports of politicians pressuring judges to rule in favor of the local 
party members in cases before the courts. Courts often were reluctant 
or unwilling to try cases of human rights abuse referred to them. A 
lack of resources and a huge backlog of unresolved cases provided a 
convenient excuse for judicial inaction. Even when the courts rendered 
a fair judgment, local officials often refused to implement their 
decisions. This was especially the case for those who won decisions 
mandating eviction of illegal occupants from their property, although 
this improved somewhat during the year under pressure from the 
international community. In addition, organized crime elements sought 
to pressure judges, especially in central Bosnia and Herzeg-Neretva 
canton.
    The Federation and the RS maintain separate structures of courts 
and prosecution agencies, with little or no cooperation across the 
entity line. Although there have been isolated instances in which the 
1998 Memorandum on Inter-Entity Legal Cooperation has been used 
successfully, little sustainable progress has been made in creating 
viable and effective structures for such cooperation. For example, 
there is no mechanism between the Ministries of Interior to enable 
arrest warrants to be executed throughout the country.
    In the Federation, the High Representative implemented the Law on 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Service on May 17. In the RS, the National 
Assembly adopted the Law on Courts and Court Service and the Law on the 
Public Prosecutor's Office. These laws provide a merit-based, 
nonpolitical structure for the appointment and dismissal of judges and 
prosecutors and provide uniform standards for their professional 
conduct. The laws provide for a review period, during which all 
prosecutors and sitting judges who fall below the standard of 
professionalism set out in the laws will be removed. Review commissions 
were established in June and began reviewing files in September.
    The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber continued to grow rapidly 
(see section 4) as more citizens turned to the Chamber to redress human 
rights violations after national institutions and domestic courts 
failed to provide an effective remedy.
    In February the Human Rights Chamber ordered a retrial for Sretko 
Damjanovic, who was convicted by a military court in Sarajevo in 1993 
of war crimes against the civilian population. The Chamber ruled that 
Damjanovic had not been granted a fair trial in the proceedings that 
led to the rejection of his petition for a retrial. In May and October 
1997, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court had denied his request to reopen 
proceedings and his appeal was finally rejected by the Federation 
Supreme Court in February 1998. The Chamber stated that the cantonal 
court's reasoning for rejecting the appeal was ``grossly inadequate and 
devoid of the appearance of fairness'' and that Damjanovic did not have 
a fair chance to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court.
    In February the Sarajevo Cantonal Court acquitted Bosniak Ibrahim 
Djedovic of charges of war crimes. Djedovic had been convicted and 
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in October 1998, after a trial that 
was viewed by international observers as unfair.
    On August 4, Sarajevo Canton police arrested former Interior 
Minister and Bosniak organized crime figure Alija Delimustafic on 
``abuse of power'' charges filed by the Federation Prosecutor. 
Delimustafic is purported to have ties across the political spectrum. 
Some observers believe that his arrest and arraignment indicate that 
the Bosnian judicial system is attempting to address the most serious 
corruption cases. Others are doubtful that the law enforcement 
community will have the political support to successfully prosecute the 
case.
    No new trial was held in the May 1999 RS Supreme Court case in 
which the court ruled that three Bosniaks were wrongfully convicted of 
1996 murders of four woodcutters.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to ``private 
and family life, home and correspondence'' and the right to protection 
of property; however, authorities in all areas infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights.
    In the RS, police routinely conduct searches of private homes 
without obtaining search warrants, citing emergency provisions in the 
law even in routine cases. This problem has not been observed in the 
Federation.
    Since the war, large numbers of citizens have been unable to 
reclaim their real property, either private or collectively owned, to 
which they had occupancy rights under the Communist system. Enactment 
of property legislation has proceeded in both entities under pressure 
from the international community. In October 1999, the High 
Representative issued several directives intended to accelerate 
evictions and enable more returns. However, implementation of the 
revised property laws has been extremely slow. In the Federation, as of 
the end of October, 54 percent of the property claims had been 
adjudicated and 25 percent of the property returned. As of the same 
time in the RS, only 28 percent of the property claims had been decided 
and 11 percent of property returned. By some estimates, resolving 
property claims in the RS at the current rate will take another 10 
years. The political leadership at all levels in both entities, but 
especially in the RS and in Croat areas of Herzegovina, continues to 
obstruct minority returns by delaying needed reforms and not 
implementing evictions and other property-related decisions. In 
Sarajevo, delays persisted due to the large backlog of cases, but 
political manipulation and obstruction decreased. During the year, 
approximately 10,000 Serbs returned to Sarajevo Canton, usually because 
of evictions of illegal occupants from their homes.
    Throughout the country, membership in the political party 
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to 
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of 
socially owned enterprises (see Sections 2.b., 3, And 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides a 
general statement supporting freedom of speech and of the press. Actual 
laws regarding freedom of the press are delegated to the cantons in the 
Federation and to the central authorities in the RS. Freedom of speech 
and of the press was respected partially in the Federation and in the 
western RS, but to a lesser extent in the eastern RS. Within the 
Federation, press freedom was restricted more severely in Croat-
majority areas. The primary restraints on press freedom are control of 
the principal media by governing political parties and the politicized 
use of tax and financial inspections instigated by the dominant 
nationalist parties. In Croat-majority areas of the Federation, party-
controlled media are the dominant electronic media and source of 
information. While there were some improvements in the development of a 
free and independent press, most media continued to be biased 
noticeably. In addition, threats to journalists from Government and 
extremist groups increased during the year.
    Some opposition and independent newspapers operate in the Bosniak-
majority areas of the Federation and in the RS, principally in Banja 
Luka. Dnevni Avaz, which in the past was controlled largely by the SDA 
party, is the daily with the highest circulation. It has noticeably 
distanced itself from the SDA during the year. Dani and Slobodna Bosna 
are the most influential independent magazines in the Federation. One 
of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter, a weekly 
published by a former correspondent of the Belgrade-based independent 
magazine Vreme. Nezavisne Novine is an independent newspaper published 
previously only in the RS, but is now distributed in the Federation.
    There are two printing facilities in the Federation; the 
government-controlled Oko company and the facility owned by the 
newspaper Dnevni Avaz. After a series of labor strikes at Oko in late 
June, Dnevni Avaz took over printing of almost all publications 
previously printed by Oko until the strike ended several months later. 
In the RS, the state-owned printing company, Glas Srpski, has a virtual 
monopoly.
    The ruling parties exerted economic pressure by refusing to allow 
state-owned companies to advertise in the independent media. Some 
independent media in the two entities, for example, Dani and Reporter, 
assist in the distribution of each other's publications in their 
respective entities.
    The number of registered threats against journalists increased 
during the year. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE)-sponsored media helpline, established in November 1999, 
registered 128 cases of possible violations of the rights of 
journalists from November 1999 through October. Complaints of abuses to 
the helpline increased markedly during the April municipal elections 
and the November general elections. Intimidation of journalists and 
media outlets most commonly took the form of verbal or written threats 
to stop a particular line of inquiry or a concerted effort to harass 
media outlets through the misuse of government agencies, by performing 
tax audits or cutting off power and telephone lines. Groundless 
defamation lawsuits also were used against journalists, as well as 
actual physical attacks.
    In a survey conducted among representatives of 50 media outlets 
attending a countrywide journalist conference, 62 percent responded 
that they personally had experienced intimidation and interference with 
their work, including direct and indirect pressure applied by both 
political parties and elected or appointed officials.
    In April a journalist for Dnevni Avaz was assaulted by the driver 
of Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic, allegedly because of 
critical articles about the Prime Minister. Bicakcic initially refused 
to take responsibility for the actions of his driver or to discipline 
him, but after strong pressure from the international community, he 
took mild disciplinary action.
    Zeljko Kopanja, the editor in chief of Nezavisne Novine who lost 
both legs in a car bomb in October 1999, was threatened several times 
during the year by unknown persons. In June RS authorities arrested six 
individuals, including two former members of the RS police 
antiterrorist brigade, for attempted blackmail of Kopanja; however, 
they had not been charged in connection with the bombing by year's end.
    On June 10, Edin Avdic, a journalist from the weekly Slobodna 
Bosna, was assaulted at the entrance to his home hours after he 
received verbal threats from SDA Chief of Cultural Affairs Muhamed 
Korda. The journalist claims Korda warned him to stop writing articles 
about the cultural activities of the SDA. Avdic claimed that his 
attackers repeated the warning and added that next time he would be 
killed.
    On August 12, Srpsko Oslobodenje journalist Ljubisa Lazic was 
assaulted on the premises of Radio Srpsko Sarajevo by Marko Asanin, 
president of the regional board of the Srpsko Sarajevo Independent 
Party of Social Democrats (SNSD). According to Lazic, the attack was 
allegedly the culmination of a series of threats and harassment by 
Asanin, who at one point attempted to have local media excluded from 
sessions of the assembly of the Srpsko Novo Sarajevo municipality.
    On September 20 in Doboj, municipal SDS leader Milan Ninkovic 
publicly threatened Radio ZOS director and Oslobodenje correspondent 
Azemina Mulahuseinovic during an interview on NTV Doboj. On October 9, 
Deputy Manager of Glas Srpski Anton Kasipovic sustained serious head 
injuries during an assault by unknown persons. The police conducted an 
investigation but there was no progress at year's end.
    In April leaflets were distributed in the hard-line Croat town of 
Livno insulting the editor in chief of the independent radio station 
Studio N and one of its journalists. The pamphlet accused the two of 
being ``miserable mercenaries'' and ``spitting and vomiting on 
everything that represents Croat legal authority in Livno.'' Studio N 
had been the object of politically motivated pressures in the past, 
including the March 1999 beating of the wife of the journalist 
mentioned in the pamphlet.
    On June 6, tax authorities raided the daily Dnevni Avaz. Agents of 
the Federation Tax Administration initially arrived without explanation 
or a court order. These provisions were eventually met, but only after 
distribution of the newspaper was delayed. The Tax Administration 
subsequently presented Dnevni Avaz with a bill for $450,000 (928,000 
KM) for unpaid taxes in 1998, which the newspaper contested and claimed 
it is unable to pay. The raid followed the newspaper's transformation 
from partisan reporting in favor of the nationalist SDA party to more 
neutral reporting. The newspaper's transformation began in late 1999, 
before the April municipal elections, in which the SDA fared poorly. 
Editor in chief Mensur Osmovic said the newspaper had received threats 
from the SDA leadership for months and claimed that the main reason for 
the audit was Dnevni Avaz's articles about corruption implicating SDA 
leaders. Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic publicly attributed 
SDA losses in the elections to loss of control over the media and 
explicitly said Dnevni Avaz had to be brought under control.
    There was a decrease in the selective application of the slander 
laws by authorities to punish opponents since the High Representative 
suspended criminal penalties for libel in July 1999. Previously the 
possibility of imprisonment for slander and libel often was used to 
threaten journalists. In December 1999, the Federation presented a 
draft Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Defamation and Libel, 
which was criticized severely for the excessive fines it sanctioned. 
The law had not yet been adopted at year's end. Although fewer 
allegations of defamation are reaching the courts, the overall number 
of cases remains high, due to a slow rate of resolution and court 
backlogs.
    In March Slobodna Bosna editor Senad Avdic, who was convicted of 
defamation in June 1999, appealed his case. Bakir Alispahic, a public 
official, successfully charged Avdic with defamation over articles 
stating that Alispahic was a party to illegal financial transactions 
involving several banks, including Narodna Banka. Avdic has requested 
that his case be retried subsequent to resolution of a case involving 
Narodna Banka, which revealed evidence that may support his claims.
    The Independent Media Commission (IMC), established by the High 
Representative in 1998, is empowered to regulate broadcasting and other 
media in the country. In this capacity, the IMC licenses broadcasters, 
manages and assigns spectra for broadcasting, sets licensing fees, and 
enforces adherence to the code of practice. The IMC has broad authority 
to punish violations to the code of practice. It may issue warnings, 
impose fines, suspend or terminate licenses, seize equipment, and shut 
down operations of any broadcaster or media outlet in violation of the 
code of practice. The IMC issued numerous fines for violations of 
broadcasting standards to stations in both entities during the year.
    The largest television broadcasters are Radio Television Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (RTV BiH) in the Federation and Radio Television of 
Republika Srpska (RTRS) in the RS. The international community launched 
the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) in 1997 as a cross-entity broadcaster 
and source of objective news and public affairs programming. However, 
only a minority of viewers cites the OBN as their key source of news. 
Independent television outlets include TV Hayat, Studio 99, OBN Banja 
Luka affiliate Alternative TV (ATV), and several small television 
stations located throughout the country. Some of these broadcasters 
originally were municipal stations. They have not yet been fully 
privatized, and their legal ownership status remains unclear.
    The High Representative's decision of July 1999 to restructure the 
broadcasting system of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has not been 
implemented fully. The restructuring was to liquidate the existing 
broadcaster, Radio Television Bosnia and Herzegovina, and create a 
statewide public broadcasting corporation, the Public Broadcasting 
System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS BiH). Plans to incorporate 
elements of the OBN into the new PBS BiH still have not been 
implemented due to difficulties linked to producing a quality PBS news 
and public affairs program.
    The July 1999 decision also established Radio Television of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV FBiH) as the public 
broadcasting company of the Federation. RTV FBiH is to broadcast on two 
channels offering a blend of Bosniak and Croat programming. The High 
Representative's decision specifies that ``programming must be based on 
truth, must respect human dignity and different opinions and 
convictions, and must promote the highest standards of human rights, 
peace and social justice, international understanding, protection of 
democratic freedoms and environment protection.'' The OHR appointed all 
21 members of the Board of Governors, including the 7 members who were 
to have been chosen by Parliament. SDA officials attempted to delay the 
transition to RTV FBiH and have attempted to exert influence on members 
of its new Board of Governors.
    The August 1999 decision by the High Representative imposing 
amendments to the RS broadcasting law has not been implemented fully. 
These amendments required Serb Radio Television (SRT) to change its 
name to Radio Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS). The High 
Representative required RTRS to comply with the country's broadcasting 
laws, regulations promulgated by the IMC or its successor, and the laws 
of the RS. On July 27, the High Representative dismissed the RTRS Board 
of Governors for obstructing international efforts to improve RTRS 
programs and management. The High Representative mandated that the new 
Board work with RS authorities and international experts to develop new 
legislation for the RTRS to bring it into conformance with 
international standards for public broadcasting.
    Until February Mostar-based Erotel TV conducted an extensive 
operation that retransmitted programs from state-run Croatian 
Television. The IMC declared Erotel broadcasts illegal in November 
1999, but Erotel refused to go off the air until the IMC, with SFOR and 
OHR assistance, forcibly shut down Erotel's transmitters on February 
17. Nationalistic Croat television continued to be broadcast by HTV-
Mostar, which is owned by the three Croat municipalities in Mostar and 
is financed by the HDZ.
    Radio broadcasting in the Bosniak-majority areas of the 
Federation--particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla--is diverse. 
Opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent 
broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the 
RS, particularly in Banja Luka. Nez Radio and Radio Pegas report a wide 
variety of political opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-
majority areas, but they are usually highly nationalistic. Local Croat 
authorities do not tolerate opposition viewpoints. One exception is 
Studio 88, in Mostar, which broadcasts reports from both sides of that 
ethnically divided city.
    Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation, Serbs and 
Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment in 
appointments and promotions at the University of Sarajevo. The 
University of Banja Luka limits its appointments to Serbs. All 
institutions suffer from a lack of resources and staff. The University 
of Mostar remains divided into eastern and western branches, reflecting 
the continued ethnic divide in the city. However, the East Mostar 
University, despite persistent reports of ethnic discrimination, has 
significant ethnic diversity in its student body and staff. The rector 
of West Mostar University, Marko Tadic, was forced out of office by the 
university board of directors following his efforts to reform the 
University, which has been politicized and dominated by Croat 
nationalists since the war. Tadic had introduced strict standards for 
hiring and retention of faculty, removed photos of Croatian generals 
and other nationalist symbols, initiated contact with the Bosniak 
University in East Mostar, and proposed a review of the legitimacy of 
degrees issued during and immediately following the war.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, authorities imposed 
some limits on this right in practice. Opposition political parties 
freely staged rallies and campaign events during the April and November 
elections in Bosniak-dominated areas, although several parties decided 
not to operate in Croat-dominated areas out of concern for their 
safety. In the November election campaign, the SDP and other 
multiethnic parties increased their campaign activities in the RS; 
however, in general few non-Serb opposition parties or candidates 
campaigned in the RS (see Section 3).
    Refugees returning to visit homes in the RS or commemorate war dead 
were harassed and subject to violence in several incidents. On May 11, 
several buses carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark 
the 8th anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by 
an angry mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were slightly injured 
by broken glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the 
peace several days later (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and a wide 
range of social, cultural, and political organizations functioned 
without interference; however, authorities imposed some limits on this 
right and indirect pressure constrained the activities of some groups. 
Although political party membership was not forced, many viewed 
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way for 
residents to obtain, regain, or keep housing and jobs in the state-
owned sector of the economy (see Section 6.a.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, including private and public worship, and in general, 
individuals enjoyed this right in predominately mixed and religious 
majority areas. However, the efforts of individuals to worship in areas 
in which they are an ethnic and religious minority were restricted by 
government and institutional harassment, and sometimes by societal 
violence. Some incidents resulted in damage to religious edifices and 
cemeteries.
    Administrative and financial obstacles to rebuilding religious 
structures impeded the ability of minorities to worship and even 
impeded their return in many areas. RS authorities have obstructed 
attempts to rebuild the 83 mosques in the RS that were destroyed during 
the war. A June 1999 Human Rights Chamber decision ordering the RS to 
swiftly grant the Islamic community the necessary permits for 
reconstruction of seven of Banja Luka's destroyed mosques largely has 
been ignored. RS authorities refused to issue necessary permits for the 
reconstruction of any of the mosques or other Islamic community-owned 
buildings in Banja Luka, particularly the symbolically important 
Ferhadija Central Mosque. The RS government allowed the Muslim 
community to block off the site, but has not yet allowed reconstruction 
to begin. In December Ivan Mandic, an HDZ hard-liner and the head of 
Mostar Municipality Southwest (MSW) refused to grant permission for 
reconstruction of Baba Besir Mosque, one of three mosques in MSW that 
were destroyed during the war. Reconstruction of a mosque near Zvornik 
began in May, and Islamic leaders declared reconstruction of a mosque 
in Kozarac complete in August.
    In December the Human Rights Chamber concluded that local 
authorities in Bijelina had prevented reconstruction of five mosques 
that had been destroyed in 1993 and had allowed buildings to be 
constructed on two of the former mosque sites, a parking lot on one, 
and flea markets on the remaining two. RS authorities had ignored an 
order by the Chamber in 1999 to halt construction on one site. The 
Chamber ordered that permits be granted for reconstruction of the five 
mosques. No action by the authorities has been taken by year's end.
    In February the Human Rights Chamber determined that the municipal 
government of Prnjavor, in the RS, had discriminated against its 
Islamic community by closing the local Muslim cemetery. The municipal 
government had ordered a Bosniak to move his deceased wife's remains 
from the Muslim cemetery to a ``new'' Muslim cemetery. At a February 
1999 Human Rights Chamber hearing concerning the case, evidence 
indicated that there was in fact no new Muslim cemetery in the area and 
that no reasonable grounds existed for closing the old Muslim cemetery 
(nearby Catholic and Orthodox cemeteries remained open). Prnjavor 
municipal authorities were ordered to allow burials within a month. By 
the end of the year, Prnjavor authorities had complied with the order 
and removed the ban on Muslim burials.
    Public schools offer religious education classes, which, in theory, 
are optional. However, schools generally do not hire teachers to offer 
religious education classes to students of minority religions. In some 
cases, children who choose not to attend the religion classes offered 
are subject to pressure and discrimination from peers and teachers. 
Schools in Sarajevo canton, except for non-Bosniak schools, offer only 
Islamic religion classes. In Croat-majority West Mostar, minority 
students theoretically have the right to take classes in non-Catholic 
religions; however, this option does not exist in practice. Orthodox 
symbols are present in public schools throughout the RS. For a variety 
of reasons, minority families with children have been slow to return to 
the RS. Consequently, municipalities have not been compelled yet to 
address the issue of minority religious education. On May 10, the 
Education Ministries of both entities and the Deputy Federation 
Education Minister agreed on a standard curriculum, which requires all 
schools to teach the shared cultural heritage of all three communities.
    In Bosniak-dominated Zenica, the Catholic school closed temporarily 
in March after school officials received a bomb threat. Although local 
authorities later discovered that the threat was a hoax, Zenica's few 
remaining Catholics are concerned for their safety. On June 25, an 
explosive device destroyed a Catholic chapel in Zivinice.
    In Croat-dominated areas of Herzegovina, Muslims feel pressure not 
to practice their religion in public and have been the subject of 
violent attacks. For example, in the Croat- dominated western Bosnian 
town of Glamoc, a building housing all of the local Muslim 
organizations and the apartment of a Muslim cleric was bombed and 
damaged seriously in April.
    In April RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik shared the stage at an 
interfaith conference in the RS government's headquarters in Banja Luka 
with the newly appointed Mufti of Banja Luka and three other Muslim 
clerics. In Mostar religious leaders representing all groups except 
Catholics attended celebrations for Muslim, Jewish, and Orthodox 
holidays.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for ``the 
right to liberty of movement and residence,'' and freedom of movement, 
including across the IEBL, continued to improve; however, some limits 
remained in practice. The IPTF and SFOR completed the dismantling of 
all permanent police checkpoints in 1999, greatly enhancing freedom of 
movement.
    Freedom of movement improved significantly with the introduction of 
universal license plates in 1998. The new plates do not identify the 
vehicles as being registered in predominantly Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, or 
Bosnian Croat areas.
    Accurate statistics on refugee returns remained difficult to 
obtain. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
between the end of the war in 1995 and October 31, 364,391 persons who 
left the country had returned. More than 174,000 returned from Germany 
alone, due to the German Government's policy of actively pressuring 
refugees to return to Bosnia. Most of those returning from Europe were 
unable to return to their prewar homes in the RS. Efforts by hard-line 
Croats to resettle returning refugees and consolidate the results of 
ethnic cleansing have ceased for the most part. The UNHCR reported that 
during the year there were 67,445 registered minority returns 
countrywide. Although the return figures are much less exact for those 
returning from other places within the country, the UNHCR reported that 
336,504 IDP's returned to their prewar homes between the end of the war 
and October, or roughly 20,000 during the year. While different refugee 
organizations provide different estimates on the numbers of minority 
returns, they all agree that the rate of minority returns during the 
year was more than twice that of 1999.
    In the spring, the international community began a concerted effort 
to compel the entity authorities to implement the property laws. 
Pressure from OHR (more than 20 obstructionist officials were dismissed 
in late December 1999) and a publicity campaign in the local media 
reinforced the message that illegal occupancies could not continue 
indefinitely. By the spring, with the pace of evictions growing 
rapidly, particularly in the RS, the number of returns also increased. 
Families and individuals increasingly abandoned occupied property 
voluntarily, with some returning to their heavily damaged or even 
destroyed dwellings. Although many of such returnees were Bosniaks, 
substantial numbers were Serbs and Croats. According to the UNHCR, 
35,836 Bosniaks, 11,591 Croats, and 18,852 Serbs returned to areas 
where they are in the minority.
    Pressure from evictions, combined with an increased sense of 
security in most areas of the country and an awareness that 
international assistance was not inexhaustible, prompted an increase in 
returns during the first half of the year. By April the rate of return 
was three times higher than for the same period in 1999. Although the 
pace decreased somewhat over the summer as it became apparent that 
reconstruction assistance would not be able to match the number of 
returnees, the rate of returns during the year was more than twice that 
of 1999. Thousands of returnees lived in tents or improvised shelters 
in their former villages and towns, hoping for assistance in rebuilding 
their homes.
    However, many problems remained to prevent returns, including the 
obstruction by hard-liners of implementation of property legislation, 
political pressure for individuals to remain displaced in order to 
increase ethnic homogeneity of the population in a specific area, and 
the lack of an ethnically neutral curriculum in public schools (see 
Section 5). For example, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) 
reported that Roma from the RS (most of whom are Muslim) who were 
forced out of their homes allegedly have had serious difficulties 
returning to their prewar homes. The ERRC reported that Roma have had 
to pay financial compensation, ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 (3,000 to 
10,000 KM) to Serbs occupying their prewar homes in order to move back. 
The ERRC also reported that some Roma's homes are occupied by RS 
government bodies.
    The 1998 Sarajevo Declaration was intended to showcase Sarajevo as 
a model city in terms of tolerance. The declaration was to provide for 
improvements in areas that hindered return: Legislation, housing, 
security and public order, employment, and education, with a goal of 
20,000 minority returns for the canton during 1998. This number of 
returns was not reached until February. During the year, with the 
implementation of the October 1999 revised property laws, the rate of 
evictions in the city increased considerably and the pace of decisions 
increased; however, a large backlog of cases remains. Many of those 
evicted returned to their destroyed property in the eastern RS, where 
some received reconstruction assistance.
    During 1998 the Federation army unlawfully took control of 4,000 
former Yugoslav military (JNA) apartments that had been abandoned and 
repaired by a Dutch company. Prewar residents continue to wait to 
return to these apartments, while authorities encouraged occupants to 
begin the purchasing process. After inadequate action by local 
authorities, several of these cases were brought before the Human 
Rights Chamber. No returns to former JNA apartments have taken place. 
There have been no reports to indicate progress in resolving this issue 
during the period covered by this report.
    The continued influence of ethnic separatists in positions of 
authority also hindered minority returns. Much of Croat-controlled 
Herzegovina and towns in eastern RS remained resistant to minority 
returns. IDP's living in those areas, even those who privately 
indicated interest in returning to their prewar homes, frequently were 
pressured to remain displaced, while those who wished to return were 
discouraged, often through the use of violence. In particular, IDP's in 
the hard-line RS areas of Bratunac and Srebrenica, mostly from 
Sarajevo, were intimidated from attempting to return (see Section 
1.c.). For example, in June Serb IDP's living in Kotorsko blocked the 
main Sarajevo-Brod highway for several hours after Bosniaks began 
returning to the village to clean their property. The Serbs were angry 
because they were unable to return to their homes in Vozuca, which 
continue to be occupied by Bosniak refugees from Srebrenica. Several 
days after the blockade, Bosniaks blocked another portion of the 
highway to call attention to Serb harassment and intimidation, which 
was obstructing their return to Kotorsko. In mid-July several hundred 
Bosniaks blocked a main road near Maglaj, in central Bosnia, to protest 
the impending eviction of Muslim fundamentalist families occupying Serb 
property in the village of Bocinja. The blockade lasted for several 
days. However, within weeks of the end of the blockade, authorities 
began evicting Muslim families from Bocinja without incident.
    Despite these obstacles, ethnic minority refugees and IDP's began 
returning to their destroyed villages in increasing numbers in some 
areas of Herzegovina and the eastern RS. For example, in the spring 
Bosniaks began returning to Zepa, the outskirts of Foca, and even 
villages near Visegrad. In the summer, several Bosniaks returned to 
Srebrenica town, and dozens more returned to several outlying villages. 
Elsewhere in the RS, Bosniaks began returning to the center of Prijedor 
and Doboj. Serb returns accelerated in the Capljina area of 
Herzegovina. However, local government officials continue to obstruct 
minority returns to Drvar and to harass Serb returnees.
    Government leaders in both the RS and the Federation often have 
used a variety of tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the 
return of IDP's (see Section 1.c.).
    The increased number of ethnically integrated police forces helped 
improve the climate for returns, although security remained inadequate 
in some areas.
    The continued depressed state of the economy throughout the country 
and the consequent lack of employment opportunities for returnees 
remained a serious obstacle to a significant number of returns. As a 
result, most minority returnees were elderly. This placed a burden on 
receiving municipalities. Younger minority group members, who depend on 
adequate wages to support families, generally remained displaced, 
especially in cases in which they had managed over the past 7 years to 
find work.
    Officially, the Government grants asylum and refugee status in 
accordance with international standards. The Government generally 
cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. During the year, approximately 3,000 refugees from 
the Kosovo conflict continued to reside in refugee camps in Bosnia. 
Some are planning to return to Kosovo, with some seeking asylum abroad. 
Approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Serbs who fled Kosovo or Serbia during 
the Kosovo confrontation are believed to be in the RS in private 
accommodation. Less than 1,000 Sandzaks are believed to still reside in 
private homes. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to 
a place where they feared persecution.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although a permanent election law is not yet in place, the Dayton 
Accords commit the parties to ``ensure that conditions exist for the 
organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically 
neutral environment'' and to ensure the right to ``vote in secret 
without fear or intimidation.'' The Dayton Peace Accords gave the OSCE 
primary responsibility for the organization and supervision of the 
country's post-war elections. The OSCE organized and supervised general 
elections in 1996, 1998, and November; municipal elections in 1997 and 
April; and special elections for the RS National Assembly in 1997. The 
OSCE released a draft of the election law in December 1999 that would 
transfer responsibilities for running elections to the Government, but 
it has not been adopted yet by the Parliament.
    In July President Alija Izetbegovic announced that he would resign 
from the three-person Bosnian presidency in October. Because the 
Bosnian Constitution did not specify the succession procedure, the 
parliamentary assembly adopted a controversial law establishing a 
procedure that gave final decision to the indirectly elected House of 
Peoples over the House of Representatives. Wolfgang Petritsch, the High 
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, imposed an amendment to 
rectify this shortcoming. The Bosniak speaker of the Parliament, Halid 
Genjac, was named to serve as Izetbegovic's temporary replacement. At 
year's end, a permanent replacement had not been elected.
    The November general elections were held without violence, although 
there were incidents of voter intimidation, multiple voting, and 
illegal preelection campaigning. The OSCE issued 28 decisions 
sanctioning or censuring parties or individuals for violations of 
election rules, ranging from slogans fostering ethnic hatred to 
obstructing audits of party financing. While most voting irregularities 
were not significant enough to influence the outcome, an HDZ-organized 
referendum held on election day provided a platform for nationalist 
rhetoric that likely increased support for nationalist parties, 
particularly among Croat and Bosniak voters. Voter turnout during the 
April and November elections was around 65 percent. Compared with 
previous years, there was a large decrease in the number of absentee 
ballots during both elections; however, such a decrease most likely was 
a result of refugee returns to Bosnia and a lower level of interest 
among voters abroad. By the end of the year, the process of 
implementing results of the November general elections was still 
underway.
    Municipal elections held in April largely were peaceful; however, 
several incidents, some violent, occurred. Two incidents were directed 
against the international community, while others resulted from 
conflict between political parties within ethnic groups. A Bosnian Serb 
male, acting alone, attacked an IPTF member with a stick near a polling 
place in Bijeljina in the RS. The OSCE reported that there were no 
major attempts at fraud, manipulation, or disruption of the election 
process, but observers noted widespread problems with incomplete voting 
lists that discouraged or prevented some citizens from voting. While 
nationalist parties in Serb- and Croat-dominated areas continued to 
attract the support of a significant portion of the electorate, the 
moderate, multiethnic parties, such as the SDP, gained strength. A 
number of electoral reforms that are contained in the draft election 
law, including provisions for preferential and open list voting, 
multimember constituencies, and new campaign finance regulations, were 
applied during the April municipal elections.
    Implementation of the results of the April municipal elections was 
smoother than in 1997, according to the OSCE. A greater familiarity 
with the laws at the local level improved the process, although 5 
months after the elections, 20 of the 146 municipalities had still not 
completely implemented the results. The OSCE screening of candidates to 
eliminate those candidates who illegally occupied refugee homes, held 
conflicting positions, or who previously had been removed from office 
by the High Representative, partially contributed to the delay. 
Obstructionism caused delays in some municipalities, such as in Vares, 
where the SDA repeatedly nominated unacceptable candidates who were 
rejected by the OSCE.
    Continued party control of the media and security apparatus 
precluded full citizen participation without intimidation, especially 
in Bosnian Croat areas and parts of the RS. To varying degrees, all 
major parties attempted to exclude other parties in areas they control. 
This was especially true in areas controlled by the SDS or the HDZ. 
However, observers believe that recent changes to the media law in the 
RS and the new media law in the Federation have improved the situation 
somewhat (see Section 2.a.).
    A democratically elected, multiethnic local government is to 
administer the Brcko municipality as a district under the direct 
oversight of the Brcko supervisor. Until new laws are issued or 
existing laws adapted, the supervisor retains discretion as to which 
laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in Brcko. A new district statute 
was issued by the supervisor on December 7 1999, and a districtwide 
multiethnic police force was established officially in January.
    Women generally are underrepresented in government and politics, 
although a few women, such as the former President of the RS, have 
occupied prominent positions. In the three legislatures, women were 
underrepresented seriously. To address this concern, election rules 
established by the OSCE prior to the 1998 general elections required 
parties to include no fewer than 3 members of each gender among the top 
10 names on their candidate lists. However, in the state-level House of 
Representatives (lower house), 2 of 42 deputies are women, compared 
with 12 before the November elections. There were no women in the 
state-level House of Peoples (upper house), whose representatives are 
appointed by the entity legislatures, prior to the November elections; 
the current upper house still was being formed by year's end. In the 
Federation legislature, 21 of 140 deputies in the House of 
Representatives are women. In the RS unicameral legislature, 15 of 83 
deputies are women, compared with 19 before the most recent elections. 
During the April municipal elections, the Provisional Election 
Commission mandated that one in every three candidates be a woman. 590 
women were elected, constituting 18 percent of successful candidates.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The authorities generally permitted outside investigations of 
alleged human rights violations. International and local NGO's involved 
in human rights appear to operate with relative freedom. The OHR 
reports that foreign government and NGO human rights monitors were able 
to travel without restriction in all areas of the country. 
International community representatives were given widespread and for 
the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and prisoners 
in the RS as well as in the Federation.
    While monitors enjoyed relative freedom to investigate human rights 
abuses, they rarely were successful in persuading the authorities in 
all regions to respond to their recommendations. Monitors' 
interventions often met with delays or outright refusal.
    The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of Human 
Rights Ombudsperson, two institutions created under Annex 6 of the 
Dayton Accords to investigate and adjudicate human rights violations, 
continued to expand during the year. During the first 11 months of the 
year, the Chamber's caseload increased to 6,353 registered cases and 
the Chamber issued 632 final case decisions. The pace of decisions 
issued by the Chamber increased due to the body of jurisprudence that 
the Chamber established in its previous 3 years of existence and to 
which the Chamber is now able to refer. In addition, the Chamber's 
increased experience in adjudicating human rights cases has led to more 
efficient operation. While governmental cooperation with the Chamber is 
still weak, the Federation made progress in implementing Chamber 
decisions, including many occupancy-rights cases and compensation-
awards cases. While the efforts by the Federation to implement Chamber 
decisions have generally brought it into compliance with almost all 
decisions, the RS has made minimal or no effort to implement decisions 
of the Chamber. The cases implemented in the RS so far have required 
relatively simple actions by the Government, such as canceling eviction 
orders for residents who still were living in contested houses. In 
February the RS National Assembly passed a law establishing an 
ombudsperson committee for the RS, a three-person, multiethnic 
institution; the first three Ombudspersons were appointed at the end of 
April.
    Cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague is a key factor in the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords and the establishment of respect 
for human rights. In 1998 RS Prime Minister Dodik altered the RS policy 
of defiance of the Tribunal and the Dayton Accords by instructing his 
officials to cooperate with the ICTY; however, no action was taken in 
practice. A majority of the 26 ICTY public indictees who remain at 
large reportedly live in the RS, some allegedly in Prijedor and Foca. 
RS authorities made no effort to arrest these indictees.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The parties agreed in the Dayton Accords to reject discrimination 
on such grounds as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, or association with a 
national minority. Nevertheless, there were many cases of 
discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Credible NGO observers 
reported that violence against women, including spousal abuse and rape, 
remained widespread and underreported. A report by the International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights estimates that about 30 percent of 
women in the country are victims of domestic violence; however, there 
is little data available regarding the extent of the problem. 
Throughout the country, rape and violent abuse are considered criminal 
offenses. The laws prohibit rape in both the Federation and the RS. 
Spousal rape and spousal abuse are also illegal in the Federation. 
However, domestic violence usually was not reported to the authorities; 
a sense of shame reportedly prevents some victims of rape from coming 
forward to complain to authorities.
    The police have little or no training in investigating cases of 
domestic violence, and there were reports of police inaction in cases 
of domestic violence and sexual assault. According to human rights 
groups, in one case, a police officer from Zvornik was accused of 
raping two teenage girls. The father reported the incident to the local 
police station, but the officers on duty did not record the complaint. 
When the police finally interviewed the victims, the accused officer 
was allowed to be present in the room. The IPTF has requested an 
independent investigation. The OHR reported that in one case, police 
answering a call about domestic abuse noticed injuries on the woman and 
her minor daughter, but offered only to take them to the hospital. The 
woman, who had previously reported other incidents of abuse to the 
police, later committed suicide. In Canton 4, a police officer hung up 
on a midnight call from a daughter calling for help when her father 
threatened her mother with a knife. No record of the complaint was 
made. The IPTF has called for an investigation and for disciplinary 
action against the duty officer.
    Trafficking in women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police primarily arrest 
women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing 
the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into 
prostitution have little recourse (see Section 6.f.).
    There is little legal discrimination against women, and women serve 
as judges, doctors, and professors; however, a male-dominated society 
prevails in both entities, particularly in rural areas, with few women 
in positions of real economic power or political power.
    Women have been discriminated against in the workplace in favor of 
demobilized soldiers, and a small but increasing number of gender-
related discrimination cases have been documented. Anecdotal accounts 
indicate that women and men receive equal pay at socially owned 
enterprises but not necessarily at private businesses. Women are 
entitled to 12 months' maternity leave and may be required to work no 
more than 4 hours per day until a child is 3 years old. However, women 
in all parts of the country encounter problems with regard to the 
nonpayment of maternity leave allowances and the unwarranted dismissal 
of pregnant women and new mothers. A woman with underage children may 
not be required to perform shift work.
    Children.--The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is 
incorporated by reference in the Dayton Accords and has the effect of 
law in both entities. The end of the fighting brought a major 
improvement in the human rights of children. During the war nearly 
17,000 children were killed, 35,000 were wounded, and over 1,800 were 
permanently disabled.
    Social services for children are in extremely short supply. 
Disabled children lack sufficient medical care and educational 
opportunities. Education is free and is compulsory through the age of 
15 in both the Federation and the RS. The most serious issue is the 
ethnic division of the education system. Students in minority areas 
frequently face a hostile environment in schools that do not provide an 
ethnically neutral setting. At times minority children are barred from 
attending school at all. Local education officials excuse such abuses 
by claiming that minority children should have their own schools and 
curricula. Obstruction by politicians and government officials has 
slowed international efforts to remove discriminatory material from 
textbooks and enact other needed reforms.
    Steps were taken during the year to integrate minority students 
into some schools. In May approximately 85 Bosniak children who had 
been attending home schools in Stolac were integrated into the Stolac 
Elementary School, which previously had taught only Croat children. 
Similar integration took place in Vares. However, segregation and 
discrimination are entrenched in Bosnian schools, particularly in 
religious education (see Section 2.c.). For example, in Sarajevo only 
Muslim religion classes were offered in public schools, which denied 
children of other faiths the opportunity to study their own religious 
traditions in school. In August Romani refugees from Kosovo protested 
the local authorities' decision that Romani children from the 
Smrekovica refugee center in Breza could not attend the local primary 
school. Although the UNHCR had arranged for 60 Romani children from the 
camp to enroll in a local primary school, the mayor intervened to 
prevent the children from enrolling, allegedly because of a lack of 
space at the school. In a compromise, two rooms in the camp were 
converted into classrooms; however, at year's end the children still 
were barred from the local school.
    There was no societal pattern of abuse against children. 
Nonetheless, they continue to suffer disproportionately from the 
societal stress of the postwar era. There have been credible but 
unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to work in begging 
rings (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Federation Government is required by 
law to assist disabled persons to find employment and to protect them 
against discrimination. In the RS, discrimination against the disabled 
also is prohibited by law. Currently there are few jobs available, and 
thousands of newly disabled victims entered the job market after the 
war. The Government has limited resources to address the special needs 
of the disabled. There are no legal provisions mandating that buildings 
be made accessible to the physically disabled. There are a number of 
international NGO's that assist the disabled in the country.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are identified 
closely in the country. The Interreligious Council, established in 1997 
and composed of the main leaders of the country's four major religious 
communities--Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Jewish--
continued its efforts to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE and 
the OHR facilitated many interfaith meetings at the local level as 
well.
    However, throughout the country, religious minorities were 
pressured and were intimidated by the ethnic/religious majority.
    On June 25, a Catholic chapel in Zivinice in the RS reportedly was 
destroyed by an explosive device. Also in June, unknown persons broke 
into the home of a Catholic priest in Derventa parish.
    RS authorities continue to impede the rebuilding of the mosques in 
the RS destroyed during the war, despite requests from the Muslim 
community for reconstruction (see Section 2.c.). Religious minorities 
throughout the country occasionally faced limited interference from the 
authorities in their right to worship freely. However, Catholic priests 
reported that they were able to conduct masses in the RS with little or 
no problems.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Claimed ``ethnic differences'' 
were used to justify the war and remain a powerful political force in 
the country. Although some politicians still support the concepts of a 
``Greater Serbia'' and a ``Greater Croatia,'' mixed communities exist 
peacefully in a growing number of areas, including Sarajevo and Tuzla. 
The SDS, HDZ, and to a lesser extent the primarily Bosniak SDA sought 
to manipulate the movement of persons and the access to housing and 
social services that they control to ensure that the ethnic groups with 
which they are associated consolidate their position in their 
respective geographic regions. Some hard-line local authorities in the 
eastern RS sought to keep information regarding the right to return and 
conditions in return sites from reaching displaced persons in their 
areas, so as to dissuade them from attempting to return to their former 
homes.
    In 1998 the RS passed new property legislation establishing a 
claims process at the municipal level. The High Representative extended 
the deadline to file claims on socially-owned apartments until April 
19. In addition in October 1999, the OHR issued a series of decrees 
amending a number of property laws in both entities to provide all 
citizens just and equal protection of their property rights, which is 
considered essential in order for IDP's to return to their former 
homes.
    Despite hopeful signs in some areas, harassment and discrimination 
against minorities continued throughout the country, often centering on 
property disputes. These problems included desecration of graves, 
arson, damage to houses of worship, throwing explosive devices into 
residential areas, harassment, dismissal from work, threats, assaults, 
and, in some cases, killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    On April 11, a group of Bosniaks attacked five Romani men in 
Banovici, reportedly because the Bosniaks believed the Roma had voted 
for a nonnationalist political party in the municipal elections. 
Amnesty International reported that local police present at the scene 
made no effort to protect the Roma.
    Ethnic tensions remained high in Brcko. In mid-October, about 1,000 
Bosnian Serb students staged violent protests for 3 days to demand 
separate schools from those of Muslims and Croats. The protests began 
after a group of Bosnian Serb students beat a Bosniak student; after 
the beating, Bosniak students demanded better security and Serb 
students began calling for separate schools. Currently, Serb and 
Bosniak students share high school buildings but attend classes in two 
shifts.
    Bosnian Serb and Croat politicians seek to increase the ethnic 
homogeneity of the population in areas they control by discouraging 
IDP's of their own ethnicity from returning to their prewar homes if 
they would be in the minority there. Hard-liners also encourage members 
of their groups currently living in areas where they are minorities to 
move to areas where their ethnic group is the majority. Hard-line 
Bosnian Croats continued to discourage some Croat returns to central 
Bosnia and actively have recruited displaced Croats to resettle in 
Herzegovina; however, this intimidation has decreased and 4,147 Croats 
returned to Central Bosnia Cantons during the year. Although the new RS 
Government officially supports the right to return, it continues to 
obstruct returns on many levels. Bosniak authorities appear tacitly to 
support some Bosniak resettlement efforts, including resettlement of 
returnees, in ``strategic'' areas of the Federation where Bosniaks are 
in the minority.
    In some cases, opponents of refugee returns used violence, 
including sporadic house burnings, and orchestrated demonstrations in 
an effort to intimidate returnees. In mid-December in the RS, the house 
of a Bosnian Croat returnee from Croatia was stoned by hard-line Croats 
opposed to his return. While incidents of violence have decreased due 
to improved security and freedom of movement, other forms of 
discrimination have not. In particular discrimination in employment and 
education are now key obstacles to sustainable returns. Widespread 
firing of ethnic minorities during and after the war has not been 
reversed in most cases, and members of the ethnic majority in a region 
often are hired over former employees who are minorities. Favoritism is 
also shown to veterans and families of those killed during the war. 
There recently have been more reported cases of employment 
discrimination based on political affiliation.
    Vague provisions in the labor law passed in the Federation in 
October 1999 allowed employers to create barriers for minorities 
seeking to regain employment. Amendments passed in August clarified the 
law; however, the authorities did not enforce it consistently and 
discrimination persists. There were no provisions in RS law to prevent 
discrimination in hiring and firing outside the Constitution until 
passage of a labor law in September. Several court cases regarding 
discrimination are pending; however, workers seldom obtained protection 
from the courts, which barely function.
    Throughout the country, membership in the political party 
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest method to 
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of 
socially owned enterprises. Membership also was influential in 
obtaining or keeping housing (see Section 2.b.).

Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitutions of the Federation 
and the RS provide for the right of workers to form and join unions, as 
do recently passed labor laws in both entities. There are no legal 
restrictions on who may join unions, and the right of minority workers 
to join unions is protected in both entities. However, in practice 
union membership in the RS is overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb and in the 
Federation overwhelmingly Bosniak. Bosnian Croats have informal labor 
organizations in areas where they are the dominant ethnic group, but 
generally are represented by the Federation union. A joint-entity union 
has been established in the district of Brcko. Union membership is 
mandatory for officially employed workers in the RS; in the Federation, 
approximately 70 percent of the official workforce is unionized.
    Unions legally are independent of the Government and political 
parties, but are highly politicized. There are no legal restrictions on 
forming new unions; however, in practice one union confederation in 
each entity represents all workers. A new confederation of trade unions 
tried to register with the Federation, but was unsuccessful due to 
political interference by the established confederation. In the RS, the 
sector-based branches of the union confederation have become 
increasingly independent, and one branch successfully has broken off 
from the umbrella organization.
    Unions have the right to strike and increasingly have used that 
right to pressure for payment of overdue salaries or wages, protest or 
demand changes in management, and voice their opinion on economic 
reform and government policy. Indeed, protest is often the only way to 
compel the payment of salaries or wages. Most strikes are legal; 
however, the Government claimed that some were illegal (on the grounds 
that they were not announced far enough in advance, or 48 hours) in an 
attempt to avoid negotiations. A Law on Strikes governs strike activity 
in both entities, and retaliation against strikers is prohibited. There 
were several major strikes, including those by teachers and health care 
workers, due to arrears in salaries of several months or more.
    The Government was found to be in violation of ILO Convention 111 
(on employment discrimination) and 158 (on termination of employment) 
in November 1999 because of its failure to act in the case of workers 
at Aluminj Mostar who were dismissed because of their non-Croat 
ethnicity during the war. Aluminj Mostar has protested the ILO ruling, 
arguing that it did not have the opportunity to respond to the union 
complaint.
    Both the Federation and RS passed comprehensive labor legislation 
in August and September as part of loan conditions established by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This legislation brings 
the legal code in line with most international standards; however, 
implementing provisions were not in place by year's end.
    Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is provided for in the Law on Working Relations in the RS 
and in a comprehensive collective agreement in the Federation; however, 
collective bargaining rarely is used. The substantial number of 
government employees, particularly in the RS, permits the Government to 
remain highly influential in determining the overall level of wages in 
each entity.
    The Law on Labor in both entities prohibits discrimination by 
employers against union members and organizers, in accordance with ILO 
standards. However, discrimination continues (see Section 5).
    There were no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, women and girls were trafficked for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f). The country is a major transit 
point for illegal immigrants; the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced 
labor and held against his will (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children in the 
Federation and in the RS is 15 years. The law on labor prohibits 
children from performing hazardous work, such as night work. Child 
labor is not known to be a problem; however, children sometimes assist 
their families with farm work and odd jobs. Children are covered under 
the Constitution's prohibition against forced or compulsory labor, and 
such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). There have 
been credible but unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to 
work in begging rings (see Section 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage in the 
Federation is $100 (200 KM); in the RS it is $32 (65 KM). The minimum 
wage was insufficient to provide for a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Many workers have outstanding claims for payment of 
salaries and pensions.
    The legal workweek is 40 hours, and overtime pay is required by 
law; however, ``seasonal'' workers may work up to 60 hours per week. 
Rest and vacation rules exceed international standards. For example, 
women are allowed 1 year of maternity leave.
    Occupational safety and health regulations generally are ignored 
because of the demands and constraints imposed by an economy devastated 
by war. Neither entity has completed passage of new laws to enforce 
international worker rights standards. Workers cannot remove themselves 
from hazardous working conditions without endangering their continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing problem. The 
country is mainly a destination point, and to a lesser extent an origin 
and transit point, for women and girls who are trafficked for the 
purpose of forced prostitution. Most victims are from Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. A significant number of women are 
manipulated or coerced into situations in which they work in brothels 
in conditions close to slavery. The country is extremely vulnerable to 
trafficking in persons, because of weak laws, almost nonexistent border 
controls, and corrupt police who are bribed easily. As many as 5,000 
trafficked women may be working in the country. Previous estimates of 
the problem by the Office of the U. N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) were overinflated due to unavailability of hard 
statistics; however, credible sources report that the problem is 
growing. From March 1999 to January 2001, there were 384 confirmed 
cases of women trafficked for sexual exploitation; 236 women were 
returned to their home countries. The IPTF reports that they have 
encountered approximately 4,000 women in their raids of bars and 
estimate that 10 percent of the women have been trafficked. The IOM 
confirmed two cases of Bosnian women who were trafficked to other 
countries. Organized crime elements control the trafficking business.
    The majority of trafficked women in Bosnia come from Moldova, 
Romania, and Ukraine, but also come from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Bulgaria. The ages of the trafficked women averaged 22.8 years, 
ranging between 16 and 33 years of age. Less than 5 percent of the 
women were minors. Many of these women were lured by the promise of 
well-paying jobs abroad, and came in hope of improving their 
socioeconomic situation. Many women responded to advertisements that 
offered work in Italy or Germany as dancers, waitresses, and domestic 
servants. Most of the trafficked women cross through Yugoslavia or 
Hungary before entering the country. Many of them are sold in Belgrade, 
and from there are smuggled across the Drina river at Zvornik and 
Bijeljina into the country. Some traffickers brought in the women and 
girls specifically to work in the country's brothels. For a variety of 
reasons, traffickers stranded or abandoned some women en route to other 
countries. Some women are trafficked to Croatia to work as prostitutes 
there or to be trafficked to other countries. Trafficked women often 
are sold several times between different bar owners after arriving in 
Bosnia. Prices vary between $500 and $1,500 (1,000 to 3,000 KM) per 
woman, and the women often are expected to repay their ``owners'' this 
amount out of their allotted share of the earnings. There have been 
reports of trafficked women being physically and sexually assaulted, 
denied food, and threatened. A significant proportion of the 
traffickers is female.
    There have been credible but unconfirmed reports that children 
(boys and girls) are trafficked to work in begging rings, mainly in 
Sarajevo (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
    It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police arrest primarily 
women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing 
the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into 
prostitution have little recourse. Authorities generally treat 
prostitution as a minor violation committed by the woman involved; 
however, the police do not charge employers or customers with any 
crimes. In most cases, the police do not conduct thorough 
investigations against the bar owners and others involved in the 
recruitment, transportation, and movement of such women, and 
prosecutions of those involved are rare. Women convicted of 
prostitution may be fined, imprisoned for 60 days, or deported. In the 
fall of 1999, the OHR issued directives governing police raids on 
brothels to ensure that trafficked women were provided assistance. 
While these directives reportedly have been followed, raids are 
infrequent. The country's deportation laws permit local police to 
release trafficked individuals in neighboring jurisdictions or across 
the border in Croatia. Police in Bihac, Gradacac, and Tuzla have broken 
up trafficking rings in recent years and deported the women. It is 
estimated that there are some 300 to 600 brothels in the country. 
Brothel operators reportedly earn $50 (100 KM) per hour per woman; in 
some cases women forced to work in brothels reportedly receive as 
little as $13 (25 KM) per month for personal expenses and are forced to 
find other money (often through begging) for essentials, including 
condoms. Other prostitutes reportedly earn $100 (200 KM) per month. 
Police in the Federation and the RS arrested and deported Russian and 
Ukrainian women working as prostitutes.
    Police officials in Brcko have been removed from office for 
involvement in prostitution, and there are allegations that police 
officers in other cities also may be involved. A May report by UNMBIH 
and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
documented evidence of complicity by local police, international 
police, or SFOR in 14 out of 40 cases that it investigated between 
March 1999 and March 2000. In one case, an SFOR civilian paid $3,057 
(7,000 KM) to purchase two women from a brothel owner. On the basis of 
his misconduct, the man was relieved of his duties and barred from the 
SFOR area of operations; he left the country and no further action was 
taken.
    In many cases women are afraid to testify against their traffickers 
and the judicial system offers them little protection. There are no 
witness protection programs for women who testify against their 
traffickers. There have been confirmed reports of witnesses being 
threatened in court despite the presence of local police and 
international representatives. Local officials have been slow to bring 
charges of intimidation.
    The country is also a major transit point for illegal immigrants, 
and the IOM confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced 
labor and held against his will (see Section 6.c.).
    The Government has done very little to combat the problem of 
trafficking. However, the IOM and several NGO's, both local and 
foreign, are addressing the issue. The IOM has established a program to 
repatriate trafficked women who seek to return home. As of November, 
nearly 160 women had been repatriated through IOM's program. There are 
a number of shelters that house trafficked women while they await 
return to their countries of origin.
    The IPTF works with local police forces to free trafficked persons 
and to crack down on traffickers. However, there have been very few 
arrests to date. On October 30, Sarajevo Interior Ministry officers 
raided a nightclub and arrested 3 persons allegedly involved in 
trafficking the 17 women who were found there.
                               __________

                                BULGARIA

    Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically 
elected government. President Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF) began a 5-year term of office in January 1997 following 
his election in late 1996. UDF leader Ivan Kostov currently serves as 
Prime Minister. The judiciary is independent but suffers from 
corruption and continues to struggle with structural and staffing 
problems.
    Internal security services are the responsibility of the Ministry 
of the Interior and include the National Police, the National Service 
for Combating Organized Crime, the National Security Service (civilian 
domestic intelligence), the National Gendarmery Service (paramilitary 
police), and the Border Police. Although government control over the 
police is improving, it still is not sufficient to ensure full 
accountability. The Special Investigative Service (SIS), which provides 
investigative support to prosecutors on serious criminal cases, is a 
judicial branch agency and therefore not under direct government 
control. Some members of the police committed serious human rights 
abuses.
    The country is in transition from an economy dominated by loss-
making state enterprises, concentrated in heavy industry, to one 
dominated by the private sector. Around 80 percent of state assets 
destined for privatization--including enterprises in the chemicals, 
petroleum processing, and metallurgy sectors--have already been sold in 
a process that featured uneven degrees of transparency. Principal 
exports are agricultural products, tobacco products, chemicals and 
metals, although light industry--including textiles and apparel--is 
growing in importance. The private sector accounts for approximately 60 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Following a severe economic 
and political crisis in early 1997, a reformist government introduced a 
macroeconomic stabilization program based on a currency board. The 
program succeeded in bringing down inflation from triple digits in 
1996-97 to only 6.2 percent in 1999. The economy grew by 3.5 and 2.4 
percent in 1998 and 1999, and the Government forecasts more robust 
growth over the next several years. Between 4 and 5 percent growth was 
forecast for the year. The annual per capita GDP of $1,600 provides a 
relatively low standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, several serious problems remained in some areas, 
while there were improvements in a few others. The authorities were 
responsible for extrajudicial killings; police were responsible for the 
deaths of at least five persons during the year, and a Bulgarian 
military officer was accused of responsibility for the death of a 
conscript recruit. Security forces beat suspects and inmates and often 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Problems of accountability 
persist and inhibit government attempts to end police abuses. 
Conditions in many prisons and detention facilities were harsh, and 
there remained some instances of prolonged pretrial detention, although 
the Government has noticeably improved its performance in preventing 
defendants' period of pre-trial detention from exceeding the statutory 
limit (normally 1 year). The judiciary is underpaid, understaffed, and 
has a heavy case backlog; corruption is a serious problem. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. There were no reports 
of police abuse of journalists, although there were several unexplained 
incidents of violence against journalists by unknown parties. 
Constitutional restrictions on political parties formed on ethnic, 
racial, or religious lines effectively limit participation for some 
groups. Police, local government authorities, and private citizens 
continued to obstruct the activities of some nontraditional religious 
groups. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. Discrimination and societal violence against Roma were 
serious problems, resulting in one death. Because of a lack of funds, 
the social service system did not assist homeless and other vulnerable 
children adequately, notably Romani children. Security forces harassed, 
physically abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained Romani street 
children. Child labor was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls was 
a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, law enforcement or military 
personnel killed at least six persons, of which one was a member of the 
Roma ethnic minority.
    The Ministry of Interior Act regarding the use of firearms by law 
enforcement officials permits them to use firearms to apprehend persons 
committing crimes or who have committed crimes, even if the crimes are 
only minor. Law enforcement officers also may use firearms to stop the 
escape of a person who has been arrested for any crime.
    On March 4, a police officer shot and killed Boyan Yovchev in 
Varna. The police officer was indicted by the military prosecutor for 
negligent homicide, which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years 
imprisonment. The defendant reached a plea bargain agreement, received 
a 2-year suspended sentence, and was fired from the police force.
    On June 14, Miroslav Marinov died in the hospital from injuries 
sustained while in police custody in Vratsa. Marinov had been released 
from police custody shortly before his death, and reportedly told 
family and friends before he died that he had been beaten severely by 
police. A police inquiry in response to the complaint concluded that 
there was no evidence that police officers were responsible for 
Marinov's death; no charges were filed.
    On July 5, Trycho Lyubomirov, a 19-year-old Roma man suspected by 
police of car theft, was shot and killed by police in Sofia, reputedly 
while attempting to flee police custody. Witnesses alleged that 
Lyubomirov was in handcuffs at the time that he was shot, according to 
human rights monitors. A police officer involved in the incident was 
charged by the military prosecutor with negligent use of a firearm, 
which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. The case was 
awaiting trial at year's end.
    On August 5, Emil Arnudov of Asenovgrad was beaten severely by two 
on-duty policemen after he allegedly caused a disturbance in a bar. He 
died of his injuries on August 15. One policeman was charged with 
homicide by the military prosecutor as a result of the incident, and 
remains in custody pending trial. The second policeman was cleared of 
responsibility. The regional police chief received a reprimand.
    On November 17, Rebin Yumer Mohamed, a 16-year-old Iraqi national 
of Kurdish heritage, was shot and killed by border police in an attempt 
to illegally cross the border into Bulgaria. Authorities stated that 
the boy was hit by a stray bullet, after a border patrol officer fired 
warning shots into the air. Mohamed was 1 of approximately 100 Kurdish 
refugees who were apprehended attempting the crossing. The shooting was 
ruled justifiable by the military prosecutor.
    On November 21, Dimitur Dimitrov, a conscript soldier, died of 
asphyxiation while running laps while wearing a gas mask. He reportedly 
had been ordered to do this by his commanding officer as punishment for 
tardiness. An investigation into the incident was pending at year's 
end.
    On July 28, Dimitrichka Marinova, a 41-year-old Roma woman, was 
shot and killed by a private security guard in the town of Dolni 
Chiflik, while trespassing in an apricot orchard. Police initially 
reported the shooting as accidental. The guard was later convicted and 
received a 2-year suspended sentence in a plea bargain agreement.
    The case of the 1999 killing of Gancho Vuchkov was closed without 
an indictment. There were no developments in the 1999 killing of Tancho 
Vasev. There were no developments in the investigation of the death of 
Kostadin Sherbetov, who died in police custody in 1999.
    The police officer sentenced in the 1998 killing of Yordan Yankov 
had his prison sentence reduced on appeal to a suspended sentence. The 
monetary damage penalty was allowed to stand. There were no 
developments in the 1998 killing of Tsvetan Kovatchev.
    Two police officers involved in the 1997 beating death of Mincho 
Surtmachev each had their sentences reduced on appeal. One was 
acquitted and released by the court, while the second received a 4-year 
sentence, of which he served 2 1/2 years and then was released. The 
court confirmed the monetary damage award to the victim's family of 
approximately $3500 (7000 leva). These cases are now closed.
    Two suspects are known to remain under active investigation for the 
1996 murder of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov. Police arrested 
one man suspected of being the killer, who remains in police custody 
while the case is being investigated. Angel Vasiliev, who is suspected 
of ordering the murder, has been released from police custody after 
spending 1 year in jail, but reportedly remains under investigation.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, despite this prohibition, 
police commonly beat criminal suspects and members of minorities, at 
times to extract false testimony. In particular security forces 
physically abused street children, the majority of whom are Roma.
    Police are allowed to shoot any fleeing criminal suspect. On 
January 11, police shot and seriously injured Stefan Yordanov, a Romani 
man, in Burgas District. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) filed a 
complaint with the Regional Military Prosecution of Sliven; however, 
the Sliven prosecutor refused to open an investigation.
    On April 29, according to unconfirmed NGO reports, a 16-year-old 
Rom, Tsvetalin Petrov, suffered third-degree burns after allegedly 
being doused with an inflammable liquid and set on fire while in 
custody in the Vidin police station. Petrov had been arrested for 
breaking and entering and theft near Vidin. Police claimed Petrov was 
set on fire by an unknown perpetrator. An investigation is pending with 
the military prosecutor's office.
    On May 10, Atanas Dzhambazov, a 14-year-old Roma, was shot and 
wounded in the head and arm by a policeman while trespassing on the 
grounds of a factory near Sliven. Dzhambazov was taken to the hospital 
by relatives after allegedly being left at the scene by the police 
officer. An August 20 decision by the Sliven Military Court found the 
policeman, Surchanoy, guilty of negligence and imposed a fine of about 
$250 (500 leva). A civil lawsuit was pending at year's end.
    On August 6, an NGO reported that police officers severely beat 
Orhan Ahmedov and Marin Georgiev, two Romani men from Varbitsa. Ahmedov 
and Georgiev filed a complaint at the Sliven Regional Police 
Department. The next day the two men obtained medical certificates 
documenting their injuries and filed a complaint with the Regional 
Military Prosecutor's Office of Sliven. In August the Military 
Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation; the case remained 
pending at year's end.
    There were no reports of police abuse of journalists; however, 
there were several unexplained instances of violence against 
journalists by unknown persons (see Section 2.a.).
    According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) data, 20 cases of police 
brutality were confirmed for the period January 1 to June 30, out of a 
total of 179 complaints of police brutality filed. The police generally 
have refused to make investigative reports available to the public. The 
MOI statistics reflect only those complaints registered by the alleged 
victims. Human rights monitors report that they receive many more 
complaints from persons who are too intimidated to lodge an official 
complaint with the authorities.
    Reports continue that criminal suspects in police custody run a 
significant risk of being mistreated, most often during the initial 
interrogation. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) conducted a 
survey in prisons of incarcerated persons arrested after January 1 and 
found that 49 percent (compared with 51 percent in 1999) of interviewed 
prisoners reported that police officers used physical force against 
them during arrest; 44 percent (compared with 53 percent in 1999) 
reported mistreatment at police stations. Romani prisoners reported 
being abused more frequently than other prisoners. Very seldom are 
allegations of police abuse properly investigated nor are the offending 
officers consistently punished. In particular the Military Prosecutor's 
office has not investigated incidents of alleged police abuse 
thoroughly or expeditiously.
    Crime and corruption remained primary concerns of the Government 
during the year. It is too early to judge the long-term effects of 
changes in the Criminal Procedure Code, which became effective on 
January 1. These changes reduced the size of the SIS while reserving to 
it the responsibility for handling the most serious crimes. At the same 
time, many investigative duties were devolved to the police and the 
Government made a significant effort to provide training in 
investigative techniques to police officers. The criminal justice 
system is still in transition and questions about its effectiveness 
remain: It is not always clear exactly what duties the SIS has in fact 
retained, and there is little evidence that devolution of powers to 
police yet has resulted in increased numbers of completed 
investigations.
    Observers have noted modest improvement in the efficiency of moving 
cases through the criminal system, although many serious systemic flaws 
remain. The police struggled without result over the difficult issue of 
how to resolve a large backlog of outstanding investigation cases, some 
as much as 10 years old, which they inherited from the former pre-
reorganization investigative service.
    There were several incidents of violence and harassment by private 
citizens of Roma during the year (see Section 5).
    Many observers allege that some members of the police, particularly 
in remote areas, are complicit in trafficking in persons, mostly women 
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c., 
6.d., and 6.f.).
    Conditions in some prisons are harsh and include severe 
overcrowding, inadequate lavatory facilities, and insufficient heating 
and ventilation. The SIS's parallel network of jails and prisons 
contains many of the harshest detention facilities. NGO prison monitors 
reported that brutality committed by prison guards against inmates 
continued to be a problem. Prison authorities sustained their battle 
against tuberculosis (TB), instituting a new procedure for regular 
testing. The overall magnitude of the TB problem remained steady during 
the year. The process by which prisoners may complain of substandard 
conditions or of mistreatment does not function effectively.
    The Government generally cooperated with requests by independent 
observers to monitor conditions in most prisons and detention 
facilities. However, unlike last year's relatively free access to SIS 
detention facilities, which was granted for the first time in 1999, 
human rights observers began to encounter significant procedural 
roadblocks to obtaining access. These administrative obstacles, while 
not denying access outright, dramatically increased the difficulty and 
amount of staff time on the part of observers necessary to secure 
access. Human rights monitors continued to enjoy good access to regular 
prisons. Observers still are prohibited from interviewing detainees in 
the SIS facilities, unlike in regular prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; 
however, police often arbitrarily detain and arrest street children, 
the majority of whom are Roma.
    The Constitution provides for access to legal counsel from the time 
of detention. However, a 1999 survey of prisoners conducted by the 
Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC) found that 54 percent of prisoners 
complained that they had no lawyer present during preliminary 
investigations. BHC believes this figure remained broadly valid during 
the year. Police normally obtain a warrant from a prosecutor prior to 
apprehending an individual; otherwise, in emergency circumstances 
police may detain individuals for up to 24 hours on their own 
authority; however, authorities must rule on the legality of such 
detention by the end of that time period. If the person is released 
without being charged before the 24-hour period elapses, there is no 
judicial involvement in the case. Human rights observers charge that 
police commonly handle minor offenses by arresting the suspect, beating 
him, and releasing him within the 24-hour period. Defendants have the 
right to visits by family members, to examine evidence, and to know the 
charges against them. Charges may not be made public without the 
permission of the Prosecutor General. In the interests of a speedy 
trial, investigations now are prescribed by law to last no more than 2 
months under normal circumstances, although this period may be extended 
to 6 months by the head regional prosecutor, and up to 9 months by the 
Prosecutor General.
    The Government noticeably improved its record during the year in 
observing the statutory limit of 1 year of pre-trial detention (or 2 
years in the case of the most serious crimes). While human rights 
lawyers noted some continuing violations of this policy, increasingly 
these situations have become uncommon exceptions rather than common 
practice. A legal consensus also seems to have emerged that the pre-
trial detention limits apply cumulatively to all of the separate 
periods of detention, in cases where defendants' cases have been sent 
to the courts for review, and returned to prosecutors for further 
investigation. This is a change from earlier practice, when such a 
situation restarted the clock on the defendant's pretrial detention. A 
remaining loophole is that many cases may be formally deemed to be in 
the ``on-trial'' phase for an extended period of time. This occurs when 
a case file has been presented to the court by prosecutors, but has not 
yet been acted upon by the judge. Cases may, not uncommonly, languish 
for months in this situation, while the defendant remains in custody. 
The Ministry of Justice reported that as of year's end, there were 947 
accused persons in pre-trial detention, 1,110 defendants incarcerated 
while in the ``on trial'' phase, and 7,514 convicted prisoners. Among 
the changes recently made to the Criminal Procedure Code was increased 
oversight by judges of pre-trial detention and conditions of bail. 
Under the new rules, only judges may determine the necessity of holding 
suspects in custody and to set bail.
    In the event of a conviction, the time spent in pretrial detention 
is credited toward the sentence. The Constitution provides for bail, 
and some detainees have been released under this provision, although 
bail is not used widely.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the Constitution, the 
judiciary is granted independent and coequal status with the 
legislature and executive branches; however, the judiciary continues to 
struggle with problems such as low salaries, understaffing, antiquated 
procedures, corruption, and a heavy backlog of cases. Partly as a 
legacy of communism and partly because of the court system's structural 
and personnel problems, many citizens have little confidence in the 
judicial system. Human rights groups complain that local prosecutors 
and magistrates sometimes fail to pursue vigorously crimes committed 
against minorities. Many observers believe that reforms are essential 
to establish a fair and impartial, as well as efficient, judicial 
system. The Government began an ambitious training program to upgrade 
the expertise of the judiciary with the help of international donor 
organizations during the year.
    The court system consists of regional courts, district courts, and 
Supreme Courts of Cassation (civil and criminal appeal) and 
Administration. A Constitutional Court, which is separate from the rest 
of the court system, is empowered to rescind legislation that it 
considers unconstitutional, settle disputes over the conduct of general 
elections, and resolve conflicts over the division of powers between 
the various branches of government. Military courts handle cases 
involving military personnel (including police personnel) and some 
cases involving national security matters. The Constitutional Court 
does not have specific jurisdiction in matters of military justice.
    Local observers contend that organized crime influences the 
prosecutor's office. Few organized crime figures have been prosecuted 
to date, but in 1997 the Government made the battle against organized 
crime a priority and reformed the Penal Code to that end. The Ministry 
of Interior has requested and received assistance from Western 
countries in its efforts to close legal loopholes and strengthen 
enforcement capabilities against criminal economic groupings engaged in 
racketeering and other illegal activities.
    Judges are appointed by the 25-member Supreme Judicial Council and, 
after serving for 3 years, may not be removed except under limited, 
specified circumstances. The difficulty and rarity of replacing judges 
virtually regardless of performance often has been cited as a hindrance 
to effective law enforcement. The 12 justices on the Constitutional 
Court are chosen for 9-year terms as follows: One-third are elected by 
the National Assembly, one-third appointed by the President, and one-
third elected by judicial authorities.
    The Constitution stipulates that all courts shall conduct hearings 
in public unless the proceedings involve state security or national 
secrets. There were no reported complaints about limited access to 
courtroom proceedings. Defendants have the right to know the charges 
against them and are given ample time to prepare a defense. The right 
of appeal is provided for and is used widely. Defendants in criminal 
proceedings have the right to confront witnesses and to have an 
attorney, provided by the state if necessary in serious cases.
    Human rights observers consider ``Educational Boarding Schools'' 
(formerly known as ``Labor Education Schools'') to which problem 
children can be sent as little different from penal institutions. 
However, since the schools are not considered prisons under the law, 
the procedures by which children are confined in these schools are not 
subject to minimal due process. Several human rights organizations have 
criticized this denial of due process. Children sometimes appear alone 
despite the requirement that parents must attend hearings; the right to 
an attorney at the hearing is prohibited expressly by law. Decisions in 
these cases are not subject to judicial review, and children typically 
stay in the Educational Boarding Schools for 3 years or until they 
reach majority age, whichever occurs first. In late 1996, the 
Parliament enacted legislation that provided for court review of 
sentencing to such schools, set a limit of a 3-year stay, and addressed 
other problems in these institutions (see Section 5). Human rights 
activists dismiss this court review provision as a formality, since the 
child is not present to speak on his or her own behalf (nor is the 
defense lawyer or the child's parents).
    There was no progress in a case begun in 1993 relating to the 
forced assimilation and expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1984-85 and 1989. 
Further action on this case now appears unlikely ever to take place.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home, the right to choose one's place of work and residence, and the 
freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and government 
authorities generally respect these provisions.
    One NGO complained that the Minister of Interior's discretionary 
authority to authorize telephone wiretaps and electronic listening 
devices without judicial review in certain instances is excessive. 
Although it is unknown to what extent this authority is employed, 
highly-publicized media accounts during the year highlighted the 
Government's employment of electronic surveillance. A public scandal 
ensued when a listening device was discovered in the home of the 
Prosecutor General, although the government denied that the device had 
ever been actively employed.
    The Bulgaria Helsinki Committee also has alleged that warrants to 
investigate suspects' private financial records sometimes are abused to 
give police broad and openended authority to engage in far-ranging 
investigations of a suspect's family and associates. There are regular, 
albeit not conclusive or systematic, reports of mail, especially 
foreign mail, being delayed or opened.
    Traffickers in persons use threats against women's families and 
family reputations to ensure obedience (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. A variety of media outlets presents a 
broad spectrum of opinion; however, the Government exerts an undue 
influence on the media via official channels such as the National 
Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), a quasi-governmental body that 
governs national media and regulates private broadcasters, and through 
less direct means such as steering advertising revenue away from media 
outlets that are critical of government policies. Surveys show that 
significant numbers of journalists feel constrained in their reporting 
because of government influence. One-third of journalists surveyed 
claimed that they had received outside pressure of some sort, whether 
from government officials or business interests, in response to 
material they had written or broadcast. Prosecutors are regarded widely 
as wielding an intimidating influence over journalists who are critical 
of the judicial process. A variety of newspapers are published freely 
by political parties and other organizations representing the full 
spectrum of public opinion. Journalists frequently color their reports 
to conform with the views of their owners.
    There were several instances of violent attacks on journalists, 
including physical assaults and bombings of newspaper offices, although 
no individuals have been seriously injured. In none of the cases have 
the perpetrators or their motives been uncovered. In February a 
reporter for the news weekly Kapital who frequently reports on the 
judicial system and on military affairs had his car blown up in front 
of his home; no one was injured in the explosion.
    Libel is punishable under the Criminal Code. In March the 
Parliament enacted modified amendments to the Penal Code, after 
President Petar Stoyanov had vetoed the original version in January. 
Responding to the President's concerns, the Parliament reduced the 
fines for libel and defamation by half to approximately $7,000 (15,000 
leva). Even this reduced fine remains a heavy penalty in the context of 
the country's economy. The new provisions did eliminate imprisonment as 
a penalty for libel. Journalists charged with libel or defamation also 
have reduced rights of appeal for libel sentences under the new law. 
Libel remains, under the new law, a criminal offense, as opposed to a 
matter of civil law, and makes losing defendants criminal convicts. 
However, press freedom monitors reported that the courts generally are 
embracing a more enlightened view of libel than in the past and are 
recognizing the principle of ``true facts and free comment'' as being 
legitimately within the bounds of journalistic expression.
    In February the Interior Minister filed a libel suit against the 
editor in chief of the Kyustendil-based newspaper Nova Bulgaria, which 
had alleged in print that the Minister, prior to assuming office in the 
Interior Ministry, had defended a company involved in illegal 
activities. The Minister later withdrew the charges.
    In June Parliament enacted a new Law on Access to Public 
Information, with the ostensible purpose of establishing broader public 
access to government information. The law has been criticized widely; 
however, for being vague in its provisions and enabling arbitrary 
denials of information. A majority of journalists believe that the new 
law actually hampers rather than facilitates public access to 
information.
    There are 261 electronic media outlets in Bulgaria, which 
represents a 60 percent increase in the number of radio and TV stations 
since last year. The number of television outlets that broadcast news 
and public affairs programming has more than doubled from 54 in 1999 to 
124 during the year, and the number of radio stations reached 123. In 
April the Government awarded a license for the first privately-owned 
television channel with nationwide coverage to the Balkan News 
Corporation, a company owned by Rupert Murdoch. The appearance of the 
new station, though still in its infancy, reanimated the competitive 
market for broadcast journalism talent in the country, and has spurred 
new programming initiatives from Bulgarian National Television (BNT). 
In August the State Telecommunications Commission (STC) launched a 
competition for a second nationwide private TV channel. The new license 
was awarded in October. The STC also launched a competition for 
licensing the first nationwide private radio station. The procedure for 
licensing private radio stations is undergoing regulatory changes 
expected to be finalized in early 2001. Some private radio stations 
complained that government policies allocating transmission strength on 
the monopoly state-owned radio transmission network gives the Bulgarian 
National Radio programming an unfair advantage.
    Television and radio news programs on the state-owned media present 
opposition views, but opposition members claim that their activities 
and views are given less broadcast time and exposure than the those of 
the ruling party. There are no formal restrictions on programming; both 
television and radio provide a variety of news and public interest 
programming.
    Bulgarian National Television launched Turkish-language newscasts 
for the first time on October 2, for the benefit of the country's 
ethnic Turkish minority. Local affiliates of Bulgarian National Radio 
broadcast limited Turkish-language programming in regions with ethnic-
Turkish populations.
    Foreign government radio programs such as the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of 
America have good access to commercial radio frequencies.
    Private book publishing remained unhindered by political 
considerations.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities require 
permits for rallies and assemblies held outdoors, but most legally 
registered organizations routinely were granted permission to assemble. 
Vigorous political rallies and demonstrations were a common occurrence 
and generally took place without government interference.
    The Government has undertaken to respect the rights of individuals 
and groups to establish freely their own political parties or other 
political organizations; however, there are constitutional and 
statutory restrictions that restrict the right of association and limit 
meaningful participation in the political process. For example, the 
Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along 
religious, ethnic, or racial lines and prohibits ``citizens' 
associations'' from engaging in political activity. This provision is 
designed to prevent the development of parties based on a single ethnic 
or other group that could prove divisive for national unity by stirring 
up ethnic tension for political purposes. Nonetheless, the mainly 
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in 
Parliament. The other major political parties generally accept the 
MRF's right to participate in the political process. Additionally, the 
mainly ethnic Roma ``Free Bulgaria'' party has been allowed to operate 
freely and has achieved some success in local elections.
    The Constitution also prohibits organizations that threaten the 
country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial, 
ethnic, or religious hatred. The Government has refused since 1990 to 
register a self-proclaimed Macedonian rights group, OMO- Ilinden, on 
the grounds that it is separatist. Aside from its symbolic importance, 
lack of registration denies the group the status of being a legal 
entity. This makes it impossible for the organization (in its own name) 
to make contracts, hire staff, rent or buy office space or meeting 
space, or other such normal administrative functions. There were no 
reports of any prosecutions for membership in this group.
    On February 29, the Constitutional Court, Bulgaria's final 
authority on the matter, ruled that the political party United 
Macedonian Organization (OMO)-Ilinden-Pirin (not the same organization 
as the similarly named OMO-Ilinden noted above, although there are 
links between the groups) was unconstitutional on separatist grounds. 
The court ruled that leaders of OMO-Ilinden-Pirin have advocated the 
secession of the Pirin-Macedonia region of southwest Bulgaria and its 
annexation by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. OMO-Ilinden-
Pirin leaders plan to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
    Notwithstanding the Constitutional Court decision, the Government 
allowed OMO-Ilinden-Pirin to hold public celebrations on Macedonian 
holidays in April and again in August; however, a similar event was 
prohibited in September by an order of the regional prosecutor's 
office.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for 
some non-Orthodox religious groups. The legal requirement that groups 
whose activities have a religious element register with the Council of 
Ministers restricted the activities of some religious groups prior to 
or in the absence of registration. Affected groups included the 
Unification Church and the Church of the Nazarene (which has tried 
repeatedly to register for more than 5 years). Furthermore, several 
municipal governments established local registration requirements for 
religious groups, despite the lack of clear legal authority to do so. 
In some cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a 
pretext for interference with some groups and employed arbitrary 
harassment tactics against others. Some church groups circumvent the 
administrative obstacles created by a lack of registration by 
registering as NGO's. Technically it remains illegal for a church to 
conduct any religious activities through its NGO-registered 
organization, although the Government sometimes tacitly allows such 
groups to conduct worship so long as they keep a very low profile. 
There are periodic reports of police using lack of local or national 
registration as a pretext to confiscate signboards and materials, 
detain or expel religious workers, and deny visas or residence permits 
to foreign-national missionaries. During the year, the ability of a 
small number of religious groups to conduct services freely came under 
occasional attack, both as a result of action by local government 
authorities and because of public intolerance.
    The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the 
``traditional'' religion. The Government provides financial support for 
the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as several other religious 
communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as 
the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths. These groups benefit 
from a relatively high degree of governmental and public tolerance.
    Religious freedom NGO's note with concern a tendency by certain 
municipalities to enact regulations that may be used to limit religious 
freedoms if a perceived need arises. For example, the Sofia 
municipality forbids references to miracles and healing during 
religious services, a provision that many fear may be employed as a 
pretext to ban or interrupt services by charismatic evangelical groups. 
The regulation cites a Communist-era law dating from 1949, which 
technically still is in effect and which forbids foreigners from 
proselytizing and administering religious services in the country. The 
decree, although subsequently modified in response to NGO objections, 
is still criticized by religious rights groups as containing provisions 
that are either discriminatory or ambiguous and open to abuse. Other 
municipalities have enacted similar regulations. The City Council in 
Burgas maintained its refusal to register the local branch of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, despite the fact that they were registered by the central 
government. The council asked the group to prove that they had not been 
banned in any European Union country in order to be registered. Plovdiv 
municipality passed an ordinance that forbade the distribution in 
public places of ``religious materials or pornography.'' The 1949 law 
also has been criticized in its own right as an outmoded potential 
impediment to free religious activity. However, despite the law's 
continued technical validity, foreign missionaries can and do receive 
permission to proselytize in the country. A new law on religious 
activity was pending in Parliament but had not yet been moved to the 
floor of the National Assembly for a vote by year's end.
    In March two members of Jehovah's Witnesses in Turgovishte were 
detained briefly by police and charged with disruption of public order 
under a city ordinance for public proselytizing.
    In April several missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints (aka the Mormon Church) in Plovdiv were challenged by 
police while distributing literature and were required to go to the 
police station. They were charged with distributing brochures without a 
license. Also in April, border police refused a member of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses entry into the country, reportedly on the grounds that she 
had been deported from the country in 1997 for practicing her then-
unregistered faith.
    In May a volunteer worker for the Christian Unity Foundation was 
beaten severely in Maritsa when he attempted to conduct a scheduled 
screening of a documentary-style film of the life of Jesus Christ. The 
film itself was stolen from his car. The attack was carried out by six 
to eight youths, under the apparent direction of a Bulgarian Orthodox 
priest.
    On June 21, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were expelled from 
the city of Petrich for distributing literature without being 
registered with the municipality, although the church does have central 
government registration.
    In July and August, the Mormon Church encountered a number of 
politically inspired legal and administrative obstacles at the local 
and regional levels to its efforts to build a new church and 
administrative center in Plovdiv. One political party in particular, 
which has several seats on the city council in Plovdiv, led protest 
marches as well as filing several administrative challenges to the 
construction. Ultimately with the support of the local mayor, the 
building was completed.
    On December 13, about 2,000 Orthodox clergy and Church members 
marched in Sofia to protest the Government's refusal to register the 
Holy Synod headed by Patriarch Maxim. The Government refuses to 
register the synod citing an administrative court ruling that there are 
two Orthodox Churches in the country.
    There were no developments in the ongoing lawsuit of the Gabrovo 
schoolteacher who claims that she was pressured to resign because of 
her Pentecostal faith.
    A number of religious groups have complained that foreign 
missionaries and religious leaders experience difficulties in obtaining 
and renewing residence visas in the country. The issuance of residence 
permits appears to be subject to the whim of local authorities. Human 
rights groups also have protested the cancellation of residence status 
of several persons on undisclosed national security grounds, alleging 
that the action was a pretext for religious discrimination.
    For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on 
attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A 
school for imams, a Muslim cultural center, university-level 
theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely. 
In December 1999, the Ministry of Education announced that schools 
would begin offering classes on Islam in regions with a significant 
Muslim minority, and in December 2000 the implementing decree took 
effect, with classes beginning in 80 schools starting in January 2001. 
However, some ethnic Turkish activists have complained that the 
implementing decree requires that these classes be taught in Bulgarian 
rather than Turkish. Since 1997 religious classes on the Bible have 
been available to students whose parents approve such instruction. 
Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were 
imported and printed freely, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish 
publications were published on a regular basis.
    Although previously during compulsory military service most Muslim 
conscripts were placed in construction units rather than serving in 
combat-role military units, these units were converted into a state-
owned construction firm in August, which no longer employs conscript 
military labor. It is unclear how this will affect military assignments 
of Muslim conscripts (see Section 5).
    There were no indications that the Government discriminated against 
members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners 
of properties that were nationalized during the Communist regime. The 
Government in general actively has supported property restitution for 
the legally recognized organization representing the Jewish community, 
although the return of two lucrative commercial Jewish communal 
properties continues to encounter administrative obstacles and legal 
challenges.
    At the Department of Theology of Sofia University, all students are 
required to present a certificate of baptism from the Orthodox Church, 
and married couples must present a marriage certificate from the Church 
in order to enroll in the Department's classes. It remains impossible 
for non-Orthodox applicants to be admitted to the Department of 
Theology.
    The Government refused to recognize an alternative Patriarch 
elected by supporters in 1996, and the schism that opened in the 
Orthodox Church in 1992 continued, despite the death of this 
alternative Patriarch in April 1999. The Government nevertheless 
encouraged the feuding factions to heal their prolonged rift. By year's 
end, these efforts had not met with success.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country and the right to leave it, and these rights 
are generally not limited in practice; however, there are two 
exceptions. One exception relates to border zones where access is 
limited for nonresidents (the border zones extend 1.2 to 3 miles inward 
from each border). Another exception is the Ministry of Interior policy 
that denies issuance of an international passport to any Bulgarian 
citizen who has ever been convicted of any crime, with no statute of 
limitations. This policy effectively prevents such persons from 
travelling abroad.
    Every citizen has the right to return to the country, may not be 
forcibly expatriated, and may not be deprived of citizenship acquired 
by birth.
    The Government grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with 
the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Law on Refugees, which went into 
effect August 1, 1999, regulates the procedure for granting refugee 
status as well as the rights and obligations of refugees. The Agency 
for Refugees, formerly the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and 
Refugees, is charged with following this procedure and cooperating with 
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
    The Government provides first asylum. In recent years, domestic and 
international human rights organizations have expressed concern over 
the Government's handling of asylum claims and reported that there may 
have been cases in which bona fide refugees were turned away at the 
border. No such cases were reported during the year. However, because 
NGO's lack institutionalized access to the country's borders, it is 
often difficult for them to monitor the Government's handling of asylum 
cases. For the first 6 months of the year, the Ministry of Interior 
reported that 703 persons applied for refugee status. Authorities 
granted 76 applicants refugee status, while 14 persons were granted 
temporary humanitarian status. Refugee applications came predominantly 
from citizens of Armenia (186), Afghanistan (178), and Iraq (130).
    The Agency for Refugees reports that it has received 5,938 
applications for asylum from its inception in 1993 through December. Of 
these, 902 persons currently are listed as holding approved asylum or 
other humanitarian residence status. Domestic and international human 
rights organizations complain that the adjudication process is slow, 
but the UNHCR notes that the Agency for Refugees has begun a major 
restructuring project to reduce the adjudication time to a period of 3 
months. The restructuring project itself is expected to take 4 years. 
In 1997 and 1998, the UNHCR, in cooperation with an NGO, opened three 
transit centers near the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian borders and 
assisted the Government with opening a small reception center in Banya. 
Plans to open a reception center at the Sofia airport continue to be 
delayed due to a lack of funding. However, the UNHCR currently is 
working on plans to open a transit center in Kapitan Andreevo, on the 
border with Turkey.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and head of 
state through the election of the President and of the members of the 
National Assembly, although the constitutional prohibition of parties 
formed on ethnic, racial, or religious lines has the effect of 
circumscribing access to the political party process for some groups 
(see Section 2.b.). Suffrage is universal at the age of 18.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in 
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold 
just under 11 percent of the seats in the current Parliament. However, 
a number of women hold elective and appointive office at high levels, 
including three cabinet-level posts and several key positions in 
Parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the 
United Democratic Forces parliamentary group (the dominant party in the 
Government) are both women.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of minorities in 
politics, apart from the prohibition of ethnically, racially, or 
religiously based parties. However, while ethnic Turks' representation 
in the National Assembly is close to commensurate with their share of 
population, there was only one Romani Member of Parliament. Both groups 
are underrepresented in appointed governmental positions, especially 
leadership positions.
    Roma groups are demanding that existing political parties adopt 
platforms pledging more representation and other improvements for Roma 
in return for Roma support.

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups operate freely, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Human rights observers reported uneven levels of cooperation from 
various national and local government officials during the year. The 
new Law on Access to Public Information has opened new channels of 
information which have sometimes proved quite helpful to human rights 
monitors. In other cases, NGO's have found government offices 
completely unresponsive to information requests under the public 
information law. Human rights observers also have experienced some new 
difficulties in getting information previously easy to obtain, from 
prosecutors for example, and have reported greater procedural 
difficulties than in the previous year in gaining access to SIS 
detention facilities.
    The police demonstrated a new level of cooperation with human 
rights NGO's in providing human rights training to police officers. The 
National Police Service invited the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC) 
to conduct a human rights awareness training seminar with 500 senior 
police officers (precinct commander and above), with the active 
participation of the deputy commander of the National Police. 
Subsequently BHC, the Human Rights Project (HRP), and representatives 
of the Council of Europe, conducted a smaller training seminar on 
International Law and Police Practice. In general human rights monitors 
detected a new receptivity and a more meaningful dialogue on the part 
of the Government and police officials toward human rights concerns, 
with one NGO crediting the Interior Minister personally with 
demonstrating greater openness and attention to the issue. However, 
this change at senior levels, has not yet resulted in noticeable 
changes in police practice at the working level.

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and 
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination 
still exists, particularly against Roma and women.
    Women.--Violence against women is a serious and common problem, but 
there are no official statistics on its occurrence. The Animus 
Association Foundation (AAF), an NGO that offers assistance and support 
to female victims of violence, estimates that one in five women suffers 
from spousal abuse. Spousal rape is a crime, but it rarely is 
prosecuted. According to a survey by a local polling agency, 80 percent 
of rapes involve a known assailant. The law exempts from state 
prosecution certain types of assault if committed by a family member, 
and the Government generally does not assist in prosecuting crimes of 
domestic assault unless the woman has been killed or injured 
permanently. Courts and prosecutors tend to view domestic abuse as a 
family rather than criminal problem, and in most cases, victims of 
domestic violence take refuge with family or friends rather than 
approach the authorities. Police often are reluctant to intervene in 
cases of domestic abuse, even if a woman calls them seeking protection 
or assistance. No government agencies provide shelter or counseling for 
victims. In Sofia the NGO Nadya De Center provides shelter to battered 
women, and AAF opened a new crisis center that provides short-term 
emergency shelter for female victims of violence. There were 15 crisis 
centers around the country which provide assistance to women victims of 
violence at year's end.
    NGO observers report a generally improved public attitude toward 
issues of violence against women in recent years. After several years 
of activism on the part of various NGO groups, the taboo against 
acknowledging and talking about domestic violence and violence against 
women has been broken. Observers also note some increased sensitivity 
on the part of police to the issue. AAF reports that it now 
periodically receives client referrals from police, which was unknown 
in the recent past.
    The courts prosecute rape, although it remains an underreported 
crime because of the stigma which society attaches to the victim. The 
maximum sentence for rape is 8 years; convicted offenders often receive 
a lesser sentence or early parole. According to the Ministry of 
Interior, 254 rapes and 30 attempted rapes were reported during the 
first half of the year.
    During the year, AAF reported that it handled 1,089 cases of 
domestic violence, 86 cases of sexual violence, and 534 cases or 
inquiries related to trafficking in women. AAF directly counseled 24 
actual returned victims of trafficking. The large increase in the 
number of cases related to trafficking in women is the result of a 
major information campaign, organized by the International Organization 
for Migration, which has publicized more widely the AAF's counseling 
services (see Section 6.f.). However, the actual incidents of each form 
of violence is certainly much higher, as these represent those cases in 
which the victims (or, in some trafficking cases, an overseas women's 
group) was willing and able to contact AAF. The Association also 
operates a 24-hour hot line for women in crisis that is staffed by the 
Association's volunteer counselors, backed up by 13 full-time 
professional therapists.
    In 1997 the Government enacted a law against trafficking in women, 
and trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see Sections 
6.c and 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is a problem; it is not illegal.
    Many of the approximately 30 women's organizations are associated 
closely with political parties or have primarily professional agendas. 
Some observers believe that women's organizations tend to be associated 
with political parties or professional groups because feminism has 
negative societal connotations. Of those organizations that exist 
mainly to defend women's interests, the two largest are the Women's 
Democratic Union in Bulgaria, heir to the group that existed under the 
Communist dictatorship, and the Bulgarian Women's Association, which 
disappeared under communism but has reemerged with chapters in a number 
of cities.
    The Constitution forbids privileges or restrictions of rights on 
the basis of sex, and women are not impeded from owning or managing 
businesses, land, or other real property and do not suffer from 
discrimination under inheritance laws. However, women face 
discrimination both in terms of job recruitment and the likelihood of 
layoffs. Official figures show the rate of unemployment for women to be 
higher than that for men. Women are much more likely than men to be 
employed in low-wage jobs requiring little education, and the National 
Statistical Institute reports that as of November, the average salary 
of a woman was 76.8 percent of the average salary of a man. Statistics 
show that women are equally likely to attend universities, but they 
have less opportunity to upgrade their qualifications and generally end 
up in lower-ranking and lower-paying positions than their male 
counterparts. Fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially 
among minorities. Women generally continue to have primary 
responsibility for child rearing and housekeeping even if they are 
employed outside the home. Since 80 percent of employed women work in 
the lowest-paying sectors of the labor force, they often must work at 
two jobs in addition to their household duties in order to provide for 
their families. Female-headed households frequently live below the 
poverty line. There are liberal provisions for paid maternity leave; 
however, these actually may work against employers' willingness to hire 
and retain female employees. This is especially noticeable in higher-
paying positions in the private sector, where many women with 
engineering degrees are compelled to work as secretaries.
    No special government programs seek to address economic 
discrimination or integrate women better into the mainstream of society 
and the economy, although much NGO activity is focused on these 
activities.
    Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting 
children's welfare but, with limited resources, falls short in several 
areas. For example, it maintains a sizable network of orphanages 
throughout the country. However, many of the orphanages are in 
disrepair and lack proper facilities. Human rights monitors are sharply 
critical of the serious deficiencies in all government-run institutions 
for children, including orphanages, ``educational boarding schools'' 
(reform schools), and facilities for the mentally handicapped. These 
facilities are plagued by inadequate budgets, poorly-trained and 
unqualified staff, and inadequate oversight. NGO monitors further 
allege that even food budgets are highly deficient, with many 
institutions dependent on the uneven flow of private donations to feed 
their charges.
    Government efforts in education and health have been constrained by 
serious budgetary limitations and by outmoded social care structures. 
The Constitution provides for mandatory school attendance until the age 
of 16. However, fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially 
among minorities.
    On September 15, approximately 300 Romani children from the Nov Put 
Romani neighborhood began the school year by being bussed to one of 
seven mixed regular schools in the town of Vidin. Starting in the 
school year 2000/01, Romani children from the settlement have attended 
nonsegregated schools as a result of local and international 
nongovernmental initiatives. Educational standards in the all-Romani 
school in Nov Pat are low, according to NGO reports.
    There are few provisions for due process of law for Romani and 
other juveniles when they are detained in Educational Boarding Schools 
(formerly Labor Education Schools) run by the Ministry of Education. 
Living conditions at these reform schools are poor, offering few 
medical, educational, or social services. Generally, staff members at 
many such institutions lack the proper qualifications and training to 
care for the children adequately. Degrading and severe punishment, such 
as the shaving of a child's head, reduction in diet, severe beatings, 
and long periods of solitary confinement, are common at the schools. In 
1996 the Ministry of Education acknowledged problems at the schools and 
attributed the cause to a lack of funding. In late 1996, Parliament 
enacted legislation providing for court review of sentencing to such 
schools and addressing other problems in the reform school system (see 
Section 1.e.), but these provisions do not seem to function. The 
decision to commit a child to an Educational Boarding School is made by 
a local Commission for Combating Juvenile Delinquency, which is 
generally not held accountable in any meaningful way to any higher 
authority. Standards differ among these local commissions in how 
closely prescribed procedures are followed. Human rights monitors 
report that in many localities, contrary to law, a child may be held in 
such a facility for months on the basis of a police referral, before 
the local commission convenes to make a decision on the case. The 
U.N.'s Common Country Assessment for Bulgaria reports that children in 
these facilities ``might be subject to physical abuse'' and upon 
leaving these homes ``may be emotionally scarred and ill-prepared to 
face the outside world.''
    The vast majority of children are free from societal abuse, 
although some Romani children are targets of frequent skinhead violence 
and arbitrary police detention; the homeless or abandoned particularly 
were vulnerable. There are reports that family or community members 
forced some minors into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). 
Police made little effort to address these problems. Some observers 
believe that there is a growing trend toward the use of children in 
prostitution, burglaries, and narcotics distribution. Trafficking in 
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 
6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons by law receive a range 
of financial assistance, including free public transportation, reduced 
prices on modified automobiles, and free equipment such as wheelchairs. 
However, as in other areas, budgetary constraints mean that such 
payments occasionally fall behind. Disabled individuals have access to 
university training (since 1999 students with disabilities must pay the 
university's initial application fee but are exempt from semester fees 
if accepted) and to housing and employment; however, architectural 
barriers are a great hindrance in most older buildings, including 
schools and universities. Problems of general unemployment and economy 
undermine initiatives aimed at advancing equal opportunity for the 
disabled. The great majority of the disabled are unemployed.
    Labor laws intended to protect the interests of the disabled and 
create greater employment opportunity sometimes have a mixed effect. On 
one hand, the law provides incentives for small firms to hire disabled 
workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor pays the first year's salary 
of a disabled employee. On the other hand, workers with disabilities 
are entitled to shorter working hours, which often leads to 
discrimination against them in hiring practices. According to the law, 
any enterprise employing more than 50 persons must hire a certain 
number of disabled workers (between 3 and 10 percent, depending on the 
industry). Those who fail to do so must pay a fine, the proceeds of 
which go to a fund for the disabled. Nevertheless, due to low fines and 
delays in the judicial system, compliance rates are extremely low.
    Recent public works have taken the needs of persons with 
disabilities into account. Sofia's new subway system was designed with 
wheelchair access to stations. Nevertheless, enforcement of a 1995 law 
requiring improved structural access for the disabled has lagged in 
existing, unrenovated buildings.
    Policies and public attitudes prevalent during the Communist era, 
which separated mentally and physically disabled persons, including 
very young children, from the rest of society have persisted. Some 
complain that the effective segregation of disabled children into 
special schools has lowered the quality of their education. However, in 
a recent positive development, construction of a training and 
rehabilitation center for the disabled youth in Pomorie began in 1999. 
The center aims to improve the overall physical and intellectual state 
of disabled youth and to encourage them to acquire new skills and 
participate more actively in the social life of the country.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination, harassment, and general 
public intolerance of ``nontraditional'' religious minorities (i.e., 
the great majority of Protestant Christian denominations) remained a 
problem, although the number of reported incidents decreased during the 
past 2 years. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations 
among the Orthodox populace is widespread and pervasive across the 
political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in 
a veneer of ``patriotism,'' intolerance of the religious beliefs of 
others enjoys widespread popularity. Such mainstream public pressure 
for containment of ``foreign religious sects'' inevitably influences 
policymakers. Nevertheless, there were fewer reported incidents of 
harassment of religious groups during the past 2 years as society 
appeared to have become more accepting of previously unfamiliar 
religions.
    Certain religions, including both groups denied registration and 
those officially registered, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, faced 
discriminatory practices, as did other groups, which despite full 
compliance with the law, were greeted with hostility by the press, 
segments of the public, and certain government officials (see Section 
2.c.).
    Non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and the Open Bible 
Fellowship, have been affected adversely by societal attitudes. 
Numerous articles in a broad range of newspapers as well as television 
documentaries, drew lurid and inaccurate pictures of the activities of 
non-Orthodox religious groups, attributing the breakup of families and 
drug abuse by youths to the practices of these groups and alleging that 
evangelicals were drugging young children.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Turks constitute almost 
10 percent of the population. In the 1992 census, 3.7 percent of the 
population identified itself as Romani; however, the real figure 
probably is closer to 6 or 7 percent, since many persons of Romani 
descent tend to identify themselves to the authorities as ethnic Turks 
or Bulgarians. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims or ``Pomaks'' are a distinct 
group of Slavic descent, constituting 2 to 3 percent of the population, 
whose ancestors converted from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. Most are 
Muslim, although a number have become atheists or converted back to 
Christianity. These are the country's largest minorities. There are no 
restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic 
names.
    Voluntary Turkish-language classes in public schools, funded by the 
Government, continued in areas with significant Turkish- speaking 
populations, although some observers complained that the Government was 
discouraging optional language classes in areas with large 
concentrations of Muslims. The Ministry of Education has estimated that 
approximately 40,000 children now study Turkish. Some ethnic Turkish 
leaders, mainly in the MRF, demanded that Turkish-language classes be 
made compulsory in areas with significant ethnic Turkish populations, 
but the Government has resisted this effort.
    Roma activists and NGO's were disappointed broadly with the 
relative lack of progress demonstrated by the Government in 
implementing its framework program for Roma integration, the Program 
for Social Integration of Roma, which was unveiled in 1999. Aside from 
the hiring of a number of individual Roma representatives in various 
institutions of local, regional, and the national government, there has 
been little discernible progress in delivering on the program.
    Attacks by private citizens on Roma continued, and Roma continued 
to suffer incidents of discrimination. There were numerous accusations 
of police and private citizen assaults on Roma.
    In the village of Mechka, near Pleven, the February murder of an 
ethnic-Bulgarian man poisoned relations between the ethnic-Bulgarian 
and Roma communities. Ethnic Bulgarian residents widely blamed the Roma 
for the killing, as well as for a spree of petty crimes, which had 
swept the neighborhood for several years. For several weeks, ethnic 
Roma were prevented from entering the city center, and a complete 
boycott against doing any business--buying or selling--with the Roma 
persisted for some months. This boycott created economic hardship for 
the Roma community, particularly because of the lack of opportunities 
to sell the dairy products, which form the livelihood of the Roma 
villagers in Mechka. The situation was further exacerbated when a Roma 
man in the act of breaking into a carpentry shop was shot in the leg by 
a booby trap, which had been set by the shop owner. The shop owner was 
arrested for the illegal use of a firearm. However, by September the 
situation in Mechka had calmed considerably and returned more or less 
to normal, after police arrested two non-local ethnic-Bulgarians for 
the February murder. Human rights NGO's closely following the case 
commended the Pleven police for handling the investigation in a 
professional and restrained manner, despite the highly inflamed local 
passions. Although the Roma villagers complained that they were 
detained disproportionately for questioning in the murder 
investigation, there were no allegations of any mistreatment or abuse.
    According to unconfirmed NGO reports, on August 23 in Gradishte, 
two Roma men, Paskal Paskalev and Ognyan Milenov, were hospitalized 
after Tsvetan Tsvetanov shot them with a homemade shotgun. Tsvetanov 
later claimed he shot the men accidentally while shooting at stray 
dogs, although the victims allege that Tsvetanov attacked them in their 
woodworking shop.
    On November 11, in Botevgrad, Asen Sashev, a 14-year-old Roma 
youth, was shot and injured by his neighbor Marko Markov during an 
altercation. Markov, a fireman, shot Sashev with his government-issue 
handgun. The Sofia Military Court ruled Markov blameless in the 
incident; an appeal to the Military Appellate Court was pending at 
year's end.
    Beginning on November 4, 1999, and continuing throughout the year, 
a group of ethnic Bulgarian residents of a Burgas neighborhood 
persisted in a petition drive and periodic calls for the expulsion of 
Roma and the demolition of Romani houses in the neighborhood.
    Police harass, physically abuse, and arbitrarily arrest Romani 
street children (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There was one arrest in 
the 1998 attack on eight Romani boys by skinheads in Sofia. Little 
progress has been made in other cases of violence against Roma during 
previous years, and these largely remain in the investigatory phase.
    As individuals and as an ethnic group, Roma faced high levels of 
discrimination. Roma encounter difficulties applying for social 
benefits, and rural Roma are discouraged by local officials from 
claiming land to which they are entitled under the law disbanding 
agricultural collectives. Many Roma and other observers made credible 
allegations that the quality of education offered to Romani children is 
inferior to that afforded most other students. The Government largely 
has been unsuccessful in attracting and keeping many Romani children in 
school. Schools in most Romani neighborhoods suffer from chronic 
absenteeism and very low graduation rates. However, an ethnic 
reintegration effort began in schools in Vidin in September. The 
program, with the help of international donor funding, uses a voluntary 
busing plan to enroll Romani children in various higher-quality, 
predominantly ethnic Bulgarian schools around the district. Many Romani 
children arrive relatively unprepared for schooling; many of them are 
not proficient in the Bulgarian language. Poverty has led to widespread 
school truancy as many children in Romani ghettos cannot afford shoes 
or basic school supplies and instead turn to begging, prostitution, and 
petty crime on the streets. A social milieu that often does not highly 
value formal education also is a contributing factor. Lack of effective 
government infrastructure and programs and economic and social factors 
thus combine to deprive increasing numbers of Romani youths of an 
education and a better future. Early indications are that some recent 
initiatives undertaken by the Government and by Romani NGO's are 
achieving some small successes in mitigating these problems, for 
example by providing free lunches and subsidizing textbook and tuition 
costs.
    Workplace discrimination against minorities continued to be a 
problem, especially for Roma. Employers justify such discrimination on 
the basis that most Roma only have elementary training and little 
education.
    Previously it had been common for ethnic Turkish and Romani 
conscripts to be shunted into military construction battalions during 
compulsory military service. This practice raised serious concerns both 
of discrimination and forced labor, particularly since the units 
sometimes accepted commercial construction contracts in addition to 
military construction projects. However, in August the Government 
completed the transformation of these units into a state-owned company 
that no longer employs conscript labor. It remains to be seen how 
future ethnic minority conscripts will be integrated into the 
mainstream of the military. There are only a few ethnic Turkish, Pomak, 
and Romani officers in the military, and an insignificant number of 
high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith.
    Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their 
community's popularly-elected representation in the National Assembly 
is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are 
underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state 
administration. Ethnic Turks and Roma are also seriously 
underrepresented in the ranks of the police agencies, and virtually 
non-existent in senior law enforcement positions.
    Both ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims complain that the 
procedures for restoring their original names (after their forcible re-
naming to Slavic names during the 1970s and 80s) is excessively 
burdensome and difficult to accomplish.
    Several thousand persons, mainly in the southwest, identify 
themselves as ethnic Macedonians, most for historical and geographic 
reasons. Members of the two organizations that purport to defend their 
interests, OMO-Ilinden and TMO-Ilinden, are believed to number in the 
hundreds (see Section 2.b.). The Government does not recognize 
Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, and the group is not enumerated 
in official government statistics.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their own choice, 
and this right was generally exercised freely. Estimates of the 
unionized share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. This 
share continues to shrink as large firms lay off workers, and most new 
positions appear in small, nonunionized businesses.
    The two largest trade union confederations are the Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and Podkrepa, which 
together represent the overwhelming majority of organized workers. 
Trade unions are required to demonstrate their membership strength 
through a periodic census of their members; however, employer 
representative organizations are not similarly required to demonstrate 
whom they represent in the trilateral process. The unions have called 
for new legislation requiring employer organizations also to 
demonstrate membership strength.
    Doctors and dentists expressed dissatisfaction with a new union 
structure that they claim the Government imposed upon them in 1998, an 
action which some maintain violates an ILO convention. The trade unions 
allege that this organization is not truly a labor representative 
organization, but simply a government- mandated fee collection agency. 
They also believe it impedes the opportunity for a genuine trade union 
to represent medical professionals.
    The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the right to strike when other means 
of conflict resolution have been exhausted, but ``political strikes'' 
are forbidden. Workers in essential services (primarily the military 
and the police) also are subject to a blanket prohibition against 
striking, although such workers on occasion held an ``effective 
strike'' in which they stop or slow their activities for 1 or 2 hours. 
The CITUB confederation argues that the number of workers classified as 
essential and ineligible to strike is excessive and unfairly restricts 
the right of many ordinary civil servants to exercise their worker 
rights.
    The Government generally does not interfere with legal labor 
strikes, and a number of work stoppages took place.
    The Podkrepa labor union has complained that an amendment to a 1990 
law, passed in March 1998, facilitated the Government's ability to 
declare a strike illegal. Under this amendment, workers no longer have 
the right to appeal when a strike is declared illegal. Podkrepa 
maintains that this provision is unconstitutional and violates an ILO 
convention. The union has raised these concerns repeatedly to the 
Government in the context of negotiations over proposed changes to the 
Labor Code. A complaint has been made to the ILO Committee of Experts.
    Another serious concern for the labor movement is the widespread 
use of temporary contracts to evade the worker protections of permanent 
staff. Many workers, who are effectively permanent staff, are hired 
under short-term contracts that are renewed at the end of each month or 
each quarter. When an employer decides to fire someone, it is legally 
simply a non-renewal of contract, rather than a severance action that 
would entail payment of benefits.
    No restrictions limit affiliation or contact with international 
labor organizations, and unions actively exercise this right.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
institutes collective bargaining, which was practiced nationally, 
regionally, and on the local level. The legal prohibition against 
striking for key public sector employees weakens their bargaining 
position; however, these groups were able to influence negotiations by 
staging protests and engaging in other pressure tactics without going 
on strike. Labor unions have complained that while the legal structure 
for collective bargaining was adequate, many employers failed to 
bargain in good faith or to adhere to agreements that were concluded. 
Labor observers viewed the Government's enforcement of labor contracts 
as inadequate.
    The Labor Code's prohibitions against antiunion discrimination 
include a 6-month period for redress against dismissal as a form of 
retribution. However, there is no mechanism other than the courts for 
resolving complaints, and the burden of proof in such a case rests 
entirely on the employee.
    In several instances, an employer was found guilty of antiunion 
discrimination, but the employers appealed the decisions. The backlog 
of cases in the legal system delayed further action, effectively 
postponing, perhaps indefinitely, redress of workers' grievances.
    The same obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor 
standards prevails in the six export processing zones, and unions may 
organize workers in these areas.
    On November 1, about 5,000 demonstrators in Sofia protested draft 
changes in the country's labor legislation that many workers felt would 
reduce their rights.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The Slavovitsa 
Boys' Reform School, which had been found to use forced child labor to 
produce goods for sale, has been closed by the Ministry of Education.
    The previous practice of shunting minority and conscientious 
objector military draftees into work units that often carried out 
commercial construction and maintenance projects was a form of 
compulsory labor; however, these units have been converted into a 
state-owned enterprise which does not use conscript labor (see Sections 
2.c. and 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 16 
years; the minimum age for dangerous work is 18. Employers and the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) are responsible for 
enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the 
formal sector, but NGO's believe that children increasingly are 
exploited in certain industries (especially small family-owned shops, 
family farms, construction, and periodical sales) and by organized 
crime (notably for prostitution and distribution of narcotics). A soon-
to-be-published ILO-commissioned report on ``Problems of Child Labor in 
the Conditions of Transition in Bulgaria'' reports on the results of a 
study conducted during the summer. The study found that 6.4 percent of 
children between the ages of 5 and 17, or about 80,000 children, were 
involved in paid employment in the informal sector. Of these, 55 
percent were between the ages of 15 and 17, while 45 percent were 
younger than 15 years old. These figures exclude children performing 
unpaid work within the household or on a family farm. Underage 
employment in the informal and agricultural sectors is believed to be 
increasing as collective farms are broken up and the private sector 
continues to grow. In addition children are known to work on family-
owned tobacco farms, and local NGO's reported children working on 
nonfamily-owned farms for meager monetary or in-kind wages (e.g., 
food). NGO observers also report that institutionalized children often 
hire themselves out to do agriculture labor for a modest income, during 
periods when they are allowed out of the residential facility.
    Forced and bonded labor by children also is forbidden by law; 
however, trafficking in young girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national monthly minimum 
wage is approximately $31 (73 leva), which is not enough to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family (the average 
industrial wage is approximately $107 or 246 leva). Nonpayment of wages 
and wage payments in arrears has been a growing problem with certain 
employers, including state enterprises. The CITUB labor confederation 
estimates that there is an overall backlog of $50 million in unpaid 
wage arrears owed to public sector workers and workers in enterprises 
which are wholly or partly state-owned. The Constitution stipulates the 
right to social security and welfare aid assistance for the temporarily 
unemployed, although in practice such assistance often is late.
    The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at 
least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSP is responsible for 
enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek. Enforcement 
generally is effective in the state sector (aside from wage arrears), 
but is weaker in the private sector.
    A national labor safety program exists, with standards established 
by the Labor Code. The Constitution states that employees are entitled 
to healthy and nonhazardous working conditions. The MLSP is responsible 
for enforcing these provisions. Conditions in many cases worsened due 
to budget stringencies and a growing private sector that labor 
inspectors do not yet supervise effectively. Protective clothing often 
is absent from hazardous areas (goggles for welders and helmets for 
construction workers, for example). The overall standard of living of 
workers stabilized in 1998 after suffering a severe downturn during the 
economic crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. The pervasive economic 
crisis and imminent, long-overdue privatizations continue to create a 
heightened fear of unemployment, leading to a reluctance on the part of 
workers to pursue wage and safety demands. Joint employer/labor health 
and safety committees to monitor workplace conditions, required by new 
legislation passed in 1999, remained in developmental stages at year's 
end.
    Under the Labor Code, employees have the right to remove themselves 
from work situations that present a serious or immediate danger to life 
or health without jeopardizing their continued employment. However, in 
practice refusal to work in situations with relatively high accident 
rates or associated chronic health problems would result in the loss of 
employment for many workers.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In 1997 the Government enacted a law 
against trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women and girls 
remains a serious problem. The country is both a source and a transit 
country for human trafficking. A 1997 amendment to the Penal Code on 
trafficking in women introduced longer prison sentences (to existing 
kidnaping penalties already in force) in those cases where the victim 
is under 18 years of age, is offered to another person for sexual 
abuse, or is trafficked abroad for sexual abuse. However, no suspected 
traffickers have been brought to trial, possibly because victims are 
afraid to confront their former criminal controllers when there are no 
government- sponsored programs to assist or protect victims of 
trafficking. Some judges and prosecutors also report that they feared 
reprisals from organized crime figures. There are two police units that 
specifically address the problem of trafficking in persons. One is part 
of the border police and the other is in the Ministry of Interior's 
organized crime fighting agency. High-level Ministry of Interior 
officials cooperated closely with foreign governments and the 
International Organization for Migration to support a research project 
and information campaign to combat trafficking.
    La Strada, a Netherlands-based NGO, reports that Bulgarian women 
constitute one of the largest groups of victims of forced prostitution 
in Western and Central Europe. Approximately 10,000 Bulgarian women, 
many under the age of 18, may be involved in international trafficking 
operations, but no official statistics are available. Village girls as 
young as 14 years of age have been kidnaped and smuggled over the 
border. This is a very lucrative business for Bulgarian criminal 
organizations, and there have been widespread albeit unconfirmed 
reports of local police involvement in trafficking in some areas. 
Victims of trafficking range from those who were duped into the belief 
that they would have good and respectable employment, to those who 
expected to work as prostitutes but were unprepared for the degree of 
violence and exploitation to which they would be subjected. A factor 
contributing to the high number of trafficking victims from the country 
is the high unemployment rate among young women. Furthermore, because 
it may be very difficult for young women to obtain visas to work in 
Western Europe, false job agencies that promise to simplify the process 
can be very successful in luring trafficking victims. The process of 
transforming girls into prostitutes generally takes place before they 
even leave the country. The women typically are taken to a large town, 
isolated, beaten, and subjected to severe physical and psychological 
torture. Some trafficking victims from countries to the east are kept 
in Bulgaria for several weeks where they are subjected to psychological 
and physical abuse to make them more submissive before they are shipped 
to their destination points. Once the women leave the country, their 
identity documents are taken away, and they find themselves forced to 
work as prostitutes in cities across Europe. Victims routinely report 
that traffickers took away their passports and visas, and forced them 
to stay illegally in countries. The women may be required to pay back 
heavy financial debts to the agency that helped them depart the 
country, leaving them in virtual indentured servitude. Traffickers 
punish women severely for acts of disobedience. Traffickers also use 
threats against the women's families and family reputations to ensure 
obedience.
    Relevant authorities and NGO observers report that thousands of 
Bulgarian women have been trafficked to Poland, the Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic, while others are trafficked to Germany, Belgium, 
France, Canada, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), 
Romania, Hungary, Macedonia, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Women 
reportedly have been trafficked into Bulgaria from the former Soviet 
Union and Macedonia, also for forced prostitution. The country also is 
a transit point for traffickers bringing women to Greece. The northeast 
and southwest border regions are where most trafficking occurs, since 
women are sent more easily to former socialist countries with less 
strict visa requirements.
    The AAF reported handling 24 cases of returned victims of 
trafficking in women during the first half of the year.
    Technical and bureaucratic obstacles hamper governmental assistance 
to female victims of violence. Many victims of trafficking and forced 
prostitution are too young to have worked previously; the lack of 
previous work experience disqualifies them from receiving social 
security assistance. If they are runaways with no registered address to 
which they can return, they are ineligible for humanitarian assistance. 
They also are largely ineligible for government assistance programs, 
most of which are in some way tied to previous employment status. 
Victims are not encouraged to file complaints, as there is no mechanism 
in place to protect witnesses.
    Prevailing public attitudes often stigmatize victims, although 
there are some signs that this may be changing slowly. There is one 
NGO-sponsored 24-hour hot line for women in crisis, including victims 
of trafficking, with trained volunteers as well as professional 
therapists to counsel victims. The NGO also coordinates with government 
agencies and other NGO's to find assistance for trafficking victims.
    On April 18, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
launched a trafficking awareness campaign. The campaign publicized the 
availability of NGO counseling facilities, and AAF reported an increase 
in cases related to trafficking during the year.
    The Government increased its efforts during the year to address the 
problem of trafficking on an interagency effort involving all relevant 
government agencies, including law enforcement and social policy 
agencies. The Government also has increased its international 
cooperation in this area, both through the Southeast Europe Cooperation 
Initiative (SECI) Anti-Crime Center in Bucharest and in bilateral 
efforts.
                               __________

                                CROATIA

    The Republic of Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy 
with a strong presidency. President Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian 
People's Party (HNS) was elected in February to a 5-year term to 
replace President Franjo Tudjman who died in office in December 1999; 
Ivica Racan is the Prime Minister. International observers 
characterized the elections as ``calm and orderly,'' noting that in 
general, ``voters were able to express their political will freely,'' 
although some problems remained. The President serves as Head of State 
and commander of the armed forces, nominates the Prime Minister who 
leads the Government, and approves certain appointments in local and 
regional government. On January 3, an opposition coalition defeated the 
ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party in voting for the lower 
house of Parliament. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) observers stated that the parliamentary elections 
represented ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE standards. The 
combination of a new President and a new democratic coalition in 
Parliament helped to increase the transparency of the role of the 
President and to end the blurring of the powers of the Presidency with 
those of the Government and the ruling party. The judiciary increased 
its independence as the Government reduced efforts to exert political 
influence over court decisions. The judiciary continued to suffer from 
bureaucratic and funding problems, as well as instances of political 
influence at the local level.
    The Ministry of Interior oversees the civilian national police, and 
the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The 
national police have primary responsibility for internal security but, 
in times of disorder, the Government may call upon the army to provide 
security. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control 
of the professional security forces; however, the police occasionally 
committed human rights abuses.
    The new Government embarked on essential economic reforms, but the 
transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy continued to 
proceed slowly. While agriculture is mostly in private hands and the 
number of small enterprises is increasing, industry and media 
enterprises largely are either still controlled by the State or 
deliberately were transferred under the Tudjman regime in 
nontransparent, noncompetitive processes to individuals sympathetic to 
the HDZ. In July an investment law was passed to remove some obstacles 
to foreign direct investment. Government spending, although lower than 
in previous years, remained high. Unemployment reached 22.4 percent at 
year's end, was much higher in the war-affected areas, and may rise 
further as nonproductive, formerly state-run enterprises are 
liquidated. The standard of living for most of the population has yet 
to recover to prewar levels. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
was $4,100 (33,210 kuna). Nonpayment of wages continued to be a serious 
problem. Banks began lending again following a liquidity crisis of 
previous years. Economic growth resumed after several years of decline, 
and the exchange rate and prices remained stable. Income from tourism 
was up over 30 percent over 1999, nearly reaching prewar levels.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; its human rights record improved during the year, but serious 
problems remained in some areas. The Government's conduct of the 
January and February elections improved citizens' ability to change 
their Government peacefully. Police occasionally abused prisoners. The 
Government continued to charge and arrest persons for war crimes 
committed during the 1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. Lengthy 
pretrial detention, particularly for ethnic Serbs indicted for war 
crimes, continued to be a problem. The judiciary remained a problem as 
a pattern of arrests of ethnic Serbs for war crimes apparently based on 
extremely weak evidence continued from previous years. The courts 
continued to be subject to occasional political influence on the local 
level and suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency, insufficient 
funding, and a severe backlog of cases. The Government's respect for 
citizens' privacy rights improved; however, the restitution of occupied 
property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the country 
remained problematic.
    The Government's respect for freedom of speech and press improved 
markedly, but some problems remained. Reports of the harassment of 
journalists and censorship virtually ceased. However, reform in public 
broadcasting has been slow, and an estimated 900 libel lawsuits against 
journalists remained pending due to backlogs in the judicial system. 
Parliament did not pass legislation to amend the law on state-owned 
television and radio (HRT) during the year. The Government respected 
academic freedom. The Constitutional Court struck down laws that 
allowed excessive governmental interference in the operation of 
associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Respect for 
freedom of religion improved somewhat during the year; however, 
restitution of nationalized property remains a high, and unaddressed, 
priority for several religious communities.
    The Government took some steps to facilitate the return of refugee 
citizens (mostly ethnic Serbs) and the return of persons internally 
displaced by the 1991-95 conflict, including the establishment of a 
coordinative commission to address issues in war-affected areas and the 
reform of laws that previously discriminated against ethnic Serb 
refugees. Although the number of refugees returning to their homes 
accelerated during the year, serious problems remained. The 
coordinative commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end, and no 
significant progress was made on the restitution of private property or 
resolution of the right to previously socially owned property, and this 
continued to be the greatest obstacle to refugee returns.
    Two rounds of presidential elections and one round of parliamentary 
voting were conducted in a calm and orderly fashion, and the Government 
addressed some irregularities and improved the process with each round. 
However, the OSCE noted continuing problems: While many refugees in 
neighboring countries, mostly ethnic Serbs, continued to be unable to 
assert their citizenship and exercise their right to vote, the Law on 
Citizenship grants voting rights to ethnic Croats born abroad but who 
have no permanent residence in Croatia.
    The Government's record of cooperation with international human 
rights and monitoring organizations improved somewhat, although 
problems remained. The Council of Europe, citing progress on human 
rights, decided to terminate its permanent monitoring of Croatia in 
September, and the OSCE terminated its police monitoring group in the 
Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) in October. In the first half of the 
year, the Government took steps to improve cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); 
however, cooperation slowed in the second half of the year, and the 
Government was reluctant and slow in providing timely access to 
witnesses and documentary evidence. Some of the Tribunal's requests for 
cooperation remained outstanding at year's end. The Government's 
Ombudsman for Human Rights met periodically with human rights groups 
and investigated, upon receipt of complaints, individual cases of human 
rights violations.
    Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. Ethnic 
minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, faced serious discrimination. 
While some progress was made, ethnic tensions in the war-affected areas 
remained high, and abuses, including ethnically motivated harassment 
and assaults, continued to occur. There were two ethnically motivated 
murders during the year. The country is a transit point and lesser 
source and destination country for trafficking in persons.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    There were two ethnically motivated killings of Serbs during the 
year (see Section 5).
    In August Milan Levar, a former police officer who previously 
provided information to the ICTY about the 1991 massacre of civilians 
in the town of Gospic, was killed at his Gospic home. Government 
leaders condemned the killing, but an intensive police investigation 
had not led to any arrests by December.
    During the year nine persons were killed by landmines laid by 
Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Three persons also 
were killed in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for 
Demining reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320 
mine incidents were recorded in which 365 persons were killed (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In July the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights released 
its second report on human rights violations during the 1995 military 
operation ``Storm'' in which Croatian forces recaptured rebel Serb 
areas in the Krajina region. The report identifies over 600 ethnic Serb 
civilians who were killed or reported missing in ``sector north.'' No 
indictments have ever been brought for the events described in the 
report.
    Courts continued adjudicating war crimes cases arising from the 
1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. In an improvement over the 
record of the previous Government, which prosecuted very few ethnic 
Croats and then in often politicized trials, several ethnic Croats were 
detained during the year for war crimes or other crimes committed 
during the conflict. Five persons, including Tihomir Oreskovic, were 
arrested in September on suspicion of war crimes committed during the 
1991 Gospic massacre. A sixth suspect was arrested in December. At 
year's end, four were in pretrial detention and two were released but 
remained under investigation. In September two military intelligence 
officers were arrested in Zadar for suspicion of involvement in the 
1993 Ahmici massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four others were 
arrested but later released on suspicion of providing the officers with 
false identities to facilitate their escape. At year's end, the two 
arrestees remained in detention as the investigation proceeded. In May 
the long-delayed retrial of soldier Mihajlo Hrastov began. The Supreme 
Court in 1993 ordered the retrial after Hrastov was acquitted in 1992 
of the massacre of 13 Serb prisoners in Karlovac in September 1991. At 
year's end, the trial was adjourned while the prosecution sought 
witnesses to the massacre. Also at year's end, the retrial was 
beginning in the case of 6 soldiers originally acquitted in the 1995 
massacre of 16 elderly Serbs in the villages of Varivode and Goscici. 
In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997 when 
it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991 
murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir (see Section 
1.e.).
    Trials of ethnic Serbs continued; however, a pattern of arresting 
Serbs for war crimes based on extremely weak evidence continued from 
previous years (see Section 1.e.). In May a Vukovar court convicted 11 
ethnic Serbs of 22 indictees for war crimes committed during the fall 
of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were tried in absentia (see 
Section 1.e.). The only individual to defend himself in person was 
Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence. 
International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as 
credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998 
without a trial (see Section 1.d.). In July five ethnic Serbs (the 
``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999 conviction for war crimes was 
overturned by the Supreme Court and remanded to a lower court for a 
retrial, were acquitted for lack of evidence (see Section 1.e.). In 
Osijek in October, 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja group'') were 
arrested on 1991 war crimes indictments despite the fact that those 
indictments had little or no supporting evidence. Eight of these 
individuals remained incarcerated at year's end. There were at least 19 
arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to Croatia after they had 
been cleared for return, in violation of return procedures established 
between the Government and UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
    Progress was made on the exhumation of graves and identification of 
persons missing from the 1991-95 war at a number of sites in the 
Danubian region. Throughout the country, the bodies of 3,197 victims 
have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the war (see 
Section 1.b.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    Government figures in December showed that 1,567 persons (mostly 
ethnic Croats) remained missing in cases unresolved from the 1991-95 
military conflict. However, this number does not reflect approximately 
900 additional persons (mostly ethnic Serbs) believed to be missing 
since mid-1995, who were reported to the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) or to international organizations. 
There has been significant progress on the recovery and identification 
of the remains of ethnic Croats; but efforts to identify missing ethnic 
Serbs continued to be hampered by political and bureaucratic obstacles. 
Throughout the country, 3,197 victims have been exhumed from mass and 
individual graves since the war, including 73 during the year. The 
remains of 110 persons were identified positively during the year. In 
July and November the government commission charged with responsibility 
for locating missing persons held a meeting with its Yugoslav 
counterpart to exchange information on the missing and detained; these 
meetings had been suspended since March 1999. In September the 
Government formalized the status of the commission by legalizing it as 
a government office with a separate budget. The September changes also 
integrated the Danubian Subcomission for Missing Persons into the 
office as a working group. In the past, the lack of transparency 
regarding the commission's authority and budget hampered its efficient 
operation.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, mistreatment, or cruel 
or degrading punishment; however, police occasionally abused prisoners.
    In October the OSCE terminated its uniformed Police Monitoring 
Group (PMG) in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia), assessing that 
the local police performance was satisfactory and the security 
situation in the region was stable. The PMG was replaced by a smaller 
cadre of civilian police observers. There were periodic reports of 
ethnic tensions between ethnic Serb and Croat police officers in the 
Danubian region. For example, one ethnic Croat police officer ``dry-
fired'' his unloaded pistol into the face of an ethnic Serb colleague. 
The officer received a short suspension from duty, and credible 
observers expressed concern that mid-level police supervisors failed to 
take the incident seriously or adequately punish the perpetrator. 
However, upon being informed of the incident, the assistant Interior 
Minister ordered a thorough investigation. The commander of the station 
where the incident took place was replaced by year's end.
    The number of reported ethnic incidents in the Danubian region fell 
to less than half its 1999 level. This development largely was due to a 
real decrease in the number of ethnic incidents. However, there were 
reports of the failure of some police officers to regularly classify 
ethnic incidents as such, and of a reluctance of ethnic Serbs to report 
harassment because of a sense that such incidents have become 
commonplace. Continuing problems include poor police investigative 
techniques, acute social sensitivity to ethnic issues, indecisive 
middle management in the police, and pressure from hard-line local 
politicians. These factors impede development of local police 
capability. In the Danubian region in particular, and depending upon 
the ethnicity of the complainant, inconsistent police response to 
housing disputes remained a problem. In May in consultation with OSCE, 
the Interior Ministry began a reform and restructuring of its field 
police presence that is intended to close 106 substations and, through 
attrition, reduce the country's uniformed police-to-population ratio to 
a level closer to that of other European countries. In December the 
Government passed a new law on police, creating the position of 
Director of Police and providing senior police officials more authority 
to implement reforms at the precinct level.
    During the year, 13 persons were injured by landmines laid by 
Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Five persons also were 
injured in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for Demining 
reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320 mine 
incidents were recorded, in which 1,281 persons were injured (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In October judge Marko Rogulja, an ethnic Serb judge on the Vukovar 
municipal bench in the Danubian region, was threatened by a mob (that 
included the county prefect) shortly after he had issued a decision to 
evict an ethnic Croat police officer from a home he was occupying that 
was owned by an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out and the 
case later was transferred to another judge. No public officials, 
either at the municipal or national level, made any public statement 
about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a judge.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. Police 
reportedly occasionally abused prisoners. Jails are crowded, but not 
excessively so, and family visits and access to counsel generally are 
available, albeit not consistently at all phases of the criminal 
proceedings (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for rights of accused persons, but the Government does not 
always respect due process provisions for arrest and detention. Police 
normally obtain arrest warrants by presenting evidence of probable 
cause to an investigative magistrate. Police may make arrests without a 
warrant if they believe a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or 
commit other crimes; such cases of warrantless arrest are not uncommon. 
The police then have 24 hours to justify the arrest to a magistrate.
    Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice 
within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with 
a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the 
magistrate appoints counsel. The magistrate must, within 48 hours of 
the arrest, decide whether to extend the detention for further 
investigation. Investigative detention generally lasts up to 30 days, 
but the Supreme Court may extend the period (for a total of not more 
than 6 months) in exceptional cases. Once the investigation is 
complete, detainees can be released on their own recognizance pending 
trial unless the crime is a serious offense, or the accused is 
considered a public danger, may influence witnesses, or is a flight 
risk.
    Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem, particularly 
for ethnic Serbs accused of war crimes. Suspects generally are held in 
custody pending trial, and there have been several cases of pretrial 
detention lasting for several months or years, including individuals 
awaiting the prosecutor's appeal of their acquittal. For example, in 
the case of Stefan Curnic, who was convicted for war crimes, 
international observers noted that he had been incarcerated since 
December 1998 without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The 
practice of posting bail after an indictment is available but is not 
common.
    The Government continued to apply the 1996 Amnesty Law (which 
amnestied acts of rebellion by ethnic Serbs) in an arbitrary and unfair 
manner. While some improvement was noted early in the year, in October 
the state prosecutor directed local prosecutors to reopen old war 
crimes cases and execute dormant arrest warrants, although there 
appeared to be no new evidence to justify the arrests. As a result, 
although there only were 7 such arrests during the first 9 months of 
the year, there were at least 36 during the final 3 months. For 
example, in October 15 ethnic Serbs were arrested in Baranja in the 
Danubian region (8 of whom still were incarcerated at year's end) for 
1991 indictments for war crimes, despite the fact that those 
indictments had little or no supporting evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 
5). Because the arrests were not based upon new evidence, they violated 
letters of agreement between the U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern 
Slavonia (UNTAES) and the Government reached under the auspices of the 
1995 Erdut Agreement. Government officials later justified the arrests 
by calling these agreements ``gentlemen's agreements'' and ``merely 
verbal agreements.''
    Several ethnic Serb defendants continued to be held in detention 
for extended periods as their cases slowly progressed through the 
overburdened judicial system. In April in the Lepoglava Prison, 27 
ethnic Serb prisoners engaged in a 2-week hunger strike to protest 
shortcomings in the application of the Amnesty Law, particularly the 
slow pace of their proceedings and the Government's failure to 
reexamine previous convictions based on unfair procedures or weak and 
contradictory evidence.
    There were at least 19 cases of ethnic Serb refugees being arrested 
upon return to the country, in violation of clearance procedures agreed 
upon by the Government and the UNHCR. In four of these cases the 
subject later was released after being amnestied under the Amnesty Act 
or when charges were dropped. In August Dusan Jokic was arrested on a 
warrant for a 1995 robbery conviction while on a U.N.-organized visit 
to his prewar home in Obrovac. In September charges were dropped under 
the Amnesty Law and Jokic was released. Also in August, Slavko Drobnjak 
was arrested in Petrinja based on a previous conviction in absentia for 
1991 war crimes. In October Miljan Strunjas was arrested in Karlovac, a 
week after returning to the country, on suspicion of committing 1991 
war crimes. International observers did not question the Government's 
right to prosecute criminals but expressed concern that arrests of 
persons who had been cleared for return and informed by authorities 
that there were no outstanding charges against them would harm the 
process of refugee returns. In the autumn, the Government streamlined 
its clearance procedure to process requests more efficiently for 
refugees intending to return.
    In the Danubian region monitors noted that police occasionally 
called ethnic Serbs to police stations for ``voluntary informative 
talks,'' which amounted to brief warrantless detentions intended to 
harass Serb citizens.
    Two Serb police officers in Borovo Selo and Ilok (both in the 
Danubian region) were arrested in 1999 for war crimes despite the fact 
that they previously were cleared for police duty by the Ministry of 
Interior. One of the officers was convicted of war crimes and sentenced 
to 15 years in prison. The other remained in investigative detention at 
year's end, pending trial. At least four Serb police officers were 
arrested during the year on war crimes charges and remained in 
detention. There were no reports of Serb officers fleeing to Yugoslavia 
when they learned they were the subject of investigations.
    The Constitution prohibits the exile of citizens. In 1998 the 
Government established procedures for Croatian Serbs who fled the 
country during the conflict to have their citizenship recognized, 
obtain personal documentation, return to Croatia, and reclaim their 
property and social benefits. Implementation of these procedures 
continued to be slow and uneven (see Section 2.d.). During the year, 
27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were able to return to Croatia in returns organized by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The pace of organized returns during 
the year was 50 percent higher than in 1999, in large part because of 
the new Government's commitment to facilitate the process. Of 
approximately 250,000 ethnic Serbs who fled their homes, organized 
returns since the end of the conflict in 1995 through December totaled 
37,144. In addition an estimated 30,000 persons returned outside of 
official programs.
    Ethnic Serbs requiring personal documentation to return to or 
regularize their status within the country continued to report 
difficulties, delays, and contradictory requirements from local 
officials charged with issuing documents. However the number of such 
reports was lower than in the past. Several NGO's reported that despite 
the central Government's commitment to facilitate the documentation 
process, obstructions often were caused by recalcitrant local 
officials.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is autonomous and 
independent under the Constitution; however, it suffers from instances 
of political influence at the local level, and a large backlog of over 
1.1 million cases and funding shortfalls remain.
    The judicial system consists of municipal and county courts, the 
Administrative court, and the Supreme Court. The independent 
Constitutional Court both determines the constitutionality of laws, 
governmental acts, and elections and serves as the court of final 
appeal for individual cases. A parallel commercial court system 
adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial 
Council (consisting of a president and 14 members serving 8-year terms) 
is a body independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of 
Justice. It is charged with the appointment and discipline, including 
removal, of judges and public prosecutors. The lower house of 
Parliament nominates and elects persons for membership on the Council. 
The 11 judges of the Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms 
in the same manner, while all other judges are appointed for life.
    In the past, the State Judicial Council was criticized for the 
politicization of its decisions. In March the Constitutional Court 
struck down some provisions of the Law on the State Judicial Council 
and criticized the Council for failing to abide by several court 
decisions and for lack of transparency in making judicial appointments. 
The Constitutional Court also directed the Council to repeat the 
confirmation process for 16 judges (including 5 Supreme Court 
nominations) that were improperly rejected by the council. However, 
because four members resigned from the Council during the year in 
protest over its politicization, the Council was not able to convene to 
act on this court order. Amendments to the Law on the State Judicial 
Council passed in December, in response to the Supreme Court ruling, 
were designed to depoliticize the Council and judicial appointments 
and, by extension, improve the quality and the number of sitting 
judges. The amendments empower the Minister of Justice (rather than the 
Council) to nominate and discipline Court presidents. They also 
introduce more transparency into the appointment and discipline of 
judges by, inter alia, providing for the Constitutional Court to review 
such proceedings.
    Judges are constitutionally prohibited from being members of any 
political party. Under the new Government, the judiciary has been 
subject to less political influence than was the case under the 
previous regime, although reports of political influence at the local 
level continued. The politicization of hard-line judges appointed by 
the previous Government, who at times made decisions in a 
nontransparant manner seemingly at odds with the evidence or the law, 
also continued to be a problem. The Constitutional Court in particular 
has demonstrated during the year a commitment to impartial and 
nonpolitical rulings that have helped to overcome the legacy of the 
previous regime and to lay the foundation for an increased respect for 
the rule of law.
    The greatest problems facing the judiciary are inexperienced judges 
and bureaucratic inefficiencies and funding shortfalls which, over the 
years, have created a massive backlog estimated at over 1.1 million 
cases, some dating back 30 years or more. Cases may drag on for years. 
The inexperience of young and recently appointed judges continued to be 
a problem. There continued to be areas of the country without a 
permanent judge. In August and September, three convicted felons were 
released because they did not receive their second instance (Supreme 
Court) decisions within the statutory limit of 30 months. Justice 
Ministry and Supreme Court officials noted that cases often would 
languish for extended periods at the first instance court and then be 
passed to the Supreme Court just days or weeks before the 30-month 
limit expired. Compounding this problem were scheduling inefficiencies 
at the Supreme Court, where there is a 10,000 case backlog and only 35 
judges who do not have access to modern court technologies and case 
management techniques. As a result of these prisoner releases, the 
Supreme Court streamlined its procedures in the autumn and no more such 
releases were reported. According to the president of the Association 
of Croatian Judges, the Government failed to provide the financial 
means necessary for the regular operation of the courts.
    Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial 
and a variety of due process rights in the courts, citizens were 
sometimes denied fair trials. Courts tried and convicted in absentia 
persons for war crimes. In May a Vukovar court convicted 11 ethnic 
Serbs out of a total of 22 Serb indictees for war crimes committed 
during and after the fall of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were 
tried in absentia. The only individual to defend himself in person was 
Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence. 
International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as 
credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998 
without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). In August and October, 
authorities arrested at least 19 ethnic Serbs for war crimes, in an 
apparent breach of established return procedures (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.d.).
    In July five ethnic Serbs (the ``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999 
convictions for war crimes were overturned by the Supreme Court and 
remanded to the Osijek court for a retrial, were acquitted for lack of 
evidence. The 1999 convictions were, according to international 
observers and ethnic Serbs, based on improper judicial procedures and 
weak evidence. In October the Minister of Justice reported that 69 
ethnic Serbs were in Croatian jails for charges relating to wartime 
events, including 61 held for war crimes.
    In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997 
when it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991 
murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir. At year's end, 
the Constitutional Court had not ruled yet on whether to order Gudelj 
rearrested and retried.
    Little or no progress was made in thousands of cases of illegal 
occupancy in which the legal property owner (typically a returning Serb 
refugee) had a positive court decision and legal right but was unable 
to recover occupied property. Judicial decisions overwhelmingly favored 
ethnic Croats in property claims involving returning refugees and 
displaced persons. In those cases in which the court ruled in favor of 
a non-Croat, only a handful of judicial orders for the eviction of a 
Croat occupant of a Serb-owned home have ever been carried out by the 
police (see Section 1.f.). Many cases of illegal occupancy involve 
current or former members of the Croatian military or police forces, 
and local authorities systematically refused to act against them on 
behalf of lawful owners. The only recourse for the lawful owner was to 
return to court to demand implementation of the first decision, a time-
consuming and costly procedure that only rarely resulted in 
implementation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution declares the home inviolable; 
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. Only a 
court may issue a search warrant, which must justify the search. Police 
may enter a home without a warrant or the owner's consent only to 
enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or prevent serious 
danger to life or property. The Government's respect for citizens' 
privacy improved measurably; however, the restitution of occupied 
private property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the 
country remained a problem. Very few property owners and apartment 
tenants were able to recover their prewar dwellings.
    Despite a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that several elements of 
the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property were 
unconstitutional, the vast majority of the thousands of ethnic Serb 
property owners who fled homes that later were occupied by ethnic 
Croats remained unable to access their property. A 1998 program for the 
return of refugees and displaced persons, which included mechanisms for 
property restitution and reconstruction, did not have the full force of 
law. The program was implemented very slowly, and only a handful of 
cases of property restitution were recorded during the year, as both 
national and local authorities declined to take steps to displace 
temporary occupants in favor of the original owners. Backlogs in the 
judicial system represented a further impediment to timely resolution 
of housing disputes. Governmental promises made in the autumn to reform 
and streamline the housing commissions were unfulfilled at year's end. 
Further, only a handful of claims by ethnic Serbs for reconstruction 
have been considered.
    Despite orders from the national Government, local authorities 
(including local housing commissions) often did not take steps to 
regulate occupancy rights or to initiate lawsuits against individuals 
who refused to vacate occupied premises. This situation largely 
remained unchanged from the previous year. Thousands of returning 
ethnic Serb displaced persons and refugees continued to remain shut out 
of their homes, although in many cases the occupier's house had been 
reconstructed so there was no impediment to the occupier's return home. 
In some cases, the Government failed to furnish reconstructed houses 
with basic utilities, discouraging returns. In other instances, 
returnees who gained access to their property were held responsible for 
water and power bills accumulated by temporary occupants, and 
authorities refused to reconnect the services until the bills were 
paid. Local housing commissions often were purposefully dysfunctional 
and failed to resolve housing disputes, or when functional legally were 
powerless to implement their own decisions under an existing legal 
framework that still was unaddressed by the Government.
    An ongoing problem was the continued occupation of homes belonging 
to Croatian Serbs by refugees from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia, as well as ``priority category'' ethnic Croat citizens, 
i.e., active duty or former members of the military, widows, and 
orphans. Meanwhile, ethnic Croats wishing to return to their homes in 
the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) generally were able to recover 
their homes by evicting ethnic Serbs occupying them. Many Serb 
returnees were unable to move into looted and devastated homes that the 
Government defined as habitable. Of the total 7,123 applications for 
repossession of property recorded by the government Office for 
Displaced Persons and Refugees at the end of August 1999, less than 
one-fourth were listed as returned to their owners. No update was 
available at year's end.
    No progress was made to resolve the thousands of cases of persons 
(mostly ethnic Serbs) who lost their claims to their prewar socially-
owned apartments due to their absence for more than 6 months during the 
conflict. Ethnic Serbs were affected disproportionately because no 
mechanism existed by which they could return to the country in order to 
claim their property or because they had lived in the occupied parts of 
the country and missed the chance to purchase their prewar apartments.
    Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to 
housing disputes were reported during the year (see Section 5).
    The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal 
data, and this provision generally was respected. In line with a March 
Constitutional Court ruling, the Parliament in May adopted amendments 
to the internal affairs law that revoked the Interior Minister's 
sweeping discretionary powers to wiretap. The amendments grant 
wiretapping authority only in cases where the Criminal Code may be 
violated or there is a threat to the country's sovereignty, and they 
establish an independent board to oversee all wiretapping. In July the 
three members of the independent board were appointed; they are 
nonpartisan nonparliamentarians who will report to the parliamentary 
Intelligence Committee. In September the Interior Minister announced 
that several intelligence officials were disciplined and prosecuted for 
illegal wiretapping.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of thought and expression, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice, although some problems remained. The 
Constitutional provisions specifically include freedom of the press and 
other media, speech, and public expression, as well as the free 
establishment of institutions of public communication. Since the new 
Government took office in January, there has been a marked improvement 
in respect for freedom of speech and the media.
    Reports of harassment including threats, wiretapping, surveillance, 
and beatings of journalists largely ceased. Official harassment in the 
form of job loss, banishment from the air (for nonpayment of excessive 
fees), and overzealous tax enforcement has stopped. Self-censorship 
(not covering controversial stories for fear of libel lawsuits) largely 
has ceased. No incidents of censorship of the electronic media were 
reported. The government campaign of harassment of the independent 
media through the use of libel suits stopped, although the estimated 
900 libel cases from previous years (including 70 lawsuits filed 
against the satirical weekly Feral Tribune) have not concluded due to a 
slow and overburdened judicial system.
    In February the Constitutional Court struck down legal provisions 
that allowed defamation cases against journalists to be tried under 
``urgent proceedings,'' meaning that the case would come to trial 
within 8 days, seriously prejudicing the defendant's ability to prepare 
a case. In May the Constitutional Court struck down a law that allowed 
prosecutors to file criminal charges against journalists for defamation 
of certain senior state officials. In June Parliament passed a bill 
amending the law to bring it in line with this ruling by formally 
rescinding the provision the court had struck down. However, by year's 
end, the Government still had not amended the Penal Code articles 
authorizing the prosecution of journalists who publish ``state 
secrets,'' articles that were abused in the past. The Government 
continued to control the regulatory framework and licensing of radio 
and television, including the selection of members of the managing 
council and the Council for Radio and Television. By year's end, the 
Government had not passed legislation to address these issues. While 
management changes at government-controlled radio and television (HRT) 
in the spring improved the quality of news programming, the Government 
was slow to fulfill its overall reform commitments (primarily due to 
the difficulty in reducing the bloated HRT workforce). A truly 
independent nationwide television station did not yet exist by year's 
end.
    The population continued to rely on government-run radio and 
television for news; however, a network of independent local television 
stations is producing Vijesti, a competing nightly news program. As a 
result of the 1999 Telecommunications Law, ``networking'' allowed 
independent media to achieve national coverage. Croatian Cable Network, 
an independent network of 8 television stations, was able to broadcast 
Vijesti, offering the first real competition to HRT'S Dnevnik program. 
The latter still was the most widely watched national news program, and 
was more balanced than in the past. HRT continued to enjoy an 
overwhelming advantage as the recipient of the bulk of advertising 
revenues and subsidies from government taxes on television users. These 
subsidies create an unfair advantage for the HRT over any independent 
television station that tries to compete, since the independents' 
ability to purchase programming, etc., is far less than that of the 
HRT. Similar problems exist in radio broadcasting. The Catholic Church 
operates the only private national radio station, but it invites other 
denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see Section 
2.c.). The new Government (unlike the previous regime) did not close 
independent media outlets for nonpayment of (often exorbitant) 
licensing fees.
    Nearly all distribution of newspapers and magazines continued to be 
controlled by Tisak, a once-profitable firm that operates 1,700 news 
kiosks. Due to mismanagement, Tisak faced bankruptcy proceedings and 
still owed large debts to print media publishers. These debts, and the 
fact that the bankruptcy case is unlikely to be resolved quickly, put 
severe financial pressure on newspaper and magazine publishers. The 
trial of Tisak chief Miroslav Kutle for forgery and abuse of power in 
Tisak's collapse was ongoing at year's end. Tisak is now administered 
by the Government's Privatization Fund and there are no longer 
complaints that Tisak manipulates the distribution of print media by 
leaving some areas oversupplied with publications and others 
undersupplied. Foreign newspapers and journals continue to be available 
in the larger urban areas throughout the country; however, because of 
their high cost they remain largely inaccessible to many.
    Academic freedom was respected. Under the new Government, there 
have been no reports of restraints on academic freedom through control 
of research funds or otherwise. The previous dean of the University of 
Zagreb's philosophy faculty, a hard-liner closely associated with the 
previous Government, was replaced in October.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
respected this right in practice. A 1999 law permits assembly for 
registered demonstrations at approved locations, and while this law was 
less restrictive, it does not make transparent the process for 
approving or denying the registration of an assembly, there were no 
reports that it was used discriminatorily.
    In March, thousands peacefully marched to protest the 45-year 
sentence served on General Tihomir Blaskic by the ICTY.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association. In February 
the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the 1997 Law on 
Associations that had increased the Government's ability to restrict 
the right of association through interference in the registration and 
operation of associations and nongovernmental organizations. Parliament 
did not pass new proposed legislation by year's end to comply with this 
ruling and to reduce governmental interference and make registration 
less onerous.
    The Government continued to operate an office for cooperation with 
NGO's that coordinates NGO efforts with government initiatives on human 
rights and civil society. Budget cuts reduced this office's 
disbursements to NGO's and civic organizations from $3.7 million (31.6 
million kuna) in 1999 to $2.5 million (20.5 million kuna) during the 
year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
conscience and religion and free public profession of religious 
conviction, and the Government respects these rights in practice. No 
formal restrictions are imposed on religious groups, and all religious 
communities are free to conduct public services and to open and run 
social and charitable institutions. Roman Catholicism is the majority 
faith, and there are smaller Eastern Orthodox, Christian, Muslim, and 
Jewish communities. Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations 
and foreign clergy and missionaries actively practice and proselytize.
    The overall situation for freedom of religion improved somewhat 
during the year. Government officials have expressed publicly a 
commitment to improving the climate for religious freedom, but their 
approach during the year was ad hoc, addressing problems as they arose 
rather than setting uniform nondiscriminatory standards for all 
communities. Early in the year, the Government established a 
``Commission for Relations with Religious Communities'' whose purview 
includes the rights of minority religions, religious instruction in 
schools, and restitution of nationalized property. This commission 
replaced a similar office under the previous government. However, 
leaders of minority religious communities, who would like to use the 
commission to secure the same benefits as those enjoyed by the Catholic 
Church, reported that no substantive progress was made by year's end.
    While there is no official state religion, the Roman Catholic 
Church is one of the most powerful national symbols and enjoys a 
historic relationship with the state not shared by other denominations. 
Approximately 85 percent of the population are Catholic. This 
relationship is codified in the ``concordats'', a series of 1997 
bilateral treaties between the Government and the Vatican that regulate 
many aspects of church/state relations from the recognition of 
marriages to state subsidies for the church. The Catholic Church 
receives state financing to support pensions for priests and nuns 
through government-managed pension and health funds. Other religious 
communities still do not have such an agreement with the State, nor is 
there a law that regulates these issues. (Orthodox priests and imams 
have been paying their contributions to the health and pension funds 
from their own resources, in order to be covered by a pension plan.) In 
July the Catholic Church signed an agreement with the state-run 
broadcaster (HRT) to provide regular, extensive coverage of Catholic 
events (as much as 10 hours per month). Other denominations receive 
about 10 minutes broadcast time per month. Separately the Catholic 
Church operates the only private national radio station, but it invites 
other denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The previous HDZ Government implemented restitution of religious 
property in a discriminatory manner. The Government signed a concordat 
with the Vatican in 1998 that provided for the return of all Catholic 
Church property confiscated by the Communist regime after 1945. This 
agreement stipulates that the Government would return seized properties 
or compensate the Church where return is impossible. Some progress has 
been made with some returnable properties being restituted, but there 
has been no compensation to date for nonreturnable properties.
    No such agreements exist between the Government and other religious 
groups. The Orthodox community filed several requests for the return of 
seized properties, and some cases have been resolved successfully, 
particularly cases involving buildings in urban centers. However, 
several buildings in downtown Zagreb have not been returned, nor have 
properties that belonged to monasteries, such as arable land and 
forest. In December 1999, the Government returned to the Jewish 
community a site in downtown Zagreb where the main synagogue was 
located until its destruction in World War II. However, other Jewish 
properties, including some Zagreb buildings, have not been returned. 
The Jewish community identifies property return as one of its top 
priorities.
    Catholic marriages are recognized by the State, eliminating the 
need to register them in the civil registry office. The Muslim and 
Jewish communities, seeking similar status, have raised this issue 
repeatedly with the Government, but there has been no resolution by 
year's end.
    Zagreb Archbishop Josip Bozanic took office in 1997 and has sought 
a role for the Catholic Church independent of the Government. Bozanic 
has been active in publicly promoting ethnic reconciliation and the 
return of refugees. The Catholic Church consolidated its privileged 
position among the several religious communities, but at the same time 
has improved ecumenical dialogue, particularly with the Serb Orthodox 
Community. In February Orthodox and Catholic bishops met in Yugoslavia, 
in June Orthodox Patriarch Pavle visited Croatia and met with Bozanic, 
and in August they met again in Belgrade.
    Notions of religion and ethnicity are linked closely in society, 
but the majority of incidents of discrimination are motivated by 
ethnicity rather than religion or religious doctrine. There were 
persistent reports of vandalism to Serb Orthodox cemeteries and 
structures, as well as to a Jewish community center (see Section 5).
    The Ministry of Defense employs 19 Catholic Priests to tend to 
Catholics in the military. However, neither Orthodox nor Muslim clerics 
were given this opportunity. A Catholic priest is present and gives a 
blessing at the oath-giving ceremony upon entering the army, but other 
clerics have not been invited to participate. The Government requires 
that religious training be provided in schools, although attendance is 
optional. Schools filling the necessary quota of seven minority 
students per class are allowed to offer separate religion classes for 
these students. In classes not meeting this quota, minority students 
may fulfill the religion requirement by bringing a certificate that 
they received classes from their religious community. Generally the 
lack of resources, minority students, and qualified teachers impeded 
religious instruction in minority faiths. Jewish officials noted that 
basic information provided to students about Judaism was inaccurate, 
and their offers to improve the material continued to go unheeded.
    Foreign missionaries occasionally reported difficulty in obtaining 
appropriate working visas, but under the new Government immigration 
authorities have made a conscious effort to process their visa requests 
more expeditiously than in the past. Missionaries do not operate 
registered schools, but the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormon) community provides free English lessons, normally followed by 
religion class. The Muslim community has a secondary school in Zagreb, 
but the Ministry of Education continued to refuse to recognize its 
diploma; a lawsuit to resolve the matter was pending at year's end. 
About 20 students per year graduate from the school.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution generally provides for 
these rights, with certain restrictions. All persons must register 
their residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional 
circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter 
or leave the country if necessary to protect the ``legal order, health, 
rights, or freedoms of others.''
    There were at least 19 arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to 
Croatia after they had been cleared for return, in violation of return 
procedures established between the Government and UNHCR (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.d.).
    There were no reports that the Government revoked citizenship for 
political reasons. The Government's procedures to verify and document 
the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the 
country after the military operations in 1995 improved slightly during 
the year; however, this process for the most part has remained slow and 
uneven. International observers assessed that delays and obstacles more 
often were created by limited resources and overburdened consular 
offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia than by willful 
discrimination.
    During the year, 27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to return to Croatia in returns organized 
by the UNHCR (see Section 1.d.).
    A significant number of internally displaced persons remains in the 
country, although not all are under the Government's direct care. While 
the government reported some 57,000 persons (34,000 internally 
displaced and 23,000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia) with refugee or displaced person status at year's end, this 
number does not reflect fully an additional 140,000 former refugees 
(nearly all ethnic Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina) who have become 
citizens of Croatia.
    International monitors and NGO's assessed that the emigration of 
ethnic Serbs from the Danubian region to third countries continued, but 
at a much slower pace than in previous years. Despite the fact that the 
Government continued an intensive program to repair thousands of 
damaged homes in the Danubian region, government officials, NGO's, and 
international observers assessed that the reduction of population 
movements into and out of the region to a trickle indicates that the 
returns process is nearing its completion there. In the first 9 months 
of the year, only 3,004 (mostly ethnic Croat) displaced persons 
returned to their prewar homes within the region, and 2,688 (mostly 
ethnic Serb) displaced persons left the region for prewar homes 
elsewhere in Croatia. Of 70,000 (mostly ethnic Croats) who fled the 
region during the conflict, 49,000 have returned. Overall the ethnic 
Serb population in the region has fallen from a prewar number of 70,000 
to an estimated 55,000 persons. While ethnic tensions continued in the 
Danubian region, the overall security situation was stable. The most 
salient disincentive to returns was the poor state of the regional 
economy.
    President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan made frequent public 
statements encouraging the return and reintegration of all Croatian 
citizens to their prewar homes. These commitments were supported by 
several initiatives. In March the Government established a commission 
to address issues in the war-affected areas. While the commission 
largely had concentrated its efforts on the Danubian region, it made 
little progress effecting return and reintegration throughout the other 
war-effected regions of the country and lapsed into inactivity at 
year's end. Also in March, the Government signed a joint declaration 
with the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate in 
a number of technical areas to facilitate two-way refugee returns. Some 
efforts were made to help register the return of 2,000 refugees from 
Bosnia; however, the other provisions of the declaration remained 
unfulfilled at year's end. In June the Government brokered the signing 
of a joint statement by leaders of the Croatian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
communities in Croatia that encourages returns and repossession of 
private property in an atmosphere of respect for human and civil 
rights; however, little progress was made during the year on property 
restitution. In June and July, the Government reformed two laws that 
previously discriminated against ethnic Serb returnees. The Law on 
Reconstruction regulates access to reconstruction assistance and the 
Law on Areas of Special State Concern provides incentives to revitalize 
war-affected areas.
    Notwithstanding the reform of the two laws, there has been no 
significant administrative or legislative progress on restitution of 
property. The greatest outstanding obstacle to the return of all 
Croatian citizens is their inability to regain access to their prewar 
homes and properties. Existing mechanisms for the return of private 
property have worked best in the Danubian region where returnees tend 
to be ethnic Croats seeking to regain their homes from ethnic Serbs who 
are occupying them. Nearly every other instance of restituted property 
occurred pursuant to a private agreement between the owner and 
occupier.
    In May the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the Law 
on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees that prohibited 
evictions unless alternative accommodation was provided for the 
evictee. This provision had the effect of reinforcing the legal 
precedence of temporary occupants over that of property owners, and it 
provided an easy means for hard-line officials to obstruct the process 
of minority returns. The law continued to contain other discriminatory 
language, notably the failure of positive amendments enacted in 
November 1999 to be applied retroactively, and that therefore allowed 
existing discriminatory definitions of ``displaced person'' and 
``refugee'' to remain in effect.
    There were persistent reports that humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance was not distributed fairly by government agencies. The 
Government allowed free access to all displaced persons by domestic and 
international humanitarian organizations and permitted them to provide 
assistance. However, the Government at times accused international 
organizations of bias in providing assistance only to ethnic Serb 
returnees.
    The Government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian and 
international organizations assisting refugees. The Government began 
implementation of the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Thus persons seeking 
refuge (notably from Kosovo and Yugoslavia) are given ``temporary 
protection.'' Separately asylum seekers are processed by the Interior 
Ministry under the Law on Residence of Aliens. A working group of 
Interior Ministry and UNHCR officials continued its work drafting new 
legislation on asylum to meet international standards. The country 
provides first asylum and there were no reports of persons claiming 
asylum being returned to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    All citizens over 18 years of age have the right to vote by secret 
ballot. The President is limited by the Constitution to two 5-year 
terms. President Stjepan Mesic was elected in two rounds of voting in 
January and February to a 5-year term to replace President Franjo 
Tudjman, who died in office in December 1999. The elections generally 
were well conducted, and irregularities (particularly at out-of-country 
polling stations) during the first round were addressed at the second 
round. OSCE monitors characterized the elections as ``calm and 
orderly,'' noting that ``voters were able to express their political 
will freely;'' however, problems remained. The Citizenship Law and 
electoral legislation grant citizenship, and thereby the franchise, on 
purely ethnic grounds to ethnic Croats abroad with no genuine link to 
the country. Meanwhile the Government failed to ensure that many 
Croatian Serbs, who fled in 1995 and who wished to assume the 
responsibilities of Croatian citizenship, were able to document their 
Croatian citizenship in order to vote and ultimately to return. 
Progress on the documentation and return of ethnic Serb refugees 
continued to be slow (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
    The Parliament comprises the (lower) House of Representatives and 
the (upper) House of Counties. During the January elections, an 
opposition coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the 
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) won a majority of the lower house, 
ending 9 years of HDZ party rule. OSCE monitors characterized the 
voting as having made ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE 
standards. The 1999 electoral law that regulated the voting allowed 
independent monitoring by NGO's and the establishment of multiparty 
voting commissions.
    Other concerns about the electoral process remained. The electoral 
law reduced the number of lower house seats reserved for ethnic 
minorities from seven to five (although minorities make up about 15 
percent of the population). Previous legislation more closely matched 
the minority representation to the size of the minority population, and 
the 1999 reduction in minority seats was especially disadvantageous to 
ethnic Serbs.
    Women and minorities were underrepresented in government and 
politics, although there were no legal restrictions on their 
participation. After the January lower house elections, 32 of 151 lower 
house seats were held by women, and 11 by ethnic (non-Croat) 
minorities. Of the upper house's 68 seats, 4 were held by women and 3 
by ethnic minorities. On the local level, Milan Djukic, an ethnic Serb 
member of Parliament, was elected mayor of the town of Donji Lapac in 
September. Djukic thus became the first member of an ethnic Serb party 
to win a mayoralty outside of the Danubian region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A variety of domestic and international human rights NGO's operate 
without government interference, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. The Government generally is 
cooperative. The Parliamentary Ombudsman for Human Rights received over 
1,500 individual complaints during the year. The Ombudsman met 
periodically with human rights groups and NGO representatives who 
reported that the Ombudsman is largely reactive, responding to 
individual complaints rather than setting an agenda for greater respect 
for human rights. Because it is a parliamentary rather than 
governmental office, the Ombudsman's authority to order compliance from 
government ministries is limited.
    A number of NGO's, the largest being Citizens Organized to Monitor 
Elections (GONG) and Voice 99 (Glas 99), were active in organizing pre-
electoral informational campaigns and in election monitoring at the 
January and February elections.
    NGO's have difficulty soliciting contributions or donations to 
support their work, in part because there is no tax benefit for donors. 
NGO's also must pay taxes on contributions classified as income. Thus 
many human rights groups rely on international donations and government 
funding to pursue their work. NGO representatives reported that the new 
Government's attitude towards NGO's was improved significantly over 
that of the previous regime. NGO's were no longer harassed for 
criticizing the Government, and the Government's office for cooperation 
with NGO's, while operating with limited resources, was active in 
coordinating NGO and governmental efforts on human rights and civil 
society. However, while cooperation with government officials in Zagreb 
improved, a lack of follow-through on central government commitments by 
local authorities continued to be a problem.
    International organizations, including the European Community 
Monitoring Mission, the OSCE, and the UNHCR among others, operated 
freely. In March the Government established a commission to address 
refugee returns and housing reconstruction in war-affected areas. This 
commission met periodically with NGO's, representatives of ethnic 
communities, and international organizations. However, after early 
promise, the commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end (see 
Section 2.d.). The Council of Europe (COE) in September, citing 
progress on human rights, decided to end its permanent monitoring of 
Croatia. Of 21 obligations which Croatia assumed when it joined the COE 
in 1996, 4 remained outstanding: The abolishment of discriminatory laws 
regulating refugee returns, full cooperation with ICTY, transformation 
of HTV into a private television station, and amending the 
constitutional law on minorities. In October the OSCE, citing a stable 
security environment in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) and 
satisfactory local police performance there, terminated its police 
monitoring group in the region. The police monitoring function was 
assumed by a smaller cadre of civilian observers.
    Committees in the Parliament and in the Government were tasked 
specifically with human and minority rights issues, and they met 
periodically throughout the year to discuss topics and legislation 
within their purview. The parliamentary Committee participated in 
several legislative initiatives including the package of laws on 
minority rights passed in May.
    The Government's record of cooperation with the ICTY improved 
during the year; however, problems remained and several of the ICTY's 
requests remained unfulfilled at year's end. In February the Government 
formalized the status of the ICTY office in Zagreb (pending since 1996) 
and conceded the tribunal's jurisdiction to investigate possible war 
crimes committed during the 1995 military operations ``Flash'' and 
``Storm'' (disputed by the previous regime). In March indictee Mladen 
Naletelic (``Tuta'') was transferred to The Hague; he was the only 
publicly indicted war criminal known to be in Croatia (ICTY requested 
his extradition beginning in December 1998). In April tribunal 
investigators conducted a field investigation in Gospic with full 
governmental support; in 1999 the previous regime refused ICTY's 
request to conduct this investigation. In April the Parliament passed a 
declaration of cooperation with ICTY that confirmed the tribunal's 
jurisdiction and supported the punishment of all war criminals 
regardless of ethnicity or level of responsibility. In May the 
Government granted ICTY researchers long-sought access to archives. 
However, the authorities remained reluctant and were slow to provide 
timely access to witnesses and documentary evidence. Each time the 
Government fulfilled a tribunal request, hard-liners both within the 
Government and in society responded with harsh criticism.
    In November ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte commented on the 
Government's cooperation in a report to the UN Security Council, 
noting, ``there has indeed been an improvement in relations when 
compared with the previous policy of obstruction and delay adopted by 
the former Government.'' However, she continued, ``where Croatia 
perceives cooperation to be against its political or narrow security 
interests, a real difficulty still exists.'' Del Ponte went on to list 
a series of unfulfilled requests and disappointing developments, 
including the failure to provide requested materials in the trial of 
Dario Kordic, government leaks of ICTY documents, and a negative media 
campaign against the Tribunal fueled by these leaks. In December the 
Government passed a 13-point statement outlining its concerns and 
objections to some elements of its relationship with the ICTY. At 
year's end, both sides were working to resolve these difficulties.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifies that individuals shall enjoy all rights 
and freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
education, social status, or other attributes. Additionally members of 
all national groups and minorities shall have equal rights. While most 
of these rights were observed in practice, serious deficiencies 
continued, particularly with regard to ethnic discrimination of Serbs 
and Roma.
    Women.--Although the Government collected only limited statistics 
on the problem, credible NGO observers reported that violence against 
women, including spousal abuse, remained a widespread and underreported 
problem. Alcohol abuse and poor economic circumstances for veterans of 
the military conflict were cited as contributing factors. Rape and 
spousal rape are illegal under the Penal Code; however, NGO's report 
that many women do not report rape or spousal rape.
    During the autumn session of Parliament, the Government revoked 
1997 Penal Code amendments that removed domestic violence from the 
categories of crimes to be prosecuted automatically by the state 
attorney. Thus a domestic violence case can again be initiated based 
on, for example, suspicions of health care workers or police rather 
than requiring the victim to press charges. Legislation passed in the 
autumn created a specific Penal Code provision for family violence to 
replace inadequate existing provisions, and to direct that perpetrators 
of family violence, in addition to punishment, be placed under 
supervision and receive psychiatric treatment. Amendments to the Law on 
Misdemeanors passed in the autumn are designed to protect victims by 
extending detention (for up to 30 days) of perpetrators of family 
violence, even during the defendant's appeal. There is only one women's 
shelter, in Zagreb.
    The Government's Commission for Gender Equality participated in 
U.N.-sponsored Beijing Plus Five activities in June but overall was not 
very effective, according to NGO's and women's activists. Failing to 
collect statistical data on violence and discrimination against women, 
the Commission relied on data from 1996 and 1997 during Beijing Plus 
Five activities. The Commission's already small budget was slashed to 
60 percent of its 1999 level and planned initiatives to encourage 
women's employment were not implemented for lack of resources.
    The country is a transit point and lesser source and destination 
country for trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Workplace sexual harassment is a violation of the Penal Code's 
section on abuse of power but is not specifically included in the 
employment law. NGO's reported that in practice, women often did not 
resort to the Penal Code for relief for fear of losing their jobs.
    The law does not discriminate by gender. However, in practice women 
generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Government 
statistics from previous years showed that, while women constituted 
roughly 50 percent of the work force, they occupied few jobs at senior 
levels, even in areas such as education and administration where they 
were a clear majority of the workers. Considerable anecdotal evidence 
suggested that women hold by far the preponderance of low-level 
clerical, labor, and shopkeeping positions. Women in these positions 
often are among the first to be fired or laid off, particularly in 
times of corporate restructuring. NGO's and labor organizations 
reported a practice in which women received short-term work contracts 
renewable every 3 to 6 months, creating a climate of job insecurity for 
them. While men occasionally suffered from this practice, it was used 
disproportionately against women to dissuade them from taking maternity 
leave, although there were fewer reports of this practice during the 
year than in the previous year. Legislation was passed in 1999 limiting 
the use of short-term work contracts to a maximum of 3 years.
    While there is no national organization devoted solely to the 
protection of women's rights, many small, independent groups were 
active in the capital and larger cities. Among the most active were 
B.A.B.E. (``Be Active, Be Emancipated'') and the Center for Women 
Victims of War.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Education is free and mandatory through grade 8 (generally age 14). 
Schools provide free meals for children, subsidized daycare facilities 
are available in most communities even for infants, medical care for 
children is free, and the Labor Code authorizes 1 full year of 
maternity leave and 3 years' leave for women with twins or more than 
two children. The majority of students continue their education to the 
age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting any notable 
exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and 
nearly all drop out by grade 8. While there is no societal pattern of 
abuse of children, 1 NGO operating hotlines for sexual abuse victims 
recorded 62 cases of abuse of children in 1 month in the city of Split.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1997 Law on Social Welfare and the 
Law on Construction specify access to public services and buildings for 
persons with disabilities; however, the construction rules do not 
mandate retro-fitting of facilities and are not always enforced, so 
access to such facilities is often difficult. While people with 
disabilities face no openly discriminatory measures, job opportunities 
generally are limited. Special education also is limited and poorly 
funded.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are closely linked in 
society, and religion sometimes was used to identify and single out 
non-Croats for discriminatory practices. However, most such incidents 
appeared to be motivated by ethnicity and not religion or religious 
doctrine. The close identification of religion with ethnicity 
periodically caused religious institutions to be targets of violence 
(see Section 2.c.), and there were persistent reports of vandalism to 
Serb Orthodox cemeteries and structures. In January two crucifixes were 
damaged on the property of the local Orthodox priest in Tenja, and 
windows were broken at an Orthodox Church in Borovo. In April swastikas 
were painted on the walls of the Jewish community center in Zagreb. No 
arrests were made in these incidents. In August unidentified 
perpetrators broke into the Orthodox Church in the Danubian town of 
Branjina and wrote anti-Serb messages on the walls; no arrests were 
made.
    There were no further developments in the case of an August 1999 
attack on the home of Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, the head of the Islamic 
community in the country. No one was charged in the August 1999 
desecration of a memorial plaque in Cakovec marking the site of the 
synagogue destroyed during the Hungarian occupation in World War II.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Constitutionally, ethnic 
minorities enjoy the same protection as other self-identified ethnic 
and religious groups; however, in practice a pattern of open and 
sometimes severe discrimination continued against ethnic Serbs and 
other minorities in a wide number of areas, including the 
administration of justice, employment, housing, and freedom of 
movement. A pattern of persistent and sometimes violent harassment and 
intimidation of ethnic Serbs in the war-affected regions continued to 
be a serious problem. Early in the year, senior government officials 
emphasized their commitment to non-discriminatory treatment of 
minorities; however, in some instances, government leaders failed to 
condemn highly-publicized incidents of discrimination and harassment of 
ethnic Serbs.
    In May the Government passed a package of laws on minority rights, 
including a Constitutional law, that added nine new recognized 
minorities to the existing list of seven in the Constitution, including 
Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes. Some observers, including ethnic Serb 
leaders, criticized the apparent haste and secrecy with which the 
constitutional law was passed. Government officials indicated that 
further amendments on minorities and local self-government would 
complement the Constitutional law; however, these amendments were not 
passed by year's end. Two other laws passed in May guaranteed equal 
status for minority languages and delineated minority educational 
rights. Nevertheless ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, 
continued disproportionately to suffer discrimination. Ethnic Serb 
leaders reported improved communication with government officials, in 
contrast to the often tense relations under the previous Government.
    There were two ethnically motivated killings, symptomatic of ethnic 
tensions throughout the country and particularly in the war-affected 
areas. In March on the Adriatic island of Vir, a 38-year-old ethnic 
Serb, who had returned to Croatia a week earlier after spending 8 years 
as a refugee in Yugoslavia, was beaten to death by three ethnic Croats 
shouting anti-Serb slogans. The perpetrators were arrested quickly, and 
international monitors assessed the police performance as satisfactory. 
However, the Government did not issue a statement condemning the 
incidents until several days had passed. At their October trial, two 
suspects were convicted of murder (receiving 10 and 9-year sentences) 
and the third was acquitted. During the same week, a 73-year-old ethnic 
Serb woman was stabbed to death in the western Slavonian town of 
Slatina by an ethnic Croat after an argument about war-related issues. 
The perpetrator was arrested quickly, was convicted of aggravated 
murder, and was sentenced to 9 years in prison.
    Intimidation and violence against Serbs continued in war-affected 
areas during the year. In May about 50 ethnic Croats disrupted a 
ceremony in Veljun of mostly ethnic Serbs commemorating victims of a 
World War II Fascist massacre; one woman urinated on the memorial, and 
Serb leader Dr. Milorad Pupovac was escorted out of the area for his 
own protection. Two weeks later, five ethnic Croats entered the area at 
night and damaged the memorial; all were arrested, but in August the 
charges against them were dropped for lack of evidence. In June in 
nearby Slunj, a group of ethnic Croats unveiled a memorial to a 
notorious World War II Fascist Colonel. President Mesic and Prime 
Minister Racan condemned these incidents. During the summer, anti-Serb 
posters appeared in several areas (Karlovac, Sisak, and Erdut) 
containing photos and the names of local ethnic Serbs and accusing them 
of war crimes. Police investigated these incidents and identified 
suspects, but prosecutors did not press charges and police did not 
always make arrests. The poster incidents, in particular, appeared 
designed to intimidate returning Serb refugees.
    In the autumn, vigilante ``wanted'' lists (similar to the anti-Serb 
posters that appeared during the summer) accusing ethnic Serbs of war 
crimes appeared in the Danubian region. Some lists appeared on the 
Internet and others were posted in public places and delivered to 
ethnic Serb homes in the area. These lists both reflected and 
exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region. No senior government 
official condemned them. In October 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja 
group'') were arrested in Osijek on 1991 war crimes widely believed to 
be based on weak evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). This led to 
speculation that the Osijek prosecutor was responding to the vigilante 
lists in pursuing the cases. Also in October, Judge Rogulja, an ethnic 
Serb on the Vukovar bench, was threatened by a mob of local Croats 
(that included county prefect Petar Cobankovic) shortly after he had 
issued a ruling to evict a Croat police commander who was occupying a 
home belonging to an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out 
and the case later was transferred to another judge. No public 
officials, either at the municipal or national level, made any public 
statement about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a 
judge (see Section 1.c.).
    Property destruction and other forms of harassment often arose from 
disputes between home occupiers of one ethnicity and returning 
homeowners of another. The number of ethnic incidents reported to the 
police in the Danubian region fell to less than half its 1999 level. 
This development likely was due to a number of factors: A real decrease 
in the number of ethnic incidents, the failure of some police officers 
to regularly classify ethnic incidents as such, and a reluctance of 
ethnic Serbs to report harassment because of a sense that such 
incidents have become commonplace. Verbal and legal harassment, 
forcible evictions, and assaults occurred regularly (see Section 2.d.). 
The number of incidents in the Danubian city of Vukovar and the nearby 
town of Tenja remained particularly high. An ongoing problem was the 
accessibility of weapons left over from the war, including firearms and 
explosives, which frequently were used in incidents of harassment 
during the year. Ethnically motivated incidents of various levels of 
severity occurred at a rate of over 50 per month. In about two-thirds 
of these cases, the victim was an ethnic Serb. In addition to the two 
murders, serious incidents included several assaults and throwing of 
hand grenades onto private property. In March a group of ethnic Croats 
went from house to house in the Danubian town of Erdut terrorizing 
ethnic Serbs, including the local Orthodox priest and the local mayor. 
The 1,270 member police force in the Danubian region comprised 42 
percent ethnic Serb and 53 percent ethnic Croat officers. There were 
periodic reports of tensions and incidents between ethnic Serb and 
Croat officers.
    The situation was similar in other war-affected regions, with high 
levels of ethnic tension, particularly in areas where ethnic Serb 
refugees were returning to their prewar homes in large numbers. 
Observers expressed particular concern about the town of Benkovac in 
the Dalmatia region, where local Serbs expressed a lack of confidence 
in the performance and the impartiality of the local police force. In 
response the assistant Interior Minister investigated the Benkovac 
situation during the summer and replaced two senior local police 
officials. In April a hand grenade exploded in the garden of an ethnic 
Serb in the Dalmatian town of Imotski causing minor damages but no 
injuries; no arrests were made. In May in Cista Mala in the Dalmatian 
region, a 68-year-old ethnic Serb was beaten by four ethnic Croats, one 
of whom cut the victim with a knife and urinated on him. Local police 
apprehended the perpetrators quickly. The main perpetrator was 
convicted of assault and was serving a 1-year sentence at year's end. 
The ethnic Croat mayor of the neighboring town of Cista Velika 
expressed his regret over the incident.
    The Constitution and the package of minority laws passed in May 
provide the legal basis and right for education in the languages of 
recognized minorities. However, problems remained. For example, in 
textbooks the history of the former Yugoslavia has been omitted in 
favor of a more nationalistic Croat interpretation, and new textbooks 
have used derogatory adjectives in reference to minorities. Government 
pledges to provide more balanced textbooks went unfulfilled. In July 
the Education Minister directed five county prefects outside the 
Danubian region to survey their students to determine how many would be 
interested in classes conducted in Serbian. Such classes already are 
available in the Danubian region.
    The Citizenship Law distinguishes between those who have a claim to 
Croatian ethnicity and those who do not. Ethnic Croats are eligible to 
become citizens, even if they were not citizens of the former Socialist 
Republic of Croatia, as long as they submit a written statement that 
they consider themselves Croatian citizens. Persons who are not ethnic 
Croats must satisfy more stringent requirements through naturalization 
in order to obtain citizenship. Even those who previously were lawful 
residents of Croatia in the former Yugoslavia (see Section 1.d.) were 
compelled to provide proof of previous residence and citizenship not 
demanded of ethnic Croats. NGO's assisting ethnic Serbs with 
documentation issues continued to report local officials applying this 
legal double standard. These obstacles to ethnic Serbs' ability to 
document their citizenship led to discrimination in other areas, 
including the right to vote (see Section 3). While a citizenship 
application is pending, the applicant is denied social benefits 
including medical care, pensions, free education, and employment in the 
civil service. Denials frequently were based on Article 26 of the 
Citizenship Law (which stipulates that citizenship can be denied to 
persons otherwise qualified for reasons of national interest) and 
Article 8 (which requires that a person's actions demonstrate that they 
are ``attached to the legal system and customs of Croatia'' and that 
they have maintained a permanent residence on the territory of Croatia 
for the 5 years preceding the application for citizenship). However, 
the Interior Ministry began recognizing the period that (mostly ethnic 
Serbs) spent outside the country as refugees as applicable to the 5-
year residency requirement.
    In March the Government established a commission led by Deputy 
Prime Minister Goran Granic to address issues in the war-affected 
areas. It met several times in various formats, bringing together 
government ministries, the international community, NGO's, and 
representatives of the ethnic communities. However, the commission 
lapsed into inactivity by year's end.
    A serious and ongoing impediment to the return and reintegration of 
ethnic Serb refugees is the failure of the Government to recognize or 
``convalidate'' their legal and administrative documents from the 
period of the 1991-1995 conflict. Despite the 1997 adoption of a 
convalidation law to allow the recognition of documents issued by the 
rebel Serb para-State, this legislation was not put into practice fully 
because several ministries failed to adopt implementing instructions. 
While the law itself did not include a deadline for filing 
applications, a decree issued by the previous regime did fix an April 
1999 filing deadline (impossible to meet for many ethnic Serbs who 
still were refugees outside the country). Even persons who filed before 
this deadline experienced arbitrary delays and obstructions. Without 
the recognition conferred by the law, citizens (almost exclusively 
ethnic Serbs) continued to be unable to resolve a wide range of 
problems including pensions, disability insurance, unemployment 
benefits, the recognition of births, deaths, and marriages, and even 
confirmation of time served in prison. The majority of requests are 
from elderly persons and relate to pension and employment histories 
from occupied territories during the conflict. This made resumption of 
a normal life almost impossible for this group. Also, contrary to the 
law, the state pension fund unilaterally and improperly denied some 
pension applications from ethnic Serbs. In 1999 one NGO providing legal 
assistance had files on 9,000 unresolved convalidation cases in Osijek 
alone.
    Serb property owners whose homes were occupied by ethnic Croat 
refugees from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, mostly from Bosnia 
and Kosovo, remained unable to access their property, despite the 1998 
program for returns, which mandated multiethnic ``housing commissions'' 
to implement property restitution. A lack of alternative housing in 
many areas and the lack of political will to evict ethnic Croat 
occupiers without alternative housing in favor of Serb homeowners 
resulted in only a handful of restituted properties outside of the 
Danubian region (see Section 1.f.).
    Discrimination and violence against Roma continued. The 1991 
Yugoslav census counted only 6,700 Roma in Croatia, but government 
officials and NGO's agree that this was a serious undercount and that 
the true number of Croatian Roma may be 30,000 to 40,000. Protective of 
their culture and reluctant to assimilate, Roma faced a host of 
obstacles, including language (many, especially women, have only 
limited Croatian language skills), lack of education, lack of 
citizenship and identity documents, high unemployment, and societal 
discrimination, and lack of Government will to address such abuses. 
There were no reports of police beatings of Roma during the year.
    The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported that on April 23, a 
group of 15 ethnic Croats beat a 23-year-old Romani man in Luka, 
northwest of Zagreb. Human Rights Watch reported that in May, local 
authorities in Varazdin County ordered 420 Roma to move from their 
settlement in the village of Strmec Prodravski after refusing to allow 
them to build more permanent homes and a water and electricity supply. 
The ERRC also reported that on June 1, a group of youths allegedly beat 
and threatened to rape a 9-year-old Romani girl in Zagreb. After her 
family confronted the attackers, a larger group of youths reportedly 
went to the Romani family's house, threw a brick through a window, 
damaged their car, and yelled insults at the family. The police then 
intervened and detained three of the attackers and four Roma.
    An estimated 10 percent of Croatian Romani children begin primary 
school, and of these only 10 percent go on to secondary school. There 
were only an estimated 50 Romani students in secondary school 
throughout the country during the year. Those individuals going beyond 
secondary school tended to leave the settlements and assimilate into 
mainstream society, depriving Romani communities of valuable skills. In 
several instances, including in Varazdin and Zagreb, local officials 
segregated Romani students into separate classes without the same level 
of materials or instructors available to regular students.
    The situation of other minority groups--such as Slovaks, Czechs, 
Italians, and Hungarians--did not reflect discrimination to the same 
extent as that of the Serb and Roma communities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers are entitled to form or join 
unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There is an 
active labor movement with one major and four minor national labor 
federations and independent associations of both blue-and white-collar 
members. Approximately 64 percent of workers are members of unions. In 
general unions are independent of the Government and political parties.
    The law prohibits retaliation against strikers participating in 
legal strikes. Workers only may strike at the end of a contract or in 
specific circumstances mentioned in the contract. The Supreme Court has 
ruled in the past that workers may not strike for nonpayment of wages.
    In December facing budget cuts, the Government unilaterally 
abrogated collective bargaining agreements with five public sector 
unions. While this action was legal under the terms of the agreements, 
it sparked protests and created concerns about the Government's respect 
for employment rights.
    When negotiating a new contract, workers are required to go through 
mediation before they can strike. Labor and management choose the 
mediator together. If they cannot agree, the Labor Law calls for a 
tripartite commission of labor, business, and government 
representatives to appoint one. The tripartite commission began to meet 
regularly during the year and prepared its first list of mediators. 
Arbitration never is mandatory but can be used if both sides agree. 
Only after submitting to mediation and formally filing a statement that 
negotiations are at an impasse is a strike legal. If a strike is found 
to be illegal, any participant can be dismissed, and the union held 
liable for damages. No strikes were found to be illegal during the 
year.
    The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution with these 
limitations and with additional limits on members of the armed forces, 
police, government administration, and public services. During the 
year, authorities permitted frequent labor demonstrations both in 
Zagreb's main square and in front of the Parliament. The strikes were 
nearly all over nonpayment of wages. The employees of NAMA, a 
department store chain, staged several demonstrations during the year 
over this issue. In addition farmers in eastern Slavonia staged several 
demonstrations over nonpayment for their produce. On December 8, the 
public employee unions held a nonviolent nationwide strike calling for 
higher wages.
    Laws limiting the right to assembly were not used against labor 
demonstrations during the year.
    The ILO Committee of Experts in 1999 requested the Government, in 
consultation with trade unions, to set criteria and a time frame for 
the division of office space and property formerly owned by the unions 
during the Communist era. While the five labor confederations signed 
the preliminary agreement, there was no further progress on this issue 
by year's end. In April the Ministry of Defense returned a Zagreb-area 
facility that had been used since 1990 as an army training site to the 
UATUC confederation.
    Unions may affiliate freely internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. The Labor Code 
governs collective bargaining contracts, protection for striking 
workers, and legal limitations on the ability of employers to conduct 
``lockouts'' during labor disputes.
    The transition to private enterprise and a free market economy kept 
labor unions under pressure at the same time that they were making 
progress towards establishing themselves as genuine trade unions, 
representative of their members rather than the Government. 
Unemployment remained high at 22.4 percent at year's end overall and 
much higher in some war-affected areas. The nonpayment of wages 
continued to be a serious problem; over 100,000 workers (10 percent of 
the workforce) failed to receive their salaries on time. During the 
summer, the Government signed an agreement with unions providing that 
all state-owned companies (the assets of which were controlled by the 
Croatian privatization fund) would pay salaries on time; however, some 
unions complained that the Government did not abide by this commitment. 
A further problem was that when salaries were not paid, associated 
contributions into the social welfare system also lagged, with the 
result that unpaid workers also were denied health coverage.
    The Labor Code deals directly with antiunion discrimination issues. 
It expressly allows unions to challenge firings in court. No reports of 
systematic firings on grounds of ethnicity were reported during the 
year. However, in the high-profile ``Magma'' case, violations of labor 
rights were alleged. The Minister of Economy, Goranko Fizulic, his 
wife, and a U.K.-based investment company were co-owners of the 
``Magma'' company in Zagreb. When workers unionized early in the year, 
Fizulic assured them that he would respect their wishes. Soon after, 
the union's president, all eight members of the executive board, and 
three union organizers were fired. The workers still were challenging 
the firings in court at year's end. Generally citizens' attempts to 
seek redress through the legal system were hampered seriously by the 
inefficiency of the court system, where cases often languished for 
months or years before reaching a final resolution (see Section 1.e.). 
There were no reports of the Government employing coercion or other 
illegal methods to induce striking employees to return to work. There 
were no further developments in the investigation of the beating of the 
vice president of the Locomotive Engineers Union by unknown assailants 
during tense contract negotiations in 1999.
    There were no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of 
these practices; however, there were occasional instances of women 
trafficked through the country for the purpose of forced prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.). While legislation does not explicitly cover 
children, the constitutional ban is comprehensive in this area, and the 
Government enforces this prohibition effectively. The Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare is the agency charged with enforcing the ban on 
coerced or forced labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years 
(the same as the ILO Convention standard), and it is enforced by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Children may not be employed 
before reaching the legal age and are not allowed to perform work that 
is harmful to their health or morality. There is no reported pattern of 
abuse of child labor. Workers under the age of 18 are entitled to 
special protection at work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor 
and night shifts. Education is free, universal, and mandatory up to the 
age of 14, generally. Children usually finish secondary school, and a 
high proportion go on to university. The broad constitutional 
prohibition against forced or compulsory labor encompasses children, 
and there were no reported instances of such cases.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1999 the Government signed a 
collective bargaining agreement establishing a minimum wage of about 
$210 (1,700 kuna) per month. In July the government Bureau of 
Statistics estimated that the average net monthly wage was 
approximately $400 (3,275 kuna), which is not sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek including a 30-
minute daily break, a 24-hour rest period during the week, and a 
minimum of 18 days of paid vacation leave annually. Workers receive 
time-and-a-half pay for any hours worked beyond 42. However, most 
unions have negotiated a 40-hour workweek.
    Health and safety standards are set by the Government and are 
enforced by the Ministry of Health. The 1997 Health and Safety Law 
allowed unions to appoint health and safety stewards in companies, but 
their activities are regulated by collective agreements. In practice 
industries are not diligent in meeting standards for worker protection. 
It is common, for example, to find workers without hardhats on 
constructions sites and for workers to remove safety devices from 
dangerous equipment. Workers can in theory remove themselves from 
hazardous conditions at work and would have recourse through the courts 
if they felt that they had been dismissed wrongfully for doing so; 
there were no reports of wrongful dismissal complaints over workplace 
safety during the year.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons. However, existing laws can be used to 
prosecute traffickers. No statistical information on trafficking 
exists, although U.N. officials tracking the issue regionally and local 
NGO's indicate that Croatia is primarily a transit country, as well as 
a lesser source and destination country for women trafficked to other 
parts of Europe for forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). 
Women reportedly were trafficked through Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia to Croatia, where some remained to work as prostitutes or 
are trafficked to other destinations.
    Public awareness of trafficking is low. There were no government or 
NGO programs to deal with the prevention of trafficking during the 
year; however, government officials and NGO's are working to develop an 
antitrafficking strategy.
    There were few support services available for trafficking victims. 
There is one women's shelter that occasionally helps trafficked women.
                               __________

                                 CYPRUS

    Prior to 1974, Cyprus experienced a long period of intercommunal 
strife between its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 
response the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began 
peacekeeping operations in March 1964. The island has been divided 
since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup 
d'etat directed from Greece. Since 1974 the southern part of the island 
has been under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. 
The northern part is ruled by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983 
that administration proclaimed itself the ``Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus'' (``TRNC''). The ``TRNC'' is not recognized by the 
United States or any other country except Turkey. The two parts are 
separated by a buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. A substantial 
number of Turkish troops remain on the island. In both the government-
controlled areas and in the Turkish Cypriot community democratic 
principles generally are respected. Glafcos Clerides was reelected 
President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1998; in April 2000 Rauf 
Denktash was declared ``President'' after ``Prime Minister'' Dervish 
Eroglu withdrew following the first round of Turkish Cypriot elections. 
The judiciary is independent in both communities.
    Police in the government-controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot 
community are responsible for law enforcement. Police forces operating 
in the government-controlled area are under civilian control, while 
military authorities direct Turkish Cypriot police forces. In general 
the police forces of both sides respect the rule of law, but instances 
of police abuse of power continued.
    Both Cypriot economies operate on the basis of free market 
principles, although in each community there are significant 
administrative controls. The government-controlled part of the island 
has a robust, service-oriented economy, with a declining manufacturing 
base and a small agricultural sector. Tourism and trade generate 22 
percent of gross domestic product and employ 29 percent of the labor 
force. In 2000 per capita income was approximately $12,902, inflation 
was 4.5 percent, and unemployment was 3.5 percent. Growth was 4.8 
percent, compared with 4.5 percent in 1999. The Turkish Cypriot economy 
is handicapped by restrictions imposed by the Government of Cyprus and 
other international institutions. In addition it relies heavily on 
subsidies from Turkey and is burdened by an overly large public sector. 
It, too, is basically service-oriented, but has a smaller tourism and 
trade base--accounting for 14 percent of gross domestic product 
employing 10 percent of the workforce--and a larger agricultural 
sector. During the year, per capita income in the north was 
approximately $5,263, and inflation was 60 percent. Growth in the north 
was 5.3 percent in 2000, compared with 4.9 percent in 1999.
    The Government of the Republic of Cyprus generally respected human 
rights; however, instances of police brutality continued to be a 
problem.
    The Turkish Cypriot authorities generally respected human rights; 
however, police abuse of suspects' and detainees' rights continued. The 
authorities also continued to restrict freedom of movement. Since 
December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have banned most 
bicommunal contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, 
including previously frequent meetings in Nicosia's buffer zone. They 
sometimes attempted to prevent Turkish Cypriots from travelling to 
bicommunal meetings off the island as well. In May Turkish Cypriot 
officials lowered the ``visa'' fees for crossing the buffer zone. The 
Turkish Cypriot authorities have taken some steps to improve the 
conditions of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the territory 
under their control, but the treatment of these groups still falls 
short of Turkish Cypriot obligations under the Vienna III Agreement of 
1975.
    Violence against women and trafficking in women for forced 
prostitution remained problems in both areas.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities still have not conducted a credible 
investigation of the 1996 murder of a prominent leftist Turkish Cypriot 
journalist, Kutlu Adali, who wrote articles critical of Turkey's role 
in the north.
    In 1996 Turkish Cypriot civilian police killed a Greek Cypriot 
demonstrator who had entered the U.N. buffer zone, and the police 
participated in the beating death of another. Again, there has not been 
any significant investigation by Turkish Cypriot authorities of the 
killings. The family of one of the deceased filed a case against Turkey 
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which declared the case 
admissible in June 1999. The case was pending at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Both the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the 
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit 
torture, the law in both communities prohibits such practices, and the 
authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; however, 
instances of Cypriot police brutality against suspects in detention 
continued, mostly involving non-Cypriots. One officer was tried and 
acquitted in March in connection with the October 1998 beating of 
illegal immigrant detainees by members of a special police unit (see 
Section 2.d.).
    On December 21, the ECHR found the Cypriot Government guilty of 
police abuse during the 1995 arrest for drug smuggling of Turkish 
Cypriot Erkan Egmez and ordered the Government to pay Egmez $16,000 
(10,400 pounds sterling) in compensation.
    The former European Commission on Human Rights agreed in January 
1998 to investigate complaints by nine Turkish Cypriots that Greek 
Cypriot police mistreated them in 1994 and expelled them to the north. 
The complainants allege they were threatened with death if they 
returned to the south and that Greek Cypriot police were responsible 
for the death of one complainant's son, who did return to the south 
later in 1994. The Cypriot Government denies all the charges; the 
Commission took oral evidence in the case in Nicosia in September 1998. 
The case was pending at year's end.
    While there were no public allegations of police brutality in the 
Turkish Cypriot community, there were credible reports of pervasive 
police abuse of power and routine harsh treatment of detainees (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Prison conditions in general meet minimum international standards. 
According to a report issued in May by the government Ombudsman, 
prisoners with psychiatric problems in the south do not receive proper 
medical care. Persons incarcerated in jails in the south on minor 
charges are mixed with more hardened, violent criminals.
    The Cypriot Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities permit 
prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Throughout Cyprus the 
police respect laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Judicially issued arrest warrants are required. No one may 
be detained for more than a day without referral of the case to the 
courts for extension of the period of detention. Most periods of 
investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal 
charges are filed. Attorneys generally have access to detainees; bail 
is permitted. The Government of Cyprus claims the right to deport 
foreign nationals for reasons of public interest whether or not they 
have been charged with or convicted of a crime.
    Some abuses of power occur at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot 
police, generally at the time of arrest. Suspects sometimes are not 
permitted to have their lawyers present when testimony is being taken, 
a right provided under the Turkish Cypriot basic law. Suspects who 
demand the presence of a lawyer may be threatened with stiffer charges 
or even physically intimidated. A high percentage of convictions in the 
Turkish Cypriot community are obtained with confessions made during 
initial police interrogation under these conditions. According to 
credible reports, police are known to abuse their right to hold persons 
up to 24 hours before having to go before a judge. Police officers use 
this tactic against persons suspected of serious crimes or believed to 
have behaved in a manner deemed insulting to the officer. The suspects 
are then released within 24 hours without charges having been filed.
    On December 1, Greek Cypriot police arrested Omer Gazi Tekogul for 
possession of 2 kilograms of heroin near the village of Pyla, located 
in the United Nations Buffer Zone. Shortly after Tekogul's arrest, a 
Turkish Cypriot official told UNFICYP that Greek Cypriots would 
``disappear'' in retaliation for Tekogul's arrest (this statement was 
later repudiated by Rauf Denktash). On December 13, Turkish Cypriot 
authorities arrested Greek Cypriot Panicos Tziakourmas for possession 
of marijuana. An SBA police investigation points to Tziakourmas being 
seized by Turkish Cypriots on SBA territory and found no evidence of 
marijuana. Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that Tziakourmas was 
arrested in the north. Both cases were pending at year's end.
    Exile is prohibited specifically by the Constitution and by the 
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community, and is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is legally 
independent of executive or military influence in both communities, and 
it is independent in practice.
    On both sides, most criminal and civil cases begin in district 
courts, from which appeals are made to Supreme Courts. No special 
courts exist for security or political offenses.
    Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United 
Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due 
process, and the right of appeal. Throughout Cyprus, a fair public 
trial is provided for in law and accorded in practice. Defendants have 
the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel 
(at government expense for those who cannot afford one), to confront 
witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense.
    On the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated 
military zones or military regulations are subject to trial in a 
military court. These courts consist of one military and two civilian 
judges and a civilian prosecutor. Members of the Turkish Cypriot bar 
have complained that civilian judges tend to defer to their military 
colleagues in such hearings.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic law 
governing the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions to protect 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and a 
judicial warrant is required for a police official to enter a private 
residence. Although authorities on both sides generally respected these 
provisions in practice, police on both sides have subjected members of 
the other community resident in their area to surveillance (see Section 
5).
    The Turkish Cypriot authorities restrict the ability of Greek 
Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to change their place of 
residence at will (see Section 5).
    In May Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that Greek Cypriots 
and Maronites resident in the north may bring their spouses to reside 
with them in the north. Greek Cypriot marriage certificates will be 
recognized as proof of marriage. Previously this required special 
permission, which was difficult to obtain. One such marriage took place 
during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and of the press 
are provided for by law, and these rights are respected in practice 
throughout the island. The proliferation of party and independent 
newspapers and periodicals in both communities enables ideas and 
arguments to circulate freely. Opposition papers frequently criticize 
the authorities. Several private television and radio stations in the 
Greek Cypriot community compete effectively with the government-
controlled stations. In addition to 2 smaller, university-run radio 
stations, 11 private radio stations operate in the Turkish Cypriot 
community along with 4 private television stations. International 
broadcasts are available without interference throughout the island, 
including telecasts from Turkey and Greece.
    In 1998 Turkish Cypriot officials filed a number of court actions 
against newspapers and journalists, alleging that certain articles 
``damaged the prestige of the state.'' Five complaints against the 
Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Avrupa were consolidated into one court 
action. In December 1999, a court ruled that the newspaper was liable 
and fined it approximately $215,000 (120 billion Turkish lira). In May 
2000 court bailiffs seized the newspaper's computers and other 
equipment to satisfy partially the court judgement. The newspaper was 
closed for a day until alternate production facilities were found. In 
July the owner-editor of the same newspaper, two journalists and a 
photographer from the newspaper, and a Turkish Cypriot ``security 
forces officer'' and his wife were taken into custody on suspicion of 
espionage. The journalists and photographer were released later without 
being charged. The owner-editor and the ``officer'' and his wife were 
released but barred from leaving the north. They were not formally 
charged and faced rearrest at any time. The same newspaper was 
acquitted in September of charges based on a 1998 story alleging that 
Turkish Cypriot soldiers assaulted a Turkish Cypriot family after a 
dispute over housing.
    Restrictions sometimes were imposed on the ability of journalists 
to cross the buffer zone to cover news events. The Cypriot Government 
denied entry to the south for visiting Turkish journalists who arrived 
in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north. In retaliation Turkish 
Cypriot authorities sometimes required Greek Cypriot journalists to 
purchase a ``visa'' to enter the north, which the journalists refused 
to do. Current Turkish Cypriot policy, while applied inconsistently, is 
to permit Greek Cypriot journalists travelling as a group to cover 
events in the north without paying a ``visa'' fee, but not to allow 
Greek journalists entry unless they pay the fee. Individual Greek 
Cypriot journalists usually also must pay the fees.
    Academic freedom generally is respected throughout the island.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The freedom to 
hold meetings, associate, and organize is protected by law, and the 
Government respects these rights in practice.
    Although Turkish Cypriot authorities also generally respected these 
rights, they imposed restrictions on bicommunal meetings (see Section 
2.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion generally is 
respected. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes five 
religions that are exempt from taxes and receive government subsidies. 
Other religions may register routinely as nonprofit organizations and 
receive tax exemptions, but not subsidies. In the Turkish Cypriot area, 
no religion is recognized in the basic law, but Islamic institutions 
receive tax exemptions and subsidies through the Wakf religious trust; 
no other church receives exemptions or subsidies. Although missionaries 
have the legal right to proselytize in both communities, missionary 
activities are monitored closely by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church 
and by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities.
    Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island and 
non-Muslims in the north are allowed to practice their religions. 
Restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots resident in the north to 
visit Apostolos Andreas monastery were eased in 1998; they now may 
visit the monastery without restriction. Maronites may not visit 
certain religious sites in the north located in military zones. 
Armenians may not visit any religious sites in the north. A Greek 
Cypriot application to allow a second priest to reside in the north to 
assist the elderly Orthodox priest already in the north has been 
pending for more than 3 years.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
enjoy freedom of movement within their respective areas. Both 
authorities respect the right to travel abroad and to emigrate. Turkish 
Cypriots have difficulty traveling to most countries because travel 
documents issued by the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'' are 
recognized only by Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots use Turkish travel 
documents instead.
    Republic of Cyprus authorities discourage travel to the northern 
part of the island. They permit only day travel by tourists to the 
north, sometimes arbitrarily refuse permission to non-Cypriots to cross 
to the north, and pressure foreigners working in Cyprus not to cross to 
the north. They have declared that it is illegal to enter Cyprus except 
at authorized entry points in the south, effectively barring entry into 
the government-controlled area by foreigners who have entered Cyprus 
from the north. Turkish Cypriots traveling to the south must seek prior 
permission from the Turkish Cypriot authorities and must provide the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities with an itinerary and the purpose of their 
travel. To pass the Greek Cypriot checkpoint, Turkish Cypriots must 
provide their planned itinerary to the checkpoint police. They do not 
need to notify the checkpoint police in advance but do need to prove 
they are Turkish Cypriots. There is no limit on how long they may 
remain in the south.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities generally allow visits to the north by 
persons who initially enter Cyprus in the south, but they have denied 
entry to foreigners of Turkish Cypriot origin who enter Cyprus in the 
south. In 1995 the Turkish Cypriot authorities instituted a policy 
under which foreign nationals of Greek Cypriot origin would be 
permitted to visit the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. However, 
implementation of the procedures has remained inconsistent, and 
visitors of Greek Cypriot or Armenian origin, or even persons having 
Greek or Armenian names, may face considerable difficulties entering 
the north.
    In May Turkish Cypriot authorities lowered ``visa'' fees at the 
main Nicosia checkpoint to 1 pound sterling. Greeks and Greek Cypriots 
still must obtain a formal ``TRNC visa'' to visit the north. Maronites 
are charged the same 1 pound sterling fee each time they cross. 
Requests to cross into the north must be submitted 48 hours in advance.
    Following an agreement in 1997 on reciprocal visits to religious 
sites, a number of visits again occurred during the year. The Cypriot 
Government permitted over 1,400 Turkish Cypriots to make a pilgrimage 
to a Moslem shrine in the south in March and allowed another 1,300 to 
travel in June. In April a group of approximately 1,950 Greek Cypriots 
visited the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the north.
    On July 1, Turkish forces established a new manned checkpoint in a 
location adjacent to the Greek Cypriot village of Strovilia and the 
British eastern SBA. Although access to Strovilia has been largely 
unimpeded, the checkpoint now provides Turkish forces the ability to 
control the approach to the village. Despite protests from UNFICYP and 
others, Turkish forces remained at the contested checkpoint in 
violation of the status quo.
    On July 31, Greek Cypriot officials denied Turkish Cypriots land 
passage to Kokkina. Visits to this pocket of land--surrounded by the 
government-controlled area--that contains a memorial are included in 
the 1997 reciprocal visit agreement. In August and November Turkish 
Cypriot officials denied access to southern Greek Cypriots to visit the 
Apostolos Andreas monastery.
    In 1996 the ECHR ruled 11 to 6 that Turkey committed a continuing 
violation of the rights of a Greek Cypriot woman by preventing her from 
going to her property located in north Cyprus. The ruling reaffirmed 
the validity of property deeds issued prior to 1974. The Court also 
found in this case that ``it was obvious from the large number of 
troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that the Turkish 
army exercised effective overall control there. In the circumstances of 
the case, this entailed Turkey's responsibility for the policies and 
actions of the ``TRNC.'' In July 1998 the court ordered Turkey to pay 
the woman approximately $915,000 in damages and costs by October 28, 
1998. The Turkish Government stated that it cannot implement the 
Court's decision, which it contends is a political decision, and argued 
that the land in question is not Turkish but is part of the ``Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.'' The Council of Europe (COE) during 2000 
continued to call on the Turkish Government to comply with the Court's 
decision. In July the COE Committee of Ministers issued a resolution 
deploring Turkey's lack of compliance and strongly urging it to comply 
fully and without further delay with the ECHR judgment. About 150 
similar cases filed by Greek Cypriots against Turkey have been declared 
admissible by the ECHR, but no judgement was issued on any of the other 
cases by year's end.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities in the past had approved most 
applications for Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicommunal meetings 
in the U.N.-controlled buffer zone, but on December 27, 1997, they 
suspended Turkish Cypriot participation in these meetings pending a 
reevaluation of bicommunal activities. The ``suspension'' soon became 
an effective Turkish Cypriot ban on bicommunal contacts on Cyprus. 
Whereas in 1997 thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
participated in bicommunal events, in which mixed groups met to discuss 
such topics as the environment, family violence, management techniques, 
business operations, and legal questions, the Turkish Cypriot ban 
halted almost all of those contacts. However, since June Turkish 
Cypriot authorities have eased the ban. On a case-by-case basis, the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed some Turkish Cypriots to 
participate in bicommunal events in and across the buffer zone. Greek 
Cypriots still must obtain a Turkish Cypriot ``visa'' to visit the 
north. Turkish Cypriot authorities also attempted to interfere with 
some bicommunal events taking place outside Cyprus by requiring civil 
servants to seek permission from their respective employer and the 
Turkish Cypriot ``Ministry of Foreign Affairs'' before confirming their 
participation. Enforcement of the policy has been inconsistent, with 
some public officials permitted to attend off-island bicommunal events. 
Private citizens have been allowed to travel to off-island bicommunal 
events.
    In recent years, Turkish Cypriot authorities have announced the 
easing of restrictions on the approximately 580 Greek Cypriots and 
Maronites living in the north. Turkish Cypriot authorities usually 
grant the applications of Greek Cypriot residents in the north to visit 
the government-controlled area. The limit on visits to the south was 
extended in 1998 from 15 days per month to a total of 6 months per 
year. The applicants must return within the designated period or risk 
losing their right to return and to keep their property, although this 
rule rarely is enforced in practice. In 1997 Turkish Cypriot 
authorities also eliminated the previous monthly limit on visits by 
close family relatives of Greek Cypriots and Maronites resident in the 
north (it was once per month until 1996 and twice per month 
thereafter). A limit on overnight stays also was increased from 2 days 
and 3 nights, to a ``reasonable period'' (said period to be determined 
by Turkish Cypriot authorities), with extensions possible. However, 
there are reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented 
family relatives from extending their stays in the north. There are 
also reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented unlimited 
travel to the north (as accorded by the 1997 elimination of a limit on 
visits) by family relatives. Greek Cypriots visiting from the south 
still may not travel in the north in their personal vehicles but must 
use taxis or buses and pay the crossing fee. In September, after a 4-
year wait, Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed the wife of the Orthodox 
priest resident in the north to rejoin her husband. The wife had left 
the north to care for the couple's children.
    Similar restrictions exist for visits by Maronite residents of the 
north to the government-controlled areas, but they are applied much 
more loosely than restrictions on Greek Cypriots, and Maronite travel 
is relatively free. However, Maronite residents also must pay the 
required crossing fees.
    While in the past the Turkish Cypriot authorities permitted school 
holiday and weekend visits to the north only by children under the ages 
of 16 (male) and 18 (female), the age limits for Maronite students and 
female Greek Cypriot students were lifted entirely in 1998. In May 
Turkish Cypriot officials announced that male Greek Cypriot students of 
military draft age who can show documentation proving they are full-
time students, and therefore not yet performing military duties, may 
continue to visit the north.
    According to regulations announced in October 1998, the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities no longer require Greek Cypriots or Maronites 
resident in the north to obtain police permits for internal travel in 
the north. They may use private vehicles registered and insured in the 
north. Implementation of the new policy has been inconsistent.
    The Government generally cooperates with the office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With the increasing number of 
illegal immigrants finding their way to Cyprus in small boats, the 
Government of Cyprus is receiving a growing number of asylum 
applications: 300 to 400 per year. These cases are referred to the 
local UNHCR office for evaluation. If recognized as a refugee, the 
applicant is granted a 3-year residence permit renewable for 3 
additional years. If applicants meet the criteria for refugee status, 
they are permitted to remain and are given temporary work permits. 
However, applicants generally are not granted permanent resettlement 
rights. Applicants are permitted to remain until resettlement in a 
third country can be arranged.
    In January, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Cyprus legislature passed 
an asylum law designed to grant temporary residence to asylum 
applicants until their applications are reviewed by the competent 
government authority. The law is designed to transfer responsibility 
for the asylum application process from the UNHCR to the Government. 
However, there have been delays in establishing a relevant government 
authority, and the UNHCR continues to review asylum applications. In 
July the Government established a 130-bed detention facility for 
housing arriving immigrants until their cases can be evaluated. In the 
north, authorities generally cooperated with refugee authorities. 
Working with the assistance of a local nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), the UNHCR recognized 2 persons as refugees in 1999 and 15 
persons as refugees in 2000.
    In 1998-2000 groups of illegal immigrants attempting to reach 
Western Europe instead landed on Cyprus after their overcrowded vessels 
encountered problems at sea. A group of 34 Syrian Kurds, all of whom 
applied for asylum with the UNHCR, arrived on November 15. On December 
12, the UNHCR notified the Government of the 34 pending asylum 
applications. The same day, under a bilateral agreement between Cyprus 
and Syria for the return of all illegal immigrants departing from 
Syrian ports, the Government returned the immigrants to Syria. The 
Government did not consult with the UNHCR prior to the return of the 
Syrian Kurds.
    On September 13, 266 persons arrived on Cyprus from Lebanon after 
Greek Cypriot authorities rescued them from a sinking boat. The 
immigrants were held on a boat in Limassol port until Cypriot 
authorities, under an agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon calling for 
the return of illegal immigrants departing from any Lebanese port, 
transported them to Lebanon October 3. Despite requests to the 
Government, representatives of the UNHCR did not meet with the 
immigrants and were unable to determine their asylum status.
    According to the Government, no individuals recognized as refugees 
were returned to countries where they credibly feared persecution.
    A group of 100 persons, all of whom applied for political asylum, 
arrived in June 1998. Only 23 were granted asylum. Most of those who 
did not receive asylum were detained and then deported against their 
will in late 1998 and early 1999. Prior to that, in October 1998, a 
special police unit was filmed by local television cameras kicking and 
beating the detainees with batons, while stopping a protest during 
which the detainees burned their bedding. An examination of the 
immigrants, mostly Africans, by a forensic pathologist revealed that 
most were injured, some seriously. The Attorney General ordered an 
investigation, and charges were brought against the officer in charge. 
In July the officer was acquitted of using excessive force in quelling 
the protest. Later in July, the Attorney General appealed the court's 
decision; the appeal was pending at year's end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Multiparty political systems exist throughout Cyprus. Under the 
Republic's Constitution, political parties compete for popular support 
actively and without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections 
are held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of President are 
held every 5 years; in February 1998 President Clerides won reelection 
to a new 5-year term. Elections for members of the House of 
Representatives are held every 5 years or less.
    The Turkish Cypriots living in northern Cyprus elect a leader and a 
representative body every 5 years or less; in December 1998 they chose 
a new ``National Assembly.'' In April 2000 Rauf Denktash was named 
Turkish Cypriot leader after his opponent, ``Prime Minister'' Dervish 
Eroglu, withdrew between the first and second round of voting.
    Under the 1960 Constitution, voting took place on a communal basis. 
Therefore, since the breakdown in 1963 of bicommunal governing 
arrangements, and since the 1974 de facto partition of the island, 
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area are barred 
from voting there, although they may travel to the north to vote in 
elections. Similarly, Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north 
are barred by law from participating in Turkish Cypriot elections. They 
are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must travel to the 
south to exercise that right. Officials in the north representing Greek 
Cypriots and Maronites are appointed by the Government of Cyprus and 
are not recognized by Turkish Cypriot authorities.
    In both communities, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics, although they face no legal obstacles to participating in the 
political process. Women hold some cabinet-level, judicial, and other 
senior positions. In the House of Representatives, women hold 4 of 56 
seats; in the ``National Assembly'' in the north, women hold 4 of 50 
seats.
    In addition to their normal voting rights, the small Maronite, 
Armenian, and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities also elect special 
nonvoting representatives from their respective communities who sit in 
the respective legislative bodies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        rights
    A number of organizations in both parts of the island consider 
themselves human rights groups; however, they generally are concerned 
with alleged violations of the rights of their community's members by 
the other community. Groups with a broad human rights mission include 
organizations promoting awareness of domestic violence and others 
concerned with alleged police brutality.
    No restrictions prevent the formation of human rights groups. 
Representatives of international human rights organizations have access 
throughout the island. Government officials are generally cooperative 
and responsive to their views.
    The United Nations, through the autonomous tripartite (United 
Nations, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot) Committee on Missing Persons 
in Cyprus (CMP), is attempting to resolve the problem of missing 
persons who remain unaccounted for since the intercommunal violence 
beginning in 1963-64 and the events of July 1974 and afterwards. The 
CMP has made little progress. However, in November 1999 the CMP met 
formally for the first time since early 1996 and agreed in principle to 
resume investigations in 2000. However, no resumption of meetings 
occurred during the year. In July 1997, the leaders of the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities agreed to collect and share 
information on missing persons by the end of September 1997, outside of 
the CMP process. Information finally was exchanged in January 1998. 
Further progress has been delayed due to Turkish Cypriot reluctance to 
proceed without first fully accounting for those who may have been 
killed in internal Greek Cypriot fighting in July 1974 prior to the 
landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus.
    Since June 1999 the Government of Cyprus has been conducting 
exhumations of gravesites in the south that may contain the remains of 
persons missing since 1974. So far 46 Greek Cypriots have been 
identified through DNA testing. Of those, 17 were listed among the 
missing since 1974; the remaining 29 were known to be dead, but the 
locations of their graves were unknown. In July 2000 the Government of 
Cyprus released a list of 1,493 Greek Cypriot missing persons whose 
cases have been submitted to the CMP for investigation.
    A report by the former European Commission of Human Rights, 
released in September 1999, held Turkey responsible for violations of 
human rights in Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military 
intervention. The result of a complaint by the Government of Cyprus, 
the report rejected the Turkish argument that the ``TRNC'' is an 
independent state and instead ruled that it is ``a subordinate local 
administration of Turkey operating in northern Cyprus.'' Turkey was 
held responsible for continuing human rights violations against Greek 
Cypriots missing since 1974, and their surviving relatives, and for 
violations concerning the homes and properties of displaced Greek 
Cypriots from 1974, as well as violations of the rights of Greek 
Cypriots still living in north Cyprus. In a September 20 hearing before 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Court reserved judgement on the 
report until a future undetermined date.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Legislation in both communities provides for protection against 
discrimination based on sex, religion, or national, racial or ethnic 
origin. While each community generally respects such laws, significant 
problems remain with the treatment of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites 
living in the north and, to a lesser extent, with the treatment of 
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.
    Women.--Spousal abuse in the Greek Cypriot community is receiving 
increasing attention, and the problem is believed to be significant. An 
NGO formed to address the domestic abuse problem reported 591 cases 
during 2000, compared with 747 cases in 1999, with 83.2 percent of the 
reported victims women, 14.3 percent children, and 2.3 percent men. The 
NGO notes that the decrease in cases in 2000 should not be interpreted 
as an actual decrease in the incidence of domestic violence. A shortage 
in volunteer staff during the year decreased the number of the 
organization's domestic abuse hot line operating hours. A shelter for 
battered women opened in 1998.
    A 1994 law aimed at making spousal abuse easier to report and 
prosecute initially had little effect because key provisions were 
unfunded and unimplemented. However, funding increased and progress was 
made in implementation during the year, with all cases reported to the 
police being referred to the courts and measures taken to ensure that 
such cases are treated as serious criminal charges, not simply as 
family disputes. Additionally amendments to the law during the year 
have facilitated the prosecution of suspected offenders. Many suspected 
cases of domestic violence still do not reach the courts, largely 
because of family pressure and the wife's economic dependence on her 
husband. Very few cases tried in the courts result in convictions. 
Little public discussion of domestic violence occurs in the Turkish 
Cypriot community, although a report issued by the NGO Women's Research 
Center described such violence as common. A women's shelter that opened 
in 1994 closed in 2000 due to lack of use. The shelter's location was 
well known in the community, and women seeking assistance feared being 
discovered by their spouses. Domestic violence cases are rare in the 
Turkish Cypriot legal system, since they often are considered a 
``family matter.''
    ``Honor'' crimes, in which women are victimized and even killed by 
relatives for alleged acts that dishonor the family, occur in the 
government-controlled area and in the north and are prosecuted in both 
areas. However, no such deaths have occurred in recent years on the 
island.
    There is no law against sexual harassment law in the government-
controlled area. Although prohibited by law in the north, sexual 
harassment is not widely discussed, and any such incidents are largely 
unreported. Republic of Cyprus law forbids forced (but not voluntary) 
prostitution. However, credible reports continue that women, generally 
East Asian or Eastern European night club performers, are trafficked 
and forced into prostitution in both communities (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    The Greek Cypriot press frequently reported on the mistreatment of 
some maids and other foreign workers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
    Throughout Cyprus, women generally have the same legal status as 
men. Greek Cypriot women married to foreign husbands were given the 
right to transmit citizenship to their children automatically in 1998 
legislation. A 1998 Turkish Cypriot law on marriage and divorce 
provides for more equal treatment of husbands and wives. Under the law, 
the man no longer is considered legally the head of the family and does 
not have the exclusive right to decide the family's place of residence. 
The wife may retain her surname but must add the husband's surname. 
Turkish Cypriot women may now marry non-Muslim men. In cases of 
divorce, the court decides on a fair distribution of the family's 
assets, with each partner assured a minimum of 30 percent. In dividing 
assets, the judge must take into account which partner is receiving 
custody of the children and provide sufficient means to support them.
    Legal provisions in both communities requiring equal pay for men 
and women performing the same job are enforced effectively at the white 
collar level, but Turkish Cypriot women employed in the agricultural 
and textile sectors routinely are paid less than their male 
counterparts.
    Children.--Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's welfare. There is no 
difference in the health care and educational opportunities available 
to boys and girls. Free education through age 15 is compulsory in both 
communities.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--In Cyprus generally, disabled persons do 
not appear to be discriminated against in education or the provision of 
state services. In the Greek Cypriot community, disabled persons who 
apply for a public sector position are entitled to preference if they 
are deemed able to perform the required duties and their qualifications 
equal those of other applicants. Legislation also mandates that new 
public building and tourist facilities provide access for the disabled, 
although little has been done to enforce this law. In the Turkish 
Cypriot community, regulations require businesses to employ 1 disabled 
person for every 25 positions they fill, although enforcement is 
inconsistent. While there is increasing awareness of the issue, the 
Turkish Cypriot community has not yet enacted legislation to mandate 
access for the disabled to public buildings and other facilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Greek Cypriots living in the north report 
that unused Orthodox churches continue to be vandalized. An Orthodox 
Church in the north is located in the center of an as yet unopened 
resort hotel constructed during the year on the grounds surrounding the 
Church. Turkish Cypriots complain that unused mosques in the south have 
been treated similarly. A previously unknown Greek Cypriot nationalist 
organization claimed responsibility for an arson attack on a mosque in 
the south in August 1999. Damage was light. The authorities repaired 
and built a fence around the mosque and pledged to increase protection 
of Muslim sites. No one had been arrested for the attack by year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Both the Government of Cyprus 
and the Turkish Cypriot administration have constitutional or legal 
bars against discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of 
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots 
living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. This 
agreement provides for voluntary transfer of populations, free and 
unhindered access by the UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living 
in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south, and facilities 
for education, medical care, and religious worship. Turkish Cypriot 
noncompliance with some of the provisions of the Vienna III Agreement 
made daily life difficult for Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in 
the north. At year's end, there were 427 Greek Cypriots and 154 
Maronites resident in the north.
    Some of the approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the 
government-controlled area face difficulties in obtaining 
identification cards and other government documents, especially if they 
were born after 1974. Turkish Cypriots also appear to be subjected to 
surveillance by the Greek Cypriot police. However, they make few formal 
complaints to the UNFICYP.
    UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north 
remains limited. Despite recent improvements in living conditions for 
Greek Cypriots and Maronites, no Greek-language educational facilities 
for Greek Cypriot or Maronite children in the north exist the beyond 
elementary level. Parents thus are forced in many instances to choose 
between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south 
for further education (in which case Turkish Cypriot authorities no 
longer allow them to return permanently to the north). Turkish Cypriot 
authorities screen all textbooks sent from the south to the Greek 
Cypriot schools, causing lengthy delays and shortages of up-to-date 
texts. Turkish Cypriot authorities did not approve about 20 percent of 
the books sent to the north in September, and the books were returned. 
A request by the Government of Cyprus to send a fourth teacher to the 
Greek Cypriot school in the north was rejected by Turkish Cypriot 
authorities. Both Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north are 
unable to change their place of residence at will. Although the Vienna 
III Agreement provides for medical care by a doctor from the Greek 
Cypriot community, only care by a Turkish Cypriot doctor registered 
with Turkish Cypriot authorities is permitted. Additional telephones 
have been installed for Greek Cypriots living in the north, although 
they, like Turkish Cypriots, must pay higher, ``international'' fees to 
call the south.
    In May 1999 a Maronite house in the village of Asomatos was 
demolished by the Turkish military. Military officials indicated that 
the action was an error and promised to rebuild the house. However, it 
had not yet been rebuilt by year's end. Maronites still lack some 
public services available in most other Turkish Cypriot areas.
    In 1998 Turkish Cypriot authorities announced they were reviewing 
legislation that bans Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north from 
bequeathing real property to heirs residing in the south. Such property 
would no longer be seized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities but would 
be taken into temporary custody pending probate of the will. However, 
it is not clear whether Turkish Cypriot legal provisions exist to 
facilitate the transfer of Greek Cypriot- and Maronite-owned property 
in the north to heirs in the south. Therefore, the practical effect of 
the 1998 announcement remains unrealized.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except for members of 
the police and military forces, have the legal right to form and join 
trade unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. 
However, in the government-controlled area, police officers are 
permitted to join associations that have the right to bargain 
collectively, although not to strike. More than 70 percent of the Greek 
Cypriot work force belongs to independent trade unions. Approximately 
50 to 60 percent of Turkish Cypriot private sector workers, and all 
public sector workers, belong to labor unions.
    In the Turkish Cypriot community, union officials allege that 
various firms have been successful in establishing ``company'' 
organizations and then applying pressure on workers to join these 
unions. Officials of independent labor unions also have accused the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities of creating rival public sector unions to 
weaken the independent unions. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) had not yet acted on these complaints by the end of September 
2000.
    In both communities, trade unions freely and regularly take stands 
on public policy issues affecting workers and maintain their 
independence from the authorities. Two of the major trade unions, one 
in each community, are affiliated closely with political parties. Both 
of the other major unions are independent.
    All workers have the right to strike, and several strikes occurred. 
In the south, no major strikes occurred. In December in the north, 
discontent with a worsening economic situation precipitated a general 
strike that was supported by the major trade and teachers unions. In 
the northern part of the island, a 1978 court ruling gives employers an 
unrestricted right to hire replacement workers in the event of a 
strike, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the right to strike. 
Authorities of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities 
have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be ``essential 
services,'' although this power rarely is used.
    Unions in both parts of Cyprus are able to affiliate with 
international trade union organizations, although Greek Cypriot unions 
sometimes object to recognition of Turkish Cypriot unions formed after 
1963.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions 
and confederations by law are free to organize and bargain collectively 
throughout Cyprus. This right is observed in practice in the 
government-controlled areas, and most wages and benefits are set by 
freely negotiated collective agreements. However, Greek Cypriot 
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable. In the rare 
instances when such agreements are believed to have been infringed, the 
Ministry of Labor is requested to investigate the claim. If the 
Ministry is unable to resolve the dispute, the union may call a strike 
to support its demands.
    In the Turkish Cypriot community wage levels are reviewed several 
times a year for both private sector and public sector workers, and a 
corresponding cost-of-living raise is established. A special commission 
composed of five representatives each from organized labor, employers, 
and the authorities conduct the review. Union leaders contend that 
private sector employers are able to discourage union activity because 
the enforcement of labor and occupational safety regulations is 
sporadic, and penalties for antiunion practices are minimal. As in the 
Greek Cypriot community, parties to a dispute may request mediation by 
the authorities.
    Small export processing zones exist in the port of Larnaca and in 
Famagusta, but the laws governing working conditions and actual 
practice are the same as those outside the zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and 
this prohibition is generally observed. However, there were credible 
reports that foreign women were forced into prostitution (see Sections 
5 and 6.f.). Foreign maids and illegal foreign workers allegedly are 
subject to the nonpayment of wages and the threat of deportation (see 
Section 6.e.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, 
the minimum age for the employment of children in an ``industrial 
undertaking'' is 16 years of age. Turkish Cypriots may be employed in 
apprentice positions at the age of 15. There are labor inspectors in 
both communities. However, in family-run shops it is common to see 
younger children working after school, and according to press reports, 
children as young as 11 or 12 years of age work in orchards during 
their school holidays in the Turkish Cypriot community. Laws prohibit 
forced and bonded child labor, and these laws are enforced effectively 
in both communities (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage in 
the Greek Cypriot community, which is reviewed every year, is 
approximately $426 (266 Cyprus pounds) per month for shop assistants, 
practical nurses, clerks, hairdressers, and nursery assistants, rising 
to $459 (287 Cyprus pounds) after 6 months' employment. This amount is 
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. All other occupations are covered under collective bargaining 
agreements between trade unions and employers within the same economic 
sector, and the wages set in these agreements are significantly higher 
than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage in the 
Turkish Cypriot area, while subject to frequent review because of high 
inflation, was approximately $253 (158 Cyprus pounds) per month as of 
September. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Unskilled workers typically earn about 
$416 (260 Cyprus pounds) per month, which is barely adequate to support 
a family.
    In the Greek Cypriot community, the standard workweek in the 
private sector is an average of 39 hours for white-collar workers and 
38 hours for blue-collar workers. In the public sector, it is 38 hours 
during the winter and 35 hours in the summer. In the Turkish Cypriot 
community, the standard workweek is 38 hours in the winter and 36 hours 
in the summer. Labor inspectors effectively enforce these laws.
    Reports on the mistreatment of maids and other foreign workers are 
frequent in the Greek Cypriot press. These reports usually involve 
allegations that maids, often from East or South Asia, were mistreated 
by their employers or fired without cause in violation of their 
contracts. Many women do not complain to authorities, fearing 
retribution from their employers. Those who do file charges run the 
risk of being fired and then deported.
    A significant percentage of the labor force in the north consists 
of illegal workers, mostly from Turkey. According to some estimates, 
illegal workers constitute as much as 25 percent of the total work 
force there. There are frequent allegations that such workers are 
subject to mistreatment, including nonpayment of wages and threats of 
deportation.
    In recent years, steps were taken to improve health and safety 
standards in the workplace in the government-controlled area. A 1997 
law harmonized health and safety standards with those in the European 
Union (EU). The law incorporates EU principles and standards for health 
and safety in the workplace and complies fully with the 1981 ILO 
convention on occupational health and safety. A second 1997 law 
requires employers to provide insurance liability coverage for work-
related injuries. According to labor union officials, these laws are 
effectively enforced.
    Occupational safety and health regulations are administered 
sporadically at best in the Turkish Cypriot area. In both areas, 
factory inspectors process complaints and inspect businesses in order 
to ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers in the 
government-controlled area can remove themselves from dangerous work 
conditions without risking loss of employment. Turkish Cypriot workers 
who file complaints do not receive satisfactory legal protection and 
may face dismissal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In January the Cypriot legislature 
passed a law making it a felony to engage in the sexual exploitation 
and trafficking of adults (with or without their consent) and children. 
The law obligates the State to provide protection and support for 
victims and provides for punishment of up to 20 years' imprisonment. No 
cases were reported by year's end. In January the Turkish Cypriot 
``National Assembly'' passed a law designed to regulate the hiring of 
women in nightclubs, including penalties for women and employers that 
engage in prostitution. The law does not prohibit trafficking. A 
holdover from British preindependence law currently makes it illegal in 
both communities to procure a woman for prostitution, although the 
crime is only a misdemeanor. Corruption among law enforcement and 
immigration personnel is an obstacle to the effective policing of 
trafficking in both communities. For example, the Chief of the 
Immigration Department in the government-controlled area was arrested 
in September 1999 for illegally issuing visas to female nightclub 
workers and pub owners and was on trial at year's end.
    During the year credible reports continued that women were 
trafficked into both communities for the purpose of prostitution. 
Agents in Eastern Europe recruited young women for prostitution in the 
Greek Cypriot community. The women entered either illegally after 
authorities were bribed or on temporary 3-month work permits. They then 
sometimes were forced to surrender their passports or forced to stay 
beyond the period of their work permits and in some cases were not paid 
their full salaries. The authorities arrested nightclub operators for 
profiting from prostitution, and the Government made some effort to 
protect women who bring complaints against employers by allowing them 
to remain to press charges or facilitate their return home. However, 
many of the women are reluctant to press charges, fearing retaliation 
by employers or deportation. A similar pattern exists of the 
recruitment and hiring of Eastern European women to work in the Turkish 
Cypriot community, and reports persist of restrictions on nightclub 
workers, such as confiscation of their passports by employers.
                               __________

                             CZECH REPUBLIC

    The Czech Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with 
a bicameral Parliament. Following elections in June 1998, Prime 
Minister Milos Zeman formed a minority government comprised almost 
exclusively of members of his left-of-center Social Democratic Party. 
The Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. President Vaclav 
Havel was reelected in January 1998 by a narrow margin and remains an 
internationally recognized advocate of human rights and social justice. 
Although the country essentially has completed the reform of political 
structures initiated after the 1989 ``Velvet Revolution,'' some 
institutions are still in a state of transformation. The judiciary is 
legally independent but is hampered by structural and procedural 
deficiencies and a lack of resources.
    The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police. The civilian 
internal security service, known as the Security and Information 
Service (BIS), reports to the Parliament and the Prime Minister's 
office through the Foreign Minister, who is a Deputy Prime Minister. 
Police and BIS authorities generally observe constitutional and legal 
protection of individual rights in carrying out their responsibilities. 
However, some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
    The economy is market-based, with over 80 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) produced by the private sector. After 2 years of 
contraction, the economy grew by 2.8 percent during the first three 
quarters of the year. Inflation dropped to 3.9 percent, while 
unemployment leveled off at 8.8 percent. The work force is employed 
primarily in industry, retail trade, and construction. Leading exports 
are machinery and transport equipment, and intermediate manufactured 
products. The GDP per capita in 1999 stood at approximately $5,400 
(186,300 Czech crowns).
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in several areas. Occasional police violence 
remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials 
are problems, due to a lack of resources for the judicial system. There 
is some violence and discrimination against women. Discrimination and 
sporadic skinhead violence against the Romani community remain 
problems. Trafficking in women and children is a problem. Since January 
1999, the Human Rights Council, headed by the Commissioner for Human 
Rights, has advised the Government on human rights issues and prepared 
legislative proposals for improving human rights in the country. In 
December the Parliament named former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl as 
Ombudsman for Human Rights.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearances.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no 
reports of such practices; however, police occasionally used excessive 
force and abused their authority.
    In May police clashed with anarchists attempting to disrupt a 
skinhead rally; the anarchists complained of being singled out for 
arbitrary arrest and beatings. Similar allegations were made after 
police prevented anarchists from disrupting neofascist rallies in 
October and November.
    During violent antiglobalization protests surrounding the September 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings in Prague, 123 
police officers were injured, many by cobblestones thrown by rioters 
(see Section 2.b.). Police arrested 900 protesters for destruction of 
property, disturbing the peace, blocking roadways, and attempting to 
disrupt the meetings. Most were released within 1 or 2 days. Police 
brought charges against 20 persons; by December 6 all had been released 
on bail. After their release, many of those detained complained of poor 
treatment and abuse before and during their detention. Most complaints 
were of illegal detention; overcrowded cells; lack of food and toilet 
facilities; no immediate access to lawyers or telephones; and rough 
treatment, strip searches, and intimidation by police and prison 
officials. Some protesters stated to NGO's monitoring police behavior 
that they had seen numerous people whom they believed had been beaten 
by the police and prison officials. One Spanish and two Danish 
protesters claimed police beat them while they were in custody. A 
Polish protester, who is suing the Czech police, stated that uniformed 
police had beaten him repeatedly over the course of his 24-hour 
detention, during which he had been chained in his cell, denied access 
to a lawyer, and not allowed to use toilet facilities. Numerous foreign 
demonstrators claimed that they were arrested despite behaving 
peacefully. Arrested protesters also reported that police and prison 
officials were wearing masks and were not wearing or were covering 
their identification numbers. A South Korean scientist and visiting 
professor at Charles University not participating in the protest was 
arrested and held for 24 hours. He complained of abuse while in 
detention.
    Government officials expressed satisfaction with overall police 
conduct during the protests, although they did not reject the 
possibility of misconduct by individual officers. However, local and 
international human rights organizations expressed concern about police 
behavior during the protests; 15 members of the European Parliament 
sent an open letter to government leaders urging a thorough 
investigation. In October the Ministry of the Interior initiated an 
investigation into complaints of police misconduct. By year's end, the 
Ministry of the Interior had received 373 complaints, 60 of which led 
to investigations. Only two cases of possible police misconduct were 
found (one for illegal fingerprinting and one for a covered 
identification number). No misconduct was found in the case of the 
Danes, the Spaniard, or the South Korean; the case of the Polish 
protester was still ongoing. Several other cases were still under 
investigation at year's end, including that of a police officer 
photographed standing over a fallen protester wielding a club. Other 
cases were suspended for lack of evidence. An NGO monitoring the police 
gathered testimony of police misconduct from over 50 protesters and 
filed at least 2 lawsuits against the police. That organization has 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Ministry of the Interior's 
investigations.
    According to press reports, an American/Austrian dual citizen 
detained during the riots jumped from a police station window, breaking 
her leg. She stated through her attorney that she had paid a fine for 
participating in the riots but had not been released at that time. In 
addition she complained of ``aggressive and improper'' police behavior 
toward her during detention. The Ministry of the Interior investigation 
into her complaint found no police misconduct.
    The police force has been restructured significantly; the majority 
of officers have been recruited since the 1989 revolution. Public 
approval ratings for the police reached a 10-year high after their 
overall good performance during the IMF/World Bank meetings. Petty 
police corruption remains a problem, although enforcement against it 
has improved. During the year, 389 members of the police force were 
charged with criminal offenses, a 12 percent increase over 1999, which 
the authorities credit to better enforcement efforts. The most common 
offenses cited were police officers fining motorists for traffic 
offenses, then keeping the money, and auto accident insurance fraud. 
Punishments include suspension from duty, fines, and prison sentences. 
Police sometimes failed to take sufficient action in cases of threats 
or attacks against Roma.
    In December police officer Marian Telega was sentenced to 18 months 
in prison and 2-and-a-half years' probation for his involvement in the 
1998 death of Rom Milan Lacko. Telega drove the car that hit and killed 
Lacko after he was beaten by skinheads and left in the road (see 
Section 5). In September Rom Martin Tomko accused a Brno police officer 
of stopping him in the street and, after an argument, beating him and 
leaving him unconscious in a park. Three police officers have been 
charged with inflicting bodily harm.
    In October a Prague court rejected a complaint against a special 
police unit alleged to have used excessive force to contain a group of 
anarchists and radical environmentalists rioting in downtown Prague in 
1998.
    The case of a Brno city police officer charged with using excessive 
force to break up a late night party outside a theater in 1995 still 
was awaiting a formal court decision at year's end. In the meantime, 
the officer continues to serve on the police force but faces suspension 
or other internal disciplinary action if convicted.
    The trial of one of the three Communist-era investigators charged 
with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in acquittal in 
January. The trial of the other two was postponed for health reasons 
(see Section 1.e.). The case of two former secret police officers 
accused of torturing dissident Vladimir Hucin was still being 
investigated at year's end. The Office for the Documentation and 
Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (UDV) continued to investigate 
cases of torture and misconduct from the Communist era (see Section 
1.e.).
    Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a 
problem (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is 
overcrowding in many prisons, but it declined during the course of the 
year. In March the general director of the prison service announced 
that the country's prisons would temporarily refuse entry to convicts 
who have been sentenced to 2 years in prison or less. In February and 
March, prisoners in several facilities rioted and staged hunger strikes 
to protest overcrowding, deteriorating facilities, and insufficient 
food and clothing. The protests ended after a week. In May the prison 
system was at 120 percent of capacity, in some areas as high as 180 
percent; there were approximately 23,000 prisoners in the country. By 
year's end, the system was at 110 percent of capacity; some prisons 
were at 135 percent. There were 21,547 prisoners and 9,890 prison 
guards. Women and men are housed separately. Attorney and family visits 
are permitted. The authorities follow these guidelines in practice.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However, 
during the IMF/World Bank protests, observers were not allowed into two 
detention facilities in Branik and Ocelarska Street (see Section 4).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this 
prohibition in practice. Police may hold persons without charge for up 
to 48 hours, during which time they have the right to counsel. The lack 
of experienced police investigators and qualified judges, combined with 
a still evolving legal environment, have contributed to a backlog of 
court cases. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 300 judges and 88 
prosecutors are needed to fill vacant positions. Pretrial detention may 
last legally as long as 4 years for cases considered ``exceptionally 
grave'' under the Criminal Code. Pretrial detention for most crimes may 
last as long as 2 or 3 years, with mandatory judicial review intervals 
beginning at the end of the first 6 months of detention. If the court 
does not approve continued detention during a judicial review, the 
suspect must be released. In practice few pretrial detainees are held 
for longer than 2 years. The law does not allow bail for certain 
serious crimes. A suspect may petition the appropriate investigating 
authorities at any time for release from detention. The average length 
of pretrial detention is now 195 days. As of November, the number of 
pretrial detainees was 6,353, about one third of the prison population.
    The law prohibits exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition in practice.
    Since 1993 local courts and foreign police have expelled to 
Slovakia ``Slovaks'' without proper citizenship or residency papers. 
Some of these expulsions involve ``Slovak'' Roma who have never been in 
Slovakia. By the first half of 1997 (latest available statistics), a 
total of 851 ``Slovaks'' had been expelled administratively or 
judicially by the authorities. A February 1998 presidential amnesty 
(that was expected to affect three-fourths of all expulsion sentences 
issued between January 1, 1993 and February 2, 1998) granted amnesty to 
those receiving expulsion sentences for crimes in which the punishment 
was less than 5 years' imprisonment. However, according to one NGO that 
follows this issue, some courts have not implemented this amnesty. 
Courts have not imposed expulsion sentences since the implementation of 
a new citizenship law in 1999, which allows ``Slovaks'' and others to 
legalize their status. There have, however, been complaints from Roma 
activists that local officials in some areas are refusing to process 
Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma 
families (see Section 5).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is impartial and independent in practice. 
Judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. Structural 
and procedural deficiencies as well as a lack of training and resources 
hamper the effectiveness of the judiciary. Ministry of Justice 
proposals for judicial reform, including term limits for Constitutional 
Court judges, a mandatory retirement age for judges, and measures to 
streamline the legal process, failed in Parliament at several points 
throughout the year. In October Justice Minister Otakar Motejl resigned 
after Parliament repeatedly rejected his attempts at broad judicial 
reform.
    The court system consists of district, regional, and high courts. 
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal. In addition the 
separate Constitutional Court has final authority for cases concerning 
the constitutionality of legislation.
    The law stipulates that persons charged with criminal offenses are 
entitled to fair and open public trials. They have the right to be 
informed of their legal rights and of the charges against them, to 
consult with counsel, and to present a defense. The State provides 
lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal and some civil cases 
through the bar association. All defendants enjoy a presumption of 
innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against themselves. 
They may appeal any judgments decided against them. The authorities 
observe these rights in practice.
    The 1991 lustration (vetting) law, passed to prevent Communistera 
collaborators from taking up senior government responsibilities, 
continues to bar many former Communist Party officials, members of the 
people's militia, and suspected secret police collaborators from 
holding a wide range of elective and appointive offices for 5 years, 
including appointive positions in state-owned companies, academia, and 
the media. In 1995 Parliament extended this legal constraint to 
December 31, 2000, overriding a veto of President Havel. In February 
the Chairman of the Government's privatization agency was dismissed 
after presenting a falsified lustration certificate clearing him of 
cooperation with Communist-era state security. In November the Chamber 
of Deputies again extended the validity of the law over the veto of 
President Havel until a new civil service law and security law are 
passed and implemented. The extended law exempts from the lustration 
process people born after December 1, 1971, an exemption not included 
in the earlier version. Some private employers also have required 
applicants to produce lustration certificates proving noncollaboration. 
By October the special section of the Interior Ministry handling 
lustration requests had processed 8,200 lustration certificates, 
bringing the total since 1991 to 395,500. During the year, 3 percent of 
the applications did not receive confirmation of a clear record, in 
line with the average of 3.2 percent since 1991. Those who did not 
receive confirmation of a clear record may file a civil suit against 
the Interior Ministry for a charge similar to slander. Twenty such 
suits were filed during the year; court decisions were still pending at 
year's end.
    Defenders of the lustration law argue that individuals who 
systematically destroyed the lives of others in order to gain 
advantages for themselves within the Communist system should not be 
entrusted with high state responsibilities. However, the law has been 
criticized for violating human rights principles prohibiting 
discrimination in employment and assigning collective guilt. It also 
has been criticized because the screening process is based on the 
records of the Communist secret police, which many believe are 
incomplete or unreliable. Citizens unjustly accused of collaboration 
may suffer diminished career prospects and damaged personal 
reputations. In its November assessment report on the Czech Republic 
for European Union (EU) accession, the European Commission again noted 
the need to eliminate the law.
    Some actions taken by state authorities and the Communist Party 
during the 1948 to 1989 Communist regime are being investigated as 
criminal acts under a 1993 law by a government office, UDV, established 
for this purpose. The UDV was established in 1995 and is an independent 
part of the Czech Police Office of Investigations. The UDV is empowered 
to launch and conduct prosecutions and propose filing suits to state 
attorney's offices. As of October, the UDV had investigated 2,756 cases 
under its jurisdiction, and recommended action against 152 individuals. 
Charges have been filed in court against 44 persons. Nine of those have 
been sentenced; five were placed on probation and four received 
unconditional sentences, the longest of which was 5 years' 
imprisonment. Nearly 2,000 cases have been dropped due to the death of 
suspects or witnesses, various presidential amnesties, or statutes of 
limitation. The trial in Uherske Hradiste of three Communist officials 
charged with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in 
January. One of the three was acquitted; the case was postponed against 
the other two for health reasons (see Section 1.c.). The UDV is still 
working with Charles University to prepare ``moral trials'' to discuss 
crimes whose offenders cannot be punished due to their death or to the 
expired statue of limitations on the cases. It targets primarily cases 
of: Torture (see Section 1.c.); border shootings; treason connected 
with the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; state persecution 
of opponents of the Communist regime; and investigation of Czech 
authorities who negligently allowed exposure of citizens to hazardous 
waste after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. Although the statute of 
limitations for many of the Communist-era crimes under investigation by 
the UDV was set to expire this year, Parliament voted in December 1999 
to suspend the statute of limitations for serious crimes committed 
during the Communist regime and enabled the UDV to continue 
investigating these cases. In September the Interior Ministry extended 
the UDV's mandate indefinitely and broadened the period of years it 
should investigate to include 1945 through 1948.
    In July the case of Communist-era judge Pavel Vitek was submitted 
to a regional prosecutor. A district court ruled earlier that Pavel 
Vitek, who was one of the judges in a show trial against seven persons 
who were accused falsely of murdering Communist officials in 1951, 
could not be tried for his role in the case because the statute of 
limitations had expired. However, the Supreme Court ruled in December 
1999 that he could be tried for aiding and abetting murder. The 
prosecutor had not yet returned the case to trial by year's end.
    In February the Prosecutor General returned the case of former 
Communist officials Milos Jakes and Jozek Lenart to the UDV for further 
investigation. The two were to be charged with high treason for 
attending a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Prague on the day after 
the Warsaw Pact invasion and for discussing the creation of a new 
``workers' and farmers''' government; they were not indicted by year's 
end.
    The UDV also opened three new high-profile cases: The unexplained 
death in August 1967 of American citizen Charles Jordan, in which 
involvement of the Czech state security service is suspected; Communist 
officials' responsibility for and attempts to cover up a 1981 mining 
accident in which 65 miners were killed; and the alleged attempts of 
two former Communist officials to conceal and protect Nazi war criminal 
Werner Tutter in the 1960's. Prosecution of former Czechoslovak Premier 
and Interior Minister Lubomir Strougal relating to the arming of the 
People's Militia, a paramilitary force of the former Communist Party, 
was halted; he still faced charges of abuse of public office at year's 
end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Electronic surveillance, the tapping of telephones, 
and the interception of mail require a court order; government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions in practice, and 
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
    Unlike in 1999, there were no reports of Roma filing complaints 
against the police for illegal searches during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. Individuals can and do speak out on political issues and 
freely criticize the Government and public figures. A wide variety of 
newspapers, magazines, and journals owned by a variety of Czech and 
foreign investors are published without government interference. The 
press law was updated in February to conform to EU norms.
    The electronic media are independent. There are 3 national 
television stations--1 public (with 2 separate channels) and 2 
private--and more than 61 private radio stations in addition to Czech 
Public Radio. A third private television station, TV3, can be viewed 
only in certain regions or through cable and satellite. The leading 
television channel, Nova, is privately owned. International arbitration 
continues on a dispute over its ownership and alleged fraud and 
commercial misconduct by the station's license holder; several courts 
found in his favor during the course of the year. Citizens also have 
access to foreign broadcasts via satellite, cable, and the Internet.
    On January 1, a new Freedom of Information Act took effect. The law 
provides for freedom of access to information under the control of 
state and local authorities as well as other institutions affecting the 
rights of citizens.
    In November President Havel signed an amendment to the Penal Code 
that imposes prison terms of between 6 months and 3 years for denying 
the Nazi Holocaust and the Communist genocide. The amendment also 
outlawed the incitement of hatred based on race, religion, class, 
nationality, or other group.
    In February the lower house of Parliament approved a press bill, 
minus its most controversial provision requiring that the press present 
responses from persons or parties who believed their reputations had 
been sullied by media reports, even if the information were correct. 
Opponents of the measure maintained that this provision would create an 
unfair burden on the press and represented an unwise regulation of free 
expression.
    A 13-member Television and Radio Council has limited regulatory 
responsibility for policymaking and answers to the parliamentary media 
committee, which exercises broad oversight of the Council and must 
approve its members. The Council can issue and revoke radio and 
television licenses and monitors programming. The Council continued to 
be the target of criticism during the year for its lack of initiative 
and ineffective action in addressing a high profile ownership dispute 
at the country's largest private television channel. There is also a 
nine-member Czech Television (CTV) Council charged with oversight of 
the Public Czech Television. The Council became embroiled in a 
controversy over political influence on CTV in mid-December when it 
dismissed the CTV general manager. The council hired a new manager 8 
days later who was alleged to be subject to political influence. In 
protest, news staff began producing their own version of the principal 
CTV and public affairs programs. The newly appointed management was 
prevented from entering CTV studios and began simultaneous broadcast of 
its own news and public affairs programs. By year's end, the situation 
had not been resolved.
    In January a Prague court dropped charges of defaming a people and 
inciting racial hatred against far-right National Alliance leader 
Vladimir Skoupy, who had questioned whether the Nazi Holocaust had 
taken place (see Section 5).
    Charges of slander, assault on a public office, and inciting racial 
discord filed against prominent national Romani leader Ondrej Gina in 
November 1999 were dropped in March. The mayor and city council of 
Rokycany formally had pressed charges against Gina for remarks that he 
had published about the mayor and the city on an Internet site about 
discrimination against Roma. Local police had concluded that these 
remarks constituted a criminal act and turned the case over to the 
state prosecutor for action. The mayor and city council had argued that 
Gina's remarks were malicious enough to constitute ``defamation of the 
Czech nation'' and ``harm to the reputation of the city of Rokycany at 
home and abroad (see Sections 1.f. and 5.).''
    In September police brought charges of abetting in the commission 
of a crime against two journalists who refused to reveal their source 
of information in a case involving an alleged slander campaign against 
a member of the Government. Such charges are usually brought only in 
cases in which police have no other means of solving a serious crime, 
such as murder. Journalists and journalists' professional organizations 
criticized the charges as an attempt to stifle freedom of the press. In 
October President Havel pardoned the two journalists, who then called 
for the case to continue in order to establish a legal precedent on the 
press' right to protect sources. A state attorney in November agreed to 
proceed with the prosecution; however, no trial had begun by year's 
end.
    The closely watched false accusation and libel case of Zdenek Zukal 
continued. Zukal faces three charges of criminal libel for reporting 
that police had provided false information in their investigation of 
high-level corruption in Olomouc. Originally Zukal had been charged 
with slander for publishing documents he knew--or should have known--to 
be forgeries. Local authorities later changed the charge to false 
accusation 1 day before a planned presidential pardon. Zukal's trial 
has been delayed on numerous occasions and was ongoing at year's end.
    At year's end, former television reporter Tomas Smrcek was awaiting 
trial on charges of deliberately endangering classified data. In a 1999 
report on possible Czech intelligence service coverup of one of its 
official's drunk driving offense, Smrcek allegedly showed a classified 
document on the air. Smrcek faces up to 8 years in prison.
    In October the far-right Republican Party (SPR-RSC) brought suit 
against the Human Rights Commissioner and the Ministry of the Interior 
for incitement to racial and ethnic hatred. The Ministry, at the 
proposal of the Human Rights Commission, has made a public tender for 
grant proposals for a study of the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) and its 
racist and anti-Semitic policies.
    In September a member of the far-right Republican Party (SPRRSC) 
was sentenced to 10 months in prison and 2 years' probation for 
spreading racial and national hatred. The man had placed photos of 
current Czech leaders in a display case with anti-Semitic labels (see 
Section 5).
    In December publisher Michal Zitko was fined approximately $53,000 
(2 million Czech crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5 
years' probation for supporting and disseminating hate speech. Zitko 
had translated and published Adolf Hitler's ``Mein Kampf'' with no 
editorial commentary. The police seized 300 copies of the book. Also in 
December, a state attorney brought similar charges against Vit Varak 
for selling ``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
    In December 1999, President Havel pardoned a Romani woman accused 
of defaming the Czech nation for comments she allegedly made about the 
construction of a wall dividing Roma and Czech communities in Usti nad 
Labem (see Section 5).
    The law provides for academic freedom but forbids activities by 
established political parties at universities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of persons to assemble peacefully, and the 
Government respects these rights in practice; however, it may restrict 
assemblies that promote hatred and intolerance, advocate suppression of 
individual or political rights, or otherwise jeopardize the safety of 
the participants. Permits are normally required for demonstrations, but 
police generally do not interfere with spontaneous, peaceful 
demonstrations. In October police detained around 900 antiglobalization 
protesters rioting outside the IMF/World Bank meetings (see Section 
1.c.) and pressed charges against 20 of them.
    The law forbids political party activity at universities (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for the right of persons to associate 
freely and to form political parties, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Either the Government or the President may submit a 
proposal to the Supreme Court calling for a political party to be 
disbanded. Organizations, associations, foundations, and political 
parties are required to register with local officials or at the 
Interior Ministry, but there is no evidence that this registration is 
either coercive or arbitrarily withheld. Prime Minister Zeman has 
called periodically for the Interior Ministry to reexamine or cancel 
the official registration of skinhead organizations and others 
propagating racial hatred or fascism. In March the Ministry of the 
Interior cancelled the registration of a neo-Nazi organization that had 
propagated anti-Semitic sentiment (see Section 5). In October the 
Ministry also refused to register the National Party, an extreme right-
wing organization, as a civic association (see Section 3). It also 
started an investigation into the charter and program of the far-right 
Patriotic Republican Party.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State 
subsidizes all religions that are registered officially with the 
Ministry of Culture. There are 21 state-recognized religions. To 
register a church must have at least 10,000 adult members permanently 
residing in the country. For any churches that the World Council of 
Churches already has recognized, only 500 adult members permanently 
residing in the country are necessary. Churches registered prior to 
1991 are not required to meet these conditions. The Jewish community, 
which numbers only a few thousand, constitutes one such exception. One 
group, the Unification Church (UC), was denied registration in January 
1999 when the Department of Churches determined that it had obtained 
the required proof of membership by fraud; the UC is contesting the 
decision in court. In July the Ministry of Culture requested a 
clarification from the Jehovah's Witnesses addressing their beliefs 
concerning blood transfusions. The Society for the Study of Sects and 
New Religious Trends, a religious observer NGO, accused the Jehovah's 
Witnesses of concealing the religion's restrictions on blood 
transfusions during its 1993 registration process. Unregistered 
religious groups, such as the small Muslim minority, may not own 
community property legally, although they are otherwise free to 
assemble and worship in the manner of their choice. Their members can 
and do issue publications without interference.
    In March and May 1999, the Government established two commissions 
to improve church-state relations. One is a ``political'' commission 
with representation from the main parties currently in the lower 
chamber of Parliament, and the second is a ``specialist'' commission 
composed of experts including lawyers, economists, and church 
representatives. The commissions advise the Government on church-state 
relations, the status of churches and methods of their financing, as 
well as church-related property questions. Members of the commissions 
also have advised the Ministry of Culture on a proposed new Law on the 
Freedom of Religious Belief and on the Status of Churches and Religious 
Societies. The proposal being considered is modeled on the religious 
registration law in effect in Austria. It would impose a two-tiered 
registration system, lowering the membership requirement for the first 
tier (non-profit religious association with limited tax benefits) to 
300, but raising the membership requirement for the second tier (full 
religious association with benefit of state funding and property 
rights) to approximately 20,000. The new law would also impose a 10year 
observation period on all first-tier organizations wishing to obtain 
second-tier status. Currently registered churches would automatically 
receive second-tier status. The proposed changes have been criticized 
by some unregistered religious groups (including the Muslims and the 
Church of Scientology) and nongovernmental observers as prejudicial 
against minority religions. Some argue that government agencies for the 
dissemination of information on ``harmful sects'' assume that the 
groups on which they maintain such information are automatically 
suspect, when in fact they are legitimate religious organizations.
    Missionaries for various religious groups, including the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present 
in the country. Although they proselytize without hindrance within the 
country, a more restrictive law on visas for resident foreigners has 
complicated their efforts and drawn criticism. The new law went into 
effect January 1. It requires that aliens apply for work visas before 
entering the country and provide financial information when doing so. 
The law is aimed at stopping illegal workers and does not specifically 
prohibit religious workers.
    In March the Government negotiated a framework agreement on the 
protection and preservation of the remnants of a medieval Jewish 
cemetery uncovered in 1997 at a commercial construction site in 
downtown Prague. More than 100 sets of remains removed by 
archaeologists in 1999 were to be reburied at the site. The remaining 
graves on the site were to be encased in cement. The Government agreed 
to pay $1.2 million (45 million Czech crowns) in compensation to the 
Czech Insurance Company, owner of the site. Twenty-five adjacent 
parcels believed to contain intact graves from the same cemetery were 
designated a national cultural monument. Minister of Culture Pavel 
Dostal published an editorial piece in July concerning the negotiations 
over the cemetery that many observers considered anti-Semitic. Dostal 
denied any anti-Semitic intent. In September the remains were buried in 
the New Jewish Cemetery in Prague instead. Although the local Jewish 
community considers the matter settled, some international Jewish 
groups expressed dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Czech 
Insurance Company implemented the March agreement.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement 
to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and 
repatriation, and the Government respects these rights in practice. 
Czechs who emigrated during the period of Communist rule frequently 
return to visit or live. A law passed in September 1999 permits such 
persons to regain citizenship without having to relinquish a foreign 
citizenship that they acquired during that time. Citizenship is not 
revoked for political reasons.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A legal and institutional framework is 
in place for the processing of refugees and asylees. A new law on 
asylum that came into effect on January 1 improves refugee processing. 
It establishes a list of ``safe countries of origin'' from which 
applicants are unlikely to receive asylum, provides financial support 
for towns with refugee camps, and increases access to legal advice for 
asylum seekers. No independent body has been established to handle the 
appeals of those denied refugee status. The Government provides first 
asylum and cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The 
Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country for migrants. 
The Government fully funds an integration program to assist those 
granted refugee status in locating housing and receiving other social 
assistance. Two reception centers, six camps, and six integration 
centers are provided for recognized refugees. As of the end of 1999, 
the Government granted citizenship to 3,200 former citizens of Slovakia 
and 564 former citizens of other countries. The new citizenship law 
passed in September 1999 enabled thousands more ``Slovaks'' to become 
citizens (see Section 5).
    From 1993 to 1999, 20,434 asylum applications were filed, of which 
838 received formal refugee status for resettlement. During the year, 
8,773 applications for asylum were filed. Through August, 100 
applications were approved. In 1999, 79 persons received refugee status 
out of a total of 7,217 applications. Persons from Afghanistan, Russia, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, and India submitted the most asylum 
requests during the first half of the year. Of the 441 asylum 
applicants from the Russian Federation, 212 are Chechens. In addition 
migrants from economically disadvantaged countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe often enter the country to take up illegal residency or 
in transit to the West. In 1999 border police prevented 32,325 illegal 
entry attempts, down by 25 percent from 1998. Through the end of 
November, 30,651 illegal migrants were stopped at the borders. The 
camps set up in 1999 for Kosovar Albanian refugees are closed and there 
is not a significant number of Kosovar Albanian refugees who remain in 
the country.
    A growing concern is the smuggling of large groups of refugees and 
economic migrants into and across the country, which lacks specific 
laws criminalizing alien smuggling. Organized rings promoting illegal 
employment abroad operate with impunity, freely advertising their 
services in dozens of local papers and on the Internet. In spite of 
existing legislative gaps, the police are taking action against large-
scale trafficking rings under organized crime statutes and a law 
criminalizing the ``illegal crossing of the state border.'' The 
authorities are working with neighboring countries to tighten border 
controls. In December 1999, Parliament passed new legislation on 
residence and visas. The new law considerably tightens previous rules 
for change of status and extension of stay and requires visas in 
advance for everyone but tourists. The number of illegal migrants 
detained by Czech authorities declined by 25 percent from 1998 to 1999, 
a result of stepped-up efforts and international cooperation. The 
number of illegal migrants detained by Czech authorities through 
September is roughly the same as over the same period in 1999. Illegal 
migrant groups were composed primarily of persons from Romania, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Afghanistan, India, Bulgaria, and Vietnam. There were 
no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government by democratic means, and citizens exercise this right in 
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis 
of universal suffrage. Citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to 
vote by secret ballot in national, regional, and local elections. 
Elections for 14 new regional governors and parliaments were held 
November 12. These were the first elections for the new regional-level 
administration, created to improve citizens' access to democratically 
elected institutions. The elections were free and fair but turnout was 
low. Opposition groups, including political parties, function openly 
and participate without hindrance in the political process. Citizens 
may join political organizations or vote for the political party of 
their choice without government interference. Political parties must 
register with the Ministry of the Interior. In October the Ministry 
denied registration to the far-right National Party because its 
constitution granted its leader a veto and prohibited its members from 
joining other associations. In December the Ministry publicly announced 
that it was conducting an investigation of the constitution of the far 
right Patriotic Republican Party to determine if the party should be 
deregistered. A new citizenship law passed in September 1999 remedied 
the situation for some persons, predominantly Roma, who were 
enfranchised under the former Czechoslovakia but who were unable to 
obtain Czech citizenship at the time of the split with Slovakia, 
despite birth or long residency in the Czech Republic. They lacked 
voting and other rights due to restrictions under the previous 
citizenship laws (see Section 5). Amendments to the election law passed 
in July make it possible for nonresident Czechs to vote in national 
elections for the first time.
    The Government of Prime Minister Milos Zeman took office in July 
1998. The Government consists almost exclusively of members of the 
Prime Minister's left-of-center Social Democratic party, the first 
nonrightist government since 1989. In addition to the largest 
opposition party, former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic 
Party, which has formally agreed to support the minority Social 
Democratic Government under certain conditions, the opposition consists 
of the Communist Party and a coalition of four small centrist and 
center-right parties. The Constitution mandates elections to Parliament 
at least every 4 years, based on proportional representation. In July 
the Parliament approved a new system with 35 smaller electoral 
districts in place of the former 8 large electoral districts. The new 
law also lowers government subsidies to political parties and raises 
the percentage of votes needed for parties running in coalition to 
enter Parliament. To enter Parliament, a single party must obtain 5 
percent of the votes cast in the election; however, coalitions must 
obtain 5 percent of the votes per party (i.e. a three-party coalition 
would have to receive 15 percent of the votes cast to enter 
Parliament). The President and a group of opposition senators have 
challenged the law's constitutionality, complaining that the new law 
discriminates against small parties and prevents free political 
competition. An amendment to the party financing law enacted in 
September over a presidential veto increases the government subsidy to 
Members of Parliament and Senators. The President is elected by 
Parliament and serves a 5-year term. The President has limited 
constitutional powers but may use a suspense veto to return legislation 
to Parliament, which then can override that veto by a simple majority 
of all members.
    There are no restrictions, in law or practice, on women's 
participation in politics; however, they are underrepresented, and 
relatively few women hold high public office. None of the 16 cabinet 
ministers in the Government at year's end was a woman. A ``shadow'' 
cabinet comprised of prominent women politicians and activists was 
formed in March. The 200-member Chamber of Deputies has only 30 female 
deputies, including 1 deputy speaker. There are 10 female senators in 
the 81-member Senate.
    No seats are reserved in either house for ethnic minorities. 
Slovaks, of whom there are an estimated 300,000, are almost all 
``Czechoslovaks'' who elected to live in the Czech Republic after the 
split. For the most part, these Slovaks define their interests in the 
context of national politics, not along ethnic lines; there is no 
Slovak party in Parliament.
    Most of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Roma have not been fully 
integrated into political life (see Section 5). Roma themselves have 
been unable to unite behind a program or set of goals to advance their 
interests within the democratic structures of the country. Few Roma 
serve in local government structures, although some have been appointed 
to advisory positions in government ministries. There is currently one 
representative of Romani background in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, and 
government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
views. The best-known human rights groups are the Czech Helsinki 
Committee and the Tolerance Foundation (an umbrella organization). 
There are also many single-issue groups.
    During the IMF/World Bank protests in September, members of the 
nongovernmental legal observer teams (OPH) were not allowed into two 
facilities where arrestees were being held. Despite agreeing before the 
protests to an access procedure for OPH observers, police at stations 
in Branik and Ocelarska Street refused entry to observers. During the 
investigation of possible police misconduct that followed (see Section 
1.c. and 2.b.), the police and Ministries of Justice and Interior were 
responsive to OPH's views.
    In July 1999, Parliament passed legislation needed to create a $14 
million (500 million Czech crowns) endowment to be used by 39 NGO's 
that work on issues of social welfare, health, culture, education, 
human rights protection, and the environment. In June the Government's 
Council for Nongovernmental Organizations announced it would be 
dedicating an additional $37.5 million (1.5 billion Czech crowns) for 
organizations focusing on human rights and the environment.
    Former U.N. Human Rights Commission expert Petr Uhl has served as 
the Government's Commissioner for Human Rights since 1999. The Human 
Rights Commissioner serves as head of the government Committee for 
Nationalities and of the Interministerial Commission for Romani 
Community Affairs, established in 1997 (see Section 5). A Council for 
Human Rights with 10 representatives of government ministries and 10 
human rights activists was established in January 1999. The Council for 
Human Rights advises the Government on human rights issues and proposes 
legislation to improve the observation of human rights in the country.
    On December 12, pursuant to legislation passed a year earlier, the 
Chamber of Deputies elected former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl 
``Public Rights Protector'' or Ombudsman. Motejl, a political 
independent, resigned from the justice post in October. No Deputy 
Ombudsman was selected. By year's end, Motejl was still hiring and 
training staff, opening his office, and beginning public outreach. The 
Ombudsman will addresses citizens' complaints of violations of civil 
and human rights and freedoms by government entities. However, he will 
have no legal power to sanction offending individuals or offices.
    In each house of Parliament there is a petition committee for human 
rights and nationalities, which includes a subcommittee for 
nationalities. A government-sponsored Council for Nationalities advises 
the Cabinet on minority affairs. In this body, Slovaks and Roma have 
three representatives each; Poles and Germans, two each; and Hungarians 
and Ukrainians, one each. In November the Government signed the 
European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages; the Chamber of 
Deputies continued debate on a law on ethnic minorities at year's end. 
There is also a government commission staffed by members of the NGO and 
journalist communities that monitors interethnic violence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and 
prohibits discrimination. Health care, education, retirement, and other 
social services generally are provided without regard to race, sex, 
religion, disability, or social status. In practice Roma face 
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and housing, and 
women face discrimination in employment.
    Women.--The actual extent of violence against women is unknown; 
however, some studies by experts indicate that it is more common than 
publicly acknowledged. Public debate about it is rare, despite the 
efforts of women's groups to focus public attention on the problem. The 
Government maintains a comprehensive awareness and prevention program 
designed to address issues of trafficking, abuse, and violence against 
women. ROSA, an NGO that helps women in trouble, estimates that 1 in 10 
women in domestic situations suffer from emotional or physical abuse, 
and that 30 percent of the abusers are university educated. The press 
occasionally reported on the problem of violence against women and 
trafficking in prostitutes. A 1998 research study conducted by Prague's 
Sexological Institute indicated that 13 percent of women are forced 
into sexual intercourse under threat of violence. Spouses or partners 
are responsible for 51 percent of rapes, with an additional 37 percent 
of the attacks committed by men known to the victims. Only 12 percent 
of rape victims are attacked by strangers. According to police 
statistics, there were 500 rapes reported countrywide during the year, 
although researchers at the Institute estimate that only 3.3 percent of 
rape victims report the crime to the police. Approximately 80 percent 
of criminal rape cases are solved. Gender studies experts reported that 
women were ashamed to report rape or speak about it, and that the 
police were not equipped to help, either by attitude or training. 
However, to improve police responsiveness and prosecution efforts, the 
Ministry of the Interior runs a training program in protocols for 
investigating family violence and sexual crime cases.
    According to Elektra, a help center for abused women, rape victims 
can seek psychological help through any help line or crisis center. 
Crisis centers that help rape victims include White Circle of Safety, 
an association for crime victims that provides free psychiatric and 
legal help, and Riaps, a help line that counsels persons who experience 
any kind of trauma. A total of 54 state-supported shelters with 771 
beds are located in most major cities and towns and accept women who 
have been raped or abused; local NGO's provide medical and social 
assistance to women. According to NGO's, the situation has improved in 
recent years, but there are still not enough shelter spaces to meet the 
demand.
    Legislation does not address spousal abuse specifically; however, 
the Criminal Code covers other forms of domestic violence. An attack is 
considered criminal if the victim's condition warrants medical 
treatment (incapacity to work) for 7 or more days. If medical treatment 
lasts less than 7 days, the attack is classified as a misdemeanor and 
punished by a fine not exceeding approximately $100 (3,000 Czech 
crowns--approximately one fourth of the average monthly wage). Repeated 
misdemeanor attacks do not result in stricter sanctions on the abuser. 
The police are training specialized personnel to handle domestic 
violence; however, they do not yet engage in regular contact with 
welfare and medical services. However, in 1998 the Police Academy and 
secondary police schools introduced, into both the introductory and 
continuing education curriculums, instructional material to improve the 
identification and investigation of domestic violence and sexual abuse 
cases and to sensitize police to the treatment of victims.
    Forced prostitution (pimping) is illegal; prostitution is not, 
although local communities have the right to regulate it and enforce 
restrictions. The Interior Ministry estimates that up to 25,000 persons 
currently earn a living from the sex industry. Prostitution and sex 
shops are particularly prevalent in the border regions with Germany and 
Austria, where international vehicular traffic is heaviest. Trafficking 
in prostitutes is forbidden by law, and trafficking in women is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment, long ignored by the media and by society, was 
the focus of more attention during the year. A new labor law approved 
in May includes a definition of and prohibition against sexual 
harassment. The law defines sexual harassment as unwanted, 
inappropriate or offensive sexual behavior, acceptance or rejection of 
which could be interpreted by another employee as affecting her status 
in the workplace. A recent study commissioned by the newspaper Lidove 
Noviny noted that nearly half of the country's working women have been 
subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. A study by the Defense 
Ministry in 1996 found that nearly half of female soldiers experienced 
harassment on duty. The concerns of women's groups over workplace 
sexual harassment have previously been ignored or dismissed. In 1999, 
however, a university student became the first woman to win a civil 
sexual harassment lawsuit.
    Women are equal under the law and in principle receive the same pay 
for the same job. Women represent roughly half of the labor force, 
though they are employed disproportionately in professions where the 
median salary is relatively low. Women's median wages lag behind those 
of men by roughly 20 percent, although the gap is narrowing. In May 
Parliament approved legislation banning discrimination in hiring and 
employment based on sex. Women enjoy equal property, inheritance, and 
other rights with men. The unemployment rate for women exceeds that for 
men by about one-third (10 percent to 7.8 percent) and a 
disproportionately small number of women hold senior positions.
    A 1991 employment law bans discrimination on the basis of sex; 
however, in practice employers remained free to consider sex, age, or 
even attractiveness when making hiring decisions, since this did not 
necessarily constitute ``discrimination'' under then current legal 
interpretation. Employers often openly used such factors as age, sex, 
and lifestyle in their employment solicitations. July 1999 and May 2000 
amendments to the law explicitly prohibit employment discrimination 
based on a variety of factors, including sex, race, skin color, sexual 
orientation, language, faith, health and family status. Repeated 
offenses are punishable by fines of up to one million Czech crowns. By 
midyear, the employment office in Plzen had warned around three dozen 
companies of discriminatory language in their classified job listings. 
No fines were levied; the discriminatory passages were removed in each 
case.
    Children.--The Government demonstrated its commitment to children's 
welfare through its programs for health care, compulsory education 
through age 15 (through age 14 in special schools), and basic 
nutrition. Girls and boys enjoy equal access to health care and 
education at all levels. Education is free and compulsory from age 6 to 
age 15.
    Child abuse and trafficking in children (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.) continued to receive press attention during the year. The 
conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia was covered widely 
as were reports of pedophile activities in border areas with Germany. A 
British disc jockey and three other foreigners were convicted in May on 
charges of pedophilia and sentenced to 33 months in prison. Press and 
government reports throughout the year indicated that Central Europe is 
still a popular destination for pedophiles due to its convenient 
location and low risk of sexually transmitted disease. Some experts 
estimate that the number of visits to the country, primarily by West 
Europeans, for the purpose of abusing children has increased 20 percent 
since 1997. Dissemination of child pornography, whether by print, 
video, CD-ROM, or the Internet is a criminal act. In July the 
Government approved a National Plan Combating Commercial Sexual Abuse, 
giving the Ministry of the Interior coordinating responsibilities. Laws 
against child pornography are enforced; in January a Czech was 
sentenced to 1 year in prison for offering a child pornography CD-ROM 
on the Internet. Court convictions against persons guilty of child sex 
abuse are reported routinely in the media.
    Since 1990 the number of reported cases of child abuse roughly 
doubled; this increase appears to be the result of increased awareness 
of the problem and more effective police training and action. Laws 
criminalize family violence, physical restraint, sexual activity, and 
other abuse of a minor. A Children's Crisis Center was established in 
1995 and is 70 percent state supported. The Fund for Endangered 
Children estimates that the total number of children suffering from 
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse is 20,000 to 40,000, but only 
about one-tenth of such cases are registered by the police. Between 50 
and 100 children die each year as a result of abuse and violence within 
the family. According to NGO's, there are approximately 10,000 children 
living in institutional settings and 4,000 foster families supported by 
the Government and various NGO's.
    Romani children often are relegated to ``special schools'' for the 
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. Both a government program 
and various private initiatives exist to prepare Romani children for 
mainstream schools. In June 1999, the European Roma Rights Center 
(ERRC) filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of 12 
Romani families in Ostrava, alleging that the disproportionate number 
of Romani children in special schools constitutes de facto segregation 
throughout the educational system. The Ostrava Court in October 1999 
dismissed the case, stating that despite evidence of a pattern of 
discrimination, individual cases of discrimination had not been proved 
since due process with respect to psychological evaluation and testing 
with parental consent had been followed in each child's case. The Court 
also ruled that it was not competent to force the Ministry of Education 
to provide nondiscriminatory education. In April the ERRC took the case 
to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; a decision is 
pending. In February an amendment to the law governing schools 
eliminated the restriction on ``special school'' graduates from 
applying to regular secondary schools (see Section 5).
    People with Disabilities.--The disabled suffer disproportionately 
from unemployment, and the physically disabled experience difficulty in 
obtaining access to buildings and public transport. Access to education 
can be a problem, due to the lack of barrier-free access to public 
schools, although there is at least one barrier-free school in each 
district. Many buildings and means of public transportation remain 
inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, although access is improving. In 
Prague 22 of 48 metro stations and 4 bus lines are accessible to the 
disabled. A 1994 Economic Ministry regulation and an update to the 1998 
Construction Code require architects to ensure adequate access for the 
disabled in all new building projects, as well as in older buildings 
undergoing restoration. These regulations are applied in practice. In 
July the Government passed a law requiring access for the disabled to 
all museums. Also in July the Government required the State Fund for 
Transportation to provide transportation subsidies for the disabled. 
Businesses in which 60 percent or more of the employees are disabled 
qualify for special tax breaks. Numerous NGO's support social 
assistance programs to diminish the disadvantages faced by the 
disabled. These NGO's report that, although problems persist, the 
situation of the disabled is receiving more attention and is vastly 
improved from that of only a few years ago. The integration of the 
disabled into society has not been the subject of significant policy or 
public debate.
    Religious Minorities.--In January a court in Jesenik sentenced Jiri 
Tuma to 10 months in prison for displaying racist and anti-Semitic 
symbols in public and propagating a movement that suppresses citizens' 
freedoms and rights. Also in January a court dropped charges of 
inciting racial hatred against Vladimir Skoupy, a leader of the 
National Alliance. At an October 1999 rally, Skoupy had questioned 
whether the Holocaust had ever occurred. A local prosecutor stated that 
because Holocaust denial was not illegal (a law passed in September 
criminalizes Holocaust denial) and because Skoupy's comments were not 
insulting or belittling, he could not be convicted (see Section 2.a.).
    In March Minister of Interior Vaclav Grulich officially disbanded 
and canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme 
right-wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have 
propagated anti-Semitic sentiment and publicly questioned the 
occurrence of the Holocaust (see Section 2.b.). The Patriotic Front, an 
extreme right-wing association accused of denying the Holocaust, was 
warned by the Interior Ministry in November 1999 that it was violating 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. A month later, the Association 
changed its charter to eliminate offending sections and has made no 
further public anti-Semitic statements.
    At an April rally, members of the National Alliance and another 
extreme right-wing entity, the Patriotic Front, threatened to deface or 
remove explanatory plaques installed at the urging of the North 
American Boards of Rabbis in March on the historic Charles Bridge in 
Prague. The plaques, in Czech, English, and Hebrew, describe the origin 
of a medieval sculpture of Christ on the Cross--one of many sculptures 
on the bridge--that bears an offensive Hebrew inscription.
    In December 1999, as part of a display on the struggles of the 
extremist right-wing Republican Party (SPR-RSC) that was hung in front 
of the local party headquarters in Decin, photographs of President 
Havel, Prime Minister Zeman, Civic Democratic Party Leader Klaus, and 
Freedom Union chairman Jan Ruml were labeled ``Jewish Free Masons and 
Murderers of the Czech Nation.'' The exhibit also included a list of 
``Jews and Jewish Half-Breeds'' in politics that included the names of 
Havel, Zeman, and Klaus. The list was removed a few days later. A 
member of the Republican Party responsible for the display was arrested 
in January and in September sentenced to 10 months in prison and with 2 
years' probation for spreading hatred and racism (see Section 2.a.). In 
December a publisher, Michal Zitko, was fined $53,000 (2 million Czech 
crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5 years' probation 
for supporting and disseminating hate speech. He had published without 
editorial comment or annotation a Czech-language version of Hitler's 
``Mein Kampf.'' (See Section 2.a.) In December a state attorney brought 
charges of disseminating hate speech and propagation of a movement 
aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms against Vit Varak for selling 
``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
    The case of a man charged with organizing a ring in Plzen that 
produced and distributed racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials 
was ongoing at year's end. In February 1999, police arrested 12 members 
of the ring and confiscated numerous racist publications, along with 
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to groups in several other European 
countries. Charges were dropped against all others involved, but the 
leader still faces up to 8 years in prison for supporting and 
propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms. In 
December police in Zlin uncovered another group distributing neo-Nazi 
recordings, publications, and badges. A 21-year-old woman was charged 
with suppressing rights and freedoms. Police confirmed the existence of 
over 20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating 
fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism.
    In February 1999, police in Plzen arrested 12 leaders, producers, 
and distributors of racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials. The 
raid netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including 
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to groups in several other European 
countries. Those arrested were charged with supporting and propagating 
a movement dedicated to the suppression of the rights and liberties of 
citizens, an offense punishable by up to 8 years in prison. The owners 
of the firms charged with having produced the fascist and antiSemitic 
materials face the loss of their operating licenses. The case against 
those arrested is still pending. Police confirmed the existence of over 
20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating fascism, 
racism, and antiSemitism.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--After ethnic Slovaks, the 
largest minority is the Romani population, officially estimated to 
number between 200,000 and 250,000. Roma live throughout the country 
but are concentrated in the industrial towns along the northern border, 
where many eastern Slovak Roma were encouraged to settle in the homes 
of Sudeten Germans transferred to the West more than 40 years ago.
    Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty, unemployment, 
interethnic violence, discrimination, illiteracy, and disease. They are 
subject to popular prejudice, as is affirmed repeatedly by public 
opinion polls. Nearly 65 percent of the respondents in a September 
opinion poll admitted to an unfavorable opinion of Roma and to racial 
intolerance, with more than 50 percent saying that there were too many 
non-Czechs living in the country. A court case charging editors of a 
Republican Party (SPR-PSC) magazine (leaders of this extreme right-wing 
party espouse anti-German and anti-Romani policies) with publishing 
offensive statements against Roma was filed with a Prague district 
court in January 1998 and was still before the court at year's end.
    The State funds television and radio programs for Roma on public 
stations and also supports Romani press publications. Until July there 
was one full-time Romani anchorman on television. He was placed on 
administrative leave after being charged with tax and welfare fraud and 
after the resolution of his case did not return to the air. There is 
one full-time anchorman of Ghanaian background on TV Nova. During the 
year, more and better information on Romani issues became available in 
the mainstream press and other sources. A November poll showed that a 
majority of Czechs (53 percent) believe that the media cover Romani 
issues well. To improve media reporting on Romani issues, a Romani 
journalism course was established in the College of Publicity, and the 
first students graduated in February of 1999. There has been a 
Department of Romani Language Studies at Charles University in Prague 
since 1991, and additional university-level Romani language study 
program exist in Usti nad Labem and Brno.
    However, efforts by NGO's and individuals in the health and 
education fields to improve living conditions for the Roma have had 
only minimal impact, sometimes due to the attitudes or intransigence of 
local authorities. Romani leaders themselves have had limited success 
in organizing their local communities, which often are disunited and 
where many are reluctant to foster contacts with the majority.
    Members of skinhead organizations and their sympathizers most often 
perpetrate interethnic violence. Roma are the most likely targets of 
such crimes, although other ``dark-skinned'' individuals come under the 
same attacks. An estimated 5,000 skinheads are active in the country. 
The Documentation Center for Human Rights recorded more than 1,800 
racially motivated attacks over the past 8 years, in which nearly 32 
persons died. Last year police recorded 364 ``racially-motivated or 
extremist crimes,'' up from 316 in 1999. However, police and courts 
sometimes are reluctant to classify crimes against Roma as racially 
motivated, and the actual figures likely are higher.
    In November 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked between 60 and 70 Roma 
in a restaurant in Ceske Budejovice; 6 persons were injured. Police 
subsequently charged 23 skinheads with racially motivated violence; 
they now face sentences of up to 3 years in prison. In July the trial 
of the 23 skinheads began; the process is currently ongoing.
    In August 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked several Romani homes in 
a village near Jaromerice nad Rokytnou, which resulted in injuries to 2 
Roma and damage to several cars and houses. The raid lasted 
approximately 1 hour. The skinheads threw bricks and stones at the Roma 
while yelling racist epithets. Police charged 12 persons with rioting, 
property damage, and violence, although they were not charged with 
racially motivated crimes. A decision in the case was still pending at 
year's end.
    In July 1999, a group of skinheads attacked a 27-year-old Rom in a 
bar in Jesenik with pool cues, pool balls, and other objects, as they 
shouted racial epithets at him. Police charged six persons involved in 
the attack with defamation of race and disturbing the peace. In January 
a court ruled that the assault was not an organized attack and 
therefore the six could not be tried as a group. The court then found 
four of the attackers not guilty and placed two of them on probation. 
In July the Justice Ministry filed a complaint before the Supreme Court 
against the court's decision to try each defendant separately. In 
August the court overturned the previous verdict and criticized the 
lower court for its ruling that the attack was not an organized one. 
The case returned to the lower court for a new decision based on the 
Supreme Court's instructions.
    In a November 1998 incident in the city of Hodonin, a group of 
skinheads attacked an elderly American citizen for apparently defending 
a young Rom whom the skinheads were harassing while dining in the same 
restaurant. After exchanging words with the man, the skinheads waited 
for him outside, and after a short chase, attacked him and left him 
seriously injured and unconscious on the ground. The incident was 
captured by the security cameras of a nearby gasoline station. Charges 
later were filed against the main attacker. During the trial, the 
prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had a previous 
conviction for shooting a pistol into a group of Romani youth in front 
of a nightclub (he was subsequently pardoned by President Havel). On 
July 19, a judge convicted him of attempted bodily harm and disturbing 
the peace, rejecting the more serious charge of assault with racial 
motivation. He was given a 2-year suspended sentence, the most lenient 
allowable. The judge also declined to impose any monetary sanction on 
the defendant. The judge ruled that as the victim had, according to 
testimony by an expert medical witness, suffered no permanent physical 
damage (a claim disputed by the victim), a stiffer sentence was 
unwarranted. In November an appeals court again rejected the 
prosecutor's contention that race had been a motive in the attack. The 
court lengthened the sentence by 6 months, still suspended, and 3 
years' probation. The court also imposed on the defendant a fine of 
$3,000 (12,000 Czech crowns) to cover the victim's medical expenses.
    The sentences of three skinheads found guilty of the 1995 murder of 
Rom Tibor Danihel were confirmed. The Justice Minister had filed a 
complaint in 1999 against the High Court for annulling the convictions 
on technical grounds.
    Rom Milan Lacko died in 1998 after being beaten by a group of 
skinheads, then being hit and killed by a vehicle driven by police 
officer Marian Telega (see Section 1.c.). In 1998 the skinheads charged 
with beating Lacko then leaving him in the road were given suspended 
sentences. The court absolved the attackers of responsibility for 
Lacko's death, placing the blame on the truck that allegedly hit him. 
After that acquittal, five skinheads were fined and given prison terms 
of 12 to 14 months for appearing at the trial wearing swastikas and 
making racial jokes and insults to the media, the victim's family, and 
supporters in the courthouse. The case was re-opened in October when 
experts testified that Lacko had died as a result of being hit by a car 
driven by a police officer. In December the court sentenced four young 
men to sentences of 3 years in prison, 1 year in prison, 2 years of 
probation, and 1+ years of probation. All four were found to be 
indirectly responsible for Lacko's death; the one defendant who 
admitted to attacking the victim was convicted of attempting to cause 
bodily harm and given the longest sentence. Police officer Marian 
Telega was given an 18-month sentence and 2-and-a-half-years' 
probation.
    Prime Minister Zeman consistently called for the cancellation of 
the official registration of groups sympathetic to the skinhead 
movement. In March the Minister of Interior officially disbanded and 
canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme right-
wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have propagated 
anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiment (see Section 2.b.). A 1999 police 
raid in Plzen led to the arrest of 12 skinhead leaders, distributors, 
and producers of Nazi materials. Another extreme right wing group, the 
Patriotic Front, changed its charter to eliminate offending sections 
after being warned in November 1999 by the Interior Ministry that it 
was violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. The raid also 
netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including 
membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
organized movement with ties to the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, 
and Slovenia. Those arrested were charged with dissemination of fascist 
propaganda, an offense with a maximum penalty of 8 years in prison. The 
raid was executed prior to a planned skinhead rally in Line, near 
Plzen, and forced the cancellation of the event. Charges were dropped 
against all but the leader, who faces up to 8 years in prison for 
supporting and propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and 
freedoms.
    In July a series of attacks against Roma and Romani homes and 
facilities took place in Rokycany. On July 5, three young men attacked 
a group of six Roma in Osek, near Rokycany. Two victims were slightly 
injured. The attackers were charged with race defamation and organized 
assault. On July 14, an unknown perpetrator broke a window at a Romani 
community center run by Romani activist Ondrej Gina and threw gasoline 
into the facility; no fire ignited. The same night, Gina received 
anonymous racist phone calls and a bomb threat at his home. Also that 
night, a group of young men on motorbikes threw Molotov cocktails at 
the house of another Rom, Jiri Gina (no relation to Ondrej Gina). Three 
17-year-old members of a previously unknown group, Czech Lion (Cesky 
Lev), were arrested and charged with a racially motivated attack. At 
year's end, investigation of the case continued; the three accused were 
not in police custody.
    In August a state prosecutor filed charges of tax evasion and 
welfare fraud against Ondrej Gina; his son, Ondrej Gina Jr.; and Gina 
Jr.''s wife. Gina Jr., the only Romani anchorman on Czech television, 
took administrative leave from his job. In October a court halted 
proceeding against Gina Jr. and his wife after they admitted to having 
presented false information on their tax return and fraudulently 
collecting social benefit payments. They agreed to pay back around $650 
(25,000 Czech crowns). Gina Jr. did not return to his previous 
anchorman position. In November additional charges of fraud relating to 
management of Romani Community funds were filed against the elder Gina. 
The investigation against him was ongoing at year's end. Several Romani 
organizations have accused Rokycany authorities of racism and selective 
prosecution.
    In September three policemen in Brno allegedly stopped Rom Martin 
Tomko arbitrarily on the street, asked for his identity documents, 
then, after an argument, beat Tomko and left him unconscious in a park 
(see Section 1.c.). In December two of the policemen were charged with 
abuse of public office and inflicting bodily harm. The third, who was 
off duty at the time of the attack, was charged with disturbing the 
peace and inflicting bodily harm.
    Other attacks were reported throughout the year. In January in Novy 
Jicin a man attacked two Roma men at a disco while shouting racial 
slurs. He was charged with defamation of a nation or race and with 
rioting. The case was still pending at year's end. In February a group 
of approximately 15 skinheads, cheered on by bar patrons, attacked and 
beat five Roma in a bar in Nachod while shouting racial epithets. One 
attacker was charged with rioting, but no racial motive was ascribed to 
the attack by investigators. In July on a road near the village of 
Osek, three men followed, verbally harassed, and then attacked six 
Roma. Police charged the three with rioting and defamation of race. 
Both cases are still pending.
    In November media reported on a Romani family in Ostrozska Nova Ves 
that received racist threats during the year. On one occasion an 
unknown person broke a window in their home, leaving a letter with a 
swastika threatening to kill them unless they moved out of town. Police 
were still investigating the case at year's end.
    There were reports of racially motivated Roma-instigated attacks on 
others during the year. In October a Rom attacked townspeople with a 
hatchet while shouting racist insults. A July Ministry of Interior 
report indicated that Roma were the perpetrators in 12 percent of 
racially motivated attacks in 1999.
    In August the founder of an NGO dedicated to improving Czech 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities received violent, racist threats 
via e-mail and telephone. In September thousands of Czech mobile phone 
users received electronic messages on their phones promising free phone 
time for every Roma they killed.
    Racial and ethnic tensions and discrimination in society continued 
to be the object of much media attention during the year. Even when 
federal authorities have spoken out on these issues, local attitudes 
often have proven impervious to change. In October 1999, local 
authorities in Usti nad Labem built a wall dividing a Romani apartment 
complex from its non-Romani neighbors across the street. After a 
national and international outcry against the wall, the Government 
negotiated its removal in November 1999, agreeing to provide a grant of 
$250,000 (10 million Czech crowns) to improve social conditions in the 
area. The houses of Czechs who refused to live near the Romani 
community were bought for $79,000 (three million crowns); one of the 
houses was converted into a new police station; the others remain 
unoccupied. A playground was opened on the street in September and 
trash is now collected regularly there (neighbors' complaints of 
children playing in the street and uncollected trash littering the area 
had led to the proposal of the wall's construction). A portion of the 
dismantled wall now stands in the municipal zoo. In a February opinion 
poll, however, threefourths of those surveyed blamed the wall 
controversy on the Roma's inability to adapt to rules of normal social 
behavior. Several NGO-supported projects aimed at improving Czech/Roma 
relations in the area were started during the year.
    In October the Committee for the Compensation of Romani Holocaust 
Victims unveiled commemorative plaques at the site of a Romani 
concentration camp in Lety. In 1999 the Government provided $12,500 
(500,000 Czech crowns) for the project when a poll showed that only 11 
percent of respondents were willing to assist in financing the Lety 
Project (and less than one-fourth were aware that Roma were persecuted 
under the Nazi regime). The Government completed the transfer of 
archives related to the site to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In 
1999 the Human Rights Commission recommended the removal of the pig 
farm built on the site in 1974, yet it remains.
    Roma wishing to integrate face practical difficulties in the areas 
of employment and education. Estimated unemployment among Roma is 70 
percent, with many unemployed Roma subsisting on government support or 
earnings from illegal activities. Some employers refuse to hire Roma 
and ask local labor offices not to send Romani applicants for 
advertised positions. An amendment to the Labor Code prohibits hiring 
and employment discrimination based on ethnic origin, but no 
enforcement statistics are yet available. Under the law, individual 
Roma do not have the right to file discrimination complaints; action 
must come from governmental authorities. Many Roma are qualified only 
for lowpaying jobs as manual laborers, since very few complete 
secondary education. A higher-than-average share of the Romani 
population applies for partial or full disability pensions due to the 
occurrence of advanced-stage malignant diseases resulting from the 
neglect of preventive health practices or the lack of available medical 
care in areas with above-average Romani populations. In June the 
Government approved a Plan for Roma Integration aimed at combating 
discrimination against the Romani community. The plan tasked the Human 
Rights Commissioner with proposing legislation in 2001 designed to give 
advantage to Romani firms in placing public orders.
    The integration of Romani children into mainstream schools 
frequently is impeded by language and cultural barriers. Official 
estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of the Romani population 
completed the ninth grade, and less than 5 percent completed high 
school. A significant number of Romani children are transferred at an 
early age, after a psychological exam, to ``special schools'' for the 
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. According to unofficial 
government estimates, Romani children make up 60 percent or more of 
pupils placed in these special schools, although Roma constitute less 
than 3 percent of the population. Some Romani parents do not send their 
children to school regularly due to a fear of violence, the expense of 
books and supplies, or the lack of a strong cultural emphasis on 
education among some Roma. In 1999 12 Romani families filed suit in the 
Constitutional Court to protest the ``de facto segregation'' of Romani 
children into special schools. The lawsuit requested the establishment 
of a compensatory educational fund, an end to racial segregation within 
3 years, and the development of an educational reform plan. However, 
the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in November 1999 and 
stated that it did not have the power to order the Ministry of 
Education to create programs to end racial discrimination. In April the 
families took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg; a decision is pending. The Ministry of Education later took 
steps independently to implement some of the recommended changes. In 
December 1999, the Parliament revoked the restriction on students in 
special schools from applying to attend mainstream secondary or upper-
level public schools. The legislation was drafted by Parliament's sole 
Romani representative and constituted a significant step in opening 
access to higher education to the Romani minority. In addition the 
Ministry of Education is working on changes to the psychological exam 
given to Czech children that many claim is culturally biased against 
Romani children. Children are assigned to ``special schools'' based on 
poor results on the exam.
    In 1993 the Government created the framework for a number of year-
long programs (so-called zero grades) to prepare disadvantaged youths 
for their first year in school. Many districts with high concentrations 
of Roma participate in the program, which is funded solely by local 
authorities. More than 100 zero grades now operate throughout the 
country. Some districts tracking local Romani students report that up 
to 70 percent of the children who attend zero-grade training 
successfully enter and remain in mainstream schools. Another 
educational initiative continued placing Romani ``assistant teachers'' 
into the primary and special school system. Their function is to help 
teachers communicate with Romani pupils and encourage cooperation 
between schools and Romani parents. According to the Ministry of 
Education, there are now 200 Romani assistant teachers in the school 
system, which is an increase from 144 last year. In 1999 the Education 
Ministry began using joint Romani-Czech language textbooks in 60 
elementary schools to help overcome the barrier in the early school 
years between Romani children and non-Romani speaking teachers. The 
Ministry of Education ordered a textbook for use in schools on the 
cultural and historical roots of the Romani minority and on successful 
members of the Romani community. Local NGO's support additional studies 
and private initiatives to prepare Romani children for mainstream 
schools. Some Roma refuse to cooperate with compulsory vaccinations for 
children or are refused treatment by general practitioners who have 
full quotas of subsidized patients.
    ``Roma advisors'' or ``Roma assistants,'' created by the Interior 
Ministry to advise local authorities on Romani issues, now serve in all 
73 of the country's district offices and at the Prague, Brno, Ostrava, 
and Plzen town halls. Over 60 percent of the advisors are Roma. The 
positions, originally slated for elimination at the time of a scheduled 
federal restructuring, will continue under the title of ``regional 
advisors for ethnic minorities'' beginning in 2003. Many advisors have 
made a significant contribution to their communities, but some Romani 
communities have complained of advisors' ineffectiveness and called for 
their removal. The advisors themselves have in some cases felt hindered 
by the lack of procedural instructions for carrying out their duties 
and a clear legal mandate.
    Roma also face discrimination in housing and other areas of 
everyday life. Despite constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, a 
civil law framework to implement these provisions has not been 
incorporated into specific offenses under the Criminal Code. Some 
restaurants, pubs, and other venues refuse service to Roma and post 
signs prohibiting their entry. The only Romani Member of Parliament 
reported having been denied entry to restaurants and clubs on numerous 
occasions. A civil court awarded her damages this year from a club 
owner in Brno who had refused her entry. Rokycany pub owner, Ivo 
Blahout, who in 1995 refused to serve Romani patrons, was fined $200 
(8,000 Czech crowns) in May. He had been acquitted previously three 
times; he appealed the sentence but no decision had been made by year's 
end.
    There were occasional reports of anti-Roma petitions, which 
complained that Roma are noisy on the street, listen to loud music, 
make messes, and spoil the neighborhood. In January 400 residents of 
Karlovy Vary signed a petition against a plan to open a Romani cultural 
center in the Doubi town district.
    Beginning in 1997, when over 1,200 Roma submitted applications for 
refugee status in Canada and the United Kingdom, Romani families have 
continued to emigrate. The numbers applying to the United Kingdom have 
decreased; most requests for asylum there are denied. Roma began 
applying in greater numbers for asylum in other European countries such 
as Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands, and in New Zealand. An 
estimated 10,000 Czech Roma have emigrated in the last 3 years. Roma 
activists state that the motive for the increased emigration is fear of 
racism, violence, and discrimination. A February poll indicated that 62 
percent of Czechs believe the Roma are departing for economic reasons. 
In December the Government of New Zealand announced the imposition of a 
visa regime with the Czech Republic effective in 2001 in response to 
the growing number of Romani asylum applicants. The Honorary Czech 
Consul in New Zealand reacted by declaring that the Roma were not 
Czechs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned his comment.
    The Government and some local municipalities reported some success 
with programs designed to deal with drug addiction and crime prevention 
in the Romani community during 1999. In December 1998, the 
Interministerial Commission for Romani Community Affairs was expanded 
to include 12 government representatives and 12 Romani representatives, 
as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights and his deputy. The 
revamped Commission has taken an increasingly active role in resolving 
disputes between Romani communities and their non-Romani neighbors in 
towns such as Usti nad Labem and Rokycany, as well as promoting 
positive initiatives in housing, education, and discrimination. The 
Commission was budgeted $625,000 (25 million Czech crowns) for projects 
to assist in integration of Roma. There also was an active effort 
underway during the year to identify, train, and recruit qualified Roma 
to serve in law enforcement. The first group of police trainees 
completed the national police academy's course in Romani language and 
culture, designed to facilitate police officers' improved communication 
and response to the Romani communities in their precincts. One 
government initiative, the three ``Romani-inspector'' positions 
authorized to penalize shop and restaurant owners who refuse service to 
Roma, has been criticized for ineffectiveness and lack of resources.
    In June the Human Rights Commission concluded its seven-month 
``Project Tolerance'' campaign. The $250,000 (10 million Czech crowns) 
project consisted of public opinion polls on Czech attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities and foreigners; ``tolerance rides'' (information 
campaigns in which Romani and non-Romani educators visited schools to 
talk about racism and the history of the different ethnic groups in the 
country); teacher training; funding for Romani cultural events; and a 
webpage. The campaign also included a series of billboards, radio, 
newspaper, and television advertisements designed to promote public 
discussion of racial tolerance and to improve public opinion toward 
Roma. In September the commission announced that the project would 
continue for another year.
    In September 1999, Parliament passed a law to allow former 
Czechoslovak citizens who have lived in the country since 1993 to claim 
citizenship by simple declaration. This bill was created to remedy the 
de facto stateless situation of some Czech Roma, who were estimated to 
number between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The law also regularizes the 
status of children in foster care who lacked citizenship or permanent 
residency status. However, the law only provides for citizenship for 
those who have resided continuously in the country since 1993. Certain 
persons who went abroad for extended periods, including some asylum 
seekers and those expelled from the country by authorities, may face 
added difficulty in filing for citizenship under the new law. Roma 
activists claimed that some local officials are refusing to process 
Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma 
families in violation of the law. In one case a ``Slovak'' applicant 
was denied Czech citizenship illegally then required to leave the Czech 
Republic, thus losing his continuous resident status and voiding his 
citizenship claim. The law does not provide benefits to those who were 
denied citizenship and benefits and expelled between 1993 and 1999. 
Many local authorities and Roma are also apparently unaware that any 
changes to the citizenship law have been made.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior 
authorization, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Union membership continued to decline during the year.
    Most workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech/
Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS). The CMKOS is a democratically 
oriented, republic-wide umbrella organization for branch unions. It is 
not affiliated with any political party and carefully maintains its 
independence.
    Workers have the right to strike, except for those whose role in 
public order or public safety is deemed crucial. The law requires that 
labor disputes be subject first to mediation and that strikes take 
place only after mediation efforts fail.
    There were no major strikes during the year. The Association of 
Independent Trade Unions, comprised of seven unions, staged a token 
strike protesting unpaid wages, unemployment, and pension reform in 
March, blocking a Prague road and halting train service in some areas.
    Unions are free to form or join federations and confederations and 
affiliate with and participate in international bodies. This freedom 
was exercised fully.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining, which generally is carried out by 
unions and employers on a company basis. The scope for collective 
bargaining is more limited in the government sector, where wages are 
regulated by law.
    The 2000 ICFTU Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights alleges that 
some employers refused to bargain or used obstructive tactics to 
prevent collective agreements from being concluded.
    There are 11 free trade zones. Their workers possess and practice 
the same right to organize and bargain collectively as other workers in 
the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
it generally is not used; however, trafficking in women and children 
for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.d. 
and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates a minimum working age of 15 
years, although children who completed courses at special schools 
(schools for the mentally disabled and socially maladjusted) may work 
at the age of 14. These prohibitions are enforced in practice. The law 
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government 
effectively enforces this prohibition (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). 
However, trafficking in children is a problem. Employment conditions 
for children aged 15 to 18 are subject to strict safety standards.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum wage 
standards. In June the Government increased the minimum wage by 500 
Czech crowns to 4,500 per month, about $113. Due to currency exchange 
rate shifts, this represented no change in dollar terms from the 
minimum wage of a year ago (approximately $115 or 3,600 Czech crowns). 
The monthly average is approximately $337 (13,473 Czech crowns) per 
month. Average net wages are 2.8 times as high as official sustenance 
costs. The minimum wage provides a sparse standard of living for a 
worker and family, although allowances are available to families with 
children. Retraining efforts, carried out by district labor offices, 
seek to provide labor mobility for those at the lower end of the wage 
scale. The enforcement of minimum wage standards was not a problem 
during the year.
    In May the standard workweek was reduced to 40 hours from 42+, 
effective January 1, 2001. It also requires paid rest of at least 30 
minutes during the standard 8-hour workday, as well as annual leave of 
4 to 8 weeks, depending on the profession. Overtime ordered by the 
employer may not exceed 150 hours per year of 8 hours per week as a 
standard practice, although the local employment office may permit 
overtime above this limit. The Labor Ministry enforces standards for 
working hours, rest periods, and annual leave.
    Government, unions, and employers promote worker safety and health, 
but conditions in some sectors of heavy industry are problematic, 
especially those awaiting privatization. Industrial accident rates are 
not unusually high. The Office of Labor Safety is responsible for 
enforcement of health and safety standards. Workers have the right to 
refuse work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific laws prohibit trafficking in 
women and children, and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose 
of forced prostitution is a problem. The Czech Republic is a source, 
transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons from the 
former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Czech women and 
girls are trafficked to Western Europe, such as to Germany. Organizing 
prostitution or pimping also is illegal and punishable by a prison term 
of up to 8 years, with a term of up to 12 years if the victim is under 
the age of 15. (Adults can be prosecuted for engaging in sexual 
activity with a minor under the age of 15.) There have been numerous 
convictions of traffickers as a result of proactive investigative 
efforts on the part of law enforcement officers. The Czech Police 
Organized Crime Division includes a Unit on Trafficking in Persons, 
established in 1995, which cooperates with other nations to enforce 
these laws. In February the Czech office of the International 
Organization on Migration (IOM) completed the first stage of an 
extensive information and media campaign aimed at educating women about 
avoiding entrapment in trafficking for prostitution schemes and 
providing information on organizations that assist victims of 
trafficking.
    In March, 13 people were arrested in West Bohemia for luring women 
from Russia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine and forcing them into prostitution, 
among other charges. Also in March, a raid in Austria broke up an 
international ring that trafficked Czech and Hungarian women into 
prostitution. Police maintain close contact with the IOM and other 
NGO's in order to provide services to women left penniless and homeless 
after trafficking arrests.
    The full extent of trafficking in children is unknown; however, 
convictions of child sex offenders are reported routinely in the media. 
For example, the May conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia 
was covered widely, as were the cases of several German citizens who 
were detained in cities near the CzechGerman border and who reportedly 
had traveled regularly to the Czech Republic for the purpose of 
soliciting sexual activity from adolescents (particularly young Roma). 
Following these incidents, police personnel took measures to prevent 
this type of ``sex tourism'' more effectively. Police maintain patrols 
in high-risk areas, enforce curfew-type policies more actively, and 
work to raise public awareness of the issue through the media. In two 
separate cases in February, men in the Teplice region were arrested for 
providing Czech children to German pedophiles. Despite increased police 
efforts, press reports still indicate that in many border regions 
sexual tourism with adolescents continues. In November police conducted 
raids at 7 nightclubs in 4 districts of the country, arresting 10 
persons.
                               __________

                                DENMARK

    Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic 
rule. Queen Margrethe II is Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to 
the unicameral Parliament (Folketing), leads the Government. A Social 
Democrat-led minority coalition remained in power following a narrow 
election victory in 1998. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police have sole responsibility for internal security. 
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security 
forces.
    Denmark has an advanced, market-based industrial economy. One-half 
of the work force is employed in the public sector. The key industries 
are food processing and metalworking. A broad range of industrial goods 
is exported. The economy provides residents with a high standard of 
living.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
instances of individual abuse. The Government is taking serious steps 
to deal with violence against women. Trafficking in women is a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors. But in July the 
U.N. Committee Against Torture criticized the Government for the number 
of prisoners held in isolation and the length of time spent in 
isolation. In response the Government revised prison rules on the 
length of isolation permitted and the reasons for assigning isolation. 
Previously all prisoners who refused to participate in work programs 
were isolated. Under the new rules, the percentage of prisoners in 
isolation dropped from 9.8 percent in 1999 to 3.7 percent in 2000.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system consists of a series of local and regional 
courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of 
the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    A permit is required for public demonstrations, but the Government 
uses objective criteria in evaluating requests and does not 
discriminate in issuing permits.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. It also 
provides for an official state religion, the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, which is subsidized by the Government. The Evangelical Lutheran 
faith is taught in public schools, but students may withdraw from 
religious classes with parental consent.
    The Government does not require that religious groups be licensed, 
but the State's permission is required for religious ceremonies, for 
example, weddings, if they are to have civil validity. And registered 
religions enjoy certain tax exemptions. In 1999 an independent, 
government-appointed Council published guidelines for future approval 
of religious organizations that are linked to the 1969 Marriage Act. 
The guidelines established clear requirements that religious 
organizations must fulfill, which include providing a written text of 
the religion's central traditions; descriptions of its most important 
rituals; an organizational structure accessible for public control and 
approval; and constitutionally elected representatives who can be held 
responsible by authorities. Additionally, the organization must ``not 
teach or perform actions inconsistent with public morality or order.''
    Scientologists continued to seek official approval as a religious 
organization. Their first application for approval was made in the 
early 1980's and rejected; the second application was made in mid-1997 
and withdrawn in early 1998. The second application was resubmitted in 
1999 and withdrawn again in early 2000, shortly before a decision by 
the Government was expected. In withdrawing the application, the Church 
of Scientology asked the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs for 
additional time to respond to reports about Scientology that had 
appeared in the media. By year's end the application had not been 
resubmitted.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum and provided 
it to 2,099 persons in the first 6 months of 2000 and to 4,526 persons 
in 1999. A total of 9,627 aslyum applications were filed during the 
year, compared with 6,950 in 1999. There were no reports of the forced 
expulsion of refugees to a country where they feared persecution or of 
those having a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage.
    The territories of Greenland (whose population is primarily Inuit) 
and the Faroe Islands (whose inhabitants have their own Norse language) 
have democratically elected home rule governments whose powers 
encompass all matters except foreign affairs, monetary affairs, and 
national security. Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens with 
the same rights as those in the rest of the Kingdom. Each territory 
elects two representatives to the Folketing.
    Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of 
government. In the current government, 9 of 20 ministers are women, as 
are 67 of the parliament's 179 members. There are two parliamentarians 
of mixed ancestry from Greenland and an ethnic Turkish parliamentarian.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative 
and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Government's operations and extensive public services do not 
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. The law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Government enforces it 
effectively. Discrimination on the basis of race is covered by two 
laws, which prohibit racial slander and denial of access to public 
places on the basis of race. The rights of indigenous people are 
protected carefully.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is 
taking steps to combat it. An umbrella nongovernmental organization 
reports that in 1998, women's crisis shelters were contacted 
approximately 9,000 times, compared with 9,961 times in 1997. A total 
of 2,054 women stayed at shelters during 1999, compared with 1,934 
women in 1998. There were 355 reported rapes in the first 9 months of 
1999, compared with 346 in all of 1999. Rape, spousal abuse, and 
spousal rape are all criminal offenses.
    The law requires equal pay for equal work, but some wage inequality 
still exists. The law prohibits job discrimination on the basis of sex 
and provides recourse, such as access to the Equal Status Council, for 
those so affected. Women hold positions of authority throughout 
society, although they are underrepresented in senior business 
positions. Women's rights groups effectively lobby the Government in 
their areas of concern, such as wage disparities and parental leave.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution was a problem 
(see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. Education is compulsory through the age of 
16 and is free through the university level. The Ministries of Social 
Affairs, Justice, and Education oversee implementation of programs for 
children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. In 1997 the 
Folketing passed legislation that banned the physical punishment of 
children by adults, including their parents.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. Building regulations require special facilities for the 
disabled in public buildings built or renovated after 1977 and in older 
buildings that come into public use. The Government enforces these 
provisions in practice.
    Indigenous People.--The law protects the rights of the inhabitants 
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland's legal system seeks to 
accommodate Inuit customs. Accordingly, it provides for the use of lay 
persons as judges and sentences most prisoners to holding centers 
(rather than to prisons) where they are encouraged to work, hunt, or 
fish during the day. Education in Greenland is provided to the native 
population in both the Inuit and Danish languages.
    In 1999 a court ruled that the government unjustly resettled 
Greenland Inuits in 1953 in order to accommodate the expansion of a 
U.S. Air Force base in northwest Greenland. The court ordered the 
government to pay compensation to the displaced Greenlanders and their 
descendants. The compensation is substantially less than the defendants 
sued for, and the case was still under appeal in the Supreme Court at 
year's end. In 1999 the office of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
issued a joint declaration with the home rule chairman of Greenland 
apologizing for the way the decision on the resettlement was reached 
and the manner in which it was carried out.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The inflow of ethnically and 
racially diverse refugees and immigrants has provoked a degree of 
tension between Danes and immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians, 
Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans until 1992; more recently refugees are 
overwhelmingly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia). In response to 
publicity concerning the involvement of foreigners in street crime and 
allegations of social welfare fraud committed by refugees, Parliament 
passed tighter immigration laws, which took effect in 1999. Family 
reunification is now more difficult, and immigrants and refugees can no 
longer acquire permanent residence by living in the country for 18 
months; rather they must now reside for 3 years and demonstrate that 
they have integrated into society. Additionally, they receive a special 
integration allowance that is 20 percent lower than the social benefits 
that citizens receive. Critics claim that this provision violates the 
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In response to 
a perception of high criminality by asylum applicants, in September the 
Interior Minister suggested that convicted offenders (who did not 
receive jail time for their offenses) be isolated on one of the 
country's deserted islands. The proposal provoked a mixed response from 
parliamentarians but an overwhelmingly positive approval rating from 
average citizens. At year's end, the subject still was being debated, 
but the Government had taken no action.
    Incidents of racial discrimination and racially motivated violence 
occur but are rare. The Government effectively investigates and deals 
with cases of racially motivated violence. On September 9, two persons 
threw firebombs at an asylum center in the town of Holeby. The fire was 
brought under control, and no one was injured, but the event 
nonetheless upset the asylum applicant community. No one was arrested 
or charged in the crime.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law states that all workers, 
including military personnel and the police, may form or join unions of 
their choosing. Approximately 80 percent of wage earners belong to 
unions that are independent of the Government and political parties. 
All unions except those representing civil servants or the military 
have the right to strike.
    Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations, and 
they do so actively.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers and 
employers acknowledge each other's right to organize. Collective 
bargaining is protected by law and is widespread in practice. The law 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union members 
and organizers, and there are mechanisms to resolve disputes. Employers 
found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate 
workers fired for union activities. In the private sector, salaries, 
benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in biennial or 
triennial negotiations between the various employers' associations and 
their union counterparts. If the negotiations fail, a national 
conciliation board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by management 
and labor. If the proposal is rejected, the Government may force a 
legislated solution on the parties (usually based upon the mediators' 
proposal). The agreements, in turn, are used as guidelines throughout 
the public as well as the private sector. In the public sector, 
collective bargaining is conducted between the employees' unions and a 
government group led by the Finance Ministry.
    Labor relations in Greenland are conducted in the same manner as in 
Denmark. Greenland's courts are the first recourse in disputes, but 
Danish mediation services or the Danish Labor Court also may be used.
    There is no umbrella labor organization in the Faroes, but 
individual unions engage in periodic collective bargaining with 
employers. Disputes are settled by mediation.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded 
labor, by adults or children, is prohibited by law, and this 
prohibition is enforced effectively by the Government. However, women 
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment is 15 years. The 
law sets a minimum of 13 years of age for any type of work. The law is 
enforced by the Danish Working Environment Service (DWES), an 
autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Export industries do not use 
child labor. Forced and bonded child labor is prohibited and does not 
occur (see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on 
the worst forms of child labor in August.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No national minimum wage is 
mandated legally, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage 
floor. The lowest wage paid is currently about $10 (82 kroner) per 
hour, which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. The law provides for 5 weeks of paid vacation per 
year. A 37-hour workweek is the norm, established by contract, not by 
law. However, the law requires at least 11 hours between the end of one 
work period and the start of the next.
    The law also prescribes conditions of work, including safety and 
health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and employees; work 
performance; rest periods and days off; and medical examinations. The 
DWES ensures compliance with labor legislation. Workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous situations or weapons production without 
jeopardizing their employment rights, and legal protections cover 
workers who file complaints about unsafe or unhealthy conditions.
    Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the Faroes, 
except that the workweek is 40 hours. As in Denmark, the workweek is 
established by contract, not by law.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, but the penalties are not severe. Trafficking in women for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. In October the Government 
rejected a proposal to harmonize trafficking penalties in the European 
Union at 8 years' imprisonment because it believed Danish sentencing 
rules were sufficient. The authorities cooperate with international 
investigations.
    Trafficking involved the importation of women mostly from Eastern 
Europe and Southeast Asia, some of whom were lured by the prospect of 
higher wages and a better life, but found themselves forced into 
prostitution. The perpetrators usually were suspected of being part of 
organized crime. No statistics were available on how many women are 
involved in prostitution.
    In June a regional conference on trafficking generated considerable 
public debate that carried over into the Parliament. In December, the 
Government set up a working group in the Ministry of Gender and 
Equality to address trafficking; a report is expected in 2001. Several 
Parliamentarians proposed changing the law regarding trafficking to 
make the penalties much more severe. To illustrate the light sentences, 
in the spring, a trafficker who received his second conviction for 
trafficking several Colombian women into the country was sentenced to 
only 8 months in jail.
    The Government does not provide medical or legal assistance 
directly to victims, and there is no governmental or nongovernmental 
entity specifically concerned with victims of trafficking. Several 
government-supported organizations provide these services on an ad hoc 
basis. In July one nongovernmental organization assisted a Colombian 
trafficking victim in a precedent-setting case in which the woman 
testified against her traffickers and subsequently received asylum in 
Denmark.
                               __________

                                ESTONIA

    Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. The Constitution established 
a 101-member unicameral legislature (State Assembly), a prime minister 
as Head of Government, and a president as Head of State. The judiciary 
is independent.
    Efforts to develop and strengthen a Western-type police force 
committed to procedures and safeguards appropriate to a democratic 
society are proceeding, with police leadership actively working to 
professionalize the force. The police, who are ethnically mixed, are 
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Corrections personnel 
are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The security service, 
called Security Police, is subordinate to the Interior Ministry but 
also reports to the Prime Minister. Police and corrections personnel 
continued to commit human rights abuses.
    Estonia has a market economy. Reflecting the extent of post-1992 
reforms, the European Union in 1998 invited Estonia to begin accession 
negotiations. Services, especially financial and tourism, are growing 
in importance compared to historically more prominent light industry 
and food production. The privatization of firms, including small, 
medium, and large-scale enterprises, is virtually complete. The 
Government is working on privatizing the remaining state-owned 
infrastructure enterprises.
    Economic growth increased after a slowdown due to the 1998 Russian 
financial collapse, with experts predicting gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth of between 3 and 5 percent in 2000. Per capita GDP is 
about $3,536 per year. Some 90 percent of exports (textiles, food 
products, wood, and timber products) now are directed to western 
markets. Unemployment is about 14 percent but is significantly higher 
in rural areas and in the northeast.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
and the large ethnic Russian noncitizen community; however, problems 
remained in some areas. The major human rights abuses continued to be 
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees and the use of excessive force 
by the police. Prison conditions are poor; however, the Government 
began a multiyear program to improve them. While some officials in the 
United Nations, the Russian Government, and members of the local ethnic 
Russian community continued to criticize the Citizenship Law as 
discriminatory, notably for its Estonian language requirements, the 
OSCE as well as other international fact-finding organizations, 
including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, confirmed that the 
Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In 1998 President Lennart Meri created an international commission 
for research into crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country 
from 1940-91. The Commission began work in 1999 and held three formal 
meetings during the year. In November 1999 the Commission authorized 
sending an investigator to study materials in the Russian and German 
archives on this subject; it met again in June and November 2000.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, there continued 
to be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal 
abuse during the arrest and questioning of suspects. Punishment cells 
(``kartsers'') continued to be used, in contravention of international 
standards.
    Prison conditions remained poor, although there were some 
improvements. By mid-year the prison population was a record 4,800 
inmates. A lack of funds and trained staff continued to be serious 
problems. Overcrowding was reported in every major prison except one. 
The percentage of prisoners suffering from tuberculosis was much higher 
than in the general population. The Government refurbished some prison 
buildings. Modest gains were made in hiring new prison staff and 
retaining existing personnel. Work and study opportunities for 
prisoners increased slightly since the Government implemented new 
programs. As of August, 162 prisoners were released in the calendar 
year under the Government's early release program for prisoners. One 
prisoner was killed by another during the year.
    The Government began to implement a multiyear plan to refurbish and 
restructure all of the country's prisons. The State Assembly, in 
addition, adopted a law authorizing the construction of a prison in 
Tartu that will be largely financed by the Nordic Investment Bank. 
However, a plan to close the overcrowded and antiquated Tallinn Central 
Prison was scrapped.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and 
laws forbid arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government 
generally observes these prohibitions. Under the Constitution, warrants 
issued by a court are required to make arrests. Detainees must be 
informed promptly of the grounds for the arrest and given immediate 
access to legal counsel. If a person cannot afford counsel, the State 
will provide one. A person may be held for 48 hours without formally 
being charged; further detention requires a court order. A person may 
be held in pretrial detention for 2 months; this term may be extended 
for a total of 12 months by court order. Police rarely violate these 
limits. By late August, 1,382 of the 4,744 prisoners were awaiting 
trial.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution establishes an 
independent judicial branch, and the judiciary is independent in 
practice. The judiciary operates through a three-tier court system: 
Rural and city courts; district courts; and the State Court (which 
functions as a supreme court). The district and State Courts are also 
courts for ``constitutional supervision.'' At the rural and city 
levels, court decisions are made by a majority vote with a judge and 
two lay members sitting in judgment. All judges and lay judges must be 
citizens. The President nominates and the State Assembly confirms the 
Chief Justice of the State Court. The Chief Justice nominates State 
Court judges who are subject to confirmation by the State Assembly. He 
also nominates the district, city, and rural court judges who then are 
appointed by the President. Judges are appointed for life.
    The role of the Chancellor of Justice and the ombudsman were 
combined under legislation passed by the State Assembly in 1999. The 
State Assembly rejected a proposal for an independent ombudsman. The 
chancellor-ombudsman is to handle complaints by private citizens 
against state institutions; however, the position of chancellor was 
vacant at mid-year.
    The Constitution provides that court proceedings shall be public. 
Closed sessions may be held only for specific reasons, such as the 
protection of state or business secrets, and in cases concerning 
minors. The Constitution further provides that defendants may present 
witnesses and evidence as well as confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses. Defendants have access to prosecution evidence 
and enjoy a presumption of innocence.
    The Government continued to overhaul the country's criminal and 
civil procedural codes. An interim Criminal Code that went into effect 
in 1992 basically revised the Soviet Criminal Code by eliminating, for 
example, political and economic crimes. This code has been amended 
several times, most recently in June. The Code of Criminal Procedure 
was adopted in 1994.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires a search warrant for the search and 
seizure of property. During the investigative stage, warrants are 
issued by the prosecutor upon a showing of probable cause. Once a case 
has gone to court, the court issues warrants. The Constitution provides 
for secrecy of the mail, telegrams, telephones, and other means of 
communication. Police must obtain a court order to intercept 
communications. Illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in court.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects 
constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and of the 
press. Four major national Estonian language and two Russian-language 
dailies are published, in addition to important weeklies. Foreign 
newspapers and magazines are available widely. All newsprint, printing, 
and distribution facilities are private companies.
    In a well-reported 1997 case, a prominent journalist was tried and 
convicted for insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a 
newspaper interview and was fined. All levels of the judiciary upheld 
the sentence. The European Court of Human Rights agreed in 1998 to hear 
the case, but it was still pending at mid-year.
    The Law on Language prohibits the use of any foreign language on 
public signs, advertisements, and notices, including election posters. 
The prohibition on campaign posters written in a language other than 
Estonian resulted in protests by one political party.
    State (public) broadcast media, including one nationwide television 
channel (Estonian Television/ETV), continue to receive large government 
subsidies. At the same time, ETV broadcasts commercials. Although a 
basic decision has been made to combine ETV and Estonian (state/public) 
Radio into one entity, no real movement toward that end has taken 
place. The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired the director of ETV in 
1999 for management failures, because of ETV's financial difficulties, 
and for ``undisciplined behavior.'' The courts said that he could not 
be fired, whereupon he returned to work but finally resigned during the 
year. A new general director, with a background in banking, was 
appointed in the summer.
    There are several major independent television and radio stations. 
Several Russian-language programs, mostly produced in Estonia, are 
broadcast over state and private/commercial television channels. The 
Government has played a key role in encouraging Russian-language 
programs on state television. Over the past 3 budgetary years, the 
ability of ETV's Russian-language department to create self-produced, 
high-quality programs has been reduced greatly due to the Government's 
large cuts in the department's budget. Russian state television, 
Ostankino programs, and commercial channels in Russia are widely 
available by cable.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to assemble freely, but noncitizens are 
prohibited from joining political parties, although they may form 
social groups. Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3 
weeks prior to the date of the gathering. The authorities have wide 
discretion to prohibit such gatherings on public safety grounds but 
seldom do so. There were no reports of government interference in mass 
gatherings or political rallies.
    The Constitution provides for the right of free association, and 
the Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The 1993 Law on Churches and Religious Organizations requires all 
religious organizations to have at least 12 members and to be 
registered with the Interior Ministry and the Board of Religion. 
Leaders of religious organizations must be citizens with at least 5 
years' residence in the country.
    The majority of citizens are nominally Lutheran, but following 
deep-seated tradition, there is wide tolerance of other denominations 
and religions. Persons of varying ethnic backgrounds profess Orthodoxy, 
including communities of the descendants of Russian Old Believers who 
found refuge in Estonia in the 17th century. The Estonian Apostolic 
Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to 
Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation, 
reregistered under its 1935 statute in August 1993. Since then, a group 
of ethnic Estonian and Russian parishes preferring to remain under the 
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the 
Soviet occupation has insisted that it should have claim to the EAOC 
name. Representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates 
agreed in 1999 that the Moscow Patriarchate would register under a new 
name. In July the Moscow Patriarchate submitted a new name proposal, 
but the Interior Ministry rejected it on the grounds that a close 
reading of the registration papers revealed variations of the name. 
Throughout the dispute, worship has occurred freely in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits free movement within the 
country, and it is honored in practice. The law also provides for the 
right of foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation for citizens. 
Passports serve as identification but do not have to be carried at all 
times. There are no exit visas.
    The Government does not restrict the right of noncitizen 
residents--persons who are citizens of another country or stateless 
persons--to foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation, although some 
noncitizens complain of delays in obtaining travel documents. The 
majority of noncitizens are ethnic Russians. In 1994 the Government 
began issuing alien passports, which are issued to resident aliens not 
in possession of any other valid travel document. Such aliens included: 
(1) Persons who are designated as stateless; (2) foreign citizens who 
lack the opportunity to obtain travel documents from their country of 
origin or from another state; (3) persons who file for Estonian 
citizenship and pass the language examination if required; and (4) 
aliens who are permanently departing Estonia. The Government already 
has approved the issuance of alien passports to noncitizens intending 
to study abroad and has agreed to issue them to former military 
personnel who cannot or do not want to take out Russian citizenship. By 
November 30, 108,982 persons had applied for alien passports, and 
122,152 alien passports were issued, including prior years.
    The Government deported a relatively small number of illegal 
aliens, usually those caught in criminal acts. A total of 10 illegal 
aliens were held as internees by September, pending deportation or a 
court order granting them residence. Internees are held in a wing of a 
regular prison. In 1999 Finland and Estonia entered into a cooperation 
agreement to construct a new facility for illegal aliens and asylum 
seekers in East Viru County.
    Domestic law is in conformity with the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1999 the 
State Assembly passed amendments to domestic refugee law that delegated 
authority from the Government to the Citizenship and Migration Board, 
clarified the refusal of refugee status, and established a state 
registry for asylum. Also, starting on October 1, 1999, temporary 
residence permits may be granted to persons whose applications for a 
residence permit are based on an international agreement. Asylum 
applicants come under the overall annual 0.1 percent quota for 
immigrants (not including Westerners, who are exempt from the quota). 
The program began as scheduled, and as of December 1, 2000, 47 persons 
had applied for asylum, of whom 10 were still waiting for a reply. Of 
the applicants processed, 4 were granted asylum, 15 left the country, 
and 1 died. The Citizenship and Migration Board turned down the 
remaining 18 applications on the grounds that the applicants did not 
fufill the criteria for refugee status as defined in the 1951 U.N. 
Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government. In March 1999, 
free and fair elections to the State Assembly were held. The new 
Government is a coalition of the Pro Patria, Moderate, and Reform 
Parties. Four ethnic Russians are Members of the State Assembly. 
Indirect presidential elections were held in 1996. When the State 
Assembly failed to muster the required two-thirds majority to elect the 
President, an Electoral Assembly consisting of Members of the State 
Assembly and representatives of local governments convened and 
reelected the incumbent, Lennart Meri.
    Only citizens can vote in parliamentary elections and be members of 
political parties. However, according to law, resident noncitizens and 
those who have lived permanently in the area for at least 5 years 
preceding the election can vote but not run for office in local 
elections.
    Approximately 1.1 million of the total population of 1.43 million 
are citizens. Of those, approximately 113,000 received their 
citizenship through the naturalization process. Holders of permanent or 
temporary residence permits number approximately 300,000, 80 percent of 
whom are ethnic Russians. Illegal residents number 30,000 to 50,000 
persons, mostly ethnic Russians; they are not included in the census 
figures.
    In 1995 the State Assembly adopted a new Citizenship Law that 
extended the residency requirement for naturalization from 2 to 5 years 
and added a requirement for knowledge of the Constitution and the 
Citizenship Law to the requirement for Estonian language capability. 
Persons who were legal residents in the country prior to July 1, 1990, 
are exempt from the 5-year legal residence and 1-year waiting period 
requirements. The law allows the Government to waive the language 
requirement but not the civic knowledge requirement for applicants who 
have Estonian-language elementary or higher education, or who have 
performed valuable service to Estonia. In 1998 the Citizenship Law was 
amended to grant citizenship to stateless children born after February 
26, 1992, to legally resident stateless parents (upon the parents' or 
guardians' application). As of September 1, parents had applied for 
citizenship for 539 such children: 427 of the applications were 
approved.
    On October 1, 1999, the Government dropped the immigration quota on 
the issuance of residence permits to those noncitizens who settled in 
the country prior to July 1, 1990, and who have not departed the 
country subsequently. In April the State Assembly approved an amendment 
to the law on aliens under which the annual immigration quota will not 
be applied to non-Estonian spouses of Estonian citizens if the spouses 
have a common child up to 15 years of age or if the female spouse is 
more than 12 weeks pregnant. In addition the amendment also states that 
the quota will not apply to children up to 15 years of age if the 
parents are applying for a residence permit.
    By law the following classes of persons are ineligible for 
naturalization: Those filing on the basis of false data or documents; 
those not abiding by the constitutional system or not fulfilling the 
laws; those who have acted against the State and its security; those 
convicted of felonies; those who work or have worked in the 
intelligence or security services of a foreign state; or those who have 
served as career soldiers in the armed forces of a foreign state, 
including those discharged into the reserves or retired. (The latter 
includes spouses who have come to Estonia in connection with the 
service member's assignment to a posting, the reserves, or retirement.) 
A provision of the law allows for the granting of citizenship to a 
foreign military retiree who has been married to a native citizen for 5 
years.
    Between 1992 and August 1, 112,822 persons received citizenship 
through naturalization. The vast majority of these persons, 87,712, 
were naturalized by the end of 1996. In 1997 the Russian embassy 
reported that some 120,000 persons had obtained Russian citizenship; 
however, the Embassy declined to supply the Government with a list. The 
number of Russian citizens may be lower since the Russian Embassy does 
not appear to keep records of those who die or leave the country. As of 
November 30, the Government had issued 116,289 permanent and 29,482 
temporary residence permits. During the year a surge in noncitizens 
filing for or renewing residency permits resulted in long lines and 
delays at overtaxed registration offices. The problems precipitated the 
dismissal of the director of the Citizenship and Migration Board.
    While some officials in the United Nations, the Russian Government, 
and members of the local ethnic Russian community continued to 
criticize the Citizenship Law as discriminatory, notably for its 
Estonian language requirements, the OSCE as well as other international 
fact-finding organizations, including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, 
confirmed that the Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
    Bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirement are also 
cited as disincentives for securing citizenship. The Government has 
established language-training centers, but there is a lack of qualified 
teachers, financial resources, and training materials. Some allege that 
the examination process, which 75 to 90 percent of persons pass, is 
arbitrary.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government or politics. However, women are underrepresented in 
government and politics. Among the 101 Members of Parliament are 18 
women. Two ministers are women. There are four ethnic Russian deputies 
in the State Assembly. The law was amended in 1999 to place language 
requirements on Members of Parliament; Russian speakers protested.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not restrict the formation or functioning of 
human rights organizations. In response to allegations of the poor 
treatment of ethnic minorities, the President established a Human 
Rights Institute, which first convened in 1992. The purpose of the 
Institute is to monitor human rights in the country and to provide 
information to the international community. It investigates reports of 
human rights violations, such as allegations of police abuse and the 
inhuman treatment of detainees. In 1997 the Institute established an 
information center in the heavily ethnic Russian town of Kohtla-Jarve. 
In addition, because of tensions surrounding the adoption of the 
Elections Law and the Aliens Law in 1993, the President established a 
roundtable composed of representatives of the State Assembly, the Union 
of Estonian Nationalities, and the Russianspeaking population's 
Representative Assembly. An analogous but independent roundtable meets 
in the county of East Virumaa. Also, with initial funding from the 
Danish Government, a nongovernmental legal information center in 
Tallinn provides free legal assistance to individuals--citizen and 
noncitizen alike--seeking advice on human rights-related issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination for any reason; however, 
reports continued of discrimination against ethnic Russian residents. 
The Government reports that no court cases charging discrimination were 
filed during the year.
    Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, continued 
to be the subject of increasing discussion and media coverage and is 
reportedly common. Rape and attempted rape occur relatively 
infrequently. In the first 8 months of the year, there were reports of 
29 rapes and 7 attempted rapes, compared with 50 rapes and 29 attempted 
rapes for all of 1999. However, studies show that 40 percent of crime 
in the country goes unreported, including domestic violence. Even when 
the police are called, the abused spouse often declines to press 
charges.
    Both the Center of Women Citizens and a roundtable of women's 
organizations were established in 1998. Although women have the same 
legal rights as men and, in theory, are entitled to equal pay for equal 
work, this is not true in practice. While women's average educational 
level was higher than that of men, their average pay in general was 
lower, and the trend did not seem to be improving. There continue to be 
female- and male-dominated professions. Women constitute slightly more 
than half of the work force. They also carry major household 
responsibilities.
    Children.--The Government's strong commitment to education is 
evidenced by the high priority that it gives to building and 
refurbishing schools. The Government provides free medical care for 
children and subsidizes school meals.
    There is no societal pattern of child abuse, but studies, including 
one published by the local U.N. Development Program office during the 
year, found that a significant proportion of children had experienced 
at least occasional violence at home, in schools, or in youth gangs. In 
the first 7 months of the year, police registered 22 cases of sexual 
abuse involving 13 female victims and 9 male victims, all below age 16. 
In the same period, there were 31 cases of procurement for prostitution 
of victims younger than 16. Also in the first 6 months of the year, 
there were 2 rape cases in which the victim was younger than 14.
    People with Disabilities.--While the Constitution contains 
provisions to protect disabled persons against discrimination, and both 
the Government and some private organizations provide them with 
financial assistance, little has been done to enable the disabled to 
participate normally in public life. There is no public access law, but 
some effort to accommodate the disabled is evident in the inclusion of 
ramps at curbs on new urban sidewalk construction. Public 
transportation firms have acquired some vehicles that are accessible to 
the disabled, as have some taxi companies. In June the State Assembly 
adopted amendments to the Citizenship and Aliens Law that make it 
possible for persons with serious sight, hearing, or speech impediments 
to become naturalized citizens without having to pass an examination on 
the Estonian Constitution and language.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is 
1.43 million. Ethnic Russians total approximately 29 percent, and 
nonethnic Estonians total approximately 37 percent. During the years of 
the country's forced annexation by the Soviet Union, large numbers of 
non-Estonians, predominantly ethnic Russians, were encouraged to 
migrate to Estonia to work as laborers and administrators. These 
immigrants and their descendants now compose approximately one-third of 
the total population; about 40 percent of them were born in Estonia. 
Approximately 8 percent of the population of the pre-1940 Republic was 
ethnic Russian.
    The OSCE mission in Estonia, established in 1993, continued to 
promote stability, dialog, and understanding among communities. The 
President's Roundtable also continued to work toward finding practical 
solutions to the problems of noncitizens. The Government during the 
year instituted an integration program for the years 2000-07 aimed at 
fostering the integration the non-Estonian-speaking portion of the 
population into Estonian society.
    The Law on Cultural Autonomy for citizens belonging to minority 
groups went into effect in 1993. The tradition of protection for 
cultural autonomy dates from a 1925 law. Some noncitizens termed the 
law discriminatory, since it restricts cultural autonomy only to 
citizens. The Government replied that noncitizens can participate fully 
in ethnic organizations and that the law includes subsidies for 
cultural organizations.
    Some noncitizens, especially Russians, continued to allege job, 
salary, and housing discrimination because of Estonian language 
requirements. Despite repeated Russian allegations of human rights 
violations against the noncitizen population, both the OSCE mission in 
Estonia and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities declared 
that they could not find a pattern of human rights violations or abuses 
in the country. The Government in 1998 addressed two outstanding 
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
by simplifying the civic knowledge portion of the naturalization 
process and passing legislation to grant automatic citizenship to 
children born after February 26, 1992, to resident stateless persons 
upon parental application. Also, at least 10 nongovernmental 
organizations develop and implement local programs to assist the 
integration of non-Estonians into society.
    Russian government officials and parliamentarians echoed these 
charges of discrimination in a variety of forums. In 1998 the 
Government accepted a Russian Government proposal to establish a high-
level commission to examine all aspects of bilateral relations. One of 
the subgroups of the commission would examine the humanitarian aspects 
of the Russian minority in Estonia and possibly of the Estonian 
minority in Russia. Although there has yet to be a formal session of 
the commission, its cochairs met in St. Petersburg in July.
    Other than for land ownership, the 1993 Property Ownership Law does 
not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of 
business or property ownership. A 1996 law on land ownership further 
liberalized land ownership by foreigners; such ownership now is 
restricted only in certain strategic areas. All legal residents of 
Estonia may participate equally in the privatization of state-owned 
housing.
    Estonian language requirements for those employed in the civil 
service went into effect in 1993. As originally passed, the Law on 
Public Service required state employees to be proficient in Estonian in 
1995. In December 1995, the State Assembly amended the Law on Public 
Service to allow noncitizen local and national government employees 
without adequate Estonian to continue working until February 1, 1997. 
No noncitizens were to be hired after January 1, 1996. This amendment 
reflected the Government's awareness that in some sectors, the number 
of employees with inadequate Estonian remained high. On February 9, 
1999, the State Assembly again amended the Law on Language, requiring 
that all public servants, service personnel, and sole proprietors be 
able to use the Estonian language. While the Government is to establish 
regulations pertaining to and describing the level of proficiency, the 
actual proficiency is to be determined through examination. Non-
Estonian citizens who have obtained at least primary education 
proficiency in the language are exempted from the requirement to pass a 
language examination. On July 27, 1999, the Government issued the 
implementation decree for the amendments to the language law regarding 
public sector employees as well as those employed in the medical 
profession. Some 150 ethnic Russian prison officials are expected to be 
fired in January for noncompliance with the language requirement.
    Following several rounds of consultations with European Commission 
experts, the Government presented, and the State Assembly approved on 
June 14, amendments to the Language Law that brought it into conformity 
with European Union (EU) recommendations regarding language 
requirements for persons working in the private sector. For employees 
of private enterprises, nonprofit organizations, and foundations, as 
well as sole proprietors, the amended law established a requirement of 
proficiency in the Estonian language if it was in the public interest. 
The OSCE Commissioner for National Minorities concluded that the 
amended law was largely in conformity with Estonia's international 
obligations and commitments.
    The language office liberally grants extensions to persons who can 
explain their failure to meet the requisite competence level in 4 
years. Estonian language training is available; however, some claim 
that it is too costly. Some Russian representatives have asked for free 
language training. They have charged also that the language requirement 
for citizenship is too difficult. There has been a proposal to make the 
language requirement less rigorous. The examination fee for either 
language test--for employment or citizenship--is 15 percent of the 
monthly minimum wage, although it is waived for the unemployed. The 
government office that conducts language examinations was forced to 
close for several months because of funding shortfalls. An EU program 
exists to reimburse language training costs for those who pass the 
examination.
    In districts where more than one-half of the population speak a 
language other than Estonian, the inhabitants are entitled by law to 
receive official information in that language.
    All residents, whether or not they are citizens, can complain 
directly to the State Court about alleged violations of human or 
constitutional rights. The State Court justices review each case and 
have decided in favor of complainants. All decisions are in Estonian, 
but if a complaint is received in a language other than Estonian 
(usually Russian), the court provides a translation.
    Two court cases begun in 1998 were resolved in May, when a court 
acquitted the leader of a Russian military pensioners' group in 
northeast Estonia and three other activists of charges that they 
fomented racial hatred by staging demonstrations. The pensioners' 
leader organized an unauthorized assembly in the city of Sillamae and 
claimed that the human rights of the Russian pensioners in the region 
were abused by the Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form and join a union or employee association. The Central 
Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) came into being as a 
wholly voluntary and purely Estonian organization in 1990 to replace 
the Estonian branch of the official Soviet labor confederation, the 
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The EAKL has 58,000 members. 
Another trade union, the Organization of Employee Unions, split from 
the EAKL in 1993 and has 45,000 members. A central union of food 
processing and rural workers was established in 1997. About one-third 
of the country's labor force belongs to one of the three labor 
federations.
    The right to strike is legal, and unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. The Constitution and statutes 
prohibit retribution against strikers. In June 5,000 energy, metal, and 
mining union workers staged a protest action in Ida-Virumaa county.
    Unions may join federations freely and affiliate internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers 
have the legally acquired right to bargain collectively, collective 
bargaining is still in its infancy. According to EAKL leaders, few 
collective bargaining agreements have been concluded between the 
management and workers of a specific enterprise. However, the EAKL has 
concluded framework agreements with producer associations, which 
provide the basis for specific labor agreements, including the setting 
of the minimum wage. The EAKL also was involved with developing the 
country's post-Soviet era Labor Code covering employment contracts, 
vacation, and occupational safety. The Labor Code principles prohibit 
antiunion discrimination, and employees have the right to go to court 
to enforce their rights. In 1993 laws covering collective bargaining, 
collective dispute resolution, and shop stewards were enacted.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor although it does not specifically 
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). The 
Labor Inspections Office effectively enforces this prohibition.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution forbids forced or bonded labor. The 
statutory minimum age for employment is 16 years. Minors 13 to 15 years 
of age may work provided that they have the written permission of a 
parent or guardian and the local labor inspector. The work may not 
endanger the minor's health or be considered immoral, cannot interfere 
with studies, and must be included on a Government-prepared list. 
Government authorities effectively enforce minimum age laws through 
inspections. There were no reports of forced or bonded labor by 
children in enterprises (see Section 6.c.); however, there were 
instances of families forcing their children to engage in peddling or 
begging.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government, after 
consultations with the EAKL and the Central Producers Union, sets the 
minimum wage. The monthly minimum wage is $82 (EEK 1,400). The minimum 
wage is not sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent 
standard of living. About 5 to 6 percent of the work force receive the 
minimum wage. The average monthly wage in the second quarter was about 
$296.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours, and there is a mandatory 24hour 
rest period. According to EAKL sources, legal occupational health and 
safety standards are satisfactory, but they are extremely difficult to 
achieve in practice. The National Labor Inspection Board is responsible 
for enforcement of these standards, but it has not been very effective 
to date. The labor unions also have occupational health and safety 
experts who assist workers to bring employers in compliance with legal 
standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous 
work situations without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, the existing criminal codes regarding kidnaping, 
extortion, and involuntary prostitution are used to address this 
problem. There were no official reports during the year that persons 
were trafficked in, to, or from the country. However, it is generally 
understood that job advertisements placed from abroad that request 
females are in some cases associated with international prostitution 
rings.
    The Government concluded several interstate cooperation agreements 
concerning fighting crime including human trafficking. It also 
concluded several bilateral agreements on the extradition of Estonian 
citizens accused of trafficking in other countries.
                               __________

                                FINLAND

    Finland is a constitutional republic with an elected head of state 
(President), a Parliament, a head of government (Prime Minister), and 
an independent judiciary.
    The security apparatus is controlled effectively by elected 
officials and supervised by the courts.
    The economy is mixed but primarily market based. It provides 
citizens with a high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking serious 
steps to address the problem of violence against women. There were 
reports of trafficking in persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, and the lower courts. The President appoints 
Supreme Court justices, who in turn appoint the lower court judges.
    The law provides for the right to fair public trial, and the 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Local courts may conduct a 
closed trial in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship cases, or when 
publicity would offend morality or endanger the security of the state. 
In national security cases, the judge may withhold from the public any 
or all information pertaining to charges, verdicts, and sentences. The 
law provides for sanctions against violators of such restrictions.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Nontraditional religious groups freely profess and propagate their 
beliefs. Such groups are eligible for some tax relief (e.g., they may 
receive tax-free donations), provided they are registered with the 
Government as religious communities. The Government's procedures for 
recognizing religious communities remained under review at year's end. 
About 87 percent of the population belongs to two state churches, the 
Lutheran and the Orthodox. All citizens belonging to one of these state 
churches pay, as part of their income tax, a church tax. These church 
taxes are used to defray the costs of operating the state churches. 
Those who do not want to pay the tax must notify the tax office.
    Such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints have been active in the country for decades. In 
1998 the Ministry of Education turned down the application of the 
Finnish Association of Scientologists to be registered as a religious 
community. This was the first time that an applicant had been denied 
church status. The Scientologists' application was pending for nearly 3 
years while the Government awaited additional information that it had 
requested from the association. The association acknowledged that it 
had not responded to the Government's request. The Education Ministry's 
decision can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. The 
Scientologists have not yet done so, but they have indicated that they 
may begin the process anew and reapply for recognition as a church.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
Approved refugees and asylum seekers are processed directly for 
residence. The issue of the provision of first asylum has never arisen. 
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid 
claim to refugee status.
    A total of 3,106 persons applied for asylum in 1999, up from 1,272 
in 1998. As many as 1,516 of them were Slovakian Roma. By August 20, 
2000, 2,472 persons had already submitted their applications for 
asylum. Of these applications, 1,192 were submitted by Polish Roma. In 
1999 the Directorate of Immigration processed 2,725 applications, 
awarding asylum to 29 persons and residence permits to 467. Government 
officials attribute the sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers 
from 1998 to the first half of 2000 to two factors: the 1999 fighting 
in Kosovo and the increase in 1999-2000 asylum applications from 
Slovakian and Polish Roma. The Government imposed a visa regime on 
Slovakian citizens in July 1999. Although the restriction was lifted in 
November of that year, it was reimposed in January 2000 for 6 
additional months after a large number of Slovakian Roma again entered 
the country and requested asylum.
    On July 10, a new asylum law took effect, under which immigration 
authorities must process an application within 7 days of the initial 
asylum examination. Asylum seekers who are rejected have 8 days in 
which to appeal the decision, after which time they are deported. This 
law is expected to decrease the number of asylum seekers substantially. 
Under the previous system, the processing of applications could take 
over a year. If the applicant received a negative decision, the 
processing of the appeal could take several years. Some members of the 
public and even politicians within the ruling coalition opposed the new 
law, citing the short period during which asylum seekers can appeal the 
rejection of their application. However, the Government defended the 
law by stating that it only can provide public resources and services 
to asylum seekers who have legitimate concerns about their safety and 
welfare in their home countries. Particularly in regard to Slovakian 
and Polish Roma, officials noted that the two source countries were 
aspirants for European Union (EU) membership and pointed out the 
contradiction of supporting Slovakia and Poland for EU membership while 
also offering asylum to their citizens.
    In 1999 a law went into effect to promote the integration of 
immigrants into society. This law is unrelated to the new statute 
governing asylum procedures; it is aimed instead at assisting those who 
have been granted asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of 
government. There are 75 women in the 200-member Parliament, and 7 in 
the 18-member Cabinet. The President, who is elected directly, and the 
Speaker of Parliament are women. A 1995 law requires a minimum of 40 
percent membership from each sex on all state committees, commissions, 
and appointed municipal bodies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, age, 
origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, or disability, and the 
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is 
taking steps to combat it. Police statistics for 1999 recorded 2,825 
cases of domestic violence, 117 more than the previous year. Of the 
victims, 2,290 were women, and 535 were men. A total of 514 cases of 
rape were reported to the police in 1999, compared with 463 in 1998. 
Government experts say that as many as half, if not more, of all rape 
cases may go unreported. The law specifically criminalizes rape, 
spousal rape, and domestic abuse. The law provides for stringent 
penalties for violence against women; the police and the courts 
vigorously enforce this provision.
    The number of calls to the police concerned with domestic violence 
is not compiled centrally but is estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 
annually. Shelter officials state that the figure represents less than 
half of the number of actual incidents. Most of the persons seeking 
shelter are women between 25 and 35 years of age, either married or in 
a common-law relationship. Nearly one-third are immigrants.
    The Union of Shelter Homes as well as the municipalities maintain 
homes all over the country for female, male, adult, and child victims 
of violence. The total number of shelters is around 20. The criteria 
for what counts as a shelter has changed. In the past battered persons 
in need of shelter could be given keys to apartments where they could 
spend the necessary length of time prior to returning home. These 
apartments were included in the 1999 statistics. Now, the minimum 
requirement for a shelter is 24-hour staff.
    A study published in 1998 indicated that the typical victim of 
family violence is a young woman between 18 and 24 years of age who is 
married or is living in a common law relationship. The study concluded 
that every fifth married woman or woman involved in a common law 
relationship has suffered from violent behavior at the hands of her 
partner. The study also concludes that as many as 40 percent of all 
women over the age of 15 have experienced some form of family violence. 
(The study considers psychological and verbal abuse as ``violence.//)
    In 1997 the Government began a special program to promote women's 
equality during the period from 1997 to 1999. This program consisted of 
30 projects, 1 of which focused on violence against women and domestic 
violence. The project against violence offered nationwide support for 
women in need and for men to combat their own tendencies to resort to 
violence. This project has been regarded as the most significant 
component of the women's equality program in that it has helped to 
break the taboo about the subject. The program may be renewed once the 
Government evaluates the results. The Government also promised to 
maintain a program against prostitution and violence until 2002.
    The government-established Council for Equality coordinates and 
sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers, mothers, 
widows, or retirees.
    The Constitution calls for the promotion of equality of the sexes 
in social activities and working life, the latter particularly in the 
determination of remuneration. In 1985 the Parliament passed a more 
detailed comprehensive equal rights law that mandates equal treatment 
for women in the workplace, including equal pay for ``comparable'' 
jobs. In practice comparable worth has not been implemented because of 
the difficulty of establishing criteria, but the Government, employers, 
unions, and others continued to work on implementation plans. Women's 
average earnings are 82 percent of those of men, and women still tend 
to be segregated in lower paying occupations. While women individually 
have attained leadership positions in the private and public sectors, 
there are disproportionately fewer women in top management jobs. 
Industry and finance, the labor movement, and some government 
ministries remain male dominated. Some 60 percent of physicians are 
women. Women serve in the armed forces. The Government's equality 
ombudsman monitors compliance with regulations against sexual 
discrimination. Of the 63 complaints processed by the Ombudsman between 
January 1 and June 30, 10 cases were judged to be violations of the 
law. In such cases, the law provides for correction of the situation as 
well as compensation for the complainant.
    There were reports of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. There is no pattern of societal abuse of 
children, and the national consensus supporting children's rights is 
enshrined in law.
    There were reports of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Although since the 1970's the law has 
required that new public buildings be accessible to people with 
physical disabilities, many older buildings remain inaccessible. No 
such law applies to public transportation, but each municipality 
subsidizes measures to improve accessibility to vehicles. Local 
governments maintain a free transport service that provides a minimum 
of 18 free trips per month for a disabled person. The deaf and the mute 
are provided interpretation services ranging from 120 to 240 hours 
annually. The Government provides subsidized public housing to the 
severely disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Sami (Lapps), who constitute less than 0.1 
percent of the population, benefit from legal provisions that provide 
for the protection of minority rights and customs. Sami language and 
culture are supported in the Constitution and financially by the 
Government. Sami receive subsidies to enable them to continue their 
traditional lifestyle, which revolves around reindeer herding. Sami 
have political and civil rights and are able to participate in 
decisions affecting their economic and cultural interests.
    In 1998 the President issued instructions on implementing an EU 
directive on the use of minority and regional languages. The 
directive's purpose is to ensure that the use of minority languages is 
permitted in school, the media, dealings with administrative and 
judicial authorities, economic and commercial life, and cultural 
activities. The Sami language belongs to the category of a minority 
language used regionally.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The number of immigrants rose 
from 18,000 in 1987 to 90,000 in 2000. Concurrent with this increase, 
concern has arisen about increasing expressions of racist and 
xenophobic behavior. Antiforeigner or racist violence has been 
reported. Leading government figures, including the President, have 
condemned such violence. The Government is attempting to address this 
problem in part through an indepth study of attitudes toward different 
ethnic groups. The government study examines discrimination in working 
life, looks into popular attitudes toward foreigners, and charts the 
attitudes of those authorities involved in immigration affairs--police, 
teachers, social workers, border guards, and employment office 
personnel. The popular attitudes survey found that half of those 
interviewed acknowledged some feelings of xenophobia or prejudice. The 
study continued at year's end.
    While the Government implemented new legislation during the year 
making it somewhat more difficult to gain political asylum (see Section 
2.d.), other government-sponsored initiatives were aimed at improving 
the situation of noncitizens. In 1999 a law promoting the enhanced 
integration of immigrants into society went into effect. In addition 
the Government in 1997 issued policy guidelines for promoting tolerance 
and combating racism.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to 
strike, and the Government respects these provisions. About 87 percent 
of the work force is organized. All unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. The law grants public sector 
employees the right to strike, with some exceptions for the provision 
of essential services. In the first half of the year, there were 72 
strikes (most of them minor and brief), of which 58 were wildcat 
strikes.
    Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective 
bargaining agreements usually are based on income policy agreements 
between employee and employer central organizations and the Government. 
The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint 
resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as 
labor law, both of which are enforced adequately.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition generally is 
observed in practice; however, there were reports of trafficking in 
persons (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor 
by children and adults, and such practices do not exist. The Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.). Youths under 16 years of age cannot work more than 6 
hours a day or at night, and education is compulsory for children from 
7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry enforces child labor 
regulations. There are virtually no complaints of the exploitation of 
children in the work force. The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 
on the worst forms of child labor in January.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated minimum 
wage, but the law requires all employers--including nonunionized ones--
to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements 
in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally 
afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families.
    The legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours. 
Employees working shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-
hour rest period during the week. The law is enforced effectively as a 
minimum, and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through 
effectively enforced collective bargaining agreements.
    The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, and 
the Labor Ministry effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse 
dangerous work situations without risk of penalty.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not explicitly prohibit 
trafficking in persons, although existing statutes address a range of 
trafficking-related crimes, and there were reports that trafficking 
occurred. Finland is a secondary destination-transit country for such 
trafficking. The Government believes that most such trafficking 
involves women and girls for prostitution. The Government and 
nongovernmental organizations are making a considerable effort to 
counter trafficking, e.g., through the Government's leading role in the 
EU's antitrafficking ``STOP'' project.
                               __________

                                 FRANCE

    France is a constitutional democracy with a directly elected 
president and National Assembly and an independent judiciary.
    The law enforcement and internal security apparatus consists of the 
Gendarmerie, the national police, and municipal police forces in major 
cities, all of which are under effective civilian control. Members of 
those police forces committed some human rights abuses.
    The highly developed, diversified, and primarily market-based 
economy provides residents with a high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide a means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. The police committed one extrajudicial 
killing. There were instances of the abuse of detainees, particularly 
foreigners, by law enforcement officers. Long delays in bringing cases 
to trial and lengthy pretrial detention are problems. Violence and 
threats against ethnic and religious minorities continued to decline; 
however, in October there were over 100 anti-Semitic incidents, 
including firebombings. The Government has taken important steps to 
deal with violence against women and children. The Government took 
steps to combat trafficking in women.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings by government officials.
    Law enforcement officers have used excessive forceparticularly 
directed against immigrants--resulting in deaths, although there is no 
evidence of a pattern of such abuses.
    In April a police officer shot and killed 25-year-old Ryad Hamlaoui 
while he was attempting to steal a car in Lille-Sud. The police officer 
believed that Hamlaoui was armed and that he was firing in self-
defense, but the authorities later determined that Hamlaoui was 
unarmed. The officer was suspended from duty, detained, and was charged 
with murder. The case was under investigation at year's end. The 
incident was followed by peaceful daytime demonstrations in Lille to 
protest the killing, and 3 nights of rioting.
    There were no developments in the judicial investigation of a 
police officer who shot and killed 17-year-old Habib Mohamed in 
Toulouse in 1998. Mohamed allegedly staggered away injured after being 
shot. The police officers involved reportedly failed to follow him, and 
also failed to follow required procedures to report that their weapons 
were fired. The investigation continued at year's end.
    A judicial investigation into the 1998 death of Mohammed Ali Saoud, 
who died following police intervention in a violent domestic 
disturbance, continued at year's end. The police had fired rubber 
bullets at Saoud and restrained him physically.
    In February the public prosecutor recommended to the investigating 
judge that no charges be brought against two of the police officers 
involved in the 1997 fatal shooting of 16yearold Abdel-Kader Bouziane. 
In March the investigating judge disagreed, and ruled that the police 
officers should be tried by the Court of Assizes. In October the 
chambre d'accusation (the prosecuting chamber of the criminal court) of 
the Paris Court of Appeals ruled that the charges against two of the 
officers should be dropped. The same court charged a third policeman in 
December; he is expected to be tried by the Court of Assizes. An appeal 
was pending at year's end.
    In November 1997, the gendarme who shot and killed Franck Moret was 
released by the correctional court in Valence, prompting the family of 
the deceased to appeal the judgment. In July 1998, the appeals court 
overturned the decision of the correctional court and sentenced the 
officer to an 18-month suspended prison term. The officer appealed the 
court's decision, and on January 5, the Court of Cassation ruled in his 
favor and reversed the decision of the appeals court.
    The trial of three police officers involved in the 1991 death of 
18year-old Aissa Ihich, who allegedly was beaten by police officers and 
subsequently died of an asthmatic attack because he allegedly was 
refused medication, was scheduled to begin in January 2001. A case 
against a doctor still was pending at year's end.
    On April 19, a bomb exploded at a restaurant near Dinan, and killed 
a female employee. The ``Breton Resistance Army'' claimed 
responsibility for an earlier bomb in Pornic, which damaged buildings 
but caused no injuries, but denied responsibility for the Dinan 
bombing; however, the police determined that similar explosives were 
used in both incidents. According to press reports, the investigation 
was at a standstill by year's end.
    The investigation into the 1998 killing of Corsican Prefet Claude 
Erignac continued at year's end. According to press reports, a total of 
nine persons have been detained in connection the killing. Yvan 
Colonna, who is presumed to have fired the shots that killed Erignac, 
was still at large and was believed to be hiding on the island at 
year's end.
    In June 1999, SOS-Attentats organization (the nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) which represents the 170 persons who were killed in 
the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772) brought a civil case against Libyan 
leader Mu'ammar alQadhafi for ``aiding and abetting voluntary 
homicide.'' In October 1999, the Paris prosecutor's office challenged 
the antiterrorism magistrate's decision to investigate the civil 
complaint, and the case reached the Court of Appeals on September 8. 
The Court ruled that Qadhafi had no sovereign immunity for terrorist 
acts. In October the Paris prosecutor's office appealed this decision 
to the Court of Cassation. A final decision is expected in May or June 
2001.
    In September 1999, an investigating judge decided that Nazi war 
criminal Alois Brunner should be tried in absentia on charges of crimes 
against humanity. Brunner previously was sentenced to death in absentia 
by a French military court in 1954, but vanished and was believed to 
have been living in Syria. According to press reports, in 1992 the 
Damascus publication Lettre d'Orient announced that Brunner had died, 
but Syrian authorities and Brunner's ex-wife and daughter refused to 
confirm or deny the report. The Chambre d'Accusation reviewed the 
investigating judge's decision in November 1999 and agreed in December 
1999 that the case should be sent to the Court of Assizes for a trial. 
The deliberations of the Court of Assizes continued at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities 
punish officials who employ them. There were reports that law 
enforcement officers used excessive force, particularly against 
immigrants; however, no complaints or criminal reports were filed. 
Isolated instances of police abuse occurred, but there is no evidence 
of a pattern of abuse.
    In May the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), 
an organ of the Council of Europe, visited the country as part of its 
regular program of periodic visits to member states. A report is 
expected in 2001.
    The Government is in the process of instituting certain judicial 
and administrative reforms that address mistreatment of detainees by 
law enforcement officials. In June Parliament passed a law that created 
a national commission on security ethics to oversee the actions of law 
enforcement officials and to investigate complaints of police abuse 
from witnesses or victims; the commission subsequently was established.
    An administrative investigation into a March 1997 incident in which 
riot police beat a few dozen persons demonstrating against the National 
Front (FN) in Marseille continued at year's end. According to 
eyewitnesses, the police allegedly used excessive force by beating 
demonstrators and using tear gas grenades to keep the anti-FN 
demonstrators away from their FN counterparts.
    In July 1999, the authorities arrested Mauritanian army Captain Ely 
Ould Dah in Montpellier, in response to accusations by two Mauritanian 
refugees living in France. The refugees alleged that Dah was 
responsible for torture inflicted upon them when they were soldiers in 
Mauritania in 1990 and 1991 and were suspected of taking part in an 
attempted coup d'etat against Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya. 
Dah was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the French League of Human 
Rights under the International Convention Against Torture. The 
authorities detained him for questioning; the Montpellier Court of 
Appeal released him in September 1999, but required that he remain in 
the country. In April Dah violated the terms of his release and 
returned to Mauritania. According to the International Federation of 
Human Rights Leagues, the Court of Appeals continued to investigate the 
allegations at year's end.
    In December 1999 and January, the main Corsican separatist groups 
agreed to a ``cease fire'' in order to allow elected Corsican officials 
to engage in a dialog with the Government. In July the Government and 
Corsican officials agreed to a plan that would give more legislative 
authority to Corsica's elected officials. Although the cease fire is 
still in effect, after the July agreement there were several bombings 
in Corsica (with some minor injuries) and one shooting attack in which 
Jean-Michel Rossi, a writer and former Corsica nationalist militant, 
and his bodyguard, Jean-Claude Fratacci, were killed. In December a 
bomb exploded at the police barracks in Corsica; a policeman was 
injured.
    Prison conditions generally exceed minimum international standards; 
however, public debate continued on the adequacy of prison conditions. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 262 deaths of persons 
in custody in 1999, of which 125 were suicides. In May the NGO 
International Observer of Prisons (IOP) published a report that 
criticized prison conditions. The report concluded that prisons are 
overcrowded, have unacceptable hygienic conditions, and provide 
inadequate food to inmates. The report focused on the problems that 
result from overcrowded prison cells and stated that as of December 1, 
1999, the average rate of occupation in prisons was 119 percent of 
intended capacity. There were no reports of incidents of alleged 
brutality by prison guards during the year; however, the IOP reported 
in May that two such incidents occurred in 1999.
    On July 5, the National Assembly and Senate each released the 
conclusions of a special investigation that each body performed 
concerning prison conditions. The investigations were prompted by a 
book written by Veronique Vasseur, the head medical officer at La Sante 
prison in Paris, which was published in January. Vasseur's book 
criticized living conditions and the availability of health care in La 
Sante prison, and led to public debate over general prison conditions. 
After 5 months of investigations, the National Assembly and Senate each 
concluded that prison reforms were necessary; however, their reform 
proposals differed. The National Assembly noted a vast difference in 
prison conditions across the country and concluded that a prison reform 
law was needed to mandate universal standards for all prisons. The 
Senate, noting more specific problems such as overcrowded cells and 
inadequate numbers of guards, concluded that a universal law would not 
be effective and instead recommended that the Government focus on 
specific problems requiring more immediate attention.
    Observers have criticized the current prison oversight mechanism as 
being ineffective because there is no external administrative oversight 
outside of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for both 
prison administration and the discipline of prison officials. In March 
the working group known as the Canivet Commission delivered its report 
on a draft code of ethics for prison guards to the Minister of Justice. 
Among other things, the commission recommended creating an office of 
prison inspectors, headed by a person named by the President, which 
would have the power to conduct investigations and to evaluate prison 
conditions and policies. The Government was considering this 
recommendation and the possibility of a code of ethics for prison 
guards at year's end.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these 
prohibitions.
    The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its 
inability to process suspects quickly. Some suspects spend many years 
in prison before a trial even starts. According to the Prison 
Administration, as of January 1, approximately 18,100 of the 51,411 
persons held in jails and prisons were awaiting trial. A system of bail 
exists.
    In June Parliament passed the ``presumption of innocence'' bill, 
which includes provisions that address pretrial detention and which are 
designed to reduce the number of persons held in jails and prisons 
awaiting trial; however, none of the bill's provisions were in effect 
at year's end. The bill establishes a new system of ``detention 
judges'' (to be implemented in 2001), who are to decide if a suspect is 
to be kept in detention pending trial. Generally pretrial detention 
only is allowed if there is a possibility that the suspect may be 
sentenced (if convicted) to more than 3 years in prison for crimes 
against persons and to more than 5 years in prison for crimes against 
property. The bill also gives detainees the right to see their lawyer 1 
hour after being detained by the police.
    On October 31, the Paris correctional court released the last of 
the 53 suspects who had been arrested in May 1998 in a roundup of 
suspected Islamic terrorists. The court cited insufficient evidence.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The court system includes local courts, 35 regional courts of 
appeal, and the highest criminal court, the Court of Cassation, which 
considers appeals on procedural grounds only. In January the Court of 
Cassation announced that defendants no longer would be required to 
present themselves to be taken into custody in order to pursue an 
appeal to the Court of Cassation. The ``presumption of innocence'' 
bill, passed by the Parliament in June (see Section 1.d.) contains a 
provision that allows defendants to seek ``reexamination'' of a court 
decision that has been found by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) to have violated the European Convention on Human Rights.
    The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its 
inability to process suspects quickly (see Section 1.d.).
    On May 23, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Leonardus Van 
Pelt. Van Pelt was arrested for drug trafficking in Spain in January 
1987, extradited to France in November 1987, tried, and convicted in 
February 1990 by the Bobigny District Court. He challenged aspects of 
subsequent appeals proceedings, including the requirement that he 
present himself to be taken into custody by law enforcement officials 
in order to pursue an appeal before the Court of Cassation. The ECHR 
ruled that some of these proceedings violated Van Pelt's right to a 
fair trial.
    On July 20, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Adrian Caloc. 
The Court rejected Caloc's argument that he had been ``treated in an 
inhuman or degrading manner'' by police authorities when he was 
arrested in 1998, but the Court ruled that Caloc's complaint against 
the police was not heard and decided within a ``reasonable amount of 
time.'' Because of lengthy police investigations and numerous appeals, 
it took more than 7 years for Caloc to obtain a final decision on his 
complaint.
    In cases of serious crimes, investigating judges detain suspects 
for questioning and direct the criminal investigation that occurs 
before a case is tried. In some cases this procedure has resulted in 
lengthy detentions of suspects before they are tried (see Section 
1.d.). The chambre d'accusation reviews the investigating judge's 
investigation to determine whether the charge established by the 
investigating judge is appropriate. The Court of Assizes investigates 
and decides cases involving the most serious offenses.
    In March the Paris Court of Appeal reconsidered the convictions of 
33 of the 138 persons tried in the October 1998 ``Chalabi network'' 
case. The court cleared four persons of all charges and released them; 
it upheld the convictions and sentences of the other persons.
    As a result of the motion for retrial submitted in January 1999, 
new evidence was discovered in the case of Omar Raddad, who was 
convicted of killing his employer in 1994. The resulting reports are 
scheduled to be released in the spring of 2001, at which time the Court 
of Cassation may decide to revise the original verdict.
    Raddad's attorney had argued that a key defense witness in the 
original trial was expelled on a technicality.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
    The judge investigating the wiretapping cases deemed inappropriate 
by the National Commission for the Regulation of Wiretapping (NCRWT) 
completed his investigation at the end of 1999 and presented his 
findings to the Paris public prosecutor's office in February; the 
office was considering the matter at year's end. According to the 
annual report of the NCRWT, the number of administrative wiretaps put 
in place in 1999 remained constant. The quota on the number of 
administrative wiretaps, which was set by the Prime Minister in 1997, 
did not change during 1999, and the number of administrative wiretaps 
put in place during 1999 was below the quota. Wiretapping is recognized 
legally as a right of the Government.
    Debate continues over whether Muslim girls have the right to wear 
headscarves in public schools (see Section 2.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company 
violated the law by permitting the public display of Nazi artifacts for 
sale on the Internet (see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There 
are regular demonstrations on various issues, which occur generally 
without incident. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by 
the Church of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration involving 
10,000 participants. The Church alleged discrimination; however, the 
prefecture justified the denial based upon the proposed size and 
duration of the demonstration, which would make it difficult to 
maintain public order. The group rented a private park outside Paris in 
which to hold their gathering.
    In December police clashed with demonstrators protesting the 
European Union summit held in Nice. The protesters used Molotov 
cocktail bombs, stones, and steel police barriers; police responded 
with tear gas, water cannons, and clubs. More than 20 persons were 
injured in clashes between police and protesters. On December 6, 
approximately 12 persons were injured when police officers used tear 
gas to prevent demonstrators in Ventimiglia from travelling to the 
summit.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion 
and the separation of church and state, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice; however, the Government took some 
actions during the year that affected religious minorities that it 
describes as ``sects.'' The 1905 law on separation of church and 
state--the foundation of current legislation on religious freedom--
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of faith.
    Religious groups may register as ``associations cultuelles'' 
(associations of worship) or as ``associations culturelles'' (cultural 
associations); religious groups normally register in both of these 
categories. Associations in these two categories are subject to certain 
management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of 
worship is exempt from taxes, but can organize only religious 
activities; it may not operate a school, print publications, or employ 
a board president. A cultural association is a type of for-profit 
association whose goal is to promote the culture of a certain group; 
although not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for 
its cultural and educational operations (such as schools). Religious 
groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an 
association of worship and therefore receive tax-exempt status under a 
1905 statute. The prefecture, upon reviewing the documentation supplied 
regarding the association's purpose for existence, then can grant that 
status; however, the prefecture can decide to review a group's status 
if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to 
the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that 
the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its 
status can be changed, and it can be required to pay a 60 percent tax 
rate on present and past donations.
    For historical reasons, contrary to practice in the rest of the 
country, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed (Protestant), and Roman 
Catholic religions in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy 
special legal status. Adherents of these four religions may choose to 
have a portion of their income tax allocated to their church in a 
system administered by the central Government.
    The State subsidizes private schools, including those that are 
church affiliated. Central or local governments also own and provide 
upkeep for other religious buildings constructed before 1905, the date 
of the law separating church and state.
    Some religious minorities have experienced problems with the 
wearing of special religious clothing. For example, debate continued 
over whether denying some Muslim girls the right to wear headscarves in 
public schools constituted a violation of the right to practice their 
religion. Various courts and government bodies have considered the 
question; however, there has been no definitive national decision on 
the issue. In June 1999, the Government Commissioner recommended that 
the administrative court repeal its October 1998 to expel a girl who 
refused to remove her headscarf. The Government Commissioner stated 
that no threat to public order was posed and that the school 
administrator was incompetent to make the definitive decision. In 
October 1999, the Conseil d'Etat reaffirmed a ban on headscarves in 
public schools.
    The Government's response to some minority groups that it views as 
``sects'' or ``cults'' has been to continue to encourage public 
caution. In 1996 the National Assembly's parliamentary commission, also 
known as the Gest or the Guyard Commission, issued a report that 
defined sects as groups that place inordinate importance on finances; 
cause a rupture between adherents and their families; are responsible 
for physical as well as psychological attacks on members; recruit 
children; profess ``antisocial'' ideas; disturb public order; have 
``judiciary problems;'' and/or attempt to infiltrate organs of the 
State. Government officials have stated that ``sects'' are 
``associations whose structure is ideological and totalitarian and 
whose behavior seriously oppresses fundamental liberties as well as 
social equilibrium.'' (These attributes are in addition to specific 
criminal behavior prohibited by law.) The Commission's report 
identified 173 groups as sects, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
Church of Scientology. The report was prepared without the benefit of 
full and complete hearings regarding the groups identified on the list. 
Groups were not told why they were placed on the list, and, because the 
document exists as a commission report to the National Assembly, there 
is no mechanism for changing or amending the list short of a new 
National Assembly commission inquiry and report.
    The Government has not outlawed any of the groups on the list; 
however, the ensuing publicity contributed to an atmosphere of 
intolerance and bias against minority religions. Some religious groups 
reported that their members suffered increased intolerance after having 
been identified on the list. A number of individuals who belong to 
groups on the list continued to report discrimination during the year--
for example, the loss of a job or the denial of a bank loan--which they 
believe occurred because of their affiliation with a ``sect.'' In a 
November 1998 report, the International Helsinki Federation criticized 
the identification of the 173 groups, which it stated ``resulted in 
media reports libeling minority religions, the circulation of rumors 
and false information, and incitement of religious intolerance.'' The 
Commission's findings also led to calls for legislative action to 
restrict the activities of sects, which the Government rejected on 
grounds of religious freedom. Instead, the Justice Ministry issued a 
directive to all government entities to be vigilant against possible 
abuses by sects, and all government offices were instructed to monitor 
potentially abusive sect activities.
    In 1996 the Government created an interministerial working group on 
sects (known as the Observatory on Sects) to analyze the phenomenon of 
sects and to develop proposals for dealing with them. The working 
group's final report in 1996 made several proposals, including the 
granting of legal standing to organizations that oppose sects; a 
modification of the law requiring associations to divulge information 
regarding the sources and management of their finances related to their 
effort to obtain tax-exempt status; a limit on the allocation of public 
campaign funds in order to limit public financial support for small 
fringe groups; the creation of a representative in each prefecture to 
provide information on sects to local officials; the creation of a 
permanent commission at the European Union level to reinforce 
international cooperation in controlling sect activities; and measures 
to restrict group members' entry into professional training programs.
    In March a Paris Correctional Court fined Jacques Guyard, the 
president of the parliamentary commission and a drafter of the 1996 
National Assembly report on socalled sects, approximately $2,850 
(20,000 francs) in response to complaints by three groups that were 
named in a parliamentary commission's June 1999 report on the financing 
of religious groups named in the original report. The court also 
ordered Guyard to pay approximately $12,850 (90,000 francs) in damages. 
The Federation of Steiner Schools, the New Brotherly Economy, and ``le 
Mercure Federale'' (an anthroposophical medical association) had filed 
a complaint against Guyard for slander for calling the groups ``sects'' 
in a June 1999 television interview. The court found that Guyard had 
made accusations against these groups when existing evidence did not 
warrant even a serious inquiry into their activities. The court noted 
that the parliamentary commission's report resulted from written 
declarations from persons claiming to be victims of anthroposophy, but 
that the parliamentary commission had not heard any of the claims in 
person, and that there was no supporting documentation for accusations 
that the groups had used mental manipulation, pressured persons to give 
them money, or used practical medicine that endangered lives. The court 
rejected Guyard's attempts to qualify his statements, and also rejected 
a request from Guyard's lawyer for parliamentary immunity. The 1999 
report in question focused on multinational groups, especially 
Jehovah's Witnesses and Scientologists. The stated basis of concern was 
that these groups may use excessive or dishonest means to obtain 
donations, which then are transferred out of the country and beyond the 
reach of French tax authorities.
    In October 1998, the Government issued a new decree disbanding the 
Observatory on Sects and creating an ``Interministerial Mission to 
Battle Against Sects'' (mission interministerielle de lutte contre les 
sectes). Although the decree instructs the commission to ``analyze the 
phenomenon of sects,'' it does not define what is meant by the term 
``sect,'' or how sects differ from religions. The Interministerial 
Mission also is charged with serving as a coordinator of periodic 
interministerial meetings, at which government officials are to 
exchange information and coordinate their actions against sects. In 
December 1998, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging state 
prosecutors to cooperate with the Interministerial Mission in bringing 
actions against sects.
    On February 7, the Interministerial Mission submitted its 1999 
annual report to the Prime Minister, which addressed the perceived 
problem of sects or cults. The report specifically raised the 
possibility of the dissolution of movements which, being ``in essence 
and in action totalitarian'' are dangerous to their members and to 
democracy in general. The report urges government action to deal with 
sects or cults according to their degrees of dangerousness, such as 
groups that limit personal freedoms of members, ``new age'' groups, and 
``absolutist'' groups which are totalitarian in nature. However, the 
report does not advocate new legislation to abolish groups considered 
to be dangerous. The report presents two options: The use of criminal 
cases against individuals for violating existing laws, which rarely is 
done; and the use of existing administrative and political means--a 
1936 decree against ``factious leagues"--which would require action by 
the Council of Ministers and the assent of the President. The report 
specifically cites concerns regarding the Church of Scientology and the 
``Solar Temple'' group.
    On December 21, the Interministerial Mission against Sects 
submitted its 2000 annual report. The report highlighted the 
globalization of sect/cult influence, specifically in underdeveloped 
countries and focused on the ``infiltration'' of NGO's by sects/cults. 
Within the context of developments within the country, the report 
evaluated the influence of sect/cult movements in the three overseas 
departments (Guyana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique). A case study examined 
the anthroposophical movement, founded by Austrian Rudolf Steiner, and 
recommended sustained vigilance over the Steiner schools.
    On June 22, the National Assembly passed on its first reading a 
private bill that would tighten restrictions on religious and other 
organizations. This bill--which amended an earlier version that had 
originated in and had been passed by the Senate in December 1999--
included the following clauses: (1) criteria for the dissolution of so-
called ``sects,'' (2) the prohibition of sect publicity in 
``vulnerable'' areas (i.e., near schools and hospitals), (3) 
prohibition of the reconstitution of dissolved ``sects'' under a 
different name, and (4) establishment of the new crime of ``mental 
manipulation.'' The Justice Minister at the time, who attended the 
National Assembly vote, noted that certain provisions of the bill would 
help ``victims'' of ``sects,'' but warned that other provisions might 
threaten fundamental liberties, such as freedom of association and 
belief. She questioned whether certain clauses were in conformity with 
the European Convention on Human Rights and called for a ``parallel 
reflection'' on these points to be organized by human rights groups 
when the Senate reconsidered the bill. On November 8, the Senate held 
hearings on the bill. Representatives from the Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish, and Muslim faiths, who had not been consulted previously, 
expressed their concerns that the provisions of the bill could be 
abused. The Senate was not expected to schedule the next reading of the 
bill until April 2001.
    In December 1998, the National Assembly debated and passed a 
private bill that would allow two specific antisect groups, both 
classified as ``public utilities,'' to become parties to court actions 
involving sects. Its main provisions, with some modifications, were 
integrated into a separate bill on legal reform aimed at strengthening 
the presumption of innocence and victims' rights (see Section 1.d.). In 
June Parliament passed that bill, which contains a provision that 
allows some associations that aid individuals against groups that 
``create or exploit psychological or physical dependence'' to become 
civil parties to certain criminal proceedings involving such groups. 
This provision is intended to allow antisect groups to become civil 
parties in certain proceedings involving sects.
    Some observers are concerned about the scrutiny with which tax 
authorities have examined the financial records of some religious 
groups. The Government currently does not recognize all branches of 
Jehovah's Witnesses or the Church of Scientology as qualifying 
religious associations for tax purposes, and therefore subjects them to 
a 60 percent tax on all funds they receive. In June the Conseil d'Etat 
decided that 2 branches of the 11 branches of Jehovah's Witnesses could 
be recognized as religious associations according to the 1905 law and 
thus be exonerated from certain tax obligations.
    In January 1996, the tax authorities began an audit of the French 
Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, and in May 1998, the tax 
authorities formally assessed the 60 percent tax against donations 
received by Jehovah's Witnesses from September 1992 through August 
1996. In June 1998, tax authorities began proceedings to collect the 
assessed tax, including steps to place a lien on the property of the 
National Consistory of Jehovah's Witnesses. The tax proceedings 
continued at year's end. In July a Nanterre court decided against the 
French Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, ruling that the Jehovah's 
Witnesses would have to pay over $42 million (300 million francs) in 
back taxes to the fiscal authorities. In the same month the Jehovah's 
Witnesses appealed the Nanterre court's decision to the Versailles 
Court of Appeals, the appeal was pending at year's end.
    The authorities previously took similar action against the Church 
of Scientology. In the case of the Paris church, the Ministry of 
Finance refused to grant the church authorization to import funds to 
pay the claimed taxes although the church offered to pay the total 
amount of all taxes assessed, a percentage of which would have come 
from outside the country. Subsequently in December 1997, the Government 
filed legal action for the claimed amount against the former officers 
of the Paris church and against the Church of Scientology International 
(a California nonprofit organization). The hearing in this legal action 
was deferred pending a decision regarding a 1998 administrative claim 
filed with the Conseil d'Etat by the Paris church that the Minister of 
Finance acted improperly in refusing to allow the church to import 
funds to pay the assessed taxes. In January 1999, the Conseil d'Etat 
requested the advice of the European Court of Justice. On March 14, the 
Court ruled that French law was incompatible with European Union laws 
regulating the free flow of capital; however, the Court ruled that such 
regulations could be allowed if required on the grounds of a threat to 
public security or public policy. The Court ruled the French laws were 
not sufficiently detailed and, on December 8, the Conseil d'Etat found 
the State at fault and upheld the decision of the European Court of 
Justice. However, the judgment's practical effect was limited because 
the affected churches had dissolved themselves and been reconstituted 
in the intervening period under different names.
    In July 1997, a Court of Appeals in Lyon recognized Scientology as 
a religion in its opinion in the conviction of Jean-Jacques Mazier, a 
former leader of the Scientologists, for contributing to the 1988 
suicide of a church member. In response the Minister of the Interior 
stated that the court had exceeded its authority and that the 
Government does not recognize Scientology as a religion. The Government 
appealed the Court of Appeals decision, but in June 1999, the Court of 
Cassation rejected the Government's appeal, but the Court stated that 
it lacked the authority to decide if Scientology was a religion.
    There have been a number of court cases against the Church of 
Scientology, which generally involved former members who sue the Church 
for fraud, and sometimes for the practice of medicine without a 
license. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by the Church 
of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration (see Section 2.b.); the 
group held their gathering in a private park.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the grant of refugee/asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government provides 
first asylum. In 1999 the Government received 30,907 requests for 
asylum and issued 4,659 refugee certificates (a document issued to 
successful asylum applicants). The Government generally cooperates with 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports of the 
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. On September 24, voters approved a referendum to 
shorten the term of the President from 7 years to 5 years. Abstention 
rates for the vote were almost 70 percent.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics or government; however, they remain significantly 
underrepresented in public offices, especially at the national level. 
Eleven of 32 cabinet members, 20 of 321 senators, and 57 of 577 
deputies in the National Assembly are women. The European Union 
Parliament includes a larger French female presence--40 percent of the 
country's elected representatives are female. To increase women's 
participation, some parties have established quotas for them on 
electoral lists or in party management. In June 1999, a joint session 
of both the Senate and the National Assembly approved a constitutional 
amendment on the principle of ``equal access of men and women to 
electoral mandates and elective functions.'' In May the Parliament 
adopted a law that implemented the constitutional amendment. The law 
provides that, starting with the municipal elections in March 2001, 
political parties are to have equal numbers of women and men on their 
lists of candidates. The President and the Prime Minister continued 
discussions on modernizing the country's political institutions, 
including measures to encourage a greater number of women in political, 
social, and public positions.
    The citizens of the ``collective territory'' of Mayotte and the 
territories of French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia 
determine their legal and political relationships to France by means of 
referendums, and they elect deputies and senators to the French 
Parliament, along with the overseas departments.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of local and international human rights 
organizations operate freely, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views. The National Consultative 
Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR)--which has nongovernmental as well 
as government members--also monitors complaints and advises the 
Government on policies and legislation. It is an independent body in 
the Office of the Prime Minister.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic 
background, or political opinion, and the Government effectively 
enforces them.
    Women.--The Penal Code prohibits rape and spousal abuse, and law 
enforcement authorities vigorously enforce these laws; however, 
violence against women remains a problem. The Ministry of Interior 
reported that in 1999 there were 7,958 rapes and 12,732 instances of 
other criminal sexual assault. The penalties for domestic violence vary 
according to the type of crime and range from 3 years imprisonment and 
a fine of approximately $42,450 (300,000 francs) to 20 years in prison. 
The penalty for rape is 15 years in prison, which may be increased due 
to other circumstances (such as the age of the victim or the nature of 
the relationship of the rapist to the victim). The Government sponsors 
and funds programs for women who are victims of violence, including 
shelters, counseling, and hot lines. Numerous private associations also 
assist abused women.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution 
is legal; acting as a pimp is not. A government agency, the Central 
Office on the Treatment of Human Beings (OCRTEH), addresses trafficking 
in women, prostitution, and pimping.
    The law prohibits sex-based job discrimination and sexual 
harassment in the workplace; however, these laws have encountered 
difficulties in implementation. Women's rights groups criticize the 
scope of the law as narrow and the fines and compensatory damages as 
often modest. For example, the law limits sexual harassment claims to 
circumstances where there is a supervisorsubordinate relationship but 
fails to address harassment by colleagues or a hostile work 
environment.
    The law requires that women receive equal pay for equal work, but 
this requirement often is not implemented in practice. Reports by 
various governmental organizations and NGO's indicates that men 
continue to earn more than women, and unemployment rates continue to be 
higher for women than for men. For example, a report released in 
September 1999 by National Assembly Deputy Catherine Genisson indicated 
that in the country's 5,000 largest firms, the average difference in 
salary between men and women is 27 percent. A study by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies indicated that in March 
the unemployment rate for women was 11.9 percent, compared with 8.5 
percent for men.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Ministry for Family Affairs oversees 
implementation of the Government's programs for children.
    There are strict laws against child abuse, particularly when 
committed by a parent or guardian. In 1999 there were approximately 
18,500 reported cases of mistreatment (physical violence, sexual abuse, 
mental cruelty, or severe negligence) of children. Approximately 4,800 
of these cases involved reports of sexual abuse. Special sections of 
the national police and judiciary are charged with handling these 
cases. The Government provides counseling, financial aid, foster homes, 
and orphanages, depending on the extent of the problem. Various 
associations also help minors seek justice in cases of mistreatment by 
parents.
    Some immigrants from countries where female genital mutilation 
(FGM) is customary subject their children to this practice, which is 
condemned widely by international health experts as damaging to both 
physical and psychological health. Authorities prosecute FGM cases 
under the provisions of the Penal Code, which states that acts of 
violence towards children that result in mutilation shall be tried in 
the highest criminal court. Since 1993 the Government and private 
associations have undertaken a campaign to inform immigrants that FGM 
is contrary to the law and would be prosecuted.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. A 1991 law requires new public buildings to be 
accessible to the physically disabled, but most older buildings and 
public transportation are not accessible.
    Religious Minorities.--The number of anti-Semitic incidents 
increased in the fall, due in part to increased unrest in the Middle 
East. According to the annual NCCHR report on racism and xenophobia, 
released in the spring, there were a total of 51 threats and 9 acts of 
violence in 1999, compared with 73 threats and 1 act of violence in 
1998.
    During October more than 100 anti-Semitic incidents, ranging from 
graffiti to harassment to firebombing, occurred across the country, 
mainly as a result of increasing tensions in the Middle East. For 
example, on October 10, a synagogue in Trappes was set on fire and 
destroyed. The city government allowed the congregation to use a city 
hall for the celebration of one of the Jewish high holy days. On 
October 12-14, local authorities in Strasbourg recovered several 
Molotov cocktails that had been planted in a synagogue. On October 14, 
a synagogue in Lyon was rammed by a car and then caught fire. Three 
synagogues in the Paris suburb of Bagnolet and a Jewish shop in Toulon 
were firebombed. On October 17, six incendiary devices were discovered 
outside a Jewish school in Paris. On October 23, a synagogue in 
Marseille was firebombed. It appeared that youths were responsible for 
many of these incidents, and some arrests were made. Government 
leaders, members of the Jewish community, the Paris Grand Mosque, the 
Protestant Federation, and the French Conference of Bishops strongly 
criticized the violence. The Government increased police security for 
Jewish institutions.
    On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company 
violated a law prohibiting defamation and incitement to hate crimes 
when it permitted the public display of Nazi artifacts for sale on the 
Internet. Following a hearing on July 24, the judge postponed 
implementation of the order. On November 21, a judge upheld the 
verdict, and ordered the company to block access from the country to 
sites offering Nazi memorabilia within 3 months.
    In October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld a Bordeaux court's 
1998 conviction of Maurice Papon for his actions as secretary general 
of the Prefecture of Gironde from 1942 to 1944. Papon was found guilty 
of complicity in committing crimes against humanity for his role in the 
deportation of hundreds of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during the 
World War II German occupation. The Bordeaux court had sentenced him to 
10 years' imprisonment; however, he had not been detained because he 
had appealed to the Court of Cassation, and just before that court's 
ruling, Papon fled from his home. His failure to appear resulted in an 
automatic rejection of his appeal. On October 22, 1999, he was arrested 
in Switzerland and returned to France; he remained in prison at year's 
end. In April Papon filed an appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights; the appeal was pending at year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Anti-immigrant sentiments led 
to various incidents, including occasional attacks on members of the 
large Arab/Muslim and black African communities. The annual NCCHR 
report noted a continuing decrease in the number of reported incidents 
of racist threats79 threats were reported in 1999, a decrease from 91 
in 1998. However, the number of reported incidents of racist violence 
increased to 12 in 1999 from 8 in 1998. There were no deaths due to 
racist violence in 1999.
    The Government strongly condemns such actions and attacks and has 
strict antidefamation laws. Government programs attempt to combat 
racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing 
together local officials, police, and citizen groups. There are also 
antiracist educational programs in some public school systems. The 
annual NCCHR report suggested that the Government continue to 
strengthen its laws against racist acts.
    According to the 1999 public opinion poll reported in the annual 
NCCHR report, 12 percent of those polled admitted to being ``rather 
racist,'' 27 percent admitted to being ``a little racist,'' 30 percent 
said they were ``not very racist,'' 29 percent said that they were 
``not at all racist,'' and 2 percent had no response.
    Romani asylum seekers often remain in the country after their 
claims have been denied. They do not have official papers, which limits 
their access to health care and education. They often live in crowded 
conditions without proper sanitary facilities.
    The Administrative Court in Nantes continued to consider the June 
1998 appeal of Moroccan national Khaddouj Tahir at year's end. In 1997 
Tahir was refused naturalization because she wore a hejab veil during 
her final interview. Naturalization officials stated that ``her 
garments showed a refusal to integrate into the French community.'' 
According to the law, applicants for naturalization must demonstrate 
their assimilation into French society as well as their loyalty to the 
French nation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association for all workers. Trade unions exercise significant 
economic and political influence, although less than 10 percent of the 
work force is unionized. Unions have legally mandated roles (as do 
employers) in the administration of social institutions, including 
social security (health care and most retirement systems), the 
unemployment insurance system, labor courts, and the Economic and 
Social Council, a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
    Unions are independent of the Government, and most are not aligned 
with any political party. However, many of the leaders of the General 
Confederation of Labor and its unions belong to the Communist Party.
    Workers, including civil servants, are free to strike except when a 
strike threatens public safety. One-fourth of all salaried employees 
work for the Government. The number of workdays lost to strike action 
in the private sector increased during the year, and the number of 
strikes increased. Most of the widely publicized national strikes or 
protests occurred in the public sector or affected state-owned 
companies, and were called principally over implementation of the 35-
hour workweek, salaries, privatization or reorganization plans, and 
working conditions (of which hours, staffing, and personal security 
were the primary issues). Teachers and health care workers mounted 
several strikes and protests over pay, personnel levels, and government 
efforts to reform the health and educational systems. Public 
transportation workers in Paris and other cities struck repeatedly in 
support of demands related to the implementation of a 35-hour workweek 
or the deployment of additional security personnel to deal with 
violence directed at transportation personnel. Railway workers also 
mounted strikes in support of demands related to the 35-hour workweek. 
Unions representing armored car workers mounted numerous strikes, 
including a 2-week national strike in May, to demand increased 
compensation and stricter security measures following several robberies 
in which several union members were killed. Air traffic controllers 
struck to protest European Union efforts to centralize air traffic 
control across Europe. Workers at two airlines struck during a busy 
spring travel period to protest anticipated job losses resulting from 
the takeover of their company by a foreign carrier. Truck drivers 
blocked border points and ports early in the year over concerns that 
European regulations for work-hours in their sector would deprive them 
of reductions called for under the move to a 35-hour workweek. In 
September owners of taxis, trucking companies, and fishing boats 
blockaded roads and ports over rising fuel prices.
    The law prohibits retaliation against strikers, strike leaders, and 
union members, and the Government effectively enforces this provision.
    Unions freely join federations and confederations, including 
international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers, 
including those in the three small export processing zones, have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. The law strictly prohibits 
antiunion discrimination; employers found guilty of such activity are 
required to correct it, including the reinstatement of workers fired 
for union activities.
    A 1982 law requires at least annual bargaining in the public and 
private sector on wages, hours, and working conditions at both plant 
and industry levels, but does not require that negotiations result in a 
signed contract. In case of an impasse, government mediators may impose 
solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by either side 
within a week. If no new agreement can be reached, the contract from 
the previous year remains valid. Over 90 percent of the private sector 
work force are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated 
at national or local levels. Trilateral consultations (unions, 
management, and Government) also take place on such subjects as the 
minimum wage, the duration of the legal workweek, temporary work, 
social security, and unemployment benefits. Labor tribunals, composed 
of worker and employer representatives, are available to resolve 
complaints.
    The law requires businesses with more than 50 employees to 
establish a works council, through which workers are consulted on 
training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar issues. Works 
councils, which are open to both union and nonunion employees, are 
elected every 2 years.
    The Constitution's provisions for trade union rights extend to the 
country's overseas departments and territories.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and 
the Government effectively enforces this provision.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--With a few exceptions for those enrolled in certain 
apprenticeship programs or working in the entertainment industry, 
children under the age of 16 may not be employed. Generally, work 
considered arduous or work between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may 
not be performed by minors under age 18. Laws prohibiting child 
employment are enforced effectively through periodic checks by labor 
inspectors, who have the authority to take employers to court for 
noncompliance with the law. The law prohibits forced or bonded child 
labor, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The administratively determined 
minimum wage, revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises 2 
percentage points, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The hourly wage was changed to $5.60 (42.02 
francs) as of July 1. Since February the legal workweek is 35 hours for 
firms of 20 or more workers. Overtime, under the 35-hour workweek, is 
capped at 1,600 hours per year for most workers. Firms of less than 20 
workers have until January 2002 to reduce their workweek to 35 hours. 
For these firms, the legal workweek is 39 hours, with a minimum break 
of 24 hours per week. Overtime work is restricted to 9 hours per week.
    The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility for policing 
occupational health and safety laws. Standards are high and effectively 
enforced. The law requires each enterprise with 50 or more employees to 
establish an occupational health and safety committee. Over 75 percent 
of all enterprises, covering more than 75 percent of all employees, 
have fully functioning health and safety committees. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of 
persons; however, trafficking in women is a problem. In the past, the 
country has been primarily a transit point for women trafficked for 
sexual purposes from Africa, South America, and Eastern and Southern 
Europe, despite stringent laws that prohibit such trafficking. The 
country is now also a destination for trafficked women, as increasing 
numbers of women from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the 
Balkans are trafficked to work as prostitutes in cities, often under 
harsh conditions.
    Prostitution is legal; however, the law prohibits pimping, 
including aiding, assisting, maintaining, or profiting from the 
prostitution of another, and the public solicitation of another person 
for the purpose of inciting sexual relations also is illegal. Pimps and 
traffickers usually are prosecuted under these laws. Aiding, abetting, 
or protecting the prostitution of another person; obtaining a profit, 
sharing proceeds or receiving subsidies from someone engaged in 
prostitution; or employing, leading, corrupting, or pressuring someone 
into prostitution are punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine 
of up to approximately $140,000 (1 million francs). Penalties rise to 
up to 10 years in prison and up to approximately $1,400,000 (10 million 
francs) if a minor or several persons are involved, or if force is 
used. Pimping by organized groups is punishable by up to 20 years in 
prison and a fine of up to $2,800,000 (20 million francs). The use of 
``torture'' or ``barbarous acts'' in the course of pimping is 
punishable by up to life imprisonment and up to $4,200,000 (30 million 
francs) in fines. These laws are enforced to various degrees--according 
to one press report, the most visible pimps are arrested, while those 
who work quietly go unnoticed.
    Several law enforcement agencies are involved in the effort to 
combat trafficking. The Central Office for the Repression of 
Trafficking in Humans is under the authority of the central criminal 
investigation directorate of the police judiciare, which handles 
organized crime. It centralizes information and coordinates operations 
to counter trafficking, and maintains contacts with the police, the 
Gendarmerie, foreign and international law enforcement authorities, and 
NGO's. Regional services of the police judiciare also combat 
trafficking, and the police judiciare has brigades to combat pimping in 
Paris and Marseille. Local police forces also address problems of 
prostitution and pimping.
    In the past, the country was a transit point for victims; however, 
in 1997 police began to see organized rings of traffickers, primarily 
from southeast Europe. The number of young women brought to the country 
to work as prostitutes continues to increase, in part because 
traffickers throughout Europe have benefited from the open borders 
under the Schengen Accords. Some victims come as a result of fraud or 
force; some are brought by a friend, or a friend of a friend; others 
have worked as prostitutes in their home countries, and are willing to 
continue the practice to pay for their immigration papers. In 1999 
OCRTEH reported investigations into rings operating out of the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Albania, Ecuador, Benin, 
Poland, and the former Yugoslavia. Much of the flow is now from Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, but women from Africa and Latin America, who 
often enter the country through Marseille or the Spanish border, also 
have been trafficked into the country.
    The number of women from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
and the Balkans has increased markedly, and has received increased 
press attention. For example, in March French and Belgian police 
dismantled an international trafficking ring organized in Paris and run 
from Brussels. This network trafficked women from the former Yugoslavia 
through Italy into forced prostitution in Brussels and Paris. Police 
dismantled the ring after French officials noticed that a number of 
prostitutes were traveling two or three times a week to Brussels on the 
highspeed train, apparently to pay their ``protectors.'' French 
officials arrested and extradited three Albanians. In January OCRTEH 
dismantled an Albanian trafficking ring in Toulouse. After reportedly 
being sequestered for several weeks and subjected to rape, torture, and 
threats against their families if they tried to escape, the women 
reportedly were sold for around $1,250 (9,000 francs), which included a 
``guarantee'' that they would work as prostitutes for 3 months.
    In May the magazine Le Nouvel Observateur quoted the Commissaire of 
OCRTEH as saying that two-thirds of the foreign prostitutes in the 
country were from Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union), 
whereas in the previous few months, they represented only onethird. The 
magazine also reported that in Nice, women have responded to 
advertisements for waitresses or models that appeared in newspapers in 
Kiev or Moscow; and in Strasbourg, the number of prostitutes has more 
than doubled in the past 5 years--approximately two-thirds of the women 
are Czechs or Bulgarians.
    There are numerous NGO's that deal with trafficking in persons and 
prostitution. The Scelles Foundation, which has a center for 
international research and documentation of sexual exploitation, 
provides information to the media on the issue, and supports other 
associations in the country and around the world. The NGO L'Amicale du 
Nid works directly with prostitutes.
                               __________

                                GEORGIA

    The 1995 Constitution provides for an executive branch that reports 
to the President and a legislature. The President appoints ministers 
with the consent of the Parliament. In April Eduard Shevardnadze was 
reelected to a second 5-year term as President in an election marred by 
numerous serious irregularities. International observers strongly 
criticized this election due to interference by state authorities in 
the electoral process, deficient election legislation, an insufficient 
representative election administration, and unreliable voter registers. 
The country's second parliamentary elections under the 1995 
Constitution were held in October 1999, which the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized as a step 
toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments. Local elections were 
held for the first time in November 1998. The country's first 
multiparty parliamentary elections after independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991 followed a military coup in 1992 that ousted the elected 
government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and brought Shevardnadze to power as 
head of a provisional government. The civil war and separatist wars 
that followed weakened greatly central government authority, not only 
in separatist Abkhazia and Ossetia, but also in other areas of the 
country, and the extent of central authority and control remain in 
question. Central government authority is limited in the autonomous 
region of Ajara. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, it is subject to executive pressure.
    Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that erupted in 
the early 1990's are unresolved. Cease-fires are in effect in both 
areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occur in Abkhazia. These 
unresolved conflicts, together with problems created by roughly 300,000 
internally displaced persons (IDP's), pose a continuing threat to 
national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia, 
and most ethnic Georgians a large plurality of the population--were 
expelled from or fled the region. In 1994 Russian peacekeeping forces 
representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed in 
Abkhazia with the agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz 
separatists. Although there has been no agreement on the return of 
IDP's to Abkhazia, a limited number have returned on their own to the 
Gali region of southern Abkhazia. As a result of fighting in May 1998, 
almost all of the 53,000 Georgian IDP's who had returned to the Gali 
region of Abkhazia again fled. After May 1998, IDP's continue to travel 
back and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living 
in the Gali Region on a more or less permanent basis. A Russian 
peacekeeping force also has been in South Ossetia since 1992 and is 
part of a joint peacekeeping force with Ossetians and Georgians in 
South Ossetia. Repatriation of Georgians to South Ossetia and of 
Ossetians to the rest of Georgia has been slow. The Government has no 
effective control over Abkhazia or much of South Ossetia. Almost no 
IDP's have returned to other parts of Abkhazia.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and Procuracy have primary 
responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State Security 
(MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in internal security. 
In times of internal disorder, the Government may call on the MOI or 
the army. Elected civilian authorities do not maintain adequate control 
over the law enforcement and security forces. Members of the security 
forces committed an increased number of serious human rights abuses.
    The Government made efforts to develop a market-based economy. Key 
exports are scrap metal, manganese, wine, mineral water, and 
agricultural products. Agriculture represents approximately 30 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP). Per capita GDP for the first 9 months 
of the year was estimated at $486. According to the Georgian Department 
of Statistics, approximately 52.6 percent of the population is living 
below the poverty level. The rate of economic growth continued to slow 
and the eastern part of the country suffered a drought. There was a 
growing fiscal deficit, as revenue collection continued to be very low. 
Government salaries and pensions were still in arrears.
    The Government's human rights record worsened, and was poor in 
several key areas. Numerous serious irregularities in the April 
presidential election limited citizens' right to change their 
government. According to the Government and nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) human rights monitors, security forces continued to 
beat and otherwise abuse detainees, force confessions, and fabricate or 
plant evidence. Reports of police brutality increased throughout the 
year. Several deaths in custody were blamed on physical abuse, torture, 
or inhuman or life-threatening prison conditions, and most government 
promises of reforms remain unfulfilled. The Ministry of Justice gained 
formal jurisdiction over the prison system from the Ministry of 
Interior in 1999; however, this transfer of responsibility was 
accomplished without adequate fiscal resources and consequently 
exacberated the already harsh conditions. Moreover, the MOI retains a 
significant role in prison staff and investigations. Minister of 
Justice Mikheil Saakashvili, appointed in October, acknowledged serious 
shortcomings in the prison system and initiated steps to address them. 
Saakashvilli fired some corrupt administrators, released some inmates 
to reduce overcrowding, and took steps toward creating a prison 
inspection system that would include NGO participation. Authorities 
allegedly continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Corruption 
in law enforcement agencies is significant and pervasive. In addition, 
despite numerous investigations, large-scale corruption on the part of 
lower level and high government officials still is tolerated widely as 
an inevitable consequence of economic hardship and low salaries. Local 
human rights groups reported that security force brutality against 
them, harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention of their members 
increased during the year, especially after April. Senior government 
officials, including the President, acknowledged serious human rights 
problems and sought international advice and assistance on needed 
reforms; however, neither the President nor other senior officials took 
concrete steps to address these problems, and Parliament failed to 
budget adequately for mandated reforms. Law enforcement agencies made 
little progress in adapting these practices to democratic norms, and 
impunity remains a problem.
    The judiciary is subject to pressure and corruption and does not 
always ensure due process; judicial reform efforts to create a more 
independent judiciary were undercut by failure to pay judges in a 
timely manner. As a result of the Law on Common Courts, many corrupt 
and incompetent judges were removed from the bench and replaced by 
judges who passed a qualifying exam and vetting process. There were 
lengthy delays in trials, and prolonged pretrial detention remains a 
problem. The Criminal Procedures Code, which was passed in 1997, was 
amended in 1999 and again in the summer in response to complaints by 
security forces that legislated reforms would hamper criminal 
investigations. Parliament also repealed provisions in the 1998 
Criminal Code that would have allowed citizens under investigation 
access to the courts prior to trial. Procuracy reform was stalled. 
Human Rights Watch released a highly critical report in October that 
detailed new restrictions on due process and other setbacks to judicial 
reform. Law enforcement agencies and other government bodies 
occasionally interfered with citizens' right to privacy. The press 
generally was free; however, security forces and other authorities on 
occasion intimidated and used violence against journalists. The 
Government restricted freedom of assembly, and law enforcement 
authorities dispersed numerous peaceful gatherings. Government 
officials infringed upon freedom of religion. Discrimination against 
and harassment of some religious minorities are problems. Violence and 
discrimination against women are problems. Trafficking in women for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem.
    Growing citizen awareness of civil rights and democratic values and 
the continued evolution of civil society provided a partial check on 
the excesses of law enforcement agencies. A number of independent NGO's 
are active in defense of the rights of individual citizens and 
religious groups. International observers noted that most NGO activity 
is concentrated in Tbilisi. Criticism from the press and the NGO 
community and timely intervention from government and parliamentary 
human rights monitors, played an important role in halting the abuse of 
citizens detained by the police in a few specific cases.
    There was little information available on the human rights 
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to limited access to these 
regions.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government 
agents. Security force abuses reportedly resulted in several deaths in 
custody.
    The Government stated that 61 prisoners died in prison, and it 
appears that 5 prisoners died in jail or prison hospitals in pretrial 
detention during the year. Human rights NGO's and the press report that 
physical abuse, torture, and inhuman prison or pretrial detention 
conditions contributed to a number of these deaths. The authorities 
attributed the majority of these deaths to illness. On May 31, Mamuka 
Rizhamadze was found hanged in a Kutaisi jail. He was arrested in 
Tkibuli on May 24 but had not been charged. The official autopsy stated 
that he committed suicide; however, an independent autopsy, carried out 
at the request of his relatives, concluded that there were numerous 
injuries to his body and that a blow to his head killed him before he 
was hanged. Police claim that Rizhamadze threatened them with a grenade 
and that they acted in selfdefense.
    Authorities attributed nine deaths in 1999 to suicide, including 
that of Ivane Kolbaya, who in February 1999, fell to his death from a 
fifth floor window of the Ministry of Internal Affairs while being 
questioned about his alleged involvement in a theft. An international 
human rights NGO brought this case to the Government's attention, as 
well as four others, including the 1998 death of Gulchora Dursunova and 
the 1997 deaths of Akaki Iacobashvili and Eka Tavartkiladze. In 1999 
the National Security Council requested that the Procuracy determine 
the legality of the decisions made in these cases. The Procuracy upheld 
decisions affirming the ruling of suicide in all cases. Two police 
officers were charged in Kolbaya's case, but the court returned the 
case to the Procuracy for further investigation. On December 4, 1999, 
Zaza Tsitsilashvili allegedly threw himself to his death from the sixth 
floor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The investigation did not 
result in any charges. However, family members say that his corpse 
showed evidence of being beaten.
    On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale was 
found dead outside of Tbilisi. His colleagues feared that he may have 
been murdered in reprisal for coverage of the conflict in neighboring 
Chechnya, Russia. Some persons believe that Russo may have been killed 
to prevent him from publishing materials on the Russian use of banned 
chemical weapons in Chechnya. There have been no allegations and there 
is no evidence implicating the Government in Russo's death. The 
Government is conducting and ongoing investigation into the murder.
    Killings were committed by elements on both sides of the separatist 
conflict in Abkhazia, including by partisan groups and by Abkhaz 
separatists. The partisan groups in the past have received government 
support and training; however, the Government claims that it no longer 
controls nor supports the partisans. The partisans are viewed by the 
general public as criminal gangs engaged in smuggling, extortion, and 
other illegal activities. The number of incidents of abuse decreased 
from the previous year. Killings and other abuses on both sides of the 
conflict have not been investigated, prosecuted, or punished.
    Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces laid tens of thousands of 
landmines during the 1992-1993 fighting. The 2000 Landmine Monitor 
Report states that in 1999 and 2000, there continued to be numerous 
reports that groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian 
Government infiltrated into Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines. The 
Government crticized these partisan groups and arrested some of their 
leaders. There has been a reduction in the number of persons killed or 
injured by landmines, primarily because a large number of persons have 
left the mined territories.
    b. Disappearance.--Georgian partisan/criminal groups active in 
Abkhazia periodically took hostages, usually in exchange for captured 
compatriots. Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts by 
their law enforcement agencies to prosecute those responsible for this 
and other criminal activity that threatened to destabilize the cease-
fire. The September 12 detention in Zugdidi of David Shengalia, the 
leader of one of the partisan bands, reduced tensions to some extent 
through the end of the year. During the year, there were several 
instances of hostage taking by criminal groups for ransom purposes. All 
of these kidnapings are believed to have been criminal or economic and 
not political.
    In June two U.N. officials, a foreign businessman, and their Abkhaz 
interpreter were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge. They were handed 
over to Georgian authorities on June 5 without payment of the $300,000 
ransom demanded by their kidnapers.
    Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff members 
were abducted in the Pankisi Gorge in August. The three staff members 
were released on August 13, one week later.
    On November 30, two Spanish businessmen were abducted and held 
captive in Pankisi Gorge. Authorities still are searching for them.
    Two U.N. observers were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge on 
December 10, and released 3 days later after negotiations with 
presidential representative Emzar Kvitsiani; reportedly no ransom was 
paid. Svan bandits are believed to be responsible for the abduction, as 
well as for a previous abductions of U.N. officials in October 1999 and 
2000.
    In Abkhazia, an autonomous republic in Georgia, six Georgians were 
taken hostage in Abkhazia's Gali region on August 23 and were released 
3 days later as a result of mediation by members of the U.N. Observer 
Mission and the CIS peacekeeping forces. The Abkhaz hostage takers did 
not receive the $2,050 (5,000 lari) they had demanded initially.
    Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that 
the fates of more than over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz 
who disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still are unknown. 
Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts to determine the 
whereabouts and repatriate the remains of missing fighters. The ICRC 
cooperated in the effort through its Red Cross message system.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, 
members of the security forces continued to torture, beat, and 
otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees, usually to extract money or 
confessions. International and domestic observers note that incidents 
of police abuse increased following the April presidential elections. 
Serious abuses and police misconduct continue and corruption and 
criminality, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, remain 
problems. Widespread impunity remains a problem. Many human rights 
observers argue that the police increasingly believe that they will not 
be held accountable for such actions.
    The most serious incidents of abuse occur in the investigative 
phase of pretrial detention when suspects are interrogated by police. 
Human rights observers and lawyers noted that abuses occur more 
frequently at the time of arrest and in police stations, rather than in 
pretrial detention facilities, as was previously the case. Human rights 
advocates noted a growing number of confessions made in police 
stations. Some observers charge that police also also conducted 
investigations in apartments outside the police stations to avoid 
registering detainees. According to human rights observers, those who 
suffer such abuse are held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial 
detention to give their injuries time to heal (see Section 1.e.). For 
example, David Sturva claimed that in September police tortured him 
with beatings and electric shocks, and attempted to suffocate him. 
Medical examinations confirmed his charges. Police also abused other 
detainees (see Section 1.d.).
    Police agents within the prison population allegedly committed 
abuses in pretrial detention facilities. For example, Paata Skhirtladze 
was beaten and his ear was bitten off by another prisoner (see Section 
1.d.). Another prisoner initially confessed on video camera that he was 
ordered to torture another inmate and force narcotics on him. Charges 
were brought against him for this incident, but he subsequently 
recanted his confession (see Section 1.e.).
    Police misconduct reportedly was worse outside Tbilisi, where 
awareness of laws and citizens' rights is lower and human rights NGO's 
are less active. However, one prominent human rights group notes that 
at the village level personal relationships work to prevent the sorts 
of abuse found in the larger towns and cities.
    Despite an overall culture of impunity, some policemen were 
arrested or administratively disciplined in high-profile cases of 
physical abuse or deaths in custody. According to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 35 administrative inquiries were performed, 21 
policemen were reprimanded administratively; and 6 policemen were 
dismissed in connection with police abuses. However, recent changes to 
the Criminal Procedures Code weakened a detainee's ability to 
substantiate claims of such abuses (see Section 1.e.). In general, 
accountability tended to occur only in extreme cases, such as those 
resulting in death, and even then it is rare (see Section 1.a.). Many 
observers claimed that prosecutors frequently are reluctant to open a 
criminal case against the police or close a case for lack of evidence. 
Observers believe that many instances of abuse go unreported by victims 
due to fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the system.
    Domestic human rights advocates reported that allegations of the 
use of torture, such as electric shock, to extract money or confessions 
significantly increased during the year. Human Rights Watch reported in 
1999 that mistreatment and physical abuse of detainees continued to be 
rampant. However, some observers noted that when the Ministry of State 
Security (as opposed to the Interior Ministry) managed the 
investigation, allegations of physical abuses were rare.
    In the past, security forces have tortured some defendants in 
politically sensitive cases, such as those involving members of the 
former Gamsakhurdia government and members of the paramilitary 
Mkhedrioni (see Section 1.e.). Local human rights observers alleged 
that abuses continued to occur in two pretrial detention facilities, 
Isolator Five in Tbilisi and the pretrial facility in Kutaisi. Isolator 
Five, in the basement of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs 
headquarters, the facility in which is detainees suspected of a serious 
crime or whose cases had political overtones incarcerated. As a 
condition of membership in the Council of Europe, Isolator Five was to 
be closed as of January 1, 2000; however, domestic human rights 
organizations claim that the facility remains open and serves the same 
function, only under a different name. According to local human rights 
observers, despite calls by senior law enforcement officials for 
investigators to show restraint, many persons who were detained in 
Isolator Five afterwards reported that they were beaten or otherwise 
abused. Often the threat of incarceration in this facility was 
sufficient to induce a confession.
    In contrast to those arrested in connection with the 1995 
assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze, in general those 
persons arrested in May 1999, for plotting against the Government and 
those arrested for the 1998 assassination attempt against President 
Shevardnadze reportedly were not mistreated. However, one suspect, Otar 
Melikadze, reported in June that investigators had tortured him. 
Although human rights observers noted that the Procuracy collected 
evidence, for use in the court proceedings, the families and state-
appointed advocates of the defendants had limited access to them. 
Melikadze, Soso Nadiradze, Archil Panjikidze, and David Tsotsoria, who 
were arrested for plotting against the Government, initiated a hunger 
strike, claiming that they and their lawyers did not have access to 
their case files.
    Government officials acknowledged that Ministry of Internal Affairs 
personnel in the past routinely beat and abused prisoners and 
detainees. Government officials continued to claim that a lack of 
proper training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and lack 
of equipment often resulted in abuse. For example, investigators in the 
past were trained to obtain confessions rather than use physical 
evidence to assemble a case. After law enforcement agencies expressed 
concern that the safeguards contained in the new Criminal Procedures 
Code would make it difficult for them to combat crime, amendments to 
the code in 1999 and during the year reinstated many of their powers 
(see Section 1.e.).
    International and local human rights observers expressed concern 
that corruption is related to the number of police officers nationwide. 
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 13,881 police 
officers; however, NGO's estimated that there are 35,000 police 
officers. The Government was unable to pay the salaries for the police 
force. Consequently, police solicited bribes from the general 
population, especially motorists, and also from suspects detained on 
suspicion of criminal activity. The period between an arrest and a bail 
hearing was another opportunity for solicitation of bribes. According 
to international and domestic observers, the police sometimes attempt 
to extort money from suspects in exchange for not officially 
registering an arrest. Police reportedly approached suspect's family 
and offered to drop charges in exchange for a bribe.
    Members of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic 
Relations and local human rights groups independently investigated 
claims of abuse. There was a significant increase in the number of 
claims filed; however, fear prevented many persons from filing claims, 
and not all claimants followed their claims all the way through to 
trial. The Committee noted that since the presidential election, claims 
shifted from requests for assistance to complaints about mistreatment 
and violations by the police and Procuracy, as well about of the 
Procuracy's failure to pursue criminal investigations of alleged 
violators. The National Security Council's human rights advisor also 
has a mandate to investigate claims of abuse. The Constitution mandates 
a human rights defender or ombudsman. The role of the ombudsman's 
office is to offer assistance to those who believe that abuse has 
occurred or a right has been violated; however, the law does not 
provide the ombudsman with the authority to forward a complaint to a 
court with a recommendation that it be reviewed prior to trial.
    Police officers reportedly sometimes beat and raped prostitutes.
    Members of the security forces beat members of religious minorities 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Police reportedly harassed and at times abused street children (see 
Section 5).
    Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Facilities lack 
adequate cell space, medicine, and food. Infrastructure is crumbling 
due to lack of resources and corruption in the prison administration. 
The President pardoned 1,500 prisoners in April 1999, and 1,700 
prisoners in October 1999 as a means of alleviating crowding; however, 
observers still consider the prisons to be overcrowded. The problem was 
exacerbated by the hasty transfer of responsibility for prison 
administration to the Ministry of Justice, which was unprepared to take 
over, according to human rights observers and government officials. The 
authorities acknowledged that conditions are inhuman and life 
threatening; however, they did not take effective steps during the year 
to address the fundamental problems.
    On January 20, a riot broke out in Kutaisi's preventive detention 
Ward 2, reportedly triggered by the rape of a prisoner. As the result 
of an investigation, nine officials were dismissed, including the head 
of the ward. Some human rights groups claim that rape by inmates is 
common in prisons. Khvicha Kvirtia claimed that, while he was in 
prison, the head of the prison regularly beat him. He also claimed that 
those prisoners who had no money to bribe officials were tortured.
    Torture and physical abuse of prisoners led to deaths in custody. 
The prison mortality rate reportedly was high; however, human rights 
NGO's claim that authorities kept the official rates artificially low 
by releasing prisoners who were terminally ill or by sending prisoners 
to the hospital when they are on the verge of death. Additionally, 
monitors state that deaths of prisoners without families usually went 
unreported. The OSCE also noted an increase in the number of deaths in 
prison in the first 3 months after the transfer of authority to the 
Ministry of Justice. Most of the deaths during the year were attributed 
officially to medical causes, usually tuberculosis. According to the 
ICRC, tuberculosis is widespread in the prison system. In recognition 
of this fact, the ICRC continued a joint program with authorities begun 
in 1997 to reduce the incidence of the disease. In 1999 a prisoner 
reportedly weighing just 66 pounds was released from a Rustavi prison; 
he died within three days. Observers reported an increase in violence 
among prisoners, sometimes resulting in deaths. The increase was 
attributed to the insufficient and demoralized guard staff. One 
observer stated that the failure to pay guard staff and the loss of 
promotion possibilities due to the penitentiary reform created a 
staffing problem.
    Temur Papuashvili, a suspect in an alleged 1999 coup plot, died in 
custody on January 3, reportedly due to illness. However, the Ministry 
of State Security began an investigation into the death after 
allegations that Papuashvili had been poisoned. Two days later, the 
investigation was closed, apparently at the request of Pauashvili's 
mother and wife.
    In accordance with requirements stipulated by the Council of 
Europe, the responsibility for the prisons was transferred from the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (MOI) to the Ministry of Justice on 
January 1, 2000. Although the Ministry of Justice is responsible for 
overall administration of the prison system, the law on prisons permits 
MOI personnel to continue to staff the prisons. The MOI also maintains 
several of its own cells in the various prisons. Other legislation also 
permits the MOI to conduct investigations among inmates to gather 
evidence for trials without judicial approval. Local and international 
human rights observers noted little change in prison conditions. No 
significant personnel changes or restructuring occured prior to the 
appointment of Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili in October. 
However, following a number of officials were removed. Advocates noted 
an improvement in access for family members and to the telephone since 
the transfer of authority.
    The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those 
in Abkhazia, in accordance with its customary procedures, which include 
meetings with detainees without the presence of third-party observers 
and regular repetition of visits. The OSCE mission, whose mandate 
includes prison visits, reported bureaucratic delays but no serious 
problems in obtaining access to prisoners and detainees. However, local 
human rights groups reported that they have increasing difficulty in 
visiting detainees, especially in cases with political overtones.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
includes provisions to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest and 
detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions. 
The Constitution provides for a 9 month period of maximum pretrial 
detention, mandated court approval of detention after 72 hours, and 
imposes restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.). 
The old Soviet Criminal Code had been amended to implement these 
constitutional safeguards and was superseded in 1997 by the Criminal 
Procedures Code. These amendments generally, although not always, were 
observed, as prosecutors continue to maintain undue influence over 
criminal procedures. A new Criminal Code was enacted in June 1999.
    Judges issue warrants and detention orders, and suspects must be 
charged within 3 days. Pretrial investigatory detention is limited to 9 
months in accordance with the Constitution, instead of 18 months as 
allowed by the old Soviet code. Judges may extend pretrial detention by 
3 month intervals up to 9 months. Human rights NGO's stated that the 
amendments to the old Soviet Code made the pretrial detention period 
less arbitrary; however, international and domestic observers also 
stated that such detention usually is longer--sometimes as much as 2 
years--because this protection routinely is interpreted to include only 
the Procuracy's investigative period, not the defense's investigative 
period as well. Reportedly, police frequently detain persons without 
warrants. At year's end, there were 8,676 persons in custody, including 
both prisoners serving sentences and suspects held in pretrial 
detention.
    A new Criminal Procedures Code, along with other legislation to 
implement constitutional protections and restrict the powers of the 
Procuracy and the police, was passed by Parliament in 1997; however, 
implementation was delayed until May 1999 (see Section 1.e.). Following 
enactment of the New Criminal Code in June 1999, the Criminal 
Procedures Code was amended substantially in July of that year. A 
number of amendments sought to harmonize the Criminal Procedures Code 
with the new Criminal Code. However, several amendments significantly 
weakened protections against arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Specifically, the changes imposed severe restrictions on a detainee's 
access to the courts in the pretrial period. According to Human Rights 
Watch, before these amendments were enacted a defendant could complain 
directly to the court prior to a trial regarding abusive actions 
committed by the police or the Procuracy during a criminal 
investigation and could request a forensic medical examination. Under 
the ammended provisions, a defendant can file a complaint of abusive 
investigation only with the Procuracy. The Procuracy's decision cannot 
be appealed to the courts. Human rights NGO's state that this hinders a 
detainee's ability to substantiate a claim of police misconduct, 
especially in view of the close ties between the Procuracy and the 
police and the delays such requests entail. Human Rights Watch and 
other human rights advocates stated that permission for an independent 
forensic medical examination rarely is granted. It is difficult for 
those under criminal investigation to obtain objective medical 
examinations in a timely manner to substantiate reports of physical 
abuse. If a medical examination is not conducted within 3 to 4 days of 
the incident it becomes difficult to establish the cause of a 
detainee's injuries. In the courts, only a state employed forensic 
medical examiner--which in the vast majority of the criminal cases is 
an employee of the Ministry of Health's Judicial Medical Expert 
Center--can testify about the detainee's injuries. Human rights 
advocates criticize the state forensic examiners as biased in favor of 
the Procuracy.
    The amendments also eliminated the right of a witness to be 
accompanied by a lawyer when being questioned by the police. A witness 
can be held by the police for 12 hours without being charged. Human 
rights monitors claimed that the police frequently charge witnesses as 
suspects at the end of this period. Human Rights Watch also reported 
that police often called in a detainee's lawyer as a witness, thereby 
denying him access to his client. Human Rights Watch released a highly 
critical report in October that detailed new restrictions on due 
process and other setbacks to judicial reform.
    According to observers, including the OSCE and the Association of 
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, police frequently treat 
individuals in their custody with brutality; however, correct legal 
procedures were observed more often once a detainee entered officially 
into the system. Police often failed to inform detainees of their 
rights and prevented access to family members and lawyers. While 
officially suspects are charged within 3 days of registration, 
observers claim that police frequently delay registering detainees for 
long periods in order to seek bribes in return for dispensing with 
registration altogether (see Section 1.c.). Authorities often held 
prisoners who were tortured and abused in police stations and pretrial 
detention for lengthy periods in order to give their injuries time to 
heal (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Police often claim that injuries 
were sustained during or before arrest.
    On June 18, Paata Skhirtladze was arrested for ``exhibitionism'' 
and later charged with two ritual murders and deaths. He allegedly was 
subjected to abuse in Isolator Five. His ear was cut off, apparently by 
a fellow prisoner, and he was forced to swallow it. Skhirtladze 
apparently confessed to the murders, but human rights observers believe 
he did so under pressure and connect the abuse of Skhirtladze to his 
affiliation with the Osho community, a spiritual movement.
    In September the police stopped and searched David Sturua in 
Tbilisi's Saburtelo neighborhood. Upon finding keys in his bag, they 
charged Sturua and his friends with involvement in multiple burglaries. 
Sturua was taken to an MOI detention cell. He was not permitted to 
notify family members or contact a lawyer. He claims that he was 
subjected to torture, including attempted suffocation, electric shocks, 
and beatings. Medical examinations confirm Sturua's charges. The 
ombudsman asked the MOI to investigate (see Section 1.c.).
    Lasha Kartvelishvili, arrested for allegedly killing a police 
officer, claimed he was beaten severely and denied access to his lawyer 
before being charged. He was charged 14 days after his arrest (the 
legal limit is 72 hours) following the intervention of government human 
rights advocates. An independent medical examination found numerous 
injuries. Police say that he sustained his injuries falling down the 
stairs. Family members argued that he was tortured. The lawyer that his 
family retained to defend Kartvelishvili repeatedly was denied access 
to his client. Kartvelishvili never formally filed a complaint and 
assented to the official explanation of his injuries. He remained in 
prison at year's end.
    The Criminal Procedures Code established a system of bail; however, 
observers note that it rarely is employed.
    There were no cases of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary often does 
not exercise full independence. Judicial impartiality is limited. The 
judicial reform process, which was completed in 1999, had some success 
in leading to the appointment of a larger number of more highly 
qualified judges; however, local and international observers agree that 
judicial authorities continue to defer to pressures from the executive 
branch and well-connected special interests. Investigators routinely 
plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct violation 
of the Constitution. Judges are reluctant to exclude evidence obtained 
illegally over the objection of the Procuracy.
    Results of the judicial reform effort were uneven. Judicial 
incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to judges, 
is still a significant problem. Although there were reports by several 
trial attorneys and local NGO's in Tbilisi that some cases were being 
handled in a more and expeditious manner since the reform, progress 
outside of Tbilisi was not as marked. Observers commented that although 
judges were better educated, they are hindered by lack of practical 
experience. Human rights organizations point to poor access to case law 
as a further contributing factor. Due to the Government's fiscal 
crisis, judges' salaries were not paid for a 6-month period, creating 
an incentive to corruption. Pressure from extensive family and clan 
networks was extensive.
    The 1997 Law on the Courts, which was designed to enhance judicial 
independence, established a three-tier court system. Implementation of 
the law was completed in 1999. At the lowest level are district courts, 
which hear routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are 
regional courts of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for district 
courts; they started functioning in May 1999. The regional (``city'') 
courts also try major criminal and civil cases, review cases, and 
either confirm verdicts or return cases to the lower courts for 
retrial. The Supreme Court acts as a higher appellate court and remains 
the court of first instance for capital crimes and appeals from the 
Central Election Commission.
    A separate Constitutional Court was created in 1996. Its mandate 
includes arbitrating constitutional disputes between branches of 
government and ruling on individual claims of human rights violations. 
The Court interpreted this latter function narrowly, agreeing to rule 
only in cases in which the complainant alleged that the violation was 
sanctioned by law. The court only considers one case at a time. Since 
its inception in 1996, many of the cases filed with the court have been 
heard and decided. The Court's rulings have demonstrated judicial 
independence.
    Administration of the court system was transferred from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Council of Justice in 1997. The Council has 
12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. The law 
established a three-part testing procedure for current and prospective 
judges to be administered by the council. The testing procedure was 
designed to reduce judicial incompetence and corruption. The 
Constitutional Court ruled in November 1998 that sitting judges could 
not be removed, thereby hampering the Government's attempts at judicial 
reform. The Parliament responded with a law stating that judges' terms 
would not be renewed beyond 2001 if they did not take and pass the 
examination, thereby observing the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, yet forcing the judges to qualify themselves through 
examination.
    The first judges' examination was administered in February 1998. A 
total of 5 examinations were administered by the end of 1999, and some 
250 judges had passed. A total of 176 judges passed both the exam and a 
vetting process and replaced judges who had not.
    Supreme Court justices also were required to take the examination. 
They resisted the requirement, arguing that the exam was an 
infringement on judicial independence and that, since they were 
confirmed by Parliament, they already were subject to public scrutiny 
and review. The Court's Chief Justice appointed 12 new justices, 10 of 
whom had passed the judicial exams. Some observers have alleged that 
the Supreme Court's decisions are subject to political and other undue 
influences.
    Aside from the judicial system, law enforcement as a whole still 
has not undergone significant reform. Payment of bribes to policemen 
and Procuracy officials reportedly is common (see Section 1.c.). The 
Procuracy is identified as part of the judicial system in the 
Constitution, and there were calls from legislators and others to move 
the Procuracy into the executive branch.
    According to the Constitution, a detainee is presumed innocent and 
has the right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand 
immediate access to a lawyer and to refuse to make a statement in the 
absence of counsel. The detaining officer must inform the detainee of 
his rights and must notify the detainee's family of his location as 
soon as possible. However, these rights are not observed fully in 
practice. Authorities frequently do not permit detainees to notify 
their families of their location. Defense attorneys and family members 
often have difficulty obtaining permission from investigators to visit 
clients. Investigators seldom inform individuals of their rights. There 
were lengthy delays in trials. Human Rights Watch noted that defense 
counsel is not required to be present at any pretrial hearings and that 
defendants and their attorneys regularly complained that they were not 
notified of scheduled hearings.
    Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police are not obliged to 
allow a lawyer to enter a police station unless hired by a detainee. 
Local police authorities limited lawyers' access to detainees. In 1999 
the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local NGO to create 
a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi police stations 
to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The project was 
implemented intermittently at the beginning of the year, but then was 
halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties. Participating 
lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of the program 
and that local police authorities limited their access to detainees. 
For example, in 1999 one lawyer witnessed police beating a detainee; 
when she began to question the police, she was pushed out of the room. 
When representatives from NGO's and the Government arrived at the 
station, the police chief denied that any beating had occurred. While 
the district prosecutor promised to investigate the case, there had 
been no investigation by year's end. The Parliamentary Committee on 
Human Rights and National Minorities also created a card listing a 
citizen's rights in case of arrest. By year's end, it had distributed 
25,000 or 31,000 printed cards to students, NGO's, and visitors to the 
Committee.
    In 1999 the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local 
NGO to create a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi 
police stations to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The 
project was implemented intermittently at the beginning of 2000, but 
then was halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties. 
Participating lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of 
the program, and that local police authorities were limiting their 
access to detainees.
    Parliament passed the legislation required to implement 
constitutional protections in 1997. The implementing legislation 
included the Criminal Procedures Code and the Law on the Procuracy. 
These laws were designed to create a legal system with adversarial 
trials by reducing the powers of the Procuracy, increasing the rights 
of defense attorneys, and enhancing the independence and authority of 
the judiciary; however, amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code 
adopted in 1999 and significantly weakened many of these provisions. As 
in the Soviet period, prosecutors continue to direct criminal 
investigations, supervise some judicial functions, and represent the 
State in trials. Most criminal trials continued to follow the Soviet 
model. Prosecutors continued to wield disproportionate influence over 
outcomes. The Criminal Procedures Code prohibits the same judge who 
signed a warrant from hearing the case; this rule frequently was 
violated outside of Tbilisi, since few regions have more than one 
judge.
    The Soviet system of state-employed criminal defense attorneys 
began to break down in 1998. Individuals who could afford to pay were 
able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil 
cases. In instances where defendants were unable to afford legal 
counsel, attorneys were assigned to a case upon the recommendation of 
the Procurator's Office by the Office of Legal Assistance, a part of 
the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain cases, defendants were 
pressured to accept a state-appointed attorney. The Procuracy not only 
had control over state-appointed lawyers; it also determined whether a 
defendant's request to change lawyers was granted. However, several 
NGO's provided free legal services for those whose human rights were 
violated in Tbilisi and one NGO was planning to open regional offices 
in 2001. Human Rights Watch noted that detainees sometimes are coerced 
by procurators to accept state-appointed attorneys or other attorneys 
who do not vigorously defend their interests.
    The quality of attorneys is uneven. In addition, licensing of 
forensic medical examiners and other experts is not an assurance of 
competence.
    International and local human rights groups agree that there are 
some political prisoners but disagree as to the number, giving 
estimates ranging from 25 to 54. A number of these individuals--
including members of the Mkhedrioni, Gamsakhurdia supporters, and state 
security personnel committed criminal acts and were tried and sentenced 
for them on criminal grounds, although they may have had political 
motives. According to some local observers, detained political leaders 
of Gamsakhurdia's supporters never took up arms and should be 
considered political prisoners. Several, including Valter Shurgaia, 
Zviad Dzidziguri, and Zaur Kobalia, were still in prison at year's end. 
These individuals--political leaders of Gamsakhurdia's movement--were 
tried and convicted on poorly substantiated charges of treason, 
banditry, and illegal possession of weapons. They are serving sentences 
ranging from seven to twelve years. President Shevardnadze pardoned 
about ten political prisoners during the year, including former 
National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and Nicholas Kvezereli. The 
latter was convicted, along with Jaba Ioseliani, of the 1995 
assassination attempt on the President. Two others who were imprisoned 
for attempting to assassinate Shevardnadze also were released. The 1998 
trial of Jaba Ioseliani, the head of the Mkhedrioni, and 14 other 
alleged conspirators in the 1995 assassination attempt on President 
Shevardnadze was characterized by the same violations found in other 
recent trials with political overtones. The Government consistently 
violated due process both during the investigation and the trial. 
Torture, use of forced confessions, fabricated or planted evidence, 
denial of legal counsel, and expulsion of defendants from the courtroom 
took place. Ten of the defendants claimed to have been beaten or 
tortured and coerced to confess during the investigative stage of the 
case. They allegedly were tried and convicted on poorly substantiated 
charges of treason, banditry, and illegal possession of weapons or have 
not yet been convicted. Some procedures were violated for those 
suspected of involvement in the 1998 assassination attempt on the 
President. The suspects were held beyond the legal maximum period of 
pretrial detention (see Section 1.d.).
    On February 2, four Zviadists (followers of Gamsakhurdia) began a 
hunger strike demanding amnesty for all political prisoners. They were 
joined by a number of sympathizers outside the prison. A local NGO, 
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, and journalists were 
denied permission to visit the hunger strikers in prison. On April 8, 
the hunger strike ended after Chairman of Parliament Zurab Zhvania 
promised that the Parliament would deal with the question of strikers' 
amnesty, as well as the matter of amnesty for all involved in the 1992-
93 civil war.
    On April 20, President Shevardnadze pardoned or reduced the term 
for 279 prisoners convicted in connection with the civil war and many 
participants in the 1995 assassination attempt, including Mkhedrioni 
leaders Jaba Ioseliani and Dodo Gugeshashvili. On April 22, the 
Parliament passed a resolution on national reconciliation. The 
resolution required the Procuracy to review the cases of those 
convicted in connection with the civil war and to create a list of 
convicts to be released by July 30. By year's end, 85 Zviadists were 
released under the program. Most of those remaining in prison had been 
charged or convicted of murder.
    Tengiz Asanidze, who was pardoned by President Shevardnadze in 
October 1999, remained in prison in Ajara. The authorities in Ajara 
refused to release him and later accused him of abduction and of 
financial crimes. He was awaiting trial at year's end. Asandize ran as 
a presidential candidate; as a result, the OSCE was able to visit him 
in prison. The Council of Europe's High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
Jose Alvaro Gil-Robles, visited Asanidze in June. Both Amnesty 
International and Gil-Robles have requested Asanidze's release.
    On October 1, 12 prisoners escaped from Tbilisi's prison hospital 
and were subsequently recaptured. Those who escaped included former 
Finance Minister (in the Gamsakhurdia administration) Guram Absanidze 
and two others who had been charged with an alleged assassination plot 
against the President. Observers suspected that the escape involved 
collusion; it was unclear whether this involved prison staff only or 
higher authorities as well. The escapees also included Vakhtang 
``Loti'' Kobalia, former leader of military forces loyal to former 
President Gamsakhurdia in the civil war against the paramilitary 
Mkhedrioni and the national guard in 1992-93. Kobalia had been 
sentenced to death for murder and treason in 1996; his sentence later 
was commuted to 20 years. Their trial, together with eight other 
defendants, was due to resume on October 2 but was postponed following 
the escape.
    The Government allows international human rights and domestic 
organizations to visit political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids the wire tapping of 
telephones and other forms of interference in an individual's private 
life without court approval or legal necessity; however, in practice 
law enforcement agencies and other government bodies occasionally 
monitored private telephone conversations without obtaining court 
orders. The Government stated that state security police and state tax 
authorities sometimes entered homes and places of work without prior 
legal sanction in emergency cases as permitted by the Criminal 
Procedures Code. Police sometimes stopped and searched vehicles without 
probable cause in order to extort bribes (see Section 1.c.). Police 
misconduct and corruption undermined public confidence in government, 
especially the law enforcement agencies.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 press 
law, and other legislation provide for freedom of the press; however, 
although the independent press was generally free, several instances of 
intimidation of journalists occurred. According to journalists and 
NGO's, security and other authorities on occasion attempted to 
intimidate the press through public comments, private admonitions and, 
in some cases, violence. During the year, journalists were able to 
publish wide-ranging and extremely critical views of officials and 
their conduct. However, some journalists practice self-censorship. The 
Administrative Code enacted in 1999 contains a freedom of information 
section that provides for public access to government meetings and 
documents; however, few journalists have employed it. Libel laws 
inhibit investigative journalism. The Civil Code and other legislation 
make it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of an individual and 
place the burden of proof on the accused. Some advocates noted that the 
Government fails to register freedom of information act requests, as 
the Administrative Code requires. Moreover, they claimed that since the 
law contains no time limit for response, the release can be delayed 
indefinitely and the requesting party has no grounds for appeal.
    Some 200 independent newspapers are in circulation. The press 
increasingly served as a check on government, frequently criticizing 
the performance of high-level officials. Increasingly, independent 
newspapers have replaced the government-controlled press as the 
population's source of information. The highest-circulation independent 
daily newspaper, Alia, has a national circulation nearly 20 percent 
higher than the government-controlled daily. However, independent 
newspapers continue to struggle in the regions, due largely to the 
population's lack of purchasing power. Several newspapers are 
relatively serious and reputable sources of information, although lack 
of financial resources hinders overall journalistic development. The 
circulation of most newspapers is limited to at most a few thousand 
copies, and usually much less. Few newspapers are editorially 
independent and commercial viability; they usually are subsidized by 
and subject to the influence of their patrons in politics and business. 
High printing costs and general poverty, especially in the countryside, 
limited the circulation of most newspapers to a few hundred or a few 
thousand readers. The Government finances and controls one newspaper 
(which also appears in Russian-, Azeri-, and Armenian-language 
versions) and a radio and television network with a national audience; 
they reflect official viewpoints.
    Most persons continue to get their news from television and radio. 
The Government's monopoly on television news was broken when Rustavi-2, 
a member of the independent television network TNG, emerged in 1998 as 
an important alternative to state television, after successfully 
resisting 2 years of government attempts to shut it down. It now is 
considered the only station other than the state-run channel with a 
national audience. In addition to Rustavi-2, there are seven 
independent television stations in Tbilisi. An international NGO that 
works with the press estimated that there are more than 45 regional 
television stations, 17 of which offer daily news. While these stations 
are ostensibly independent, a lack of advertising revenue often forces 
them to depend on local government officials for support. Some regions, 
such as Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kutaisi, have relatively independent 
media. Rustavi-2 has a network of 15 stations, 5 of which broadcast 
Rustavi-2's evening news program daily. Independent newspapers and 
television stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities. 
Stations desiring benefits and better working relations with 
authorities, practice self-censorship.
    Journalists stated that they are vulnerable to pressure from the 
authorities, as well as from business and societal elements. For 
example, Clara Abramia claimed that the police harassed her after she 
criticized the Internal Affairs Minister in a series of published 
articles. According to press reports, the Minister had requested that 
the Procuracy bring a criminal case against her, but the Procuracy 
refused citing a lack of evidence. She was granted political asylum in 
Sweden in February.
    Gia Abdalaze, a photographer for Kviris Palitra newspaper, alleged 
that four police officers beat him and broke his camera outside the 
Tbilisi Sports Palace on April 8. He was attempting to photograph 
police beating several youths who were attending a pre-election 
concert. He filed a complaint with the Saburtelo district police and 
the Procuracy. He claimed that the police threatened that they would 
plant narcotics on him and beat his family. The Procuracy never filed 
charges against the police. A group of NGO's protested the beating.
    On May 19, Akaki Gogichaishvili, the lead reporter for ``60 
Minutes,'' Rustavi-2's weekly investigative journalism series, 
announced that he had received a death threat indirectly from the 
Procurator's office. He was warned to stop broadcasting or face 
criminal charges, and then via a relative he was told to leave the 
country for his own safety. Following Gogichaishvili's May 19 
announcement, NGO's and members of the public gathered to protest the 
threats on his life. This threat allegedly was connected to allegations 
of corruption in the Georgian writers' union broadcast on his February 
26 and April 2 programs. In May the President issued a directive to the 
Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs, the Procurator, and 
the Chamber of Control to investigate the allegations made by 60 
minutes against the union. On May 11 the union was exonerated of 
corruption charges. Prior to the incident in May, Gogichaishvilli and 
others on his staff had received death threats and been harassed.
    On July 27, in Tbilisi, Vasiko Silagadze, a reporter for Eco Digest 
was beaten severely and his right thumb and forefinger slashed after he 
wrote a series of stories about alleged corruption of senior officials 
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Silagadze claimed that he was 
attacked again on September 7. The Procuracy was investigating the 
first attack at year's end.
    On August 16, a mob led by Orthodox extremists, attacked 
journalists at a courtroom in Tbilisi (see Section 2.c.).
    In October President Shevardnadze publicly criticized the daily 
newspaper Rezonansi for reporting comments by an opposition politician 
in Parliament who called for the overthrow of the ``Shevardnadze 
regime.'' He asked the Procuracy to investigate the newspaper, which he 
stated had a history of provocative, antigovernment news coverage.
    On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale, was 
found dead outside of Tbilisi (see Section 1.a.).
    On October 14, 1999, George Kupuradze, a reporter for Rezonansi 
newspaper, and Sergei Belousov, a photographer, alleged that they were 
beaten severely by Devnoz Gabatashvili and other policemen when they 
tried to intervene on behalf of another person whom they claim was 
being beaten by police. Kupuradze suffered a concussion. He lodged a 
formal complaint and reportedly identified all three police officers 
involved at an identification procedure in the Gldani procurator's 
office. Only Gabatashvili was brought to trial and was charged with 
exceeding his authority and intentionally inflicting injury. Kupuradze 
alleged that the police officers tried to bribe him not to pursue the 
case. The Tbilisi court began hearing the case, but found the 
investigation inconclusive and referred the case back to the 
Procurator's office for further investigation. Kupuradze appealed, but 
the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in September.
    In 1998 the trial of two journalists from the independent newspaper 
Orioni who reported allegations of sexual harassment and homosexuality 
in the armed forces was postponed indefinitely in April 1998. At that 
time, government and military officials reportedly responded by 
threatening the reporters with arrest, demanding the names of sources, 
and filing a civil lawsuit that charged defamation. One of the two 
journalists, Amiran Meskheli, was detained for allegedly having evaded 
military service. He subsequently was conscripted and assigned to the 
unit about which he had reported. Human rights monitors considered this 
an attempt at intimidation and filed a lawsuit to overturn his 
conscription. Meskheli remained free on bail.
    The lack of an active journalists' association limited the 
effectiveness of media advocacy. Media observers noted that few 
journalists and government officials, especially in the regions, 
understand the legal protections afforded journalists and few have the 
resources to hire a lawyer to pursue court cases. Some have enlisted 
the assistance of the NGO community.
    The 1999 Law on Post and Communications removed the 
telecommunications licensing process (including radio and television) 
from the direct control of the Minister of Communications and 
established an independent, self-financed, three-person regulatory 
commission to create an open and transparent process. However, the 
commission has not yet become active.
    Channel 25 is the only independent television station broadcasting 
in Ajara, and has been operating since 1998. On February 14, it 
broadcast its first uncensored news coverage. On February 19, three of 
the four owners of the station alleged that they were coerced by Ajaran 
regional government officials and Mikhail Gagoshidze, chairman of 
Ajaran Television and Radio, to cede 75 percent of the company's shares 
to Gagoshidze. The owners stated that in return they were forced to 
take $50,000 (100,000 laris) in cash. The same day, Batumi mayor Aslan 
Smirba physically assaulted Avtandil Gvasalia, the station's commercial 
director. Smirba claimed that he had a right to own the station, as he 
had helped the company get permission to broadcast. The owners brought 
suit against Gagoshidze, but lost their case in Ajara regional court. 
The case was in the appeal process at year's end.
    The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission 
from the authorities; however, both the national Government and local 
governments sometimes restrict this right in practice. A 1997 law on 
freedom of assembly requires political parties and other organizations 
to give prior notice and obtain permission from local authorities if 
they intend to assemble on a public thoroughfare. Members of the local 
NGO community believe that the law violates the Constitution and have 
sought to have it overturned by the Constitutional Court. However the 
Court refused to hear the case, explaining that a test case must be 
brought before it in order for it to consider the challenge, and that, 
an individual must prove that he has been harmed by this law. Most 
permits for assembly are granted without arbitrary restriction or 
discrimination; however, this is not the case for Zviadists, supporters 
of former President Gamsukhardia. Extreme Zviadists never have accepted 
any successor to the Gamsakhurdia government as legitimate and held 
demonstrations demanding that the present Government resign. The 
Government viewed the public rallies of the Zviadists as a threat 
because of the publicity they generated for themselves and against the 
Government. The police broke up one of their rallies held in May 1999 
and another in October. A hunger strike involving several hundred 
persons and conducted in the shell of Gamsakhurdia's burnt-out villa in 
Tbilisi since mid-June 1999 was not disturbed and continued at year's 
end.
    During the year, numerous rallies were held throughout Tbilisi and 
in other cities to protest pension and wages arrears. Police did not 
interfere. In June approximately 300 displaced persons gathered outside 
the Constitutional Court to demand payment of their overdue allowances. 
The police prevented the group from protesting in front of the 
Parliament. During the fall, demonstrations protesting energy shortages 
were common and allowed to proceed without hindrance. In February 
Zviadist politician Leila Tsomaia was beaten by two unidentified men in 
Tbilisi and hospitalized with a concussion. Zviadists claimed that she 
was beaten in order to prevent a rally the following day. She never 
filed a complaint. On April 6, Tsomaia and another opposition 
politician, Luisa Shakashvili, were escorted by the police out of the 
city, allegedly to prevent them from participating in a rally. In 
February 1999, she and Tamila Nikoldaze, a fellow Zviadist, had been 
pardoned and released from prison. They had been incarcerated on 
charges of civil disorder for attempting to stage a rally in front of 
Tbilisi university in 1997.
    During the year, the police broke up rallies or gatherings and 
meetings held by various religious groups or watched while members of 
the public disrupted them (see Section 2.c.). Local authorities several 
times prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from conducting open-air assemblies 
on private and public property. In September police did nothing to 
prevent and allegedly participated in the break-up of two such 
assemblies in Zugdidi and Marneuli by followers of a radical former 
Orthodox priest, Father Basil Mkalavishvili. Jehovah's Witnesses 
reported ongoing threats and harassment by local police and other 
authorities in the fall (see Section 2.c.). On December 15, in the 
village of Uraveli, a group of 100-150 persons surrounded a house where 
40 Jehovah's Witnesses had gathered and forced them to flee the area. 
On December 18, Father Mkalavishili and his followers tried to disrupt 
construction work on a Pentecostal meeting hall in Tbilisi. On December 
19, followers of Father Mkalavishvili tried to enter Guram 
Markozashvili's Tbilisi residence in order to force him to sign a 
document stating that he would no longer conduct meetings of Jehovah's 
Witnesses in his home.
    According to press reports, police prevented a group of Chechens 
from starting a public walk for peace to Azerbaijan from the Akhmeta 
district on February 14. One participant allegedly was beaten. The 
authorities reportedly stated that the action was not registered and 
therefore was illegal.
    In the Baghdati region of Imereti, police attempted to prevent a 
foreign labor union official and representatives of the Free Trade 
Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' (FTUTGS) from holding a 
meeting (see Section 6.a.).
    Some rallies of opposition presidential candidate Jumber 
Patiashvili were disrupted, and in some areas he was denied permission 
to use public buildings (see Section 3).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice. Authorities 
granted permits for registration of associations without arbitrary 
restriction or discrimination. However, on June 24, the Tbilisi 
appellate court overturned the registration of two organizations 
affiliated with Jehovah's Witnesses on the grounds that there was no 
law regulating the registration of religious organizations (see Section 
2.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, local police and security officials harassed several non-
Orthodox religious groups, particularly local and foreign missionaries, 
including Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, and Hare Krishnas.
    The Constitution recognizes the special role of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church in the country's history without further defining it, 
but also stipulates the independence of the Church from the State. The 
tax code grants tax exemptions only for the Orthodox church and not for 
any other religion. The Georgian Orthodox Church has lobbied Parliament 
and the Government for laws that would grant it special status and 
restrict the activities of missionaries from nontraditional religions. 
Various draft laws, some modeled on the Russian law on religion, have 
been rejected by Parliament.
    Certain members of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the public view 
non-Orthodox, so-called ``sects'' as a threat to the Church and 
Georgian cultural values, a perception that some politicians exploited 
during elections. Local police and security officials at times harassed 
foreign missionaries and non-Georgian Orthodox congregations or did not 
intervene when others harassed them. For example, on September 16, the 
police and followers of the excommunicated priest Basil Mkalavishvili 
prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from holding a convention in Marneuli by 
stopping buses, physically attacking followers and burning and looting 
the convention site (see Section 2.b.). Jehovah's Witnesses allege that 
police actively participated in these activities, and at least one 
eyewitness confirmed that police did not impede the so-called 
Basilists. The head of the Marneuli district administration was 
dismissed on September 19 for undisclosed reasons following the 
incident there. An investigation was being conducted at year's end.
    On September 9, police impeded buses from traveling to a Jehovah's 
Witnesses convention in Zugdidi. The convention began as scheduled, but 
was cut short due to pressure from local authorities, according to 
Jehovah's Witnesses. As the convention was dispersing, unidentified 
persons attacked some followers, looted the private property on which 
the convention was held, and burned the rostrum. According to Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the attackers were dressed in special forces uniforms.
    On May 29, 1999, the police violently broke up a public prayer 
meeting of the Assembly of God in the Gldani district of Tbilisi, 
beating a number of members, pushing a 60-year-old woman to the ground, 
and screaming threats of murder. Church members sued police and prior 
to the subsequent civil trial, Ministry of Internal Affairs officials 
repeatedly harassed the pastor and members of the congregation. At the 
trial on August 16, 1999, the judge ruled that the police had not 
violated the individuals' constitutional rights. The group filed an 
appeal and incurred further harassment from law enforcement 
authorities. On August 29, 1999, a riot allegedly instigated by the 
police broke out at one of the organization's churches. Some members 
were beaten, and the police confiscated some members' documents, 
forcing the victims to retrieve them at the police station.
    In July and August Customs officials and security officials 
impounded over 40 tons of religious materials being imported by 
Jehovah's Witnesses. The materials were not released, despite 
intervention by the National Security Council official responsible for 
human rights. The Customs Department stated that it had received 
notification that the Tbilisi Appellate Court had annulled Jehovah's 
Witnesses' organizational registration and therefore legally had to 
hold the literature. Jehovah's Witnesses filed suit against the Customs 
Department and officials in August; and their literature was released 
in December.
    In September the Government refused to extend the visa of the 
official representative of the Watchtower Society (Jehovah's Witnesses) 
to the Caucasus; however, he later was issued a visa.
    In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses' worship service of 120 
parishioners in the Gldani section of Tbilisi was attacked violently by 
renegade Georgian Orthodox group (see Section 5). (The leader of this 
group was excommunicated from the Church due to its radical and 
confrontational stance). The Gldani police refused to intervene. 
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, 1999, the 
case was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal 
charges. Despite the advocacy by the National Security Advisor for 
human rights on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses, in January the Gldani 
regional prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's 
office, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues to 
press for prosecution of the police's behavior in this and similar 
subsequent incidents. Instead, the official in charge of the 
investigation decided in June to charge one of the plaintiffs with 
hooliganism. On September 28, the two were given suspended sentences of 
6 months and 3 years, respectively. The two witnesses are planning to 
appeal their conviction. The judge also refered for further 
investigation the case of two followers of excommunicated priest Father 
Basil Mkalavishvili, who were charged with burning Jehovah's Witnesses 
literature during the same incident; however, unlike those of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, these cases were later dismissed.
    A member of parliament brought a civil suit in April 1999 to ban 
Jehovah's Witnesses, arguing that the organization is antiOrthodox, 
antistate, and antinational. Appeals by Jehovah's Witnesses to an 
appellate court and then to the Supreme Court contending that the suit 
was groundless were refused. The Supreme Court stated that the lower 
court first must hear the case. In November 1999, the lower court judge 
remanded the issue to an academic study group to study the literature 
of Jehovah's Witnesses. In February the Isani-Samgori district court 
dismissed the lawsuit based on the opinion of an academic panel. The 
case was appealed to the Tbilisi district appeals court, and on June 
23, the court ruled in favor of the member of parliament. Jehovah's 
Witnesses' appealed to the Supreme Court; a hearing was scheduled for 
January 2001.
    On January 16, two members of Jehovah's Witnesses were attacked on 
the street in Gldani. On February 13, another pair of members was 
attacked. They filed a complaint with both the police and the 
prosecutor; both refused to pursue charges.
    On August 20, the chief of the Tianeti District police and three 
other policemen reportedly dispersed a service in a Baptist Church and 
looted the property. The pastor allegedly was taken to the police 
station and threatened with future arrests. No action had been taken 
against the policemen by year's end.
    On September 28, police raided a Hare Krishna meeting house in 
Tbilisi and confiscated a large amount of religious literature.
    The Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church have 
been unable to secure the return of churches closed during the Soviet 
period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox church 
by Soviet authorities. A prominent Armenian church in Tbilisi remained 
closed. The Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, and 
Protestant denominations have had difficulty obtaining permission to 
construct new churches, reportedly in part as a result of pressure from 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. However, a new Catholic Church opened in 
Tbilisi in 1999 and another in Batumi during the year.
    Regular and reliable information about the ``Republic of 
Abkhazia,'' which is not recognized by any country and over which the 
government of Georgia does not exercise control, is difficult to 
obtain. The Abkhaz ``President,'' Vladislav Ardzimba, issued a decree 
in 1995 that banned Jehovah's Witnesses in Abkhazia. It remains in 
effect. A number of members of Jehovah's Witnesses were detained 
subsequently. Five persons who were detained in April 1999 for 
violating the decree were released in early May after their counsel 
argued that their detention violated a freedom of conscience clause in 
the Abkhaz Constitution.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution, the 1993 Law on 
Migration, and other legislation generally provide for these rights, 
and the Government generally respected them in practice. Registration 
of an individual's place of residence is not required, nor were 
internal passports. Old Soviet passports bearing ``propiskas'' (proof 
of legal residence in a particular locality) were accepted as proof of 
identity because passports and identity cards are expensive and 
difficult for many members of the electorate to obtain, especially in 
poorer and more remote rural areas.
    On July 21, border guards prevented Jehovah's Witnesses traveling 
from Armenia from entering the country, claiming that the group no 
longer was a legal organization in Georgia. Only after official 
authorization by the head of the border guards were the followers 
permitted to cross.
    Approximately 275,000 so-called ``Meskhetian Turks,'' who were 
expelled from southern Georgia to Central Asia by Stalin in the 1940's, 
still face both official and public opposition to their return in the 
face of threats by local ethnic-Armenian inhabitants of the Samtske-
Javakheti region and officials of the government of Armenia that their 
return to the region would cause a violent reaction. Many of the 
Meskhetians were expelled a second time from Central Asia when the 
Soviet Union broke up and remain stateless.
    In 1996 President Shevardnadze issued a decree authorizing the 
return of 1,000 Meskhetians per year for 5 years. The decree has never 
been implemented, and to date only a few hundred Meskhetians have 
returned as illegal immigrants. The Government has provided housing for 
most of them, but because they were to be the subject of a separate 
law, which has not yet been passed, they were deprived early in 1998 of 
their refugee status and, consequently, of their housing subsidy. Most 
of the approximately 600 Meskhetians living in the country have 
Georgian citizenship.
    In December 1997, Parliament passed a law entitled ``Recognizing 
Georgian Citizens as Political Victims and Social Protection of the 
Repressed.'' This law, intended to rehabilitate victims of the Soviet 
era, specifically excluded the Meskhetians, whom it identified as the 
subject of a separate law. Draft legislation regarding Meskhetians has 
yet to be introduced in Parliament.
    In March 1999, a presidential decree was issued to address the 
Meskhetian issue. It established the State Commission on the 
Repatriation and Rehabilitation of the Population Deported from 
Southern Georgia. In connection with its accession to the Council of 
Europe in April 1999, the Government undertook to begin the process of 
Meskhetian repatriation within 3 years. In July 1999, the Government 
announced that it had granted citizenship to 36 Meskhetians.
    The 1994 quadripartite agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, 
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in 
Abkhazia called for the free, safe, and dignified return of internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) and refugees to their homes. The Abkhaz 
separatist regime prevented virtually any official repatriation and 
unilaterally abrogated the agreement in late 1994. From 1994 to May 
1998, an estimated 53,000 of the 283,000 IDP's and refugees from 
Abkhazia returned spontaneously, most to the southern part of the Gali 
district. In May 1998, the unstable security situation in Gali 
deteriorated into open warfare between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian 
partisans and MOI troops. The partisans were defeated and, in the 
aftermath, many of the Georgian returnees fled once again as their 
homes were burned and looted by Abkhaz separatist forces.
    In January 1999, the Abkhaz separatists unilaterally invited IDP's 
to return to Gali starting on March 1, 1999, but did so in the absence 
of measures acceptable to the Georgian Government for ensuring their 
safe return and security. The move did not affect significantly the 
return of IDP's to Gali, who continued to travel back and forth to Gali 
to tend their property. Since May 1998, IDP's continue to travel back 
and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living in 
Gali on a more or less permanent basis.
    The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of 
thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia 
fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other 
Georgian regions fled to Russia. In 1997 the UNHCR began a program to 
return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created obstacles 
that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian refugees 
living in North Ossetia, Russia. To date about 370 Ossetian families 
from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South 
Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic 
Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 200 families 
returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for 
the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to 
their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government 
publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their 
homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return. 
Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local 
level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the 
organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. During the 
year, approximately 13 Ossetian refugee families returned to South 
Ossetia, 11 Ossetian refugees returned to Georgia proper, and 32 
Georgian IDP families returned to South Ossetia. Since the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Chechnya region of Russia in September 1999, the 
Government has registered approximately 7,000 refugees from that 
region. Most were women and children and settled in the Pankisi Gorge.
    There is no effective law concerning the settlement of refugees or 
the granting of political asylum, including first asylum, in accordance 
with the principles of 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Parliament passed an asylum law in 
March 1998, but it is not fully consistent with international standards 
as set out in the U.N. Convention.
    According to the UNHCR, the Government processed no asylum cases 
during year, one in 1999, and none in 1998. There were no reports of 
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution and the 1995 parliamentary and presidential 
election laws provide citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully through regular elections; however, the April 
presidential elections were marred by numerous serious irregularities 
and limited this right in practice. An elected president and parliament 
govern most of the country.
    Presidential elections were held on April 9. There were seven 
official candidates, although two candidates, Aslan Abashidze and 
Tengiz Asanidze, withdrew less than 24 hours before the election. Only 
two candidates campaigned actively: the incumbent, President Eduard 
Shevardnadze, and Jumber Patiashvili, both former leaders of the 
Georgian Communist Party during the Soviet period. International 
observers strongly criticized the election. The CEC reported that 
Shevardnadze won with over 78 percent of the vote to Patiashvili's 16 
percent, in contrast to observer estimates of 50 to 70 percent of the 
vote for Shevardnadze and 30 percent for Patiashvilli. The OSCE noted 
serious irregularities, including instances of ballot stuffing, group 
voting, groups of identical signatures on voters lists, media bias, and 
lack of transparency in vote counting and tabulation. Some observers 
also noted a police presence in polling places and insufficiently 
representative electoral commissions at all levels. The OSCE noted that 
the situation deteriorated in the counting process. In general 
procedural safeguards were not implemented. The CEC annulled the 
election results of six polling stations.
    During the campaign period, Patiashvili protested unfair media 
coverage. Eleven candidates applied for registration to the CEC. Seven 
parties nominated and registered independent candidates through a 
procedure that was not fully transparent. Former President 
Gamsakhurdia's finance minister Guram Absanidze, who was accused of 
organizing an assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze in 
1998 (see Section 1.e.), applied to register as a presidential 
candidate. The CEC rejected his application, since he had not been 
living in the country for 2 years before the election. On August 31, 
the Supreme Court overturned this decision. At year's end, Absandze was 
awaiting trial after his escape from prison and subsequent recapture in 
October.
    The Revival Bloc, a coalition of opposition political parties also 
known as the Batumi Alliance and closely linked to Ajaran leader Aslan 
Abashidze, claimed that the election discredited the political process 
in the country. A number of smaller political parties boycotted the 
election, and another party urged the electorate to vote against all 
candidates. A number of opposition rallies were disrupted by police or 
bureaucratic obstacles were erected to prevent their organization (see 
Section 2.b.).
    Extensive amendments to the electoral laws were adopted less than 
three weeks before the presidential election, causing confusion in the 
administration of the election. There was inadequate time to implement 
some of the amendments properly. The OSCE also raised concerns about 
the transparency of the candidate registration process and ballot 
distribution.
    Parliamentary elections were held in October 1999. Thirteen 
electoral blocs and 34 political parties fielded candidates for 150 
proportional and 75 majoritarian seats. The Citizens' Union of Georgia 
(CUG), chaired by President Shevardnadze, won an outright majority. 
International observers judged the conduct of the elections throughout 
the country to be a step towards compliance with OSCE commitments, but 
noted that the election process did not meet all commitments. A number 
of irregularities were noted, including restrictions on freedom of 
movement, which on occasion prevented political parties and observers 
from exercising their rights. A second round was held on November 14, 
which OSCE observers described as well-conducted in some districts but 
marred with irregularities in others. The OSCE cited in particular 
intimidation of members of precinct election commissions and instances 
of ballot stuffing in Tbilisi, Abasha, and Chkhorotsku. The OSCE noted 
problems such as the election law's provision permitting the ruling 
party to dominate all levels of the election administration, the CEC's 
insufficiently transparent vote tabulation, and the CEC's poor handling 
of election complaints. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, dominated 
by Ajaran supreme chairman Aslan Abashidze, fraud was widespread. There 
was no voting in these elections in the separatist regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, which remain outside government control. Ten Members 
of Parliament from Abkhazia elected in 1992 had their terms extended.
    The local governments elected in November 1998 were expected to 
have more authority over how local government is run; however, lack of 
funding from the central government (in lieu of an independent tax 
base), corruption, and the absence of legislative guidelines made it 
difficult for them to exercise authority. The opposition criticized the 
Government for retaining the power to appoint the mayors of the largest 
cities and regional chairmen, who were not always from the area they 
serve.
    The division of power between the central and local governments 
remained a key issue in the country's transition to democracy.
    The degree of actual autonomy to be exercised by the ``Autonomous 
Ajaran Republic'' was at the center of this debate during the year. 
Ajara's post-independence relationship to the rest of the country still 
was undefined and, in matters such as elections, Ajara's authorities 
claimed that regional laws took precedence over national laws. The 
Revival Party, the dominant political party in Ajara led by Aslan 
Abashidze, the supreme chairman of the Ajaran Autonomous Republic, 
boycotted the national Parliament for much of the year in a dispute 
with the CUG over the degree of autonomy in Ajara. The party took part 
in the October 1999 parliamentary elections as the major opponent to 
Shevardnadze's CUG. The Government was reluctant to challenge 
interference in the local electoral process by the Ajaran authorities 
because it sought to avoid encouraging threats of separatism in this 
ethnically Georgian, but historically Muslim region.
    In the November 1998 local elections, the mayor was elected by a 
direct vote in Batumi, in contrast to the other major cities. In the 
October 1999 parliamentary elections, international and domestic 
observers reported various forms of intimidation and abuses in Ajara, 
as well as outright fraud.
    In April the Parliament granted the former autonomous Soviet 
Republic of Ajara the constitutional status of an autonomous republic. 
The division of authorities and competencies between the national and 
Ajaran governments had not yet been defined.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however, 
women's NGO's took an active role in the 1999 parliamentary election 
season, engaging candidates in discussions about issues of concern to 
their memberships. In the 235-seat Parliament, women were represented 
poorly in the 1999 election with only 16 women winning seats. Only two 
women held ministerial posts.
    Representation of national minorities decreased in the new 
Parliament from 16 members to 13 members; there were 6 ethnic Armenian 
representatives and 4 ethnic Azeris in the new Parliament. Ethnic 
Armenians in 1995 constituted 11 percent of the population as a whole, 
while ethnic Azeris made up 3.8 percent of the population. Other 
minority groups represented include Ossetians, Kurds, Jews, and Greeks.
    ``Presidential elections'' were held in Abkhazia in October 1999. 
International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE declared 
them illegal. Georgian authorities criticized them as having no legal 
basis, as they had the Abkhaz local elections of March 1998, on the 
basis that a majority of the population has been expelled from the 
region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally respected the right of local and 
international organizations to monitor human rights but continued to 
restrict the access of local human rights groups to some prisoners (see 
Section 1.c.).
    There are a number of credible local organizations that monitored 
human rights, most of them in Tbilisi. Other local human rights groups 
that are extensions of partisan political groups have little 
credibility or influence. Local human rights NGO's reported that the 
Government was slightly less responsive during the year. They continued 
to view the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights as the most 
objective of the Government's human rights bodies. The National 
Security Council's human rights advisor was engaged on some human 
rights matters, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses (see Section 
2.c.).
    The constitutionally mandated Office of Public Human Rights 
Defender, or ombudsman, was created in 1995. The first ombudsman was 
appointed to the position in November 1997 and chose to focus on social 
and economic issues, rather than on defending political and civil 
rights. He resigned in August 1999. On July 16, Nana Devdariani was 
appointed to the position. While government representatives have been 
effective in individual cases, neither they nor the NGO's have been 
successful in prompting systemic reform. NGO's can and do bring suits 
to courts of the first instance on behalf of persons whose rights have 
been abused.
    In 1997 the UNHCR and the OSCE mission established a joint human 
rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, to investigate security incidents 
and human rights abuses. The office, which has operated sporadically 
because of fluctuating security conditions, provides periodic findings, 
reports, and recommendations. The human rights office in Sukhumi 
registered relatively few complaints of abuse by de facto police and 
judicial authorities in the region.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens without 
regard to race, language, sex, religion, skin color, political views, 
national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, social status, land 
ownership, or place of residence, and the Government generally 
respected these rights. The Constitution stipulates Georgian as the 
state language. Ethnic Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, Abkhaz, Ossetian, and 
Russian communities prefer to communicate in their native languages or 
in Russian. Both Georgian and Russian are used for interethnic 
communication.
    Women.--The Criminal Code, in force since June 1, classifies 
marital rape and sexual coercion as crimes. There are no laws that 
specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women. 
According to a poll conducted in 1998 by the NGO Women for Democracy, 
younger women reported that spousal abuse occurs with some frequency 
and, since it is a social taboo to go to the police or otherwise to 
raise the problem outside the family, it is reported or punished only 
rarely. Spousal abuse is reportedly one of the leading causes of 
divorce. Domestic violence continued to rise as economic conditions 
became more difficult. Police did not always investigate reports of 
rape. A local NGO, with the help of an international NGO, opened a 
shelter for abused women in the spring of 1998. The Government 
established a hot line for abused women, but provided no other 
services. There are currently anonymous telephone services specialized 
in assisting female rape victims, but there are no shelters, 
specialized services, or other mechanisms to protect and assist them. 
In February the President approved a national action plan on combating 
violence against women, which charged the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs, Labor, Health and Social Affairs with providing support to 
victims; however, this plan was not implemented at year's end. Sexual 
harassment, reportedly a problem in the workplace, was not 
investigated.
    Kidnaping of women for the purpose of marriage continues to occur, 
especially in rural areas, although the practice is declining. Such 
kidnapings are often arranged elopements; however, these abductions 
often occur against the will of the intended bride, and sometimes 
involve rape.
    Prostitution is not a criminal offense. There were proposals to 
create legal controls for prostitution, in part to prevent the spread 
of venereal diseases. The President has indicated his opposition to the 
idea.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace is a 
problem, especially as economic conditions worsen, according to a U.N. 
Development Program report.
    The Civil Code gives women and men equal inheritance rights. A 
number of women's NGO's, including the women's group of the Georgian 
Young Lawyers' Association, the Women's Center, and Women for 
Democracy, promote women's rights. NGO's supported a 1998 poll of women 
conducted by Women for Democracy, which found a gap between the 
perceptions of older and younger women. Older women tended to view 
their place in traditional society as an honored one; younger women 
reported that although there were no real barriers to a professional 
life or to a good education, discrimination and harassment in the 
workplace were problems. Younger women also reported that the economic 
balance had shifted in their favor, as many traditionally male jobs 
disappeared due to the depressed economy. Women's access to the labor 
market was improving but remained primarily confined, particularly for 
older women, to low-paying and low-skilled positions, often without 
regard to high professional and academic qualifications. Many women, 
especially of the generation under the age of 35, hold highly 
professional positions. However, these are a lower percentage than men. 
A study released by the Caucasus Center for Sociological Studies during 
the year noted that 72 percent of working women no longer believe that 
they should have a dependent role in the family. However, almost half 
of these women stated that they would compromise this belief to 
preserve the family unit. Many women seek employment abroad.
    A study released in 1999 reported that women were paid 78 percent 
of men's wages in the public sector and 67 percent of men's wages in 
the private sector. The Government's data noted a wider disparity in 
both categories. Reportedly, men were given preference in promotions. 
Of the 105,000 unemployed persons throughout the country, 55 percent 
were women. Women rarely fill leadership positions. The Government had 
no active efforts focused on women's issues. According to the UNDP, 
employers frequently withhold benefits connected to pregnancy and 
childbirth.
    Children.--Government services for children were extremely limited. 
The 1995 Health Reform Act withdrew free health care for children over 
the age of 3 years. While education is officially free, many parents 
were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents have 
to pay for their children's education. The Ministry of Education 
announced in that it was beginning an overhaul of the educational 
system; however, no action had been taken by year's end.
    There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, but difficult 
economic conditions broke up some families and increased the number of 
street children. The private voluntary organization Child and 
Environment noted a significant increase in the number of homeless 
children following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimated that 
there are currently more than 2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to 
the inability of orphanages and the Government to provide support. The 
organization opened a shelter in 1997. The Ministry of Education opened 
a second shelter in July 1998. However, even together, the two shelters 
can accommodate only a small number of the street children. Outside of 
Tbilisi, even in areas of acute need such as Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and 
Batumi, no such facilities or services existed. The children 
increasingly survive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and 
prostitution. Police increasingly harassed and abused street children. 
Despite a cultural tradition of protecting children, the Government 
took little official action to assist street children due to a lack of 
resources.
    The Isolator for street children in Gldani is allegedly overcrowded 
and children frequently are abused. In September police beat and 
detained Sasha Duchenko in the Gldani facility for 3 days before his 
parents were informed. His parents had reported him missing to their 
local district police station. However, the child had not been 
registered and his parents at first were told that he could not be 
found. The police then tried to extort money for the boy's return. The 
child was released only after a public protest.
    The lack of resources negatively affected orphanages as well. In 
all orphanages children received inadequate food, clothing, education, 
and medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The 
adult staff was paid poorly and had many months of unpaid wages. The 
staff often diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for 
its own use.
    The Criminal Code states that child prostitution and pornography 
are punishable by imprisonment of 3 months to 3 years.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legislated or otherwise 
mandated provision requiring access for the disabled. However, the 1995 
Law on the Social Security of Disabled Persons mandates that the State 
ensure appropriate conditions for the disabled to use freely the social 
infrastructure and to ensure proper protections and supports. The Law 
on Labor has a section that includes the provision of special discounts 
and favorable social policies for those with disabilities, especially 
disabled veterans.
    Many of the state facilities for the disabled that operated in the 
Soviet period have been closed because of lack of government funding. 
Most disabled persons are supported by family members or by 
international humanitarian donations.
    Religious Minorities.--The Georgian Orthodox Church repeatedly has 
spoken out against so-called ``sects'' and argued that foreign 
Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-Christian 
areas. Foreign missionaries continued to report harassment on the part 
of extremist Orthodox groups, local police, and security officials (see 
Section 2.c.).
    There was no pattern of anti-Semitism. The Jewish community 
experienced delays in the return of property confiscated during Soviet 
rule. A court ordered a former synagogue, rented from the Government by 
a theater group, to be returned to the Jewish community in 1997. The 
theater group refused to comply and started a publicity campaign with 
anti-Semitic overtones to justify its continued occupation of the 
building. In December 1997, President Shevardnadze promised Jewish 
leaders that the synagogue would be returned before the celebration of 
2,600 years of Jewish settlement in Georgia, on September 9, 1998. 
However, the President's order was not enforced and the building 
remained in the hands of the theater group. The district court ruled 
again in February 1999 that the synagogue building must be returned to 
the Jewish community and ordered the city to find other premises and 
provide compensation for the theater company. However, the case was 
appealed and on, July 3, the Tbilisi appellate court overturned the 
February 1999 decision. The Jewish community plans to appeal to the 
Supreme Court.
    On April 19, Jehovah's Witnesses services were dispersed in four 
different cities in the western part of the country. Complaints were 
lodged, but no charges were filed. On May 17, the excommunicated priest 
Basil Mkalavishvili and his followers held a protest demonstration 
outside Parliament, demanding that the Georgian Orthodox Church be 
declared the state religion and that Jehovah's Witnesses be banned. The 
Basilists also tried to beat an official of Jehovah's Witness and 
burned a photograph of a prominent human rights activist who has been 
active on behalf of oppressed religious minorities. On May 18, the 
Basilists held a rally in front of Parliament to protest the activities 
of nontraditional religious groups and NGO's.
    In January and February police and prosecutors refused to prosecute 
persons who attacked members of Jehovah's Witnesses.
    On July 28, in Gldani a large mob of Father Basil Mkalavishvili's 
supporters encircled and forcibly stopped a busload of Jehovah's 
Witnesses traveling to a religious gathering in Marneuli. The attackers 
disabled the bus by puncturing a tire, and they shoved, pushed, and 
struck the men, women, and children as they left the vehicle. Shortly 
thereafter the attackers traveled to Marneuli and demanded that the 
local police disperse the religious gathering. In August more then a 
dozen followers of Basilia assaulted two members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses. These two attacks followed a court decision on June 26 to 
revoke the registration of Jehovah's Witnesses in the country.
    In early August, a prayer meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was broken 
up by unidentified armed men. In Kutaisi, two traffic police officers 
stopped a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, tore up his religious 
literature, and beat him.
    On August 16, a mob of 80 Orthodox extremists, wielding metal 
crosses and icons, disrupted a packed courtroom in Tbilisi after the 
testimony of an Orthodox woman accused of sharing in an earlier violent 
attack on Jehovah's Witnesses. The mob attacked journalists, lawyers, 
and members of Jehovah's Witnesses who were in the courtroom.
    In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the 
Gldani section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently 
by members of a religious sect led by the excommunicated priest Basil 
Mkalavishvili. The Gldani police refused to intervene. Sixteen persons 
were injured in the attack. President Shevardnadze, in a televised 
appearance, publicly criticized the attack and called for prosecution 
of the attackers. On December 25, 1999, the case was forwarded to the 
Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges. Despite appeals by the 
National Security Advisor for Human Rights, the Gldani regional 
prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's office 
in January, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues 
to press for prosecution of police in this and similar subsequent 
incidents (see Section 2.c.). The official in charge of the 
investigation decided instead in June to charge two of the plaintiffs, 
as well as two Basilists, with hooliganism. On August 16 and 17, at the 
first hearing of the trial in Gldani-Nadzaladevi court, Basilists 
attacked journalists, human rights advocates, and members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses. The police did not intervene and the Procuracy is conducting 
an investigation. The trial resumed without incident on September 18 
and on September 28, the two Jehovah's Witnesses were found guilty and 
given suspended sentences. The two Basilists were not convicted and 
their cases were returned to the Procuracy for further investigation.
    On August 26, a cross-erected at the Zedazeni Monastery by the 
international Georgian Youth Foundation to commemorate the war in 
Abkhazia was blown up. This apparently was due to the organizer's 
association with a religious group led by Boris Ivanov. On August 31 
the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church criticized the violence. 
On October 1, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was disbanded by police 
in Tsageri, according to the group's public affairs office in Tbilisi.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally 
respected the rights of members of ethnic minorities in nonconflict 
areas but limited selfgovernment and played a weaker role in ethnic 
Armenian and Azeri areas (see Section 3). The Government reportedly 
provided less funding for schools in ethnic Azeri and Armenian areas 
than in other parts of the country. School instruction in non-Georgian 
languages is permitted.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1997 Law on 
Trade Unions provide for the right of citizens to form and join trade 
unions. The Law on Collective Agreements was passed in 1997.
    The principal trade union confederation is the Amalgamated Trade 
Unions of Georgia (ATUG). The ATUG is the successor to the official 
union that existed during the Soviet period. The union broke from the 
central Soviet labor confederation in 1989. Its present structure was 
established in 1992, after the union had resisted efforts first by the 
Gamsakhurdia Government and later by the State Council to bring the 
union under government control. The ATUG consists of 31 sectoral 
unions. Representatives to the ATUG congress elected its leadership 
indirectly for a period of 5 years in 1995; elections were held again 
in November.
    The organization officially claims 600,000 members but acknowledges 
that the number of active, dues-paying members is lower. The union has 
no affiliation with the Government and receives no government funding 
(except for support to send 200 children each year to summer camp). The 
union sees its primary role as defending the economic and social 
interests of workers, a departure from its Soviet predecessor, which 
was essentially an administrative body concerned with property and 
finance rather than with worker rights. The ATUG supported public 
sector strikes by teachers, medical service employees, and energy 
sector workers. These were mostly wildcat actions. In each case, the 
issue was unpaid wages. On December 23, 1999, the ATUG led a 
demonstration in front of the State Chancellery to demand that back 
wages and pensions be paid. The State Minister met with leaders and 
promised to meet with unions in January to resolve the problem; 
however, no meetings took place by year's end.
    On January 31, 1999, President Shevardnadze signed a decree that 
ordered all governmental agencies to consult and negotiate with unions. 
During the year, the Health and Social Welfare Ministry took steps 
toward negotiating agreements with unions.
    In 1998 the ATUG brought suit against the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for illegally firing 220 employees in the MOI's visa office. 
The suit was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. To date several 
employees have been ordered reinstated, but the MOI has refused to do 
so.
    There are two trade unions independent of the ATUG. The Free Trade 
Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' based in Kutaisi (FTUTGS) 
successfully struck for payment of teachers' back wages in 1999. The 
Independent Trade Union of Metropolitan Employees was formed in Tbilisi 
during the year.
    On June 22, the police initially prevented a foreign official of a 
teachers' union, accompanied by representatives of the FTUTGS, from 
meeting with teachers in Bagdati, a town in the Imereti region. Local 
authorities allegedly told the minivan driver that his van would be 
confiscated if he were to transport the group to Bagdati. When the 
group entered Bagdati on foot, the local police chief and district 
administrator each claimed that the FTUTGS had no right to organize the 
meeting. Eventually, the foreign official was able to conduct a 
meeting, although members of the local ATUG teacher's union disrupted 
it.
    There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and 
participation in international organizations. The ATUG worked closely 
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In 
February a delegation from the ICFTU held a joint conference with 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the ATUG in Tbilisi. During 
that time, the ICFTU reviewed the ATUG's application for membership in 
ICFTU and recommended admittance. The AFTUG became a full member of the 
ICFTU in November.
    In December 1999, the ICFTU reported that the Ministry of Labor was 
abolished. There has not been an assessment on the impact of this 
action.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and 
bargain collectively, and this right is respected in practice. The law 
prohibits discrimination by employers against union members. Employers 
may be prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and forced to reinstate 
employees and pay back wages. The ATUG and its national unions report 
frequent cases of management warning staff not to organize trade 
unions. Some workers reportedly complained of being intimidated or 
threatened by employers for union organizing activity. These include 
teachers in the Imereti region; employees of various mining, 
winemaking, pipeline and port facilities; and the Tbilisi municipal 
government. Observers also claim that employers fail to transfer 
compulsory union dues, deducted from wages, to union bank accounts. The 
Ministry of Labor investigated some complaints but no action has been 
taken against companies that allegedly have violated workers' rights.
    On August 22, the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia 
``Solidarity'' organized a demonstration in front of government offices 
in Kutaisi to demand payment of back wages to teachers in the Imereti 
region's school system. According to several school principals, the 
governor of the Imereti region told them that the FTUTGS was a 
``negative force'' and should be resisted. Since then, a number of 
FTUTGS members allegedly were fired, regardless of seniority, when 
layoffs or staff reduction took place. According to a foreign union 
expert, the FTUTGS complained of increased pressure from the school 
authorities in the second half of the year, including principals 
instructing teachers not to join the union and actively preventing 
teachers from attending meetings.
    In 1999 the FTUTGS conducted a number of successful actions for the 
payment of back wages in Kutaisi.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and provides for sanctions against 
violators, and in general there were no reports of its use; however, 
trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a problem (see 
Section 6.f.). The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by 
children and enforced this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to current legislation, the minimum age for 
employment of children is 16 years; however, in exceptional cases, the 
minimum age can be 14 years. The Ministry of Labor enforced these laws, 
and generally they were respected. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children and enforced this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.). The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs enforces child 
labor laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The state minimum wage was 
raised in 1999 to $10.80 (20 lari) a month. There is no state-mandated 
minimum wage for private sector workers. The minimum wage is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. In general salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet 
basic minimum needs for a worker and family. The state statistics 
department of Georgia estimates that over half the population lives at 
or below the poverty line. Average wages in private enterprises were 
$75 to $100 (150 to 200 lari) monthly; in state enterprises, $15 to $30 
(30-60 lari).
    The law provides for a 41-hour work week and for a weekly 24-hour 
rest period. The Government work week often was shortened during the 
winter due to the continuing energy crisis. The Labor Code permits 
higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker to refuse duties 
that could endanger life without risking loss of employment.
    The old Soviet labor code, with some amendments, is still in 
effect. A new labor code has not been adopted.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws concerning 
trafficking in women, and it is a problem. Trafficking in women is not 
prosecuted as a separate offense under the criminal law; however, other 
offenses connected to trafficking can be found in the Constitution and 
different laws such as those on slavery, forced labor, and illegal 
detention.
    Information on trafficking is difficult to obtain, and little, if 
any research is done on the subject. Anecdotal reports indicate that 
the country is both a source and transit country for trafficking; 
however, due to slow economic development, poverty, and unemployment, 
it is not a final destination for a significant number of trafficked 
women. Women are primarily trafficked to Turkey and Greece, where many 
work in the adult entertainment sector or as prostitutes, including 
those who thought that they would actually be employed as waitresses in 
bars and restaurants or domestic help. There is also evidence that 
Russian and Ukrainian women have been trafficked through the country to 
Turkey, sometimes using fraudulently obtained Georgian passports.
    There is no evidence linking traffickers to government authorities. 
The absence of laws aimed specifically at trafficking, together with 
police indifference, make it difficult for the government to pursue 
criminal cases against suspected traffickers.
    There are no government policies that deal with the problem of 
trafficking. There are now several NGO's in country that are involved 
in dealing with trafficking and its victims. During the year, the NGO 
Women Aid Georgia received international funding to launch a wide-scale 
public information drive to educate women about the dangers of 
trafficking.
                               __________

                                GERMANY

    The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary 
democracy; citizens periodically choose their representatives in free 
and fair multiparty elections. The head of the Federal Government, the 
Chancellor, is elected by the Bundestag, the first of two chambers of 
Parliament. The powers of the Chancellor and of the Parliament are set 
forth in the Basic Law (Constitution). The 16 states represented in 
Parliament in the Bundesrat enjoy significant autonomy, especially as 
concerns law enforcement and the courts, education, the environment, 
and social assistance. The judiciary is independent.
    Law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of state governments, 
and the police are organized at the state level. The jurisdiction of 
the Federal Criminal Office is limited to counterterrorism, 
international organized crime, especially narcotics trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. Police forces in 
general are well trained, disciplined, and mindful of citizens' rights, 
although there have been instances in which police committed human 
rights abuses.
    A well-developed industrial economy provides citizens with a high 
standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with cases of individual abuse. There were instances in which police 
were accused of human rights abuses, mostly against foreign residents 
and asylum seekers. Instances of societal violence and harassment 
directed at foreign residents continued as well, some resulting in 
deaths. After a 13.7 percent decline in rightwing-motivated crime in 
1999, preliminary figures for the year suggest a significant increase 
in the number of such crimes. Moreover, the number of proven or 
suspected violent rightwing crimes (most of which resulted in bodily 
harm to the victim) during the year rose by more than 12 percent, from 
746 to 840, continuing a trend found in 1999. The Government is taking 
serious steps to address the problem of violence against women and 
children. Women continue to face some wage discrimination in the 
private sector, as do members of minorities and foreigners. Trafficking 
in women and girls is a serious problem, with Germany being both a 
destination and a transit country. The Government has taken the lead in 
coordinating federal and state efforts to combat trafficking and aid 
its victims.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In December 1999, suspected Red Army Faction member Andrea Klump 
was extradited from Austria to stand trial for her alleged role in 
various terrorist acts, including two murders, committed in the 1980's. 
Her trial began in November and continued at year's end. In 1999 
Michael Steinau and Bernhard Falk, members of a leftwing terrorist 
organization, the Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), were convicted on four 
charges of attempted murder and sentenced in connection with a series 
of bombing attacks in 1995. Steinau was sentenced to 9 years' 
imprisonment. Falk, who was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment, 
appealed his sentence in May, and his case continued at year's end.
    An investigation continued in the case of Aamir Ageeb, a Sudanese 
asylum seeker, who died in May 1999 during a deportation flight while 
in the custody of Federal Border Police. The Border Police apparently 
physically subdued the man during takeoff because he was resisting 
deportation violently, and they did not notice until Ageeb stopped 
struggling that he was not breathing. As a result of this incident, the 
Federal Interior Ministry has instituted new deportation procedures 
that prohibit methods that could hinder breathing.
    The trial of four individuals accused of the 1986 bombing of the 
Berlin La Belle discotheque, which began in 1997, continued at year's 
end. The attack killed one Turkish and two U.S. citizens and injured 
230 persons.
    In January Johannes Weinrich, a German terrorist, was convicted of 
one count of murder and five counts of attempted murder in connection 
with a 1983 bomb attack on the French cultural center in what was then 
West Berlin. The trial of Hans-Joachim Klein began in October and 
continued at year's end. Klein was charged with three murders during 
the 1975 attack by left-wing terrorists on a convention of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, 
Austria.
    Violence by rightwing extremists against marginalized social 
groups, such as the homeless and foreigners, resulted in a number of 
deaths during the year. In June a Mozambican immigrant was beaten and 
kicked to death in Dessau by three rightwing extremists who were 
caught, tried, and convicted; one was sentenced to life in prison and 
the two others were sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment each (see 
Section 5). Groups of rightwing extremists beat and kicked to death at 
least five homeless men during the year. In each case, police arrested 
the alleged perpetrators and they were charged with the crimes; several 
have been convicted and sentenced to prison terms.
    On January 25, two rightwing extremists were sentenced in Lower-
Saxony to 5 years' imprisonment in a youth detention center for their 
attack in August 1999 on a German man, who died the following day from 
his injuries. The 44-year-old victim had spoken critically about 
xenophobia to one of the perpetrators. The youths, who were drunk at 
the time, broke into the victim's apartment and kicked him and stabbed 
him with a broken glass.
    The trial of 11 rightwing defendants accused of causing the 1999 
death of an Algerian asylum seeker in Brandenburg ended in November 
with 8 defendants being convicted of negligent homicide and all 11 
being found guilty of lesser crimes (see Section 5). Three of the 
convicted youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' detention in a youth 
facility, and the others received suspended sentences or warnings. The 
family of the victim filed an appeal demanding stiffer sentences, and 
10 of the 11 youths appealed their convictions. The case continued at 
year's end.
    As of October, seven cases remained before the courts concerning 
individuals involved in the shooting deaths of East Germans who 
attempted to flee to West Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
In July former East German defense minister Heinz Kessler was sentenced 
to 7-and-a-half years' imprisonment, while three other former Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) leaders were acquitted. In January the Federal 
Constitutional Court upheld the conviction of former East German 
Politburo member Egon Krenz, who had been sentenced to 6-and-a-half 
years' imprisonment for his role in East Germany's shoot-to-kill policy 
at the East-West border. Krenz began serving his sentence on January 
13. His appeal to the European Court for Human Rights was heard in 
November, and a decision is expected in the spring of 2001. On 
September 6, Berlin's governing mayor pardoned Krenz's two 
codefendants, Guenter Schabowski and Guenther Kleiber, who each had 
received 3-year sentences; the men were released on October 2 in a 
gesture of reconciliation on the 10th anniversary of German 
reunification the following day.
    The Government continued to cooperate in bringing war criminals 
from the former Yugoslavia to justice. In October, for example, the 
Government signed an agreement with the International War Crimes 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia to have a convicted Bosnian war criminal serve 
his 20-year sentence in a German prison.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities 
generally respect these prohibitions. However, Amnesty International 
published a report in July 1999 that found that police treatment of 
foreigners in custody showed ``a clear pattern of abuse.'' In September 
an Iranian family facing deportation claimed that police held the 
father's arms behind his back, pushed his head down and then held him 
on the ground in a manner that hindered his breathing. Two older 
children who tried to help were allegedly slapped. Border Police claim 
that the father and an older child were violently resisting 
deportation. Human rights and asylum-assistance organizations have 
called for an investigation.
    The Government investigates abuses and prosecutes police who 
mistreat persons in custody. For example in July, authorities in Dessau 
initiated an investigation against three officers accused of 
mistreating a man from Burkina Faso who had been arrested for drug 
dealing. The accusations were found to be without merit. In July the 
Federal Court of Justice upheld the convictions of three police 
officers from Bernau, Brandenburg, for physically mistreating 
Vietnamese detainees in 11 cases in 1993 and 1994. Moreover, the Court 
ordered a lower court to consider stiffer penalties for the two 
officers originally sentenced to probation.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this 
prohibition. A person can be arrested only on the basis of an arrest 
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, unless the person is 
caught in the act of committing a crime, or the police have strong 
reason to believe that the person intends to commit a crime. Any person 
detained by police must be brought before a judge and charged within 24 
hours of the arrest. The court then must issue an arrest warrant 
stating the grounds for detention or order the person's release.
    Police often detain known or suspected rightwing and leftwing 
radicals for brief periods when they believe such individuals intend to 
participate in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. For example, in 
August police in Thuringia took into temporary custody 53 persons who 
were suspected of heading for illegal rallies to mark the 13th 
anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (see Section 5). The rules 
governing this type of detention are different in each state, with 
authorized periods of detention ranging from 1 to 14 days, provided 
judicial concurrence is given within 24 hours of initial apprehension.
    If there is evidence that a suspect might flee the country, police 
may detain that person for up to 24 hours pending a formal charge. The 
right of free access to legal counsel has been restricted only in the 
cases of terrorists suspected of having used contacts with lawyers to 
continue terrorist activity while in prison. Only judges may decide on 
the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail exists but seldom is 
employed; the usual practice is to release detainees unless there is 
clear danger of flight outside the country. In these cases, a person 
may be detained for the course of the investigation and subsequent 
trial. Such decisions are subject to regular judicial review, and time 
spent in investigative custody applies toward the sentence. In cases of 
acquittal, the Government must compensate the individual.
    The Government does not use forced exile, which is prohibited by 
the Basic Law.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The court system is highly developed and provides full legal 
protection and numerous possibilities for judicial review. Ordinary 
courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. There are four 
levels of such courts (local courts, regional courts, higher regional 
courts, and the Federal Court of Justice), with appeals possible from 
lower to higher levels. In addition to the ordinary courts, there are 
four types of specialized courts: administrative, labor, social, and 
fiscal. These courts also have different levels, and appeals may be 
made to the next higher level.
    Separate from these five types of courts is the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which is Germany's supreme court. Among other 
things, it reviews laws to ensure their compatibility with the 
Constitution and adjudicates disputes between different branches of 
government on questions of competencies. It also has jurisdiction to 
hear and decide claims based on the infringement of a person's basic 
constitutional rights by a public authority.
    The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process, although court proceedings are sometimes delayed due to ever 
creasing caseloads. For simple or less serious cases, the Government 
adopted a procedure allowing for an accelerated hearing and summary 
punishment at the local court level. The maximum sentence for such 
cases is limited to 1 year, and if a sentence of 6 months or more is 
expected, a defense counsel must be present.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, of 
Correspondence.--The Basic Law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
    In October a Lower Saxony court ruled that a school district could 
not refuse to hire an Islamic teacher because she wished to wear a 
traditional headscarf in the classroom. The school district said it 
would appeal the decision. In 1998 a Muslim teacher sued the Stuttgart 
school district over its decision not to hire her because she wore a 
headscarf. Although a local administrative court dismissed her suit, 
she appealed the ruling and the case continued at year's end (see 
Section 2.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom 
of the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech--with some 
limits--and of the press, including academic freedom. Freedom of speech 
does not extend to the possession or distribution of the propaganda of 
proscribed organizations or to statements endorsing Nazism or denying 
the Holocaust, all of which are illegal.
    The authorities seek to block what they consider dangerous material 
on the Internet. The 1997 Teleservices Law bans access to prohibited 
material (for example, child pornography and Nazi propaganda), and the 
Government has explored ways to expand cooperation in countering 
Internet crime. In June the Justice Ministry cosponsored a major 
symposium on combating the spread of hate materials on the Internet, 
and it proposed voluntary measures for Internet service providers and 
companies doing online business, as well as improved international law 
enforcement cooperation. The Federal Criminal Office in February hosted 
a similar event, bringing service providers and domestic law 
enforcement officials together to discuss ways to enhance cooperation. 
German officials estimate that there are approximately 800 Internet 
sites with what they consider objectionable or dangerous rightwing 
extremist content.
    In December the Federal Court of Justice ruled that German laws 
against Nazi incitement could apply to individuals who post Nazi 
material on Internet sites available to users in Germany, even if the 
site resides on a foreign server. The Court overturned a lower court 
decision that such material was not subject to criminal prosecution in 
the case of German-born Australian Holocaust revisionist Frederick 
Toben, who had, among other things, posted material denying the 
Holocaust on his Internet site. Previously in November 1999, Toben, had 
been sentenced to 10 months in prison (7 months already served were 
applied to that sentence) for denying the Holocaust and that Nazis 
killed millions of Jews. At that time, the lower court had ruled that 
Toben could not be prosecuted for Holocaust denial material he had 
posted on a website in Australia. He was released from a Mannheim 
prison after posting a bond. Toben is the director of the Adelaide 
Institute, which questions the reality and scope of the Holocaust.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Permits must be obtained for open-air public rallies and 
marches. State and local officials have the authority to deny such 
permits when public safety concerns arise or when outlawed 
organizations attempt to hold public assemblies. For example, rallies 
and marches by neo-Nazis and rightwing radicals commemorating the death 
of Nazi official Rudolf Hess are banned routinely.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. The Basic Law permits the banning of 
organizations whose activities are found to be illegal or opposed to 
the liberal democratic order as established by the Basic Law. The 
Federal Constitutional Court is the only body that can outlaw political 
parties; under this provision, the Court in the 1950's banned a neo-
Nazi and a Communist party. Federal or state governments may ban other 
organizations, and legal recourse against such decisions is available. 
Such banned organizations include a number of groups that authorities 
generally classify as rightwing or leftwing, foreign extremist, or 
criminal in nature. In addition several hundred organizations were 
under observation by the Federal and state Offices for the Protection 
of the Constitution (OPC). The OPC's are charged with examining 
possible threats to the democratic system; they have no law enforcement 
powers, and OPC monitoring by law may not interfere with the 
organizations' continued activities. In observing an organization, OPC 
officials seek to collect information, mostly from written materials 
and first-hand accounts, to assess whether a threat exists. More 
intrusive methods would be subject to legal checks and require evidence 
of involvement in treason or terrorist activities.
    In August the Government established a commission of experts to 
examine whether evidence against the rightwing extremist National 
Democratic Party (NPD) would meet the threshold to support a legal ban, 
which was widely demanded after a surge of rightwing extremist activity 
in the summer months. Based on the commission's recommendations, in 
November the Government agreed to petition the Federal Constitutional 
Court to ban the NPD. Although the Bundestag and Bundesrat formally 
supported this decision, the Government had not yet submitted the 
petition to the Court at year's end. On September 14, the Federal 
Interior Minister banned the rightwing extremist skinhead organization 
``Blood and Honor'' and its youth organization, ``White Youth,'' citing 
the groups' rejection of the constitutional order as a justification. 
While the ban (the first issued by the Federal Government since 1995) 
allows the Government to seize the groups' assets, members are free to 
reconstitute themselves under a new name.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
Most religious organizations enjoy tax-exempt status, a designation 
that requires them to operate on a nonprofit basis and contribute 
socially, spiritually, or materially to society.
    Church and state are separate, although historically a special 
relationship exists between the State and those religious communities 
that have the status of a ``corporation under public law.'' Religions 
enjoying this status may request that the Government collect church 
membership taxes on their behalf. However, not all religious groups 
take advantage of this privilege, since the Government charges an 
administrative fee for doing so. State governments subsidize various 
institutions affiliated with public law corporations, such as church-
run schools and hospitals. State subsidies also are provided to some 
religious organizations for historical and cultural reasons. Many 
religions and denominations have been granted public law corporation 
status; among them are the Lutheran and Catholic Churches, Judaism, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Seventh-Day Adventists, 
Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Christian Scientists, and the 
Salvation Army. Applications from several Islamic groups are pending in 
various states.
    In December the Federal Constitutional Court overturned a lower 
court's ruling that denied Jehovah's Witnesses public law corporation 
status and remanded the case back to the lower court. The case stemmed 
from an April 1993 decision of the Berlin state government that denied 
the church public law corporation status, a decision upheld in 1997 by 
the Federal Administrative Court. The Administrative Court concluded 
that the group did not offer the ``indispensable loyalty'' towards the 
democratic state ``essential for lasting cooperation'' because, for 
example, it forbade its members from voting in public elections. In 
overturning this decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
forbidding church members to vote or to perform military service were 
not sufficient justifications for withholding from the church public 
law corporation status. The Court added that the judiciary should not 
evaluate the compatibility of church doctrine with the democratic 
order, but only judge such cases on the actual behavior of the church 
and its members. Although the Court found that Jehovah's Witnesses in 
Germany follow the rule of law and demonstrate no intent to overthrow 
the government or political system, it did not grant them public law 
corporation status. It instead returned the case to the lower court 
with instructions to examine whether the Jehovah's Witnesses use 
coercive methods to oppose their members leaving the congregation and 
whether their child-rearing practices conform to German human rights 
standards. The case continued at year's end.
    With an estimated 3 million adherents, Islam is the third most 
commonly practiced religion in Germany (after Catholicism and 
Lutheranism). All branches of Islam are represented in the country, 
with the vast majority of Muslims in Germany coming from a large number 
of other countries. This has, at times, led to societal discord, such 
as local resistance to the construction of mosques or disagreements 
over whether Muslims can use loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods 
to call the faithful to prayer. There also remain areas where German 
law conflicts with Islamic practices or raises religious freedom 
issues. In November the Government published a comprehensive, 93-page 
report on ``Islam in Germany'' which examined these issues in response 
to an inquiry from the Bundestag.
    In October the Lueneburg administrative court ruled that the state 
education ministry must employ a teacher who was barred in 1999 from 
wearing a headscarf in the classroom. The Lower Saxony education 
ministry had refused to employ the Muslim woman after she completed her 
training because state officials took the position that allowing a 
teacher to wear a headscarf on the job would violate the religious and 
political neutrality legally required of all civil servants, including 
teachers. (Members of Christian religious orders are similarly not 
allowed to wear their habits while teaching at public schools, although 
habits are permitted in denominational schools.) The state has vowed to 
appeal the ruling and has said it will not hire the woman until it has 
exhausted its legal options. In March the Stuttgart administrative 
court dismissed a similar suit filed by a Muslim woman who was denied a 
teaching position in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The state minister of 
education supported the school district's decision not to hire the 
woman because the Ministry argued the headscarf was a political symbol 
of female submission rather than a religious practice prescribed by 
Islam. The woman appealed the ruling, and the case was pending at 
year's end. In the meantime she accepted a teaching position at a 
public school for Muslims in Berlin, where she is allowed to wear a 
headscarf. Muslim students generally are free to wear headscarves to 
school (see Section 1.f.).
    The right of Muslims to ritually slaughter animals was the subject 
of two court cases during the year. In November the Federal 
Administrative Court ruled that the Islamic Community of Hesse was not 
a religious community as provided for in Germany's animal protection 
laws and could not, therefore, receive a waiver to laws requiring an 
animal to be stunned before slaughter. The Court did not rule on 
whether Islam prescribes the exclusive consumption of ritually-
slaughtered meat, noting that such decisions were beyond the scope of 
the courts. A similar case was heard by the Federal Constitutional 
Court and a decision was pending at year's end.
    Most public schools offer religious instruction in cooperation with 
the Protestant and Catholic churches and will offer instruction in 
Judaism if enough students express interest. A nonreligious ethics 
course or study hall generally is available for students not wishing to 
participate in religious instruction. The issue of Islamic education in 
public schools is becoming increasingly topical in several states. In 
February the Federal Administrative Court upheld previous court rulings 
that the Islamic Federation qualified as a religious community and thus 
must be given the opportunity to provide religious instruction in 
Berlin schools. The decision drew criticism from the many Islamic 
organizations not represented by the Islamic Federation. The Berlin 
state government has expressed its concerns about the Islamic 
Federation's alleged links to Milli Gorus, a Turkish group classified 
as extremist by the Federal OPC. In November Bavaria announced that it 
would offer German-language Islamic education in its public schools 
starting in 2003.
    Several states have published pamphlets, which are provided to the 
public free of charge, detailing the beliefs and practices of non-
mainstream religions. Many of the pamphlets are factual, but the 
inclusion of some religious groups in publications covering known 
dangerous cults or movements may harm their reputations. For example 
publications from the Hamburg state government and state-run youth 
welfare offices in Lower Saxony, Thuringia, and Schleswig-Holstein, 
describe theologically conservative or minority Christian groups and 
imply that they can be harmful to their adherents. Scientology is the 
focus of many such pamphlets, some of which warn of alleged dangers 
posed by Scientology to existing political and economic structures and 
to the mental and financial well-being of individuals. For example, the 
Hamburg OPC publishes ``The Intelligence Service of the Scientology 
Organization,'' which claims that Scientology tries to infiltrate 
governments, offices, and companies, and that the church spies on its 
opponents, defames them, and ``destroys'' them.
    The Church of Scientology, which operates 18 churches and missions, 
remained under scrutiny by both federal and state officials who contend 
that its ideology is opposed to democracy and that it is not a religion 
but an economic enterprise. Since 1997 Scientology has been under 
observation by the Federal and state OPC's, except in Schleswig-
Holstein where the state constitution does not permit such observation 
(see Section 2.b.). Observation is not an investigation into criminal 
wrongdoing, and the Government has filed no criminal charges against 
Scientology since observation began. However, in April the Federal OPC 
concluded in its 250-page annual report for 1999 that the reasons for 
initiating observation of Scientology in 1997 still were valid. The six 
pages in the report covering Scientology described those aspects of the 
organization's beliefs that were deemed undemocratic, quoting from the 
writings of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard and Scientology-
published pamphlets and books. In 1998 the Church of Scientology filed 
a suit in a Berlin state court to enjoin the Berlin interior ministry, 
under whose authority the OPC falls, from further observation of the 
organization and its members. The case was pending at year's end.
    Scientologists continued to report discrimination because of their 
beliefs. A number of state and local offices share information on 
individuals known to be Scientologists. The Federal Government uses its 
``Defense Clause'' (commonly referred to as a ``sect filter'') for 
procurement involving some training and consulting contracts, 
specifically those that may provide opportunities for mental 
manipulation or behavior modification. The sect filter requires a 
bidder to declare that the firm rejects and will not employ the 
``technology of L. Ron Hubbard'' within the framework of the contract, 
and that the firm does not require or permit employees to attend 
courses and seminars conducted via this ``technology'' as part of its 
business function. Some state and local agencies, businesses (including 
several major international corporations), and other organizations 
require job applicants and bidders on contracts to sign similar ``sect 
filters.'' The Federal Property Office has in several cases barred the 
sale of real estate to Scientologists, nothing that the Finance 
Ministry has urged that such sales be avoided, if possible.
    At the state and local level, some governments also screen 
companies bidding on contracts for training and the handling and 
processing of personal data, and in April the Hamburg administrative 
court dismissed the suit of two Scientology members against the city-
state for its use of ``sect filters.'' In the state of Bavaria, 
applicants for state civil service positions must complete 
questionnaires detailing any relationship that they may have with 
Scientology; the form specifically states that employment will not be 
considered if the form is not completed. Moreover Bavaria has 
identified some state employees as Scientologists, sometimes years 
after they were first employed, and has required them to complete the 
questionnaire. Some of these employees have refused and two of them 
have filed suit in Bavarian courts. In October the Munich labor court 
ruled that the state cannot require employees to complete the 
questionnaire in the absence of evidence that the employee is involved 
in anticonstitutional behavior. The court further stated that even if 
the Scientology Church were to be found to be anticonstitutional, an 
individual's mere membership in the organization could not justify the 
Government delving into that person's private life in the absence of 
illegal behavior on his or her part.
    The interministerial group of mid-level federal and state officials 
that exchanges information on Scientology continued its periodic 
meetings. The group published no report or policy compendium during the 
year and remained purely consultative in purpose.
    In December the Federal Social Court in Kassel upheld a lower 
court's ruling that membership in the Church of Scientology was not, in 
and of itself, reason to deny a person a professional license. In 1999 
the State Social Court of Appeals in Rhineland-Palatinate ruled that 
the Federal Labor Office had in 1994 incorrectly refused to renew a 
Scientologist's license to run her au pair agency based solely on her 
Scientology membership. The case was remanded to the state court to 
clarify whether the specific individual's membership in the Church of 
Scientology has any bearing on her reliability as an au pair agent. The 
case continued at year's end.
    Some private sector entities have followed the governments' example 
in using ``sect filters,'' often using them for a much broader range of 
contracts. On at least one occasion a foreign firm wishing to do 
business in the country was asked to declare any affiliation that it or 
its employees might have with Scientology. Private firms that screen 
for Scientology affiliations frequently cite OPC observation of 
Scientology as a justification for discrimination and have on occasion 
quoted advice they say they have received from state or local 
government officials as to the legality of the ``sect filter.''
    Late in 1999, allegations that Microsoft's Windows 2000 contained a 
``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door'' that would permit the Church of 
Scientology to obtain information from an unsuspecting user's system 
surfaced in the technology trade press. These allegations arose after 
Hamburg's sect commissioner expressed public concern about the software 
because a firm whose chief executive officer is a Scientologist 
developed a disk defragmenting component for Windows 2000. Critics 
claimed--with no proof--that the defragmenter would secretly send 
personal data from individual computers to Scientology offices. 
Microsoft yielded to German pressure and allowed the German Federal 
Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI) to investigate the 
software. BSI conducted various tests but failed to find any evidence 
of or anything that in any way validated the concerns regarding the 
existence of a ``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door.'' Nevertheless in 
December Microsoft published instructions on how to remove the disk 
defragmenter from Windows 2000 as an alternative to further testing by 
BSI.
    In February the German branch of Amway Limited dismissed 10 
distributors because of their admitted association with Scientology, 
which the company claimed could damage the company's image. Parent 
company representatives claimed that the distributors refused to comply 
with the firm's prohibition against proselytizing in connection with 
their Amway activities, a policy that applies to all religious beliefs, 
and that other known Scientologists continue to work for the company. 
In at least one case, a major bank unilaterally closed the accounts of 
a law firm that had represented the Scientology Church.
    Scientologists have taken their grievances to the courts, with 
mixed results. Some individuals who had been fired because they were 
Scientologists sued their employers for ``unfair dismissal.'' Several 
have reached out-of-court settlements with employers. For example in 
March, a woman who had been summarily dismissed from her position in 
the bond department of a bank because of her association with 
Scientology received $27,300 (DM 60,000) under a settlement with her 
former employer.
    Major political parties continued to exclude Scientologists from 
membership, arguing that Scientology is not a religion but a for-profit 
organization whose goals and principles are antidemocratic and thus 
incompatible with those of the political parties. However, there has 
been only one known enforcement of this ban. A Bonn court upheld the 
practice in 1997, ruling that a political party had the right to 
exclude from its organization those persons who do not identify 
themselves with the party's basic goals.
    Public exhibitions by Scientologists in a number of cities to 
explain themselves to citizens encountered difficulties. In April the 
Visitor's Bureau of the Federal Press and Information Office intervened 
with a Berlin hotel, forcing the hotel to cancel Scientology's 
reservations for rooms for an exhibit titled ``What is Scientology?'' 
The hotel claimed that the Visitors' Bureau threatened to cancel 
several hundred thousand dollars worth of reservations if Scientology 
were allowed to exhibit in the hotel. Scientology was able to rent 
space elsewhere but incurred substantial extra expenses related to the 
last minute move of the exhibit. In Frankfurt a late February 
Scientology exhibit in the cafe of a well-known, city-owned museum 
sparked significant criticism, with city officials speaking out openly 
against Scientology and the exhibit. However, Scientology's recently 
established information office in Frankfurt has generated little or no 
public controversy. A Scientology exhibit at the Leipzig book fair in 
March provoked complaints about what some visitors considered 
aggressive marketing tactics, and fair authorities were reviewing 
whether to allow the exhibitors to return next year. In April 
Scientology was able to rent the public congress center in Hanover for 
a 2-day exhibition, after a hotel cancelled its reservation when it 
learned that Scientology had made the booking.
    There were no new attempts to deregister Scientology organizations 
previously registered as non-profit organizations, but the judgments in 
two such earlier cases were appealed during the year. The government of 
Baden-Wuerttemberg appealed a decision by the Stuttgart Administrative 
Court, which ruled that a Scientology organization could not be 
deregistered as a nonprofit organization because its activities were 
used to accomplish its ideological purposes. The case was pending at 
year's end. The Celebrity Center Munich, a Scientology-affiliated 
organization that was stripped of its status as a nonprofit 
organization in 1995, has appealed a 1999 upper court ruling upholding 
that decision. The case was pending at year's end.
    The Government continued its policy of not engaging in dialogue 
with the Church of Scientology this year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Basic Law and subsequent legislation 
provide for the right of foreign victims of persecution to attain 
asylum and resettlement in accordance with the standards of the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. Both the Federal Government and state governments cooperate 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, although 
immigration matters are primarily a state-level responsibility.
    For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
the Basic Law provides both for citizenship immediately upon 
application and for legal residence without restrictions. On January 1, 
a new law came into effect that grants citizenship to children born to 
legal foreign residents. Individuals can retain both German citizenship 
and that of their parents until the age of 23, when they must choose 
one or the other. The law also decreased the period of residence in the 
country required for legal foreign residents to earn the right to 
naturalization from 15 to 8 years.
    The Basic Law and subsequent legislation provide for the right of 
foreign victims of persecution to attain asylum and resettlement. 
Criteria for granting asylum were tightened by several provisions 
enacted in 1993. Individuals attempting to enter via a ``safe third 
country'' (any country in the European Union or adhering to the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees) are ineligible for asylum and can be turned 
back at the border or returned to that ``safe third country'' if they 
manage to enter Germany. Persons coming directly from any country which 
officials designate as a ``safe country of origin'' normally cannot 
claim asylum in Germany, and individuals whose applications are 
rejected on these grounds have up to 2 weeks to appeal the decision, a 
time period critics consider too brief. Individuals who arrive at an 
international airport and who are deemed to have come from a ``safe 
country of origin'' can be detained at an airport holding facility. In 
these cases, the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees 
must make a decision on an asylum application within 48 hours or allow 
the person to enter the country. The person may appeal a negative 
decision to an administrative court within 3 days, and the court must 
rule within 14 days or allow the individual to enter the country. 
Although stays in the airport facility thus are supposed to be limited 
to a maximum of 19 days, applicants whose claims were rejected, but who 
could not be immediately deported have been held at the airport for 
months, a practice criticized by refugee assistance groups and human 
rights advocates (see Section 1.c.). However, the Constitutional Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the amendments in 1996.
    Applicants who enter Germany and are denied asylum at their 
original administrative hearing may challenge the decision in court, 
and 80 percent of applicants denied asylum do so. Approximately 3 to 4 
percent of such rejections are overturned. The rejected applicant is 
allowed to remain in country during the course of the appeal, which 
usually takes at least a year and sometimes significantly longer. In 
October the Government announced changes to the regulations governing 
asylum seekers and employment. Starting January 1, 2001, applicants for 
asylum and civil war refugees will be allowed to work after a 1-year 
waiting period. The Government estimates that approximately 75,000 
foreigners will be entitled to work under the new rules. Some 
foreigners whose asylum applications were rejected, but who would be 
endangered if they were sent back to their home country, such as those 
fleeing civil wars, receive temporary residence permits--the so-called 
small asylum. However, they are expected to leave when conditions in 
their home country allow for their safe return. The vast majority of 
the approximately 345,000 Bosnians and the approximately 200,000 
Kosovars whom Germany admitted during the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia fall into this category. Once their residence permits 
expire, these people can be deported. Individuals who fail to cooperate 
during the deportation process or who are deemed liable to flee to 
avoid deportation can be held in predeportation detention, with the 
average detention period lasting 5 to 6 weeks.
    Refugee assistance organizations have expressed concern about how 
certain provisions related to the right of asylum have been interpreted 
by the courts, notably the practice of excluding ``quasi-governmental'' 
persecution as a basis for granting asylum. In August the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that lower courts had erred in denying 
asylum to three Afghan applicants because their persecutors were not a 
state government but members of a Mujahidin group (defined as a 
``quasi-governmental entity''). The case was remanded back to the lower 
court with instructions to reconsider the issue of quasi-governmental 
persecution, and a decision was pending at year's end. In response to 
the Constitutional Court ruling, the federal Office for the Recognition 
of Foreign Refugees has postponed making decisions in all current 
asylum cases involving quasi-governmental persecution until the lower 
court reissues its ruling.
    During the year, 78,564 persons applied for asylum, an almost 17.4 
percent decrease over the same period in 1999 and the lowest level 
since the amendment of the asylum law in 1993, when the criteria for 
granting asylum were tightened. The approval rate for first-time 
applicants was around 3 percent, and an additional 7.9 percent of 
rejected applicants received temporary protection from deportation.
    State authorities, working in close cooperation with the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR, and other 
domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), continued to repatriate 
Bosnian refugees, unless they qualified for an extension of stay on 
certain humanitarian grounds. According to unofficial estimates, 
approximately 25,000 Bosnian refugees remained in country at year's 
end. Among those were up to 15,000 who were considered traumatized or 
were with family members who were deemed too traumatized to return to 
Bosnia. In November the Federal and state interior ministers decided at 
their annual meeting to grant severely traumatized Bosnians and their 
family members, including unmarried adult children, temporary residence 
permits for the duration of their medical treatment. In addition some 
older Bosnian refugees, as well as some categories of Kosovars (such as 
orphaned children, ethnically mixed couples from areas with no minority 
protection, and war crimes tribunal witnesses) will be allowed to stay 
in the country.
    The Government continued to support voluntary return programs for 
refugees from the former Yugoslavia, providing financial incentives of 
between $765 and $2,250 (DM 1,350 to DM 4,500) to help cover travel and 
resettlement costs; many states provided additional resettlement funds. 
The Government repatriated approximately 48,000 Kosovars under such 
voluntary programs through December. However, failure to accept 
voluntary repatriation subjects these refugees to the threat of 
deportation, and forces them to leave their personal property behind 
and excludes them from reentering the country for a 5-year period.
    The right of most Kosovar refugees to stay in the country expired 
in the spring, and most states began regular deportations in March. By 
the end of the year, 6,800 Kosovar refugees had been deported, among 
them approximately 1,300 ex-offenders. Some national officials, the 
UNHCR, and domestic refugee support organizations have cautioned that 
the refugees' place of origin and ethnicity should be given careful 
consideration in the implementation of Kosovar returns.
    An investigation is ongoing into the 1999 death of a Sudanese 
asylum seeker who died during a deportation flight while in the custody 
of the Federal Border Police (see Section 1.a).
    In June the Federal Government appointed a commission of experts to 
examine every aspect of immigration and to propose administrative or 
legislative changes if deemed necessary. The commission held its first 
meeting in September and is expected to present its recommendations in 
mid-2001.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Basic Law provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections. Members of Parliament's 
first chamber, the Bundestag, are elected from a mixture of direct-
constituency and party-list candidates on the basis of universal 
suffrage and secret balloting. The second chamber, the Bundesrat, is 
composed of delegations from state governments.
    Women are somewhat underrepresented in government and politics, 
although the law entitles them to participate fully in political life, 
and a growing number are prominent in the Government and the parties. 
Slightly under 31 percent of the members of the Bundestag are female. 
Women occupy 6 of 15 Federal Cabinet positions. On the Federal 
Constitutional Court, 5 of the 16 judges are women, including the Chief 
Justice. Three of the parties represented in the Bundestag are headed 
by women: the Christian Democratic Union, the Greens/Alliance 90 (co-
chaired by a woman and a man), and the Party of Democratic Socialism. 
All of the parties have undertaken to enlist more women. The Greens/
Alliance 90 Party requires that women constitute half of the party's 
elected officials; and 57.5 percent of the Party's federal 
parliamentary caucus members are women. The Social Democrats had a 40-
percent quota for women on all party committees and governing bodies 
and met that goal. The Christian Democrats required that 30 percent of 
the first ballot candidates for party positions be women, a goal which 
it met.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    In December the Bundestag voted to create the National Institute 
for Human Rights, an autonomous foundation whose function will be to 
monitor human rights both domestically and abroad and to promote 
education and scientific research in the field.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits denial of access to housing, health care, or 
education on the basis of race, religion, disability, sex, ethnic 
background, political opinion, or citizenship. The Government enforces 
the law effectively.
    Women.--While violence against women is a problem and almost 
certainly is underreported, it is prohibited by laws that are enforced 
effectively. The Government has implemented a vast array of legal and 
social structures to combat it. Societal attitudes toward such violence 
are strongly negative, and legal and medical recourse is available. 
Police statistics on rape, including attempted rape and spousal rape, 
showed a 4.4 percent decrease from 7,914 cases in 1998 to 7,565 cases 
in 1999.
    The Government conducted campaigns in the schools and through 
church groups to bring public attention to the existence of such 
violence and proposed steps to counter it. The Federal Government has 
supported numerous pilot projects throughout the country. For example 
there are 435 ``women's houses'', including 115 in the eastern states 
(excluding Berlin), where victims of violence and their children can 
seek shelter, counseling, and legal and police protection.
    Trafficking in women and forced prostitution also are illegal; 
however, trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see 
Section 6.f.). In recent years, the Federal Ministry for Women and 
Youth has commissioned a number of studies to gain information on 
violence against women, sexual harassment, and other matters.
    Union contracts typically identify categories of employment in 
which participants are to be paid less than 100 percent of the wage of 
a skilled laborer covered by the same contract. Women are represented 
disproportionately in these lower-wage scale occupations.
    In January the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany's 
prohibition on women in combat roles in the armed forces violated 
European Union directives against discrimination based on gender. The 
Government accepted the ruling and in December completed the process of 
amending the Constitution to open all military jobs to women on a 
voluntary basis. The first group of 244 women are scheduled to report 
for duty on January 2, 2001.
    The Government continued to implement its multiyear action plan, 
``Women and Occupation,'' adopted in 1999. The program promotes the 
equality of women and men in the workforce, including increased 
vocational training for women, greater representation of women in 
political advisory councils, and the promotion of female entrepreneurs 
through government grants and participation in regional projects 
earmarked for women. The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, 
Women, and Youth also announced a multiyear initiative designed to 
increase the number of girls who receive training in information 
technology (IT) and in media careers, with the goal of raising the 
number of IT-training slots to 60,000 by 2003 and the share of female 
IT-trainees to 40 percent by 2005.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. Public education is provided and is 
mandatory through the age of 16.
    The Government recognizes that violence against children is a 
problem requiring its attention. Police figures recorded 15,279 cases 
of sexual abuse of children in 1999, a 7.9 percent decrease from 16,596 
in 1998. Officials believe that the number of unreported cases may be 
much higher. The 1990 Child and Youth Protection Law stresses the need 
for preventive measures, and the Government has taken account of this 
in stepping up its counseling and other assistance.
    The Criminal Code was amended in 1993 and in 1997 to further 
provide for the protection of children against pornography and sexual 
abuse. For possession of child pornography, the maximum sentence is 1 
year's imprisonment; the sentence for distribution is 5 years. The 1993 
amendment makes the sexual abuse of children by German citizens abroad 
punishable even if the action is not illegal in the child's own 
country.
    Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (See Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against the 
disabled in employment, education, or in the provision of other state 
services. The law mandates several special services for disabled 
persons, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. The 
disabled are entitled to assistance to avert, eliminate, or alleviate 
the consequences of their disabilities and to secure employment 
commensurate with their abilities. The Government offers vocational 
training and grants for employers who hire the disabled. The severely 
disabled may be granted special benefits, such as tax relief, free 
public transport, special parking facilities, and exemption from radio 
and television fees.
    The Federal Government set guidelines for the attainment of 
``barrier-free'' public buildings and for modifications of streets and 
pedestrian traffic walks to accommodate the disabled. All 16 states 
have incorporated the federal guidelines into their building codes, and 
98 percent of federal public buildings follow the guidelines for a 
``barrier-free environment.''
    Religious Minorities.--The number of crimes classified by the 
authorities as anti-Semitic fell in 1999 to 871, a 17.5 percent 
decrease from 991 in 1998. In the first 6 months of the year, anti-
Semitic crimes rose 3.3 percent over the same period in 1999, from 287 
to 297. These incidents included 7 cases of bodily injury, one case of 
arson, 14 cases of desecration of graves, and 254 ``other'' crimes that 
include the distribution of anti-Semitic materials or the display of 
symbols of banned organizations. For example, in March the police 
arrested eight youths for allegedly painting anti-Semitic slogans, 
swastikas, and other symbols on tombstones in a Jewish cemetery in 
Guben, Brandenburg. The overwhelming majority of the perpetrators of 
anti-Semitic acts were frustrated, largely apolitical youths and a 
small core of rightwing extremists.
    On April 20, a firebomb was thrown at a synagogue in Erfurt, 
Thuringia. Neighbors discovered and extinguished the fire before the 
building was damaged seriously. Two teenagers were arrested and 
convicted. The first was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and the 
second to 2 years and 2 months. On October 2, a Dusseldorf synagogue 
sustained minor damage after being firebombed. In December police 
arrested two men of Arab origin in connection with the crime.
    In June four rightwing youths threw a brick through the window of 
an Islamic prayer house in Gera, Thuringia. No one was injured during 
the attack, and the youths were arrested and charged shortly 
thereafter.
    In the July U.S.-German Agreement on the establishment of the 
German foundation, ``Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,'' Germany 
agreed to ensure that all Holocaust era insurance claims made against 
German insurance companies that come within the scope of the 
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) 
handling procedures are processed by the companies and the German 
Insurance Association on the basis of these procedures.
    Scientologists continued to report instances of societal 
discrimination (see Section 2.c.). There was no progress during the 
year in the investigation of the 1998 bombing of the grave of Heinz 
Galinski, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany until his 
death in 1992.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Preliminary Federal Criminal 
Office statistics for the year show a 39 percent increase in the 
overall number of proven or suspected rightwing crimes compared with 
1999, from 10,037 to approximately 14,000, reversing the past several 
years' downward trend. Moreover the number of violent rightwing crimes 
(including murder, attempted murder, and attacks that result in bodily 
injury, arson and bombings) rose more than 12 percent, from 746 in 1999 
to 840 during the year, including the beating deaths of at least five 
homeless men (See Section 1.a.). In 1999 the number of violent 
rightwing crimes rose 5.4 percent.
    The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC) 
reported that 51,400 persons were active in rightwing circles in 1999, 
a decrease of 4 percent from 53,600 in 1998. They included 37,000 
members of rightwing political parties, 2,200 neo-Nazis, 4,200 members 
of other rightwing groups, and some 9,000 violence-prone individuals 
(an almost 10 percent increase from 8,200 in 1998). Perpetrators of 
rightwing extremist violence were predominantly young, male, and low in 
socioeconomic status; they often committed such acts spontaneously and 
while inebriated. Most of the violent individuals (85 percent of whom 
are ``skinheads'') could best be described as rightwing-oriented, 
having loose, if any, practical or ideological ties to organized 
extremist groups. As in previous years, the percentage of crimes with 
proven or suspected rightwing background was disproportionately high in 
the east; the Federal OPC reported that more than half of rightwing 
``skinheads'' live in the east, an area with only 21 percent of the 
population. In addition to these rightwing extremists, the Federal OPC 
estimates that there are some 7,000 violence-prone leftwing extremists, 
whose primary targets are their rightwing counterparts.
    On June 11, Alberto Adriano, a Mozambican immigrant, was beaten to 
death by three rightwing extremists as he walked home through a park at 
night in Dessau, Saxony-Anhalt. Three perpetrators were convicted; a 
24-year-old defendant was sentenced to life in prison, while two 16-
year-old accomplices were sentenced to 9 years in a youth facility. The 
24-year-old and one of the juveniles have appealed their sentences, and 
the case continued at year's end.
    On July 16, three Kosovar Albanian children were injured when a 
firebomb was thrown through the window of the shelter for asylum 
seekers where they were staying in Ludwigshafen, Rhineland-Palatinate. 
Police arrested four skinheads 4 days later, and they were charged with 
the crime.
    The Federal Government and state governments remain firmly 
committed to combating and preventing rightwing violence. The 
Chancellor and leaders of all political parties publicly denounced 
rightwing violence after a surge of such activity in the summer months. 
In August and in November, Federal and state interior ministers agreed 
on a slate of measures to combat extremist violence, which includes 
increased physical protection of Jewish and other potential targets, 
the creation of a national register of violent rightwing extremists, 
stepped up patrolling or video monitoring by the border police in 
transit stations, and the prosecution of illegal rightwing content on 
the Internet. The Federal Border Police established a hotline for 
concerned citizens to report rightwing crimes. The Government also 
announced that it would use $34 million (DM 75,000,000) from the 
European Union Social Fund for antirightwing initiatives, to be 
cofinanced by the states or communities wishing to apply for project 
funds. In addition a number of state and local governments initiated 
programs to crack down on rightwing extremist activities and to engage 
young people considered most ``at risk'' for rightwing behavior.
    On August 2, a bomb at a Dusseldorf train station injured 10 recent 
Russian immigrants, among them 6 Jews. Because the group followed the 
same route each day, police have not ruled out that they were the 
specific targets of a xenophobic or anti-Semitic attack. No arrests 
have been made in the case.
    Isolated attacks targeting Turkish establishments and individuals 
occurred. Although some attacks were linked to rightwing perpetrators, 
many were attributed to intra-Turkish political or private disputes. 
None was directly attributable to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a 
banned organization. In August a 43-year-old Kurd was arrested and 
indicted for his alleged actions as a PKK functionary, including his 
order for Kurdish demonstrators to occupy foreign embassies and 
consulates in Germany after the 1999 arrest and return to Turkey of PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan.
    The trial of 11 rightwing extremists charged with the February 1999 
death of Algerian asylum seeker Farid Guendoul in Brandenburg ended in 
November with the convictions of 8 defendants on charges of negligent 
homicide and of all 11 for lesser charges. The suspects were found 
guilty of having caused Guendoul's death when they failed to assist him 
after he threw himself through a glass door to escape the skinheads, 
who were chasing him and yelling, ``Foreigners out!'' Guendoul bled to 
death. Of the 11 persons convicted, 10 have appealed their convictions, 
while Guendoul's family appealed what they consider the too-lenient 
sentences: 3 youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' term in a youth 
facility while the others received suspended sentences or warnings. 
Since its dedication, a memorial to Guendoul has been desecrated a 
number of times by suspected rightwing extremists.
    Since 1997 the Government has taken steps to protect and foster the 
languages and cultures of national and ethnic minorities that 
traditionally have lived in the country (e.g., Sorbs, Danes, Roma, 
Sinti, and Frisians). Although the Government has recognized the Sinti 
and Roma as an official ``national minority'' since 1995, the Federal 
and state interior ministries have resisted including Romani among the 
languages to be protected under relevant European statutes. Critics 
contend that the Sinti/Romani minority is the only official national 
minority that does not have unique legal protection, political 
privilege, or reserved representation in certain public institutions.
    There were no reports of violent anti-Roma or Sinti incidents, 
similar to the 1998 desecration of a Magdeburg memorial to Roma and 
Sinti murdered during the Nazi era.
    Resident foreigners and minority groups continued to voice credible 
concerns about societal and job-related discrimination. Unemployment 
affects foreigners disproportionately, although this is sometimes due 
in part to inadequate language skills or nontransferable professional 
qualifications of the job seekers. The Federal Government and all 
states have established permanent commissions to assist foreigners in 
their dealings with government and society.
    On January 1, a new citizenship law came into effect that allows 
children born to legal foreign residents to become citizens (see 
Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right to associate freely, choose 
representatives, determine programs and policies to represent workers' 
interests, and publicize views is recognized by the Basic Law and 
freely exercised. About 29 percent of the total eligible labor force 
belongs to unions. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) represents 
about 82 percent of organized workers.
    The Basic Law provides for the right to strike, except for civil 
servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive positions, 
such as members of the armed forces. In the past, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Government's definition of 
``essential services'' as overly broad. The ILO was responding to 
complaints about sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in the state 
of Hesse in 1989 and, earlier, the replacement of striking postal 
workers by civil servants. In neither case did permanent job loss 
result. The ILO continues to seek clarifications from the Government on 
policies and laws governing the labor rights of civil servants.
    Compared with previous years, strike activity declined further in 
1999. According to preliminary data for 1999, only 2,000 workers 
participated in strikes, and only 13,000 work days were lost. There 
were no notable strikes during the year.
    The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) participates in various 
international and European trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Basic Law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this 
right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous 
contract negotiations, mediation is used infrequently. Basic wages and 
working conditions are negotiated at the industry level. However, some 
firms in the eastern part of the country have refused to join employer 
associations or have withdrawn from them and then bargained 
independently with workers. Likewise, some firms in the west withdrew 
at least part of their work force from the jurisdiction of employer 
associations, complaining of rigidities in the industrywide, 
multicompany negotiating system. However, they have not refused to 
bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system of ``works 
councils'' and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus 
workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they 
work. The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion 
discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Basic Law 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced or bonded child 
labor, and there were no reports that it occurred, apart from 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    In July agreement was reached among seven nations, German 
companies, and victims' representatives on the establishment of a 
German foundation which will distribute funds for payments to private 
and public sector Nazi era forced/slave laborers and others who 
suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi era. Germany 
and German companies will each contribute $2.3 billion (DM 5 billion) 
to the foundation, which is established under German law. The 
foundation concluded agreements with partner organizations that are to 
receive foundation funds in order to process and pay claims according 
to agreed procedures and be subject to audit. Payments are expected to 
commence in 2001.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 15, with a few exceptions: those 13 or 14 years of age 
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver newspapers 
for up to 2 hours per day; and those 3 to 14 years of age may take part 
in cultural performances, albeit under stringent curbs on the kinds of 
activity, number of hours, and time of day. The Federal Labor Ministry 
effectively enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or 
administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set 
either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer 
federations or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of 
all wage- and salary-earners, the collective bargaining agreements set 
minimum pay rates and are enforceable by law. These minimums provide an 
adequate standard of living for workers and their families. The number 
of hours of work per week is regulated by contracts that directly or 
indirectly affect 80 percent of the working population. The average 
workweek for industrial workers is 36 hours in the western part of the 
country and about 39 hours in the eastern states.
    In September the Federal Constitutional Court refused to review a 
case filed by a civil servant in east Berlin, who had argued 
unsuccessfully that the prevailing system of different rates of pay for 
public service workers in the east and west were unconstitutional. The 
Court ruled that lower wages in the east were justifiable due to 
differences in the economic situation in both parts of the country and 
that the pay gap had narrowed steadily since 1992.
    Federal regulations limit the workweek to a maximum of 48 hours. 
Provisions for overtime, holiday, and weekend pay vary depending upon 
the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
    Foreign workers are protected by law and generally receive 
treatment equal to that of citizens. However, foreigners who are 
employed illegally, particularly in the construction industry in 
Berlin, are susceptible to substandard wages. Wage discrimination also 
affects legal foreign workers to some extent. For example, foreign 
teachers in some schools are paid less than their German counterparts. 
In addition seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who come to Germany on 
temporary work permits often receive wages below normal German 
standards. Furthermore workers from other European Union countries 
sometimes are employed at the same wages that they would receive in 
their home country, even if the corresponding German worker would 
receive a higher wage.
    An extensive set of laws and regulations on occupational safety and 
health incorporates a growing body of European Union standards. These 
provide for the right to refuse to perform dangerous or unhealthy work 
without jeopardizing employment. A comprehensive system of worker 
insurance carriers enforces safety requirements in the workplace. The 
Labor Ministry and its counterparts in the states effectively enforce 
occupational safety and health standards through a network of 
government bodies, including the Federal Institute for Work Safety. At 
the local level, professional and trade associations--self-governing 
public corporations with delegates both from the employers and from the 
unions--oversee worker safety.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and forced 
prostitution are forbidden by law; however, trafficking in women and 
girls is a serious problem. The laws against trafficking in women were 
modified in 1992 and 1998 to deal more effectively with problems 
stemming from the opening of the country's eastern borders; trafficking 
in persons is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment.
    Germany is a destination and transit country for trafficked women. 
Estimates vary considerably on the number of women and girls trafficked 
to and through the country, ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 per year. Most 
trafficking victims are women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25 
who are forced to work as prostitutes. According to police statistics, 
less than + of 1 percent of trafficking victims are men or boys. Of the 
women trafficked to the country through fake employment offers, 
arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures, 80 percent come from 
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily 
from Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The other 20 percent of 
trafficking victims come from Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America.
    The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, and Youth 
heads an interagency working group to coordinate the efforts of state 
and federal agencies to combat trafficking and to aid victims of 
trafficking. The Ministry has lobbied states successfully to provide 
victims of trafficking who have been detained by police 4 weeks to 
leave the country, rather than have them face immediate deportation. 
The 4-week grace period allows the victims time to decide whether to 
cooperate with police on investigations of those suspected of 
trafficking. Those who cooperate, although they are very few in number, 
are granted a temporary stay for at least part of the proceedings and 
may be eligible for witness protection at the state level. In three 
cases during recent years, the children of women in such witness 
protection programs were brought to the country to prevent possible 
retaliation against them due to their mother's testimony. However, 
protection ends once the case is concluded. Trafficking victims who 
cannot afford to pay for their return tickets home may be eligible for 
state and federal funds for transportation and some pocket money.
    The Federal Government has embarked on a multiyear ``Action Plan to 
Combat Violence Against Women,'' introduced in December 1999. This 
effort includes the creation of a number of combined federal and state 
working groups, with the participation of relevant NGO's, to address in 
as comprehensive a manner possible legislative changes, public 
educational campaigns, and opportunities for greater institutional 
cooperation. Under this program, the Government plans to spend 
approximately $373,000 (DM 822,000) over 3 years to establish a 
``National Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Women and Violence 
Against Women in the Migratory Process.'' The Federal Government 
continued its funding of six counseling centers for women from Central 
and Eastern Europe, and most states and many communities cofinanced 
institutions that help counsel and care for victims of trafficking. The 
Government publishes a brochure that provides information on residency 
and work requirements, counseling centers for women, health care, 
warnings about trafficking, and information for sex-industry workers 
that is printed in 13 languages and distributed by NGO's and German 
Consulates abroad.
                               __________

                                 GREECE

    Greece is a constitutional republic and multiparty parliamentary 
democracy in which citizens choose their representatives in free and 
fair elections. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the 
majority of parliamentary seats for a second consecutive term in 
parliamentary elections held in April. Its leader, Constantine Simitis, 
has been Prime Minister since 1996. The New Democracy Party is the main 
opposition party. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police and security services are responsible for 
internal security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of 
all security forces. The police and security services are subject to a 
broad variety of restraints. Some members of the police and security 
forces nevertheless committed human rights abuses.
    Greece has a market economy with a large public sector that 
accounts for some 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Residents 
enjoy a relatively advanced standard of living. Structural adjustment 
funds from the European Union (EU) account for approximately 4 percent 
of the country's GDP.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Security force 
personnel sometimes abused persons. Overcrowding and harsh living 
conditions continued in some prisons. Police sweeps resulted in the 
detention of undocumented immigrants under often squalid conditions. 
There are legal limits on the freedom of association of ethnic 
minorities. Overall, leaders of minority religions noted a general 
improvement in government tolerance, but some legal restrictions and 
administrative obstacles on freedom of religion persisted. The 
Government sometimes placed human rights monitors, including foreign 
diplomats, non-Orthodox religious groups, and minority groups under 
surveillance. Violence against women and trafficking in women for the 
purpose of forced prostitution are problems. Discrimination against 
ethnic minorities remained a problem, although it is decreasing. 
However, Roma continued to suffer widespread discrimination. Although 
it reaffirmed individuals' right of self-identification, the Government 
continues formally to recognize as a minority only the Muslim minority 
specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, some individuals 
who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to 
express their identity freely and to maintain their culture, although 
problems in this area decreased during the year. Muslims note positive 
developments in education and in the living conditions in villages.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government 
officials.
    In the 1998 case of a Romani man killed by police in Partheni, 
Thessaloniki, the policemen were acquitted in March on all charges. The 
court found that they fired in self-defense.
    In the 1998 case of a foreign student killed by a policeman, the 
policeman received a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment for involuntary 
manslaughter in November; he has appealed the judgment.
    Isolated incidents of terrorism continued during the year. A 
British military attache was shot and killed in June by the terrorist 
group November 17. The group has claimed responsibility for 22 killings 
during the past 25 years, but no one has ever been arrested and charged 
in these cases.
    There was no resolution of the cases of seven doctors accused of 
manslaughter in 1998 in connection with the case of an alleged hostage-
taker in an Athens hospital or of a policeman who in 1996 shot and 
killed a Romani man at a roadblock in Livadia.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and a 1984 
law (that has never been invoked) makes the use of torture an offense 
punishable by a sentence of 3 years' to life imprisonment; however, 
security force personnel occasionally abused persons, including Roma 
(see Section 5).
    In August two foreigners accused police in Crete of mistreatment 
while under detention.
    The 1998 case of three policemen who allegedly beat two Romani 
teenagers was still pending in September 2000 (see Section 5). The 1996 
case of five police officers accused of beating an Iraklion man also 
remained pending.
    In 1997 a man on Rhodes accused three policemen of beating him 
while in custody. The three accused officers were charged, but the 
charges were dropped later by the prosecutor in December 1999.
    Immigrants--mostly Albanian citizens--accused police of physical, 
verbal, and other mistreatment (including the confiscation and 
destruction of their documents), particularly during police sweeps to 
apprehend illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
    Numerous anarchist and terrorist groups attacked a wide spectrum of 
targets, mostly commercial property, during the year. The firebombing 
of vehicles, drive-by shootings of buildings, and bombings at 
commercial establishments, mostly late at night, were widespread.
    The Ministry of Public Order opened a Bureau of Internal Affairs in 
October 1999 to investigate cases of police misbehavior. The Bureau 
took several disciplinary measures, including dismissal and suspension, 
against officers involved in corruption. The corruption mostly involved 
trafficking, bribes for illegal construction, and drugs.
    Conditions in some prisons remained harsh due to substantial 
overcrowding and outdated facilities. As of July, the Ministry of 
Justice reported that the total prison population was 8,131 (of whom 
2,775 were foreigners), while the total capacity of the prison system 
was 4,825.
    Non-EU illegal aliens awaiting deportation at the Drapetsona police 
detention center in Piraeus staged another hunger strike in April to 
protest what was described by a human rights organization as a ``lack 
of adequate exercise, lack of natural daylight, insufficient sanitary 
facilities, restriction on visits, inadequate food, severely limited 
access to medical treatment, and no access to social services.'' Poor 
conditions also were reported at the Amygdaleza detention center for 
illegal alien women.
    The Ministry of Justice continued its program to improve prison 
conditions and expand capacity. Construction is underway on four new 
prisons. The Government has been inconsistent in permitting prison 
visits by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There were no reports 
of restricted prison access this year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
requires judicial warrants for all arrests, except during the actual 
commission of a crime, and the law prohibits arbitrary arrest orders; 
the authorities respected these provisions in practice. The police by 
law must bring persons who are detained or arrested before an examining 
magistrate within 24 hours. The magistrate must issue a detention 
warrant or order the release of the detainee within 3 days, unless 
special circumstances require a 2-day extension of this time limit.
    Defendants brought to court before the end of the day following the 
commission of a charged offense may be tried immediately, under an 
``expedited procedure.'' Although legal safeguards, including 
representation by counsel, apply in expedited procedure cases, the 
short period of time may inhibit defendants' ability to present an 
adequate defense. Defendants may ask for a delay to provide time to 
prepare their defense, but the court is not obliged to grant it. The 
expedited procedure was used in less than 10 percent of misdemeanor 
cases; it does not apply in felony cases.
    The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18 months 
for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Defense lawyers assert that 
pretrial detention is exceedingly long and overused by judges. A panel 
of judges may grant release pending trial, with or without bail. 
Pretrial detainees made up 31 percent of those incarcerated, 
contributing to overcrowding, according to government sources. A person 
convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment or 
less may, at the court's discretion, pay a fine instead of being 
imprisoned.
    Throughout the year, the police conducted large-scale sweeps and 
temporarily detained large numbers of foreigners under often squalid 
conditions while determining their residence status (see Section 2.d.). 
Some of the foreigners are detained on an indefinite basis with no 
judicial review, which, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch, 
constitutes arbitrary detention.
    Exile is unconstitutional, and no cases have been reported since 
the restoration of democracy in 1974. In a significant step, the 
Government in 1998 repealed Article 19 of the Citizenship Code, which 
permitted it to revoke the citizenship of Greek citizens of non-Greek 
ethnic origin who traveled outside Greece. Between 1955 and 1998, 
according to then-Minister of Interior Papadopoulos, some 60,000 
citizens lost their citizenship under the old law. The 1998 law had no 
provision for retroactive application. About 400 individuals who lost 
their citizenship in the past under Article 19 continued to reside in 
Greece. Following the repeal of Article 19, most of these individuals 
were issued identification documents characterizing them as stateless, 
but they were permitted to apply to reacquire Greek citizenship. Most 
of these 400 persons had not had their applications adjudicated by 
year's end (also see Section 2.d.).
    Article 20 of the Citizenship Code, which permits the Government to 
strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary to the 
interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state,'' remained in 
force. In the past, this article affected Greek citizens abroad who 
asserted a ``Macedonian'' ethnicity. There have been no reports of 
Article 20 being invoked by the Government since 1998 (also see Section 
2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    The judicial system includes three levels of civil courts, (first 
instance, appeals, and supreme) and three levels of criminal courts 
(first instance--divided into misdemeanor and felony divisions, 
appeals, and supreme), appointed judges, and an examining magistrate 
system, with trials by judicial panels.
    The Constitution provides for public trials, unless the court 
decides that privacy is required to protect victims and witnesses or 
the cases involve national security matters. Defendants enjoy a 
presumption of innocence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the right to present evidence and call witnesses, the right of 
access to the prosecution's evidence, the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to counsel. Lawyers are provided to defendants 
who are not able to afford legal counsel only in felony cases. Both the 
prosecution and the defense may appeal.
    Defendants who do not speak Greek have the right to a court- 
appointed interpreter. According to several immigrant associations in 
Athens, the low fees paid for such work often result in poor 
interpretation. Foreign defendants who depend on these interpreters 
frequently complain that they do not understand the proceedings of 
their trials.
    The legal system does not discriminate on the basis of sex, 
religion, or nationality; however, there were some exceptions: 
nonethnic Greek citizens are prohibited legally from settling in a 
large ``supervised zone'' near the frontier (although this prohibition 
is not enforced in practice); and a 1939 law (also not enforced in 
practice) prohibits the functioning of private schools in buildings 
owned by non-Orthodox religious foundations.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits the invasion of privacy and 
searches without warrants, and the law permits the monitoring of 
personal communications only under strict judicial controls; however, 
these safeguards do not appear to be entirely effective. The security 
services continued to monitor some human rights groups, such as the 
Greek Helsinki Monitor (see Section 4), non-Orthodox religious groups, 
minority group representatives, and foreign diplomats who met with such 
individuals. Some human rights monitors reported suspicious openings 
and diversions of mail. The Government apparently took no steps to stop 
such practices or to prosecute those involved.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice. Legal restrictions on free speech 
nevertheless remain in force.
    Articles of the Penal Code that can be used to restrict free speech 
and the press include Article 141, which forbids exposing the friendly 
relations of the Greek state with foreign states to danger of 
disturbance; Article 191, which prohibits spreading false information 
and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and cause 
disturbances in the country's international relations and inciting 
citizens to rivalry and division, leading to disturbance of the peace; 
and Article 192, which prohibits inciting citizens to acts of violence 
or to disturbing the peace through disharmony among them. Those 
convicted in the past were allowed to convert their prison sentences, 
up to 3 years, into a fine of approximately $14 (5,000 drachmae) per 
day.
    According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a renowned violinist and a 
composer were given prison sentences in March for defamation based on 
statements made during newspaper interviews. In such criminal 
defamation cases in the past, the defendant typically has been released 
on bail pending appeal, and no jail time is ever served. In November 
1999, according to HRW, two journalists for Eleftherotypia were 
indicted for defamation for alleging that the Lesvos police were 
associated with smugglers. Also, in December 1999 an Athens court 
convicted Dimitris Rizos, publisher of Adesmeftos Typos, of aggravated 
defamation of the publisher of another newspaper with the same name.
    In a 1997 case, two journalists were convicted of publishing 
classified government documents; their convictions were still under 
appeal at the Supreme Court in September 2000.
    On matters other than the question of ethnic minorities, there is a 
tradition of outspoken public discourse and a vigorous free press. 
Satirical and opposition newspapers routinely attack the highest state 
authorities. Members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities 
freely publish periodicals and other publications, often in their 
native language. The Constitution allows for seizure (though not prior 
restraint), by order of the public prosecutor, of publications that 
insult the President, offend religious beliefs, contain obscene 
articles, advocate violent overthrow of the political system, or 
disclose military and defense information. However, seizures are very 
rare; none have occurred since 1998.
    A Thessaloniki court of first instance ruled in September in favor 
of a former Member of Parliament (M.P.), Mimis Androulakis, whose novel 
``M to the Power of N'' was banned from circulation in seven northern 
prefectures in May as a ``blasphemous'' book because of sexual 
connotations regarding the relationship between Christ and Mary 
Magdalene. The court ruled that the novel was a ``work of art'' and 
thus protected by the Constitution.
    The Constitution provides that the state exercise ``immediate 
control'' over radio and television. Once the state monopoly on radio 
and television ended in 1989, numerous private stations began 
operations in an essentially unregulated market while the Government 
sought to draft and implement legislation on licensing and frequency 
allocations. The National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) has an 
advisory role in radio and television licensing, whereas the Ministry 
of Press and Mass Media has final authority.
    A 1995 law established ownership and technical frequency limits on 
electronic media; the Government and media outlets disputed application 
procedures and frequency allocations. In December 1998, the Government 
passed legislation designed to legalize stations operating with pending 
applications; with more applicants than available frequency spectrum, 
not all stations will gain licenses. The Government occasionally closes 
stations for violating intellectual property rights or interfering with 
civil aviation, military, and law enforcement transmissions. In 
December 1999, Channel Station 2000, an Evangelical radio station, was 
closed. The station's owners stated that the closure was because of 
religious content (although other non-Orthodox stations continue to 
operate unhindered), whereas the Government asserted that the station's 
broadcasts sporadically interfered with military channels. In January 
2000, the station legally resumed operation. State-run stations tend to 
emphasize the Government's views but also report objectively on other 
parties' programs and positions. Private radio and television stations 
operate independently of any government control over their reporting. 
Turkish-language television programs are available widely via satellite 
in Thrace.
    The 1998 conviction of Abdulhalim Dede, the Muslim owner of Radio 
Isik, for illegal construction of a new radio antenna intended to 
extend the range of the station, was upheld on appeal in June. The 
court reduced the sentence from 8 to 2 months in jail but suspended 
enforcement pending Dede's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court decided in May 2000 that Abdulhalim Dede did not receive a fair 
trial on a fifth charge of illegal construction of a new radio antenna 
intended to extend the range of the station. Dede paid a $1,368 
(500,000 drachmae) fine in lieu of 2 months jail for his initial 
conviction.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Police permits are issued routinely for public 
demonstrations, and there were no reports that the permit requirement 
was abused.
    In the spring of 1999, a large number of demonstrations occurred in 
Athens and Thessaloniki to protest NATO actions in Kosovo, and 
demonstrations took place against the visit of President Clinton in 
November 1999. Pro-Serb activists in Thessaloniki continued to 
demonstrate against the U.S. periodically, most notably in the spring 
of 2000, when U.S. troops travelling to and from the Kosovo 
peacekeeping mission were transiting northern Greece. In demonstrations 
organized by the Orthodox Church, over 100,000 supporters gathered in 
Athens and Thessaloniki in the summer of 2000 to protest the 
Government's decision to remove notation of religion on the national ID 
card.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, which the 
Government respected; however, the courts continue to place legal 
restrictions on the names of associations involving ethnic minorities 
(see Section 5).
    Government authorities legally recognize the existence of the 
Muslim minority but contend that other ethnic/linguistic or religious 
groups have no legal basis for official recognition as ``minorities.'' 
The Government has affirmed an individual, but not a collective, right 
of self-identification. However, in 1997 it signed (but had not yet 
ratified) the European Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the Eastern 
Orthodox Church of Christ (Greek Orthodoxy) as the ``prevailing'' 
religion; it also provides for the right of all citizens to practice 
the religion of their choice; however, while the Government respects 
this right, non-Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles 
or legal restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits 
proselytizing and stipulates that non-Orthodox rites of worship may not 
disturb public order or offend moral principles.
    The Orthodox Church wields significant political and economic 
influence. The Ministry of Education and Religion supervises the 
Church, and the Government provides some financial support by, for 
example, paying the salaries of clergy, subsidizing their religious 
training, and financing the construction and maintenance of Orthodox 
Church buildings.
    The Orthodox Church and the Jewish and Muslim religions are 
considered by law to be ``legal persons of public law.'' Other 
religions are considered ``legal persons of private law.'' In practice 
a primary distinction is that establishment of other religions' 
``houses of prayer'' is regulated by the general provisions of the 
Civil Code regarding corporations. For example other religions cannot, 
as religious entities, own property; the property must belong to a 
specifically created legal entity rather than to the church itself. In 
practice this places an additional legal and administrative burden on 
non-Orthodox religious community organizations. Parliament passed a law 
in July 1999 that extended legal recognition to Catholic churches and 
related entities established prior to 1946.
    Two laws from the late 1930's require recognized or ``known'' 
religious groups to obtain house of prayer permits from the Ministry of 
Education and Religion in order to open houses of worship. By law the 
Ministry may base its decision to issue permits on the opinion of the 
local Orthodox bishop, but Ministry officials state that they no longer 
obtain the opinion of the Orthodox bishop when considering house of 
prayer permit applications. According to ministry officials, once a 
``known'' religion receives a house of prayer permit, applications for 
additional houses of prayer are approved routinely. Minority religious 
groups have requested that laws regulating house of prayer permits be 
abolished. Many provisions of these laws are not applied in practice, 
but local police still have the authority to bring minority churches to 
court, as demonstrated in the case of the 16 churches charged but 
acquitted on December 12 in Thessaloniki for operating without a house 
of prayer permit.
    The only recent application for recognition as a known religion at 
the Ministry was submitted in February by the Scientologists of Greece. 
Although the deadline mandated by law for processing the applications 
is 3 months, it took the Ministry until October to decide that it would 
not recognize the Scientologist community as an ``official'' religion.
    A 1997 tax bill imposed three new taxes on all churches and other 
nonprofit organizations. Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups 
claimed that all taxes on religious organizations were discriminatory, 
even those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, since the Government 
subsidizes the Orthodox Church while other groups are self-supporting. 
The Government also pays the salaries of the two official Muslim 
religious leaders and provides them with official vehicles.
    Approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country's 10.6 million 
citizens adhere at least nominally to the Greek Orthodox faith. With 
the exception of the Muslim community (some of whose rights, 
privileges, and related government obligations are covered by the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne), the Government does not keep statistics on the 
size of religious groups. Ethnic Greeks account for a sizeable 
percentage of most non-Orthodox religions. The balance of the 
population is composed of Muslims (officially estimated at 98,000 
although some Muslims claim up to 110,000 countrywide); accurate 
figures for other religions are not available. Protestants, including 
evangelicals (approximately 30,000); Jehovah's Witnesses (50,000); 
Catholics (50,000); Jews (5,000); plus small congregations of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), Scientologists, 
the Baha'i Faith, and other Christian denominations are scattered 
throughout the country.
    Several religious denominations reported difficulties in dealing 
with the authorities on a variety of administrative matters. Privileges 
and legal prerogatives granted to the Greek Orthodox Church are not 
extended routinely to other recognized religions. The non-Greek 
Orthodox churches must make separate and lengthy applications to 
government authorities on such matters as gaining permission to move 
places of worship to larger facilities. In contrast Greek Orthodox 
officials have an institutionalized link between the church hierarchy 
and the Ministry of Education and Religion to handle administrative 
matters.
    The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is still in force, gives Muslims 
in Western Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable 
organizations (``wakfs'') and provides for muftis (Islamic judges and 
religious leaders with limited civic responsibilities) to render 
religious judicial services.
    The Muslim population, concentrated in Western Thrace with small 
communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of ethnic 
Turks but also includes Pomaks and Roma. The approximately 10,000 
member Muslim community in Athens (composed primarily of economic 
migrants from Thrace) has no mosque or state-appointed cleric to 
officiate at various religious functions, including funerals. Members 
of the Muslim community often transport their deceased back to Thrace 
for religious burials. In June the Parliament approved a bill allowing 
construction of the first Islamic cultural center and mosque in the 
Athens area. According to official sources, a total of 287 mosques 
operate freely in Western Thrace and others on the islands of Rhodes 
and Kos. Construction of a long-delayed mosque in Kimmeria, Thrace was 
completed in 1998, although its minaret remained unfinished. The issue 
is one of local sensitivities rather than religious motivation, and the 
religious operation of the mosque has not been affected.
    Differences remain within the Muslim community and between segments 
of the community and the Government over the means of selection of 
muftis. Under a 1991 law, the Government appointed two muftis and one 
assistant mufti, all resident in Thrace. The appointments to 10-year 
terms were based on the recommendations of a committee of Muslim 
notables selected by the Government. The Government argued that it must 
appoint the muftis because, in addition to their religious duties, they 
perform judicial functions in civil and domestic matters under Muslim 
religious law, for which the State pays them.
    Some Muslims accept the authority of the two officially appointed 
muftis; other Muslims, with support from Turkey, have ``elected'' two 
different muftis to serve their communities (although there is no 
established procedure or practice for election). The courts repeatedly 
have convicted (14 times in 5 years) one of the elected muftis for 
usurping the authority of the official mufti. All of the respective 
sentences remain suspended pending appeal. The other elected mufti, who 
was convicted in 1991 of usurping the authority of the official mufti, 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In December 1999, the 
Court ruled that the conviction violated his freedom of religion and 
self-expression, but it did not rule on the question of his legal 
status as mufti.
    Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also 
continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs, 
regarding the appointment of officials as well as the degree and type 
of administrative control. A 1980 law placed the administration of the 
wakfs in the hands of the appointed muftis and their representatives. 
In response to objections from some Muslims that this arrangement 
weakened the financial autonomy of the wakfs and violated the terms of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 presidential decree put the wakfs under 
the administration of a committee for 3 years as an interim measure 
pending the resolution of outstanding problems. The interim period was 
extended indefinitely in 1999.
    Muslim activists complained that the Government regularly lodges 
tax liens against the wakfs although they are in theory tax-free 
religious foundations. Under a national land and property registry law 
that came into full effect in January 1999, the wakfs, as with all 
property holders, must register all of their property with the 
Government. The law permits the Government to seize any property that 
owners are not able to document; there are built-in reporting and 
appeals procedures. The wakfs were established in 1560; however, due to 
the destruction of files during the two world wars, the wakfs are 
unable to document ownership of much of their property. They have not 
registered the property, so they cannot pay assessed taxes. To date the 
Government has not sought to enforce either the assessments or the 
registration requirement.
    Protestant groups constitute the second largest religious group 
after the Greek Orthodox Church. Some groups, such as the evangelicals 
and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks. 
Other groups, such as the Latter-Day Saints and Anglicans, consist of 
an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. Non-
Greek citizen clergy reported difficulty renewing their visas during 
the year because the Government does not have a distinct visa category 
for religious workers. The Government, by virtue of the Orthodox 
Church's status as the prevailing religion, recognizes de facto its 
canon law. The Catholic Church in 1999 unsuccessfully sought government 
recognition of its canon law (the official ``constitution'' of the 
Church).
    As part of new obligations under the Schengen Treaty and the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, all non-European Union citizens face a more restrictive 
visa and residence regime than they did in the past.
    Although Jehovah's Witnesses are recognized as a ``known'' 
religion, they continued to face some harassment in the form of 
arbitrary identity checks (although reduced from 1998), difficulties in 
burying their dead, and local officials' resistance to their 
construction of churches (which in most cases was resolved quickly and 
favorably). In Thessaloniki in late 1999, the Government Tax Office 
refused to recognize Jehovah's Witnesses as a nonprofit association and 
imposed an inheritance tax for property willed to them. The individuals 
appealed the decision in 2000, and byyear's end, the case still was 
pending. In 1999 a European Court of Human Rights case was resolved 
when the Government admitted surveillance of an adherent and promised 
that it would never conduct surveillance of Jehovah's Witnesses again.
    In previous years, the armed forces consistently refused to exempt 
Jehovah's Witnesses' clergy from mandatory military service. In 1998 a 
law providing an alternative form of mandatory national service for 
conscientious objectors took effect. All clergy now are exempt from any 
service. The law provides that conscientious objectors may work in 
state hospitals or municipal services for 36 months. Conscientious 
objector groups characterized the legislation as a positive first step 
but criticized the 36-month alternative service term, which is double 
the regular 18-month period of military service.
    Evangelical parishes are located throughout the country. Members of 
missionary faiths report difficulties due to constitutional and legal 
prohibitions on proselytizing. Church officials express concern that 
antiproselytizing laws remain on the books, although such laws no 
longer hinder their ministering to the poor and to children. In 
December 1999, the Government, applying legislation covering radio and 
television broadcasts, shut down an evangelical radio station over a 
technical issue on transmission frequency; however, the station resumed 
operation legally a few months later once the case was adjudicated.
    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has about 80 
missionaries in the country each year, for approximately 2year terms. 
Church leaders report that their permanent members (nonmissionaries) do 
not encounter discriminatory treatment. However, the police 
occasionally detained Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses (on average every 
2 weeks) after receiving complaints that individuals were engaged in 
proselytizing. In most cases, these Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses 
were held for several hours at a police station and then released with 
no charges filed. Many reported that they were not allowed to call 
their lawyers and that they were verbally abused by police officers for 
their religious beliefs. In 1998 the European Court of Human Rights 
found the Government in violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights for convicting Protestants of proselytizing in past cases. There 
were no proselytizing-related court cases during the year.
    Scientologists, most of whom are located in the Athens area, 
practice their faith through a registered nonprofit philosophical 
organization. According to the president of the Greek Scientologists, 
the group chose to register as a philosophical organization because 
legal counsel advised that the Government would not recognize 
Scientology as a religion. In a step toward gaining recognition as a 
religion, Scientologists reapplied for a house of prayer permit in 
February. The application was rejected by the Ministry of Education and 
Religious Affairs on October 17 on the grounds that Scientology ``is 
not a religion.''
    The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod. CARITAS, 
a charitable organization, and the Missionaries of Charity (Mother 
Teresa's order of nuns) also operate in the country. Legal recognition 
of the Catholic archdiocese of Athens, earlier denied, was granted in 
July 1999. The Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents; 
the majority live in the Athens and Thessaloniki regions. In October 
1999, a rededication of a synagogue in Hania, Crete as a house of 
prayer and a cultural center was marred by public criticism of the 
event by the regional governor. The Minister of National Education and 
Religion, and other government and Greek Orthodox officials lent their 
support to the rededication.
    Religious instruction in Orthodoxy in public primary and secondary 
schools is mandatory for all Greek Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox 
students are exempt from this requirement. However, Jehovah's Witnesses 
have reported some past instances of discrimination related to 
attendance at religious education classes or other celebrations of 
religious or nationalistic character. Members of the Muslim community 
in Athens are lobbying for Islamic religious instruction for their 
children. The neighborhood schools offer no alternative supervision for 
the children during the period when religious issues are taught. The 
community has complained that this forces the parents to have their 
children attend Orthodox religious instruction by default.
    The Government decided in the summer to remove the notation of 
religious affiliation on national identity cards. This sparked a 
national debate on the role of the Church in society. For example, the 
issue led Archbishop Christodoulos to organize religious protest 
rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens in June. Both demonstrations drew 
over 100,000 supporters. Archbishop Christodoulos vociferously 
criticized the Government and has started collecting signatures to 
petition the Government to allow religious affiliation as an option on 
national identity cards.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Unlike 
in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim leaders that 
the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims seeking to 
change their legal residence, which determines where they vote, from 
rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from elsewhere in 
Greece to Thrace.
    A section of the Citizenship Code, Article 20, permits the 
Government to strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary 
to the interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state.'' While 
the law as written applies equally to all Greeks regardless of ethnic 
background, to date it has been enforced, in all but one case, only 
against citizens who identified themselves as members of the 
``Macedonian'' minority. The Government has not revealed the number of 
Article 20 cases that it pursued. There were no reports of such cases 
during the year. Dual citizens who are stripped of Greek citizenship 
under Article 20 sometimes are prevented from entering the country 
using the passport of their second nationality.
    The Government offers asylum under the terms of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It 
cooperates with the local office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, a presidential decree took effect that 
significantly expanded the rights of asylum seekers and brought the law 
into compliance with UNHCR minimum standards on asylum procedures. 
UNHCR commented on its good relations with police during the year. The 
Government did not forcibly deport refugees during the year to 
countries where they feared persecution.
    Individuals recognized as refugees under the terms of the U.N. 
convention are eligible for the residence and work permits that are 
necessary to settle permanently. In the first 6 months of 2000, 1,295 
individuals submitted applications for refugee status; 132 individuals 
were recognized as refugees. Another 43 were granted temporary 
residence on humanitarian grounds until return to their countries 
becomes possible. The remaining 1,120 cases were pending.
    The Government usually does not recognize the concept of first 
asylum rights for refugees. UNHCR has expressed its concern over the 
fact that very few applicants are granted asylum on first application 
to the authorities; most who are granted asylum succeed on their second 
try, when UNHCR participates. Interpretation services are lacking, as 
are adequate personnel who would ensure timely access to the asylum 
process for all those who seek it. UNHCR also has expressed its concern 
that there exists no publicly funded legal aid system for free 
counseling to asylum seekers and refugees.
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that thousands of individuals from 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran enter the country illegally each 
year; only a small percentage eventually apply for official refugee 
status. Some of those who do not apply remain illegally, often living 
in camps or in NGO shelters where conditions range from adequate to 
very poor. Others proceed to Western Europe, often applying for asylum 
there. In January an accident involving a truck that carried 80 
smuggled persons from Turkey killed 6 of them and wounded several 
dozen. Other accidental deaths occurred in similar circumstances. In 
the largest immigrant smuggling operation ever reported, a Turkish ship 
carrying 655 illegal migrants bound for Italy was seized off Chios on 
October 20. The applications of those aboard who wanted to apply for 
asylum were being processed; none were forcibly deported. The 
Government usually does not seek out such individuals for deportation; 
since Greece and Turkey do not have a readmission agreement, the 
Government finds it practically impossible to deport formally 
individuals who enter Greece from Turkey.
    Deportations of both illegal and legal immigrants, abusive 
treatment by police, and inconsistencies and inequities in the way 
employers provide wages and benefits were common. The police conducted 
many large-scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by immigrants, 
temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals while determining 
their residence status. The detainees were held in squalid conditions: 
A report by Human Rights Watch in December cited severe overcrowding 
and a lack of sufficient exercise, sleeping accommodations, adequate 
food, or medical care. The only government-funded center for asylum 
seekers is old and in need of repair.
    The Organization for the Employment of Human Resources (OAED), a 
government agency, reported that by 2000, 386,000 illegal aliens, out 
of an estimated total alien population of 700,000, had applied for 
legal status or a ``white card,'' under a program designed to 
regularize the residency status of illegal, (usually economic) 
immigrants. A few, mostly Albanian, white card holders were able to 
meet all the requirements of the law and receive a ``green card,'' 
which serves as a residence permit and allows the immigrants to live 
and work in the country for a limited period of time. OAED issued 
159,807 green cards by July. Some 80 percent of the green cards issued 
so far are of 1-year duration. A new application is required to extend 
the card for an additional year. Holders of a white card may reside and 
work legally on a short-term basis while meeting the other requirements 
necessary to obtain a green card. Press reports cite the obstacles of a 
complex bureaucracy and the unwillingness of employers to pay social 
security contributions as primary reasons for the limited ability of 
white cardholders to advance to the green card application process. The 
OAED estimated that out of a total of 386,000 white cardholders in 
1998, 163,000 simply dropped out of the green card application process. 
Legislation provides for the green card program to remain in effect 
until the end of 2001. Atyear's end the Government proposed a bill to 
establish a new legalization process. Press reports estimated that it 
would take 3 years just to process the applications already submitted.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Greece is a multiparty democracy whose Constitution provides for 
full political rights for all citizens and for the peaceful change of 
governments and of the Constitution. The Government headed by Prime 
Minister Constantine Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) won in free and fair elections in September 1996 and again in 
April 2000. Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. Voting 
is mandatory for those over age 18, but there are many conditions that 
allow citizens not to vote, and penalties are not applied in practice. 
Members of the unicameral 300-seat Parliament are elected to maximum 4-
year terms by secret ballot. Opposition parties function freely and 
have broad access to the media.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no 
legal restrictions hinder their participation, and their numbers are 
slowly increasing. During the year, women held 2 of 20 ministerial 
positions in the Government and 3 of 29 subministerial positions. Of 
the 300 members elected to Parliament in April, 31 were women.
    While the Government generally respects citizens' political rights, 
there are occasionally charges that it limits the right of some 
individuals to speak publicly and associate freely on the basis of 
their self-proclaimed ethnic identity, thus impinging on the political 
rights of such persons. However, in the 2000 parliamentary elections, 
one Muslim was elected in Thrace, from PASOK. A second Muslim became a 
Member of Parliament (M.P.) in September after winning a court 
challenge to the eligibility of the seated M.P. for violating a 
constitutional provision.
    Romani representatives report that local authorities sometimes have 
deprived Roma of the right to vote by refusing to register them. 
However, Romani activists also report that some municipalities 
encourage Roma to register. Municipalities can refuse to register Roma 
who do not fulfill basic residency requirements, which many Roma have 
trouble meeting.
    In 1996 the Government transferred responsibility for oversight of 
all rights provided to the Muslim minority under the Treaty of Lausanne 
(including education, zoning, administration of the wakfs, and trade) 
from elected local governors to a government-appointed regional 
administrative official, the periferiarch of Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace. Some minority members charged that the transfer reduced their 
ability to use the democratic process to influence decisions that 
affect them. The Government stated that it made the change because the 
central authorities could administer Greece's treaty obligations more 
effectively. In 1994 the Government set up a system to elect nomarchs 
to govern at the provincial level. These officials work in close 
cooperation with both elected mayors and local leaders (Christian and 
Muslim). Members of the Muslim community noted that this 
decentralization has been a positive factor in local and regional 
development.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government allows domestic human rights organizations to 
operate, but cooperation with them varies. The security services on 
occasion monitor contacts of human rights groups, including listening 
in on conversations held between those groups and human rights 
investigators and diplomats and questioning contacts (see Section 
1.f.). Monitors view this surveillance as a form of intimidation that 
deters others from meeting with investigators.
    The government ombudsman's office, which opened in 1998, received 
781 complaints in the first 8 months of the year directly related to 
human rights issues, of which 455 were processed. Human rights cases 
constituted 26 percent of all cases, an increase of 30 percent compared 
with the full year in 1999. The office has proved to be an effective 
means for resolving human rights and religious freedom concerns.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law irrespective 
of nationality, race, language, religious or political belief; however, 
government respect for these rights in practice was uneven.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The incidence of 
violence against women reported to the authorities is low; however, the 
General Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes (GSES), an independent 
government agency that operates the only shelter for battered women in 
Athens, believes that the actual incidence is ``high.'' According to 
press and academic estimates, there were approximately 4,500 cases of 
rape in 1999. Reportedly only 6 to 10 percent of the victims contact 
the police, and only a small fraction of the cases reaches trial. 
Conviction rates on rape charges are low for first time accused, but 
sentences are harsh for repeat offenders. Spousal rape is a crime.
    The GSES asserts that police tend to discourage women from pursuing 
domestic violence charges and instead undertake reconciliation efforts. 
The GSES also claims that the courts are lenient when dealing with 
domestic violence cases. GSES, in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Public Order, continued during the year training courses begun in 1999 
for police personnel on how to treat domestic violence victims.
    Facilities for battered women and their children often are staffed 
inadequately to handle cases properly. Two government shelters provide 
relevant services in Athens and Piraeus, including legal and 
psychological advice. Battered women also can go to state hospitals and 
regional health centers. In June the Secretariat started operating a 
24-hour emergency telephone hot line for abused women to call for help. 
An interministerial committee composed of the GSES, the Ministry of 
Public Order, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of 
Justice, was established in 1999 to focus on women's issues.
    Prostitution is legal. Prostitutes must register at the local 
police station and carry a medical card that is updated every 2 weeks. 
While the number of Greek women entering the profession has declined 
steadily over the years, according to the police and academic sources, 
trafficking in women for prostitution, mostly from the former Soviet 
republics, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, has increased sharply in 
recent years (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). It is estimated that fewer 
than 1,000 prostitutes are ethnic Greeks, and approximately 20,000 are 
of foreign origin--most in the country illegally.
    Most prostitutes who are arrested are foreigners who are 
apprehended for noncompliance with legal requirements. While national 
data on such arrests is not available, police reports estimate that 
4,197 women were arrested for prostitution from December 1998 through 
December 2000. A total of 1,693 were arrested during 2000, compared 
with 2,267 in 1999. Media reports implicated several police officers as 
participants in prostitution rings. The press alleged on a number of 
occasions that police accepted bribes from traffickers or pimps or 
forced illegal immigrants to have sex with them and then channeled them 
into prostitution rings. The vice squad unit of the police was 
disbanded for a couple of weeks in 1998 in part as a result of these 
allegations.
    Trade unions report that lawsuits for sexual harassment are very 
rare: according to the unions, only four women have filed such charges 
in the past 3 years. In all four cases, the courts reportedly imposed 
very lenient civil sentences. The General Confederation of Greek 
Workers (GSEE) women's section reports that sexual harassment is a 
widespread phenomenon, but that women are discouraged from filing 
charges against perpetrators by family members and coworkers since they 
believe they might be socially stigmatized.
    Women enjoy broad constitutional and legal protection, including 
equal pay for equal work. However, the National Statistical Service's 
most recent data, for the fourth quarter of 1998, show that women's 
salaries in manufacturing were 71 percent of those of men in comparable 
positions; in retail sales, women's salaries were 88 percent of those 
of men in comparable positions.
    Although relatively few women occupy senior positions, in recent 
years women entered traditionally male-dominated occupations such as 
the legal and medical professions in larger numbers. However, women 
still face discrimination when they are considered for promotions in 
both the public and private sectors. Women also are underrepresented in 
labor unions' leadership. According to the women's section of the GSEE, 
58.6 percent of the country's long-term unemployed are women, while 
women constitute only 38 percent of the work force. To ameliorate the 
situation, the GSES established two regional employment offices for 
women in Thessaloniki and Patras. It also continued to provide 
vocational training programs for unemployed women and programs to 
reinforce entrepreneurship, subsidies to women for setting up an 
enterprise, information and counseling to unemployed women, and created 
childcare facilities to assist unemployed women to attend training 
courses and look for a job.
    Children.--The Government is committed to providing adequate basic 
health and education services for children. Education is compulsory 
through the ninth grade, but the legislation does not provide for 
enforcement or penalties. University education is public and free.
    Several government organizations have responsibility for children's 
issues. The National Welfare Organization, which has a nationwide 
network of offices, is active in the field of child protection. A 1998 
law combined the National Welfare Organization with two similar 
entities in 1999 to provide better services. The services of the new 
organization were regionalized to provide greater access to child 
welfare services and funding prioritized according to regional needs.
    Penal law prohibits the mistreatment of children and sets penalties 
for violators, while welfare legislation provides for preventive and 
treatment programs for abused children and for children deprived of a 
family environment; it also seeks to ensure the availability of 
alternative family care or institutional placement.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. No national data 
exist on the incidence of child abuse; authorities other than police 
are not required to report such cases. In a 10-year clinical study of 
200 cases of abused children, the Institute of Child Health (ICH) 
reports that 59.5 percent involved physical abuse, 20 percent involved 
neglect, and 21 percent involved children who were not abused at the 
time but had a history of abuse. (The study did not cover victims of 
sexual abuse.) An ICH prevalence study of child sexual abuse among 740 
university students revealed an incidence rate of 7 percent among boys 
and 17 percent among girls prior to age 18. Societal abuse of children 
in the form of pornography and child labor is rare. Child prostitution 
is a growing phenomenon, particularly in some parts of immigrant 
communities of central Athens.
    Children's rights advocacy groups claim that the protection of 
high-risk children in state residential care centers is inadequate and 
of low quality. They cite lack of coordination between welfare services 
and the courts, inadequate funding of the welfare system, and poor 
staffing of residential care centers as systemic weaknesses in the 
treatment of child abuse. Many NGO's make honest efforts to cover the 
gap, but they are not manned by professionals, lack supervision from 
the State, and do not have built-in evaluation systems. Two municipal 
shelters for battered children opened in Athens in 1999. Child health 
specialists note that the number of children in residential care 
facilities is decreasing, while the number in foster care is rising. 
Child health specialists say that some social groups, such as Roma and 
illegal immigrants, are underserved.
    In recent years, the number of street children who panhandle or 
peddle at city intersections on behalf of adult family members or for 
criminal gangs increased. According to the Ministry of Public Order, 78 
percent of these children are Albanian, 12 percent are from other 
Balkan countries, and 10 percent are Romani. The Government implemented 
measures to combat this phenomenon, which included the institutional 
placement of children up to 12 years old, therapeutic consultations 
with their families, and the deportation of juveniles 12 to 17 year 
old. Street children are rounded up regularly by police. However, it is 
believed widely that even those who were deported managed to return 
eventually.
    In August police detained a group of 35 Roma children from Albania, 
between the ages of 3 months and 11 years old, who were begging or 
being exploited by beggars in the streets. Police apprehended 20 
adults, identified as parents. Police believe that this was the largest 
child exploitation ring ever uncovered in the country. The group of 
Roma was deported. A children's NGO, A Child's Smile, claims that many 
street children are victims of abuse. Based on the findings of a study 
it carried out in Thessaloniki in 1999, the majority of street children 
are between the ages of 8 and 14. Some 60 percent of the children are 
from Albania, and most have been separated from their parents, who 
remain in their native country. They are brought to Greece by someone 
posing as their guardian or parent. In most cases, their parents, faced 
with extreme financial difficulties in Albania, agreed to send their 
child to Greece in exchange for a small percentage of the monthly 
earnings.
    People with Disabilities.--Legislation mandates the hiring of 
disabled persons in public and private enterprises that employ more 
than 50 persons. However, the law reportedly is enforced poorly, 
particularly in the private sector. The law states that disabled 
persons should account for 3 percent of staff in private enterprises. 
In the civil service, 5 percent of administrative staff and 80 percent 
of telephone operator positions are reserved for disabled persons. 
Recent legislation mandates the hiring of disabled persons in the 
public sector from a priority list. The disabled are exempt from the 
civil service exam. Persons with disabilities have been appointed to 
important positions in the civil service.
    The Construction Code mandates physical access for disabled persons 
to private and public buildings, but this law, too, is enforced poorly. 
A 1997 survey showed that over 60 percent of public buildings are not 
accessible to persons with mobility problems. Ramps and special curbs 
for the disabled have been constructed on some Athens streets and at 
some public buildings, and sound signals have been installed at some 
city street crossings. Since 1993 the Government has been replacing old 
city buses with new ones designed to accommodate the disabled. The new 
Athens subway lines provide full access for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Greeks tend to link religious affiliation 
very closely to ethnicity. In the minds of many Greeks, an ethnic Greek 
is also Orthodox Christian. Non-Orthodox citizens have complained of 
being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek 
when they revealed their religious affiliation. Non-Orthodox citizens 
also have claimed that they face career limits within the military and 
the civil service due to their religions.
    In the military, generally only members of the Greek Orthodox faith 
become officers, leading some members of other faiths to declare 
themselves Orthodox. Only two Muslim officers have advanced to the rank 
of reserve officer.
    Although in the past there have been numerous cases of 
discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for business licenses, 
tractor ownership, or property construction, both Muslim and Christian 
leaders report that these discriminatory practices have ended.
    Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal 
discrimination, such as local bishops warning parishioners not to visit 
clergy or members of minority faiths and neighbors requesting that the 
police arrest missionaries for proselytizing. Some non-Orthodox 
religious communities believe that they have been unable to communicate 
with officials of the Orthodox Church and claim that the attitude of 
the Orthodox Church toward their faiths has increased social 
intolerance towards their religions. The Orthodox Church has issued a 
list of practices and religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Evangelical Protestants, Scientologists, Mormons, Baha'is, and others, 
which it believes to be sacrilegious. In 1999 there was an incident in 
which local Orthodox clergy and local government officials mobilized to 
demolish a government-approved house of prayer in the process of 
construction by Jehovah's Witnesses in Halkidiki in northern Greece. 
The incident was resolved swiftly through the intervention of police 
forces. Officials of the Orthodox Church have acknowledged that they 
refuse to enter into dialog with religious groups considered harmful to 
Greek Orthodox worshipers; church leaders instruct Orthodox Greeks to 
shun members of these faiths.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--An increase in xenophobia 
paralleled an increase in the number of non-Greeks living and working 
in the country. Antiforeigner sentiment is directed mainly at Albanians 
(who make up over three-fifths of the alien population). Landlords in 
Athens and other parts of the country routinely refuse to rent to 
Albanians, even to that country's diplomats.
    Significant numbers of Greek citizens identify themselves as Turks, 
Pomaks, Vlachs, Roma, Arvanites (Orthodox Christians who speak a 
dialect of Albanian), or ``Macedonians'' or ``Slavomacedonians.'' Most 
are integrated fully into society. The Government formally recognizes 
only the ``Muslim minority'' specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, 
although it stated publicly in August 1999 that members of that 
minority could identify themselves individually as belonging to 
different ethnic groups. However, the Government failed to acknowledge 
formally the existence of non-Muslim ethnic groups, principally 
Slavophones, under the term ``minority.'' As a result, some individuals 
who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to 
express their identity freely and to maintain their culture. Most of 
the Muslim minority (officially estimated to number 98,000) are 
ethnically Turkish or Turcophone and live in Western Thrace. The Muslim 
minority also includes Pomaks and Roma. Many Greek Muslims, including 
Pomaks, identify themselves as Turks and say that the Muslim minority 
as a whole has a Turkish cultural consciousness. While use of the terms 
``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' (``Turk'' and ``Turkish'') is prohibited 
in titles of organizations, individuals legally may call themselves 
``Tourkos.'' To most Greeks, the words ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' 
connote Turkish identity or loyalties, and many object to their use by 
Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The 8month prison sentence of a dozen 
Muslim teachers, convicted in 1996 for using the name ``Turkish 
Teachers of Western Thrace'' in a union document, remained suspended 
pending appeal. In December the Supreme Court overturned an appeals 
court decision that upheld a 1986 trial court's order to close the 
``Turkish Union of Xanthi'' because of the use of the word ``Turkish'' 
in the organization's name. The Supreme Court stated that the court's 
decision should be based on the organization's activities and not its 
name, and it therefore ordered the appeals court to review the case.
    The Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the 
right to Turkish-language education, with a reciprocal entitlement for 
the Greek minority in Istanbul (now reduced to about 3,000 persons). 
Western Thrace has both Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools. 
Under a 1952 educational protocol, Greece and Turkey may exchange 
annually 35 teachers on a reciprocal basis for service in Istanbul and 
Western Thrace. Due to the dwindling needs of the small and aging Greek 
population in Istanbul, in recent years the Greek side limited the 
exchanges to 16 teachers per country. There were no complaints during 
the year from Muslim leaders about bureaucratic barriers preventing 
Turkish teachers from working in Thrace.
    In 1999 the Government approved 19 Turkish textbooks for use in the 
secular Turkish-language schools (referred to as ``minority'' schools 
in Thrace). Under a 1960 bilateral protocol, Turkey provides copies of 
the approved texts for use in the schools of Western Thrace. The books 
arrived in May 2000.
    In Western Thrace over 8,000 Muslim children attended Turkish-
language primary schools. An additional 150 attended 2 bilingual middle 
schools with a religious curriculum. Approximately 700 attended 
Turkish-language secondary schools, and approximately 1,300 attended 
Greek-language secondary schools. In the past, many Muslims reportedly 
went to high school in Turkey due to both the limited number of places 
in the Turkish-language secondary schools, which are assigned by 
lottery, and parent preference. However, the lottery system was not 
used during the year, and all students who applied were admitted. In 
1999 the Government instituted an European Union-funded program for 
teaching Greek as a second language to Muslim children, primarily for 
those students in the Greek-language public schools, to improve their 
academic performance and chance of obtaining postsecondary education in 
Greece. In addition the Government offered further opportunities for 
minority students to learn Greek through preschool, kindergarden, 
afterschool, and summer school courses.
    Government incentives encourage Muslim and Christian educators to 
reside and teach in isolated villages. However, in a 1999 law, the 
Government cancelled the program of incentives for Christian educators 
teaching temporarily in minority schools. Teachers Union 
representatives complained that the move would discourage Christians 
from seeking temporary teaching positions in minority schools. The law 
permits the Minister of Education to give special consideration to 
Muslims for admission to universities and technical institutes. 
Universities and technical institutes are required to create a certain 
number of places for Muslim students each year; 400 spaces were 
available for the 2000-2001 school year. Under this law, 123 Muslim 
students entered Greek universities and technical institutes during 
1999. Approximately 1,700 other Muslim students entered via the 
national examination process open to all Greeks and were attending 
universities and technical schools.
    The rate of employment of Muslims in the public sector and in 
state-owned industries and corporations is much lower than the Muslim 
percentage of the population. Muslims in Western Thrace claim that they 
are hired only for lower level, part-time work. The Government claims 
and Muslims and Christians note that a lack of fluency in written and 
spoken Greek and the need for university degrees for high-level 
positions limit the number of Muslims eligible for government jobs.
    Public offices in Thrace do their business in Greek; the courts 
provide interpreters as needed. Since 1998 there have been no claims of 
discrimination against Muslims who apply for business licenses, tractor 
ownership, or property construction. Muslims and Christians in Thrace 
commended the Government for the basic public services (electricity, 
water, and telephone) provided to Muslim villages in recent years.
    Other than in one multicultural elementary education ``pilot 
school,'' the Government does not provide instruction in Greek as a 
second language to Turcophone children in the Athens area. Muslim 
parents report that their children are unable to succeed in school as a 
result of this policy. The Government maintains that Muslims outside 
Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not 
enjoy those rights provided by the treaty.
    Unlike in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim 
leaders that the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims 
seeking to change their legal residence, which determines where they 
vote, from rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from 
elsewhere in Greece to Thrace.
    The Government refuses to acknowledge formally the existence and 
``minority'' status of ethnic/linguistic groups, such as Vlachs and 
Slavophones, other than the Muslim minority specified in the Treaty of 
Lausanne. As a result some individuals who define themselves as members 
of a minority find it difficult to express their identity freely and to 
maintain their culture.
    Northwestern Greece is home to an indeterminate number (estimates 
range widely, from under 10,000 to 50,000 or more) of citizens who 
still speak at home a Slavic dialect, particularly in Florina province. 
A small number of them identify themselves as belonging to a distinct 
ethnic group and assert their right to ``Macedonian'' minority status. 
Their assertions generate strong objections among the 2.2 million non-
Slavophone Greek inhabitants of the northern Greek region of Macedonia, 
who use the same term to identify themselves. The Government will not 
recognize the Slavic dialect as a ``Macedonian'' language distinct from 
Bulgarian. Members of the minority assert that the Government pursues a 
policy designed to discourage use of their dialect. Government 
sensitivity on this issue stems from concern that members of the 
``Macedonian'' minority may have separatist aspirations. Greece's 
dispute with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over that 
country's name heightened this sensitivity. Complaints of government 
harassment and intimidation directed against these persons decreased 
significantly since 1998 and ceased in 2000.
    In July 1999, three Muslim Members of Parliament and a number of 
Greek human rights organizations issued a letter calling on the 
Government to recognize legally the right of self-identification for 
members of all minorities, including the Muslim and ``Macedonian'' 
minorities. Senior government officials in August 1999 reaffirmed an 
individual, but not a collective, right of self-identification.
    Roma continued to face discrimination from some local authorities 
and society at large. The Prime Minister's Office for Quality of Life, 
responsible for coordinating government projects for Roma, estimates 
the total Romani population to be 150,000 to 200,000. Nonofficial 
sources estimate the total at 250,000 to 300,000. Most of the Roma in 
Western Thrace are Muslims; elsewhere the majority are Greek Orthodox. 
Many Roma are settled permanently, mainly in the Athens area. Others 
are either mobile, working mainly as agricultural laborers, peddlers, 
and musicians throughout the country, or live in camps. The number of 
Roma who move around the country is decreasing gradually as families 
settle mainly into slums and camps around major cities. There are 
approximately 70 Romani camps with a total camp population between 
100,000 and 120,000 persons.
    At a September 1999 Implementation Review Meeting in Vienna of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Greek 
delegation recognized that the situation of Roma in Greece was 
``unsatisfactory and unacceptable'' and committed the Government to 
remedy the situation. Government representatives identified as 
impediments to progress the lack of a unified voice from the Roma 
community and the widespread social prejudice against them.
    In 1999 the Ministry of Interior completed a survey on the housing 
needs of the Roma; in March 2000 it established an interministerial 
committee to coordinate government action for them. Most Romani camps 
have no running water or electricity, much less garbage disposals or 
sewage treatment. Local authorities harass and threaten to evict Roma 
from their camps. The Roma of Tyrnavos, Thessaly, attempted to build 
their own lavatories in order to improve their living conditions, but 
local authorities pulled them down and imposed fines for violating 
construction codes. The Ministry of Defense allocated land in 1999 and 
houses in December 2000 at a former army camp (Gonou) for the Roma of 
Evosmos, Thessaloniki, to occupy. (The 3,500 Roma were evicted in 1998 
from their homes of some 30 years and then evicted from 4 other sites 
in the following 15 days.)
    The NGO Greek Helsinki Monitor reported that many communities of 
Roma tent-dwellers were evicted or threatened with eviction during the 
year. A number of evictions took place in Athens from the location that 
will host the 2004 Olympics. In August 1999, local authorities evicted 
30 Roma families from an area in Ioannina, which they had been renting 
for 7 years. In June 2000, the municipal authority of Nea Kios, 
Peloponnese, issued a decision to evict all 300 Roma from the region 
because the municipality claimed that the Roma contributed to the high 
crime rate. Police were asked to take action and implement the decision 
within 48 hours. A Roma hut was set on fire by unknown perpetrators. 
Human rights NGO's held the municipal authority responsible for the 
arson because of its decision to declare the Roma presence 
``undesirable.'' The decision of the municipal authority was repealed 
following the intervention of the Ombudsman's Office. In August 
municipal authorities in Crete attempted to evict over 100 Roma from 
their homes of 15 years in Nea Alikarnasos; the national ombudsman 
stopped the action.
    Roma experience police abuse more frequently than some other 
groups. In September police were accused of beating Roma during a 
routine traffic stop in Nafplio. The trial of three policemen accused 
of beating two Romani teenagers in Mesolonghi in May 1998 still had not 
begun in September.
    Roma frequently face discrimination in employment and in housing, 
particularly when attempting to rent accommodations. The approximately 
400 Roma families in Tyrnavos, Thessaly, live in tents because the 
authorities refuse to include the area in city planning.
    Romani representatives report that some local authorities have 
refused to register Roma as residents in their municipalities. Until 
registered with a municipality, no citizen can vote or exercise other 
civic rights such as obtaining an official marriage, commercial, or 
driver's license, or contributing to social security.
    Government policy is to encourage the integration of Roma. The 
Prime Minister has designated a member of his staff to coordinate the 
efforts of all government ministries having a role in their 
integration, and the Ministry of Interior established an 
interministerial committee with the same aim. Poverty, illiteracy, and 
social prejudice nevertheless continue to plague large parts of the 
Romani population; these problems are most severe among the Roma who 
are mobile or who live in slums. The illiteracy rate among Roma is 
estimated at 80 percent. However, the Ministry of Education reported 
that the illiteracy rate is dropping among the Roma children, because 
the school enrollment rate increased by 17 percent and the dropout rate 
decreased to 75 percent as a consequence of an identity card system, 
set up by the Ministry, which allows students to change schools more 
easily as their parents move. The idea of setting up satellite 
elementary schools near Romani camps has been set aside in favor of the 
policy of integration (except for preschool centers).
    The integration of Roma into social security systems is quite low. 
It is estimated that 90 percent of Roma are not insured by the public 
social security systems, since they are unable or unwilling to make the 
required contributions. Like other qualified citizens, indigent Roma 
are entitled to free health care. However, their access to health care 
at times is hindered by the fact that their encampments are located far 
from public health facilities. The Municipality of Pyrgos, Peloponnese, 
issued health cards to the Roma living permanently in the area and 
established a preschool center close to the Roma camp near the Alfeios 
River.
    The Ministry of Health and Welfare continued work on projects to 
address the chronic problems of the Roma community. The projects 
included training courses for civil servants, policemen, and teachers 
to ``increase sensitivity to the problems of the Roma,'' the 
development of teaching materials for Roma children, and the 
establishment of youth centers in areas close to Roma communities. The 
Ministry established six such centers.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide 
for the right of association. All workers, with the exception of the 
military, have the right to form or join unions. Police have the right 
to form unions but not to strike.
    Approximately 26 percent of wage earners (nearly 650,000 persons) 
are organized in unions. Unions receive most of their funding from a 
Ministry of Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes 
mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Workers, 
employers, and the state are represented in equal numbers on the board 
of directors of the Workers' Hearth. Approximately 10 public sector 
unions have dues-withholding provisions in their contracts, in addition 
to receiving Workers' Hearth subsidies.
    Over 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral 
federations and 2 umbrella confederations, 1 for civil servants (ADEDY) 
and 1, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), for private 
sector employees. Unions are highly politicized, and there are party-
affiliated factions within the labor confederations, but day-to-day 
operations are not controlled by political parties or the Government. 
There are no restrictions on who may serve as a union official.
    Legal restrictions on strikes include a mandatory period of notice, 
which is 4 days for public utilities and 24 hours for the private 
sector. Legislation mandates a skeleton staff during strikes affecting 
public services, such as electricity, transportation, communications, 
and banking. Public utility companies, state-owned banks, the postal 
service, Olympic Airways, and the railroads also are required to 
maintain a skeleton staff during strikes.
    The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal, although such 
decisions seldom are enforced. However, unions complain that this 
judicial power serves as a deterrent to some of their members from 
participating in strikes. The courts declared some strikes illegal 
during the year for reasons such as failure of the union to give 
adequate advance notice of the strike or the addition of demands by the 
union during the course of the strike. However, no striking workers 
were prosecuted.
    Fewer strikes took place during the year than ever before, and 
those that occurred were fairly brief and nondisruptive. Strikes by 
public sector employees, including mass transport employees, lasted 
between 1 and 5 days and primarily concerned securing timely pay 
increases and greater job security.
    Unions are free to join international associations and maintain a 
variety of international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively in the 
private sector and in public corporations. These rights are respected 
in practice. There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for 
private sector employees.
    In 1997 and 1998 civil servants were accorded the right to organize 
and bargain collectively with the Ministry of Public Administration. 
The civil servants confederation conducted official negotiations with 
the Ministry of Interior for the first time in 1999.
    In response to union complaints that most labor disputes ended in 
compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in 1989 that 
provided for mediation procedures, with compulsory arbitration as a 
last resort. A 1992 law established a National Mediation, 
Reconciliation, and Arbitration Organization that applies to the 
private sector and public corporations (the military and civil service 
excluded).
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. The Labor Inspectorate or a 
court investigates complaints of discrimination against union members 
or organizers. Court rulings have mandated the reinstatement of 
improperly fired union members.
    Three free trade zones operate according to European Union 
regulations. The labor laws apply equally in these zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and the Ministry of Justice enforces this prohibition; 
however, women and girls are trafficked into the country for the 
purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The 
Government may declare the ``civil mobilization'' of workers in the 
event of danger to national security, life, property, or the social and 
economic life of the country. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Committee of Experts has criticized this power as violating the 
standards of ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. The Government did not 
resort to civil mobilization during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in the industrial sector is 
15 years, with higher limits for certain activities. The minimum age is 
12 years in family businesses, theaters, and the cinema. These age 
limits are enforced by occasional Labor Inspectorate spot checks and 
generally are observed. However, families engaged in agriculture, food 
service, and merchandising often have younger family members assisting 
them, at least part time. The Constitution contains a blanket 
prohibition of compulsory labor. Although no specific legislation 
explicitly prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.), except among some 
Roma and immigrants (see Section 5).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Collective bargaining between 
the GSEE and the Employers' Association determines a nationwide minimum 
wage. The Ministry of Labor routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which 
has the force of law and applies to all workers. The minimum wage of 
$17.40 (6,986 drachma) daily and $389.20 (155,943 drachma) monthly, 
effective July 1, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the 
private sector and 37+ hours in the public sector. The law provides for 
at least one 24-hour rest period per week, mandates paid vacation of 1 
month per year, and sets limits on overtime.
    Legislation provides for minimum standards of occupational health 
and safety. Although the GSEE characterized health and safety 
legislation as satisfactory, it charged that enforcement, the 
responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, was inadequate. Legislation 
passed in 1999 places the Labor Inspectorate under a central authority 
in compliance with ILO Convention 81. Workers do not have the legal 
right to remove themselves from situations that they believe endanger 
their health. However, they do have the right to lodge a confidential 
complaint with the Labor Inspectorate. Inspectors have the right to 
close down machinery or a process for a period of up to 5 days if they 
see safety or health hazards that they believe represent an imminent 
danger to the workers.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically 
criminalize trafficking in persons, but other statutes in the Penal 
Code are used to prosecute such cases. Arrests and court cases for 
prostitution by unlicensed foreign women, and cases against their 
traffickers, have increased, but remain at a very low level. Fines and 
sentences for traffickers are minimal.
    Greece is both a transit and destination country for trafficked 
women. Trafficking in women for prostitution in Greece has increased 
sharply in recent years. At any give time, some 16,000 to 20,000 
trafficked women are in the country, according to unofficial estimates. 
Approximately 2,400 trafficked women were deported from Greece during 
the year; many are quickly brought back into the country, according to 
official sources. While the Government is stiffening its border 
controls, in part because of the European Union Schengen Agreement 
requirements, there are fissures through which many women are brought 
into the country from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Local 
police corruption also plays a role in facilitating their entry into 
the country.
    According to a Panteion University professor, 75 percent of foreign 
female prostitutes are not told why they are being brought to Greece. 
Some women arrive as ``tourists'' or illegal immigrants who seek work 
and are lured into prostitution by club owners who threaten them with 
deportation. Some women are kidnaped from their homes by their fellow 
countrymen and smuggled into Greece where they are ``sold'' to local 
procurers. The victims of this practice are often minors. Frequently 
connections exist between illegal prostitution and other criminal 
activities.
                               __________

                                HUNGARY

    Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected 
legislative assembly. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the leader of the 
FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, heads a coalition Government formed after 
elections in May 1998 by FIDESZ, the Independent Smallholders' Party, 
and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Government respects the 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
    The internal and external security services report directly to a 
minister without portfolio, and the police report to the Interior 
Minister. Credible reports of police abuses persist, although their 
frequency has declined compared with last year.
    The Government demonstrated a sustained commitment to economic 
reform, resulting in a successful transition to a fully functioning 
market economy. The private sector accounts for 85 percent of gross 
domestic product. Services, trade, and government employ about 67.4 
percent of the labor force. The proportion of the labor force involved 
in industry has declined to only 33 percent. Major exports include 
manufactured goods (30.3 percent) and machinery and transport equipment 
(58.5 percent). Unemployment has declined substantially to around 6 
percent. However, an estimated 25 percent of the population live in 
poverty, with elderly pensioners, dependent housewives and children, 
and Roma most affected. The large Roma population is eight times more 
likely to be poor than the remainder of the population.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Although the 
authorities addressed problems in specific cases, police continued to 
use excessive force against suspects. Police also harassed and abused 
both Roma and foreign nationals. In practice the authorities do not 
always ensure due process in all cases. Prosecutors and judges may 
impose what amounts to unlimited pretrial detention, although the 
Government expanded legal provisions for the right to fair trial.
    The electronic media are a mix of state-owned and privately owned 
national, local, and regional radio and television, with private 
stations dominating audience share by a wide, and ever-widening, 
margin. After taking office in 1998, the Government publicly declared 
its intention to ``balance'' the media in order to encourage more 
extensive attention to the conservative values and themes that the 
Government promotes. After 2 years in office, the Government recognized 
that it was only one (although an influential) player in the media 
market, and decided to stop pursuing such balance. In spite of numerous 
dismissals of journalists in the state-owned radio and television, 
certain members of the governing coalition still publicly contend that 
these outlets are overrepresented by liberal, opposition-leaning 
journalists. The junior coalition partner, the Smallholders, submitted 
a proposal to the Parliament to investigate the pre1990 political 
activities of state-employed journalists. Although certain news 
analysis programs on state media often function as platforms for right-
wing voices, the main news programs remain largely politically neutral.
    Violence against women and spousal abuse of women remain serious 
problems. Sexual harassment and discrimination on the job also remain 
serious problems. Steps have been taken to improve the rights of women 
and persons with disabilities. Anti-Semitic and racial discrimination 
persisted, but no new attacks were reported this year. Societal 
discrimination against Roma remains a serious problem. Trafficking in 
women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a growing 
problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In December an unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum applicant died while 
being deported; his feet were cuffed after his repeated efforts to 
break free (see Section 2.d.). The official report cites heart attack 
as the cause of death.
    Trials continued in a number of cases of men charged with crimes 
against humanity for shooting into crowds of demonstrators with machine 
gun fire and for throwing hand grenades, all at the time of the 1956 
Revolution. The defendants were tried in 1993. At the time, they were 
charged with murder, but acquitted because the 15-year statute of 
limitations for such a charge had passed. The new trial became possible 
after the Supreme Court overturned the previous verdicts in June 1999, 
stating that these cases should be tried as war crimes, which have no 
time limit. In these cases, the issue before the courts was whether 
each specific individual is guilty of a war crime, an argument that can 
be made because a civil war was in progress at the time, and all 
defendants were members of the border guards, police, or military. 
Byyear's end, 10 cases had concluded with guilty verdicts. Those 
accused were sentenced to short prison terms that subsequently were 
suspended, were stripped of their rank, and had their pensions reduced 
accordingly.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other such practices. No 
known incidents of torture occurred. An investigation into allegations 
of torture made in early 1999 by a confessed mass murderer concluded 
during the year without enough evidence to bring charges against any 
police officers. Police abuses continued, including use of excessive 
force, beatings of suspects, and harassment. Police also continued to 
harass and physically abuse Roma and foreign nationals. In 1999, 2,397 
reports of police abuse were filed compared with 2,296 in 1998. Of 
these complaints, only 377 resulted in court cases, compared with 312 
in 1998. In 845 cases, no investigation occurred. Many of the cases 
that did make it into the court system were still pending atyear's end; 
no accurate data on convictions were available. Historically, 10 to 15 
percent of such cases result in conviction. In the first 6 months of 
the year, policemen were convicted in five cases. Also in the first 6 
months of the year, the National Police Headquarters reports the 
following number of incidents of police abuse to be: 5 cases of forced 
questioning, 8 cases of abuse against Roma, and 16 cases of abuse 
against foreigners. Punishments include fines, probation, and the 
imposition of suspended sentences. In 1997 the Budapest central 
district court sentenced four police officers to 1 to 2 years in prison 
for the exceptionally severe beating of a detainee under interrogation. 
The appeals court suspended the sentences, and three out of the four 
officers continue to serve as police officers. According to a report by 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, persons detained by police complain 
of abuse, but very few file official complaints because they do not 
expect positive results and fear that the complaint may affect their 
cases adversely. Some sources attribute the rise in numbers of reports 
of police abuse to a growing willingness to seek official redress in 
these instances. The Romani minority community and dark-skinned 
foreigners are the most common victims of police abuse, with Roma 
bearing the brunt. In June 1999, after several incidents of police 
brutality against Roma in Hajduhadhaz, the Ministry of Interior 
admitted that the town had the highest level of reported police 
violence in the country, and that half of the town's police force was 
under investigation for allegations of abuse. In May the Debrecen 
County Court convicted three of five officers charged with abuse and 
sentenced them each to prison terms of 2 years and 5 months. A Roma 
rights organization reported that in Budapest in June 1999, three 
police officers beat and kicked a Romani university student as he 
walked through a park. When the man told the officers that he would 
report their abuse, they beat him further. The Rom filed a lawsuit 
against the officers; the case was still pending atyear's end. Despite 
such occurrences, the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs believes that the 
situation is, at worst, remaining constant, and possibly is marginally 
better. The Ombudsman continues to promote a uniform anti-
discrimination law.
    The police and Interior Ministry are working to change the police's 
authoritarian image, and human rights organizations report that police 
generally are more cooperative with outside monitoring of police 
behavior. However, these efforts are hampered by low salaries and a 
lack of physical resources. A 1997 study by the Ombudsman's office, 
which investigates constitutional violations in the public sector, 
denounced police corruption but noted that it was unsurprising that it 
existed, given police officers' low pay and poor working conditions. 
The Ombudsman found that working conditions in the vast majority of 
police offices were unsuitable. In 1999 the Interior Ministry, as part 
of the Government's general anticorruption plan, launched a program to 
fight corruption in law enforcement. The program promotes reform of the 
systems for recruitment and training at the National Police and the 
Border Guards. Applicants for these organizations have to pass a 
thorough psychological test; in addition their financial situation and 
other risk factors are examined. The program also prepares law 
enforcement officers to recognize and avoid ``corruption situations.'' 
As part of the program, the Interior Ministry has added 86 new officers 
to the Office for Supervision and Control.
    Police frequently harass foreign residents, particularly 
nonEuropeans. At times, police showed indifference towards foreigners 
who had been victims of street crime.
    Prisons are overcrowded but meet minimum international standards. 
The population of prisons and detention centers as of September was 
15,769 persons (4,264 of whom were in pre-trial detention), or 160 
percent of capacity, which represents an increase of over 600 prisoners 
from the end of 1999. Tougher maximum sentences have contributed to the 
increase of the prison population. The age of most prisoners is now 
between 25- and 40-years-old. Between 65 and 70 percent of prisoners 
earn wages while in prison, either from work performed in prison or 
from workrelease programs. Some programs allow prisoners to spend 
weekends at home. A recent change in philosophy led to more efforts to 
rehabilitate criminals for their eventual return to normal life. Civil 
organizations and foundations assist in the rehabilitation process. 
According to officials, the general health of prisoners declined in the 
last few years. The chief Ombudsman issued a report on prison 
conditions and facilities in 1997. A new predetention center was opened 
in the summer, and two new prisons are scheduled to open within the 
next 2 years. A 1999 survey among prisoners about alleged abuse 
concluded that abuse by prison personnel was not a problem.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police must inform 
suspects upon arrest of the charges against them but may hold them for 
a maximum of 72 hours before filing charges. The law requires that all 
suspects be allowed access to counsel prior to questioning and 
throughout all subsequent proceedings, and that the authorities provide 
counsel for juveniles, the indigent, and the mentally disabled; 
however, credible reports suggest that police do not always allow 
access to counsel, particularly for minor crimes. Bail has been 
available to citizens since January, when a new Criminal Code entered 
into force. It is also available to foreigners, but rarely is used.
    The Police Act permits police to hold suspects in public security 
detention (PSD) in the following cases: In which the suspect has no 
identity papers; in which blood or urine tests must be performed to 
determine blood alcohol content; or if the suspect continues to commit 
a misdemeanor offense in spite of prior warning. Suspects may be held 
in PSD for up to 24 hours. Such detainees are not always informed of 
the charges against them, because such periods of ``short'' detention 
are not defined as ``criminal detention'' and so are not considered to 
be covered by the Criminal Code.
    On December 18, a 30-year-old unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum 
applicant, Ebune Christian Ecole, died while being deported by police 
at Budapest Airport (see Section 1.a.). Ecole's repeated protests and 
attempts to break free led the captain of the SABENA flight, which was 
to transport him out of the country, to refuse to take him on board. 
Police then proceeded to further restrain Ecole by shackling his feet, 
at which point he reportedly fainted. Emergency Medical Technicians 
were unable to revive him. The official report of his death cites heart 
attack as the cause. Local NGO's have called for a thorough 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding Ecole's death.
    Pretrial detention, based on a warrant issued by a judge, is 
initially limited to 1 year while criminal investigations are in 
progress; it may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor's motion 
(provided the judge concurs). According to the new Criminal Procedure 
Law, pretrial detention is to be limited to a maximum of 3 years, after 
which the case expires automatically if formal charges are not brought. 
The lack of a bail system gives tremendous leeway to the judge. In 1999 
the average length of pretrial detention was 3.5 months, although 
nearly 10 percent of detainees were held for periods ranging from 8 to 
12 months. In addition foreigners usually are held until their trial 
since they are considered likely to flee the country. Roma allege that 
they are kept in pretrial detention longer and more frequently than 
non-Roma (see Section 1.e.). The law provides for compensation when a 
detainee is released for lack of evidence, but the procedure rarely is 
exercised since detainees must undertake a complicated legal procedure 
to pursue their claims. The Minister of Justice, on behalf of the 
State, decides on compensation. The amount depends on the case and can 
cover the costs of the trial, attorney's fees, lost wages, and some 
other miscellaneous sums.
    The law does not provide for exile, and it is not employed.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair, although 
sometimes slow, process.
    Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the 
administration of justice, with the Supreme Court exercising control 
over the operations and judicial procedure of all the courts. There are 
three levels of courts. Original jurisdiction in most matters rests 
with the local courts. Appeals of their rulings may be made to the 
county courts or to the Budapest municipal court, which have original 
jurisdiction in other matters. The Supreme Court is the final court of 
appeal, while the Constitutional Court is the final court on 
constitutional matters. In the case of military trials, appeals also 
may be addressed to the Supreme Court. Under the new Criminal Procedure 
Law enacted in January, an intermediate court of appeal was to be 
established between the metropolitan/county courts and the Supreme 
Court. These intermediate courts are designed to alleviate the current 
backlog of court cases and permit lower courts to hear simple cases. 
Critics of the new system charge that it would instead slow court 
procedures and increase costs. Although passed and signed by 
Parliament, the Government delayed indefinitely the implementation of 
the new level of courts, citing budgetary constraints. A National 
Judicial Council (NJC) was established in 1997 to nominate judicial 
appointees and oversee the judicial budget process. The NJC will also 
oversee the implementation of the fourth level of courts.
    The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it as well as 
their compliance with international treaties that the Government has 
ratified. Citizens may appeal directly to the Constitutional Court if 
they believe that their constitutional rights have been violated. 
Parliament elects the Court's members to 9-year terms, which may be 
renewed; no renewals have been made to date. The retirement age of the 
Constitutional Court judges is 70 years. No judge or member of the 
Supreme or Constitutional Courts may belong to a political party or 
engage in political activity.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the authorities 
respected this right in practice. Counsel is appointed for indigent 
clients, but public defenders are paid poorly--less than $5 (1,000 Huf) 
for the first hour of the trial and less than $2.50 (500 Huf) for each 
additional hour--and do not give indigent defendants priority. Lawyers 
often meet indigent clients for the first time at trial.
    Defendants are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal 
proceedings and are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judicial 
proceedings are generally investigative rather than adversarial in 
nature. The public defender system provides generally substandard 
service. (There is no public defender's office, as such; private 
attorneys may or may not choose to serve in this capacity. Since public 
defenders are paid only for the hours spent in trial, little to no 
preparation is done and lawyers often meet their clients for the first 
time at the trial.)
    In selected cases, judges may agree to a closed trial to protect 
the accused or the crime victim, such as in some rape cases. In October 
1998, the victim protection office was established in the Ministry of 
the Interior. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, witnesses (and in 
some cases, victims, judges, and translators) are to be protected by 
having their personal data kept closed, in a separate location from the 
case files. For specially protected witnesses, court appearances are 
unnecessary; they are to be questioned personally by the judge. In July 
1999, Parliament passed a resolution calling for a new victim 
protection plan, which would provide new identities and homes for 
victims and their family members. A bill must be submitted by December 
31, 2001. There is no jury system; hence judges are the final arbiters. 
Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, prosecutors are to have greater 
influence over their cases. Plea bargaining, which is known as a 
``trial waiver,'' is now available to prosecutors.
    Military trials follow civil law and may be closed if national 
security or moral grounds so justify. In all cases, sentencing must 
take place publicly.
    Many human rights and Romani organizations claim that Roma receive 
less than equal treatment in the judicial process. Specifically they 
allege that Roma are kept in pretrial detention more often and for 
longer periods of time than nonRoma. This allegation is credible in 
light of general discrimination against Roma; however, there is no 
statistical evidence because identifying the ethnicity of offenders is 
not allowed under the data protection law. Since the majority of Roma 
fall into the lowest economic strata, they also suffer from poor 
counsel and unenthusiastic representation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides that the prosecutor's office may 
issue search warrants. Police must carry out house searches in the 
presence of two witnesses and must prepare a written inventory of items 
removed from the premises. Wiretapping, which may be done for national 
security reasons and for legitimate criminal investigations, requires a 
court's permission. These provisions appear to be observed in practice. 
During the last 2 years, there were no publicized reports that police 
entered private residences without warrants to check foreigners' 
identification.
    In August 1998, Prime Minister Orban stated that FIDESZ politicians 
and their families were the targets of illegal secret surveillance in 
1997. Orban claimed that the investigators, whose identity he did not 
reveal, sought damaging information to use in the spring 1998 
elections. Opposition (former government) leaders vigorously denied the 
accusations. In its final report issued in the spring, the 
parliamentary committee formed to investigate the matter did not find 
evidence to support allegations of widespread misconduct.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this right 
in practice. However, during the year the FIDESZ-led coalition 
Government actively attempted to counterbalance what it considers a 
leftwing bias in news coverage through its influence on personnel 
decisions within the state-owned media. Nonetheless, a wide variety of 
views and opinions is available among the highly competitive print and 
broadcast media.
    After the transition from communism, the majority of print media 
outlets were purchased by foreign publishing companies. In addition 
numerous new publications made the local print market much more 
competitive. Political opposition sources claim that this competition 
was utilized by the coalition in its attempt to balance the print 
media, some elements of which the Government views as too liberal and 
anticoalition. Advertisements from state-owned companies and financial 
institutions were awarded to progovernment papers, which also tend to 
receive better access to government sources.
    Parliament passed a media law in 1996 creating institutions 
designed to foster a free and independent electronic media. The law 
provided for the creation of nationwide commercial television and radio 
and was intended to insulate the remaining public service media from 
government control. The National Television and Radio Board (ORTT), the 
regulatory agency created by the 1996 Media Law, has continued to 
monitor news broadcasts for equal treatment of all political parties. 
Several commercial stations were warned publicly by the ORTT during the 
year for giving more time to one party over others.
    The state broadcast media continue to lay off large numbers of 
journalists and administrative personnel to reduce overhead. Opposition 
figures have accused the Government of firing journalists based on 
political bias. State-owned media (Hungarian Radio, Hungarian 
Television, and Duna TV) operate with incomplete Boards of Trustees 
representing only coalition nominees, an issue debated in the 
constitutional court and in the Parliament.
    On March 14, some 6,000 demonstrators marched across Budapest to 
demand an independent supervisory board for the broadcast media. The 
demonstration was organized by the Socialist Party, trade unions, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); representatives of other 
opposition parties also took part.
    Academic freedom generally is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. There are essentially no restrictions on peaceful 
public gatherings. In general the Government does not require permits 
for assembly, except when a public gathering is to take place near 
sensitive installations, such as military facilities, embassies, or key 
government buildings. Police sometimes may alter or revoke permits, but 
there is no evidence that they abuse this right.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Any 10 or more persons may 
form an association, provided that it does not commit criminal offenses 
or disturb the rights of others. Associations with charters and elected 
officers must register with the courts.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and members of all faiths are allowed to practice their 
religion freely. There are 92 officially recognized religions. A group 
needs 100 members (or 100 signatures) to register as a religion in any 
county court. There is no preferred religion, although not all 
religions receive state support. State support is in the form of funds 
negotiated each year between the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and the 
Finance Ministry. A 1996 law allows citizens to donate 1 percent of 
their taxes to any religion, and a 1997 law extended this option by 
allowing citizens to donate 1 percent to any religion and 1 percent to 
a civil organization or public institution. In 1999 the Ministry of 
Cultural Heritage provided $11.24 million (2.81 billion Huf) for the 
reconstruction of church properties and monuments and for other 
investments. In May the Government passed an amendment to existing tax 
laws that confirmed sales tax exemption for country's historic 
denominations and for NGO's. However, minority religions (including 
Adventists, Pentecostals, Methodists, and all Eastern religions) cannot 
reclaim sales tax under the amendment, which they feel threatens to 
marginalize them even further. The churches took the case to the 
Supreme Court, which chose not to review it. However, in December the 
Government passed a new amendment to replace that which had passed in 
May. The new amendment set criteria under which direct contributions to 
churches are tax deductible; these criteria limit the benefit to 14 of 
the some 90 registered churches in the country.
    In 1997 the Government signed a treaty with the Vatican to return 
church property confiscated by the Communist regime; the treaty also 
provided for a minimum state payment (separate from the annual 
negotiated support) of $7.8 million (1.7 billion Huf). Similar compacts 
were signed with the country's three other historical religions in 
1998. The Jewish community receives $2.6 million (608 million Huf), and 
the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches each are entitled to $4.3 million 
(1 billion Huf). Religious schools receive support per child in the 
same way that state schools do. Religious orders and schools have 
regained some property confiscated by the Communist regime.
    Several synagogues have been built since World War II, generally 
replacing older demolished synagogues. The first completely new 
synagogue built since the war was constructed in 1998 at a Jewish 
summer camp in Szarvas.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on the 
movement of citizens within or outside the country, including on the 
rights of emigration and repatriation. However, local authorities have 
in some cases tried to expel Roma from towns or have taken advantage of 
situations (eviction for nonpayment of bills or condemnation of Roma 
homes) to relocate and concentrate Romani populations, in effect 
creating ghettos. The Government may delay but not deny emigration for 
those who have significant court-assessed debts or who possess state 
secrets. Those with about $40,000 (over 10 million Huf) in public debt 
may be denied travel documents. The Government requires that foreigners 
from countries that do not have a visa waiver agreement with Hungary 
obtain exit visas each time they leave the country, although blanket 
permission sometimes is available.
    A total of 6,247 refugees from the former Yugoslavia are registered 
in the country. Most are in private housing, with only 506 housed in 3 
permanent and 2 temporary refugee camps, or ``reception centers,'' run 
by the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), formerly known as 
the Office of Migration and Refugee Affairs (ORMA). (In January the 
Government established OIN as a central authority for asylum and 
immigration matters.) In addition to the three government-owned camps, 
two additional temporary camps are used through contracts with the 
NGO's that run them. They have been operating since 1991 and 1993, 
largely as a result of the influx of refugees fleeing the various 
conflicts and incidents of ethnic cleansing to the south. The 
Government estimates that there are as many as 5,000 asylum seekers and 
as many as 40,000 to 60,000 immigrants (the vast majority from Romania) 
living in the country in unregistered status; the local office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes that these figures 
is too high. OIN began drafting amendments to the country's asylum laws 
in June to comply with existing European Union (EU) regulations.
    The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the local 
office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting 
refugees. In 1999 the Government granted 313 out of 11,499 applicants 
refugee status under the Geneva Convention; 1,776 applicants were 
granted temporary protected status. During the first 9 months of this 
year, 151 out of 5,720 applicants were granted refugee status and 567 
were allowed to stay on temporary protected status. The number of 
applicants, excluding Yugoslav citizens, increased by 8 percent. Of 
11,299 applications submitted in 1999, 1,176 were Afghan, 1,176 from 
Bangladesh, 506 from Iraq, 228 from Sri Lanka, and 3,306 were from the 
former Yugoslavia. While the high number of Afghan refugees is not 
unusual, the significant increase in Yugoslav applicants in 1999 
corresponded with the onset of a series of crises in Kosovo. In the 
months following the cessation of hostilities, many of these 
applications were withdrawn, and OIN authorities believe that many more 
refugees simply have gone home. A March 1998 law lifted Hungary's 
geopolitical reservation to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government now 
adheres completely to the provisions of this Convention. Under the old 
law, the Government only handled claims from European asylum seekers, 
and the UNHCR handled all other claims. The increase in caseload 
resulting from this change and from events in Kosovo and the resulting 
NATO action placed a tremendous strain on the OIN's resources, leading 
to the high number of pending cases and increasing the processing time 
per application. Prospective refugees who seek only to transit to 
Western Europe are encouraged to return to their countries of 
departure. There were approximately 1,831 asylum seekers located in 3 
permanent and 2 temporary reception centers as of September 27. The 
Government has been criticized by NGO's and Western countries for 
inhuman conditions in detention facilities and the arbitrary 
application of asylum procedures. In February 1999, the Parliament's 
human rights Ombudsman criticized the conditions in border facilities 
as ``uncivilized and intolerable.'' In response to this criticism, the 
Government has closed down the worst buildings within the centers and 
has begun the construction of others. There is an ongoing project to 
refurbish the border guards' community shelters. Of the eight currently 
in operation, three have been fully refurbished and reopened, and one 
reopened early in the year. The conditions in the older facilities are 
not good. The country, which has been dealing with refugee issues on a 
large scale for only the past 10 years, has borne a great deal of the 
refugee burden resulting from the Kosovo crisis, and the Government has 
sought to work with NGO's to improve conditions.
    Aliens caught trying to cross the border illegally may apply for 
refugee status or are housed temporarily at one of eight border guard 
facilities throughout the country pending deportation. During the first 
6 months of the year, 910 persons occupied the facilities, while in 
1999 there were between 500 to 600 occupants. During the first half of 
the year, 5,798 illegal aliens were apprehended, while in 1999, 12,438 
were apprehended. While police seek the timely deportation of detainees 
who do not qualify for refugee status, a shortage of funds and the 
detainees' lack of property or documentation, such as passports, often 
result in lengthy stays. In 1999 the authorities expelled 12,000 
foreigners from the country; however, there were no reports of the 
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens age 18 and over have the right to change their government 
through national elections held at least every 4 years. Members of 
Parliament are elected through a complex voting procedure for 
individuals and party lists. The FIDESZHungarian Democratic Civic Party 
heads the coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (the latter two parties formed the government 
coalition between 1990 and 1994 with the Christian Democrats, one 
segment of which later merged with FIDESZ.) The opposition includes the 
extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life Party and two leftwing 
parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Free Democrats.
    No legal impediments hinder women's participation in government or 
the political process, although they are underrepresented in relation 
to their percentage of the population; only 33 of 386 parliamentary 
representatives are women, and 1 woman serves in the Cabinet. Few women 
occupy other leadership positions in the Government or political 
parties. Despite the lack of ensured minority representation, there are 
several Members of Parliament, including one ethnic German and one 
ethnic Slovak, who are members of ethnic minorities; however, none 
specifically represents their respective minority populations. There 
are no Romani Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Numerous human rights organizations operate without government 
restriction or interference. Many NGO's report that the Government is 
generally responsive to their requests for information. An increasing 
number of NGO's are involved in the law-making process. However, 
individual police units and prosecutors reportedly are uncooperative at 
times, particularly in cases involving Roma or police abuses. There is 
also a 21member parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and 
Religious Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and 
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination 
still exists, particularly against Roma. This is due to widespread 
prejudice, lack of positive reporting, and lack of opportunity for 
advancement.
    Women.--Spousal abuse is believed to be common, but the vast 
majority of such abuse is not reported, and victims who come forward 
often receive little help from authorities. While there are laws 
against rape, often it is unreported for cultural reasons. Police 
attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse are often reportedly 
unsympathetic, particularly if the victim was acquainted with her 
abuser. Laws recognize rape within marriage. Women's rights 
organizations claim that 1 woman in 10 is a victim of spousal abuse and 
that societal attitudes towards spousal abuse are ``archaic.'' In 1999 
there were 4,668 reports of crimes against family, youth, and sexual 
morality; 4,589 such crimes were reported in 1998. In 1999 women were 
the victims of 103,855 crimes; they were the victims of 106,211 crimes 
in 1998.
    The law does not prohibit sexual harassment in the work place. A 
1995 report prepared under the auspices of the U.N. to evaluate 
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women termed sexual harassment in the workplace as ``virtually 
epidemic.'' Women's groups report that there is little support for 
efforts to criminalize sexual harassment, and that harassment is 
tolerated by women who fear unemployment more than harassment. Under 
present law, acts of sexual harassment may be prosecuted under the 
defamation statutes (if violent, they are considered sexual 
misconduct).
    Legally women have the same rights as men, including identical 
inheritance and property rights. In September 1999, the Office for 
Women's Issues started operating an anti-discrimination hot line, which 
operates 10 hours a day and offers free legal advice to women who feel 
that they were discriminated against with respect to employment. 
According to the head of the office, the hot line receives 20 to 30 
calls per day. While there is no overt discrimination against women, 
the number of women in middle or upper managerial positions in business 
and government remains low, although the number of women in the police 
and the military has risen significantly over the past several years, 
with significant increase in 1999. Women are heavily represented in the 
judiciary and in the medical and teaching professions. A Women's 
Representative office was established in the Ministry of Social and 
Family Affairs to address women's issues more effectively. As of August 
1, the Women's Representation Secretariat became an independent 
department within the Ministry.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights. 
Education is mandatory through 16 years of age, and employment is 
illegal below the age of 15. There is no societal pattern of child 
abuse, although NGO's report that neglect and abuse are common in state 
care facilities. In 1999 children were the victims in 8,977 crimes, 
while in 1998 they were the victim of 8,769 crimes.
    People with Disabilities.--Government sources estimate that between 
600,000 and 1 million persons (6 to 10 percent of the population) are 
disabled. Of these, 300,000 to 350,000 are considered seriously 
disabled and receive increased government benefits. A law that was 
passed in 1998 requires that all public buildings be made accessible to 
the disabled within 10 years. A Council for the Disabled was 
established in January 1999, under the chairmanship of the Minister of 
Social and Family Affairs. The Council serves as an advisory board to 
the Government. At present services for the disabled are limited, and 
most buildings are not wheelchair accessible. A 1997 decree requires 
all companies that employ over 20 persons to reserve 5 percent of their 
jobs for the physically or mentally disabled, with fines of up to 75 
percent of the average monthly salary for noncompliance. In 1999 such 
fines yielded $6 million (approximately 1.77 billion Huf) for 
rehabilitation funds for the disabled. While the Government appears to 
be ready to consider reviews for mentally disabled patients under 
limited guardianship, U.S.-based NGO Mental Disability Rights 
International (MDRI) and local NGO Hungarian Mental Health Interest 
Forum (PEF) note that contrary to internationally recognized norms, no 
review procedures exist for patients under plenary guardianship. MDRI 
and PEF also criticize the use of cages in government facilities for 
the mentally disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Early in the year, the Council of Europe's 
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance published a report that 
criticized the ``latent anti-Semitism'' in some media, in some elements 
of Parliament, and in society.
    On November 2, some 30 gravestones were vandalized in Budapest. The 
damage to the stones was estimated to be $16,000 (5 million Huf).
    In July 1999, two skinhead members of the Arrow Cross Movement 
admitted to defacing 15 graves in a Jewish cemetery in Szombathely. The 
skinheads painted anti-Semitic graffiti on gravestones shortly before a 
Holocaust commemoration was to take place on July 3 in the cemetery. 
The desecration was criticized sharply by President Goncz. In November 
1999, a municipal court found the two youths guilty and sentenced one 
skinhead to 1 year in prison, which was commuted to 3 years' probation, 
while the second skinhead was sentenced to 8 months in prison, which 
was commuted to 2 years' probation. No new incidents of skinhead 
violence were reported during this year.
    In August 1999, the ``Protocols of the Elder of Zion,'' a notorious 
anti-Semitic forgery, was published and available for purchase in a 
Hungarian translation for the first time since World War II. The Jewish 
community in Nagykoros filed a complaint against the publication with 
the Prosecutor General. The publication also was criticized by the 
Calvinist Church and the Catholic Church, which expressed concern over 
the increasing problem of lack of ``respect and tolerance'' toward 
various religious communities. Also in August 1999, the Ministry of 
National Cultural Heritage criticized any defamation of religion and 
announced that it supported a call by the Confederation of Hungarian 
Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ) for the publication of a scholarly work 
in the country addressing the book's false claims. The Ministry of 
Culture later sponsored a lecture and reception to introduce that book.
    In November 1999, MAZSIHISZ asked the Cabinet to take action 
against ``Fascist, racist, and anti-Semitic'' outbreaks that were a 
source of public concern. The organization objected to the planned 
rehabilitation of the country's World War II Prime Minister Laszlo 
Bardossy, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and the publication of 
anti-Semitic books. MAZSIHISZ argued that the law should be changed to 
prohibit the denial of the Holocaust. In response to the concerns of 
the Jewish Community, Orban tasked an official in the Ministry of 
Culture to oversee issues of concern to the Jewish community.
    MAZSIHISZ and international Jewish organizations criticized as 
unfair a 1998 decision by the Government to provide $128 (30,000 Huf) 
each to the heirs of Holocaust victims. In February 1999, the president 
of MAZSIHISZ said that hundreds of Holocaust survivors were returning 
compensation payments to the Government, protesting that the small 
amounts were an insult. Previous awards to the heirs of victims 
distributed by the Communist regime were $4,255 (1 million Huf). The 
Orban Government provided the 30,000 Huf figure as a line item in the 
Fiscal Year 1999 budget, stating that this amount was all that could be 
paid out without budget imbalances. Opposition parties were seeking to 
hold a special parliamentary session on this and other issues, but the 
Government was opposed to resolving the issue in this manner. Although 
the figure of $128 was accepted originally by the leaders of the Jewish 
Community who had negotiated with the Government, it generally is 
agreed that the amount is too small, and it is a matter of ongoing 
renegotiation. In December the Constitutional Court ruled that the 
negotiated amount was unconstitutional. After this ruling, the Prime 
Minister instructed the Ministry of Justice to investigate the matter 
further and to draw up a new compensation proposal.
    On March 20, the Budapest court sentenced Ehrem Kemal (Gyorgy Kemal 
in Hungarian) to 2 years imprisonment for inflammatory anti-Semitic 
speeches made in 1997. The sentence was suspended and replaced with 5 
years probation. Kemal has appealed, and the case has been forwarded to 
the Supreme Court.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The 1993 Law on National and 
Ethnic Minorities' Rights recognizes individuals' minority rights, as 
well as establishes the concept of collective rights of ethnic 
minorities, and states that it is their inalienable collective right to 
preserve their ethnic identity. The law also permits associations, 
movements, and political parties of an ethnic or national character and 
mandates the unrestricted use of ethnic languages. For an ethnic group 
to be recognized as such it has to have at least 100 years' presence in 
the country, and its members have to be citizens. On this basis, 
minority status is granted specifically to 13 national or ethnic groups 
(among which Roma are by far the most numerous). Other groups may 
petition the Chairman of Parliament for inclusion if they believe that 
they fulfill the requirements.
    The law considers the establishment of local minority 
selfgovernments as a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of 
ethnic minorities. For this reason, local minority selfgovernment 
elections, in conjunction with local government elections, have been 
held since 1994. Any of the 13 minorities can set up a minority self-
government if at least 50 valid votes are cast in settlements with 
fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and if at least 100 votes are cast in 
larger settlements. Since ethnicity is not registered officially, 
voting on minority selfgovernments is not limited to the minorities 
themselves; all the voters receive a minority ballot in addition to the 
local government ballot. The elected local minority self-governments 
can elect their national minority self-governments; all 13 minorities 
have formed national self-governments. To improve cooperation between 
local and national minority self-governments, the establishment of 
county level self-governments is planned for next year. This model of 
minority self-government has been criticized mainly on two grounds: 
first, several minority representatives have objected to the fact that 
members of the majority can vote for minority candidates and thus 
influence minority politics. The Government is currently collecting 
proposals for an amendment to the minority law to define more precisely 
both the competencies of minority self-governments and their source of 
financial support. Second, critics call for an increase in the 
competence of the minority self-governments and considerably more 
financial resources for them. However, this would require modification 
of the law, which is not expected in the near future.
    There were 770 Romani minority self-governments elected in the 
local elections in October 1998, a significant increase over the 477 
elected self-governments in the first minority elections held in 1994. 
The new self-governments began operating in January 1999. Of these, 738 
continue to function; the discrepancy reflected the number that ceased 
functioning between 1999 and this year due to a lack of funds. With 
some funding from the central budget and some logistical support from 
local governments, these bodies seek to influence and oversee matters 
affecting minorities. The Romani minority poses a special challenge for 
the system of national minority self-governments. In contrast to other 
minorities for whom the preservation of their identity and culture is 
the basic goal, the Roma also have to contend with the fact that they 
generally belong to the lowest socio-economic strata of Hungarian 
society. Ethnicity and poverty coincide with Roma; therefore, the 
Romani selfgovernments are faced with the task of improving the lives 
of their constituents with no additional resources. The concept of 
minority self-governments is in itself new, and policies still are 
evolving.
    In 1995 Parliament appointed an Ombudsman--currently an ethnic 
German--specifically charged with defending minority rights.
    Roma constitute at least 5 percent of the population, with some 
estimates going as high as 9 percent. In view of the higher birth rate 
among Roma compared with the general decline in the Hungarian 
population, this percentage is likely to remain constant or grow. This 
fact causes concern among a substantial portion of the majority 
population. Germans, the second largest minority group, constitute 
about 2 percent of the population. Smaller communities of Slovaks, 
Croats, Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Greeks, Serbs, Slovenes, 
Armenians, Ruthenians, and Bulgarians are recognized as ethnic 
minorities. Ethnicity and religion are only optional questions, so this 
may or may not provide a more accurate estimate of the actual numbers 
of the minority populations.
    Education is available to varying degrees in almost all minority 
languages. There are minority-language print media, and the state-run 
radio broadcasts 2-hour daily programs in the mother tongue of major 
nationalities, i.e., Romani, Slovak, Romanian, German, Croatian, and 
Serbian. State-run television carries a 30-minute program for each of 
the larger minority groups, complemented by 5-minute weekly news 
bulletins.
    Conditions of life for the Romani community are significantly worse 
than among the general population. Roma suffer from discrimination and 
racist attacks and are considerably less educated, with lower than 
average incomes and life expectancy. The percentage of the country's 
Roma graduating from high school in 1993 was 1.6 percent compared with 
23.8 percent for non-Roma; only 0.24 percent of Roma graduated from 
university compared with 9.45 percent for non-Roma. The unemployment 
rate for Roma is estimated to be 70 percent, over ten times the 
national average. With unemployment benefits exhausted and social 
services stretched thin, Roma often confront desperate situations. As 
of January 1, the Government has reduced the limit on unemployment 
benefits from 1 year to 9 months, which affects the Romani community 
disproportionately, with its high unemployment rate, and exacerbates 
the poverty of this large segment of society. This may likely reinforce 
negative stereotypes of Roma as poor, shiftless, and a social burden.
    Roma continue to suffer widespread discrimination in education, 
housing, and access to public institutions, including restaurants and 
pubs. Roma and other civic organizations highlighted the practice of 
placing Roma children in remedial education programs designed for 
children with mental disabilities or low academic performance, 
resulting in a form of de facto segregation. Although the children 
could be returned to the regular school system, only a small percentage 
return. In September 1999, the Minister of Education and the 
parliamentary Ombudsman for Minority Rights announced at a press 
conference that there is segregation in the country's educational 
system. The statement followed the publication of a report by the 
Ombudsman's office that found that the high proportion of Romani 
children in ``special schools'' for the mentally disabled was a sign of 
prejudice and a failure of the public education system. Schools for 
Roma are more crowded, more poorly equipped, and in markedly poorer 
condition than those attended by non-Roma. Only 1.5 percent of the 
Romani community graduate from high school, while 0.001 percent 
graduate from college or university. There are programs aimed at 
increasing these numbers (the Romaversitas program supports Romani 
students finishing degrees in institutions of higher education), and 
there are Departments of Roma Studies in the Teachers' Training College 
in Pecs and Zsambek. However, the impact has yet to be significant. The 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee found that there are 132 segregated 
schools throughout the country. The Government contests these claims of 
human rights organizations and states that the Romani schools are 
designed to provide intensive help for disadvantaged children. An 
interministerial committee was established in the fall of 1999 and is 
led by the Minister of Justice. This committee was tasked with 
assigning Romani affairs desk officers in each ministry. There is 
currently such a desk officer in the Ministry of Education, who is 
himself a Rom. Several ministries have already accomplished this task, 
including the Ministry of Education, whose desk officer is a Rom.
    In what is considered a landmark case, in July 1998 a court ordered 
a bar owner in the city of Pecs to pay a $750 fine and take out a 
newspaper advertisement apologizing for refusing to serve a Rom.
    Local officials have in some cases taken advantage of rules 
prohibiting overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary housing, or have 
punished nonpayment of utility bills by evicting Roma families, among 
others, from residences without providing alternative housing as the 
law requires. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) has reported cases 
of forced evictions during the year. For example, in the town of Ozd, 
ERRC visited apartment buildings from which Roma were forced to leave 
for renovations, many without having been given alternative housing for 
the duration and who may return only if they pay high fees for the 
costs of renovation. In some areas, this relocation and concentration 
of Roma populations has, in effect created ghettos. During the summer, 
laws on the tenancy of flats were amended to ease administrative 
procedures for evicting squatters. Under the new procedures, notaries 
public may authorize evictions and are required to enforce the order 
within 8 days, even if an appeal has been filed against the decision. 
Local NGO's worry that Roma families will bear the brunt of the new 
rules, saying that it expands the power of local officials to remove 
Roma from their homes.
    The Government sponsors programs both to preserve Romani languages 
and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic assimilation. 
Oversight and budgetary control of the Coordination Council for Roma 
Affairs and the Office of National Ethnic Minorities were shifted from 
the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Justice. In July 1999, 
the Government published an action plan designed to improve living 
conditions in Romani communities, with specific focus on public health, 
education, and work training. However, the plan provides no additional 
funds; rather, it redistributes already inadequate resources.
    Early in the year, the Council of Europe's Commission Against 
Racism and Intolerance published a report that criticized the living 
conditions of the country's Roma population. It contends that the legal 
protection of Roma is ineffective and that regulations banning 
discrimination are insufficiently implemented. Government officials 
stress that the situation of the country's Roma is an issue that it is 
addressing.
    Widespread popular prejudice against Roma continues. Police 
commonly abuse them (see Section 1.c.). Foreigners of color reported 
harassment by police and at border control checkpoints. The Martin 
Luther King Organization (MLKO), which documents assaults on nonwhites, 
reported a gradual decrease in the number of such incidents over the 
past several years, with three such cases in the first 9 months of the 
year. However, MLKO sources believe that many cases go unreported.
    In 1997 changes to the Penal Code made it easier to enforce and 
stiffen penalties for hate crimes committed on the basis of the 
victim's ethnicity, race, or nationality. The law has already been 
applied several times.
    In March the Prime Minister's Office brought legal action against 
Peter Szegvari, a high-ranking official in the office, for having 
suggested that contraceptives be distributed to the Romani population 
to combat ``excessive multiplication.''
    In October 1999, a group of skinheads attacked two Roma at a pub in 
Kakucs. One Rom suffered serious injuries as a result of the beating. 
Local police began an investigation in the case, but no results were 
reported by year's end.
    In August 1999, a group of approximately 30 persons attacked a 
Romani family in a village near Nyiregyhaza. The attackers beat male 
members of the family, eight of whom were treated in the hospital for 
injuries. Local police reported that they interrogated two suspects in 
the case.
    Discrimination, poverty, and unresolved social problems continue to 
drive Roma emigration. In July, 47 members of a Roma clan from the 
village of Zamoly made the news this year when they applied for refugee 
status in France and indicated their intent to file suit against the 
Hungarian Government at the Strasbourg International Human Rights 
Court. Following 3 years of increasing tensions over adequate housing 
between members of the clan and the local community, 47 members of the 
family travelled to Strasbourg, where they have sought asylum. The 
Strasbourg court has agreed to review that asylum case and is 
temporarily housing and maintaining the 47 applicants. In 1998 an 
investigation by the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs concluded that the 
local mayor had indeed denied basic social services due to the Roma. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the asylum claims by 
announcing that the Roma family was free to return.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the 
right of unions to organize and bargain collectively and permits trade 
union pluralism. Workers have the right to associate freely, choose 
representatives, publish journals, and openly promote members' 
interests and views. With the exception of military personnel and 
police officers, they also have the right to strike. Under a separate 
1992 law, public servants may negotiate working conditions, but the 
final decision on increasing salaries rests with Parliament.
    The largest labor union organization is the National Confederation 
of Hungarian Trade Unions, the successor to the former monolithic 
Communist union, with over 735,000 members. The Democratic League of 
Independent Unions and the Federation of Workers' Councils have 
approximately 100,000 and 56,000 members, respectively.
    There are no restrictions on trade union contacts with 
international organizations, and unions have developed a wide range of 
ties with European and international trade union bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
permits collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level, 
although the practice is not widespread and is discouraged actively in 
the growing private sector. Labor organizations appear willing to 
cooperate with one another; this is particularly evident in their 
relationship in forums such as the National Labor Affairs Council 
(OMT), which succeeded the Interest Reconciliation Council in April and 
which provides a forum for tripartite consultation among 
representatives from management, employees, and the Government. The OMT 
discusses issues such as wage increases and the setting of the minimum 
wage, which is negotiated centrally within the OMT in order to control 
inflation. Individual trade unions and management may negotiate higher 
wages at the plant level. The new Government disbanded the Ministry of 
Labor and split its work between the Ministry of Economy (covering 
policy issues) and the newly created Ministry of Social and Family 
Affairs (covering employment issues and responsible for drafting 
laborrelated legislation). In January the Government assigned all labor 
responsibilities to the Ministry of Economy. Employers are prohibited 
from discriminating against unions and their organizers. The Ministry 
of Economy enforces this provision.
    There are no export processing zones per se, but individual foreign 
companies have been frequently granted duty-free zone status for their 
facilities.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
the Ministry of Economy enforces this prohibition.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.). The Labor Code forbids labor by children under the age 
of 15 and regulates labor conditions for minors (14 to 16 years of 
age), including prohibitions on night shifts, hard physical labor, and 
guaranteed overtime payments. The National Labor Center enforces these 
regulations in practice, and there does not appear to be any 
significant abuse of this statute. Education is compulsory through age 
16. Roma are far more likely than non-Roma to stop attending school 
before age 16. The Government converted the family allowance into a 
school attendance allowance in September. This measure was intended to 
``force'' children to go to school, but some Romani NGO's fear that 
this may be another form of discrimination against Roma, many of whom 
live in small villages with no high schools within manageable distance. 
Furthermore, the extreme poverty of many Roma makes it difficult for 
them to clothe their children appropriately for school. Taking away the 
family allowance is thus seen by Roma as punishment for neglecting to 
do something that they cannot afford. By the Government, however, it is 
perceived as a way to provide incentives for greater commitment to 
education among Roma and as an effort to end a cycle of poverty in 
which impoverished Roma bring up large and illiterate families, whose 
members themselves later may become public burdens.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The OMT establishes the legal 
minimum wage, which is subsequently implemented by Ministry of Economy 
decree. The minimum wage, $85 (25,500 Huf) per month, is insufficient 
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. This is 
only 35 percent of the average wage. Many workers supplement their 
primary employment with second jobs, and there are reports that many 
citizens, while officially earning the minimum wage, actually make 
more. Reporting the minimum wage is a way for both employer and 
employee to avoid paying higher taxes.
    The Labor Code specifies various conditions of employment, 
including termination procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade 
union consultation rights in some management decisions, annual and sick 
leave entitlement, and labor conflict resolution procedures. Under the 
Code, the official workday is set at 8 hours; however, it may vary 
depending upon the nature of the industry. A 24-hour rest period is 
required during any 7-day period.
    Labor courts and the Ministry of Economy enforce occupational 
safety standards set by the Government, but specific safety conditions 
generally are not consistent with internationally accepted standards. 
The enforcement of occupational safety standards is not always 
effective in part due to the limited resources that the Ministry of 
Economy is able to commit to enforcement. In theory workers have the 
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment. Foreign firms generally meet or 
exceed international standards for occupational safety.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the country was once primarily 
a source for women and children trafficked for the purpose of forced 
prostitution, it increasingly is a transit and destination point as 
well. Hungarian women are trafficked to Western Europe or other parts 
of the world, primarily to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands but also to Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
Hungary receives persons from Eastern Europe, especially from Russia, 
Ukraine, and Romania, who either use the country as a point of transit, 
or who remain in the country as their final destination. According to 
the Office of International Migration (IOM), in 1998 3,200 persons were 
trafficked in the country, which makes up one quarter of all illegal 
migrants apprehended. In 1999 348 human smugglers were arrested, while 
this year the number rose to 569. These figures include both those who 
assist in the illegal migration of others and those trafficking in 
persons. The penalty for trafficking is between 1 and 5 years in 
prison; however, if an organized trafficking ring is involved, the 
sentence can be doubled. A recent amendment to the alien law provides 
for immediate expulsion from the country of foreign traffickers. The 
Government has concluded agreements with 10 European countries to 
facilitate improved police cooperation to combat organized crime and 
trafficking in persons. However, prosecution of traffickers is 
difficult because there is no legislation to protect victims. 
Parliament passed a resolution in July 1999 that called for a victim 
protection plan to be implemented no later than August 2001. Initial 
steps already taken include the creation of a Victim Protection Office 
in the Ministry of Interior, the establishment of a victim protection 
fund, and the posting of information brochures on victim protection in 
every police station. Branches of a new Victim Protection Office, which 
provide psychological support services and legal advocacy for victims, 
safeguard their rights, and attempt to minimize the trauma of trials, 
began operating in a few towns in the fall of 1999. This office does 
not deal exclusively or even primarily with victims of trafficking.
    Many of the victims of trafficking are brought to the country by 
organized crime syndicates, either for work in Budapest's thriving sex 
industry or for transit to Western Europe or North America, to which 
some Hungarian smuggling rings also provide babysitters, housekeepers, 
and manual laborers. Russian-speaking organized crime syndicates are 
active in trafficking women primarily from Ukraine and other countries 
of the former Soviet Union to the EU via Hungary. Hungarian victims are 
mainly young women, although they also include men, middle-aged women, 
and children. They are recruited at discos and modeling agencies, 
through word-of-mouth, or even through open advertisements in local 
papers and magazines. Some know that the purpose of the trip is to 
perform illegal work, while others simply think they are using a back-
door means of attaining a visa. Others plan to work but believe that 
the appropriate papers and permission will be obtained by the 
organizers, who turn out to be traffickers. IOM continued a program 
funded by the European Union to raise awareness of the problem of 
trafficking and to educate potential victims.
                               __________

                                ICELAND

    Iceland is a constitutional republic and a parliamentary democracy 
in which citizens periodically choose their representatives in free and 
fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
    Elected officials control the police force, which scrupulously 
observes and enforces the laws that ensure protection of human rights.
    Iceland has a mixed, open economy that provides residents with a 
high standard of living. The leading exports, fish and other marine 
products, account for almost 70 percent of export revenues. An 
abundance of cheap hydroelectric power provides a comparative advantage 
for the main manufacturing activity--aluminum smelting. Aluminum is the 
second leading export. Growth was expected to approach 4 percent in 
1999.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Human rights monitors expressed 
concern about the Government's frequent use of solitary confinement for 
remand prisoners. The Government is taking steps to deal with violence 
against women. Some societal discrimination against women persists, 
especially in the area of equal pay. Instances of suspected trafficking 
in women were reported.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment are prohibited by law and do not occur.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards. 
Most of the country's small prison population (less than 100 inmates 
total) is held at Litla Hraun Prison in Reykjavik, which includes a 
state-of-the-art detention facility opened in 1995. However, the prison 
system still uses a substandard jail (Hegningarhusid in downtown 
Reykjavik) to hold a small number of prisoners, where the individual 
cells lack toilets and sinks.
    Human rights monitors have expressed concern about the use of 
illegal drugs by some inmates at Litla Hraun Prison and about the lack 
of social services to help inmates overcome drug addiction and prepare 
them for eventual release. Despite the small inmate population at Litla 
Hraun, the authorities have not been able to stop narcotics from being 
smuggled into the prison.
    In a 1999 report, the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) expressed concern during its visit to Litla Hraun prison 
in 1998 that nearly all detainees still were placed in solitary 
confinement while their cases were under investigation. While the 
average duration of solitary confinement was between 2 and 3 weeks, the 
CPT noted that in some cases, solitary confinement lasted up to 3 
months. Under the strictest form of solitary confinement, prisoners 
cannot leave their cells, except briefly to exercise alone or to use 
the showers, and are not allowed to listen to the radio, watch 
television, or receive visitors other than their lawyers, the prison 
doctor, and a chaplain. In November 1999, the supervising doctor at 
Litla Hraun wrote to prison authorities, warning that the mental health 
of several prisoners awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges could 
be in danger due to the extended time that they were expected to spend 
in solitary confinement.
    In a preliminary response to the CPT report on September 30, 1999, 
the Government argued that solitary confinement was absolutely 
necessary in some circumstances to keep suspects from tampering with 
witnesses, destroying evidence, or hindering the investigation. On the 
other hand, it conceded that ``in the vast majority of cases'' 
incarceration alone was sufficient to protect the integrity of 
witnesses and evidence. However, the Prison and Probation 
Administration's statistics show that solitary confinement has been the 
rule rather than the exception, with most of those arrested being 
placed into solitary confinement, at least initially.
    In May the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of an 
Icelandic woman who had been denied compensation for wrongful arrest on 
the grounds that she had not cooperated with police. The woman was held 
in solitary confinement for 5 weeks in 1989 in connection with a drug 
case before being cleared and released. The Government since has 
changed the law to make it easier for victims of wrongful arrest to 
receive compensation, recognizing the principle that all detainees 
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
    With the closing of the Sudumuli remand prison in 1996, the 
Government passed a law in 1998 that allows pretrial detainees to be 
incarcerated with the general prison population. Some human rights 
monitors claim that this law is inconsistent with the country's 
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention and European 
prison rules issued by the Council of Europe.
    Juveniles who are 15 years of age or older can be sentenced to 
prison terms, but the vast majority of juvenile offenders are given 
probation or suspended sentences or agree to attend a treatment program 
instead of going to jail. In the rare instances when juvenile offenders 
are incarcerated, they are confined with the general adult prison 
population due to the lack of a separate detention facility for 
juveniles. In its 1999 report, the CPT stated that it was ``very 
concerned'' about the current situation and recommended that the 
Government take ``immediate steps . . . to ensure that juvenile 
prisoners are held separately from adults.'' In signing the u.n. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, the Government entered a 
reservation on the provision requiring the separation of adult and 
juvenile prisoners. Government officials said that it is not practical 
to establish and operate a separate facility for juvenile prisoners in 
a small country like Iceland because the requirement to incarcerate a 
juvenile occurs so infrequently.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide 
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this 
provision in practice.
    There are two levels of courts. A five-member Judicial Council 
appointed by the Minister of Justice administers the district courts, 
while the Supreme Court guards its independence and fairness by 
administering itself. All judges, at all levels, serve for life.
    The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process. Juries are not used, but multijudge panels are common, 
especially in the Supreme Court, which hears all appeals. Depending on 
the seriousness of the case, a Supreme Court panel can include from 
three to seven judges. Defendants are presumed innocent. They are 
provided access to legal counsel of their own choosing with sufficient 
time to prepare their defense. For defendants unable to pay attorneys' 
fees, the state covers the cost, as set by the court, but defendants 
are required to reimburse the state. Defendants have the right to be 
present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to participate 
otherwise in the proceedings. No groups are barred from testifying, and 
all testimony is treated alike. The courts have the discretion to allow 
the introduction of evidence obtained illegally by the police. With 
limited exceptions, trials are public and conducted fairly, with no 
official intimidation. Defendants have the right to appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the official state religion is 
Lutheranism, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The salaries of Lutheran 
ministers are paid by the state. Citizens 16 years of age and above are 
presumed to be members of the state church and are required to support 
the church by paying a tax, unless they designate another religious 
denomination to receive their tax payment. The religion tax payment of 
persons who choose not to belong to any specific, organized religious 
group goes to the University of Iceland. Religious instruction in 
Christianity is required in the public schools, although students may 
be exempted.
    A new law passed by Parliament in December 1999 (Law No. 108) sets 
specific conditions and procedures that religious organizations must 
follow in order to be recognized officially and registered by the 
State. Such recognition is necessary in order for religious 
organizations other than the state church to receive a per capita share 
of church tax funds. The 1999 law is narrower in scope than the 1975 
law it replaced and applies only to religious organizations that are 
seeking to be, or are already, officially recognized and registered. No 
restrictions or requirements are placed on unregistered religious 
organizations, which have the same rights as other groups in society. 
The law is considered necessary to deal with frequent attempts by 
individuals to obtain recognition of religious organizations simply to 
receive the tax income benefits.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    Although neither the Constitution nor the 1965 Law on the 
Supervision of Foreigners includes provisions for granting refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, in practice the Government 
adjudicates cases in accordance with their principles. The Government 
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees.
    However, human rights monitors have expressed concern about the 
lack of a modern and comprehensive immigration law to govern the 
processing of asylum seekers and to provide a framework for the 
handling of foreigners and immigrants in general. In particular there 
is concern that the Supervision of Foreigners Law gives police and 
custom officers at ports of entry too much discretion to deny admission 
to asylum seekers whose claims they deem to be not ``credible.''
    In response the Government states that official discretion is 
rarely exercised and that none of the 42 individuals who were denied 
entry to the country during the first 9 months of 2000 requested 
asylum. Nevertheless, many government officials agree that a 
comprehensive and modern immigration law is necessary.
    In view of the country's geographic isolation and the lack of 
direct transportation from any traditional source of refugees, the 
question of first asylum rarely arises. However, the Directorate of 
Immigration (which is responsible for adjudicating applications for 
asylum) and the Icelandic Red Cross (which houses and assists asylum 
seekers under a contact with the Government) report that 24 individuals 
applied for asylum during the year, compared with 17 in 1999. None was 
found to qualify for refugee status (several cases were still under 
consideration or on appeal), but the 1999 application of an individual 
who claimed to be 17 years old and fleeing persecution in central 
Africa was approved. It was the first application for asylum status 
ever approved. There were no reports of asylum seekers being detained 
or forcibly expelled during the year.
    The Government accepted 23 UNHCR-designated ``quota'' refugees from 
the former Yugoslavia during the year, continuing a program begun in 
1996 of bringing in 20 to 25 refugees from the region each year. In 
1999 the Government also admitted 75 Kosovar refugees into the country, 
37 of whom since returned to Kosovo with the financial support of the 
Government. Local government authorities in the towns where refugees 
settle take a strong interest in helping them adapt to their new 
environment. The Icelandic Red Cross, in cooperation with the Refugee 
Council of the Ministry of Social Affairs, developed a support family 
program, whereby at least three Icelandic families are enlisted to 
assist each refugee or refugee family. The refugees immediately are 
granted work permits and assisted in finding jobs. For the first year, 
they also are given free housing, utilities, and health care and 
receive a stipend so that they can participate daily in a special half-
day language course designed specially for them. Refugees generally are 
successful in assimilating into society, but their children generally 
drop out of school earlier than children of citizens.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The most recent elections to the Althingi 
(unicameral Parliament) were held in May 1999.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, but no legal 
or practical impediments hinder their participation. Some human rights 
monitors criticized the Minister of Justice (herself a woman) for 
filling a vacancy on the Supreme Court during the year by choosing the 
sole male candidate (who had never served on the bench) over three 
experienced female district court judges. Only one of the nine Supreme 
Court justices is a woman. Similarly, only 2 of 12 ministerial 
permanent secretaries (civil servants who function as deputy ministers) 
are women.
    Women have greater representation in politics. Of the 12 government 
ministers, 4 are women, and women hold 24 of the 63 seats in 
Parliament. There has been a marked increase in the number of female 
parliamentarians elected since the Women's List (WL), a feminist 
political party, was founded in 1983. The WL forced the established 
political parties to nominate more female candidates or face losing 
support. The WL disappeared from the scene as the result of a political 
party merger, but its legacy survives. Women's issues have moved into 
the mainstream of political debate, and all of the major political 
parties now have at least one woman in a prominent leadership position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The country's ethnically homogenous population is strongly 
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination based on any of these 
factors. The law and practice generally reflect this attitude.
    Women.--Violence against women continued to be a matter of concern. 
A public women's shelter offers counseling and protection to victims of 
domestic violence and their children. Approximately 340 women used the 
shelter during the year, 94 of whom sought temporary lodging, while the 
rest asked for counseling or information. About 60 children accompanied 
their mothers to the shelter during the year. At a rape trauma center, 
between 300 and 400 women and children seek assistance annually. Both 
facilities are financed by national and municipal governments, as well 
as by private contributors. The emergency ward of the National Hospital 
in Reykjavik has a special staff to care for rape victims. It reports 
approximately 100 visits per year associated with incidents of sexual 
abuse.
    A police program to train officers in correct interrogation 
procedures in rape and sexual abuse cases appears to be addressing 
prior concerns that police indifference and hostility to female victims 
did not assure proper attention and consideration for victims of such 
abuses. Parliament passed legislation in May that gives courts the 
power to issue restraining orders, an action that human rights monitors 
praised as a potentially useful legal tool in keeping abusive husbands 
away from their spouses.
    A large majority of victims nevertheless decline to press charges, 
and even more forgo trial, fearing publicity in this small, tightly 
knit society. With an increasing number of interracial marriages, 
mostly involving Icelandic men and Asian women, there is concern that 
these new Asian immigrants are not assimilating well into local society 
and could be vulnerable to mistreatment. To address this concern, the 
city of Reykjavik offers these immigrant women emergency accommodation, 
counseling, and information on legal rights, language training, and 
Icelandic societal norms.
    There were indications that some foreign women were trafficked to 
work as striptease dancers or prostitutes against their will (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The sale of sex for money is not illegal per 
se, but it is against the law for someone to engage in prostitution as 
his or her main source of income. It is also illegal to act as an 
intermediary in the sale or procurement of sex.
    The rate of participation by women in the labor market is high. In 
part this reflects the country's comprehensive system of subsidized day 
care, which makes it affordable and convenient for women to work 
outside the home. The Act on the Equal Status of Men and Women requires 
that preference be given to the hiring and promotion of women in areas 
where they are underrepresented, as long as they are equal in all other 
respects to their male job seekers. Despite laws that require equal pay 
for equal work, a sizeable pay gap continues to exist between men and 
women. A survey by a union in Reykjavik showed that women, on average, 
earned 30 percent less than men. A 12 percent difference in pay is 
attributable to the fact that men work 4.2 more hours per week than 
women, but the rest of the gap is unexplained.
    Parliament passed legislation during the year that gives fathers 
the same right as mothers to paid leave upon the birth of a child. When 
the law is fully implemented in 2003, both mother and father will be 
allowed to take 3 months of paid leave, with an additional 3 months 
that can be taken by either parent or shared between them. Previously, 
a mother was given 6 months of paid maternity leave and the father just 
2 weeks. The new leave requirements apply equally to the public and 
private sectors.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights through its well-funded systems of public education 
and medical care. School attendance is compulsory through the age of 
15. About 85 percent of students continue to upper secondary education, 
which is financed completely by the State. The Government provides free 
prenatal and infant medical care, as well as heavily subsidized 
childcare. The Office of the Children's Ombudsman in the Prime 
Minister's Office has a mandate to protect children's rights, 
interests, and welfare by, among other things, exerting influence on 
legislation, government decisions, and public attitudes.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    In an effort to improve the rate of prosecution of child sexual 
abuse and lessen the trauma to the child, the Government in 1998 
established the Children's Assessment Center. The objective of the 
center is to create a safe and secure environment where child victims 
feel more comfortable talking about what happened to them and are not 
subjected to multiple interviews. The center brings together police, 
prosecutors, judges, doctors, and officials from child protection 
services. However, a 1999 change in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
inadvertently undermined the center by making judges (instead of the 
police) responsible for the investigatory interview of abused children 
and by allowing these interviews to be conducted in specially designed 
rooms at district courthouses. In September the Supreme Court upheld 
the right of a Reykjavik district court judge to hold an investigatory 
interview in the courthouse rather than at the assessment center. As of 
September, only about 20 percent of child sexual abuse cases were being 
handled through the center, a development that human rights monitors 
claim is a step backwards in the protection of children's rights.
    People with Disabilities.--Disabled individuals are not subject to 
discrimination in employment, education, or the provision of other 
state services. A 1992 law calls for the disabled to have the right to 
``all common national and municipal services'' and provides that they 
be given assistance to ``make it possible for them to live and work in 
normal society with others.'' The law also provides that the disabled 
should receive preference for a government job when they are qualified 
equally, or more qualified, than regular applicants.
    Building regulations updated in 1998 call for public 
accommodations--such as hotels, restaurants, banks, and stores--as well 
as government buildings to be accessible so that persons in wheelchairs 
have access without assistance. Building regulations also specify that 
elevators in such buildings should be large enough to accommodate 
wheelchairs and that 1 percent of parking spaces (a minimum of one 
space) should be reserved for disabled use only. Moreover, the 
regulations specify that, to the extent possible, the sidewalk outside 
the main entrance of a public accommodation or government building 
should be heated so that it remains clear of ice and snow throughout 
the winter.
    The 1997 Planning and Building Act provides that violations of 
these regulations are punishable by a fine or a jail sentence of up to 
2 years. However, the country's main association for the disabled 
complains that enforcement is lax and that penalties are rarely 
assessed for noncompliance. Access to new buildings tends to be good, 
while efforts to make old buildings more accessible have lagged. A 
government committee is currently doing a systematic survey of all 
state-owned buildings in the country to evaluate their accessibility. 
Since 1995 the Reykjavik city government, in cooperation with local 
associations representing bicycle riders and the blind, has been 
systematically beveling sidewalks at intersections throughout the city 
to facilitate the movement of pedestrians, bicyclists, and disabled 
persons in wheelchairs. The city is spending about $175,000 a year on 
this project, which it aims to have completed by 2006.
    In what was heralded as a major human rights victory for the 
disabled, the Supreme Court ruled in December that the Government's 
practice of basing a disabled person's social security payment on the 
income of his or her able-bodied spouse or partner was 
unconstitutional. The Court said that such means testing violated 
constitutional protections regarding equality and support for the 
disabled and that it was contrary to the country's obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At 
year's end, the Government appointed a committee to study the court 
ruling, a move that the Association of Disabled Persons criticized as a 
delaying tactic. It called on the Government to take immediate action 
to end the means testing and reimburse disabled persons for past 
reductions in their social security payments.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Concern was voiced during the 
year that the rapidly increasing number of foreigners being brought 
into the country to meet the labor shortage in fish processing and 
other less desirable occupations could lead to future problems, 
especially in the event of an economic downturn. At the end of 1999, 
7,271 foreigners were living in Iceland, or about 3 percent of the 
population, according to the statistics office. However, persons of 
foreign origin actually constituted 4 or 5 percent of the population 
when account is taken of individuals who were born in foreign countries 
but have since become citizens. New work and residence permits were 
issued at a rate of about 150 per month during the year. Many of these 
``temporary'' workers come from Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, and the Directorate of Immigration expected most 
of them to seek to remain permanently rather than return to their 
countries of origin.
    Human rights monitors expressed concern about the establishment in 
1997 of an ultra-nationalist organization called the Association of 
Icelandic Nationalists, whose motto is ``Iceland for Icelanders.'' The 
avowed aim of the association is to prevent further settlement of 
foreigners of other than European origin in the country. Some human 
rights monitors claim that the Government is not living up its 
obligations under Article 4 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination because there is no 
law that prohibits organizations that promote and incite racial 
discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers make extensive use of the 
right provided by the Constitution to establish organizations, draw up 
their own constitutions and rules, choose their own leaders and 
policies, and publicize their views. The resulting organizations are 
controlled neither by the Government nor by any single political party. 
Unions take active part in Nordic, European, and other international 
trade union bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers 
in the public sector whose services are essential to public health or 
safety, unions have had and used the right to strike for many years. 
Approximately 80 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions. 
During the year, 3 major strikes took place: A 2-week strike in the 
spring by most of the unskilled and semiskilled labor unions outside of 
Reykjavik, a 2-month strike during the summer by the main bus drivers' 
union, and a 2-month strike at the end of the year by secondary school 
teachers. The teachers' strike, which was the longest such strike in 
the country's history, led some students to leave school and take up 
full-time jobs.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Union 
membership is not impeded in law or practice. Employers are required to 
withhold union dues (1 percent of gross pay) from the pay of all 
employees, whether or not they are union members. This is because union 
dues help support, among other things, disability, strike, and pension 
funds to which all workers are entitled.
    The various trade unions and management organizations periodically 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements that set specific terms for 
workers' pay, hours, and other conditions. New collective bargaining 
agreements were negotiated in the spring of 2000, and most will expire 
in either 2003 or 2004. The Government played only a minor role in the 
bargaining process, providing mediation assistance in a few cases 
(through the State Mediator's Office) while generally encouraging wage 
restraint to limit inflation. The new contacts provide that if 
inflation exceeds expectations during the first year, the unions have 
the right to seek renegotiation of the wage terms. In recent years, the 
Government has played almost no role in the private sector collective 
bargaining process, other than generally to encourage wage restraint 
that would help to limit inflation.
    Labor courts effectively adjudicate disputes over contracts and 
over the rights provided for in the 1938 Act on Trade Unions and 
Industrial Disputes, which prohibits antiunion discrimination. By law 
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to 
reinstate workers fired for union activities. In practice the charges 
are difficult to prove.
    In 1996 Parliament passed legislation updating the labor laws and 
bringing them into compliance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
    There are no export processing or other special economic zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by law and does not occur; however, some women 
reportedly were coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes 
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.), and work permit practices could leave 
workers vulnerable to abuse by employers (see Section 6.e.). The law 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 
6.c.). The law requires children to attend school until the age of 16 
and prohibits the employment of younger children in factories, on 
ships, or in other places that are hazardous or require hard labor. 
This prohibition is observed in practice. Children 14 or 15 years old 
may be employed part time or during school vacations in light, 
nonhazardous work. Their work-hours must not exceed the ordinary work 
hours of adults in the same occupation. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration enforces child labor regulations.
    The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor in May.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No minimum wage is mandated 
legislatively, but the minimum wages negotiated in the various 
collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees 
in those occupations, whether they are union members or not. Union 
membership is so extensive and effective that labor contracts afford 
even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard 
of living for themselves and their families.
    Workers are protected by laws that effectively provide for their 
health and safety as well as for unemployment insurance, paid 
vacations, pensions, and reasonable working conditions and hours. The 
standard legal workweek is 40 hours, which includes nearly 3 hours of 
paid breaks. Work exceeding 8 hours in a workday must be compensated as 
overtime. Under changes that took effect during the year, workers are 
entitled to 11 hours of rest (up from 10 hours previously) within each 
24-hour period and to a day off every week. Under defined special 
circumstances, the 11-hour rest period can be reduced to 8 hours, but 
the worker must then be compensated with 1.5 hours of rest for every 
hour he received less than 11 hours. The day off can be postponed by a 
week, in which case the worker has a right to 2 additional hours off in 
the following week. Health and safety standards are set by Parliament 
and administered and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through 
its Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which can close down 
workplaces until safety and health standards are met. Workers have a 
collective, not an individual, right to refuse to work in a place that 
does not meet the criteria of occupational safety and health. Firing 
workers who report unsafe or unhealthy conditions is illegal.
    However, in the case of newly arrived foreign workers or refugees 
(i.e., those who have been in the country for less than 3 years), human 
rights monitors expressed concern that the Government's practice of 
issuing the applicable work permit to the employer rather than to the 
individual concerned could leave the worker vulnerable to abuse by the 
employer.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically 
criminalize trafficking in persons; however, a number of provisions in 
the Penal Code can be used to prosecute such cases.
    Although no charges have ever been filed, trafficking in women is 
suspected in connection with the hundreds of foreign women who enter 
the country to work in striptease clubs. The main concern is that some 
of the women, especially those from Eastern and Central Europe, are 
being brought to Iceland under false pretenses and then coerced to work 
as striptease dancers or prostitutes. The police believe that the 
foreign women also may be used to bring illegal drugs into the country.
    Parliament passed legislation in May that closed a loophole that 
allowed striptease dancers to enter the country and perform without a 
work permit for up to 4 weeks under an exemption given for ``artists.'' 
Now any foreign woman (except those from the Nordic area and countries 
of the European Economic Area) seeking to come to the country to work 
as a striptease dancer must first obtain work and residence permits, 
which are typically valid for 3 months. However, the Government has not 
yet put any numerical limits or other controls on the issuance of work 
permits for foreign striptease dancers. The clubs are allowed to bring 
in as many as they want. One check is provided by the Icelandic 
Federation of Labor. The Federation reviews the work permit 
applications and labor contacts for striptease dancers (under the law, 
all work permit applications must be reviewed and approved by the 
``relevant'' labor union) and ensures that the dancers are afforded the 
minimal labor protections and benefits.
    The number of women entering the country for such work, while still 
based on anecdotal evidence, has fallen to a few hundred since they can 
now stay longer legally. Byyear's end, there had been no arrests in 
connection with these activities.
                               __________

                                IRELAND

    Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long tradition of 
orderly transfer of power. The Government consists of an executive 
branch headed by a prime minister, a legislative branch with a 
bicameral parliament, a directly elected president, and an independent 
judiciary.
    The national police (Garda Siochana) are under effective civilian 
control and have primary responsibility for internal security. Since 
the police are an unarmed force, the army acts in their support when 
necessary--the latter under the effective civilian control of the 
Minster for Defense. Ireland's principal internal security concern has 
been to prevent the spillover of terrorist violence from Northern 
Ireland. With the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement on April 
10, 1998, virtually all parties in Northern Ireland acknowledged the 
goals of democracy, peace, and reconciliation. All major paramilitary 
groups, on both sides of the border, have declared permanent cease-
fires. Members of the police have committed some human rights abuses.
    Ireland has an open, market-based economy that is highly dependent 
on international trade. Over the last 2 decades it has been a large net 
recipient of funds from the European Union (EU), and this assistance 
has helped to address imbalances in the socioeconomic environment. 
Strong economic growth over the past few years lowered unemployment to 
4.4 percent, the lowest in 30 years.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens. Human rights problems arise primarily from: Instances of 
abuse by the police; prison overcrowding and substandard facilities; 
the continuation of special arrest and detention authority and the 
nonjury court; the occasional censorship of films, books, and 
periodicals; violence and discrimination against women; the abuse of 
children; and discrimination against asylum seekers and Travellers (an 
itinerant ethnic community).
    As stipulated in the Good Friday Agreement, the Government 
established a human rights commission in July, which is to cooperate 
with a parallel commission in Northern Ireland. The human rights 
commissions are to provide information and promote awareness of human 
rights, comment on human rights draft legislation referred to them by 
the legislatures, make recommendations to the governments on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, and initiate court 
proceedings or provide assistance to individuals doing so. The Good 
Friday Agreement also mandates equivalency with regard to protection of 
human rights in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. To this 
end, the Government atyear's end was preparing legislation which would 
allow for an 'interpretive incorporation' of the European Convention on 
Human Rights into Irish law.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    During the year, the Garda in the Republic of Ireland and the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland cooperated in questioning 
87 persons in connection with the August 1998 Omagh bombing that killed 
29 people and injured hundreds. To date only one person, Colm Murphy, 
has been charged in connection with the bombing. Murphy, an Irish 
citizen charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion, is expected to 
stand trial in Dublin in 2001. In October 2000, at the conclusion of 
the inquests of 28 of the 29 victims, the RUC announced that it knew of 
15 suspects responsible for the bombing but lacked evidence sufficient 
to charge and prosecute them.
    In May 1999, the Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains, a 
joint body made up of representatives from the Republic and Northern 
Ireland, began efforts to locate the remains of nine persons, termed 
the ``disappeared,'' abducted and killed by the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in the 1970's.
    Pursuant to joint Irish and British legislation granting limited 
immunity to IRA members involved in these acts, information was given 
to the Commission by the IRA on the location of the nine bodies. In 
1999 the remains of three of the nine victims were recovered and 
returned to their families. In January 2000 the Commission halted 
excavations until May, when digging resumed for another 3 weeks 
following receipt of new information from the IRA. At the end of May, 
the Commission again suspended the search pending new information from 
the IRA. Work had not resumed byyear's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and officials generally 
did not employ them. However, there were instances of abuse of 
detainees and prisoners. While the mistreatment of persons in police 
custody is not widespread, detainees filed a number of cases claiming 
damages for injuries sustained while in police custody.
    Human rights organizations have called for the establishment of an 
independent ombudsman or authority to investigate complaints against 
the police. It would replace the current statutory board, the Garda 
Siochana (Police) Complaints Board, through which the Garda authorities 
investigate alleged misconduct by their peers. In 1999 the Board 
received 1,264 complaints, a decrease from 1,400 complaints in 1998. 
The complaints included charges of criminal behavior (mistreatment or 
abuse). After a review process conducted in accordance with the 1986 
Garda Siochana (Complaints) Act, 192 cases were referred to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who directed that members of the Garda 
Siochana be prosecuted in 9 of those cases. None of the 9 cases 
reportedly resulted in convictions.
    The Board also referred 20 of the complaints to an internal 
disciplinary body in 1999. Of the nine cases dealt with byyear's end, 
five were found to involve wrongdoing. The Board in addition sent 28 
complaints directly to the Garda Commissioner for disciplinary action.
    In response to a pan-European program, ``Police and Human Rights 
1997-2000,'' the Garda Commissioner in late 1999 launched the Garda 
Siochana Human Rights Initiative for 1999-2000 in order to further 
develop policing practices that uphold human rights. This initiative 
focused on the training of officers (from the senior level to incoming 
students), a review of practices and procedures, and increased 
coordination and cooperation with NGO's. In addition to this 
initiative, the Government introduced the recording of questioning of 
suspects in Garda stations, a practice designed to deter further abuse 
or mistreatment.
    Ireland has a low incarceration rate (80 inmates per 100,000 
population), and the prison regime is generally liberal. However, the 
physical infrastructure of many prisons is inadequate. Following 
charges that prisons are overcrowded and lack in-cell sanitation 
facilities such as toilets and running water, many are undergoing 
renovation. In addition prisons lack sufficient health care facilities 
and services. Cloverhill remand prison and Mountjoy women's prison (the 
Dochas Center), both unable to accept inmates at their initial openings 
in 1999, are now fully operational. These new facilities are designed 
to accommodate a further 1,200 prisoners and thereby help reduce 
overcrowding.
    Prisoners with complaints of mistreatment by prison officials or 
negligence of health and safety due to prison conditions have ready 
access to mechanisms for redress. However, according to the Justice 
Department, no allegations of mistreatment of prisoners were leveled 
against the Prison Service during the year, and no similar claims were 
left outstanding from previous years. However, 44 complaints were made 
in 1998, the last year for which statistics are available. The 
authorities continued to arrest and incarcerate at Portlaoise prison 
persons involved in paramilitary activity. Conditions for these inmates 
are the same, if not better, than those for the general prison 
population.
    Domestic and international human rights monitors are permitted to 
visit prisons without reservation. The Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) visited prisons in 1998. In December 1999, the 
Government responded to the CPT's report with plans for improving 
conditions. In May 2000 the Government published a followup report as 
requested by the CPT.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty without 
due process under the law; however, special arrest and detention 
authority continued. A detainee has the right to petition the High 
Court, which is required to order release unless it can be shown that 
the person is being detained in accordance with the law. The 1984 
Criminal Justice Act provides for an initial period of detention of 6 
hours, with an extension of another 6 hours when a police officer of 
the rank of superintendent or above so directs, in cases in which there 
are grounds for believing that such detention is necessary for the 
proper investigation of an offense. A continuation of detention of 8 
hours overnight is possible, to allow a detainee to sleep.
    In cases covered by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, the 
initial period of detention without charge is 24 hours on the direction 
of a police superintendent; detention can be extended another 24 hours 
by a judge. This act allows police to arrest and detain for questioning 
anyone suspected of committing a ``scheduled offense,'' i.e., one 
involving firearms, explosives, or membership in an unlawful 
organization. Although the stated purpose of the act is to ``prevent 
actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the 
authority of the state,'' it is not restricted to subversive offenses. 
Therefore, the police have broad arrest and detention powers in any 
case involving firearms. However, under the terms of the 
Decommissioning Law enacted in 1997 in support of the Northern Ireland 
peace process, proceedings may not be instituted against persons in 
relation to any offense that may be committed in the course of 
decommissioning illegally held arms in accordance with an approved arms 
decommissioning scheme.
    The 1939 act also provides for the indefinite detention, or 
internment, without trial of any person who is engaged in activities 
that are ``prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or 
to the security of the State.'' While this power has not been invoked 
since the late 1950's, the Government could do so by simply issuing a 
proclamation.
    An amendment to the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act was enacted 
in the wake of the Omagh bombing in 1998. The amendment allows police 
to detain suspects in certain crimes, usually involving serious 
offenses with firearms or explosives, for 48 hours, with a possible 24-
hour extension if approved by a judge.
    The legislation also curtails the right of silence. Under the 
amendment, if the accused was informed of the consequences of remaining 
silent to questions regarding his whereabouts, associations, or 
actions, then the accused's silence may be used as corroborative 
evidence of guilt. The accused person's failure to respond to 
accusations of membership in an illegal organization also may be used 
as corroborative evidence of guilt. However, the accused cannot be 
convicted based solely on his refusal to speak.
    Membership in or leadership of an illegal organization carries a 
possible life sentence under the new amendment (illegal organizations 
are defined by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act). The word of a 
police superintendent can be used as corroborative evidence of 
membership. Collecting information to aid in a serious offense carries 
a penalty of up to 10years' imprisonment, a fine, or both. Withholding 
information that could prevent a ``serious'' offense or that could aid 
in the apprehension or conviction of a perpetrator also is illegal, 
with a penalty of up to 5years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
    The Government established a committee, chaired by a justice of the 
district court, to investigate allegations that the legislation 
violates international human right conventions. The legislation, which 
was set to expire in June, was extended in July for an additional 12 
months. The committee was expected to report its findings by the end of 
the year.
    The 1996 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act permits detention 
without charge for up to 7 days in cases involving drug trafficking. 
However, to hold a suspected drug trafficker for more than 48 hours the 
police must seek a judge's approval.
    Following approval in 1996 of a referendum calling for stricter 
bail laws, legislation was enacted in 1997 that allows a court to 
refuse bail to a person charged with a serious offense where it is 
considered reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of another 
serious offense. A schedule of serious offenses is contained in the 
bill; the offense must be one that carries a penalty of 5years' 
imprisonment or more. In May the courts implemented the entire bail act 
following a delay due to a lack of prison accommodations.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system includes a district court with 23 districts, a 
circuit court with 8 circuits, the High Court, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The President appoints judges 
recommended by the Judicial Appointment Board, who choose from a list 
presented by the Government.
    The Director of Public Prosecutions, a state official with 
independent status, prosecutes criminal cases. Jury trial is the norm. 
The accused generally may choose an attorney. For indigent defendants, 
the State assumes the cost of counsel under the criminal legal aid 
scheme.
    However, the Constitution explicitly allows ``special courts'' to 
be created when ``ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the 
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public 
peace and order.'' In 1972, under the 1939 Offenses Against the State 
Act, the government created a nonjury ``Special Criminal Court'' (SCC) 
to try ``scheduled offenses'' (see Section 1.d.). Largely a reaction to 
the spillover of paramilitary violence from Northern Ireland, the use 
of the SCC was justified over the years to address the problem of jury 
intimidation in cases involving defendants with suspected paramilitary 
links. The continued need for the SCC is being kept under review by the 
Government.
    During the first 6 months of the year, the SCC indicted 25 persons 
and held 14 trials, compared with 25 indictments and 18 trials in all 
of 1999. In addition to ``scheduled offenses,'' the Director of Public 
Prosecutions can have any nonscheduled offense tried by the SCC if he 
certifies that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the 
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public 
peace.
    In lieu of a jury, the SCC always sits as a three-judge panel. Its 
verdicts are by majority vote. Rules of evidence are essentially the 
same as in regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police 
chief superintendent identifying the accused as a member of an illegal 
organization is accepted as prima facie evidence. Sessions of the SCC 
are usually public, but judges may exclude certain persons other than 
journalists. Appeals of SCC decisions are allowed in certain 
circumstances.
    Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, releases continued of 
those imprisoned for crimes related to the terrorist campaign in 
Northern Ireland. Prisoners belonging to organizations that have 
declared permanent cease-fires and who have committed themselves to 
work through peaceful, democratic means are the only persons qualified 
for this program. All releases were completed by July.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution and the law prohibit such practices, 
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and 
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides 
individuals with the right to ``express freely their convictions and 
opinions.'' However, freedom of the press is subject to the 
constitutional qualification that it not ``undermine public order or 
morality or the authority of the state.'' The publication or utterance 
of ``blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter'' is prohibited by the 
Constitution. While the press in practice operates freely, the 1961 
Defamation Act (which puts the onus on newspapers and periodicals 
accused of libel to prove that defamatory words are true) and the 1963 
Official Secrets Act (which gives the State wide scope to prosecute 
unauthorized disclosures of sensitive government information) are 
believed to result in some self-censorship.
    Broadcasting remains mostly state controlled, but private sector 
broadcasting continues to grow. There are 43 independent radio stations 
and an independent television station. Expanded access to cable and 
satellite television is lessening considerably the relative influence 
of state-controlled broadcasting. The Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission oversees standards and investigates complaints about 
programming. The 1960 Broadcasting Act empowers the Government to 
prohibit the state-owned radio and television network from broadcasting 
any matter that is ``likely to promote or incite to crime or which 
would tend to undermine the authority of the state.'' It was on this 
basis that the government banned Sinn Fein (the legal political front 
of the Irish Republican Army) from the airwaves from 1971 to 1994. 
Following Sinn Fein's agreement to participate in the Northern Ireland 
peace process and the declaration of the IRA cease-fire, the Government 
restored Sinn Fein's access.
    The Office of the Film Censor must classify films and videos before 
they can be shown or sold. Distributors pay fees to finance the 
censor's office. Under the 1923 Censorship of Films Act, the censor has 
the authority to cut or ban any film that is ``indecent, obscene, or 
blasphemous'' or which tends to ``inculcate principles contrary to 
public morality or subversive of public morality.'' As of October, no 
theatrical films were banned during the year, but 125 videos were 
banned, mainly because of their pornographic or violent content. 
Decisions of the censor can be appealed to a nine-member appeal board 
within 3 months, but neither the censor nor the appeal board is 
required to hear arguments or evidence in public or to state the 
reasons for its decisions.
    Books and periodicals are also subject to censorship. The 1946 
Censorship of Publications Act calls for a five-member board to examine 
publications referred to it by the customs service or the general 
public. It also can examine books (but not periodicals) on its own 
initiative. The board can prohibit the sale of any publication that it 
judges to be indecent or obscene. As of October, the board had not 
banned any books or periodicals. In 1999 the board banned the 
mainstream In Dublin magazine for carrying advertisements for ``massage 
parlors,'' which were regarded by the board as solicitations for 
prostitution. The publishers challenged the ban in court, and the 
board's ruling was overturned on the condition that the magazine take 
out the advertisements. In 1999 the board did not ban any books, but it 
banned 8 periodicals, compared with 15 books and 10 periodicals in 
1998.
    In 1996 Veronica Guerin, a journalist and crime reporter with the 
Sunday Independent newspaper, was murdered. The murder was seen as an 
attempt by criminal elements to silence press coverage of their 
activities. The incident shocked public opinion and led to the adoption 
of new legislation to combat narcotics-related crime. The courts 
convicted two men, Paul Ward (November 1998) and Brian Meehan (July 
1999), in connection with the murder and sentenced them to life 
imprisonment. As of October, a third, John Gilligan, extradited from 
the United Kingdom, was awaiting trial; three other men have been 
sentenced on lesser charges related to the Guerin case. No incidents of 
violence against journalists have been reported since Guerin's murder 
in 1996.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to ``assemble peaceably and without 
arms'' and to form associations and unions; however, it also allows the 
State to ``prevent or control meetings'' that are calculated to cause a 
breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general 
public. Under the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, it is unlawful 
to hold any public meeting on behalf of, or in support of, an illegal 
organization. Although the law mandates the prosecution and 
incarceration of persons for mere membership in a terrorist 
organization, the Government allows meetings and assemblies by some 
groups that are associated with illegal terrorist organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice 
of any faith. Even though overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Ireland has no 
state religion. However, most primary and secondary schools are 
denominational, and the Catholic Church partially controls their boards 
of management. The Government provides equal funding to the schools of 
different religious denominations. Although religious instruction is an 
integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt their children from 
such instruction. There is no discrimination against nontraditional 
religious groups.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is complete freedom of movement 
within the country, as well as freedom to engage in foreign travel, 
emigration, and repatriation.
    The existing refugee law, enacted in 1996, has been implemented 
only partially and was under review. The law gives effect to the 1990 
Dublin Convention, harmonizing European Union asylum procedures, and it 
also makes provision for program refugees (those invited by the state 
to apply for asylum; in 1999 mostly Kosovars). The law also expressly 
forbids the forced return of persons to a country where they fear 
persecution.
    The Government grants refugee or asylee status in accordance with 
the provision of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and it cooperates with the office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government drew up 
specific administrative procedures for implementation of the convention 
in consultation with the UNHCR. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that 
these procedures were binding on the Department of Justice, Equality, 
and Law Reform.
    The large increase in the number of asylum seekers continued to 
cause problems, severely straining the Government's processing system 
and societal acceptance (see Section 5). A total of 10,938 asylum 
seekers entered the country during the year. As of July, over 5,000 new 
applications were filed. The total number of applications awaiting 
processing as of December was 6,972; most applicants were from Romania 
and Nigeria. The Government provided first asylum in 211 cases during 
the year. An equal or larger number of asylum applications are expected 
in 2001.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution. Measures taken to speed the lengthy 
processing time of applications (currently about 18 months), including 
recruitment of additional staff, have had little impact because of the 
increasing number of refugee applications. The Government improved the 
situation of asylum seekers awaiting review of their applications by 
allowing those who filed before July 26, 1999, and have been waiting 
over 12 months, to work in Ireland. The Government established a new 
Garda (police) National Immigration Bureau to monitor and track 
nonnationals who are the subject of deportation orders. The new Bureau 
also plans to: Coordinate activities leading to deportation, 
operational strategies and resources at ports of entry, and strategies 
to combat trafficking in illegal immigrants; strengthen international 
liaison on immigration issues; administer the nonnational registration 
service; and enforce immigration law generally.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage for citizens over the age of 18. Several political 
parties have seats in the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Dail 
(House of Representatives)--the chamber that carries out the main 
legislative functions--are popularly elected; in the Seanad (Senate), 
most members are elected by vocational and university groups, and the 
others are appointed by the Prime Minister. The President is popularly 
elected for a 7-year term and is limited to 2 terms. An appointed 
Council of State serves as an advisory body to the President.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although the 
President is a woman, only 22 of the 166 deputies in the Dail and 11 of 
the 60 senators are women. Of the 15 government ministers, 3 are women, 
as are 3 of the 17 junior ministers. Two women sit on the 26-member 
High Court; 2 of the 8 Supreme Court judges are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids state promotion of one religion over 
another and discrimination on the grounds of religion, profession, 
belief, or status. However, until recently few laws implemented these 
provisions of the Constitution. The 1998 amended Employment Equality 
Act went into effect in October 1999. It outlaws discrimination in 
relation to employment on the basis of nine distinct discriminatory 
grounds: Gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation, 
religious belief, age, disability, race, and membership in the 
Traveller community. The 2000 Equal Status Act outlaws discrimination 
in the provision of goods, facilities, and services on the basis of the 
nine grounds listed above.
    Women.--Domestic violence and emotional abuse are common. In 
response to what it sees as a ``hidden'' and ``severely under 
reported'' issue, the National Steering Committee on Violence Against 
Women (a multiagency government body) began a public outreach campaign 
in December 1999. The campaign aims to facilitate victims' reporting of 
domestic and other types of violence by informing women of the 
resources available and rallying public support for victims. There are 
24 women's shelters, funded in part by the Government. According to the 
Dublin Rape Crisis Center, the overall number of reported rapes 
continued to rise. However, calls to the center registered a slight 
decrease: 7,243 calls were received between July 1999 and June 2000, 
compared with 7,500 calls received over the same period in the previous 
year, probably due to changes in the call system. For the 1999-2000 
period, the center estimated that 28 percent of rape and child sexual 
abuse victims reported the crime to police and that 10 percent of these 
cases resulted in convictions, with 39 percent of cases still pending. 
Recent rape victims and victims raped by a stranger were more likely to 
have reported the rape to police.
    A 1990 law criminalizes rape within marriage, and the 1995 Civil 
Legal Aid Act provides for free legal advice to victims in cases of 
serious sexual assault. In rape cases, the State brings the case 
against the accused, with the complainant (victim) acting as a witness. 
Until 2000, as a witness, the victim was afforded no legal 
representation. The 2000 Sex Offenders Bill provides that ``separate 
legal representation will be provided to complainants in rape and other 
serious sexual assault cases where application is made to adduce 
evidence or to cross-examine the complainant about his or her past 
sexual experience.''
    Discrimination against women in the workplace is unlawful, but 
inequalities persist regarding pay and promotions in both the public 
and the private sectors. Women hold about 43 percent of public sector 
jobs but are underrepresented in senior management positions. A 1999 
government report found that at least 50 percent of state-sponsored 
bodies have no guidelines for dealing with sexual harassment and no 
policy on equal opportunity. The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 
the 1977 Employment Equality Act, and the amended 1998 Employment 
Equality Act provide for protection and redress against discrimination 
based on gender and marital status. The Equality Authority monitors the 
implementation of these acts. According to 1998 statistics, women's 
earnings have increased more rapidly than men's since 1985, albeit from 
a lower starting point. The weekly earnings of women in industry still 
averaged only 65 percent of those of men in 1998.
    Women's participation in the work force still is hampered by the 
lack of adequate childcare facilities. To encourage the participation 
of parents, both men and women, in the work force, the Government 
included in its 2000-2006 national development plan in March an equal 
opportunities childcare program, under which approximately $275 million 
(250 million Irish pounds) was allocated to fund measures to improve 
childcare availability and quality.
    The 1994 Maternity Protection Act provides a woman with 14 weeks of 
paid maternity leave and the right to return to her job. A 1998 
Parental Leave Act allows a child's mother and father each to take 14 
weeks of unpaid leave to care for a child under the age of 5. Although 
each parent has a separate entitlement to parental leave, the leave is 
not transferable, i.e., the mother cannot take the father's leave or 
vice versa. Parental leave does not affect a mother's right to 
maternity leave.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and health care. Under the 1991 Child Care Act, education is 
free and compulsory for children from 6 to 15 years of age. The act 
places a statutory duty on government health boards to identify and 
help children who are not receiving adequate care, and it gives the 
police increased powers to remove children from the family when there 
is an immediate and serious risk to their health or welfare. The 
Minister of State (junior minister) for Health has special 
responsibility for children's policy, including monitoring the 
implementation of the Child Care Act by the eight regional health 
boards. The 1987 Status of Children Act provided for equal rights for 
children in all legal proceedings.
    The sexual abuse of children continued to receive significant media 
attention. The Dublin Rape Crisis Center reported that 58 percent of 
calls to its crisis line involved child sexual abuse, and only 13 
percent of the incidents had occurred within 1 year preceding the call. 
The 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act strengthens and updates 
measures to protect children from sexual exploitation, including any 
exchange of information on the Internet that implies a child is 
available for sex.
    People with Disabilities.--The government Commission on the Status 
of People with Disabilities estimated in 1996 that 10 percent of the 
population have a disability. Under the 1998 Employment Equality Act, 
it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone on the basis of 
disability in relation to employment. The 1991 Building Regulations Act 
established minimum criteria to ensure access for people with 
disabilities to all public and private buildings constructed or 
significantly altered after 1992, but enforcement is uneven. A National 
Disability Authority (NDA) began operations in 1999 with a budget of 
$2.7 million (2 million Irish pounds). The NDA is to set disability 
standards, monitor the implementation of these standards, and engage in 
research and the formulation of disability policy. The Authority's new 
strategic plan was awaiting approval by the Government atyear's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 25,000 nomadic 
persons regard themselves as a distinct ethnic group called 
``Travellers,'' roughly analogous to the Roma of continental Europe. 
The ``travelling'' community has its own history, culture, and 
language. The Travellers' emphasis on self-employment and the extended 
family distinguishes them from the rest of society.
    Travellers regularly are denied access to premises, goods, 
facilities, and services; many restaurants and pubs, for example, will 
not serve them. Despite national school rules that provide that no 
child may be refused admission on account of social position, 
Travellers frequently experience difficulties in enrolling their 
children in school. Sometimes they are segregated into all-Traveller 
classes. According to 1998 government statistics, of 4,978 Traveller 
families, approximately 1,191 live on roadsides or on temporary sites 
without toilets, electricity, or washing facilities. Many Travellers 
are dependent on social welfare for survival and are unable to 
participate in the mainstream economy because of discrimination and a 
lack of education.
    The 1998 Employment Equality Act outlaws job discrimination against 
Travellers. A 1993 task force on the travelling community produced a 
comprehensive report in 1995 on various aspects of Travellers' lives, 
including education, work, accommodation, health, and discrimination. A 
monitoring committee is overseeing implementation of the 
recommendations of the report, some of which have resulted in the 
formation of special committees in the Departments of Education, 
Environment, and Health to examine Traveller difficulties in these 
areas.
    A 1998 law, entitled the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act--
recommended by the 1995 task force--obliges local elected officials to 
draw up and implement Traveller accommodation plans on a 5-year basis 
and requires Traveller input in the process. In the event of a failure 
to agree on a draft plan, county and city managers are responsible for 
their adoption and implementation. According to traveller groups, the 
act was implemented with mixed results during its first 2 years.
    The growing immigration of foreign workers has been accompanied by 
societal discrimination and racial violence against the newcomers. 
These developments have sparked public debate over the openness of 
society to immigrants and how to address outbreaks of xenophobic 
incidents of violence. Although asylum seekers have the right to work 
if their cases remain pending for over a year, 4 in 10 claimed to have 
experienced racism and discrimination from recruiters and employers 
while looking for work, according to a study commissioned by the Irish 
Refugee Council. Racially motivated incidents occurred frequently, 
involving physical violence, intimidation, and verbal slurs. A British 
citizen visiting Dublin was stabbed and seriously wounded in June while 
defending his black wife and son from attack. A Dublin bus driver was 
convicted and fined under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 
in September as a result of a verbal exchange, which included racist 
slurs, with a black passenger. Groups of young people reportedly 
targeted white foreigners as well for verbal harassment and violent 
attacks. Government officials spoke out against racism and xenophobia, 
and in July racism was one of two major topics addressed at a 
government-sponsored NGO forum on human rights. In addition the 
Government initiated a public outreach campaign welcoming immigrants.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right to join a union is provided 
for by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. About 48 percent 
of workers in the private and public sectors are members of unions. 
Police and military personnel are prohibited from striking, but they 
may form associations to represent themselves in matters of pay, 
working conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely 
exercised in both the public and private sectors. The 1990 Industrial 
Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and union leaders; 
the Government effectively enforces this provision through the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment. A number of strikes 
occurred during the year, including a nurses' strike, a bus drivers' 
strike, a train engineers' strike over wages, and a hauliers' (truck 
drivers) ``go-slow'' over fuel prices. All concluded peacefully, with 
the unions involved achieving some, if not all, of their goals.
    The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) represents 64 unions in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The ICTU is independent 
of the Government and political parties.
    Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions 
have full freedom to organize and to engage in collective bargaining. 
The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act and the 1977 Employment Equality 
Act make the Equality Authority responsible for the investigation of 
allegations of antiunion discrimination. If the Authority is unable to 
effect resolution, the dispute goes before the Labor Court, which 
consists of one representative each for the employer and the union, 
plus an independent chairperson. The 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act 
provides for various forms of relief in cases where employers are found 
guilty of antiunion discrimination, including the reinstatement of 
workers fired for union activities.
    Most terms and conditions of employment are determined through 
collective bargaining, in the context of a national economic pact 
negotiated every 3 years by the ``social partners,'' i.e., unions, 
employers, farmers, and the Government. The latest version of these 
agreements, the Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness, was signed in 
April.
    The 1990 Industrial Relations Act established the Labor Relations 
Commission, which provides advice and conciliation services in 
industrial disputes. The Commission may refer unresolved disputes to 
the Labor Court, which may recommend terms of settlement and may set up 
joint employer-union committees to regulate conditions of employment 
and minimum wages in a specific trade or industry.
    The export processing zone at Shannon Airport has the same labor 
laws as the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
does not occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--By law children are required to attend school through the 
age of 15. Under the terms of the 1997 Protection of Young Persons Act, 
employers may not employ those under the age of 16 in a regular full-
time job. Employers may hire 14- or 15-year-olds for light work on 
school holidays, as part of an approved work experience or educational 
program, or on a part-time basis during the school year (for children 
over the age of 15 only). The act incorporates international rules on 
the protection of young workers drawn up by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the European Union; it sets rest intervals and 
maximum working hours, prohibits the employment of 18-year-olds for 
late night work, and requires employers to keep specified records for 
workers who are under 18 years of age. Enforcement is reportedly lax, 
but violations appear to be rare. The law prohibits forced and bonded 
child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively 
(see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the 
worst forms of child labor in December.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A new national minimum wage, 
$4.84 (4.40 Irish pounds) per hour, went into effect on April 1. This 
wage alone would not provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. Low-income families continue to be entitled to benefits 
such as subsidized housing and children's allowances.
    The standard workweek is 39 hours. Working hours in the industrial 
sector are limited to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime 
work is limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in 
a year. The Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment is 
responsible for enforcing four basic laws dealing with occupational 
safety that provide adequate and comprehensive coverage. No significant 
complaints arose from either labor or management regarding enforcement 
of these laws. Regulations provide that employees who find themselves 
in situations that present a ``serious, imminent and unavoidable risk'' 
may leave without the employer being able to take disciplinary action.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Recent legislation criminalizes 
trafficking in persons, which so far is limited and infrequent. The 
1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, criminalized trafficking in 
children for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with penalties of up 
to life imprisonment. The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill passed 
in October was upheld as constitutional but has not yet been 
implemented. It will criminalize the activities of persons trafficking 
in illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. There is no specific 
legislation addressing the trafficking in women for sexual criminal 
activities. According to an NGO, trafficking in women does not receive 
much attention from organizations or the Government.
                               __________

                                 ITALY

    Italy is a longstanding, multiparty parliamentary democracy. 
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by 
the president of the Council (the Prime Minister). The Head of State 
(President of the Republic) nominates the Prime Minister after 
consulting with leaders of all political forces in Parliament. The 
current Parliament was elected in free and democratic elections in 
April 1996. The judiciary is independent, but critics complain that 
some judges are politicized.
    The armed forces are under the control of the Ministry of Defense. 
Control over the Carabinieri, a military security force, was 
transferred in March from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of 
Defense; however, the Ministry of Interior retains authority over this 
force in matters of internal security. Four separate police forces 
report to different ministerial or local authorities. Under exceptional 
circumstances, the Government may call on the army to provide security 
in the form of police duty in certain local areas, thereby freeing the 
Carabinieri and local police to focus on other duties. For several 
years, the army supported the police in Sicily and in the province of 
Naples, areas with high levels of organized crime. The army left Naples 
at the end of 1997 and Sicily in 1998 but was redeployed back to both 
locations for a short period in 1999, during which time special actions 
were in progress against organized crime. In September the Government 
sent an augmented force to Naples of 500 police and Carabinieri, some 
of whom wore military-style camouflage battle dress uniforms, to combat 
criminal violence in the city. Amnesty International (AI) reported 
numerous allegations that the police used excessive force against 
individuals, often Roma, refugees, and, increasingly, women, at the 
time of arrest and initial detention.
    Italy has an advanced, industrialized market economy, and the 
standard of living is high. Small and midsized companies employ from 70 
to 80 percent of the work force. Major products include machinery, 
textiles, apparel, transportation equipment, and food and agricultural 
products. The Government owns a substantial number of enterprises in 
finance, communications, industry, transportation, and services, but 
privatization is moving forward at a measured pace.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and the judiciary generally provide effective means of 
dealing with instances of individual abuse; however, there were 
problems in some areas. There were isolated reports of police abuse of 
detainees; such accusations are investigated by the judiciary. Prisons 
are overcrowded. The pace of justice is slow, and perpetrators of some 
serious crimes avoid punishment due to trials that exceed the statute 
of limitations. Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem. The 
Government has taken steps to combat violence against women and child 
abuse; however, they remain problems. Societal discrimination against 
women and discrimination and sporadic violence against immigrants and 
other foreigners continue to be problems. Child labor, mainly involving 
immigrant children, persists in the underground economy but is 
investigated actively. Exploitation of clandestine immigrants is 
widespread. Trafficking in women and girls to the country for 
prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem, as is trafficking 
in children.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government 
officials.
    On May 20, 1999, Massimo D'Antona, a senior adviser to the Minister 
of Labor, was shot and killed outside his home in Rome. The Red 
Brigades, a terrorist movement, claimed responsibility for the killing. 
A suspect detained by police in Rome in May subsequently was released, 
and the investigation continued atyear's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and cruel or degrading 
punishment; however, there were reports of isolated incidents in which 
police abused detainees. Amnesty International, the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission (UNHRC), the U.N. Committee Against Torture, and the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture regularly assess the country's judicial 
and prison system. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Antigone, 
which is composed mainly of lawyers, magistrates, and academics, 
promotes the rights of detainees, works closely with the European 
Commission for Prevention of Torture, and monitors the prison system.
    According to a report issued by AI in June, there are numerous 
allegations of the deliberate use of excessive force against 
individuals detained in connection with common criminal offenses or in 
the course of identity checks. Allegations of mistreatment relate to 
the time of arrest and first 24 hours in custody and concern both 
citizens and foreigners, with an increasing number of women appearing 
as alleged victims. A high proportion of the allegations received by AI 
concern foreign nationals (many of them from Africa), as well as Roma. 
In a May letter to penal authorities, AI expressed concern over suits 
filed the previous month by inmates of the Sassari District Prison, who 
had been subjected to cruel and degrading punishment. In a separate 
communication, AI referred to allegations of mistreatment at newly 
established temporary detention centers for aliens (see Section 2.d.).
    Overcrowded and antiquated prisons continue to be a problem. The 
prison system has a capacity of 35,000 but holds over 53,000 detainees, 
of whom 3,500 were added in 1999 alone. Older facilities tend to lack 
outdoor or exercise space, compounding the difficulties of close 
quarters. Approximately 54 percent of detainees are serving sentences; 
the other 46 percent consist mainly of persons awaiting trial or the 
outcome of an appeal. Nearly one in three pensioners has been jailed 
for a drug violation. One in four is an alien. Of drug users, almost 10 
percent are HIV positive. Over 80 prisoners died while in jail in 1999; 
53 committed suicide, with a reported 920 unsuccessful suicide attempts 
and some 6,500 acts of self-mutilation.
    In the spring these conditions led to protests both by prisoners 
and guards. A 2-day guard strike in Sassari that left inmates without 
food or water led to a prisoner riot in March, which was followed by 
retaliation by prison guards in April. In early May, 82 Sassari guards 
and wardens were arrested in connection with the April abuses. These 
arrests provoked sympathy strikes and demonstrations by prison guards 
across the country, who protested their low pay, long hours, and the 
conditions of tension and risk under which they work. During the same 
period, prisoner protests broke out at several jails and the Parliament 
debated proposals for decriminalizing certain crimes, the shortening of 
sentences, alternative punishments to imprisonment, and the expulsion 
of non-EU nationals who are sentenced to prison terms. The Pope's call 
in June for a Jubilee-Year clemency increased the pressure on 
parliamentarians and raised prisoner expectations; however, proponents 
of such measures could not obtain the necessary twothirds support in 
each chamber. The Government and opposition forces were unable to 
agree, and no action was taken byyear's end.
    The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison 
conditions by parliamentarians, local human rights groups, the media, 
and other organizations.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Detainees are allowed 
prompt and regular access to lawyers of their choosing (although 
occasional lapses in this general rule have been alleged) and to family 
members. If detainees are indigent, the State provides a lawyer. Within 
24 hours of being detained, the examining magistrate must decide 
whether there is enough evidence to proceed to an arrest. The 
investigating judge then has 48 hours in which to confirm the arrest 
and recommend whether the case goes to trial. In exceptional 
circumstances, usually in cases of organized crime figures, where there 
is danger that attorneys may attempt to tamper with evidence, the 
investigating judge may take up to 5 days to interrogate the accused 
before the accused is allowed to contact an attorney. The U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recommended that this 5-day 
period be reduced and that all detainees have access to legal advice 
immediately upon arrest.
    Preventive detention can be imposed only as a last resort, or if 
there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious offense, such as 
crimes involving the Mafia, or those related to drugs, arms, or 
subversion. In these cases, a maximum of 2 years of preliminary 
investigation is permitted. Except in extraordinary situations, 
preventive custody is not permitted for pregnant women, single parents 
of children under 3 years of age, persons over 70 years of age, or 
those who are seriously ill. Preventive custody can be imposed only for 
crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of not less than 4 years.
    Magistrates' interrogations of persons in custody must be recorded 
on audio tape or videotape to be admissible in judicial proceedings. 
Prosecutors are required to include all evidence favorable to the 
accused in requests for preventive detention. The defense may present 
any favorable evidence directly to the court.
    There is no provision for bail, but judges may grant provisional 
liberty to suspects awaiting trial. As a safeguard against unjustified 
detention, panels of judges (liberty tribunals) review cases of persons 
awaiting trial and rule whether continued detention is warranted. 
Persons in detention include not only those awaiting trial, but also 
individuals awaiting the outcome of a first or second appeal (see 
Section 1.e.). The Constitution and the law provide for restitution in 
cases of unjust detention.
    The law prohibits punishment by internal exile or exile abroad.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
    There are three levels of courts. A 1998 law that aimed to 
restructure and expedite the judicial process established that a single 
judge would hear cases at the level of courts of first instance. 
Implementation of the measure's civil provisions began in June 1999, 
while changes in criminal proceedings took force in January. At the 
second level, separate courts hear appeals for civil and penal cases. 
Decisions of the Court of Appeals can be appealed to the highest court, 
the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) in Rome, but only for reasons 
related to correct application of the law, not a case's merit.
    The law provides for trials to be fair and public, and the 
authorities observe these provisions. The law grants defendants the 
presumption of innocence. Defendants have access to an attorney 
sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense and can confront 
witnesses. All evidence held by prosecutors normally is made available 
to defendants and their attorneys. Defendants can appeal verdicts to 
the highest appellate court.
    Both domestic and European institutions criticize the slow pace of 
justice in the country, which is due in part to cumbersome and 
frequently changing procedures, unclear or contradictory legal 
provisions, and an inadequate number of judges. In April the National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) reported that the average trial lasts 35 
months; appeal procedures can add another 59 months. The length of 
trials varies by region; those in the north tend to be shorter than 
those in the south. The European Court of Human Rights noted the high 
number of complaints filed against the country in 1999 and the number 
of adverse decisions (44 of 120) that the court rendered. These 
decisions almost always centered on excessive trial delays. In June the 
Council of Europe's (COE) Committee of Ministers reiterated to the COE 
parliamentary assembly that excessive delays in the administration of 
justice constituted ``an important danger, in particular for the 
respect of the rule of law.'' While noting that Italian authorities 
shared these concerns, the ministers observed that the trend in the 
number of new cases referred to the Court had not changed.
    Excessive trial delay has also complicated the outcome of judicial 
processes involving ``clean hands'' investigations of corruption 
launched in 1991. Public prosecutors uncovered numerous instances of 
illegal arrangements between businessmen and political figures, 
including illicit financing of political parties, as well as ties 
between elected officials and organized crime. Over 1,300 persons were 
either convicted and sentenced or accepted plea bargains. Those 
sentenced to prison terms, generally for periods of 3 years, were able 
to benefit from a legal system that allows alternative punishment for 
persons whose sentences do not exceed 4 years. Thus few individuals 
served jail sentences as a result of the trials. The most sensational 
cases involved multiple accusations against two former prime ministers, 
Giulio Andreotti and Silvio Berlusconi. With regard to the latter, two 
cases ended at the appeals level (following lower court convictions) 
when judicial delays and maneuvers caused the trials to exceed the 
statute of limitations. Berlusconi won acquittals in two other appeals 
cases, however, as well as one at a lower court level, and cited these 
outcomes as vindication, signifying that the original charges had been 
an effort by elements in the judiciary to achieve political objectives 
through prosecutorial means. Milan's chief public prosecutor retorted 
that Berlusconi's criticisms were aimed at undermining the legitimacy 
of investigating magistrates. In the case of (now) senatorforlife 
Andreotti, prosecutors relied heavily in two separate trials on 
testimony by turncoat Mafia witnesses (``pentiti''). These trials ended 
with court criticisms of both the prosecution and defendant. The court 
stated that prosecutors failed to produce concrete evidence backing up 
vague and contradictory testimony by the pentiti. Other court 
observations, which asserted that Andreotti had lied at the trial, fell 
short of resolving doubts about his conduct.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law safeguards the privacy of the home, and the 
authorities respect this provision. Searches and electronic monitoring 
may be carried out only under judicial warrant and in carefully defined 
circumstances. Violations are subject to legal sanctions.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press.
    However, courts are sensitive to criticism and impose fines for 
``defamation.'' In May Member of Parliament Alessandra Mussolini was 
sued for $600,000 (1.2 billion lire) by two judges on the highest 
appeals court. Mussolini had criticized as a ``killer sentence,'' a 
court ruling that failed to consider the pregnancy of a rape victim as 
an aggravating factor, warranting a heavier penalty. In July a court 
levied a $27,000 (55 million lire) fine against weekly magazine 
Panorama for a 1997 article that defamed anti-Mafia prosecutors in 
Palermo.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
does not restrict the right of peaceful assembly, including protests 
against government policies, except in cases where national security or 
public safety is at risk. Permits are not required for meetings, but 
organizers of public demonstrations must notify the police in advance.
    Catholic Church authorities strongly opposed gay community plans to 
hold a world pride week in Rome during the first week in July, calling 
it a provocation and an affront to the Church's Jubilee Year. However, 
the event was held, with the cooperation of national and municipal 
authorities.
    While allowing general freedom of association, the Constitution and 
law prohibit clandestine associations, those that pursue political aims 
through force, that incite racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, 
or that advocate fascism. Professional associations organize and 
operate freely.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Roman Catholicism is not the state religion but it is the dominant 
one, in the sense that most citizens were born and raised under 
Catholic principles, which form part of their culture. Roman Catholic 
religious instruction is offered in public schools as an optional 
subject. Students who do not opt to attend can elect to take an 
alternative course or, in some schools, have a free class period. A 
1929 agreement between the Catholic Church and the Government, which 
was revised in 1984, accords the Church certain privileges. For 
example, the Church can select Catholic religion teachers, whose 
earnings are paid by the State. This privilege has led to charges of 
unconstitutional discrimination.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and the Law provide for 
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. Citizens 
who leave are ensured the right to return. The Constitution forbids 
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Parliament has not 
yet repealed the XIII transitory provision of the 1947 Constitution, 
which forbids male heirs of the former king, Umberto I of Savoy, from 
entering the country. For this reason, in December 1999, royal 
descendant Vittorio Emanuele IV filed a suit in the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg challenging the validity of this 
constitutional bar. In March the European Parliament voted against 
including a reference to the Savoy case in its human rights report.
    Political asylum is obtained according to the provisions of the 
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. However, the country still lacks a specific law on political 
asylum; such a law has been pending before Parliament since 1997. The 
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It provides 
first asylum to refugees fleeing hostilities or natural disasters. Such 
refugees are granted temporary residence permits, which must be renewed 
periodically and do not ensure future permanent residence.
    In 1999 the Ministry of Interior approved 912 asylum requests and 
disapproved some 12,000 others. (In 1998, 7,674 persons applied for 
asylum, of whom 1,045 were found eligible.) Nationals of Yugoslavia, 
Iraq, Turkey, and Iran accounted for over half of the approvals. An 
immigration law passed in February 1998 levies high fines and penalties 
for land, air, and sea carriers that board passengers without 
documentation. There is a huge influx, mainly by sea, of Albanians, 
Serbs, Kurds, North Africans, Chinese, Nigerians, and other West 
Africans, many of whom enter the country intending to transit to other 
member states of the European Union. In April the Government approved a 
migration accord with Albania (similar to previous such accords with 
Tunisia and Morocco) aimed at promoting regular annual emigration of 
5,000 Albanians. More aggressive coastal patrolling helped reduce 
illegal immigrant landings in the south. A total of 16,100 illegal 
immigrants landed in the first 7 months of the year, compared with 
35,200 in the same period in 1999 (due largely to the conflict in 
Kosovo). Some 37,200 such entrants were repatriated over the first 7 
months of the year, compared with 34,800 in 1999.
    Most illegal migrants paid fees to smugglers; some risked death, as 
smugglers unloaded their human cargo at sea to avoid capture by patrol 
boats. Others were forced to engage in illegal activities, were paid 
substandard wages, or forced to work as prostitutes to pay off debts 
incurred for their passage (see section 6.f.).
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a 
valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. There are no restrictions on women's participation 
in government and politics; however, few women hold elected office: 
women hold 4 of 24 cabinet positions, 24 of 325 Senate seats, and 69 of 
630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
    In October the Senate gave final approval to a constitutional 
change allowing an estimated 3.9 million Italians abroad to vote, and 
seting aside 12 seats in the 630-seat Chamber of Deputies and 6 in the 
315-seat Senate to represent them. However, the law's implementation 
required administrative action that did not take place byyear's end.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex (except 
with regard to hazardous work), religion, ethnic background, or 
political opinion, and provides some protection against discrimination 
based on disability, language, or social status. However, societal 
discrimination persists to some degree.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. A 1998 ISTAT 
survey (the first one nationwide) reported that at least 9.4 million 
women between the ages of 14 and 59 had experienced some form of sexual 
violence during their lives. The NGO Telefono Rosa which provides a hot 
line through which abused women can obtain legal, medical, and other 
assistance, reports that nearly half of all complaints it receives 
nationally involve physical violence, much of it at home.
    Legislation to protect women from physical abuse, including by 
family members, was updated and strengthened in 1996. The revised law 
makes the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women easier 
and shields women who have been objects of attack from publicity. The 
law treats spousal rape in the same manner as any other rape. Law 
enforcement and judicial authorities are not reluctant to bring 
perpetrators of violence against women to justice, but victims 
sometimes do not press charges due to fear, shame, or ignorance of the 
law. Telefono Rosa notes that the entry of more women into the police 
force has contributed greatly to an increased willingness of female 
victims of violence to cooperate with police. Acting on behalf of local 
government administrations, some 60 local women's associations maintain 
and run shelters for battered women.
    In December 1999, the Labor Ministry and major trade union 
confederations agreed on a code of conduct regarding sexual harassment 
in the workplace. The code, which follows a 1991 EU recommendation, is 
to be attached to national sectoral labor contracts as they are 
negotiated. Telefono Rosa reports that previous ad hoc labor contract 
sexual harassment provisions have worked as a deterrent to workplace 
harassment both in the public and private sectors.
    Trafficking in illegal immigrant women and girls for prostitution 
and forced labor is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Women enjoy legal equality with men in marriage, property, and 
inheritance rights. Males and females enjoy equal access and treatment 
with regard to education, health, and other government services. Many 
NGO's actively and effectively promote women's rights. Most are 
affiliated with labor unions or political parties.
    A number of government offices work to ensure women's rights. The 
Ministry for Equal Opportunity is headed by a woman. In addition, there 
is an equal opportunity commission in the office of the Prime Minister. 
The Labor Ministry has a similar commission that focuses on women's 
rights and discrimination in the workplace, as well as equal 
opportunity counselors who deal with this problem at the national, 
regional, and provincial government levels. However, many counselors 
have limited resources with which to work. A decree approved in May 
requires civil service recruiters to explain in writing their motives 
for hiring or promoting a man rather than a woman as a manager. The 
rule was designed to promote women's access to the higher echelons of 
public administration and is to apply in offices where women managers 
number less than a third of the total.
    In February 1999, the European Union directive regulating night 
work for women was incorporated into the law, thus amending the 1977 
law that had prohibited night shifts for women. With some exceptions 
(if pregnant, the mother of a child below 3 years of age, or the mother 
of a disabled person), women now are allowed to work at night. Liberal 
maternity leave, introduced to benefit women, adds to the cost of 
employing them, with the result that employers sometimes find it 
advantageous to hire men instead. A March law on parental leave, which 
grants mothers and fathers an equal right to take leave when a child is 
sick, is aimed at offering equal opportunity without penalizing women 
at work.
    According to research conducted by Eurostat, the statistical office 
of the European Commission, women's salaries are 23.5 percent lower 
than men's for comparable work. They are underrepresented in many 
fields, such as management and the professions. According to a recent 
report based on ISTAT data, women account for 36 percent of the labor 
force, with yearly growth in female employment of 2 percent (compared 
with 0.2 percent for men). The National Council for Economy and Labor 
(CNEL) reported that in 1998, 3 percent of executives in large firms 
were women, a figure that rose to 5 percent in mid-size firms and 8 
percent in small firms. In 1999 women occupied 19.1 percent of public 
offices, 11.3 percent of teaching positions, and 3.8 percent of media 
executive positions. Employed women are more likely to have a high 
school diploma (34.7 percent) than employed men (28.5 percent). The 
comparable figures for a university degree are 13.8 percent for women 
and 9.4 percent for men. Unemployment figures show that women still are 
lagging. In 1999 male unemployment was 9.6 percent, while female 
unemployment was 16.8 percent. Youth unemployment (ages 15 to 24) was 
30.2 percent for men (53.5 in the south) and 39.0 percent for women 
(66.9 in the south).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare. As of academic year 1999-2000, schooling 
became compulsory for children from age 7 to age 18; those unable (or 
unwilling) to follow the academic curriculum are allowed to shift to 
vocational training at age 15. This reform was intended to reverse the 
middle and secondary school dropout rate, which had been high.
    Abuse of children is recognized as a societal problem; an estimated 
90 percent of violence against minors is committed within their own 
families. Social workers counsel abused children and are authorized to 
take action to protect them. The NGO Telefono Azzurro maintains two 
toll-free hot lines for reporting incidents of child abuse. Research 
conducted on behalf of the Government by a private institute estimates 
the number of minors involved in cases of violence (including 
prostitution) to be 10,000 to 12,000. There are 1,880 to 2,500 minors 
who work as street prostitutes, of whom 1,500 to 2,300 were trafficked 
illegal immigrants (predominantly Albanians, other eastern Europeans, 
and some Nigerians), many of whom were forced into prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.). Social Service International (a domestic NGO) assists in 
repatriating unaccompanied immigrant minors.
    Several laws and government programs enhance the protection 
available for minors. In 1996 minors offices staffed by trained police 
(often women) were established in police stations around the country to 
offer emergency help for minors and families in distress, as well as 
counsel in dealing with other government social and judicial entities. 
A 1997 law established an information gathering network to collect data 
on the condition of minors. A 1998 immigration law formalized an office 
in the Ministry of Social Affairs that protects the rights of 
unaccompanied immigrant minors. (In 1997 this office screened and 
authorized entry permits for nearly 48,000 minors and 3,000 
accompanying adults.) In 1998 the Parliament enacted a law to combat 
pedophilia, child pornography, the possession of pornographic material 
involving children, sex tourism involving minors, and trafficking in 
children (also see Section 6.f.). The law established a special police 
unit to monitor and prosecute Internet sites devoted to promoting 
pedophilia.
    People with Disabilities.--In January a new law replaced previous 
legislation that forbade discrimination against disabled persons in 
employment, education, or the provision of state services. The new law 
requires companies having 15 or more employees to hire one or more 
disabled workers: those with 15 to 35 employees must hire 1 disabled 
worker, those with 35 to 50 must hire 2 , and, for larger companies 7 
percent of the work force must consist of the disabled. Companies 
hiring the disabled are granted certain benefits, including lower 
social security contributions, while the cost of worker training is 
borne by the Government. The new law also provides for more severe 
sanctions against violators.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some traditional minorities, 
including French and German speaking Alpine communities in the north 
and a mixture of German and Slovene speakers in the northeast, enjoy 
special autonomous status. The special rights of these areas 
(respectively the Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli 
Venezia Giulia) include use of non-Italian languages in government 
offices and public schools in the former two.
    Roma are another traditional minority, but without a specific 
geographic base. Of a national total of 115,000, some 70,000 are 
citizens--most of whom can trace ancestry in the country to the late 
fourteenth century. Most of these Roma live in the center and south, in 
conditions indistinguishable from those of other Italians. Roma in the 
north, whose numbers have swelled with the arrival of 40,000 immigrants 
from the former Yugoslavia, live in more precarious conditions. 
Although many municipalities are building permanent settlements, poor 
housing, limited employment prospects, and inadequate educational 
facilities remain problems. With limited income and job opportunities 
available, some turn to begging or petty crime, generating in turn 
repressive measures by police authorities. Roma communities complain 
that their language does not enjoy the same privileged status as that 
granted to minority languages in the autonomous regions.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to 
establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in 
the workplace. The unions state that they represent between 35 and 40 
percent of the work force. Trade unions are free of government controls 
and have no formal ties with political parties. The right to strike is 
embodied in the Constitution and is exercised frequently. In April 
following a period of multiple land, sea, and air transport sector 
strikes, a new law changed provisions of a 1990 measure that restricted 
strikes affecting essential public services (e.g., transport, 
sanitation, and health). The new law defined minimum service to be 
maintained during a strike as 50 percent of normal, with staffing by at 
least one-third the normal work force. The law established compulsory 
cooling off periods and more severe sanctions for violations. Besides 
transport worker unions, the law also covers lawyers and selfemployed 
taxi drivers. In May a Transport Ministry regulation required all 
national labor contracts involving employment sectors covered by the 
law to adjust contract provisions to the new rules. These changes were 
backed by the three major national trade union confederations, which 
sought to avoid inconvenience to tourists and the traveling public 
alike during the Catholic Church's Jubilee Year.
    Unions associate freely with international trade union 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively, and these rights are respected in practice. By custom, 
although not by law, national collective bargaining agreements apply to 
all workers, regardless of union affiliation. The law prohibits 
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. It 
requires employers that have more than 15 employees and who are found 
guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate any workers affected. 
In firms with less than 15 workers, an employer must provide the 
grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge deems the 
grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or compensate 
the worker.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
generally it does not occur; however, some illegal immigrants and 
children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5), and trafficking 
in illegal immigrant women for prostitution and forced labor, as well 
as trafficking in illegal immigrant children, are problems (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under age 15 
(with some limited exceptions). There also are specific restrictions on 
employment in hazardous or unhealthful occupations for men under age 
18, and women under age 21. The enforcement of minimum age laws is 
difficult in the extensive underground economy. Estimates of the number 
of child laborers differ, ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 children (the 
most probable figure may be in the area of 50,000). Most of these cases 
involve immigrants, but instances involving Italian children also have 
been reported. Illegal immigrant child laborers from Northern Africa, 
the Philippines, Albania, and especially China have entered in record 
numbers every year since 1989, and the influx from China is rising. 
According to the Carabinieri, an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese work 
in sweatshop conditions near Florence, with many minor children working 
alongside the rest of their families to produce scarves, purses, and 
imitations of various brand name products. Many of these factories, 
which face threats of infiltration or coercion by Chinese organized 
crime, are equipped with escape tunnels to thwart labor inspections. 
Carabinieri officers who work on child labor developed a videocassette 
program to educate schoolchildren on child labor laws, their rights as 
specially protected workers, and workplace hazards.
    The Government, employers associations, and unions continue their 
tripartite cooperation on child labor. Their periodic consultations, 
begun in 1997, cover such matters as better enforcement of school 
attendance regulations; programs to reduce the number of school 
dropouts; faster assistance for families in financial difficulty; 
further restrictions on exceptions to the minimum wage law; and 
canceling economic or administrative incentives for companies found to 
make use of child labor, whether domestically or abroad. The Prime 
Minister's office provided a toll-free telephone number to report 
incidents of child labor. The footwear and textile industries have 
established a code of conduct that prohibits the use of child labor in 
their international as well as national activities; the code is 
applicable to subcontractors as well. In 1999 a child labor clause was 
attached to the national labor contract in the health sector, whereby 
the parties committed themselves not to use surgical tools produced by 
child labor. The law forbids forced or bonded labor involving children, 
and the Government generally enforces this prohibition effectively; 
however, some illegal immigrant children were forced into prostitution 
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and some of them were trafficked (see 
Section 6.f.).
    The Government ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention 182 prohibiting the worst forms of child labor following 
completion of parliamentary action in May.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are not set by 
law, but by collective bargaining agreements on a sector by sector 
basis. These specify minimum standards to which individual employment 
contracts must conform. When an employer and a union fail to reach an 
agreement, courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of 
practice in comparable activities or engagements, although this rarely 
happens in practice.
    A 1997 law reduced the legal workweek from 48 hours to 40. Most 
collective agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour workweek. The 
average contractual workweek is 39 hours but is actually less in many 
industries. Overtime work may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average 
of 12 hours per week.
    The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for 
compensation for on-the-job injuries. For most practical purposes, 
European Union directives on health and safety also have been 
incorporated into the law. Labor inspectors are from the public health 
service or from the Ministry of Labor. They are few in number, given 
the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose fines and sometimes 
prison terms for violation of health and safety laws. The Workmen's 
Compensation Institute reports that there were a million accidents in 
1999, involving 1,309 deaths. Accidents occur with the greatest 
frequency in the underground economy, which employs between 3.5 and 5 
million workers. Workers have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not address 
specifically trafficking in persons, it can be prosecuted through 
application of provisions of a 1958 law on prostitution and other 
articles of the Penal Code. Trafficking in women and girls for 
prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem.
    Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation 
involves vulnerable, illegal immigrants, most of whom come from Nigeria 
and Eastern Europe. The country is also a destination for trafficked 
women and girls. Varying estimates suggest that nearly 20,000 foreign 
women--from Albania, Nigeria, Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine, and other 
countries of Eastern Europe--are involved in prostitution, of whom some 
1,500 (according to the social research institute Parsec) may be 
trafficked forcibly. For some, Italy is only a point of entry, and 
their ultimate destinations are elsewhere in Western or Northern 
Europe. Trafficking in children for sweatshop labor is a particular 
problem in Tuscany's expanding Chinese immigrant community, where 
children are considered to be part of the family ``production unit'' 
(see Section 6.d). The Chinese consulate in Florence cooperates with 
Carabinieri in persuading families to enroll their children in school.
    The Ministry of Equal Opportunity leads an intergovernmental 
committee charged with monitoring trafficking and coordinating 
government activity to combat it. Other members include the Ministries 
of Social Affairs, Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, as well as a 
special anti-Mafia prosecutorial unit. Major lay and Catholic NGO's 
concerned with trafficking, among which Parsec and Caritas are the most 
active, cooperate with this body.
    While most prostitution involves women fleeing economic destitution 
in their home countries, those who are trafficked forcibly are often 
unable or reluctant to contact the police for help. A 1998 immigration 
law, for which implementing regulations were completed in November 1999 
and assistance programs established in February, provided temporary 
residence/work permits to such women who seek to escape their 
exploiters. The legislation permits a temporary stay for victimized 
women. During this time, victims are provided with shelter, benefits, 
and services such as counseling and medical assistance, in cooperation 
with NGO's. They also may be permitted to work or study. If the victim 
agrees to cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities, the 
residence permit and services are extended for the length of the 
criminal proceedings. In July the Government set up a toll-free 
telephone number to help victims take advantage of this program and in 
its first month of operation received 7,000 calls for help. As a result 
of these and related policies, almost 750 women were able to benefit 
from these programs in their first weeks of operation, and significant 
increases in witness testimony and successful prosecution of 
traffickers were reported. In October the Ministry of the Interior 
hosted an international conference on trafficking in persons to focus 
attention on the issue.
    In August 1998, a law was passed to combat abuses against children, 
including trafficking in children. The NGO, End Child Prostitution, 
Pornography and Trafficking (ECPAT), was a main advocate for this law, 
which criminalizes prostitution or pornography involving minors, even 
if committed abroad. In conjunction with other concerned NGO's, ECPAT 
has worked to ensure that police treat juvenile prostitutes as victims 
of trafficking, not criminals. In May ECPAT and components of the 
tourism industry (tour companies, travel agents, computer reservation 
system personnel, airline companies, airport authorities, and trade 
unions) initiated a voluntary code of conduct designed to impede sex 
tourism.
                               __________

                               KAZAKHSTAN

    The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the 
presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant political 
figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a referendum marred by 
irregularities, permits the President to dominate the legislature and 
judiciary, as well as regional and local governments; changes or 
amendments to the Constitution are nearly impossible without the 
President's consent. President Nazarbayev was elected to a new 7-year 
term in a 1999 election that fell far short of international standards. 
Previous presidential elections originally scheduled for 1996 did not 
take place, as President Nazarbayev's term in office was extended in a 
separate 1995 referendum, also marred by irregularities. Parliamentary 
elections held in October 1999 were an improvement on the presidential 
election but still fell short of the country's commitments as a member 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
    A law passed in June would allow the President to maintain certain 
policy prerogatives and a seat on the National Security Council after 
he leaves office. The 1995 Constitution limited Parliament's powers 
more than previously, notably by precluding it from appropriating state 
money or lowering taxes without executive branch approval. However, 
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) have the right to introduce legislation, 
and some bills introduced by M.P.'s have become laws. The judiciary 
remained under the control of the President and the executive branch. 
The lack of an independent judiciary made it difficult to root out 
governmental corruption, which was pervasive, although some corrupt 
officials were removed from office.
    The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the 
Soviet-era Committee on State Security (KGB)) is responsible for 
national security, intelligence, and counterintelligence. In practice 
it also plays a role in law enforcement. It also oversees the external 
intelligence service, Barlau. The chairman of the KNB reports directly 
to the Prime Minister and President. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD) supervises the criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely 
believed to be corrupt. Both the KNB and the MVD police monitored 
government opponents, the opposition press, human rights monitors, and 
some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), who claimed that KNB and 
MVD officials pressured them to limit activities objectionable to the 
Government. The KNB continued efforts to improve its public image by 
focusing on fighting government corruption, religious extremism, 
terrorism, illegal arms exports, and organized crime. Members of the 
security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The country is rich in natural resources, particularly petroleum 
and minerals. The Government has made significant progress toward a 
market-based economy since independence. It has successfully privatized 
small- and medium-sized firms and many large-scale industrial complexes 
and has attracted significant foreign investment, primarily to the 
energy and minerals sectors. The agricultural sector, which represents 
about 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), has been slower to 
reform since the Government has not established a legal basis for 
private land ownership. Official statistics indicate that the long fall 
in real wages after independence stopped in 1997. The average annual 
wage in 1999 was approximately $1,180 (167,560 tenge). The average 
monthly nominal wage in 2000 was $95.14 (13,521 tenge). Real wages grew 
5.3 percent in 2000 over 1999 figures. According to government data, in 
the first 3 quarters of the year approximately 25.5 percent of the 
population had incomes below the ``minimum subsistence level'' of $27 
(3,969 tenge) per month, compared with 34.5 percent whose incomes were 
below the 1999 minimum subsistence level of $24 (3,394 tenge) per 
month.
    Rising oil prices in the second half of 1999 combined with the 
positive effects of an April 1999 decision to allow the currency to 
float helped the country to post GDP growth of 1.7 percent in 1999, 
after a 2.5 percent fall in GDP the previous year. GDP per capita also 
increased slightly to $1066 (127,000 tenge). Inflation, which initially 
spiked after the currency fell following the April 1999 decision to 
float the currency, has been under control and was 9.8 percent in 2000. 
Real GDP grew by 9.5 percent.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The 
Government severely limits citizens' right to change their government, 
and democratic institutions remain weak. The OSCE concluded that 
presidential elections in January 1999 fell far short of international 
standards, although it saw some improvement in the Parliamentary 
elections held later in the year. The Government barred two opposition 
politicians from competing in the presidential elections on 
administrative grounds and authorities harassed opposition candidates 
during both election campaigns. During the year, government officials 
began a series of conferences on electoral reform with opposition 
leaders and others under the auspices of the OSCE, although the Central 
Elections Commission moved to effect electoral commission changes 
before waiting for the conclusion of the conferences. The legal 
structure, including the Constitution adopted in 1995, does not fully 
safeguard human rights. Members of the security forces committed 
extrajudicial killings as a result of abuse of military conscripts and, 
reportedly, through mistreatment of individuals in custody. President 
Nazarbayev spoke out against police use of torture, and there were a 
number of cases in which the Government pressed criminal charges 
against police accused of mistreating individuals in their custody. 
However, human rights monitors criticized the efforts as inadequate. 
Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government began a process of 
transferring authority over prisons from the MVD to the Justice 
Ministry, a step that human rights monitors had long sought, but the 
effect of this change could not be determined as of year's end. The 
Government on some occasions used arbitrary arrest and detention, and 
prolonged detention is a problem. The judiciary remains under the 
control of the President and the executive branch, and corruption is 
deeply rooted. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. The 
Government harassed much of the opposition media, and government 
efforts to restrain the independent media continued. Vague laws 
concerning the media, state secrets, libel, and national security 
increased pressure on the media to practice self-censorship. The 
Government introduced draft amendments to the Law on Media in October 
that, if enacted, would constitute a step backward for the independent 
media. However, the Government continued to issue new licenses for 
various types of media and, according to the Government, the number of 
media outlets increased. The Government continued to own some major 
printing and distribution facilities and to enjoy influence over those 
owned privately. Academic freedom is not respected. The Government 
imposes significant restrictions on freedom of assembly. At least two 
organizers of unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested and fined or 
imprisoned. The Government imposes significant restrictions on freedom 
of association, and complicated and cumbersome registration 
requirements hinder organizations and political parties. Some political 
parties increased their organizational activities successfully. The 
Government sometimes harasses those whom it regards as religious 
extremists. Domestic violence against women remained a serious problem. 
There was discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic 
minorities. The Government discriminated in favor of ethnic Kazakhs. 
The Government limited worker rights; it tried to limit the influence 
of independent trade unions, both directly and through its support for 
state-sponsored unions, and members of independent trade unions were 
harassed. Workers continued to protest chronic nonpayment of wages. 
Child labor persists in agricultural areas. There was evidence of 
trafficking in women and in at least one case customs and border 
officials were under investigation for complicity in trafficking.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings.
    Members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings as 
a result of abuse of military conscripts and, reportedly, through 
mistreatment of individuals in custody.
    In July 28-year-old Kairat Sabdenov, the son of an M.P., died from 
internal injuries that he sustained from a police beating in Kokshetau 
after he had been detained following a car accident. In December police 
charged the policeman who allegedly beat Sabdenov with murder. Five 
policemen were charged with improper performance of their duties and 
one from the Akmola Oblast MVD was relieved of his post for 
investigating the accident scene improperly.
    Ivan Prokopenko died in a detention center in Aktobe on March 1. He 
had been arrested 2 months earlier on suspicion of having stolen $250 
(36,750 tenge) worth of wooden poles. Human rights monitors reported 
that a doctor who examined the body and the boy's parents saw evidence 
of brain trauma, burns, and cuts. The Aktobe city prosecutor found in 
October that Prokopenko had died from head injuries suffered when he 
slipped and fell, hitting his head on the concrete floor. The 
authorities indicated that their investigation had found no other 
injuries and they closed the case.
    In April a man named Bekov died in a hospital from injuries he had 
said he sustained when police in Almaty detained and beat him. An 
official investigation was launched, but no further information was 
available at year's end.
    According to press reports, a criminal case was brought against a 
police sergeant in Makhtaaralsk (Shymkent Oblast) for the 1999 beating 
death of a 24-year-old man, Nurzhan Saparov, who was in custody 
following his arrest for disturbing the peace. At year's end, 
reportedly four police officers were awaiting trial charged with 
responsibility for his death.
    On December 1, a District court fined Lieutenant Colonel 
Zhanteleyev 2 month's wages in the 1998 death of Yalkynzhan Yakupov, 
whose body was found hanging in the Chunjua District police station. 
However, the court dismissed the charges of abuse of power and illegal 
detention against the Colonel. Zhanteleyev was amnestied under the 
December 2000 general amnesty.
    Reports indicate that deaths caused by military hazing persist. The 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff reported 17 cases of death due to 
mistreatment in the first 6 months of 1998. No statistics on the 
incidence of this form of mistreatment have been available since that 
time. However, there are some reports that military personnel engaging 
in hazing have been prosecuted, and the Government has begun a program 
to improve training of military forces on social and legal issues. (See 
Section 1.c.)
    Harsh prison conditions led to the deaths of some persons in 
custody, many from disease (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one must be subject to 
torture, violence or other treatment and punishment that is cruel or 
humiliating to human dignity;'' however, police tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused detainees, often in order to obtain confessions. 
Government officials acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and 
undertook some efforts to combat it. There were no reports of police 
beating protestors as they have done in earlier years. In a speech to 
law enforcement officials on April 19, President Nazarbayev criticized 
police use of an ``arsenal of torture (that) can surprise the most 
extreme sadists.'' President Nazarbayev referred in his speech to cases 
where law enforcement officials seared one detainee with a hot iron and 
poured cold water over another as he stood naked outside in cold 
weather. He said that the use of such tactics was ``widespread.'' 
Prosecutors brought criminal charges against 70 police officers for the 
unlawful use of violence against citizens during the year and 
disciplinary actions were taken against hundreds more. More than 20 
Interior Ministry (MVD) employees reportedly were convicted on such 
charges. Human rights observers believe that these cases cover only a 
small fraction of the incidents of police abuse of detainees, which 
they characterized as routine. Training standards and pay for police 
are very low, and individual law enforcement officials often are 
supervised poorly.
    Some of the instances of mistreatment occur in prisons, and the 
Government formally transferred authority over prisons from the 
Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry in a move intended to reduce 
such abuses. The actual transfer of authority will be implemented over 
a period of 2 years. In March 2000, the MVD opened a training center 
for penitentiary system employees in Pavlodar. Together with the OSCE 
and Prison Reform International (PRI) the Government has undertaken 
training abroad for 15 instructors from this new institute to review 
penal policies, including human rights of prisoners.
    On April 26, three teenagers widely believed to have been tortured 
in detention slit their throats in a Zhanatas courtroom after being 
sentenced to prison terms for fighting with police. One of the 3, 17-
year-old Kairat Seidakhmetov, died from the self-inflicted injury. The 
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights (KIBHR) and 
independent television stations charged that police repeatedly tortured 
these 3 boys and the 17 other individuals charged in the same case. One 
reportedly suffered a concussion and two broken arms. Police reportedly 
cut the feet of another and stuck needles under the fingertips of 
detainees under interrogation. One female detainee charged that police 
repeatedly raped her. The detainees, some of whom confessed, reportedly 
had no access to lawyers. Reports of the mistreatment led to 
demonstrations in Zhanatas in February and again in April following 
Seidakhmetov's suicide. The July 4 edition of the official 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper reported that the Chief of the Legal 
Bureau of the Presidential Administration visited Zhanatas to 
investigate the allegations of police torture. The head of the city 
police force was fired and other MVD employees reprimanded, but 
criminal charges brought against the policemen involved in the case 
were later dropped.
    Almaty authorities brought criminal charges against two policemen 
for beating opposition activist Aleksei Martynov in custody in December 
1999. A trial began in August but had not been concluded at year's end. 
No arrests were made in connection with the assault against opposition 
activist Andrei Grishin in November 1999, shortly after he published a 
newspaper article critical of a new museum dedicated to President 
Nazarbayev. Law enforcement authorities claimed that Grishin never 
filed a complaint. Grishin said he filed a complaint with the Almaty 
city prosecutor's office in December 1999 and was subsequently 
interviewed by an Interior Ministry official in January. The 
authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat 70 
members of an Islamic group from Taraz whom they detained in July 1999. 
The authorities took no actions against police accused of beating a 
group of female hunger strikers in Aralsk in April 1999. Police closed 
investigations, without making arrests, into 1998 assaults against 
opposition activist Amirzhan Kosanov and a Kazakhstani employee of a 
foreign embassy. The latter assisted diplomats in making contacts with 
opposition and human rights figures. Police detained a suspect in 
connection with the 1998 assault against opposition activist Yelena 
Nikitenko but did not bring charges, according to official sources, 
because Nikitenko, who moved away from Kazakhstan, was unavailable to 
testify.
    Six unidentified men assaulted Sergey Bondartsev, a youth organizer 
for the opposition Republican National People's Party (RNPK), in Almaty 
on April 9. Bondartsev suffered serious internal injuries that required 
two operations. At the time of the assault, Bondartsev was organizing a 
demonstration in support of opposition figure Madel Ismailov, who had 
earlier in the week been sentenced to a jail term (see Section l.d.). 
The demonstration did not take place. Law enforcement authorities made 
no arrests in the case, claiming that Bondartsev had never filed a 
complaint. Bondartsev asserted that he filed a complaint and that 
police from the Medeu district of Almaty interviewed him about the 
assault while he was in the hospital. The attack clearly appeared to 
have been premeditated.
    MVD and other government officials participated in a September 
conference in Almaty on combating police use of torture that was 
organized by the OSCE, the KIBHR and the Government of Germany. They 
acknowledged that police use of torture and other abuses were 
widespread.
    Army personnel continued to subject conscripts to brutal hazing, 
including beatings and verbal abuse. No statistics were available on 
the extent of the problem. The Army launched a campaign to punish 
violators of a new antihazing policy in 1998, and the Government has 
taken action occasionally against officials charged with abuses, often 
levying administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty. 
A military court in Zhambul region sentenced a sergeant to death by 
firing squad in December. The court ruled the man was guilty of killing 
two persons and of desertion to avoid responsibility for beating up a 
soldier under him.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening due 
to inadequate resources. In 1998, 1,290 inmates, more than 1 percent of 
all prisoners, died from disease, mostly tuberculosis, aggravated by 
harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions and inadequate 
medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). In 2000, 498 prisoners died in 
custody. More than 200 of these deaths were due to illness, mostly 
tuberculosis. Another 170 gravely ill prisoners died shortly after 
release from prison. Government officials indicate that improved 
treatment undertaken in cooperation with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) has reduced the deaths from tuberculosis. In 1999, 384 prisoners 
died of the disease in custody and 409 were released on humanitarian 
grounds due to illness and died at home (see Section 1.c.).
    Overcrowding, inadequate prison diet, and a lack of medical 
supplies and personnel contributed to the spread of tuberculosis and 
other major diseases. Government officials reported that l0,000, or 12 
percent of all, prisoners suffered from tuberculosis. Government 
representatives assert that the incidence of tuberculosis is declining, 
in part as a result of cooperation with WHO to improve conditions for 
both prisoners and the civilian population. These figures do not differ 
significantly from figures provided by human rights observers. The 
Government's senior prisons official acknowledged that the number of 
prisoners with AIDS is growing. The number infected reportedly grew 
from 256 in 1999 to 263 in 2000, although the authorities maintain that 
the prisoners were infected before being incarcerated. Experts believe, 
however, that many cases go unreported. Prison guards, who are poorly 
paid, steal food and medicines intended for prisoners. Violent crime 
among prisoners is common. Prisoners protested poor living conditions 
in prison through mass self-mutilation. According to the official 
press, 44 prisoners in Arkalyk reportedly cut open their abdomens on 
July 13. Some 57 prisoners in an Almaty Juvenile Detention Center cut 
open their abdomens and wrists on August 11. None of the prisoners 
died. The deputy head of the Arkalyk prison and the head and deputy 
head of the Almaty juvenile facility were fired as a result of these 
incidents.
    According to the Interior Ministry, during the year there were 
approximately 80,000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 60,000. A 
1999 amnesty reduced the total prison population by about 15,000, but 
the population nearly returned to pre-amnesty levels within a year. The 
chief national prosecutor deplored overcrowded conditions in an Astana 
detention center he visited in March, noting that cells of 200 square 
feet contained 20 detainees each. He reportedly ordered the release of 
several of the detainees.
    The Government followed up its 1999 general prison amnesty in 
December with a law to provide amnesty in the first 6 months of 2001 
for 18,200 inmates, shorten the terms of an additional 2,500, and 
terminate approximately 3,000 pending criminal cases. The 1999 amnesty 
resulted in the release of over 15,000 prisoners. Prisoners are allowed 
one 4-hour visit every 3 months, but additional visits may be granted 
in emergency situations. Some prisoners are eligible for 3-day visits 
with close relatives once every 6 months. Juveniles are kept in 
separate facilities.
    Although there is no known statutory requirement, human rights 
monitors and journalists wishing to visit prisons must receive 
authorization from the MVD. Although the Government sometimes created 
obstacles for those who requested access to prisons, the KIBHR reported 
that its representatives sometimes, but not always, received 
authorization. The KIBHR visited men's, women's, and juveniles' prisons 
during the year. Prison experts from the OSCE visited prisons in Akmola 
and East Kazakhstan oblasts. Two international NGO's, the Dutch 
Interchurch Aid and Penal Reform International (PRI), accompanied KIBHR 
on prison visits in Pavlodar during the year. PRI also visited prisons 
for juveniles and women in Almaty. On September 6, the Minister of 
Justice announced that the Government had decided to transfer 
responsibility for prisons from the Ministry of the Interior to the 
Ministry of Justice. Human rights monitors had called for the change, 
which President Nazarbayev endorsed in a September 1 address to 
Parliament.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government used 
minor infractions of the law frequently related to unsanctioned 
assembly to arrest and detain government opponents (see also Section 
2.b.). On April 6, authorities in Almaty arrested, tried, and convicted 
labor movement leader Madel Ismailov for organizing an unsanctioned 
demonstration and for contempt of court. The Court sentenced Ismailov 
to 15 days in jail. Ismailov served a 1-year prison sentence in 1998-99 
for publicly calling the President a ``scoundrel.'' The demonstration 
in question, a regular monthly pensioners' protest over living 
conditions, took place on January 30. The contempt of court charge 
stemmed from Ismailov's refusal to answer a summons to appear in court 
on April 5. Ismailov went to the courthouse on April 5 but refused to 
enter when, he and press reports alleged, the authorities refused to 
allow his lawyer or supporters to enter with him.
    A court in Almaty on April 24 sentenced two members of the 
opposition Republican National People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK), 
Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev, to 3+ years in prison for a 
weapons offense. An appeals court upheld the convictions. Afanasenko 
and Ibrayev, former KNB officers, served as bodyguards to RNPK leader 
Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Although it appeared there could be a factual 
basis for the charges against Afanasenko and Ibrayev, the OSCE and 
international and domestic human rights observers charged that 
government prosecution and sentencing of them was politically 
motivated. Some human rights observers also criticized the authorities 
for incarcerating Afanasenko and Ibrayev in ordinary prisons rather 
than in special institutions created to protect former members of the 
security forces from possible retribution by other prisoners.
    A member of the RNPK, film director Rashid Nugmanov, a long-time 
resident of France, was detained by customs and tax officials upon 
arriving on an international flight to Almaty on May 24 and summoned to 
appear before the tax police on May 25. His brother, Murat, an Almaty 
businessman, was also summoned by tax authorities on May 24. Details of 
the investigation were unclear. RNPK and human rights observers alleged 
that the investigation of Rashid Nugmanov was motivated politically.
    The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and 
an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in 
Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass 
gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
    The law sanctions pretrial detention. According to the 
Constitution, police may hold a detainee for 72 hours before bringing 
charges. The Criminal Code allows continued detention for much longer 
periods with the approval of the General Prosecutor of the Republic. 
Lower-ranking prosecutors may approve interim extensions of detention. 
In practice police routinely hold detainees, with the sanction of a 
prosecutor, for weeks or even months without bringing charges, and 
prolonged detention is a serious problem. The General Prosecutor's 
office was reported in the official Russian-language newspaper 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda as stating that law enforcement authorities held 
more than 7,000 persons in custody longer than legally allowed in 1998. 
Government officials have subsequently denied this, but no other 
statistics concerning the scale of this practice have been made 
available. Additionally, short (3hour) and long (72-hour) detentions 
for ``suspicion'' are used widely.
    A bail system exists, but government officials indicate that only 
47 persons were released on bail in the first 8 months of the year (no 
figure for total detainees was available, but 28 persons were released 
on bail out of the 26,598 persons detained in the first 8 months of 
1999).
    According to the Constitution, every person detained, arrested, or 
accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a 
defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation. 
This right generally is respected in practice. Human rights monitors 
allege that law enforcement officials have pressured prisoners to use 
certain attorneys or to refuse the assistance of an attorney, sometimes 
resulting in a delay before the accused sees a lawyer. Detainees also 
may appeal the legality of detention or arrest to the prosecutor before 
trial, but in practice most persons refrain from making an appeal due 
to fear of reprisal for doing so. If the defendant cannot afford an 
attorney, the Constitution provides that the State must provide one 
free of charge. Human rights organizations allege that many prisoners 
are unaware of this provision of the law. The Government's reluctance 
to provide a lawyer is partly attributed to a shortage of funds to pay 
court-appointed lawyers to which defendants are entitled. Some lawyers 
are reluctant to defend clients unpopular with the Government.
    Almaty authorities detained well-known criminal defense lawyer 
Anatoly Ginzburg for 3 days in July after Ginzburg agreed to defend a 
man charged in a high-profile murder case. Ginzburg remained under 
investigation for allegedly stealing documents from the MVD in 1994, 
although no charges were filed. According to one press report, Ginzburg 
had been warned by ``the authorities'' not to defend Anatoly Adamov, 
the former deputy director of the national arms export agency, 
Kazspetsexport, in connection with the April 15 murder of 
Kazspetsexport director Talgat Ibrayev. Ginzburg and human rights 
monitors alleged that the authorities detained Ginzburg in order to 
dissuade him from defending Adamov. In July the Union of Lawyers of 
Kazakhstan sent an open letter to the heads of the national law 
enforcement agencies to protest the Ginzburg case and a ``universal'' 
pattern of abuse of the rights of criminal defense lawyers. The letter 
charged that law enforcement authorities infringe on the rights of 
lawyers to meet confidentially, and as often as necessary, with 
defendants; deny lawyers access to government buildings, including the 
courts; search the lawyers' belongings when allowing them to enter; and 
surreptitiously record lawyers' conversations with clients. In response 
to the letter, the Coordinating Council of the National Law Enforcement 
Agencies, under the chairmanship of the Prosecutor General, passed a 
resolution in August calling on the agencies to abide by the law and, 
where necessary, to draft new statutes guaranteeing that lawyers can 
effectively do their work. However, a representative of the local 
lawyer's association maintained that the Government had not passed any 
statutes facilitating lawyers' work by year's end.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does 
not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Government interference and 
pressure compromised the court system's independence throughout the 
year--a situation based largely on legislative, administrative and 
Constitutional arrangements that in practice subjugate the judiciary to 
the executive branch of government. A presidential decree signed in 
September sought to lessen executive branch control of the judiciary by 
moving responsibility for the courts' administrative support from the 
justice ministry to the Supreme Court, though its ultimate impact 
remained uncertain.
    There are three levels in the court system: Local; oblast 
(provincial); and the Supreme Court. According to the Constitution, the 
President proposes to the upper house of Parliament (the Senate) 
nominees for the Supreme Court. (Nominees are recommended by the 
Supreme Judicial Council, members of which include the chairperson of 
the Constitutional Council, the chairperson of the Supreme Court, the 
Prosecutor General, the Minister of Justice, Senators, judges, and 
other persons appointed by the President.) The President appoints 
oblast judges (nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council) and local 
level judges from a list presented by the Ministry of Justice. The list 
is based on recommendations from the Qualification Collegium of 
Justice, an institution made up of deputies from the lower house of 
Parliament (the Majilis), judges, public prosecutors, legal experts, 
and Ministry of Justice officials. Under a change introduced in 
December, the President appoints the collegium chairman.
    According to legislation passed in December 1996, judges are 
appointed for life, although in practice this means until mandatory 
retirement at age 65. Under a 1995 presidential decree on the courts 
and the status of judges, the President can remove judges, except 
members of the Supreme Court or chairmen of judicial collegia, upon 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. (The Minister's 
recommendations must in turn be based on findings by either the Supreme 
Judicial Council or Qualification Collegium of Justice that the judge 
failed to, or was no longer capable of, performing his duties.) The 
President can request, based on recommendations from the Supreme 
Judicial Council, that the Senate remove members of the Supreme Court 
or chairmen of judicial collegia.
    The 1995 Constitution abolished the Constitutional Court and 
established a Constitutional Council. The Council rules on election and 
referendum challenges, interprets the Constitution, and determines the 
constitutionality of laws adopted by Parliament. The President directly 
appoints three of its seven members, including the chairman, and has 
the right of veto over Council decisions. The Council can overturn a 
presidential veto if at least two-thirds, or five, of its members vote 
to do so. At least one presidential appointee must therefore vote to 
overturn the President's veto in order for the Council to overrule the 
President. Citizens do not have the right to appeal to the Council 
about the constitutionality of government actions, although they were 
allowed to make such appeals to the former Constitutional Court. Under 
the Constitution, only the President, chairperson of the Senate, 
chairperson of the Majilis, Prime Minister, one-fifth of the members of 
Parliament or a court of law may appeal to the Constitutional Council. 
The Constitution states that a court shall appeal to the Council if it 
``finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application 
undermined the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen.''
    Local courts try less serious crimes, such as petty theft and 
vandalism. Oblast courts handle more serious crimes, such as murder, 
grand theft, and organized criminal activities. The oblast courts also 
may handle cases in rural areas where no local courts are organized. 
Judgments of the local courts may be appealed to the oblast-level 
courts, while those of the oblast courts may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. There is also a military court.
    The Constitution and the law establish the necessary procedures for 
a fair trial. Trials are public, with the exception of instances in 
which an open hearing could result in state secrets being divulged, or 
when the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen must be 
protected.
    According to the Constitution, defendants have the right to be 
present, the right to counsel (at public expense if needed), and the 
right to be heard in court and call witnesses for the defense. 
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, are protected from self-
incrimination, and have the right to appeal a decision to a higher 
court. Legal proceedings are to be conducted in the state language, 
Kazakh, although Russian also may be used officially in the courts. 
Proceedings also may be held in the language of the majority of the 
population in a particular area. In most cases, these rights are 
respected. However, cases involving government opponents frequently are 
closed. Labor movement leader Madel Ismailov alleged that the Medeu 
district court in Almaty refused to allow the public to observe an 
administrative trial against him in April (see Section 1.d.).
    The problem of corruption is evident at every stage and level of 
the judicial process. Lawyers and human rights monitors alleged that 
judges, prosecutors or other officials solicit bribes in exchange for 
favorable rulings in nearly all criminal cases. Judges are poorly paid. 
According to the Minister of Interior, in 2000 the Government dismissed 
613 MVD officers and initiated criminal proceedings against 105 for 
corruption related crimes. The Prosecutor General stated that 9 senior 
prosecutors, 8 district prosecutors and 3 department heads had been 
fired for similar offenses. The Ministries of Justice and Internal 
Affairs have received additional funding to increase salaries for law 
enforcement agents and judges. Human rights monitors allege that these 
government actions only scratch the surface of the problem. According 
to press and other accounts, judicial positions can be purchased.
    There were no political prisoners. However, opposition and human 
rights activists charged that the prosecution and imprisonment of Pyotr 
Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev was politically motivated (see Section 
1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Despite Constitutional protections, the Government 
infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that citizens have 
the right to ``confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, 
correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other 
messages.'' However, limitation of this right is allowed ``in cases and 
according to procedures directly established by law.'' The KNB and 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the concurrence of the general 
prosecutor's office, can and do interfere with citizens' privacy and 
correspondence. The Criminal Procedure Code allows the police and KNB 
to conduct searches or monitor telephone calls and mail without a 
warrant if they inform the General Prosecutor's office within 24 hours 
of such activity. Some government opponents complained that the 
Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
    A central, state-run billing center for telecommunications services 
opened during the year. Few companies complied with government 
requirements to route their services through the center; those that did 
comply routed service only for the city of Almaty through the center. 
The Government presented the creation of the center as an attempt to 
ensure that all telecommunications traffic was being taxed properly. 
NGO's, opposition figures, and human rights monitors expressed concern 
that the Government would use the center to enhance its ability to 
monitor telecommunications and control the availability of information 
on the Internet. Government officials denied that this was their 
intent. As of year's end there was no effort to systematically block 
access to web sites. However, clients of the two largest Internet 
providers, Kazakhtelecom and Nursat, were blocked from direct access to 
the opposition Evrasia website from September 15 to October 15. They 
still could access the site through proxy servers. Users of other 
Internet services could access the site without difficulty.
    A 1999 decree that would have required telecommunications companies 
to conform their equipment to KNB standards was repealed on May 22. 
Human rights monitors and many potentially affected companies had 
sharply criticized the decree.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1999 press 
and media law provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, 
the Government restricted these freedoms in practice. The Government 
harassed independent and opposition media, and as a consequence many 
journalists practiced self-censorship.
    The media law reaffirms the Constitutional provision for free 
speech and prohibits censorship; however, the Government takes 
advantage of the law's vague language effectively to restrict media 
freedom. For example the law prohibits the mass media from 
``undermining state security'' or advocating ``class, social, race, 
national, or religious superiority'' or ``a cult of cruelty and 
violence.'' Under the law, owners, editors, distributors, and 
journalists can be held responsible for violations. The law also 
requires all media to register with the Government, but it does not set 
forth an appeals process, other than through the courts, if 
registration is denied. A vaguely written 1998 law on national security 
similarly restrains media freedom. It gives the Prosecutor General the 
authority to suspend the activity of news media that undermine national 
security. A 1999 state secrets law established a list of government 
secrets the release of which is proscribed in the Criminal Code. Much 
of the information on the expansive list was vaguely defined and 
thereby likely to inspire media self-censorship. The law defines, for 
example, certain foreign policy information as secret if ``disclosure 
of this information might lead to diplomatic complications for one of 
the parties.'' The list of state secrets enumerated in the law also 
included all information about the health and private life of the 
President and his family. Also defined as state secrets was basic 
economic information such as the volumes and scientific characteristics 
of national mineral reserves and the amount of government debt owed to 
foreign creditors.
    In an April 19 speech to law enforcement officials, the President 
called for the verification of mass media compliance with the media and 
national security laws and how the media are financed. The President 
sharply criticized much of the national mass media, including the 
Khabar state television channel, which is operated by his eldest 
daughter. He accused Khabar of tendentious reporting; he accused other 
unnamed media outlets of ``inciting national strife, insulting the 
dignity of the people, coming out against the Constitutional system 
(and) disparaging their country.'' Consistent with public assurances on 
April 24 by the Minister of Culture, Information, and Social Accord 
that the President's speech did not presage a crackdown on the media, 
government policy toward the media did not appear to change after the 
President's speech. However, human rights monitors charged that the 
tone of the President's speech reinforced a climate of media self-
censorship and law enforcement harassment of the media. Nonetheless, 
new licenses for media of various forms continued to be issued and, 
according to the Government, the number of media outlets in the country 
increased.
    In October the Government introduced draft amendments to the media 
law that would limit foreign media rebroadcasters to per cent of a 
station's total air time, hold media outlets responsible for the 
accuracy of foreign media they rebroadcast, and force websites to 
register as media outlets. Journalists and NGO's charged that the draft 
law would infringe freedom of speech.
    The Government continued to be in a strong position to influence 
most printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals, 
including many that supposedly were independent. Although publications 
expressing views independent of the Government continued to publish, 
the Government took measures to punish publications that reported 
certain undesirable stories and harassed two publications that were 
affiliated with one of the opposition parties, measures taken with the 
evident intention of intimidating certain media critics. These actions 
and the resulting widespread belief that the Government was cracking 
down on independent media effectively resulted in widespread media 
self-censorship. In January a court in Ust-Kamenogorsk ordered the 
local HBC-Press newspaper to suspend publication for 3 months. The 
court found, and an appeals court subsequently upheld, that the 
newspaper had violated the media law by publishing an article calling 
for the overthrow of the country's constitutional system. The article 
in question contained a public appeal from the leader of a Russian 
nationalist group arrested in November 1999 for plotting to overthrow 
the local government in Ust-Kamenogorsk. The newspaper had received a 
copy of the appeal at a news conference attended by other local media. 
The editor of HBC-Press asserted that representatives of the KNB at the 
press conference did not warn journalists not to publish the press 
release. HBC-Press went out of business without resuming publication 
after the court-ordered suspension.
    The key subject considered ``off limits'' by journalists was 
personal criticism of the President and his family. Most newspapers did 
not present the story, widely reported in the western press, about 
alleged American and Swiss investigations into possible illicit 
payments by a foreign businessman to President Nazarbayev and two 
former Prime Ministers. However, The Globe, a small-circulation 
Russian-English bilingual newspaper based in Almaty, dedicated most of 
one edition to the subject. Law enforcement authorities visited the 
newspaper's office on the day the issue appeared, July 6, to summon its 
publisher for questioning. The visit appeared to be in response to the 
content of the July 6 edition, although government officials 
characterized the visit as a routine tax inspection. The Globe stopped 
printing for a month after refusing, its management claimed, to agree 
to a request from its government-owned publishing house to refrain from 
including such controversial material. About 1 month after resuming 
publication, the newspaper announced that the publishing house would no 
longer print the newspaper following inclusion of an article critical 
of the Prime Minster. However, the newspaper continued to publish, and 
no charges were brought against the publisher, who remained abroad.
    The Government took steps that inhibited the publication and 
distribution of newspapers affiliated with the opposition. The tax 
police temporarily seized newspapers during investigations of various 
printing houses; they were later returned. Government actions appeared 
to focus in particular on two newspapers associated with RNPK, the 
party of former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Twenty-First 
Century (XXI VEK) and SolDat. Both newspapers had difficulty finding 
printing houses willing to publish them, resulting in several missed 
editions. Twenty-First Century finally purchased its own small printing 
machine but on December 27 unknown individuals allegedly broke into 
their offices and short-circuited the machine. Customs officials seized 
a run of Soldat newspaper when the editors tried to bring it across the 
border from Russia. These papers were also later returned. SolDat also 
attempted to print in the Kyrgiz Republic twice during the year, but 
both runs were confiscated by customs at the border. However, both 
newspapers continued to appear during the year.
    The KNB reportedly was investigating SolDat and its editor in 
chief, Yermurat Bapi, in connection with a complaint that the newspaper 
insulted the honor and dignity of the President, an offense proscribed 
in the Criminal Code. The complaint arose from two articles in the 
newspaper's June 22 edition that reported corruption allegations 
against the President. The articles were purportedly reprints from 
Western publications.
    In June a government-run publishing house refused to continue 
printing SolDat. The Ministry of Agriculture publishing house had been 
printing the newspaper for 8 months. The chief of the publishing house 
told journalists that he acted because the newspaper's editors failed 
to meet unspecified contractual obligations. The management of SolDat 
denied the charge. After SolDat subsequently began publishing in 
Russia, its management claimed that customs officials at a border 
crossing point near Semipalatinsk seized an entire print run of the 
newspaper on July 5. Editor in chief Bapi, who was transporting the 
newspapers, said that customs officials justified the action because 
Bapi misstated the number of newspaper bundles he was transporting. 
SolDat management publicly charged that officials seized the newspaper 
because it contained articles critical of President Nazarbayev on the 
occasion of his 60th birthday. Twenty-First Century continued to have 
difficulty finding printing houses willing to publish it, though it 
managed to circulate with inferior print quality. On April 27, the tax 
police in Almaty seized an entire print run of the newspaper at a 
publishing house because of alleged tax violations by the printer. 
Government authorities said that the seizure was directed at the 
printer, not the newspaper.
    The independent newspaper Nachnyem's Ponedelnika, which specializes 
in investigative articles about government corruption, continued to 
face a number of defamation lawsuits, many from government officials. 
After finding in favor of a defamation suit brought by the association 
of judges, a court in Almaty ordered the seizure of the newspaper's 
assets, along with the personal assets of its founder and executive 
director, on May 24. Police confiscated the newspaper's print run, 
financial records, office equipment, and furniture, on the next day. In 
June a judge in Almaty fined Nachnyem's Ponedelnika $350,000 (50 
million tenge) for infringing on the name of another newspaper. The 
fine was reduced to $2,000 (290,000 tenge) by an appeals court in July. 
Management of Nachnyem's Ponedelnika alleged that these and other 
lawsuits against it were politically motivated and that prosecutors, 
the tax police, and the mayor of Almaty were harassing the newspaper. 
Government officials denied they were conducting a campaign against the 
newspaper, and maintained that reckless allegations in the newspaper 
were responsible for the spate of civil law suits against it.
    Government's influence over media outlets is extensive. According 
to government statistics, there were 1,258 mass media and information 
agencies in the country as of September 1, 76 percent of them privately 
owned. However the Government runs the newspapers that appear most 
frequently, five times a week, a number of privately owned media are 
believed to be controlled by members of the President's family, and 
many of those which are nominally independent, particularly Kazakh-
language print media, receive government subsidies. There are a number 
of newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example, 
Kazakhstan Science, which is published by the Ministry of Science. Each 
major population center has at least one independent weekly newspaper. 
There are 11 major independent newspapers in Almaty.
    The Government controls nearly all broadcast transmission 
facilities. There are 45 independent television and radio stations (17 
television stations, 15 radio stations, and 13 combined television and 
radio stations). Of these, 11 are in Almaty. There are only two 
government-owned, combined radio and television companies; however, 
they represent five channels and are the only stations that can 
broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies; 
however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local 
administrations to use the majority of these. An organization of 
electronic media, the Association of Independent Electronic Media of 
Central Asia (ANESMI), exists, but it is divided and weak.
    On March 31, the independent Almaty television channel 31 fired 
Tatiana Deltsova, the chief editor of its nightly news program, under 
what the station president publicly alleged was a government threat to 
close the station. The reported cause of Deltsova's dismissal was an 
article that she presented March 30 about vandals' attacks earlier that 
day on the homes of three leading Government opponents (see Section 
2.b.). Government officials reportedly had expressed their 
dissatisfaction previously with Deltsova's coverage of the opposition. 
At year's end, Deltsova was hosting a new news program on the 
television company TAN, an independent television station.
    There were no reports, as there were in 1998, that the Government 
threatened not to renew broadcast licenses of outoffavor independent 
stations. There were also no frequency auctions; many members of the 
independent media and human rights monitors believed that the 
Government used the auctions in the past to harass and even eliminate 
independent media.
    During the campaign for the January 1999 presidential election, 
many members of the independent media reported Government pressure not 
to cover opposition candidates. Media coverage of the campaign for the 
October 1999 parliamentary elections was extensive and featured all 
candidates. A nationally televised 2 + hour live debate on Khabar state 
television featured representatives of the nine registered parties that 
were participating in the party-list section of the vote. Despite these 
improvements over the presidential election, independent media around 
the country reported official pressure to give the majority of their 
parliamentary election coverage to the propresidential Otan party. They 
also reported that government authorities told them to limit coverage 
of, and to focus on negative news about, the RNPK and Azamat opposition 
parties, as well as the Orleu (``Progress'') opposition movement. Some 
television editors claimed that they were told categorically not to 
cover certain opposition candidates. An RNPK candidate, Twenty-First 
Century newspaper editor Bigeldy Gabdullin, charged, correctly, that 
his free broadcast was not shown in his home constituency of Talgar.
    The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the 
President, and the law against insulting the President and other 
officials remained on the books. The 1999 media law did not control, as 
did the earlier media law, advertising in the mass media. One law 
restricts alcohol and tobacco advertising on television. The 1999 media 
law prohibited violence and all ``pornography'' from television 
broadcasts.
    Academic freedom is circumscribed. As is the case for journalists, 
academics cannot violate certain taboos, such as criticizing the 
President and his family. During the presidential election campaign of 
1999, there were widespread credible reports that university and school 
administrators coerced faculty, students, and the parents of 
schoolchildren to sign nominating petitions for the reelection campaign 
of President Nazarbayev. Administrators reportedly pressured faculty to 
join the propresidential Otan party formed later in 1999. According to 
credible reports, authorities in Karaganda pressured the administration 
of the private Bolashak University to cancel a scheduled April 11 
lecture by a leading critic of the Government, political scientist 
Nurbulat Masanov. An MVD officer was reportedly fired in April for 
allowing Masanov to deliver a lecture at the MVD senior officers 
school. Masanov was unemployed since faculty at the state Al-Farabi 
University in Almaty voted in 1998 not to renew his contract, allegedly 
over his political views. Unknown vandals attacked Masanov's apartment, 
as well as those of two other opposition activists, in March (see 
Section 2.b.). Course topics and content generally are subject to 
approval by university administrations. There were reports that 
university students in private as well as state universities sometimes 
had to pay bribes for admission and good grades.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for peaceful assembly; however, the Government and the law 
impose significant restrictions. The 1998 law on national security 
defined as a threat to national security ``unsanctioned gatherings, 
public meetings, marches, demonstrations, illegal picketing, and 
strikes'' that upset social and political stability.
    Under the law, organizations must apply to the local authorities 
for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting at least 10 days 
in advance, or the activity is considered illegal. In some cases, local 
officials routinely issued necessary permits. However, opposition and 
human rights monitors complained that complicated procedures and the 
10-day notification period made it difficult for all groups to organize 
public meetings and demonstrations. They reported that local 
authorities, especially those outside the largest city, Almaty, turned 
down most applications for demonstrations in central locations. 
Officials in Almaty authorized a March 31 demonstration in the center 
of the city by members of the opposition RNPK, although party members 
alleged that the authorities were complicit in allowing students from 
Interior Ministry and olympic-games training schools to disrupt the 
event.
    In the early morning hours of the day preceding the demonstration, 
unknown persons vandalized the Almaty apartments of RNPK activists 
Nurbulat Masanov and Amirzhan Kosanov as well as of another well-known 
opposition figure, Seidakhmet Kuttykadam of the Orleu movement. The 
vandals cemented or jammed shut the apartment doors, cut electrical and 
telephone lines, painted threatening graffiti, and hurled a rock 
through a window into a bedroom where Kosanov's infant daughter was 
asleep. The three activists publicly charged that government agents 
working through the KNB were responsible for the crimes. Government 
officials denied the charge and suggested that the victims might have 
orchestrated the incidents to attract sympathy, a charge the activists 
denied. During the week following the incident, Kosanov received a 
series of messages threatening him and his family. Law enforcement 
investigations into the incidents were closed without arrests. On March 
31, the President of Almaty's independent Television-Radio Channel 31 
acting under what he said was government pressure, fired the station's 
news editor for including a report about the vandalism incidents on the 
nightly news (see Section 2.a.).
    There were numerous peaceful, unsanctioned demonstrations by 
workers and pensioners protesting difficult economic conditions and the 
nonpayment of wages. For the most part, law enforcement authorities did 
not interfere in the demonstrations or take action against the 
individuals who participated; however, there were some exceptions. In 
March a court in Astana sentenced a labor union leader to 24 hours in 
jail for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration by striking 
construction workers (see Section 6.a.). The authorities arrested well-
known government opponent Madel Ismailov (see Section 1.d.), who took 
part in the longstanding monthly pensioners' demonstrations in Almaty; 
other participants were not arrested. On April 20, the city court of 
Ust-Kamenogorsk suspended the activities of the local chapter of the 
Pokoleniye pensioners' movement for 3 months, charging that the group 
systematically carried out unsanctioned demonstrations. On December 13, 
the Bostandyk district court of Almaty found Sakhib Zhanabayeva guilty 
of organizing an unsanctioned mass gathering and sentenced her to 5 
days in jail. Zhanabayeva, an activist of the Kazakhstan Workers 
Movement, had taken part in a protest by pensioners on November 30.
    The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and 
an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in 
Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass 
gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
    The RNPK claimed that it was denied access to hotels and other 
venues in Almaty in May and June. Allegedly the Government had told 
hotels and other venues in Almaty not to provide their premises for 
meetings of political parties or movements.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government and the law impose significant restrictions on this right. 
Organizations that conduct public activities, hold public meetings, 
participate in conferences, or have bank accounts must be registered 
with the Government. ``Membership organizations,'' such as churches or 
political parties, must register in each of the 14 provinces where they 
have active members, whereas ``nonmembership organizations,'' such as 
NGOs, only register at the national level. Registration on the local 
level requires a minimum of 10 members and on the national level, a 
minimum of 10 members in at least 7 of the 14 oblasts. In addition a 
registration fee of $135 (19,845 tenge) is required, and most 
organizations must hire lawyers or other consultants to expidite their 
registrations through the bureaucracy. This increases the registration 
cost by approximately $200 (29,400 tenge). Some groups consider these 
costs to be a deterrent to registration.
    The Constitution prohibits political parties established on a 
religious basis. The Government has refused to register ethnically 
based political parties on the grounds that their activities could 
spark ethnic violence; however, the small Kazakh ethnic nationalist 
``Alash'' Party was registered for the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
The Constitution bans ``public associations"--including political 
parties--whose ``goals or actions are directed at a violent change of 
the Constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the republic, 
undermining of the security of the state (and), fanning of social, 
racial, national, religious, class, and tribal enmity.'' All of the 
major religious and ethnic groups have independently functioning 
cultural centers.
    To participate in elections, a political party must register with 
the Government. The Government registered 3 new parties in addition to 
the 10 registered to participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
At least three parties registered in 1999 were widely viewed as 
opponents of President Nazarbayev. Under current law, a party must 
submit a list of at least 3,000 members from a minimum of 9 oblasts. 
(The cities of Almaty and Astana count as oblast-equivalents in 
addition to the 14 oblasts for this purpose.) The list must provide 
personal information about members, including date and place of birth, 
address, and place of employment. For many citizens, the submission of 
such personal data to the Government is reminiscent of the tactics of 
the former Soviet KGB and inhibits them from joining parties. Under the 
law, members of unregistered parties may run for elected office as 
individuals but not as party members. The party affiliation of 
candidates does not appear on ballots for candidates in single-mandate 
parliamentary constituencies. Since the 1999 elections, 10 members of 
the lower house of Parliament (Majilis) are elected on the basis of 
proportional, party-list voting. Two registered opposition parties, 
Azamat and the RNPK, increased their organizational activities. They 
participated in training seminars, were active in public political 
debates, and held press conferences.
    The Minister of Internal Affairs rescinded in October a directive 
that MVD claimed gave law enforcement officers the right to attend any 
meetings of political parties and NGO's. This claim, to which human 
rights monitors and opposition party leaders had strongly objected, had 
been upheld by the Supreme Court in July. Authorities had first 
asserted this claim when they brought charges against Bigeldy 
Gabdullin, a leading figure in the opposition RNPK, for obstructing the 
work of a state organ. The charges arose from a December 1999 incident 
in which Gabdullin insisted that a senior MVD officer leave a meeting 
of RNPK officials at the RNPK office in Almaty. An Almaty court 
convicted Gabdullin on January 25 and fined him $35 (5,000 tenge). The 
conviction was upheld on appeal. The judge in the case said she based 
her decision on the presidential decree on the organization and conduct 
of peaceful meetings, rallies, pickets, and demonstrations, which 
authorizes law enforcement agents to attend certain public gatherings. 
However, Gabdullin's lawyer stressed that article 11 of the decree 
explicitly exempts indoor meetings of public associations, such as 
political parties, that are held in accordance with law and the group's 
charter.
    The Constitution prohibits foreign political parties and foreign 
trade unions from operating. In addition the Constitution prohibits the 
financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal 
entities and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the various denominations worship largely without 
government interference; however, the Government sometimes harasses 
Islamic and Christian groups whose members it regards as religious 
extremists. The Constitution defines the country as a ``secular'' 
state. The constitution also requires foreign religious associations to 
carry out their activities, including the appointment of the heads of 
religious associations, ``in coordination with appropriate state 
institutions.'' In general the Government does not interfere with the 
appointment of religious leaders or other activities of foreign 
religious associations, although foreign missionaries have encountered 
some visa problems.
    Religious organizations, including churches, must register with the 
Ministry of Justice in order to receive legal status. Without 
registration, religious organizations cannot buy or rent real property, 
hire employees, obtain visas for foreign missionaries, or engage in any 
other legal transactions. Although religious organizations, unlike 
other nongovernmental organizations, are entitled by law to carry out 
their activities without government registration, in practice many 
local officials insisted that they register and in a few instances, 
disrupted services by unregistered groups. Registration requires an 
application submitted by at least 10 persons and is usually a quick and 
simple process. Some religious groups out of favor with the Government 
have encountered difficulties registering in certain jurisdictions. 
These groups include Jehovah's Witnesses and some Korean Protestant 
groups, as well as Muslim groups independent of the Mufti (the national 
leader of Islam). Foreign missionaries require state accreditation. 
Witnesses reported continued difficulties with registration in 
Pavlodar, Osakarovka and Kzyl-Orda in 2000. One group of Jehovah's 
Witnesses in Petropavlovsk has attempted to register five times. They 
received four rejections and still have no answer to their latest, 
September 9, application. One human rights monitor asserted that the 
Government typically claims that religious groups' charters do not meet 
the requirements of the law. For example, Kazakhstani law does not 
allow religious groups to engage in educating children without 
education ministry approval, and many religions include education in 
their charters.
    A 1999 law on education forbids the activities of educational 
institutions, including religious schools, that have not been 
registered by the Ministry of Education. Although no religious schools 
are known to be registered, the Government apparently took no action 
against religious schools over registration pending full implementation 
of the law. On December 19, First Deputy Minister of Education Erlan 
Aryn sent a letter to all regional education departments rescinding an 
earlier ban on visits to schools by religious figures, humanitarian and 
other aid from religious organizations, and the rental of facilities to 
religious groups.
    Government officials frequently expressed concerns about the 
potential spread of religious extremism from Afghanistan and other 
states. Despite concerns about regional security threats from groups 
claiming a religious basis, the Government did not impose new legal 
restrictions on religious freedom. Draft restrictive amendments to the 
law on religion, withdrawn by the government in March 1999, were not 
reintroduced. However, the country's highest law enforcement officials 
called for toughening the religion law. The Procurator General of the 
Republic and the Interior Minister both called for prohibiting the 
activities of unregistered religious organizations. In February the 
Interior Minister publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
presence of conservative Muslims in the country and criticized a local 
official for attending a stadium meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses. The 
KNB has characterized the fight against ``religious extremism'' as a 
top priority of the internal intelligence service. The official 
Russian-language newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, and the official 
television station, Khabar, present as objective news allegations that 
unregistered religious groups present a threat to national security and 
social cohesion.
    The Ministry of Justice has requested that Jehovah's Witnesses 
amend their charter to eliminate education as a religious activity. 
However there were no reports that the Government shut down religious 
schools. Information on the number of such schools, if any, operating 
in Kazakhstan, was not available.
    In September an education ministry official announced that the 
Foreign Ministry would ``recall'' all Kazakhstani students studying in 
religious institutions outside Kazakhstan, a step considered by some 
observers to be aimed primarily at preventing young Muslims from being 
radicalized by militant Islamic education abroad. The official said 
that the measure was intended to protect the country against religious 
extremism. It was unclear how the Government would implement the 
policy. The Government announced that several students studying in 
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey would return voluntarily by year's end.
    On June 26, the Third Congress of Muslims in Kazakhstan voted to 
appoint Absattar Derbisaliyev as the new mufti (spiritual chief) of the 
national Muslim organization. Senior government officials, including 
reportedly the Chief of the Presidential Administration and the 
Minister of Culture, Information, and Public Accord, took part in the 
Congress. Some Muslims alleged that the government officials engineered 
Derbisaliyev's appointment and the resignation of his predecessor. 
Derbisaliyev publicly denied that government officials present at the 
Congress influenced the votes of congress participants, arguing that 
they were not there when the voting was conducted.
    Some local officials continued to maintain, contrary to law, that 
unregistered religious organizations could not conduct religious 
activities. Local KNB officials disrupted meetings in private homes of 
unregistered groups of Jehovah's Witnesses in Pavlodar, Osakarovka and 
Kyzl-Orda. In March the city prosecutor's office in Astana, the 
national capital, issued a written warning to a group of schismatic 
Baptists for not being registered. Earlier in the month, the head of 
the local Astana office of the Ministry of Culture, Information, and 
Social Accord visited the leader of the schismatic Baptists to 
recommend that the church alter its charter prohibition against seeking 
government registration and apply for registration. In September a 
Baptist congregation in Astrakhanka was ordered to close by the 
district court until it complied with registration requirements. 
Earlier, the pastor had been fined $10 (1,500 tenge) for failing to 
register the church. In September KNB official confiscated Bibles and 
other literature from a prayer group in Kyzl-Orda and had not by year's 
end returned the documents despite the Prosecutor's order to do so. Law 
enforcement authorities in Akmola Oblast, the province that includes 
Astana, conducted regular inspections of religious organizations in 
order, they asserted, to prevent the development of religious extremism 
and to ensure that religious groups pay taxes.
    Representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses alleged incidents of 
harassment by a number of local governments. They claimed that city 
officials in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent sometimes blocked the group 
from renting stadiums or other large public or private sites for 
religious meetings. In other cities, officials allowed the church to 
rent facilities for such gatherings. Church representatives alleged in 
March that the director of one facility in Almaty told them that city 
officials had given instructions not to rent space to Jehovah's 
Witnesses. A city official denied the allegation. Church 
representatives also alleged that the Prosecutor's Office in Kostenai 
requested information from the church about its clergymen, 
organizational structure, and schools, and that in April documents of 
Jehovah's Witnesses congregations in Taraz and Abay were inspected. The 
church faced difficulties registering communities of church members in 
Petropavlovsk, where registration has been denied several times, and 
Aktau, although it ultimately was registered in Aktau. On June 7, local 
KNB and Interior Ministry officers, accompanied by local government 
officials, raided a prayer house belonging to a registered community of 
Jehovah's Witnesses in the village of Derbesek (South Kazakhstan 
Oblast). The officers confiscated religious literature and church 
correspondence. Church representatives complained to district and 
oblast KNB officials that the raid was illegal because the officers did 
not have a prosecutor's warrant. In response the director of the KNB 
department for South Kazakhstan Oblast wrote a letter confirming that 
no evidence of ``illegal missionary activity'' was discovered and that 
the local KNB officers who participated in the raid had been ordered to 
return the seized literature and correspondence, which they did at the 
end of June.
    On occasion the authorities took action against groups engaged in 
proselytizing. In December, two female Jehovah's Witnesses were 
arrested and detained for one day for proselytizing in Talgar. The 
police confiscated their documents but returned them after three days. 
No charges were filed. On December 15, two Krishna Consciousness 
devotees were detained in Aktobe for selling Krishna books on the 
street. Police confiscated 20 books, but later released the women 
without charges. However, one Krishna leader reported that in most 
oblasts officials leave their followers alone. In July in Akshoki, near 
the Chinese border, members of a Baptist church reported that local KNB 
officials, police and clergy incited a crowd to threaten a group 
preaching Christianity and burn Christian literature. One member was 
severely beaten by a group of eight men who demanded he convert to 
Islam. Government officials declined to comment on this incident.
    Foreign missionary activity is authorized under law, but only when 
missionaries are accredited by the State. In practice many missionaries 
operate without accreditation. Although legally entitled to register 
religious organizations, foreign missionaries generally find that to be 
registered they had to list a majority of local citizens among the 10 
founders of the religious organization. Some foreign missionaries, 
whose presence is unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox citizens, have 
complained of occasional harassment by junior government officials. In 
particular evangelical Protestants working in schools, hospitals, and 
other social service institutions have alleged government hostility 
toward their efforts to proselytize. Jehovah's Witnesses reported 
difficulties obtaining visas for foreign missionaries to visit 
Kazakhstan. Other missionaries are harassed by local officials 
regularly. On June 7, immigration officials at Almaty airport refused 
to admit an American missionary. The missionary, who held a valid visa, 
alleged that airport authorities did not give an explanation for his 
exclusion, saying only that the reasons were secret. The missionary 
suggested that his exclusion might have been related to problems that 
he had experienced 6 months earlier with customs officials in Russia, 
where he had performed religious work. He subsequently was denied a 
visa to return to Russia. Government officials subsequently confirmed 
the refusal to grant entry to the missionary and indicated that his 
name matched one on an immigration lookout list that had been 
circulated to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
    Other foreign missionaries, unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox 
citizens, have complained of occasional harassment by low-level 
government officials. In particular evangelical Protestants working in 
schools, hospitals, and other social service institutions have alleged 
government hostility toward their efforts to proselytize. Kazakhstan's 
small Jewish population continued to revive. Following the foundation 
of the Jewish Congress of Kazakhstan in December 1999, seven new 
synagogues opened during the year.
    The authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat 
70 members of an Islamic group from Taraz who were detained and 
ultimately released in 1999. The Government invited the national 
leaders of the two largest religions, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, to 
participate jointly in state events. Leaders of other faiths 
participated in some events, especially in Almaty. In December 1999, 
during a visit to the United States, the President presented to the 
Lubavitcher community documents relating to the father of the late 
Lubavitcher rabbi, Menachem Schneerson. Joint appearances by the 
Islamic mufti and the Orthodox archbishop, often in the presence of the 
President, were intended to promote religious and ethnic harmony. Some 
members of other faiths, including Muslims not affiliated with the 
national Muslim organization headed by the mufti, criticized the 
Government's inclusion of the mufti and archbishop in state events as 
official favoritism and a violation of the Constitutional separation of 
church and state. Many also believe that the distinction government 
officials sometimes make between ``traditional'' and ``nontraditional'' 
religions violated the fundamental standard of equality among 
religions.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to emigrate and the right of repatriation; both are respected in 
practice. The Law on National Security prohibits persons who had access 
to state secrets through their work from taking up permanent residence 
abroad for 5 years after leaving government service. Citizens have the 
right to change their citizenship, but are not permitted to hold dual 
citizenship.
    According to the Constitution, everyone who is legally present in 
the country has the right to move freely on its territory and freely 
choose a place of residence except in cases stipulated by law. This 
provision formally abolished the ``propiska'' system of residence 
permits, a holdover from the Soviet era, which ended in 1991, and 
replaced it with a system of registration. However, in practice 
citizens still are required to register in order to prove legal 
residence and obtain city services. Registration in most of the country 
generally was routine, but it was difficult to register in Almaty due 
to its relative affluence and local officials' fears of overcrowding. 
The Government can refuse to register a citizen, just as it did under 
the propiska system, in order to limit the number of persons who can 
move to a certain city or area.
    There were no further reports of government efforts to restrict the 
movement of foreigners around the country. There were no further 
reports of foreigners being detained for entering restricted areas that 
were not clearly marked. Likewise, there were no further reports by 
foreigners that they were denied access or required to pay exorbitant 
entry fees to ostensibly free national parks. There were no reports 
that the authorities refused to approve the assignment of foreign aid 
workers to towns considered ``sensitive,'' as had been the case in 
earlier years. Internal visas are no longer required for foreigners 
traveling outside Almaty.
    An exit visa is required for citizens who wish to travel abroad. 
Although refusals are rare in general, some opposition political 
figures encountered difficulties obtaining exit visas. The deputy 
chairman of the RNPK, Gaziz Aldamzharov, did not receive an exit visa 
for a trip he planned in February. He reported that immigration 
authorities told him that the visa could not be issued because of an 
unspecified criminal investigation against him. He ultimately received 
a visa after the dates of his intended travel. There have been reports 
of some officials demanding bribes for exit visas. It is usually 
necessary to meet a number of bureaucratic requirements before the exit 
visa is issued. A permanent exit visa is much more difficult to obtain. 
It requires criminal checks, documents from every creditor stating that 
the applicant has no outstanding debts and letters from any close 
relatives with a claim to support from intending emigrants giving their 
concurrence to the exit visa. In October the President and then-
Minister of Internal Affairs announced their intention to eliminate the 
exit visa requirement for temporary visits or permanent residence 
abroad, but no action had been taken by year's end.
    Foreigners must have exit visas, although they receive them 
routinely as part of their entry visa. Foreigners who overstay their 
original visas, or who did not receive exit visas as part of their 
original visas, must get exit visas from the immigration authorities 
before leaving. Foreign visitors are required to register, depending on 
their circumstances, either with the immigration officials who admit 
them at the airport or with the local office of visas and registration 
(OVIR). Many foreigners complained that the process was 
bureaucratically cumbersome. Foreigners are no longer required to 
register in every city they visit. One registration with OVIR is 
sufficient for travel throughout the country. Immigration authorities 
occasionally refused to allow foreigners without proof of registration 
to leave the country.
    Authorities used the 1999 Law on State Secrets to justify 
confiscating the passport of Amirzhan Kosanov, an official of the 
opposition RNPK, as he tried to fly to the United Kingdom on November 
25 (see Section 3). Kosanov, who had traveled abroad during the 3 years 
between his departure from government service and full implementation 
of the state secrets law, said that he had a valid exit visa and U.K. 
entry visa for the November trip. Almaty migration police in October 
had tried to seize Kosanov's passport. The Government alleged that 
Kosanov had access to state secrets when he served as press secretary 
to former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the leader of the RNPK; 
that Kosanov had refused to sign a standard non-disclosure agreement 
and follow other simple procedures prescribed by the law; and that 
other former officials with knowledge of sensitive information had been 
allowed to travel after complying with the procedures. The Government 
is not known to have used the Law on State Secrets to block the foreign 
travel of any other former officials since the law's passage in 1999.
    The Government accords special treatment to ethnic Kazakhs and 
their families who fled during Stalin's era and wish to return. Kazakhs 
in this category are entitled, in principle, to citizenship and many 
other privileges. Anyone else, including ethnic Kazakhs who are not 
considered refugees from the Stalin era, such as the descendants of 
Kazakhs who moved to Mongolia during the previous century, must apply 
for permission to return. However, it is the stated policy of the 
Government to encourage and assist all ethnic Kazakhs living outside 
the country to return, if they wish.
    The Government usually cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. In 1999 the Government ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the 
Government did not pass implementing legislation for the Refugee 
Convention by year's end. The absence of implementing legislation left 
unclear many aspects of the status of refugees, such as whether they 
have a right to work.
    Following the passage of a 1997 migration law and the creation of 
the Agency for Migration and Demography, the Government began in 1998 
to register asylum seekers and to determine their status in 
consultation with the UNHCR. The Government in most cases allowed UNHCR 
access to detained foreigners. Ethnic Kazakh migrants are automatically 
eligible for citizenship, although the Government has granted 
citizenship to only about 10 percent of the 191,000 Kazakh migrants. 
Migrants from other CIS countries are not considered to be refugees as 
they may travel and settle freely in any CIS country. The Government 
has not allowed refugees without passports to register and has 
restricted registration largely to refugees from Afghanistan. All non-
CIS citizens are considered to be intending immigrants. However, in 
practice the Government is tolerant in its treatment of local refugee 
populations. Only the President can grant political asylum; he is known 
to have done so only once since independence in 1991.
    The Agency for Migration integrates the UNHCR and a local NGO, 
Kazakhstan Refugee Legal Support, into the process of reviewing refugee 
claims. However, the limited resources of the agency impeded the 
processing of many cases. Asylum claims were processed only in Almaty, 
which is as far as 2,000 miles from other major Kazakhstani cities. The 
Agency for Migration and the courts took a restrictive approach to many 
asylum claims, apparently out of a desire to limit the number of 
refugees. The Government's desire to control the size of the refugee 
population appeared to be motivated by the country's difficult economic 
situation and national security concerns stemming from the national 
origins of many asylum seekers. The UNHCR estimated that there were 
approximately 18,000 refugees in the country (at least 10,000 Chechens 
from Russia and about 5,000 persons from Tajikistan, 2,500 from 
Afghanistan, and 500 from other countries). There was a large influx of 
Chechens fleeing the conflict with the central authorities in Russia. 
Consistent with the Minsk Convention on Migration within the CIS, the 
Government did not formally recognize the Chechens as refugees. 
However, the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR and Chechen 
organizations, did grant indefinite legal resident status to Chechens 
until they could return home to safe conditions. By September the 
Government registered 1,211 asylum seekers and accorded refugee status 
to about two-thirds of them. The Government continues to give priority 
to the return of ethnic Kazakhs in order to increase the percentage of 
Kazakhs in the overall population and to offset the large-scale 
emigration of ethnic Russians and Germans. Since independence 
approximately 190,000 ethnic Kazakhs, mostly from other CIS countries, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Turkey, China, and Saudi Arabia have 
immigrated. The Government struggled to find resources for integration 
programs for these immigrants, some of whom lived in squalid settings. 
The problem of integrating the Kazakh migrants was compounded by the 
inability of about 90 percent of them to obtain Kazakhstani 
citizenship, to which theoretically they are entitled by law. Without 
citizenship, the migrants do not have clear rights to own property, 
open businesses, or conduct other legal transactions.
    Agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia that established broad 
legal rights for the citizens of one country living on the territory of 
the other and provided for expeditious naturalization for citizens of 
one country who moved to the other entered into force in 1999.
    Kazakhstan and China agreed in December 1999 not to tolerate the 
presence of ethnic separatists from one country on the territory of the 
other. Human rights monitors were concerned about the impact of this 
agreement on Uyghurs from China present in Kazakhstan. The Government 
did not consider any asylum claims from Uyghurs; it was unclear whether 
any Uyghurs applied. In general the Government was tolerant toward the 
Chinese Uyghur population. There were no known cases of the Government 
returning Uyghurs to China since February 1999, when the Government 
returned three Uyghurs. The Chinese authorities had accused the three 
of murdering a policeman; Amnesty International reported evidence that 
at least one was wanted for ``separatist'' activities. Some reports 
indicate that the three men were subsequently executed upon return to 
China, but this information has not been confirmed.
    There were no reports that the Government forcibly repatriated 
refugees in the period covered by this report to any country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for a democratic government; however, in 
practice the Government severely limited the right of citizens to 
change their government. The Constitution concentrates power in the 
presidency, granting the President considerable control over the 
legislature, judiciary, and local government. Modifying or amending the 
Constitution is nearly impossible without the consent of the president. 
President Nazarbayev was elected to a 7-year term in a 1999 election 
that fell far short of international standards. He extended his 
previous term of office via a deeply flawed 1995 referendum without a 
contested presidential election (which, according to the Constitution 
then in force, should have been held in 1996).
    The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. His appointment of the Prime Minister, but not of cabinet 
members, is subject to parliamentary consent. He has the power to 
dismiss Parliament. If Parliament does not act within 30 days on bills 
the President designates as urgent, the President can issue the bills 
as decrees with the force of law. He appoints judges, senior court 
officials, and all regional governors. He directly appointed the 
chairman and members of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) who 
oversaw the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 
1999. In accordance with the Constitution, the lower house of 
Parliament (Majilis) confirmed the CEC chairman and members nominated 
by the President in May.
    President Nazarbayev won his current term in office in a 1999 
election held nearly 2 years earlier than previously scheduled. The 
previous October, the President and the Parliament passed in 1 day, 
without any prior public notice, a series of 19 constitutional 
amendments that enabled them 1 day later to call the early presidential 
election. Among other changes, the constitutional amendments extended 
the presidential term of office from 5 to 7 years and removed the 65-
year age limit on government service. (President Nazarbayev would be 65 
year of age before the end of his current 7-year presidential term.) 
The Constitutional amendments also extended the terms of members of 
Parliament from 4 to 5 years for the lower house (Majilis) and from 4 
to 6 years for the Senate. Government opponents and international 
observers criticized the short-notice call of early elections because 
it did not leave enough time for the government to implement promised 
electoral reforms and for intending candidates to organize effective 
campaigns.
    The Government imposed onerous requirements on candidates seeking 
to qualify for the presidential ballot. Candidates were required to 
submit petitions with approximately 170,000 signatures collected in 
equal proportions from at least 11 of the country's 16 regions (the 14 
oblasts plus the cities of Almaty and Astana). They also were required 
to pass a Kazakh-language test and to make a nonrefundable payment of 
1,000 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately $30,000), although 
an equal sum was then provided to each registered candidate for 
campaign expenses. Although three candidates, in addition to President 
Nazarbayev, qualified for the ballot, two of them, then-Senator Engels 
Gabassov and then-Customs Committee chairman Gani Kasymov, were known 
as supporters of the President and widely believed to be running at 
government behest.
    In October 1998, less than 1 week after the early presidential 
election was called, the Government resorted to a provision of the 
presidential decree on elections, passed in May 1998, that prohibited 
persons convicted of administrative offenses from running for public 
office within a year of their conviction. A district court in Almaty 
summoned on less than 24 hours' notice 5 leading government opponents--
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Social Democratic 
party leader Dos Kushim, Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement leader Irina 
Savostina, Azamat movement co-chairman Petr Svoik, and Tabigat 
ecological movement leader Mels Yeleusizov--to face charges of 
participating in the October 1998 meeting of an unregistered 
organization called For Fair Elections. The court convicted all five. 
Despite the judgment against him, Kazhegeldin, the most widely known 
opposition figure, applied for registration as a candidate in the 
presidential election. The presidentially appointed CEC disqualified 
his candidacy under the provision of the presidential decree on 
elections that then served as the election law. The Supreme Court 
upheld the disqualification. The CEC also used the election law 
provision to disqualify the presidential candidacy of Amantai Asylbek, 
leader of the Attan antinuclear testing movement, because of a 3-day 
jail sentence that he received in February 1998 for participating in an 
unsanctioned demonstration.
    The Government harassed President Nazarbayev's opponents throughout 
the presidential election campaign. According to credible reports, 
government agents repeatedly pressured managers of conference 
facilities to deny access at the last moment to government opponents 
who had arranged to use the facilities for meetings and press 
conferences. When opposition meetings and press conferences did take 
place, electricity at the facilities often was interrupted. Government 
attempts to disrupt opposition meetings appeared to have extended 
beyond national borders when the management of a Moscow hotel withdrew 
permission at the last moment for a December 1998 opposition congress. 
Communist Party leader Serykbolsyn Abdildin, the only candidate from 
the ranks of the preelection opposition who qualified for the 
presidential ballot, publicly complained that local officials loyal to 
the President impeded his attempts to hold campaign rallies and 
meetings. As recently as November, authorities used the State Secrets 
Law to confiscate the passport of RPNK official Amirzhan Kosanov as he 
tried to travel to the United Kingdom (see Section 2.d.).
    Assaults on two of Kazhegeldin's advisers appeared to have been 
politically motivated and, government critics charged, sanctioned by 
the Government. In addition, Kazhegeldin claimed that two gunshots were 
fired at him on the eve of the press conference at which he announced 
his presidential candidacy. Unknown assailants beat one of his public 
relations advisers, Yelena Nikitenko (see Section 1.c.) and beat his 
press spokesman, Amirzhan Kosanov. Several days before the attack, 
officials of the al-Farabi National University in Almaty forced 
Nikitenko to resign from the faculty because of her political 
activities. Government officials alleged that the Kazhegeldin campaign 
staged or invented all three attacks. Following the announcement of 
Kazhegeldin's candidacy, the then first deputy chairman of the KNB held 
an unprecedented press conference at which he made admittedly 
unsubstantiated allegations of financial malfeasance against 
Kazhegeldin. The tax authorities brought an action against Kazhegeldin 
during the campaign and, according to credible reports, threatened 
actions against other government opponents. At a news conference, 
Kazhegeldin supporters showed videotape of police repeatedly pulling 
over Kazhegeldin's car for unspecified ``inspections.'' Kazhegeldin 
also claimed that border control officials at the Almaty airport tried 
to prevent him and his family from taking a flight out of the country. 
An attack on a Kazakhstani employee of a foreign embassy also appeared 
to be motivated politically and, human rights observers believe, 
sanctioned by the Government. In December 1998, three men beat the 
employee outside his apartment as the employee returned home. The 
employee suffered a cracked rib, some internal injuries, and required 
stitches to close wounds near both eyes. The attackers stole the 
employee's briefcase but did not try to steal his wallet and other 
valuables. The absence of robbery as a motive and the fact that the 
employee's responsibilities included assisting diplomats in making 
contacts with political opposition and human rights figures suggested 
that the attack was motivated politically. Law enforcement authorities 
closed the investigations into all of these cases without arrests. A 
suspect was identified in the Nikitenko case but no charges were 
brought, allegedly because Nikitenko had left the country and was 
unavailable to identify her assailant.
    The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of 
the OSCE announced in December 1998 that it would not meet the 
Government's request to send a presidential election observation 
mission. In its public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the 
exclusion of two opposition candidates, unequal access to the media, 
and coerced support for President Nazarbayev. The ODIHR sent a small 
election assessment team to report to the OSCE on the full election 
process. The assessment team concluded that the presidential election 
fell ``far short'' of Kazakhstan's commitments as an OSCE participating 
state. It cited in particular the exclusion of candidates, the short 
duration of the election campaign, obstacles to free assembly and 
association, the use of government resources to support President 
Nazarbayev' s campaign, unequal access to the media, and the flawed 
presidential decree that served as the election law.
    A newly elected bicameral legislature took office in December 1999. 
The lower house (Majilis), consisting of 77 members, was elected 
directly in October 1999. Under amendments to the Constitution passed 
in 1998, membership in the Majilis elected in 1999 included 10 new 
seats assigned proportionally to political parties based on the 
percentage of votes they received nationally (with a minimum vote 
threshold of 7 percent). As before the other 67 seats were attributed 
by single mandate districts. The upper house (the Senate) consists of 
39 members 32 of whom are elected directly by members of oblast and 
city parliaments; the President appoints the remaining 7 senators. (The 
number of senate seats was reduced from 42 in accordance with the 
Government's 1997 decision to reduce the number of oblasts from 19 to 
14. Each oblast elects two senators, as do the cities of Almaty and 
Astana.) Elections were held in September 1999 for 16 Senate seats. The 
May 1999 election law requires candidates for both houses to meet 
minimum age and education requirements and to pay a nonrefundable 
registration fee of 25 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately 
$50070,000 tenge). This fee represented a 75 percent decrease over 
previous registration fees, which opposition figures, human rights 
monitors, and the OSCE/ODIHR had considered a barrier to participation. 
The election law does not require Majilis candidates to collect a 
certain number of signatures in order to be placed on the ballot; 
however, Senate candidates must obtain signatures from 10 percent of 
the members of the local assemblies in their oblasts in order to be 
placed on the ballot. Political parties wishing to compete for the 10 
proportionally allocated seats in the Majilis must be registered by the 
CEC and regional electoral commissions in two-thirds of the principal 
administrative jurisdictions (the 14 oblasts, plus the former and new 
capital cities, Almaty and Astana). The Constitution states that 
participation in elections is voluntary. One of the Constitutional 
amendments passed in October 1998 rescinded the requirement that at 
least 50 percent of eligible voters participate in order to make an 
election valid. Experts had cited the old requirement as one of the 
causes of fraud and vote inflation in past elections.
    The legislature exercises little oversight over the executive 
branch, although it has the Constitutional authority to remove 
government ministers and vote no-confidence in the Government. The 
Constitution and other arrangements allow the executive branch to 
dominate the legislature. Although Parliament must approve the overall 
state budget, the Constitution precludes Parliament from increasing 
state spending or decreasing state revenues without executive branch 
approval. The executive branch used this authority to block legislation 
drafted by Members of Parliament. Nearly all laws passed by Parliament 
originate in the executive branch. The executive branch controls the 
budget for Parliament's operations; it has not provided funds for 
Members of Parliament to hire staff, a situation generally viewed as 
decreasing Parliament's effectiveness. Should Parliament fail to 
consider within 30 days a bill designated as ``urgent'' by the 
President, the President may issue the bill by decree. Although the 
President has never resorted to this authority, it gives him additional 
leverage with Parliament. While the President has broad powers to 
dissolve Parliament, Parliament can remove the President only for 
disability or high treason, and only with the consent of the 
Constitutional Council, which largely is controlled by the President 
(see Section 1.e.).
    The introduction, for the 1999 parliamentary elections, of 10 new 
seats in the Majilis distributed by party-list vote enhanced the role 
of political parties, which, with the exception of the Communists, were 
previously very weak. The Communist Party and three propresidential 
parties--Otan (Fatherland), the Civic Party, and the Agrarian Party--
divided the 10 new party-list seats in the 1999 parliamentary election. 
No candidate nominated by a non-Communist opposition party won a seat 
in the Parliament. One member of the opposition RNPK won a seat after 
running as an independent candidate. The RNPK withdrew its party-list 
slate after two of its candidates, Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Madel 
Ismailov, were declared ineligible. (They were the only two candidates 
rejected of more than 600 applicants for Majilis contests.) Of the more 
than 600 other candidates, about half who won ran as independents. Many 
of them were former government officials with strong presumed sympathy 
for the progovernment parties.
    Many activities of Parliament remained outside public view. In June 
1999, Parliament banned the press and other outsiders from observing 
the vote of confidence in the Government. Final totals in the 
parliamentary vote of confidence were made public, but not the votes of 
individual members. The Parliament invited nongovernmental 
representatives to observe at least four meetings. Many draft bills 
were held closely and published in the press only after passage and 
signature by the President. In 2000 the Parliament became more open by 
publishing important draft laws (for example, the tax code) and by 
meeting with NGO's on others (for example, the local self-government 
law).
    Although an improvement in many ways over the most recent 
presidential election, parliamentary elections held in 1999 were marred 
by election law deficiencies, executive branch interference in the 
electoral process, and a lack of government openness about vote 
tabulations. There was convincing evidence of government manipulation 
of results in some cases. The OSCE mission sent to observe the 
elections concluded that the elections were ``a tentative step'' toward 
democracy but ``fell short of (Kazakhstan's) OSCE commitments.'' The 
OSCE also expressed concern that parliamentary runoff races were 
conducted just 2 weeks after first-round voting, which left no time for 
the CEC and the courts to act on hundreds of complaints filed about the 
conduct of first-round voting and the campaign.
    The May 1999 election law replaced a presidential decree that had 
served as the election law. It lowered candidate registration fees by 
75 percent but failed to correct other deficiencies of the decree it 
replaced. The law maintained a system of territorial, district, and 
precinct electoral commissions subject to regional and local government 
authorities, who recommend commission members. It failed to incorporate 
suggestions for creating a more open vote tabulation process. It also 
maintained more than 40 administrative provisions that bar candidates 
convicted of administrative offenses from running for office for a 
year, although one offense was eliminated from the list of 
disqualifying offenses.
    The CEC issued regulations to ameliorate some of these deficiencies 
in time for the parliamentary elections, but the effects were limited. 
For example the CEC filled vacant seats on electoral commissions by 
lottery among all registered political parties. However, the initiative 
affected only 25 percent of commissions and was limited to 1 seat per 
commission, each of which usually consists of 7 members. Regulations 
that clarified the rights of election observers significantly improved 
the ability of observers to monitor vote counts at the precinct level. 
However, observers could not, in the end, use the information they 
obtained to corroborate or challenge official results. The CEC 
ultimately released comprehensive precinct- and district-level vote 
tallies for only 1 of 67 single-mandate districts, despite repeated 
requests from the OSCE and other observers. With the exception of the 
one district for which comprehensive results were released, the CEC 
never issued the order of finish or final totals for Majilis candidates 
who neither won nor qualified for a run-off.
    The Government, prior to the 1999 parliamentary elections, removed 
participation in the activities of an unregistered organization from 
the list of administrative offenses that potentially could disqualify 
candidates for public office. However, more than 40 other 
administrative offenses remained on the list. Among these offenses were 
participation in unsanctioned demonstrations or rallies, an offense 
that the Government has used to charge its opponents (see Section 
2.b.). The Government presented rescission of the administrative 
offense as a measure to enable the five opposition leaders convicted of 
participating in the For Fair Elections meeting to run for Parliament. 
Two of the five successfully registered as candidates. However, the CEC 
declined to register Akezhan Kazhegeldin due to a December 1998 
administrative conviction for contempt of court. The conviction arose 
from Kazhegeldin's failure to respond in person to the For Fair 
Elections charge. (Kazhegeldin argued at the time that he met the law's 
requirements by sending his attorney.) The chairperson of the CEC 
publicly encouraged Kazhegeldin to seek the overturn of his contempt of 
court conviction 1 week before the registration deadline for the 
parliamentary elections. A successful appeal by Kazhegeldin would have 
made him eligible, according to the CEC, to run in the parliamentary 
election. Kazhegeldin subsequently wrote to the Supreme Court 
requesting that it overturn his contempt conviction, but the court 
ruled that his letter did not constitute a proper legal appeal.
    Within a day of the CEC exclusion of Kazhegeldin's candidacy, 
Russian authorities detained Kazhegeldin on a pre-existing warrant 
issued 2 months earlier by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan. The 
Government requested the extradition of Kazhegeldin, who was living in 
exile, in connection with allegations that he had laundered illicit 
funds received while serving as Prime Minister from 1994 to 1997. 
Following protests from international human rights groups, the 
Prosecutor General dropped his extradition request, and the Russian 
authorities released Kazhegeldin. In July Kazhegeldin was detained 
again in Italy on charges of corruption, pursuant to an Interpol 
warrant posted by Kazakhstan. Italian authorities released him shortly 
thereafter. The investigation of Kazhegeldin, while possibly grounded 
in facts, appeared motivated politically.
    The CEC barred the 1999 parliamentary candidacy of Madel Ismailov 
because of his February 1998 criminal conviction for insulting the 
President (see Section 1.d.). Ismailov had sought to register as a 
candidate on the RNPK party list. The election law precludes candidates 
convicted of criminal offenses from running for office for 3 years 
following their convictions.
    A flawed provision in the electoral law was used to disqualify from 
the 1999 parliamentary election another RNPK candidate, deputy party 
chairman Gaziz Aldamzharov, after he apparently received a majority of 
votes in an election in Atyrau. The CEC annulled the second round of 
the Atyrau election, as well as two other second-round elections, but 
gave no specific reason in its official decree. The electoral law 
precludes all candidates who participated in an invalidated election 
from running in a make- up election, regardless of who was responsible 
for the violations that led to invalidating the election. The CEC 
interpreted this provision to exclude from the 3 rerun elections all of 
the approximately 500 candidates who ran unsuccessfully for any Majilis 
seat in 1999. Although the CEC did not formally specify the reason for 
invalidating the Atyrau election, the CEC chairperson said in a 
television interview that district and precinct electoral officials in 
Atyrau refused to certify protocols after a series of disturbances that 
the chairperson attributed to the ``opposition.'' These disturbances 
included alleged bomb threats, alleged falsification of ballots, and 
the incursion into one polling station of four masked men who opened 
and overturned ballot boxes. Given widespread expectations that 
Aldamzharov would receive a majority of votes in Atyray, 
unsubstantiated CEC allegations that the ``opposition'' disrupted 
voting in Atyrau appeared contrived.
    There were widespread, documented allegations that regional and 
local executive authorities (akims) interfered with the parliamentary 
elections during the campaign and in the voting process. In one case, 
the chief election commissioner for the Ili district (Almaty Oblast) 
resigned because, he alleged, the district akim ordered him to deliver 
a victory for the akim's favored candidate. The commissioner, like most 
election officials a government employee, offered to resign from his 
full-time government job in addition to his electoral responsibilities. 
A significant number of complaints filed in several regions indicated 
that akimats and, through them, other employers threatened supporters 
of opposition candidates with job loss. In one such case, the akimat of 
the capital city, Astana, allegedly threatened to fire more than 20 
government employees for their support of a nonfavored candidate. There 
were also reports that tax inspectors and some KNB officials 
intimidated opposition candidates, their supporters, and the 
independent media. Akimats used government personnel and other 
resources, including office space, to support ``favored'' candidates 
and to distribute campaign literature for the propresidential Otan 
party. On first- and second-round voting days, international and 
domestic observers found akimat representatives ``supervising'' the 
work of putatively independent precinct electoral commissions in 
numerous locations throughout the country.
    The failure of the CEC to release most precinct- and district- 
level vote tallies undermined the credibility of election results. 
Evidence of official vote tampering in many districts exacerbated this 
problem. The OSCE observation mission obtained copies of flagrantly 
falsified protocols (reports of official results). During the first 
round of voting OSCE observers found multiple vote protocols prepared 
in one Almaty polling station. OSCE and domestic observers reported 
that precinct officials frequently did not use official protocol forms 
to record results in the presence of observers or filled out the 
official forms in pencil. District election officials, especially in 
first-round elections, generally refused to allow observers to witness 
the tabulation of results from various polling stations. Observers' 
access to district vote tabulations improved in the second round of 
voting after the CEC issued new instructions for preparing protocols 
and instructed district officials to cooperate with observers. 
Nevertheless, the district election commission in Atyrau refused 
initially to allow OSCE observers into the district commission office. 
District officials ultimately allowed the observers into their office 
but subsequently recommended that they leave because the commission 
``could not assure the (observers') safety.''
    Government officials said that President Nazarbayev took 
disciplinary actions against some local officials for interfering with 
the parliamentary elections but this could not be confirmed; the 
Government did not release any details such as the names of the 
officials, their offenses, or punishment.
    In February a team of OSCE representatives visited Astana to 
discuss the final OSCE report on the parliamentary elections. 
Government officials agreed during the visit to an OSCE proposal for a 
series of roundtable discussions of the electoral reforms recommended 
in the report. The agreement called for broad participation in the 
discussions, including by representatives of the Government, all 
registered political parties, other political movements, and NGO's. 
After some delays, the first of four planned sessions took place on 
September 2 in Astana. Participants agreed to a future work plan with 
the inclusion of the OSCE and all political parties registered in 1999 
in a parallel government working group on electoral reform. The 
remaining sessions were scheduled for 2001; the leading opposition 
parties and movements took part, as did approximately 15 Members of 
Parliament from across the political spectrum. The CEC and 
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and 
Culture, Information, and Public Access also took part. Shortly after 
the September session, and with only a few days' notice, the CEC 
announced that it would organize new regional and local electoral 
commissions without waiting for the issue to be discussed in subsequent 
sessions. The CEC said it had to act because the terms of the previous 
commissions were expiring. Other roundtable participants criticized the 
CEC for failing to discuss its plans to reconstitute the commissions or 
to give political parties more notice that they would be invited to 
nominate candidates.
    The Constitution and laws significantly constrain the independence 
of the judiciary (see Section 1.e.). A Constitutional Council replaced 
the Constitutional Court in August 1995 when the new Constitution was 
adopted. The President appoints three of its seven members, including 
the chairman. A two-thirds majority of the Council is required to 
overrule a presidential veto. All judges below the level of the Supreme 
Court are appointed directly by the President. The President's nominees 
for the Supreme Court are subject to Senate confirmation.
    According to the Constitution, the President selects Governors of 
oblasts (the ``akims''), based on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister; they serve at the discretion of the President, who may annul 
their decisions. All adult citizens (at least 18 years of age) have the 
right to vote. Membership in political parties or trade unions is 
forbidden to members of the armed forces, employees of national 
security and law enforcement organizations, and judges.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no 
legal restrictions on the participation of women and minorities in 
politics, but the persistence of traditional attitudes means that few 
women hold high office or play active parts in political life. At the 
end of the year, no women held ministerial portfolios, although one had 
ministerial rank and several deputy ministers were women. There were no 
female provincial governors (akims). Of 39 Senate members, 5 are women; 
of 77 Majilis members, 8 are women.
    Although minority ethnic groups are represented in the Government, 
ethnic Kazakhs hold the majority of leadership positions. Nearly half 
the population are non-Kazakhs according to the national census 
completed in 1999. Non-Kazakhs hold 1 of 3 positions as vice premier 
and head 2 of 14 government ministries and the national bank. Non-
Kazakhs also are underrepresented in the Majilis and the Senate. In 
Parliament 8 of 39 senators are non-Kazakhs, and 19 of 77 members of 
the Majilis are non-Kazakhs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of 
Law (formerly the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights) and the 
Almaty Helsinki Commission are the most active of a small number of 
local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and 
legal reform issues. Although these groups operated largely without 
government interference, limited financial means hampered their ability 
to monitor and report human rights violations. Law enforcement 
investigators closed an investigation into a November 1999 fire that 
destroyed the main office and archives of the Bureau for Human Rights 
in Almaty. The Almaty fire department concluded that arson was the 
probable cause of the fire. It absolved the organization from potential 
civil liability for the fire. However, investigators identified no 
suspects and made no arrests. Some human rights observers complained 
that the Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
    The Civil Code requires NGO's to register with the Government, and 
most NGO's are registered; however, some continue to operate without 
legal standing. An increasing number of government officials made an 
effort to work with domestic and foreign NGO's, although others 
persisted in asserting that NGO's should stay out of sectors of 
government interest. A coalition of NGO's played an apparently 
unprecedented role in government consideration of draft local 
government laws. After successfully delaying passage of what was widely 
viewed as flawed legislation on this subject early in the year, the 
coalition successfully lobbied Parliament to publish the draft. That 
draft was withdrawn in December for revision. Some NGO's chose not to 
register because they objected to the requirement of registration in 
principle or because they did not have the money to pay the 
registration fee. Others believe that they were not eligible to 
register because they promoted the interests of one ethnic group or 
religion and are considered by some to violate the constitutional ban 
on inciting social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal 
enmity. The new Criminal Code that took effect in 1998 criminalized the 
activity of NGO's that are not registered. In 1998 five leading 
opposition figures were convicted for participating in a meeting of an 
unregistered NGO, the For Fair Elections group (see Section 3).
    The Government permitted international and foreign NGO's and 
multilateral institutions dealing with human rights to visit the 
country and meet with local human rights groups as well as government 
officials. The International Labor Organization, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the UNHCR, the 
International Organization on Migration, and the OSCE have permanent 
offices in the country. The Constitution forbids ``the financing of 
political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and 
citizens, foreign states and international organizations.''
    The Presidential Commission on Human Rights is a consultative body. 
It prepares annual reports to the President that can be released to the 
public only with the President's consent. At the end of 1998, the 
Commission made public its annual report to the President for the first 
and only time by publishing an expurgated version of its report for 
1997. The report focused almost exclusively on ``economic and social 
rights,'' for example, the right to a decent standard of living. It 
concluded that the country consistently abides by human rights 
principles and suggested that those who blame the Government for social 
problems should realize that individual well-being ultimately is the 
responsibility of the individual. The Commission reached out to 
independent human rights organizations but made little progress in 
establishing itself as an Ombudsman. In general the Government showed 
greater willingness to focus on abuses highlighted by human rights 
monitors and individual citizens in the criminal justice system and to 
investigate allegations of corruption but tended to deny or downplay 
charges of abuses of civil liberties and political rights. In general 
the Government tended to deny or ignore charges of specific human 
rights abuses that were levied by human rights monitors and individual 
citizens. In its report to the President for 1997, the Commission 
charged that many domestic NGO's are oriented towards developed 
countries' standards and do not realize that progress towards a market 
economy and civil society is a slow, gradual process. It said that 
NGO's sympathetic to ``left-wing radicals'' have nothing constructive 
to offer.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``everyone is equal before law and 
court. No one may be subjected to any discrimination for reasons of 
origin, social position, occupation, property status, sex, race, 
nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of 
residence, or any other circumstances.'' However, the Government does 
not enforce this provision effectively on a consistent basis. The 
Government has favored ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and, 
according to many citizens, in the process of privatizing state 
enterprises.
    Women.--According to human rights groups, there is considerable 
domestic violence against women. A local NGO, the Feminist League, 
estimates that hundreds of thousands of women are the victims of 
spousal abuse. The Interior Ministry reported that family members or 
domestic partners were responsible for about onethird of the nearly 
8,500 crimes against women registered in the first half of 1999. During 
the same period, 81 women were killed by family members. The Feminist 
League reported that the levels of domestic violence remained 
approximately the same in 2000. Karaganda oblast reported 3,060 crimes 
against women in the first 6 months of 2000, including 33 murders and 
53 rapes. Almaty police reported 49 murders, 134, rapes and 936 
assaults against women during the first nine months of the year. There 
was no information on the percentage of these crimes successfully 
prosecuted, but police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic 
disputes, considering them to be the family's business, unless they 
believe that the abuse is life threatening. However, new domestic 
violence units opened during the year within the Almaty and Astana 
police departments. A women's crisis center in Almaty maintains that 
the Almaty police are very effective when there is a complaint. 
However, the police cannot detain a person legally for more than 72 
hours if the victim refuses to provide a written complaint. In most 
cases, women refuse to follow through with charges. The maximum 
sentence for wife beating is 3 years, but few such cases are 
prosecuted. A government commission on women and family continued to 
draw attention to the issue of domestic violence. Law enforcement 
authorities reported that 288 persons were convicted of rape in the 
first 8 months of 1999, although the total number of reported rapes was 
unavailable. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutors can 
initiate a rape case, absent aggravating circumstances such as gang 
rape, only upon the application of the victim. There were unconfirmed 
reports that prosecutors sometimes interpreted this provision to 
require rape victims to pay for forensic testing, pay the expenses of 
prosecution, and personally prosecute rape cases themselves. The 
punishment for rape can range from 3 to 15 years' imprisonment. There 
is very little reporting on rape in the press. There is no law 
specifically against spousal rape, which is proscribed under general 
rape laws.
    Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    There is no legal discrimination against women, but traditional 
cultural practices limit their role in everyday society and in owning 
and managing businesses or real property. The President and other 
members of the Government speak in favor of women's rights, and 
official state policy (adopted in 1997) states that constitutional 
prohibitions on sex discrimination must be supported by effective 
government measures. Women are underrepresented severely in higher 
positions in state enterprises and overrepresented in low-paying and 
some menial jobs. Women have unrestricted access to higher education. 
Approximately 30 women's rights organizations are registered, including 
the Feminist League, Women of the East, the Almaty Women's Information 
Center, and the Businesswomen's Association. In September the 
Government announced the creation of a $4.5 million (661 million tenge) 
fund to provide loans to female entrepreneurs. However, as of year's 
end, the fund had not distributed any loans.
    Children.--The Government is committed in principle to children's 
rights, but as in many other areas, budget stringencies and other 
priorities severely limit its effectiveness in dealing with children's 
issues. Education is mandatory through the llth grade, although 
students may begin technical training after the 9th grade. Secondary 
education is both free and universal. Kazakhstani law provides for 
equal access to education by both boys and girls. There is no societal 
pattern of abuse against children. Rural children normally work during 
harvests (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--Citizens with disabilities are entitled 
by law to assistance from the State. There is no legal discrimination 
against the disabled, but in practice, employers do not give them equal 
consideration. There are laws mandating the provision of accessibility 
to public buildings and commercial establishments for the disabled, but 
the Government does not enforce these laws. However, improvements to 
facilitate access are not uncommon in Almaty and Astana. Assisting 
disabled persons is a low priority for the Government. Mentally ill and 
mentally retarded citizens can be committed to institutions run by the 
State. These institutions are poorly run and inadequately funded. The 
NGO, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights, observed that 
the Government provides almost no care for the mentally ill and 
mentally retarded due to a lack of funds.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to results of the 
1999 census, the population of about 15 million consists of 
approximately 50 percent Kazakhs and 33 percent ethnic Slavs (Russians, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others) with many other ethnic groups 
represented, including Uzbeks (2.5 percent), and Germans (2.4 percent).
    The Government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazakhs 
in government employment, where ethnic Kazakhs predominate, as well as 
in education, housing, and other areas. However, the Government has 
largely abandoned the explicit ``Kazakhification'' campaign of the 1st 
year of independence (1991- 1992). President Nazarbayev has emphasized 
publicly that all nationalities are welcome. Nonetheless, many non-
Kazakhs are anxious about what they perceive as expanding preferences 
for ethnic Kazakhs. Many ethnic Kazakhs believe that such preferences 
are needed to reverse 200 years of discrimination against their 
community.
    Most of the population speaks Russian; only about one-half of 
ethnic Kazakhs speak Kazakh fluently. According to the Constitution, 
the Kazakh language is the state language. The Constitution states that 
the Russian language is used officially on a basis equal with that of 
the Kazakh language in organizations and bodies of local self-
administration. Some ethnic Russians believe that Russian should be 
designated as a second state language. The Government is encouraging 
more education of children in the Kazakh language, but it has done 
little to provide Kazakh-language education for adults. A 1997 language 
law intended to strengthen the use of Kazakh without infringing on the 
rights of citizens to use other languages has not been funded 
sufficiently to make Kazakh-language education universal.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provide for basic worker rights, including the right to organize and 
the right to strike; however, the Government at times infringed on 
worker rights. Activist unions came under government pressure for 
holding unsanctioned demonstrations and marches.
    A new Labor Code took effect on January 1. Among many other 
revisions, the new law provides for individual contracts between an 
employer and each employee, but allows ``optional'' collective labor 
contracts. It also allows unions to represent an employee in labor 
disputes, but an employee may choose other representation.
    Most workers remained members of state-sponsored trade unions 
established during the Soviet period, when membership was obligatory. 
At most enterprises, the state-sponsored unions continued to deduct 1 
percent of each worker's wage as dues. The state unions under the 
Communist system were, and for the most part still are, organs of the 
Government and work with management to enforce labor discipline and to 
discourage workers from forming or joining independent unions.
    A collective bargaining law gives workers the right to join or form 
unions of their choosing and to stop the automatic dues deductions for 
the state unions. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTUK, 
formerly the Independent Trade Union center of Kazakhstan) claims 
membership of about 250,000 persons; however, the actual number of 
independent trade union members is estimated to be much lower. The pro-
Government Federation of Trade Unions claims 4 million members; 
however, that figure is regarded as too high. To obtain legal status, 
an independent union must apply for registration with the local 
judicial authority at the oblast level and with the Ministry of 
Justice. Registration is generally lengthy, difficult, and expensive. 
The process of registering a union appears to be completely subjective, 
with no published criteria. No unions were registered or denied 
registration during the year. The two major independent trade union 
confederations are registered. Courts may cancel a union's 
registration, as a provincial court did in Kentau in 1998.
    The law does not provide mechanisms to protect workers who join 
independent unions from threats or harassment by enterprise management 
or state-run unions. Members of independent unions have been dismissed, 
transferred to lower paying or lower status jobs, threatened, and 
intimidated. According to independent union leaders, state unions work 
closely with management to ensure that independent trade union members 
are the first fired in times of economic downturn.
    Unions and individual workers exercised their right to strike 
during the year, primarily to protest the nonpayment of wages and in an 
attempt to recover back wages owed to workers. The nonpayment of wages 
continued to be the priority issue for workers. Early in the year, 
workers of the Uralsk ``Mettalist'' factory, led by the independent 
trade union of the factory, conducted mass meetings demanding the full 
payment of salaries. The company subsequently prohibited one of the 
union's leaders, Vlaoimir Podzhidaev, a member of the local city 
council, from entering the factory's territory. In addition police 
detained the union's chairman, Ainur Kurmanov, on March 31. Kurmanov 
alleged that police drugged and beat him, and detained him without 
charges for 7 days. He claimed that a local television station 
subsequently slandered him by showing footage of his ``drunk'' behavior 
in police custody.
    According to the law, workers may exercise the right to strike only 
if a labor dispute has not been resolved by means of existing 
conciliation procedures. In addition the law requires that employers be 
notified that a strike is to occur no less than 15 days before its 
commencement. There were numerous strikes throughout the country to 
protest the nonpayment of wages and unsafe working conditions. 
Construction workers in Astana held a series of strikes complaining of 
the degradation of their working conditions under foreign contractors. 
According to the CFTUK, the Turkish construction company ``Okan Holding 
Isot,'' under various pretexts, fired 125 of its employees in Astana 
shortly after the employees formed an independent labor union in 
November 1999. Workers at the company began a strike on March 29 to 
demand recognition of the union, collective bargaining, and the timely 
payment of wages. Police detained 8 out of 19 participants for 5 hours 
the same day. The workers were tried the following day and the leader, 
J. T. Sharipov, was sentenced to one day in jail for organizing an 
unsanctioned demonstration. The other seven were warned and then 
released.
    Independent unions complain about a provision in the Constitution 
that forbids the financing of trade unions by foreign legal entities 
and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations. After 
independence in 1991, independent trade unions received financial 
assistance from the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). Most 
of this assistance ended in 1996 when funding was reduced, and FTUI 
currently provides no funding. Independent trade unions have sought new 
means of support; some associations of trade unions were able to 
receive financing from foreign sources by registering as ``public 
organizations'' rather than labor unions. The law does not forbid other 
nonmonetary types of assistance such as training, participation in 
which appeared to increase.
    By law unions freely may join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies. Most independent trade unions 
belong to the CFTUK, headquartered in Astana. The Independent Miners 
Federation of Kazakhstan and the State Miners' Union of Karaganda are 
members of the Miners' International Federation. Unions belonging to 
the CFTUK are not members of international federations but are able to 
maintain contacts with foreign trade union federations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law permits 
collective bargaining and collective agreements. If a union's demands 
are not acceptable to management, it may present those demands to an 
arbitration commission composed of management, union officials, and 
independent technical experts. Unions routinely appealed to arbitration 
commissions.
    The new Labor Law that took effect January 1 reduced the role of 
unions by requiring employers and employees to negotiate individual 
labor contracts. Collective bargaining agreements are allowed as long 
as they do not reduce protections afforded to the workers in their 
individual contracts or under law. Previously the terms of contracts 
were set only by law and collective bargaining agreements. The new law 
also gave employers the right to fire an employee without the consent 
of the employee's union.
    There is no legal protection against antiunion discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones. Free economic zones enjoy all 
the privileges of export processing zones as well as other tax 
privileges and abatements, but labor conditions there appear to be no 
different from elsewhere in the country. On August 1, the President 
signed a decree abolishing the last free economic zone to become 
effective on January 1, 2001.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor except ``at the sentence of the court or in the 
conditions of a state of emergency or martial law,'' and it is 
generally not known to occur; however, in 1999 there were reports that 
some persons were required to provide labor or the use of privately 
owned equipment with no, or very low, compensation to help gather the 
annual grain harvest.
    The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded 
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years, but only for 
parttime work (5 hours a day) that is not physically onerous. A child 
between the ages of 14 and 16 may work only with the permission of his 
or her parents. Education is compulsory to age 16, and the law 
stipulates harsh punishment for employers who exploit children under 
this age. Responsibility for enforcement rests with the Ministry of 
Labor, for administrative offenses punishable by fines, and the MVD for 
criminal offenses. The Criminal Code allows for fines up to $25,000 
(3,675,000 tenge) and 2 years in prison in cases where a minor is 
injured or placed in unhealthy conditions. Children from the ages of 16 
to 18 can work full time provided that they are not required to do any 
heavy work. The Government has acknowledged that children in this age 
group work in construction and other heavy industries but report that 
duties for children are limited to washing windows, general cleaning, 
laying tile, and similar nonstrenuous activities. Although the 
Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, the sale, trafficking, and abduction of children or hiring 
minors for exploitation are punishable with up to 12 years in prison. 
There were no reports of forced or bonded child labor (see Section 
6.c.), and abuse of child labor is generally not a problem; however, 
child labor is used routinely in agricultural areas, especially during 
harvest season.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 the Government resumed 
setting a minimum wage. The minimum monthly wage remained at its 1999 
level of approximately $20 (2,680 tenge). The Government raised the 
minimum monthly pension to approximately $25 per month (3,500 tenge) 
and cleared pension arrears. These amounts do not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family and fell far short of the 
minimum subsistence amount for one person as calculated in 1998 by the 
Kazakhstan Institute of Nutrition.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although most enterprises 
maintained a 40-hour workweek, with at least a 24hour rest period. The 
Constitution provides that labor agreements stipulate the length of 
working time, vacation days, holidays, and paid annual leave for each 
worker.
    Although the Constitution provides for the right to ``safe and 
hygienic working conditions,'' working and safety conditions in the 
industrial sector are substandard. Safety consciousness is low. Workers 
in factories usually do not wear protective clothing, such as goggles 
and hard hats, and work in conditions of poor visibility and 
ventilation. Management largely ignores regulations concerning 
occupational health and safety, which are not enforced by the Ministry 
of Labor and the state-sponsored unions. Workers, including miners, 
have no legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons, although government officials generally 
maintained that prosecutors could effectively charge traffickers under 
the existing Criminal Code. Article 270, Illegal Involvement in 
Prostitution, provides punishment of up to 3 years in jail. 
Prostitution connected with organized crime is punishable by up to 5 
years in jail. According to Article 135, kidnaping of persons is 
punishable by a term of up to 7 years. An organized group working for 
sexual or other exploitation can be punished with up to 15 years in 
jail and confiscation of property.
    There are no official statistics on trafficking, but women's rights 
groups and the IOM report additional indications that the problem is 
serious and growing. However, experts estimate that from 5,000 to 
70,000 women have been victimized in the past 10 years. The higher 
figure was the result of a survey of Almaty women completed in April, 
the Crisis Center for Women and Children. In 1999, 25 women were 
repatriated from greece, 21 from the United Arab Emirates, 16 from 
Turkey and 3 from Israel, according to the MVD. In December the press 
reported that 2,000 women were sent to South Korea for prostitution; 2 
had been repatriated. All of the trafficking cases known to the IOM 
involve women between the ages of 18 and 25 who had been trafficked for 
purposes of sexual exploitation. According to the Kazakhstan Crisis 
Center for Women and Children, most women are recruited with promises 
of good jobs or marriage abroad. The organization blames the rising 
number of women being trafficked from the country on the lack of 
employment opportunities and lack of information about trafficking. The 
KNB reported in June that it broke up a trafficking ring that 
specialized in sending women to the United Arab Emirates for 
prostitution. Criminal charges were brought against five alleged 
members of the ring. The five were arrested while trying to board a 
woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai. The official press 
reported that customs officers and border officials were under 
investigation for complicity with the ring.
    The Government has no programs to target trafficking in women. 
However senior government officials presented reports on the problem, 
including the lack of appropriate legislation, during a November 
conference on trafficking in persons. The participants adopted a 
resolution which called for revision of legislation to make trafficking 
illegal; a distinction between victims of trafficking and illegal 
migrants, and a joint governmental, NGO and international organization 
approach to the problem.
    Nongovernmental efforts to combat trafficking in persons increased. 
The Kazakhstan Crisis Center for Women and Children published a 
brochure warning of the danger of trafficking in women and conducted a 
survey to measure the level of awareness of the trafficking problem. In 
response to international organizations' efforts to raise awareness of 
the problem, local feminist leagues have also begun to get involved. 
The Feminist League of Kokshetau discovered that 50 local women had 
been sent to Greece for prostitution. Four regional workshops on 
trafficking in Aktau, Petropavlosk, Kokshetau, and Shmkent were held 
during the year.
                               __________

                               KYRGYZSTAN

    Although the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government as a 
democratic republic, President Askar Akayev dominates the Government. 
Both presidential and parliamentary elections were held during the 
year, and both were marred by serious irregularities. In October 
President Akayev was elected to his third term. Although the 
Constitution only allows an individual to serve two presidential terms, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that Akayev could serve a third term 
because he had been elected to his first term under the old Soviet-era 
Constitution. The Government disqualified otherwise qualified 
candidates through conviction on questionable criminal charges. 
Observers reported instances of ballot box stuffing, voter 
intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, and the presence of a large 
number of local and regional administration officials in and around the 
polling stations. Parliamentary elections were held in February and 
March, the second such elections since independence in 1991. For the 
first time, 15 of the Legislative Assembly's 60 seats were distributed 
proportionally based on party lists; however, political parties remain 
weak, and the Government took numerous actions that disadvantaged 
opposition political parties. The Government used judicial proceedings 
in numerous instances to prevent prominent political opposition 
candidates from participating in or winning office in the parliamentary 
and presidential elections. The Parliament has become increasingly 
active and on occasion has blocked presidential initiatives; however, 
in many areas it still does not check the power of the President 
effectively. The judiciary also is dominated by the executive branch. 
Beginning in August, there were continuous military engagements in the 
southwest of the country, near the border with Tajikistan, between 
government forces and armed insurgents.
    Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the Ministry of National 
Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and the procurator's office for 
both types of crime. Both the MVD and the MNB deal with corruption and 
organized crime. These ministries inherited their infrastructure from 
their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general control 
of the Government and generally conform their actions to the law.
    Border guards are under the full control of the Government. Some 
members of the police committed human rights abuses.
    The country is poor and mountainous, with a rough balance between 
agricultural and industrial production. Cotton, tobacco, vegetables, 
and sugar are the primary agricultural exports. The country also 
exports hydroelectric power, gold, antimony, and mercury. The 
Government has carried out progressive market reforms, although some 
reforms have not been implemented fully. The economy was stable during 
the year. According to government figures, gross domestic product 
growth (GDP) growth was 5 percent. Inflation was estimated at 9.6 
percent. The country faces an external debt of roughly $1.69 billion. 
Industrial production remains significantly below preindependence 
levels. The level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed workers, and 
government workers with low salaries or unpaid benefits continues to be 
high. Government figures indicate the average annual salary is $165 
(8,072 soms), while the subsistence level is estimated at $295 (14,463 
soms). Foreign assistance plays a significant role in the country's 
budget.
    The Government's human rights record worsened and was poor in 
several key areas. The Government limits citizens' ability to change 
their Government. Prison conditions are very poor, and there were many 
cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. Executive domination of the 
judiciary limited citizens' rights to due process. Executive branch 
interference affected verdicts involving prominent opposition figures. 
The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. 
Authorities pressured journalists who criticized individual members of 
the Government. The Government used bureaucratic means to harass and 
pressure the independent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), 
and the opposition. The Government at times restricted freedom of 
assembly; in particular, there were serious problems with political 
parties' rights to free assembly. The Government at times inhibited 
freedom of association. The Government generally respected freedom of 
religion; however at times it infringed on this right. The Government 
harassed and pressured human rights groups. Violence against women is a 
problem that authorities often ignore, and societal discrimination 
against women persists. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose 
of forced prostitution also is a persistent problem. Child abuse is a 
problem, and there is a growing number of street children. 
Discrimination against ethnic minorities and child labor are problems.
    Armed insurgents in the country's southwest areas along the Tajik-
Kyrgyz/Kyrgyz-Uzbek border took citizens and foreign nationals hostage 
in August.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no further developments in the January 1998 beating 
death by police of Muratbek Sulaimanov.
    The criminal investigation of the 1998 police beating and killing 
by burial alive of Sergei Skromnov continues. Two police officers 
suspected of the killing are in detention. A third police officer was 
released on bail.
    Nigmat Bazakov, a leading representative of the ethnic minority 
Uighur community was murdered on March 28. The identity of the 
perpetrator is unknown. Figures in the Uighur community indicated that 
the killing likely was a criminal, business-related act, and not linked 
to government discrimination against Uighurs. Bazakov had run for a 
seat in the legislative assembly in the second parliamentary election 
but lost in Bishkek's eighth district.
    In early August, fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), an organization opposed to the present Uzbek Government, crossed 
the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and engaged Kyrgyz security forces. As of 
October 9 when fighting ended, a total of 30 government troops were 
killed. It was estimated that 120 IMU partisans died and 200 were 
injured. No new attacks had occurred by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances due to action by the Government or domestic groups.
    In August armed insurgents entered the Southern Batken Oblast from 
Tajikistan and took a number of citizens and foreign nationals hostage. 
There were military engagements between the Government and the 
insurgents, who identified themselves as members of the IMU. Some of 
the hostages escaped uninjured after 6 days of captivity. The other 
hostages were released unharmed several days later.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, the 
supervision of conditions for pretrial detainees is poor, and abuses, 
such as beatings to extract confessions, sometimes occur. Police 
patrols are supervised poorly, are not always paid promptly, and 
sometimes commit crimes. Police sometimes used ill-defined charges to 
arrest persons (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
    On March 22, police in Kara Bura, Talas Oblast, reportedly used 
excessive force to break up a peaceful demonstration. Between 70 and 
120 demonstrators were arrested. Approximately half were released the 
following day, and the remainder were eventually released. The 
participants were protesting irregularities in the February 20 and 
March 12 rounds of parliamentary elections (see Section 2.b.).
    Several police officials were charged with issuing passports 
specifically for use in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
    In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded their authority by 
trying major crimes, using torture to extract confessions, or even 
levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as stoning and death 
sentences have abated, and there were no reports of such action during 
the year (see Section 1.e.).
    Prison conditions (including overcrowding, food shortages, and lack 
of heat and other necessities) are very poor. Those detained by the MNB 
rather than the MVD are kept in MNB facilities; after conviction, they 
go to a regular prison. In June 1999 a new Criminal Procedure Code went 
into effect, replacing the previous 1994 Soviet-era Criminal Code. The 
new code contains the right for attorney-client visits of unlimited 
number and duration; however official permission still is required. The 
code also greatly expands the rights of defense lawyers to obtain all 
evidence gathered during the course of the investigation. Prison visits 
by family members are at the discretion of the investigator during the 
investigation phase. After conviction, family members may visit 
regularly.
    In principle nonfamily visitors seldom are permitted. However, some 
citizens, including local human rights monitors, usually can obtain 
official permission for a visit through personal connections. The 
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited Feliks Kulov, 
an opposition political leader, in March when he was in jail; however, 
it does not have full access to prisons (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The judicial system 
continues to operate, in many cases, under Soviet laws and procedures, 
and authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; 
however, there were many cases of arbitrary arrest and detention 
related to the Parliamentary and presidential elections. The 
Procurator's Office determines who may be detained, arrested, and 
prosecuted. The MNB, the MVD, and the General Procurator carry out 
investigations. Since 1990 persons arrested or charged with crimes have 
had the right to a defense counsel, who is required to visit the 
accused within the first 3 days of incarceration. However, sometimes 
the accused first sees the defense counsel only at the trial.
    The Criminal Code permits the Procurator to detain suspects for 72 
hours before releasing them or charging them with a crime. The 
Procurator must issue an arrest warrant before a person can be 
detained. If a suspect is charged, the Procurator must advise defense 
counsel immediately. The accused usually remains in detention while the 
Procurator investigates and prepares the case for trial. The Procurator 
has discretion to keep the accused in pretrial detention for up to 1 
year, but there are conditions for provisional release before trial. 
After 1 year, the Procurator must release the accused or ask Parliament 
to extend the period of detention. Since independence there have been 
no known instances in which Parliament has been asked to extend a 
detention. The Criminal Procedure Code requires notification of a 
detainee's family by the investigator within 12 hours of detention. 
This requirement often is not observed in practice.
    The Government used judicial proceedings in numerous instances to 
prevent prominent political opposition candidates from participating in 
or winning office in the parliamentary and presidential elections. For 
example, on January 25, the Government began criminal proceedings 
against People's Party opposition leader and registered parliamentary 
candidate Daniyar Usenov based on 4-year-old assault charges that had 
been withdrawn long before by the person allegedly assaulted (see 
Sections 1.e. and 3).
    The Government arrested opposition party Ar-Namys activist Emil 
Aliyev on March 9, 3 days before the second round of the parliamentary 
elections. The charges related to alleged fraud in a 1994 loan 
transaction. Aliyev was released from custody on August 14 for reasons 
of poor health. Also on March 9, the Government declared the Issyk-Kul 
election invalid. The Government subsequently charged Omurbek 
Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys party and candidate in that 
election, with fraud, which made him ineligible to run in the repeat 
election.
    On March 22, the Government arrested opposition political leader 
Feliks Kulov at a hospital where he was receiving treatment for cardiac 
problems. The arrest followed his defeat in a parliamentary election 
and the announcement of his intention to run in the presidential 
election. He was arrested on suspicion of participating in illegal 
activities by members of the Kalkhan antiterrorist squad, while he 
headed the Security Ministry in 1997-1998. Kulov also was suspected of 
misappropriating some $22,000 that the Security Ministry received from 
commercial firms. After his arrest, demonstrations were held demanding 
his release. On April 5, the Government terminated People's Party 
leader Daniyar Usenov's conditional release and took him into custody, 
despite no violation of the terms of his conditional release. He was 
released later that same day by intervention of President Akayev.
    The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (a Turkic people 
native to western China) closely. In the past, it arrested Uighurs on 
ill-defined charges. In March the MNB arrested a resident ethnic Uighur 
from China for lacking a residence permit and for possession of Islamic 
literature that was deemed fundamentalist by the authorities. He 
reportedly was deported forcibly to China (see Section 2.c.).
    In Jalalabad Oblast, throughout the year, the MNB detained more 
than 20 persons for membership in the Khieb-Ut-Takhrir Islamic 
organization and distribution of its literature. The Government has 
prosecuted criminally 11 of those detained for alleged possession of 
material containing appeals of an extreme character.
    The Government does not employ forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, despite extensive reforms in the court 
system and a large body of new law, the executive branch continues to 
dominate the judiciary.
    Cases originate in local courts; they may move to appeals courts at 
the district or regional level and finally to the Supreme Court. 
Separate courts of arbitration handle civil disputes, and traditional 
elders' courts handle low-level crime in rural areas.
    Defendants are afforded the same constitutional protections in both 
military and civilian courts, although military court proceedings can 
be closed to the public. A civilian can be tried in a military court if 
one of the codefendants is a member of the military.
    Local elders' courts are found in almost every oblast and region. 
They exercise their authority by trying petty crimes, such as robbery, 
hooliganism, or theft. In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded 
their authority by trying major crimes, using torture to extract 
confessions or even levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as 
stoning and death sentences have abated, and there were no reports of 
such action during the year. Local elders' courts are under the 
supervision of the Procurator's Office, but they may not receive close 
oversight due to the fact that many such courts are located in remote 
regions, which makes monitoring difficult.
    The Procurator brings cases to court and tries them before a judge 
and two ``people's assessors'' (pensioners or citizens chosen from 
labor collectives). The accused and the defense counsel have access to 
all evidence gathered by the Procurator. They attend all proceedings, 
which are generally public, and are allowed to question witnesses and 
present evidence. In practice, all members of the court have equal 
rights. Anyone in the courtroom may question witnesses. Witnesses do 
not always recapitulate their evidence in court; instead they affirm or 
deny their statements in the Procurator's files.
    The court compares the facts as presented by the Procurator and the 
defense, and in most cases makes its decision after receiving all 
available information in each case. The court may render one of three 
decisions: innocent; guilty; or indeterminate, that is, the case is 
returned to the Procurator for further investigation. The decision of a 
court to return a case to the Procurator for further investigation may 
not be appealed, and accused persons are returned to the Procurator's 
custody, where they may remain under detention. In practice there was 
considerable evidence of executive branch interference in verdicts 
involving prominent political opposition figures.
    The Procurator, not the judge, is in charge of criminal 
proceedings. Thus the courts are widely perceived as a rubber stamp for 
the Procurator and for high-ranking Government officials and not as the 
protectors of citizens' rights. In addition very low judges' salaries 
have led to a well-grounded view among lawyers and citizens that all 
but a very few scrupulously honest judges are open to bribes or 
pressure.
    The Government introduced in 1999 several judicial reform measures, 
including a proposal to establish an independent judicial budget, 
creation of judicial judgment enforcement procedures, and independent 
judicial training; however, but no progress was made during the year in 
implementing these measures. Generally accepted international 
practices, including the presumption of the innocence of the accused, 
exist in law but are not always respected.
    Judges do not hold positions for life. As provided in the 
Constitution, terms for judges range from 15 years for Constitutional 
Court judges to 3 years for first-term local judges. In 1993 a new 
system of court administration was introduced; judges are tested on 
their knowledge of the law and new civil codes. If judges fail these 
tests, they may be disqualified from holding office. The process 
appears to have increased judicial professionalism, and a number of 
judges have been removed due to poor performance on the exams. Some 
removals appear to have been subjective, but most lawyers and judges 
consider the system to be a fair measure of competence.
    The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial 
system has led to charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary 
and unfair and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members 
of other groups; however in December an ethnic Korean was appointed 
head of the Supreme Court. Although systematic discrimination is not 
clearly evident, allegations that it exists are credible in some cases. 
There are also complaints by Uzbeks, and even by ethnic Kyrgyz, that 
the southern portion of the country is underrepresented in the 
judiciary.
    Economic crimes such as tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of 
government property, including electric power, are common. Prosecution 
for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears to be 
directed at opponents of the Government. Legislators in the past have 
used their parliamentary immunity to avoid being brought to court. 
However, an October 1998 referendum included an amendment that limited 
immunity to official acts only.
    Trials took place in March and September for two of the three 
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) who were arrested in 1999 for 
misappropriation of state property, abuse of power, and tax evasion. 
One M.P. was found guilty and sentenced to time served during the 
course of the investigation. The other was sentenced to 14 years' 
imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The case of the third MP 
remains under investigation.
    The Government frequently used the judicial process to eliminate 
key political opposition leaders from participation in elections and 
narrow the range of choice for voters. A number of judicial actions 
against individuals apparently were motivated politically.
    On June 27, the Government began the trial of opposition Ar-Namys 
Party leader Feliks Kulov in a closed military court on charges of 
instigation of and accessory to fraud and abuse of power for personal 
interests. He was held in custody from March 22 through August 7. Legal 
provisions allow the judge discretion to release Kulov pending trial; 
however, he was not released. The military court acquitted Kulov of all 
charges on August 7, but the military Procurator appealed the 
acquittal. On September 11, the Appeals Court ruled in the Procurator's 
favor and returned the case to the lower court for possible retrial. 
The Supreme Court denied Kulov's appeal of the Appellate Court's 
decision. The Government began a new trial on the same charges on 
October 3. The Government denied Kulov the right to representation by 
two Russian lawyers on the grounds that his case involved sensitive 
information and therefore foreign attorneys could not participate.
    There were no reports of political prisoners; however, the 
Government detained Feliks Kulov, Emil Aliyev, and Daniyar Usenov on 
grounds that appeared to be politically motivated (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unlawful entry into a home 
against the wishes of the occupant and states that a person's private 
life, privacy of correspondence, and telephonic and telegraphic 
communications are protected. The law and procedures require the 
General Procurator's approval for wiretaps, searches of homes, 
interception of mail, and similar acts. A change in the law in 1995 
weakened these protections by allowing the Procurator to give approval 
for searches over the telephone; thus no written proof exists to verify 
that the search was approved. Furthermore, in certain cases, law 
enforcement officers first may carry out a search and then get approval 
ex post facto within 24 hours. If approval is not given, any evidence 
seized is inadmissible in court.
    Organizational structures responsible for violations during the 
Soviet era have remained largely in place; however, there were no 
reports of violations of citizens' privacy. There were concerns by 
citizens active in politics or human rights problems that the privacy 
of their communications was violated, but evidence to that effect is 
not available.
    The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (see Section 
1.d.)

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these 
rights.
    The 1992 law on the mass media provides for freedom of speech and 
of the mass media and outlines registration procedures. It identifies 
prohibited material: Government and commercial secrets; material 
advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious 
groups; desecration of national norms, ethics and symbols such as the 
national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the 
honor and dignity of a person. Two laws related to the media, On 
Guarantees and Free Access to Information and On The Protection of the 
Professional Activities of Journalists, were adopted in December 1997.
    The Government closed three newspapers during the year by refusing 
to publish them. Kapitalism and Litsa stopped publishing in October, 
and Res Publica was closed for 4 months. One journalist was arrested as 
a direct result of journalistic activities.
    All media must register with the Ministry of Justice and wait for 
ministry approval before beginning to operate. The media law states 
that the registration process requires 1 month. During the year, there 
were no reports of media organizations that could not register in a 
timely manner.
    Libel is a criminal, not a civil, action. The Government attempted 
at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to amend the Criminal Code 
to remove libel; however, its efforts were defeated in Parliament by an 
overwhelming majority. As a result of the October 1998 referendum, the 
Constitution now includes language that precludes Parliament from 
passing laws that infringe on free speech. However, to date there has 
been no implementing legislation for this amendment.
    There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and 
magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are 
also several hours daily of independent television and radio 
broadcasting. However, state television, radio, and government 
newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to 
influence media coverage. Additionally, the State's printing house, 
Uchkun, is the only newspaper publisher in the country.
    Uchkun refused to print the independent newspaper Res Publica for 4 
months during the year. This action was taken pending Res Publica's 
full payment of a fine awarded to the president of the state television 
and radio corporation in an earlier honor and dignity suit. Uchkun also 
refused to deliver Res Publica to the regions via its distribution 
system after it resumed publishing the newspaper. Res Publica also 
experienced distribution problems with the state postal system prior to 
the presidential elections, and the newspapers were confiscated from 
kiosks by authorities in Osh and Jalalabad.
    The opposition Kyrgyz-language newspaper Asaba again was subjected 
to pressure and intimidation shortly after the newspaper's owner 
declared his candidacy to run in the Presidential election. Two honor 
and dignity suits were lodged against the newspaper, a longstanding tax 
dispute continued, and a long-dormant debt case was reactivated against 
the newspaper. A Bishkek district court ruled on October 20 that Asaba 
must pay $105,000 (5 million soms) in compensation to parliamentary 
deputy Turdakun Usubaliev for having insulted him repeatedly over a 
period of 8 years Seven Asaba journalists also were ordered to pay $20 
to 30 (1,500 soms) each for articles critical of Usubaliyev. The 
newspaper had lodged a counter suit against Usubaliyev accusing him of 
insulting the newspaper and its journalists. The judge ruled in favor 
of the counter suit, Usubaliyev must pay the newspaper $1,000 (50,000 
soms).
    After a year of government harassment, tax investigations, and 
change of its editorial leadership and direction, the independent daily 
newspaper Vecherny Bishkek muted its criticism of the Government.
    In June an independent journalist from Jalalabad was sentenced to 2 
years' imprisonment and fined $2,250 (108,000 soms) for libeling a 
judge. After spending 5 weeks in jail, the journalist upon appeal was 
released and his fine was reduced to $210 (10,080 soms). Three NGO's, 
Internews, the Association of Journalists, and the Osh Media Resource 
Center provided legal representation for the journalist. On October 27 
the independent newspaper Res Publica was fined $5,000 (25,000 soms) 
for an article it published 2 years earlier that criticized the 
Ministry of Justice's decisions to revoke the registration of the 
Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights in September 1997 and to register in 
1998 an alternative body with the same name that was loyal to the 
Government.
    The Government harassed the owner, the editor, and a journalist of 
the independent newspaper Delo No. These journalists underwent lengthy 
interrogations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their offices 
and homes were raided and searched. A case is pending against the 
newspaper, alleging that it published state secrets during its coverage 
of the closed trial of Feliks Kulov. The Government also pressured 
independent television stations. The Government interfered with the 
stations' programming, particularly their coverage of politics, 
elections, and candidates. During Feliks Kulov's pretrial 
incarceration, the Government directed stations to air a documentary 
program that was highly critical of Kulov. Government interference with 
independent television and radio stations continues.
    There are two television stations in Osh that broadcast in Uzbek: 
Osh Television broadcasts in Uzbek part of the time--although the 
station has been criticized by the Government for airing too much Uzbek 
language programming--and Mezon Television, all of whose programs are 
in Uzbek. The latter was founded by the Mezon Uzbek Ethnic Center to 
serve the needs of the large Uzbek population in Osh. A case was 
pending against Mezon Television for broadcasting a candidate's 
political advertisement, which allegedly had the potential to inspire 
interethnic hatred during the parliamentary elections.
    Although Osh Television has a license to broadcast, its dispute 
with the National Agency for Communications (NAC) continues. The NAC 
required Osh Television to change its broadcast frequency. The station 
and the association of journalists continue to protest the change as 
unfair and not justified technically. It also would impose a financial 
hardship on the station. The NAC's directive that Osh Television switch 
channels was postponed until the end of the year. In addition Osh 
television is engaged in an ongoing dispute with the tax authorities 
for what it considers unfair tax assessments.
    Some independent media continue to operate despite these pressures.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; however, at times 
the Government restricted this right in practice. The Government on 
occasion used force to disrupt peaceful demonstrations and officials, 
including those at local levels, sometimes use regulations that require 
registration of rallies and demonstrations to restrict this right. The 
law requires official written permission for holding assemblies, 
rallies, and demonstrations.
    Permits are required for public marches and gatherings but are 
routinely available. Rallies and demonstrations are held regularly in 
front of the Government Building and in other places. Throughout the 
year, several peaceful protests were held outside the President's 
office. Those demonstrating included pensioners, political and human 
rights monitors, and ethnic groups living in the country, such as 
Uighurs and Kurds. During the year, there were many demonstrations 
protesting the results of the parliamentary elections and the arrests 
of opposition figures. On March 25, approximately 500 demonstrators 
gathered in front of the Constitutional Court in Bishkek to demonstrate 
against the results of the second round of parliamentary elections. 
This demonstration was held without incident. Throughout the spring, 
demonstrations were held by supporters, particularly in the Talas 
Oblast in support of Feliks Kulov (see Section 3). While the police and 
local authorities did not disrupt the majority of demonstrations, there 
were instances when the Government either broke up peaceful 
demonstrations, or harassed those protesting. There are credible 
reports that police used excessive force to break up a peaceful 
demonstration in Kara Bura (Talas Oblast) on March 20. Over 100 
demonstrators were arrested. In April demonstrators who were protesting 
Kulov's arrest throughout downtown Bishkek were required to move from 
the steps of a government building to a park. Local authorities stated 
that the demonstrators did not obtain the required permit and that the 
demonstrations were impeding traffic and creating disturbances. The 
demonstrators subsequently were moved to another, less public, area of 
Bishkek. Pro-Kulov demonstrators also gathered in front of various 
government offices and the White House. They also demonstrated in front 
of the U.S. Embassy and the office of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These demonstrations were peaceful and 
were not broken up by police.
    The opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (``DDK'') was 
denied a permit to organize a demonstration in front of the White 
House.
    Demonstrations also were held in support of opposition People's 
Party Leader Daniyar Usenov, who was arrested and briefly detained 
after the second round of the parliamentary elections.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
while the Government generally respects this right, at times local 
authorities inhibited it in practice.
    The 1991 Law on Public Organizations, which includes labor unions, 
political parties, and cultural associations, requires registration of 
these organizations with the Ministry of Justice. Excessive caution by 
some officials is a contributing element for the delay some 
organizations experience in registering. Ultimately all organizations 
that sought registration during the year were registered. The Kyrgyz 
Committee for Human Rights (KHCR) was reregistered in 1999; however, 
due to government pressure its president, Ramazan Dyryldaev, fled the 
country (see Section 4).
    In June 1999 Parliament passed a new law on NGO's. This law 
distinguishes NGO's from political parties, labor unions, and religious 
organizations and lowers the required number of members for 
registration. The President signed this law into effect at the end of 
1999.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the law provide for 
freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice; however, the Government occasionally infringes on this 
right. The Constitution provides for a secular state and the separation 
of church and state, and the Government does not support any one 
religion. The Government expressly forbids the teaching of both 
religion and atheism in public schools.
    In 1996 the Government created a State Commission on Religious 
Affairs (SCRA), officially in order to promote religious tolerance, 
protect freedom of conscience, and oversee laws on religion. The 
Commission quickly became active and has overseen the registration of 
over 300 religious institutions, of which 210 are Christian 
denominations. According to a 1997 presidential decree, all religious 
organizations must register with the SCRA, which must recognize the 
registrant as a religious organization; each congregation must register 
separately. Subsequently a religious organization must register with 
the Ministry of Justice to obtain status as a legal entity, which is 
necessary to own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in 
contractual activities. However, if a religious organization engages in 
commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes in accordance with the 
tax code. In practice the Ministry has never registered a religious 
organization without prior registration by the SCRA. There were no 
known instances during the year of the Commission refusing attempts by 
religious groups to register, although the process sometimes is 
cumbersome, taking a month on average. The Unification Church, which is 
registered as a social, rather than a religious organization, has 
``semiofficial status''.
    Islam is the single most widely practiced faith. Official sources 
estimate that up to 80 percent of the populace Muslim. There are 
approximately 1,225 mosques in the country, of which 700 are 
registered. Approximately 17 percent of the population is Russian 
Orthodox. There are 40 houses of prayer for other Christian 
denominations. There were no reports of interference by authorities 
with worship services.
    A number of missionary groups operate in the country. They operate 
freely, although they are required to register with the Government. 
There is anecdotal evidence of periodic tension between followers of 
conservative Islam and foreign missionaries in rural areas. Government 
authorities indicated that they would monitor the activities of the 
Unification Church, which is led by Reverend Moon. The Unification 
Church currently is not active in the country, but it has a presence 
through the charity organization of Reverend Moon's wife. There were no 
reports of interference with its activities during the period covered 
by this report.
    The Government is concerned about the threat of political extremism 
in the guise of conservative Islam, whose followers it labels 
``Wahabbis''. The sentencing in May of three Uighur Islamic militants 
who were charged with the 1998 bombings in Osh added to the 
Government's concern about ``Wahhabist'' elements operating in the 
country. Armed incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
in August, as well as between August and October 1999, also increased 
the Government's apprehension about radical Islam and the actions of 
its followers.
    According to a March 21 Amnesty International report, Jelil Turadi, 
an ethnic Uighur Chinese national was arrested in Bishkek for not 
having a necessary residency permit. Unofficial sources stated that 
after a police search of his apartment turned up religious material 
that was deemed fundamentalist, Turadi was taken into custody for 
possessing ``Wahabbist'' material, and after being interrogated by 
Chinese and Kyrgyz security agents, was deported back to China.
    On September 6, security forces arrested a 23-year-old man in Kara 
Suu and charged him with instigating ``national, racial and religious 
enmity.'' He admitted to security forces that he belonged to the banned 
fundamentalist organization Hezeb-E-Tahrir. According to press 
accounts, eight persons were arrested in August for distributing 
literature produced by the IMU.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In general government policy allows free 
travel within and outside the country; however, certain Soviet-era 
policies continue to complicate internal migration, resettlement, and 
travel abroad. Under the Soviet-era law still in force, citizens need 
official government permission (a propiska) to work and settle in a 
particular area of the country. Strictly speaking the propiska affords 
the right to reside in a given city or region. In addition home and 
apartment owners legally can sell their property only to buyers with 
such permission. In practice many employers traditionally have refused 
to provide employment to any applicant residing illegally. However, 
this law has not been enforced recently. Persons now move within the 
country, purchase homes, and sell businesses without hindrance.
    There is no law on emigration. In August 1999, a presidential 
decree stated that exit visa requirements would be abolished by October 
1999, and the law was fully implemented by the end of the year. 
Citizens now can travel abroad without an exit visa; however, some 
travelers still may be required to present letters of invitation to 
validate their passports for international travel for their first trips 
abroad, or for the purpose of emigration. After validation of the 
passport, travel is unrestricted. A Soviet-era law prohibits emigration 
within 5 years of working with state secrets. No one is believed to 
have been barred from emigration under this statute during the year. 
After validation of the passport, travel is unrestricted. All passport 
applications are reviewed by the Ministry of National Security. 
Emigration of both ethnic Russian and Russian-speakers has risen 
significantly since independence due to fears of discrimination, the 
threat of continued fighting in the south, and the issue of dual 
citizenship (an agreement recognizing dual citizenship has not been 
signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan). Since independence over 300,000 
ethnic Russians and 200,000 Russian-language speakers have emigrated 
from the country (see Section 5).
    Emigrants are not prevented from returning to the country, and 
there is reportedly a small but steady flow of returnees.
    The armed militants who crossed the border into southern portions 
of the country from Tajikistan caused an estimated 1,139 citizens to 
flee their homes and left them internally displaced. Most of those 
displaced have returned to their homes. The Government, assisted by 
NGO's and international organizations, rendered assistance to the 
displaced.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees.
    According to the UNHCR, there were approximately 140 refugees from 
Chechnya in the country who were granted first asylum. An additional 
11,671 were granted refugee status. Of this number, 1,000 were from 
Afghanistan, and the remainder from Tajikistan. Twenty-two asylum 
requests from Tajikistan were denied. Since 1993 the country has 
offered ``first asylum'' to those who have qualified for first asylum 
status.
    There were no reports of expulsion of those having a valid claim to 
refugee status. However, there were reports of Uighurs opposed to 
Chinese policies being repatriated forcibly to China where they feared 
persecution. The UNHCR assisted approximately 669 Tajik refugees to 
return to Tajikistan during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully; however, in practice citizens' ability to do so 
is limited. During the year both presidential and parliamentary 
elections were held and both were marred by serious irregularities.
    The Constitution mandates presidential elections every 5 years. 
There is a two-term limit. Although the Constitution only allows an 
individual to serve two presidential terms, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that Akayev could serve a third term because he had been elected 
to his first term under the old Soviet-era Constitution. However the 
Government took steps to disqualify otherwise qualified candidates 
through conviction on questionable criminal charges.
    Akayev was elected to a third term as President on October 29 in an 
election that did not follow international standards for equal, free, 
fair, and accountable elections. Restrictions on the registration of 
candidates limited the field to six candidates, and there was 
intervention by local officials in the electoral process. The OSCE/
ODIHR stated that ``international standards for equal, free, fair, and 
accountable elections were not met.'' Although six competing candidates 
offered the electorate some political choice, the restrictive process 
of candidate registration excluded a number of prominent opposition 
leaders from the election. Harassment of opposition candidates' 
activities negatively influenced the fairness of the campaign. Pressure 
against a major domestic election-monitoring NGO violated fundamental 
freedoms, a setback from the parliamentary elections. Executive 
authorities, mostly at local and regional levels, interfered in the 
functioning of election commissions and the electoral process in 
general. Campaign restrictions and biased media failed to ensure free 
and fair conditions for candidates. Central Election Commission 
chairman Sulaiman Imanbaev conceded that violations occurred but 
accused the OSCE of bowing to pressure from unnamed political forces to 
give an overly negative evaluation of the election.
    The law requires a demonstration of Kyrgyz language competency 
before final registration as a presidential candidate. According to the 
Election Code Article 61, command of the language is the ability to 
read, write, express one's thoughts and speak publicly. The examination 
is given by a linguistic commission. The procedure for evaluating the 
examination is not transparent, and the OSCE noted that the difficulty 
of the exam was not uniform for all candidates. Examination results 
eliminated seven candidates from the race, including several native 
Kyrgyz speakers. In September the Constitutional Court heard and 
rejected a challenge of the requirement brought by two candidates. 
According to the OSCE, the language test was used to limit the 
possibilities of participation by opposition candidates.
    The administration of voting procedure technically was correct. All 
six candidates remained on the ballot through election day. The 
independent media continued to appear until election day, although the 
Government interfered with the distribution of opposition newspapers. 
There were candidate observers in most, if not all precincts, although 
they tended to be poorly trained and unwilling to challenge precinct 
commissions when their rights as observers were violated. The 
Government excluded independent observers representing the constituent 
organizations of the ``Coalition of NGO's for Democracy and Civil 
Society'' from polling places. A pattern emerged whereby local 
Coalition representatives were denied admittance to polling places when 
the polls opened, then allowed to enter later in the day after they 
sought relief through the courts, then again denied access on technical 
grounds at the end of the voting day. As a result, Coalition 
representatives were not present in many polling places for the vote 
count.
    According to information released by the Central Election 
Commission, Akayev received 74.4 percent of the vote; his closest 
opponent Omurbek Tekebayev received 13.6 percent. The election was 
flawed in numerous ways including ballot box stuffing, voter 
intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, a large presence of local 
and regional administration officials in and around the polling 
stations, and the discovery during opening procedures in a precinct in 
Bishkek of 700 ballots marked for Akayev in a ballot box that was 
supposed to be empty. In some instances, election observers were unable 
to witness the counting procedure to verify that votes were tallied for 
the candidate indicated on the ballot.
    In February and March, the first and second rounds of parliamentary 
elections were held. The Constitution provides for parliamentary 
elections every 5 years. For the first time, 15 of the Legislative 
Assembly's 60 seats were distributed proportionally based on party 
lists. The OSCE noted that executive and judicial branch interference 
in the electoral process continued through the runoffs, despite 
international criticism of these practices following the first round. 
In decisions that appear politically motivated, a number of prominent 
opposition candidates were disqualified or deregistered before the 
runoffs, despite having led the voting after the first round. Although 
there were improvements in overall election administration on the day 
of the vote, the process was marred by serious irregularities in a 
number of key electoral districts. There were allegations of ballot 
tampering, government intimidation of voters, and harassment of 
campaign officials in the elections of a number of opposition leaders.
    Prior to the parliamentary elections, the Government took numerous 
actions which disadvantaged opposition political parties. Four 
political parties, including one of the most popular opposition 
parties, the People's Party, were blocked from competing because their 
charters did not state specifically they could compete in elections for 
state bodies. In a legal challenge, the courts upheld this restriction 
in the election law. Eight parties were barred from competing because 
they were registered less than 1 year prior to the announcement of 
elections. This included a second major opposition party, the Ar-Namys 
Party, and the progovernment party Adilet. The participation of three 
registered parties, including the opposition Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan, subsequently was challenged on the grounds that their 
nominating conventions were conducted improperly.
    In March a district election commission deregistered opposition 
candidate Daniyar Usenov from the second round elections on technical 
grounds related to his alleged failure to include ownership of an 
apartment in his financial disclosure statement. On March 11, after the 
parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
decision, but neither the Supreme Court nor the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) would permit a repeat of the election so that Usenov 
could run in his district. In another instance, on March 9 the 
Government declared the Issyk-Kul election invalid. The Government 
subsequently charged Omurbek Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys 
Party and candidate in that election, with fraud, making him ineligible 
to run in the second election.
    On March 10, the Government attempted to deregister Parliamentarian 
and candidate Omurbek Tekebayev in Bazar-Korgon for filing an allegedly 
false financial disclosure form. However, the court did not rule in the 
Government's favor. Before the court decision was rendered, hundreds of 
Tekebayev's supporters demonstrated and blocked streets in his 
district.
    Opposition candidate Feliks Kulov competed in both rounds of the 
elections but lost badly in the second round amid credible allegations 
of ballot tampering. His supporters demonstrated against the election 
in his district and in Bishkek for several months. The OSCE determined 
that in the second round of election, in district 44 (in which Kulov 
ran) there was clear evidence of systematic fraud committed by both 
state and election authorities. In the second round, more than 10 
candidates were automatically declared winners as a result of their 
opponents' refusal to run or, in 9 cases, the Government's cancellation 
of the opponents' registration.
    The conduct of elections in many places, especially in Talas and 
Jalalabad, was seriously flawed. Problems included credible reports of 
a massive increase in advance voting, vote buying, premarked ballots, 
ballots shown to officials before being deposited in the ballot box, 
and an atmosphere of intimidation in the election district, including 
threats to students of arrest and eviction from dormitories and 
confiscation of driver's licenses from truck drivers.
    Amendments approved in a 1996 constitutional referendum, which was 
marred by serious flaws, strengthened the formal power of the President 
and his advisers, who dominate the Government. The Parliament tends to 
be subordinate to the executive branch but shows increasing signs of 
independence, such as the overriding of presidential vetoes. During the 
year, Parliament adopted 33 laws, of which the President signed 11. The 
overwhelming majority of local government officials, including mayors 
and governors, continue to be appointed by the President, but the first 
elections for local legislative bodies were held in October 1999. The 
elections were flawed but were an improvement over the l996 referendum.
    Political parties remain weak. There are 27 registered political 
parties, 15 of which qualified for the proportional representation 
component of the parliamentary elections. To receive any of the 15 
seats available under proportional representation, parties must receive 
5 percent of the overall vote. The remaining seats are held by single-
mandate candidates. In the lower chamber, 29 of 60 members elected in 
2000, including those elected to party seats, claimed party 
affiliation. In addition there is a parallel structure involving 3 
factions with a total of 23 members. In the upper chamber, the People's 
Representatives Assembly, 7 of 45 members claim party affiliation.
    Women and most ethnic minorities are underrepresented in government 
and politics. Women hold only 7 of 105 seats in the legislature. The 
Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
are women. The Democratic Party of Women participated in the 
parliamentary elections and won two party seats, earning 13 percent of 
the party-list votes. Russians and Uzbeks are underrepresented in 
government positions, although the newly named First Deputy Prime 
Minister, is an ethnic Russian, as was his predecessor. In December an 
ethnic Korean was appointed head of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operated in an increasingly hostile environment 
and were faced with continuous government pressure to curtail their 
activities, especially activities related to the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Despite this pressure, most groups were able to 
continue investigating and publishing their findings on government 
interference with elections, as well as on human rights cases.
    The Government repeatedly threatened leaders of the Kyrgyz 
Committee for Human Rights (KCHR), the NGO Coalition for Democracy and 
Civil Society (Coalition), and the Republican party with criminal 
action for their activity on behalf of opposition political leaders and 
their supporters. On March 29, the Bishkek city prosecutor sent the 
Coalition a warning that the Coalition, together with the KCHR, the 
Public Union for Social Defense of the Population, Union of Kyrgyz 
Children and Women, and several political parties violated a law that 
prohibits the destabilization of society by preparing and distributing 
flyers that appealed for public support of Ar-Namys candidate Feliks 
Kulov (see Sections 1.d, 1.e, and 3). On March 30, the Bishkek city 
prosecutor summoned KCHR chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev and Republican 
Party chairman Giyaz Tokombayev and delivered the same warning.
    In June the Minister of Justice stated that since the Coalition was 
not registered as a public association with the Ministry, it did not 
have the right to receive funds from abroad to support its activities, 
nor could it assess internal political developments. Although no formal 
action was taken against the Coalition, threats against and 
intimidation of the coalition continued throughout the year.
    On May 31, the Government opened a criminal case against KCHR 
chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev for failure to comply with provisions of 
the Labor Code related to the firing of an employee. The fired employee 
in question was terminated during the period when the Government 
deregistered the KCHR and registered a different organization under 
different leadership under the KCHR's name. Also in May, the Government 
charged former KCHR deputy chairman Eleman Mambetaipov with 
misappropriation of furniture located in a room rented by the KCHR from 
the Ministry of Agriculture. At the trial, the judge would not accept 
evidence that the property in question was in its proper place. On July 
14, Mambetaipov was given a year prison sentence. Dyryldayev has 
remained abroad since July. In July police attempted to force their way 
into the office of the KCHR in an effort to locate him.
    In June the Government held a political roundtable including some 
political parties, NGO's, and social movements. The OSCE initially 
planned to hold such an event under its auspices. A preparatory 
committee consisting of nine representatives from the Government, nine 
representatives from NGO's, and nine representatives from political 
parties was established for the event. During the preparatory stage, 
two political parties, Ar-Namys, whose leader was in jail, and Kairan 
El, withdrew from the process because their conditions for 
participation were not met. On June 3, the Government withdrew from the 
preparations in favor of holding its own event. The majority of NGO's 
on the preparatory committee and five political parties refused to 
participate in the Government's roundtable due to unilateral changes of 
the agenda and the format of the discussion introduced by the 
Government. The OSCE withdrew its support for the event after the 
Government's refusal to abide by the formulation worked out by the 
preparatory committee but attended the event as an observer. OSCE 
observers stated that the meeting had flaws, including the absence of 
significant opposition elements and a failure to alleviate tensions 
that arose after the parliamentary election.
    The Government formed a progovernment NGO called the Association of 
NGO's (the Association). There are reports that local authorities apply 
pressure on independent NGO's to become affiliated with the government-
organized Association. Only those NGO's with independent sources of 
funding are able to resist this pressure.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the rights and freedom of individuals 
and prohibits discrimination, including that based on language, and the 
Government expresses a strong commitment to protecting the rights of 
members of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, as well as 
those of women; however, in practice it does not always ensure these 
rights effectively.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Research conducted in 
1996 on violence against women showed a noticeable increase in such 
incidents since independence in 1991. Activists note that rape is 
becoming more common. It is not clear whether the incidence of rape or 
only the reporting of such attacks is becoming more common, but 
authorities often ignore such attacks. Government statistics indicate 
that in 1999, there were 400 to 450 crimes against women, but many 
crimes never are reported due to psychological pressures, cultural 
traditions, and apathy by law enforcement officials. The Government has 
not devised a program to deal with this problem, and the number of 
shelters for battered women is not increasing to meet the need. The 
Umut (Hope) Center opened in 1997 to provide basic protection as well 
as psychological, legal, and medical counseling for battered women and 
girls. The Umut Center has organized biweekly discussions and training 
for women to advise and counsel them about their rights. It provides 10 
days of emergency shelter, clothing, and meals for battered women as 
well as employment counseling and legal services. In 1998 the director 
attributed the rise in the number of women visiting the shelter to the 
country's severe economic crisis, which had led to increased violence 
against women. Umut received grants from a variety of foreign sources 
during the year, and provided shelter for 165 persons and provided 
advice to 1,524 others through its hot line. Umut also offers 
psychiatric counseling to victims. There were internationally funded 
crisis centers for women in need of such assistance in both Talas and 
Jalalabad.
    In 1997 the NGO Tendesh opened a crisis center in Naryn with a hot 
line to support women affected by violence. It provides psychological, 
legal, and medical assistance. Another center, Sezim, opened in April 
1998 in Bishkek with a staff of lawyers, psychologists, and doctors, 
and operates a crisis hot line for the public. Staff members conduct 
training, debates, and seminars on women's rights and family planning. 
During the year, at least three new programs were introduced to address 
the needs of women by NGO's. The Congress of Women has set up legal 
clinics for women throughout the country to help counsel women on legal 
issues and women's' issues. Center Mercy embarked on a program to find 
employment in handicraft production for mothers of large families. The 
Center for Women's Initiative Aigerim introduced programs to assist 
with needy families.
    Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a growing problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Discrimination against women persists. The law gives equal status 
to women, and they are well represented in the work force, in 
professions, and in institutions of higher learning. Women are 
prominent in law, medicine, accounting, and banking. They also play an 
active role in the rapidly growing nongovernmental sector.
    During the parliamentary elections, NGO's embarked on programs to 
help educate women in the electoral process and on their voters' 
rights. The Center of Women's Initiative Aigerim helped train women to 
monitor during the parliamentary elections. According to Counterpart 
Consortium, 293 NGO's dealing with women's issues operated in the 
country during the year, of which 25 deal with women's advocacy. In 
1999 women's advocacy NGO's sent an appeal to the Government, 
Parliament, journalists, international organizations, as well as other 
NGO's in support of women's rights. Nonetheless deteriorating economic 
conditions have had a severe effect on women, who are more likely than 
men to lose their jobs. According to a U.N. Development Program report, 
as of January, the unemployment figures for women were considerably 
larger (58,300) than those for men (48,100). For women the average 
wages were lower than $13 per month (637 soms), and for men $18 per 
month (881 soms). Women with children under the age of 16 account for 
67 percent of unemployed women. Women make up the majority of 
pensioners who have felt the negative effects of the country's economic 
downturn as inflation has eroded pensions that often are paid late. 
Women's groups express general concern about the situation of rural 
women. With the end of communism, traditional attitudes toward women 
are reasserting themselves strongly in the countryside, where women are 
relegated to the role of wife and mother, and educational opportunities 
are curtailed. Data indicate that women are becoming less healthy, more 
abused, less able to work outside the home, and less able to dispose of 
their earnings independently.
    Family law prohibits divorce during pregnancy and while a child is 
younger than 1 year of age. A special expert counsel under the State 
Commission on Family, Women, and Youth Issues reviewed all legislation 
for a gender perspective and submitted its recommendations to 
Parliament. The findings demonstrate that while women's rights are 
supported by legislation, the principle of women's equality is not 
always observed.
    The women's advocacy NGO community is becoming increasingly 
organized. As a result of conferences held in 1999 an appeal was sent 
to the Government, Parliament, journalists, NGO's, and international 
organizations in support of women's rights.
    Children.--The socioeconomic situation does not effectively provide 
decent living conditions for all children. Basic needs for shelter, 
food, and clothing seldom are met, and the Government does not take 
effective measures to address these needs. After independence, vaccine-
preventable diseases such as diphtheria, polio, and measles reemerged. 
A range of serious nutrition-related problems affects a large number of 
children, especially in rural areas. Traditional social safety measures 
are now inadequate to cope with the social pressures that affect 
families, and in major cities children regularly are observed begging 
or selling cigarettes. There are increasing reports of abandonment due 
to parents' lack of resources to care for children.
    Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, and the country has 
a 97 percent literacy rate. However, the educational system has 
suffered material and financial hardships, and conditions continue to 
deteriorate due to an acute shortage of budgetary and material 
resources. The Government established two funds, Jetkinchek and Kadry 
XXI Veka (Cadres the 21st Century), to provide educational benefits for 
low-income and disabled children. Jetkinchek, a Presidential 
Educational Program, created in 1999, provides assistance such as pens, 
books, clothes to low-income children. The program is funded primarily 
by the Government but has received assistance from international 
organizations. Kadry XXI Veka is another government program financed by 
international organizations that helps talented youth continue their 
education abroad.
    The Law on Education requires that secondary education be free and 
universal. However, financial constraints prevent the Government from 
implementing this for all students. According to the Criminal Code, the 
penalty for infringing on a student's right to obtain free secondary 
education ranges from receiving a public reprimand to 1 year of forced 
labor. The law penalizes parents who do not send their children to 
school or obstruct their attendance. Many of those families who can 
afford it choose to send their children to more expensive private 
schools. Moreover those families that keep their children in public 
schools must pay administrative fees. These costs add up and are 
difficult for families, particularly large ones, to bear.
    The Government and its Commission on the Affairs of Under-age 
Children disseminate information regarding children's rights among both 
children and adults. The Ministries of Justice, Education, Science and 
Culture, and Health as well as the state television and radio company 
and various NGO's also help disseminate information including by 
translations into Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek in order to reach those 
segments of the population that speak different languages. There are 
also plans to publish textbooks on human rights problems for high 
school students, with information on children's rights. The Talent 
Support Fund, an NGO funded by Save the Children and UNICEF, produced a 
series of educational television programs titled ``The Rights of 
Children in Kyrgyzstan'' to help educate the population.
    Human rights groups and the Kyrgyz Children's Fund (KCF) monitor 
the condition of children. Human rights groups note that children who 
are arrested usually are denied lawyers. Police often do not notify 
parents of children who are arrested, and neither parents nor lawyers 
generally are present during questioning, despite laws to the contrary. 
Children often are intimidated into signing confessions.
    The KCF is concerned about the growing number of street children, 
many of whom have left home because of abusive or alcoholic parents. 
Social workers and police regularly conduct street sweeps to locate 
abandoned children. Children who are found are sent to orphanages and 
police holding centers depending on the amount of space available. The 
KCF has one shelter in Bishkek to provide food, clothing, and schooling 
to approximately 30 children In 1999, the Svetlii Put shelter (formerly 
known as the Ak Zhol shelter), was reestablished with assistance from 
UNICEF. During the year, the shelter received training assistance from 
UNICEF and cared for approximately 32 children. The SOS Children's 
Village, funded by the Austrian organization Kinder Dorf International 
and other foreign and domestic organizations, opened in 1998 to care 
for orphans. Approximately 110 children and 14 mothers live in this 
village, which offers housing and a kindergarten.
    Girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    The forced marriage of underage girls has become more common, and 
the authorities often tacitly approve this practice. Cultural 
traditions and social structures discourage victims from going to the 
authorities.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government passed the Law on Social 
Protection of Invalids in 1991 and adopted amendments in October 1998. 
The amendments provide for convenient access to public transportation 
and parking for the disabled; subsidies for mass media sources that 
make their services available to the hearing or visually impaired; and 
free plots of land to construct a home. Social facilities for the 
mentally disabled are strained severely, as budgets have fallen and 
workloads remain heavy. In one program facilitated by foreign 
volunteers, local high school students have begun to visit special 
institutions such as those for the mentally disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are reports of 
discrimination in the treatment of citizens who are not ethnic Kyrgyz. 
The most recent statistical data reflect the following ethnic breakdown 
of the population: 61.2 percent are Kyrgyz; 14.9 percent are Russians; 
14.4 percent are Uzbeks; 1.1 percent are Tatars; 0.3 percent are 
Germans; and others constitute 8.1 percent. Members of the minorities 
allege discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain 
that government officials at all levels favor ethnic Kyrgyz.
    Russian-speaking citizens (those who do not speak Kyrgyz) also 
allege that a ceiling exists in government employment that precludes 
their promotion beyond a certain level. The representation of ethnic 
Kyrgyz at senior and intermediate levels of government is 
disproportionately high, giving credence to perceptions that career 
opportunities in government are limited for those who are not ethnic 
Kyrgyz. There also were complaints about discrimination against non-
Kyrgyz in the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
    Since independence, over 300,000 ethnic Russians and 200,000 
Russian-language speakers have emigrated. In order to help stem the 
tide of migration, the Government passed legislation elevating Russian 
to the status of an ``official language.'' On May 20, President Akayev 
issued a decree to moderate emigration by improving the situation of 
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. During the year, a bilateral 
agreement was signed with Russia on the legal status of Russian 
citizens living in Russia and Kyrgyz citizens living in Russia. This 
agreement is to provide maximum social benefits possible under Kyrgyz 
law for those Russian citizens living in the country.
    The Constitution designates Kyrgyz as the state language, but it 
provides for preservation and equal and free development of Russian and 
other languages spoken in the country. Kyrgyz increasingly is replacing 
Russian, and the Government has announced that by 2010 all government 
documents are to be in Kyrgyz. A new draft law that was introduced in 
November allows for Russian to be used in the workplace until measures 
can be established to change to Kyrgyz. On March 20, President Akayev 
issued a draft decree calling for all high and middle-level government 
officials to have sufficient proficiency in Kyrgyz, with the aim to 
have all official business conducted in Kyrgyz by 2005. This draft 
decree was not enacted into law as a result of widespread criticism. 
Candidates in the 2000 presidential elections were required to 
demonstrate ability in Kyrgyz. Some otherwise qualified candidates were 
disqualified on the basis of exams, the fairness of which was 
questioned (see Section 3).
    University education is carried out largely in Russian (although 
Kyrgyz instruction is available in some departments in some 
universities, where textbooks are available), so that Russian-language 
capability remains an important skill for those who wish to pursue 
higher learning.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor law provides for the 
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions, and there is 
no evidence that the Government has tried to obstruct the formation of 
independent unions. The Federation of Trade Unions of Kyrgyzstan, the 
successor to the former official union, remains the only trade union 
umbrella organization in the country, although unions are not required 
to belong to it. The Federation forms one part of a bilateral 
commission, along with the Cabinet. Each year the two parties sign an 
agreement on ``cooperation.'' There is one small independent union, the 
Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, whose membership 
reached approximately 80,000. Precise numbers for the Federation's 
membership are not available, but it is significantly larger than other 
unions.
    The Federation has been critical of government policies, especially 
privatization, and their effect on working class living standards. The 
Federation still regards itself as being in a process of transition, 
during which it is adjusting its relations with the Government, with 
other unions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and with 
other foreign unions. Growing numbers of smaller unions are not 
affiliated with the umbrella organization.
    The law calls for practices consistent with international 
standards.
    While the right to strike is not codified, strikes are not 
prohibited. There were no retaliatory actions against strikers, nor 
were there instances of abuse generally directed at unions or 
individual workers. During the year, there were several instances when 
workers repairing the Bishkek-Osh Highway went on strike against 
foreign companies that employed them since they did not receive payment 
for their work. In November vendors at the Dorodoi Market in Bishkek 
went on strike to protest against the decision of the Dorodoi Market's 
administration to allocate preferred selling areas to Chinese merchants 
over local merchants.
    The law permits unions to form and join federations and to 
affiliate with international trade union bodies. Since independent 
unions are still in their infancy, no meaningful affiliation with 
international trade union bodies has taken place.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
recognizes the right of unions to negotiate for better wages and 
conditions. Although overall union structure and practice are changing 
only slowly from those of the Soviet era, there is growing evidence of 
active union participation in state-owned and privatized enterprises. 
The Government sets the minimum wage, and then each employer sets its 
own wage level.
    The law protects union members from antiunion discrimination, and 
there were no recorded instances of discrimination against anyone 
because of union activities.
    There are Free Economic Zones (FEZ's) that can be used as export 
processing zones. The minimum wage law does not apply to the 
approximately 3,000 workers in ordinary FEZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids 
forced or compulsory labor, as well as forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, women and girls are trafficked for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Although the majority of children are enrolled in school, 
child labor is a problem.
    Provisions of the Labor Code, the Law on Public Safety, and the Law 
on the Protection of Rights of Underage Children address child labor. 
The Labor Code provides for the protection of children from economic 
exploitation and from work that poses a danger to their health, or 
spiritual, physical, mental, or academic development. The Labor Code is 
contradictory in the requirements it sets for the minimum age of 
employment in work that can harm their physical and moral well being 
(i.e. employment in casinos, bars, night clubs, etc.). Article 285 
states that such work is prohibited for those under age 21; however, 
Article 319 prohibits such employment for those under age 18. According 
to Article 317 of the Labor Code, those between 14 and 16 years of age 
are permitted to perform strenuous work with parental consent. However, 
minors less than 18 years of age cannot work in underground conditions. 
Minors between 18 and 21 years of age may not perform hazardous or 
manual work. Article 319 sets the maximum daily hours of work for those 
between 14 and 16 years of age at 5 to 7 hours respectively. Underage 
children cannot work beyond this limit or during night shifts. These 
laws also apply to disabled children who work.
    Given its budget constraints and lack of resources, the Government 
is unable to enforce adequately these laws. Although those employers 
who are caught violating the Labor Code can be charged with 
disciplinary, financial, administrative, or criminal penalties, the 
punishment is usually minimal.
    Child labor is becoming more widespread both in towns and rural 
areas. Since many children are ``self-employed'' (selling newspapers, 
carrying handcarts at markets, selling cigarettes and candy on the 
streets, etc.) or work for their families, it is very difficult for the 
Government to determine if their work schedule and environment conform 
to government regulations. Families are traditionally large, and it is 
sometimes necessary for children to work at an early age to help 
support the family on the family farm or in the family business.
    According to reports from various NGO's, child labor is 
particularly evident in the south. During the fall, classes are 
cancelled, and children are sent to fields to pick cotton. During the 
summer, children are used to harvest tobacco and are involved in all 
steps of production from the actual picking of the leaves to the 
preparation for shipping. Some fields are located on school grounds, 
and the income earned goes directly to the schools, not to the 
children. Children also are involved in family enterprises such as 
shepherding, bread baking, selling products at roadside kiosks, and 
growing fruits and vegetables.
    The Prosecutor's Office and the State Labor Inspectorate are 
responsible for enforcing employers' compliance with Labor Code laws. 
The legislative assembly has established a special commission on 
education, women's affairs, the family, and minors, which oversees the 
legal protection of the interests of minors whenever new laws are 
discussed in Parliament. Public control of compliance with the labor 
code is enforced by trade unions, a function holdover from the Soviet 
period.
    The Government has undertaken additional initiatives to help 
protect minors from forced labor. Since the budget is facing severe 
funding constraints, many children who are entitled to receive help do 
not.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government mandates a 
national minimum wage at a level theoretically sufficient to assure a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The legal minimum 
wage is about $2.50 (100 soms) per month. In practice this wage is 
insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family, and therefore industries and employers set the minimum level 
wages that actually are paid. The Federation is responsible for 
enforcing all labor laws, including the law on minimum wages. Minimum 
wage regulations largely are observed. However, the enforcement of 
labor laws is nonexistent in the growing underground economy. Market 
forces help wages in the unofficial sector keep pace with official wage 
scales.
    The standard workweek is 41 hours, usually within a 5-day week. For 
state-owned industries, there is a mandated 24-hour rest period in the 
workweek.
    Safety and health conditions in factories are poor. Despite the 
recent improvement in economic growth, the previous deterioration in 
enforcement of existing regulations continued to hamper investment to 
improve health and safety standards. In March 1999, the State 
Inspectorate of Labor was established to protect and educate workers as 
well as also inform business owners on their respective rights and 
responsibilities. A 1992 law established occupational health and safety 
standards, as well as enforcement procedures. Besides government 
inspection teams, trade unions are assigned active roles in assuring 
compliance with these measures, but the deterioration of the economy 
has led to an uneven compliance record among businesses. Workers have 
the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe working conditions, 
and workers who choose not to work in an unsafe environment may find 
employment elsewhere. However, in practice refusal to work in 
situations with relatively high accident rates or associated chronic 
health problems could result in loss of employment, although only if 
informal methods of resolution failed.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides that those involved in 
trafficking can be sentenced up to 15 years' imprisonment; however, 
very few traffickers are caught, and those that are receive lenient 
sentences or fines. A lack of coordination between government agencies 
involved in migration issues, the obscure wording of laws regarding 
trafficking issues, and corruption contribute to the problem. The 
trafficking of Kyrgyz women and girls,largely to Turkey, Germany, and 
the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of forced prostitution, is a 
growing problem. According to the International Office of Migration 
(IOM), approximately 4,000 women and 7 boys were trafficked abroad in 
1999. Often women are trafficked through deception. They are lured 
abroad under the pretext of legitimate employment (i.e. waitresses, au 
pairs, dancers, etc.), and by the time they discover the true intent of 
the traffickers, they find themselves without the money for return 
tickets, without documents, and are forced to agree to the conditions 
and terms of the employers. A flourishing sex trade draws girls, as 
young as age 10, from destitute mountain villages. Several media 
articles have raised public awareness of the problem. The Ministry of 
Interior had planned to establish a special police unit to combat 
trafficking but was unable to do so due to lack of funding.
    According to IOM, fraudulent passports are issued to those being 
trafficked. Eleven law enforcement officers have been accused of 
preparing fraudulent documentation for trafficked women, and criminal 
proceedings have begun against three of the accused officers. During 
the year, 4 persons were tried and sentenced to prison terms for 
trafficking; 18 persons were tried and sentenced in 1999.
    Trafficked women do not normally receive assistance due to lack of 
understanding of the problem. Many have reported being victimized by 
law enforcement officials upon their return.
                               __________

                                 LATVIA

    Latvia is a parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister, as chief 
executive, and the Cabinet are responsible for government operations. 
The President, as Head of State, is elected by the Parliament (Saeima). 
The Saeima elected Vaira Vike-Freiberga to a 4-year term in June 1999. 
The October 1998 elections for the 100-seat Parliament and the national 
referendum to amend the Citizenship Law to meet European standards were 
free and fair. The judiciary is independent but not well-trained, 
efficient, or free from corruption.
    The security apparatus consists of: The national police and other 
services, such as the Special Immigration Police and the Border Guards, 
who are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior; municipal police under 
local government control; the military Counterintelligence Service and 
a protective service under the Ministry of Defense; and the National 
Guard, an element of the national armed forces, which also assists in 
police activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective 
control of the security forces. The Constitution Protection Bureau 
(SAB) is responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. Some 
members of the security forces, including police and other Interior 
Ministry personnel, committed human rights abuses.
    Privatization essentially is complete, although some large utility 
companies remain in state hands including the national electric 
company, railroads, and shipping. The currency remained stable and 
traded freely; unemployment was 7.8 percent, and annual inflation was 
1.8 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was approximately 
$2,950.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
and the large resident noncitizen community; however, problems remained 
in certain areas. Members of the security forces, including the police 
and other Interior Ministry personnel, sometimes used excessive force. 
In most instances, the Government took disciplinary measures against 
those responsible. Prison conditions remained poor. Lengthy pretrial 
detention was a problem. The inefficient judiciary did not always 
ensure the fair administration of justice. Women are discriminated 
against in the workplace. Domestic violence, trafficking in women 
(including minors), and child prostitution and abuse are significant 
problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In March 1999, a member of the security police shot and killed two 
persons and injured three others during a bar fight in Jelgava. In 
October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the verdict of the lower court.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there were 
credible reports that police and prison guards mistreated persons. In 
September 1999, four prison guards at Riga Central Prison were 
dismissed for excessive use of force against prisoners.
    In conjunction with the Soros Foundation and the National Human 
Rights Office (NHRO), the Ministry of Interior continued its programs 
for educating police officers about human rights concerns. In 1999 a 
local nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a free legal 
advisory service for prisoners and others who believe that they were 
victims of police abuse (see Section 4).
    Prison conditions remained poor, although human rights groups noted 
some improvements during the year. Prison cells often are overcrowded 
severely. Inadequate sanitation facilities, persistent shortages of 
blankets and medical care, and insufficient lighting and ventilation 
are common problems, as is the shortage of resources in general. Most 
jails badly need renovation. The Government has taken additional steps 
to upgrade certain facilities. The NHRO records complaints of 
violations of the right to humane treatment and respect of dignity. 
During the year, 47 prisoners filed complaints concerning their 
treatment, and 19 persons filed such complaints relating to the police. 
The NHRO investigates each complaint. Human rights groups are alarmed 
by the number of drug-resistant tuberculosis cases in the prisons, and 
the Government has received assistance from several foreign 
organizations to address this problem. Although the number of 
tuberculosis cases has decreased, the Riga central prison hospital 
remains overcrowded at close to 200 percent capacity.
    At a prominent conference attended by human rights groups and 
government officials in November, the deputy director of the prison 
administration and the Prosecutor General criticized the the Government 
for its failure to improve the Criminal Code and provide resources to 
the judicial system. Two youths committed suicide in July while in 
pretrial detention awaiting trial for murder. They were held in the 
same cell, one for 17 months, the other for 5 months. The archaic 
provisions of the Criminal Code make it difficult to investigate and 
move a case forward in the court system. Press reports estimate that 70 
percent of all juveniles in prisons are awaiting trial. While most have 
been waiting for about 2 years, some have been waiting 4 years or more. 
Unlike convicts, those in pretrial detention are not allowed to work or 
go to school, have limited contact with outside NGO's or family, and 
suffer considerably worse living conditions than prisoners in general. 
The deputy director of the prison system also noted the lack of work 
and job training for inmates and the need to provide social support to 
inmates after release.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires the 
Prosecutor's Office to make a formal decision whether to charge or 
release a detainee within 72 hours after arrest. Charges must be filed 
within 10 days of arrest. There were no known instances of arbitrary 
arrest. The responsibility for issuing arrest warrants was transferred 
from prosecutors to the courts in 1994. Detainees have the right to 
have an attorney present at any time. These rights are subject to 
judicial review but only at the time of trial. According to credible 
reports, these rights are not always respected in practice, especially 
outside of Riga.
    According to Ministry of Interior personnel, detainees awaiting 
trial spend an average of 2 years in prison, but many have been there 
much longer. More than 40 percent of all inmates are in pretrial 
detention. Complaints were filed by 94 prisoners during the year 
concerning their right to a just and timely trial.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its 
use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice. However, the courts must rely on the Ministry of 
Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well 
trained, efficient, or free from corruption.
    The judicial structure is composed of district (city) courts, 
regional courts, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court is a seven-judge panel that is authorized to hear 
cases regarding constitutional issues at the request of state 
institutions or individuals who believe that their constitutional 
rights were violated.
    The Government continued to reform the judicial system. In 1995 it 
completed the establishment of regional courts to hear appeals of lower 
court decisions. For more serious criminal cases, two lay assessors 
join the professional judge on the bench. Corruption in the judicial 
system reportedly is widespread. In 1997 the judges appointed to 
preside over the trial of the president of the collapsed Bank Baltija, 
Aleksander Lavent, resigned from the case, citing alleged political 
pressure from the Government. The accusation came after the judges 
released Lavent to house arrest following a heart attack that he 
suffered in the courtroom on the first day of the trial. In December 
1998, the courts determined that Lavent had recovered his health, and 
he was returned from house arrest to prison. The trial of Lavent and 
his alleged accomplices resumed briefly in the fall, but it was 
suspended again at year's end 1999. The trial resumed in 2000 but was 
suspended again due to the defendant's illness. On July 27, Lavent 
filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights accusing the 
Latvian courts of violating his right to a fair and speedy trial. In 
October Lavents led a hunger strike with several other prisoners to 
protest lengthy pretrial detention.
    Most judges have inadequate judicial training, and the court system 
is too weak to enforce many of its decisions. A major difficulty in 
enforcing court decisions is the continuing lack of an effective 
bailiff or sheriff system. In 1999 a new criminal law went into force, 
which allows for more alternative punishments, including community 
service. Despite the new law, alternative punishments are utilized 
rarely by the courts.
    Court decisions are not published systematically, nor is there a 
centralized index for those that are published. Trials may be closed if 
state secrets might be revealed or to protect the interests of minors. 
All defendants have the right to hire an attorney, and the State will 
lend funds to destitute defendants for this purpose. Defendants have 
the right to read all charges, confront all witnesses, and may call 
witnesses and offer evidence to support their case. They also may make 
multiple appeals.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires that law enforcement authorities have 
a judicial warrant in order to intercept citizens' mail, telephone 
calls, or other forms of communication. The laws protecting privacy 
apply to citizens and noncitizens equally. There were no credible 
reports of the unsanctioned wiretapping of the telephone conversations.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits 
censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and 
magazines are privately owned. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian 
publish a wide range of political criticism and viewpoints.
    A large number of independent television and radio outlets 
broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of persons 
receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
    The Law on the Media, revised in October 1998, contains a number of 
restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of 
broadcasts. No less than 51 percent of television broadcasts must be of 
European origin, of which 40 percent should be in the Latvian language. 
However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition 
foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in 
electronic media organizations.
    There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for peaceful assembly, and the authorities may not prohibit 
public gatherings; however, organizers of demonstrations must provide 
advance notice to local authorities, who may change the time and place 
of public gatherings for such reasons as fear of public disorder. In 
1997 the Saeima passed legislation on public demonstrations that 
requires protesters to remain specified distances from foreign 
missions, the Saeima, the Prosecutor's Office, and certain other public 
institutions. While the law purports to imitate Western European 
statutes, independent human rights organizations find its provisions 
contradictory and confusing. Numerous demonstrations nevertheless took 
place peacefully and without government interference during the year.
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to associate in 
public organizations; however, the Law on Registering Public 
Organizations bars the registration of Communist, Nazi, or other 
organizations whose activities would contravene the Constitution. 
Noncitizens can join and form political parties, but there must be at 
least 200 citizens in the party and at least half of the total 
membership must be citizens. More than 40 political parties are 
registered officially.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, bureaucratic problems for minority religions persist. There is 
no state religion, but the Government distinguishes between 
``traditional'' (Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers, 
Baptists, and Jewish) and ``new'' religions.
    Although the Government does not require the registration of 
religious groups, the 1995 Law on Religious Organizations accords 
religious organizations certain rights and privileges when they 
register, such as status as a separate legal entity for owning property 
or other financial transactions, as well as tax benefits for donors.
    By law any 10 citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18 
may apply to register a church. Congregations functioning in the 
country for the first time that do not belong to a church association 
already registered must reregister each year for 10 years. 
Congregations numbering 10 or more of the same denomination having 
permanent registration status may form a religious association. Only 
churches with religious association status may establish theological 
schools or monasteries. A decision to register a church is made by the 
Minister of Justice.
    According to Ministry of Justice officials, most registration 
applications are approved eventually once proper documents are 
submitted. The Ministry has registered over 1,000 congregations. 
Problems arise and registration is denied because the Law on Religious 
Organizations does not permit simultaneous registration of more than 
one religious union (church) in a single confession. Because of this 
provision, the Government can not register any splinter groups, 
including an independent Jewish congregation, the Latvian Free Orthodox 
Church, and a separate Old Believers group. The Christian Scientists 
have been refused registration due to opposition from the Doctors 
Association.
    Shortly after the renewal of independence in 1991, the Vatican, 
with the support of the Latvian Catholic community, requested 
negotiations for a reestablishment of the 1922 Concordat, which existed 
between Latvia and the Vatican during Latvia's period of independence 
between World War I and World War II. In 1996 the Prime Minister 
established a working group to negotiate a new agreement. This 
agreement reportedly would grant the Roman Catholic Church privileged 
status. The negotiations have led to some concern among members of 
other religions. If approved it is expected that adherents of other 
faiths would seek similar recognition and benefits for their own 
religious community. In November the draft agreement was submitted to 
the Saima for review.
    Visa regulations require that religious workers present either an 
ordination certificate or evidence of religious education that 
corresponds to a Latvian bachelor's degree in theology. The visa 
application process still is cumbersome. However, difficulties in this 
area diminished, and Citizenship and Migration Department officials 
have worked to ease the situation. The Government cooperated to resolve 
several difficult visa cases in favor of missionary workers.
    Foreign evangelists and missionaries are permitted to hold meetings 
and to proselytize, but the law stipulates that only domestic religious 
organizations may invite them to conduct such activities. Foreign 
religious denominations have criticized this provision.
    The law provides that religion may be taught to students in public 
schools on a voluntary basis only by representatives of Evangelical 
Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believer, Baptist, and Jewish 
religions. The State provides funds for this education. Students at 
state-supported national minority schools also may receive education on 
the religion ``characteristic of the national minority'' on a voluntary 
basis. Other denominations may provide religious education in private 
schools only.
    The Latvian Lutheran Church established its own clergy education 
center, the Luther Academy in Riga, in 1998. The Roman Catholic Church 
also has its own seminary but wants to establish its own separate 
faculty of theology at the University of Latvia or, alternatively, join 
forces with a Catholic university elsewhere in Europe that would issue 
degrees. The University of Latvia's theological faculty is now 
nondenominational.
    Citizen's passports currently indicate the ethnicity of the bearer. 
Jews are considered an ethnic group and are listed as such rather than 
Latvian, Russian, etc.
    Jewish community leaders have regained a number of major properties 
around the country, and they report that the legal framework for 
restitution of religious property is adequate. While restitution of a 
few Jewish properties proceeds, the process is slow, complex, and often 
delayed by legal wrangling and bureaucratic obstacles.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government 
has readmitted noncitizens who claimed refugee status in a foreign 
country, or who voluntarily abandoned their permanent residence and 
then decided to return to the country to live and work. Noncitizens who 
left the country as refugees based on Soviet-era persecution have no 
difficulty returning on foreign refugee travel documents for business 
reasons or for family visits. The Government also extends protections 
to noncitizen residents who travel abroad.
    The 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens stipulates 
that registered permanent resident noncitizens enjoy the right to 
establish and change residences, travel abroad, and return to the 
country. Noncitizens, as well as citizens, may be granted amnesty. 
However, certain rights are denied to noncitizens. They are prohibited 
from working as armed guards or criminal trial attorneys. Noncitizens 
may own land only under complex procedures but may not purchase land in 
the border zones. The law also provides for the issuance of a 
noncitizen travel document that certifies these rights.
    The Government works closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and the Law on Asylum Seekers and Refugees complies with all 
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Special immigration police and border 
guards units help prescreen asylum requests. Decisions of the Citizens 
and Migration Affairs Office can be appealed to the Asylum Appeals 
Board in the Ministry of Justice.
    The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during the 
year and never has arisen. According to statistics provided by the 
immigration police, during the year 1,126 aliens were detained for 
questioning. Of those, 218 were deported, and 79 departed voluntarily. 
The Government has approached Russia and Belarus about concluding 
refugee readmission agreements, the lack of which poses a major barrier 
to effective control of the eastern border. However, by year's end 
agreements had not been concluded.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Free and fair elections for Parliament were held in 
1998, and in June 1999 the Parliament elected the President. In the 
1998 election, candidates from 6 of the 21 participating parties, 
representing a broad political spectrum, won Saeima seats, and 72 
percent of eligible voters participated.
    The election law prohibits persons who remained active in the 
Communist Party or various other pro-Soviet organizations after January 
13, 1991, or who worked for such institutions as the former Soviet 
Committee for State Security, from seeking elected office. Noncitizens, 
most of whom are ethnic Russians, are not allowed to vote; however, 
many ethnic Russians are Latvian citizens and can vote.
    On December 15, 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a regional court 
decision that the extreme Russian nationalist of the Equal Rights 
Movement and Riga city council deputy Tatyana Zhdanok was not eligible 
to run for public office due to her pro-Soviet activites after Janury 
13, 1991. After the Riga City Council annulled her election, Zhdanok 
filed suit against the Latvian Government in the European Court of 
Human Rights.
    Following the restoration of independence in 1991, citizenship was 
accorded immediately only to those persons who were citizens of the 
independent Latvian Republic in 1940 and their direct descendants. 
After independence the status of approximately 670,000 persons, mostly 
ethnic Russians, changed from citizens of the Soviet Union to 
noncitizen residents in Latvia. Since 1995 about 39,000 persons have 
become citizens. Approximately 35 percent or 14,00 of these persons 
were naturalized in 2000 alone. Owing to the Russification policy 
pursued during the Soviet era, ethnic Latvians constitute only 56 
percent of a total population of 2.5 million, and 78 percent of 
citizens. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a majority in three of 
Latvia's seven cities.
    The 1998 Citizenship Law includes a Latvian language and residence 
requirement for those seeking to naturalize, as well as restrictions on 
former Soviet intelligence and military personnel. The law also 
requires applicants for citizenship to renounce previous non-Latvian 
citizenship, to have knowledge of the Constitution and Latvian history, 
and to pledge allegiance to Latvia. At present, according to 
Naturalization Board figures, nearly 95 percent of applicants pass the 
citizenship tests on the first attempt.
    In addition a 1998 referendum brought the citizenship law into 
compliance with Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) standards. Children of noncitizens born after August 1992 are 
entitled to citizenship upon application.
    International observers, including the resident OSCE mission, 
credit the Government with establishing a competent and professional 
Naturalization Board with offices throughout the country to implement 
the law. In the estimation of the NHRO, the OSCE, and various NGO's, 
the Board has sought to apply the law fairly.
    International experts, government officials, and domestic human 
rights monitors agreed that Latvia must continue to place high priority 
on and devote sufficient resources to implementing the citizenship law 
in a fair and impartial manner, as well as seek ways to expedite 
naturalization and promote social integration. Working with the 
European Union and the U.N. Development Program, the Government also 
has implemented a long-term nationwide Latvian language teaching 
program for adults and children in non-Latvian schools.
    There are no ethnic restrictions on eligibility to hold political 
office. Nonethnic Latvians, including ethnic Russians and the first 
Roma deputy in the Saeima, serve in various elected bodies. Women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. There are 20 women in the 
100-member Saeima. Two women are in the 15-member Cabinet of Ministers. 
For the first time, the President of the country is female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A growing number of NGO's devoted to research and advocacy on human 
rights issues, including prison conditions and women's and children's 
rights, operate without government restriction. Several organizations 
deal with issues of concern to local noncitizens and other nonethnic 
Latvians, presenting them to the courts and the press.
    The Government engages in dialog with NGO's working on human rights 
issues. The NHRO is an independent governmental institution with a 
mandate to promote human rights, provide information on human rights, 
investigate individual complaints, and initiate its own investigation 
into alleged violations. The office acts as a general ombudsman on 
social issues and handles a variety of individual complaints, primarily 
concerning problems receiving social benefits.
    A number of NGO's provide assistance to those who wish to complain 
of police abuse or abuse in prisons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    According to the 1922 Constitution, all citizens are equal under 
the law. In 1998 the Saeima passed amendments to the Constitution that 
granted constitutional protection to fundamental human rights. The 
amendments supersede provisions of the 1991 Constitutional Law, which 
had served in the interim, and contain constitutional provisions for 
the exercise of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, the 
press, and other basic liberties. The amendments also provide for 
protection from discrimination due to race, sex, religion, language, or 
disability. Only citizens can vote or hold government office. There are 
some restrictions on land purchases by noncitizens.
    Women.--Despite legal protections, international observers and 
human rights groups increasingly are concerned about problems facing 
women. Although no overall statistics are available, sources indicate 
that domestic violence against women, often connected with alcohol 
abuse, is significant and underreported. Women who are victims of abuse 
often seem to be uninformed about their rights and reluctant to seek 
redress through the justice system. Human rights groups assert that the 
legal system, including the courts, tends to downplay the seriousness 
of domestic violence and that the police are sometimes reluctant to 
make arrests in such cases.
    There are no shelters designed specifically for battered or abused 
women. There is one shelter in Riga where homeless women with children 
may reside for up to 2 months. Likewise, there are no specific rape or 
assault hot lines; however, two crisis hot lines are managed by NGO's.
    Police do not compile figures for domestic violence as a distinct 
category. Instead, episodes are placed under more general categories 
such as assault or battery. During the year, 107 rape cases were 
reported.
    Both adult and child prostitution are widespread, often linked to 
organized crime, and abetted by economic problems (see Section 6.f.). 
The Government estimates that 3,000 persons work as prostitutes. The 
NHRO reports that adult prostitutes have no legal protections. 
Prostitution is legal; procuring is not. There are no state 
institutions to assist prostitutes. However, the private Latvian Center 
for Gender Problems provides medical help and social support for 
prostitutes.
    Sexual harassment of women in the workplace, although illegal, is 
reportedly common. Cultural factors tend to discourage women from 
coming forth publicly with complaints of abuse.
    Women possess the same legal rights as men. The Labor Code 
prohibits women from performing ``hard jobs or jobs having unhealthy 
conditions,'' which are specified in a list agreed upon by the Cabinet 
and labor unions. The code also bans employment discrimination. In 
reality women frequently face hiring and pay discrimination, especially 
in the emerging private sector. According to the Central Statistics 
Bureau, the number of women in the lower income brackets exceeds that 
of men by 75 percent, while men outnumber women two to one in upper 
income levels. The Ministry of Welfare has designated a one-person 
office with responsibility for gender issues.
    Women's advocacy groups are growing in size and number. They are 
involved in finding employment for women, lobbying for increased social 
benefits, and assisting victims of domestic abuse.
    Children.--The law on the rights of the child and the 
constitutional provisions on children are based on Western European 
models and provide for various protections, including health care and 
legal protections against physical abuse. However, resources are not 
adequate to ensure observance of these provisions. There is a national 
center for the protection of the rights of the child.
    Evidence suggests that abandonment and child abuse, including 
sexual abuse, are relatively widespread, as is child prostitution. An 
estimated 12 to 15 percent of prostitutes are considered juveniles, 
that is, between the ages of 8 and 18. Although in theory the 
Constitution and the Law on the Rights of the Child protect children, 
these rights only are enforced sporadically in the case of child 
prostitutes. Schooling is mandatory through the ninth grade, between 
the ages of 7 and 16, and free through the 12th grade, or age 18. 
Despite the existence of laws on mandatory education, truancy is 
widespread and growing. A few children's advocacy groups are active, 
particularly in lobbying for legislation to protect children's rights 
and for increased welfare payments for children.
    Law enforcement authorities have won court suits to remove children 
from abusive parents and secured convictions in child molestation 
cases.
    Trafficking in young girls for forced prostitution abroad is 
increasing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for protection of 
the disabled against discrimination; the 1992 Law on the Medical and 
Social Protection of Disabled provides for their right of access to 
public facilities. Provisions in the Labor Law and other laws aim to 
protect the disabled from bias in the workplace and from job 
discrimination. In 1998 the Cabinet adopted a framework document 
entitled ``Equal Opportunity for Everyone.'' The document is designed 
to coordinate the efforts of all branches of Government in assisting 
the disabled. The Government supports special schools for disabled 
persons. It does not enforce uniformly a 1993 law requiring buildings 
to be accessible to wheelchairs, and most buildings are not. However, 
some larger cities, including Riga and Ventspils, have undertaken an 
extensive wheelchair ramp building program at intersections.
    Religious Minorities.--In August the magazine Kapitals published a 
derogatory article about Jews and business. The public and senior 
government officials immediately condemned the article. The editor of 
the magazine resigned, and senior officials of the company apologized.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Of the country's more than 2.4 
million inhabitants, approximately 1 million persons are of non-Latvian 
ethnicity, including more than 700,000 ethnic Russians, 100,000 ethnic 
Belarusians, almost 64,000 ethnic Ukrainians, and more than 60,000 
ethnic Poles. More than 74 percent of the country's inhabitants are 
citizens, including nearly 400,000 persons who belong to national or 
ethnic minorities. There are approximately 583,000 resident 
noncitizens, of whom an estimated 68 percent are Russian; 12 percent, 
Belarusian; 9 percent, Ukrainian; and smaller percentages of Poles, 
Lithuanians, Jews, Roma, Germans, Tatars, Estonians, and Armenians.
    Ethnicity is identified in the passport of Latvian citizens but not 
in the passports of Latvia's noncitizen residents. Groups such as Roma 
and Belarusians have complained that, because the passport is a basic 
form of identification, this requirement has opened them to various 
forms of discrimination based on ethnicity.
    On December 9, 1999, the Saeima passed a revised version of the 
language law, which went into effect on September 1, 2000. The language 
law regulates the uses of language that affect public safety, health 
care, protection of the consumer, and labor rights. The law requires 
that documents submitted to the Government be translated into Latvian, 
including company reports and records, except in cases of emergency. If 
a public event is coorganized by the State, one of the working 
languages must be Latvian. Labels and user instructions for goods sold 
must be in Latvian, although other languages can be present as well. 
The law and its implementing regulations meet international standards. 
However, the implementation of this law remains a matter of public 
debate and continued international attention.
    In July 1998, the police arrested Vilis Linins, the chief ideologue 
of the ultranationalist Thundercross organization, which was suspected 
of terrorist attacks against Soviet memorials and other targets. On May 
29, 2000, Linins was found guilty of several acts of vandalism and 
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and fined $35,000 (21,000 lats). 
This was the first case where a political group was convicted of 
violent acts carried out to promote its political goals.
    The Government financially supports education in both Latvian and 
Russian, as well as in eight other minority languages. However, under 
the revised Education Law, the Government is implementing a bilingual 
education program at the elementary school level. The goal of this 
program is to facilitate the eventual transition to Latvian-language 
secondary schools by 2004. Although all non-Latvian-speaking students 
in public schools are supposed to learn Latvian and to study a minimum 
number of subjects in Latvian, there is a shortage of qualified 
teachers.
    State-funded university education is in Latvian, and incoming 
students whose native language is not Latvian must pass a language 
entrance examination. However, several private institutions offer 
higher education in Russian.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Trade Unions stipulates 
that workers, except for the uniformed military, have the right to form 
and join labor unions of their own choosing. Union membership is about 
30 percent of the work force. Free elections for union leadership are 
held every 4 years.
    The law does not limit the right to strike, but there were no major 
strikes during the year. The law bans the dismissal of employees who 
have invoked the right to strike. No cases of such dismissals have been 
reported.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have established 
contacts with European labor unions and international labor union 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions 
have the right to bargain collectively and are largely free of 
government interference in their negotiations with employers. The law 
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers. The 
Government's ability to protect the right to organize in the private 
sector is weak.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and it generally is 
not practiced. Inspectors from the Ministry of Welfare's State Labor 
Inspection Board or Inspectorate enforce this ban. However, trafficking 
in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad is a significant 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 15 
years, although children between the ages of 13 and 15 years may work 
in certain jobs outside of school hours. The law restricts employment 
of those under the age of 18; for example, by banning night shift or 
overtime work. Schooling is compulsory until age 16 and free until age 
18. State authorities are lax in their enforcement of child labor and 
school attendance laws. There generally is no evidence of forced or 
bonded labor involving children, which is prohibited by law (see 
Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in young girls for prostitution is 
a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage is 
about $82 (50 lats), far below the amount that trade union officials 
describe as the bare minimum for survival.
    The Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum workweek 
with at least one 42-hour rest period weekly, 4 weeks of annual 
vacation, and a program of assistance to working mothers with small 
children. The laws establish minimum occupational health and safety 
standards for the workplace, but these standards frequently are 
ignored. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from 
hazardous work situations without endangering their continued 
employment, but these standards also frequently are ignored in 
practice.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In May the Criminal Code was revised to 
make it illegal to forcibly send a person to a foreign country for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation. There were no prosecutions by year's 
end.
    There were instances of trafficking in women for purposes of forced 
prostitution. Prostitution is a significant problem in Riga, and there 
is evidence that trafficking in women (including minors) for 
prostitution abroad also is increasing. The country is primarily a 
source or transit country rather than a destination.
                               __________

                             LIECHTENSTEIN

    The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and 
a parliamentary democracy. The reigning Prince is the head of state; 
all legislation enacted by the popularly elected Parliament (Landtag) 
must have his concurrence. The Parliament elects and the Prince 
appoints the members of the Government and of the independent 
judiciary. In July the Prince decided to postpone the ongoing debate on 
a new Constitution until after parliamentary elections in 2001. 
Consultations between the Prince and Parliament's constitutional 
commission collapsed in April over diverging views on the executive 
powers of the monarch.
    The Interior Ministry effectively oversees the regular and 
auxiliary police forces. There is no standing military force.
    Liechtenstein has a prosperous, highly industrialized, free 
enterprise economy with a vital service sector. It participates in a 
customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national 
currency. As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), its 32,000 
citizens enjoy a very high standard of living. Unemployment fell to 1.1 
percent during the year.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Violence against women is a 
problem. The Government is working to eliminate societal discrimination 
against women.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government 
observes these provisions. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must 
bring suspects before an examining magistrate, who must either file 
formal charges or order release. The law grants suspects the right to 
legal counsel of their own choosing; counsel is provided to indigents. 
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the 
examining magistrate has reason to believe the suspects are a danger to 
society or will not appear for trial.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judicial system has three tiers: Lower court; high court; 
and Supreme Court. In addition an Administrative Court hears appeals 
against government decisions. The State Court protects the rights 
accorded by the Constitution, decides conflicts of jurisdiction between 
the law courts and the administrative authorities, and acts as a 
disciplinary court for members of the Government.
    The Constitution provides for fair public trials and judicial 
appeal, and an independent judiciary respects these provisions.
    The Constitution authorizes the Prince to alter criminal sentences 
or pardon offenders. However, if the offender is a member of the 
Government and is sentenced for a crime in connection with official 
duties, the Prince can take such action only if the Parliament requests 
it.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for personal liberty and for 
the inviolability of the home, postal correspondence, and telephone 
conversations. No violations were reported. Police need a judicial 
warrant to search private property.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--An independent press, an effective 
judiciary, and a democratic political system combine to ensure freedom 
of speech and of the press. Two daily newspapers are published, each 
representing the interests of one of the two major political parties, 
as is one weekly newsmagazine. One state and one private television 
station broadcast, along with a private radio station, and residents 
freely receive radio and television broadcasts from neighboring 
countries. An information bulletin is also issued by the third party 
(Freie Liste) represented in Parliament. There are no limits on access 
to the Internet.
    In October 1999, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) fined 
Prince Hans-Adam II for abusing one of his subject's freedom of speech. 
The ECHR reprimanded the monarch for refusing to reappoint a judge, 
Herbert Wille, who disagreed with him in an ongoing constitutional 
debate. In a public lecture held in 1995, Wille said that the State 
Court should decide on cases of disagreement between citizens 
(represented in parliament) and the Prince. The Prince wrote Wille 
shortly afterwards that the opinions that he expressed disqualified him 
from office, and in 1997 he refused to endorse Parliament's support for 
Wille's reappointment as head of the administrative court. The ECHR 
found that Hans-Adam II had curbed Wille's right to free speech and 
ordered him to pay $59,000 (100,000 Swiss francs) in costs and damages. 
In his response on the following day, Prince Hans-Adam II stated that 
he took note of the judgement of the ECHR; however, the Prince had not 
reappointed Wille to the court by year's end. The Prince further stated 
that he and his successors will no longer publish the reasons for such 
appointment decisions. The 100,000 Swiss francs in costs and damages 
were paid out to Willie and his two legal counsels in February.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice 
of any faith. The relationship between the Government and the Catholic 
Church currently is being redefined, and a new agreement is scheduled 
for 2002. The Government contributes to the Catholic Church, as well as 
to other denominations. The finances of the Catholic Church are 
integrated directly into the budgets of the national and local 
governments. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory 
in all schools, but the authorities routinely grant exemptions for 
children whose parents request them.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have unrestricted freedom to 
travel in the country, to emigrate, and to return.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. On 
July 3, the Government signed a trilateral agreement with Switzerland 
and Austria regarding the return of persons entering the country 
without permission. The treaty was ratified on October 25.
    The Government provides first asylum; however, the country's lack 
of an airport or international train station means that it receives few 
requests. The 1998 asylum law is in accord with the U.N. 1951 
Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since its passage, the 
number of asylum requests has increased. Those persons who enter from 
Austria without permission still are returned to Austrian authorities 
in accordance with a 1955 bilateral agreement.
    The Government granted collective protective status to Kosovar 
immigrants in the fall of 1998, following rising numbers of asylum 
applications. In April 1999, the Government decided that children under 
age 20 and spouses of guest workers from Kosovo could enter the country 
on request. In total the Government granted temporary protective status 
to 748 immigrants from Kosovo. In September 1999, the Government 
stopped granting collective asylum and set a deadline 8 months later 
(May 31) for repatriations.
    By October 1999, 505 Kosovars left the country voluntarily, 481 of 
whom agreed to their repatriation before the May 31 deadline and thus 
benefited from government financial and material assistance in 
coordination with Switzerland's refugee repatriation program. Beginning 
in June, 19 Kosovars were ``forcibly'' repatriated, but only 1 was 
repatriated under police escort. To avoid repatriation, 92 Kosovars 
disappeared. An additional 115 Kosovars, whose asylum applications are 
pending, remained in the country awaiting a decision on their 
applications.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    The country is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary 
democracy. The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The 25member 
unicameral legislature is elected every 4 years. Suffrage is universal 
for adults over age 18, and balloting is secret. Political parties 
operate freely. Citizens regularly vote on initiatives and referendums.
    Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although 
since gaining the right to vote in 1984, a growing number have been 
active in politics. A woman, the Foreign Minister, is one of the five 
members of the Cabinet, and another is a Member of Parliament. Women 
serve on the executive committees of the major parties. In June 1999, 
women's organizations, political parties, and the Government's Bureau 
for the Promotion of Equal Rights for Women and Men held a convention 
to promote greater participation by women in politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    International and domestic human rights groups operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    The sole local human rights organization, Justitia et Pax, is an 
informal group of about 10 members who monitor prison conditions and 
assist foreign workers with immigration matters.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
language, or social status, and the authorities respect these 
provisions. The law also prohibits public incitement to violence or 
public agitation or insult directed against a race, people, ethnic 
group, or state.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) estimate that one in five women is a victim of 
physical or psychological violence. There is 1 women's shelter, which 
provided refuge for 33 women, only 12 of whom were citizens, and 30 
children during the year. Annual government financing for the shelter 
is approximately $140,000 (240,000 Swiss francs). The law prohibits all 
forms of domestic violence, and the Government vigorously enforces the 
law.
    NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in 
women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    Societal discrimination still limits opportunities for women in 
fields traditionally dominated by men. Men earn more than women. In 
accordance with a 1992 constitutional amendment mandating equality for 
women, Parliament amended a significant number of laws to provide for 
equality of treatment. For example, Parliament revised the citizenship 
law, the employment law, the law on labor conditions, the tax law, and 
the divorce law. The process of amending laws is almost complete. In 
March 1999, Parliament passed legislation on equal opportunity for 
women and men. The law is designed to eliminate discrimination and 
sexual harassment in the workplace and to create conditions that allow 
both women and men to combine work and family. It entered into force in 
May 1999. In April 1999, the Government approved a plan to promote 
equal opportunity and to create conditions that allow both men and 
women to combine work and family. Measures include: Raising public 
awareness about the new law; improving programs and infrastructure for 
traditional and single-parent families, such as affordable housing and 
childcare; promoting educational and career opportunities for women; 
and raising recognition for work in the home to the same level as for 
work outside the home. The Government took steps to end all forms of 
discrimination against women. In December 1999, the Government signed 
the optional protocol to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All 
Discrimination Against Women.
    Three women's rights groups were active. Their chief concerns were 
public affairs, information, legal counseling, lobbying, and other 
political activities.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free, 
and universal primary school education for children of both sexes for 9 
years, normally until the age of 16.
    The Government supported programs to protect the rights of children 
and matches contributions made to the four NGO's that monitor 
children's rights. A children and youth service belonging to the Office 
for Social Services oversaw the implementation of government-supported 
programs for children.
    In September the Government signed two optional protocols to the 
1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. One protocol strictly 
regulates the drafting of minors into the armed services, and the other 
forbids child prostitution and child pornography as well as trafficking 
in children.
    In November the Government established a Commission for the 
Coordination of Professionals in Cases of Sexual Offences against 
Children. The group consisted of experts from different backgrounds and 
focused on assisting professionals (counselors, therapists, and 
physicians) who deal with sexual offences against children. The 
Commission takes a comprehensive approach to sexual offences against 
children.
    During the year, two children allegedly were abused sexually by 
acquaintances, but the prosecutor's office dropped the case after 
further inquiries undermined the validity of the allegations. The 
suspect, a Brazilian national, no longer resides in the country.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--Although the law expressly does not 
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities, complaints of 
such discrimination may be pursued in the courts. Amendments to the law 
on insurance for the disabled, which were intended to improve the 
economic situation of disabled persons, came into force in 1997.
    The Government requires that buildings and government services be 
made accessible for people with disabilities, but in general they are 
not, particularly old buildings.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In its 1998 security report, 
the Government confirmed the existence of a small number of rightwing 
extremists, consisting of about 20 skinheads between the ages of 20 and 
30, and about as many followers of a slightly younger age. A 1999 
government survey of 700 young persons indicated that approximately 20 
percent of youths expressed ambivalence toward or sympathy for 
extremist views, while 4 percent supported extremist views. Incidents 
of violence increased in 1999, according to the survey. On August 19, 
an adolescent from former Yugoslavia was injured in a fight with a 
local youth. The attack appeared to have been motivated racially. The 
rightwing extremists have not been publicly active. One case of 
repeated verbal attacks against Kosovar refugees was reported to a 
local NGO. In November 1999, a local youth was fined $375 (600 Swiss 
francs) and sentenced to 2 weeks of social work for putting a racist 
web site on the Internet. There were no reports of rightwing propaganda 
on the Internet during the year.
    Parliament adopted national antiracism legislation in December 
1999. The law entered into force on February 11 and makes it a crime to 
produce or distribute racist propaganda, deny or trivialize genocide 
and crimes against humanity, engage in racist or religious 
discrimination, deny services to a particular group, or support racist 
organizations. Violations are punishable with a maximum 2-year prison 
sentence. On March 1, the country acceded to the U.N. Convention 
against Racial Discrimination. On June 18, voters approved a referendum 
that changed naturalization requirements to facilitate the 
naturalization of long-term residents, but it required that applicants 
relinquish their citizenship in other countries.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners, 
are free to associate, join unions of their choice, and select their 
own union representatives. Due to the country's small size and 
population, only one trade union operates, representing about 13 
percent of the work force. However, the sole trade union looks after 
the interests of nonmembers as well. It is a member of the World 
Confederation of Labor but is represented on an ad hoc basis by a Swiss 
union.
    Workers have the right to strike except in certain essential 
services. No strikes were reported during the year. The law does not 
provide specific protections for strikers. Employers may dismiss 
employees for refusing to work; such dismissals may be contested. In 
1997 the Government incorporated EEA guidelines into its domestic labor 
law. These guidelines require that, among other things, employers 
consult in cases of projected mass dismissals and submit employment 
contracts in written form.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. 
However, collective bargaining agreements generally are adapted from 
ones negotiated by Swiss employers and unions.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. Except by 
implication, the law does not forbid forced and bonded labor by 
children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur. NGO's 
assume that trafficking in women occurs, but there were no reports of 
specific cases (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government does not prohibit forced and bonded labor 
by children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur 
(see Section 6.c.). The law generally prohibits the employment of 
children under 16 years of age. However, exceptions may be made for the 
limited employment of youths at least age 14 and for those who leave 
school after completing their 9 years of compulsory education. Children 
ages 14 and older may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 
hours a week during the school year and 15 hours a week at other times.
    Inspections are adequate. No employers have been fined or 
imprisoned for violations of the law. The Government devoted adequate 
resources and oversight to child labor policies. The Department for 
Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy effectively 
supervised compliance with the law.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. The number of working poor households has not increased in recent 
years. In 1999 36 households (0.3 percent) depended on public welfare 
to obtain a yearly minimal income, set at $10,700 (17,720 Swiss francs) 
for a one-person household, and were considered working poor. A total 
of 458 households (2.7 percent) received public assistance. The law 
sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours for white-collar workers and 
employees of industrial firms and sales personnel, and 48 hours for all 
other workers. With few exceptions, Sunday work is not allowed. Workers 
over age 20 receive at least 4 weeks of vacation; younger workers 
receive at least 5 weeks.
    The law sets occupational health and safety standards, and the 
Department for Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy 
effectively enforces these provisions. The law provides for a hearing 
in cases in which workers remove themselves from dangerous situations.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons.
    NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in 
women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented. Although 
there were no reports of trafficking during the year, six cases of 
trafficking in persons (assistance with illegal immigration) were 
reported in 1999. In most cases, the traffickers concerned were 
relatives of illegal immigrants.
                               __________

                               LITHUANIA

    Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy with a Constitution adopted 
by referendum in 1992. The Constitution established a 141-member 
unicameral legislature, the Seimas; a directly elected president; and a 
government whose ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister, 
appointed by the President, and approved by the Seimas. The Government 
exercises authority with the approval of the Seimas and the President. 
The judiciary is independent.
    A unified national police force under the jurisdiction of the 
Interior Ministry is responsible for law enforcement. The State 
Security Department is responsible for internal security and reports to 
Parliament and the President. The police committed a number of human 
rights abuses.
    Since its independence in 1990, Lithuania has made steady progress 
in developing a market economy. Most housing and small businesses are 
privatized, and the contribution of the private sector to gross 
domestic product amounts to more than 70 percent. Trade is diversifying 
and expanding both to the West and the East. Agriculture employs the 
largest number of workers (20 percent). Major exports include textiles, 
mineral products, machinery, and electronic appliances. Inflation from 
January to August remained low at 0.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999 
was $2,878. During the first half of the year, real GDP reportedly 
increased by 2 percent. However, unemployment continued to remain high 
at over 11 percent. (It was above 15 percent according to a labor 
market survey.)
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion 
beat detainees and misused detention laws. The Government has made some 
progress in bringing police corruption under control. Prison conditions 
remained poor, and prolonged detention in a small number of cases 
remained a problem. State media continued to be subject to political 
interests. Violence and discrimination against women and child abuse 
were serious problems. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose 
of forced prostitution was a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In 1998 the President formed the International Commission to 
Investigate the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in 
Lithuania. The Commission includes historians, human rights 
representatives, representatives of international Jewish organizations, 
and lawyers from Lithuania and a number of foreign countries. The 
Government allotted $37,500 (150,000 litas) to establish a full-time 
working secretariat for the Commission. The secretariat was in 
operation by October 1999, and the first research group of the 
Commission began work in December 1999.
    In August 1999 a court found six persons guilty of complicity in 
the January 1991 coup attempt. The defendants were former leaders and 
officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party who were sentenced to 
prison terms of from 3 to 12 years for crimes that included 
premeditated acts of murder and inflicting serious bodily harm. Defense 
lawyers appealed the verdict, but their appeal was still under 
consideration at year's end.
    Formal charges were filed against alleged war criminals Aleksandras 
Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas. After being stripped of his U.S. 
citizenship in 1996 for concealing his World War II activities, 
Lileikis returned to Lithuania. He was accused of acts of genocide 
committed when he headed the security police of the Vilnius district 
under Nazi control. Lileikis's trial was postponed several times due to 
his poor health; he died at age 93 without trial on September 27.
    Gimzauskas, who served as Lileikis's deputy during the war, 
returned to Lithuania in 1993. On October 13, 2000, the Vilnius 
regional court decided to try the case of Gimzauskas in absentia due to 
his poor health. The court hearing started in November. It is expected 
that the court will hear the case and make a decision regarding guilt, 
but that there would be no sentence imposed. After considering the 
case, the court also can adopt a resolution on whether Gimzauskas' 
actions in this particular case constituted a crime or not, thus 
formally closing the case.
    In June 1999, the Prosecutor General's Office of Special 
Investigations filed genocide charges against Vincas Valkavickas, who 
returned to Lithuania in June 1999. In July 1999, a case was initiated 
against Petras Bernotavicius, a resident of the United States, and 
Antanas Gudelis, an Australian citizen. In July 1999, the prosecutor 
launched an investigation into the role of Kazys Ciurinskas in a 
separate war-related criminal case. No substantial progress was 
reported in the latter four cases by the end of the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    There is a growing problem of women being forced or sold into 
prostitution by organized crime figures. Their families often believe 
that they disappeared or were kidnaped (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 
6.f.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and there 
were no reports of its use; however, police sometimes beat or otherwise 
physically mistreat detainees. The press reported that incidents of 
police brutality are becoming more common. In many instances, the 
victims reportedly are reluctant to bring charges against police 
officers due to fear of reprisals. According to the Ministry of 
Interior, during the first 6 months of the year no police officers were 
charged with abuse of power or sentenced. In 1999 four officers were 
charged and one was sentenced for this crime.
    The Interior Ministry states that district police inspectors are 
the most negligent in the force. To strengthen the integrity of the 
police, the Inspectorate General of the Interior Ministry was given 
administrative autonomy in 1997. In 1999 the Inspectorate General was 
reorganized into an office of the Inspector General, and some functions 
of the Inspectorate were delegated to the internal investigations 
division at the police department. The Inspector General cannot 
investigate abuses on his own authority but can act only on the order 
of the Minister.
    In the past, noncommissioned military personnel committed human 
rights abuses by hazing recruits, despite efforts to quash the 
practice, which was inherited from the former Soviet armed forces. As 
living conditions improve for military personnel, human rights 
violations committed by noncommissioned officers have declined 
significantly. During the year, seven criminal cases were filed for 
``systemic degrading treatment'' or breach of discipline involving 
violence (the relevant legal codes). According to the Ministry of 
National Defense, most trauma inflicted on conscripts is psychological 
rather than physical. The Ministry believes that a lack of 
professionalism among noncommissioned officers--rather than ethnic, 
regional, or social factors--is a primary factor in cases of hazing, 
and it is working actively to improve their skills and judgment. In 
1999 the Seimas approved a new disciplinary statute for the armed 
forces, and the military police formed by a 1998 law are charged with 
maintaining discipline. The disciplinary statute sets procedures for 
the investigation of disciplinary offences, provides for the right to 
appeal, and lists the types of punishments.
    Prison conditions are poor. Due to limited resources, most prisons 
are overcrowded and poorly maintained. One local human rights group 
claims that the administration of penal institutions does not do enough 
to prevent violence among prisoners. During the first 9 months of the 
year, 35 deaths were recorded among prisoners (16 of them killings) as 
well as 524 injuries, mostly self-inflicted (in order to escape abuse 
from fellow inmates or guards).
    The Government is attempting to reform the prison system with 
international assistance; however, progress has been very slow. In 
September the Seimas adopted a new Criminal Code. The prison department 
was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Justice Ministry, 
heralding the beginning of practical reforms in the correctional 
system. New hygiene norms came into effect in 1999 that require a 
certain amount of space for each convict to assure healthy and safe 
conditions. However, in 2000 the budget allotted $5 million (20 million 
litas) less for running 14 correctional institutions than in 1999. 
Funding only covers minimal needs and on average amounts to 75 cents 
for three meals per prisoner per day. Thus prison overcrowding 
persists, particularly in pretrial detention.
    As a result of the funding shortfall and overcrowding, a Law on 
Amnesty was passed in April that reduced the number of prisoners and 
detainees from 15,000 (as of January 1, 2000) to 9,000 (as of July 1, 
2000). As of August 30, there were 7,045 prisoners, including 251 women 
and 125 juveniles (2 women). There were 1,612 detainees, including 68 
women and 99 juveniles (2 women). The latter are held separately from 
adults.
    Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that no person may be arbitrarily arrested or detained; 
however, there were instances of prolonged detention. Under the law, 
police temporarily may detain suspects for up to 48 hours, based upon 
reliable evidence of criminal activity and approval by an investigator 
or prosecutor. Pretrial detention applies only in the case of felonies 
and when it is impossible to prevent flight by other means or to allow 
unhindered investigation. A district judge, acting on a prosecutor's 
application, may order longer pretrial detention, which can last up to 
6 months and may be extended using the same procedure for periods not 
to exceed 18 months in total. However, in practice the prison 
department admits that pretrial detention has in some instances 
exceeded 18 months. The prison department faults a slow justice system 
that cannot bring cases to trial expeditiously. Bail in theory is 
available, but it is not used widely. The Constitution provides for the 
right to an attorney from the moment of detention (see Section 1.e.).
    In an effort to cope with the rise in violent organized crime, the 
1997 Law on the Prevention of Organized Crime allows for the imposition 
of restrictions on the freedom of a person who by his actions might 
``restrict the rights and freedoms of other persons, create conditions 
for the emergence and development of social and economic preconditions 
of organized crime, or pose a threat to public security.''
    The Government is addressing concerns that periods of detention 
were excessive. The Prosecutor General is stepping up his monitoring of 
the investigation of cases, and additional and better qualified judges 
are being added.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
    The Constitution and the 1994 Law on Courts established a four-tier 
court system: The Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals; district courts; 
and local courts. The local courts are tribunals of first instance for 
all cases that are not assigned to some other court by law. The Supreme 
Court's Senate of Judges, consisting of the Supreme Court chairman, the 
division chairmen, and other members of the Supreme Court, rules on the 
decisions by lower domestic courts that may violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution also established a 
Constitutional Court and allowed for specialized courts for 
administrative, labor, family, and other purposes.
    The administrative courts began functioning on May 1, 1999. The 
main function of administrative courts is to investigate the legality 
and validity of administrative acts and conflicts in the sphere of 
public administration and taxation. The creation of administrative 
courts completed national court reform, a process that started in 1995. 
The Ministry of Justice is moving towards a system of specialization of 
judges in district and local courts according to the types of cases.
    A new Civil Code was adopted in July. It will enter into force in 
July 2001. The Civil Code complies with the requirements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and takes into account the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The Seimas adopted 
a Criminal Code in September 2000. It will enter into force 
simultaneously with the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was still 
under preparation at year's end.
    The Constitutional Court, at the request of the President, members 
of the Seimas, the Government, or the judiciary, reviews the 
constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, as well as that of 
actions by the President and the Cabinet. The Constitutional Court's 
authority to issue the final word on subjects within its jurisdiction 
is unquestioned; it is the country's ultimate legal authority with no 
further appeal of its rulings.
    The 1996 Law on Commercial Arbitration provides for the 
establishment of arbitration institutions and the abolition of the 
economic court (abolished in 1998). The law provides for private 
dispute resolution by an arbitration tribunal, either organized by a 
permanent arbitration institution or by the parties themselves.
    The Prosecutor General exercises oversight responsibility through a 
network of district and local prosecutors who work with police 
investigators--employed by the Ministry of the Interior--in preparing 
the prosecution's evidence for the courts.
    The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel for 
defendants. In practice the right to counsel is abridged by the 
shortage of trained advocates, who find it difficult to cope with the 
burgeoning numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. Outside 
observers have recommended the establishment of a public defender 
system to regularize procedures for the provision of legal assistance 
to indigent persons charged in criminal cases. By law defense advocates 
have access to government evidence and may present evidence and 
witnesses. The courts and law enforcement agencies generally honor 
routine, written requests for evidence. By law a judge may decide to 
hold a closed trial in a limited number of circumstances.
    Government rehabilitation of over 50,000 persons charged with anti-
Soviet crimes during the Stalin era led to reports in 1991 that some 
persons who allegedly were involved with crimes against humanity during 
the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. A special 
judicial procedure was established in 1997 to examine each case in 
which an individual or organization raised an objection that a 
rehabilitated person may have committed a crime against humanity. 
During the first 8 months of 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the 
rehabilitation of 15 persons.
    Parliamentarian Audrius Butkevicius, a former Minister of National 
Defense, was charged in 1997 with several counts of corruption. 
According to the Lithuanian Human Rights Association, the case was 
based on false information from the State Security Department. 
Butkevicius's pretrial detention was prolonged without the decision of 
a judge. The parliamentary ombudsman said that there were many similar 
cases and confirmed that the authorities had violated the law. 
Typically, he wrote, judges and prosecutors wrongly interpret the law 
to mean that pretrial detention can be extended automatically when a 
case is submitted to a court of law. In 1998 Butkevicius was sentenced 
to 5+ years in prison, fined $12,500 (50,000 litas), and half of his 
property was confiscated. On May 12, 1999, the Supreme Court rejected 
Butkevicius's appeal. Butkevicius's lawyers appealed to the European 
Court of Human Rights, and in September the Court agreed to review the 
case; but it had not been resolved by year's end 2000. Butkevicius was 
released on March 20 after serving two-thirds of his 5+-year jail term. 
He resumed his seat in the Parliament. However, the court decided that 
he had not completed the sentence at least 65 days before election day, 
and thus he was not allowed to be a candidate for the parliamentary 
elections in October.
    In November the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced 
that it would try three new cases against Lithuania. The cases were 
brought by former Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, former Kaunas 
Police Commissioner Stasys Sipavicius, and businessman Arvydas 
Stasaitis. The ECHR found that Stasaitis' entire period of detention 
(1996-2000) may have been unjustified. He was charged with large-scale 
financial crime. Slezevicius was accused of abusing his position as 
Prime Minister when he withdrew his personal funds from a Lithuanian 
bank just days before it failed. The case was accepted because charges 
against him were investigated for too long (4 years) and never came 
under scrutiny in a court of law. Sipavicius spent 10 months in custody 
before his trial on charges of abusing his powers in a major smuggling 
case. He was sentenced to the 10 months served for neglecting his 
duties and released in court. Sipavicius complained that the charges 
against him suddenly were changed and that he had not had time to 
prepare to defend himself against the new charges.
    Through December 2000, the ECHR ruled against the Government in 5 
cases involving various breaches of conventions, laws, and regulations 
concerning arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy, 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The 
authorities do not engage in indiscriminate or widespread monitoring of 
the correspondence or communications of citizens. However, with the 
written authorization of a prosecutor or judge, police and security 
service personnel may engage in surveillance and monitoring activities 
on the grounds of national security. Except in cases of hot pursuit or 
the danger of disappearance of evidence, police must obtain a search 
warrant signed by a prosecutor before they may enter private premises.
    However, it is assumed widely that law enforcement agencies have 
increased the use of a range of surveillance methods to cope with the 
expansion of organized crime. There is some question as to the legal 
basis for this police surveillance, but there are no known legal 
challenges to such surveillance.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice.
    Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and 
restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government 
determines that national security is involved. Under a 1996 media law, 
the media created a special ethics commission and an ombudsman to 
address complaints and seek conciliation in potential libel cases. This 
ombudsman position later was established and funded by the Seimas.
    The independent print media are flourishing and comprise a wide 
range of newspapers and magazines. Radio and television include a mix 
of state and private stations. National television and radio are in the 
process of being transformed into an entirely public entity; however, 
attempts to make it independent financially from the Government have 
lagged.
    There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, and the 
Government respects them in practice.
    The Communist Party of Lithuania and other organizations associated 
with the former Soviet regime continued to be banned.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respects this provision in 
practice. A 1995 law grants religious communities, associations, and 
centers property rights to prayer houses, homes, and other buildings. 
Article 5 of this law mentions nine religious communities that have 
been declared ``traditional'' by the law and therefore are eligible for 
governmental assistance: Latin Rite Catholics; Greek Rite Catholics; 
Evangelical Lutherans; Evangelical Reformers; Orthodox; Old Believers; 
Jews; Sunni Muslims; and Karaites. In 1999 the Hasidic Chabad Lubavich 
community was recognized by the Ministry of Justice as a part of the 
Jewish religious community, thereby gaining the status of an official 
religious community that the rest of the Jewish community had enjoyed 
since 1995. Other religious communities are not eligible for financial 
assistance from the Government, but there are no restrictions on their 
activities or property rights. Nontraditional foreign religious workers 
must obtain work permits, and they face difficult bureaucratic 
requirements in obtaining residence permits from officials who regard 
them as representatives of cults and sects. These religious workers 
complain of unofficial harassment. There are no restrictions on the 
activities of other religious communities. In 1999 the Seimas amended 
the Law on Religious Communities and Associations. The amendment 
provides funding from the national budget for educational institutions 
of traditional religious organizations. The Government Department of 
European Law has warned publicly that this amendment discriminates in 
favor of traditional religious communities versus nontraditional; the 
law is expected to come into effect in 2001.
    Under 1995 legislation, the Catholic community has been more 
successful in having its property returned than the Jewish community; 
an agreement between Jewish community leaders and the World Jewish 
Restitution Organization signed in 1995 never has been implemented. 
However, some religious property, including 26 synagogues, was returned 
to the Jewish community, mostly from 1993 to 1996.
    The law provides for the restitution of private property to 
citizens, but the deadline for filing claims has passed. A number of 
successful claims were made, and others still are pending. A lack of 
funds for compensation and protracted bureaucratic obstacles are the 
primary problems preventing the return of private property. The 
Government has taken no action on the problem of heirless (community) 
property and has no plans to do so.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the law, citizens and permanent 
residents are permitted free movement within the country and the right 
to return to the country, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. There are no restrictions on foreign travel.
    Under 1997 and 1998 legislation, the Government grants refugee 
status to qualified applicants in accordance with the provisions of the 
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol.
    There is a registration center for migrants and asylum seekers in 
the town of Pabrade, where 30 illegal immigrants were registered in 
August, and a refugee reception center for asylum seekers in the town 
of Rukla, where 56 persons were registered. Living conditions at the 
center for refugees in Rukla are modern, safe, and healthy. The center 
has benefited from financing from other European countries. The center 
in Pabrade is overcrowded and rundown, but construction was underway on 
a new complex there. As of September, of a total of 2,765 foreigners 
initially settled at the Pabrade center (since 1997), 1,884 eventually 
were deported. Irregular migration reached its peak in 1997. By mid-
2000 it had decreased by more than 400 percent due to improved border 
control, the adoption of new and strict laws against human smuggling, 
and the more effective detention and return of migrants to their 
countries of origin. However, counter to this trend, illegal 
immigration from CIS countries and Afghanistan was on the rise. The 
Government continued its efforts to stop illegal migrants by 
negotiating readmission agreements with Russia and Belarus, the two 
countries used by most migrants to reach Lithuania, but no progress had 
been made by year's end. A border demarcation agreement with Belarus 
was ratified. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not 
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Of 141 seats in the Seimas, 71 are elected 
directly, and 70 are elected through proportional representation. Only 
those parties that receive more than 5 percent of the total ballots (or 
7 percent for coalitions) are allowed representation in the Parliament.
    In 1998 independent candidate Valdas Adamkus was elected President 
by a narrow margin. Following the resignation of Prime Minister 
Gediminas Vagnorius, the Seimas endorsed the 14member Cabinet of Prime 
Minister Rolandas Paksas, a member of the ruling Conservative Party, to 
carry out the amended program of the Government. Paksas resigned in 
October 1998 in opposition to a government oil privatization contract. 
The next Prime Minister, Andrius Kubilius, stepped down after the 
October 2000 general elections, and Rolandas Paksas, who switched 
parties and became leader of the Liberal Union, was sworn in as Prime 
Minister.
    Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although 
there are no legal restrictions on their participation. The number of 
female parliamentarians in the new 141-seat Seimas, elected in October, 
is 14 compared with 24 in the previous Seimas; as in the previous 
government, there is 1 female minister in the new 14-member Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Most government authorities cooperate with local nongovernmental 
organizations and actively encourage visits by international and 
nongovernmental human rights groups. A key exception in the past was 
the Ministry of Interior, which continually refused to release 
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related 
incidents. The Ministry is more willing to share such information; 
however, it has released few statistics or reports. The Association for 
the Defense of Human Rights in Lithuania is an umbrella organization 
for several small human rights groups, all of which operate without 
government restriction.
    The division of human rights of the department of international law 
and European integration in the Ministry of Justice monitors law and 
legal practice to determine whether they are in accord with the 
country's international obligations.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, or ethnic background; however, discrimination 
against women in employment and other areas persists.
    Women.--The abuse of women at home is reportedly common, especially 
in connection with alcohol abuse by husbands, but institutional 
mechanisms for coping with this problem are developing slowly. A 
women's shelter funded in part with Norwegian assistance is now in 
operation. According to one sociological survey published in 1997, 20 
percent of women reported experiencing an attempted rape, while another 
33 percent reported having been beaten at least once in their lives. 
During the first 6 months of the year, 154 rapes were reported, but 
only 78 were registered and prosecuted. Official statistics on the 
incidence of abuse of women in the home are not reported separately 
from other categories of assault. Persons convicted of rape generally 
receive sentences of from 3 to 5 years in prison.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for men and women; 
however, women continue to face discrimination. Official policy 
specifies equal pay for equal work. The Law of Realization on Equal 
Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men came into effect on March 1, 
1999. The Office of the Ombudsman for Equal Opportunities of Women and 
Men was established in May, and the Seimas appointed lawyer Ausra 
Burneikiene as ombudsman. The Ombudsman's Office is an independent 
public organization, accountable to the Seimas, which oversees the 
implementation of the law and investigates complaints concerning 
violations of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. The 
ombudsman also has some enforcement powers in this regard, and the new 
Criminal Code envisions criminal sanctions for discrimination or 
harassment. Generally, men and women receive the same pay for 
comparable work, but women are underrepresented significantly in some 
professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Women are 
underrepresented in businesses. Significant inequalities in society 
based on gender continue, and conservative views about the role of 
women persist. In 1999 the Ministry of Education and Science abolished 
preferential university entrance criteria. Since then the equal 
opportunities ombudsman also closely followed admission examinations to 
high schools. During the period from March to August, the ombudsman 
received 20 complaints based on gender discrimination. During the 
period from July 1999, when the ombudsman's office began operating, to 
March 2000, 35 complaints were registered.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through a system of public education and medical 
care. The Government provides compulsory, free, and universal primary 
school education for children through the age of 15 or 9th grade. The 
Government provides low-cost health care for all children. A special 
office in the Ministry of Social Security and Labor oversees 
implementation of the Government's program for children, and an 
ombudsperson for children was established during the year.
    The Ministries of Social Security and Labor and of the Interior 
share official responsibility for the protection of children's rights 
and welfare. By the end of April 1999, the Minister of Justice had 
appointed 85 judges in the district courts for hearings in juvenile 
criminal cases and cases related to children's rights (adoption and 
paternity matters). Starting in 1994, the Children's Rights Office of 
the Ministry of Social Security and Labor (also known as the Children's 
Rights Protection Council) began to take on many of the functions 
formerly handled by the Interior Ministry and its police officers 
throughout the country, thereby focusing more attention on the social 
welfare needs of children. As of January 2000, the service identified 
36,856 children in abusive and dysfunctional families, a 44 percent 
increase compared with 1995. The number of such families grew by 65 
percent over the same period.
    The ombudsperson's office for children, established in November, is 
taking over most of the functions of the Children's Rights Protection 
Council. In August an adoption service at the Ministry of Social 
Security and Labor was established to oversee implementation of the 
1993 Hague Adoption Convention. The Office of Family and Children at 
the Ministry of Social Security and Labor formulates and implements the 
Government's program for family and children.
    Child abuse is a problem. Child abuse in connection with alcohol 
abuse by parents is a serious problem. The prevalence of authoritarian 
values in family upbringing has discouraged more active measures 
against child abuse; however, the press has reported increases in 
cruelty to children, including sexual abuse, intentional starvation, 
beatings, and murder. Authorities reported that two children were 
killed by their parents in 1998; however, the media widely reported on 
five cases during the year. The penalties for violence and cruel 
behavior against underage persons were made stricter in 1999, providing 
for imprisonment terms of from 1 to 2 years. No department or 
organization collects information on child abuse.
    There is one rehabilitation center in the country for children who 
have been abused sexually. The Penal Code provides for terms of up to 3 
year's imprisonment for sexual abuse and from 1 to 4 years' 
imprisonment for exploiting children in the production of pornography. 
There is no official data on the exploitation of children in 
pornography cases.
    Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The 1991 Law on Integrating Disabled 
People provides for a broad category of rights and public benefits to 
which disabled people are entitled legally. Legal provisions for access 
to buildings for the disabled are in place but are not enforced widely; 
the vast majority of public buildings remain inaccessible to the 
disabled.
    In 1999 there were 544,674 adults and 13,276 children with 
disabilities. The latest data available shows that in 1998 spending for 
disabled persons was $166 million (666.58 million litas) or 1.55 
percent of GDP, with various assistance programs being implemented. A 
project in Kaunas to build an apartment building for persons with 
disabilities has not been finished due to a lack of funds and the 
pending privatization of the state institution that was to have 
supervised the project. A center for deaf children and a program for 
children with special orthopedic problems have been in effect since 
1997.
    Religious Minorities.--A certain level of anti-Semitic sentiment 
persists in the country, reflected in sporadic public incidents of 
anti-Semitism and sensationalist exploitation of anti-Semitism for 
commercial gain. In November the Prosecutor General launched an 
official criminal investigation into anti-Semitic articles published on 
October 18 in the national daily newspaper Lietuvos Aidas (circulation 
10,000). The President, Prime Minister, and the journalists' union 
publicly condemned the articles. The Penal Code provides for a sentence 
of from 2 to 10 years' imprisonment for incitement of racial or 
national hatred or incitement of violence against foreigners. The 
investigation continued at year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minority ethnic groups--
including Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and 
Karaites--make up roughly 20 percent of the population. Members of the 
Polish Parliament criticized the Government in February over alleged 
discrimination against the Polish minority.
    Many nonethnic Lithuanian public sector employees by law were 
required to attain a functional knowledge of the Lithuanian language 
within several years, although the authorities have been granting 
liberal extensions of the time frame in which this competence is to be 
achieved. In the first half of the year, 223 persons took the language 
portion of the citizenship test, and 209 persons passed. From January 
to August, 352 persons were naturalized (compared with 567 in 1999 and 
550 in 1998). There is no documented evidence of job dismissals based 
on the language law. The authorities have indicated that the intent of 
the law is to apply moral incentives to learn Lithuanian as the 
official language of the State; they have asserted that no one would be 
dismissed solely because of an inability to meet the language 
requirements.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on 
Trade Unions recognize the right of workers and employees to form and 
join trade unions. The Law on Trade Unions formally extends this right 
to employees of the police and the armed forces, although the 
Collective Agreements Law of 1991 does not allow collective bargaining 
by government employees involved in law enforcement and securityrelated 
work.
    In 1990 the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's
    All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which includes 23 of 25 
trade unions, renamed itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(CFTU) and began asserting increased independence from its Soviet 
parent organization. In 1993 the CFTU joined eight other unions that 
also had been part of the All-Union Central Council to form the 
Lithuanian Trade Union Center (LTUC).
    Four major trade union associations work within the trilateral 
commission, which is composed of representatives of the Government, 
trade unions, and employers' organizations: The LTUC (110,000 members 
as of June 2000), the Lithuanian Workers' Union or LWU (52,000 
members), the Association of Lithuanian Trade Unions (41,650 members), 
and the Lithuanian Work Federation (over 15,000 members).
    The Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions provide for the right 
to strike, although public workers in essential services may not do so. 
No major strikes took place during the year; 56 other labor actions 
occurred during the first 8 months of the year.
    There are no restrictions on unions affiliating with international 
trade unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Collective 
Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining and the right of 
unions to organize employees, although several provisions reportedly 
hinder the establishment of new unions. Probably as a result of the 
discrediting of labor unions during the Soviet period, only 10 percent 
of enterprises have trade unions. Some 10 to 15 percent of the 
workforce is unionized. Collective negotiations regarding labor 
relations, including wages, are not very widespread. Workers often 
present their own case against their employer. Negotiations are more 
common in enterprises that have trade unions.
    According to the law, unions, in order to be registered, must have 
at least 30 founding members in large enterprises or have a membership 
of one-fifth of all employees in small enterprises. Difficulties 
commonly arise in state enterprises in which employees are represented 
by more than one union. LWU officials charge that managers in some 
state enterprises discriminated against LWU organizers and have on 
occasion dismissed employees in retribution for their trade union 
activities. The LWU also charged that the judicial system was slow to 
respond to LWU grievances regarding dismissals from work. LWU 
representatives claimed that state managers sometimes preferred the 
CFTU/LTUC over LWU unions as collective bargaining partners.
    In general trade union spokesmen said that managers often determine 
wages without regard to trade union preferences, except in larger 
factories with well-organized trade unions. The Government issues 
periodic decrees that serve as guidelines for state enterprise 
management in setting wage scales. The LWU and the LTUC engage in 
direct collective bargaining over wages at the workplace level. Wage 
decisions increasingly are being made at the enterprise level, although 
government ministries still retain some control over this sphere in 
state-owned enterprises. The LWU reports that it supplements its 
bargaining efforts with active lobbying in government ministries that 
own enterprises.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced labor by all, including children, and 
this prohibition generally is observed in practice; however, 
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution 
is a problem (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.f.). Families of women who 
are trafficked often believe they have disappeared or been kidnaped.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children without 
parental consent is 16 years; with the written consent of parents, it 
is 14 years. Complaints about the infringement of child labor 
regulations generally are referred to local prosecutors who investigate 
the charges and take legal action to stop violations. Child labor 
problems appear to be rare.
    The Constitution specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and this prohibition generally is observed in practice; 
however, girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution 
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for 
every person's right to receive just payment for work.
    The legal minimum wage has been stable at $107.50 (430 litas) per 
month since December 1999. The minimum wage does not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The average wage in July 
2000 was $275 (1,100 litas) per month, which is a 0.5 percent increase 
since July 1999. The Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Social 
Security and Labor periodically adjust the minimum wage. Every 3 months 
these government bodies must submit their minimum wage proposals to the 
Seimas, which has the right to approve or revise the minimum wage 
level. Enforcement of the minimum wage is almost nonexistent, in part 
because the Government does not want to increase unemployment.
    The 40-hour workweek is standard, with a provision for at least one 
24-hour rest period. For a majority of the population, living standards 
remain low. Some 65 percent of the expenditures of the poorest 16 
percent of households goes for food, compared with 30 percent for food 
in the top 10 percent.
    The Constitution provides that workers have the right to safe and 
healthy working conditions. The State Labor Inspection Service 
implements the Labor Safety Law. From January to July, the Labor 
Inspection Service received 2,169 complaints and declarations, of which 
more than 1,458 were found to have merit. Of the complaints, 90.5 
percent involved abuses of labor laws while only 9.5 percent dealt with 
working conditions. The most numerous abuses include illegal employment 
(working without a written contract), wage arrears, and time off.
    In October the Seimas passed amendments to the Law on Safety at 
Work. The law now complies with European Union directives and outlines 
clear responsibility of the employer for the safety and health of 
employees at work. The 1993 Labor Safety Law sets out the rights of 
workers facing hazardous conditions and provides legal protection for 
workers who file complaints about such conditions. Workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous job conditions without losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution was a problem. A 1998 law criminalizes trafficking 
in persons for purposes of sexual abuse: the penalty is 4 to 8 years' 
imprisonment. There were no prosecutions under this statute during the 
year.
    The country is a source, transit point, and destination for 
trafficking in women. Women from Belarus, Russia (Kalingrad District), 
Latvia, and the Lithuanian countryside are trafficked to major cities. 
Some are trafficked further to Western Europe and elsewhere. Germany, 
Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria are major destinations, 
based on the figures of women subsequently deported from these 
countries to Lithuania.
    A number of women, some underage, have been enticed or forced into 
prostitution and sold abroad by organized crime figures. Many are lured 
by deceptive offers of seemingly innocent jobs such as household 
helpers, bar dancers, or waitresses. Women also are tricked into 
prostitution through false marriage advertisements. Their families 
often are unaware of their predicament and believe that they have 
disappeared or been kidnaped. However, it is difficult to determine 
what percentage were enticed or coerced and how many departed 
voluntarily. Of those returned to Lithuania as deportees, 70 percent 
reportedly said that they knew what type of work they were going to 
undertake.
    Experts from nongovernmental organizations consider government 
efforts to prevent trafficking in persons and search for missing 
persons unsatisfactory. In July the border police were instructed to 
pay more attention to young persons, particularly females, traveling 
abroad. Since January statistics on deported persons are being 
collected. During the first half of the year, 1,618 persons were 
deported back to Lithuania. Most of them worked or attempted to work 
illegally, stayed illegally in other countries, or were turned back at 
the border. The absolute majority of them are citizens of Lithuania. 
There are no specific government assistance programs for victims of 
trafficking; however, the police offer protection for witnesses.
    The media report extensively on trafficking in persons. A local 
nongovernmental organization, the Missing Persons' Families Support 
Center, received a foreign grant during the year to conduct an 
awareness campaign on trafficking in persons.
                               __________

                               LUXEMBOURG

    Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic, 
parliamentary form of government. The role of the Grand Duke is mainly 
ceremonial and administrative. The Prime Minister is the leader of the 
dominant party in the popularly elected Parliament. The Council of 
State, whose members are appointed by the Grand Duke, serves as an 
advisory body to the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
    The Government effectively controls the security apparatus, which 
consists of the police and gendarmerie.
    Luxembourg has a prosperous market economy with active industrial 
and service sectors. The standard of living and the level of social 
benefits are high.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. The 
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    From December 1999 to May 2000, 6 inmates committed suicide at the 
penitentiary in Schrassig, which houses 330 inmates. A report 
commissioned by the Government cited poor management, rampant drug use, 
and an insufficient number of trained personnel at the prison to cope 
with the inmates' medical and psychological problems. In October the 
Minister of Justice appointed a new prison director and allocated $1.3 
million (LUF 60 million) to fund antidrug programs at the penitentiary.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    Judicial warrants are required by law for arrests except in cases 
of hot pursuit. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must lodge 
charges and bring suspects before a judge. Suspects are given immediate 
access to an attorney, at government expense for indigents. The 
presiding judge may order release on bail.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The independent judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, whose 
members are appointed by the Grand Duke. One of the country's three 
Justices of the Peace has jurisdiction over minor criminal, civil, and 
commercial cases, and one of two District Courts hears more serious 
cases. The Youth and Guardianship Court rules on matters concerning the 
protection of young people.
    Defendants are presumed innocent. They have the right to public 
trials and are free to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence. 
Either the defendant or the prosecutor can appeal a ruling; an appeal 
results in a completely new judicial procedure, with the possibility 
that a sentence may be increased or decreased. In response to a 1995 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights, the government 
established an administrative court system to review citizen challenges 
to legislation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    The Government failed to act on its 1999 pledge to introduce 
legislation to reform an 1869 press law that requires journalists to 
reveal confidential sources, following the 1998 police search of a 
journalist's office who had alleged corruption on the part of the 
Interior Minister.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The 
Government requires and routinely issues permits for public meetings 
and demonstrations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is 
no state religion, but the State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic, 
some Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish clergy, and several local 
governments maintain sectarian religious facilities. The Anglican and 
Islamic congregations continued to wait for a decision by the 
Department of Religion regarding requests for government funding made 
several years ago.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and 
provides first asylum. The law provides for the granting of refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not 
expel those having a valid claim to refugee status, and there were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
    The country has a refugee population of 4,681, some 4,400 of whom 
come from Montenegro, according to government reports. This number 
represents more than 1 percent of the total population. In March the 
Government passed legislation to create a status of temporary 
protection for refugees and to modify procedures to adjudicate requests 
for asylum. The Government received some 600 new requests for asylum 
during the year. Of the 1,800 total asylum requests examined, 100 were 
approved.
    In March the Government enacted a financial assistance program to 
encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their countries of 
origin. In April the Government created a service council to assist 
those refugees wanting to utilize the financial aid program. By August 
some 280 refugees returned voluntarily to their countries of origin, 5 
were forcibly returned to Albania, and 29 were transferred to other 
European Union member states under the 1993 Dublin Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Luxembourg is a multiparty democracy. Suffrage is universal and 
compulsory for citizens 18 years of age and above, and balloting is 
secret. National parliamentary elections are held every 5 years.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they are active in political life. Of 60 members of Parliament, 10 are 
women, as are 4 members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction. 
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
    In June the Government established the Consultative Commission on 
Human Rights. This 22-member independent body acts as a consultant to 
the Government on human rights issues. The commission can propose 
measures to the Government to increase the protection and promotion of 
human rights and also serves as the national correspondent for the 
Vienna-based European Observatory of Racial and Xenophobic Phenomena.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits racial, sexual, or social discrimination, and the 
Government enforces these provisions. Blatant societal discrimination 
occurs only rarely.
    Women.--In 1999 shelters provided refuge to 368 women and 413 
children, a slight decrease from 1998 levels. Information offices set 
up to respond to women in distress reported that they received 4,364 
telephone calls in 1999. The Government funds organizations that 
provide shelter, counseling, and hot lines. Women enjoy the same 
property rights as men. In the absence of a prenuptial agreement, 
property is divided equally upon the dissolution of a marriage.
    The law mandates equal pay for equal work, and the Ministry for the 
Promotion of Women has a mandate to encourage a climate of equal 
treatment and opportunity. However, according to government reports, 
women are paid 20 to 30 percent less than men for comparable work. The 
Government cites the interruption in the careers of women caused by 
childbirth and their maternal roles as one reason for the disparity. To 
date there have been no work-related discrimination lawsuits. Women 
constitute 38 percent of the work force.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The law mandates school attendance from the 
ages of 4 to 16. Schooling is free through the secondary level, and the 
Government provides some financial assistance for postsecondary 
education.
    In September at the millennium summit of the United Nations, the 
Government signed two children's rights protocols: The Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography, and the Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child Concerning the Implications of Armed 
Conflict.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. A physicians' 
organization estimates that approximately 200 cases of child abuse are 
treated in hospitals each year that result in legal proceedings. This 
group is working to reform judicial procedures to permit videotaped 
testimony in court proceedings and the testimony of child 
psychiatrists, as well as the coordination of hospital records in child 
abuse cases. In May the Government set up a hot line for young persons 
in distress; by the end of the year it had received 183 calls.
    In 1999 the Government passed a comprehensive new law dealing with 
the sexual exploitation of children. The law increased penalties for 
adults who traffic in children, facilitate child prostitution, or 
exploit children through pornography. The law also extended the 
country's criminal jurisdiction over citizens and residents who engage 
in such activities abroad. No such trafficking was reported during the 
year.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of 
other state services. The law does not directly mandate accessibility 
for the disabled, but the Government pays subsidies to builders to 
construct ``disabled-friendly'' structures. Despite government 
incentives, only a modest proportion of buildings and public 
transportation are modified to accommodate people with disabilities.
    The Government helps disabled persons obtain employment and 
professional education. Businesses and enterprises with at least 25 
employees by law must fill a quota for hiring disabled workers and must 
pay them prevailing wages. The quotas are fixed according to the total 
number of employees; employers who do not fulfill them are subject to 
sizable monthly fines. The Government provides subsidies and tax breaks 
for employers who hire the disabled. There have been no known 
complaints of noncompliance with the disability laws.
    Despite strong legal protections, the Government acknowledged that 
laws establishing quotas for businesses that employ over 25 persons are 
not applied or enforced consistently, and there is a particular problem 
in the case of persons with mental disabilities. The Government was 
reviewing the effectiveness of the disability legislation, particularly 
the provisions that establish quotas, at year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the right to 
associate freely and choose their representatives. About 57 percent of 
the working population belongs to a trade union. Membership is not 
mandatory. Unions operate free of governmental interference. The two 
largest labor federations are linked to, but organized independently 
of, major political parties. The law prohibits discrimination against 
strike leaders, and a labor tribunal deals with complaints.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for 
government workers who provide essential services. Legal strikes may 
occur only after a lengthy conciliation procedure between the parties. 
The Government's National Conciliation Office must certify that 
conciliation efforts have ended for a strike to be legal. No strikes, 
legal or illegal, occurred during the year.
    Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for and protects collective bargaining, which is conducted in 
periodic negotiations between centralized organizations of unions and 
employers. Enterprises having 15 or more employees must have worker 
representatives to conduct collective bargaining. Enterprises with over 
150 employees must form joint works councils composed of equal numbers 
of management and employee representatives. In enterprises with more 
than 1,000 employees, one-third of the membership of the supervisory 
boards of directors must be employee representatives.
    The law provides for the adjudication of employment-related 
complaints and authorizes labor tribunals to deal with them. A tribunal 
can fine an employer found guilty of antiunion discrimination, but it 
cannot require the employer to reinstate a worker fired for union 
activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor by children and adults, and it is not known 
to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 16 and requires all children to remain in school until the age of 
16. Apprentices who are 16 years old must attend school in addition to 
their job training. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child 
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    Workers under the age of 18 have additional legal protection, 
including limits on overtime and the number of hours that can be worked 
continuously. The Ministries of Labor and Education effectively monitor 
the enforcement of child labor and education laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for minimum 
wage rates that vary according to the worker's age and number of 
dependents. The minimum wage for a single worker over the age of 18 is 
$6.34 (LUF 285) per hour. Supporting a family is difficult on the 
minimum wage, but most employees earn more than the minimum.
    The law mandates a maximum workweek of 40 hours. Premium pay is 
required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on Sunday is 
permitted in continuous-process industries (steel, glass, and 
chemicals) and for certain maintenance and security personnel; other 
industries have requested permission for Sunday work, which the 
government grants on a case-by-case basis. Work on Sunday, allowed for 
some retail employees, must be entirely voluntary and compensated at 
double the normal wage; employees must be given compensatory time off 
on another day, equal to the number of hours worked on Sunday. The law 
requires rest breaks for shift workers and limits all workers to a 
maximum of 10 hours per day including overtime. All workers receive at 
least 5 weeks of paid vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
    The law mandates a safe working environment. An inspection system 
provides severe penalties for infractions. The Labor Inspectorate of 
the Ministry of Labor and the Accident Insurance Agency of the Social 
Security Ministry carry out their inspections effectively.
    No laws or regulations specifically provide workers the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to 
continued employment, but every worker has the right to ask the Labor 
Inspectorate to make a determination, and the inspectorate usually does 
so expeditiously.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country. In August the Ministry of Labor 
denied allegations made by a European Parliament Deputy that Luxembourg 
is a ``turntable'' for trafficking in women. The Deputy's report stated 
that the Government grants limited entry visas to Eastern and Central 
European women to work as performers in cabarets. The Ministry said 
that it issued 146 limited visas during the year to women who had 
received job offers as janitors, hairdressers, and other similar 
positions.
                               __________

                 MACEDONIA, FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF

    Macedonia, which became independent in 1991 following the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, is a parliamentary democracy led by a coalition 
government. It has a popularly elected president. In multiparty 
parliamentary elections held in October and November 1998, opposition 
parties defeated parties of the governing coalition in voting that 
international observers concluded was conducted fairly and reflected 
the will of the electorate. International observers considered the 
conduct of the first round of voting for president on October 31, 1999, 
to be satisfactory; however, there were allegations of fraud and ballot 
stuffing in the second round on November 14, and the Supreme Court 
ordered another vote in most of the country's ethnic Albanian polling 
stations, which was conducted on December 5. That final round also was 
marred by irregularities; however, international observers concluded 
that these likely did not affect the final outcome and resulted in the 
election of President Boris Trajkovski. The judiciary is generally 
independent, although at times inefficient.
    The Ministry of Interior oversees the uniformed police, criminal 
police, border police, and the state intelligence service. Municipal 
police chiefs are responsible to the Ministry of Interior, not to 
municipal leaders. The Ministry is under the control of a civilian 
minister; a parliamentary commission oversees operations. The Ministry 
of Defense shares with the border police responsibility for border 
security. Some members of the police occasionally committed human 
rights abuses.
    The economy is in transition from Yugoslav-style communism to a 
market-based system. Most firms are privatized, large money-losing 
state enterprises are being restructured, and inflation has remained 
below 4 percent in recent years. However, during the year, the 
transitive effects of introducing a new Value Added Tax system, coupled 
with a year-end surge in fuel prices, caused inflation to reach about 
10 percent. The economy improved substantially after the lifting of the 
Greek embargo and the suspension of international sanctions against 
Serbia, both in 1995, before which the gross domestic product (GDP) had 
fallen an estimated 50 percent. Growth resumed slowly in 1996 and 
continued at about a 5 percent rate until the outbreak of the Kosovo 
crisis in the spring of 1999. The crisis cut many firms off from 
customers in Serbia and made the transportation of goods to and from 
other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall 
economic effects of the Kosovo crisis were quite negative, but the 
local and regional influx of international funds related to 
humanitarian efforts and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission has 
helped stem the economic decline and generated positive growth. The 
economy made broad-based gains during the year, and GDP grew about 6 
percent. Unemployment was high; the gray economy was large. Some 
workers received their pay weeks or months late.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems remained in several areas. Police 
were accused of extrajudicial killings involving at least two deaths of 
detainees in custody, and the Government took inadequate steps to 
clarify the circumstances or discipline responsible officers. Police on 
occasion abused suspects and prisoners, in particular Roma and ethnic 
Albanians. Arbitrary arrest and detention were problems. The Government 
was working to end the practice of police compelling citizens to appear 
for questioning, pursuant to a 1997 law; however, incidents involving 
the use of such practices still occurred. Another 1997 law imposes some 
limitations on religious practices. The Government took inadequate 
measures to ensure the security of the electoral process during 
nationwide local elections, resulting in incidents of violence and 
procedural problems that were strongly criticized by the OSCE. Societal 
discrimination against minorities, including Roma, ethnic Albanians, 
ethnic Turks, and ethnic Serbs, was a problem. Ethnic minorities 
continued to make progress in securing more representation in 
Government and politics, although ethnic Macedonians still hold a 
disproportionately high number of positions. Violence and 
discrimination against women remained problems; trafficking in women 
and girls for prostitution was also a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, there were credible reports of 
at least two deaths in police custody. An ethnic Albanian suspected of 
involvement in the January 11 murder of three police officers died 
under suspicious circumstances while in police custody in January. The 
official report stated that the suspect died of a drug overdose, but 
friends and family members who saw the body before the burial charged 
that he was shot. No autopsy report has been made public. A second 
ethnic Albanian suspect died in police custody in February after his 
arrest for theft. Authorities reported his death to be a suicide, but 
his family claimed that he died due to injuries received while being 
questioned. On May 14, an ethnic Albanian man died in a Skopje prison. 
The Government did not take adequate steps to investigate, to inform 
the public, or to discipline the responsible officers in any of these 
cases. During a December 1998 police raid on the home of an ethnic 
Albanian suspect believed to have stockpiled illegal arms, the 
suspect's father was killed by police gunfire. A government inquiry 
cleared the police of any wrongdoing, but the incident remained 
controversial.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances attributed to government agents.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such treatment and punishment; 
however, police occasionally used excessive force during the 
apprehension of criminal suspects, and they occasionally abused 
prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities.
    Following the killing of three police officers outside Aracinovo on 
January 11, police beat numerous ethnic Albanian residents, destroyed 
property, and used tear gas in raids. One of the three suspects 
arrested in connection with the killings died in police custody (see 
Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that nine other suspects 
were arrested and beaten in custody and that some were forced to sign 
confessions. An investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman found that 
the police had used excessive force in Aracinovo and recommended an 
internal investigation. Although some families were compensated for 
damage to their property, the Government did little to address police 
abuse in the wake of the incident.
    There are credible reports of occasional police violence against 
Roma, including beatings during arrest and while in detention. Roma 
rights organizations also complained of police harassment of Roma and 
accused the police of reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination 
by consistently siding with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes 
involving Roma.
    On April 21, police reportedly beat an ``Egyptian'' couple (the 
country's Egyptians consider themselves distinct from Roma) near Ohrid 
at a traffic stop. The husband, a taxi driver, was arrested for not 
presenting the necessary permits, although he later claimed that he had 
presented them. Police allegedly beat the man in custody and kept him 
in jail for 8 days. According to the European Roma Rights Center 
(ERRC), a police officer reportedly beat a 20-year-old Romani man with 
a truncheon at the police station in Stip on January 9. Police 
reportedly beat a 16-year-old Romani boy in the village of Krivolak on 
May 14. Police officers and non-Romani civilians reportedly attacked 
and severely beat six Romani men in Stip on May 26.
    The vast majority of Kosovar refugees returned to Kosovo during the 
second half of 1999; most of those who remain are Roma. Several 
thousand Roma refugees are housed in collective centers or in private 
accommodations. According to the ERRC, the police allegedly beat and 
detained a Romani refugee from Kosovo on September 10. In October the 
Roma residents of the Suto Orizari collective center began a series of 
protests over the food served to them. The World Food Program (WFP) 
inspected the facility and reviewed the food situation; WFP concluded 
that the water system at the center was barely adequate and needed 
improvements, but that the food rations given to refugees were up to 
international standards.
    There were three attacks on police stations during the year. On 
February 2, a bomb exploded in front of the Directorate of Interior in 
Kumanovo. No one was reported injured in the explosion.
    There were some incidents of violence during the September 
elections. Police beat an opposition supporter; several police officers 
were suspended pending an investigation. There were a few shootings by 
members of political parties. In another incident, a Member of 
Parliament fired into a crowd of demonstrators (see Section 3).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards; however, 
there were two deaths in custody. Prisons meet basic needs of food, 
hygiene, and access to medical care. Men and women are held separately. 
While juveniles are also supposed to be held separately, limited 
facilities sometimes result in older juveniles being confined with 
adults.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and 
the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Government agreed to allow the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons under 
procedures which the ICRC finds acceptable, but has not yet agreed to 
commit to those procedures in a binding, written agreement with the 
ICRC.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states 
that a person must be arraigned in court within 24 hours of arrest. The 
maximum length of pretrial detention was increased in 1998 from 90 to 
180 days by constitutional amendment. The accused is entitled to 
contact a lawyer at the time of arrest and to have a lawyer present 
during police and court proceedings. Arbitrary arrest and detention are 
problems. Although the law requires warrants for arrests, this 
provision frequently is ignored, and it is not uncommon for a warrant 
to be issued some time after an arrest. According to human rights 
observers and criminal defense attorneys, police sometimes violate the 
24-hour time period within which a suspect must be arraigned and deny 
immediate access to an attorney.
    The Government has not yet ended completely the practice of police 
compelling citizens to appear at police stations through an 
``invitation'' for ``informative talks.'' Although a law on criminal 
procedures was passed in 1997 that states that police cannot force 
citizens to appear for these sessions without presentation of a court 
order, the practice continued to be applied on occasion. Roma rights 
organizations accuse the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining 
Roma, and there are credible reports of such police actions.
    The police continued a pattern of selective enforcement of various 
laws and regulations against individuals and businesses linked with the 
political opposition. The police initiated a series of raids on 
businesses in 1999, seized records, and briefly detained some 20 
enterprise directors and officers to question them on charges of 
corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the individuals who 
were questioned or whose offices were raided were connected to 
opposition political parties, and the raids were widely viewed as 
having been politically motivated. The Government publicly defended 
itself against media criticism of its actions by releasing information 
on the alleged crimes under investigation, but no charges were ever 
brought against the subjects of the raids. During the year several 
opposition-oriented media outlets and other firms were the subject of 
tax inquiries; in one case official action was initiated to tear down 
an illegally constructed building erected by an opposition-oriented 
media owner (see Section 2.a.). The authorities defended their actions 
as being based upon law, but the individuals and firms involved noted 
that while tax and construction offenses are very common, the 
Government appeared to take enforcement actions mostly against entities 
linked to the opposition. A similar police raid in December 1999 
against the director of a company involved in a dispute with the 
Government resulted in a media outcry and the suspension by the 
Ministry of Interior of the local chief of police who conducted the 
operation.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice, although the court system is still developing and is 
sometimes inefficient and slow.
    The court system is three tiered and comprises municipal courts, 
district courts, and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Court deals with 
matters of constitutional interpretation.
    The Constitutional Court has a mandate to protect the human rights 
of citizens but has not taken action in any case in this area. In 
addition the Constitution provides for a public attorney to protect the 
constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of 
state administration and other agencies with public mandates. The 
Office of the People's Ombudsman was created and became functional in 
1997 (see Section 4).
    Trials are presided over by judges appointed by the Republican 
Judicial Council (an independent agency) and confirmed by Parliament. 
The judges are assisted by two members of the community who serve 
essentially as consulting jurors, although the judge makes the final 
decision. Court hearings and the rendering of verdicts are open to the 
public except in some cases, such as those involving minors and those 
in which the personal safety of the defendant is of concern. Trials 
cannot be televised, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, although 
the court in certain cases can authorize the presence of television and 
film cameras.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and 
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions. Opposition 
political leaders accused the Government of wiretapping their 
telephones and released some transcripts of telephone conversations 
from late in the year that they claimed proved the truth of their 
charges. An investigation into the charges is underway.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice.
    Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as 
numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most 
towns and municipalities have local newspapers. Government-subsidized 
newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and 
distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. The 
Government subsidizes some other newspapers and magazines. The process 
of granting media subsidies is not transparent, leading to charges of 
political bias in government support for the independent media. Several 
privately owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the 
country, and some are considered to be oriented toward opposition 
political parties. The media that remain partially state owned are 
government oriented but report on opposition press conferences and 
statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition 
parties. The leading newspaper publisher is still partially government 
owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing 
facilities in the country, as well as many newspaper kiosks. Following 
the parliamentary elections in late 1998, influence over this publisher 
passed to the new Government. International monitors noted that the 
media provided generally unbiased coverage of the full spectrum of 
political debate. However, media outlets often reflected the views of 
one or another political party.
    Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain the 
permission of the Ministry of Interior. All such requests during the 
year were approved. Media reports indicated that one edition of the 
Albanian newspaper Bota Sot was confiscated in Gostivar and Tetovo 
because it contained articles critical of the leadership of the 
Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). The party denied any involvement 
and quickly arranged for the articles in question to be reprinted and 
run in the local Albanian language newspapers. Foreign newspapers, 
including those from neighboring countries, are available throughout 
the country.
    State-run radio and television is in countrywide competition with 
two private television stations and one private radio station that are 
licensed to broadcast nationally. The state broadcast media also face 
the competition of dozens of small independent local radio and 
television stations throughout the country. The Broadcast Council 
issues licenses to broadcasters, in a process that international 
observers consider generally meets international norms. License fees 
collected from private broadcasters are supposed to help subsidize the 
state-run system, but collections are inconsistent. Dozens of illegal, 
``pirate'' radio and television stations operate without licenses and 
pay no fees.
    Individuals and opposition political groups criticize the 
Government, but during the year media complaints arose over alleged 
intimidation of newspapers and television companies critical of the 
Government. The intimidation took the form of law enforcement action 
against the media companies and their financial backers in areas such 
as tax collection and checks of building permits, areas in which there 
is widespread noncompliance among private companies. One notable case 
involved the Government's order to tear down a building belonging to 
the owner of an opposition-oriented media company because of a supposed 
failure to obtain the proper building permit. The Government eventually 
reversed its order, but the incident left the impression that officials 
were selectively enforcing laws in an effort to control the behavior of 
the media (see Section 1.d.).
    On May 12, the Government introduced a draft law on information to 
replace existing regulations from the Communist era. Local journalists 
and international press groups criticized the draft law and provisions 
that would require local journalists to obtain government-issued press 
accreditation. The law remained pending at year's end.
    The Government respects academic freedom. Because government-
recognized higher education is not yet available in the Albanian 
language (except for teacher training), some ethnic Albanians claim 
that they do not have complete academic freedom. They want to see the 
currently unauthorized Albanian-language Tetovo University gain legal 
status, or a new accredited private institution to be established, so 
that they can study in their native language at the university level 
(see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right in practice. Advance notification of large 
meetings is optional; political and protest rallies occur regularly 
without major incident. Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of 
specific religious facilities, must be approved in advance by the 
Ministry of Interior and can only be convened by registered religious 
groups (see Section 2.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice. Political 
parties and organizations are required to register with a court. More 
than 40 political parties are registered, including ethnically based 
parties of Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Roma.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
However, the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups limits some 
aspects of religious practice, although the law does not appear to be 
enforced consistently. While the Macedonian Orthodox Church is 
mentioned by name in the Constitution, it does not enjoy official 
status.
    The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups designates the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman 
Catholic Church as ``religious communities,'' while all other religions 
are designated ``religious groups.'' However, despite the difference in 
designation, there is no legal difference between the two categories.
    The law places some limitations on religious practices. For 
example, only a citizen may found a religious group. The law also 
stipulates that anyone carrying out religious work be registered with 
the Government's Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
    The Government requires that religious groups be registered. The 
1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a 
number of specific requirements for the registration of religious 
groups that were struck down by the Constitutional Court in 1999. 
Subsequently there was considerable confusion over which procedures 
still applied, and several foreign religious groups experienced delays 
in their efforts to register. During the year, the Government acted to 
make the remaining requirements more transparent, but the process 
remained slow and cumbersome. At least one international Protestant 
church was granted legal registration, and several others are at some 
stage of the process. One Islamic group withdrew its 1998 application 
for registration but continues to operate openly without taking further 
steps toward legal registration, and the Government has not taken any 
enforcement actions against the group. The Government no longer keeps a 
count of registered religious groups and communities.
    Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific religious 
facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior and 
can only be convened by registered religious groups.
    The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the self-
proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church has led to difficulties for 
ethnic Serbs who wish to worship in their own church. On several 
occasions in 1998 the Government refused Serbian Orthodox priests 
permission to enter the country because of the recognition issue. No 
Serbian Orthodox priests attempted to enter the country for religious 
purposes during the year. In December 1999 a delegation from the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church traveled to Istanbul to consult with 
Orthodox leaders on ways to end the impasse with the Serbian Orthodox 
Church.
    On March 10, the Jewish community of Skopje inaugurated a new 
synagogue. The Government supported the opening of the synagogue; the 
mayor of Skopje and former President Gligorov attended the events.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government generally respects them in practice.
    Citizenship in the old Yugoslav system was national, but all 
records and processing were at the level of the individual republics, 
so some residents at the time of independence had Yugoslav citizenship 
that became citizenship in other newly independent former republics. 
During the first year of independence, beginning with the adoption of 
the Constitution in November 1991, any Yugoslav citizen who had legal 
residence (of any duration) in the republic could acquire citizenship 
by simple application. The Law on Citizenship adopted in November 1992 
established new procedures for conferring citizenship, and under its 
transitional provisions citizenship was granted essentially 
automatically to any legal resident who applied before November 1993. 
Despite this 2-year window of opportunity for residents to become 
citizens by simple application, several thousand residents did not 
regularize their status before November 1993. Some of these persons, 
and others who arrived in the country later, have complained that the 
provisions of the Law on Citizenship that followed the transition 
period are too restrictive and have prevented them from obtaining 
citizenship. For example, after the transition period the law required 
applicants for naturalization to have 15 years of residency. The law 
also affects many Roma who wish to become citizens, particularly with 
regard to difficulties they encountered in establishing residence and 
meeting requirements of a regular income. During 1999 the 15-year 
residence requirement was lowered to 10 years, in conformity with the 
Council of Europe Convention on Citizenship, but the enabling 
legislation needed to fully implement the change still was not 
completed. New procedures instituted in 1998 have made the citizenship 
application process considerably more transparent; the Macedonian 
Helsinki Committee has full access to all files, and the office within 
the Ministry of Interior that processes the cases works closely with 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in 
Skopje. A total of 2,124,599 citizens have established their status 
since independence; since the end of the early procedures for gaining 
citizenship, 140,495 individuals have applied through the Ministry of 
Interior, and about 96 percent of those applications have been 
approved. About 2,000 new applications for citizenship are received 
annually by the Ministry of Interior.
    During the 1999 crisis, over 360,000 Kosovars found refuge in 
Macedonia. Following the conclusion of the crisis, the great majority 
of those refugees still in the country returned to Kosovo; the 
exception were the Roma, who feared returning because of dramatically 
deteriorated relations with the ethnic Albanian Kosovars. During the 
year, the overall number of refugees continued to decrease, and at 
year's end only 7,600 registered refugees remained. In addition 
officials estimate that about another 2,000 unregistered individuals 
remain. Of the registered refugees, approximately 60 percent are Roma. 
The largest number of registered Roma refugees (about 1,200) reside in 
the Suto Orizani collective center. Roma also reside in collective 
centers at Dare Bombol, Llubanci, Saraj, and Struga. Ethnic Albanian 
refugees all reside at the Radusa collective center. In all only about 
2,100 of the total registered refugee population reside in centers; 
however, the remaining 5,500 live with host families or in rental 
accommodations. During the year there were several Roma protests about 
living conditions and food at the collective centers, although 
international donors and administrators judge conditions to meet 
generally accepted standards.
    Continued tensions in the Presevo region of southern Serbia also 
generated potential for refugee flows during the year, but by year's 
end only a small number of Presevo residents had chosen to come to 
Macedonia; they did not enter as refugees, but rather as temporary 
visitors.
    Macedonia provides first asylum, and there were no reports of 
persons being returned to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The country's third parliamentary elections were 
held in October and November 1998 and resulted in an opposition victory 
and a peaceful change of government. The unicameral Parliament governs 
the country. The Prime Minister, as head of government, is selected by 
the party or coalition that produces a majority in the Parliament. The 
Prime Minister and the other Ministers may not be Members of 
Parliament. The Prime Minister is formally appointed by the President, 
who is head of state, Chairman of the Security Council, and commander 
in chief of the armed forces.
    The Government was accused by opposition leaders and the media of 
harassing members of the opposition prior to the presidential elections 
held in October 1999. In the summer of 1999, police conducted a number 
of raids on businesses and charged some 20 enterprise directors with 
corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the enterprise 
directors singled out for this treatment belonged to an opposition 
party (see Section 1.d.).
    On October 31, 1999, the first round of balloting in the 
presidential election was held. There were six candidates on the 
ballot, representing every major political party, including both ethnic 
Albanian parties. International observers reported that the conduct of 
the first round was satisfactory, and the candidates who received the 
most votes advanced to the second round. The ruling VMRO (Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) candidate Trajkovski gained the 
majority of the votes cast in round two on November 14, but the 
opposition SDSM (Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) candidate 
claimed fraud and appealed the results. International observers agreed 
that irregularities occurred in some areas of the country in the second 
round, and the Supreme Court ruled that round two should be rerun in 
230 polling precincts, all of which were predominantly ethnic Albanian. 
The voting held on December 5, 1999, was as flawed as the previous 
round, according to international monitors, who reported numerous 
incidents of ballot stuffing and other problems in some polling 
stations. Trajkovski again gained the majority of votes cast, and the 
SDSM filed a list of complaints of irregularities. Claiming that the 
Government was incapable of conducting a fair vote in the contested 
precincts, the SDSM later withdrew those complaints and did not press 
for another repeat of the voting. President Trajkovski was sworn into 
office on December 15, 1999.
    Nationwide local elections held in September drew OSCE and other 
international criticism due to poor organization, sporadic violence, 
and voting irregularities. While the voting was calm and orderly in 
most of the country, serious incidents of violence caused the polls to 
be closed in several municipalities. Irregularities and intimidation in 
other areas further marred the process. The worst election day problems 
included some blatant cases of ballot stuffing, some smashing of ballot 
boxes, incidents of unauthorized persons being present at polling 
stations in an intimidating manner, and shooting incidents in Debar and 
Ohrid that left four persons wounded. In Debar a Democratic Party of 
Albania (DPA) activist shot a Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) 
activist on September 10, although investigators concluded that the 
incident was personally ``- rather than politically--motivated. In 
Ohrid two opposition members belonging to the SDSM were shot, one in 
the head, causing serious injury. Several arrests were made in these 
cases, and charges were brought against individuals who had been 
identified as participants in violent acts; however, in several cases 
the perpetrators remained unknown at year's end. These problems caused 
the elections to be rerun in several areas, and the Government did not 
act decisively to prevent some repetition of the same difficulties 
during the reruns. During the campaign period, six Members of 
Parliament (M.P.'s) from the ruling party defected to an opposition 
party, and their homes were surrounded briefly by crowds of angry party 
loyalists; some property damage occurred before police moved to protect 
the homes. Following an incident in which an opposition supporter was 
beaten by police during the campaign, several police officers were 
suspended pending an investigation. In Skopje approximately 200 
demonstrators threatened a Member of Parliament at his home; in 
response he fired several pistol shots into the crowd, lightly injuring 
two persons. The police, slow to respond to the initial disturbance, 
later charged the M.P. with illegal use of a firearm. A local NGO 
reported the alleged beating of a group of Roma in the town of Strumica 
on September 24, the day of the second round of the local elections. 
Non-Romani men allegedly beat Roma in the street with their fists and 
rubber truncheons. Many electoral difficulties were judged by 
international observers to have resulted from a weak and ambiguous Law 
on Local Elections, and they criticized the State Electoral Committee 
for not acting to anticipate or overcome those weaknesses.
    Although no formal restrictions exist on the participation of women 
in politics and government, they are severely underrepresented in these 
areas. The Government has two female ministers. In the Parliament, 9 of 
120 members are women, an increase from 4 women in the previous 
Parliament. In Muslim communities, especially among more traditional 
ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised due to the 
practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on behalf of the 
women in their families (see Section 5).
    A number of political parties represent the interests of 
minorities, including ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, ethnic Serbs, and 
Roma. Two ethnic Albanian parties and the Roma party have members in 
the Parliament; the ruling government coalition includes one of the two 
major ethnic Albanian parties, as well as the Romani party. The 
Parliament includes 25 ethnic Albanian members, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1 
Rom, and a small number of Vlachs. Minorities nonetheless maintain that 
political structures continue to be biased against them. Partly to 
address these concerns, the electoral law includes elements of 
proportional representation. A total of 35 of the 120 parliamentary 
members are chosen on the basis of proportionality, while the other 85 
members are elected in single-member districts. Some ethnic Albanians 
and Roma complain that discrimination against them in citizenship 
decisions effectively disenfranchises them (see Section 2.d.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally is responsive to the concerns of human 
rights groups. Human rights groups and ethnic community representatives 
meet freely with foreign representatives without government 
interference. Several independent forums for human rights exist and 
operate freely, but their activities have not been prominent.
    The Office of the Ombudsman, established in 1997, is active; 
however, most complaints filed with the office do not relate to human 
rights issues.
    The Government allows independent missions by foreign observers. 
The Kosovo crisis led many international NGO's to establish new offices 
in the country, staffed by scores of international workers; many of 
these organizations have a strong interest in human rights issues. The 
Government generally has been cooperative in its dealings with these 
and other international organizations concerning such issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens 
regardless of their sex, race, color of skin, national or social 
origin, political or religious beliefs, property, or social status. 
However, societal discrimination against ethnic minorities and the 
protection of women's rights remain problems.
    Women.--Violence against women, especially in the family setting, 
is a persistent and common problem. Criminal procedures are available 
to victims of rape, including limited legal recourse in the case of 
marital rape. Cultural norms discourage the reporting of such violence, 
and criminal charges on grounds of domestic violence are very rare. 
Public concern about violence against women is not evident in the 
media, although some women's groups are working to raise awareness of 
the issue. Shelters for victims of spousal abuse are operated by NGO's. 
A hot line remains open but has limited hours. The Government offers 
some limited support for victims of domestic violence, but relies 
heavily on international donor support to maintain a hot line and 
shelter.
    Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution and pornography is 
a growing problem (see Section 6.f.). Traffickers have recruited women 
and girls from other countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, 
and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes in several towns (see Section 6.c. 
and 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is a problem, but no 
statistics are available to indicate its scope. Maternity benefits 
include 9-months' paid leave, and benefits are received in practice. 
Women also retain the right to return to their jobs for 2 years after 
giving birth.
    The Constitution provides that women possess the same legal rights 
as men. Macedonian society, in both the Muslim and Christian 
communities, is strongly patriarchal, and the advancement of women into 
nontraditional roles is limited. Women are underrepresented severely in 
the higher levels of the private sector, although some professional 
women are prominent. Women from some parts of the ethnic Albanian 
community do not have equal opportunities for employment and education, 
primarily due to traditional and religious constraints on their full 
participation in society. In Muslim communities, especially among more 
traditional ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised 
due to the practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on 
behalf of the women in their families (see Section 3).
    Women's advocacy groups include the Humanitarian Association for 
the Emancipation, Solidarity, and Equality of Women; the Union of 
Associations of Macedonian Women; and the League of Albanian Women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of 
children; however, in some areas it is limited by resource constraints. 
Education is compulsory through the eighth grade, or to the age of 15 
or 16. At both the primary and secondary levels, girls in some ethnic 
Albanian communities are underrepresented in schools. The Ministry of 
Education encourages ethnic minority students, especially girls, to 
enroll in secondary schools. Secondary education is free to all. 
Medical care for children is adequate but is hampered by the generally 
difficult economic circumstances of the country and by the weak 
national medical system.
    Trafficking in girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--Social programs to meet the needs of the 
disabled exist to the extent that government resources allow. 
Discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden by law; however, 
in practice this mandate is not enforced. No laws or regulations 
mandate accessibility to buildings for disabled persons.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of 2.2 million 
is composed of a variety of national and ethnic groups, mainly 
Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Vlachs. All citizens 
are equal under the law. The Constitution provides for the protection 
of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of 
minorities, including state support for education in minority languages 
through secondary school and the official use of ethnic minority 
languages in areas where ethnic minorities make up a majority of the 
population.
    Ethnic tensions and prejudices are present in society. The 
Government is committed to a policy of peaceful integration of all 
ethnic groups into society but faces political resistance and continued 
popular prejudices regarding the means to achieve this goal (hiring 
quotas, affirmative action in school admissions, education in minority 
languages, etc.).
    Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the 
largest minority group with 23 percent of the population according to 
government statistics, are the most vocal in charging discrimination. 
The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police 
is a major grievance in the community. Despite government efforts to 
recruit more ethnic Albanians, the police force remains overwhelmingly 
Slavic Macedonian, even in areas where the ethnic Albanian population 
is large. Members of ethnic minorities constitute 8.7 percent of the 
law enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior; in the 
primarily ethnic Albanian cities of Tetovo and Gostivar the respective 
figures are 17 percent and 12 percent. To raise the percentage of 
ethnic minority police officers, the Government for several years has 
set a recruiting quota of 22 percent for enrolling minority students at 
the police secondary school. Attrition has kept the graduating classes 
from retaining that percentage of ethnic minorities.
    The military continues efforts to recruit and retain minority 
officers and cadets. The military is composed mostly of short-service 
conscripts, drawn from all ethnic groups. The proportion of ethnic 
Albanians in the ranks is estimated to be about 25 percent, but the 
proportion is significantly lower in the officer corps. Minorities 
constitute about 12 percent of the total of officers, noncommissioned 
officers, and professional soldiers; about 15 percent of the cadets at 
the military academy are from ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities 
constitute about 11 percent of Ministry of Defense civilian employees. 
The Deputy Minister of Defense and 2 of a total of 10 general officers 
are ethnic Albanians.
    The Constitution provides for primary and secondary education in 
the languages of the ethnic minorities. Primary education is available 
in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian. Albanian-language 
education is a crucial issue for the ethnic Albanian community; it is 
seen as vital for preserving Albanian heritage and culture. Almost all 
ethnic Albanian children receive 8 years of education in Albanian-
language schools. The number of ethnic minority students who receive 
secondary education in their native languages is increasing and was 
about 15 percent in 1999, up from 14 percent in 1998. However, only 
about half of ethnic minority students go on to high school, partly 
because of the lack of available classes in minority languages at the 
secondary level and partly because the traditional nature of parts of 
Albanian society leads many families in rural areas to see no need to 
educate their children, particularly girls, beyond the eighth grade.
    At the university level, ethnic minorities are underrepresented, 
but there has been much progress in increasing the number of ethnic 
minority applicants and students since independence in 1991. There are 
eased admission requirements for minorities at the universities in 
Skopje and Bitola for up to 23 percent of entering places, although the 
quota has not always been filled. In 1991 302 ethnic minority students 
attended university; in 1998 1,073 attended, representing about 16 
percent of all university students; no updated figures were available 
for the year. Most university education is conducted in the Macedonian 
language; there is Albanian-language university education only for 
students at Skopje University's teacher training faculty, for students 
studying to be teachers at Albanian-language primary and secondary 
schools. An obstacle to increasing university attendance of ethnic 
Albanians and Roma, especially for girls, is their low but slowly 
increasing enrollment in secondary education.
    In July the Government adopted legislation to address longstanding 
demands by ethnic Albanians for university-level courses taught in the 
Albanian language with the passage of a new Law on Higher Education. 
The new law authorizes private institutions of higher learning and, 
under an OSCE sponsored plan, a new internationally funded institution 
is being created which would be designed to conduct classes in 
Albanian, English, and Macedonian, with initial funding coming from 
foreign donors. Plans have been made for construction to begin early in 
2001. This legislation was designed to resolve the question of Tetovo 
University, a private Albanian-language institution that the 
authorities declined to accredit but tacitly allowed to function. The 
new, internationally funded institution would allow ethnic Albanians to 
study in their own language; however, courses in Macedonian must also 
be provided in at least two subjects. The law received the support of 
the Albanian party in the ruling government coalition; however, many 
ethnic Albanians, who favor recognition and funding of Tetovo 
University, did not support the new institution.
    The new Government met one major demand of the ethnic Albanian 
community in 1999 by agreeing to change the 15-year residence 
requirement for naturalization to 10 years (see Section 2.d.); however, 
enabling legislation still is pending to complete that change. The new 
Government has continued previous governments' rejection of demands for 
legalizing use of the Albanian language in dealings with the central 
Government and in the Parliament and for allowing official use of the 
Albanian flag.
    Ethnic Turks, who make up about 4 percent of the population, also 
complain of governmental, societal, and cultural discrimination. Their 
main complaints center on Turkish-language education and media. One 
continuing dispute has been over the desire of parents who consider 
themselves Turkish to educate their children in Turkish despite the 
fact that they do not speak Turkish at home. The Education Ministry 
refuses to provide Turkish-language education for them, noting that the 
Constitution provides for education in the native languages of 
minorities, not in foreign languages. Some parents have hired teachers 
of their own, although this kind of private education is not authorized 
legally.
    Ethnic Serbs, who constitute about 2 percent of the population, 
also complain about discrimination and their inability to worship 
freely in the Serbian Orthodox Church (see Section 2.c.).
    There were credible reports of occasional police violence and 
harassment against Roma during the year. Roma rights organizations also 
complain of police harassment of Roma and accuse the police of 
reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination by consistently siding 
with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes involving Roma (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In June five Romani houses in Stip burned under suspicious 
circumstances; police suspected arson.
    Relations between Roma and other citizens were strained during 1999 
as a result of dislocations of Roma caused by the Kosovo crisis. 
According to the 1994 census, there were 43,700 Roma in the country 
(2.0 percent of the population). Romani leaders claim that the 1994 
census seriously undercounted the actual number of Roma. There were 
incidents of societal violence against Roma (see Section 1.c.). In 1999 
approximately 6,000 Roma fled Kosovo and took up residence in the 
country. They left not only because of the direct dangers of the 
conflict, but also because of the hostility of ethnic Albanian 
Kosovars, who widely consider the Roma to have supported the Serbs and 
to have committed theft and other crimes against ethnic Albanians 
during the crisis. The new Roma arrivals initially were sheltered in a 
refugee camp (about 2,000 persons) and under host family arrangements 
(about 4,000 persons) that were underwritten by the international 
relief community. During the year, all of the registered Romani 
refugees were staying with host families or in collective centers. The 
presence of these Romani refugees is not popular among ethnic 
Albanians, who largely share the view of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars 
concerning both Roma and Serbs. Ethnic Macedonians also express 
irritation at the new arrivals, many of whom settled in Skopje, and 
some of whom frequent busy traffic intersections to beg, wash car 
windows, or sell small items. The Macedonian Roma already tended to 
occupy the lowest economic position of society, and the new arrivals 
added to the ranks of the very poor. Optional Romani-language education 
has been offered at several primary schools since 1996, but there has 
been limited demand and no pressure for a more extensive curriculum. 
According to Romani community leaders, up to 10 percent of Romani 
children never enroll in school, and of those who do, 50 percent drop 
out by the fifth grade, and only 35 to 40 percent finish the eighth 
grade. There is some Romani-language broadcasting.
    There are also a number of ethnic Macedonian Muslims and Bosnian 
Muslims in the country. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contend that 
they are identified too closely with ethnic Albanians, most of whom are 
also Muslim, and with whose policies the ethnic Macedonian Muslims 
often disagree.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form trade unions, but this right is restricted for members of 
the military, police, and civil service. Independent trade unions have 
been allowed to organize since 1992, when an Association of Independent 
and Autonomous Unions was formed. However, there is still a national 
trade union. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Macedonia is the 
successor organization to the old Communist labor confederation. It 
maintains the assets of the old unions and is the Government's main 
negotiating partner on labor issues, along with the Chamber of the 
Economy. While its officers may tend to oppose strikes because of the 
legacy of the past, they appear to be genuinely independent of the 
Government and committed to the interests of the workers they 
represent.
    The total number of strikes during the year was 100 to 150, which 
included many protest work stoppages of a few hours or less. The 
reasons for the strikes included demands for overdue pay, workers' 
objections to government changes in management personnel at some state-
owned entities, and objection to various decisions related to 
privatization. Strikes were generally small and confined to company 
grounds, although in September 1999 striking workers at a government-
owned smelting plant blocked a major highway for several hours, 
protesting government plans to close the plant if a private purchaser 
or partner could not be found. Most strikes were calm and well 
organized and took place without serious incident.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution implicitly recognizes employees' right to bargain 
collectively, a concept that nonetheless is still in its infancy. 
Collective bargaining takes place, but in the country's weak economic 
environment employees have very little practical leverage. Legislation 
in this area has yet to be passed by Parliament.
    An export processing zone is being developed with the advice and 
financial support of the Taiwanese Government and various Taiwanese 
businesses. No date has been set for the beginning of operations.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children; however, 
trafficking of women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a 
growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The constitutional minimum age for employment is 15 years. 
Children legally may not work nights or more than 40 hours per week. 
Education is compulsory through grade eight, or to the ages of 14 or 
15. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for 
enforcing laws regulating the employment of children. These laws are 
generally enforced; however, the authorities are reluctant to attempt 
to enforce these laws on Roma. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor 
by children; however, trafficking in girls for prostitution and 
pornography is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The average monthly wage was 
about $158. The minimum wage is by law two-thirds of the average wage; 
however, it was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The average month's worth of food for a family 
of four exceeded average incomes by about 20 percent. This economic 
situation meant that few workers could support a family on their wages 
alone. Many households are dual-income, and many persons take on 
additional work, often in the gray market.
    Yugoslavia had extensive laws concerning acceptable conditions of 
work, including an official 42-hour workweek with a minimum 24-hour 
rest period and generous vacation and sick leave benefits. The 
Government adopted many of these provisions, including the workweek and 
rest period. However, high unemployment and the fragile condition of 
the economy led many employees to accept work conditions that do not 
comply with the law. Small retail businesses in particular often 
require employees to work far beyond the legal limits.
    The Constitution provides for safe working conditions, temporary 
disability compensation, and leave benefits. Although laws and 
regulations on worker safety remain from the Yugoslav era, they are not 
enforced strictly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is 
responsible for enforcing regulations pertaining to working conditions.
    Under the law, if workers have safety concerns, employers are 
obliged to address dangerous situations. Should an employer fail to do 
so, employees are entitled legally to leave the dangerous situation 
without losing their jobs; however, this does not happen often, if 
ever, in practice.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits 
trafficking for the purpose of prostitution; however, trafficking in 
women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing problem. 
Trafficking in persons for the purpose of illegal immigration is not 
prohibited specifically by law but is covered by immigration 
regulations. The country is a source, transit, and destination point 
for trafficking in persons. Traffickers have recruited women from other 
countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, 
to work as prostitutes in several towns. Women are trafficked through 
the country on their way to West European countries, especially Italy. 
There are no reliable estimates of the number of victims of trafficking 
in the country.
    Trafficking in women is not treated as a priority on either the 
governmental or nongovernmental level. Trafficking is handled by the 
Interior Ministry Department on Organized Crime. The Government 
cooperated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to 
provide shelter and assistance to trafficked women on an ad hoc basis 
in several cases, and late in the year a small center was opened to 
establish such services on a more regular basis.
    Police expelled 108 prostitutes from Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Russia in December. Deputy Interior Minister Rifat Elmazi said the 
police intend ``to deport all prostitutes from other countries.'' The 
Government cooperated with the IOM to arrange passage of these and 
other trafficking victims to their home countries. Very few traffickers 
have been caught, and the owners of the establishments where the women 
worked have either fled or managed otherwise to avoid prosecution.
                               __________

                                 MALTA

    Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy. The 
chief of state (President) appoints as the head of government (Prime 
Minister) the leader of the party that gains a plurality of seats in 
the quinquennial elections for the unicameral legislature. The 
judiciary is independent.
    The appointed commissioner who commands the police is under the 
effective supervision of the Government and may be either a civilian or 
career member of the force.
    The economy is a mixture of state-owned and private industry, with 
tourism and light manufacturing as the largest sectors, and it provides 
residents with a moderate to high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with instances of individual abuse. An independent judiciary upholds 
the Constitution's protections for individual rights and freedoms. 
Violence against women is a problem, and societal discrimination 
against women persists, but the Government has taken steps to address 
both issues.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet minimal 
international standards, and the Government permits visits by human 
rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
law prohibit arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions. The police may arrest a person for 
questioning on the basis of reasonable suspicion but within 48 hours 
must either release the suspect or lodge charges. Arrested persons have 
no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period. Persons 
incarcerated pending trial are granted access to counsel. Bail normally 
is granted. In June the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 
Government had violated articles 5/3 and 5/4 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights by holding a Tunisian citizen in custody for 2 years 
prior to trial, thereby denying the accused prompt due process.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The Chief Justice and 16 judges are appointed by the President on 
the advice of the Prime Minister; judges serve until the age of 65, and 
magistrates serve until the age of 60. The highest court, the 
Constitutional Court, interprets the Constitution and has original 
jurisdiction in cases involving human rights violations and allegations 
relating to electoral corruption charges. The two courts of appeal hear 
appeals from the civil court, court of magistrates, special tribunals, 
and from the criminal court, respectively. The criminal court, composed 
of a judge and nine jurors, hears criminal cases. The civil court first 
hall hears civil and commercial cases that exceed the magistrates' 
jurisdiction; the civil court's second hall offers voluntary 
jurisdiction in civil matters. The court of magistrates has 
jurisdiction for civil claims of less than $2,207 (1,000 Maltese liri) 
and for lesser criminal offenses. The juvenile court hears cases 
involving persons under 16 years of age.
    The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an impartial 
court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice or, if they 
cannot pay the cost, to court-appointed counsel at public expense. 
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. They may confront 
witnesses, present evidence, and have the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanctions. Police officers with the rank of 
inspector and above may issue search warrants based on perceived 
reasonable grounds for suspicion of wrongdoing. Reportedly only the 
Home Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister may issue warrants for 
telephone tapping, and then only in drug-related cases and matters 
relating to national security.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. However, the 1987 Foreign Interference Act bans 
foreign participation in local politics during the period leading up to 
elections. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    Diverse views are expressed in four daily newspapers, seven 
weeklies, and five Sunday editions. A total of 6 television stations, a 
commercial cable network, and 19 radio stations function freely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
state-supported religion is Roman Catholicism. The Government and the 
Catholic Church participate in a foundation that finances Catholic 
schools. The church transferred nonpastoral land to this foundation as 
part of the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. Parts of the proceeds 
accruing from the dispersal of the land are transferred to the 
foundation to support free education of church school students. 
Students in government schools may decline instruction in Catholicism.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not arbitrarily 
restrict movement within the country, foreign travel, or emigration. A 
court order may prohibit the departure from the country of anyone who 
is the subject of a formal complaint alleging nonfulfillment of a legal 
obligation, such as the nonpayment of a debt or nonsupport of an 
estranged spouse.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The passage of a new refugee law in 
February expanded due process and the protection available to refugee 
applicants and formalizes what had been a system of de facto refugee 
status. However, enabling legislation and regulations had not been 
implemented by year's end. Under the law, the position of commissioner 
for refugees, as well as an appeals board will be established. In 
addition to the current humanitarian temporary protected status, the 
law provides for refugee status, access to free social services and 
education, residence permits, and travel documents. Work permits for 
refugees are issued on a case-by-case basis.
    The UNHCR considers approximately 165 immigrants to be refugees and 
another 215 to be applicants. The authorities expel or repatriate those 
determined to be ineligible for refugee status. However, the Government 
did not force the return of any persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the 
September 1998 elections, six women were elected to Parliament, three 
in each party, and one received a ministerial post. The Government has 
taken steps to include more women in civil service and other government 
positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
views
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination based on race, 
place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The 
Government respects this prohibition. Alleged victims of job 
discrimination may apply directly for relief to the Employment 
Commission of the first hall of the Civil Court in the appropriate 
jurisdiction.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is a problem. During the 
first 6 months of the year, 235 cases of domestic violence were 
reported to the Police Domestic Violence Unit. A special police unit 
and several voluntary organizations provide support to victims of 
domestic violence. For women who are threatened or physically abused, 
the Government also maintains an emergency fund and subsidizes 
shelters. During the year, 53 women used the shelters.
    The Government set up a hot line in 1996 to assist victims of abuse 
through counseling and through referrals to legal assistance and 
shelters.
    A committee was set up during 1998 to review existing family 
legislation and propose amendments dealing with domestic violence. Its 
findings were under consideration by the Government.
    Prostitution is a serious offense under the law, and stiff 
penalties are reserved for organizers. Rape and violent indecent 
assault carry sentences of up to 10 years imprisonment. The law treats 
spousal rape the same as other rape. Divorce and abortion are not 
legal.
    The Constitution provides that all citizens have access, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, to housing, employment, and education. While 
women constitute a growing portion of the work force, they are 
underrepresented in management. Cultural and traditional employment 
patterns often direct them either into traditional ``women's jobs'' 
(such as sales clerk, secretary, bank teller, teacher, or nurse) or 
into better paying jobs in family-owned businesses or select 
professions (e.g., academia or medicine). Therefore women generally 
earn less than their male counterparts.
    Women's issues are handled by the Department of Women's Rights 
under the Minister of Social Policy. The Minister is a prominent member 
of the Government who is also Deputy Prime Minister and the Nationalist 
Party's deputy leader. Legislation enacted in 1993 granted women 
equality in matters of family law, and a 1991 constitutional amendment 
committed the Government to promote equal rights for all persons 
regardless of sex. The Government has taken steps to ensure that 
legislation is gender neutral to the degree possible. Redress in the 
courts for sexual discrimination is available. The Government's policy 
on gender abandoned the concept of introducing gender-based quotas in 
the civil service. The Government is sponsoring a report to study the 
prevalence of sexual harassment.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and health care. It provides compulsory, free, and universal 
education and free health care for children through age 16. The 
Government voices concern for children's rights and welfare but 
addresses those concerns within family law. In September the Government 
signed the Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the Nairobi Protocol.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The number of 
reported cases of child abuse has grown as public awareness has 
increased. For the first 6 months of the year, 434 cases of child abuse 
were reported. The introduction of a ``helpline'' telephone number to 
report suspected cases of child abuse has been effective.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for rights for the 
disabled. The Persons with Disabilities Act built on provisions in the 
1969 (public employment) and 1992 (accessibility) laws. The new law 
requires the private sector to apply equal employment guarantees 
already in place in the public sector. During the year for the first 
time, private development project plans must include access for the 
disabled. Government and private sector efforts to advance the status 
of the disabled are improving.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 2,000 men of 
North African origin are married to Maltese women. This community has a 
mosque and a separate school.
    Owners of some bars and discos reportedly discourage or prohibit 
darker-skinned persons from entering. In a February report, the leisure 
industry acknowledged that such incidents do occur and recommended 
corrective steps to both the Government and industry. In September the 
Government announced that it plans include criminalization of ``racial 
hatred'' in proposed amendments to the Criminal Code.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate 
freely and to strike, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. Only noncivilian personnel of the armed forces and police are 
prohibited from striking. There are 36 registered trade unions, 
representing about 50 percent of the work force. Although all unions 
are independent of political parties, the largest, the General Workers' 
Union, generally is regarded as having close informal ties with the 
Labor Party.
    Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible 
minister may refer labor disputes either to the Industrial Tribunal (a 
government-appointed body consisting of representatives of government, 
employers, and employee groups) or to binding arbitration. The 
International Labor Organization Committee of Experts objects to a 
provision of the act that permits compulsory arbitration to be held at 
the request of only one of the parties, but neither unions nor 
employers appear to object to this provision. In practice a striking 
union can ignore an unfavorable decision of the Tribunal by continuing 
the strike on other grounds. During the first 6 months of the year, one 
strike was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
    There is no prohibition on unions affiliating internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are 
free, in law and practice, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions 
and employers meet annually with government representatives to work out 
a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial relations and income 
policy.
    Under the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not take action 
against any employee for participation or membership in a trade union. 
Complaints may be pursued through a court of law, through the 
Industrial Tribunal, or through the Tribunal for the Investigation of 
Injustices (presided over by a judge of the Superior Court); however, 
most disputes are resolved directly between the parties. Workers fired 
solely for union activities must be reinstated.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children younger than 
age 16. This injunction generally is respected, but some underage 
children were employed during summer months, especially as domestics, 
restaurant kitchen help, or vendors. The Department of Labor enforces 
the law effectively, but it is lenient in cases of summer employment of 
underage youths in businesses run by their families. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The weekly legal minimum wage is 
$96 (44 Maltese liri) for persons under age 17; $99 (45 Maltese liri) 
for 17-year-olds; and $105 (48 Maltese liri) for persons age 18 and 
over. Additionally a mandatory bonus of $10 (4 Maltese liri) per week 
is paid. This minimum wage structure provides a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family with the addition of government 
subsidies for housing, health care, and free education. Wage Councils, 
composed of representatives of government, business, and unions, 
regulate work hours; for most sectors the standard is 40 hours per 
week, but in some trades it is 43 or 45 hours per week.
    Government regulations prescribe a daily rest period, which is 
normally 1 hour. The law mandates an annual paid vacation of 4 
workweeks plus 4 workdays. The Department of Labor effectively enforces 
these requirements.
    Enforcement of the 1994 Occupational Health and Safety (Promotion) 
Act is uneven, and industrial accidents remain frequent. Workers may 
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to 
their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits 
trafficking in persons, although traffickers may be prosecuted under 
the Immigration Act for unlawful entry or unregulated status.
    There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, 
through, or within the country.
                               __________

                                MOLDOVA

    Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
in 1994 adopted a constitution that provides for a multiparty 
representative government with power divided among a president, 
cabinet, parliament, and judiciary. International observers considered 
the 1996 presidential and 1998 parliamentary elections to be free and 
fair, but authorities in the separatist Transnistrian region interfered 
with citizens' ability to vote. President Petru Lucinschi's 4-year term 
ends in January 2001. The Parliament, which was dismissed at the end of 
the year, was composed of: The Communist Party with 40 seats, centrist 
parties with 39 seats, a rightwing party with 9 seats, and 13 
independents. The Parliament amended the 1994 Constitution on July 21 
by voting to transform the country into a parliamentary republic, 
significantly reducing the President's powers and changing the 
presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The 
amendment also eliminated the President's ability to introduce 
legislation for Parliament's consideration. The Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted 
undue influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the 
year that judicial independence continued to increase.
    The country remains divided, with mostly Slavic separatists 
controlling the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border. This 
separatist regime has entered into negotiations with the national 
Government on the possibility of a special status for the region. 
Progress in resolving the ongoing conflict has been blocked by the 
separatists' continuing demands for statehood and recognition of the 
country as a confederation of two equal states. The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine act as mediators. The two sides generally have observed the 
cease-fire of 1992, which ended armed conflict between them, but other 
agreements to normalize relations often have not been honored. In the 
second half of the year, Russian State Commission chairman Yevgeniy 
Primakov launched a new initiative for a resolution of the 
Transnistrian issue. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, enjoys 
local autonomy in the southern part of the country. The Gagauz elected 
a new governor (Bashkan) and 35 deputies to their Popular Assembly in 
free and fair elections in September 1999. The stability of the 
agreement on autonomy was put in doubt as differences developed between 
the Gagauz and central authorities over the distribution of tax 
revenues, budget allocations, and property ownership.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs has responsibility for the police. 
The Ministry of National Security renamed by Parliament the Information 
and Security Service (ISS) was placed under Parliament's control. The 
Border Guards are no longer under ISS control, but are a separate 
agency. The ISS has the right to investigate, but not to arrest. The 
Constitution assigns to Parliament the authority to investigate the 
activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ISS, and ensures 
that they comply with existing legislation. Some members of the 
security forces committed a number of human rights abuses. General 
Aleksei, the head of the Anti-Organized Crime and Corruption Department 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was suspended from his position 
and is under investigation for misuse of funds. The General 
Prosecutor's office is conducting the investigation, which was still 
ongoing at year's end.
    The country continued to make progress in economic reform. 
International observers viewed the Government of Prime Minister Braghis 
as strongly proreform. The economy is largely based on agriculture. 
Citizens and foreigners can buy and sell land at market prices. 
However, foreigners cannot buy agricultural land, nor can agricultural 
land be resold for a period of 5 years. Over 900 of approximately 1,000 
large collective farms have applied for the Government's land 
privatization program. By year's end, approximately 634,000 landowners 
have received title to almost 1.7 million plots of land. The leading 
exports are foodstuffs, wine, tobacco, clothing, and footwear. The 
gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated officially at about $312 
(3900 lei) per capita but may be considerably underestimated because of 
activity in the large shadow economy and underreporting for tax 
purposes. According to some estimates, the shadow economy accounts for 
about two-thirds of the national economy. The officially reported 
median salary is $33 per month (410 Moldovan lei). According to 
government statistics about 80 percent of the population lives below 
the poverty level and 20 percent of the population is classified as 
extremely poor. Some 65.4 percent of the poorest people live in rural 
areas. According to the results of the Government's household budget 
survey for the first quarter of the year, the monthly disposable income 
per person was about $15.50 (193 Moldovan lei) and 92 percent of the 
population lives on less than $1 per day. A majority of citizens cannot 
afford to buy fish, meat, milk and other dairy products on a regular 
basis. Malnutrition is recongnizable in the rates of anemia for 
children, and the percentage of young men not physically fit for 
military,service. The infant mortality rate is increasing, life 
expectancy is decreasing, and deaths in childbirth are increasing. The 
GDP increased by 1.9 percent during the year. GDP per capita was $353 
(439 Moldovan lei). A program privatizing state-owned enterprises and 
real estate based on vouchers issued to all citizens is complete. The 
exchange rate remained stable for most of the year, with local currency 
depreciation in the beginning of the year and its slow appreciation in 
mid-year. Inflation for the year was 18.4 percent. The country has 
considerable foreign debt. The economic situation is worse in 
Transnistria.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, there were problems in some areas. The police occasionally 
beat and otherwise abused detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions 
remained harsh, with attempts to improve them are hampered by lack of 
funding. While the executive branch has exerted undue influence on the 
judiciary, there were indications during the year that judicial 
independence continued to increase. It is widely believed that security 
forces monitor political figures, use unauthorized wiretaps, and at 
times conduct illegal searches. The Constitution potentially limits the 
activities of the press, political parties, and religious groups. In 
the past, journalists have practiced self-censorship, due to fear of 
protracted legal battles. A recent Supreme Court decision tightened the 
requirements for bringing such suits. The law also imposes restrictions 
on some religious groups. Societal discrimination and violence against 
women persisted. The Constitution allows parents the right to choose 
the language of education for their children. Trafficking in women and 
girls was a very serious problem.
    The Transnistrian authorities continued to be responsible for 
abuses, including questionable detentions, harassment of independent 
media, restrictions on freedom of religion, and discrimination against 
Moldovan/Romanian speakers.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings in the country or 
its separatist region.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were credible 
reports that police sometimes beat and abused prisoners or suspects.
    From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between 
police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their 
free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports 
alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against 
the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and 
approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were 
filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau 
municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's 
end. Subsequent protests over wage arrears were peaceful (see Section 
1.d.).
    A businessman alleged that the police kidnaped his brother for 3 
days in July 1999. The police reportedly tortured him, then released 
him after charging him with drunkenness and resisting arrest. The 
businessman also charged that this was a case of racketeering and 
involved persons from the prosecutor's office as well as the police. 
The Prosecutor's Office announced in December 1999 that physical 
assault charges were pending against three police officers, but the 
case was dismissed on April 17 for lack of evidence. There was no 
investigation into the racketeering charges.
    Conditions in most prisons remain harsh, with serious overcrowding. 
Cell sizes do not meet local legal requirements or minimum 
international standards. Conditions are especially harsh in prisons 
used to hold persons awaiting trial or sentencing. These prisons suffer 
from overcrowding, bad ventilation, and a lack of recreational and 
rehabilitation facilities. Conditions for those serving sentences are 
better only marginally. According to the 1999 Human Development Report 
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2.3 percent of the 
total number of inmates are children. There are separate facilities for 
children and teenaged prisioners; most are in detention camps. The 
incidence of malnutrition and disease, especially tuberculosis, is high 
in all facilities. The medical section of the Department of 
Penitentiaries released figures of 1,871 inmates with tuberculosis and 
124 with HIV/AIDS. Abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or by jailers 
themselves, ostensibly for disciplinary reasons, has been reduced by 
the dismissal or retirement of some of the worst offending guards; 
however, the practice likely continued at diminished levels. The 
Ministry of Justice administers the prison system. Attempts to improve 
prison conditions are frustrated by a lack of financing.
    Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons. Local and 
international human rights monitors were allowed to visit prisons in 
Moldovia, and Council of Europe (COE) monitors were allowed to visit 
some prisoners in Transnistria; however, COE monitors were not allowed 
to inspect prisons in Transnistria.
    After questionable trials in 1993, four ethnic Moldovans continued 
to serve sentences in Transnistria for alleged terrorism-related crimes 
(see Section 1.e.). At the end of July 1999, one of the four, Ilie 
Ilascu, wrote a letter to the press claiming to be on his 77th day of a 
hunger strike and alleging a number of abuses by the Transnistrian 
authorities. A member of the OSCE mission visited him in July 1999 and 
observed that he did not appear to be in imminent danger. At the end of 
1999, he still was claiming to be on a hunger strike. In December 1999, 
the wives of all four complained that they were not able to visit, 
although they were allowed to send food. In March a Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) official visited Ilascu, but OSCE members were 
not allowed to accompany him. None of the visitors made any observation 
of imminent danger to the state of health of the prisoner. In May 
Moldovan Parliamentary President Diacov visited Ilascu. This was the 
first time a senior government official met with him. The visit was 
filmed and televised by local television stations (see Section 1.e.). 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited these 
prisoners in 1992 and again in 1993 in Tiraspol, but later were denied 
visitation. The ICRC continued negotiating with Transnistrian officials 
at year's end to visit the prisoners with an international medical 
team. In June the Government of Moldova officially requested a retrial 
of the Ilascu group in a third country OSCE member state. In August 
Ilascu himself conveyed to a visiting Council of Europe official that 
he wanted a retrial. Some OSCE member states are considering the 
Government's request; however, at year's end, no state had yet 
confirmed its willingness to do so.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The former Soviet Code 
on Penal Procedure remains in force with some amendments, and 
authorities respect its provisions. New penal and civil codes and the 
Code on Punishment for Minor Offenses were undergoing hearings in 
Parliament. The July session of Parliament decided that the Prosecutor 
General's office would no longer supervise the implementation of laws. 
Its function was restricted to criminal prosecution, presentation of 
formal charges before a court, and overall protection of the rule of 
law and civil freedoms. The Prosecutor General's office is under the 
judiciary branch. A law was passed during the year to make the 
Prosecutor General's office an independent body within the Supreme 
Council of Magistrates. Judges issue arrest warrants based on cases 
being presented by prosecutors. Under the Constitution, a suspect may 
be detained without charge for 24 hours. The suspect normally is 
allowed family visits during this period. The 24-hour time limit is not 
always respected, especially if a person is arrested late on a Friday 
or on a weekend. If charged a suspect may be released on personal 
recognizance or pending trial. There is no system of bail, but in some 
cases, in order to arrange release, a friend or relative may give a 
written pledge that the accused will appear for trial. Suspects accused 
of violent or serious crimes generally are not released before trial.
    The Constitution permits pretrial arrest for an initial period of 
30 days, which may be extended up to 6 months. Detentions of several 
months are fairly frequent. In exceptional cases, Parliament may 
approve extension of pretrial detention on an individual basis of up to 
12 months. The accused has the right, under the Constitution, to a 
hearing before a court regarding the legality of his arrest. According 
to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice, 3,477 persons of a 
total prison population of 9,449, were held in confinement awaiting 
trial at year's end (these statistics do not include persons held in 
Transnistria).
    According to the Constitution, a detained person must be informed 
immediately of the reason for his arrest and must be made aware of the 
charges as quickly as possible. The accused has the right to a defense 
attorney throughout the entire process, and the attorney must be 
present when the charges are brought. Many lawyers point out that 
access to a lawyer generally is granted only after a person has been 
detained for 24 hours. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the 
State requires the local bar association to provide one. Because the 
State is unable to pay ongoing legal fees, defendants often do not have 
adequate legal representation.
    From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between 
police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their 
free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports 
alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against 
the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and 
approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were 
filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau 
municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's 
end (see Section 1.c.).
    The Transnistrian authorities have imposed a state of emergency 
that allows law enforcement officials to detain suspects for up to 30 
days, reportedly without access to an attorney. Such arbitrary 
detention procedures usually have been applied to persons suspected of 
being critical of the regime and sometimes last up to several months. 
According to a credible report by Amnesty International (AI), many 
pretrial detentions in Transnistria fit this description; however, 
there were no reports that Transnistrian authorities used this 
provision during the year.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch has exerted undue 
influence on the judiciary. Many observers believe that arrears in 
salary payments also make it difficult for judges to remain independent 
from outside influences and free from corruption. There were continuing 
indications during the year that judicial independence was increasing.
    Since 1997 prosecutors have the right to open and close 
investigations without bringing the matter before a court, which gives 
them considerable influence over the judicial process. The Constitution 
provides that the President, acting on the nomination of the Superior 
Court of Magistrates, appoints judges for an initial period of 5 years. 
This provision for judicial tenure is designed to increase judicial 
independence. Beginning during the year, judges being considered for 
reappointment were required to take a specialized training course at 
the Judicial Training Center. At the end of this training, they are 
tested. The test is evaluated by the Superior Council of Judges and the 
results are considered when making reappointment decisions. This 
process was designed to increase the professionalism of the judges.
    The judiciary consists of lower courts of the first instance, five 
appellate courts (tribunals), a Higher Court of Appeals, a Supreme 
Court, and a Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court supervises and 
reviews the activities of the lower courts and serves as a final court 
of appeal.
    By law defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. In 
practice prosecutors' recommendations still carry considerable weight 
and limit the defendant's actual presumption of innocence. Trials 
generally are open to the public. Defendants have the right to attend 
proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Defense 
attorneys are able to review the evidence against their clients when 
preparing cases. The accused enjoys a right to appeal to a higher 
court. Because of a lack of funding for adequate facilities and 
personnel, there is a large backlog of cases at the tribunal and Higher 
Appeals Court levels. Court decisions involving the restitution of 
salary or a position are not always implemented.
    To date no pattern of discrimination has emerged in the judicial 
system. The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to have 
an interpreter both at the trial and in reviewing the documents of the 
case. If the majority of the participants agree, trials may take place 
in Russian or another acceptable language instead of Moldovan/Romanian.
    There continued to be credible reports that local prosecutors and 
judges extort bribes for reducing charges or sentences. In January 
1999, a judge in the Chisinau economic court was arrested for allegedly 
accepting a bribe to reduce a fine against a firm. He was convicted and 
sentenced to 10 years in prison.
    Prosecutors occasionally use bureaucratic maneuvers to restrict 
lawyers' access to clients.
    The Constitutional Court showed signs of increasing independence 
during the year. The Court reviewed 90 cases during the year, a 40 
percent decrease from 1999. The Court declared unconstitutional 16 
laws, 1 parliamentary decision, and 4 government acts. In the period 
since Parliament passed the July 5 amendment to the constitution, the 
court has been called upon to issue a number of rulings on the 
interpretation of the amendment and subsequent implementing 
legislation. Despite the political rivalry between the President and 
the Parliament, the court's decisions have generally been regarded as 
fair and objective. On October 10, the Court ruled recent legislation 
requiring political parties be registered for 2 years before 
participating in elections to be unconstitutional.
    There were no reports of political prisoners outside Transnistria.
    In Transnistria four ethnic Moldovans, members of the ``Ilascu 
Group,'' (one of whom, Ilie Ilascu, is an elected member of the 
Romanian Parliament but has never been able to take his seat) remained 
in prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly killing two 
separatist officials (see Section 1.c.). International human rights 
groups raised serious questions about the fairness of the trial; local 
organizations alleged that the Moldovans were prosecuted solely because 
of their membership in the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD), a 
Moldovan political party that favors unification with Romania. Family 
members have been allowed access. In April 1999, the Ilascu Group filed 
a case with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against the 
Government of Moldova and the Russian Federation. In June 1999, the 
ECHR registered the case and began examining it. The ECHR notified both 
Governments during the year that it would hear the case and ordered 
them to file their responses by September 25. Both governments 
submitted their documents on October 25, which were sent by the ECHR to 
the Ilascu Group's lawyers. Lawyers for the Ilascu Group are scheduled 
to present their case before the ECHR in January 2001. The President of 
the Parliament of Moldova, Dumitru Diacov, visited Ilascu on May 16. 
This was the first time a senior government official met with Ilascu. 
The visit was filmed and then broadcast by local television stations. 
International organizations continued to pressure the Transnistrian 
authorities to retry the Ilascu Group in another OSCE-member state; 
however, by year's end no country had expressed willingness to retry 
them. In July 1999, the Transnistrians issued a moratorium on capital 
punishment, which in effect suspended implementation of Ilascu's death 
sentence.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Prosecutors issue search warrants; however, in some 
instances searches are conducted without warrants. Courts do not 
exclude evidence that was obtained illegally. There is no judicial 
review of search warrants. The Constitution specifies that searches 
must be carried out ``in accordance with the law'' but does not specify 
the consequences if the law is not respected. It also forbids searches 
at night, except in the case of flagrant crime.
    It is widely believed that security agencies continue to use 
electronic monitoring of residences and telephones without proper 
authorization. By law the prosecutor's office must authorize wiretaps 
and may do so only if a criminal investigation is under way. In 
practice the prosecutor's office lacks the ability to control the 
security organizations and police and prevent them from using wiretaps 
illegally.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the law 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, although with some 
restrictions. The Government does not limit freedom of speech, and the 
print media express a wide variety of political views and commentary. 
National and city governments subsidize a number of newspapers, but 
political parties and professional organizations, including trade 
unions, also publish newspapers. Most newspapers have a circulation of 
less than 5,000.
    Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and 
operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of 
these independent media still are in the service of a political 
movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large 
subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio 
stations, including one religious station, with some stations 
rebroadcasting programs from Romania and Russia. There are three 
independent television stations in the Chisinau area and one in the 
city of Balti. The Government owns and operates several radio stations 
and a television station that covers most of the country. A number of 
local governments, including Gagauzia, operate television and radio 
stations. The Association of Electronic Press was founded in September 
1999. The Association of Independent Press was founded in July 1997.
    The 1995 Moldovan Audiovisual (AV) law requires a minimum of 65 
percent of broadcasting be in the state (Moldovan/Romanian) language. 
The law did not specify if the 65 percent rule applied to all broadcast 
content or only that locally produced. In August the Audio-Visual 
Council (AVC) suspended the licenses of two radio stations and two 
television channels for their failure to respect the 65 percent 
requirement. On September 20, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
revocation of the licenses and ordered the AVC to enforce the 
revocation. A court case brought by the Club of Romanian and Western 
University Graduates, against a number of other stations for failure to 
respect the 65 percent rule, was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 
This decision forced the AVC to suspend the licenses of several other 
radio and television stations. This decision caused much controversy 
within the country and abroad. The Transnistrian authorities 
immediately proclaimed it further proof of their need to be independent 
of Chisinau. The Communist faction in Parliament demanded that the 
court decisions be annulled and the audiovisual legislation be 
modified. Several groups, among them the Student Association at the 
Academy of Economic Studies and a group of performing artists and 
composers, spoke out against the closure of television and radio 
stations under this law, as did the OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities and the Head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. The law also 
elicited strong criticism from Russia. The television and radio 
stations continued broadcasting despite suspension of their licenses, 
because the AVC had no real means to enforce the suspension. In October 
Parliament passed an amendment to the AV law, specifying that the 65 
percent rule applied only to locally produced broadcast content. This 
allowed the AVC to reinstate the suspended licenses, because the 
affected stations were primarily repeater stations for foreign produced 
material.
    The Constitution restricts press freedoms, forbidding ``disputing 
or defaming the State and the people'' and political parties that 
``militate'' against the country's sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity. These restrictions lack implementing legislation 
and are not invoked. In the past, criticism of public figures had 
resulted in a number of lawsuits. Consequently to avoid lengthy 
lawsuits, journalists practiced self-censorship. The Supreme Court in 
1999 overturned an article in the Civil Code that allowed public 
figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between their 
public and private persons. Under the Court's 1999 ruling, parties 
filing lawsuits must prove that the information was false and 
defamatory and published recklessly or with intentional malice. Since 
the 1999 decision, the plaintiffs generally have lost in cases where 
suits have been filed against journalists and media organs.
    Legislation was passed in May giving access to public information. 
Journalists and ordinary citizens now have the right to obtain 
information from government organizations, which must also provide a 
timetable of when they will supply the information; however, at year's 
end the Government had not yet put into place the necessary mechanisms 
to respond to public inquiries.
    The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However, 
Western publications do not circulate widely since they are very 
expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, and 
some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. The country receives 
television and radio broadcasts from Romania, France, and Russia. A 
small number of cable subscribers receive a variety of foreign cable 
television programs. Parliament prohibited the use of locally based 
foreign media outlets from accepting political ads and publishing 
editorials in favor of a particular candidate. Of the two major 
newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by the regional 
authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government. There is one 
independent newspaper in Tiraspol and one in the northern Transnistrian 
city of Ribnitsa. At times the independent newspapers criticize the 
Transnistrian regime and have been harassed by separatist authorities. 
Other print media in Transnistria do not have a large circulation and 
appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless some of them also 
criticize local authorities. The one independent television station is 
trying to enlarge its broadcast radius, but produced less than 10 hours 
of programming per week. The official Transnistrian television station, 
which previously had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising 
revenues, continued to resist the independent station's expansion. Most 
Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria although they are 
available in Tiraspol. Circulation of all print media in Transnistria 
is hampered by the closed nature of the society. The independent 
newspaper in Tiraspol, the Novaya Gazeta, was effectively shut down 
from January to August 1999 through the repeated confiscation of its 
press run by the Transnistrian authorities. Authorities did not present 
search warrants or court orders authorizing these confiscations. After 
a number of legal proceedings in which Transnistrian courts ruled the 
interventions illegal, and an intervention by the OSCE, the newspaper 
began to publish again in August 1999, although with a sharply limited 
circulation and under a modified name (Samya Novaya Gazeta). An 
independent newspaper in Ribnitsa was almost put out of business by two 
costly libel suits by local officials during the year.
    Article 34.5 of the Constitution prohibits censorship and the 
Government does not officially censor books, films, or any other media; 
however, members of Parliament and other government officials often 
contact a media outlet with complaints about their reporting, which 
usually results in the criticism being toned down. Internet access is 
not limited by the government, but is prohibitively expensive; however, 
Internet cafes are plentiful in major cities.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and authorities respected 
this right in practice. Mayors' offices issue permits for 
demonstrations; they may consult the national government if a 
demonstration is likely to be extremely large. On March 20, 
approximately 5,000 teachers and other protesters went on strike in 
front of the government building, protesting the nonpayment and low 
level of teachers' salaries. Although over 500 police officers and 
cadets were present with riot gear and gas masks, the protest remained 
peaceful.
    From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place between police and 
as many as 20,000 students, reportedly from every higher education 
institution in Chisinau, protesting the municipal decision to cancel 
the students' free public transportation privileges. Both police and 
students sustained serious injuries, including broken arms and legs 
(see Section 1.c.). It is estimated that some 400 students were 
detained over the 3 days. The incident was currently under 
investigation by the Chisinau municipal prosecutor's office at year's 
end.
    On September 7, about 180 pensioners and others demonstrated 
peacefully in downtown Chisinau against the municipal withdrawal of 
free transportation on trolleys and buses for pensioners. The 
pensioners later enlarged their grievances to include a call for a 
larger increase in the size of pension deemed necessary to maintain a 
decent standard of living. Approximately 2,500 pensioners returned to 
protest on November 1, demanding an increase in their monthly payments 
and the provision of free public transportation. In December pensioners 
staged a small, peaceful demonstration protesting pension arrears; 
there was a similar demonstration in support of veterans who had 
illegally occupied a building earmarked for parliamentary delegates. 
Police did not use force at any of the demonstrations.
    The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and 
other social and political organizations, and authorities respected 
this right in practice. Private organizations, including political 
parties, are required to register, but applications are approved 
routinely. The Constitution forbids parties that ``militate against the 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova.'' A 
total of 30 parties met the requirement of the October 1998 law 
requiring 5,000 members and are registered officially. An amendment to 
this law, which required that parties must have been registered for at 
least 2 years before taking part in elections, was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in October. Parties 
registered for less than 2 years will therefore be allowed to 
participate in February 2001 elections.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government generally permits the free 
practice of religion; however, a 1992 law on religion that codifies 
religious freedoms contains restrictions that couldand in some 
instances did--inhibit the activities of some religious groups. The law 
provides for freedom of religious practice, including each person's 
right to profess his religion in any form. It also protects the 
confidentiality of the confessional, allows denominations to establish 
associations and foundations, and states that the Government may not 
interfere in the religious activities of denominations. The procedures 
for registering a religious organization are the same for all groups. 
In the territory under effective control of the Moldovan authorities 
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church is the only religious group presently 
denied registration.
    Several religious organizations face difficulties registering or 
conducting religious activities in the area under control of the 
Transnistrian authorities.
    The law on religion as amended to legalize proselytizing--in 
principle bringing the legislation in line with the ECHR--went into 
effect in June 1999. However, the law on religion explicitly forbids 
``abusive proselytizing.'' Abusive is defined as ``an attempt to 
influence someone's religious faith through violence or abuse of 
authority.'' Although some Protestant groups were concerned that the 
previous prohibition on proselytizing could inhibit their activities, 
the Government has not taken legal action against individuals for 
proselytizing.
    Although Eastern Orthodoxy is not designated in the law on religion 
as the official religion, it continued to be a strong religious force 
and exerted significant influence. A notable example has been that of 
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church. The Government denied recognition to 
the Bessarabian Orthodox Church in October 1992, March 1996, August 
1996, and March 1997. The Bessarabian Orthodox Church was formed in 
1992 when a number of priests broke away from the Moldovan Orthodox 
Church, which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The 
Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which sees itself as the legal and 
canonical successor to the pre-World War II Romanian Orthodox Church in 
Bessarabia (the part of Moldova between the Nistru and Prut Rivers), 
subordinated itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church. The Government consistently has refused to register 
the Bessarabian Church, citing unresolved property claims and stating 
that the Bessarabian Church is a ``schismatic movement.'' The issue has 
political as well as religious overtones, because it raises the 
question whether the Orthodox Church should be united and oriented 
toward Moscow, or divided with a branch oriented toward Bucharest. 
(Leaders of the Moldovan Orthodox Church appear more interested in 
independence than in links to Moscow.) In 1997 the Supreme Court 
overturned an appellate court decision affirming the right of the 
Bessarabian Church to register with the Government. However, the 
Supreme Court's decision was based on a procedural issue rather than on 
the merits of the case. The Bessarabian Church appealed the case to the 
European Court of Human Rights in June 1998. The Government submitted 
its response in February, arguing that registering the Bessarabian 
Church would interfere with an internal matter of the Moldovan Orthodox 
Church. There was no decision by year's end.
    In January 1998, authorities in Transnistria canceled the 
registration of Jehovah's Witnesses. Repeated attempts by Jehovah's 
Witnesses to reregister have been denied or delayed. Transnistrian 
officials regularly confiscate religious tracts from members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses, most recently in January, because the group is not 
registered properly. According to local leaders of Jehovah's Witnesses, 
two preachers were arrested and detained for several days in April 
1999. The Church of the Living God has been denied registration in five 
towns in Transnistria. Baptist leaders have complained that they are 
not allowed to distribute religious literature or organize public 
meetings in Transnistria. Non-Orthodox groups complain that they 
generally are not allowed to rent property and often are harassed 
during religious services.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel 
within the country, and there are no closed areas. Citizens generally 
are able to travel freely; however, there are some restrictions on 
emigration. Close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant 
must give their concurrence. The Government also may deny permission to 
emigrate if the applicant had access to state secrets. However, such 
cases are very rare, and none were reported during the year. It is 
generally accepted that a large number of Moldovan citizens are working 
in foreign countries without having legal status in those countries. 
Figures on emigration from a variety of official Moldovan sources are 
statistically inaccurate; however, current government estimates claim 
that between 600,000 and 800,000 Moldovans are illegally working 
outside the country due to economic depravation. Estimates indicate 
that the majority of them are working in Russia, Romania, Ukraine and 
Bulgaria. There also are occasional news stories of arrests of illegal 
Moldovans in South Africa and South Korea. The Interior Ministry 
reported in October that 2,240 Moldovan citizens working illegally 
abroad had been extradited back to the country.
    Travel between Transnistria and the rest of the country is not 
prevented. There are regularly scheduled buses and trains. However, the 
separatist authorities often stop and search incoming and outgoing 
vehicles. In May 1999, the Moldovan Government established fixed and 
mobile ``fiscal posts'' to control smuggling of untaxed goods from 
Transnistria.
    Moldova is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government has no 
processing procedures for potential refugees resident in the country. 
According to a representative of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) about 10 to 15 people per month arrive in Moldova seeking 
refuge. Many originate in Chechnya, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and 
Nigeria. Most are detained at the airport until they can be deported. 
The Chechens, Russian speakers who physically resemble resident 
Moldovans, are more successful in gaining admission. The Government 
formally started cooperating with the UNHCR in late 1997.
    The approximately 60 to 100 Chechen refugees who arrived in Moldova 
during the year led to controversy between the Government and the UNHCR 
over the extent of legal protection refugees should receive. According 
to a UNHCR representative, the authorities frequently fail to inform 
the UNHCR of the arrival of refugees or disregard UNHCR guidance and 
advice. At the urging of the UNHCR, the Government accelerated the 
submission of a law on refugees to the Parliament, but it had not been 
passed by year's end.
    The issue of providing first asylum has never arisen formally. 
There were no official reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared prosecution; however AI reported a case in 
which such a forced return took place. According to AI, a Kurdish Turk, 
allegedly a leader in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), was seized on 
July 13 by unidentified men in Chisinau and flown to Turkey where he 
faces charges that could carry a death sentence. Local human rights 
organizations charge that the Government failed to follow correct 
procedures in the case. There are allegations that national security 
officers were involved; however, the authorities deny them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have voted in multiparty presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 1996 and 1998 respectively. International observers 
considered the elections to be free and fair, but Transnistrian 
authorities have interfered with citizens' ability to vote in these 
elections.
    The Constitution adopted in 1994 provided for the division of power 
among the popularly elected President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and 
the judiciary. The President as Head of State, in consultation with the 
Parliament, appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who functions 
as the head of government. A minister can be dismissed only with the 
assent of the Prime Minister. Some observers believe that the 
Constitution does not define adequately how executive powers are to be 
shared between the President and the Prime Minister. The President held 
a nonbinding referendum in May 1999, asking if citizens wanted a 
stronger presidency. Based on a 65 percent positive response, the 
President proposed an initiative to revise portions of the Constitution 
in August 1999. The proposal sought to create a ``presidential 
republic'' with more power in the hands of the chief executive. Two 
groups of parliamentarians presented alternative constitutional 
amendments to create a ``parliamentary republic.'' On July 5, 
Parliament acted on the proposals and voted to amend the 1994 
Constitution to transform the country into a parliamentary republic, 
significantly reducing the president's powers and changing the 
presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The bill 
was sent to the President who vetoed it and sent it back to parliament. 
The Parliament overrode the veto on July 21 and the bill became law.
    In September Parliament passed implementing legislation. According 
to this legislation, three-fifths of the vote in Parliament are 
required to elect a candidate, and the vote must be held by secret 
ballot. If Parliament fails to elect a candidate in the first round of 
voting, a runoff can be held between the two leading candidates. If the 
runoff fails to produce a winner, another vote can be held within 15 
days. If Parliament fails to elect a president after the second round 
of voting, the sitting President can dissolve Parliament.
    On December 1, Parliament held the first round of the presidential 
election. Two candidates competed for the position of President: 
Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin and Constitutional Court 
President Pavel Barbalat. Several Parliamentarians did not respect the 
secret ballot and the results of the first round of voting were 
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. A repeat of the first 
vote was held on December 4. Neither candidate secured the necessary
    three-fifths majority of the vote, therefore a runoff was held on 
December 6; however, both candidates were again unsuccessful in 
securing a three-fifths majority. A second round of voting on December 
21 ended in disarray when several parties boycotted the vote, 
preventing Parliament from achieving the required quorum to hold the 
vote. The Constitutional Court however ruled that the December 21 
Parliamentary session, although unsuccessful, constituted the legal 
second round of elections. Thus on December 31, Moldovan President 
Petru Lucinschi dissolved the Parliament and scheduled new 
parliamentary elections for February 25, 2001. His decision to dissolve 
Parliament was made on the grounds that Parliament had failed to elect 
a new president according to the constitutional procedure and 
timeframe, a position supported by the Constitutional Court.
    The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and 
other socio-political organizations. However, the controversial Article 
41 of the Constitution states that organizations that are ``engaged in 
fighting against political pluralism,'' the ``principles of the rule of 
law,'' or ``the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity'' 
of the country are unconstitutional. Small parties that favor 
unification with neighboring Romania have charged that this provision 
is intended to impede their political activities. The Association of 
Victims succeeded in registering as a political party, but a request to 
change its name to the National Romanian Party, was refused. Following 
an appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the organization could 
change its name. The Ministry of Justice followed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and registered the party under its new name in 
December.
    A law on administrative and territorial reform went into effect in 
January 1999 and reduced the number of administrative districts from 42 
to 12. New districts included the municipality of Chisinau, the Gagauz 
autonomous region, and the Transnistrian region. Citizens voted for 
mayors and newly created district and municipal councils in May 1999 
elections. Twenty-three parties and a number of independent candidates 
participated in the campaign. Although the parties in Parliament won 
most of the posts, a leftist party, not in Parliament, gained several 
positions in the north, and independents were elected throughout the 
country. Transnistrian authorities did not allow citizens to vote in 
their region. The Gagauz did not participate in the May 1999 elections 
but held separate elections in September 1999 for governor (Bashkan) 
and 35 deputies to its Popular Assembly.
    In 1991 separatist elements, assisted by uniformed Russian military 
forces in the area and led by supporters of the 1991 coup attempt in 
Moscow, declared a ``Dniester Republic'' in the area of the country 
that is located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. Fighting flared 
briefly in 1992 but ended after Russian forces intervened, and a truce 
has held since. Russian, Ukrainian, and OSCE mediators have attempted 
to encourage the two sides to reach a settlement that preserves 
Moldovan sovereignty and independence while granting a measure of 
autonomy to Transnistria. In 1997 the Transnistrian authorities signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the Government. Since then further 
negotiations have been inconclusive, and there was no significant 
progress towards a settlement by year's end. In August Russian State 
Commission chairman Yevgeniy Primakov launched a new initiative for a 
resolution of the Transnistrian issue. The initiative recommended the 
federalization of Moldova and the creation of a Russian-led OSCE 
peacekeeping force.
    Women are underrepresented in leading positions both in government 
and political parties, although there are no restrictions in law or 
practice on the participation of women or minorities in political life. 
Women hold 8 of 101 parliamentary seats. All female parliamentarians 
formed a club in September 1999 to unite efforts to improve the social 
condition of women and children. The Association of Moldovan Women, a 
sociopolitical organization, competed in the 1998 parliamentary 
elections but was unable to gain parliamentary representation. Russian, 
Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Gagauz minorities are represented in 
Parliament, with deputies elected from nationwide party lists rather 
than local districts. Debate takes place in either the Moldovan/
Romanian or Russian language, with translation provided.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several local human rights groups exist. They operate without 
interference except in the Transnistrian region. The local Helsinki 
Watch Organization maintains contacts with international human rights 
organizations, as does the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. AI established a 
satellite office in Chisinau in 1997 and has become active in the 
country, although the authorities in Tiraspol impede its activities in 
the Transnistrian region. Amnesty, a local human rights nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) unaffiliated with Amnesty International, applied for 
registration in Transnistria, as required by the Transnistrian 
``Constitution.'' Their petition took 8 months to be approved (as 
opposed to the usual 2 months) and their members were called in 
separately by the police for questioning. Two members reported they had 
received veiled death threats.
    Citizens may appeal to the EHCR in Strasbourg if they believe their 
rights have been violated or Moldovan laws are not in accordance with 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In the first half of the year, citizens 
filed 50 cases with the ECHR. The majority of the cases dealt with lack 
of social protection and salary and pension arrears accumulated by the 
Government. At year's end, none of the cases had been resolved. Most 
citizens are unaware of the convention and their rights to legal 
remedies in general.
    Parliament passed the Law on Parliamentary Advocates in October 
1997, which created three positions of parliamentary advocates 
(ombudsmen) and established an independent center for human rights. 
Parliament appointed the three advocates, with equal rights and 
responsibilities, in February 1998 for 5-year terms. A parliamentary 
advocate may only be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of 
Parliament, which gives them substantial independence. Parliamentary 
advocates are empowered to examine claims of human rights violations 
and advise Parliament on human rights issues. Advocates also have the 
right to submit any legislation to the Constitutional Court for a 
review of constitutionality, even if no specific case has been brought 
before them. The advocates oversee the operation of a human rights 
center, which opened in April 1998 with the support of the U.N. 
Development Program. The center provides training for lawyers and 
journalists, visits jails, tries to influence legislation, and conducts 
seminars and training programs. In 1999 with financial aid from the 
Government of the Netherlands, it organized eight seminars and 17 
training sessions on human rights issues. Of the approximately 7,300 
complaints handled by the center this year, the majority involved 
private property violations, labor rights, access to justice, personal 
security, right to life and personal dignity issues. The center also 
held approximately 80 specialized seminars and educational training 
programs for police, penitentiary personnel, judges, prosecutors, 
public administration officials, and law students.
    The Government has supported the work of the OSCE, which has had a 
mission in the country since 1993 to assist in efforts to resolve the 
separatist conflict. The OSCE participates in the Joint Control 
Commission-composed of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Transnistrian 
members-which reviews violations of the cease-fire agreement. The 
mission generally enjoys access to the security zone along the river 
dividing the separatist-controlled territory from the rest of the 
country.
    The Government has cooperated with the ICRC in the past, permitting 
visits to prisoners from the 1992 conflict. In August Transnistrian 
separatist authorities agreed in principle to allow the ICRC access to 
the four members of the original Ilascu Group, who have remained in 
prison since 1993 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.); however, the visit had 
not taken place by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that persons are equal before the law 
regardless of race, sex, disability, religion, or social origin. There 
are remedies for violations, such as orders for redress of grievances, 
but these are not always enforced.
    Women.--Spousal violence is known to occur, although the Government 
does not keep official data on incidences of domestic violence. A 
prominent women's rights advocate asserts that one-half of women are 
victims of domestic violence. The Government supports educational 
efforts, usually undertaken with foreign assistance, to increase public 
awareness of this problem and to train public officials and law 
enforcement officials in how to address domestic violence. The Criminal 
Code does not specifically address crimes of domestic assault, and the 
Government rarely prosecutes domestic assault crimes under its general 
assault laws; however, women abused by their husbands have the right to 
press charges. Husbands convicted of such abuse may receive prison 
sentences (typically up to 6 months). There is no law on spousal rape. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 382 cases of spousal abuse 
cases during the year, including 95 resulting in serious bodily injury, 
10 murder attempts, and 72 murders.
    The First Lady and the mayor of Chisinau initiated a project in 
October 1999 to open a women's shelter in Chisinau. The city donated a 
former kindergarten to a private organization to operate the shelter, 
and a member of Parliament was named as executive director of the 
organization. By year's end, the shelter had not yet opened due to lack 
of funds. A private organization operates a confidential service to 
provide support to abused spouses, including a hot line for battered 
women. According to knowledgeable sources, women generally do not 
appeal to police or the courts for protection against abusive spouses 
because they are embarrassed to do so and are not convinced that the 
authorities would react positively, as the police generally do not 
consider spousal abuse a serious crime. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs recorded 193 cases of rape and 22 cases of attempted rape, an 
11 percent decrease from the same period in 1999. Women's groups 
believe that the numbers of rapes and incidents of spousal abuse are 
underreported.
    Trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.e. 
and 6.f.).
    The law provides that women shall be equal to men; however, 
according to statistics, women have been affected disproportionately by 
growing unemployment. By law women are paid the same as men for the 
same work, although they still are victimized by societal 
discrimination. There are a significant number of female managers in 
the public sector and in banking. The president of the country's 
largest bank is a woman.
    Children.--There is extensive legislation designed to protect 
children, including extended paid maternity leave and government 
supplementary payments for families with many children. Free, basic 
education is compulsory for 9 years, and may be followed by either 
technical school or further study leading to higher education. The 
requirement can change at the discretion of the Minister of Education 
or budgetary constraints. During the year, many inadequately funded 
schools in the countryside started charging parents for their 
children's education. While not technically illegal, it runs counter to 
the educational guarantees of the government. This resulted in many 
children being kept at home by their parents. Children are sent to work 
in the fields or to find other work in violation of the child labor 
laws. Some credible estimates state that as many as 25 percent of the 
students in the countryside are no longer in school. The health system 
devotes extensive resources to childcare.
    There are no statistics on child abuse, but it is believed to be 
widespread. Observers allege that women begging on the streets of 
Chisinau often sedate their babies in order to spend long hours begging 
without having to take time out to attend to their babies' needs. Child 
support programs suffer from inadequate funding.
    The situation of children in the country's orphanages is generally 
very bad. Official estimates put the number of orphans at about 10,000, 
although NGO's estimate up to 30,000 children. Among the major problems 
are insufficient food, warehousing of children, lack of heat in the 
winter, and disease. Most of these problems are caused by lack of 
funding. One orphanage director lost his job for selling the food 
earmarked for the children on the black market. He also was rumored to 
have sterilized forcibly a teenage girl in his care.
    Homeless children live on the streets of Chisinau and other large 
urban areas. Reliable statistical information is not available, 
although estimates were as high as 1,000 in 1998.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced in December 1999 that it 
had uncovered a network trafficking children for purposes of adoption 
between Moldova and Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry, 18 children, 
most of them under one year of age, were sold in Tashkent during 1998 
and 1999 for an average price of between approximately $2,000 and 
$3,000 (approximately 25,000 `` 37,000 Moldovan lei). The Ministry of 
National Security stopped a similar ring that trafficked children 
between Moldova and Israel in 1995.
    Trafficking in girls for forced prostitution between the ages of 15 
to 18 years is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against 
persons with disabilities; however, there are no laws providing for 
access to buildings, and there are few government resources devoted to 
training persons with disabilities. The Government does provide tax 
advantages to charitable groups that assist the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There were no reports during the year of 
incidents such as that in May 1999 when a group of about 500 Orthodox 
Christians led by 4 to 6 priests attacked a small group of Baptists in 
the village of Mingir, injuring 3 persons, and partially destroying a 
Baptist church.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the 1989 census, 
the population is about 4.3 million, of which 65 percent are ethnic 
Moldovans. Ukrainians (14 percent) and Russians (13 percent) are the 
two largest minorities. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, lives 
primarily in the southern regions of the country. The Gagauz are 
largely Russian-speaking and represent about 3.5 percent of the 
population. Official statistics put the Roma population at 11,600, 
although estimates from the OSCE and Roma NGO's range from 50,000 to 
200,000. The Government announced in September that it would allocate 
money from the budget to conduct a national census in 2001; however, no 
action had been taken by year's end.
    The issue of minority rights and the language issue are closely 
related, particularly in the perceptions of the Russian speaking 
minority and the Moldovan/Romanian speaking majority. Moldovan/Romanian 
was declared at independence to be the state language; however, in 1989 
Russian was designated a language for interethnic communication. The 
1990 citizenship law offered an equal opportunity to all persons 
residing in the country at the time of independence to adopt Moldovan 
citizenship. The OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights described the law as very liberal. A new law permitting dual 
citizenship went into effect in August. According to this law, dual 
citizenship can be obtained through birth, marriage, on the basis of a 
bilateral agreement (although no such agreements are in effect), or if 
it is provided by an international accord to which the country is a 
party. Naturalization requirements of the new law include a 
``sufficient knowledge'' of the state language and constitution.
    Parliament has postponed indefinitely the implementation of 
language testing, which was called for in the 1989 language law and was 
to have begun by 1994. According to the law, a citizen should be able 
to choose which language to use in dealing with government officials or 
commercial entities. Officials are required to know Russian and 
Moldovan/Romanian ``to the degree necessary to fulfill their 
professional obligations.'' Since many Russian speakers do not speak 
Moldovan/Romanian (while most educated Moldovans speak both languages), 
they argued for a delay in the implementation of the law in order to 
permit more time to learn the language. The Constitution provides 
parents with the right to choose the language of instruction for their 
children.
    In October 1999, the Parliament approved the Government's decision 
to grant district status to Taraclia, a region in the south with a 64 
percent ethnic Bulgarian majority. The vote reversed the results of the 
territorial-administrative reform begun in January 1999, which had 
eliminated Taraclia's district status and subsumed it under a region 
where Bulgarians would no longer constitute a majority. Voters in the 
Taraclia district approved a referendum in January 1999 specifying they 
not be included in the larger district, with 88 percent of eligible 
voters participating and 92 percent voting in favor of the referendum.
    In the separatist Transnistrian region discrimination against 
Moldovan/Romanian speakers continued. State schools are required to use 
the Cyrillic alphabet when teaching Romanian. Many teachers, parents, 
and students objected to the use of the Cyrillic script to teach 
Romanian. They believe that it disadvantages pupils who wish to pursue 
higher education opportunities in the rest of the country or in 
Romania. (Cyrillic script was used to write the Romanian language in 
Moldova until 1989, since ``Moldovan,'' as it was then called, was 
decreed officially during the Soviet era to be a different language 
from Romanian, which is written in the Latin alphabet. The 1989 
language law reinstituted obligatory use of the Latin script. As a 
result of an agreement between the Government and the separatist 
authorities, eight schools in the separatist region obtained permission 
in 1996 to use the Latin alphabet, with salaries and textbooks to be 
supplied by the Moldovan Ministry of Education. These schools are 
considered private schools by the local authorities. They must pay rent 
for their facilities and meet local curriculum requirements, building 
codes, and safety standards. The Government still has no budgetary 
provisions to pay the high rents of such facilities. As a result, 
classes were held in local homes or run in shifts in the few available 
buildings.
    After delaying its opening and threatening to keep it closed, 
separatist authorities allowed the Romanian Language School (Latin 
alphabet) in Tiraspol to open in September 1999 without restriction 
from the authorities. The Ministry of Education and the Romanian 
government supplied books to the school and the UNHCR provided 
furniture and vehicles. The school is running three to four shifts per 
day to accommodate the number of students.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions 
enacted by Moldova's thenSupreme Soviet remains in effect and provides 
for independent trade unions. Laws passed in 1989 and 1991, which give 
citizens the right to form all kinds of social organizations, also 
provide a legal basis for the formation of independent unions. The 1994 
Constitution states that any employee may found a union or join a union 
that defends workers' interests. However, there have been no known 
successful attempts to establish alternate trade union structures 
independent of the successor to the Soviet trade union system.
    The successor organization is the General Federation of Trade 
Unions (GFTU). The GFTU's continuing role in managing the state 
insurance system and its retention of former official union 
headquarters and vacation facilities provide an inherent advantage over 
other groups who might wish to form a union. The growing 
dissatisfaction with the GFTU's policies resulted in several splits 
within the organization; however, these informal splinter groups have 
been unsuccessful in forming a new independent union. Virtually all 
employed adults are members of a union.
    Government workers do not have the right to strike, nor do those in 
essential services such as health care and energy. Other unions may 
strike if two-thirds of the members vote for a strike in a secret 
ballot. There were several labor actions for payment of wage arrears, 
including a number of strikes by teachers, health care workers, and 
spouses of police officers in various parts of the country.
    Unions may affiliate and maintain contacts with international 
organizations. The GFTU became a member of the International 
Confederation of Trade Unions in 1999.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law, which 
is based on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective 
bargaining rights; however, wages are set through a tripartite 
negotiation process involving government, management, and unions. The 
three parties meet and negotiate national minimum wages for all 
categories of workers. Then each branch union representing a particular 
industry negotiates with management and the government ministries 
responsible for that industry. They may set wages higher than the 
minimum set on the national level and often do, especially if the 
industry in question is more profitable than average. Finally on the 
enterprise level, union and management representatives negotiate 
directly on wages. Again they may set wages higher than negotiators on 
the industry level.
    There were no reports of actions taken against union members for 
union activities. The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions provides that 
union leaders may not be fired from their jobs while in leadership 
positions or for a period after they leave those positions. There were 
no reports of such firings this year.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced and compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to 
occur; however, trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see 
Section 6.f.). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children; however, trafficking in girls for purposes of forced 
prostitution is a very serious problem (see Section 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for unrestricted employment is 18 years. 
Employment of those between the ages of 16 and 18 is permitted under 
special conditions, including shorter workdays, no night shifts, and 
longer vacations. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and the 
Family is primarily responsible for enforcing these restrictions, and 
the Ministry of Health also has a role. Child labor is not used in 
industry, although children living in rural areas often assist in the 
agricultural sector. Education is compulsory for 9 years (see Section 
5). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children; however there were reports of trafficking in girls (see 
Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum monthly 
wage of $9 (100 Moldovan lei), for those employed by the state and 
$12.75 (150 Moldovan lei) for those employed by private firms, but this 
is used primarily as a basis for calculating pensions, scholarships, 
and fines. The average monthly wage of approximately $33 (410 Moldovan 
lei) does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The lowest wages are in the agricultural sector, where the 
monthly average is approximately $17 (216 Moldovan lei). Due to severe 
budgetary constraints, the Government and private sector often do not 
meet payrolls for employees, and workers conducted labor actions to 
protest wage arrears several times during the year (see Section 2.b.). 
The Constitution sets the maximum workweek at 40 hours, and the Labor 
Code provides for at least 1 day off per week.
    The State is required to set and check safety standards in the 
workplace. The unions within the GFTU also have inspection personnel 
who have a right to stop work in the factory or fine the enterprise if 
safety standards are not met; however, this right is rarely exercised. 
Further, workers have the right to refuse to work, but they may 
continue to draw their salaries if working conditions represent a 
serious threat to their health. However, in practice the depressed 
economic situation has led enterprises to economize on safety equipment 
and generally to show little concern for worker safety issues. Workers 
often do not know their rights in this area. The Ministry of Labor 
reported 83 serious industrial injuries, 38 of which resulted in death 
during the year. The Ministry of Labor has announced it will publish a 
new statistical report on labor standards in April 2001.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
and it cannot be prosecuted under other statutes, and trafficking in 
women and girls is a very serious problem (see sections 5 and 6.c.). 
The new criminal code under consideration in Parliament does contain a 
prohibition on trafficking in persons. Although no statistics are 
available, Moldova is a source country for women and girls, who are 
trafficked to various locations, including Turkey, Greece, Italy, 
Kosovo, and Israel for forced prostitution. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that more than 50 percent of 
the women working in forced prostitution in Kosovo are from Moldova. 
Turkey deports approximately 2,500 Moldovan women for prostitution 
yearly. Women and girls reportedly are trafficked to Italy and Greece 
through Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania. There are also reports 
that women are trafficked to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, France, 
Spain, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. A prominent women's 
rights activist and member of Parliament states that more than 10,000 
Moldovan women are working as prostitutes in other countries. The large 
profits of the trafficking industry allow traffickers to exploit 
opportunities for the corruption of officials. There have been 
unsubstantiated reports by local NGO's of involvement by government 
officials; however, no official charges have been made. Women and girls 
accept job offers in other countries, ostensibly as dancers, models, 
nannies, or housekeepers. Then traffickers take their passports, 
require them to ``repay'' a sizeable sum, and force them into sexual 
bondage. It is common for traffickers to recruit women from rural 
villages; the women are brought to larger cities and then trafficked 
abroad.
    Apart from a 1999 documentary shown on state television the 
problem, the Government has taken few steps to prevent the trafficking 
of women or to assist victims; however, it slowly is beginning to 
address the problem. In addition to participating in a Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Human Trafficking Task Force, 
the Government started a working group in May to implement a project of 
the IOM on trafficking in women and girls. The group consists of the 
Vice-Prime Minister, the Ministers of Labor, Justice, and External 
Affairs, and three Parliamentarians involved in women's issues. The 
group created a special law enforcement unit within the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, during the year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
proposed strengthening laws against trafficking in women in the new 
criminal code; however, the amendment had not yet been sent to 
Parliament by year's end. There are no government-operated assistance 
programs for victims.
    Several NGO's made efforts, with foreign assistance, to combat the 
problem through information campaigns and job training for women. Save 
the Children works with victims, especially repatriated girls. There 
are also local NGO's involved in public school programs to educate 
young women about the dangers of prostitution and to establish a hot 
line for those in need of advice. The IOM established an office in 
Chisinau in January.
                               __________

                                 MONACO

    Monaco is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign Prince 
plays a leading role in governing the country. The Prince appoints the 
four-member Government, headed by a Minister of State chosen by the 
Prince from a list of candidates proposed by France. The other three 
members are the Counselor for the Interior (who is usually French), the 
Counselor for Public Works and Social Affairs, and the Counselor for 
Finance and the Economy. Each is responsible to the Prince. Legislative 
power is shared between the Prince and the popularly elected 18-member 
National Council. In addition, there are three consultative bodies 
whose members are appointed by the Prince: The 7-member Crown Council; 
the 12-member Council of State; and the 30-member Economic Council, 
which includes representatives of employers and trade unions.
    In addition to the national police force, the ``Carabiniers du 
Prince'' carry out security functions. Government officials control 
both forces.
    The principal economic activities are services and banking, light 
manufacturing, and tourism.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Constitution distinguishes 
between those rights that are provided for all residents and those that 
apply only to the approximately 5,000 residents who hold Monegasque 
nationality. The latter enjoy free education, financial assistance in 
case of unemployment or illness, and the right to vote and hold 
elective office. Women traditionally have played a less active role 
than men in public life, but this is changing; women currently hold 
both elective and appointive offices.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet or 
exceed minimum international standards, and the Government permits 
visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally 
observes these prohibitions. Arrest warrants are required, except when 
a suspect is arrested while committing an offense. The police must 
bring detainees before a judge within 24 hours to be informed of the 
charges against them and of their rights under the law. Most detainees 
are released without bail, but the investigating magistrate may order 
detention on grounds that the suspect either might flee or interfere 
with the investigation of the case. The magistrate may extend the 
initial 2-month detention for additional 2-month periods indefinitely. 
The magistrate may permit family members to see detainees.
    The Government does not use forced exile on its own nationals . 
However, sometimes it expels non-Monegasque nationals who violate of 
residency laws or who have committed minor offenses, such as disorderly 
conduct.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the 1962 Constitution, the 
Prince delegated his judicial powers to an independent judiciary. The 
law provides for a fair, public trial, and an independent judiciary 
respects these provisions. The defendant has the right to be present 
and the right to counsel, at public expense if necessary. As under 
French law, a three-judge tribunal considers the evidence collected by 
the investigating magistrate and hears the arguments made by the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys. The defendant enjoys a presumption 
of innocence and the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices and 
Government authorities generally respect these rights in practice.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. However, the Monegasque Penal Code prohibits public 
denunciations of the ruling family, a provision that the media respect 
in practice. Several periodicals are published. Foreign newspapers and 
magazines circulate freely, including French journals that specifically 
cover news in the Principality. Foreign radio and television are 
received without restriction. There are no restrictions in the access 
to the Internet. Stations that broadcast from the Principality operate 
in accordance with French and Italian regulations.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the rights of peaceful assembly and association. 
Outdoor meetings require police authorization, which is not withheld 
for political or arbitrary reasons. Formal associations must be 
registered and authorized by the Government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman Catholicism 
is the state religion.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Residents move freely within the country 
and across its open borders with France. Monegasque nationals enjoy the 
rights of emigration and repatriation. They can be deprived of their 
nationality only for specified acts, including naturalization in a 
foreign state. Only the Prince can grant or restore Monegasque 
nationality, but he is obliged by the Constitution to consult the Crown 
Council on each case before deciding.
    In light of its bilateral arrangements with France, the Government 
does not grant political asylum or refugee status unless the request 
also meets French criteria for such cases. The number of cases is very 
small. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Authority to change the government and to initiate laws rests with 
the Prince. The 1962 Constitution cannot be suspended, but it can be 
revised by common agreement between the Prince and the elected National 
Council. The Prince plays an active role in Government. He names the 
Minister of State (in effect, the Prime Minister) from a list of names 
proposed by the French Government. He names as well the three 
Counselors of Government (of whom the one responsible for the interior 
is usually a French national). Together the four constitute the 
Government. Each is responsible to the Prince.
    Only the Prince may initiate legislation, but the 18-member 
National Council may propose legislation to the Government. All 
legislation and the adoption of the budget require the Council's 
assent. Elections for National Council members, which are held every 5 
years, are based on universal adult suffrage and secret balloting. Both 
political parties currently are represented on the Council. There is 
one independent member.
    The Constitution provides for three consultative bodies. The seven-
member Crown Council (composed exclusively of Monegasque nationals) 
must be consulted by the Prince on certain questions of national 
importance. He may choose to consult it on other matters as well. The 
12-member Council of State advises the Prince on proposed legislation 
and regulations. The 30-member Economic Council advises the government 
on social, financial, and economic questions. One-third of its members 
come from the trade union movement, and one-third from the employers' 
federation.
    Women are active in public service. The Mayor of Monaco, one member 
of the Crown Council, four members of the National Council, and four 
members of the Economic Council are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    While the Government imposes no impediments to the establishment or 
operation of local groups devoted to monitoring human rights, no such 
groups have been formed. Outside groups have not sought to investigate 
human rights conditions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all Monegasque nationals are equal 
before the law. It differentiates between rights that are accorded to 
nationals (including preference in employment, free education, and 
assistance to the ill or unemployed) and those accorded all residents 
for example, freedom of religion and inviolability of the home.
    Women.--Reported instances of violence against women are rare. 
Marital violence is prohibited strictly and any wife who is a victim 
may bring criminal charges against her husband. Women are represented 
fairly well in the professions; they are represented less well in 
business. The law governing transmission of citizenship provides for 
equality of treatment between men and women who are Monegasque by 
birth. However, women who acquire Monegasque citizenship by 
naturalization cannot transmit it to their children, whereas 
naturalized male citizens can.
    Children.--The Government is committed fully to the protection of 
children's rights and welfare and has well-funded public education and 
health care programs. The Government provides compulsory free and 
universal education for children. There is no societal pattern of abuse 
of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government mandated that public 
buildings provide access for the disabled, and this objective has been 
largely accomplished.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to form unions, but 
fewer than 10 percent of workers are unionized, and relatively few of 
these reside in the Principality. Unions are independent of both the 
Government and the Monegasque political parties. The Monegasque 
Confederation of Unions is not affiliated with any larger labor 
organization but is free to join international bodies.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike in conformity 
with relevant legislation. However, government workers may not strike. 
Strikes are rare. The last strike occurred in 1996, when the Monegasque 
Confederation of Unions organized a 1-day work stoppage by bank, 
transportation, and factory employees.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the free exercise of union activity. Agreements on working 
conditions are negotiated between organizations representing employers 
in a given sector of the economy and the respective union. Antiunion 
discrimination is prohibited. Union representatives can be fired only 
with the agreement of a commission that includes two members from the 
employers' association and two from the labor movement. Allegations 
that an employee was fired for union activity may be brought before the 
Labor Court, which can order redress, such as the payment of damages 
with interest.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The 
Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and enforces 
this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years; those 
employing children under that age can be punished under criminal law. 
Special restrictions apply to the hiring, work times, and other 
conditions of workers 16 to 18 years old. The Constitution prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor, and the government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for full-
time work is the French minimum wage plus 5 percent, that is 
approximately $6.90 (42.76 French francs) per hour. The 5 percent 
adjustment is intended to compensate for the travel costs of the three-
quarters of the workforce who commute daily from France. The minimum 
wage is adequate to provide a decent living for a worker and family. 
Most workers receive more than the minimum. The legal workweek is 39 
hours. Health and safety standards are fixed by law and government 
decree. These standards are enforced by health and safety committees in 
the workplace and by the government Labor Inspector.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within or through the country.
                               __________

                            THE NETHERLANDS

    The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary 
legislative system. Executive authority is exercised by the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet representing the governing political parties 
(traditionally a coalition of at least two major parties). The 
bicameral Parliament is elected through free and fair elections. The 
judiciary is independent.
    Regional police forces are primarily responsible for maintaining 
internal security. The police, the royal constabulary, and 
investigative organizations concerned with internal and external 
security are under effective civilian authority.
    The market-based economy is export oriented and features a mixture 
of industry, services, and agriculture. Key industries include 
chemicals, oil refining, natural gas, machinery, and electronics. The 
agricultural sector produces fruit, vegetables, flowers, meat, and 
dairy products. Living standards and the level of social benefits are 
high. Unemployment is 2.7 percent; however, long-term unemployment, 
particularly among ethnic minorities, remains a problem.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Problems include violence and 
discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in women and 
children, and discrimination against minorities. The Government is 
taking steps to deal with all of these problems.
    Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are two autonomous 
regions of the kingdom, also feature parliamentary systems and full 
constitutional protection of human rights. In practice respect for 
human rights in these islands generally is little different from that 
in the European Netherlands. The islands' prison conditions remain 
substandard.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    The Government took steps in 1999 to facilitate the filing of 
complaints about police behavior, to create uniform complaint 
procedures, and to ensure that complaints are assessed by an 
independent committee.
    Prison conditions in the Netherlands meet minimum international 
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    The Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has urged the 
Governments of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba to 
improve the ``inhuman'' conditions in Curacao's Koraal Specht prison 
and in cell blocks at the police stations on the islands of St. 
Maarten, Bonaire, and Aruba. The CPT's criticism focused on 
overcrowding, extremely poor sanitary conditions, poor food, and 
insufficient ventilation. The Committee also criticized widespread 
corruption and the mistreatment of prisoners by guards at Koraal 
Specht. In May the CPT specifically criticized the Government for not 
doing enough to prevent outbursts of violence among prisoners--
including sexual assaults--and the use of riot police to guard 
prisoners at the Koraal Specht prison.
    The Dutch Government repeatedly offered financial assistance to the 
Government of the Netherlands Antilles for the construction of a new 
juvenile wing, a maximum security facility, and other improvements at 
Koraal Specht. The Government also sent experts on prison organization 
and the training of guards. Steady progress has been made in improving 
conditions (prisoners now have mattresses, hygiene and food have 
improved, and construction began on a new wing to relieve 
overcrowding). The entire prison complex is being renovated, and a new 
facility is being built. The Antillean Government reached agreement 
with a private company to supply expert personnel who are to reorganize 
prison management and train mid-level staff during a period of 1 year. 
The management team began work on September 1 and is being paid by the 
Dutch Government. New wardens and security guards also were hired.
    The Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba allow access 
by nongovernmental organizations to prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. A pyramidal 
system of cantonal, district, and appellate courts handles both 
criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court acts as the highest 
appellate court and ensures the uniform interpretation of the law. In 
criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of innocence and 
the right to public trial, to counsel (virtually free for low income 
persons), and to appeal. The law provides for the right to a fair 
trial, and the independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. State 
subsidies are provided to religious organizations that maintain 
educational facilities.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports 
of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee 
status. The Government does not provide first asylum as such, but most 
asylum seekers (86 percent in 1999), except those who obviously came 
from a ``safe country of origin'' or stayed for some time in a ``safe 
third country,'' are permitted to apply for resident status. In 1999 
the Government turned down 75 percent of the asylum requests that were 
processed. However, up to 30 percent of those whose applications were 
denied nonetheless were permitted to stay temporarily on humanitarian 
grounds or as long as their country of origin was considered unsafe.
    The Government's asylum policy is designed to protect genuine 
refugees while excluding economic migrants and illegal immigrants. In 
the early 1990's, the Government adopted several measures to curb the 
relatively high influx of asylum seekers. This policy initially 
resulted in the desired decrease, but as other countries adopted even 
stricter laws, the influx rose again to 45,217 in 1998, a 31 percent 
increase over 1997. In 1999 the number of asylum seekers fell to 
41,306. A new series of harsher rules aims to discourage economic 
migrants at all stages of the asylum process, by means of a stricter 
intake, the accelerated processing of asylum requests, limited appeal 
procedures, and a denial of social assistance to asylum seekers who are 
screened out. Several of the measures are scheduled to come into effect 
in 2001.
    The Justice Ministry estimates on the basis of interviews with 
applicants that two-thirds of asylum seekers came to the country via 
alien smuggling organizations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    No restrictions in law or in practice hinder the participation of 
women and minorities in government and politics; women are nevertheless 
underrepresented. A total of 52 of the 150 members of the second 
chamber of Parliament are women, as are 4 of the 15 cabinet ministers. 
However, the two Deputy Prime Ministers are women. The Government 
pursues an active policy to promote the participation of women in 
politics and public administration.
    Although a minority, women also hold positions in the Parliaments 
and Cabinets of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials are very cooperative and responsive to their 
views.
    In view of its longstanding tradition of hosting international 
legal tribunals, the Government facilitated the trial of two Libyans 
accused of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which 
killed 270 persons. By agreement among the parties, the Government 
provided Camp Zeist to the United Kingdom as an extraterritorial venue 
for the trial, which began in 1999 and is being conducted under 
Scottish law. The trial continued at year's end.
    The Government also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the headquarters of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of any of these 
factors or political preference. The Government generally is effective 
in enforcing these provisions. Under the Equal Treatment Act, 
complainants may take offenders to court under civil law.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. A recent report by the 
Utrecht University's human rights department showed that about 1 out of 
25 women, particularly of ethnic minority groups, are victims of 
violence by their former and present partners. Each year 60 to 80 women 
and 40 children die of domestic violence.
    The Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence 
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of 48 
government-subsidized shelters offering the services of social workers 
and psychologists. In addition battered women who leave their domestic 
partners become eligible for social benefits, which include an adequate 
basic subsidy as well as an allowance for dependent children. 
Nongovernmental organizations also advise and assist women who are 
victims of sexual assault. Marital rape is a crime and carries the same 
penalty as nonmarital rape, a maximum of 8 years' imprisonment. Spousal 
abuse carries a one-third higher penalty than ordinary battery.
    In addition to helping victims of sexual abuse, the Government has 
pursued an active prevention campaign through commercials and awareness 
training of educators. A recent evaluation showed that, on average, the 
campaign positively influenced two-thirds of the population.
    Prostitution is legal, and since 1999 the law no longer treats 
``organizing the prostitution of somebody else'' as a crime when done 
with the consent of the prostitute. However, any form of forced 
prostitution remains punishable. All brothels now require licenses 
issued by local governments with strict conditions to be observed by 
brothel owners. The Government's assumption is that by decriminalizing 
prostitution, licensing brothel operators, and improving working 
conditions and health care for prostitutes, while at the same time 
prohibiting the employment of minors and illegal immigrants, 
prostitution would be less susceptible to criminal organizations 
trafficking in women and children. An additional advantage is that the 
licensing system would make prostitution more transparent and easier 
for the police to monitor. Between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals are 
employed in prostitution. It is estimated that half of all prostitutes 
originate in non-European Union countries and are residing illegally in 
the country. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution remains a problem, which the Government is giving priority 
to fighting (see Section 6.f.).
    The law requires employers to take measures to protect workers from 
sexual harassment; research shows that about 245,000 women, or 6.6 
percent of the female working population, are confronted with sexual 
intimidation in the work place each year. The Government funds an 
ongoing publicity campaign to increase awareness of the problem. As the 
largest employer, it has taken measures to counter harassment among 
civil servants, for example, in the police force.
    Women increasingly are entering the job market, but traditional 
cultural factors and an inadequate number of day care facilities tend 
to discourage them--especially women with young children--from working. 
One-third of women stop working after the birth of their first child. 
The participation of women in the labor market increased significantly 
in the last 25 years, from 29 percent of the working-age female 
population in 1975 to 58 percent in 2000. The Government wants to raise 
this figure to at least 65 percent in 2010 through various measures, 
including an expansion of child care facilities and special leave 
programs. About 42 percent of women hold part-time jobs. In 1998 the 
Government established favorable conditions for part-time employment by 
adopting a law that prohibits employers from treating part-time workers 
differently from those in full-time jobs.
    Women often are underemployed and have less chance of promotion 
than their male colleagues. They often hold lower level positions than 
men, mostly because of their part-time status. According to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the difference in earnings 
between men and women is 23 percent. Some women nevertheless are making 
steady progress by moving into professional and high-visibility jobs.
    In 1988 the Government started affirmative action programs for 
women. Collective labor agreements usually include one or more 
provisions to strengthen the position of women. Legislation mandates 
equal pay for equal work, prohibits dismissal because of marriage, 
pregnancy, or motherhood, and provides the basis for equality in other 
employment-related areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment 
Commission actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas 
as well as allegations of pay discrimination.
    The social welfare and national health systems provide considerable 
assistance to working women with families. Women are eligible for 16 
weeks of maternity leave with full pay. The Parental Leave Law allows 
parents to take (unpaid) full-time leave during 3 months and to extend 
the leave over a period longer than 6 months to care for children up to 
8 years old. Persons working fewer than 20 hours per week also are 
entitled to parental leave.
    Children.--The Government works to ensure the well-being of 
children through numerous well-funded health, education, and public 
information programs. The Council for the Protection of Children, 
operated through the Ministry of Justice, enforces child support 
orders, investigates cases of child abuse, and recommends remedies 
ranging from counseling to withdrawal of parental rights. The 
Government also maintains a popular hot line for children and a network 
of pediatricians who track suspected cases of child abuse on a 
confidential basis.
    An estimated 50,000 children are victims of child abuse each year, 
although only approximately 15,000 formal reports of child abuse are 
registered. As a result of abuse, 40 children died in 1998. The U.N. 
Commission on Childrens' Rights in 1999 questioned the Government about 
its performance in this area. In particular the United Nations 
questioned the long waiting list for assistance to abused children. 
Approximately 7,000 abused children are on the waiting list.
    The age of consent is 16. Sexual intercourse with minors under age 
12 always constitutes a criminal offense; in cases involving minors 
between the ages of 12 and 16, an interested party must file a 
complaint. The new prostitution law imposes heavier penalties on 
prostitution activities involving minors. Maximum penalties vary 
between 6 years' imprisonment for sex with minors (in the context of 
prostitution) under age 18, 8 years for sex with minors under 16 years 
of age, and 10 for sex with minors under 12 years. International sex 
tourism involving the abuse of minor children is prosecutable. Since 
1996 several Dutch citizens have been tried and convicted for the abuse 
of minors in other countries.
    Trafficking in female African youths for the purpose of 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The maximum penalty for child pornography is 4 years' imprisonment 
and 6 years in the event of financial gain. The law allows for 
provisional arrest, house searches, and criminal financial 
investigations. The mere possession of child pornography is punishable, 
but exemptions are made for scientific or educational use. However, 
these exemptions caused some problems with two child pornographic 
collections claimed to be of historic value. The age at which minors 
are allowed to act in pornographic movies was expected to be raised 
shortly from 16 to 18 years.
    The Government has begun a national offensive against child 
pornography on the Internet. The police monitored the Internet in a 
year-long pilot project that ended in August. Another police 
investigation showed that child pornography on the Internet has 
increased. The police discovered that a large portion of new 
photographs are processed digitally into pornographic material. The law 
does not yet include a provision to fight this new form of child 
pornography. The current law is aimed at the abuse of children, but the 
children shown on the manipulated pictures in fact have not been 
abused.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. Local governments increasingly mandate access to public 
buildings for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There were a number of complaints about 
anti-Semitism on Internet sites set up by Dutch citizens.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The traditionally homogeneous 
nature of society has changed in recent decades due to the influx of 
immigrants and asylum seekers who make up about 9 percent of the 
population. Despite comprehensive policies to promote the integration 
of racial and ethnic minorities, integration remains a problem. In 
general citizens are averse to discrimination and unequal treatment and 
support integration. Society has become increasingly alert to racial 
discrimination, and various organizations monitor violations.
    The Government pursues an active campaign aimed at increasing 
public awareness of racism and discrimination. According to the latest 
statistics, 112 persons or organizations were tried on discrimination 
charges in 1997 (latest statistics available). The chief public 
prosecutor set up the National Expertise Center on Discrimination in 
2000 to improve the prosecution's handling of discrimination cases.
    A central government organization was set up in 1999 to fight 
racial discrimination and to collect nationwide statistics on incidents 
of discrimination, but it has yet to work out a uniform system. The 29 
local antidiscrimination bureaus together registered about 3,000 
complaints per year in recent years. Many complaints concern 
discrimination in the workplace.
    In 1998 the Equal Opportunities Committee received 104 complaints 
relating to race or nationality and ruled in 53 cases of 
discrimination. Its rulings on such issues as headscarves, dismissal, 
accent, and language requirements are of major importance because they 
are applied widely. Most complaints concerned the labor market, 
including denial of promotion, discrimination in the work place, 
unequal pay, and dismissal.
    At the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the University 
of Leiden each year investigates the extent of rightwing and racist 
violence. It reported an increase from 201 registered incidents in 1996 
to 313 in 1998, but it assumed that the problem is more widespread 
because many cases remain unregistered. The 313 cases in 1998 were 
subdivided as follows: Threats 157; abuse 41; painting slogans 41; 
vandalism 27; bomb threat 23; other 24. Only a limited number of 
incidents can be attributed to rightwing extremism: about 19 percent of 
the 313 cases in 1998. However, that percentage was much higher in the 
past, which may be connected with the steady decline in membership of 
rightwing groups from about 1,400 in 1997 to some 600 in 1999. Most of 
the racist violence is committed at random and arbitrarily by youths 
often under the influence of alcohol. The culprits rarely are tracked 
down. In 1998 the culprits were identified in only 22 of the 313 cases. 
Only half of all discrimination cases are prosecuted.
    Immigrant groups also face some discrimination in housing and 
employment. These groups, concentrated in the larger cities, suffer 
from a high rate of unemployment. The Government has worked for several 
years with employers' groups and unions to reduce minority unemployment 
levels to the national average.
    The 1998 Act on the Stimulation of Labor Participation by Ethnic 
Minorities is intended to increase job opportunities for ethnic 
minorities. It requires employers with a work force of over 35 persons 
to register their non-Dutch employees. Employers are to strive for a 
composition of their work force that reflects the regional working 
population. They must submit their annual social action plans, 
including recruitment targets, to the regional labor bureaus. The Labor 
Inspectorate oversees implementation of the law. Despite these efforts, 
unemployment among ethnic minorities is still about four times higher 
than within the ethnically Dutch workforce. In May the U.N. Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the Government 
for not doing enough to prevent discrimination in hiring. It 
recommended that the Government take steps to reduce segregation in 
schools and create a police force whose composition reflects the entire 
population.
    A campaign beginning in April, in which several ministries, 
government job centers, and the Dutch small business association 
pledged to find jobs for some 20,000 persons from ethnic minorities 
before May 2001, had succeeded in recruiting just 240 persons by the 
end of August.
    With the proliferation of Internet web sites, the dissemination of 
racial and discriminatory material on Internet has also increased. The 
privately run Discrimination on the Internet Registration Center 
received 181 complaints in 1999 about 360 controversial statements, 
subdivided by category as follows: Racism 147, anti-Semitism 91, denial 
of the Holocaust 21, sexual preference 46, religion 15, discrimination 
against asylum seekers 12, incitement to violence 6, and ``other'' 19. 
It also investigates web sites and home pages on its own. Over 70 
percent of the statements are removed voluntarily at the Center's 
request. In 2 cases in 1999, the Center requested that criminal 
proceedings be initiated; such a request was still under review in 18 
other cases; and another 25 cases were being prepared. Four cases were 
passed on to the Government's antidiscrimination office for action.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Membership in labor unions is open to 
all workers including armed forces personnel, the police, and civil 
service employees. Workers are entitled to form or join unions of their 
own choosing without prior government authorization, and unions are 
free to affiliate with national trade union federations. This right is 
exercised freely.
    Unions are free of control by the Government and political parties. 
Union members may and do participate in political activities.
    All workers have the right to strike, except for most civil 
servants who have other institutionalized means of protection and 
redress. Industrial relations are very harmonious, and strikes are 
infrequent. In 1999 some 75 labor days per 1,000 workers were lost, 
mostly over union demands for higher pay and a 36-hour workweek. By law 
retribution against striking workers is prohibited.
    About 28 percent of the work force is unionized, but union-
negotiated collective bargaining agreements usually are extended to 
cover about three-quarters of the work force. The white-collar unions' 
membership is the fastest growing.
    The three union federations are active internationally, without 
restriction.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established. 
Discrimination against workers because of union membership is illegal 
and does not occur.
    Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in the framework of 
the ``Social Partnership'' developed between trade unions and private 
employers. Representatives of the main union federations, employers' 
organizations, and the Government meet each autumn to discuss labor 
issues, including wage levels and their relation to the state of the 
economy and to international competition. The discussions lead to a 
central accord with social as well as economic goals for the coming 
year. Under this umbrella agreement, unions and employers in various 
sectors negotiate sectoral agreements, which the Government usually 
extends to all companies in the sector.
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Union federations and 
employers' organizations are represented, along with independent 
experts, on the Social and Economic Council. The Council is the major 
advisory board for the Government on policies and legislation regarding 
national and international social and economic matters.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by the 
Constitution and generally does not occur; however, trafficking in 
women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem 
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Mandatory 
attendance at school ends at age 16, or after at least 12 years of 
education. Those still in school at the age of 16 may not work more 
than 8 hours per week. The law prohibits persons under the age of 18 
from working at night, overtime, or in areas dangerous to their 
physical or mental well-being. Anyone working more than 4.5 hours per 
day is entitled to a 30-minute break. The laws are enforced effectively 
by the tripartite Labor Commission, which monitors hiring practices and 
conducts inspections.
    Holiday work and after school jobs are subject to very strict 
rules, which are set in the Work Time Act, the Child Labor Regulation 
(for children under age 16), and the Working Conditions Decree. 
Observance of the rules is overseen by the Social Ministry's Labor 
Inspection Office. Although child labor is banned, an increasing number 
of children work for pay during holidays. The parents of such children 
are to be reported officially by labor inspectors, and the Public 
Prosecutor may decide to prosecute the parents for violating the ban on 
child labor. In 1999 the labor inspections showed that one out of four 
companies violated the regulations applying to holiday work, including 
by employing children under age 13.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and this 
prohibition is enforced effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for adults is 
established by law and can be adjusted every 6 months to changes in the 
cost-of-living index. Over the last few years, the statutory minimum 
wage has been pegged to the average wage in collective labor contracts. 
The gross minimum wage is about $1,000 (2,448 guilders) per month. For 
workers earning the minimum wage, employers currently pay $3,750 a year 
(6,000 guilders) in premiums for social security benefits, which 
includes medical insurance. Only 3 percent of workers earn the minimum 
wage because collective bargaining agreements, which normally are 
extended across a sector, usually set a minimum wage well above the 
legislated minimum. The Government, unions, and employers have taken 
measures to increase the number of minimum wage jobs and to decrease 
employers' social payments in order to lower the cost of hiring new 
workers and to create more jobs, especially for the long-term 
unemployed.
    A reduced minimum wage applies to young persons under the age of 
23--one of the groups with the highest rate of unemployment--and is 
intended to provide incentives for their employment. This wage ranges 
from 34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers 16 years of age 
to 85 percent for those 22 years of age. The legislated minimum wage 
and social benefits available to all minimum wage earners provide an 
adequate standard of living for workers and their families.
    Although the law sets a 40-hour workweek, the average workweek for 
those with full-time jobs is 37+ hours. This workweek is the result of 
agreements reached in collective bargaining on shorter workweeks, often 
in conjunction with more flexible working hours. This combination makes 
it possible to adapt shorter working hours to the specific situation in 
a particular business or branch of industry.
    Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety and 
health standards set by law and regulations, are monitored actively by 
the tripartite Labor Commission. Enforcement is effective. Workers may 
refuse to continue working at a hazardous work site. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs also monitors standards through its Labor 
Inspectorate.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically criminalizes alien 
smuggling and trafficking in persons, both of which are problems. The 
maximum sentence for trafficking in persons is 6 years. In cases 
involving minors, severe physical violence, or organized trafficking, 
the maximum sentence is 10 years. The maximum sentence for alien 
smuggling is 8 years.
    The Government has an active policy to combat trafficking in 
persons, including a more aggressive prosecution policy as well as 
closer international cooperation. A number of police forces have 
established special units to deal with the problem. The Justice 
Minister appointed a national rapporteur on trafficking in persons in 
April. The rapporteur is to study the extent of the problem and report 
annually to the Government.
    The country is a major destination for trafficked women. According 
to the Justice Ministry, 20,000 to 30,000 persons work in prostitution, 
about half of them illegal residents from non-EU countries. Many come 
from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Eastern Europe, and Nigeria. The 
Foundation Against Trafficking in Women estimates that each year some 
3,000 women and girls are brought into the country for the purpose of 
prostitution. With the introduction of the new prostitution law, which 
prohibits the employment of prostitutes in the country illegally, the 
Government seeks to intensify the fight against criminal organizations 
trafficking in women and children (see Section 5).
    In 1998 a ruling was obtained under the Aliens Law to prevent 
illegal residents, who may have become victims of trafficking, from 
being expelled before investigations are completed. Victims are allowed 
3 months to consider pressing charges. Victims who do so are allowed to 
stay in the country until the judicial process is completed. During 
this period, victims receive legal, financial, and psychological 
assistance. In special circumstances, residence permits are granted on 
humanitarian grounds. After completion of the judicial process, illegal 
prostitutes returning to their native countries are eligible for 
temporary financial assistance.
    African women, in particular those from Nigeria, make up a sizeable 
portion of foreign women illegally working as prostitutes. According to 
the authorities, the most widely used ploy for trafficking African 
women is the fraudulent use of special asylum procedures for minors, 
who are virtually ensured entry. Although most such women are not 
actually under age 18, all claim to be. Once at the open-door asylum 
center, they remain for a few days and then disappear, only to turn up 
later as prostitutes in the country or elsewhere in Europe. Most such 
young African women are under extreme pressure to work as prostitutes. 
According to the Terre des Hommes organization, their families have 
signed contracts with trafficking organizations, often sanctioned by 
``voodoo'' priests. The girls strongly believe in the magical power of 
voodoo.
    A Dutch study of prostitutes from Central and Eastern Europe shows 
that five out of six, ``liberated'' from trafficking organizations in 
the Netherlands, knew exactly that they were to be employed in the sex 
industry when they accepted the offer of their recruiters. Some 40 
percent already had worked as prostitutes in their native country. The 
study concluded that most such women came to the Netherlands 
voluntarily, and only after their arrival, did they become victims of 
their traffickers. They are often treated as slaves: intimidated, 
threatened, and locked up.
                               __________

                                 NORWAY

    Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy 
with King Harald V as the Head of State. It is governed by a prime 
minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (Parliament) that is elected 
every 4 years and cannot be dissolved. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police have primary responsibility for internal 
security, but in times of crisis, such as internal disorder or natural 
catastrophe, the police may call on the armed forces for assistance. In 
such circumstances, the armed forces are always under police authority. 
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security 
forces.
    Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy 
combining private and public ownership that provides a high standard of 
living for residents. The key industries are oil and gas, metals, 
engineering, shipbuilding, fishing, and manufacturing (including fish 
processing equipment). The leading exports are oil and gas, 
manufactured goods, fish, and metals. During the year, 80.6 percent of 
workers were in the service sector (including public service), and 13.3 
percent were in the manufacturing sector.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens, and 
the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. Violence against women and abuse of 
children are problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    The Government in the past has been criticized for its practice of 
indefinite detention, often in solitary confinement with restricted 
communications, for suspects during the investigation of criminal cases 
(most recently in September 1999 by the Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture). Restrictions were used sometimes to 
pressure prisoners to be more cooperative during investigations. In 
response to international criticism, the Government was reevaluating 
its practices and by year's end had made some changes. In September the 
Government tightened the requirements for restricting prisoners' 
communications and visitation rights. In June two working groups 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice presented their recommendations 
for a more comprehensive reform of the practice. The reports will form 
the basis for a white paper, which is expected to be presented to the 
Parliament in 2001. Prison conditions meet minimum international 
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court 
Appellate Court (committee), superior courts, county courts for 
criminal cases, magistrate courts for civil cases, and claims courts. 
Special courts include the Impeachment Court (composed of 
parliamentarians), the labor court, trusteeship courts, fishery courts, 
and land ownership severance courts.
    All courts, some of which date to laws passed in the 11th century, 
meet internationally accepted standards for fair trials, including 
providing counsel to the indigent. The law provides for the right to a 
fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this 
right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Both the Constitution and the law prohibit such 
practices, government authorities generally respect these prohibitions, 
and violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government generally respects them in 
practice.
    In August a small, previously unknown neo-Nazi group was denied 
permission to stage a Rudolf Hess commemorative march in downtown Oslo; 
the group then staged an illegal march in the nearby town of Askim; a 
counter demonstration by 15,000 persons took place in Oslo on August 
19.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway, 
which is supported financially by the State, and to which 93 percent of 
the population nominally belong. The Constitution requires that the 
King and one-half of the Cabinet belong to this church. The 
relationship between church and State is increasingly debated by the 
public. The Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act permits 
prospective employers to ask applicants for employment in private or 
religious schools, or in day care centers, whether they respect 
Christian beliefs and principles.
    In July 1998, the Government suspended two priests in the Church of 
Norway and asked the courts for approval legally to terminate their 
priesthood due to insubordination and disloyalty. The priests openly 
refused to accept religious and spiritual guidance from their bishop, 
with whom they were in disagreement on a number of social issues (such 
as gay rights). In January 2000, the Alta district court ruled that the 
priests' employment could not be terminated legally. Upon taking office 
in March, the new Labor Party Government appealed the ruling to a 
higher regional court, which had not ruled by year's end.
    Other denominations operate freely. A religious community is 
required to register with the Government only if it desires state 
support, which is provided to all registered denominations on a 
proportional basis in accordance with membership. In 1995 the 
Parliament introduced the subject ``religious knowledge and education 
in ethics'' into the national school system. The class teaches the 
ethical values of Christianity, as well as Christian beliefs and the 
main features of Christianity. All children must attend this mandatory 
class; there are no exceptions for children of other faiths. 
Organizations for atheists as well as Muslim communities have contested 
the legality of forced religious teaching, but the Oslo city court 
twice has ruled against their arguments. The case was being tried in a 
regional appellate court. Because of its potential for setting a 
precedent, the case is expected to go ultimately to the Supreme Court. 
Workers belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for their 
religious holidays.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government grants refugee or asylee status in 
accordance with the the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    During the year, the Government granted protective residency to 
8,231 persons. The total included: Political asylum for 97 persons; 
temporary collective residency permits for 2,019 Iraqi Kurds; 
individual residency permits for 2,856 persons; and asylum as U.N. 
quota refugees for 1,485 persons. Immigration authorities rejected 
4,899 applications for protective residency. In addition 1,778 persons 
received residency status through a family reunification program.
    The collective 1-year residency permits that were granted to 
Kosovar Albanians in 1999 expired in August 2000, and all members of 
this group were encouraged to return to Kosovo voluntarily. The 
Government gives financial aid for repatriation to all Kosovar 
Albanians who do so. Of almost 8,000 Kosovar Albanians who sought 
refuge in Norway during and after NATO's campaign in Kosovo, 1,500 
returned voluntarily in 2000 (3,600 returned voluntarily in 1999). Of 
those who had previously gone back to Kosovo, 1,063 came back to Norway 
once again in 2000. When the collective residency permits expired, the 
Kosovar Albanians could apply for individual permits--and most did. By 
year's end, most had been rejected. However, in October all Kosovar 
Albanian families with small children were granted so-called postponed 
implementation of deportation until after March 1, 2001. The decision 
was based on complaints made by the UNHCR and other onsite U.N. 
agencies in October 2000 that Kosovo could not handle a major influx of 
returning refugees before the winter. However, as the March 1 extension 
deadline passes, a mass repatriation of Kosovar Albanians is expected 
in the spring and summer of 2001.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a 
valid claim to refugee status or of persons being forcibly returned to 
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their Government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage.
    Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of 
government. However, no restrictions in law or practice hinder their 
participation. Women lead 8 of the 18 government ministries. They hold 
60 of the 165 seats in Parliament (36.4 percent), chair 5 of 12 
standing committees in Parliament, and lead 2 of the 6 main political 
parties. A woman heads the Parliament.
    In addition to participating freely in the national political 
process, in 1997 Norwegian Sami (formerly known as Lapps) elected their 
own constituent assembly, the Sameting, for the third time. Under the 
law establishing the 39-seat body, the Sameting is a consultative group 
which meets regularly to deal with ``all matters which in [its] opinion 
are of special importance to the Sami people.'' In practice the 
Sameting has been most interested in protecting the group's language 
and cultural rights and in influencing decisions on resources and lands 
where Sami are a majority.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    When the new Labor Government took office in March, the Prime 
Minister transferred the human rights portfolio from the Ministry of 
Development, Cooperation, and Human Rights to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The new Government reversed the previous government's decision 
to appoint a minister for human rights issues. In 1999 the previous 
government presented a white paper to the Parliament on human rights, 
which addresses how the country can improve the state of human rights 
both domestically and internationally. On November 2, 2000, the 
Parliament's committee on foreign affairs supported the previous 
government's proposal and stressed the importance of incorporating 
human rights into law and society in general. The white paper was 
debated and passed in Parliament on November 14. It then was sent back 
to the respective ministries for implementation.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition in practice.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Public and private 
organizations run several shelters that give battered women an 
alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation. In 1999 the 
country's 14 shelters registered 9,183 overnight stays. In addition 967 
other women contacted the shelters for advice or counseling. During the 
year, 555 rapes were reported, along with 126 attempted rapes. The 
police believe that increases in reported rapes and domestic abuse in 
recent years have been largely due to greater willingness among women 
to report these crimes. The police vigorously investigate and prosecute 
such crimes. They also instituted special programs to prevent rape and 
domestic violence and to counsel victims.
    The rights of women are protected under the 1978 Equal Rights Law 
and other regulations. According to that law, ``women and men engaged 
in the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value.'' 
However, the equal rights ombudsman's office, which monitors 
enforcement of the law, confirms that women generally receive 10 to 15 
percent less pay and benefits than men for work of ``equal value.''
    The equal rights ombudsman processes complaints of sexual 
discrimination. In 1999 there were 254 written complaints and 393 
telephone inquiries to the ombudsman. Women filed 40 percent of the 
complaints, men 28 percent, organizations 23 percent, and the remainder 
were filed by the ombudsman's office. The increase in men filing 
complaints is related to an increase in postdivorce child custody 
cases.
    In 1995 the Parliament adopted a harassment amendment to the 
Working Environment Act, which states that ``employees shall not be 
subjected to harassment or other unseemly behavior.'' Employers who 
violate these provisions, including the harassment clause, are subject 
to fines or prison sentences of up to 2 years, depending on the 
seriousness of the offense.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of 
education and medical care. The Government provides education for 
children through the postsecondary level. There is no difference in the 
treatment of girls and boys in education or health care services. An 
independent Children's Ombudsman Office, within the Ministry of 
Children and Families, assures the protection of children in law and in 
practice.
    Abuse of children is a problem. A total of 191 sexual assaults on 
children by nonfamily members were reported, along with 96 such 
assaults by family members. The latter is a substantial decrease from 
the 153 cases reported in 1999. Children's rights advocates have 
expressed concern that authorities may have found investigation of 
these crimes so difficult that they have not pursued investigations in 
some legitimate cases. The Government is examining this problem. In 
1999 welfare services assisted 23,800 abused or neglected children (2.1 
percent of children under 18). Of these, 4,950 received assistance in 
the home (such as financial assistance, guidance and support for 
parents, or temporary stays at respite homes).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for people 
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in 
practice.
    Indigenous People.--Apart from a tiny Finnish population in the 
northeast, the indigenous Sami constituted the only significant 
minority group until the influx of immigrants during the 1970's. In 
recent years, the Government has taken steps to protect Sami cultural 
rights by providing Sami language instruction at schools in their 
areas, radio and television programs broadcast or subtitled in Sami, 
and subsidies for newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami. In a 
rare political statement in October 1999 at the opening of the third 
Sami Parliament, King Harald V publicly apologized to the Sami people 
for repression under Norwegian rule. In 1997 the Government created the 
position of Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Affairs to deal specifically with Sami issues. When the Labor 
Party Government took office in March, new State Secretary Steinar 
Pedersen--of Sami origin like his predecessor--took over responsibility 
for coordinating government policies for the Sami minority.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to associate freely and to strike. The Government changed the 
wage negotiating process in 1996, shifting negotiations from the 
national to the local and company level. During the year, almost 
100,000 workers in the private and public sectors went on strike, an 
80-year high. The strikes were settled mainly through negotiations, 
although compulsory arbitration was used to settle a 2-week oil 
workers' strike. The strikers achieved the largest wage settlement in 
many years and also obtained a fifth week of annual leave.
    The Government has the right, with the approval of the Parliament, 
to invoke compulsory arbitration under certain circumstances. The 
Government came under increasing criticism in 1995 for resorting to 
compulsory arbitration too quickly during strikes. In addition this 
procedure, which was also invoked several times in the 1980's, 
particularly in the oil industry, was criticized repeatedly by the 
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization, which 
argued that the situations were not a sufficient threat to public 
health and safety to justify invoking compulsory arbitration. The 
Supreme Court is reviewing a case that will allow it to rule on whether 
the national process in this regard violates the country's 
international commitments.
    After the 1998 wage negotiations, the Government appointed a 
committee with representatives from all employer organizations and 
employee unions to look at the present practice of using compulsory 
arbitration in especially difficult labor conflicts. Its mandate is to 
provide a new system for handling labor conflicts and wage 
negotiations, and avoid situations in future labor conflicts that could 
lead to the use of compulsory arbitration. The committee is expected to 
present its proposal by April 1, 2001. The Ministry of Regional Affairs 
takes the position that it is not the legislation itself that needs to 
be amended, but the way in which this legislation is interpreted by the 
parties in labor conflicts and implemented by the Government.
    With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force, unions 
play an important role in political and economic life, and the 
Government consults them on important economic and social problems. 
Although the largest trade union federation is associated with the 
Labor Party, all unions and labor federations are free of party and 
government control.
    Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate 
internationally. They maintain strong ties with such international 
bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers, 
including government employees and military personnel, exercise the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is 
widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated settlements, 
either directly or through understandings that extend the contract 
terms to workers outside the main labor federation and the employers' 
bargaining group. Any complaint of antiunion discrimination would be 
dealt with by the Labor Court, but there have been no complaints in 
recent years.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is 
prohibited by law and does not exist. The Government prohibits forced 
and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it 
occurred. The Directorate of Labor Inspections (DLI) ensures compliance 
and is effective. Domestics, children, or foreign workers are not 
required to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children 13 to 18 years of age may be employed part time 
in light work that will not affect adversely their health, development, 
or schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and enforced 
by the DLI. Education is compulsory for 9 years. School is mandatory 
through the ninth grade; most children stay in school at least until 
the age of 18. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section 
6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor in December.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Normal working hours are 
mandated by law and limited to 37.5 hours per week. The law also 
provides for 25 working days of paid leave per year (31 days for those 
over age 60). A 28-hour rest period is mandated legally on weekends and 
holidays. There is no specified minimum wage, but wages normally fall 
within a national scale negotiated by labor, employers, and the 
Government. Average income, not including extensive social benefits, is 
adequate to provide a worker and family with a decent living.
    The 1977 Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act provides 
for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed 
persons. Specific standards are set by the DLI in consultation with 
nongovernmental experts. According to the act, environment committees 
composed of management, workers, and health personnel must be 
established in all enterprises with 50 or more workers, and safety 
delegates must be elected in all organizations. Workers have the right 
to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health. The 
DLI ensures effective compliance with labor legislation and standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically criminalizes 
trafficking in persons, but existing labor and immigration statutes may 
be used in such cases.
    Norway is becoming a destination country for trafficked women, 
according to an OSCE report.
                               __________

                                 POLAND

    Poland is a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty political 
system. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October, 
resulting in the re-election of President Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
Executive power is shared by the Prime Minister, the Council of 
Ministers, and to a lesser extent, the President. The Parliament is 
bicameral (Senate and Sejm). The Government formed after free and fair 
elections in 1997 was a two-party coalition composed of the center-
right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) party anchored by the 
Solidarity Labor Union and the Centrist Freedom Union (UW), also with 
origins in Solidarity. The majority government dissolved in June when 
UW withdrew and five of its ministers resigned; AWS is now a minority 
government. Parliamentary elections are next scheduled for fall 2001. 
The judiciary is independent but inefficient.
    Internal security forces and the armed forces are subject to 
effective civilian control by the Government. Since 1996 the civilian 
Minister of Defense has had clear command and control authority over 
the military chief of the general staff as well as oversight of 
military intelligence. Civilian control was reinforced further by a 
restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and general staff undertaken 
as part of the country's entry into NATO in April.
    After several years of strong growth in the mid-1990's, the economy 
slowed starting in 1998 as a result of the Russian financial crisis and 
economic slowdown in the country's largest export markets in Europe. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth dropped to 4.1 percent in 1999 and 
stayed at this level in 2000. After dropping steadily through the last 
decade, inflation began increasing again in 1999, climbing as high as 
11.7 percent in the summer but dropping to 8.5 percent in December 
2000. The ongoing process of restructuring, and increasing numbers of 
youths entering the labor force, have increased unemployment in recent 
years. The official unemployment rate was 15 percent at year's end. 
Since 1989 most small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises have 
been privatized, and the Government has launched privatizations of 
major state-owned enterprises such as insurance, telephone, airline, 
power generation, petroleum refining, steel, coal, and banks. 
Significant reforms are underway in other areas as well, including 
pensions, health, decentralization of government, and education. Still 
to be addressed are the agriculture sector, a major part of the economy 
(employing more than 25 percent of the labor force), and lagging 
development in rural areas.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in some areas. Prison conditions are generally 
poor. A cumbersome legal process, poor administration, and an 
inadequate budget hamper the court system. Lengthy pretrial detention 
occurs occasionally. Court decisions frequently are not implemented, 
particularly those of the administrative courts, and simple civil cases 
can take as long as 2 or 3 years. As a result, public confidence in the 
judicial system is low. Many poorly paid prosecutors and judges have 
left public service for more lucrative employment. The threat of 
organized crime has provoked legislative responses that raise questions 
regarding the right to privacy. The Government maintains a large number 
of wiretaps without judicial review.
    There are some marginal restrictions in law and in practice on 
freedom of speech and of the press. With few exceptions, the Criminal 
Code provides protection for journalists' sources. Spousal abuse 
continues to affect many women. Women continue to experience serious 
discrimination in the labor market and are subject to various legal 
inequities as a consequence of paternalistic laws. Child prostitution 
is a problem. There were incidents of desecration of graves in both 
Jewish and Catholic cemeteries and anti-Semitic graffiti on Jewish 
buildings. The Government has worked constructively toward resolving 
issues of concern to the Jewish community. There is some societal 
discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities. Although the 
right to organize unions and bargain collectively largely was observed, 
some employers violated worker rights provided for by law, particularly 
in the growing private sector. Trafficking in women and children in, 
to, and from the country is a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In January 1998, a police officer was charged with the beating 
death of 13-year-old Przemek Czaja following a basketball game in the 
Baltic coast city of Slupsk. The officer was sentenced in May 1999 to 6 
years in prison. In December 1999, the appeals court increased the 
sentence to 8 years. The defendant has lodged an appeal to the Supreme 
Court. At year's end, the defendant was still free on appeal. On March 
7, the District Court in Koszalin decided that the defendant should be 
examined by psychiatrists from the Szczecin Medical Academy.
    A police officer indicted in connection with the shooting deaths of 
two unarmed civilians and the wounding of another in Brodno, a suburb 
of Warsaw, was sentenced in December 1999 to 7 years in prison. His 
appeal was pending at year's end.
    On October 30, the Lublin Appeals Court sentenced the former Lomaz 
police chief to 4.5 years in prison (originally he was sentenced to 15 
years in 1998, but he appealed the decision). The October verdict is 
final.
    Trials related to extrajudicial killings during the Communist 
period continued in 1999. A new trial began in a Katowice appeals court 
in October 1999 in the case of 22 riot policemen accused of killing 
miners during the Communist martial law era after a 1998 appeals court 
decision annulled their acquittals. In September 1999, the decision of 
a district court was upheld in the case of the appeal of two officers 
convicted in 1997 of the 1983 Communist era beating death of Grzegorz 
Przemyk.
    One officer was sentenced to 2 years in prison for participating in 
the beating, and the other officer was found not guilty of attempting 
to destroy the file in the case. In November 1999, the Supreme Court 
ordered a new trial for former Communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski and 
nine other officials who allegedly ordered police to shoot workers 
during the 1970 riots in Gdansk. The Court ruled that the trial that 
began in the Gdansk provincial court should be started over in the 
Warsaw district court. No new trial date was set. In December 1999, 
lawyers representing miners submitted a motion requesting the retrial 
of former Communist Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in 
the pacification of the Wujek mine, but a Katowice district court did 
not rule on the motion by year's end. In December 1999, the Warsaw 
regional court ruled that Kiszczak's health made it possible for him 
(although to a limited degree) to face the court and thus rejected a 
defense motion to suspend his trial because of poor health. Kiszczak 
appealed; the trial was still pending at year's end.
    On October 30, the retrial began in Warsaw of General Wladyslaw 
Ciaston, one of the two former Communist Security Services (SB) 
generals accused (and acquitted in 1994) of having directed the 1984 
murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko. Popieluszko upset the Communist 
regime during martial law for openly supporting the cause of the then-
outlawed Solidarity trade unions in his sermons. He was tortured to 
death in October 1984 by the secret police at the time and became a 
martyr and the ``patron saint'' of Solidarity. In March 1996, the 
appeal court ordered a retrial. The other accused general was excused 
from the trial in January of this year for health reasons.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Criminal Code prohibits torture, and there were no 
reported incidents of it. Unlike in the previous year, there were no 
reports of police using force to disperse violent protestors or to 
break up illegal roadblocks.
    In June 1998, a Gdansk court indicted 11 riot policemen for their 
participation in the October 1997 beating of soccer fans attending a 
match in the town of Gdynia. The officers' activities, which took place 
before, during, and after the match, both at the stadium and at a 
nearby bar, were captured on videotape. A civil case against the 
officers, launched by the father of one of the teenage victims, also 
was pending. Both civil and criminal cases stemming from the incident 
were pending at year's end. The civil case against the officers ended 
during the year; it was suspended pending resolution of the criminal 
case. Public television was fined $2,400 (10,000 PLN) and the private 
television station TVN $1,200 (5,000 PLN) for airing tapes of the 
incident. Both stations also must apologize to the victim on their main 
news programs. Initially the court acquitted the police officers but 
the prosecutor appealed; the criminal case was still pending at year's 
end.
    Prison conditions are still generally poor, according to reports by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); overcrowding, damp cells, and a 
lack of medical treatment are the chief problems. According to a July 
1998 report by the National Penitentiary Authority, the prison system 
is in urgent need of additional funding. Of 156 detention facilities, 
100 require considerable renovation. At the same time, the National 
Penitentiary Authority's annual budget continued to fall; it has 
declined by approximately 34 percent since 1991. The Ombudsman for 
Human Rights complained about the safety of prisoners, noting that 
inmates are often the victims of violent attacks by other prisoners. 
Civil litigation against the prison administration in the 1996 case of 
an 18-year-old mentally retarded boy who was beaten and sodomized by 
fellow inmates was considered by the Bydgoszcz district court in 
February; the case was still pending at year's end. The Ombudsman also 
suggested in 1999 that the prison population be reduced, including by 
decriminalizing certain offenses, pointing out that the ratio of 
prisoners to rehabilitation officers is very poor.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
this prohibition. Courts rather than prosecutors issue arrest warrants. 
The law allows a 48-hour detention period before authorities are 
required to bring a defendant before a court and an additional 24 hours 
for the court to decide whether to issue a pretrial detention order. 
During this period, access to a lawyer normally is limited. Once a 
prosecutor presents the legal basis for a formal investigation, the law 
provides for access to counsel. Detainees may be held in pretrial 
detention for up to 3 months and may challenge the legality of an 
arrest through appeal to the district court. A court may extend this 
pretrial confinement period every 3 months for up to 18 months until 
the trial date. Total time of temporary arrest until the first sentence 
rendered by the court of lower instance cannot be more than 2 years. 
However, under certain circumstances, the 2-year period may be extended 
further by the Supreme Court. Bail is available, and most detainees are 
released on bail pending trial.
    The Government does not employ forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. However, the judiciary remains inefficient and lacks 
resources and public confidence.
    The Government continues to restructure the court system in order 
to streamline and accelerate the legal process. At present there is a 
four-tiered court and prosecutorial structure. The courts consist of 
regional, provincial, and appellate divisions, as well as a Supreme 
Court. These tiers are subdivided further into five parts: Military, 
civil, criminal, labor, and family. Regional courts are courts of first 
instance, while appellate courts are charged solely with appeals. 
Provincial courts have a dual responsibility, handling appeals from 
regional courts while enjoying original jurisdiction for the most 
serious types of offenses. Appellate courts handle appeals tried at the 
provincial level, and the Supreme Court only handles appeals about 
questions of law. The prosecutorial system mirrors the court structure 
with national, provincial, appellate, and regional offices.
    Judges are nominated by the national judicial council and appointed 
by the President. They are appointed for life and can be reassigned but 
not dismissed, except by a court decision. The Constitutional Tribunal 
rules on the constitutionality of legislation. In October 1999, 
Constitutional Tribunal decisions became final and binding, after a 2-
year interim period following the entry into force of the new 
Constitution during which a two-thirds majority in the Sejm could 
overrule its decisions.
    The court system is cumbersome, poorly administered, overstaffed, 
and underfunded. There are numerous inefficiencies, most notably the 
fact that many districts have more criminal judges than prosecutors. 
These factors contribute to a lack of public confidence. Many effective 
judges and prosecutors have left public service for the more lucrative 
private sector. Court decisions frequently are not implemented. 
Bailiffs normally ensure the execution of civil verdicts such as damage 
payments and evictions. However, according to some observers, they are 
underpaid, subject to intimidation and bribery, and have a mixed record 
of implementing court decisions. Civil and administrative rulings 
against public institutions such as hospitals often cannot be enforced 
due to a lack of funds. Simple civil cases can take as long as 2 to 3 
years before resolution, and the pretrial waiting time in criminal 
cases can be several months. The backlog and the costs of legal action 
appear to deter many citizens from using the justice system at all, 
particularly in civil matters such as divorce. The long wait for 
routine court decisions in commercial matters is an incentive for 
bribery and corruption.
    All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At the 
end of a trial, the court renders its decision orally and then has 7 
days to prepare a written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal 
within 14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made on the 
basis of new evidence or procedural irregularities.
    Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a 
panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors. The 
seriousness of the offense determines which is the court of first 
instance. Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to 
study the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at 
public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial 
date is set. Defendants are required to be present during trial and may 
present evidence and confront witnesses in their own defense. Since 
1995 prosecutors have had the authority to grant witnesses anonymity at 
trial if they express fear of retribution from the defendant. This law, 
designed to help combat organized crime, impairs defendants' right to 
confront their accusers. In 1996 reforms were made that provide for a 
two-level appeal process in most civil and criminal matters; 
previously, citizens enjoyed access only to a one-step appeal process.
    Trials are normally public. However, the courts reserve the right 
to close a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as divorce 
cases, trials in which state secrets may be disclosed, or cases whose 
content might offend ``public morality.'' (See Section 1.f.) The courts 
rarely invoke this prerogative.
    The current Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure went into 
effect in September 1998. However, in March 1998 the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) unanimously ruled that a provincial appellate 
court's examination of the verdict in the presence of the prosecutor, 
but not the defendant or his representative, infringed on the European 
Convention on Human Rights provisions concerning fair trial. Article 
451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to take account of 
all implications of the March 1998 ruling of the ECHR. This amendment 
came into force on September 1.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of 
correspondence; however, the Government maintains, without judicial 
review or oversight, a large number of wiretaps. There is no 
legislation that provides for the general right to privacy. However, a 
1998 law prohibits the collection of information about a person's 
ethnic origin, religious convictions, health condition, political 
views, or membership in religious, political, or trade union 
organizations. The law allows for certain exceptions, specifically, the 
gathering of information without a person's permission by courts, 
hospitals, or organizations if the information pertains to their 
members. All exceptions are subject to some restrictions. A few 
continuing practices (such as a requirement to fill out ``creed'' or 
``nationality'' items in some questionnaires) became illegal, effective 
April 1999. Violators of these provisions are subject to imprisonment 
for up to 3 years. The Ministry of Justice reports that from March 1998 
to September of this year, the office of the prosecutor received 324 
notifications of crimes pursuant to Articles 49 to 54 of the 1998 Law 
on Personal Data Protection. Of those, 304 have been closed; the office 
declined to prosecute 90 cases; 39 cases were referred to the court; 
and 170 cases were discontinued by the court. In nine cases, the 
prosecutor recommended conditional discontinuance. There is no record 
of a conviction obtained in any case.
    In response to the growing threat of organized crime and money 
laundering, Parliament permitted the police and intelligence services 
to monitor private correspondence and to use wiretaps and electronic 
monitoring devices in cases involving serious crimes, narcotics, money 
laundering, or illegal firearms sales. Under the Criminal Code, the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior, both political 
appointees, must authorize these investigative methods. In emergency 
cases, the police may initiate an investigation that utilizes wiretaps 
or the opening of private correspondence at the same time that they 
seek permission from the ministers. Estimates on the number of 
wiretapping devices installed annually at the request of the police 
vary widely; however, a high-ranking public prosecutor in 1998 put the 
number at 4,000. After interventions by the Human Rights Ombudsman, the 
Prosecutor General curtailed the number of warrants for wiretapping. 
Levels are reportedly back at pre-1998 levels, over 4,000.
    Parliamentarians and human rights groups expressed concern about 
the lack of control over this type of surveillance. There is no 
independent judicial review of surveillance activities, nor is there 
any control over how the information derived from investigations is 
used. A growing number of agencies have access to wiretap information, 
and the Police Code allows electronic surveillance to be used for the 
prevention of crime as well as for investigative purposes. As is the 
case under the Criminal Code, police must obtain permission from the 
Ministers of Justice and Interior before initiating wiretap procedures.
    The law forbids arbitrary forced entry into homes. Search warrants 
issued by a prosecutor are required in order to enter private 
residences. In emergency cases, when a prosecutor is not immediately 
available, police may enter a residence with the approval of the local 
police commander. In the most urgent cases, in which there is no time 
to consult with the police commander, police may enter a private 
residence after showing their official identification. There were no 
reports that police abused search warrant procedures.
    A law on ``lustration'' or vetting went into effect in November 
1998. The law, designed to expose government officials who collaborated 
with the Communist-era secret police, bans from office for 10 years 
those caught lying about their past. The law requires officials to 
provide sworn affidavits concerning their possible cooperation with the 
secret police; the public interest spokesman (lustration prosecutor) 
then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of 
misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge 
panel whose decisions may be appealed. Several high-profile cases came 
before the court during the year, including that of a Deputy Defense 
Minister who was judged to have lied in his affidavit; the case is 
currently on appeal. Many of these cases are closed to the public 
because they involve classified documents. In accordance with the 
presidential election law, all candidates for the October presidential 
elections were vetted in August; after some controversy surrounding the 
lustration of President Kwasniewski and former president Walesa, all 
passed muster. Critics continue to voice concern that the procedures 
may be unfair, in view of the likelihood that secret police records 
were subject to loss or tampering. In June Parliament agreed on a 
chairman for the Institute of National Remembrance, creation of which 
the lustration law mandated in order to organize all communist-era 
secret police files and eventually give citizens access to information 
in files compiled on them.
    In June 1998, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled unconstitutional a 
1997 draft law envisioning the possible removal from service of judges 
proven to have violated judicial independence by issuing unjust 
verdicts between 1944 and 1989 at the request of the Communist 
authorities. Disciplinary proceedings against the judges in question 
were to be initiated by the Minister of Justice, the presidents of the 
appellate or regional courts, the National Judiciary Council, or 
individuals who felt wronged by court verdicts. In December 1998, the 
Sejm addressed the issue and adopted amendments to the law requiring 
that procedures against accused judges be initiated before December 31, 
2002. The law went into effect in January 1999. According to the 
National Judiciary Council, at the end of the year, 10 cases had been 
filed against 13 judges.
    Men are not permitted to marry without parental permission until 
the age of 21, whereas women may marry at the age of 18 (see Section 
5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects these 
rights; however, there are some marginal restrictions in law and 
practice. Nonetheless, the press is vigorous and independent.
    The Criminal Code states that an individual who ``publicly insults 
or humiliates a constitutional institution of the Republic of Poland'' 
is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years, while an 
individual who insults a public functionary is subject to a fine or 
imprisonment of up to 1 year. In December 1999, the trial began in 
Elblag in the case of Andrzej Lepper, who was accused of insulting 
Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek and state officials in January 1999; the 
case was still pending at year's end. Prosecutors charge that during a 
road blockade in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Lepper called Buzek's cabinet a 
``government of national betrayal, a government of dilettantes, 
traitors to Poland.'' He is said to have called the Prime Minister and 
another political leader ``bandits and criminals.'' In May the Warsaw 
district court ruled that the daily newspaper ``Zycie'' must apologize 
to President Aleksander Kwasniewski for publishing untrue information 
suggesting that the President had contacts with Russian spies. However, 
the court rejected the President's demand that Zycie pay $0.6 million 
(2.5 million PLN) in damages in favor of flood victims. The President 
said he would not appeal the verdict, while Zycie said that it would. 
This provision of the Criminal Code also can be used by individual 
citizens and businesses ``to protect their good name.'' In March 1998, 
Network Twenty One, which sells Amway products, and seven of its 
employees used the provision to prevent the broadcast, showing, or 
copying of a 1-hour documentary critical of the company and its 
practices. The documentary had not been shown by year's end.
    The case against talk show host Wojciech Cejrowski, charged with 
publicly insulting President Kwasniewski, was decided against the 
defendant in April 1998; it since has been appealed and still was 
pending decision at year's end. Also pending was a 1995 case against 
presidential candidate Leszek Bubel for violating a section of the 
Penal Code that prohibits acts that ``publicly insult, ridicule, and 
deride the Polish nation, the Polish Republic, its political system, or 
its principal organs.'' Bubel had claimed publicly that a former head 
of the Presidential Chancellery protected a group of criminals.
    There was no progress during the year in the ongoing investigation 
into the case of Mikolaj Siwicki for publishing an allegedly hate-
mongering book that could damage the nation's interests.
    The Criminal Code also stipulates that offending religious 
sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or a 3-year 
prison term. In 1995 a provincial court charged presidential candidate 
Leszek Bubel with violating this article by publishing a pamphlet 
containing anti-Semitic ``humor.'' A verdict on the case was still 
pending at year's end.
    In July 1999, the Warsaw district court revoked the 1998 decision 
of prosecutors not to start proceedings against the leftist newspaper 
Trybuna for insulting Pope John Paul II in one of its articles. In 1997 
Tadeusz Rydzyk and AllPolish Youth director Roman Giertych, both acting 
on behalf of the Council for the Coordination of the Defense of the 
Dignity of Poland and Poles, originally filed charges against Trybuna 
for its alleged insults of the Pope. In April 1998, the Warsaw 
prosecutor's office decided to drop the case; subsequently, some 1,500 
persons appealed to the Warsaw district court to reopened. In the wake 
of the lost lawsuit, Trybuna had to apologize twice for publishing the 
article. A separate suit against the author was ended when he died, but 
it appears that the Prosecutor's Office may charge the then editor-in-
chief of the paper for having allowed the article to go to press. At 
least one civil suit related to the Trybuna case was still pending at 
year's end.
    The State Secrets Act allows for the prosecution of citizens who 
publish or otherwise betray state secrets. Human rights groups 
criticize this law, since it restricts the right of free speech of 
private citizens.
    The Criminal Code regulates the protection of journalistic sources. 
The code grants news sources absolute protection, except in cases 
involving national security, murder, and terrorist acts. Pursuant to 
the law, statutory provisions are applied retroactively if their terms 
are beneficial to the accused. Journalists who refused to divulge 
sources prior to the new code's enactment also can avoid sanctions by 
invoking ``journalistic privilege.''
    There is no restriction on the establishment of private newspapers 
or distribution of journals; private newspapers and magazines flourish. 
There was no progress in the ongoing privatization of RUCH, a national 
network of newspaper kiosks.
    The national radio and television broadcasting council (KRRiTV) has 
broad powers in monitoring and regulating programming on radio and 
television, allocating broadcasting frequencies and licenses, and 
apportioning subscription revenues to public media.
    In order to encourage the KRRiTV's apolitical character, the nine 
KRRiTV members are obliged legally to suspend any membership in 
political parties or public associations. However, they are chosen for 
their political allegiances and nominated by the Sejm, the Senate, and 
the President following political bargaining, thus raising potentially 
serious questions about the independence of broadcasting oversight from 
political influence.
    The broadcasting law stipulates that programs should not promote 
activities that are illegal or against state policy, morality, or the 
common good. The law, whose constitutionality has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Tribunal, requires that all broadcasts ``respect the 
religious feelings of the audiences and in particular respect the 
Christian system of values.'' This provision has never been used as a 
means of censorship, although the restrictions theoretically could be 
used as such.
    Private television broadcasters operate on frequencies selected by 
the Ministry of Communications and auctioned by the KRRiTV. Private 
radio flourishes on the local, regional, and national levels alongside 
public radio.
    The Government owns 2 of the 3 most widely-viewed television 
channels and 17 regional stations, as well as 5 national radio 
networks. PAP, the national wire service, was privatized partially in 
1997, and a five-member supervisory board is preparing the service for 
full privatization. However, there was no progress at year's end. 
Although public television remains a major source of news and 
information, private broadcast television, satellite, and private cable 
services (domestic and foreign) are available across most of the 
country. Cable services, available in all major cities, carry the main 
public channels, two nationwide private networks (Polsat and TVN), as 
well as local and regional stations and a variety of foreign offerings.
    The law on radio and television requires public television to 
provide direct media access to the main state institutions, including 
the presidency, ``to make presentations or explanations of public 
policy.'' The President and the Prime Minister have complained 
occasionally of the other's abuse of the access privilege. Both public 
and private radio and television provide coverage of all ranges of 
political opinion.
    Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints 
are widely available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications 
from abroad.
    The Internet is widely available and is not regulated.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Permits are not necessary for public meetings but are 
required for public demonstrations; demonstration organizers must 
obtain these permits from local authorities if the demonstration might 
block a public road. For large demonstrations, organizers also are 
required to inform the local police of the time and place of their 
activities and their planned route. Every gathering must have a 
chairperson who is required to open the demonstration, preside over it, 
and close it.
    Unlike in 1999, there were no violent clashes between police and 
demonstrators during the year.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice. Private associations need 
government approval to organize and must register with their district 
court. The procedure essentially requires the organization to sign a 
declaration that commits it to abide by the law. However, in practice 
the procedure is complicated and may be subject to the discretion of 
the judge in charge.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Citizens 
enjoy the freedom to practice any faith they choose. Religious groups 
may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive 
contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without government 
interference. There are 15 religious groups in the country whose 
relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation and 140 
other religious communities. The legislation outlines the internal 
structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for 
property restitution. There are no government restrictions on 
establishing and maintaining places of worship. More than 95 percent of 
Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and 
much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely. 
Although the Constitution provides for the separation of church and 
state, a crucifix hangs in both the upper and lower houses of 
Parliament. State-run radio broadcasts Catholic mass on Sundays, and 
the Catholic Church is authorized to relicense radio and television 
stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church, the only 
body outside the KRRiTV allowed to do so.
    Religious communities may register with the Government, but they 
are not required to do so and may function freely without registration. 
Registration requires that the group have submitted the names of 100 
members as well as information regarding the group itself. This 
information on membership must be confirmed by a notary public, 
although the registration itself often appears to be a formality. Four 
new religious communities were registered during the year. All churches 
and recognized religious groups share the same privileges, such as 
duty-free importation of office equipment and reduced taxes.
    Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their 
children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical 
beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the 
public schools at public expense. While children are supposed to have 
the choice between religious instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's 
office states that in most schools, ethics courses are not offered due 
to financial constraints. Catholic Church representatives are employed 
to teach religious classes in the schools. Such classes constitute the 
vast majority of all religious education classes offered, since the 
population of the country is approximately 95 percent Catholic. 
However, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions 
legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish. Such 
non-Catholic religious instruction exists in practice, although it is 
not common; the Ministry of Education pays the instructors. Priests 
receive salaries from the state budget for teaching religion in public 
schools.
    In mid-year the Government announced plans to establish by 
September, a department within the Ministry of Interior to monitor the 
activities of ``new religious groups'' and cults; by year's end, the 
new department had not yet been formed.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the Constitution does not 
address freedom of movement, the Government does not restrict internal 
or foreign travel. Citizens who leave the country have no trouble 
returning. There are no restrictions on emigration.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons 
with a valid claim to refugee status. Foreigners recognized as refugees 
under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol are granted full refugee status and permission to 
remain permanently. The Government received 4,519 petitions for refugee 
status during the year, compared with 2,864 for all of 1999. Including 
petitions carried over from 1999, 76 have been approved, 2,626 were 
denied, and 1,206 discontinued or abandoned. The increase from 1999 can 
be attributed to the marked increase in Chechen refugees. The 
Government approved 22 Chechens for refugee status prior to August, 
when they ceased granting approvals for political reasons.
    The 1997 Aliens Act addresses immigration issues. Human rights 
organizations generally view the Aliens Act as positive. The law gives 
all prospective refugees access to a procedure for adjudicating refugee 
status and established an independent board to which prospective 
refugees can appeal negative status decisions by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Refugee advocates note that the board serves as an 
impartial and independent adjudicator of appeals. The law does not 
recognize the concept of first asylum or any other form of temporary 
protection.
    The new Aliens Act would, for the first time, include the category 
of humanitarian assistance as a reason for re-settling aliens. The 
Government currently only has categories for asylum seekers and for 
refugees (for example, those who qualify under the Geneva Convention 
standards). A new category would be created for those who do not 
qualify as refugees but who cannot be returned to their countries of 
origin. Previously the Government had to find creative means of 
allowing refugees to stay in the country, as the Government did during 
the Kosovo conflict when they issued 1-year residency permits.
    The new Aliens Act would create the Office of Repatriation and 
Aliens. This office would control the various refugee boards and 
agencies as well as have some political control over the border guards. 
The law would also create an expedited system of refugee processing. 
Aliens would receive an answer to their petition within 2 days. If they 
were denied, they would be able to appeal to the refugee board, from 
whom they would receive an answer within 5 days. If their claims were 
found to be ``manifestly unfounded,'' they would be denied and no 
further appeal would be available to them. This would represent a 
significant change from the current system, in which refugees could 
wait up to 3 months for the first answer and could then appeal all the 
way to the Supreme Court.
    During the year, the Government cooperated with the UNHCR and the 
Polish NGO Caritas in a program monitoring portions of the country's 
eastern and western borders from offices in Bialystok and Zgorzelec. 
The UNHCR reports that the Government has been cooperative as the 
offices monitor relevant issues such as tracking asylum cases.
    The UNHCR reports isolated incidents of the border guards turning 
away potential refugees, in particular Chechen refugees. In addition 
UNHCR expressed concern during the year over the fate of unaccompanied 
children seeking asylum in the country. It urged that procedures and 
practices concerning the appointment and maintenance of supervisors and 
guardians for minors be improved.
    Many of the problems that the Government faces in dealing with 
aliens present in the country center around funding. The Government 
receives significant EU funds for upgrading its refugee processing 
system, which includes money for such things as fingerprinting 
equipment and running the refugee centers. However, the Government has 
very little money available to send aliens who have been denied 
petitions back to their country of origin (only 20 were returned by air 
in 1999). Most denied applicants simply receive a letter informing them 
that their petition has been denied and that they should leave the 
country. The Government does not have funding to help assimilate those 
persons who receive permission to permanently reside in the country. 
The approved petitioners receive funds from various NGO's, but this 
money covers only basic living needs, and not services such as language 
training, medical care, or other social benefits.
    The country is becoming a destination point for refugees, rather 
than simply a transit point. The UNHCR reports that significantly fewer 
persons are abandoning their refugee applications and that fewer 
persons are leaving the country after receiving status. The National 
Labor Office also estimates that as many as 200,000 foreigners are 
working illegally in the country, while the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) estimates that some 300,000 irregular migrants are 
present at any given moment in the country. The IOM also reports that 
in recent years, 10,000 to 15,000 foreigners annually have been 
apprehended crossing the border into the country. Most of the illegal 
residents come from the countries of the former Soviet Union, although 
an increasingly larger number are coming from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and 
Sri Lanka. Poland's relatively strong economic growth and its status as 
an EU candidate country are mainly responsible for this phenomenon, and 
illegal and legal immigrants alike can find employment in the country.
    The UNHCR has been working with government officials, police, and 
hospital personnel to sensitize them to the plight of refugees and 
train them in better ways of handling refugees. As part of this 
campaign, in September the UNHCR, in conjunction with the domestic NGO 
Polska Akcja Humanitarska and the entertainment agency 'Alter Art,' 
hosted a ``Refugee Day'' in Warsaw that featured bands, food, and 
entertainment appealing to younger persons.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully. This 
right is provided for in the Constitution and exists in practice. All 
citizens 18 years of age and older have the right to vote and to cast 
secret ballots, and voting is voluntary. The country is a multiparty 
democracy. A permanent, democratic Constitution entered into force in 
1997. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October. 
Multiple candidates ran and had access to the media. President 
Kwasniewski was re-elected to a second (and final) 5-year term in the 
first round with 53 percent of the vote.
    Executive power is divided between the President and a government 
chosen by the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament. There is also an 
upper house (the Senate). The Constitution provides for parliamentary 
elections at least once every 4 years. The President, elected for 5 
years, has the right, in certain very limited cases and after seeking 
the opinion of the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, to shorten the 
Sejm's term of office. Whenever the Sejm's term of office is shortened, 
the Senate's term automatically is shortened as well. Parliament may 
impeach the President.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 13.7 
percent of parliamentarians (63 of 460) are women, and presently none 
of the 19 cabinet ministers is a woman. The Speaker of the Senate is 
the only female parliamentary leader, and none of the leaders of the 
nation's largest political parties are women.
    Two members of the German minority party are Members of Parliament 
(M.P.s) (see Section 5). The electoral law exempts ethnic minority 
parties from the requirement to win 5 percent of the vote nationwide in 
order to qualify for seats in individual districts.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
    The Helsinki Foundation, a major NGO, conducts human rights 
investigations without government interference. Members of the 
foundation report that the Government displays a generally positive and 
helpful attitude towards human rights investigations. However, some 
domestic NGO's believe that a hostile regulatory climate is developing 
in parts of the government bureaucracy.
    The Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the 
Ombudsman), established in 1987, is the Government's watchdog for human 
rights. The Ombudsman's office is an effective, independent body with 
broad authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights and 
liberties. The Ombudsman registers each reported case and files 
grievances, where appropriate, with the relevant government office. He 
has no legislative authority and is sworn to act apolitically. The 
Government cooperates with his office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``no one shall be discriminated 
against in political, social, or economic life for any reason 
whatsoever.'' The Government attempts to ensure that these provisions 
are observed; however, violence and societal discrimination against 
women and ethnic minorities persist.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Women's 
rights advocates report that unofficial statistics are similar to those 
of previous years, although there are no recent comprehensive surveys. 
Physical abuse is illegal and spousal rape is treated the same as other 
types of rape. In 1996 some 9 percent of women polled by the Public 
Opinion Research Center admitted to being beaten repeatedly by their 
husbands. Women's organizations assert that the number of women 
suffering from domestic abuse is probably much higher. They explain 
that battered women usually refuse to admit abuse even to themselves. 
Violence against women remains hidden, particularly in small towns and 
villages. Government and police statistics do not differentiate between 
male and female victims of violence. Police intervene in cases of 
domestic violence, and husbands can be convicted for beating their 
wives. In 1998 the police, in cooperation with the State Agency for 
Solving Alcoholic Problems, introduced the so-called ``blue card,'' a 
record-keeping system designed to better document incidents of spousal 
abuse. Sentences for abuse of family members range from 3 months to 5 
years, or from 2 to 10 years if the victim attempts suicide as a result 
of the abuse. However, statistics suggest that a large majority of 
convictions result in suspended sentences. According to a spokesman for 
the police, there were 23,147 cases of family abuse reported during the 
year, with 161 of those being of particularly severe abuse. According 
to NGO's, the courts often treat domestic violence as a minor crime, 
pronounce lenient verdicts, or dismiss cases.
    According to the Women's Rights Center Report published during the 
year, there has been significant progress in raising public awareness 
of the problem of violence against women. The topic received increasing 
coverage in the media during the year, most notably through a highly 
visible media campaign. In addition an increasing number of NGO's are 
addressing the problem. Fifteen centers have been established to assist 
victims, to provide preventive treatment as well as resocialization 
counseling to perpetrators, and to train personnel working with victims 
of domestic violence. As of July 6, an Office of Victims' Rights 
Spokesman at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has 
been established. The main task of the office is to ensure that victims 
of violence are treated with respect by law enforcement and the 
judicial system. The office provides legal and psychological assistance 
for victims and their families.
    The law has no provision for restraining orders to protect battered 
women against further abuse. For example, in divorce cases, courts 
frequently grant a divorce but do not issue a property settlement, 
sending the woman back to live with the abusive husband. This problem 
is exacerbated by a lack of alternative housing in the country. Women's 
advocacy groups also have complained about the small number of state-
supported shelters for battered women.
    According to police statistics, the frequency of rape is 
increasing. During the year, there were 2,399 cases reported, compared 
with 2,029 in 1999. NGO's report that women often are unwilling to 
report the crime and estimate that the actual number of rapes is 10 
times higher than reported statistics suggest.
    Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    While laws specifically addressing sexual harassment do not exist, 
social awareness is increasing, as are mechanisms with the potential to 
deal with the problem. For example, the Criminal Code states that 
whoever takes advantage of a position of power in a relationship to 
gain sexual gratification may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison. 
According to a Supreme Court advisory opinion, such a relationship can 
occur between employers and employees, between supervisors and 
subordinates, or between teachers and students. However, this provision 
can be invoked only when alleged sexual harassment occurs between a 
supervisor and an individual in a subordinate position. Abuse of power 
cannot be claimed when harassment occurs between persons of equal rank. 
In August a prosecutor charged a former director of a hospital 
emergency ward of sexually harassing six nurses; the case was still 
pending at year's end. Public discussion of the problem of sexual 
harassment is relatively new, but women increasingly are talking about 
the problem and speaking out against it.
    The Constitution provides for equal rights regardless of gender and 
grants women equal rights with men in all areas of family, political, 
social, and economic life, including equal compensation for work of 
similar value. However, in practice women frequently are paid less for 
equivalent work, mainly hold lower level positions, are discharged more 
quickly, and are less likely to be promoted than men. According to the 
1999 government statistical bulletin, men have a higher employment rate 
(54 percent) than women (45.9 percent), and women have a higher 
unemployment rate (13.5 percent) than men (11.7 percent). Despite a 
generally higher level of education, women earn on average 30 percent 
less than men. In August 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
expressed its concern about the situation and agreed that women are 
discriminated against in the labor market.
    Women are employed in a wide variety of professions and 
occupations, and a number of women occupy high positions in government 
and in the private sector. Although clauses in social insurance law 
limit child sick care benefits to women, since June 1999, both men and 
women have the right to claim child sick care. The pension law passed 
in late 1998 did not change the mandatory earlier retirement for women 
at age 60 (65 for men). As a result women get about 60 percent of the 
average pension that men receive. In December the Constitutional 
Tribunal ruled that the law setting retirement age at 60 for women and 
65 for men is discriminatory, as it reduces women's chances of 
promotion and better pensions. Based on this verdict women can appeal 
to the labor court if employers insist that they retire at 60. The law 
does not address equality in hiring practices (there are no legal 
penalties for discriminatory behavior in this area), and advertisements 
for jobs frequently indicate a gender preference. Although women have 
access to a number of previously forbidden careers since the Labor Code 
was modified in 1996, they still are prevented from working underground 
or in jobs that require heavy lifting. In March 1999, the Parliament 
failed to approve the proposed law on equal status that would have 
remedied some of these inequalities. Apart from the Constitution, there 
is no other legal provision for equal rights for women.
    The Ombudsman for Human Rights monitors the rights of women within 
the broader context of human rights. Observers note that the broad 
scope of the office's mandate dilutes its ability to function as an 
effective advocate of women's issues. In 1997 the government 
Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs within the Cabinet replaced the 
government Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, a change that many 
women's rights groups perceived as an example of discrimination. There 
are several women's rights NGO's. Among the most notable are the Polish 
Foundation for Women and Family Planning and the Women's Rights Center. 
These groups are active advocates of gender equality and advance their 
goals through research, monitoring, and publishing. There are several 
church-sponsored women's advocacy organizations, but their cooperation 
with other women's NGO's is limited.
    Women have the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their 
foreign-born spouses.
    Children.--The Constitution extends some state protection to the 
family and children and the Sejm appointed an ombudsman for children's 
rights in June, although he resigned in August. A replacement was being 
sought at year's end. The Government sponsors some health programs 
targeted specifically at children, including a vaccination program and 
periodic checkups conducted in the schools. In reality, budget 
shortfalls prevent complete implementation of these programs. There are 
no procedures in schools to protect children from abuse by teachers; in 
fact, the teachers' work code provides legal immunity from prosecution 
for the use of corporal punishment in classrooms.
    Violence against children is illegal. A provision of the Criminal 
Code threatens those who physically or psychologically abuse a juvenile 
with a prison sentence of 3 months to 5 years. If the victim attempts 
suicide the sentence is increased, as it is if the perpetrator is found 
to have acted with extreme cruelty. Abuse rarely is reported, and 
convictions for child abuse are even more rare. There is no societal 
pattern of abuse of children; however, trafficking in children is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Young men and women are treated unequally in terms of the age of 
majority. Men and women reach majority at the age of 18 under the Civil 
Code. However, a young woman can reach majority at the age of 16 if she 
has entered into marriage with the consent of her parents and the 
guardianship court. In addition men are not permitted to marry without 
parental consent until the age of 21, whereas women may do so at the 
age of 18 (see Section 1.f.). Lawmakers' rationale for this difference 
in treatment is the assumption that it is better that men entering 
compulsory military service not be encumbered with families.
    People with Disabilities.--There were approximately 5.5 million 
disabled persons in the country by year's end, and the number is 
expected to reach 6 million by the year 2010. During the year, the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (GUS) reported that 17 percent of disabled 
persons able to work are unemployed. Advocacy groups claim that the 
percentage is much higher. GUS data from 1999 indicate that 48.7 
percent of the disabled have no more than an elementary school 
education, compared with 33.7 percent of those without disabilities, 
and that only 4.2 percent have a university education, compared with 
8.2 percent of the nondisabled.
    The Constitution provides for aid to disabled persons ``to ensure 
their subsistence, professional training, and social communication,'' 
and a number of laws protect the rights of the disabled. However, 
implementation falls short of rights set forth in the legislation. 
Public buildings and transportation generally are not accessible to the 
disabled. Current law provides only that buildings ``should be 
accessible.''
    The law creates a state fund for the rehabilitation of the disabled 
that derives its assets from a tax on employers of over 50 persons, 
unless 6 percent of the employer's work force are disabled persons. 
While the fund has adequate resources, its management has encountered 
difficulties, including frequent changes in leadership. According to 
press reports, the fund has 4,000 grant applications pending. During 
the year, the fund had $0.4 billion (1.8 billion PLN) at its disposal. 
Thirty percent of this sum was spent for social rehabilitation and the 
rest for professional rehabilitation. The fund has branches in all 16 
provinces. According to the August 1997 revision of the law on 
professional and social rehabilitation, 5 to 10 percent of the fund can 
be used to assist disabled children.
    A 1996 law allows individuals from certain disability groups to 
take up gainful employment without the risk of losing their disability 
benefits. Previously, disabled individuals from those groups lost their 
benefits once they began to work.
    Religious Minorities.--Current law places Protestant, Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Jewish communities on the same legal footing, and the 
Government attempts to address problems that minority religious groups 
face. Among the most important of these problems is that of property 
restitution. The laws governing restitution of communal property allow 
for the return of churches and synagogues, cemeteries, and community 
headquarters, as well as buildings that were used for other religious, 
educational, or charitable activities. The laws included time limits 
for filing claims; in several cases the deadlines have expired, and no 
additional claims may be filed. Restitution commissions (composed of 
representatives of the Government and of the affected religious 
community) are continuing to adjudicate previously filed claims. The 
Government established four separate commissions to process the claims 
of the Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox Churches, and the Jewish 
community. A fifth commission to handle the claims of other religious 
groups became active on September 1.
    The Concordat, a treaty regulating relations between the Government 
and the Vatican, took effect in April 1998.
    The time limit for applications by the Catholic Church expired in 
December 1991. At the end of December, 2,512 of 3,045 claims filed by 
the Catholic church had been concluded, with 1,184 claims settled by 
agreement between the church and the party in possession of the 
property (usually the national or a local government); 859 properties 
were returned through decisions of the commission on property 
restitution, which rules on disputed claims; 456 claims were rejected; 
and 13 cases were expected to go to court. The local Jewish community's 
deadline for filing claims under the 1997 law expires in 2002. By 
year's end, 532 had been filed. Of those 532 claims, by year's end the 
commission on property restitution considered and closed 145 cases; 78 
of the 145 cases were closed by an agreement between the parties. As of 
early in the year, Lutheran claims for 1,200 properties had resulted in 
392 cases being closed with the return of the properties in question 
(the deadline for filing such claims was August 1993). Seventy-four 
claims were filed by the Orthodox Church, one property has been 
transferred, and the commission is considering another 20 claims.
    Laws on religious communal property do not address the private 
property of any group, and laws on communal property restitution do not 
address the issue of communal properties to which third parties now 
have title, leaving several controversial and complicated cases 
unresolved. In a number of cases over the years, buildings and 
residences were built on land that included Jewish cemeteries that were 
destroyed during or after World War II. For example, a school for 
disabled children now stands on the site of a completely destroyed 
Jewish cemetery in Kalisz. The existence of the school complicated the 
issue of returning the cemetery to the Jewish community. Efforts 
continued during the year to reach a resolution acceptable to all 
concerned.
    Units set up to monitor new religious movements that are being 
trained to deal with criminal activities by sects have been criticized 
by Adventist church leaders, who allege that the ``anti-sect'' training 
material gives a distorted picture of minority religions that could 
lead to discrimination against them.
    Relations between the various religious communities are generally 
amicable, although anti-Semitic feelings persist among certain sectors 
of the population, occasionally manifesting themselves in acts of 
vandalism and physical or verbal abuse. It is not always clear that 
vandalism of graves is anti-Semitic in nature. Surveys in recent years 
show a continuing decline in anti-Semitic sentiment and avowedly anti-
Semitic candidates fare very poorly in elections.
    Sporadic and isolated incidents of harassment and violence against 
Jews continue to occur in the country, often generated by skinheads and 
other marginal societal groups. Occasional cases of cemetery 
desecration, including both Jewish and Catholic shrines, also occurred 
during the year. Government authorities consistently criticized such 
actions and made efforts to prevent similar acts from occurring in the 
future, for example, by increasing police patrols around Jewish sites. 
No arrests or prosecutions took place after any of these events.
    In February near Katowice, some 60 graves were desecrated in what 
apparently was an attempt to steal and sell the stones from the local 
Catholic cemetery; no one was charged in the case. Later in the month, 
two other Catholic cemeteries were desecrated with Satanist graffiti, 
one near Zamosc and one near Wroclaw. Perpetrators in the case were not 
found and the investigation was discontinued.
    In March hooligans vandalized a monument to martyred priest Jerzy 
Popielusko; no one was arrested in the case. Also in March, the 
citizens of Lodz took action of their own accord to clean up anti-
Semitic (and other) graffiti in the town. The same evening as the 
clean-up, vandals spray-painted anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti on 
the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943 
Warsaw ghetto uprising. The attack was criticized strongly by both the 
President and the Prime Minister. The case was investigated, but no 
perpetrators were identified and the investigation was discontinued.
    In April anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti were painted on the 
Wall of the Jewish cemetery at Oswiecim (Auschwitz). The perpetrators 
were not caught. The town paid to have the graffiti removed. Also in 
April, on 2 successive nights, vandals in Krakow painted swastikas and 
anti-Semitic graffiti on the walls of a local museum, whose site once 
had housed a pharmacy operated by the only non-Jewish Pole to live in 
the Krakow ghetto. The pharmacy's owner had received the Israeli 
``righteous among nations'' award for the help he rendered to many Jews 
during the war. Although the local public housing authorities 
responsible for maintenance of the property painted over the graffiti 
the following afternoon, the next evening the vandals wrote anti-
Semitic slogans over the fresh paint. The second set of graffiti was 
painted over the next morning. Local police vowed to step up patrols in 
the area but no arrests were made by year's end.
    Also in April, Satanist graffiti defaced some 20 gravestones in a 
Catholic cemetery in a village near Poznan. The vandals were never 
identified. In August a group of eight to nine teenagers armed with 
clubs attacked a Buddhist center in Krakow. The teenagers assaulted 
three persons inside the center, one of whom required hospitalization, 
and broke windows and smashed furniture. Center representatives said 
the attack was the most serious in a series of incidents--including 
assaults on Buddhists visiting the center, breaking windows, and 
threatening graffiti--that began earlier in the year. Although the 
center has been open since 1991, this is the first year that it became 
the target of such attacks. The Krakow prosecutor initiated an 
investigation into the case and two persons have been arrested in 
relation to the case. The investigation is ongoing and legal 
proceedings against the arrestees continued at year's end.
    The ``Pope's Cross,'' located on the grounds of a former Carmelite 
convent in Oswiecim adjacent to the Auschwitz concentration camp 
museum, remained in place at year's end.
    In April Opole University fired professor Dariusz Ratajczak for 
publishing a book denying the Holocaust. The firing followed the 
unsuccessful prosecution of Ratajczak in December 1999 for violating 
the law on the preservation of national remembrance, a provision of 
which criminalizes public denials of Nazi and communist-era crimes. The 
University announced that Ratajczak had violated ethical standards and 
would be barred from teaching at other universities for 3 years.
    In January 1999, vandals damaged or destroyed 57 gravestones in the 
Jewish cemetery in Krakow. In May 1999, the cemetery was vandalized 
again when unidentified perpetrators overturned 30 gravestones and set 
fire to the main door of the pre-burial house. Perpetrators in these 
events were not found and the investigation into the cases was 
discontinued. The local Jewish community now pays for two guards and 
two guard dogs at the cemetery, where such incidents have ceased.
    In July 1999, unknown vandals sprayed swastikas and anti-Semitic 
graffiti on the Jewish community headquarters in Bielsko-Biala. 
According to the mayor of Bielsko-Biala, city police officers were 
ordered to guard the building after the attack and an investigation 
opened in 1999 into the case was discontinued in 2000. There were no 
further incidents reported during the year.
    In May during the 12th March of the Living from Auschwitz to 
Birkenau to honor victims of the Holocaust, several hundred Poles 
joined the Presidents of Israel and Poland as well as some 6,000 
marchers from Israel and other countries. This was the largest 
participation of Polish citizens in the event to date. Government 
officials participating in the march included M.P.s, the province's 
governor, and Oswiecim's mayor and city council chairman. 
Schoolchildren, Boy Scouts, the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society, and 
the Jewish Students Association of Poland also participated in the 
march.
    Investigations continued into the May 1998 desecration of graves in 
the Warsaw Jewish cemetery and the July 1998 vandalism of a plaque 
commemorating Jewish Holocaust victims in Rzeszow. No charges have been 
filed to date, and the Rzeszow case was still under investigation at 
year's end.
    In September dignitaries from Poland, Israel, the United States, 
and other countries (including Prince Hassan of Jordan) gathered in 
Oswiecim (Auschwitz) to commemorate the opening of the refurbished 
Chevra Lomdei Mishnayot synagogue and the Auschwitz Jewish Center. The 
synagogue, the sole synagogue in Oswiecim to survive World War II, and 
an adjacent Jewish cultural and educational center, provide visitors a 
place to pray and to learn about the active pre-war Jewish community 
that once existed in Oswiecim. The synagogue was the first communal 
property in the country to be returned to the Jewish community after 
the fall of communism under a 1997 law allowing restitution of Jewish 
communal property.
    On November 11, some 400 persons participated in a demonstration in 
Katowice officially organized by the No To Europe Association; some of 
the participants chanted anti-Semitic slogans and burned the EU and 
Israeli flags. The association's head told prosecutors investigating 
the case that only some 30 percent of the rally's participants were 
actual members of his organization.
    There is some public concern about the growth of groups perceived 
to be ``sects'' and the influence of non-mainstream religious groups, 
especially in the wake of press reports of the deaths of a few young 
persons in circumstances suggesting cult activity.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law provides for the 
educational rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to be 
taught in their own language. There were 5 Lithuanian-language 
textbooks in use during the year and the number will probably increase 
to 8 or 9 in 2001. The Ministry of Education fully finances their 
publication and uses Lithuanian minority representation on development 
of the texts. The issue of Lithuanian minority rights, including 
language instruction, is routinely addressed during governmental talks 
at the highest levels.
    The Romani community, numbering around 30,000, faces 
disproportionately high unemployment and was hit harder by economic 
changes and restructuring than were ethnic Poles, according to its 
leaders. The national Government does not discriminate overtly against 
Roma, though discrimination against Roma is commonplace in society at 
large and some local officials have been known to discriminate by not 
providing services in a timely manner or at all. Romani leaders 
complain of widespread discrimination in employment, housing, banking, 
the justice system, the media, and education. There have been 
occasional incidents of skinheads clashing with Roma and racially 
motivated violence directed at Roma. The central Government is 
cooperating with local governments to develop and finance programs to 
assist the poorest Roma. Some local governments are becoming more 
active in dealing with the problems of local Romani communities. In the 
southern town of Nowy Sacz, where some of the country's poorest Roma 
reside, the local government launched a new initiative to improve the 
lives of the city's Roma. The initiative calls for hiring a special 
liaison to the Romani community, improving housing and access to 
utilities (sewers and running water), and expanding educational 
opportunities for Roma. The Government has also mounted an advertising 
campaign featuring a famous Polish actor that emphasizes tolerance and 
friendly attitudes towards foreigners and refugees resident in the 
country. A November poll showed no significant change in Polish 
attitudes toward other nationalities. The highest negative attitude is 
towards Roma and Romanians (64 percent and 63 percent); Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarussians (57 percent, 58 percent, 50 percent); and 
Jews (49 percent).
    The small Ukrainian and Belarussian minorities occasionally 
experience petty harassment and discrimination. Individuals of African, 
Asian, or Arab descent have experienced verbal or other types of abuse, 
including physical abuse. In February an African-American woman was 
kicked at the Czestochowa train station, in what she felt was a 
racially-motivated attack. In April a group of African-American 
military personnel visiting Wroclaw in connection with a NATO exercise 
were singled out for harassment by a group of skinheads. Part of the 
group was involved in a shoving match outside of a local restaurant, 
which ended when a larger group of military personnel arrived and the 
skinheads dispersed. In a second related incident, three of the 
servicemen were cornered by a group of skinheads carrying bottles who 
identified themselves as ``white racists.'' In June two African-
Americans were verbally harassed by a group of skinheads in Gdansk. 
They did not respond to the taunts and there was no further incident.
    The German minority in Opole province makes up one-third of the 1 
million inhabitants of this area of Poland that was part of Germany 
prior to World War II. Some members of the community complain that not 
enough German is used in the province's schools and that the minority 
rights bill will not successfully pass Parliament. However, two members 
of the German minority party are able to voice such concerns as Members 
of Parliament (see Section 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers, 
including civilian employees of the Armed Forces, police, and frontier 
guards have the right to establish and join trade unions of their own 
choosing. The law sets minimum size requirements for establishing a 
trade union: 10 persons may form a local union, and 30 may establish a 
national union. Unions, including interbranch national unions and 
national interbranch federations, must be registered with the courts. A 
court decision refusing registration may be appealed to an appeals 
court. During the year, the number of officially registered national-
level unions remained at about 360, about the same as in 1999. No 
precise data exist on work force unionization, although the trend 
continues to be downward. Recent studies suggest that only 9 to 10 
percent of workers belong to a union. As a rule, newly established 
small- and medium-sized firms were nonunion, while union activity in 
most cases carried over into privatized (former state-owned) 
enterprises. The Independent Selfgoverning Trade Union (NSZZ) 
Solidarity has a verified regular dues-paying membership of about 1 
million. Small spin-offs from mainstream Solidarity include the rival 
factions Solidarity '80, August '80, and the Christian Trade Union 
Solidarity (Popieluszko). There are no reliable estimates of their 
membership.
    The other principal national unions are those affiliated with the 
All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), the formerly Communist-aligned 
confederation established in 1984 as the sole legal alternative to 
then-outlawed NSZZ Solidarity, and its teachers' affiliate, the Polish 
Union of Teachers (ZNP). The OPZZ reports that its membership has 
dropped by more than 50 percent in recent years to about 1.7 million, 
but this figure is unverified, and independent sociological surveys 
suggest that its regular dues-paying membership is considerably less 
than Solidarity's. A recent survey found that Solidarity represents 
some 7.6 percent of all Polish workers, while the OPZZ represents only 
3.6 percent (one estimate put OPZZ membership at roughly 700,000 to 
800,000 workers). According to a 1999 study by the State Labor 
Inspectorate, out of some 27,000 local union organizations, Solidarity 
had 13,500 organizations, the OPZZ had 11,000 organizations, and 
Solidarity '80 had 770 organizations.
    The law on collective bargaining, in force since 1994, does not 
require union membership figures to be verified or based on dues-paying 
members in order for unions to be considered ``representative'' 
negotiating partners for management and government. Solidarity 
protested some unions' (largely OPZZ affiliates) participation in 
negotiations with the Government on the grounds that their membership 
figures remain unproved.
    Most trade unions were active in politics at all levels. Trade 
unions are affiliated with political parties and scores of union 
activists were parliamentarians, and several became senior government 
officials. Solidarity plays a key role in political life. With 62 
deputies, 27 senators, dozens of ministers, governors, and other senior 
national and local officials, the union serves as the backbone of the 
ruling AWS coalition. The OPZZ has 42 deputies, about one-quarter of 
the opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) caucus.
    Unions have the right to strike except in ``essential services.'' 
However, labor leaders complain that the 1991 Act on Collective Dispute 
Resolution prescribes an overly lengthy process before a strike may be 
called. Employers consider the law too lenient, since it allows only 
one-quarter of the work force to vote to call a strike. As a result, as 
many as 60 to 90 percent of strikes called in recent years have been 
technically ``illegal'' because one or both of the sides did not follow 
each step exactly as required by law. Labor courts act slowly on 
deciding the legality of strikes, while sanctions against unions for 
calling illegal strikes, or against employers for provoking them, are 
minimal. Arbitration is not obligatory and depends on the agreement of 
disputing parties. Unions allege that laws prohibiting retribution 
against strikers are not enforced consistently and that fines imposed 
as punishment are so minimal that they are ineffective sanctions to 
illegal activity. Workers who strike in accordance with the law retain 
their right to social insurance but not to pay. However, if a court 
rules a strike ``illegal,'' workers may lose social benefits, and 
organizers are liable for damages and may face civil charges and fines. 
The social partners (unions, employers, and the Government) continued 
to work out ambiguities in dispute resolution mechanisms in the new 
Labor Code, which went into effect in 1996, and which represented a 
major overhaul of communist-era labor regulations.
    The number of strikes in the first 6 months of the year remained 
relatively low and dropped to 6 from 25, compared with the same time 
period in 1999. There were strikes lasting for a few days in public 
transportation, health, armaments, and metallurgy sectors. Railroad 
(PKP) workers struck for a few hours during the year, demanding overdue 
payments, changes in the privatization process, and protesting layoffs.
    In November hundreds of nurses began hunger strikes and protests 
throughout the country to protest the Government's failure to pay wage 
increases. In December the Sejm passed a bill giving the nurses a 
raise. The nurses found the offer unsatisfactory, and the matter was 
still pending conclusion at year's end.
    Unions have the right to join labor federations and confederations 
and to affiliate with international labor organizations. Independent 
labor leaders reported that these rights were observed in practice. 
Solidarity is a full member of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and the European Trade 
Union Confederation.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1991 Law on 
Trade Unions created a favorable environment for trade union activity. 
However, labor leaders report that the 1991 law has not prevented 
employers from discriminating against workers who attempt to organize 
or join unions, particularly in the growing private sector. The law 
also has not prevented employer harassment of union members for labor 
activity. The ICFTU alleges that the sanctions provided in the law 
against acts of antiunion discrimination are not sufficiently 
dissuasive.
    The 1991 law provides for parties to take disputes first to labor 
courts, then to the prosecutor general, and, in the last resort, to the 
Supreme Court. In a typical year, Solidarity takes several thousand 
cases to labor courts, several hundred to the Prosecutor General, and 
dozens to the Supreme Court for resolution. In an overwhelming majority 
of these cases, the courts ordered employers to correct practices or 
reinstate dismissed workers or unions to reimburse employers for 
activity found to be illegal. However, penalties are minimal and are 
not an effective deterrent.
    Enterprise-level collective bargaining over wages and working 
conditions increasingly characterized the labor relations system. Labor 
and management are adapting their relationship to the demands of a 
market economy, but experience in modern labor relations is still in 
its early stages. Many enterprises rolled over agreements concluded in 
earlier years.
    Since its formation in early 1994, the Tripartite Commission 
(unions, employers, and the Government), currently chaired by Labor 
Minister Longin Komolowski, has become the main forum that determines 
national-level wage and benefit increases in such politically sensitive 
areas as the so-called budget sector (health, education, and public 
employees), while rendering opinions on pension indexation, energy 
pricing, and other important aspects of social policy. The Commission 
serves as an important forum in which the social partners air 
differences, discuss grievances, and often negotiate agreements before 
problems erupt into social conflict.
    Many disputes arose because of the weakness of the employer side of 
the union/employer/Government triangle. Key state sector employers 
(largely in heavy industry and the budget sector) still were unable to 
negotiate independently with organized labor without the extensive 
involvement of central government ministries to which they are 
subordinate, although the Government repeatedly stated that its 
intention was not to be drawn into labor disputes. This weakness 
complicated and politicized the Government's labor relations system. 
Claiming that the Government was refusing seriously to discuss labor 
issues with it, the OPZZ suspended participation in the commission in 
April 1999 and stayed away all throughout this year.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor 
does not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses, 
and otherwise is prohibited by law, including that performed by 
children. There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor by 
children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law contains strict legal prescriptions about the 
conditions in which children may work. Education is universal and 
mandatory until age 18, and public schools are free of charge. The 
Labor Code forbids the employment of persons under the age of 15. Those 
between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed only if they have 
completed primary school and if the proposed employment constitutes 
vocational training and is not harmful to their health. The age 
requirement rises to 18 years if a particular job might pose a health 
danger.
    Child labor is not a problem, although the State Labor Inspectorate 
reported that increasing numbers of minors now work, and that many 
employers violate labor rules in employing them (by underpaying 
workers, paying them late, etc.). Inspectors found violations on stud 
farms, in restaurants, and, in some instances, in small private sector 
businesses and factories. Sanctions for illegal employment of children 
range from warning letters through orders to cease the work of under-
age employees. These orders can be enforced through the police to 
demand the transfer of under-age employees or shut down all or part of 
the offending workplace, or, working through the Ministry of Labor, to 
impose fines ranging from $5 to $125 (20 to 500 PLN) per offense. Cases 
may also be referred to an administrative tribunal, which can levy 
fines of up to $1,250 (5,000 PLN). Jail sentence may be imposed if the 
infractions are serious enough; such cases generally involve serious 
injury or death. In 1999, the last year for which figures are 
available, the State Labor Inspectorate (PIP) conducted 1,494 
investigations involving some 12,000 possible underage employees. Fines 
were levied in 417 of these cases, amounting to some $35,000 (140,000 
PLN). The number of cases sent to the administrative tribunal were 358.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, the 
unions, and employers' organizations negotiate a revised national 
minimum wage every 3 months. The minimum monthly wage in state-owned 
enterprises is approximately $162.50 (700 PLN), which constitutes no 
real increase over 1999 figures. This amount was insufficient to 
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living in view of 
rising prices. A large percentage of construction workers and seasonal 
agricultural laborers from the former Soviet Union earn less than the 
minimum wage. The large size of the informal economy and the small 
number of state labor inspectors make enforcement of the minimum wage 
very difficult. As long as unemployment remains high, workers often 
agree to inferior working conditions and lower pay in order to find or 
keep their jobs.
    The standard legal workweek is 42 hours, which allows 6- or 7-hour 
days, including at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires 
overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard workweek.
    The Labor Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of 
workers' health and safety. Provisions are strict and extensive, and 
trade unions have the right to stop production or extract a worker from 
dangerous working conditions without jeopardizing the worker's 
continued employment. However, enforcement is a major problem because 
the Labor Inspectorate is unable to monitor the state sector 
sufficiently, much less the private sector, where a growing percentage 
of accidents take place. In addition there is a lack of clarity 
concerning which government or legislative body has responsibility for 
enforcing the law. The Labor Inspectorate can shut down workplaces in 
which it finds unsafe conditions. In 1999, the last year for which 
figures are available, there were 16 shutdowns of either a part or of a 
whole workplace.
    In the 41,011 work-related accidents reported during the first 6 
months of the year, 277 individuals were killed and 602 seriously 
injured. The Government's Central Statistical Office reported that most 
accidents were in the public sector, while most serious accidents were 
in the private sector, where proportionally more deaths also occurred. 
Solidarity contends that the problem lies not in the law, which 
establishes safe standards, but in enforcement, because employer 
sanctions for illegal behavior are minimal. Standards for exposure to 
chemicals, dust, and noise are exceeded routinely. Workers may remove 
themselves from dangerous working conditions without losing their jobs, 
but there were reports that fears of such loss prompted some to stay on 
the job.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and children is 
illegal and several specific provisions in the Criminal Code address 
this issue; however, it remains a problem. The Criminal Code prohibits 
trafficking in human beings, and pimping, and imposes sentences of up 
to 10 years on those convicted. It also bans recruiting or luring 
persons into prostitution; penalties for this offense are also up to 10 
years. The most severe sentences are reserved for individuals 
trafficking in children and those luring women into prostitution 
abroad. Statutes on trafficking were most recently revised in 1998.
    Due to the illicit nature of the activity, it is difficult to 
estimate the numbers of women who are trafficked. There was an increase 
in numbers of prosecutions from 1998 to 1999. In 1998 the police 
reported 70 cases (18 cases of trafficking and 52 of luring women and 
children into prostitution); in 1999 they reported 184 (8 cases of 
trafficking and 176 cases of luring women and children into 
prostitution). It is not clear whether this increase is due to a growth 
in the number of women trafficked or to greater activity by the Polish 
authorities. According to a recent press report, road prostitution has 
doubled since 1998. However, in 1999 there was a police crackdown on 
highway trafficking and prostitution in response to a letter from the 
Polish Episcopate to the Prime Minister, and the Polish police report 
that the crackdown resulted in an estimated 20 percent decrease in such 
activity. Nonetheless, the international NGO La Strada, which focuses 
on trafficking in women and girls worldwide, and other sources report 
that this did not represent an overall decrease in the problem. Rather 
the activities were moved to secondary roads and agencies. La Strada 
also estimates that 90 percent of cases handled by Polish prosecutors 
are the results of deportations from Germany to Poland that are 
initiated and investigated in Germany. According to La Strada, Polish 
authorities lack the resources to initiate and investigate cases 
originating within Poland.
    It is particularly difficult to estimate the extent to which 
children are victims of trafficking. Trafficking in children is 
reported to be marginal; that which exists appears to be in connection 
with illegal adoption. Police authorities deal with child traffickers 
more severely, in part because laws on statutory rape are easier to 
prosecute. As a result the activity has been driven completely 
underground. Child prostitution is a crime, while prostitution of 
adults is neither banned nor regulated by law, making it more difficult 
for the police to pursue. The authorities do not always recognize 
trafficking in children since minors can be trafficked on false 
documents identifying them as adults. Twenty of the 184 cases initiated 
by prosecutors in 1999 involved victims who were minors.
    Poland is a source, transit, and destination country for trafficked 
women and girls. Polish women are trafficked into the sex trade to 
Germany and other Western European countries through such means as fake 
employment offers, arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures. 
Women and girls are trafficked into Poland primarily from east and 
south central Europe, where they are recruited from areas with low 
socioeconomic conditions, sometimes quite openly. Many believe that 
they are accepting employment as waitresses or maids in the west. While 
they are en route to what they believe to be their destinations, their 
passports and identity papers are taken away from them. Stripped of 
their personal identity, the women and girls are kept under the control 
of the traffickers through fear and intimidation. They are required to 
serve a minimum number of clients each day in order to earn their keep. 
They are threatened with violence, and those who resist are raped or 
beaten. If they try to flee, their legs may be broken. There are also 
reports of victims being killed by their traffickers. Since the border 
guards and police may regard them as criminals who have violated 
passport laws, the women and girls are afraid to turn to officials for 
help. They have no legal status and there are no public resources 
available to assist them. When detained by the police, they may be 
deported to the border, where they are met by traffickers who quickly 
provide them with new travel documents and return them to Poland. One 
official mentioned the case of a Bulgarian woman who had been arrested 
in Poland four times, each time under a different name. Bulgaria is the 
largest single source of foreign women trafficked in Poland. Women from 
Bulgaria tend to be from the Turkish and Roma minorities. There are 
also significant numbers of women from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and 
Latvia. Recently there also have been reports of Roma women from 
Romania who are trafficked on Bulgarian documents. Those women and 
girls with the lowest socioeconomic status are most vulnerable, and 
subjected to the worst conditions. For example, Roma and ethnically 
Turkish Bulgarians tend to be employed on highways. They may spend a 
few months in Poland before they are trafficked further west. In 
contrast, women from other countries of Eastern Europe are also 
trafficked in agencies run as brothels. Educated Polish and Russian 
women are more likely than others to be employed voluntarily by escort 
services.
    In the last few years, trafficking has become increasingly 
organized and has been associated with a rampant growth in document 
fraud. As many as 90 percent of the women and girls trafficked in the 
country have false travel documents, and the trafficking of a single 
woman will involve a whole network of criminals. One criminal will 
recruit the woman; the second will provide false travel documents and 
traffic her across the border. A third criminal will supervise her work 
with clients, functioning as a pimp. La Strada reports that last year a 
large scale ``auction'' of women was held at a convention of 
traffickers meeting at a major hotel outside Warsaw. Polish authorities 
are investigating reports that such auctions occur regularly; one news 
source indicates that such auctions take place regularly. Prices paid 
for women and girls who are trafficked reportedly range from $2,000 to 
$4000 (4,000 to 8,000 DM). They are usually trafficked by nationals 
from the same source country. For example, Bulgarian women are 
trafficked by Bulgarians and Ukrainians by Ukrainians. Foreign 
traffickers systematically pay a percentage of their receipts to Polish 
traffickers operating out of the same region.
                               __________

                                PORTUGAL

    The Portuguese Republic is a constitutional democracy with a 
President, a Prime Minister, a Parliament freely elected by secret 
ballot in multiparty elections, and an independent judiciary.
    Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the Ministries 
of Justice and Internal Administration. Security forces are controlled 
by, and responsive to, the Government. They occasionally committed 
human rights abuses.
    Portugal has a market-based economy. The service sector (with 
tourism playing a prominent role) is the leading source of employment, 
while employment in agriculture and industry continues to be static or 
decline. Manufacturing provides about 35 percent of total economic 
output. The principal exports are textiles, machinery, and vehicles. 
The standard of living has increased: per capita gross domestic product 
is approximately $10,000 (2.15 million escudos).
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Credible reports 
continued that security personnel occasionally beat detainees. Prison 
conditions remained poor but improved somewhat. There were lengthy 
delays in holding trials. Violence against women and trafficking in 
women are problems, as are discrimination and violence against Roma, 
minorities, and immigrants. The Government is taking active steps to 
deal with the problem of child labor.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In a widely reported January incident in Porto, Alvaro Rosa 
Cardoso, a member of the Roma community, died from internal abdominal 
bleeding after a violent encounter with police. The officers had been 
called to the scene of a local disturbance. The two officers alleged to 
be responsible were charged, but in August a court found the officers 
not guilty since it could not be determined whether the internal 
bleeding was due to the fight before the arrest or the alleged police 
mistreatment afterwards. Cardosa's family continued to blame the death 
on police mistreatment.
    A similar event happened on the same day in another part of the 
city in which Paulo Silva died of internal bleeding which may have come 
about during an arrest for drug use. This case was reopened in October 
and was pending at year's end.
    An inmate was reported to have died as a result of beatings by 
prison guards in Vale de Judeus in 1997; however, the Ministry of 
Justice later determined that the inmate committed suicide.
    No one was ever charged or disciplined in the case of the death of 
Olivio Almada, whose body was found in 1996. He was last seen in the 
company of three police officers.
    Three PSP officers were convicted on criminal charges related to 
the death in custody in 1996 of Carlos Areujo. The officers appealed 
the verdict, and their case remained in the appeals process at year's 
end. Disciplinary proceedings against the officers were deferred until 
after the criminal case is resolved.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under torture 
in criminal proceedings; however, credible but infrequent reports 
continued that police and prison guards beat and otherwise abused 
detainees, particularly non-Europeans.
    In an attempt to respond to past negative reports on the treatment 
of detainees and to consolidate alleged improvements in the system, new 
legislation entitled ``Regulations on the Material Conditions of 
Detention in Police Establishments'' was adopted in May 1999. The law 
provides detailed guidelines covering all aspects of arrest and 
custody.
    According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Amnesty 
International (AI), a National Republican Guard (GNR) infantry sergeant 
reported in August 1999 that in spite of the new regulations, the 
mistreatment of detainees was ``virtually systematic.'' In November 
1999, the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration (IGAI) opened 
an inquiry into the sergeant's allegations and began disciplinary 
proceedings against him personally, on unrelated charges. However, the 
IGAI stated that these proceedings were not in response to the 
allegations he made.
    AI also brought to light the alleged mistreatment of Jorge Manuel 
da Conceicao Simoes. He was arrested in May 1999 on suspicion of 
possessing drugs and allegedly was beaten when he refused to sign a 
confession. In a September 1999 Madeira incident, also reported by AI, 
Marco Fernandes claimed to have been beaten by police with a pipe and a 
police radio. Judicial and disciplinary proceedings were opened and 
remained pending at year's end.
    A police officer who used electroshock torture in Sintra in 1999 
was fired from the force. A civil case against him was ongoing at 
year's end. Police were disciplined for misconduct during a January 
1999 street festival in Lisbon.
    In late 1997, two police officers were accused of having violated 
sexually a female drug addict in 1994. The supervisors of the officers 
initially delayed the opening of an investigation, but in December 1997 
the divisional commander in Lisbon suspended the officers and ordered 
an investigation. The officers subsequently were fired and jailed, 
according to the Inspector General's office.
    In April AI released a report covering the last 6 months of 1998, 
which noted the mistreatment of prisoners and excessive use of force by 
the police. In September 1997, Marcelino Soares, a 17-year-old inmate 
at the Caxias prison, reportedly was beaten and confined to an 
isolation cell for 3 days by guards for complaining that prison 
authorities had blocked visits by his brother. The guards involved in 
this case were fired, according to the Ministry of Justice.
    Prison conditions remained poor; however, the Directorate General 
of Prison Services (DGSP) has taken steps to improve them. Prison 
crowding remains a major problem, but due to higher levels of funding 
and DGSP-led improvements, the rate of overcrowding went from a 1996 
high of 57.5 percent (14,177 prisoners and 8,999 places) to a low of 
13.4 percent (12,728 prisoners and 11,221 places) as of September 1.
    By year's end, every cell was equipped with proper hygiene 
facilities. Health problems such as hepatitis and drug dependency 
nevertheless continued, and prisoners suffer from a high AIDS infection 
rate. In 1999 the health services director of the Bureau of Prisons 
reported that 7 out of every 10 convicts entering the prison system 
were infected with AIDS, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C. An estimated 20 
percent of the total prison population is infected with AIDS. 
Tuberculosis was also on the rise. Prison health services, although 
still not adequately staffed, have benefited from increased spending on 
health services, the use of local health care providers to help prison 
inmates, and the construction of new health care facilities in many 
prisons.
    Reports persisted about the mistreatment of prisoners by prison 
guards, severe overcrowding, poor medical treatment and the spread of 
contagious diseases, drug addiction, and cold temperatures in winter. 
Prisoners alleged that at Linho the warden and other supervisory staff 
seemed powerless to stop daily beatings of inmates by guards. Prison 
authorities deny these reports and point to the existence of organized 
violence among inmates. According to AI, other prisons where brutality 
by guards was alleged were Pinheiro da Cruz and Angra Heroismo. To help 
combat brutality by guards, the General Directorate of Prison Services 
began using resources from AI; all guards participate in mandatory 
training conducted by AI on such topics as nonviolent control of 
prisoners and conflict resolution.
    An independent ombudsman, chosen by the Parliament, investigates 
complaints of mistreatment by the police and prison authorities. IGAI 
also conducts internal investigations in cases of alleged mistreatment. 
Police officers receive training in human rights and proper 
investigative procedure. However, NGO's have been critical of the slow 
pace of police investigations in general and internal investigations by 
the police in particular.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. 
Human rights organizations reported no difficulties in gaining access 
to inmates at detention facilities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the 
Government respects its provisions in practice.
    Under the law, an investigating judge determines whether an 
arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released 
outright. A person may not be held more than 48 hours without appearing 
before an investigating judge. Investigative detention is limited to a 
maximum of 6 months for each suspected crime. If a formal charge is not 
filed within that period, the detainee must be released. In cases of 
serious crimes, for example, murder or armed robbery, or of more than 
one suspect, investigative detention may last for up to 2 years and may 
be extended by a judge to 3 years in extraordinary circumstances. A 
suspect in investigative detention must be brought to trial within 18 
months of being charged formally. If a suspect is not in detention, 
there is no specified period for going to trial. A detainee has access 
to lawyers; the state assumes the cost if necessary.
    Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
impartial.
    The court system, laid out in the Constitution, consists of a 
Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Justice, and judicial courts 
of first and second instance. There is also a Supreme Court of 
Administration, which deals with administrative and tax disputes, and 
which is supported by lower administrative courts. An audit court is in 
the Ministry of Finance.
    All trials are public except those that may offend the dignity of 
the victim, such as in cases of sexual abuse of children. The accused 
is presumed innocent. In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three 
judges presides. For lesser crimes, a single judge presides. At the 
request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major crimes; 
in practice, requests for jury trials are extremely rare.
    The judicial system provides citizens with a fair legal process. 
However, frequent critics point to a large backlog of pending trials 
resulting from inefficient functioning of the courts. A new law passed 
during the year aims to reduce the case backlog by increasing the 
number of judges. The bill also has provisions to reduce the time it 
takes a lawyer to become a judge. Another new law provides for 
witnesses to testify in cases heard in distant jurisdictions via 
teleconference. Also the Ministry of Justice announced in November a 
plan to speed the service of subpoenas. Many factors, from the 
underutilization of technology (case folders are still sewn closed by a 
large number of ``needlemen/women''), to the heretofore confusing and 
drawn out method of serving subpoenas, to the reluctance of the justice 
system to change old ways of doing things all contribute to the backlog 
problem. The extremely slow pace of the judicial process was cited as 
contributing to a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in a 1999 report from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).
    In March the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a fine to 
three plaintiffs in three separate civil cases. The first case involved 
two sets of proceedings that lasted nearly 11 years. The second case 
was not resolved after 7 years, and the third case had continued for 
4.5 years. In April the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a 
fine to a corporate plaintiff in a case that had lasted over 17 years 
without a final resolution. Many similar examples of judicial delay and 
backlog are reported in the press.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids such practices, and the 
Government respects these provisions in practice. Violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution (law) provides 
for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects 
these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, 
and a functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom 
of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    In a September freedom of the press case, the ECHR found in favor 
of Vicente Jorge Silva, a former editor of the center-left daily, 
Publico, in his appeal of a decision of the Constitutional Court. In 
1993 he published a scathing editorial highly critical of the policies 
of a local politician running for public office. The politician sued 
for ``abuse of freedom of the press,'' but Silva won the case in 
criminal court. Upon appeal two higher courts found in favor of the 
politician. The ECHR determined that the Constitutional Court had 
failed to support the freedom of the press in Silva's case.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The Roman 
Catholic Church is the dominant religion; it receives tax exemptions 
and other privileges unavailable to other denominations. Although the 
overwhelming majority of citizens are Roman Catholic, other religions 
practice freely.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for 
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for granting refugee or asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. Persons who qualify as refugees 
are entitled to residence permits. There were no reports of the forced 
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status. However, the 
Government almost never rules that an asylum seeker has a ``valid'' 
claim. Immigration authorities attempt to distinguish among political, 
humanitarian, and temporary refugees, but the Government continues to 
maintain that the majority are economic refugees using Portugal as a 
gateway to the other European Union ``Schengen'' countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections on the basis of universal 
suffrage. Portugal is a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. However, 
they and minorities have full political rights and participate actively 
in political life. Women head the Ministries of Health and of 
Environment. There are 49 female members of the 230-member Parliament. 
Race is rarely an issue in politics; persons of minority origin have 
achieved political prominence. Some persons advocate laws mandating 
female quotas on political party lists, but such legislation has not 
been passed. Some political parties nevertheless adopted their own 
internal quotas.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic (and international) human rights groups 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are 
generally cooperative, although most groups complain of slow 
investigations or remedial actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on ancestry, sex, 
language, origin, religion, political or ideological convictions, 
education, economic situation, or social condition, and the Government 
enforces these prohibitions.
    Women.--Domestic and other violence against women is reportedly a 
common but hidden problem for which few seek legal recourse. According 
to the first national report on family violence, presented in March 
1999, police agencies recorded 2,889 cases of family violence during 
the period October 1998 through January 1999. Of the 633 family 
violence crimes reported in January, more than two-thirds involved acts 
of physical violence and occurred between spouses or partners. Of the 
victims, 81 percent were women, and 87 percent of the suspects were 
men.
    According to the 1999 statistics of a major NGO providing services 
to victims of crime, 46 percent of the 4,653 cases it handled involved 
domestic violence, and in the vast majority of those cases the target 
of the violence was women. The same NGO agreed with the Governmental 
Commission for Equality and Women's Rights that the frequency of 
violent incidents is probably the same, but increased publicity and 
resources have increased the number of victims who seek help. The law 
provides for criminal penalties in cases of violence by a spouse, and 
the judicial system shows no apparent reluctance to prosecute suspects 
accused of abusing women. Changes to the Penal Code in May granted any 
interested party the ability to file charges in domestic violence 
cases. However, traditional societal attitudes still discourage many 
battered women from recourse to the judicial system.
    The toll-free hot line for victims of domestic violence, in service 
since November 1998, now operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its 
first 6 months of operation, approximately 64 percent of the calls 
related to acts of physical violence, while 30 percent related to 
psychological concerns. The majority of callers (66 percent) were 
themselves victims. Women between the ages of 25 and 35 accounted for 
about 29 percent of the calls, while about 31 percent were women 
between the ages of 35 and 45. Although calls came from all over the 
country, the vast majority came from the large urban centers of Lisbon 
and Porto. These percentages have remained essentially unchanged.
    Parliament has continued to address the problem of domestic 
violence with the passage of several laws in recent years. One provided 
for the expansion of the system of shelters for victims. Educational 
campaigns for the public and specialized training for the police also 
were strengthened. The creation of domestic violence units in the 
police, and of a new domestic violence category in the Attorney 
General's report on crime, were mandated by one of the new laws in May. 
Perpetrators of domestic violence now can be barred from contact with 
their victims, and in extreme cases, the police can order the immediate 
expulsion of a perpetrator from the victim's dwelling. The law also 
calls for the development of new programs to teach anger management to 
the perpetrators of domestic violence and to assist victims with the 
professional development necessary to live independent lives.
    In August 1999, Parliament passed legislation to establish a 
national support network and a system of compensation for victims of 
domestic violence. In May 2000 Parliament changed the legal definition 
of domestic violence, the net result of which was expected to give 
police and the courts more leverage to prosecute such cases and remove 
some of the burden of bringing charges from the victim.
    Prostitution is legal, but procurement is not. Trafficking in women 
for the purposes of forced prostitution continues to be problem (see 
Section 5 and 6.f.). Prostitution is linked closely to other types of 
organized crime, especially international narcotics trafficking. 
Specific legislation prohibits forced prostitution and trafficking in 
human beings. The Nest, an NGO, operates economic and social recovery 
programs for prostitutes.
    The Civil Code provides for full legal equality for women. Sexual 
harassment, a problem that continues to gain public attention, is 
covered in the Penal Code as a sex crime, but only if perpetrated by a 
superior and in the workplace. The penalties are 2 to 3 years' 
imprisonment. As in the case of domestic violence, socially ingrained 
attitudes discourage many women from taking advantage of the legal 
protection available.
    The Commission on Equality in the Workplace and in Employment, made 
up of representatives of the Government, employers' organizations, and 
labor unions, is empowered to examine, but not adjudicate, complaints 
of sexual harassment, but it receives few. It does review numerous 
complaints of discrimination by employers against pregnant workers and 
new mothers, who are protected by law. Maternity leave was increased in 
2000 from 90 days to 120 days with full pay and benefits. Also after 
return to work a new mother (or father) may take time off every day to 
nurse or feed an infant. If pregnant or nursing women or new fathers 
are fired, they may take their complaint to the government Equality 
Commission (CITE), which was established to deal with equal opportunity 
complaints. If CITE finds that the employee's legal rights were 
violated, the employer must reinstate the worker and pay double back 
pay and benefits for the time at work missed due to the wrongful 
firing.
    Women increasingly are represented in university student bodies, 
business, science, and the professions. However, a gap remains between 
male and female salaries: according to the most recent figures 
available (1997), women earned an average of 77 percent of men's 
earnings. Women make up the majority of university graduates.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provides 9 years of 
compulsory, free, and universal education for children through the age 
of 15. The Government provides free or low cost health care for all 
children up to the age of 15. A special office in the Directorate 
General of Health oversees implementation of the Government's programs 
for children. A 9-year period of education is compulsory. A 1996 study 
by the European Commission indicated that only 50 percent of children 
receive preschool education. To counter this problem, the Ministry of 
Education instituted a pilot project on early childhood education in 
the Algarve region in 1997. This program proved successful. More 
teachers were hired, and more new schools were constructed in remote 
places. Preschool education became free for 5 year olds in 1998 and was 
scheduled to become free for 3 and 4 year olds by 2001. Each year the 
number of students enrolled in preschool has increased. In the 1998-99 
school year, 207,109 attended; in 1999-2000, the number increased to 
218,225; and in the 2000-2001 school year, 230,000 students attended 
preschool.
    The National Children's Rights Commission is charged with 
implementing the principles of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The Commission operates under the aegis of the 
High Commissioner for the Promotion of Equality and of the Family and 
includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Health, 
Education, and Solidarity, as well as from leading NGO's. The quasi-
independent Institute for the Support of Children organized a network 
of 48 NGO's dedicated to helping at-risk youth. The University of 
Minho's Institute for the Study of Children is a research center 
dedicated solely to the study of children's issues. The Institute for 
the Support of Children organizes public awareness programs, serves as 
an information clearinghouse for NGO's working on childrens' issues and 
promotes legislation protecting children's rights. It provides 
telephone and in-person counseling, intervention, and prevention 
services in cases of child abuse and neglect. It also operates services 
assisting the at-risk youth known as ``criancas da rua''--``street 
kids.''
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child 
labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
    Following the uncovering of a pedophile ring in Madeira in 1997, 
the Parliament passed a law in 1998 that enlarged the definition of 
pedophilia to include the consumers of child pornography as well as the 
producers.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for persons 
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in 
practice. However, no such legislation covers private businesses or 
other facilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal minority groups 
are immigrants, legal and illegal, from Portugal's former African 
colonies. There is also a resident Romani population of approximately 
40,000 persons, who are the subject of some discrimination and 
violence.
    In 1999 the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination conducted a periodic review of the Government's 
obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In its report, the Committee 
expressed concern about racial discrimination and xenophobia in the 
country, including violence against blacks, Roma, immigrants, and 
foreigners--frequently perpetrated by skinheads. While acknowledging 
efforts by the Government to combat such acts, the Committee urged that 
the law be extended to prohibit all racist groups. According to an NGO 
that tracks racist and xenophobic issues, activities by racist groups 
are increasing, and the police response to such actions tends to be 
inconsistent.
    The law permits victims and antiracism associations to participate 
in race-related criminal trials by lodging criminal complaints, 
retaining their own lawyers, and calling witnesses. In 1999 the 
Parliament approved a new set of antiracism laws, reiterating 
antidiscrimination sections of the Constitution and the Penal Code. The 
new laws prohibit and penalize racial discrimination in housing, 
business, and health services. They also provided for the creation of a 
new Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination to work 
alongside the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities. 
However, by year's end the new commission had yet to be established.
    The growing number undocumented persons who enter the country 
illegally in order to work is a problem. Recent economic growth has 
created a need for many workers, especially in the construction and 
service sectors. These undocumented workers, usually ethnic minorities, 
are allowed to remain and work but have no access to health care, 
education, or other social services. Parliament rejected legislation 
during the year that was intended to bring them into the social 
services system.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers in both the private and 
public sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish 
committees in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution 
provides for the right to establish unions by profession or industry. 
Trade union associations have the right to participate in the 
preparation of labor legislation. Strikes are permitted by the 
Constitution for any reason, including political causes; they are 
common and generally are resolved through direct negotiations. 
Policemen and members of the armed forces may not strike. The 
authorities respect all provisions of the law on labor's rights.
    Two principal labor federations exist, the Workers' General Union 
(UGT) and the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP). No 
restrictions limit the formation of additional labor federations. 
Unions function without hindrance by the Government and are associated 
closely with political parties.
    There are no restrictions on the ability of unions to join 
federations or of federations to affiliate with international labor 
bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions are free 
to organize without interference by the Government or by employers. 
Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is 
practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
    Collective bargaining disputes usually are resolved through 
negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector 
such as health, energy, or transportation, the Government may order the 
strikers back to work for a specific period. The Government rarely has 
invoked this power, in part because most strikes last only 1 to 3 days. 
The law requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided during 
strikes in essential sectors, but this requirement is applied 
infrequently. When it is applied, minimum levels of service are 
established by agreement between the Government and the striking 
unions, although unions have complained, including to the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), that the minimum levels were set too high. 
When collective bargaining fails, the Government may appoint a mediator 
at the request of either management or labor.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities 
enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor 
promptly examines complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including by children, is prohibited and generally does not occur. 
Specific legislation prohibits trafficking in persons; however, 
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years. There are instances 
of child labor, but the overall incidence is small and is concentrated 
geographically and sectorally. The greatest problems are reported in 
Braga, Porto, and Aveiro and tend to occur in the clothing, footwear, 
construction, and hotel industries. Government agencies have noted a 
recent gradual shift from child labor in industries to the home, where 
children work in family businesses. The extensive national network 
designed to combat child labor is beginning to shift some of its 
resources in this direction. The Government prohibits forced and bonded 
child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 
6.c.).
    In 1998 the Government created a commission called Plan for the 
Elimination of Exploitation of Child Labor (PEETI). Working with 
several NGO's, PEETI has developed an integrated program of education 
and training in which local teams of social workers and educators 
intervene in situations involving dropouts and working children. These 
teams develop programs of scholastic and vocational study tailored to 
the individual child and his community. PEETI gives ``scholarships'' to 
help offset the loss of income to the family. In the first year of 
PEETI'S existence, 600 teenagers were involved. The Government also 
created in 1996 the National Council Against the Exploitation of Child 
Labor (CNETI), a multiagency body that coordinates government efforts 
to eliminate child labor. CNETI is the successor to the National 
Children's Rights Commission CCNCTI.
    In a first-of-its-kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO 
in 1998, the Government polled 26,500 families, with separate 
questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the 
incidence of child labor. According to this survey, as many as 20,000 
to 40,000 children under the age of 16 may be engaged in some form of 
labor. The majority of these cases consist of daily chores on family 
farms, which do not prevent school attendance. However, the study 
estimates that as many as 11,000 children may be working for nonfamily 
employers, a figure that represents 0.2 percent of the labor force. The 
next comprehensive study of the problem is scheduled for April 2001.
    The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws falls to labor 
inspectors. Because of an increase in the minimum working age from 15 
to 16 in 1997, the total number of child labor cases has increased in 
the last few years. However, according to the Ministry of Labor and 
Equality, the incidence of child labor is decreasing as a result of 
government efforts to combat child labor and a move towards a higher 
technology industrial base (with a corresponding need for better 
educated and skilled labor). The Ministry reported a 74 percent 
decrease in child labor cases from 1997 to 2000. The Minister of Labor 
attributed this decrease to the extensive reorganization of groups 
fighting this problem and the effectiveness of new programs being 
carried out. Portugal's fight against exploitative child labor is no 
longer limited to inspectors' visits to factories and farms, but 
includes policies designed to address some of the root causes of this 
problem.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage legislation covers 
full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages 
18 years and over. For 2000 the monthly minimum wage was approximately 
$284 (63,800 escudos). Along with widespread rent controls, basic food 
and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum 
income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a 
worker and family. Only 9.2 percent of the work force received the 
minimum wage.
    Employees generally receive 14 months' pay for 11 months' work: the 
extra 3 months' pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and 
22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours, and the 
maximum workweek is 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid 
overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year, with a minimum of 
12 hours between workdays. The Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
    Employers legally are responsible for accidents at work and are 
required by law to carry accident insurance. An existing body of 
legislation regulates safety and health, but labor unions continue to 
argue for stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor 
Security develops safety standards in harmony with European Union 
standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their 
enforcement. However, the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and 
inspectors to combat the problem of work accidents effectively. Workers 
injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits. A relatively large 
proportion of accidents occurs in the construction industry. Poor 
environmental controls in textile production also cause considerable 
concern.
    While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations 
where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers 
for any reason.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits 
trafficking in persons, which nevertheless is a problem. Under the 
Penal Code, trafficking in persons is punishable by 2 to 8 years' 
imprisonment. Parliament passed legislation during the year that 
established training programs for those who provide services for 
victims of trafficking. The Commission for Equality and Women's Rights 
has two working groups, one to oversee the training of social service 
workers and the other to inform victims of their legal rights; both are 
providing services.
    However, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution continues to be a problem. International trafficking rings 
take Portuguese women abroad, often to Spain, and bring foreign women 
to Portugal. The Portuguese women involved tend to be from poorer areas 
and are often, but not always, drug users. Women from Brazil and from 
Lusophone Africa also are involved, as are women from non-Lusophone 
countries such as Senegal.
    Russian mafia organizations are present in the country in 
increasing numbers, largely as the networks behind the trafficking in 
Eastern European women. One such network reportedly sells Moldovan and 
Ukrainian women for the equivalent of around $4,000 each. The 
authorities broke up one such ring in 1999 that was headed by a nuclear 
scientist from the former Soviet Union.
                               __________

                                ROMANIA

    Romania is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty, bicameral 
parliamentary system. Prior to the end-of-year elections, Prime 
Minister Mugur Isarescu was the Head of Government, and President Emil 
Constantinescu, who was elected directly, was the Head of State. On 
December 29, Adrian Nastase was sworn into office as the new Prime 
Minister, and Ion Iliescu was elected President on December 10. The 
judiciary is a separate branch of the Government; however, in practice 
the executive branch exercises influence over the judiciary.
    Several different security forces are responsible for preserving 
law and order and protecting against external threats. The laws that 
established these organizations are somewhat vague, and their security 
responsibilities overlap. All security and intelligence organizations 
operate under the authority of civilian leadership. The Ministry of the 
Interior supervises the national police, which have primary 
responsibility for security, and the border police. Some police 
officers committed serious human rights abuses.
    Romania is a middle-income, developing country in transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy. The private sector 
accounted for 61.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and employed 
61.9 percent of the work force, primarily in agriculture, commerce, and 
services. Although privatization is under way, government ownership 
remains dominant in the industrial sector. From 1993 through October 
2000, 7,108 firms were privatized; 1,162 during the year. Approximately 
1,200 firms are left in the State Privatization Fund's portfolio, 
including several of the country's largest firms. The economy 
contracted 6.6 percent in 1997, 5.4 percent in 1998, and 3.2 percent in 
1999. However, GDP grew 2 percent during the year. GDP per capita in 
1999 was about $1,512. Exports decreased 1.5 percent in 1998 and rose 
2.4 percent in 1999. Inflation increased from 40.6 percent in 1998 to 
54.8 percent in 1999. Official statistics significantly understated 
economic activity because of the size of the informal economy.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens; 
however, several serious problems remained. Police use of excessive 
force resulted in one death. Some police officers continued to beat 
detainees. The Government investigated police officers suspected of 
abuse and in some cases indicted those accused of criminal activities 
in military courts. However, investigations of police abuses generally 
are lengthy and inconclusive and rarely result in prosecution or 
punishment. While some progress was made in reforming the police, cases 
of inhuman and degrading treatment continue to be reported. The 
Government promised important modifications to the criminal code in 
1998, but no such changes were made. Prison conditions did not meet 
minimum international standards, and overcrowding remained a serious 
problem, despite improvements made in 1999. The judiciary remained 
subject to executive branch influence. Violence and discrimination 
against women remained serious problems. There was a large number of 
impoverished homeless children in large cities. Societal harassment of 
religious minorities still remained a problem, and religious groups not 
officially recognized by the Government sometimes complain that they 
receive discriminatory treatment from the authorities. Discrimination 
and instances of societal violence against Roma continued. Child labor 
was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution was a problem.
    The Ombudsman's Office, which was established in 1997, registered 
3,326 complaints as of early September 2000, 4,372 complaints in 1999, 
2,985 in 1998, and 1,168 in 1997. The Ombudsman's role still is not 
fully clear to the public. Many complaints were rejected because they 
related to problems with the judiciary and not the administration.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, Amnesty International and 
APADOR-CH, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the 
International Helsinki Federation, reported one case in which police 
used excessive lethal force against a member of the Romani minority.
    On May 21, a police officer shot and killed Petre Letea, a Romani 
man, and wounded Marian Pilos in Bucharest as they were attempting to 
escape in a car. Police had stopped to ask Letea what he was doing in a 
parked car by an apartment block. When told that he was waiting for two 
friends, police entered the apartment block and found two men 
attempting to burglarize an apartment. The men fled. One disappeared, 
while the other, Pilos, got into Letea's car, and Letea drove away. The 
police officer who had remained on the street opened fire on the car, 
shooting Letea in the head and killing him and wounding Pilos with a 
shot in the back. A 1994 law on the organization of the police force 
allows police to shoot in order to stop persons who are fleeing from 
attempts to take them into custody. The law also allows the use of 
firearms against persons who have escaped detention or run away from an 
escort.
    On November 30, Sorin Moldovan, deputy chairman of the Hunedoara 
County branch of the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) was 
killed by an unknown assailant. It was unclear whether the murder was 
politically motivated. Moldovan was the head of the Hunedoara customs 
office and had been sentenced for taking bribes in 1997; the Supreme 
Court later lifted his sentence.
    In several cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly due to 
police brutality during 1999, investigations and trials still are 
dragging on. There was no progress in the investigation of the death of 
Aurel Uluiteanu in police custody in September 1999 in Barcanesti. 
There were no further developments in the case of Cristian-Venus 
Dumitrescu, who allegedly was beaten by police in September 1999 and 
died after he ``threw'' himself out of a third floor window en route to 
a police station. There was no progress in the investigation of the 
death of Sevastian Apostol, a Rom killed by police while trying to flee 
a bar where he had a serious conflict with the owner and other clients. 
There was no further investigation into the August 1999 case of Elinoiu 
Toader, who died after being beaten by police. There was no further 
investigation into the killing of Radu Marian, an unarmed Rom who was 
killed in October 1999 during a police raid on a group of cigarette 
smugglers.
    According to the Government, the chief of police in Valcele was 
indicted in June 1999 for the illegal use of his weapon in the 1996 
killing of Mircea-Muresul Mosor, a Rom from Comani who was shot in the 
back and killed while in police custody. A lower court found the police 
officer not guilty, but the prosecutor's office appealed the verdict in 
May 1999; the superior court's decision still was pending at year's 
end.
    In several earlier cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly 
due to police brutality, investigations and trials still are dragging 
on, years later.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or 
Punishment
    The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment, and these prohibitions generally were 
respected in practice; however, there were credible reports that police 
beat detainees and used excessive force.
    Amnesty International cited numerous reports of torture and 
mistreatment. In 1999 in seeking to cover up the death of Elinoiu 
Toader, a witness allegedly was beaten to induce him to sign a 
statement that Toader had died as a result of alcohol abuse. At least 
two other witnesses were threatened similarly (see Section 1.a.).
    Romani NGO's claimed that police used excessive force against Roma 
and also subjected them to brutal treatment and harassment (see Section 
5). In one case excessive force reportedly resulted in death (see 
Section 1.a.).
    On January 8, Constantin Vrabie, of Candesti, was beaten severely 
by police officers in Buzau County. In December 1999, Vrabie had been 
fined approximately $30 (600,000 lei) for failure to produce 
identification and insulting the police. On the evening of January 8 
Vrabie, a friend named Valentin Barbu, and two more friends were 
stopped by three plainclothes policemen who took Vrabie and Barbu to a 
van and allegedly beat them. The two men were then taken to the Buzau 
police station. Vrabie was reportedly fined $10 (200,000 lei) for 
insulting the police and Barbu was admonished. Medical examination of 
Vrabie by the Buzau county hospital after he was released noted that he 
had massive bruises on his eye, lip, and forehead. Marks on Vrabie's 
lips and eye were still obvious on February 4 when he was interviewed 
by APADOR-CH representatives. Vrabie reportedly filed a complaint with 
the military prosecutor's office and challenged his fine. Barbu also 
reportedly filed a complaint.
    On January 25, Silviu Rosioru from Buzau County became involved in 
an altercation with several police officers from the Buzau intervention 
unit in a bar. The police threw Rosioru to the floor, handcuffed him, 
kicked him, and beat him with their batons. Rosioru was placed into a 
police van and then beaten on the way to Buzau police station. Rosioru 
was fined $10 (200,000 lei) for insulting the bar owner and refusing a 
reasonable request to provide personal identification. Rosioru claims 
that his signature was falsified on his police report, which claimed 
that he confessed to these crimes. Police officers allegedly subjected 
a witness to the incident to pressure and intimidation to ensure that 
her statement was consistent with police reports. The chief of the 
Bazau intervention unit was reported by local press reports to have a 
record of violence. As a result of this case and the Vrabie case, both 
involving the Bazau County intervention unit, several police officers 
in the unit, including the commander, were administratively sanctioned, 
and several were removed from the unit.
    On February 14, Alexandru Botu, of Prunaru village in the county of 
Teleorman, was reportedly beaten seriously by police. Botu had stopped 
in front of the shop S.C. Dina to talk to some acquaintances. The shop 
owner, the brother of Prunaru's mayor, had had an altercation with 
Botu's brother, beating him, in January. Botu finished his conversation 
and began to cross the street when he was stopped by the police chief 
and his deputy and led back to the shop. The shop owner closed the shop 
and its blinds and left. The policemen proceeded to beat Botu for about 
half an hour. A villager who heard Botu scream alerted Botu's wife, who 
rushed to the shop and took Botu home. The next day he was taken to 
Alexandria hospital where he was diagnosed with a series of deep 
bruises and two broken ribs. When interviewed by APADOR-CH 
representatives a month later he was still in poor physical condition.
    On May 18, in Bucharest a police officer shot Mugurel Soare, a 
Romani man, in the head and severely injured him. Police reports 
claimed that Soare and his brother, Vipan Soare, were chasing their 
former brother-in-law, Sorin Cutea, in order to kill him. When detained 
by three plainclothes policeman sitting nearby in an unmarked car, who 
been informed of the chase by Sorin Cutea, Soare attacked one officer, 
allegedly injuring him with a knife, and was shot in the scuffle that 
followed. However, local newspapers later reported that witnesses to 
the incident claimed that Soare was unarmed. Soare's right side remains 
paralyzed, and he is unable to speak. He is reportedly unlikely to make 
a full recovery. The case remained under investigation.
    Police reportedly abused journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    In April 1998, a policeman with whom he had refused to share a pool 
game beat Nicolae Iloaie of Tandareni. Iloaiei was hospitalized for 90 
days. When he asked for a certified medical report for the forensic 
laboratory, the physician in charge refused to issue it. The case 
remained under investigation. In May 1998, a policeman shot Marian 
Ciulei from Brasov in the leg while he was running from a confrontation 
in a discotheque. The case remained under investigation.
    In April 1998, the Government responded to the 1997 report of the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Special Rapporteur received 
allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the police. The 
Government in its response promised in 1998 to make modifications to 
the criminal code and to detention regulations, but no such 
modifications have been made.
    Judicial cases involving military personnel and the police are 
tried in military courts. Local and international human rights groups 
criticize this system, claiming that the military prosecutor's 
investigations are unnecessarily lengthy and often purposefully 
inconclusive, and that some military prosecutors sometimes block proper 
investigation of alleged police abuses. The Government declined to 
provide updated information on cases of alleged police abuse from 1998 
and 1997.
    Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards; 
however, the prison system is improving slowly as efforts increase to 
bring prisons in line with these requirements. The year's prison budget 
increased 74 percent over the 1999 budget. There are now a total of 41 
penal units, 34 prisons, (an increase from 33 prisons in 1999), 5 
prison hospitals, and 2 juvenile detention facilities. Nevertheless, 
overcrowding remains a serious problem, although it has improved 
slightly from 1999. On September 22, 49,540 people, including 1,571 
minors, were under detention. The legal capacity of the system was 
33,464.
    In May 1999 a law providing for alternative sentences for minor 
offenses went into effect. The law provides for community service 
instead of a prison sentence and is aimed at reducing the prison 
population.
    Human rights organizations continued to report the abuse of 
prisoners by other prisoners and prison authorities. Prisons continued 
to use the ``cell boss'' system, in which some prisoners are designated 
to be in semiofficial charge of other prisoners. There were attempts to 
ameliorate this system in some prisons by giving the inmates some input 
in the selection of these ``cell bosses.'' Prison guards wore firearms 
only when guarding prisoners working outside the prison, correspondence 
was no longer opened routinely, and inmates had the right to telephone 
calls. Prison authorities introduced some vocational training programs 
to assist inmates' future integration into society.
    The Government permitted prison visits by human rights monitors, 
and several NGO's made such visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids the 
detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without an arrest warrant 
from a prosecutor, who may order detention for up to 30 days, and 
authorities generally respected this provision in practice. Detention 
can be extended past the 30-day limit only by a court ruling. Detainees 
have the right to apply for bail and may ask for a hearing before a 
judge. Such a request must be granted within 24 hours.
    However, police often appear to take advantage of Article 16, 
Section b in the Police Organization Law 26 of 1994, which states that 
persons endangering the public, other people, or social order and whose 
identity cannot be established, can be taken to a police station. 
Police often use this provision of the law to detain people for up to 
24 hours at a police station.
    Police often do not inform citizens of their rights. The law 
requires the authorities to inform arrestees of the charges against 
them and of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal 
process. Police must notify defendants of this right in a language they 
understand before obtaining a statement. However, the prosecutor's 
office may delay action on a request for a lawyer for up to 5 days from 
the date of arrest.
    Under the law, minors detained by police and placed under guard in 
a center for the protection of minors are considered by judicial 
authorities to be in detention or under arrest if their age is more 
than 16, or, if aged between 14 and 16, they have consciously committed 
a crime. However, since the Penal Code does not apply to minors in 
these centers until their cases are referred to a prosecutor, police 
are permitted to question them without restriction and may hold those 
suspected of criminal offenses for up to 30 days in such centers. This 
law appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, and both Amnesty 
International and local human rights groups have called on the 
Government to change it.
    According to APADOR-CH, the Interior Ministry issued new 
instructions on detention in 1999 that provide for the confidentiality 
of discussions between detainees and their lawyers.
    Exile was not used as a means of punishment.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the terms of a 1992 law, the 
judicial branch is independent of other government branches; however, 
it remains subject to influence by the executive branch. Although 
members of the Senior Council of Magistrates, which controls the 
selection, promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges, are appointed 
by Parliament from a list provided by the courts and prosecutorial 
offices represented on the council, the Justice Minister may avoid the 
appointment of members he does not want by simply keeping them off the 
agenda.
    The 1992 law reestablished a four-tier legal system, including 
appellate courts, which had ceased to exist under Communist rule. 
Defendants have final recourse to the Supreme Court or, for 
constitutional matters, to the Constitutional Court. The 1992 law that 
reorganized the judicial system divided the Prosecutor General's Office 
into 16 local offices (paralleling the appeals court structure) and 
established an office at the Supreme Court; the law also curtailed 
certain powers of the Prosecutor General, including the right to 
overturn court decisions and bypass appeals courts by going directly to 
the Supreme Court.
    The law provides for fair public trial and the presumption of 
innocence. The Penal Code requires that an attorney be appointed for a 
defendant who cannot afford legal representation or is otherwise unable 
to select counsel. In practice the local bar association provides 
attorneys to the indigent and is compensated by the Ministry of 
Justice. Either a plaintiff or a defendant may appeal. These provisions 
of the law are respected in practice. The law provides that confessions 
extracted as a result of police brutality may be withdrawn by the 
accused when brought before the court.
    In a notable case in January 1999, a criminal appeals court ruled 
against miners' union leader Miron Cozma and overturned the 
Government's implicit deal to protect Cozma from prosecution for his 
role in a miner's strike.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--During the year there were no reported instances of 
interference with individual citizens' right to privacy.
    The Constitution provides for protection against the search of a 
residence without a warrant, but this protection is subordinate to 
``national security or public order.'' The 1992 National Security Law 
defines national security very broadly and lists as threats not only 
crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed 
insurrection but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions or 
attempts to change the existing national borders. Security officials 
may enter residences without proper authorization from a prosecutor if 
they deem a threat to national security ``imminent.''
    The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of 
communication is inviolable; thus, the Romanian Internal Intelligence 
Service (SRI) is prohibited legally from engaging in political acts 
(for example, wiretapping on behalf of the Government for political 
reasons). However, the law allows the security services to monitor 
communications on national security grounds after obtaining 
authorization. The law requires the SRI to obtain a warrant from the 
``public prosecutor specially appointed by the General Public 
Prosecutor'' in order to carry out intelligence activities involving 
``threats to national security.'' It may engage legally in a wide 
variety of operations to determine if a situation meets the legal 
definition of a threat to national security, or to prevent a crime.
    Legislation that permits citizens access to secret police files 
kept by the Communist government was passed in 1999. Under the law, any 
Romanian or foreign citizen who had Romanian citizenship after 1945 is 
entitled to have access to his file; a council approved by Parliament 
reviews the files and release the information unless it was a state 
secret or could threaten national security. The files remain in the 
custody of Romania's intelligence services. This law has been 
criticized on the grounds that it exempts files of current employees of 
the intelligence services for review, and changes the definition of 
informer to require actual payment. Many informers were unpaid 
volunteers.
    The NGO Romani CRISS reported that on September 26, police evicted 
12 Romani families from an apartment building in Bucharest. According 
to the testimony of the evicted Roma, they did not receive prior notice 
of the evictions, nor did the police present them with warrants for 
eviction. During the eviction police reportedly intimidated and 
harassed the families. The police station chief stated that the 
eviction was conducted pursuant to the permission of the prosecutor's 
office of the Sector Three Court of Bucharest. A spokesperson for the 
Bucharest city government stated that the Roma were illegally occupying 
the building and that they were housed in a hostel after their 
eviction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides 
for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it limits the 
bounds of free expression by prohibiting ``defamation of the country'' 
and ``offense to authority;'' the Government respected the 
constitutional provisions in practice.
    An amended Penal Code passed by Parliament in 1996 rectified many 
of the shortcomings of the former, Communist-era code. However, the new 
version is criticized by human rights organizations and professional 
journalists for retaining jail terms for those convicted of libel or 
slander, including journalists. Despite official promises that jail 
terms would be removed from penalties for libel and calumny, Parliament 
has yet to amend the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Consequently, 
Articles 205 and 206 concerning libel and calumny and articles 238 and 
239 concerning offense to authority and defamation of character are 
still in force.
    On the recommendation of the Council of Europe, legislation that 
would reduce the sentence for violating Article 205 to a fine instead 
of a prison term, and that would decrease a violation of Article 206 to 
3 to 12 months instead of the previous 2 to 6 years passed the Chamber 
of Deputies in June. This legislative package would have abolished 
Article 238, which criminalizes an offense against authority, along 
with Article 239, paragraph 1, which establishes a crime of verbal 
outrage against the authorities. However, the legislation failed to 
pass in the Senate during the year.
    The Government failed to rescind the prohibitions on ``defamation 
of the nation'' and ``defamation of public officials'' used to harass 
and punish journalists who report governmental or bureaucratic 
corruption. In 1999 several journalists were arrested and tried during 
the year for reporting on corruption by local government officials; 
journalists who were investigating corruption cases were also targets 
of violence.
    There were reports of police abuse of journalists. In May police 
severely beat Valentin Dragin, a Constanta-based journalist, while he 
was trying to photograph a party hosted by Constanta County's police 
chief. Dragan suffered several injuries, including a broken leg. He 
received most of his injuries from press officer Major Marian Saragea. 
The Interior Ministry still was investigating the matter.
    Independent media continued to grow in an increasingly competitive 
market. Several hundred daily and weekly newspapers are published. 
Several private television stations broadcast nationwide, with the 
largest reaching approximately 20 percent of the rural and 80 percent 
of the urban market. There are 72 private television stations and 162 
private radio stations. Approximately 2.8 million households were wired 
for cable, giving significant portions of the population access to both 
private and foreign broadcasts. Romanian State Television (RTV) and 
Radio Romania remained at year's end the only national broadcasters 
capable of reaching the bulk of the rural population. Independent 
stations continued to enlarge their coverage throughout the country by 
over-the-air, cable, and satellite transmissions. A French media group 
received a license for a private radio nationwide broadcasting 
operation in 1999 and is operating. Romania plans to bid licenses for 
another nationwide radio license in the future.
    Foreign news publications may be imported and distributed freely, 
but high costs, relative to domestic publications, limit their 
circulation.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected that 
right in practice. The law on public assembly provides for the right of 
citizens to assemble peacefully while unarmed but states that meetings 
must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not 
be held near locations such as hospitals, airports, or military 
installations. Organizers of demonstrations must inform local 
authorities and police before the event. Authorities may forbid a 
public gathering by notifying the organizers in writing within 48 hours 
of receipt of the request. The law prohibits the organization of, or 
participation in, a counterdemonstration held at the same time as a 
scheduled public gathering.
    The law forbids public gatherings to espouse Communist, racist, or 
Fascist ideologies or to commit actions contrary to public order or 
national security. Unauthorized demonstrations or other violations are 
punished by imprisonment and fines.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties gain 
legal status if they have at least 10,000 members. (The minimum 
membership required was increased in 1996 in order to reduce the number 
of small parties.) Associations may be granted legal status with proof 
of only 20 founding members and over 200 supporting members.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally does not impede the observance of 
religious belief. However, several denominations continued to make 
credible allegations that low-level government officials and Romanian 
Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. The press 
reported several instances when adherents of minority religions were 
prevented by others from practicing their faith, and local law 
enforcement authorities did not protect them. Members of religious 
communities not officially recognized by the Government during the year 
again accused government officials of harassment--allegations denied by 
the Government. Proselytizing that involves denigrating recognized 
churches is perceived as provocative.
    Under the provisions of a 1948 decree, the Government recognizes 14 
religions. A December 1989 decree reestablished the Catholic Church of 
the Byzantine rite, or Greek Catholic Church, which had been merged 
forcibly with the Romanian Orthodox Church by the communists in 1948. 
Only the clergy of these 15 recognized religions are eligible to 
receive state financial support. The number of adherents each religion 
had in the last census determines the proportion of the budget each 
recognized religion receives. Representatives of minority religious 
groups dispute the 1992 census results, claiming that census takers in 
some cases argued with citizens over their religious affiliation or 
simply assigned an affiliation in some cases even without inquiring 
about religious affiliation.
    The Government requires religious groups to register. To be 
recognized as a religion, religious groups must register with the State 
Secretariat for Religious Denominations and present their statutes, 
organizational, leadership, and management diagrams, and the body of 
dogma and doctrines formally stated by a religion. Representatives of 
religious groups that sought recognition after 1990 allege that the 
registration process was arbitrary and unduly influenced by the 
Romanian Orthodox Church. They also allege that they did not receive 
clear instructions concerning the requirements and that often the time 
frame in which a decision on their application has to be made is not 
respected by the State Secretary of Religions. Not one religious group 
has succeeded in receiving religion status since 1990. For example, 
although the Romanian Supreme Court has recognized that Jehovah's 
Witnesses are a religion, the State Secretariat for Cults and the 
Military Court of Appeals refuse to do so.
    The Government registers religious groups that it does not 
recognize as ``independent religions'' either as religious and 
charitable foundations or as cultural associations. This registration 
process was simplified, in theory, by a new law enacted on May 1. The 
Government currently interprets this law as forbidding religious groups 
registered as associations or foundations from building churches or 
other buildings designated as houses of worship.
    The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 86 percent of 
the population nominally adheres, predominates. The official 
registration of religious associations is extremely slow because of 
bureaucratic delays; in this regard, smaller religious groups have 
criticized the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs for its 
obstructionist tactics in favor of the Romanian Orthodox Church. A 
draft bill on religious denominations proposed in September 1999, which 
most religious groups objected to on the grounds it would have 
increased state control over religious activity and made the Romanian 
Orthodox Church the national church, was withdrawn in February.
    The Greek Catholic Church has made only limited progress in 
recovering its properties taken by the Romanian Orthodox Church after 
its forced merger in 1948. Of approximately 2,600 properties to which 
it has claim, only a handful have been returned. The Greek Catholics 
say they have received 136 churches, while the Government claims 142 
churches have been returned as of this year. The Greek Catholic Church 
has very few places of worship. Many followers still are compelled to 
hold services in public places or parks (260 such cases, according to 
Greek Catholic reports) because most of the former Greek Catholic 
churches have not been returned. A joint Orthodox and Greek Catholic 
committee formed by government decree in 1990 has failed to resolve the 
issue due to Orthodox resistance, despite the scaling back of the Greek 
Catholic requests from 2,600 properties to 300 churches. Restitution of 
the existing churches is important to both sides because local 
residents, who prize tradition, are likely to attend their local church 
whether it is Greek Catholic or Orthodox. Thus the number of believers 
and share of the state budget allocation for religions is at stake. The 
historical Hungarian churches, including the Hungarian Roman Catholic 
and the Hungarian Protestant Reformed, Evangelical, and Unitarian 
churches, largely have not received their property back from the 
Government. Out of 1,400 to 1,450 buildings claimed by the Hungarian 
churches, they have received about 10. The Jewish community reported in 
May that out of 21 properties nominally returned by the Government, it 
only has obtained actual possession of 5.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on 
travel within the country, except for certain small areas reserved for 
military purposes. Citizens who wish to change their place of work or 
residence do not face any official barriers. The law stipulates that 
citizens have the right to travel abroad freely, to emigrate, and to 
return. In practice citizens freely exercise these rights.
    The 1996 refugee law implemented the provisions of the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. This legislation established a refugee office in the Interior 
Ministry to receive, process, and house asylum seekers. The Ministry 
received 807 applications for asylum in the first 6 months of 1999; 
more recent figures were unavailable.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. In mid-1998 the 
Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry began funding programs to 
assist asylum seekers and refugees. Financial support provided by the 
Government (reimbursable loans for a period of 6 to 9 months) is 
minimal, usually not enough to cover basic needs. The Government 
provides temporary accommodation in only a few locations; more 
facilities are to open as funds are made available. Programs for 
integrating refugees into society are developing slowly. An increasing 
number of transiting illegal migrants regards the country as a 
springboard to the West.
    There were no reports during the year of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government through periodic and free elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    In November and December the left-center Democratic Socialist Party 
of Romania (PDSR) won a near majority in the legislature and the PDSR 
candidate, Ion Iliescu, won the Romanian presidency. The PDSR planned 
to govern as a minority government. The extremist, xenophobic Greater 
Romania Party (PRM) won the next largest share of parliamentary and 
presidential votes. Allegations of widespread voting fraud by the 
losing PRM candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, were not judged credible.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in 
government or politics; however, societal attitudes are a significant 
impediment, and women are underrepresented significantly in government 
and politics. Before the November 26 elections, there were 2 women out 
of 143 senators, and 25 women out of the 343 deputies in the lower 
house of Parliament, or 5.6 percent of total seats in Parliament. 
However, after the November elections, the percent of women in 
Parliament increased to 9.8 percent. Prior to the November elections, 
there was one female cabinet member; the current cabinet has five 
female members.
    The Constitution and electoral legislation grant each recognized 
ethnic minority one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, provided 
that the minority's political organization obtains at least 5 percent 
of the average number of valid votes needed to elect a deputy outright 
(1,784 votes in the 1996 elections). Organizations representing 15 
minority groups elected deputies under this provision in 1996. Ethnic 
Hungarians, represented by the UDMR, obtained parliamentary 
representation through the normal electoral process. Roma are 
underrepresented in Parliament because of low Roma voter turnout and 
internal divisions that worked against the consolidation of votes for 
one candidate, organization, or party. One Romani parliamentarian, the 
former Romani minority representative, joined the PDSR and sits in the 
legislature in addition to the one seat provided for Roma by the 
Constitution and electoral legislation.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic human rights monitoring groups include the Romanian 
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH), the independent Romanian Society for 
Human Rights (SIRDO), the League for the Defense of Human Rights 
(LADO), the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, and several issue-
specific groups such as the Young Generation of Roma and the Center for 
Crisis Intervention and Study, also a Romani NGO. Other groups, such as 
political parties and trade unions, continued to maintain sections 
monitoring the observance of human rights. These groups, as well as 
international human rights organizations, functioned freely without 
government interference.
    The Government cooperates with local and international monitoring 
groups, although some offices are slow to respond to inquiries. Local 
human rights monitoring agencies have found it difficult to obtain 
statistics concerning police abuses. The General Inspectorate of 
Police, which is responsible for investigating such abuses, responds 
unevenly to inquiries from monitors. Often victims are reluctant to 
come forward, and the Government does not promote transparency in this 
regard.
    The Ministry of the Interior stiffened conditions for prison visits 
by human rights organizations in February. The new regulations, which 
are authorized by internal regulations the Ministry does not release to 
the public, require the visit be requested by a prisoner, and be 
announced 3 to 4 days in advance.
    With the aim of protecting citizens against abuses or capricious 
acts of public officers, the Ombudsman's Office envisioned under the 
1991 Constitution was instituted by law in March 1997, and its first 
appointee, Paul Mitroi, took office in June 1997. However, due to a 
lack of office space, the office began working at normal capacity only 
at the beginning of 1998; by November it had received 4,255 cases. The 
office is registering these complaints and is obliged by law to provide 
an initial response within a year of the date they were recorded. It 
deals not just with human rights but with all facets of citizens' 
interaction with the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, nationality, 
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political 
allegiance, wealth, or social background. However, in practice the 
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and women, 
Roma, and other minorities are subject to various forms of extralegal 
discrimination. Homosexuals reportedly have been the victims of police 
brutality in the past.
    In September the Government issued emergency ordinance number 137 
which outlaws discrimination based on a number of factors and 
introduces the ability to sue on the grounds of discrimination. An 
emergency ordinance has the effect of law unless it is nullified by the 
Parliament.
    Women.--Violence against women, including rape, continued to be a 
serious problem. Both human and women's rights groups credibly reported 
that domestic violence is common, and a 1999 report by the U.N. 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) emphasized that violence against women in the 
workplace is not uncommon since their subordinate position exposes them 
to greater risk. According to UNICEF, the country has an average of 108 
sexual incidents per 1,000 women and 41 assaults per 1,000 women. Under 
a government pilot project begun in 1997, a shelter for victims of 
domestic violence opened in Bucharest in 1997. The shelter can 
accommodate only four persons. It received 490 calls for help during 
1998 on a hot line, and registered 230 walk-in victims. The prosecution 
of rape is difficult because it requires both a medical certificate and 
a witness, and a rapist can avoid punishment if he marries the victim. 
There is no specific legislation dealing with spousal abuse or rape, 
and successful prosecution of spousal rape is almost impossible. Police 
are often reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence.
    In April the Romanian edition of Playboy published a satirical 
article that explained in graphic detail how to beat one's wife without 
leaving marks. International and domestic protests led to apologies by 
Playboy's foreign editors and local publisher, and in July the Romanian 
edition of Playboy published an article on the costs of domestic 
violence.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution 
continues to be a growing problem. Several domestic prostitution rings 
are active (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution grants women and men equal rights. However, in 
practice the Government does not enforce these provisions, nor do the 
authorities focus attention or resources on women's issues.
    Few resources are available for women who experience economic 
discrimination. Despite existing laws and educational equality, women 
have a higher rate of unemployment than men, occupy few influential 
positions in the private sector, and earn lower than average wages. In 
1996 the Government created a department in the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection to advance women's concerns and family policies. This 
department organizes programs for women, proposes new laws, monitors 
legislation for sexual bias, targets resources to train women for 
skilled professions, and addresses the problems of single mothers, 
especially in rural areas. In 1998 this department organized with the 
U.N. Development Program a series of conferences on ``promoting gender 
politics.'' An Ombudsman was created within the department for child, 
woman, and family protection in 1998, but the total budget for women's 
programs for 1999 was less than $75,000.
    Children.--The Government administers health care and public 
education programs for children, despite scarce domestic resources. 
International agencies and NGO's supplement government programs in 
these areas. However, living conditions in all child care institutions 
very seriously deteriorated in 1999 for financial and administrative 
reasons and did not improve during the year. Inspectors who visited 
institutions and identified humanitarian needs at the request of the 
European Union Commission reported that while conditions were not 
equally bad in all institutions, the general situation in the summer 
could only be described as unacceptable in terms of basic 
infrastructure as well as hygiene, medical care, nutrition, and general 
assistance. According to official statistics, there were approximately 
60,000 orphans in state institutions.
    There was no perceptible societal pattern of abuse against 
children. Nevertheless large numbers of impoverished and apparently 
homeless, but not necessarily orphaned, children were seen on the 
streets of the larger cities. The Government does not have statistics 
defining the scope of the problem. NGO's working with children remained 
particularly concerned about the number of minors detained in jail and 
prison. These NGO's continued to seek alternative solutions, such as 
parole for juveniles. Because time served while awaiting trial counts 
as part of the prison sentence but does not count towards time to be 
served in a juvenile detention center, some minors actually requested 
prison sentences.
    The prevalence of child labor in the Roma community is widespread 
(see Section 6.d.).
    The sexual exploitation of children continued to attract press 
attention, and the police staged a few high-publicity arrests of 
foreign pedophiles. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Other issues, such as 
adequate legislation to protect children, received less attention. The 
law does not outlaw pedophilia expressly. Instead, pedophiles are 
charged with rape, corporal harm, and sexual corruption.
    People with Disabilities.--Difficult economic conditions and 
serious budgetary constraints contributed to very difficult living 
conditions for those with physical or mental disabilities. Many 
disabled persons cannot make use of government-provided transportation 
discounts because public transport does not have facilitated access. 
The law does not mandate accessibility for the disabled to buildings 
and public transportation. According to official statistics, there were 
3,500 disabled children living in state institutions.
    Religious Minorities.--Most mainstream politicians publicly have 
criticized anti- Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. However, the fringe 
press continued to publish anti-Semitic harangues. The Romanian 
Orthodox Church has attacked the ``aggressive proselytism'' of 
Protestant and neo-Protestant groups.
    In October a 19th century synagogue in Timisoara was vandalized and 
several religious items were stolen. A Jewish cemetery was desecrated 
in Turnu-Severin. There was no progress in the investigations of the 
desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in Galati and Transylvania in 1999. 
On December 28, two men attacked a guard at the Jewish History Museum 
in Bucharest and vandalized the exhibit. No arrests had been made at 
year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Department for the 
Protection of National Minorities has the responsibility to monitor the 
specific problems of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, to 
maintain contacts with minority groups, to submit proposals for draft 
legislation and administrative measures, to maintain permanent links 
with local authorities, and to investigate complaints.
    Ethnic Hungarians, numbering more than 1.6 million, constitute the 
largest and most vocal minority, and their UDMR party was a coalition 
member in the ruling Government for most of the year. Many of the 
issues addressed in the Romanian-Hungarian treaty of 1996 were 
implemented. Progress was made on economic issues, high-level visits, 
and infrastructure improvements such as border crossings. A government 
decree on Hungarian-language minority education was enacted and went 
into force in 1999. The decree permits students in state-funded primary 
and secondary schools to be taught in their own language, with the 
exception of secondary school courses on the history and geography of 
Romania.
    The Romani population, officially estimated by the Government at 
400,000, is estimated by the European Commission to number between 1.1 
and 1.5 million. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported a case 
of ethnically motivated violence against Vasile Florica, a Rom, and his 
family in April. Non-Romani villagers in Palos repeatedly beat Florica 
and attacked his wife and children. Florica filed a complaint with the 
Military Prosecutor's Office against a police officer and four civilian 
perpetrators; the case remained under investigation. Romani groups 
complain of routine police brutality, prejudice, and racial harassment 
at the local level. Four people arrested, tried, and convicted in a 
1993 incident in Hadareni, in which three Roma died in a house burning, 
were released in 2000 after serving their sentences. The victims are 
considering appealing to the European Court of Justice, arguing that 
the sentences given to the perpetrators were too light at 2 to 6 years.
    In February Bucharest-based Roma organizations filed charges 
against Marcel Flueraru, a journalist for the National, for using 
racist language in an article. On March 21, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty reported that Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman stated 
that the Government had an obligation to ``protect 23 million Romanians 
against the few thousand Gypsies'' who were damaging the country's 
image abroad. The NGO Romani CRISS reported a job announcement, posted 
in Bucharest's Third Sector Labor Force Office by a private firm called 
S.C. Guard, which stated, ``no Roma accepted.'' Romani CRISS filed a 
complaint with the Ombudsman's Office but had not received a response 
as of October 10. There was no further progress on the ban on Roma in 
the Iasi County hospital, where Roma who cannot afford to pay for 
medical treatment and cannot prove that they have medical insurance 
provided by the State are banned from the hospital. Some steps have 
been taken toward establishing an institutional framework to improve 
the conditions of the Roma, but in practice little progress has been 
made. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities and a 
working group of Roma associations set up by the Roma community signed 
an agreement for drafting a strategy for the protection of the Roma 
minority. However, the Roma office within the GOR is still understaffed 
with two civil servants. Meanwhile, the Roma population continues to be 
subject to societal discrimination.
    According to Human Rights Watch, the ERRC lodged applications 
against Romania with the European Court of Human Rights regarding cases 
of violence and destruction of property in Casinul Nou (1990) and 
Plaiesii de Sus (1991). These cases had been denied in Romanian courts 
in part because the statute of limitations had expired before they 
could initiate final appeals, due to the slowness of the court system. 
Police in both cases failed to conduct on-site investigations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except certain public 
employees have the right to associate freely, engage in collective 
bargaining, and form and join labor unions without previous 
authorization. Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of 
Interior personnel are not allowed to unionize. Trade unions may 
acquire property, support their member's exercise of their profession, 
establish mutual insurance funds, print publications, set up cultural, 
teaching and research bodies, establish commercial enterprises and 
banks, and borrow money. Limitations on the right to strike apply only 
to industries that the Government considers critical to the public 
interest and to other public employees. No workers may be forced to 
join or withdraw from a union, and union officials who resign from 
elected positions and return to the regular work force are protected 
against employer retaliation. The majority of workers are members of 
about 18 nationwide trade union confederations and smaller independent 
trade unions.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 2000 
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights'' reported that 
violations of trade union rights continued in practice. The unions 
reported that the Government interfered in trade union activities, 
collective bargaining, and strikes. The requirements to register a 
union were excessive.
    Amendments to Romania's 1991 law on labor disputes in November 1999 
brought some improvements and eliminated many restrictions. It widened 
the scope of the right to strike, although it continues to be difficult 
to hold a legal strike because of lengthy and cumbersome procedures. 
Union members complained that unions must submit their grievances to 
government-sponsored conciliation before initiating a strike, and they 
were frustrated with the courts' propensity to declare illegal the 
majority of strikes on which they have been asked to rule. Past studies 
indicated that the labor legislation adopted in 1991 falls short of 
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards in several areas, 
including the free election of union representatives, binding 
arbitration, the financial liability of strike organizers, the 
restriction of eligibility for trade unions, and the restriction of 
eligibility for trade union membership and offices to ``employees.'' 
Although the 1991 legislation supports collective bargaining as an 
institution, the contracts that result are not always enforceable in a 
consistent manner. Unions representing a wide range of economic sectors 
carried out strikes during the year, often protesting wage levels that 
did not keep pace with the rate of inflation. Early in the year, 
railway workers went on strike and only returned after a court 
determination that their strike was illegal. Additionally public 
education was suspended for several weeks until the Government awarded 
back wages and a pay increase to teachers. Utility company employees, 
lawyers, defense industry workers, textile workers, and public finance 
workers also carried out strikes, pressing for higher wages during the 
year. While most of these strikes ended with government promises to 
improve wages and working conditions, union leaders complain that these 
agreements frequently are not implemented.
    The November 1991 collective labor dispute law defined the 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration procedures under which strikes 
can be conducted. An important provision from both the labor and 
management perspective was the establishment of tripartite arbitration 
panels. The list of arbitrators must be approved by the economic and 
social council where trade unions and employers associations each have 
one-third of the membership.
    In January 1999 striking coal miners from the Jiu valley launched a 
march on Bucharest to protest mine closures. Due to previous violent 
miners' demonstrations the government denied them permission to march 
to Bucharest. Defying the Government decision, the miners continued on 
and attacked law enforcement officials. However, the Government 
succeeded in restoring order, and the perpetrators of the violence were 
arrested and tried.
    The law stipulates that labor unions should be free from government 
or political party control, a provision that the Government has honored 
in practice. Unions are free to engage in political activity and have 
done so.
    Labor unions may form or join federations and affiliate with 
international bodies. The National Confederation of Trade Unions-Fratia 
and the National Union Bloc are affiliated with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union 
Confederation. The Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania 
is affiliated with the World Labor Confederation. Representatives of 
foreign and international organizations freely visit and advise 
domestic trade unionists.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the legal right to bargain collectively, but collective bargaining 
efforts are complicated by continued state control of most industrial 
enterprises and the absence of independent management representatives. 
Basic wage scales for employees of state-owned enterprises are 
established through collective bargaining with the Government. Public 
employees may bargain for everything except salaries, which are set by 
the Government.
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
    Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country, 
including in the four free trade zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection generally 
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women and girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.-- The minimum age for employment is 16 years, but children 
as young as the age of 15 may work with the consent of their parents or 
guardians, although only ``according to their physical development, 
aptitude, and knowledge.'' Minors are prohibited from working under 
dangerous or hazardous conditions. Violations of the child labor laws 
are punishable by imprisonment for periods of from 2 months to 3 years, 
although there is no recent evidence of anyone being charged or 
convicted under this law. Working children under the age of 16 have the 
right to continue their education, and the law obliges employers to 
assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has 
the authority to impose fines and close sections of factories to ensure 
compliance with the law. There is no recent evidence of anyone being 
charged or convicted under this law. The Constitution prohibits forced 
and bonded child labor, and the Government generally enforces this 
provision; however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 5, 
6.c., and 6.f.).
    A department in the Office of the Prime Minister was established in 
1997 responsible for child protection. Local organizations were 
established in the counties and city of Bucharest to enforce child 
labor laws. As of September, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection confirmed that violations of the child labor laws have not 
been controlled.
    There are no accurate statistics of the number of illegally 
employed children. However, there is growing recognition of the 
problem. The Ministry of Education reported that 500,000 children under 
the age of 15 left school in 1997-98, which is approximately 20 percent 
of the school-age population. The prevalence of child labor in the Roma 
community is widespread (see Section 5). As the economy continues to 
restructure and as the gray market grows, the incidence of child labor 
is expected to increase. In March the ILO and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection agreed to form a task force to collect data and 
assist in organizing a national steering committee to combat child 
labor. The first meeting of the committee was held on July 4. The ILO 
is to provide $600,000 to assist 1,500 children to return to school.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most wage rates are established 
through collective bargaining at the enterprise level. However, they 
are based on minimum wages for specific economic sectors and categories 
of workers that the government sets after negotiations with industry 
representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates 
generally are observed and enforced. During the year, the minimum 
monthly wage, an equivalent of about $30 (700,000 lei), did not keep 
pace with inflation and did not provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and family. Prices for utility services such as water and 
heating have risen dramatically. However, basic foodstuffs and 
pharmaceutical products still are subject to price ceilings. Housing is 
no longer subsidized. A proposal to raise the minimum wage to 1 million 
lei was approved in November.
    The Labor Code of 1991 provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours 
or 5 days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work 
in excess of 40 hours. It also includes a requirement for a 24-hour 
rest period in the workweek, although most workers receive 2 days off. 
Paid holidays range from 18 to 24 days annually, depending on the 
employee's length of service. The law requires employers to pay 
additional benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly 
dangerous or difficult occupations. The Labor Code was to be revised 
during the year. However, trade unions and business associations were 
not included in the drafting discussion. No agreement could be reached 
on changes and no new legislation was presented to Parliament by year's 
end.
    Some labor organizations lobby for healthier, safer working 
conditions on behalf of their members. However, neither the government 
nor industry, which is still mostly state owned, has the resources 
necessary to improve significantly health and safety conditions in the 
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has established 
safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing 
them. However, it lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and 
enforcement, and employers often ignore its recommendations. In 1999 a 
department was established within the Ministry to conduct comprehensive 
safety inspections. European Union PHARE funds have assisted in 
building capacity within the new department. Although they have the 
right to refuse dangerous work assignments, workers seldom invoke it in 
practice, appearing to value increased pay over a safe work 
environment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women is an 
underreported but serious problem. The law is vague and outdated and 
does not address trafficking directly. Those involved in trafficking 
may be prosecuted for such offenses as prostitution and procurement, 
falsifying documents, assisting individuals to cross borders illegally, 
blackmail, forced labor, or illegal deprivation of freedom.
    Romania is both a source and a transit country for trafficked women 
and girls. The full extent of the problem is not known, since neither 
the Government nor NGO's maintain statistics on this issue; however, 
there is evidence that the problem is growing. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) office in the country reported that 
during the year about 141 women and girls were repatriated from sexual 
slavery by December, including 7 from Cambodia and 5 from Moldova. 
Figures for 1999 were less than 10. The number of individuals 
prosecuted for prostitution and procurement has been increasing since 
1997, but this phenomenon appears to be partially due to an increased 
awareness of the problem among law enforcement officials as well as to 
an increase in the activities themselves. The IOM Romania estimates 
that as many as 20,000 women are trafficked from Romania each year.
    It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 22,000 illegal 
immigrants, and that part of this total is a result of illegal 
trafficking. According to official statistics, 28 groups that tried to 
transit the country illegally were discovered in 1998. Women reportedly 
were trafficked to Serbia, Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Cambodia. Romania remains a 
popular transit country for persons, especially women, being trafficked 
from the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and other parts of the former 
Soviet Union. Iasi and Timisoara are major centers. Romania is also a 
source country; in 1997 the Government of Turkey deported some 7,000 
Romanian women. Authorities in the Netherlands broke up a trafficking 
ring late in 1999 that victimized some women from Romania. In May of 
this year, the Romanian embassy in Abu Dhabi had under its protection 3 
Romanian women who alleged that they were brought to the United Arab 
Emirates under false pretenses and were forced to engage in 
prostitution. Their passports were allegedly confiscated by their 
traffickers. In August Cambodian police and U.N. human rights officers 
rescued seven women from Romania and Moldova who had been trafficked 
and forced into prostitution there.
    Women often are recruited to work abroad by friends, relatives, or 
newspaper advertisements. According to the IOM, most women were unaware 
that they would be forced into prostitution. A minority of trafficked 
women are sold into prostitution by their parents or husbands or are 
kidnaped by trafficking rings. Ministry of Interior officials reported 
that trafficking rings appear to be operated primarily by Romanians. 
Several domestic prostitution rings are active.
    No separate IOM statistics exist for children trafficked to other 
countries. The Romanian NGO Sanse Egale Pentru Femei (Equal 
Opportunities for Women) reports that cases of trafficking in children 
rose from 8 in 1997 to 43 in 1999. In 1998, the NGO Save the Children 
dealt with 101 cases of children, mostly Roma, being taken to Germany 
and Italy and being forced to work as beggars or petty thieves. 
Trafficking of girls for prostitution is also a problem. The country 
has an extensive system of orphanages with approximately 60,000 
dependents, and many are complicit in letting girls escape into 
prostitution. Children forced out of orphanages between the ages of 16 
and 18 often have no identity documents, very little education, and 
few, if any job skills. NGO's estimate that many girls from these 
orphanages fall victim to trafficking networks.
    Legislation is generally inadequate to deal with this issue, and 
while the Government is beginning to recognize trafficking as a 
problem, it has not yet been able to mount any effective efforts to 
combat it. Corruption in the police force, particularly in local 
forces, also may contribute to the problem. Police officials often deny 
that Romania is a source country for trafficking; however, acceptance 
of the problem is slowly growing.
    One problem raised by law enforcement officers is that victims 
transiting or leaving the country may be doing so voluntarily, under 
the false belief they are accepting legitimate jobs or are unaware of 
the exploitation they will face if they are aware that they are to be 
prostitutes. Victims returned to Romania in the past have been 
prosecuted for the crime of leaving the country illegally, reducing 
their willingness to return or to cooperate with law enforcement 
authorities. Because there is no legislation that directly addresses 
trafficking, victims have no way to press charges against traffickers. 
The law also does not ensure a woman's safety if she decides to speak 
out against a trafficker. Legislation for the protection of minors is 
similarly inadequate.
    A very small number of local NGO's deal with trafficking issues. 
There are two shelters for victims of sexual abuse. Some NGO's 
expressed fear of reprisal from organized crime groups as a deterrent 
that prevents them from taking aggressive action against traffickers. 
NGO's are having some success in providing training for and working 
with local police forces on trafficking.
    Awareness of human trafficking is low. No large-scale awareness 
campaigns have been launched to publicize the issue and the dangers of 
accepting employment abroad. The IOM, working with local NGO's, plans 
to start a campaign in 2001.
    The Southeastern Europe Cooperation Initiative's task force on 
trafficking in human beings met twice during the year. As part of this 
initiative a seven man police unit of officers fully dedicated to 
combating human trafficking was established in November and December.
                               __________

                                 RUSSIA

    The 1993 Constitution established a governmental structure with a 
strong head of state (a president), a government headed by a prime 
minister, and a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly) consisting of 
the State Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house). 
Unlike its predecessor, this Duma is characterized by a strong pro-
presidential center that puts a majority within reach of almost all 
presidential priorities. Both the President and the Duma were selected 
in competitive elections, with a broad range of political parties and 
movements contesting offices. President Vladimir Putin was elected in 
March, and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov took office in May. Both the 
presidential elections and the December 1999 Duma Elections were judged 
by international observers to be largely free and fair, although in 
both cases preelection manipulation of the media was a problem. There 
were credible reports in March of election fraud in some locations; 
however, there was no evidence that such abuses affected the outcome of 
the presidential election. There were some modifications to the 
legislature and administrative structures; however, democratic 
institution building continues to face serious challenges, in part due 
to significant limitations on the state's financial resources. The 
judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack of resources and 
by high levels of corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are 
responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government. The FSB 
has broad law enforcement functions, including fighting crime and 
corruption, in addition to its core responsibilities of security, 
counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only 
limited oversight by the Procuracy and the courts. The primary mission 
of the armed forces is national defense, although they have been 
employed in local internal conflicts for which they are prepared 
inadequately, and they are available to control civil disturbances. 
Internal security threats in parts of the Russian Federation in some 
recent cases have been dealt with by militarized elements of the 
security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic 
law enforcement. Members of the security forces, particularly within 
the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit numerous, serious 
human rights abuses.
    Economic recovery following the August 1998 financial crisis and 
the steep ruble devaluation continued to exceed expectations. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew 3.5 percent in 1999, and according to 
preliminary estimates was 7.6 percent in 2000. Industrial production 
increased by 9 percent in 2000. GDP was estimated at $197.1 billion for 
the year. In 1999 inflation was 36.5 percent; by year's end it was 20.2 
percent. The ruble's devaluation continued to give domestic producers a 
significant cost advantage over imported goods, although the ruble has 
appreciated approximately 10 percent since the 1998 crisis. Economic 
growth during the year was led by a recovery in domestic demand, with 
net exports contributing less than in previous years. Real income grew 
in the first half of the year by 8.7 percent, compared with the same 
period in 1999 but remained 10 percent lower than in 1998 and 25 
percent lower than in 1997. Average wages increased to $89 per month by 
year's end, compared with $66 per month in the fall of 1999. However, 
approximately 36 percent of citizens continue to live below the 
official monthly subsistence level of $35. Official unemployment was 
10.2 percent, down from 12 percent at the beginning of the year. 
Reported levels of barter transactions--which make up a significant 
element in the economy--declined steadily in 1999, stabilizing during 
the last quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of the year. Corruption 
continued to be a negative factor in the development of the economy and 
commercial relations.
    Although the Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens in many areas, serious problems remain, including the 
independence and freedom of the media and the conditions of pre-trial 
detention and torture of prisoners. Its record was poor in Chechnya, 
where the Russian security forces demonstrated little respect for basic 
human rights and there were credible reports of serious violations. 
There were numerous reports of extrajudicial killings by both the 
Government and Chechen separatists. Beatings by security officials 
throughout the country resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Law 
enforcement and correctional officials tortured and severely beat 
detainees and inmates. Police also beat, harassed, and extorted money 
from persons. Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh and 
frequently life-threatening. According to human rights groups, 
approximately 11,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary 
facilities annually, some from beatings, but most as a result of 
overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and lack of 
medical care. The Government made little progress in combating abuses 
committed by soldiers, including ``dedovshchina'' (violent hazing of 
new recruits). Military justice systems consistent with democratic 
practices remained largely underdeveloped. While the military Procuracy 
reported decreases in the number of reported crimes and hazing 
incidents in 1999, human rights groups continued to receive the same 
number of complaints of such abuses and claimed that only about 10 to 
12 percent of serious cases are reported. Existing laws on military 
courts, military service, and the rights of service members often 
contradict the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees, 
elevating arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention and police corruption remain 
problems. Police and other security forces in various parts of the 
country continued their practice of harassing citizens from the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, and darker-skinned persons in general 
through arbitrary searches, detention, beatings, and extortions on the 
pretext of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration 
requirements. In August human rights groups in Moscow complained of 
increased detentions of persons from the Caucasus. Lengthy pretrial 
detention remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs have attempted to educate officers about 
safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through 
training provided by other countries; however, such institutions remain 
largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent 
with standards of law enforcement in a democratic society. The 
President and the Government were mostly silent about violations of 
human rights and democratic practice. While the President made 
statements about the need for a ``dictatorship of law,'' the Government 
has not institutionalized the rule of law required to protect human 
rights. Most abuses occur at lower levels, but government officials do 
not investigate the majority of cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or 
discipline the perpetrators.
    The Government made no progress during the year in the 
implementation of constitutional provisions for due process, fair and 
timely trial, and humane punishment. In addition the judiciary often 
was subject to manipulation by central and local political authorities 
and was plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. There were 
some indications that the law was becoming an increasingly important 
tool for those seeking to protect human rights; however, serious 
problems remain. For example, in August the Procurator appealed the 
December 1999 ruling by a St. Petersburg judge that found Aleksandr 
Nikitin, a retired Soviet Navy captain and environmental reporter, not 
guilty on charges of treason and espionage. The Presidium of the 
Supreme Court rejected this appeal on September 13, ending Nikitin's 
four year legal battle with the FSB and the Procurator.
    Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. 
Government technical regulations that require Internet service 
providers and telecommunications companies to invest in equipment that 
enables the FSB to monitor Internet traffic, telephone calls, and 
pagers without judicial approval caused serious concern. However, in 
response to a challenge by a St. Petersburg journalist, the Supreme 
Court ruled in September that the FSB is required to obtain and show 
court approval to telecommunications companies before it can proceed to 
initiate surveillance. Past practices raised questions among many 
observers about whether the FSB would abide by this ruling.
    The Government's record on media freedom worsened and significant 
problems persist. There was persistent evidence of government pressure 
on the media. Federal, regional, and local governments continued to 
exert pressure on journalists by: initiating investigations by the 
federal tax police, FSB, and MVD of media companies such as independent 
Media-Most; selectively denying access to information (including, for 
example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and filming 
opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories prior to 
publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and 
hearings; withholding financial support from government media 
operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to 
influence unduly the appointment of senior editors at regional and 
local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing 
reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them. The 
disappearance and subsequent arrest and prosecution of Radio Liberty 
reporter Andrey Babitskiy caused great concern, since there was 
credible evidence that the Babitsky case was politically motivated and 
that units of the Federal Government were involved in trying to silence 
critical reporting about the Chechen conflict.
    The Federal Government took few steps to mitigate the potentially 
discriminatory effects of a 1997 religion law that required national 
and local religious organizations to register or reregister with the 
Government. By year's end approximately 70 percent of religious 
organizations had managed to register or reregister their local 
organizations successfully. There were numerous reports that religious 
organizations from certain minority or ``nontraditional'' denominations 
either were denied registration or experienced long delays in 
reregistration. The delays in reregistration are in part due to the 
slow pace at which the federal Ministry of Justice at first 
disseminated the regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to 
understaffing both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels. 
However, delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination 
by some local officials. Religious organizations and human rights 
experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to extend the 
period for reregistration to prevent a situation in which a large 
number of religious organizations are left unregistered and therefore 
vulnerable to legal liquidation by court order after year's end. No 
extension was implemented by year's end. While the previous 
presidential administration promised to implement measures to 
discourage local authorities from attempting to liquidate (i.e., 
eliminate the organization's status as a juridical person) unregistered 
religious organizations, President Putin and the Government did not to 
comment on the law by year's end. Critics of the Religion Law fear 
that, while the law does not require the closure of unregistered 
religious organizations, that may be the practical effect of losing 
legal status. Discriminatory practices at the local level were 
attributable in part to the decentralization of power that took place 
during the Yeltsin administration, as well as to government inaction 
and widely held discriminatory attitudes; it remains unclear whether 
President Putin's efforts to strengthen central authority throughout 
the country might in some cases affect the situation for religious 
minorities.
    Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of 
movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some 
regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow) 
restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These 
restrictions, although repeatedly challenged in city court (most 
recently in September with success by a human rights organization), 
remain largely in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government. 
The presence of these restrictions, which increased following terrorist 
bombings in September 1999 and were reinvigorated following an 
explosion in Moscow in August, demonstrated the continued obstacles to 
the enforcement of judicial rulings.
    Government institutions intended to protect human rights are still 
weak and lack independence but are becoming more active. Human Rights 
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has played an increasingly public role in 
promoting human rights, speaking out on human rights abuses in pretrial 
detention, Chechnya, psychiatry, and on religious freedom. Mironov has 
an office with 150 staff members who investigate human rights 
complaints and promote human rights education. The Presidential Human 
Rights Commission, chaired by Vladimir Kartashkin, also investigates 
human rights complaints and promotes human rights education. Kartashkin 
currently is working with the armed forces to introduce human rights 
training manuals for soldiers. Nonetheless, the Presidential Commission 
has not played a vital role and receives limited financial support from 
the Government. The Office of Vladimir Kalamanov, the Presidential 
Representative for Securing and Defending Human Rights and Freedoms in 
Chechnya, is understaffed, underfunded, and has as limited mandate. 
While Kalamanov worked with the Council of Europe and the 
nongovernmental organization Memorial, he lacked a prosecutorial 
mandate and even the independence and resources to monitor human rights 
abuses adequately. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the human 
rights field documented and reported on human rights violations; 
however, they also reported some limited governmental interference. 
Some environmental and human rights groups complained of harassment 
from the Procuracy, tax police, and the FSB. In August armed masked men 
accompanied by a local police official in uniform raided the office in 
Moscow of the Glasnost Public Foundation, a human rights organization, 
holding personnel at gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes.
    Violence against women, and the abuse of children remain problems, 
as does discrimination against women and religious and ethnic 
minorities. People with disabilities continue to face immense problems 
from both societal attitudes and lack of governmental support. Societal 
discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of some 
religious minorities remained a problem. Although there were 
improvements in some areas, there were continued reports of religious 
violence in the North Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic 
incidents to which the government did not adequately respond. There 
were credible allegations of politically motivated government 
interference in the internal affairs of the Jewish community. There are 
some limits on worker rights, and there were reports of instances of 
forced labor. Trafficking in women and young girls is a serious 
problem.
    Chechen separatists reportedly committed abuses, including the 
killing of civilians and Russian security forces they captured. 
Government officials accused separatists of organizing and carrying out 
a series of bomb attacks throughout the country beginning in September 
1999 and continuing into the year; hundreds of civilians were killed or 
injured.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed political killings by agents of the Government.
    During the conflict in Chechnya in February, there were credible 
reports that the military used indiscriminate force in areas of 
significant civilian populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see 
Section 1.g.). There also were credible reports that military forces 
engaged in extrajudicial killings in Chechnya. For example, on February 
5 Russian riot police and contract soldiers (men hired by the military 
for short-term service contracts) executed at least 60 civilians in 
Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of Grozny. The perpetrators raped some 
of the victims and extorted money, later setting many houses on fire to 
destroy evidence. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), authorities 
suspended their investigation of the incident, and there were no 
indications that those responsible for similar incidents in late 1999 
were apprehended or punished (see Section 1.g.). According to the 
Presidential press service, since the start of the second war in 
Chechnya, 35 cases relating to crimes committed by servicemen against 
the local population were initiated; seven have been found guilty. 
NGO's argue that this is only a fraction of the true number of cases 
and there is little or no progress in accountability. According to HRW, 
no one has been held accountable for the extrajudicial killings of 130 
civilians in Alkjan-Yurt, Staropromyslovski, and Novye Aldi in late 
1999 and 2000.
    A number of government officials were murdered throughout the 
country. Some of these killings appear to have been politically 
motivated, connected with the ongoing strife in Chechnya, and others 
may be connected to local politics. For example, on December 5 Svetlana 
Semenova, SPS regional coordinator for the Leningrad Oblast was 
murdered; that same day the Mayor of Murom, Petr Kaurov was also 
murdered. It is not clear whether these incidents were politically 
motivated.
    An estimated 11,000 detainees and prisoners died during the year 
(see Section 1.e.). Hazing in the armed forces resulted in the deaths 
of servicemen (see Section 1.c.).
    On August 11, a bomb exploded in a crowded Moscow pedestrian way at 
the Pushkinskaya metro station, killing 12 people and injuring nearly 
90. Government officials implied at first that Chechnya-based Islamic 
extremist groups were responsible for the bombing and arrested four 
Muslim suspects from the Northern Caucasus. However, investigators have 
not ruled out the possibility that the incident was a result of feuding 
between rival criminal gangs.
    According to media reports in February, a woman was being held in 
connection with the murder of a prominent member of Parliament, Galina 
Starovoitova. Starovoitova was shot outside of her apartment in 1998 in 
what appeared to be a political killing. In 1999 a former police 
officer became a suspect in the assassination, but charges were dropped 
due to lack of evidence.
    There were no developments in the 1999 killings of the St. 
Petersburg Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov and 
Deputy Mayor Mikhail Menevich. In the case of St. Petersburg 
legislative assembly Deputy Viktor Novoselov, police arrested the 
killers but had no information on who hired them.
    On November 9, a military court began hearings against five former 
military intelligence officers accused of organizing the murder of 
``Moskovskii Kosomolets'' journalist Dmitri Kholodov. A sixth 
defendant, the head of a bodyguard agency, is charged with complicity. 
Kholodov was killed by a suitcase bomb in 1994; at the time of his 
murder, he was investigating widespread corruption among the military 
leadership.
    There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg 
city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case 
reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of 
Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen Republic 
Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen 
official Shadid Bargishev.
    Religious figures also were kidnaped and killed in Chechnya during 
the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).
    There were credible press reports that Chechen separatists tortured 
and killed a number of civilians and Russian captives. For example, on 
September 10, separatists shot and killed Mayor of Oktyabrskoye village 
Bukara Akhmatov. Government officials accuse separatists of organizing 
and carrying out a series of bomb attacks throughout the country 
beginning in September 1999. Since then, authorities have tied 
incidents in Dagestan and several cities in Southern Russia to 
separatists. Authorities have produced evidence and tried and convicted 
at least six persons for bombings around Russia. In addition 
separatists have executed summarily Russian soldiers whom they have 
taken prisoner (see Section 1.g.).
    There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four 
foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding 
hostage in Chechnya for 2 months.
    Government forces and Chechen Separatists have used landmines 
extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999 (see Section 
1.g.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were reports of Government involvement in 
politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya. According to credible 
reports, units of the Government were involved in the detention and the 
temporary disappearance of journalist Andrey Babitskiy in January. The 
Government at first denied any knowledge of Babitskiy's whereabouts, 
but after considerable international pressure officials asserted that 
the journalist was in the custody of ``local Chechens.'' Despite 
assurances that Babitskiy would be released on February 2, Russian 
officials declared the following day that he had been delivered to 
Chechen separatists in exchange for three Russian prisoners of war. 
However, separatists denied they had participated in such an exchange 
or that they held Babitskiy. Almost 2 months after his initial 
disappearance, Babitskiy was released but then was held by Russian 
authorities at a detention center in Makhachkala, Dagestan. Authorities 
stated that he had been charged with carrying a falsified passport. 
Babitskiy subsequently claimed that the passport was thrust upon him, 
essentially to set him up to be arrested. Journalists and human rights 
activists believe Babitskiy was targeted by the Government for his 
critical reports on the conflict in Chechnya. Babitskiy was tried in 
Makhachkala in September and convicted of possession and use of a false 
passport. However, he was covered under the amnesty granted for the 
anniversary of World War II and was released (see Sections 1.g. and 
2.a.).
    The NGO Memorial claimed in October that the total number of 
detainees had exceeded 15,000 persons. Many of these persons 
disappeared, but the majority were bought back by relatives. Memorial 
estimated that the number of individuals unaccounted for was somewhere 
between several hundred to one thousand.
    In a December report, Vladimir Kalamanov, the President's Special 
Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya, stated that his office had 
received complaints of 853 disappearances by year's end. His office 
forwarded a list of 462 missing residents of Chechnya to the Ministry 
of Interior. Forty-eight of the 462 were found to have been convicted 
and incarcerated into corrective labor institutions. According to this 
report, the Government began 34 criminal cases in connection with the 
disappearances of persons after their detention, including the Chairman 
of the Chechen Parliament, R.A. Alikhagiyev. Several media reports in 
October claimed that Alikhagiyev was being held in Lefortovo prison by 
the FSB; however, to at year's end there is no word on his whereabouts.
    In 1999 Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations with 
ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Grozny.
    On March 5, 1999, unknown assailants abducted Major General 
Gennadiy Shipgun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--
from his airplane at Grozny airport. Although the motives behind 
Shipgun's kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that 
his role in the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity. 
Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest 
warrants for six unnamed assailants. Russian authorities reported that 
what most likely were Shipgun's remains were found in May; forensics 
tests were being conducted in a laboratory in Rostov at year's end.
    There has been no progress in the case against the alleged 
kidnapers of a foreign missionary and university instructor, who was 
kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. In 
1999 Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that 
they had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the case. 
Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed the victim on 
June 29, 1999. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections 
1.a. and 5).
    Kidnaping frequently is used by criminal groups in the Northern 
Caucasus, some of which may have links to elements of the separatist 
forces. The main motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom, 
although some cases have political or religious overtones. Many of the 
hostages are being held in Chechnya or Dagestan. For example, Alla 
Geyfman, the daughter of a Jewish businessman, was held for nearly 7 
months by a Chechen gang demanding ransom. She was freed in February by 
security forces.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits torture, 
violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment; 
however, there are credible reports that law enforcement personnel 
regularly use torture to coerce confessions from suspects and that the 
Government does not hold most of the torturers accountable for their 
actions. There were credible reports that Government and separatist 
forces in Chechnya tortured detainees. There are also claims of abuse 
of psychiatry by authorities. Institutions such as the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding 
human rights during law enforcement activities through training 
provided by other countries but remain largely unreformed and have not 
yet adopted practices fully consistent with law enforcement in a 
democratic society. Since torture has never been defined in a 
subsequent law or the Criminal Code and is only mentioned in the 
Constitution, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can 
be accused of exceeding granted authority, a far milder violation of 
the Criminal Code.
    Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups, 
documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and correctional 
officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. Human rights groups 
describe the practice of torture as ``widespread.'' Numerous press 
reports indicate that the police frequently strike persons based on 
little or no provocation or use excessive force to subdue those whom 
they arrest. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and the press suggest a 
pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by police against persons 
with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, Central Asia, 
or Africa. However, press reports and human rights groups indicate that 
police in some republics engage in beatings and torture as part of 
investigative procedures as well. Police also increasingly harassed 
defense lawyers, including beatings and arrests, and intimidated 
witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police are reported to plant drugs and 
other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and detain persons 
based on their political views and religious beliefs, and conduct 
illegal searches of homes. Police also are reported often to extort 
money from suspects, their friends, and their relatives.
    According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia 
released in November 1999, torture by police officers usually occurs 
within the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of 
four forms: beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation 
using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks; 
or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists, 
which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are 
difficult to substantiate because of lack of access by medical 
professionals and because the techniques used often leave few or no 
permanent physical traces.
    Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice 
system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate 
defense of the accused. Law enforcement entities are expected to meet 
an unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite 
the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4 
percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with 
democratic practices and international standards for due process.
    In 1999 Sergey Pashin, a Moscow judge and rule of law activist, 
stated repeatedly that, in the cases that come before him, confessions 
often have been coerced from suspects through beatings. He also charged 
that ``witnesses'' often have been beaten to force them into 
testifying, when in fact they may have no knowledge of the case. As 
Pashin has told the press, he estimates that out of 1,200 official 
torture complaints received in the country annually, only 20 criminal 
investigations are opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. Human Rights 
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov estimated in October that 50 percent of 
prisoners with whom he spoke claimed to have been tortured. In April 
1998, the Permanent Human Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential 
committee, concluded that torture was ``common'' among representatives 
of the Ministry of Interior, and that it was ``widespread and 
systematic,'' especially in the pretrial stages of law enforcement. 
Yakov Pister, head of the administration of the Procurator General's 
office, testified to the Chamber that the Criminal Code has no 
definition of torture, and that no statistics were gathered on the use 
of torture. He blamed police reliance on torture as a means of 
gathering evidence on a lack of professional training.
    HRW noted that, assuming that they are aware of their rights under 
the law, defendants often are not granted access to defense attorneys 
or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention conditions are so miserable 
that defendants sometimes confess simply to be moved to relatively 
easier prison conditions. Retractions of forced confessions usually are 
ignored. The accused can spend many months or even years in pretrial 
detention because the current criminal procedure code allows judges to 
send cases back for investigation an unlimited number of times (see 
Section 1.e.).
    Under the ``Operation Clean Hands'' program, created in 1995, MVD 
officials continued to combat police crime. By the end of 1998, more 
than 34,000 citizen complaints were lodged against police officers. 
Over 2,100 cases were initiated against police personnel. Of that 
number, 922 were group crimes, and 127 included civilian perpetrators. 
For example, in Ulyanovsk court, proceedings were initiated against 
five militiamen on charges of ``exceeding their authority,'' for 
regularly subjecting young male suspects to torture. A Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) official estimated that during the first nine months of 
the year, the number of cases initiated against police personnel was 
similar to the number registered during the same period in 1999, with 
108 convictions in the first six months of the year.
    Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not 
limited to the practice of ``dedovshchina'' (the violent, sometimes 
fatal, hazing of new junior recruits for the armed services, MVD, and 
border guards), continued during the year. Press reports citing serving 
and former armed forces personnel, the Military Procurator's Office, 
and NGO's monitoring conditions in the armed forces indicate that this 
mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods in the 
face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press 
reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment resulted in 
permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not 
report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to 
fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or 
even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There 
are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline 
soldiers whom they find to be ``inattentive to their duties.''
    In July 1999, the Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported 
that cases involving the abuse of military position or authority 
increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence. 
However, the MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes 
during 1999 and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. Statistics 
for the year were unavailable, although MMPO officials estimated that 
from January to June, over 4,800 investigations into allegations of 
human rights abuses were initiated.
    Both the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee (USMC) and the MPPO 
also noted an increase in the number of reports about ``nonstatutory 
relations'' in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean 
their subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful 
conditions throughout the armed forces and to the widespread placement 
of inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in 
primary troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee 
expressed concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened 
during the period of military service by such incidents.
    In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents 
of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of 1999 just 
on the aircraft carrier cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov. Similar activity, 
including the theft of hardware and weapons by sailors seeking to 
escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy nuclear cruiser 
(and flagship) Petr Velikiy in 1999. According to press reports, in 
September, a warrant officer on a Pacific Fleet ship became drunk and 
began to beat enlisted men on board. As a result, 41 sailors, over half 
the ship's company, left the ship and went to the Pacific Fleet 
Headquarters to complain about repeated, savage beatings by drunken 
noncommissioned officers. Admiral Rasskazov told the press that sailors 
complain to him or to prosecutors every day. In the same article, a 
prosecutor revealed that, as of July 10, criminal cases had been filed 
in Vladivostok against naval officers and sailors who ``tortured'' 
their subordinates and shipmates.
    Other reported abuses of armed forces personnel included the 
practice by officers and sergeants of ``selling'' soldiers to others as 
slave labor (to build dachas, etc.) or to other officers who have a 
military need for personnel but are not able to work through the 
system, most often linked to units in the Northern Caucasus military 
district. The USMC reported that such practices continue. In one recent 
complaint received in the USMC's Moscow office, a soldier was allegedly 
sold for approximately $2 (50 rubles) to another unit. In another case, 
an officer bought a soldier for 10 bottles of vodka. The USMC continues 
to receive complaints about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
accused it of being among the worst of the branches in its human rights 
record.
    The MMPO continues to cooperate with the USMC to investigate 
allegations of abuse and established telephone and postal ``hot lines'' 
to receive reports directly from soldiers. Nonetheless, the USMC 
believes that the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not 
reported, due to fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and 
deliberate efforts to cover up such activity. The USMC estimates that 
only 10 to 12 percent of serious incidents are reported; it received 
nearly 4,000 complaints in its Moscow office alone during the year.
    According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45 
percent of military personnel committing or attempting suicide were 
driven to it by either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions 
of military service. Nonpayment of wages could also be a factor, 
although nonpayment decreased significantly during the year. (However, 
contract soldiers serving in Chechnya complained of chronic nonpayment, 
and in some cases, such as in Rostov on the Don in September, they 
engaged in protests). The USMC reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of 
the cases brought to the authorities attention, there was an official 
finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action 
was taken as a result. These figures remained unchanged by year's end. 
The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main reason 
for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence during the 
conscription process. A rise in the acceptance of draftees who are 
unfit for military service allegedly also is contributing to crime 
within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common, including the 
reported ``purchase'' of unwarranted medical deferments by potential 
conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many categories of legal 
deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its campaign against draft 
evasion and cracked down on conscription abuses. The USMC reported that 
after the spring draft, police often dragged unsuspecting recruits 
without documents, regardless of their mental or physical health, into 
draft board offices.
    Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the 
armed forces, principally due to insufficient funding. August 
television reports of naval housing in the Murmansk region showed 
decrepit, crowded apartments even for officers.
    Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the leadership 
of the armed forces has made only superficial efforts to implement 
substantive reforms in training, education, and administration programs 
within units to combat abuse. Their limited efforts were due at least 
in part to lack of funding and the leadership's preoccupation with 
urgent reorganization problems and the fighting in Chechnya.
    There was still no law providing for the constitutional right to 
alternative civilian service, and the proposal for an all-volunteer 
armed forces has been put off indefinitely by the Government's 
inability to raise military pay sufficiently. Although some regional 
authorities have attempted to introduce alternative service programs, 
national legislation necessary to implement the constitutional right to 
alternative service has not been passed by the Duma. Without such 
legislation there is no legal basis beyond the constitutional language 
itself for any alternative service program. As a result, the courts 
often rule against the individual based upon the legal requirements 
relating to military service.
    The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment 
prevalent during the Soviet era has ended. However, human rights groups 
charge that psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives 
and their practices. Further, authorities reportedly still sometimes 
abuse the practice of psychiatry for other purposes. The Independent 
Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human rights 
organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in 
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' and in testifying 
against ``nontraditional'' religions in court cases. In deprogramming 
cases, authorities allegedly use pseudo-psychological and spiritual 
techniques to ``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious 
groups (see Section 2.c.). Human rights groups are concerned about 
court-appointed ``expert commissions'' charged with evaluating rituals, 
beliefs, and the mental health of believers. Groups assert that the 
commissions lack objectivity and often act under pressure from regional 
authorities negatively disposed toward the religious denominations.
    Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of 
Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric 
hospitals were used to punish dissidents), and other human rights 
activists such as the Moscow Helsinki Group head Lyudmila Aleksyeva, 
criticized the trial of Platon Obukhov, a Russian diplomat charged with 
espionage. Although independent psychiatrists deemed Obukhov mentally 
unfit to stand trial, a court-appointed commission found him competent. 
Human rights activists charge that the evaluation was based on 
political considerations and pressure from the FSB. Obukhov's case is 
currently under appeal.
    Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life 
threatening. Since 1998 the penitentiary system has been administered 
centrally from Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the 
Ministry of Education all maintain penal facilities. There are five 
basic forms of custody in the criminal justice system: Police detention 
centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's), correctional labor colonies 
(ITK's), prisons designated for those who violate ITK rules, and 
educational labor colonies (VTK's) for juveniles. Responsibility for 
operating the country's penal facilities falls under the Ministry of 
Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences (GUIN). The 
country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded. According to 
January statistics of the Public Center for Penitentiary Reform (PCPR), 
1,060,000 persons were incarcerated in the prison system run by GUIN. 
By year's end, PCPR estimated there had been a decrease of prisoners 
that brought the total to 912,100, approximately 655 per 100,000 
persons of the population at large. While this number only includes 
prisoners in the GUIN system, PCPR estimates that approximately 90 
percent of all prisoners fall into this system. Conditions for 
detainees and prisoners in most government facilities remain extremely 
harsh. According to the 1995 Law On the Detention of Those Suspected or 
Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate 
space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's 
provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were 
not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most 
judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison 
population.
    Conditions in police station detention centers vary considerably, 
but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not fed and have 
no bedding, places to sleep, running water, or toilets.
    Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial, 
sentencing, or appeal, are confined in a Special Isolation Facility 
(SIZO), which is a pretrial detention facility, mainly for a person who 
is awaiting trial. Persons can spend up to three years awaiting trial 
in a SIZO. Around 280,000 persons are held in the 195 SIZO's. Around 
65,000 are held in police detention centers with another 5,000 to 6,000 
in special facilities for the homeless. Convicts on occasion are 
imprisoned in SIZO's because there is no transport to take them 
elsewhere. Conditions in SIZO's remain extremely harsh and pose a 
serious threat to life and health. Health, nutrition, and sanitation 
standards in penal facilities remain low due to a lack of funding. Head 
lice, scabies, and various skin diseases are prevalent. Prisoners and 
detainees typically rely on families to provide them with extra food. 
The PCPR estimates that SIZO's are filled to 230 percent of capacity. 
In larger cities such as Moscow, the average space per prisoner amounts 
to 0.5 cubic meters. In the majority of police detention centers there 
is no shower and no outdoor exercise, and inmates are fed only twice a 
day. To alleviate overcrowding, the Government announced an amnesty (to 
reach 120,000). According to PCPR, on September 1 more than 99,000 
inmates were released in an amnesty (358 of them were juveniles). The 
total number amnestied was expected to reach 120,000 by November. While 
the amnesty has affected the overall number of prisoners, by most 
accounts the greatest decrease is due to the increased use of 
alternative punishments such as selective parole for certain offences. 
In some regions such as Murmansk, more than 70 percent of all convicted 
offenders are given sentences not involving incarceration. In 1998 the 
occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112 percent. 
Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of 
capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International. 
As of September, there were 40,800 women held in correctional labor 
colonies, according to the MCPCJR. Under such conditions, prisoners 
sleep in shifts, and there is little, if any, room to move within the 
cell. In most pretrial detention centers and prisons, there is no 
ventilation system. Poor ventilation is thought to contribute to 
cardiac problems and lowered resistance to disease. Cells are 
overcrowded and stiflingly hot in the summer.
    Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's 
convicts. Of the 742 ITK's, 644 are designated for men (122 of these 
are ``timber'' correctional colonies). Although they are not as crowded 
as SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break 
down resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and 
starved. According to the PCPR, conditions in the ITK's are better than 
in SIZO's prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the 
timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their 
time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards reportedly are common. A 
total 678,500 male prisoners and 40,800 female prisoners are held in 
the ITK's. Of the 34 colonies for women, there are a few special 
facilities for children to be held with their mothers (465 children up 
to 4 years old). In the educational labor facilities, there are 19,000 
males and 1,100 females. The country's ``prisons''--distinct from the 
labor colonies or ITK's--are penitentiary institutions for those who 
repeatedly violate the rules in effect in ITK's.
    Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for 
from 14 to 20 years of age. The PCPR's September statistics indicate 
that there were approximately 20,000 persons in the 64 educational 
colonies, some 19,000 males and 1,000 females. Conditions in VTK's are 
significantly better than in ITK's, but juveniles in VTK's and juvenile 
SIZO cells reportedly also suffer from beatings, torture, and rape. The 
PCPR reports that such facilities have a poor psychological atmosphere 
and lack educational and vocational training opportunities. Many of the 
juveniles are from orphanages, have no outside support, and are unaware 
of their rights. There currently are two prisons for children in 
Moscow. Boys are held in small crowded, smoky cells with adults. 
Schooling in the prisons for children is sporadic at best, with 
students of different ages studying together when a teacher can be 
found.
    According to statistics provided by the PCPR, the proposed federal 
budget as of the end of September allocated $778 million (14 billion 
rubles) for the upkeep of the GUIN system. According to GUIN, $1.3 
billion (23 billion rubles) are needed to maintain the system 
adequately. However, the full allotment is not always spent. For 
example, in a Ryazan educational colony for females, less then $1 (18 
rubles) per day for each inmate is considered necessary. In the budget, 
the institution is allotted only 10 rubles per inmate, while in 
actuality, less than four rubles actually make it to the institution. 
There are no steps underway at present to increase the portion of the 
budget allotted to GUIN.
    According to the PCPR, conditions in penal facilities vary among 
the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food, 
clothing, and medicine. NGO's and religious groups offer other support.
    Inmates in the prison system often suffer from inadequate medical 
care. Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far 
higher than in the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general 
population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human 
rights experts to be not only a national, but an international health 
threat. PCPR estimates that 96,000 prisoners suffer from infectious 
tuberculosis--approximately 42 to 43 percent of all tuberculosis 
patients in Russia. A total of 25,000 of these prisoners are infected 
with a drug-resistant form of the disease. Some 90,000 of the overall 
patients, mostly under 30 years of age, are incarcerated in SIZO's. Of 
these, 26,000 are in special prison hospital wards for tuberculosis, 
42,000 in medical facilities, and 17,000 in isolation in prison 
facilities, with the rest being held among the healthy prison 
population. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned with the 
tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded the 
tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the 
PCPR. GUIN is working the with Soros Foundation to develop programs in 
some regions to combat tuberculosis.
    HIV/AIDS infection rates are also a source of concern. The PCPR 
estimated that there were 8,000 prisoners infected either with HIV or 
who had developed AIDS, but the lack of adequate health care precludes 
estimating the true number of such prisoners and suggests that this is 
an underestimate. Space shortages do not allow for separate facilities 
for prisoners with AIDS.
    Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed 
or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel 
disciplined for the use of excessive force are not released publicly. 
PCPR estimates that around 11,000 prisoners died in penitentiary 
facilities during the year (2,500 of whom died in SIZO's). Most died as 
a result of overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, or lack of medical 
care (the leading cause of death was heart disease), but some died due 
to beatings. The Procuracy General claimed that it receives 
approximately 1,000 complaints of torture per year, but no reliable 
figures are available. The press often reports on innocent individuals 
mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported 
cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.
    Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common. 
There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers, 
homosexuals, rapists, prison rape victims, child molesters, and others 
are considered to be ``untouchable'' and treated very harshly, with 
little or no protection provided by the prison authorities.
    At a March 1999 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the 
President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy 
General developed a plan to address the ``critical'' state of the 
national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and 
the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes 
in the Criminal Code that could yield a prison population decrease of 
400,000 over 1 year.
    According to the PCPR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN in 
the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the prison 
population is to change the Criminal Code provisions regarding 
pretrial, parole and probation, and postconviction release measures. 
Zubkov stated that the Criminal Code is too severe and allows 
unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of restraint (as opposed 
to bail or release on the prisoner's own recognizance, for example). 
The PCPR called for greater use of alternatives to custody, such as 
bail and house arrest. Moreover, the PCPR reported that detainees spend 
too long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or 
more. The Ministry of Justice concurs with the PCPR that limits must be 
placed on time in detention awaiting trial.
    Moscow-based human rights groups make infrequent visits to prisons 
in the Moscow area, and they have neither the resources nor a national 
network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions. The pretrial 
detention centers and filtration camps for suspected Chechen fighters, 
are not usually accessible to human rights monitors (see Section 1.g.). 
In May, the ICRC began to visit persons detained by Russian 
authorities. The ICRC works throughout Russia and is especially active 
in the North Caucasus. They are currently carrying out regular prison 
visits, but by agreement with the Government, their findings are kept 
confidential. The ICRC provides advice to authorities on how to improve 
conditions.
    In January and February the remand prison at Chernokozovo was the 
principal detention center for those detained in Chechnya. Prolonged 
beatings to the genitals and to the soles of the feet, rape, electric 
shocks, tear gas and other methods of torture were used at the center. 
Guards subjected detainees to humiliation and degrading treatment. At 
least one person was beaten to death. Often prison guards and other law 
enforcement officers use torture to coerce confessions or testimony. 
Conditions improved at Chernokozovo in mid-February; however, an 
increasing number of detainees subsequently were held elsewhere and 
continued to suffer abuses, including torture, according to Human 
Rights Watch. The Government has allowed ICRC access to some facilities 
in the North Caucasus where Chechen detainees are held.
    In one of many reported incidents, a Chechen man described how he 
saw federal guards puncture detainees' eardrums and file their teeth 
and damage their lips with a file forced into their mouths--an 
apparently new form of torture. In another reported incident, a Chechen 
man was pulled from his cell, homosexually raped, and taunted with 
anti-Chechen epithets. In the case of the Chernokozovo prison, the 
torture of prisoners by federal guards came to light in part through 
reports of Andrey Babistkiy, a reporter for Radio Liberty who was 
himself detained and beaten there. According to credible reports, units 
of the Government were involved in the detention and disappearance of 
Babitskiy in January for his reporting in Chechnya (see Section 1.b. 
and 2.a.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain serious problems. The Constitution provides that the 
arrest, taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of 
crimes are permitted only by judicial decision. Under the 1997 code the 
maximum sentence for all offenses increased from 15 years to 30 years. 
Criminal proceedings continue to be governed both by the 1997 Criminal 
Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code, adopted in 1960.
    Efforts to achieve Duma approval of a new Criminal Procedure Code 
have been unsuccessful.
    There are credible reports from throughout the country that police 
detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue 
proper arrest warrants or receipts for confiscated property. This is 
especially true for persons from the Caucasus. There are credible 
reports that security forces continue regularly to single out persons 
from the Caucasus for document checks, detention, and extortion of 
bribes. In 1999 Moscow city law enforcement authorities frequently 
detained persons unlawfully for alleged violations of registration 
requirements, especially in response to the terrorist bombings in 
September 1999, when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and 
deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Russian forces commonly 
rounded up and detained groups of Chechen men at checkpoints along the 
borders and during ``mop-up'' operations following military 
hostilities, and engaged in severe beating and torture.
    In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards 
contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven 
and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal 
Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators 
authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's 
authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a 
crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours 
without a warrant.
    The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that 
detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of 
detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout 
investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This 
procedure generally is followed in practice. The PCPR reports that 
detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in 
accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high 
cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public 
defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively 
deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a 
result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe 
it useless. Families have access to individuals in pre-trial detention; 
however, in initial detention by the police in precincts, they may at 
times not be granted access.
    Articles 47 to 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that in 
certain cases the court, an investigator, or a procurator is to provide 
the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect cannot 
afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint a 
lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However, lawyers 
(advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does not in 
fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a result, 
in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no assistance 
during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-court 
assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained 
lawyers. At times the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning 
cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a 
lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny 
access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time 
when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has 
to wait for days to get a meeting with the client).
    A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons 
suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing 
charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994 
and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree 
also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal 
law on preventing vagrancy and providing social rehabilitation of the 
homeless. However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet 
any such draft law under consideration.
    The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should 
elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the 
file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file 
formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations 
seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or 
longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal 
investigation is conducted. The PCPR reports terms of pretrial 
detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to 
10 months. However, in some extreme cases the PCPR reports detention 
periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor 
investigative and court work.
    The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of 
criminal investigation to 6 months in ``complex'' cases. If more time 
is required in ``exceptional'' cases, the Procurator General personally 
can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation 
period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the 
investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of 
the Procurator's office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. There is no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty 
during the investigative period, although if a suspect informs the 
investigator that he is guilty, the period of the investigation usually 
is shorter than if he maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear 
exercising their right to request judicial review of their detention 
due to fear of angering the investigating officer.
    There also were credible reports that persons were detained far in 
excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses, in some 
cases so that police officials could extort money from friends or 
relatives of detainees. The situation has improved somewhat since the 
issuance of the 1997 presidential decree that annulled a previous 
decree that had allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of 
detaining individuals in excess of permissible periods is common, and 
this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.
    The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or 
have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding 
in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial, 
results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer 
than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted. In the 
juveniles' prisons, boys and girls (in separate facilities) are 
incarcerated in the facility for up to several years while they await 
trial and sentencing.
    Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure 
Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the 
judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion 
in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Judges 
often do not dismiss cases involving improper investigations or 
indictments, particularly if the procurator's case has political 
support or if the case is controversial. Such cases often are returned 
to the procurator for further investigation.
    Some regional and local authorities have taken advantage of the 
system's procedural weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for 
expressing views critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in 
the regions have been charged with libel, contempt of court, or 
interference in judicial procedures in cases with distinct political 
overtones. Others have been charged with other offenses and held either 
in excess of normal periods of detention or for offenses that do not 
require detention at all (see Section 4).
    On June 2, Taisa Isayeva, a Chechen journalist, was arrested at the 
border checkpoint ``Nizhny Zaramag'', between North Ossetia and 
Georgian controlled Ossetia. Isayeva, who works for the Chechen Press 
agency based in Georgia, was detained at the border because she was 
carrying a video camera and a portable computer.
    On October 3, Primorye Regional FSB authorities opened a criminal 
case against Vladimir Schurov, Director of the Sonar Laboratory of the 
Pacific Oceanographic Institute (POI). He was charged with divulging 
state secrets, unlawful transfer of dual use technologies, and also for 
organizing a criminal group. Schurov has denied all charges.
    Russian authorities took measures in two ``espionage'' cases 
involving foreigners who worked with Russians and obtained information 
the authorities considered sensitive. In both cases, proceedings took 
place behind closed doors and the defendants and their attorneys 
encountered difficulties in learning the details of the charges. In 
both cases, the circumstances suggested that the security services were 
seeking to discourage foreigners on issues they considered to be 
sensitive.
    In November 1999 disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA 
Canada Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information 
about the specific charges was made public. At first the case appeared 
to focus on his work on a study of civil-military relations funded by 
the Canadian Defense Ministry. Sutyagin's family stated that the study 
did not deal in secret matters and was partially funded by the Russian 
Defense and Foreign ministries. Evidence in the case is secret and 
lawyers stated that Sutyagin received copies of the details on December 
15. The trial was recessed until January 9, 2001.
    Throughout the year there have also been numerous other cases of 
individuals charged with treason and detained. In August 1999 
Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soyfer filed a complaint 
in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July 1999 the FSB 
confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment, the removal 
of which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's 
official record of the search. While under investigation the FSB 
dropped the case stating that Soyfer fell under the November amnesty. 
Soyfer appealed this decision to clear his name, arguing that he was 
innocent, and that there was no basis or need to amnesty him. The court 
agreed, passing the case back to the FSB for either investigation and 
prosecution, or dropping charges.
    In October 1999 Vladimir Slivyak, director of the antinuclear 
organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference that Moscow 
police detained and questioned him for a few hours in September about 
his possible involvement in the August bombing of the Manezh shopping 
center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly had been framed 
on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of Chelyabinsk also was 
detained and questioned by police officers in September as she and four 
other activists were on their way to city hall to deliver a letter 
protesting the potential import of spent nuclear fuel into the country. 
Authorities charged all five with hooliganism. Reportedly authorities 
told another activist in Voronezh to report to the police station for 
an ``informal conversation'' on the topic of an antinuclear camp near 
the NovoVoronezh nuclear power plant and threatened him with drug 
possession charges if he failed to appear.
    St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled at the end of 1999 that 
Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain, 
was not guilty on charges of espionage and treason. Although 
prosecutors later appealed the decision, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Court on September 13 upheld the acquittal. Legal observers believe 
that the legal foundations of the Golets ruling were sound and that it, 
along with the Supreme Court decision, may provide an important 
precedent in combating abuses by the FSB.
    Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due 
process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically 
motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996 
on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes 
punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with 
the Bellona foundation, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the 
publication of a report detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste 
generated by the Northern Fleet, in which Nikitin served. Indictments 
cited classified decrees that were made available to Nikitin's defense 
team only at the beginning of the trial, which finally commenced in 
October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's detention. In his December 
1999 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the secret decrees used to charge 
Nikitin violated every citizen's right to access to the law and 
therefore were not binding under the Constitution. Moreover, according 
to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to the Criminal Code 
during the investigation and violated Nikitin's constitutional rights. 
The case against Nikitin was finally closed by the September ruling of 
the Supreme Court presidium that the prosecutor's appeal of Nikitin's 
acquittal was without merit. However, the Federal Tax Police continued 
to harass him, claiming that the money provided by Bellona for his 
legal defense was taxable income.
    Media-Most chairman Vladimir Gusinskiy was detained in Moscow's 
Butyrka Prison for three days in June, in connection with the General 
Procuracy's criminal fraud case against him. Gusinkiy left Russia in 
July, shortly after the Procuracy dropped its criminal case against 
him. Later it became known that Gusinskiy signed an agreement with 
Gazprom-Media chief Alfred Kokh just before leaving the country in 
which he pledged to sell a controlling share of his media enterprises 
to Gazprom. Gusinskiy insisted publicly that he had signed under 
duress, citing a protocol to the agreement that was co-signed by Press 
Minister Mikhail Lesin. Many observers interpreted the protocol as a 
quid pro quo in which the Government agreed to drop its criminal 
investigations of Gusinskiy and Media-Most in exchange for receipt by 
Gazprom of a controlling share in NTV and
    Media-Most. Later in the year, the General Procuracy cited 
Gusinskiy's refusal to appear for further questioning on a broader 
criminal fraud case against Media-Most as grounds for seeking his 
extradition. At year's end, Gusinskiy remained in Spain under house 
arrest as Spanish officials considered the Government's extradition 
request.
    No new arrests of human rights monitors were documented during the 
year.
    In July 1999 after 20 months in pretrial detention, military 
journalist and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko 
was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for dereliction of duty but 
immediately was released under the prisoner amnesty. However, 
prosecutors subsequently appealed the sentence and the military 
collegium of the Supreme Court dismissed the earlier conviction and 
sent the case back to Vladivostok to be retried for the more serious 
charges of espionage and treason. The trial is expected to begin in 
March 2001. Pasko originally was charged with treason and espionage 
after reporting on radioactive contamination by Russian Pacific Fleet 
sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. The trial was 
marked by a number of irregularities, including the judge's decision to 
remove one of Pasko's defense attorneys for contempt of court and also 
a key witness recanting earlier testimony claiming it had been made 
under duress from investigators. The Committee to Protect Journalists 
and the Glasnost Defense Fund observed that the case is still a 
powerful disincentive to investigative reporting (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited judicial 
independence; however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective 
counterweight to other branches of government. Efforts to develop an 
independent judiciary continue. Judges remain subject to some influence 
from the executive, military, and security forces, especially in high 
profile or political cases. The judiciary still lacks sufficient 
resources and is subject to corruption.
    The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general 
jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court 
system under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional 
Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary 
jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court 
system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or 
rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal 
cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the 
regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions 
of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately 
superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The 
arbitration court system consists of city or regional courts as well as 
appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of Arbitration. 
Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal 
entities and between legal entities and the state. Qualifying Collegium 
nominate judges for approval (by the President), remove them, and 
approve requests by prosecutors to investigate judges. Approximately 
1,000 justices of the peace were appointed in 33 regions throughout the 
country during the year. These judges handle family law and criminal 
cases where the maximum sentence is 2 years.
    Low salaries and lack of prestige make it difficult to attract 
talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing 
judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental 
salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges recruited and 
raising the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working 
conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.
    The 2000 government budget increased funding for the judicial 
system; however, it is not enough to cover all of the system's needs. 
Not all of the money allocated was dispersed and regional 
administration support is still needed.
    Judges are subject to intimidation and bribery from officials and 
others. As judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a 
verdict and handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for 
intimidation. In July 1999, the chair of the Primorskiy Kray 
arbitration court, Tatyana Loktionova, announced that Primorskiy Kray 
Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in the court's 
activities and that she and her colleagues feared for their personal 
safety. The governor blamed the court for bankrupting the region's 
enterprises and destroying its economy and persuaded then-Prime 
Minister Putin to authorize an internal investigation of the 
arbitration court for possible illegal conduct. Loktionova was removed 
from the court but appealed to the Supreme Court for reinstatement. On 
August 23, the Supreme Court's Board of Appeal upheld the lower court's 
ruling removing Loktionova from the bench. Loktionova appealed to the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In October the Moscow 
City Collegium of Judges removed Moscow City Judge Sergey Pashin from 
the bench for ostensible infractions of professional etiquette. 
However, most observers believe that Pashin was removed for political 
purposes, as punishment for his outspoken views criticizing judicial 
colleagues on cases ranging from the conscientious objector Neverovskiy 
in Kaluga to the legal procedures surrounding Media-Most. Pashin 
appealed the Collegium's decision to a higher body and he was later 
reinstated.
    The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the 
suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of 
Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide 
legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any 
representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it 
uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal 
professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the 
indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to 
pay for trial attorneys for them and public defenders are poorly 
trained.
    Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is 
not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony 
given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to 
a lawyer or that they were coerced into making false confessions or 
statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases 
in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the 
defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of 
guilt.
    In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been 
introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the 
prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking 
questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate 
that in practice the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence 
often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly developed cases 
to the prosecution for additional investigation rather than risk 
confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover in certain cases the 
Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no limitation on the 
number of times the case can be investigated. The Constitutional Court 
partly addressed this issue in an April 20, 1999, decision that held 
that part of the article of the Code providing for this practice was 
unconstitutional. The practice of repeatedly returning cases for 
further investigation greatly increases the time that defendants spend 
in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.).
    Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public reportedly 
favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to criminal 
justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to prefer 
trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.
    The Independent Council of Legal Expertise reported that defense 
lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment, including 
beatings and arrests. Professional associations at both the local and 
federal levels reported abuses throughout the country. They charge that 
police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys and to cover up 
their own criminal activities. For example, on March 28 Moscow defense 
lawyer K. Moskalenko was assaulted by members of Moscow's Organized 
Crime Unit of the MVD while attempting to assist a client illegally 
detained by the Unit at a residence. Moskalenko complained to the 
Procurator, but her complaint was rejected at the end of April. The 
Glasnost Public Foundation criticized the September 30 arrest of public 
defender Mikhail Konstantinidiy in Novorossiysk. Konstantinidiy was 
arrested for purported ``illegal entrepreneurial activity,'' which 
human rights activists believe was concocted in retaliation for the 
lawyer's successes against an oil company and a local politician.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private 
residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a 
judicial decision. It permits the government to monitor correspondence, 
telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with 
judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization, 
and dissemination of information about a person's private life without 
his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as 
part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal 
penalties. However, problems remain, and no one has ever been convicted 
of violating those safeguards. There were reports of electronic 
surveillance by government officials and others. Moscow law enforcement 
officials reportedly entered residences and other premises without 
warrants. For example, on October 19, three investigators from the 
Organized Crime Unit and Economic Crime Unit of the MVD entered the 
premises of the Moscow Choral Synagogue without a warrant and searched 
the offices of Moscow Chief Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt (see Section 
2.b.).
    Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that 
interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian 
acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were 
issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency 
of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies 
present a serious threat to privacy rights, and violate the Civil Code, 
the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to 
SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995, 
granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications 
transmissions for investigative purposes. It required a warrant to 
carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the Constitution and 
other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB the same kind of 
monitoring power over Internet communication that it had for 
telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.
    Internet service providers were required to install, at their own 
expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal. 
Those providers that did not comply with the requirements faced either 
loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2 
framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or 
the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to 
privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a 
warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There 
appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to 
Internet traffic without a warrant.
    On July 25 Minister of Communications Leonid Reyman issued an order 
implementing the last stage of SORM. According to the order, registered 
by the Ministry of Justice on August 9, the FSB is no longer required 
to provide to the telecommunications and Internet companies any court 
documentation or any information about targets of interest. Human 
rights activists suggest that this order only formalizes the practices 
established since SORM was introduced. However, Pavel Netupskiy, a St. 
Petersburg journalist, challenged Reyman's order in court, claiming 
that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court examined the case and 
ruled September 25 partially in Netupskiy's favor, leaving the 
requirement that the FSB conduct monitoring only by court order and 
that it provide information to the company about the target of 
surveillance. However, despite the court ruling, adequate oversight and 
enforcement of this constitutional provision and the court order are 
lacking. On September 12 Putin signed the ``Doctrine of Information 
Security of the Russian Federation'' which offers general language on 
protecting citizens' constitutional rights and civil liberties but also 
includes specific provisions that would justify greater state 
intervention. The Doctrine gives much leeway to law enforcement 
authorities in carrying out SORM surveillance of telephone, cellular, 
and wireless communications.
    Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special 
services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and 
the FSB, have used their services' power to gather compromising 
materials on political and public figures as political insurance and to 
remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies, both active and 
retired, were accused of working with commercial or criminal 
organizations for the same purpose.
    There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB 
continue to exert pressure on Russian citizens employed by Western 
firms and organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into 
becoming informants.
    Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from 
houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The indiscriminate use of force by government 
troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian 
casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, 
the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of 
Ingushetiya. The Federal Government has been fighting a war against 
separatists in Chechnya since August 1999 following attacks by Chechen 
separatists in neighboring Dagestan. In the fall of 1999, government 
forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen 
villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the 
territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. 
Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were 
accompanied by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery, 
particularly in the fall 1999 campaign to retake the capital, Grozny. 
There were numerous reports of attacks on civilian targets, including 
the bombing of schools and residential areas. In early 2000 a large-
scale offensive military campaign by government forces continued 
against the separatists. That offensive campaign largely ended 
following federal occupation of most of Chechnya by late spring, 
although federal forces remained engaged in an intensive anti-
insurgency campaign against separatist guerillas. The security 
situation prevented most foreign observers from travelling to the 
region, and the Federal Government enforced strict controls on press 
access. NGO's reported that federal authorities in some cases 
confiscated recording devices and communications equipment at the 
border. These restrictions made independent observation of conditions 
and verification of reports very difficult. Nevertheless, there were 
numerous credible reports of human rights abuses and atrocities 
committed by federal forces.
    Federal authorities continued to claim that government forces 
utilized ``high precision'' weapons and tactics against the rebels; 
however, a wide range of reports indicated that government military 
operations resulted in many civilian casualties and the massive 
destruction of property and infrastructure. The number of civilian 
fatalities caused by federal military operations cannot be verified, 
and estimates of the total number of civilian dead vary from the 
hundreds to the thousands. For example, on December 20, seven students 
were killed when Russian forces fired mortar rounds on Grozny State 
Pedagogical Institute. The procurator was investigating the incident at 
year's end. The number of civilians wounded by federal forces also 
could not be verified, although reports from hospitals that still were 
operating in the region indicated that the majority of patients were 
mine or ordnance victims, and that such weaponry was the primary cause 
of death. Throughout the conflict, accusations were made by both sides 
about the use of chemical weapons. However, no credible evidence has 
been offered to support these claims.
    In addition to casualties attributable to indiscriminate use of 
force by the federal armed forces, many atrocities reportedly were 
committed by individual federal servicemen or units. Command and 
control among military and special police units often appeared to be 
weak, and a culture of lawlessness, corruption and impunity flourished. 
This culture fostered individual acts (by government forces) of 
violence and looting against civilians. For example, according to HRW 
and press reports, on February 5, Russian riot police and contract 
soldiers (men hired by the military for short-term service contracts) 
executed at least 60 civilians in Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of 
Grozny. The perpetrators reportedly raped some of the victims and 
extorted money, later setting many of the houses on fire to destroy 
evidence.
    According to HRW and other NGO reports, Russian soldiers executed 
at least 38 civilians in the Staropromyslovski district between 
December 1999-January 2000. Most of the victims were women and elderly 
men, and all apparently were shot deliberately by Russian soldiers at 
close range. Similar events also occurred in Katr Yurt, were hundreds 
of already displaced persons were forced to flee, persons were killed, 
and houses were burned. Russian forces allegedly did this because 
Chechen fighters had passed through the village after the retreat from 
Grozny on February 5. In November 1999, government troops opened fire 
on doctors and other medical staff at a psychiatric hospital, injuring 
three persons. According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped 
civilian women in Chechnya in December 1999 in the village of Alkhan-
Yurt and in other villages.
    According to human rights NGO's, federal troops on numerous 
occasions looted valuables and foodstuffs in regions they controlled. 
Many internally displaced persons (IDP's) reported that they were 
forced to provide payments to, or were otherwise subjected to 
harassment and pressure by, guards at checkpoints. There were also 
widespread reports of the killing or abuse of captured fighters by 
federal troops, as well as by the separatists, and a policy of ``no 
quarter given'' appeared to prevail in many units. A private wounded in 
the conflict told representatives of the Union of Soldiers Mother's 
Committee (USMC) organization that the commander of his unit gave the 
order that no prisoners should be taken and no one should be left alive 
in Grozny. Federal forces reportedly beat, raped, tortured, and killed 
numerous detainees. The human rights NGO Memorial compiled a list of 
300 missing captured rebels, some of whom had not been seen in 6 
months. Federal forces reportedly ransomed Chechen detainees to their 
families. Prices were said to range from several hundred to thousands 
of dollars.
    Armed forces and police units reportedly routinely abused and 
tortured persons held at so-called filtration camps, where federal 
authorities claimed that fighters or those suspected of aiding the 
rebels were sorted out from civilians.
    There were some reports that federal troops purposefully targeted 
some infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian 
population, such as water facilities or hospitals. The NGO Physicians 
for Human Rights reported that that physicians in Grozny Ambulatory 
Clinic #5 and Grozny City Hospital #4 stated that their hospitals were 
destroyed. The indiscriminate use of force by federal troops resulted 
in massive destruction of housing and commercial and administrative 
buildings, as well as the breakdown of gas- and water-supply facilities 
and other types of infrastructure. Representatives of international 
organizations and NGO's who visited Chechnya also reported little 
evidence of federal assistance for rebuilding war-torn areas.
    International organizations estimate that the number of IDP's and 
refugees who left Chechnya as a result of the conflict reached a total 
of about 280,000 at its peak in late spring. Of this total, most went 
to Ingushetiya (245,000). Some 6,000 Chechen IDP's were reported in 
Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in Georgia. About 20,000 
Chechen IDP's reportedly went to other regions of the Russian 
Federation. Federal refugee policy aimed at repatriating IDP's as soon 
as possible back to Chechnya. However, as of early fall, federal 
authorities promised that no one would be repatriated forcibly. 
Reliable information on the number and status of displaced persons 
within Chechnya was especially difficult to obtain, due to heavy 
fighting and limited outside access to the region. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that at times as many 
as 150,000 persons were displaced within Chechnya and lacked access to 
humanitarian assistance. There were approximately 6,000 Dagestani IDP's 
in Dagestan. NGO's also estimated that at least a quarter of a million 
residents, including almost the entire Russian, Armenian, and Jewish 
populations, migrated from Chechnya as a result of the current conflict 
and the first war of 1994-96.
    At various points during the conflict, authorities restricted the 
movement of IDP's fleeing Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's, 
early in the conflict border guards at times permitted only ethnic 
Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to the Russian press, 
some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts of 
Chechnya that were under government control. In 1999 refugees at the 
border sometimes had to live in the open, without access to food or 
water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border between 
Chechnya and neighboring regions reportedly required Chechen refugees 
to pay money to pass. According to UNHCR, the authorities early in the 
year prevented medical supplies destined for hospitals from entering 
Chechnya. There also were many credible reports that Russian guards at 
checkpoints within Chechnya demanding money to allow persons to pass. 
Some refugees also had trouble moving about because their documents had 
been lost, stolen, or confiscated by Russian authorities. Currently 
8,000 persons live in railway carriages in the region. During the year, 
4,000 others who had been living in railway cars were transferred to a 
winterized tent camp. According to the Council of Europe (COE), about 
2,000 persons live in harsh conditions in rail wagons in Sernovodsk 
without sufficient heating and appropriate sanitation facilities, which 
puts them at risk of contagious diseases.
    While Russian media coverage of events in Chechnya was extensive, 
most journalists and editors appeared to be exercising self-censorship 
and avoiding subjects embarrassing to the Government (see Section 
2.a.). Since the resumption of the war in October 1999, federal 
authorities--both military and civilian--limited journalists' access to 
war zones and confiscated reports and equipment, citing threats to the 
safety of reporters. After November 1999, additional accreditation--
besides the usual Foreign Ministry accreditation--was required for 
entry to the region. In some cases, foreign journalists publicly 
complained that military officials in the northern Caucasus region made 
it excessively difficult for them to receive local press accreditation. 
In one instance in September, Associated Press reporter Ruslan Musayev 
was detained, beaten, and held in a covered pit for 24 hours until he 
paid Russian soldiers to release him.
    In April U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson 
visited Chechnya to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. 
However on the visit, according to Robinson's report to the UNCHR, 
Russian authorities denied her access to a number of locations, 
including five detention centers where Amnesty International alleged 
that Russian guards committed abuses against Chechen detainees. She 
also was denied access to villages near Grozny where Russian troops 
were accused of killing and raping civilians. Robinson did meet with 
IDP's in Ingushetiya, who provided firsthand testimony of alleged 
violations of human rights by Russian military, militia, and Ministry 
of Interior forces in Chechnya. Authorities asserted that Robinson 
distorted the true nature of the state of affairs and that Russia never 
hid the truth about the situation in Chechnya.
    In response to international criticism of the human rights 
situation in Chechnya, several official Russian organizations were 
established to examine alleged human rights violations in the republic. 
In February President Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamanov as special 
Presidential Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya. Kalamanov's 
office, with a staff of 25 persons, including 3 experts on loan from 
the COE, opened branches in Moscow and a number of locations in the 
North Caucasus to take complaints about alleged human rights 
violations. In April Pavel Krasheninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma 
Committee on Legislation, was elected head of a newly created 
Independent Commission on Human Rights in the North Caucasus. In 
September the Commission opened nine offices in Chechnya and three in 
Ingushetiya. Together Kalamanov's office and Krasheninnikov's 
Commission heard thousands of complaints from citizens, ranging from 
destruction or theft of property to rape and murder. However, neither 
organization was empowered to investigate or prosecute alleged offenses 
and had to refer complaints to the military or civil prosecutors. By 
the end of the year, the prosecutors had opened more than 100 cases of 
alleged crimes. Almost all of these concerned alleged violations of 
military discipline and other common crimes. The Presidential 
Administration press service reported that 38 cases relating to crimes 
committed by servicemen against the local population were opened, and 
that seven servicemen were convicted by year's end. The charges against 
the seven service men were not known. The Federal Government did not 
comply with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution's calling 
for a broad-based, independent commission of inquiry to investigate 
alleged human rights violations and breaches of international 
humanitarian law.
    Chechen separatists also committed abuses, but--as with the many 
reported Russian violations--there were difficulties in verifying or 
investigating them. According to unconfirmed reports, separatists 
killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human 
shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented 
refugees from fleeing Chechnya. For example, the rebel fighter Akhmed 
Ibragimov reportedly murdered 34 fellow villagers, including 3 
children, after 1 of the villagers refused to dig trenches. One witness 
described seeing four bodies of persons who were crucified on spikes by 
separatists for cooperating with federal authorities in Grozny.
    Separatists allegedly killed and attempted to kill numerous Chechen 
officials loyal to the Federal Government. For example, on May 31, 
Grozny Mayor Supyan Makhchayev was wounded and his aide and a Russian 
official were killed by a car bomb. According to press reports, Chechen 
rebels opened fire on an EMERCOM (Ministry of Civil Defense, 
Emergencies, and the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters) 
Car on June 9 in Grozny, killing three Russian epidemiologists and 
wounding three others. In July Ruslan Khamidov, head of the 
administration of the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, was killed in his 
home. On August 4, head of the Nozhay-Yurtovskiy Rayon Administration 
Isita Gayribekova was wounded and her brother and sister killed in a 
bomb explosion at the home of their mother. Chechen separatists started 
a series of suicide attacks in June. Two Chechen women detonated a 
truck packed with explosives at a Russian army base west of Grozny.
    Human rights NGO's reported that Chechen separatist units abused 
civilians and endangered their lives by provoking Russian 
counterattacks on civilian areas. The rebels took up positions in 
populated areas and fired on Russian forces, thereby exposing the 
civilians to Russian counterattacks. When villagers protested, they 
sometimes were beaten or fired upon by the rebels.
    Separatist military units also reportedly abused, tortured, and 
killed captured Russian soldiers. In one incident, rebel sources 
reported that they executed nine Russian prisoners after Moscow refused 
to exchange them for a Russian officer accused of raping and killing a 
Chechen woman. In another incident reported by an NGO, a Chechen 
witness described seeing the body of a Russian soldier with his throat 
cut. When asked by the witness why the soldier was killed, the rebel 
fighters purportedly replied that it was their standard practice to 
slit the throats of Russian captives.
    Individual rebel field commanders were reportedly responsible for 
funding their own units, and some allegedly resorted to drug smuggling 
and kidnaping and ransom to raise funds. As a result, it often was 
difficult, if not impossible, to make a distinction between rebel units 
and simple criminal gangs. Some rebels received financial and other 
forms of assistance from foreign supporters of international terrorism. 
The international terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden reportedly sent 
funds, personnel, and material to elements in the rebel camp. According 
to press reports, as many as 400 of Bin Laden's followers may have 
joined the rebels from his base in Afghanistan (see Section 1.a.).
    Government forces and Chechen separatists have used landmines 
extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999. In April, the 
country announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. There is not 
accurate information on the number of those killed by landmines 
throughout Russia.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and numerous national and regional 
media reflect a multitude of opinions; however, government pressure on 
the media persisted and in some respects increased significantly, 
resulting in numerous infringements of these rights. The Government 
exerted pressure on journalists, particularly those who reported on 
corruption or criticized officials, by: selectively denying them access 
to information (including, for example, statistics theoretically 
available to the public) and filming opportunities; demanding the right 
to approve certain stories prior to publication; prohibiting the tape 
recording of public trials and hearings; withholding financial support 
from government media operations that exercised independent editorial 
judgment; attempting to influence the appointment of senior editors at 
regional and local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; 
removing reporters from their jobs; and bringing libel suits against 
journalists. Faced with continuing financial difficulties and increased 
pressure from the Government, many media organizations saw their 
autonomy erode during the year. The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF), 
an NGO that tracks violations of the rights of journalists in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, estimates that several hundred 
lawsuits and other legal actions were brought by government agencies 
against journalists and journalistic organizations during 1999, the 
majority of them in response to unfavorable coverage of government 
policy or operations. During the year, judges rarely found for the 
journalists; in the majority of cases, the Government succeeded in 
either intimidating or punishing the journalist. On October 4 the 
Kirovskiy district court of Kazan ordered the local television company 
``Efir'' to compensate Anatoliy Vasilyev, a former candidate to the 
State Council of Tatarstan, for airing a program which, according to 
the court, falsely accused Vasilyev of deceiving his business partners. 
On November 1, Kirovskiy district court in Yekaterinburg ruled that an 
article in the local newspaper ``Vecherniye Vedomosti Yekaterinburga'' 
accusing Arkadiy Chernetskiy, the mayor of Yekaterinburg, of applying 
illegal methods in his election campaign, was false. The court ordered 
the newspaper to print a disclaimer, and to pay damages to Chernetskiy. 
On November 9, the Sovietskiy district court in the city of Bryansk 
required the local newspaper ``Bryanskoye Vremya'' to print an apology 
and to compensate Bryansk governor Yuriy Lodkin, who sued the paper for 
criticizing him in a way that he considered insulting.
    With some exceptions, judges appeared unwilling to challenge 
powerful federal and local officials. Stiff fines for journalists were 
a common result of these proceedings; jail terms occasionally were 
handed down as well. Such rulings served to reinforce the already 
significant tendency toward self-censorship. Not infrequently 
journalists were attacked physically, although in the majority of these 
cases, no direct link was ever established between the assault and the 
authorities who reportedly took offense at the reporting in question. 
The financial dependence of most major media organizations on the 
Government or on one or more of several major financial-industrial 
groups continued to undermine editorial independence and journalistic 
integrity in both the print and broadcast media.
    The concentration of ownership of major media organizations--
already a serious threat to editorial independence in 1999--increased 
during the year. The largest media empires (including media outlets 
owned by the federal, regional, and local governments) remained intact. 
However, Media-Most, the country's largest independent company was 
under pressure by the Government and the Government resumed operational 
control of ORT. In particular, government structures, banking 
interests, and the state-controlled energy giants UES and Gazprom 
continued to dominate the Moscow media market even as they extended 
their influence into the regions. Continuing financial difficulties 
exacerbated this problem during the year, weakening the fiscal 
positions of most news organizations and thereby increasing their 
dependence on financial sponsors and, in some cases, the federal and 
regional governments. Although advertising revenues began to return to 
1998 levels, they did not do so completely. As a result, the media's 
autonomy and concomitant ability to act as a watchdog remained weak. In 
key respects, private media organizations across the country remained 
dependent on the Government during the year. According to the GDF, some 
90 percent of print media organizations continued to rely on state-
controlled concerns for paper, printing, or distribution, while many 
television stations were forced to rely on the state (in particular, 
regional committees for the management of state property) for access to 
the airwaves and office space.
    Moreover, journalists continued to depend on local authorities for 
accreditation to major news events. Reports of both favoritism toward 
reporters associated (or aligned) with the federal or local 
administration and denial of access to journalists representing 
independent media organizations were widespread. The Presidential 
Administration, for example, refused to accredit a reporter from the 
Moscow-based newspaper Novyye Izvestiya for President Putin's summer 
visit to China and Japan. Novyye Izvestiya has frequently criticized 
the President since his election in March. Kommersant Daily has also 
reportedly been denied access to some official sources. Moreover, in 
the immediate aftermath of the Kursk submarine sinking, the Government 
denied site access to all media except the official network, Russian 
Television and Radio (RTR), a decision that gave rise to heavy 
criticism from the majority of media outlets.
    The GDF also reported that officials continued to manipulate a 
variety of other ``instruments of leverage'' (including the price of 
printing at state-controlled publishing houses) in an effort to apply 
pressure on private media rivals. The Foundation noted that, as in 
1999, this practice was more common outside the Moscow area than in the 
capital itself. Private print and broadcast media, like other 
enterprises, were vulnerable to arbitrary changes in the policy and 
practice of tax collection. Although media still routinely receive tax 
breaks on high-cost items such as paper, the GDF and other media NGO's 
documented numerous instances of use by the Government of tax levers to 
pressure media across the country. Further, the Government occasionally 
sought to limit reporting on tax matters. In Volgograd oblast, for 
instance, local tax police in November declared the entry into force of 
an ``Agreement on Cooperation'' which stipulated that all information 
related to the activities of the tax police should be ``cleared'' with 
the relevant authorities prior to publication. In certain cases, 
journalists were even forbidden to cite sources from the local tax 
service. A number of local newspapers, including Volgogradskaya Pravda, 
Inter, Gorodskiye Vesti, and Delovoye Povolzhye were reportedly 
pressured into signing the agreement. This agreement came on the heels 
of a similar agreement with the FSB in Volgograd, binding the same 
publications to inform the FSB before they publish any materials 
related to the security service. National independent media, such as 
NTV, expressed concern that such contracts would serve as examples for 
other regions around the country.
    The private media continue to face more direct challenges from the 
Government as well. The Government owns about 150 of the 550 television 
stations in the country and nearly one-fifth of the 12,000 registered 
newspapers and periodicals. Of the three national television stations, 
the State owns Russian Television and Radio (RTR) and a majority of 
Russian Public Television (ORT); it also maintains ownership or control 
of major radio stations (Mayak and Radio Rossii) and news agencies 
(ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti). At the regional and local levels, 
governments operated or controlled a much higher percentage of the 
media than in Moscow; in many cities and towns across the country, 
government-run media organizations were the only major source of news 
and information, according to the GDF. Thus, in many media markets, 
citizens received information mainly from unchallenged government 
sources. In efforts to control the media, federal authorities issued 
orders and formulated doctrines designed to limit free expression and 
electronic privacy. On June 22 President Putin signed an amendment to 
the law on mass media that places restrictions on media coverage of 
narcotics issues, banning reporting on: ``The location of illegal trade 
in drugs;'' ``methods of narcotics consumption''; and ``the composition 
of drugs.'' Media outlets which violate these bans could be closed 
after two warnings. Newspapers did not successfully challenge the 
legality of the amendment during the year. On September 12 President 
Putin approved an Information Security Doctrine which had been adopted 
by the Security Council on June 23. The 40-page document outlined 
``threats to Russian national security'' in the fields of ``mass media, 
means of mass communication, and information technology.'' Sergey 
Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council, claimed that the goals of 
the document are ``the protection of the rights of the individual, 
freedom of speech, and the prohibition of censorship.'' However, the 
doctrine immediately raised concerns among journalists that its real 
purpose may be to consolidate government control over the mass media. 
Many observers viewed it as an indication that the Kremlin considers 
the media as ``yet another sphere subject to the administration and 
control of the government.'' Although the document reaffirms the 
state's commitment to preserve the freedoms of expression and of access 
to information, it contains numerous clauses that are extremely vague, 
and which according to critics, can be interpreted very broadly by 
lawmakers and bureaucrats. Of particular concern, for example, were the 
clauses calling for an ``increase in propaganda activity to counter the 
negative effects of the dissemination of misinformation about the 
internal policies of the Russian state''; and ``clarification of the 
status of foreign journalists and media outlets'' working in the 
country, in order to ``place them on an equal footing with the domestic 
media.''
    The system of operative and investigate procedures (SORM) continued 
during the year to limit the electronic privacy of both citizens and 
foreigners (see section 1.f.).
    Government intimidation and censorship, both direct and indirect, 
remained a significant problem during the year. On January 17 
Aleksander Khinshtein, a journalist with Moskovskiy Komsomolets and TV-
Center known for his frequent vitriolic attacks on senior Government 
officials, was visited at his home by armed FSB agents who demanded 
that the journalist accompany them to the city of Vladimir for 
``psychiatric testing.'' (Khinshtein produced documentation to the 
effect that he was ill and, in the end, was not forced to leave his 
home.) Police also charged the journalist with falsification of his 
Moscow driver's license; Khinshtein denies any wrongdoing. Khinshtein 
and many other independent observers characterized the arrest as ``an 
act of intimidation designed to send a message.'' The case was closed 
on February 16. On March 15 the Moscow daily Novaya Gazeta reported 
that its computer network was hacked, preventing the publication of 
that day's edition. Dmitriy Muratov, the newspaper's editor in chief, 
told the GDF that the hacking occurred on the very day that the 
newspaper was to publish a number of articles exploring irregularities 
in the financing of Vladimir Putin's election campaign. Muratov 
categorically ruled out any possibility of an ``accidental'' or 
``technical'' failure. Muratov also stated that his newspaper had come 
under ``increased pressure from the authorities'' in connection with 
its reporting on corruption in the Government and the war in Chechnya. 
Moreover, Muratov stated that the newspaper was offered financial 
``favors'' on a number of occasions in exchange for ``reconsidering its 
political stance.'' The perpetrators of the computer attack were never 
identified.
    The Government has also brought considerable pressure to bear on 
the largest media conglomerates. The most notable example of this 
phenomenon was the high-profile conflict between the Kremlin and Media-
Most (owned by Vladimir Gusinskiy). The conflict, which became public 
in the summer of 1999, intensified significantly in 2000. Government-
controlled media, including the RTR and the government-aligned ORT, 
continued to ``expose'' Media-Most's debts to state structures, 
including the energy giant Gazprom. The state filed a lawsuit against 
Media-Most and demanded repayment to the state-controlled 
Vneshekonombank of a $42.2 million credit. In March the state-backed 
Gazprom repaid Credit Suisse-First Boston a $211 million Media-Most 
loan that the firm had guaranteed in 1998. Immediately following the 
repayment, Gazprom demanded that Media-Most repay this debt, refusing 
to accept shares in the holding's outlets as a form of repayment. 
Media-Most executives and most media experts maintain that Gazprom 
acted at the behest of the Putin administration. On October 18 a 
district court in Moscow found for Media-Most in its suit against the 
FSB for ``slandering its business reputation'' as a result of 
information the FSB made public earlier in the year. The court held 
that the FSB must apologize for this on ORT during prime time; the FSB 
has appealed this decision.
    Notwithstanding this pressure, the Media-Most media companies 
(including the NTV, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the news daily 
Segodnya, and the weekly Itogi) which are generally well regarded for 
their relative professionalism and independence, did not cede editorial 
ground. These media outlets continued to criticize President Putin and 
his administration on a wide range of problems, including the Kremlin's 
media policy. On May 11 masked law enforcement officers raided the 
offices of Media-Most in central Moscow and confiscated documents and 
technical equipment. The authorities charged that the holding's 
security service illegally recorded telephone conversations. Media-Most 
called the raid ``a politically motivated attack on freedom of the 
press.'' In a statement, the Russian Union of Journalists termed it 
``an unconstitutional act aimed at intimidating the independent 
media.'' On June 11 Media-Most chief Vladimir Gusinskiy was arrested on 
charges of embezzlement of state property in the course of the 1995 
privatization of Russkoye Video, a television production company in St. 
Petersburg. (The head of Russkoye Video remained in jail, although no 
formal charges have yet been brought against him.) While observers 
expressed differing opinions on the legitimacy of the charge, most 
disinterested analysts considered the arrest to be an ``excessive'' 
measure. Gusinskiy was released 3 days after his arrest following 
widespread domestic and international criticism. Although the 
progovernment media defended the arrest, arguing that ``everyone is 
equal before the law,'' politicians, journalists, and observers in 
opposition to the Kremlin agreed that the case was politically 
motivated and that it augured poorly for the future of freedom of 
expression. After Gusinskiy's release, law enforcement officers once 
again raided the Media-Most headquarters and Gusinskiy's private 
residence, where they inventoried his property, reportedly in 
connection with the ``Russkoye Video'' case. On July 27 Gusinskiy left 
the country to join his family in Spain. On September 19 both Media-
Most and Gazprom Media acknowledged that Gusinskiy, Media Minister 
Mikhail Lesin, and Gazprom Media head Alfred Kokh signed an agreement 
in July to sell Media-Most for $300 million in cash and $473 million in 
debt to Gazprom Media. The agreement, published in the media in 
September, contained a paragraph on the dropping of criminal charges 
against Gusinskiy, who later declared the agreement ``null and void'' 
for having been signed under duress--in his own words, ``at 
gunpoint''--and indeed under the direct threat of imprisonment. Gazprom 
alleged that Media-Most hid assets in offshore companies. Deputy 
Procurator General Vasiliy Kolmogorov said on September 19 that if 
these allegations were substantiated, he would launch a criminal case 
against the holding (see Section 1.d.).
    On December 8 the Media Ministry ordered independent privately-
owned MAKS-TV in Sochi closed. According to the Ministry, the Station 
had violated both the law on advertising, by running a commercial for 
Ararat cognac in September, and the law on elections in early December. 
MAKS-TV went back on the air in late December.
    The Kremlin has also reportedly sought to strengthen its control 
over the country's most widely watched television network, ORT. In 
September the weekly ``Sergey Dorenko Show,'' a widely watched news 
analysis program, was taken off the air abruptly after Dorenko aired a 
program on September 2 highly critical of President Putin's handling of 
the Kursk submarine disaster. ORT General Director Konstantin Ernst, a 
Putin appointee, reportedly instructed Dorenko to produce ``a program 
the Kremlin could be happy with.'' When Dorenko refused, the program 
was terminated on September 9. Other senior journalists at ORT, such as 
Tatyana Koshkaryeva and Rustam Narsikulov, were also dismissed. On 
December 5 a group of law enforcement agents wearing masks and 
bulletproof vests searched the offices of ORT, confiscating boxes of 
financial documents. ORT had allegedly failed to pay customs duties on 
imported films that it broadcast between 1996 and 1998. The Prosecutor 
General stated that ``there was no need to apply force'' during the 
search and demanded the resignation of the investigator who led the 
raid.
    Freedom of the press came under the greatest challenge in the 
country's farthest regions. On April 14 local authorities in the city 
of Saratov made changes to a front-page article in the local issue of 
the Moscow-based daily, Izvestiya, which leveled criticism against 
Saratov Governor Dmitriy Ayatskov. Phrases containing ``unfriendly'' 
content were edited out prior to the publication. Mikhail Kozhokin, 
Izvestiya's editor in chief, described this censoring action as an 
example of ``the new phenomenon of oblast-level censorship.'' On April 
19 St. Petersburg police confiscated the entire issue of the local 
newspaper, Moya Stolitsa, saying that the newspaper ``lacked proper 
registration documentation.'' However, according to editor in chief 
Aleksey Razoryonov, the real issue was the newspaper's political 
leanings, not the registration documentation. The newspaper frequently 
carried articles critical of St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev. 
According to the GDP, on April 26 police once again confiscated issues 
of Moya Stolitsa from street vendors. However, the newspaper continued 
to publish. On May 1, police in Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovskiy Region, 
ordered Artyem Schadrin, a cameraman of the local television company 
Gong-TV, to erase a videotape showing participants at a May Day rally 
beating up his colleague, Gong-TV correspondent Konstantin Litvinenko. 
The police also warned Denis Poteryayev, a photographer of the local 
newspaper Novyy Kompas, not to publish the pictures he took during the 
rally. Later that day, several police officers visited the newspaper 
and ordered Poteryayev to expose the film containing the photographs in 
their presence. The journalist complied. On May 5, local authorities in 
Rostov-on-Don ordered the destruction of an entire issue of the local 
newspaper Perekrestok Kentavra. The newspaper contained an editorial 
about the upcoming inauguration of President Putin and a collage 
depicting Putin as a Nazi officer. The publication of ``fascist 
symbolism,'' including Nazi imagery, is prohibited by law.
    On July 26, local authorities arrested Irina Grebneva, the editor 
of Vladivostok newspaper Arsenyevskiye Vesti, on charges of ``petty 
hooliganism.'' Grebneva published uncensored, profanity-ridden 
transcripts of phone conversations of top regional officials, including 
Primorye Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Grebneva was convicted of the 
charges on which she was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail. When 
she was denied the right to appeal the decision, she launched a hunger 
strike to protest the sentence. Arsenyevskiye Vesti is one of the few 
local newspapers which regularly criticized Governor Nazdratenko and 
his allies. The governor and local authorities have sued the paper for 
libel 22 times since Nazdratenko was elected in 1995. All of the cases 
are pending.
    Journalists who publish critical information about local 
governments and influential businesses, as well as investigative 
journalists writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued 
to be subjected to threats of physical violence, beatings, and murder. 
A number of independent media NGO's have characterized beatings of 
journalists as ``routine,'' noting that those who pursued investigative 
stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest 
risk.
    The press and media NGO's reported a number of killings of 
journalists, presumed to be related to the journalistic work of the 
victims, and dozens of other bodily assaults on journalists. As in 
1999, police seldom identified the perpetrators of crimes against 
journalists. On July 16, Igor Domnikov, a Moscow journalist from Novaya 
Gazeta died in the hospital after a brutal beating in April. According 
to Dmitriy Muratov, editor in chief of Novaya Gazeta, the killing was 
directly linked to his professional activities. Press reports after the 
incident speculated that Domnikov was mistaken for his colleague Oleg 
Sultanov, an investigative reporter who has written extensively on 
alleged corruption in LUKOIL and the FSB. On July 18, Andrey Barys, a 
reporter from Uralskiy Rabochiy, was attacked by three unidentified 
assailants in the city of Kachkanar (Sverdlovsk oblast), where he had 
traveled to do a story on a criminal group headed by Valeriy Volkov. 
Shortly after his arrival in Kachkanar, Barys discovered that he was 
being followed by a group of men. Later, the men attacked Barys, 
telling him, ``Don't poke your nose into Volkov's affairs!'' After the 
beating, the men advised Barys to leave the city. The next day, Barys 
attempted to contact the local police, but the police chief refused to 
hear his complaint. On July 21, a correspondent of the local 
Yekaterinburg TV company ASV Prestige, Sergey Melnikov, was badly 
beaten; Melnikov and his colleagues contend that the attack was the 
result of his reporting on the city's illegal drug trade. The 
journalist had to be hospitalized with serious head injuries. No 
arrests were made.
    On July 26 Sergey Novikov, president of Smolensk's only independent 
radio station, Vesna, was killed in his apartment building. Since 1999 
the radio station had repeatedly denounced corruption within the ranks 
of the regional administration, the courts, and the police. A month 
before his death, Novikov wrote an open letter to Smolensk governor 
Aleksandr Prokhorov that included the names of officials suspected of 
corruption. The Ministry of the Interior classified the murder as a 
contract killing and has not ruled out a link to Novikov's work as a 
journalist. On August 23 journalists from local Pskov newspapers were 
denied access to a meeting of Governor Mikhaylov with the employees of 
the farm Krasnyy Luch. When a journalist from Pskov Lenta Novostey, 
Tatyana Mustaykina, tried to convince the guards to let her in, Yuriy 
Kusov, an officer of local administration, arrived, grabbed Mustaykina 
by the hair, and attempted to force her to the ground. When Kusov 
realized that the episode was being filmed by a cameraman, he tried 
unsuccessfully to confiscate the camera. In October, the Pskov 
Procuracy decided that Kusov could be charged on administrative 
charges. Kusov was summoned to but replied he was sick. On November 9, 
the GUVD Chief received Kusov's request to close the case due to 
expiration of statute of limitations and the case was closed.
    On September 22, Iskander Khatloni, a Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty journalist was murdered in Moscow. The police have opened an 
investigation but have not so far released any information.
    On December 17, Oleg Lure, an investigative journalist for Novaya 
Gazeta was severely beaten by five assailants. The assailants did not 
take either his money or valuables. Lure believes the attack was 
related to his articles touching on the interests of such individuals 
as the presidential chief of staff, the State Duma deputy, and his most 
recent article on alleged kickbacks to Kremlin officials. Police are 
investigating the incident.
    No progress was made in the investigation of the August 1998 
beating death of Anatoliy Levin-Utkin, deputy editor of Yuridichesky 
Petersburg Segodnya.
    The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region 
for Russian journalists. Kidnapings and assaults remained serious 
threats. In addition, federal authorities--both military and civilian--
limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated reports and 
equipment. Special accreditation besides the usual Foreign Ministry 
accreditation was required for entry to the region. In some cases, 
foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the 
northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to 
obtain local press accreditation.
    The best-known example of the violation of the rights of a 
journalist operating in this region is that of Radio Liberty's Andrey 
Babitskiy. Babitskiy's coverage of the conflict in Chechnya prompted an 
angry reaction from the Government and the armed forces; the latter 
frequently accused the correspondent of ``conspiring with Chechen 
rebels.'' On January 8 security agents raided Babitskiy's Moscow 
apartment and confiscated several items. On January 15, Babitskiy was 
reported ``missing'' in Chechnya. Although the Government denied at 
first any involvement in the case, Interior Ministry spokesman Oleg 
Aksenov acknowledged on January 28 that law enforcement authorities had 
arrested Babitskiy in Chechnya on the grounds that he ``lacked the 
proper accreditation.'' On February 3, Acting Procurator General 
Vladimir Ustinov stated that Babitskiy had been ``exchanged'' for three 
Russian prisoners of war. Ustinov later revised his statement, 
explaining that Babitskiy had been released and that the journalist had 
``gone over to the Chechen rebels'' of his own volition. However, later 
on, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, a senior Presidential aide for public 
information on Chechnya, confirmed that Babitskiy had indeed been 
exchanged, and Interior Minister Vladimir Rushaylo defended the 
exchange as ``correct and justified.'' On February 8, a group of 
prominent Russian journalists issued a statement saying, ``Until we 
learn the truth about this story, we have every reason to think that 
the Russian government suspended not only freedom of speech, but also 
the rule of law itself, and is moving toward totalitarianism.'' 
Babitskiy subsequently was released but was later taken into custody in 
Makhachkala, Dagestan, by Government forces on charges of ``carrying a 
falsified passport. On February 28, Acting President Putin announced 
publicly that there was no need to detain Babitskiy further, and the 
RFE/RL correspondent was released that day and sent back to Moscow. In 
October Babitskiy was tried and convicted in a court in Makhachkala of 
this offense but was immediately amnestied under an amnesty granted in 
honor of World War II. Babitskiy had trouble obtaining a passport; 
however, he did receive one and is now working abroad.
    On February 2, Russian troops in Chechnya detained Giles Whittell, 
Moscow Bureau Chief of the Times of London. Presidential aide Sergey 
Yastrzhembskiy said at a press conference that the journalist was 
detained and returned to Moscow because he ``lacked accreditation 
allowing him to work in Chechnya.'' The GDF issued a statement 
characterizing the Chechnya accreditation requirements of the Russian 
authorities as ``illegal.''
    On February 15, the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti reported 
that Yastrzhembskiy announced an official order denying journalists 
access to the Chechen capital of Grozny ``for 2 to 3 weeks.'' The order 
additionally limited journalist access to military hospitals by 
requiring that interviews take place only ``under the supervision of 
representatives of federal troops.'' On March 3, federal troops in the 
Chechen city of Mozdok confiscated and destroyed an ORT videotape 
containing interviews with Russian soldiers. According to ORT 
correspondent Roman Perevezentsev, the crew had traveled into Mozdok to 
report on casualties among Russian troops in a recent combat operation 
in the Chechen village of Pervomayskoye. On March 15 the Russian 
Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting, and Mass 
Communications issued a statement that warned the Russian mass media 
that providing air time or news-space to Chechen rebel leaders would be 
considered a violation of the counterterrorism laws. In April the 
Ministry issued specific warnings to the newspapers Kommersant and 
Novaya Gazeta for publishing interviews with Chechen president Aslan 
Maskhadov. No further action was taken. The new Information Security 
Doctrine approved by the Security Council in August implies that 
foreign media outlets, such as Radio Free Europe Liberty, represent a 
danger to the state. Human rights activists and journalists fear that 
media freedom could be even more severely restricted.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom; however, human 
rights activists question whether recent cases such as Sutyagin and 
others discourage academic freedom and contact with foreigners on 
issues that might be deemed sensitive.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits in 
order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin 
between 5 and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and 
actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to 
demonstrate were granted readily to both opponents and supporters of 
the Government. However, certain religious denominations such as 
Jehovah's Witnesses have been either denied permission to assemble, or 
once Ministry of Justice officials issued permission, local officials 
have withdrawn it.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Public 
organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders 
with the Ministry of Justice. A 1995 registration law specified that 
organizations had until July 1999 to reregister. When the deadline 
expired, some human rights monitors expressed concern that an estimated 
10,000 NGO's would be vulnerable to possible ``liquidation'' 
(elimination of juridical status by court order) by local authorities 
who were hostile to human rights or opposition political activity. In 
November 1999, the Federation Council rejected a bill passed by the 
Duma to extend the reregistration deadline by a year, a move which 
human rights activists marked as a potentially serious blow to freedom 
of association. The Ministry of Justice maintained that there were not 
a large number of liquidations as a result of the passing deadline. 
Most of the organizations that wanted to register were able to do so 
with the notable few whose names or charters were unacceptable to the 
authorities (e.g., Yablokov's Ecology and Human Rights).
    However, a February report, prepared by the NGO Human Rights 
Information Center and the Center for Development of Democracy and 
Human Rights, cited Ministry of Justice statistics indicating that only 
57.8 percent of the total number of organizations managed to reregister 
by the July 1999 deadline. According to the report, 42.2 percent of 
organizations became liable to liquidation of their juridical status. 
The report further claimed that only 12 percent of Moscow organizations 
succeeded in registering or reregistering. The report claimed that the 
net result was to reduce the overall number of organizations and to 
eliminate ``politically undesirable'' organizations from certain 
regions. While the numbers are high, many organizations continued to 
work without registration, while others reregistered under a new name. 
Reasons for failure to register varied, but a common thread was the 
request by the Ministry of Justice for many organizations to refrain 
from citing ``defense of human rights'' as one of their goals. The 
Ministry demanded that organizations such as Ecology and Human Rights, 
Glasnost Public Foundation, and Memorial remove such references since, 
according to the Constitution, NGO's are not among the institutions 
authorized to ``defend'' human rights. According to the reasoning used 
by the MOJ, such organizations can only aid the government and lawyers 
in the defense of such rights. Ecology and Human Rights managed to 
register in August, but only as a branch of an organization registered 
in St. Petersburg by prominent activists Aleksandr Nikitin and Grigoriy 
Pasko. Despite the apparent high number of unregistered groups, many 
organizations are defunct or changed names. Lyudmila Alekseyvena, Chair 
of the Moscow Helsinki Group, reported that the majority of groups that 
desired to register were able to do so, although sometimes this came 
after repeated attempts.
    In addition to submitting their bylaws and the names of their 
leaders, political parties must present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee 
to register. The Constitution and the Law on Elections ban the 
participation in elections of organizations that profess 
anticonstitutional themes or activities.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of 
all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in 
practice the Government does not always respect the provision for 
equality of religions, and in some cases local authorities imposed 
restrictions on some groups.
    In 1997 the Duma enacted a new, restrictive, and potentially 
discriminatory law on religion. This law replaced the progressive 1990 
religion law that had helped facilitate a revival of religious 
activity. The new law ostensibly targeted so-called totalitarian sects 
or dangerous religious cults. However, the intent of some of the law's 
sponsors appears to have been to discriminate against members of 
foreign and less well-established religions by making it difficult for 
them to manifest their beliefs through organized religious 
institutions. The Presidential Administration has been mostly silent on 
implementation of the law. Implementation of the 1997 law on religion 
has varied in the regions. To a great extent, implementation depends on 
the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice in each area which 
are responsible for registering new organizations, reregistering 
existing organizations, and liquidating those that do not manage to 
reregister. In some areas such as Moscow, minority religious 
denominations like the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Salvation Army have 
not been able to reregister local religious organizations.
    The 1997 law on religion has many ambiguous and contradictory 
provisions. The law creates various categories of religious communities 
with differing levels of legal status and privileges, distinguishes 
between religious ``groups'' and ``organizations,'' two mutually 
exclusive registration categories, and creates two categories of 
organizations: ``regional'' and ``centralized.'' A religious ``group'' 
is a congregation of worshipers that does not have the legal status of 
a juridical person. However, groups are permitted to rent public spaces 
and hold services. Moreover, the law does not purport to abridge the 
rights of individual members of ``groups.''
    Organizations, both local and centralized, are considered juridical 
persons, enjoy tax exemptions, and are permitted to proselytize, 
conduct liturgical services and other religious activities, establish 
religious schools, host foreign religious workers, and publish 
literature.
    Under the 1997 religion law, representative offices of foreign 
religious organizations are required to register with state 
authorities. In practice foreign religious representatives' offices 
(those not registered under the law) have opened without registering or 
have been accredited to a registered Russian religious organization. 
However, these representative offices cannot carry out religious 
activities and do not have the status of a religious organization.
    Critics of the law have claimed that it violates the Constitution's 
provision of equality before the law of all confessions. In particular, 
many religious groups criticized the law's 15 year requirement and 
feared the consequences of the law's provisions limiting the actions of 
foreign religious missionaries. Officials at the local level have used 
the law to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
    Human rights activists welcomed a March 1999 and December 2000 open 
letter to the President and Duma by Human Rights Plenipotentiary Oleg 
Mironov, in which he criticized the 1997 religion law and recommended 
changes to bring it into accordance with the Constitution and 
international norms for religious freedom. In practice the registration 
process--which involves simultaneous registration at both the federal 
and local levels--requires considerable time, effort, and legal expense 
and has proven onerous for a number of groups. International and well-
funded Russian religious organizations, in particular, began the 
reregistration process soon after publication of the regulations. 
Russian Pentecostal groups, which have a solid and growing network of 
churches throughout the country, sought guidance from the Ministry of 
Justice on reregistration as early as November 1997. One of the larger 
organizations, the Russian Unified Fellowship of Christians of the 
Evangelical Faith (which traces its origins back to the early 1900's), 
reregistered as a centralized religious organization by late March 
1998. It has since incorporated many smaller, newer Pentecostal groups 
within its structure. However, nearly 500 Pentecostal local religious 
organizations did not succeed in reregistering and are now subject to 
liquidation of their status as juridical persons.
    The vast majority of organizations attempting to reregister as 
central organizations succeeded, although there were a few notable 
exceptions: Salvation Army, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and a faction of 
the Muslim communities under the Mufti Tayzhuddin. By year's end, the 
Ministry of Justice estimated that 70-75 percent of local religious 
organizations needing to reregister had done so. However, these figures 
are misleading, since in some cases the organizations no longer exist. 
The Russian Orthodox Church reregistered between 65-75 percent of its 
organizations, Protestant communities 78 percent, Muslim 60 percent, 
Jewish 80 percent, Buddhists 65 percent, and Catholic 70-80 percent. 
All organizations, according to the Congress of Religious Jewish 
Communities of Russia (KEROOR) and the Federation of Jewish Communities 
of Russia (FEOR) have reregistered at year's end. However, one of 
KEROOR's local Moscow organizations has not been able to register as a 
new organization, applying already three times unsuccessfully.
    By year's end no religious organization had ceased operations as a 
result of the law; however the Salvation Army has had problems in 
Moscow trying to extend office leases and operate its food distribution 
program because landlords and social services personnel have assumed it 
has been liquidated.
    Jehovah's Witnesses reported that since the 1997 law went into 
effect they managed to register or reregister 97 percent of their 
organizations. A total of 190 of those were organizations already 
extant which had to reregister. Some 156 were new organizations 
registering for the first time. There were several regions such as 
Tartarstan, Moscow, Chelyabinsk, and Kalbadrino-Balkaria where 
organizations experienced problems.
    Hare Krishnas have experienced no problems at the federal level; 
however, they have encountered significant opposition from the Russian 
Orthodox Church. For many years the group operated underground, and in 
1999 it successfully registered as a religious organization and 
received permission to lease a building in Moscow to use as a temple. 
The city has slated the area in which the current central temple is 
located as part of a new ring road, however, and Hare Krishnas have 
experienced problems in trying to obtain permission to build a new 
complex. The Krishna Movement has grown to more than 130 centers across 
the country and nearly 100,000 believers. They have experienced 
problems in the Krasnador Oblast, particularly. The Procurator General 
of Moscow has opened an investigation into the group's liturgy as of 
October. Investigators claim they are examining whether the literature 
``incites criminal acts''.
    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints registered or 
reregistered all of its organizations requiring registration by year's 
end but continued to encounter problems in registering four of its new 
organizations in Chelyabinsk, Tver, and Tatarstan. In September the 
directorate of justice in Chelyabinsk rejected the local registration 
application of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for a 
seventh time. Even without registration, the church continued to hold 
regular services without incident, although its missionaries 
experienced problems in registering with the local visa office; this 
required them to stay in a hotel in a different city and then travel to 
the area for brief periods.
    The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was denied federal registration 
because the order's status, which is independent of a local bishop, 
does not meet requirements contained in the 1997 law's provisions. 
However, an April 13 the Constitutional Court ruling authorized the 
Jesuits to be registered. This ruling in Rossisskaya Gazeta referred 
extensively to passages in the November 1999 Constitutional Court 
ruling (which effectively legalized registered organizations existing 
at the time of the passage of the 1997 law). The April ruling also 
specifically refuted points cited by the Ministry of Justice as reasons 
for initial refusal. By year's end they were registered.
    Around sixty percent of Muslim organizations managed to reregister. 
The large percentage that did not is due partly to an internal struggle 
between the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European Russia 
and Siberia, based in Ufa and led by Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, and the 
Moscow-based Russian Council of Muftis, led by Chief Mufti Ravil 
Gainutdin. Due to the refusal to register Mufti Tayzhuddin's group as a 
central organization, many local organizations did not manage to 
reregister in time. Additionally, many rural parishes either did not 
know they needed to reregister or did not know how to go about 
reregistering.
    The delays in reregistration are in part due to the slow pace at 
which the federal Ministry of Justice at first disseminated the 
regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to understaffing 
both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels. Although the 
Ministry of Justice claims that internal organizational disputes, which 
lead to the failure of many religious leaders to prepare documentation 
properly, is to blame for the slow pace of registration. However, 
delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination by some 
local officials against what they believe are ``sects,'' such as 
Scientologists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and others. In many 
instances, the Ministry of Justice asks for additional information and 
demands changes in the organizational structure and by-laws of some 
groups to ensure that they are in conformance with the law. In other 
instances, groups are rejected with no explanation. Another problem is 
the lack of congruence between regional and federal laws. As of 1999, 
of 89 regions, 30 had laws and decrees on religion that violated the 
Constitution by restricting the activities of religious groups. 
Government authorities have attempted to deal with this by introducing 
a federal register of laws to ensure that laws conformed to the 
constitution.
    The Moscow city authorities continued to create difficulties for 
some religious denominations. The Moscow Directorate of Justice 
continues to refuse registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow, 
despite the precedent set by the federal Ministry of Justice's April 
30, 1999, decision to reregister Jehovah's Witnesses at the federal 
level. The Directorate has refused four applications for local 
registration by Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses for unclear reasons. In this 
case, the Judge has appointed an ``expert panel'' to assess the merits 
of the organization as a religion. In some cases, human rights groups 
have accused such panels of lacking objectivity and ruling according to 
political allegiance rather than legal criteria. In November the 
Salvation Army was denied registration by the Moscow City Appeals 
Court, which refused to register their Moscow branch as a Local 
Religious Organization (LRO). The Appeals Court upheld a lower court 
ruling that the organization could only be accorded the status of 
``representative of a foreign religious organization'' since its 
headquarters is abroad. This denial has implications for other 
religious groups since it may affect the registration of Roman 
Catholics, Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses.
    Although it can be a slow and costly process, the judicial system 
has provided an appeal process for religious organizations threatened 
with loss of registered status or ``liquidation'' as a religious 
organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Some local 
churches initially denied local registration have been registered 
following successful lawsuits, as in the case of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Mission in Khakasiya in November 1998, when the federal 
Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the Khakasiya Supreme Court. In 
February 1999 the Supreme Court of Khakasiya rejected the regional 
procurator's request to nullify the registration of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Mission; the procurator plans to appeal the case. In 1998 a 
local Procuracy opened a civil case against the Word of Life 
Pentecostal Church in the Far Eastern city of Magadan under Article 14 
of the 1997 religion law, accusing the Church of using cult practices 
to manipulate its members. After a lengthy delay, a Magadan municipal 
court finally dismissed the case in May due to insufficient evidence, a 
decision that was upheld in June by the Magadan oblast court. However, 
the Church fears that the same Procuracy soon may try to open a 
criminal case. The Word of Life Church also won a court battle for 
reregistration in March. A church member employed by the Government who 
was threatened with the loss of her job late in 1998 was still at her 
post as of June. Church officials report that two other church members 
were fired because of their religion, but such allegations are 
difficult to prove. Also, tax investigations on two separate charges 
continue. Church members reported that negative stories about them 
repeatedly appeared in the local state-controlled press, with no 
mention of their court victories. Despite the court case and other 
difficulties, the Word of Life Pentecostal Church continues its normal 
activities.
    The Government has restricted the activities of a number of foreign 
missionaries and of congregations associated with them. There were 
reports that four foreign missionaries were being refused visas to 
return to the country. The former pastor of the Vanino Baptist Church 
in the Khabarovsk region was banned from receiving a visa based on 
allegations that he violated customs regulations and evaded property 
taxes; however, it appears that local authorities violated their own 
regulations and refused to take necessary actions (such as providing a 
timely tax assessment), which would have enabled the pastor to comply 
with the law. An official of the Church of Christ in Magadan also faced 
a criminal charge for failing to report $8,000 to customs officials, 
reportedly because he feared that the money would be stolen. He was 
acquitted in December 1999, primarily because the investigation and 
prosecution were marred by serious violations of due process by local 
authorities. Local authorities then defied a court ruling to return the 
money, returning it briefly only to confiscate it a few minutes later, 
citing administrative customs regulations not applicable to the case. 
The third case, regarding the Church of Christ in Volgograd, appears to 
have been a response to articles in the local press accusing a church 
official of being a spy. Those allegations may have led local 
authorities to recommend to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a visa 
be refused. A member of the local congregation, reported in May that 
since local authorities no longer object to the missionary's return, it 
appears to be federal authorities who still are refusing to authorize 
issuance of a visa. A fourth missionary, of the Evangelical Free Church 
of America, who entered the country legally with a visa sponsored by a 
Moscow congregation, has been refused registration to reside in 
Naberezhniy Chelniy, Tartarstan. The missionary, who is married to a 
Russian citizen, also has been refused permission to register as a 
resident foreign spouse of a Russian citizen. The letter of refusal he 
received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs' local passport control 
office cited ``national security'' concerns.
    Critics contend that the Federal Government should be more active 
in reversing discriminatory actions taken at the local level and, when 
necessary, reprimanding the officials at fault. Also according to 
critics, the federal authorities need to take action to ensure that 
regional and local legislation or other actions do not contradict 
constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. Government 
officials have established consultative mechanisms to facilitate 
government interaction with religious communities and to monitor 
application of the law on religion. Federal authorities and Moscow 
human rights monitors often have limited information about what is 
happening in the regions, however. According to various sources, most 
citizens, especially those living in the regions, still are skeptical 
about the protection of religious freedom and are reluctant to assert 
their rights due to fear of retaliation. Some local and municipal 
governments reportedly prevented religious groups from using venues, 
such as cinemas, suitable for large gatherings. In many areas of the 
country, government-owned facilities are the only available venues. As 
a result, in some instances denominations that do not have their own 
property effectively are denied the opportunity to practice their faith 
in large groups. Jehovah's Witnesses organized a convention to take 
place in Ivanovo on July 7-9. On July 4, the deputy head of the city 
administration issued an injunction prohibiting the convention. The 
Jehovah's Witnesses local leader, Yevgeniy Borisov, ignored the 
injunction and went ahead with the convention. However, on July 31, the 
Ivanovo Oktyabrskiy district court ruled that Borisov had violated the 
administrative order and sentenced him to 2 months of ``correctional 
activities'' (not incarceration) and forfeiture of 20 percent of his 
salary during this period. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this 
ruling, and the Regional Court of the Federal Judiciary System 
overturned the lower court ruling on the basis that the city 
administration's injunction violated federal law. On October 10, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sergeir Airiyev, one of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses who had been accused by local officials of breaking the law 
by organizing a religious convention in Kislovodsk.
    Reports of official harassment and punishment for religious belief 
or activity continued. Despite legal registration, members of some 
religions--including Protestant groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints--continue to face 
discrimination in their ability to rent premises and conduct group 
activities. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses report that in Volgograd, 
on August 20, national and religious extremists broke up their 
religious meetings and whipped some of their members. Criminal charges 
have been brought, but no prosecution or conviction has occurred to 
date. In six cases in St. Petersburg and Moscow, police arrested and 
harshly treated Jehovah's Witnesses while they were engaged in publicly 
discussing their religious views with neighbors. Two of these cases 
occurred in the Northern Administrative county in Moscow (where the 
trial to ban Jehovah's Witnesses will be heard). In four other cases, 
two men and two women were beaten by hooligans while engaged in public 
evangelizing work. Charges have been filed with the police. Jehovah's 
Witnesses report that there are currently about 20 cases across Russia 
where local authorities have arbitrarily refused to issue permits for 
construction, renovation, or occupancy of buildings to be used as 
houses of worship for Jehovah's Witnesses. In regard to a proposed 
house of worship in St. Petersburg, the Governor's Office is said to 
have stated that Jehovah's Witnesses had enough places of worship and 
any permit was subject to the feelings of local residents. Jehovah's 
Witnesses also report that in Alagir, Northern Ossetia, local 
authorities sealed the door of a newly built house of worship on July 5 
and prohibited its use despite the fact that all permits had been 
obtained.
    The Church of Scientology has been in conflict with authorities 
since a February 1999 raid on its Hubbard Center in Moscow by the tax 
police, FSB, and procurator. Since then the organization has faced 
charges that it engaged in a commercial enterprise without a license. 
The case is still pending. The Church has been repeatedly refused in 
its efforts to reregister its national center and register local 
religious organizations. While the Church has succeeded in registering 
50 ``Dianetics Centers'' as social organizations, it has only managed 
to register 1 Church of Scientology in Moscow as of October. The Church 
reports that authorities have impeded the operation of its centers in 
Dmitrograd, Khabarovsk, and Izhevsk.
    Groups such as the Catholic Church have complained about undue 
attention from the authorities in Moscow, being forced to submit to 
unwarranted fire inspections, document verifications by the Ministry of 
Interior, and harassment of believers at a Sunday Mass.
    Property disputes are among the most frequent complaints cited by 
religious groups. Many synagogues, churches, and mosques were returned 
to communities to be used for religious services. The Federal 
Government met the requirements of the 1993 presidential decree on 
communal property restitution, and the decree continues to guide the 
ongoing process. According to statistics from the Ministry of State 
Property, as of 1999 over 2,000 federally owned properties had been 
returned to religious communities since 1989. However, jurisdiction in 
most cases is at the regional level, and there is no centralized source 
of information on these cases. One Ministry of Culture official 
responsible for restitution of religious historical monuments estimated 
early in 1999 that over 3,600 transfers of religious buildings had 
occurred at the regional level and that approximately 30 percent of 
property designated for return had been transferred back to its 
original owners at both the federal and regional levels. Nonetheless, 
there continue to be reports of religious property that has not been 
returned. For example, the Roman Catholic Church of Saints Peter and 
Paul in Moscow has not been returned to the Catholic Church despite 
numerous appeals to the authorities and court. Twice in 1997 the 
Arbitration Court ruled against the Church. However, the Catholic 
Church continues to press for the return of this property despite the 
rulings.
    Some Protestant faiths have suggested that the Russian Orthodox 
Church influences the Government regarding land allocated for churches 
of other religious groups. The Russian Orthodox Church denies such 
influence. The Jewish community, which had some success on communal 
property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other religious 
communities on the issue of the return of Torah scrolls, many of which 
are in state museum collections. In May the Ministry of Culture turned 
over 60 Torah scrolls to the Congress of Religious Jewish Communities, 
welcomed by the Jewish community.
    In its preamble (which government officials insist has no legal 
force), the 1997 religion law recognizes the ``special contribution of 
Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and 
development of Russia's spirituality and culture.'' It accords 
``respect'' to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and certain 
other religions as an inseparable part of the country's historical 
heritage. Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist 
circles as the de facto official religion of the country. Many Russians 
firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox 
Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian.
    The Russian Orthodox Church was involved actively in drafting the 
1997 law on religion. It has special arrangements with government 
agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual 
counseling to members of the armed forces. These arrangements do not 
appear to be available to other religions. In particular, Muslim 
religious leaders have complained that they are not permitted to 
minister to Muslim members of the armed forces. The head of the Moscow 
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Moscow 
and all Russia, participates in most high-level official events and 
appears to have direct access to and influence with officials of the 
executive branch. Even well-established foreign religious organizations 
have been characterized by the Orthodox leadership as ``dangerous and 
destructive sects.'' In addition, during the year the Russian Orthodox 
Church entered into formal agreements with the Ministries of Education, 
Interior, and Tax. In the latter case, October press reports indicated 
that the Church has agreed to cooperate with the tax authorities in 
investigating tax infractions by religious organizations. However, the 
nature of such cooperation remains vague. The Ministry of Education 
sent a letter in September to the rectors of higher education 
establishments throughout the country alleging that 700 ``foreign'' 
religious groups--including the True Orthodox Church, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, and the Salvation Army--are involved in military espionage 
and the encouragement of separatist activity, and blames foreigners for 
allegedly encouraging splits within the ``traditional'' Russian faiths, 
the Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists.
    The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with 
several human rights organizations, criticized the use of psychiatry in 
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' (see Section 1.c.). 
In such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual 
techniques to ``treat'' persons who were members of new religious 
groups. Human rights monitors condemned the secret video taping of a 
Pentecostal Church's service in Kostroma, which was introduced as 
evidence of hypnosis in a court case against the church in October. The 
Association of Independent Psychiatrists claimed that not only was the 
video taping illegal, but that the quality was so poor that any sort of 
conclusion drawn from it would be questionable. In addition, both human 
rights activists and independent psychiatrists believe that the 
``expert commission'' appointed to review the tape was biased.
    Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and 
societal discrimination, authorities have generally not inhibited the 
free practice of their religion. Other religions, including Buddhism 
and Shamanism, are practiced in specific localities where they are 
rooted in local traditions.
    President Putin issued public expressions of sympathy for Jews and 
made a public appearance at the opening and on the first night of 
Hanukkah at a Jewish Cultural Center in Moscow. Nevertheless, he and 
his administration were accused by some members of the Jewish community 
and some in the press of fomenting division within the community by 
supporting as head Rabbi of Russia the FEOR head Rabbi, Berel Lazar 
over the long-time Chief Rabbi of Russia, Adolf Shayevich. Shayevitch, 
is associated with a Jewish community organization headed by Vladimir 
Gusinskiy, owner of Russia's sole independent television network, which 
has been critical of President Putin and his support for Government 
forces in Chechnya. Fears of Kremlin interference in the Internal 
Affairs of the Jewish Community were reignited when, on October 19 law 
enforcement authorities conducted an illegal search of the Choral 
Synagogue's offices of Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, who is aligned with 
Rabbi Shayevich. While officials claimed that the search was not 
directed against the synagogue or Jewish community, but rather against 
the Media-Most Security Service then owned by Gusinskiy that was 
guarding the premises, investigators nevertheless focused on the Moscow 
Jewish Community's charter, membership lists, and the synagogue's 
financial documents. Moreover, during the search, investigators told a 
synagogue employee present that they were looking for evidence of money 
laundering. Organizations such as the Union Councils of Soviet Jews 
have accused the administration of harboring anti-Semitic figures. On 
September 7, Aleksandr Ignatov, identified as head of an office in the 
Presidential Administration, published an essay in the Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta claiming that a ``Chasidic para-Masonic group'' stood behind a 
supposed ``world government'' that was leading the drive for 
globalization. Subsequent to the publication of this anti-Semitic 
piece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Kremlin had 
established that as of October there was no Ignatov in the rolls of the 
Presidential Administration, and that it was conducting an internal 
investigation of the events surrounding the article's publication. It 
is unclear whether Ignatov indeed had been an official in the 
Presidential Administration.
    Newly elected Kursk Governor Aleksandr Mikhaylov made anti-Semitic 
statements that were published in newspapers and aired on a television 
network. The Jewish community urged Putin to separate himself from the 
Governor. The Presidential District Representative Poltavchenko 
reprimanded Governor Mikhaylov in public and Mikhaylov apologized for 
his comments to the press.
    The Federal Government states that it has moved forward on its 
promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism, but only 
limited steps have been taken. In November 1998, the Duma adopted a 
resolution against public statements damaging to interethnic relations 
in the country. In March 1999, the Government presented to the Duma a 
draft law on combating political extremism. The Duma is still 
considering a draft law forbidding ``Nazi symbols and literature.'' 
Separately the Procurator General sent to regional procurators in 
January 1999 a letter describing the Moscow city procurator's 
experience in combating political extremism with instructions to cut 
off distribution of any literature or printed material depicting Nazi 
symbols. The Government also states that in implementing the 
presidential decree on extremism, it conducted interagency 
consultations, beginning in June 1999 and continuing on a quarterly 
basis, which involve the Presidential Administration, the judiciary, 
law enforcement bodies, and experts from outside the Government. A 
government review of the implementation of existing laws against acts 
of national, racial, and religious hatred revealed that 25 criminal 
investigations were conducted in 1998, and 10 were opened by June 1999.
    A prominent public figure who has regularly engaged in anti-Semitic 
remarks is Krasnodar region's former Governor Nikolay Kondratenko. 
During his tenure, the governor's speeches often contained anti-Semitic 
remarks and stereotypes and blamed Jews and alleged Jewish conspiracies 
for the country's problems. For example, Kondratenko had said that the 
essence of Russian history is the Russian battle against Jewish 
domination. He blamed ``Zionists'' for the war in Chechnya, for the 
destruction of the Communist Party, for attacks on the Russian Orthodox 
Church, and for introducing homosexuality into the country. According 
to credible reports, Kondratenko urged the firing of Jewish public 
employees in the region.
    Particularly troubling to human rights groups and some of the 
Russian media has been the very public support of Kondratenko by the 
Kremlin-backed party Yedinstvo. Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey 
Shoygu, who heads Yedinstvo, openly encouraged Kondratenko to run again 
in the December elections. According to NTV reports, the Kremlin sent 
public relations specialists to the region in early September to 
organize a ``grass roots'' campaign of support for Kondratenko's 
candidacy, although Kondratenko decided against running for another 
term.
    Several religious groups encountered extremist violence this year, 
with little or belated response from the local authorities (see Section 
5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with 
the right to choose their place of residence freely; however, some 
regional governments continue to restrict this right through 
residential registration rules that closely resemble the Soviet-era 
``propiska'' (pass) regulations. Although the rules, which came into 
effect at the beginning of 1996, were touted as a notification device 
rather than a control system, their application has produced many of 
the same results as the propiska system. Corruption in the registration 
process in local police precincts is a problem. Police demand bribes in 
processing registration applications and during spot checks for 
registration documentation.
    While citizens are free to travel within the country, the 
Government also imposes registration requirements on domestic travel. 
All adults are issued internal passports, which they must carry while 
traveling and use to register with local authorities for visits of more 
than 3 days (in Moscow, 24 hours). However, travelers not staying in 
hotels usually ignore this requirement. Citizens must register to live 
and work in a specific area within 7 days of moving there. Russian 
citizens changing residence within the country, as well as persons with 
a legal claim to citizenship who decide to move to Russia from other 
former Soviet republics, often face enormous difficulties or simply are 
not permitted to register in some cities. In 1999 UNHCR and refugee 
rights NGO's cited Stavropol, Krasnodar, Moscow, and St. Petersburg as 
being the cities least open to migrants (although some NGO's dispute 
including St. Petersburg on this list). This continued to hold true 
this year. The cost of permanent registration is only $0.30 (8 rubles). 
Temporary registration is available for periods ranging from 45 days to 
6 months and costs $0.16 (4 rubles and 18 kopeks) regardless of the 
length of stay. The Government and many residents of Moscow and other 
large cities defend registration as necessary in order to control 
crime, keep crowded urban areas from attracting even more inhabitants, 
and gain revenue.
    There have been several disputes between the central authorities 
and regional governments regarding internal ``passports,'' identity 
documents required for obtaining many governmental services. On 
December 15, the Presidents of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and a 
presidential representative of the Volga federal district reached an 
agreement on resuming the issuance of passports to residents of the two 
republics. Both leaderships suspended issuing passports three years ago 
to protest the failure of new Russian passports to indicate the 
bearer's ethnicity. Under the agreement, a special page will be 
inserted in passports issued in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan giving the 
bearer's data in the national language.
    While federal law provides for education for all children in the 
country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to the 
children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants because 
they lack residential registration. Similarly, while the Moscow 
procurator's office has upheld the right of migrants to receive 
publicly available medical care, those services are frequently denied 
to unregistered persons, migrants, and asylum seekers.
    The city of Moscow frequently is cited by NGO's for violating the 
rights of nonresidents and ethnic minorities, as well as the rights of 
those legitimately seeking asylum. Mayor Luzhkov has in the past called 
for the expulsion from Moscow of Chechens and other persons from the 
Caucasus. Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON (special forces 
unit of the Ministry of Interior) units, conduct frequent document 
checks, particularly of persons who are dark-skinned or appear to be 
from the Caucasus or elsewhere. Such checks on many occasions have 
involved police entering residences without warrants. There are many 
credible reports that police fined unregistered persons in excess of 
legal requirements and did provide proper documentation of the fine. 
According to HRW, it is not unusual for darker-skinned persons to be 
stopped at random and for officers to solicit bribes from those without 
residence permits.
    In connection with bomb explosions in August and September 1999 
which Moscow officials attributed to terrorists from the Northern 
Caucasus, Mayor Luzhkov issued an ordinance on September 13, 1999, 
requiring all temporary residents in Moscow since January 1, 1999 to 
reregister within 3 days with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Reportedly 74,000 temporary residents sought reregistration, and 
approximately 15,500 were refused. In order to reregister, residents 
had to demonstrate a legal place of work, payment of city taxes, and a 
legal place of residence. Moscow authorities also restricted the 
arrival of new residents to the city and increased road checks and 
checks in train stations and marketplaces for these new arrivals. Law 
enforcement officials conducted searches of 26,500 apartments, 180 
hotels, 415 guest houses, and 548 nightclubs and cafes. Police 
continued to conduct road checks at train stations, but the number of 
people detained was reportedly much less then last year. Human rights 
NGO's claim that authorities detained some 2,000 persons and expelled 
500 from Moscow (see Section 1.d).
    In April, the Movement for Human Rights in Moscow joined forces 
with the procurator general to challenge Moscow's registration 
requirements in Moscow City Court. In September the procurator's 
office, in what many believe was a political concession, withdrew its 
support for the lawsuit. Nevertheless, on September 25 the Moscow City 
Court ruled that the city's rules on registration were 
unconstitutional, violating the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of 
movement. The Supreme Court overturned an earlier similar decision by 
the Moscow City Court and forced the court to hear the case again. In 
October the requirement was still in effect, and the practice--which 
police reportedly use mainly as a threat to extort money--continues.
    The 1999 Moscow Helsinki Group's (MHG) human rights report 
highlighted restrictions placed by the authorities on Meskhetian Turks. 
During 1989-90 some 90,000 Meskhetians were forced by ethnic conflicts 
to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. An estimated 60,000 
Meskhetians remain in the Russian Federation. More than 13,000 of them 
settled in Krasnodar Kray, and approximately 700 settled in the 
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic. Authorities in Krasnodar Kray and the 
Karbardino-Balkaria Republic deny the Meskhetians the right to 
register, which deprives them of all rights of citizenship, despite the 
provisions of the Constitution that all Meskhetians who were residing 
in the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse are entitled to 
citizenship. Meskhetian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic 
minorities, are subject to special registration restrictions, for 
example, having to register as a ``guest'' every 45 days. According to 
the MHG, in May 1998 Krasnodar Kray authorities initiated an attempt to 
compel Meskhetians to emigrate to Turkey. By September 1998 it was 
believed that almost 90 families had left the region for Turkey. 
Krasnodar human rights groups continue to state that the situation in 
Krasnodar has not improved. In December, the speaker of the Krasnodar 
Duma stated in a interview that approximately 30 families had left the 
region but later returned.
    The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate. 
The Government imposes nominal emigration taxes, fees, and duties. On 
average it takes three months to process a passport application, 
although it can take much longer if documentation is needed from 
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
    Some liberal principles regarding emigration procedures were 
codified formally in a 1996 law on exit from and entry into the 
country. This law abolished the old Soviet requirement that, in order 
to emigrate, citizens must receive a stamp permitting ``permanent 
residence abroad'' (PMZh)--essentially a propiska for those living 
outside the country. The law required the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR), to establish 
regulations for eliminating this practice within six months of the 
passage of the law. However, implementation of the law (which was to go 
into effect early in 1997) is still incomplete. According to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), border guards continue 
to require a PMZh-like stamp of all emigrants, and the passport control 
agency OVIR continues to issue it.
    Another feature of the 1996 law is the codification of the legal 
grounds for denying foreign travel documents to citizens who had access 
to state secrets. Under the new law, access to such classified material 
can occur only with the consent of the citizen, established in the form 
of a written contract that states that the signatory understands that 
he has been given access to state secrets and that his ability to 
travel abroad may be restricted. The law envisions a maximum period of 
delay under normal circumstances of five years, and it grants the 
interagency Commission on Secrecy the right to add an additional 5-year 
term to the period of delay if the Commission finds that a person had 
access to particularly sensitive materials. This latter provision has 
raised serious concerns among human rights advocates who monitor 
arbitrary and excessive powers on the part of the Government to 
restrict foreign travel. There was one report that the provision was 
applied in a restrictive manner. According to human rights monitors, in 
1999 the FSB told Raisa Isakova, a former researcher at a secret 
institute in Omsk, that if she did not sign compromising testimony 
against the Jewish Agency (an NGO that promotes emigration to Israel), 
her application for an exit visa to Israel would be denied. When she 
refused to sign, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed her that she 
was ineligible for a visa until 2003.
    If a citizen had access to classified material, police and FSB 
clearances are necessary to receive an external passport. Persons 
denied travel documents on secrecy grounds can appeal the decision to 
an interagency commission (called the Ivanov Commission) chaired by the 
First Deputy Foreign Minister. The Ivanov Commission cannot rule on 
whether the material should or should not be classified, but it can 
rule on the legality of travel restrictions imposed and on whether or 
not the traveler actually had access to materials requiring a travel 
restriction. Since it was established in 1994, the Ivanov Commission 
has granted travel permission to approximately 90 percent of 
appellants.
    Other grounds for denial of the right to travel abroad are military 
conscription or assignment to civilian alternative service (although in 
fact the Duma has failed to pass legislation implementing the 
constitutionally provided right to civilian alternative service), being 
under investigation for or serving a sentence for a crime, evasion of a 
court-ordered obligation, or providing false information on a passport 
application. The requirement that citizens satisfy obligations to 
immediate relatives, such as material support for parents, was 
eliminated except for court-ordered obligations such as alimony 
payments.
    Emigrants who resettled permanently abroad have been able to visit 
or repatriate without hindrance. However, visiting emigrants who 
departed without first obtaining a PMZh stamp have been stopped at the 
border and prevented from departing the country (although they may 
enter without difficulty), since they could present neither a 
nonimmigrant visa to another country nor evidence of permission to 
reside legally abroad.
    The current conflict in Chechnya resulted in a large number of 
internally displaced persons (see Section 1.g.). International 
organizations estimate that the number of IDP's who left Chechnya as a 
result of the conflict reached a total of about 280,000 at peak. Of 
this total, most of the IDP's went to Ingushetiya (245,000), 6,000 were 
reported in Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in the Republic 
of Georgia. A total of 20,000 Chechen IDP's were reported to have gone 
to other regions of the Russian Federation. Reliable information on the 
number and status of displaced persons within Chechnya itself was 
especially difficult to obtain due to heavy fighting and limited 
outside access to the region. At times as many as 200,000 persons were 
estimated by the UNHCR to be displaced within Chechnya and without 
access to humanitarian assistance. In addition, 6,000 Dagestani IDP's 
were reported displaced within Dagestan. At various points during the 
conflict, authorities restricted the movement of the IDP's fleeing 
Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's, border guards at times 
permitted only ethnic Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to 
the press, some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts 
of Chechnya that were under Russian Government control. Refugees at the 
border sometimes had to live in the open, often without access to food 
or water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border 
between Chechnya and neighboring regions--and at checkpoints within 
Chechnya--reportedly required Chechen refugees to pay money to pass. 
According to UNHCR, authorities early in the year prevented medical 
supplies for Chechen hospitals from entering Chechnya; however since 
spring they have been able to do so. Some refugees also had trouble 
moving about because their documents were lost, stolen, or confiscated 
by Russian authorities. The NGO Civic Assistance estimated in October 
that only 141,870 of 171,000 IDP's were able to register and thereby 
receive aid (see Section 1.g.). In April North Ossetia's Deputy Prime 
Minister stated that an estimated 15,000 South Ossetian refugees, who 
fled to North Ossetia from Georgia in the early 1990's to escape ethnic 
violence, should be sent back to the country. North Ossetian officials 
claim that refugees occupying sanatoria and tourist facilities have 
deprived the republic of millions of rubles in income.
    Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that federal 
and republic authorities at times pressured the IDP's to return from 
Ingushetiya to Chechnya. According to these reports, government 
officials singled out persons from Chechen towns and districts that 
were designated as ``safe'' by the Government. According to some 
accounts, refugee camp administrators announced that persons from these 
areas would no longer receive food rations. After international 
criticism of these actions, government officials publicly said that 
they would not pressure or compel refugees to return to Chechnya. At 
the same time, authorities consistently announced their determination 
to repatriate all refugees back to Chechnya as soon as possible.
    The Government rarely provides first asylum. It cooperates to a 
limited extent with the UNHCR and the IOM. Both organizations assist 
the Government in developing a humane migration management system; this 
includes effective and fair refugee status determination procedures. As 
of July 31, the UNHCR had registered 40,000 asylum seekers who 
originated from outside the territories of the former Soviet Union 
since 1992. The UNHCR estimates that only 11,000 of these are active 
cases, i.e., persons still seeking asylum or receiving UNHCR 
assistance. The remainder either integrated into Russian society, left 
the country, or have been resettled or repatriated. According to the 
NGO Civic Assistance, as of October, the Government had granted refugee 
status to only 39 petitioners.
    According to UNHCR, as of October, the Government had granted 
refugee status to 238 petitioners this year. Of the 238, 141 were from 
outside the CIS countries and 97 were from the ``near abroad'' or other 
CIS countries.
    According to the UNHCR, between 1993 and November 1999, the 
Government granted refugee status to only 491 persons from outside the 
former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states; all but 17 of those 
individuals were from Afghanistan. By contrast, the comparable figure 
for former citizens of the Soviet Union apart from the Baltic states 
(mainly ethnic Russians) who were granted refugee status by the former 
Federal Migration Service (FMS) is 98,188. The Government acted more 
expeditiously for the latter group and applied a more lenient standard.
    The UNHCR and Amnesty International were working with the FMS and 
border officials to ensure that interviews of potential refugees are 
conducted in a timely fashion, that the UNHCR is allowed access to 
potential refugees in airport transit lounges, and that deportations of 
potential refugees are delayed until cases are adjudicated. However, 
under government reorganization, the FMS was disbanded with its 
functions and responsibilities transferred to other ministries. There 
continues to be widespread ignorance of refugee law both on the part of 
officials (MVD, EMERCOM, Border guards) and would be petitioners.
    According to Civic Assistance, involuntarily displaced persons and 
asylum seekers suffer the greatest difficulties in cities with 
restrictive registration regulations. Their migrant registration 
documents generally are not recognized by the MVD officials who control 
registration. They often are subject to harassment, unauthorized 
detention, and extortion of bribes.
    A large number of workers and students from Africa and Asia who 
came to work or study in accordance with treaties between their 
countries and the former Soviet Union remain in the country. The 
Government has not deported them but encourages their return home. The 
number of persons in Russia from these countries has increased in 
recent years due to the recent arrival of persons seeking refugee 
status.
    The situation of asylum seekers and refugees at Moscow's 
Sheremetyevo-2 Airport continues to be of major concern to the UNHCR. 
Improperly documented passengers are deported systematically, including 
persons who demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
countries of origin. If a passenger wants asylum, Aeroflot gives out 
telephone numbers for FMS and UNHCR, but these numbers are not posted 
publicly anywhere in the transit zone. Despite repeated UNHCR 
recommendations, there are also no signs in the transit area to advise 
asylum seekers about the refugee status determination process at the 
airport. Undocumented travelers are not allowed to leave the transit 
zone and often are returned to the carrier on which they entered the 
country. Legally bound to provide food and emergency medical care for 
undocumented travelers, the airline returns them to their point of 
departure as quickly as possible. (Airlines are fined if an 
undocumented passenger is admitted to Russia but not if the passenger 
is returned to the country of origin.) Human rights organizations 
allege that Aeroflot improperly deports hundreds of asylum seekers. 
Until 1998 the FMS Point of Immigration Control (PIC), whose officials 
are responsible for processing requests for refugee status, was located 
outside of the transit zone, where asylum seekers were unable to reach 
it. The PIC now has a fully equipped office inside the transit zone, 
which UNHCR staff are also permitted to use.
    The PIC interviews almost exclusively persons referred to it by the 
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the process is neither fair or 
effective; as of the end of 1998, the PIC had not yet rendered any 
decisions in favor of asylum seekers. As of late 1998, 82 percent of 
asylum seekers who managed to contact the UNHCR were deported before 
the former FMS made a determination of refugee status. The actual 
number of deportees is presumed to be higher, as many asylum seekers 
did not have an opportunity to contact the UNHCR.
    The treatment of asylum seekers in the transit zone can be harsh. 
The UNHCR has received reports of physical and verbal abuse of transit 
passengers by police officers and Aeroflot employees. Authorities 
rarely release passengers from the transit zone, unless there is a 
medical emergency.
    A group of about 1,400 to 2,000 Armenian refugees evacuated from 
Baku in the wake of late 1980's ethnic violence still are housed in 
``temporary quarters'', usually in Moscow hotels or workers' 
dormitories. They are unable to return to Azerbaijan and are not 
accepted by Armenia; they also lack residency permits for Moscow. They 
have been invited to apply for Russian citizenship, which would entitle 
them to the benefits accorded to Russian forced migrants, but 
representatives of the community have stated that they do not believe 
such a step would improve their situation materially. They also have 
rejected offers of relocation to other regions, because they allege 
that the alternative housing that they are offered frequently is not 
suitable or available. Their situation remains precarious as the 
formerly state-owned hotels in which many reside are privatized. A 
number of eviction orders already were served in such cases. Despite 
official promises, their status and permanent housing had yet to be 
resolved by year's end.
    The Constitution does not permit the extradition to other states of 
persons who would be persecuted there for their political beliefs or 
for actions (or inaction) that are not considered a crime in the 
Russian Federation. However, according to press reports and the UNHCR, 
in December 1999 the Government deported seven North Korean refugees to 
China in an apparent violation of the Refugee Convention, despite 
promises to allow them to travel to South Korea for third country 
resettlement. The exact reason for the return of these refugees is 
unclear. The Government of China reportedly returned the seven to North 
Korea. Moreover, in the past there were instances in which opposition 
figures were deported to countries of the former Soviet Union to face 
charges that were political in nature. Under the 1993 Commonwealth of 
Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and 
Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants can be detained for 
periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator General investigates the 
nature of outstanding charges against the detainee. This system is 
reinforced informally but effectively by collegial links among senior 
law enforcement and security officials in the various republics of the 
former Soviet Union. Human rights groups allege that this network is 
employed to detain opposition figures from the other former Soviet 
republics without actual legal grounds.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    The Constitution also provides the President and the Prime Minister 
with substantial powers, which they used to dominate most areas of 
administration and daytoday policy making and to limit the independence 
of the judicial branch. The judiciary is showing signs of limited 
independence in cases such as the Supreme Court acquittal of Nikitin, 
religious freedom cases in a number of reforms dealing with 
registration, and in the SORM case. Unlike its predecessor, this Duma 
is characterized by a strong pro-presidential center that puts a 
majority within reach for almost all presidential priorities. 
Competitive elections for various regional and local offices were held 
during the year, including elections for the chief executives in 44 of 
the country's 89 regions. Observers generally viewed the elections as 
free and fair. Challengers were able to defeat incumbents in almost 
one-third of the races for regional executive positions and losing 
candidates generally accepted the legitimacy of the voting results. 
There were problems in a number of regions relating to unequal access 
to the media, non-compliance with financial disclosure requirements, 
and use of ``administrative resources'' (such as government staff and 
official media) by incumbents to support their candidacies. Voters 
generally had the opportunity to choose among all serious candidates, 
but a regional court in the Kursk region struck the name of incumbent 
Governor Aleksandr Rutskoy from the ballot for alleged campaign law 
violations on the eve of the October 22 election. Many observers 
considered this court action to be politically motivated and arbitrary, 
particularly in light of similar campaign law violations allegedly 
committed by other incumbents, but the Supreme Court sustained the 
lower court decision on appeal.
    A democratic election for the President took place in 1996 for the 
first time in the history of Russia as an independent state. Former 
President Yeltsin was reelected in a generally free and fair election. 
After President Yeltsin's December 31, 1999, resignation, Vladimir 
Putin assumed the post of acting President. In March, in an election 
that was generally considered to be free and fair, Putin was elected 
President. While the opposition and the media leveled accusations of 
widespread election fraud, most international observers concluded that 
the results of the election were valid. There were credible reports of 
election fraud in some locations, particularly in the Republic of 
Dagestan and a few other regions with a long history of falsifying 
votes, but there was no evidence that such abuses were systematic or 
that they affected the choice of the new President. Problems with 
voting that did occur were due to a lack of attention to proper 
procedure or carelessness rather than to premeditation. Vote counting 
was generally transparent and absent of fraudulent intent.
    In elections that were judged by international observers largely to 
be free and fair, a more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December 
19, 1999. Elections were conducted in all 89 of the country's regions, 
including 12 of the 15 districts of the Chechen Republic, where polling 
was suspended for the Duma elections. This election had a 69 percent 
voter turnout, and was the first democratic transfer of power in the 
country. In spite of efforts made by authorities to prepare for safe 
and orderly elections in the Chechen Republic, observers stated that 
many of the conditions associated with democratic elections could not 
be met.
    Many observers pointed to problems with biased media coverage of 
the presidential election campaign. Paid political advertisements in 
newspapers often are disguised as legitimate news stories. Campaigns 
pay ``under the table'' for stories favorable to their candidate, which 
allows them to bypass limits on campaign spending. In the final days of 
the presidential campaign, ORT (at that time aligned with the 
Presidential Administration) aired a false story reporting on a 
``grass-roots'' initiative by a supposed group of homosexuals to 
support the Yabloko candidate Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. During the same 
period ORT aired several investigative reports about Yavlinskiy's 
supposed financial links to the head of Media-Most, Vladimir Gusinskiy. 
During these reports, footage of Gusinskiy, who is also the president 
of the Russian Jewish Congress, showed the Media-Most head in Jewish 
settings. Critics accuse ORT of playing on anti-Semitic sentiments 
within Russian society to discredit Yavlinskiy.
    In July the Federal Assembly passed legislation according to which 
regional executive and legislative leaders will appoint members of the 
Federation Council instead of serving in that body themselves. Also 
during the year the President appointed high-level presidential 
representatives to exercise a range of oversight and coordination 
responsibilities in seven newly established federal districts. He 
established an advisory State Council consisting of leaders of all 89 
regions. The net effect of these modifications to Russia's legislative 
and administrative structures for democratic development was not 
entirely clear at year's end.
    In March 1999, President Yeltsin signed the Law On the Basic 
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate 
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal Law on Public 
Associations. These laws clarify which political public associations 
may participate in elections; add restrictions on preferential media 
coverage, donations, and financial or material support from foreign 
entities for campaign-related activities; introduce measures to reduce 
the number of noncompetitive political parties and candidates on the 
ballot; increase the level of information available to voters about 
candidates' financial and criminal history; and introduce provisions 
allowing multi-candidate constituencies. Changes to the Voting Rights 
Act affect legislation on both the federal and regional levels of the 
Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court was expected to rule on 
Voting Rights Act provisions that pertain to holding referendums, which 
may compel lawmakers to reconsider the law.
    There were reports of politically motivated violence and 
intimidation during the gubernatorial campaign in St. Petersburg. 
Yabloko activists reported that police and others harassed them during 
the campaign and prevented them from distributing campaign literature. 
Not long after the presidential elections in March, two Yabloko student 
activists, Dmitriy Barkovskiy and Konstantin Suzdal, reported an 
attempt by the FSB to recruit them to spy on the political party. 
According to press reports, the students were threatened with dismissal 
from Baltic State Technical University, where they studied, and with 
conscription to fight in Chechnya if they refused. When they refused, 
they were expelled from the university. Barkovskiy is currently in 
hiding.
    Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov's office set up a working group to 
monitor electoral rights violations in both the 1999 Duma elections and 
2000 Presidential elections. In August 1999, Mironov called for 
legislation to increase the transparency of elections funding. To date 
no legislation has been passed.
    Political parties generally are organizationally weak and rise and 
fall quickly. There are two exceptions `` the Communist Party and the 
pro-Putin ``Unity'' Party. In December, Putin submitted draft 
legislation that would require parties to have 10,000 members in order 
to be registered, with no less than 100 members in each region. The 
draft law would grant political parties a partial monopoly on running 
candidates for legislative office, erect serious hurdles for the 
registration of new political parties and give the executive branch and 
procuracy broad powers to regulate, investigate, and even close down 
parties. The law is scheduled for its first review in February 2001.
    On November 29, State Duma deputies approved the first reading of a 
bill that would allow some regional leaders to seek a third and fourth 
term in office. The bill would amend an existing law, passed in October 
1999, that forbids heads of regions to serve more then two terms in 
office. The law was passed on January 31, 2001.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the 
December 1999 elections, 32 female deputies were elected to the 450-
member Duma, a decrease from the 46 female deputies in the Duma elected 
in 1995. Only one woman, Valentina Matviyenko, serves as a Cabinet 
Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Many domestic and international human rights groups operate freely. 
Most investigated and publicly commented on human rights problems, 
generally doing so without government interference or restrictions. 
Human rights monitors have worked mostly unhindered by authorities in 
recent years; however, some local officials harassed human rights 
monitors (see Section 1.d.). The Government's attitude towards human 
rights NGO's varied. Officials such as Vladimir Kalamanov and Oleg 
Mironov regularly interact and cooperate with NGO's. The level of 
cooperation tends to depend on the perceived threat to national 
security or level of opposition that an NGO might pose. For example, 
NGO's monitoring prison conditions enjoy an excellent relationship with 
Government authorities, while those monitoring Chechnya enjoy a more 
tense relationship. On August 30, a uniformed militia officer and 
several armed masked men entered the offices of Glasnost Public 
Foundation, a human rights group that has been critical of official 
actions in Chechnya and abuses by the security services in general. 
Activists were planning a conference about the security services at the 
time of the raid. The authorities held participants on the floor at 
gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes while they checked documents of 
individuals and of the foundation. After the press learned of the 
incident and began to call the Glasnost offices, the security officials 
left without arresting anyone. Human rights activists viewed this raid 
as an act of intimidation on the part of authorities.
    Several NGO's are headquartered in Moscow and have branches 
throughout the country. Some of the more prominent human rights 
organizations are the Public Center for Prison Reform, the Society for 
the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions, the Glasnost Public and 
Defense Funds, Memorial, the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, 
the Union of Soldiers' Mothers' Committees, the Mothers' Rights 
Foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki Group. Several of these groups are 
recognized by government and legislative officials for their expertise 
in certain fields, and such groups participate (with varying degrees of 
success) in the process of drafting legislation and decrees. Also, the 
prominent human rights organization Memorial worked with the offices of 
Vladimir Kalamanov, Special Presidential Representative for human 
rights in Chechnya, turning to Kalamanov to provide security for trips 
to the regions.
    Various types of regionally based human rights groups are being 
established. Socioeconomic rights groups are the most numerous and 
monitor issues such as unpaid wages and benefits. There are fewer 
civil-political rights groups, but according to Memorial these are 
growing in number. These groups include ``generalist'' organizations 
that cover the range of human rights issues and ``specialist'' 
organizations that cover only one issue. Public legal centers have been 
formed, due to the critical lack of legal advice that is available to 
the general public. These centers usually are run on a part-time basis 
by lawyers who, while they cannot afford to offer trial counsel or 
actual legal work, offer advice at no cost on legal rights and recourse 
under the law. Resources for human rights work became even scarcer 
after the 1998 financial crisis, threatening the work of NGO's. Most 
groups rely on foreign support in the form of grants to maintain 
operations.
    Regional groups generally receive little, if any, international 
support or attention. Although at times they reported that local 
authorities obstructed their work, criticism of the Federal Government 
and regional authorities usually is permitted without hindrance. The 
threshold appears to be criticism of a specific political leader in the 
region (usually the governor or a senior law enforcement official). 
Local human rights groups have far fewer opportunities to interact with 
legislators in developing legislation than their Moscow counterparts; 
some are excluded from the process entirely by local authorities.
    Because of the risk of kidnaping and ongoing military conflict (see 
Sections 1.b. and 1.g.), NGO's largely withdrew from Chechnya; some 
still operate but on a limited basis working from Ingushetia.
    The Government's human rights institutions lack independence but 
some of them appear to be making efforts to promote human rights. The 
Office of the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman appears to be 
working actively to develop its authority and public profile. Since 
taking office, Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has worked on becoming an 
increasingly high-profile government spokesman on human rights issues, 
despite earlier criticism by human rights organizations due to his lack 
of human rights expertise. Mironov's office has grown to over 150 
employees and has several specialized sections responsible for 
investigating complaints of human rights abuses. The effectiveness of 
Mironov's office in assisting individual victims cannot yet be assessed 
accurately. However, Mironov continues to expand the scope of his 
activities, attempting to promote broader compliance with international 
human rights standards. During the summer of 1999, Mironov established 
a department of human rights education within his office. The staff of 
six, headed by Anatoliy Azarov (a former director of the Moscow School 
of Human Rights), developed guidelines and materials for teaching human 
rights to the public. The office also established a section on 
religious freedom. Perhaps most importantly, Mironov's office has 
issued four reports detailing human rights abuses in areas ranging from 
psychiatry to pretrial detention. In eight of the regions, regional 
human rights ombudsmen established operations in a similar manner as 
Mironov. In many other regions, human rights commissions were set up. 
However, the effectiveness of the regional ombudsmen and committees 
differs significantly from region to region.
    The President's Human Rights Commission, now composed primarily of 
government officials (unlike the 1993-96 commission under Sergey 
Kovalev, which included a large number of human rights monitors), 
appeared largely inactive during the year. Some human rights groups 
continued to complain that the Commission's focus has changed from 
advocacy of human rights to defending the Government's policy and that 
the Commission has failed to engage well-established human rights 
NGO's. According to Commission chair Vladimir Kartashkin, his role is 
mainly consultative and investigatory, without powers of enforcement. 
Kartashkin receives little financial support from the Government and 
has a very small staff that spends most of its time responding to 
letters from the regions.
    The country has yet to comply with the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) resolution on Chechnya provisions to facilitate visits 
to the region by UN special rapporteurs and special representatives of 
the Secretary General. The country reportedly invited only the Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and Special Rapporteur 
for Violence against Women, but explicitly de-linked these invitations 
to the resolution. The country did not invite the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons.
    Citizens can file appeals to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations that 
occurred after Russia's May 5, 1998, accession to the Council of 
Europe. Complainants need no longer exhaust all appeals in Russian 
courts before they can turn to the European Court. According to the 
press, the ECHR received 914 complaints from Russia, 60 of which are 
based on human rights violations in Chechnya. However, because the 
Government refused so far to respond to the initial complaints accepted 
by the ECHR (a procedural requirement), no cases have yet been heard.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, language, social status, or other circumstances. However, 
both official and societal discrimination still exist.
    Women.--Domestic violence remains a major problem, since victims 
rarely have recourse to protection from the authorities. Police 
frequently are reluctant or unwilling to involve themselves in what 
they see as purely domestic disputes. Many women are deterred from 
reporting such crimes because of this and because the housing system 
makes it difficult either to find housing outside the family dwelling 
or to expel an abusive spouse, even after a final divorce action. The 
underlying problem is that much of society, including some leaders in 
the human rights community, do not acknowledge domestic violence as a 
problem or do not believe it to be an area for concern outside the 
family. No reliable statistics exist to evaluate the true extent of the 
problem. There is a general lack of understanding of these problems in 
the legal community, and there is no legal definition of domestic 
violence. Some forms of battering are addressed in the new Criminal 
Code but are defined too narrowly to apply to most cases. There is also 
no national political will to consider these problems seriously. More 
than four dozen versions of a national civil law to address domestic 
violence have failed to make any progress in the Duma. Women's NGO 
monitor Yelena Yershova has pointed out that law enforcement 
authorities distinguish between crimes committed outside the home and 
``acts of violence'' committed at home. In the latter case, such acts 
often are not treated as crimes, but rather as a domestic affair. In 
the first six months of the year, 4,787 persons were convicted of rape.
    There are no current statistics on the reported rape or attempted 
rape of women. The Ministry of Interior states that in 1998 there were 
9,014 cases of rape and attempted rape reported. In 1998 a HRW Europe 
researcher estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of rapes are reported to 
police. HRW further reported that Yekaterina Lakhova, former President 
Yeltsin's then-adviser on women's issues, estimated in 1997 that 14,000 
women are killed by husbands or family members each year. However, HRW 
notes that these statistics underestimate the extent of the problem, 
due to underreporting of these crimes by victims. In 1996 the MVD 
estimated that 80 percent of violent crimes occurred in the home.
    Hospitals and members of the medical profession provide assistance 
to women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant 
to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that they may be 
required to spend long periods in court.
    Trafficking of women for sexual exploitation is a very serious 
problem, particularly because of lack of adequate employment 
opportunities. Reliable statistics on the number of women involved are 
difficult to obtain (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Despite serious problems and difficulties in addressing these 
problems, many effective projects are underway. Approximately 40 crisis 
centers for women are in operation throughout the country, and their 
number continues to grow. The crisis centers formed an association in 
order to coordinate their efforts better, and they chose Marina 
Pisklakova, the Director of the crisis center ANNA, as President. The 
association held its first national conference September 1999, in 
Moscow. Since the conference, ANNA has been working with the Ministry 
of Interior to organize a class to educate police on domestic violence. 
Nongovernmental work in this area is recognized and supported by 
several government entities.
    Women report sexual harassment in the workplace, and anecdotal 
information suggests that many potential employers seek female 
employees who are receptive to sexual relations. The phrase, ``without 
complexes,'' is used occasionally in job advertisements. Some firms ask 
applicants for employment to complete a form including the abbreviation 
``VBO,'' a Russian abbreviation for ``possibility of close relations,'' 
to which the applicant is expected to reply ``yes'' or ``no.'' There is 
no law in the legal code that prosecutes sexual harassment.
    Credible evidence suggests that women encounter considerable 
discrimination in employment. NGO's continue to accuse the Government 
of participating in discriminatory actions against women, contending 
that the Government seldom enforces employment laws concerning women. 
Article 19 of the Constitution states that men and women have equal 
rights and opportunities to pursue those rights. In addition Article 2 
of the labor code prohibits discrimination, further stating that every 
person has the right for equal pay for equal work. Employers prefer to 
hire men, thereby saving on maternity and child-care costs and avoiding 
the perceived unreliability that accompanies the hiring of women with 
small children. The problem of age-based discrimination is very 
relevant to women. Employers try to avoid the requirement of a three 
year paid maternity leave for childcare. Women continue to report cases 
in which they are paid less for the same work that male colleagues 
perform. There has been no recent substantial research in this area, so 
exact figures are difficult to ascertain.
    Job advertisements often specify sex and age groups, and sometimes 
physical appearance as well. Women's average incomes generally are 
estimated to be significantly below average male incomes. Professions 
dominated by women are much lower paid than those dominated by men. 
Moscow human resources managers privately admit that discrimination 
against women in hiring is common. Unemployment, at 10.2 percent of the 
workforce, also disproportionately affects women.
    In July 1999, Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued a decree 
permitting men in the republic to have up to four wives. According to 
Aushev, the decision came in response to the republic's demographic 
situation, and he appealed to the Duma to make the necessary changes in 
the family code; the law was ruled unconstitutional.
    Children.--The Constitution assigns the Government some 
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of children. The State 
endeavors to provide, within its limited means, for the welfare of 
children. While federal law provides for education for all children in 
the country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to 
the children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants 
because they lack residential registration (see Section 2.d.).
    The educational system includes both private and public 
institutions. Children have the right to free education until the 11th 
grade (approximately 17 years old). Students are obligated to stay in 
school until the 9th grade. Boys and girls are treated equally in the 
school system. Health care for children is legally free, although the 
quality varies and individuals incur significant out of pocket 
expenses.
    A Family Code regulating children's rights and marriage and divorce 
issues came into effect in 1996; however, implementation of the code 
has been slow. Many Moscow charitable organizations established 
productive relations with the city government to address the needs of 
disabled children, as well as other vulnerable groups.
    The position of many children deteriorated since the collapse of 
communism because of falling living standards, an increase in the 
number of broken homes, and domestic violence. According to press 
reports, 40 percent of all children live below the poverty line. 
Children on the street often become dependent on illegal narcotics. To 
combat the growing number of children being abducted, police 
organizations are establishing programs to protect children.
    Figures for homeless children are unreliable at best. Nationwide 
they range from 1 to 4 million. Oleg Zykov, head of the No to 
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Foundation, estimates that there are about 
15,000 street children in Moscow alone. The St. Petersburg NGO 
Perspektiva estimate that about 3,000 children are actively involved in 
street life there and that 500 to 600 of these actually live on the 
streets. Many of these children have come from the regions, only to be 
sent back to where they came from by city police. One shelter director 
complained that young girls from Chechnya also were returned there, 
despite the danger to them. Homeless children often engage in criminal 
activities, receive no education, and are vulnerable to drug and 
alcohol abuse. Some young girls who find themselves on the street turn 
to prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.f.).
    An estimated 50,000 children run away from their homes each year. 
The main reasons children run away appear to be family violence, 
financial problems, or social problems such as drug or alcohol abuse by 
one or both of the parents. In Moscow approximately 6,000 children per 
year are brought to the Center of Temporary Isolation of Minor 
Delinquents (COVINA). These children stay in COVINA for no more than 30 
days. During this period, the child's guardian is located and his or 
her case is investigated. However, in 90 to 95 percent of these cases, 
the police simply return the child to the family or to the institution 
from which the child ran away. Many officials consider domestic 
problems as private and prefer not to interfere.
    In St. Petersburg local and international NGO's provide a variety 
of services for the homeless. In particular Perspektiva: Medecins du 
Monde (MDM) supports homeless children with a ``social hotel'' and a 
medical/social consultation center that provides medical help, 
vaccines, and referrals to hospitals and orphanages. Perspektiva also 
organizes specialized training seminars for medical and social 
professionals and city officials engaged in work with homeless youth.
    As the former Soviet Union opened to the international community, 
attention focused on the status of orphans and the disabled, who were 
removed from mainstream society and isolated in state institutions. A 
complex and cumbersome system was developed to manage their life-long 
institutionalization. Three different ministries (Education, Health, 
and Labor and Social Development) assumed responsibility for different 
age groups and categories of orphans. Rather than focus on the needs of 
the child, the system revolves around the institution itself. Child 
welfare is easily lost within the bureaucracy; little clear recourse 
exists in instances of abuse by the system. Human rights groups allege 
that children in state institutions are provided for poorly (often 
because funds are lacking) and in some cases are abused physically by 
staff.
    While there are no comprehensive studies of the effects of the 
orphanage system, its costs, and the extent of its problems, several 
groups have compiled important information. Many NGO's including Human 
Rights Watch and Mental Disability Rights International, have called 
for reform to the child protection system. Several approaches have been 
proposed to reform the orphanage and have been implemented by regional 
governments with the help of international donors.
    A 1997 report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, 
which is cited often, indicate that there are approximately 600,000 
children registered as orphans. Of these children, 10 percent are 
orphans with no parents and 90 percent are ``social orphans,'' who have 
at least one living parent who has given up the child to the State for 
a variety of reasons. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of registered 
orphans increased by 30 percent and the number residing in institutions 
by 35 percent. Concurrently, the number of children in foster families 
increased by 46 percent (most children are related to the members of 
their foster families). However, the number adopted has remained fairly 
consistent, with an overall increase of only 2 percent.
    Although comprehensive statistics are not available, the prospects 
of children/orphans who are disabled physically or mentally are 
extremely bleak. The label of ``imbecile'' or idiot, which signifies 
``uneducable,'' is almost always irrevocable. The most likely future is 
a lifetime in state institutions. Even the label of ``debil,'' or 
lightly retarded, follows a person throughout his or her life on 
official documents, creating barriers to employment and housing after 
graduation from state institutions. One study conducted by the Rights 
of the Child program of the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights 
found that on graduation from a state institution for the lightly 
retarded at age 18, 30 percent of orphans became vagrants, 10 percent 
became involved in crime, and 10 percent committed suicide. Even for 
those orphans classified as ``normal,'' life after institutionalization 
poses serious problems, as they may lack the necessary social, 
educational, and vocational skills to function in society.
    The existing system provides little oversight and no formal 
recourse for orphans who have been misdiagnosed as mentally ill or 
retarded, abused, or neglected. Facilities to which such children are 
remanded frequently use unprescribed narcotics to keep children under 
control. Boris Altshuler of the Rights of the Child Program has called 
for the establishment of an ombudsman for the rights of children with 
the power to enter and inspect children's facilities at any time of day 
or night without advance notification. Since 1998 the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Development has been working with the U.N. Children's Fund 
on a pilot program to establish regional children's rights ombudsmen. 
According to the Ministry and the Rights of the Child NGO, there are 
now ombudsmen in the cities of Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg and in 
the regions of Novgorod, Kaluga, and Volgograd, and there are plans to 
establish new ombudsmen in two other regions. Ombudsmen can only write 
a letter requesting an inquiry by law enforcement authorities, assist 
those whose rights have been violated to understand their legal rights, 
and make suggestions to legislators (local, regional, and federal) on 
ways to improve legislation.
    Trafficking in children and young girls is a problem (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    Conditions for children in prisons and pretrial detention are a 
problem (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.)
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution does not address 
directly the issue of discrimination against disabled persons. Although 
laws exist that prohibit discrimination, the Government has not 
enforced them. The meager resources that the Government can devote to 
assisting disabled persons are provided to veterans of World War II and 
other conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with various 
disabilities, but do not serve their needs adequately. The Government 
does not mandate special access to buildings for the disabled. The NGO, 
Society for the Defense of Invalids, is working to broaden public 
awareness and understanding of problems concerning the disabled.
    A 1995 law requires that firms with over 30 employees to either 
reserve 3 percent of their positions for persons with disabilities or 
contribute to a government fund to create job opportunities for the 
disabled. The law also removed language defining an ``invalid'' as a 
person unable to work. However, the Government has not implemented this 
law. Some persons with disabilities find work within factories run by 
the All-Russian Society for the Disabled, but the majority are unable 
to find work and frequently are discouraged from working, forced to 
subsist on social benefits.
    The December 1998 Human Rights Watch report ``Abandoned to the 
State,'' documented the conditions which persist in many orphanages, 
including in special state orphanages for the disabled. Being disabled 
is still a serious social stigma in the country, an attitude that 
profoundly influences how institutionalized children are treated. Many 
physically or mentally disabled children are considered ineducable, 
even those with only minor birth defects. According to the report, many 
disabled children are confined to beds around the clock or to rooms 
that are lit, heated, and furnished inadequately. The children are 
given only minimal care by low-paid unskilled workers with no training 
in the care of the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Until its abolition by presidential decree on 
September 22, 1998, the Moscow-based State Committee for the 
Development of the North was charged with representing and advocating 
the interests of indigenous people. With only a small staff, its 
influence was limited. The Committee's functions were transferred to 
the new Ministry for Regional Affairs and Nationalities, which is 
directed by presidential decree to take ``into account the need for 
singling out the most important issues of northern territories'' as one 
of its priorities. A 1999 bill, signed into law by President Yeltsin, 
on indigenous ethnic communities, provides them with support, 
permitting the creation of self-government bodies, and permitting them 
to seek compensation if economic development threatens their lands. In 
some areas local communities have organized to study and make 
recommendations regarding the preservation of the culture of indigenous 
people. People such as the Buryats in Siberia; the Tatar and Bashkiri 
in the Urals; the people of the North, including the Enver, Tafarli, 
and Chukchi; and others work actively to preserve and defend their 
cultures, as well as the economic resources of their regions. In this 
context, some groups in the far eastern part of the country criticized 
the Government for not developing an overall concept for the 
development of indigenous people. Most believe that they are treated 
equally with ethnic Russians, although some groups believe that they 
are not represented or are underrepresented in regional governments. 
The principal problems for indigenous people center on distribution of 
necessary supplies and services, particularly in the winter months for 
those who live in the far north.
    Religious Minorities.--Incidents of societal violence apparently 
based on religious belief decreased this year. Nevertheless, some 
serious incidents were recorded. On August 20, a group of extremists in 
Volgograd accosted a group of Mormons, beat four Russian members and 
threatened foreign missionaries. The same day, the same group similarly 
attacked Jehovah's Witnesses in Volgograd, beating a minister with a 
``Cossack'' whip. Members of the victimized groups have accused the 
authorities of being slow to investigate these incidents and make 
arrests. To date there has been no prosecution in the Volgograd 
incidents despite the fact that the identity of at least one of the 
accused perpetrators is known to authorities. On September 17, a group 
of extremists burst into a school in Ryazan where Jewish classes were 
being held and smashed windows, furniture, and an art exhibit made by 
the children, shouting death threats at the teachers present. 
Subsequent to the attack, the extremists left slogans on the school 
threatening to return and kill all the Jews. Police and local 
administration officials initially appeared to dismiss the case. Only 
after international and Moscow media began to probe the case did the 
authorities announce that four suspects were identified and would be 
charged with ``hooliganism.'' As of October, local officials reported 
that they had identified and detained one suspect, but that he had 
inexplicably disappeared. An editor of the local newspaper Vechermi-
Ryazan was threatened with dismissal for publishing an article related 
to the incident. There have been no developments in solving the 
bombings of two Moscow synagogues in May 1999 and in July 1999.
    As foreign or so-called nontraditional religions in the country 
continue to grow, many Russians continue to feel hostility toward these 
``foreign sects,'' perhaps influenced by negative reports in the mass 
media and public criticism by Russian Orthodox Church officials and 
other influential figures. These sentiments appear to have sparked 
occasional harassment and even physical attacks.
    During the Jubilee Bishops' Conference of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, August 13-16, the Church issued a document entitled 
``Fundamental Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church's Relations 
with Other Faiths.'' In the document the Church identifies 
denominations such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons as 
proselytizing ``cults'' whose operations on the ``canonical'' territory 
of Russia must be stopped. According to the document, the mission of 
other ``traditional'' confessions is possible only under the condition 
that they refrain from proselytizing or tempt the faithful away from 
the Church with material goods. Occasionally opposition to the 
dissemination of information came from religious groups. From time to 
time the Russian Orthodox Church has criticized the press for what it 
called ``anti-church publications,'' but stopped short of imposing any 
church sanctions against particular authors or editors. However, the 
Church appealed to authors of what it considered inaccurate accounts of 
church history to ``realize the sinfulness of their evil deeds.''
    Minority religious groups frequently complain of discriminatory 
stories in the media. Newspapers have published sensational or biased 
articles criticizing both traditional and nontraditional religious 
minorities. In October Russian Muslim groups complained of biased 
portrayal of Russian Muslims in a Russian State Television documentary 
entitled ``Half Moon in the Caucasus.'' The documentary, Muslims claim, 
exaggerated the influence of radicals and implied that all Muslims were 
working to support the Chechen separatists.
    Following large-scale emigration over the last two decades, between 
600,000 and 700,000 Jews remain in the country (0.5 percent of the 
total population). While Jewish emigration rates are significantly 
lower than during the Soviet period, the number of Jews emigrating to 
Israel for economic and other reasons increased approximately 70 
percent from January 1998 to January 1999. The vast majority of Jews--
80 percent--live in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Jews continue to 
encounter societal discrimination, and government authorities were 
criticized for insufficient action to counter it.
    Several reports of acts of intimidation were linked to anti-Semitic 
groups or motives during the year. Anti-Semitic leaflets, graffiti, and 
articles continued to appear in some regions, such as St. Petersburg, 
Ryazan, and Krasnodar. On September 7, an anti-Semitic article appeared 
on the pages of the prominent daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reportedly 
authored by Kremlin official Aleksandr Ignatov. In the article, Ignatov 
refers to a ``Chasidic para-Masonic'' group standing behind ``world 
government'' and globalization. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials 
reported in October that no one by that name was employed in the 
Presidential administration and that an internal investigation was 
under way (see Section 2.c.). The attack in Ryazan on a Jewish School 
was one of the first incidents of its kind during the year. The attack 
was followed by the publication of an extremely anti-Semitic article in 
the Vechernyaya Ryazan, a local newspaper, accusing the local Jewish 
organization of orchestrating the attack to gain publicity and foreign 
financial support. A Jewish cemetery in Nizhniy Novgorod was vandalized 
in July. Police apprehended the juvenile offenders within 2 weeks, 
earning support from the local Jewish community, and received a reward 
from FEOR. On September 29, an orthodox Jew associated with the Moscow 
Choral Synagogue was attacked by a group of ``skin heads''. Similar 
attacks have occurred on Africans and African-Americans in Moscow and 
other cities.
    The ultranationalist and anti-Semitic Russian National Unity (RNE) 
paramilitary organization, formerly led by Aleksandr Barkashov, 
appeared to have splintered and lost some of its support in the 
regions. The group ousted Barkashov in September, and several of its 
affiliates split off from the organization, unhappy with the current 
leadership. The RNE claims a membership of 100,000 in 64 federation 
chapters, but press reports estimate its membership at 12,000, and it 
is registered officially in 22 regions. According to various pollsters, 
the radical movement appears to have won some degree of national name 
recognition and may enjoy the support of up to 3 percent of the 
population. According to press accounts, the RNE managed to get a 
representative elected to the local administration in Saratov. In 
Borovichiy the RNE and another local Fascist group, Mertvaya Voda, were 
active, according to local Jewish leaders, and desecrated Jewish 
graves, mailed death threats to Jews, and displayed anti-Semitic 
posters. The local Borovichiy Duma passed a decree in December 1998 
prohibiting RNE activities and the distribution of its propaganda, and 
in March 1999 city and law enforcement officials formed a commission to 
counteract the RNE's activities and propaganda. In April 1999, 
officials from the Borovichiy city administration invited the Harold 
Light Center, a Jewish NGO, to present a 2-day seminar on combating 
anti-Semitism and extremism. In August, a group of city and regional 
officials traveled to San Francisco to meet with law enforcement 
officials dealing with hate crimes, and in October the San Francisco 
officials traveled to Russia and participated in a hate-crimes seminar 
with their Russian colleagues.
    Jewish NGO's claimed that anti-Semitic themes figured on the eve of 
the presidential elections, citing ORT's airing of a report showing 
opposition figure Grigoriy Yavlinskiy supported by Jewish leader 
Vladimir Gusinskiy, wearing a yarmulke and participating in a meeting 
with Jewish leaders (Rabbis included) in a cynical attempt to discredit 
Yavlinskiy among those who would find the association troublesome.
    A prominent public figure who regularly used anti-Semitic remarks 
was former Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko (see Section 
2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In July 1998, the presidential 
Human Rights Commission issued an official statement noting that ``the 
increase in the threat of fascism'' was ``taking on visible and ominous 
features,'' and that incitement of national, racial, and religious 
enmity was ``taking on an increasingly organized nature.'' It noted the 
increasing number of extremist groups that advocated racial supremacy 
and ``national xenophobia'' and commented that such groups were moving 
with increasing frequency from combat training (under the guise of 
sports training) to ``acts of direct terror, hoodlum attacks on persons 
of 'unwelcome' nationality, the desecration of cemeteries, and 
explosions of monuments.'' The statement followed a number of 
wellpublicized incidents that spring, including several racially 
motivated attacks on members of minorities, particularly Asians and 
Africans. Attacks generally appeared to be random, inspired by racial 
hatred, and carried out by private individuals or small groups, some of 
whom were known to local law enforcement authorities for their racial 
intolerance or criminal records. In December, an African-American 
student was beaten on a tram in Moscow.
    Roma and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia face widespread 
societal discrimination, which often is reflected in official attitudes 
and actions. Police reportedly beat, harassed, and solicited bribes 
from persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, or Africa. Discrimination against persons from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia also increased concurrently with new measures 
at both the federal and local levels to combat crime. Law enforcement 
authorities targeted persons with dark complexions for harassment, 
arrest, and deportation from urban centers, particularly after the 
August 1999 bombing in Moscow. In Moscow such persons are subjected to 
far more frequent document checks than others and frequently are 
detained or fined in excess of permissible penalties, often without 
formal documents recording the infraction being drawn up and presented 
by police.
    During the year, members of ethnic or racial minorities were the 
victims of beatings, extortion, and harassment by ``skinheads'' and 
members of other racist and extremist groups. Arrests seldom are made 
in most such attacks, many of which have been reported by human rights 
organizations. Many victims, particularly refugees who lack residence 
documents recognized by the police, choose not to report such attacks 
or report indifference on the part of police. On October 21, a group of 
``skinheads'' in Moscow attacked Vietnamese residents in front of their 
dormitory. When Vietnamese residents poured out of the dormitory to 
assist in fending off the attackers, police intervened to protect the 
``skinheads.'' No arrests were made.
    The Government reported that in 1998 authorities investigated 25 
criminal cases on charges of incitement to national, racial or 
religious hatred. In July 1999, 10 cases were opened, and courts have 
ruled on 9 of them. Chechen IDP's and the Civic Assistance Committee 
for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding 
lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the 
usual rent for an apartment.
    In February 1999, the republican legislature in Bashkortostan 
passed a law naming Bashkiri and Russian as its two official languages, 
but excluded Tatar. There are more Tatars than Bashkir in the republic, 
and Tatars constitute 30 percent of the republic's population. The 
legislature of the republic of Tatarstan appealed to the Bashkortostan 
legislature to include the language, but the appeal was rejected. On 
January 21, some 20 Tatars protested a draft version of the language 
law outside the republican legislature, and authorities arrested 7 of 
the protesters. The law still remains in effect.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the 
exercise of this right continue to arise from governmental policy and 
the dominant position of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of 
Russia (FNPR), the successor organization to the Communist trade 
unions. Approximately 55 percent of the work force is unionized (of an 
estimated 72.4 million workers), and approximately 4 percent of union 
members belong to independent unions. However, there is no 
authoritative data on union membership, because there was no mandatory 
reregistration of union members following the Soviet era, during which 
all workers were registered as trade union members. Union membership 
overall has fallen as a result of economic restructuring, including the 
closing of some enterprises and a resistance by some foreign companies 
to trade union activities.
    The FNPR claims that some 80 percent of all workers belong to the 
FNPR, although International Labor Organization (ILO) representatives 
state that 60 percent is a more accurate estimate. The FNPR thus 
largely dominates the union movement and provides a practical 
constraint on the right to freedom of association. The FNPR inherited 
the bulk of the property of its predecessors, including office and 
recreational property. The majority of its income comes from sources 
other than dues, such as rental income, sale of real estate, and fees 
for member services. Its unions frequently include management as part 
of the bargaining unit or elect management as delegates to its 
congresses. The FNPR and other trade union federations act 
independently on the national political level, but FNPR unions 
sometimes are affiliated closely with local political structures. 
Political parties often act in parallel with unions, for example, in 
calling for a national day of protest.
    Benefits of membership presently vary depending on union 
affiliation and generally discourage the formation of new unions. These 
benefits are largely financed by the Social Insurance Fund. As the 
largest group of trade unions, FNPR enjoys a privileged position with 
regard to the distribution of state funds at the municipal, oblast, and 
federal levels. It routinely decides who receives benefits, such as 
child subsidies and vacations, based on the politics or affiliation of 
union members. However, the new tax code, effective January 1, 2001, 
will include a single social tax and essentially end trade union 
control over the distribution of social benefits at the federal level. 
FNPR sees this as a threat to its dominant role. Other trade unions 
worry that a consolidation of social security assets in the federal 
budget and an additional layer of bureaucracy in the distribution of 
benefits will lead to reduced benefits for workers and the public in 
general.
    The number of court decisions supporting the right of association 
and ruling in favor of employees increased during the year. However, 
the enforcement of these court decisions remains a problem. Moreover, 
most workers do not understand or have faith in the legal structure, 
fear possible retaliation, and thus are reluctant to bring cases to 
court. For example, the Association of Flight Personnel at Vnukovo 
Airport (an independent union) won an out-of-court dispute over unpaid 
monthly bonuses in December 1998. Members of the union, who numbered 
100 at the time, subsequently found themselves excluded from the list 
of payees. The only reason appeared to be their union membership, as 
those who quit the union immediately received bonuses. In January 1999, 
the union filed a lawsuit. After several postponements, management 
agreed in March to pay the remaining 10 members bonuses owed since 
December 1998.
    Management and FNPR local unions often work together to discourage 
the establishment of new unions. In August 1999, management at the Alit 
Factory and the Sverdlovsk Oblast FNPR leadership convened a ``trade 
union conference'' where a newly elected chairman of a local 
construction workers' union was dismissed from her position. The 
chairman filed a case in the municipal court, claiming that management 
and the oblast committee of FNPR were not authorized to convene a local 
union's conference and that conference participants were not even 
members of the local union. The municipal court refused to hear the 
case. The chairman appealed the decision to the Oblast Court, which 
ruled in her favor. The case has been sent back to the lower court for 
review.
    In accordance with the federal Law on Public Organizations, all 
civic organizations founded before 1994 were required to reregister 
with the Ministry of Justice by July. The registration procedure for 
NGO's requires that the local departments of justice check all articles 
of charter documents for compliance with existing laws. However, the 
registration procedures for unions are governed by the Law on Trade 
Unions, which specifies that registration requires a simple 
``notification'' and submission of documents. Departments of Justice 
throughout Russia have ignored the procedures set out by this law and 
continually refused to register new unions by requiring changes in 
charter documents or confirmation of attendance at founding 
conferences. In one case in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the local Department of 
Justice demanded that founders of a trade union sign again the founding 
documents in the presence of a Justice Department official, a procedure 
not required in any law. Such practices have prevented the registration 
of new unions or the reregistration of existing ones.
    Department of Justice officials extended their authority far beyond 
the letter of the law and in some cases canceled the registration of 
unions. In 1997 the Sverdlovsk Court of Arbitration canceled the 
registration of a local union of utility workers at management's 
request. The Supreme Arbitration Court in June cancelled the initial 
ruling and sent the case back to the lower court for review. Recovery 
of registration will allow the union to again become a legal entity and 
reinstate its chairman, who had been illegally fired. In March the 
leader of a union of ambulance drivers in Nizhniy Tagil received a 
warning from the local procurator's office, demanding that she stop 
interfering with the work of her ambulance depot. The municipal court 
ruled that the leader be fined. The leader appealed the case, and the 
Sverdlovsk Oblast Court ruled in her favor in May. In the opinion of 
independent lawyers, these actions contradict the laws governing union 
registration and are a direct and illegal attempt to discourage labor 
activism.
    Court rulings have established the principle that nonpayment of 
wages--still by far the predominant grievance--is an individual dispute 
and cannot be addressed collectively by unions. As a result, a 
collective action based on the nonpayment of wages is not recognized as 
a strike, and individuals are not protected by the labor law's 
protection against being fired while on strike. Prior to 1999, 
collective actions on this issue were considered strikes if they 
concerned violations of a collective bargaining agreement that 
specified the time frame for wage payments.
    The right to strike is difficult to exercise. Most strikes are 
considered technically illegal, because the procedures for disputes are 
exceedingly complex and require coordination of information from both 
sides, even before courts are involved. Strikes may be reviewed by a 
civil court to establish their legality. The Russian Law on Resolution 
of Collective Labor Disputes specifies that if a strike could affect 
the safety or health of citizens, then a minimum level of essential 
services must be provided. Under such a definition, it is difficult to 
exclude any public sector employees. After a trade union declares a 
strike, the trade union, management, and local executive authority have 
5 days to agree on the required level of essential services. If no 
agreement is reached--which is often the case, the local executive 
authority simply decrees the minimal services. The local executive 
authority also often sets the minimal level of essential services at 
roughly the same level as the average work load. Moreover, the civil 
court has the right to order the confiscation of union property to 
settle damages and losses to an employer if a strike is found to be 
illegal and not discontinued before the decision goes into effect. As a 
result, an increasing number of strikes are organized by strike 
committees, rather than unions. Reprisals for strikes are also common, 
although strictly prohibited by law. In August 1998, workers at St. 
Petersburg's Oktyabrskaya Railroad declared a strike over nonpayment of 
wages, management's refusal to conduct collective bargaining with the 
local union, and noncompliance with health and safety standards. Strike 
participants were sent on forced leave with reduced pay. Management 
claimed there was no work for them at the depot. The workers filed 
cases against management, but the local court ruled against them in 
April. All participants in the strike have been subject to transfer to 
``idle time'' due to low ticket sales.
    In 1995 transportation unions complained that because 
transportation can be considered an essential service that must be 
provided under law, their right to strike is denied. The Constitutional 
Court agreed and found that banning industry-wide strikes was 
unconstitutional and that each needs to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. However, a subsequent 1995 federal Law on Railways banned 
railway strikes in contradiction to the Constitution. After successful 
negotiations with the air traffic controllers' union to avoid a strike, 
the Government drafted a regulation that became law in 1999 to ban all 
strikes in the air traffic sector. In addition to the railway and air 
traffic sector, strikes are banned by workers at nuclear power stations 
and by members of the military, militia, government agencies, and 
disaster assistance organizations.
    Union leaders have been followed by the security services, detained 
for questioning by police, and subjected to heavy fines, losses of 
bonuses, and demotions. In January the death of a youth in Polevskoy 
allegedly was due to the trade union activism of his parent who was a 
leader of the regional trade union center. The leader had received 
threats to her job and family after filing cases against the local 
prosecutor's office, municipal court, and police concerning misuse of 
funds. The leader subsequently left her position. There were no further 
developments in the investigation of the son's death by year's end.
    According to an International Labor Organization report, on January 
27, 1999, unknown assailants murdered Gennadiy Borisov, a leader of the 
Vnukovo Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union at the entrance 
to his apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists 
began picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being 
paid for 4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged 
illegal practices involving the company's shares. To date, there have 
been no significant developments in this case, and it reportedly is 
still open.
    There were no prolonged strikes during the year. According to 
official statistics, wage arrears in the first half of the year fell by 
over 80 percent in real terms when compared with the same period in 
1998. Nonpayment of wages, which had motivated strikes in previous 
years, grew less prevalent. The number of strikes fell by 25 percent in 
1999 and continued to fall this year. Unions may freely form 
federations and affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--The law provides for the 
right of collective bargaining, but this right is not always protected. 
The law requires employers to respond to a trade union's initiative and 
negotiate with the union, but no time limit is specified. Moreover, the 
law does not require management to sign the agreement, even after both 
sides have signed protocols approving a draft text. As a result, the 
right to conclude a collective agreement is often not protected. 
Employers often ignore the requirement to negotiate and refuse to come 
to the bargaining table or refuse to provide financial information 
demanded by trade unions. In the past, employers have successfully 
refused to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, particularly for 
unions not affiliated with the FNPR. However, some progress has been 
made in this area. In December 1999, the trade union of employees of 
the State TV and Radio Company filed suit against management because of 
the latter's refusal to enter into collective bargaining negotiations. 
Management demanded that the union prove it was authorized to 
participate in collective bargaining, which it did twice. The court 
ruled that management should start negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement. Management appealed the ruling, but the higher court left 
the decision unchanged--a significant victory for the trade union.
    An estimated 14 percent of enterprises have officially registered 
collective bargaining agreements. (FNPR claims that approximately 80 
percent of its enterprises have such agreements.) It is not obligatory 
to register collective agreements, and it is very likely that there are 
far more collective agreements than those actually registered. However, 
a gap in the law, which fails to establish the employer's legal 
identity, often makes collective agreements ineffective. A lack of 
clear identification under the Law of the Employer has made nonbinding 
tripartite tariff agreements (with labor, management, and government 
participation) nonbinding at the municipal, regional, national, and 
industrial levels and has brought their legal validity into question. 
Even after an agreement is signed, employers often claim that the 
``employer representative'' was not authorized to represent the factory 
involved.
    In December the Duma was scheduled to consider two draft versions 
of a new Labor Code. The Government proposed the first in 1999, while 
prounion deputies in the Duma support the second. The government draft 
seeks to increase labor mobility and reduce the so-called gray economy. 
However, trade unionists view the government draft as antiunion and 
fear that it will undercut collective bargaining because of its 
emphasis on individual labor agreements, provision for entities other 
than unions to represent workers, and restrictions of collective 
bargaining to legal entities that essentially eliminate local trade 
union representation. The prounion draft strengthens trade union rights 
and guarantees for workers, including repayment of delayed wages with 
interest and employees' right to stop working if payment is delayed 
more than 10 days.
    There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the special 
economic zones and free trade zones are covered fully by the existing 
Labor Code and are the same as in other parts of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children; however, 
there were some reports of its use relative to adults. Officers have 
reportedly sent soldiers under their charge to work on farms to gather 
food for their units or perform work for private citizens or 
organizations. Women are trafficked from the country for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There were no reports of 
forced or bonded labor by children.
    According to credible media reports, significant numbers of foreign 
workers from countries of the former Soviet Union are forced to work 
without pay because their passports are held by firms that brought them 
into the country. Similar reports describe North Koreans brought in to 
work in the construction and timber industries in the Russian Far East, 
with salaries remitted to their Government.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits regular employment for children 
under the age of 16 and also regulates the working conditions of 
children under the age of 18, including banning dangerous, nighttime, 
and overtime work. Children may, under certain specific conditions and 
with parental approval, work in apprenticeship or internship programs 
at the ages of 14 and 15. Such programs may not pose any threat to the 
health or welfare of children. The Ministries of Labor and the Interior 
are responsible for child labor issues. Local police authorities are 
responsible for conducting inspections of entities suspected of 
violating child labor laws; however, investigations are entirely 
complaint-driven.
    Accepted social prohibitions against the employment of children and 
the availability of adult workers at low wages generally prevent 
widespread abuse of child labor legislation. However, the transition 
from a planned to a market economy has brought with it drastic 
economic, political, and social changes. An increase in the number of 
children working and living on the streets is largely the result of 
deterioration in the social service infrastructure, including access to 
education and health care. In some cases, economic hardship has 
undermined traditions and social customs, and eroded the protection 
families traditionally provided to children. Homeless children are 
especially at risk for exploitation in prostitution or criminal 
activities. Children often are used by their parents to lend credence 
to their poverty when begging.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, some girls were trafficked abroad for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage of 
$4.70 (132 rubles) remains well below the official subsistence level of 
$35 (1,234 rubles) per month and is insufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Approximately 37 percent of 
the population have incomes below this survival minimum, compared with 
38 percent in 1999. Most workers receive several times the monthly 
minimum, and the minimum wage is essentially an accounting reference 
for calculating university stipends, pensions, civil service wages, and 
social benefits. It is not a number used for real salaries. Enterprises 
often use this number to avoid taxation by reporting the number of 
employees paid at the minimum wage instead of reporting actual 
salaries. According to Ministry of Labor statistics, unreported wages 
currently account for about 12 percent of the gross domestic product. 
Legally paid wages account only about 36 percent of the total income of 
citizens. In addition, much of the population continues to reside in 
low-rent or subsidized housing and receives various social services 
from enterprises or municipalities. Dependence on such subsidies, in 
conjunction with the residency registration system--illegal but widely 
practiced--generally prevents relocation to find work.
    The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at 
least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for 
overtime work or work on holidays. Workers have complained of being 
required to work well beyond the normal week, that is 10- to 12-hour 
days, of abrogations of negotiated labor agreements, and of forced 
transfers.
    Despite a steady decline since the 1998 crisis, the nonpayment of 
wages continues to be the most widespread abuse of the Labor Code, 
especially for workers in the education, medicine, and coal sectors. 
While the overall problem of nonpayment of wages appeared to diminish 
greatly, total wage arrears at the end of November remained high and 
equaled over $1 billion (36.8 billion rubles). While some enterprises 
still force their employees to take wages in barter, the practice is 
much less prevalent than in the period before or immediately after the 
1998 financial crisis. The International Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) contends that the total bill of wage arrears is now more than 
$15 billion.
    An increasing number of workers owed back wages seek relief through 
the court system, but the process is lengthy. Courts often are willing 
to rule in favor of employees, but the collection of back wages remains 
difficult. Courts often insist that cases be filed individually, in 
contradiction to the Law on Trade Unions, thereby undercutting union 
attempts to include the entire membership in one case. This insistence 
also makes the process lengthier and more difficult for the affected 
workers and exposes them to possible retaliation. It is widespread 
practice to remove the names of workers who win judgments for back 
wages, but have not yet received the wages, from the list of those who 
can buy food on credit from the company store.
    Labor mobility continues to be a problem. For various reasons, many 
workers are not able to move to other areas of the country in search of 
work. Many are constrained economically because their savings were 
destroyed by the rampant inflation of the early 1990's and the 
nonpayment of wages. Their freedom to move in search of new employment 
is limited further by the system of residency permits. Other workers 
effectively are tied to enterprises that can give them only credits at 
the company cafeteria and grocery and the hope of future salary 
payments. The knowledge that workers cannot easily move across regions 
and find employment has made managers in some one-factory towns 
reluctant to lay off workers. Because of the inability of local 
employment agencies to provide benefits or to absorb laid-off employees 
from some factory towns, local governors and mayors often overturn the 
enterprises' decisions to lay off workers who are not really working. 
Other factors, such as the availability of subsidized housing and 
cultural ties to locations, also inhibit the movement of workers. By 
decriminalizing the nonpayment of wages and by maintaining the system 
of residency permits, the Government has restricted even further the 
mobility of labor.
    The law establishes minimal conditions for workplace safety and 
worker health, but these standards often are not enforced. Workers wear 
little protective equipment in factories, enterprises store hazardous 
materials in open areas, and smoking is permitted near containers of 
flammable substances. Funds remain limited for safety and health in the 
workplace.
    The Labor Code guarantees workers the right to remove themselves 
from hazardous or life-threatening work situations without endangering 
their continued employment and entitlements to such compensations as 
shorter hours, increased vacations, extra pay, and pension benefits for 
working under such conditions. However, the pressure for survival often 
displaces concern for safety. There continue to be reported cases of 
miners removing the supports from mineshafts and selling them for scrap 
metal. Doctors and nurses have been known to sell health and safety 
equipment at hospitals to patients' families in order to supplement 
salaries that often remain below the minimum subsistence level.
    The risk of industrial accidents or death for workers remains high, 
although reliable recent statistics on accident and death rates at the 
workplace are not available. After repeated requests went unanswered, 
members of a St. Petersburg local locomotive engineers' union this year 
sued management to obtain information on health and safety risks 
associated with their work and measures taken to address these 
problems. The workers based their case on a federal law that grants 
employees the right to obtain information on their working conditions 
and occupational hazards. Hearing of the case has been postponed.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and young girls is 
a problem, but there are no reliable estimates of its scope. There is 
no special legislation nor has the Government established special task 
forces on the issue. However, there are several articles of the 
Criminal Code that relate to trafficking of persons. For example, 
Article 322, the principal legal statute against trafficking in 
persons, provides for punishment of up to 5 years' imprisonment for 
unlawful violation of Russian borders by a ``group of persons in prior 
arrangement or by an organized group either using violence or the 
threat of violence.'' Crossing the country's borders without required 
documentation is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years. 
Regarding trafficking of women, Article 133 prohibits forcing a person 
into sexual activity; Article 240 prohibits drawing a person into 
prostitution by force or threat of force, and Article 241 prohibits the 
organization and maintenance of a house of prostitution. Prostitution 
itself is not illegal in the country.
    Russia is a country of origin for trafficking in persons, 
especially in the trafficking of women. However, the authorities often 
dispute the extent to which trafficking occurs, and who believe that 
estimates are based on too little information. The difficulty is that 
law enforcement bodies consider that most of the illegal activity takes 
place outside its borders and therefore is not within their 
jurisdiction. The country also serves as a transit and destination 
country for a large portion of women trafficked from the New 
Independent States to Western Europe. There are reports that women from 
Tajikistan are trafficked to Russia. Women reportedly are trafficked to 
European Union countries, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States. 
Reportedly women also are trafficked within the country. Women (most 
often young girls) usually are transferred from provincial areas to 
Moscow and St. Petersburg.
    Due to a continuing lack of adequate employment opportunities, a 
significant number of women are victims of international trafficking 
for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics on the number of women 
involved are difficult to obtain. NGO's allege that Russian organized 
crime increasingly is involved in trafficking in women and children, 
but reliable data are not available. Women often respond to 
advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad, where they are forced 
into prostitution. A comprehensive 2-year study of trafficking in the 
former Soviet Union, completed in 1997 by the Global Survival Network, 
an international NGO, remains one of the few sources of information on 
the scope of this problem. The study concluded that most women who are 
trafficked are unwitting participants who respond to advertisements 
while searching for legitimate work. Some government officials and law 
enforcement agencies acknowledge that a trafficking problem exists. 
However, the belief that women are aware of the risks involved is still 
pervasive. According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
more then half of the women engaged in prostitution abroad learned 
about the nature of their future occupation before leaving the country. 
NGO's contend that women are more often told they are would be 
hostesses, exotic dancers, hotel workers, models, etc. They further 
claim that even those who agreed to be sex workers did not agree to the 
kinds of working and living conditions to which they were subjected, or 
to the loss of their documentation and the lack of pay. According to 
credible reports in the national media, there are significant numbers 
of foreign workers from countries of the former Soviet Union who are 
forced to work without pay because their passports are held by firms 
which brought them into the country.
    There are no known specific measures undertaken by law enforcement 
bodies in order to prevent the export of women for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation. The criminal persecution of representatives of the 
``business'' usually takes place in connection with cases whose 
investigation is performed within the framework of cooperation with 
international law enforcement structures. The Ministry of the Interior 
believes that the ``trafficking in women'' problem is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Consular Services 
abroad. However, NGO's charge that exploited women commonly are refused 
help by Russian consular officials abroad. Women rarely seek the 
assistance of local authorities nor do they file complaints against the 
agencies that recruited them once they are back in the country because 
they often do not trust the law enforcement authorities.
    The Government does not provide assistance to trafficking victims. 
Victims of trafficking can turn to a crisis center or other NGO's that 
render assistance to women victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse. 
There are 40 crisis centers and NGO's that render assistance to female 
victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse.
    There are no Government initiatives to return trafficked women. 
Unless deported by the host country, women must pay their own way home. 
Some women who return have reportedly told NGO's that they were unable 
to communicate with local law enforcement in their destination country. 
Women reported that their documentation was withheld and that without 
it they were not able to gain assistance from the Russian consulates.
    There are also reports of officers ``selling'' soldiers. The Union 
of Soldiers' Mothers Committee reported in October that this practice 
remains widespread, especially in Chechnya. According to the Committee, 
they received reports that the going rate for a soldier was $2 (50 
rubles). In one egregious case in September, a soldier in Chechnya 
reportedly was purchased for 10 bottles of vodka (see Section 1.c.).
    Law enforcement bodies take the trafficking of children more 
seriously. There are reports of children being kidnaped or purchased 
from orphanages for sexual abuse, child pornography, and body parts. 
There are no statistics available, but law enforcement acknowledge that 
Internet child pornography is an increasing business. There is also 
some evidence of trafficking for organs and body parts. In a much 
publicized case near Moscow, police set up an undercover operation 
which resulted in the arrest of a grandmother and uncle of an 8 year 
old boy, who had sold the child for $90,000 to persons who admitted 
they wanted the boy for sale of his body parts.
                               __________

                               SAN MARINO

    San Marino is a democratic, multiparty republic. The popularly 
elected Parliament (the Great and General Council (GGC)) selects two of 
its members to serve as the Captains Regent (co-Heads of State). They 
preside over meetings of the GGC and of the Cabinet (Congress of 
State), which has 10 other members (Secretaries of State), also 
selected by the GGC. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has 
some of the prerogatives of a prime minister. The Government respects 
the law's provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
    Elected officials effectively control the centralized police 
organization (the Civil Police) and the two military organizations (the 
Gendarmerie and the Guardie di Rocca).
    The principal economic activities are tourism, farming, light 
manufacturing, and banking. In addition to revenue from taxes and 
customs, the Government also derives revenue from the sale of coins and 
postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from an annual 
budget subsidy provided by the Italian Government under the terms of 
the Basic Treaty with Italy.
    The authorities generally respect citizen's rights in practice; 
however, although the Parliament and the Government have demonstrated 
strong commitment to the protection of human rights, some laws 
discriminate against women, particularly with regard to the 
transmission of citizenship.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process. The judicial system requires that the country's lower 
court judges be non-Sammarinese citizens, with the aim of assuring 
impartiality.
    A local conciliation judge handles cases of minor importance. Other 
cases are handled by the non-Sammarinese judges who serve under 
contract to the Government. The final court of review is the Council of 
Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (4 replaced every 2 
years) from among the members of the GGC.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices. Government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations. 
Although it does not formally offer asylum to refugees, the Government 
has permitted a few individuals to reside and work in the country. The 
issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year; 
nor were there any reports of the forced repatriation of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they face no legal impediments. In 1974 the first female member was 
elected to the GGC. Since then, women have served on the Council as 
Secretary of State for Internal Affairs and as Captain Regent. All 
women's branches of the political parties have been integrated into the 
mainstream party organizations, where women hold important positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no domestic human rights organizations, although the 
Government does not impede their formation. The Government has declared 
itself open to outsiders' investigations of alleged abuses, but there 
have been no known requests.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, 
disability, language, or social status, and the authorities respect 
these provisions. The law also prohibits some forms of discrimination 
based on sex, but vestiges of legal as well as societal discrimination 
against women remain.
    Women.--The law provides for the protection of women from violence, 
and occurrences of such violence, including spousal abuse, are rare.
    Several laws provide specifically for the equality of women in the 
workplace and elsewhere. In practice there is no discrimination in pay 
or working conditions. All careers are open to women, including careers 
in the military and police as well as the highest public offices.
    However, one law discriminates against women by stipulating that a 
woman who marries a foreigner cannot transmit citizenship to her 
husband or children, but that a man who marries a foreigner can do so 
to both his wife and their children. In a September 1999 referendum, 
the electorate by a very narrow margin failed to confirm a change to 
the law that was approved by Parliament in June 1999. The proposed law 
would have provided for the transmission of Sammarinese citizenship by 
women, but it was narrowly defeated despite support by all political 
parties.
    The September 1999 referendum also failed to confirm a provision 
that would have revoked the citizenship of women who acquired 
citizenship through marriage 5 years after a divorce, if they no longer 
resided in the country. This provision was included in the proposed law 
after the Government had noted that several Eastern European women 
recently had married significantly older citizens, presumably with the 
aim of acquiring citizenship.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public education 
and medical care. No differences are apparent in the treatment of girls 
and boys in education or health care, nor is there any societal pattern 
of abuse directed against children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. A 1992 law established guidelines for easier access to 
public buildings, but its implementation remained incomplete.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--By law all workers (except the armed 
forces but including the police) are free to form and join unions. A 
1961 law sets the conditions for the establishment of a union. Unions 
may form domestic federations or join international labor federations.
    Union members constitute about half of the country's work force 
(which numbers about 10,300 Sammarinese citizens plus 4,000 Italians 
from the country's total population of about 25,000 persons).
    Trade unions are independent of the Government and the political 
parties, but they have close informal ties with the parties, which 
exercise strong influence on them.
    Workers in all nonmilitary occupations have the right to strike. No 
general strikes occurred in at least the last 10 years. However, during 
this period some brief sector-wide and company strikes took place.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.
    The law gives collective bargaining agreements the force of law and 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Effective mechanisms 
exist to resolve complaints. Negotiations are conducted freely, often 
in the presence of government officials (usually from the Labor and 
Industry Departments) by invitation from both the unions and the 
employers' association. For the last several years, all complaints have 
been resolved amicably by a ``conciliatory committee'' composed of 
labor union and business association representatives and government 
officials.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, including by children, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The 
minimum working age and compulsory education age ceiling is 16 years. 
The Ministry of Labor and Cooperation permits no exceptions. Most 
students continue in school until age 18.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Since January 1, the legal 
minimum wage has been approximately $1,100 (2.29 million lira) per 
month, which affords a decent living for a worker and family. Wages 
generally were higher than the minimum.
    The law sets the workweek at 36 hours in public administration and 
37+ hours in industry and private business, with 24
    consecutive hours of rest per week for workers in either category.
    The law stipulates safety and health standards, and the judicial 
system monitors them. Most workplaces implement the standards 
effectively, but there are some exceptions, notably in the construction 
industry.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                            SLOVAK REPUBLIC

    The Slovak Republic became an independent state in 1993, following 
the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Its 
Constitution provides for a multiparty, multiethnic parliamentary 
democracy, including separation of powers. Prime Minister Mikulas 
Dzurinda took office after parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998. 
The first direct presidential elections were held in May 1999. Both 
elections were declared free and fair by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR). The Slovak Republic chose to carry over the 
entire body of CSFR domestic legislation and international treaty 
obligations, which still are being renewed or updated. The Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, some experts allege 
that the Ministry of Justice's logistical and personnel authority 
allows it to exert some influence on the judicial system.
    The national police, which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Interior, are the primary law enforcement agency. In 
addition to domestic law enforcement, they also have responsibility for 
border security. The Slovak Information Service (SIS), an independent 
organization reporting directly to the Prime Minister, is responsible 
for all civilian security and intelligence activities. A parliamentary 
commission composed of legislators from ruling and opposition parties 
oversees the SIS. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective 
control of the security forces. Police committed some human rights 
abuses.
    The Slovak Republic continued to make progress in the transition to 
a market-based economy, with more than 83 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) now generated by the private sector. The economy is 
largely industrial, with only 5 percent of the GDP generated by 
agricultural production. Major exports are iron and steel products, 
vehicles and automobile parts, audio and video equipment, machinery and 
transport equipment, petroleum products, and organic chemicals. GDP 
growth reached 2 percent during the year. The economy's growth is 
fueled by foreign demand as exports increased by 30 percent in the 
third quarter of the year. Inflation grew by 12 percent, lower than 
expected, due to a combination of increases in regulated prices, 
growing competition on the retail market, and lower than expected 
domestic demand. Slow growth is largely the result of the failure of 
the previous government to implement structural reforms, such as 
financial sector privatization and industrial restructuring. The GDP 
per capita was $3,569 during the year. This provided most of the 
population with an adequate standard of living. The unemployment rate 
was 18.8 percent at year's end, reaching almost 30 percent in some 
areas. A disproportionate number of unemployed are Roma, who face 
exceptional difficulties in finding and holding jobs, partly as a 
result of discrimination. According to the law, social benefits of 
those unemployed over 2 years were cut in half. Savings have been 
transferred to municipalities to pay for community service jobs. More 
than 64,000 jobs have been created to date, of which over half have 
gone to the Roma minority.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the human rights situation improved during the year; 
however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion allegedly 
beat and abused Roma. Although the practice under the former government 
of using the SIS to conduct surveillance of many political figures, 
journalists, and their spouses nearly has been eliminated, there were 
allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both 
opposition and government politicians. The absence of government 
intimidation removed the pressure on journalists to practice self-
censorship. Media monitors report that government politicization of the 
state-owned electronic media nearly has been eliminated; and although 
the potential for political interference with Slovak Television (STV) 
and Slovak Radio (SRO) exists because they are reliant on government 
funds, no threats of retaliation for negative reporting of government 
actions were reported. On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of 
Information Act, which grants citizens access to virtually all 
unclassified information from national and local government offices. 
Discrimination and violence against women remain problems. Cases of 
abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled were 
reported. Ethnic minorities, in particular Roma, faced societal 
discrimination. The frequency of skinhead attacks on Roma appeared to 
remain the same during the year. Police sometimes failed to provide 
adequate protection against these attacks or to investigate such cases 
vigorously. Some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, and limited societal 
discrimination against the Hungarian minority persists, mainly in 
regions where only small numbers of the ethnic Hungarian minority 
reside. There were instances of trafficking in women and girls.
    During the year, the Government initiated investigations into some 
serious crimes. In 1999 the Government created the position of special 
government commissioner for Roma issues in the Office of Deputy Prime 
Minister for Human Rights and Minorities. However, the Government still 
has not fulfilled the United Nations (UN) recommendation to create a 
national committee for human rights and a human rights ombudsman. The 
government Office for Human Rights and National Minorities established 
an ad hoc working group in June to examine existing anti-discrimination 
legislation. The group completed an in-depth analysis of the 
legislation in December and found that although anti-discrimination 
provisions in the Penal Code are sufficient, improvements in the Civil 
Code and more effective implementation of all legislation are needed. 
The cabinet approved an action plan to prevent all forms of 
discrimination and intolerance.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings by government officials.
    However, former Prime Minister Meciar's party, the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), alleges that the January 1999 killing of 
Jan Ducky, the former Economy Minister under the Meciar Government and 
head of the national gas distribution monopoly, was the result of a 
political vendetta. Ducky was killed in the lobby of his apartment 
building a week after the authorities filed charges against him for 
financial mismanagement and illegal property transfers while at the gas 
monopoly. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner publicly speculated that 
Ducky might have been killed to prevent his testimony. In November the 
Bratislava district court ruled to halt the criminal prosecution of 
Ukrainian citizen Oleg T. due to lack of incriminating evidence, 
although the appeals court has not yet confirmed this decision. The 
investigation into the murder of Ducky continued at year's end.
    The August 1999 case of a police officer allegedly shooting a 21-
year-old Rom during interrogation is still under investigation, and the 
police officer involved was dismissed this year for violating the law 
by interrogating the Rom alone when he had access to a gun. The 
Government has appointed independent investigators to examine the case 
further; the investigation continued at year's end.
    There was no progress during the year in the on-going investigation 
of the 1996 death of Robert Remias. There has been widespread press 
speculation that elements of the security services under the Meciar 
administration were involved in his death.
    In November 1999, Minister of Justice Jan Carnogursky established a 
department for the documentation of crimes committed by the communist 
regime. The commission provides legal advice regarding restitution and 
rehabilitation after imprisonment or persecution during the communist 
regime. The commission responded to approximately 250 requests during 
the year. The commission also prepared draft legislation to assist 
victims of the communist regime.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, both 
national and city police on occasion allegedly beat suspects in 
custody. Police reportedly use pressure and threats to discourage Roma 
from pressing charges of police brutality (see Section 1.e.). Credible 
sources say that the police sometimes tolerate violence against Roma by 
not thoroughly investigating attacks against them in a timely and 
thorough manner or by coercing Roma to refrain from submitting 
incriminating evidence (see Sections 1.e. and 5.). Some police also 
infringe on the rights of Roma to social benefits and housing (see 
Section 2.d.). In 1998 and 1999, Roma in the town of Vrable lodged 
complaints against local law enforcement officer Roman Frajka for 
allegedly attacking teenage Romani boys. The Ministry of Interior 
investigated the case and found Frajka not guilty. The case was closed 
and no official charges or further complaints were registered against 
him this year.
    Residents of African and Asian origin continued to complain that 
police fail to investigate skinhead attacks against them.
    The 1995 case of the violent abduction of the former president's 
son, Michal Kovac, Jr. to Austria, during which he was tortured, 
remains unsolved. The Government actively reinvestigated the case in 
which former SIS personnel are alleged to be implicated. Interior 
Minister Pittner released a report in January 1999 attesting to the 
SIS's influence over the Ministry of Interior under Meciar, especially 
over the investigative and criminal police sections. In February 1999, 
the police arrested two former high-ranking officers of the SIS. The 
Constitutional Court concluded that amnesties granted to Gustav Krajci 
and a second official involved in the case, Jaroslav Svechota, by 
former Prime Minister Meciar shielded them from prosecution. Police 
closed their investigation in April. Twelve persons, most of whom were 
formerly members of the SIS, were charged. Former SIS head Ivan Lexa 
was the primary person accused.
    In April 1999, the Parliament lifted the immunity of former SIS 
head Ivan Lexa in five of the seven criminal cases in which he 
allegedly was implicated. Subsequently he was placed in preliminary 
detention; however, he was released later on the decision of a regional 
court due to insufficient evidence. On September 4, the Bratislava 
district court issued an international warrant for the arrest of Lexa, 
who allegedly had fled the country. Lexa faces several charges, 
including abuse of power, fraud, and money laundering. Following the 
issuance of the international arrest warrant, Slovak police applied for 
Interpol's help in finding and detaining him. Lexa's attorneys have 
charged that the Government's continued pursuit of their client is 
unfair persecution since they argue that he cannot be prosecuted 
because of Meciar's amnesties. However, the Government's investigation 
into Lexa's involvement in crimes for which he had not received amnesty 
continues.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    A person accused or suspected of a crime must be given a hearing 
within 24 hours and be either set free or remanded by the court. During 
this time, the detainee has the right to an attorney. If remanded by a 
court, the accused is entitled to an additional hearing within 24 
hours, at which time the judge either sets the accused free or issues a 
substantive written order placing the accused in custody. Some critics 
argue that the initial 24-hour detainment period, during which time 
investigators must gather all evidence, which can be submitted, to the 
prosecutor, is not sufficient and occasionally results in the release 
of guilty suspects. A Ministry of Justice judicial reform committee 
recommended lengthening the initial detainment period to 72 hours.
    In April Special Forces broke into the residence of former Prime 
Minister Vladimir Meciar, and detained and transported him to 
Bratislava to question him concerning his alleged misuse of authority 
as a public official. His supporters called the action an excessive use 
of force and an illegal and politically motivated indictment. Police 
defended the action and stated that it was in accordance with the law.
    Investigative detention may last 18 to 40 days, with further 
pretrial detention permitted. The total length of pretrial detention 
may not exceed 1 year, unless the Supreme Court extends it, after 
determining that the person constitutes a serious danger to society.
    Pretrial detainees constituted roughly 26.7 percent of the total 
prison population, and the average pretrial detention period was 7.2 
months. The law allows family visits and provides for a court-paid 
attorney if needed. A system of bail exists. Noncitizens may be held 
for up to 30 days for identification purposes or for 18 to 40 days in 
investigative detention. Detainees have the right to see an attorney 
immediately and should be notified of this right; however, one 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports that not all detainees are 
notified of their rights.
    The law allows monthly family visits upon request and receipt by 
detainees of a package of up to 10 pounds every 2 weeks. Attorney 
visits are allowed as frequently as necessary, and consular visits are 
allowed upon request by the judge.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
courts that are independent, impartial, and separate from the other 
branches of government; however, some critics allege that the 
dependence of judges upon the Ministry of Justice for logistical 
support, the granting of leave requests, and other services undermines 
their independent status. Also, the Ministry of Justice can demote 
presidents and vice presidents of the courts for any reason, although 
they remain judges, and it has done so. Although not specified in 
legislation, in practice the Judicial Council, an independent 
organization of lawyers and judges, recommends nominations for 
presidents of courts, and the Minister of Justice then officially 
nominates the recommended judge. The Ministry has denied nomination of 
only one of the council's recommendations. This practice increases the 
independence of the judicial branch.
    The court system consists of local and regional courts, with the 
Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal except for on 
constitutional questions. There is a separate Constitutional Court--
with no ties to the Ministry of Justice--that considers constitutional 
issues. In addition there is a separate military court system, the 
decisions of which may be appealed to the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court. Under the Constitution, the President appoints 
Constitutional Court judges to 7-year terms based upon parliamentary 
nominations. Parliament elects other judges, based on recommendations 
from the Ministry of Justice, and can remove them for misconduct.
    Many activists make credible allegations that some judges are 
corrupt and that adequate safeguards against corruption do not exist.
    Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and 
open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the charges 
against them and of their legal rights, to retain and consult with 
counsel sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and to confront 
witnesses. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. Defendants also 
have the right to refuse to make self-incriminating statements, and 
they may appeal any judgment against them.
    According to existing legislation, suspects are presumed innocent 
during the appeal process, and if that process lasts more than 3 years, 
the suspect will be released. Critics say that this rule occasionally 
results in the release of dangerous criminals.
    Human rights monitors continued to charge that police and 
investigators are reluctant to take the testimony of witnesses, 
particularly Roma, to skinhead attacks on Roma, and police on occasion 
have failed to investigate cases of skinhead violence when the skinhead 
did not admit the crime (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Some NGO's have 
defended the police, contending that the real fault lies in the 
legislation, which states that only evidence that is collected by the 
investigator in the 24-hour detention period can be considered in the 
decision on whether to hold the suspect. Furthermore human rights 
monitors reported that police used the device of countercharges or 
threats of countercharges to pressure Roma victims of police brutality 
to drop their complaints. They also reported that medical doctors and 
investigators cooperated with police by refusing to describe accurately 
the injuries involved, and that lawyers often were reluctant to 
represent Roma in such situations, for fear that this would have a 
negative effect on their law practice.
    Credible sources say that it is increasingly difficult for citizens 
who are disadvantaged economically to obtain noncriminal legal 
representation, and therefore it is becoming more difficult for some 
who may have had their rights infringed upon to take further legal 
action. The Ministry of Justice has initiated a program in which free 
legal advice is offered in seven cities every Wednesday for 5 hours. 
However, a legal NGO claimed that a more systematic approach is 
necessary. The practice of Chamber of Advocates leadership encouraging 
their membership to avoid indigent cases has been eliminated. The 
Slovak bar association currently is preparing a program to encourage 
lawyers to accept pro-bono cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights, but the authorities 
sometimes infringed upon them. The Criminal Code requires police to 
obtain a judicial search warrant in order to enter a home. The court 
may issue such a warrant only if there is a well-founded suspicion that 
important evidence or persons accused of criminal activity are present 
inside, or if there is some other important reason. Police must present 
the warrant before conducting the house search or within 24 hours after 
the search.
    Some Roma activists have alleged that local police detachments on 
occasion have entered Roma premises without a search warrant.
    The 1993 police law regulates wiretapping and mail surveillance for 
the purposes of criminal investigation, which may be conducted on the 
order of a judge or prosecutor only in cases of extraordinarily serious 
premeditated crimes or crimes involving international treaty 
obligations. There were allegations in October that SIS surveillance 
continued on both opposition and government politicians (see Section 
2.a). Unlike during the previous year, there were no known reports of 
alleged government surveillance of Roma.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. The print media are free and 
uncensored. Individuals report that they feel able to criticize the 
Government without fear of reprisal. However, there were many 
allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both 
opposition and government politicians (see Section 1.f.).
    Newspapers and magazines regularly publish a wide range of opinions 
and news articles. The politicization of state-owned broadcast media, 
which was a significant problem under the previous Government, no 
longer is evident. There were no reported cases of journalists being 
intimidated or threatened in attempts to influence their reporting 
during the year.
    The potential for political interference exists because STV and SRO 
are reliant on government funds; there have been no reports of such 
interference this year. However, STV and SRO officials assert that 
government officials do not threaten retaliation if they do not report 
the news to the Government's liking.
    In one case the Government used libel laws to suppress criticism of 
political or other leaders, and some human rights activists have 
criticized the section of the Penal Code that prohibits the defamation 
of the republic. The Government does not use tax laws or allocations of 
newsprint or advertising revenue to suppress criticism of political and 
other leaders or the expression of viewpoints not favored by the 
Government.
    On February 16, former HZDS Member of Parliament (M.P.) Frantisek 
Gauleider rescinded his complaint to the European Court for Human 
Rights in Strasbourg against the Slovak Republic for his 1996 expulsion 
from Parliament, after the Government agreed to a conciliation 
agreement and financial compensation.
    On March 23, the editor-in-chief of the extreme nationalist weekly 
Zmena, Vladimir Mohorita, was found guilty of defaming the Government 
in an article in which he used inflammatory rhetoric to criticize the 
Government for its decision to open its airspace to NATO flights during 
the Kosovo crisis. Mohorita called the decision a ``shameful and 
fratricidal act,'' denounced the Cabinet as a ``government of mass 
murderers,'' and attacked the ``crazy Satanists from the United 
States.'' He received a 4-month suspended sentence with 2 years 
probation. The law under which he was charged, Article 102 of the Penal 
Code, had been passed under the Government of former Prime Minister 
Vladimir Meciar.
    On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of Information Act, 
effective January 1, 2001, which grants citizens access to virtually 
all unclassified information from national and local government 
offices.
    None of the 26 journalists fired from the STV in 1999 have pursued 
legal action or received legal relief.
    Three boards appointed by a majority vote of Parliament supervise 
radio and television broadcasting. The Slovak Television Council and 
the Slovak Radio Council establish broadcasting policy for state-owned 
television and radio. The Slovak Council for Radio and Television 
Broadcasting issues broadcast licenses and administers advertising laws 
and some other regulations. The Radio and Television Council has made 
significant progress in fostering the spread of private broadcasting, 
for which it has issued 27 radio and 78 television and cable television 
licenses. TV Markiza, a private company with a signal covering two-
thirds of the country, is the most watched station.
    The Government does not censor books, films, or plays; it also does 
not limit access to the Internet.
    Money has been reallocated to minority groups for the publication 
of minority language newspapers. However, the media monitoring 
organization Memo said that from April until June, Slovak media devoted 
only one percent of their combined airtime to minority issues. In 
addition Roma received no positive coverage, and the Czech, Ukrainian, 
and Ruthenian minorities received no coverage.
    The law provides for academic freedom. Unlike the previous 
government, the current Government neither intervenes in the 
administration and funding of institutions of higher education, nor 
approves all professors' appointments. Many of the school 
administrators who were appointed based solely upon political 
favoritism during the previous regime have been replaced. The practice 
of diverting money from the older, then pro-opposition, universities 
largely has been reversed. In April the Parliament passed legislation 
establishing a private Catholic university in the town of Ruzomberok, 
which officially opened in September. It received a state subsidy of 
$200,000, which constitutes 70 percent of the school's budget. The use 
of bribery by some students to increase their chances for acceptance 
into some more prestigious faculties is believed widely to result in 
unequal access for economically disadvantaged students.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Registration is not required, but under existing law, only registered 
churches and religious organizations have the explicit right to conduct 
public worship services and other activities. However, in practice no 
specific religions are banned or discouraged by the authorities. In 
order to register as a church, a religious organization must collect 
the signatures of 20,000 persons with long-term residency in the 
country. Some experts argue that the requirement to collect 20,000 
signatures is too stringent and unfairly limits the registration of 
smaller churches. The State provides financial benefits, including 
subsidies for clergy and office expenses, only to the 15 registered 
churches and religious organizations.
    In February 1999, police arrested two former high officials in the 
SIS for involvement in the 1995 effort to discredit the chairman of the 
Slovak Bishops Conference. Allegedly the SIS framed the Bishop for 
selling religious art for personal gain. If convicted, former Chief of 
the SIS Counterintelligence Unit Jaroslav Svechota and Deputy Director 
of the Surveillance Unit Robert Beno would face sentences of between 5 
and 12 years in jail. SIS involvement in the case was proven, and 
property was returned; however, the court had not made any rulings 
regarding Svechota or Beno by year's end.
    By law churches and religious organizations could apply for the 
return of their property that had been confiscated by the communist 
government; the deadline for these claims was December 31, 1994. The 
property was returned by the State, by municipalities, by state legal 
entities, and under certain conditions by private persons. The main 
obstacles to the resolution of outstanding restitution claims are the 
Government's lack of financial resources, and bureaucratic resistance 
on the part of those entities required to vacate restitutable 
properties. While the Orthodox Church reported that six of the seven 
properties on which it had filed claims already had been returned, the 
Catholic Church and the Federation of Jewish Communities (FJC) reported 
lower rates of success. The FJC is dissatisfied with the Government's 
failure to discuss compensation for property that belonged to Jewish 
families who no longer have living heirs.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    According to a legal rights NGO, although the law requires state 
administrators to register all citizens, some local police officers 
refused to give a registration stamp to Romani citizens, which prevents 
them from receiving social benefits and housing.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. During the year, 
1,556 persons applied for asylum. Of these cases and cases held over 
from previous years, none were granted citizenship, 10 were accepted as 
refugees, 123 claims were rejected, 1,366 persons terminated their 
cases, and 400 cases were pending at year's end.
    On April 19, Parliament amended the law on refugees to no longer 
require asylum seekers to register at the migration office within 24 
hours of entering the country.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a 
valid claim to refugee status; however, some refugee claimants had 
difficulty in gaining access to initial processing.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government 
through the periodic free election of their national representatives. 
All citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, and voting is by 
secret ballot. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the 
President as Chief of State (directly elected by the citizens), but 
executive power rests with the Prime Minister. Legislative power is 
vested in the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Parliament).
    On August 31, charges against former Minister of Interior, Gustav 
Krajci, for abuse of power and forgery of ballots in the 1997 
referendum on direct presidential elections were dropped. As deputy 
chairman of the central election commission, Krajci allegedly deleted 
from the referendum ballot the question on holding direct elections for 
president and marked the new ballot with the commission's official 
stamp, without notifying the commission of the change. Legal 
proceedings were halted because of a Constitutional Court ruling that 
Krajci was covered by an amnesty issued by former Prime Minister Meciar 
while the latter was temporarily exercising presidential authority.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2 
female ministers, 1 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges appointed in 
November 1999 is a woman, and women hold 21 seats in the 150-member 
Parliament. In the last parliamentary elections, only 273 of the 1,618 
candidates (17 percent) were women.
    The large ethnic Hungarian minority, whose coalition gained 15 
seats in Parliament in the September 1998 elections, is well 
represented in Parliament and the Government. One ethnic Hungarian sits 
on the Constitutional Court. Roma are not represented in Parliament, 
but a Rom holds the position of Government Commissioner for Roma 
Issues.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally are 
cooperative and responsive to their views. A 1996 law requiring NGO's 
and foundations to reregister and have substantial financial resources 
in order to operate, eliminated some foundations, primarily dormant 
groups. However, no organization was denied registration or faced any 
other major problem in continuing to operate. Some NGO leaders 
continued to allege that the current Government at times is 
unresponsive to their requests.
    Roma calls for Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's resignation had little 
effect. The Roma community appeared more satisfied with the performance 
of his office during the year; however, there has been an increase in 
dissatisfaction among Roma with the performance of the Government's 
commissioner for Roma Issues, Vincent Danihel. The Roma community has 
called for Danihel's resignation to little effect.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination and provides for the equality of 
all citizens. However, enforcement is uneven, with different minority 
groups reporting that their members often receive no government 
assistance with complaints about discrimination. Health care, 
education, retirement benefits, and other social services are provided 
regardless of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social 
status; however, there were credible reports by human rights monitors 
that indicate that Roma continued to suffer from discrimination in 
employment, housing, schooling, health care, and the administration of 
state services. Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's office appointed a 
commission in May to examine existing anti-discrimination legislation 
and determine whether additional legislation is necessary. The 
committee completed its assignment in December. The result of the 
committee's findings indicate that the Penal Code sufficiently 
addresses anti-discrimination concerns, but both improved legislation 
protecting civil rights and better implementation of the legislation is 
needed.
    Women.--Violence, particularly sexual violence against women, 
remains a serious and underreported problem. According to Ministry of 
Interior statistics, both domestic and public violence against women 
has been increasing: 1,000 cases of public violence were registered in 
1997, compared with 276 in 1985. Domestic violence in 1997 included 
2,656 cases, compared with 1,874 in 1995 when statistics first were 
kept. Further police statistics indicate that from 1995 to 1997, 69.8 
percent of all violent crimes occurred at home, with 90 percent of the 
victims being women or children. One NGO's regional research showed 
that 38 to 40 percent of women were victims of domestic violence. A 
national poll from this year indicated that as many as one in five 
women are subjected to some form of physical violence in the home, and 
that 70 percent of all violence against women occurs in the home. 
Police estimate that two-thirds of female rape victims fail to report 
their cases. Police treat spousal abuse, other violence against women, 
and child abuse in the same way as other criminal offenses; sections in 
the criminal code specifically address rape, sexual abuse, and 
trafficking in women.
    Legislation has not yet recognized and defined the term domestic 
violence. There is one consulting center for abused women in the 
country. There is no shelter for battered women without children, but 
there are three family shelters for victims of child and spousal abuse. 
In the view of some NGO's, the lack of relevant data on domestic 
violence is used by police authorities to downplay the extent of 
domestic violence.
    Many activists argue that existing legislation does not 
specifically address domestic violence and fails to protect victims 
sufficiently, but noted that the Government adopted a law that 
addresses specifically abuse of family members. As a result of 
amendments to the criminal code that took effect in 1994, prostitution 
is not illegal. However, the code prohibits activities related to 
prostitution, such as renting apartments for conducting prostitution, 
spreading sexually transmitted diseases, or trafficking in women for 
the purpose of prostitution. Trafficking in women is a problem, and the 
Government views it with concern (see Section 6.f.).
    Women are equal under the law. They have the same property, 
inheritance, and other legal rights as men. However, discrimination 
against women remained a problem. According to sociological studies, 
women receive approximately 85 percent of men's wages for similar work. 
However, the definition of similar work is not defined precisely. For 
example, women may have fewer years' experience on the job due to time 
spent out of the work force raising a family. Women earn, on average, 
22 percent less than men.
    In December 1997, the Gender Center for Equal Treatment of Men and 
Women was founded. The Center is an independent NGO that cooperates 
with the U.N. Development Program and the Government. The Government's 
Coordinating Committee for Women's Affairs (including NGO's) has done 
little to implement the 1997 national action plan meant to reduce 
violence against women, protect women's health, and reduce women's 
economic disadvantages.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through its system of public education and medical 
care. The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of the Government's 
programs for children. The Constitution, the law on education, the 
Labor Code, and the system of assistance payments to families with 
children each address in part the issue of children's rights. Education 
is universal, free, and compulsory for 9 years, or until the age of 15.
    Abuse of children remains a problem and is underreported. Experts 
from various state institutions dealing with child abuse claim that 
there are significant discrepancies between official figures on child 
violence and the actual situation. A 1999 survey of over 7,000 children 
conducted by an NGO offering resources to abused children indicated 
that 12 percent of children are victims of sexual abuse, while 20 
percent are victims of physical abuse. According to available police 
statistics, child beating and sexual abuse are on the rise. In 1997 
there were 1,083 reported cases of crimes against children. Among the 
most frequent crimes committed against children were: Nonpayment of 
child support, sexual violence, and beatings. In the past 10 years, 
only 127 cases of abused children were reported officially, while the 
actual number is likely 20 to 30 times greater. According to 
independent research, 25 percent of all children are punished 
physically on a regular basis. The lack of legislation protecting 
children in state institutions presents a problem.
    Youth criminality has increased as well. In 1990 children under the 
age of 15 reportedly committed 226 crimes; in 2000 this number rose to 
4,159. Juveniles (15 to 18 years of age) committed 5,565 crimes during 
the year. Child prostitution is not addressed specifically in the 
Criminal Code, but is covered by more general provisions in the law. 
The Penal Code was amended in September 1999 to include a provision 
outlawing child pornography.
    The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), several NGO's, and other 
institutions dealing with children's issues have called for amendments 
to the law on families, particularly the part on relations between 
parents and children. Although new departments dealing specifically 
with children's issues have been established in the Ministries of 
Education and Social affairs, the Government has not yet created an 
ombudsman's office to defend children's rights, as UNICEF recommended 
in 1999. In June the Ministry of Social Affairs established a 
Commission on the Rights of the Child. The Commission provides 
information to children regarding their rights and performs the duties 
traditionally fulfilled by an ombudsman. There are two regional 
emergency hot line numbers for abused children and one counseling help 
line.
    Existing legislation appears to place emphasis on parents' rights 
over children's rights. Current legislation allows parents to place 
their child in a state-run institution for abandoned children, and as 
long as contact is maintained once every 6 months, the child remains in 
the custody of the parents and cannot be adopted. NGO leaders claim 
that existing legislation protects aggressors before victims. If a 
husband or wife is guilty of child and/or spousal abuse, it is often 
the victim who is forced to leave the family home. However, legislation 
was amended in 1999 to allow children who are victims of physical or 
sexual abuse to seek assistance and treatment, without parental 
consent.
    Trafficking of girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution and implementing 
legislation provide for health protection and special working 
conditions for mentally and physically disabled persons, including 
special protection in employment relations and special assistance in 
training. A 1994 decree provides incentives to employers who create a 
``sheltered'' workplace (i.e., a certain percentage of jobs set aside 
for the disabled). The law also prohibits discrimination against 
physically disabled individuals in employment, education, and the 
provision of other state services. Nevertheless, experts report 
discrimination in the accessibility of premises and access to education 
(especially higher education), and in 1998 the quotas for mandatory 
hiring of disabled citizens were lowered in accordance with employers' 
wishes. Although not required specifically by law, another 1994 
Government decree mandates accessibility for new public building 
construction. The decree provides for sanctions but lacks a mechanism 
to enforce them. A spokeswoman for an NGO dealing with the disabled 
said that due to pressure from a number of NGO's and the willingness of 
the Dzurinda Government, accessibility has been improving, particularly 
regarding new construction; however, many barriers remain. NGO's 
complained that other legislation, including the provision of jobs for 
the disabled, while on the books, often is ignored.
    Religious Minorities.--Despite an order by former Prime Minister 
Meciar to withdraw a controversial history book entitled the ``History 
of the Slovak Republic and the Slovaks'' by Milan Durica, it remains 
available in schools. The book has been criticized widely by religious 
groups and the Slovak Academy of Sciences for gross inaccuracies and 
distortions, particularly in its portrayal of wartime Slovakia and the 
deportation of Jews and Roma.
    In March the city council of the town of Zilina announced its 
decision to install a plaque honoring the Nazi-collaborationist and 
wartime Slovak President, Jozef Tiso, on the city's Catholic community 
center. High-level politicians including President Rudolf Schuster and 
Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda publicly condemned the proposal. The 
council eventually reversed its decision.
    On May 18, the Government sponsored a national conference on 
racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance. At the conference 
the President announced that he would dedicate September 10 as a 
memorial day to victims of the Holocaust; the event took place as 
announced.
    In September the Government approved an agreement between the 
Vatican and the Republic. In February the Ministry of Education and the 
Institute of Judaism undertook a joint educational project on Jewish 
history and culture that is targeted to elementary and high school 
teachers of history, civic education, and ethics. This project is 
intended to assist in educating the public about Jewish themes and 
increase tolerance toward minorities. The Government currently is 
seeking to obtain membership in the task force for international 
cooperation on Holocaust education, remembrance, and research.
    In July 1999, the FJC in the Slovak Republic expressed its concern 
over the desecration of the monument to Holocaust victims located in 
the old city in Bratislava. Investigation into the case revealed that 
it was one of pure vandalism; no connection to racism was found.
    In November 1999, Parliament passed legislation compensating Slovak 
citizens who were deported to German-controlled concentration camps 
during World War II on the basis of their nationality, race, or 
religion. For each month of deportation, those eligible are to receive 
a cash sum of $75 (SK 3,000), plus a $.75 (SK 30) addition to their 
monthly pension. Direct heirs of deceased victims, who at the time of 
deportation were minors, are entitled to a lump sum of up to 
approximately $2,500 (SK 100,000). The legislation disqualifies the 
nearly 700 Slovak Jewish survivors from southern Slovakia, which was 
under Hungarian control during World War II, because they received 
compensation from the Hungarian Government.
    In May 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a prior verdict that the 
publisher of Zmena weekly had to publish an apology to the honorary 
chairman of the FJC for abusing his person and offending his religious 
feelings. The apology still was not published by year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides 
minorities with the right to develop their own culture, receive 
information and education in their mother tongue, and participate in 
decisionmaking in matters affecting them. The Government continued to 
provide funding for cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing 
activities for the major ethnic minorities, but at greatly reduced 
levels. However, there is no comprehensive law against discrimination.
    The largest minority is the ethnic Hungarian minority. It is 
concentrated primarily in the southern part of the country, with a 
population registered at 568,714 at the end of 1999 (150,000 of whom 
are thought to be Roma who speak Hungarian and choose to declare 
themselves as ethnic Hungarian). Most ethnic Hungarians and ethnic 
Slovaks living in mixed areas continued to coexist peacefully, but in 
recent years there have been occasional expressions of anti-Hungarian 
sentiments by Slovak nationalists. In 1998 the Slovak Government and 
the Government of Hungary signed an implementation agreement for their 
1996 bilateral treaty, which called for the establishment of 
commissions to deal with the treatment of ethnic minorities. The 
commissions were established in February 1999.
    A 1999 minority language law provides for the use of minority 
languages in official activities. According to the law, in places where 
a minority group constitutes at least 20 percent of the population, the 
minority language can be used in contacts with government officials. 
The law was deemed acceptable by the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and the European Union. However, all members of the 
Hungarian coalition voted against the law because they felt that it did 
not ensure that the provisions in the new law would take precedence 
over the existing state language law. The Hungarian minority felt that 
a more comprehensive law was necessary, and that this law did not 
protect the use of Hungarian in cultural and educational activities. 
The Cabinet held numerous negotiations regarding the European Charter 
on Minority Languages, in an attempt to reach a solution acceptable to 
all government parties.
    The special parliamentary advisory committee for Roma issues that 
was created in February 1999 met only twice this year.
    In January 1999, Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual 
recordkeeping at schools with Hungarian or other minority language 
instruction. As a result of these changes, the Ministry of Education 
ordered report cards in both Hungarian/Slovak and Ukrainian/Slovak 
versions.
    Roma constitute the second largest ethnic minority, estimated by 
experts to number up to 500,000 citizens, although the Government 
officially reported 83,988 Roma in the country. Police on occasion beat 
Roma, and in a 1999 case allegedly shot a Rom during questioning at the 
police station (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). They suffer 
disproportionately from high levels of poverty and unemployment. 
Credible reports by human rights monitors indicated that Roma continued 
to suffer from discrimination in employment, housing, schooling, health 
care, and the administration of state services. Discrimination is most 
severe in the eastern part of the country, where unemployment is higher 
and the Romani population is larger. Among Roma living in settlements 
in the east, the unemployment rate is nearly 100 percent. In urban 
areas in the east, incidents of Roma being denied admission to certain 
hotels, restaurants, and swimming facilities are widely reported. 
According to the Office for Protection of Legal Rights (KPO), Roma are 
often segregated in hospitals, particularly in maternity wards, and 
some say Roma receive inferior care. The Ministry of Health promised in 
July to investigate the claim and to ensure that all citizens receive 
equal care and that wards are not segregated; the Ministry was 
continuing its investigation at year's end. The practice of 
unemployment offices identifying Roma in their records by placing an 
``R'' next to their name in the register was eliminated by order from 
the National Labor Bureau. Romani children disproportionately are 
placed in special schools for the mentally retarded in many cases due 
to their insufficient knowledge of the Slovak language.
    In August 1999, the Government increased the budget for the office 
of Special Government Commissioner for Roma Issues Vincent Danihel. The 
office's budget totaled $667,000 (SK 30 million) in 2000; it funded 102 
Roma projects. It also allocated about $375,000 (SK approximately 15 
million) for special projects aimed at improving the situation of Roma, 
including ``Headstart'' programs for Roma in 10 schools; training for 
Roma and non-Roma mayors, local government officials, and police 
officers; publication of two Romani textbooks in Slovak, Hungarian, and 
the Romani language; public television programs to educate the public 
about the Romani minority; support for the Kosice Roma secondary art 
school; and support for regional Roma cultural centers, social advisory 
bodies, and health care programs.
    In September 1999, the Cabinet approved a new program, ``the 
Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the Solution of the Problems of the 
Roma Minority,'' for addressing issues of the Romani minority. While 
many Romani leaders and experts on Roma issues believe that the 
strategy is a positive step, they also criticized it for lacking 
specific proposals, being formulated with limited input from Roma, and 
not allocating sufficient resources. On April 7, the Cabinet approved 
an additional $241,000 (approximately SK 10.5 million) for 56 
assistance projects aimed at improving infrastructure and housing in 
Roma settlements.
    During the year, approximately 3,387 Slovak citizens applied for 
asylum in Western European countries, mainly Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Netherlands, and Norway, of which only 9 cases have 
been adjudicated successfully. Many human rights organizations claim 
that these asylum seekers migrate in order to receive the generous 
benefits to pay back incurred debt from high interest loans they have 
received from moneylenders. Allegedly the moneylenders organize these 
trips for the Romani families.
    Illegal high interest moneylending to economically disadvantaged 
Roma occurs frequently and occasionally results in Roma losing all 
possessions including housing. The Government has not developed a 
concrete strategy to deal with this problem.
    On August 4, SNS M.P. Vitazolslv Moric proposed setting up 
reservations for Slovak Roma who refuse to assimilate into society. He 
further said, ``It is clear that many mentally retarded people are born 
into Romani communities, why should the State allow a moron to create 
another moron and thus raise the percentage of morons in our nation?'' 
In response to his statements, the Slovak Romani initiative (RIS) filed 
a suit with the general prosecutor against Moric. On September 22, 
Parliament voted to lift his parliamentary immunity, thus allowing 
criminal prosecution on the grounds of instigating racial hatred.
    Skinhead violence against Roma was a serious problem, and human 
rights monitors reported that police remain reluctant to take action. 
Occasionally police also infringed on Roma rights to social benefits 
and housing (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). Attacks against Roma 
continued at 1999 levels, however; these cases received increased media 
attention. The authorities sometimes tolerate such attacks. In May 
1999, a Banska Bystrica court ruled that a crime that was committed by 
a skinhead against a Rom could not be racially motivated since they are 
of the same race.
    On April 28, the Banska Bystrica district court issued a guilty 
verdict for the crime of bodily harm with a racial motive. The court 
found a skinhead guilty of racially motivated damage to health and 
sentenced him to 2 years in prison plus 3 years' probation for his 1996 
verbal and physical abuse against a Rom. Lawyer Jan Hrubala claimed 
that this was the first time authorities had applied ``racially 
motivated crimes'' provisions of the Penal Code to an assault case.
    Roma citizens have established their own police patrols in the 
largely Roma-populated Kosice suburb, Lunik Ix, because of the alleged 
inability of local police to protect effectively the area. The unit was 
established and funded by the local self-government with assistance 
from the Society for Personal Safety of the Slovak Republic and has 
been successful in patrolling the area.
    Members of Zebra, an organization representing interracial 
marriages, said that citizens of racially mixed background are denied 
equal access to opportunity. Further, they claim that skinhead violence 
has increased, and that police fail to protect adequately citizens from 
this violence.
    Skinheads reportedly continued distributing racist materials to the 
mailboxes of Romani families in Kosice, Trebisov, and Plavecky Strvtok.
    An international poll released in September indicated that 79 
percent of Slovaks have a negative view of Roma, 46 percent believe 
that too many non-Slovaks reside in the Slovak Republic, and only 54 
percent believe that Roma should have the same rights as Slovaks.
    On January 7, skinheads beat an African American citizen. The 
victim sought medical treatment for a contusion in his head. The case 
was still pending at year's end.
    On January 29, five skinheads attacked a black man in Bratislava 
and called him a black pig. The suspects were arrested but a racially-
motivated verdict was not applied.
    On February 17, eight male teenagers attacked two Japanese tourists 
in Bratislava. According to a police spokesperson, they were not 
seriously injured. The tourists apparently left the country after 
lodging a complaint with the police.
    In March two Roma from the eastern town of Michalovce voluntarily 
came to the police station for questioning. They were allegedly beaten 
by some police officers. The victims suffered several injuries 
including broken legs, hands, and ribs. When questioned about the 
incident, the police first claimed the action was justified but later 
admitted that it was unwarranted. Both policemen involved in the case 
were subsequently dismissed from active duty.
    On March 11, approximately 20 supporters of the skinhead movement 
attacked 2 Brazilians and 2 Angolans in Bratislava. One of the victims 
escaped, but the skinheads beat the remaining three with baseball bats 
while shouting racist slogans. The case was still pending at year's 
end.
    On March 27, 10 skinheads verbally abused an Afro-Slovak family 
with 3 small children, one of whom was disabled. When the family got 
into their car, the skinheads started to hit it with baseball bats. The 
family went to the police, who informed them that charges could not be 
filed because no one was injured.
    On June 18, three Afghan men were attacked during a benefit concert 
for refugees organized by the UNHCR. All three victims were treated for 
injuries while one was hospitalized suffering from a concussion. The 
UNHCR spokesperson expressed disappointment over police reaction to the 
attack, claiming that ``the officers just stood by for 2 or 3 minutes 
while the beatings took place.''
    On July 21, a group of 50 Roma armed with machetes, knives, axes, 
and iron rods allegedly forced a moving car to stop and attacked one of 
its occupants. The 21-year-old non-Roma victim is expected to spend up 
to 6 months in the hospital to recover. Police are investigating the 
motive for the attack.
    Anastazia Balazova, Roma mother of eight, died of injuries from a 
beating by unknown assailants in her Zilina home on August 20. On 
September 23, Zilina regional police placed two suspects in custody and 
confirmed that the attack was racially motivated. Three suspects are 
currently imprisoned, one of whom is a Rom. The investigation continued 
at year's end; no conclusion had been made regarding whether or not the 
crime was racially motivated.
    On August 30, Rom Jan Sudman was shot and injured in his hand by a 
pellet gun while doing clean-up work in the public works program. The 
case is currently under investigation. Allegedly other Roma 
participating in the public works program have also been attacked by 
skinheads, and citizens are deliberately throwing litter out their 
windows in response to their participation.
    There was no progress during the year in a number of 1999 cases of 
violence against Roma. Many cases of skinhead violence that occurred in 
1999 were dropped due to lack of witnesses.
    During the most recent census (1991), 14,000 citizens registered 
themselves as Ukrainians, and 17,000 registered themselves as 
Ruthenians. However, the statistical office does not differentiate 
between Ruthenian and Ukrainian; it records 32,747 persons in the 
Ruthenian/Ukrainian ethnic group. The current Government also considers 
the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities as a single group. However, 
about 50,000 persons listed Ruthenian as their native language in the 
1991 census. Ruthenians disagree that they are Ukrainians, and that 
their language is only a Ukrainian dialect. In September 1998, Slovak 
State Radio started broadcasting a long-promised daily regional program 
for the Ruthenian minority in Presov. However, after the 1998 
parliamentary elections, this broadcasting was discontinued, and the 
broadcast is now in Ukrainian. There is a television broadcast in 
Ruthenian on STV, which is aired once every 2 months. In addition the 
Ruthenian minority receives state funding to publish a biweekly 
newspaper in Ukrainian. A representative of the Ruthenian Revival 
Organization stated that Ruthenian language instruction is provided in 
two schools in the northeast. There is an institute for minority 
languages at Presov University in the northeast. Two instructors at the 
Institute teach Ruthenian culture and language.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form and join unions, except in the armed forces. 
Approximately 45 percent of the work force is unionized. Most unions 
are independent of the Government and political parties but lobby those 
entities in order to gain support for union positions on key labor 
issues.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no 
restrictions on this right. The national statistical office reported no 
official strikes during the year.
    However, an increasing number of strike alerts and unofficial 
strikes were reported during the year. Many of these actions 
anticipated layoffs or protested the nonpayment or partial payment of 
salaries due to restructuring of the company or insolvency. Local 
unions also held strike alerts.
    There were no instances of retribution against strikers or labor 
leaders. Relevant legislation on collective bargaining prohibits the 
dismissal of workers legally participating in strikes. However, 
according to this law, a strike is legal and official only if it is for 
the purpose of collective bargaining; if it is announced in advance; 
and if a list of strike participants is provided. If the strike is not 
considered to be official, strikers are not ensured protection.
    Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and 
to affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining. Following the September 1998 
parliamentary election the KOZ decided to reenter tripartite 
negotiations with employers and the Government. However, unions have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Government, claiming that it has not 
included them in important decisionmaking and does not give adequate 
attention to their demands.
    The law on citizens' associations prohibits discrimination by 
employers against union members and organizers. Complaints may be 
resolved either in collective negotiations or in court. If a court 
rules that an employer dismissed a worker for union activities or for 
any reason other than certain grounds for dismissal listed in the Labor 
Code, the employer must reinstate the worker. There were no reports of 
abuses targeted against unions or workers.
    In July the Railway Workers, with the support of the ILO, appealed 
to the Government to amend the Act on Collective Bargaining to lower 
the quorum of employees necessary for the declaration of a strike and 
to eliminate the requirement that a list of employees participating in 
a strike be provided to the employer. Although the Government has 
developed draft amendments to this legislation, no agreement has been 
reached to date.
    The 1996 Customs Act regulates free customs zones and customs 
warehouses. Firms operating in such zones must comply with the labor 
code; there have been no reports of special involvement by the trade 
unions to date. No special legislation governs labor relations in free 
trade zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the 
Constitution and the employment act prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, trafficking in women 
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.). The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and 
Family, as well as district and local labor offices, have 
responsibility for enforcement.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government ratified ILO convention 182 in 1999; it 
came into force in December, and the Government adheres to its 
standards. The law sets the minimum employment age at 15 years. 
Children must remain in school for 9 years, or until the age of 15, 
although this requirement is not enforced strictly, particularly for 
the Romani minority. Workers under the age of 16 may not work more than 
33 hours per week; may not be compensated on a piecework basis; may not 
work overtime or night shifts; and may not work underground or in 
specified conditions deemed dangerous to their health or safety. 
Special conditions and protections, though somewhat less stringent, 
apply to young workers up to the age of 18. The Ministry of Labor 
enforces this legislation. There were no reports of violations. The law 
and the Constitution prohibit forced and bonded child labor, and the 
Government enforces these prohibitions effectively; however, instances 
of trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was $93 (SK 
4,000) per month during the year. Even when combined with special 
allowances paid to families with children it did not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor is 
responsible for enforcing the minimum wage. No violations were 
reported. The standard workweek mandated by the Labor Code is 42.5 
hours, although collective bargaining agreements have achieved 
reductions in some cases (most often to 40 hours). For state 
enterprises, the law requires overtime pay up to a maximum of 8 hours 
per week, and 150 hours per year, and provides 5 weeks of annual leave. 
Private enterprises can compensate their employees for more hours of 
overtime than stipulated by the law. There is no specifically mandated 
24-hour rest period during the workweek. The trade unions, the Ministry 
of Labor, and local employment offices monitor observance of these 
laws, and the authorities effectively enforce them.
    The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that the 
Office of Labor Safety effectively enforces. For hazardous employment, 
workers undergo medical screening under the supervision of a physician. 
They have the right to refuse to work in situations that endanger their 
health and safety and may file complaints against employers in such 
situations. Employees working under conditions endangering their health 
and safety for a certain period of time are entitled to paid 
``relaxation'' leave in addition to their standard leave.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits 
trafficking in persons in all forms; however, there were instances of 
trafficking in women and girls. The country is a source country, a 
transit country, and a destination country for such victims of 
trafficking. There is no evidence of government involvement in or 
tolerance of trafficking, and the Ministry of Interior is involved in 
activities to combat trafficking. According to the Ministry of 
Interior, there were 13 documented cases of Slovak women being forced 
into prostitution in other countries or foreign women being forced into 
prostitution in the Slovak Republic during the year, of which 11 were 
resolved. A case can be documented either when a trafficked person 
files a complaint with the police or when the police initiate a 
criminal investigation against a suspected trafficker. During the year, 
there were 11 investigations opened against pimps, of which 7 were 
resolved. The problem received more public attention this year, but it 
is still likely that there are more cases than those that are 
documented. There are no NGO's or organizations that have as their main 
purpose to specifically provide support to victims of trafficking; 
however, women's NGO Fenestra provides support for these victims. In 
April a women's NGO, the Alliance for Women, sponsored a conference on 
trafficking.
    In July an 18-year-old Roma girl from Hencovce was allegedly 
kidnaped, taken to the Czech Republic where she was sold for $93, and 
forced into prostitution. This case is pending. Other Roma women have 
reported similar stories. Some NGO's argue that the women voluntarily 
chose the profession and then claim they were forced in order to avoid 
contempt from their community when they return, while others contend 
they were true victims of trafficking.
    A report issued by the Ministry of Interior states that the Slovak 
Republic is a transit country for persons being trafficked mainly to 
Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany for the purpose of forced 
prostitution. There were also reports of Slovak women being trafficked 
to Western Europe with promises of work as models, waitresses, and au 
pairs. Their passports were allegedly confiscated, and they were 
allegedly forced to work in adult entertainment clubs or as 
prostitutes. According to the report, 3 cases of trafficking were 
prosecuted in 1998 and 11 in 1999. There were four prosecuted cases of 
forced prostitution in 1998 and nine cases in 1999.
    Some women from Russia and Ukraine reportedly are trafficked 
through the Slovak Republic on their way to countries such as Turkey, 
Greece, Italy, Germany, and Serbia, where they are forced to work as 
prostitutes. According to a report on trafficking in women issued by 
the Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department in March 1999, 
women from the Slovak Republic work in Sweden as prostitutes. In four 
1998 court cases involving women trafficked to Sweden, some women came 
from the Slovak Republic, among other countries. Although previously it 
was primarily a source country, increasingly women from less prosperous 
eastern countries (including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and 
Bulgaria) find themselves trafficked through and to the Slovak 
Republic.
                               __________

                                SLOVENIA

    Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic. 
Power is shared between a directly elected president, a prime minister, 
and a bicameral legislature. Since the country's independence with the 
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, free, fair, and open elections have 
characterized the political system. In October elections were held to 
elect representatives to the Parliament's lower house. The Government 
respects constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in 
practice.
    The police are under the effective civilian control of the Ministry 
of the Interior. By law the armed forces do not exercise civil police 
functions.
    The country has made steady progress toward developing a market 
economy. Although ``social property'' was abolished in 1998, the 
Government continues to own 50 percent of the economy, particularly in 
the financial sector, utilities, and the port of Koper. Trade has been 
diversified toward the West and the growing markets of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Manufacturing accounts for most employment, with 
machinery and other manufactured products constituting the major 
exports. Labor force surveys put unemployment at 7.6 percent, but 
registration for unemployment assistance was 13.6 percent. Inflation 
was 6.1 percent in 1999, while real gross national product grew 4.9 
percent. The currency is stable, fully convertible, and backed by 
substantial reserves. The economy provides citizens with a good 
standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse. An ombudsman deals with 
human rights problems, including citizenship cases. Police on occasion 
beat and abused Roma. Violence against women is a problem. 
Approximately 13,000 non-Slovene (former Yugoslav) residents who had 
been without legal status since independence in 1991, some due to the 
Government's slow processing of their original applications, and others 
because they had never applied, were offered legal residence in late 
1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were 
accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 were still being processed at 
year's end. These minorities reported some discrimination. There were 
instances of trafficking in women.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment 
as well as ``humiliating punishment or treatment;'' however, police on 
occasion beat Roma, allegedly resulting in severe injuries in some 
cases. Danko Brajdic, a Rom, was beaten by the police and admitted to a 
hospital with severe injuries. Sadik Kemalj, a Rom and former citizen 
of Slovenia, allegedly left the country without a passport and was 
beaten by police at the border when he attempted to return with a 
Macedonian passport. The authorities have not announced the filing of 
charges or the imposition of disciplinary measures in any of these 
cases.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and were not 
the subject of complaint by any human rights organization.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and 
the media.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest or deprivation of liberty, and the 
Government respects these provisions in practice.
    The authorities must advise detainees in writing within 24 hours, 
in their own language, of the reasons for the arrest. Until charges are 
brought, detention may last up to 6 months; once charges are brought, 
detention may be prolonged for a maximum of 2 years. Some 26 percent of 
the average prison population of 1,100 inmates are in pretrial 
detention at any given time. The law also provides safeguards against 
self-incrimination. These rights and limitations are respected in 
practice.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judicial system consists of district courts, regional courts, a 
court of appeals, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court. A 
nine-member Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of 
legislation. Judges, elected by the State Assembly (Parliament) upon 
the nomination of the Judicial Council, are constitutionally 
independent and serve indefinitely, subject to an age limit. The 
Judicial Council is composed of six sitting judges elected by their 
peers and five presidential nominees elected by the Parliament.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, including 
provisions for: Equality before the law, presumption of innocence, due 
process, open court proceedings, the right of appeal, and a prohibition 
against double jeopardy. Defendants by law have the right to counsel, 
without cost if need be. These rights are respected in practice, 
although the judicial system is so burdened that justice frequently is 
protracted. In some instances, criminal cases reportedly have taken 2 
to 5 years to come to trial. The problem is not widespread, and 
defendants are released on bail except in the most serious criminal 
cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of 
privacy, ``personal data rights,'' and the inviolability of the home, 
mail, and other means of communication. These rights and protections 
are respected in practice, and violations are subject to effective 
legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other 
forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship 
and some indirect political pressures continued to influence the media.
    The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more 
restricted past. The major media do not represent a broad range of 
political or ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language 
television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic 
Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio 
programming is common in the northeast where there are approximately 
8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community 
have newsletters in their own languages.
    Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. The 
major print media are supported through private investment and 
advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys 
government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing. 
Seven local television channels are available and four of them are 
independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available 
via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable 
television. Numerous business and academic publications are available. 
Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
    In theory and practice, the media enjoyed full journalistic 
freedom. However, for over 40 years the country was ruled by an 
authoritarian Communist political system, and reporting about domestic 
politics may be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and 
indirect political pressures.
    The election law requires the media to offer free space and 
broadcasting time to political parties at election time. Television 
networks routinely give public figures and opinion makers from across 
the political spectrum access via a broad range of public service 
programming.
    The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom for universities 
and other institutions of higher education. There are two universities; 
each has numerous affiliated research and study institutions. Academic 
freedom is respected, and centers of higher education are lively and 
intellectually stimulating.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly, association, and 
participation in public meetings, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. These rights can be restricted only by an act of 
Parliament in circumstances involving national security, public safety, 
or protection against infectious diseases.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. No person 
can be compelled to admit his religious or other beliefs. There are few 
formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government. 
Religious groups, including foreign missionaries, must register with 
the Ministry of the Interior. Registration entitles such groups to 
value added tax rebates on a quarterly basis. All groups in the country 
report equal access to registration and tax rebate status. Foreign 
missionaries (including a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormon) mission) and religious groups (including Hare Krishna, 
Scientology, and Unification organizations) operate without hindrance.
    The appropriate role for religious instruction in the schools 
continues to be an issue of debate. The Constitution states that 
parents are entitled ``to give their children a moral and religious 
upbringing. . . .'' Before 1945 religion was much more prominent in the 
schools, but now only those schools supported by religious bodies teach 
religion.
    The Roman Catholic Church was a major property holder in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia before World War II. After the war, much church 
property--church buildings and support buildings, residences, 
businesses, and forests--was confiscated and nationalized by the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenian independence 
in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization 
(restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. However, a 
subsequent change of government in 1992 led to a virtual standstill in 
denationalization proceedings for several years. At year's end, over 
one-half of all cases had been adjudicated at the initial 
administrative level, representing over two-thirds of the total value 
of all cases. However, an increase in administrative processing in turn 
has led to a judicial backlog.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides that each 
person has the right to freedom of movement, to choice of place of 
residence, to leave the country freely, and to return. Limitations on 
these rights may be made only by statute and only where necessary in 
criminal cases, to control infectious disease, or in wartime. In 
practice citizens travel widely and often.
    The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum in accordance 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government has provided asylum 
(or ``temporary protection'') to refugees but on a very limited basis 
in recent years. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not 
arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared prosecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides that elections should be held at least 
every 4 years. Citizens have the right to change their government, 
voting by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. The country 
has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. The President 
proposes a candidate to the legislature for confirmation as Prime 
Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties 
in the Parliament.
    No restrictions hinder the participation of women or minorities in 
politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Of the 90 Members of Parliament, 13 are women, while 3 of 18 
cabinet ministers are women. During the October 15 Parliamentary 
elections, an increased number of women were nominated to run by 
political parties; however, the majority of these female candidates 
were assigned to run in districts in which their parties had little 
chance of winning (based on 1996 election results). The Prime 
Minister's Office has an active agency for monitoring and promoting the 
participation by women in public life.
    The Constitution stipulates that the Italian and Hungarian ethnic 
communities each are entitled to at least one representative in the 
Parliament, regardless of their population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Independent human rights monitoring groups promote respect for 
human rights and freedoms and freely investigate complaints about 
violations. The Government generally does not place obstacles in the 
way of investigations by international or local human rights groups.
    An independent ombudsman appointed by Parliament deals with human 
rights problems, including so-called ``economic rights.'' The incumbent 
is regarded as fair, but he lacks the power to enforce his opinions. In 
addition Parliament has been criticized as a major factor in the slow 
progress of property restitution (``denationalization''), casting doubt 
on the ombudsman's ability to alter the pace of the process. The 
ombudsman criticized the Government for the slow pace of legal and 
administrative proceedings, in criminal and civil cases, as well as in 
denationalization proceedings.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law, and the 
Government observed this provision in practice. According to the 1991 
census, the population is approximately 2 million, of whom 1.7 million 
are ethnic Slovenes and the remainder are persons of 23 other 
nationalities. There were some 50,000 Croats, 48,000 Serbs, 27,000 
Muslims, 8,500 Hungarians, and 3,000 Italians.
    The Constitution provides special rights for the ``autochthonous 
Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities,'' including the right to use 
their own national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from 
other privileges. It also provides for special status and rights for 
the small Romani community, which are observed in practice.
    Women.--While violence against women occurs and almost certainly is 
underreported, the awareness of spousal abuse and violence against 
women is on the rise. During 1999 and 2000, 224 persons were charged 
with offenses including domestic violence (82), ``brutality'' (25), 
``threat to safety'' (27), and other unspecified offenses that resulted 
in injuries (51). In 1998 83 men were charged with rape. In 1998 10,021 
misdemeanor charges of ``endangering safety in a private place'' were 
filed. Although no breakdown of victims is available by sex for 1998, 
records from previous years indicate that at least 40 percent, or 
approximately 4,000 cases, involved domestic disputes where women were 
threatened. Three shelters are available for battered women, which are 
partially funded by the State. The shelters operate at capacity (about 
40 beds combined) and turn away numerous women every year. In cases of 
reported spousal abuse or violence, the police actively intervene, and 
criminal charges are filed. Although the law allows police to fine both 
parties in cases of domestic violence, in practice fines and arrests 
are reportedly confined to men only.
    Slovenia is primarily a transit country for trafficking in women 
for prostitution, although it is also a destination country (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Equal rights for women are a matter of state policy. There is no 
official discrimination against women or minorities in housing, jobs, 
or education. Under the Constitution, marriage is based on the equality 
of both spouses. The Constitution stipulates that the State shall 
protect the family, motherhood, and fatherhood.
    In rural areas, women, even those employed outside the home, bear a 
disproportionate share of household work and family care, because of a 
generally conservative social tradition. However, women frequently are 
encountered in business and in government executive departments.
    Equal pay for equal work for men and women is the norm. Although 
both sexes have the same average period of unemployment, women still 
are found more often in lower paying jobs. On average women's earnings 
are 85 percent of those of men.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free, 
and universal primary school education for children through grade 9 
(ages 14 and 15). The Government provided universal health care for all 
citizens, including children.
    The Constitution stipulates that children ``enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and level of maturity.'' 
Moreover, special protection from exploitation and maltreatment is 
provided by statute. Social workers visited schools regularly to 
monitor for any incidents of mistreatment or abuse of children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled, 
and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. Modifications 
of public and private structures to ease access by the disabled 
continued slowly but steadily.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minorities make up about 12 
percent of the population; most are nationals of the former Yugoslavia. 
Ethnic minorities face a complex reality. ``Autochthonous'' groups in 
general are provided special rights and protection by the Constitution. 
Three of these groups--Italians, Hungarians, and Roma--are identified 
in the Constitution for special treatment, and the first two are 
assigned representation in Parliament. Other ``autochthonous'' groups 
include some 500 ethnic Germans and fewer than 100 Jews.
    However, ``new minorities"--ethnic Serbs, Croats, Kosovar 
Albanians, and nonautochthonous Roma from Kosovo and Albania--are 
unprotected by special provisions of the Constitution and face some 
societal and governmental discrimination. Many of these 5,000 to 10,000 
non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia migrated internally to 
Slovenia during the decades leading to independence because of the 
economic opportunities. Most opted not to take Slovene citizenship 
during a 6-month window in 1991-92 and have been living in the country 
as essentially stateless persons since then, while others were without 
residence status because of slow processing of their applications by 
the Government. In 1999 Parliament offered these persons permanent 
resident status; a 3-month window for applications closed at the end of 
1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were 
accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 still were being processed at 
year's end.
    The Roma are best characterized as a set of groups rather than as 
one community. Some have lived in the country for hundreds of years, 
while others are very recent migrants. Police on occasion beat Roma 
(see Section 1.a.). A lack of cohesion prevented the Romani communities 
from taking advantage of their special constitutional status, although 
the Government also failed to implement fully the special legislation 
on Romani status called for in Article 65 of the Constitution. Roma 
report discrimination in employment, which in turn complicates their 
housing situation. In education the Government has attempted to involve 
more Romani children in formal education at the earliest stages, both 
through enrichment programs and through inclusion in public 
kindergartens. However, despite a renewed emphasis on assistance 
programs in the 1990's, Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty and 
unemployment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution stipulates that 
trade unions, their operation, and their membership shall be free and 
provides for the right to strike. Virtually all workers, except police 
and military personnel, are eligible to form and join labor 
organizations. In 1993 the Parliament for the first time passed 
legislation restricting strikes by some public sector employees. 
However, after government budget-cutting, some public sector 
professionals (judges, doctors, and educators) became increasingly 
active on the labor front.
    Labor has two main groupings, the Association of Free Slovene Trade 
Unions, and the Union of Slovene Rail Workers, with constituent 
branches throughout the country. A third, much smaller, regional labor 
union operates on the Adriatic coast. Unions are formally and actually 
independent of the Government and political parties, but individual 
union members hold positions in the legislature. The Constitution 
provides that the State shall be responsible for ``the creation of 
opportunities for employment and for work.''
    There are no restrictions on unions joining or forming federations 
and affiliating with like-minded international union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The economy is 
in transition from the former Communist system, which included some 
private ownership of enterprises along with state-controlled and 
``socially owned'' enterprises. In the transition to a fully market-
based economy, the collective bargaining process is undergoing change. 
Formerly, the old Yugoslav Government had a dominant role in setting 
the minimum wage and conditions of work. The Government still exercises 
this role to an extent, although in the private sector, wages and 
working conditions are agreed annually in a general collective 
agreement between the ``social partners:'' The labor unions and the 
Chamber of Economy. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
    Export processing zones exist in Koper, Maribor, and Nova Gorica. 
Worker rights in these zones are the same as in the rest of the 
country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children, and 
there were no reports of forced labor by adults or children; however, 
police reported 20 cases of trafficking in women for prostitution in 
1999 (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16. Children must remain 
in school through grade 9 (ages 14 and 15). During the harvest or for 
other farm chores, younger children do work. In general urban employers 
respect the age limits. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $252 (59,150 
tolars) per month, which provides a decent standard of living for the 
average worker and family. The workweek is 40 hours. In general 
businesses provide acceptable conditions of work for their employees. 
Occupational health and safety standards are set and enforced by 
special commissions controlled by the Ministries of Health and Labor. 
Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe conditions 
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law on ``enslavement'' prescribes 
criminal prosecution for a person who ``brings another person into 
slavery or a similar condition, or keeps another person in such a 
condition, or buys, sells or delivers another person to a third party'' 
or brokers such a deal. Sentences for enslavement convictions range 
from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. Persons also can be prosecuted for 
pimping or pandering ``by force, threat or deception.'' The penalty 
ranges from 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment or, in cases involving 
minors or forced prostitution, 1 to 10 years' imprisonment.
    The country was primarily a transit point for trafficking in 
persons, although it was also a destination country. Police interest in 
the issue was limited; victims were not encouraged to file complaints 
and very few cases were reported to the police. Police reported 20 
cases in 1999 in which the country was a destination for prostitutes 
from Ukraine. Statistics on prosecutions were not available. The 
Government had no programs in place to prevent trafficking or to assist 
victims. There were no NGO's that dealt specifically with trafficking.
                               __________

                                 SPAIN

    Spain is a democracy with a constitutional monarch. The Parliament 
consists of two chambers, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. In 
March Jose Maria Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) was reelected Prime 
Minister, with the title President of the Government. The next national 
elections are scheduled for March 2004. The Government respects the 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
    There are three levels of security forces. The National Police are 
responsible for nationwide investigations, security in urban areas, 
traffic control, and hostage rescue. The Civil Guard polices rural 
areas and controls borders and highways. Autonomous police forces have 
taken over many of the duties of the Civil Guard in Galicia, parts of 
Catalunya, and the Basque country. The security forces are under the 
effective control of the Government. The security forces also maintain 
anticorruption units. Some members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The economy is market based, with primary reliance on private 
enterprise. Although a number of public sector enterprises remain in 
key areas, the Government's policy has been to privatize as many of 
them as possible. The economy grew during the second quarter at a 4.2 
percent annual rate. The annual inflation rate at the close of 1999 was 
2.9 percent; in the third quarter of 2000 it was 3.6 percent. 
Unemployment in the third quarter dropped to 14.2 percent, continuing 
its downward trend.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including cases 
of police brutality, lengthy pretrial detention, and delays in trials. 
Government investigations of alleged human rights abuses by the 
security forces are often lengthy, and punishments light. The 
Government is taking steps to deal with the problem of violence against 
women. Incidents of racism and rightwing violence against minorities 
and discrimination against Roma continued to be problems. There were 
instances of forced labor and child labor. Trafficking in women for the 
purpose of forced prostitution was a problem.
    Throughout the year there were ongoing judicial proceedings related 
to the involvement of former government officials in the Antiterrorist 
Liberation Groups (government-sponsored death squads known by their 
acronym, GAL), which killed 27 persons between 1983 and 1987, including 
10 persons with no connection to the terrorist group Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty (ETA), the ostensible target of the GAL.
    In December 1999, ETA ended its 14-month unilateral cease-fire and 
launched a new campaign of terrorism. ETA attacks claimed 23 lives 
during the year. ETA sympathizers also conducted a campaign of street 
violence and vandalism in the Basque region. Judicial proceedings 
against members of ETA continued. Spanish and French police arrested 
dozens of suspected ETA members and collaborators.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudical killings by government 
agents.
    No developments were reported in the following ongoing cases: The 
March 1997 case of a Civil guard officer who allegedly shot a Moroccan 
boy in the back and killed him; the appeal of police officer Antonio 
Barrionuevo's conviction in the 1996 killing of Portuguese citizen 
Manual Abreu Silva; and the deaths of eight prison inmates under 
suspicious circumstances in 1996-97.
    Five individuals were convicted during the year in the GAL case of 
Jose Ignacio Zabala and Jose Antonio Lasa, who were kidnaped, tortured, 
and killed in 1983. Enrique Rodriguez Galindo, a Civil Guard general, 
and Julen Elgorriaga, the then civil governor of Guipuzcoa, each 
received sentences of 71 years' imprisonment. An additional three Civil 
Guard officers were sentenced to 69 and 67 years' imprisonment. Miguel 
Brecia Guillen was sentenced in 1999 to 68 years in jail for the 1986 
murder of two French citizens. The state prosecutor recommended closure 
of the 1984 Monbar case for lack of evidence. Other cases in which 
security forces are alleged to have committed murder in the mid-1980's, 
such as those of Ramon Onaederra, Mikel Zabaltza, and Robert Caplanne, 
remain open but are unlikely to be prosecuted, also due to lack of 
evidence.
    ETA declared an end to its 14-month ``cease-fire'' in December 1999 
and resumed its terrorist activities. ETA's declared aim is to 
establish an independent Basque state in the Basque region of northern 
Spain and southern France. By year's end, ETA car bombings and 
shootings resulted in the deaths of 23 victims.
    The ETA attacks began on January 21 when an ETA car bomb killed Lt. 
Col. Pedro Blanco in Madrid. On February 22, an ETA car bomb in Vitoria 
killed Basque Socialist Party Spokesman Fernando Buesa and his 
bodyguard. On March 6, an ETA car bomb exploded in San Sebastian, 
injuring eight persons. ETA assailants shot and killed newspaper 
columnist Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle on May 7 in Navarra. On June 4, 
ETA shot and killed Popular Party councilman Jesus Maria Pedrosa in 
Durango. On June 25, an ETA car bomb injured seven in Getxo.
    An ETA car bomb detonated in the central shopping district of 
Madrid on July 12, injuring eight people. City councilman Jose Maria 
Martin Carpena was shot and killed in front of his family on July 15 in 
Malaga. On July 16, an ETA car bomb injured the wife of a civil guard 
in Agreda. On July 29, Juan Maria Jauregui, former Socialist Party 
delegate to Guipuzcoa, was shot and killed. On August 8, an ETA car 
bomb killed Basque businessman Jose Maria Korta. In Madrid 6 hours 
later, another ETA car bomb injured 11 persons. On August 9, an ETA 
assailant shot and killed army Lt. Francisco Casanova in Navarra.
    On August 20, ETA killed two civil guards in the northern region of 
Huesca by planting a bomb under their patrol car. On August 30, an ETA 
assailant shot and killed Popular Party town councilman Manuel Indiano 
Azaustre in his Guipuzcoa candy shop. On September 13, an ETA assailant 
shot and severely wounded Jose Ramon Recalde, a former Socialist Party 
Counselor, at his home in San Sebastian. On September 20, ETA 
assailants shot and killed Popular Party town counselor Jose Luis Ruiz 
Casado near Barcelona. ETA killed a military doctor in Andalucia on 
October 16 and a prison official in Victoria on October 22. An ETA car 
bomb took the life of a Supreme Court judge and three persons in Madrid 
on October 30. An ETA assailant shot and killed former Health Minister 
Ernest Lluch in Barcelona on November 11. ETA ended the year with the 
killing of its fifth Popular Party town counselor and a policeman, both 
near Barcelona. It was the bloodiest year of ETA violence since 1994. 
ETA publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks.
    Legal actions against ETA members continued. Spain obtained the 
extradition of the former leader of ETA, Francisco Mugica Garmendia, 
from France in February. He faces charges that include involvement in 
23 killings, illicit possession of explosives, and falsification of 
documents. In February a court sentenced ETA member Mikel Azurmendi 
Penagaricano to 36 years in prison for the killing of Army Lt. Miguel 
Peralta in 1994. On July 6, a court sentenced members of the Andalucian 
command of ETA to a total of 108 years in prison for crimes committed 
in 1997 and 1998, when the group tried to murder the then mayors of 
Granada and Seville. On July 25, a court convicted ETA member Ramon 
Aldasoro for his participation in the March 1988 bombing of a police 
barracks and sentenced him to 67 years' imprisonment.
    In March Amnesty International (AI) appeared before the Basque 
Parliament and made a strong appeal for ETA to stop violating human 
rights through murder, kidnaping, and intimidation. AI expressed its 
support for the Government's 1999 compensation law for victims of ETA 
terror but called on the Government to compensate victims of government 
torture as well. AI also criticized the Government for permitting 
suspected terrorists to be held incommunicado for up to 5 days after 
arrest.
    Several organizations are dedicated to the concerns of victims of 
terrorism, among them the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT). 
AVT was founded in 1981 and serves 1,300 families, providing legal and 
psychological counseling. The Government supports its work.
    A Spanish extradition request for former Chilean dictator Augusto 
Pinochet was denied after a lengthy judicial review in the United 
Kingdom. Spanish courts sought to try Pinochet for his involvement in 
the disappearance of 600 Spaniards under Chilean and Argentine 
governments in the 1970's and 1980's. On March 2, the United Kingdom 
Minister of Home Affairs allowed Pinochet to return to Chile without 
trial on grounds of ill health.
    No developments occurred in case of the 1999 international arrest 
warrants for former Argentine junta Generals Galtieri and Videla, 
Admiral Massera, and 95 lower ranking military officers. The High Court 
refused jurisdiction in December in the the criminal suit filed by 
indigenous Guatemalan leader Rigoberta Menchu against eight former 
Guatemalan military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such acts; however, suspects charged 
with terrorism routinely assert that they have been abused during 
detention, and other detainees sometimes make similar charges. The 
Government investigates allegations of torture and also permits outside 
parties to investigate them.
    On May 20, Antonio Fonseca, an illegal African immigrant, died 
after his arrest in Arrecife. Witnesses contend that police 
aggressively detained Fonseca. One claimed that four officers beat 
Fonseca before he reached his holding cell. The police chief of 
Arrecife denied the accusations, claiming that Fonseca's contusions 
resulted from his struggle to escape. In September Interior Minister 
Mayor Oreja announced that two investigations and autopsies indicated 
that Fonseca died of natural causes and that there was no basis for 
prosecution of the arresting officers.
    No developments were reported in the following cases from previous 
years: The November 1998 case of two policemen in Melilla who were 
charged with raping a Moroccan girl; the trial that began in November 
1998 of six members of the Civil Guard who were accused of torturing 
three suspected ETA members in 1992; the complaint filed against the 
police in the beating of Ivan Gonzalez in September 1997.
    In April a Madrid court sentenced a policeman to 5 years' 
imprisonment for the July 1994 illegal detention and beating of a man 
from the Madrid suburb of Majadahonda.
    ETA sympathizers engaged in extensive street violence in the Basque 
region throughout the year. On February 25, 8 families were evacuated 
from their homes in Vizcaya after 30 hooded individuals threw Molotov 
cocktails at a bank in the central square. Molotov cocktails also were 
thrown into the home of Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle, member of the 
anti-ETA Ermua forum and columnist, on February 28. (ETA subsequently 
killed Lopez de la Calle in May.) Incidents of street violence in 
support of ETA, called the ``kale barroka'' in the Basque language, 
increased during the year: 681 acts of street violence were reported in 
the Basque region and neighboring Navarra during the year. The Basque 
police and the Spanish National Police arrested over 160 persons in 
connection with the street violence.
    Prison conditions generally meet or exceed minimum international 
standards.
    In Madrid prisons there were 21 reports of abuse during 1999. In 
the first 3 months of 2000, eight cases were reported. On February 24, 
17 prisoners in San Sebastian's Martutene Prison began a sit-in and 
hunger strike in solidarity with ETA prisoner Daniel Derguy, who had 
been fasting for 60 days in a French prison.
    No developments were reported in the March 1998 investigation into 
31 cases of alleged abuse and negligence by prison officials in 1996 
and 1997 that led to 8 inmate deaths. The Supreme Court awarded 
$115,000 (20 million pesetas) to the family of Juan Antonio Fernandez, 
a prisoner who was killed by a fellow inmate in the Madrid prison of 
Carabanchel in March 1997.
    Basque activists continued to demand that all imprisoned ETA 
terrorists be moved to prisons in the Basque region or the adjacent 
region, Navarra. As of March, 378 ETA terrorists were in jail.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors, 
including the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions in practice.
    A suspect may not be held for more than 72 hours without a hearing 
except in cases involving terrorism, in which case the Penal Code 
permits holding a suspect an additional 2 days without a hearing and 
the possibility of incommunicado detention, provided that a judge 
authorizes such action.
    At times pretrial detention can be lengthy. By law suspects may not 
be confined for more than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless 
a further delay is authorized by a judge, who may extend pretrial 
custody to 4 years. In practice pretrial custody is usually less than a 
year. However, criticism is heard in legal circles that some judges use 
``preventive custody'' as a form of anticipatory sentencing. In late 
2000, approximately 20 percent of the prison population was in pretrial 
detention (9,446 inmates out of 44,866 total), although that number 
included convicted prisoners whose cases were on appeal.
    The law on aliens permits detention of a person for up to 40 days 
prior to deportation but specifies that it must not take place in a 
prison-like setting.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
    The judicial structure consists of local, provincial, regional, and 
national courts with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitutional 
Court has the authority to return a case to the court in which it was 
adjudicated if it can be determined that constitutional rights were 
violated during the course of the proceedings. The National High Court 
handles crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The European 
Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases concerning human 
rights.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and 
the authorities respect this right in practice. There is a nine-person 
jury system.
    Defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney (at 
state expense for the indigent). They are released on bail unless the 
court believes that they may flee or be a threat to public safety. 
Following conviction, defendants may appeal to the next highest court.
    The law calls for an expeditious judicial hearing following arrest. 
However, the AVT and others have criticized delays in the judicial 
process, which can result at times in lengthy pretrial detention (see 
Section 1.d.) and delays in trials. In cases of petty crime, suspects 
released on bail sometimes wait up to 5 years for trial.
    Human rights groups such as the Association Against Torture and 
members of the press complain that many persons convicted of offenses 
constituting violations of human rights avoided sentencing by 
prolonging the appeals process and that sentences for persons convicted 
of such offenses are unduly light. According to AI, custodial sentences 
of less than 1 year and a day customarily are not served in such cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the privacy of the home 
and correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government authorities 
must obtain court approval before searching private property, 
wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The 
antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the Minister of the 
Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval in ``cases of 
emergency.''

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Opposition viewpoints, both from political parties 
and nonpartisan organizations, are reflected freely and widely in the 
media.
    The Catalunya regional government's failure in 1999 to renew 
broadcast licenses for three Catholic Church radio stations was 
challenged successfully in the Catalunya Supreme Court in March. The 
court ruled that the criteria used by the regional government to award 
licenses placed disproportionate emphasis on the use of Catalan 
language in the programming. The government of Catalunya elected not to 
appeal the decision.
    On March 2, the Supreme Court prohibited the radical Basque party 
Euskal Herritarrok (EH) from using free broadcast time in the public 
media. The pro-ETA newspaper Egin and its affiliated radio station 
(Egin Irratia) were closed in 1998. Gara--another pro-ETA newspaper--
has since emerged. An investigation into the alleged subordination of 
Egin's editorial line and hiring practices to ETA's command and the use 
of coded classified ads to coordinate ETA strategy still was underway.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is 
no state religion, although Catholicism is the predominant religion and 
receives some government funding. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have 
official status and also receive some support from the Government. 
Other recognized religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, 
are covered by constitutional protections but receive no assistance. 
Religions not recognized officially are treated as cultural 
associations. Religious courses are offered in public schools but are 
not mandatory.
    There are some allegations that the Government discriminates 
against non-Catholic religions, principally by not providing to other 
churches all of the privileges accorded to the Catholic Church.
    In 1999 Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the 
Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive 
``sects.'' A 1989 law on sects already had authorized the police to 
investigate their activities, and a special unit was created for that 
purpose. The resolution was preceded by press accounts of a death under 
unusual circumstances of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and the arrest 
of the leader of a group called The Orientation in April 1999.
    Also in April 1999, a Helsinki Human Rights Federation report 
criticized the Government for discrimination against ``new religions.''
    The decision of the regional government of Cataluyna not to renew 
three local radio broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church was 
overturned in court in March (see Section 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within and 
outside the country, to emigrate, and to repatriate, and the Government 
respects these rights in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, including the 
Spanish Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), in assisting 
refugees and asylum seekers. Under a 1994 law, asylum requests are 
adjudicated in a two-stage process with the Office of Asylum and 
Refugees (OAR) making an initial decision on the admissibility of the 
application for processing. The Interministerial Committee for Asylum 
and Refuge (CIAR) examines the applications accepted for processing. 
The CIAR includes representatives from the Ministries of Interior, 
Justice, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and a nonvoting member of the UNHCR. 
The decision of the CIAR in each case must be approved by the Minister 
of the Interior.
    The 1994 law eliminated the distinction between asylum status and 
refugee status. This distinction was eliminated to prevent applicants 
from drawing out judicial proceedings by applying first for refugee 
status and then for asylum, if the former was denied.
    The UNHCR advises the authorities throughout the process. 
Applicants for asylum have the right to have their applications sent 
immediately to the local office of the UNHCR. The authorities are not 
bound by the judgment of the UNHCR in individual cases, but they often 
reevaluate decisions with which the UNHCR does not agree. Appeals of 
rejection at either stage may be made to the National High Court, and 
appeals of the National High Court's decisions may be made to the 
Supreme Court.
    Asylum requests may be made from outside as well as within the 
country. From outside anyone can request asylum from a Spanish 
diplomatic or consular representative. Illegal immigrants are permitted 
to apply for asylum. Those who lack visas or permission to enter may 
apply at the border or port of entry. The applicant in such cases may 
be detained until a decision is made regarding the admissibility for 
processing of the application. In cases of persons who apply inside the 
country, a decision must be reached within 2 months, but in cases of 
persons who apply at a port of entry this period is reduced to 72 
hours. The period for filing an appeal in such cases is 24 hours. The 
Ombudsman (see Section 4) challenged the legality of this form of 
detention before the Constitutional Court. The Court issued a 
preliminary decision in which it ruled that this form of detention does 
not deprive the detainee of his liberty. This provisional decision 
allowed the Government to continue to detain applicants without 
modifications to its detention procedures.
    Applicants have the right by law to free legal assistance, 
regardless of where they are when they apply for asylum. This 
assistance is available from the first step in the process through any 
appeals of unfavorable decisions. The applicant also has the right to 
the assistance of translators and interpreters, and the OAR admits 
documents in any language without requiring an official translation.
    In 1999 the Government received 8,405 requests for political 
asylum. Only 294 of the applicants were granted refugee status. An 
additional 679 were permitted entrance on humanitarian grounds. In the 
first 5 months of 2000 the Government received 3,010 requests for 
political asylum. The majority of applicants came from Algeria, 
Romania, Sierra Leone, and Armenia. The number of persons granted 
asylum has dropped steadily during the past 5 years.
    The ombudsman expressed his concern over the high percentage of 
applications not admitted for processing (68.5 percent in 1997 and 56.6 
percent in 1998). However, many persons with falsified documents are 
rejected early in the process. Many such applicants come from 
politically stable but economically impoverished countries.
    The Government's practice of substituting temporary admittance on 
humanitarian grounds for granting asylum also has been criticized. The 
former status includes some restrictions on access to the labor market 
and welfare payments, although it does grant the applicant residency 
and work permits. Another concern is that in some cases individuals 
whose asylum requests were turned down may have been expelled while 
their appeals were still in progress, although no statistics are 
available. The law allows the applicant a 15 day grace period in which 
to leave the country if refugee status is denied. Within that time 
frame, the applicant may appeal the decision, and the court of appeal 
has the authority to prevent the initiation of expulsion procedures, 
which normally begin after the 15th day.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
    A new law on immigration was passed in January and took effect in 
April. Although the new law does not include any specific mandates 
regarding work permits, it does recognize the rights of immigrants to 
peaceful assembly and association. The law grants eligibility for 
emergency health care to all immigrants and for all forms of health 
care to minors and pregnant women.
    The new law prompted thousands of illegal aliens to seek to 
regularize their status. Between March and July, immigrants submitted 
about a quarter of a million applications. Of the 131,700 applications 
reviewed, 85,526 received legal status. The Government later concluded 
that the law, by granting illegal and legal immigrants many of the same 
rights, promoted increased illegal immigration. The authorities 
intercepted 3,569 aliens entering illegally via the Straits of 
Gibraltar in all of 1999. By August 2000, the authorities had already 
intercepted 7,833. The Government amended the immigration law in 
December to increase sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens and 
to draw a sharper distinction between the rights afforded to legal 
versus illegal immigrants. Under the amended law, illegal aliens do not 
have the right to join unions or strike.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which all 
citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote by secret 
ballot. At all levels of government, elections are held at least every 
4 years. In the 1996 national elections, the Popular Party ended 13 
years of Socialist (PSOE) rule, and Jose Maria Aznar became President 
of the Government. The Popular Party received an absolute majority in 
the 2000 parliamentary elections. The next national elections are 
scheduled for March 2004.
    Governmental power is shared between the central government and 17 
regional ``autonomous communities.'' Local nationalist parties give 
political expression to regional linguistic and cultural identities.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they are increasing their participation in the political process. Of 19 
Cabinet Ministers, 3 are women. The President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies are women. The number of female 
Members of Parliament increased after the 2000 elections: of the 350 
members of the lower house, 99 are women. Of 259 Senators, 63 are 
women. In the 1999 European Parliament elections, both the PP and PSOE 
placed women at the top of their lists. On the PSOE list, 50 percent of 
the candidates were women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of nongovernmental human rights groups, including the 
Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid and the Human Rights 
Institute of Cataluyna in Barcelona, operate freely without government 
interference. The Government cooperates readily with international 
organizations, international nongovernmental human rights groups, and 
independent national groups investigating allegations of human rights 
abuses.
    The Constitution provides for an ombudsman, called the ``People's 
Defender,'' who as part of his duties actively investigates complaints 
of human rights abuses by the authorities. The ombudsman operates 
independently from any party or government ministry, must be elected 
every 5 years by a three-fifths majority of the Congress of Deputies, 
and is immune from prosecution. He has complete access to government 
institutions and to all documents other than those classified for 
national security reasons and may refer cases to the courts on his own 
authority. The ombudsman has a staff of approximately 150 persons and 
received some 25,000 complaints during the year. The majority of the 
complaints pertained to education and social services, although some 
dealt with discrimination, domestic violence, and mistreatment by law 
enforcement agencies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. In 
1995 the Parliament modified the Penal Code to make it a crime to 
``incite, publicize, or otherwise promote abuse or discrimination of 
people or groups'' because of race, ethnicity, nationality, ideology, 
or religious beliefs. However, incidents of racism and rightwing 
violence against minorities and discrimination against Roma continued 
to be problems.
    Women.--Sexual abuse, violence, and harassment of women in the home 
continued to be problems. According to the Government, at least 40 
women and 6 men died as a result of domestic violence during the year. 
During 1999 over 25,000 women filed complaints of abuse against their 
husbands or partners, compared with 19,621 complaints in 1998. In 2000 
5,722 criminal complaints were filed against husbands for abuse of 
their wives, as well as 14,846 misdemeanor complaints. However, experts 
believe that only 10 percent of violent acts against women are reported 
to the authorities. The Women's Institute, which is part of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, counseled 104,856 women 
concerning domestic violence and legal aid in 1998 compared with 86,893 
in 1997. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that from 
600,000 to 800,000 cases of domestic abuse occur each year.
    In 1998 the Government unveiled a 3-year, $60 million (9 billion 
pesetas) ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The plan criminalizes the 
violation of restraining orders and the infliction of psychological 
violence and calls for a quadrupling of the number of offices that 
assist victims and an expansion of medical and legal services. (Rape, 
spousal rape, and spousal abuse were already crimes.) Other provisions 
of the plan include: Public awareness campaigns in the media and in the 
schools; the establishment of a domestic abuse database to streamline 
judicial investigations; increased access of victims to public housing; 
and greater linkage between medical, police, legal, and counseling 
services in order to promote an integrated approach to treating 
victims. Public service announcements and press articles drawing 
attention to the problem of domestic violence were ubiquitous 
throughout the year.
    Women's rights' advocates, while acknowledging that the plan 
incorporated many of their demands, expressed disappointment with 
several of its omissions. The Federation of Separated and Divorced 
Women criticized the plan as lacking in specifics, particularly its 
public sensitization campaigns. According to the Federation, the plan's 
key shortcoming is that it fails to make the issuance of a restraining 
order automatic upon filing a complaint. Currently, a restraining order 
is issued only after a guilty verdict.
    The Government has invested over $15.2 million (2.288 billion 
pesetas) in the plan. Since the plan was approved, 9 special services 
units and 54 Civil Guard units staffed by 110 women have been created 
to assist battered women. There are special sections in the police 
department to deal with violence against women, which are staffed by 
trained female officers, and there are approximately 25 shelters for 
battered women. There are 54 official centers in all for mistreated 
women. A toll-free hot line advises women where to go for government 
shelter or other aid if mistreated.
    On April 9, the Government announced an initiative that would 
complete the 1998 ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The initiative 
calls for 5,000 lawyers specializing in domestic violence to be 
assigned throughout the country. The Government hopes that the presence 
of these lawyers will encourage women to come forward with complaints 
of violence or domestic abuse.
    A 1999 law allows for an ``immediate'' divorce upon conviction of a 
husband for domestic violence. The socially conservative political 
parties (PP and nationalist parties) tended to favor this bill. Womens' 
groups and the more left-of-center political parties (PSOE and NI) 
opposed the bill, due to concern that a woman's right to divorce her 
abusive husband would be dependent on an inefficient legal system that 
often takes years to complete a single criminal proceeding.
    A 1989 law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, but very 
few cases have been brought to trial under this law. Police received 
319 sexual harassment complaints during the year. Meanwhile the number 
of women in the labor market is increasing steadily. The Government 
recognizes the difficulties faced by women in the workplace. According 
to a 1998 decree, employers no longer have to pay social security 
benefits to someone filling in for a worker on leave either for 
maternity, adopting children, or in other similar circumstances. 
Previously, companies hired substitutes for only 10 percent of workers 
on maternity leave. The Government hopes to raise this figure to 25 
percent. A ministerial order to increase women's presence in sectors in 
which they currently are underrepresented provides a 2-year reprieve 
from paying social security taxes to employers who hire women in these 
sectors. The 1999 National Employment Action Plan gives priority to 
battered women who search for employment.
    The Minister of Social Affairs reports that women constitute 43 
percent of the work force. However, according to the Taxation Agency 
(Agencia Tributaria) and its 1997 report ``Employment, Salaries and 
Pensions'' completed by the Institution of Fiscal Studies, women hold 
only 18 percent of better paying positions. The female unemployment 
rate was 23 percent in 1999, down from 26.6 percent in 1998. It was 
still more than double the 11.1 percent unemployment rate for 1999 for 
men. Women outnumber men in the legal, journalistic, and health care 
professions but still play minor roles in many other fields.
    Discrimination in the workplace and in hiring practices persists. A 
1998 study of 100 labor union contracts revealed that 38 contracts 
failed to use gender-neutral language, 22 employed gender-specific job 
titles resulting in the imposition of discriminatory wage differentials 
(i.e., the salary of a male secretary, ``secretario,'' was 13 percent 
higher than that of a ``secretaria'' in one food processing industry 
contract), and only 17 addressed the problem of sexual harassment. 
Discriminatory wage differentials continue to exist. A 1999 report by 
the General Workers' Union shows that women's salaries are 30 percent 
less than those of their male counterparts.
    Women are equal under the law for divorce, inheritance, and 
business purposes.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily 
from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
welfare through well-funded and easily accessed programs of education 
and health care. Education is compulsory until age 16 and free until 
age 18. The Constitution obligates both the State and parents to 
protect children, whether or not born in wedlock. The Ministries of 
Health and Social Affairs are responsible for the welfare of children 
and have created numerous programs to aid needy children. Numerous 
NGO's further children's rights. For example a school help program for 
the protection of children has a team of experts who work with 
educators to help identify abused or abandoned children in the 
classroom.
    The 1995 Law of the Child gives legal rights of testimony to minors 
in child abuse cases; it also obliges all citizens to act on cases of 
suspected child abuse and, for the first time, sets out rules regarding 
foreign adoptions. Under the Penal Code, children under the age of 18 
are not considered responsible for their actions and cannot be sent to 
prison.
    A 1996 penitentiary law lowered the maximum age that a child can 
remain with an incarcerated mother from 6 to 3 years. When the children 
reach their third birthday, they are sent to live with relatives or are 
placed in an institution. Some prisons have special units for mothers 
with children under age 3. The units usually include a kindergarten, 
psychological support, and programs for children to get out of prison 
regularly. Family groups with children under the age of 3 can now stay 
together in cases where both parents are convicts.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for the State to 
provide for the adequate treatment and care of the disabled, ensuring 
that they are not deprived of the basic rights that apply to all 
citizens. The law aims to ensure fair access to public employment, 
prevent discrimination, and facilitate access to public facilities and 
transportation. The national law serves as a guide for regional laws; 
however, levels of assistance and accessibility differ from region to 
region and have not improved in many areas.
    The Penal Code continues to allow parents or legal representatives 
of a mentally disabled person to petition a judge to obtain permission 
for the erilization of that person. In 1994 the Constitutional Court 
held that sterilization of the mentally infirm does not constitute a 
violation of the Constitution. In practice many courts have authorized 
such surgery. Religious groups continue to protest this ruling.
    The labor market reform laws of 1997 and 1998 worked out between 
the Government, labor, and management provided for incentives to hire 
individuals from groups underrepresented in the work force, such as the 
disabled. In the 1998 agreement, the Government agreed to subsidize 
partially the costs of hiring the disabled for part-time work.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Public opinion surveys indicate 
the continued presence of racism and xenophobia, which result in 
discrimination against minorities. A February poll conducted by the 
Government's polling organization regarding attitudes towards 
foreigners found that Spaniards feel most identification with other 
Western Europeans and Latin Americans. There is less acceptance of 
immigrants from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. In February hundreds of 
Spanish villagers attacked the Moroccan immigrant population of El 
Ejido (Almeria) with baseball bats and iron rods. The riot was sparked 
by the murder of a Spanish woman by a Moroccan immigrant. The 
disturbance lasted 4 days and was followed over the course of several 
weeks by smaller outbreaks of anti-Moroccan immigrant violence.
    On January 25, the Council of Europe cited a resurgence in 
nationalism, sometimes violent, which manifested itself in intolerance 
towards Roma, Africans, and Arabs. The Council recommended that the 
Government implement the antiracist provisions of the Penal Code; 
provide better statistics on racist attacks and vulnerable groups; deal 
with the marginalization of Roma and immigrants; and combat the 
activities of rightwing networks.
    Roma continue to suffer discrimination in jobs, schools, and 
housing. According to a report issued by Gypsy Presence, the largest 
Roma-rights NGO, as many as 1 million Roma may live in the country. The 
organization estimates that half of this population is under 16 years 
of age and two-thirds are under the age of 25. The report states that 
one-third of Roma families are not economically self-sufficient. Romani 
activists attribute the high incidence of Romani informal sector 
employment in agriculture and peddling (an estimated 75 to 80 percent) 
to discrimination and historical marginalization. Although the Madrid 
High Court of Justice struck down in 1999 a city ordinance prohibiting 
peddling, Gypsy Presence reports that local authorities continue to 
find ways to enforce the ban. According to the organization, several 
other municipalities have enacted similar statutes, and this has been 
detrimental to the economic welfare of many Roma. Romani women suffer 
even more acute difficulties when seeking employment, since employers 
are reluctant to hire women from ethnic groups with high birth rates.
    A 1998 study found that only 35 percent of Romani children are 
integrated fully into the educational system. About 60 percent of 
Romani children do not complete primary school, and only very few 
progress to middle school and beyond. According to a Gypsy Presence 
report, one-fifth of teachers describe themselves as anti-Roma, and 
one-fourth of students say that they would like to see Roma expelled 
from school. Truancy and dropout rates among Roma are very high, and 
Romani parents, over 80 percent of whom are functionally illiterate, 
often do not see the value of an education or are unaware of the 
educational opportunities for their children.
    A shooting incident in the village of Albaladejo in 1999 
illustrated the problems that even economically successful Roma can 
face. According to an NGO, the victim in the case was Juan Jose Garcia 
Garcia, who at one time was accused of drug dealing and assaulting 
Civil Guards but was acquitted of both charges. However, Civil Guards 
continued to harass him, often stopping him for identity checks or not 
wearing a seatbelt. According to Gypsy Presence, after being refused 
service at a bar, Garcia arranged to meet an employee of the bar, who 
later appeared at the appointed place with a another man, shot Garcia, 
and left him for dead. Garcia was able to contact his wife by cellular 
phone, and help arrived in time to save him. After the two assailants 
were apprehended, the residents of Albaladejo turned out in force to 
protest their incarceration and petition for their release. The mayor 
often led the demonstrations. In June a court freed the two accused 
after they posted bond in the amount of $3,333 and $2,666 (500,000 and 
400,000 pesetas respectively). Garcia and his family left Albaladejo.
    In April 2000 the Department of Social Services announced a plan to 
relocate 300 Roma immigrants from a rural area to Madrid to improve 
their living conditions. The Roma were provided amenities such as 
running water, electricity, toilets, trash services, showers, and a 
community area in return for attending employment training. The project 
cost $2 million (350 million pesetas). As of July 25, 17 of the Roma 
participants had secured outside employment.
    Quasi-organized rightwing youth groups (called ``skinheads'' by the 
press) continued to commit violent acts throughout the year, 
terrorizing minorities. According to a 1999 report by the NGO Movement 
Against Intolerance, which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
helped prepare, the number of persons involved in ultrarightist groups 
more than quintupled since 1995: at least 10,400 citizens are known to 
be involved in such groups, and the actual number could be as high as 
20,800. Movement Against Intolerance reported in March the presence of 
Spanish neo-Nazi groups on the Internet, aiming their attacks at 
Maghrebi immigrants. Through their web pages, these groups urged others 
to take violent action against all immigrants of North African descent.
    In 1999 an NGO urged the Government to halt neo-Nazi activites in 
the formerly deserted village of Los Pedriches in the southeast. 
Foreign neo-Nazis were said to be organizing camps in the village. The 
authorities were monitoring the situation closely. After press 
attention, the groups reportedly left the village.
    No arrests were made in July 1999 incidents in which a mosque in 
Gerona and a building in Banyoles that housed immigrants from Senegal 
and the Gambia were burned.
    A language or dialect other than Castilian Spanish is used in 6 of 
the 17 autonomous communities. The Constitution stipulates that 
citizens have ``the duty to know'' Castilian, which is the ``official 
language of the state,'' but it adds that other languages also can be 
official under regional statutes and that the ``different language 
variations of Spain are a cultural heritage which shall . . . be 
protected.''
    The Law of the Catalan Language, approved by the Catalan regional 
legislature (Generalitat) in 1998, stipulates the use of Catalan as the 
official language in local government and administrative offices, 
regional courts, publicly owned corporations, and private companies 
subsidized by the Catalan regional Government. Spanish-speaking 
citizens have the right to be addressed in Spanish by public officials. 
The legislation also establishes minimum quotas for Catalan-language 
radio and television programming. Controversy continued over the 
language law implementing legislation and related regulatory measures. 
Facing strong resistance from film distributors, the regional 
government in March annulled legislation that required foreign films 
distributed in sufficient quantities also to be dubbed and distributed 
in Catalan.
    In June an administrative court in Tarragona considered a challenge 
to a local university regulation that imposed extensive use of Catalan 
in university affairs. The court, although leaving some of the 
regulation intact and declaring itself not competent to rule on the 
constitutionality of the linguistic law, struck down several sections 
of the regulation. For example, the court found that the regulation's 
treatment of certain administrative issues and a requirement that staff 
use Catalan at all public university functions exceeded university 
authority and autonomy and were not in conformance with other laws. 
Another court challenge involved the propriety of the same university's 
discipline of a professor for supplying copies of the university 
entrance examination in Spanish, rather than Catalan, to two students 
requesting Spanish versions. The court ruled in December that the 
professor was excluded wrongly from the administration of the 
examinations and praised her for defending the students' rights. The 
court clearly implied that the university's regulation limiting access 
to the exmination in Spanish was discriminatory and said that it was 
permissible to foster the use of Catalan but not to do so in a manner 
that excludes or limits the use of Spanish. The university 
administration responded that it had no intention of modifying its 
regulation and intended to appeal the continued suspension of certain 
aspects of the regulation. Notwithstanding its response, in May it 
began supplying the entrance examination in Spanish to those who 
requested it.
    The European Parliament in September declined to investigate 
allegations brought by Spanish-speaking activists that the linguistic 
law discriminated against Spanish-speakers. Both Galicia and Valencia 
have laws stating that it is the duty of the Government to ``promote'' 
their regional languages in schools and at official functions.
    The debate continued over the extent to which the Basque language 
(Euskera) should be promoted. The Union of Basque-Speaking Lawyers, 
affiliated with the pro-ETA HB political party, intensified its 
campaign against the use of translation services in trials of Basque-
speaking citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except those in the 
military services, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled 
to form or join unions of their own choosing. About 15 percent of the 
workforce is unionized.
    Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their 
representatives, determine their policies, represent their members' 
interests, and strike. They are not restricted or harassed by the 
Government and are independent of political parties. A strike in 
nonessential services is legal if its sponsors give 5 days' notice. Any 
striking union must respect minimum service requirements negotiated 
with the respective employer. The right to strike was interpreted by 
the Constitutional Court to include general strikes called to protest 
government policy. There were 632 strikes in 1998, a decrease of 53 
from 1997. The number of striking workers in 1998 was 680,500, an 
increase of 29,900 on the previous year. The number of workdays lost to 
strikes in 1998 was 1,280,900, a decrease of 555,900 on the previous 
year. The number of workdays lost to strikes continued to decrease in 
1999 and 2000. In December government workers held a protest march and 
general strike over their demands for salary increases that kept pace 
with inflation.
    Unions are free to form or join federations and affiliate with 
international bodies and do so without hindrance.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1980 statute 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Trade 
union and collective bargaining rights were extended in 1986 to all 
workers in the public sector except military personnel. Public sector 
collective bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and 
employment levels, but the Government retained the right to set these 
if negotiations failed. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread 
in both the public and private sectors; in the latter they cover 60 
percent of workers, notwithstanding that only about 15 percent of 
workers are actually union members.
    The law prohibits discrimination by employers against trade union 
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in the labor 
courts. The law gives unions a role in controlling temporary work 
contracts to prevent the abuse of such contracts and of termination 
actions. Unions nonetheless contend that employers discriminate in many 
cases by refusing to renew the temporary contracts of workers engaging 
in union organizing. More than one-third of all employees are under 
temporary contracts.
    Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones and export 
processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country. Union 
membership in these zones is reportedly higher than the average 
throughout the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited, and the law 
is enforced effectively; however, there were instances of trafficking 
in women who were forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment 
of Children.--The statutory minimum age for the employment of children 
is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is primarily 
responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is enforced effectively in 
major industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to 
enforce on small farms and in family-owned businesses, where some child 
labor persists. Legislation prohibiting child labor is enforced 
effectively in the special economic zones. The law also prohibits the 
employment of persons under the age of 18 at night, for overtime work, 
or in sectors considered hazardous. The law prohibits forced or 
compulsory labor by children, and it is enforced effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    In 1998 UNICEF called for an investigation into child labor on 
tomato farms in Badajoz. According to Red Cross personnel providing 
assistance to migrant farm workers there, over 200 children under the 
age of 16, the majority Portuguese citizens, worked 10-hour days and 
earned less than $14 (2,000 pesetas) per day. Many of the children were 
less than 10 years old.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was set in 
December 1999 for 2000 and is $14.16 (2,356 pesetas) per day or $424.80 
(70,680 pesetas) per month, a 2 percent increase compared with 1999. 
The legal minimum wage for workers over 18 years of age is considered 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The rate is revised every year in line with the consumer price 
index and is enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs.
    The law sets a 40-hour workweek with an unbroken rest period of 36 
hours after each 40 hours worked. Workers enjoy 12 paid holidays a year 
and a month's paid vacation.
    Several press stories reported that illegal immigrants worked for 
substandard pay and in substandard working conditions. The Inspectorate 
of Labor reported 2,724 cases of labor rights violations related to 
immigrants during the first 8 months of the year.
    Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions and 
occupational health and safety rules, but bureaucratic procedures are 
cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health legislation is being 
revised to conform to European Union (EU) directives. The 1995 Law to 
Prevent Labor Risks is the basis for the completion of the rest of the 
EU directives. The National Institute of Safety and Health in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security has technical responsibility for 
developing labor standards, but the Inspectorate of Labor has 
responsibility for enforcing the legislation through judicial action 
when infractions are found. Workers have firm legal protection for 
filing complaints about hazardous conditions, but easily replaced 
temporary workers may be reluctant to use this protection due to fear 
of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides for sentences of up to 
3 years' imprisonment and a fine for trafficking in persons. 
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, primarily 
from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, appears to be growing.
    The Guardia Civil announced a plan in May to focus on trafficking 
in women for prostitution and made 162 arrests from May to the end of 
the year. In February police arrested 19 persons for trafficking in 
women for prostitution in Andalucia. The network controlled 235 women, 
most were from Eastern Europe. In March police in Taragona and 
Castellon arrested 7 Moldovan nationals for operating a trafficking 
network which brought 520 women from Eastern Europe into Spain for 
purposes of prostitution. In late December, the Guardia Civil arrested 
a network of 30 traffickers. The coordinated arrests occurred in 
Madrid, the Basque region, and several other cities. The women were 
from Latin America.
    At least three such rings were broken up in 1999. One ring was run 
by Russians and Azerbaijanis and involved the trafficking women from 
Eastern Europe. Another, which police in Castilla-La Mancha broke up in 
mid-July, brought women to the country from Africa, Europe, and South 
America. In August police in Andalucia detained 51 persons and broke up 
a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In all 
these cases, women were promised jobs and given the necessary documents 
to enter the country. Upon arrival their documents were seized, and 
they were taken to alternative clubs and forced to have up to 10 sexual 
encounters per day.
    Most women apprehended in raids are Latin Americans who entered the 
country legally as tourists (most from countries whose citizens do not 
require visas), but who began working as prostitutes instead. Profits 
in the sex industry are 10 times higher than those in other occupations 
commonly filled by migrants (waitresses, maids, etc.). Nonetheless, 
officials concede that significant numbers of women are trafficked to 
Spain by eastern European Mafia groups that ruthlessly exploit their 
victims. A Chinese gang, which forced migrants to submit to abortions, 
was apprehended. Media attention to the issue of international 
trafficking in women has encouraged NGO's and others to demand 
protection for victims. The April immigration law provides protections 
for trafficking victims who cooperate with police against traffickers. 
Press accounts state that authorities detained 163 pimps and freed 865 
foreigners from abusive situations in the first half of the year. The 
half-year figures surpass the totals for all of 1998. A 1999 Civil 
Guard study estimated that 10,000 women were working in sex clubs, of 
whom 90 percent were immigrants.
    The NGO Doctors of the World, which works with prostitutes, 
estimated during the year that 60 percent of the 45,000 female 
prostitutes were immigrants. Doctors of the World reported that 69 
percent of these immigrant prostitutes were from Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 
percent were from Latin America, and 8 percent were from Eastern 
Europe.
                               __________

                                 SWEDEN

    Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy. The King is Chief of State. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime 
Minister, exercises executive authority. The judiciary is independent.
    The Government effectively controls the police, all security 
organizations, and the armed forces.
    Sweden has an advanced industrial economy, mainly market based, and 
a high standard of living, with extensive social welfare services.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Government has longstanding 
programs to deal with violence against women and abuse of children and 
took steps against trafficking in women. Neo-Nazi violence remained a 
problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In June a police officer was charged with breach of duty, serious 
ill treatment, and causing the death of another, in a March incident in 
which he shot a fleeing suspect. The police officer reportedly fired a 
warning shot, then shot the man from behind because he was convinced 
that the suspect was armed.
    In June a prison escapee died after being caught and restrained by 
four prison guards. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are concerned 
that the man may have died as a result of excessive use of force by the 
guards. The guards were suspended pending the results of a police 
investigation into the death.
    The Prosecutor General closed his review of the initial 
investigation of a 1995 case in which a man died in police custody, 
acknowledging that there had been flaws in the investigation. He urged 
that a further, independent investigation be carried out into how the 
authorities had handled the different aspects of the case. No one was 
ever prosecuted for the death, although the two policemen involved were 
convicted of a minor offense in 1996. A report by the parliamentary 
Ombudsman concluded that the current procedure for dealing with 
complaints against the police was inadequate and proposed that an 
independent system be established. In June the Minister of Justice 
decided to appoint a commission of inquiry to look into past deaths in 
custody in order to propose safeguards. NGO's remain very interested in 
such cases.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities 
generally respect such prohibitions. Complaints of the excessive use of 
force by the police are infrequent. Thorough investigations have 
produced no evidence of a systemic problem. Typically, police officers 
found guilty of abuse are suspended or otherwise disciplined.
    Five cases of excessive use of force by policemen during the year 
were under investigation. Three officers were fined for excessive use 
of force in October 1999, but there were no reported cases of policemen 
being fired for committing crimes in the course of their duties--
including the use of excessive force.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions. Arrests are by warrant. The police must 
file charges within 6 hours against persons detained for disturbing the 
public order or considered dangerous, and within 12 hours against those 
detained on other grounds. The law requires arraignment within 48 
hours. The time between arrest and the first court hearing may be 
extended to 96 hours for detainees considered dangerous, likely to 
destroy evidence, or likely to flee. In cases involving more than one 
individual and in the case of foreigners, courts can and do order 
continued detention for 2 weeks at a time while police are 
investigating. Such detentions can be protracted, particularly in drug 
cases. Other than such dangerous suspects, detainees routinely are 
released pending trial. Bail as such does not exist. If a person files 
for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with an official investigation, 
a court may order detention for up to 3 months, with judicial review 
every 2 weeks.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is composed of three levels of courts: District 
courts, a court of appeals, and a Supreme Court. All criminal and civil 
cases are heard first in district court regardless of the severity of 
the alleged crime.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an 
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law limits home searches to investigations of 
major crimes punishable by at least 2 years' imprisonment. The 
authorities respect this provision. Normally the police must obtain 
court approval for a search or a wiretap. However, a senior police 
official may approve a search if time is a critical factor or the case 
involves a threat to life. The national police and the Prosecutor 
General's Office submit a report to Parliament every year detailing all 
of the electronic monitoring done during the previous year. In April 
the Minister of Justice presented a proposal to expand the use of 
police wiretapping. According to the proposal, wiretapping would be 
allowed only if serious drug crimes or serious crimes that would result 
in at least 4 years' imprisonment were suspected. A parliamentary 
decision is likely in 2001. A court must grant permission for wiretaps 
on a case-by-case basis. NGO's were critical of the Ministry's 
proposal.
    In 1997 journalistic investigations focused attention on the 
country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization. The majority of 
persons sterilized were disabled either mentally or physically. Such 
operations were known for years to have taken place under pre-World War 
II legislation, most of them without force. It initially was reported 
that between 1934 and 1976, 62,888 forced sterilizations were carried 
out, 95 percent of them on women. In 1999 a government-appointed 
commission concluded that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of these 
sterilizations were forced. The commission gave priority to the 
question of damages to victims and also looked into the possible 
existence of other categories of victims. The commission concluded its 
inquiry in 1999, and Parliament decided to pay damages of approximately 
$21,000 (175,000 krona) to each victim. By October 1,925 persons had 
applied for compensation. By year's end, some 1,300 had received 
payment. The Government allocated additional resources to pay 
compensation since the number of applicants far exceeded expectations.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
provisions in practice. Most newspapers and periodicals are privately 
owned. The Government subsidizes daily newspapers, regardless of 
political affiliation. Broadcasters operate under a state concession. 
Until a few years ago, the State had a monopoly over ground-based 
broadcasting, but a variety of commercial television channels (one 
ground-based and several via satellite or cable), and several 
commercial radio stations now exist.
    The Government may censor publications containing national security 
information. A quasi-governmental body excises extremely graphic 
violence from films, television programs, and videos.
    Criticism of child pornography is widespread, and the debate on the 
legality of ownership of pornographic material continued. A 1999 law 
criminalizes the possession and handling of child pornography. It also 
is illegal to publish or distribute such material. The Queen remains a 
strong and popular advocate of children's rights and an active opponent 
of child pornography.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects 
this right in practice. Police require a permit for public 
demonstrations. The authorities routinely grant such permits, with rare 
exceptions to prevent clashes between antagonistic groups or due to 
insufficient police resources to patrol an event adequately.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The debate that began in 
1999 over the possible criminalization of neo-Nazi organizations 
continued.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects that right in practice. The 
Government does not hamper the practice or teaching of any faith.
    The country maintained a state (Lutheran) church for several 
hundred years, supported by a general ``church tax'' (although the 
Government routinely grants exemptions). However, in 1995 the Church of 
Sweden and the Government agreed to a formal separation, which became 
effective during the year, but the Church still is to receive some 
state support. The reform also made it possible for all religious 
communities to register by fulfilling certainmainly organizational--
requirements. The principles governing state support to all religious 
communities have been laid down in a new special act of law.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law and regulations incorporate the precepts of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
They are also consistent with the European Union's (EU) Dublin 
Convention. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees; it also provides first asylum. In keeping with international 
agreements, the Government reviewed applications for asylum more 
thoroughly than before. The number of applications for asylum decreased 
in 1999 to 11,231 (from 12,844 in 1998). Applicants included 3,576 
Iraqi citizens, 1,812 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 854 
Iranians. The Government approved 5,597 applications in 1999. A total 
of 6,835 persons sought asylum through July 2000. Nearly 11 percent of 
the country's population is foreign born.
    The Government carries out expeditious returns of asylum seekers 
from EU countries or from countries with which there are reciprocal 
return agreements. In many cases, asylum seekers were deported within 
72 hours of arrival, and NGO's were critical of their lack of access to 
legal counsel. To remedy this situation, the Government is 
experimenting with pilot programs at selected border crossings to 
provide expeditious legal assistance. Most of these are cases of 
persons who passed through or have asylum determinations pending in 
other EU countries. Applications can remain under consideration for 
long periods of time with applicants in uncertain status. Because of 
the appeals process in the courts, cases can extend for several years. 
These cases are few in number.
    The principal complaint of NGO's is that the country lacks a 
transparent process for making decisions in asylum cases. They maintain 
that the asylum procedures lack rules to guide the conduct of 
authorities to ensure legal protection for asylum seekers. The 
procedures accord great discretion to individuals in decisionmaking 
positions. According to the NGO's, the decisionmakers use arbitrary, 
unspecified, and inconsistent criteria. NGO's are particularly critical 
of the unclear burden of proof and the lack of an appeals process to an 
independent court. Four cases, in which the Government sought to return 
asylum seekers to countries where they feared persecution, were pending 
at the U.N. Committee Against Torture; the Committee was expected to 
review the cases in the fall of 2000.
    The Government conducted a review of the safety of countries that 
are considered safe third countries. NGO's raised the issue of 
insufficient protection for returnees to countries without a reciprocal 
return agreement. While these countries provide safe asylum, they are 
often reluctant to accept asylum seekers deported from European 
countries. Despite the Government's review, late in the year the 
authorities ordered the deportation of two Iranian asylum seekers to 
Tehran. The deportation was halted after the U.N. Committee Against 
Torture decided to review both cases to determine if the individuals 
would face torture if returned to Tehran.
    A total of 3,752 Kosovar Albanian refugees were granted temporary 
residence permits in 1999, initially valid for 11 months. By July more 
than 2,500 of the refugees had returned to Kosovo. The Government has 
accepted over 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The 
Government provides grants to Bosnians to travel to their homeland in 
order to determine if they wish to be repatriated. It also provides 
financial incentives for returnees, but there is no forced 
repatriation. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to 
a country where they feared persecution.
    In March the Government withdrew a proposal envisaging changes to 
its temporary protection regulations in a situation of mass 
immigration. The proposal was withdrawn following massive criticism by 
the political opposition, the UNHCR, NGO's, and the parliamentary 
Committee on Social Insurance.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Citizens exercised this right most recently in 
1998. Elections to the 349-member unicameral Parliament are held every 
4 years.
    Women participate actively in the political process and Government. 
They constitute 43.6 percent of the Parliament and 55 percent of the 
Cabinet. The governing Social Democratic Party largely kept its pledge 
to place women in half of all political appointments at all levels.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several private organizations actively monitor issues such as the 
impact of social legislation, anti-immigrant or racist activities, and 
the condition of the indigenous Sami population. The official ombudsmen 
publicize abuses of state authority and may initiate actions to rectify 
such abuses. Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of 
local and international groups working in the country and abroad to 
improve human rights observance, and they are very open to dialog and 
input from these groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and 
the Government respects this provision.
    Women.--A total of 19,982 reported cases of assault against women 
(excluding rape) were reported in 1999, compared with 20,516 in 1998. 
Most involved spousal abuse. In three-quarters of the assaults, the 
perpetrator was an acquaintance of the victim. Reported abuse against 
women occurs disproportionately in immigrant communities. On average 33 
murders of women and girls are reported each year, half of them by men 
closely related to the victim. The number of reported rapes of persons 
over age 15 was 1,747 in 1999, compared with 1,386 in 1998. The law 
does not differentiate between spousal and nonspousal rape. In 1998 
(latest statistics available) 4,928 cases of violence against women 
were prosecuted, as were 243 rape cases, 208 of which were sexual 
assaults on persons over age 15.
    Trafficking in women from Russia and the Baltics for purposes of 
forced prostitution continues to be a small but serious problem (see 
Section 6.f.). The purchase or attempted purchase of sexual services 
became illegal in 1999.
    The Government has longstanding programs to deal with violence 
against women. The law provides complainants with protection from 
contact with their abusers, if so desired. In some cases, the 
authorities help women obtain new identities and homes. The Government 
provides electronic alarms or bodyguards for women in extreme danger of 
assault. Both national and local governments help fund volunteer groups 
that provide shelter and other assistance to abused women. The 
authorities strive to apprehend and prosecute abusers. Typically, the 
sentence for abuse is a prison term--14 months on average--or 
psychiatric treatment. However, women complain about short sentences 
and the early release of offenders.
    The law prohibits sexual harassment and specifies clearly 
employers' responsibilities to prevent and--if applicable--to 
investigate sexual harassment in the workplace and to formulate and 
post a specific policy and guidelines for the workplace. Employers who 
do not investigate and intervene against harassment at work can be 
obliged to pay damages to the victim. As with other forms of 
discrimination, women and men may take complaints to the courts or to 
their unions. To combat gender discrimination in the longer term, the 
Equal Opportunities Act requires all employers, both in the public and 
private sector, actively to promote equal opportunities for women and 
men in the workplace.
    The law requires employers to treat men and women alike in hiring, 
promotion, and pay, including equal pay for comparable work. According 
to 1998 statistics, women's salaries were 82 percent of men's salaries. 
Adjusting for age, education, and occupational differences between men 
and women, women average 91 percent of men's salaries. The equal 
opportunity Ombudsman, a public official, investigates complaints of 
gender discrimination in the labor market. Women and men also may 
pursue complaints through the courts. A third option, and by far the 
most common, involves settling allegations with the employee's labor 
union as mediator. In 1999 gender discrimination cases by 94 women and 
16 men were registered with the equal opportunity Ombudsman. The courts 
did not rule on any of the cases in 1999 (pending the resolution of 1 
of the cases in the European Court of Justice), 11 were settled through 
mediation, 22 were withdrawn, and 72 were dropped. The remainder were 
pending. In the past, many of these cases involved salary 
discrimination.
    All employers with more than 10 employees must prepare an annual 
equality plan, including a survey of pay differences between male and 
female employees. The equal opportunity Ombudsman reviews these plans.
    Women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization, 
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976. 
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or 
physically, and 95 percent were women. In May 1999, Parliament decided 
to pay damages in such cases (see Section 1.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free, 
and universal primary school education for children for 9 years. It 
also provides free medical and dental care for all children up to the 
age of 16 (19 for dental care). Parents receive some $1,000 per year 
for each child under 16 years of age. An official children's Ombudsman 
monitors the Government's programs.
    The Government allocates funds to private organizations concerned 
with children's rights. An NGO, Children's Rights in Society, offers 
counseling to troubled youngsters. The Government remains active 
internationally in efforts to prevent child abuse.
    Although the physical abuse of children appears relatively 
uncommon, the public and authorities remain concerned by consistent 
data indicating an increase in cases over the past several years. The 
number of reported cases for children under the age of 15 rose to 5,919 
in 1999, up from 5,642 in 1998. The number of reported cases of sexual 
abuse of children under the age of 15 was 2,969 in 1999 and 2,756 in 
1998. The U.N. Children's Committee criticized the Government, stating 
that it provides less protection for the children of immigrant and 
disadvantaged groups.
    The law prohibits parents or other caretakers from abusing children 
mentally or physically in any way. Parents, teachers, and other adults 
are subject to prosecution if they physically punish a child, including 
slapping or spanking. Children have the right to report such abuses to 
the police. The authorities respect these laws, and the usual sentence 
is a fine combined with counseling and monitoring by social workers. 
However, if the situation warrants, authorities may remove children 
from their homes and place them in foster care. Foster parents 
virtually never receive permission to adopt long-term foster children, 
even in cases where the parents are seen as unfit or seek no contact 
with the child. Critics charge that this policy places the rights of 
biological parents over the needs of children for security in permanent 
family situations.
    People with Disabilities.--With one exception, there are no 
specific laws that prohibit discrimination against persons with 
disabilities, but considerable efforts are made to ensure that the 
disabled enjoy equal opportunities. A 1999 act prohibits discrimination 
against disabled persons in the workplace. In May the Parliament 
adopted a national plan on disability policy that provides for freedom 
of access and social support as basic rights for disabled citizens. 
Since 1994 the country has had an Ombudsman for disability issues. The 
Government provides disabled persons with assistance aimed at allowing 
them to live as normal a life as possible, preferably outside an 
institutional setting. This support may include a personal assistant 
for the severely disabled, plus improvements in the workplace's 
accessibility to wheelchairs. Government assistance also encompasses 
services such as home care or group living. Regulations for new 
buildings require full accessibility, but the Government has no such 
requirement for existing public buildings. Many buildings and some 
public transportation remain inaccessible. Deaf children have the right 
to education in sign language. The parents of disabled children and 
disabled workers under the age of 65 receive financial assistance every 
7 years to buy a car adapted to the person's disability.
    Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization, 
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976. 
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or 
physically (see Section 1.f.). In 1999 Parliament decided to pay 
damages in such cases.
    Indigenous People.--The country counts at least 17,000 Sami 
(formerly known as Lapps) among its 8.87 million inhabitants (Sami 
organizations place that number somewhat higher, 25,000 to 30,000). In 
1993 the Government allowed the formation of a Sametinget, or Sami 
Parliament, as an advisory body to the Government. Under the current 
Government, Sami issues fall under the Ministry of Agriculture.
    The Sami continue a protracted struggle for recognition as an 
indigenous people under a variety of international agreements, such as 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169. Historically, 
the Government resisted granting the Sami such rights. For example, 
Sami children had no right to education in their native language until 
the provision of such education to immigrant group children under a 
1977 law forced the Government to grant Sami at least equal treatment. 
As a result of such education, northern Sami dialects have enjoyed a 
recent renaissance. However, Sami dialects in the southern portions of 
traditional Sami lands now may have too few native speakers to survive 
as living languages. In 1997 the Government initiated an inquiry into 
whether the country could ratify ILO Convention 169. The inquiry was 
published in 1999 and concluded that the country could ratify the 
convention, but that it should not be ratified until a number of steps 
relating to Sami land rights are taken. No further steps were taken 
during the year.
    In 1994 the Government removed from the Sami the right to control 
hunting and fishing activities on Sami village lands, permitting 
instead totally unlimited hunting and fishing activity on all 
government property. Sami leaders continued to protest this change 
during the year.
    Some Sami state that they face discrimination in housing and 
employment on an individual basis, particularly in the southern 
mountain regions. In January the Government officially recognized the 
Sami people as a national minority in the context of its ratification 
of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities.
    Religious Minorities.--The Government continued to take proactive 
steps to combat anti-Semitism by increasing awareness of Nazi crimes 
and the Holocaust. Under its living history project, the Government 
provides educational material on the Holocaust to schoolchildren and 
families throughout the country. The media are also active in 
publicizing and condemning neo-Nazi activity.
    The Government declared January 27, the anniversary of Auschwitz's 
liberation, as a national day of remembrance. In January Sweden hosted 
a large, high-level international conference on Holocaust education. 
The Stockholm international forum on the Holocaust was attended by over 
40 countries and over 20 heads of state and government.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 11 percent of 
Sweden's population is foreign born, with the largest groups being from 
Finland, Iran, and the former Yugoslavia. ``Skinhead'' and neoNazi 
related violence increased during the year. Neo-Nazi activity in the 
past was rarely lethal or well organized and was directed mostly at 
immigrants. However, cases over the last couple of years are notable 
for the fact that they mainly targeted white, native, non-Jewish 
citizens. Crimes with racial overtones increased, but only 13 per cent 
of the racist crimes reported could be linked directly to neo-Nazis. 
Violent incidents with racial overtones have averaged about 100 per 
year in recent years, although no official statistics are kept.
    Three neo-Nazis were sentenced in January to life imprisonment for 
killing two police officers during the course of a May 1999 bank 
robbery. Two young neo-Nazis were sentenced to 11 years in prison in 
April for the murder of a trade union official in October 1999. A third 
defendant was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment for being an 
accessory.
    The public continued to urge a tougher stance against neo-Nazi 
groups. Several demonstrations against violence and racism were 
organized all over the country. The Government supports volunteer 
groups that oppose racism and xenophobia. As a result of the 1999 press 
campaign against 62 of the country's leading neo-Nazis, 5 were expelled 
from their unions, and 1 was fired from his job.
    Most estimates place the number of active neo-Nazis at fewer than 
2,000, and there appears to be little popular support for their 
activities or sentiments. Many citizens doubt whether such youth 
actually embrace neo-Nazi ideology, and the Government supports 
activities by volunteer groups working against racism. The Government 
investigates and prosecutes race-related crimes, although in many 
clashes between Swedish and immigrant youth gangs, authorities judge 
both sides to be at fault. Neo-Nazi groups operate legally, but serious 
discussion has been taking place about outlawing such groups. The 
Supreme Court ruled that it can be illegal to wear xenophobic symbols 
or racist paraphernalia. Rightwing groups, which have and exercise the 
right to demonstrate, are not permitted to display signs and banners 
with provocative symbols at their rallies.
    The Ombudsman for racial discrimination reported in January that 
complaints of ethnic discrimination in the labor market increased by 50 
percent in 1999 to 184 cases, compared with 122 cases in 1998. The 
increase could be linked to a new law, introduced in May 1999, which 
provides easier redress.
    A government committee presented a report that proposed a 
tightening of the laws against Nazi and racist crimes. The committee 
proposed that a new charge be introduced, ``seriously disorderly 
conduct,'' in order to be able to prosecute people for crimes that do 
not fall under ``agitation against ethnic groups.''
    In January the Government decided to ratify the Council of Europe's 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The decision 
implies that the Sami people, Swedish Finns, Tornedal-Finns, Roma, and 
Jews are recognized as national minorities. It means that the 
Government should support and protect minority languages such as Sami, 
Finnish, and Yiddish. A new law that gave effect to the conventions 
entered into force on April 1.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The work force is approximately 80 
percent unionized. Career military personnel, police officers, and 
civilian government officials, as well as private sector workers in 
both manufacturing and service industries, are organized. Most business 
owners belong to counterpart employer organizations.
    Unions and employer organizations operate independently of the 
Government and political parties (although the largest federation of 
unions has always been linked with the largest political party, the 
Social Democrats). The law protects the freedom of workers to associate 
and to strike, as well as for employers to organize and to conduct 
lockouts. Within limits protecting the public's immediate health and 
security, public employees also enjoy the right to strike. These laws 
are respected fully and are not challenged.
    Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. They 
are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation among others.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Management-
labor cooperation tends to be excellent and nonconfrontational. Labor 
and management, each represented by a national organization by sector 
(for example retailers and engineering industries), negotiate framework 
agreements every 2 to 3 years. More detailed company-level agreements 
put such framework agreements into effect at the local level. New 
framework agreements were signed during 1998, with most valid until 
2001. In contrast with the recent past, most agreements with labor 
unions now provide for a degree of individualized pay, including merit 
bonuses.
    The law provides both workers and employers with effective 
mechanisms for resolving complaints. The vast majority of complaints 
are resolved informally. The law protects union officials and members 
from dismissal or reprisals for official union activities. In some 
instances, unions even demand collective agreements regardless of the 
views and union status of employees. The Government is studying ways to 
strengthen the system of public mediation. During the year, a new 
government office, the Mediation Institute, began functioning. During 
1999 there were seven legal and two illegal strikes. No strikes or 
lockouts were reported during the year, apart from two small wildcat 
actions in October.
    Agreement was reached in 1997 between 12 employer associations and 
8 unions representing 800,000 manufacturing employees on steps to 
prevent strikes and lockouts, such as requiring serious wage 
negotiations to start 3 months before a collective agreement expires 
and appointing a mediator if an agreement has not been reached after 2 
months. As a result of this agreement, wages increased by approximately 
3 percent in 1998 and a further 3 to 3.5 percent in 1999. Similar 
agreements were signed in the municipal sector and in the retail-
commercial and service sectors.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce 
this ban. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively. However, women 
are trafficked to the country for the purposes of forced prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and the law 
permits full-time employment at that age under the supervision of local 
authorities. Employees under age 18 may work only during the daytime 
and under supervision. During summer and other vacation periods, 
children as young as 13 years may work part time or in ``light'' work 
with parental permission. Union representatives, police, and public 
prosecutors effectively enforce this restriction. The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which 
nonunion establishments usually observe as well. Even the lowest paid 
workers can maintain a decent standard of living for themselves and 
their families through substantial benefits (such as housing or day 
care support) provided by social welfare entitlement programs. However, 
cutbacks in these programs have made it harder for some workers to make 
ends meet, particularly low-paid single women with children.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours or less. Both the law and 
collective bargaining agreements regulate overtime and rest periods. 
For workers not covered by a labor agreement, the law stipulates a 
limit for overtime at 200 hours a year, although exceptions may be 
granted for key employees with union approval; some collective 
bargaining agreements put the limit at 150 hours. The law requires a 
rest period after 5 hours of work but does not stipulate a minimum 
duration; in practice it is usually 30 minutes. The law also provides 
all employees with a minimum of 5 weeks of paid annual leave; labor 
contracts often provide more, particularly for higher ranking private 
sector employees and older public service workers. Amendments to the 
labor law in 1997 made it easier for employers to hire workers for 
limited periods, as well as empowering local unions to agree to 
exceptions to last-in, first-out laws.
    Currently the focus of concern is on the psychosocial aspect of 
health and safety. Occupational health and safety rules are set by a 
government-appointed board and monitored by trained union stewards, 
safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government inspectors. These 
standards are very high, making workplaces both safe and healthy. 
Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop unsafe activity immediately 
and to call in an inspector. An individual also has the right to halt 
work in dangerous situations in order to consult a supervisor or safety 
representative.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit such 
trafficking, although traffickers are prosecuted under other statutes. 
Women are trafficked to the country for forced prostitution. In 1999 
the Government initiated six court cases against individuals involved 
in trafficking. The 11 cases prosecuted in 1998-99 resulted in 6 
convictions. All of the accused traffickers are Swedish residents with 
family and personal ties to Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East. The affected women in these cases, numbering 200 to 500 per year, 
came principally from Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Russia. 
The women typically are recruited in their own countries to come and 
work as cleaners, babysitters, or similar employment. Some reportedly 
were ``purchased'' from other traffickers and brought into Sweden. A 
1998 baseline report stated that considerable additional information 
available to the police suggests that the problem of trafficking is 
more widespread than the few prosecutions indicate.
    The Government and the EU provided funds to the Foundation of 
Women's Forums to combat trafficking in women in the Nordic and Baltic 
nations by creating interactive networks that link NGO's and research 
institutions that deal with prevention and the rehabilitation of 
trafficked women.
                               __________

                              SWITZERLAND

    Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure. 
The bicameral Parliament elects the seven members of the Federal 
Council, the highest executive body, whose presidency rotates annually. 
Because of the nation's linguistic and religious diversity, the Swiss 
political system emphasizes local and national political consensus and 
grants considerable autonomy to individual cantons. Voters approved a 
new Constitution in April 1999 that came into force on January 1, 2000. 
The judiciary is independent.
    The armed forces are a civilian-controlled militia based on 
universal military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no 
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential 
headquarters staff. Police duties are primarily a responsibility of the 
individual cantons, which have their own police forces that are kept 
under effective control. The National Police Authority has a 
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law enforcement. 
There were allegations of occasional abuses by police.
    Switzerland has a highly developed free enterprise, industrial, and 
service economy strongly dependent on international trade. The standard 
of living is very high.
    The Government generally respects human rights, and the law and 
judiciary provide effective means of dealing with individual instances 
of abuse. There continue to be allegations by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) of occasional police harassment directed against 
foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, including arbitrary detention. 
Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is continuing 
to take serious steps to address it. Trafficking in women for forced 
prostitution increased. Some laws still tend to discriminate against 
women. There continue to be reports of verbal abuse against foreigners 
by private citizens.
    The new Constitution approved by voters in 1999 provides for new 
protection for citizens' rights, including the principle of equal 
opportunity for the disabled and the right to strike.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Human rights groups strongly criticized police for the death of 27-
year-old Palestinian Khaled Abuzarifeh, who died at Zurich-Kloten 
airport while being forcibly deported in March 1999. In January Zurich 
cantonal authorities announced that forensic tests showed that 
Abuzarifeh died of suffocation. For deportation he was strapped into a 
wheelchair and adhesive tape was placed over his mouth to prevent him 
from shouting. According to airport police, such restraints were 
permitted because Abuzarifeh's physical resistance thwarted a first 
deportation attempt. Cantonal authorities claim no longer to be using 
adhesive tape to cover the mouth during deportations. In connection 
with Abuzarifeh's death, three police officers and a doctor were placed 
under formal investigation of charges of manslaughter by culpable 
negligence.
    Fulgence Niyonteze, the former mayor of the Rwandan town of 
Mushubati, sought asylum in Switzerland in 1994 and was arrested in 
1996. In May 1999, a military court convicted him of crimes committed 
during the 1994 genocide, including murder (taking part in the massacre 
of Tutsis), attempted murder, incitement to murder, and war crimes. He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Niyonteze was tried by a military 
tribunal because Swiss law stipulates that alleged war crimes and 
violations of the Geneva Conventions be tried by a military tribunal.
    On May 26, 2000, a military appeal court heard Niyonteze's appeal 
of his sentence of life imprisonment. The court found Niyonteze guilty 
of war crimes and violations of the Geneva Conventions but dropped the 
first charges of murder and incitement to murder and declared that a 
military tribunal had no authority to try such offenses when committed 
abroad by a civilian. The military appeal court sentenced Niyonteze to 
14 years in prison. Both the public prosecutor and Niyonteze filed 
appeals of the sentence.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution proscribes such practices, and there were 
no reports of violations. There were allegations by NGO's and some 
individuals of occasional police harassment of foreigners, particularly 
asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.).
    Brazilian national Luis Felipe Lourenco was arrested in 1998 in 
Geneva on charges of theft of a credit card. A prison guard allegedly 
beat him while he was in custody. Prison authorities reportedly waited 
2 hours before transporting Lourenco to the hospital, where he was 
diagnosed with a perforated lung and damage to his spinal cord. 
Lourenco is paralyzed in all his limbs as result of the injuries that 
he claims to have suffered while detained. The prison administration 
maintained that Lourenco's injuries were incurred when he threw himself 
against a door.
    On August 28, a Geneva magistrate decided not to indict the guard 
for negligence causing bodily harm, as Lourenco had demanded, on the 
grounds that there was insufficient evidence for criminal charges. The 
magistrate based the decision primarily on the results of a medical 
study of Lourenco's injuries but also took into consideration the 
guard's previously unblemished record. In their report, the three 
medical experts consulted by the magistrate stated that they failed to 
establish the truth with certainty, but that they deemed the guard's 
version of events, that Lourenco's injuries were self-inflicted, more 
plausible. In October Lourenco's lawyers filed an appeal of the 
magistrate's decision with the Genenva Criminal Court.
    No new developments occurred in the case of Clement Nwankwo, a 
Nigerian human rights monitor who accused the Geneva police of 
mistreatment during his arrest in 1997. Having exhausted domestic 
remedies unsuccessfully, Nwankwo is appealing his case to the European 
Court of Human Rights. NGO's believe that the Nwankwo case underscores 
overall problems with police treatment of foreigners, especially asylum 
seekers in Geneva and perhaps elsewhere. Their concern was echoed in a 
1997 report by the U.N. Committee Against Torture, which expressed 
concern about ``frequent allegations of ill-treatment'' inflicted in 
the course of arrests and police custody. The report also noted a lack 
of independent mechanisms in the cantons to provide certain legal 
protections such as the possibility, ``especially for foreigners,'' to 
contact their family or a lawyer in case of arrest and to be examined 
by an independent doctor on entering police custody, after each 
interrogation, and before being brought before an investigating 
magistrate or being released. Responding to these concerns, in 1998 a 
team of experts appointed by the Federal Office of Justice presented a 
preliminary study identifying possible characteristics of a future 
federal-level code of penal procedures that would replace the cantonal 
codes. The study recommends granting fundamental protections to 
detainees in police custody, including the introduction of a legal 
right to inform relatives or third parties of their arrest. However, 
the committee did not recommend a provision for access to a lawyer from 
the time of arrest.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, although 
some NGO's complain of prison overcrowding. The Government has taken 
measures to improve prison conditions and address overcrowding. The 
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The legal prohibitions 
on arbitrary arrest and detention generally are respected at all levels 
of government. The cantons are responsible for handling most criminal 
matters, and procedures vary somewhat from canton to canton. In general 
a suspect may not be held longer than 48 hours without a warrant of 
arrest issued by an investigative magistrate. However, asylum seekers 
and foreigners without valid documents may be held for up to 96 hours 
without an arrest warrant. Some NGO's alleged that the authorities 
arbitrarily detained asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A suspect may 
be denied legal counsel at the time of detention but has the right to 
choose and contact an attorney by the time an arrest warrant is issued. 
The State provides free legal assistance for indigents who may be 
jailed pending trial. Investigations are generally prompt, even if in 
some cases investigative detention may exceed the length of sentence. 
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the 
magistrate believes the person is dangerous or will not appear for 
trial. Any lengthy detention is subject to review by higher judicial 
authorities. During the year, about onethird of all prisoners were in 
pretrial detention, and the average length of such detention was 52 
days.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    All courts of first instance are local or cantonal courts. Citizens 
have the right to appeal, ultimately to the Federal Court.
    Minor cases are tried by a single judge, difficult cases by a panel 
of judges, and murder (or other serious cases) by a public jury. Trials 
usually are held expeditiously. The Constitution provides for public 
trials in which the defendant's rights are fully respected, including 
the right to challenge and to present witnesses or evidence.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Cantonal laws regulate police entry into private 
premises. These regulations differ widely from canton to canton, but 
all prohibit such practices without a warrant. All government 
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.
    Instances of forced sterilization of women resurfaced in public 
debate during the year. In 1981 the Swiss Academy for Medical Science 
decided that forced sterilization is not permissible if a person is 
incapable of understanding the consequences. This guideline is 
undergoing revision because of what the Academy calls a changed social 
understanding of the sexuality of the mentally disabled. Although no 
data indicates that more pregnancies occur when disabled women and men 
live together in homes, the Academy considers its guideline outdated. 
Draft legislation to revise the Academy's position is in parliamentary 
consultation. The draft would permit forced sterilization in cases when 
no other form of contraception is usable.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom. The authorities 
legally may restrict these freedoms for groups deemed to be a threat to 
the State, but no groups were restricted during the year. In addition 
an article of the Penal Code criminalizes racist or anti-Semitic 
expression, whether in public speech or in printed material.
    Parliamentary immunity protects parliamentarians from prosecution 
for acts that relate to their government position. However, following a 
1998 incident in which a national councilor, Rudolf Keller, made anti-
Semitic remarks and could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused 
to lift his immunity, the upper house of Parliament voted in 1999 for 
its partial abolishment. However, the National Council, the lower house 
of Parliament, rejected the legislative proposal twice, the second time 
in October, thus preserving the existing rules.
    The nationwide broadcast media are government funded but possess 
editorial autonomy. Private and foreign broadcast media operate freely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for complete 
freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice. There is no single state church, but all cantons support 
at least one of the three traditional denominations--Roman Catholic, 
Old Catholic, or Protestant--with public funds. In all cantons, an 
individual may choose not to contribute to church funding. However, in 
some cantons, private companies are unable to avoid payment of the 
church tax. A religious organization must register with the Government 
in order to receive tax-exempt status. There have been no reports of a 
religious group applying for the ``church taxation'' status that the 
traditional three denominations enjoy.
    Foreign missionaries must obtain a ``religious worker'' visa to 
work in the country. Requirements include proof that the foreigner 
would not displace a citizen from doing the job, that the foreigner 
would be financially supported by the host organization, and that the 
country of origin of religious workers also grants visas to Swiss 
religious workers.
    Religion is taught in public schools. The doctrine presented 
depends on which religion predominates in the particular canton. 
However, those of different faiths are free to attend classes for their 
own creeds during the designated class period. Atheists also may be 
excused from the classes. Parents also may send their children to 
private (parochial) schools or teach their children at home.
    In July 1999, the Business Review Commission of the National 
Assembly issued a report entitled ``Sects or Assimilative Movements in 
Switzerland,'' containing recommendations to the Government on the need 
for state involvement and the creation of national policy. The 
Commission recommended that the Government formulate a ``sect'' policy 
and coordinate the cooperation of researchers and informational and 
counseling committees. In June 2000, the Government rejected the 
Business Review Commission's recommendation to formulate a national 
sect policy. The Government stated that such a policy would conflict 
with the constitutional right to freedom of religious beliefs. The 
Government also opposed the creation of a National Information and 
Counseling Center pointing out that religious matters fall under the 
jurisdiction of the cantons.
    In 1998 the city of Basel passed a law banning aggressive tactics 
for handing out flyers. This action was prompted by complaints about 
Scientologists' methods. In June 1999, Scientology lost a bid in the 
country's highest court to overturn a municipal law that barred persons 
from being approached on the street by those using ``deceptive or 
dishonest methods.'' The Court ruled that a 1998 Basel law, prompted by 
efforts to curb Scientology, involved an intervention in religious 
freedom but did not infringe on it.
    The city of Buchs, St. Gallen, also passed a law modeled on the 
Basel law. However, it is still legal to proselytize in nonintrusive 
ways, such as public speaking on the street or by going door-to-door in 
neighborhoods.
    In Zurich in June 1995 Scientologists appealed a city decision that 
prohibited them from distributing flyers on public property. In 
September 1999, a higher court decided that the Scientologists' 
activities were commercial and not religious, and that the city should 
grant them and other commercial enterprises such as fast food 
restaurants more freedom to distribute flyers on a permit basis. 
Fearing a heavy administrative and enforcement workload, the city 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision rejected the 
appeal in June 2000, reinforcing the decision by the previous court 
that the Scientologists' activities were commercial in nature. The 
Supreme Court decision is expected to establish a nationwide legal 
guideline on the issue.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the Constitution and the law, 
citizens are free to travel in or outside the country, to emigrate, and 
to repatriate. Non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive sentences that 
include denial of reentry for a specific period following the 
completion of a prison sentence.
    Switzerland traditionally has been a haven for refugees, but public 
concern over the high number of asylum seekers entering the country in 
the wake of the Kosovo conflict generated domestic political pressure 
on the Government in 1999 to tighten its policy regarding their 
acceptance. The Government granted temporary asylum to approximately 
63,000 Kosovars seeking refuge from the armed conflict. Following the 
end of hostilities and the deployment of the international protection 
force, the Federal Council in August 1999 deemed a return of refugees 
to Kosovo justifiable and ended its policy of granting temporary asylum 
collectively.
    The Government initially offered material and financial aid to 
refugees leaving the country voluntarily. Some 32,000 Kosovars accepted 
this offer, which ended in May. Since June the Government proceeded 
with forced repatriations, expelling by the end of August some 4,300 
Kosovars--178 of them on special flights in police custody. In May the 
Federal Government granted a delay in departure dates in some 4,000 
cases that involved individual hardship (families with children in 
school, members of ethnic minorities, the elderly, the sick, single 
mothers, and pregnant women). In December approximately 1,500 Kosovars 
with expired temporary residence permits remained in the country. In 
coordination with the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, the Government agreed to 
slow the flow of repatriations in December and in January 2001.
    In August the umbrella organization of refugee aid NGO's criticized 
the Federal Government for some forced repatriations of Kosovo refugees 
that they termed excessively harsh and inhumane. Another human rights 
group, Eyes Open, criticized Zurich cantonal police practices in the 
compulsory repatriations of failed asylum seekers (see Section 1.c.). 
The group noted that the excessive use of hand and leg restraints in 
the return of Conglolese asylum seekers in August gave the impression 
that they were criminals.
    The 1999 asylum law provides for the collective admission of 
victims of violence and authorizes the Federal Council to grant them 
temporary protective status. It also simplifies and accelerates the 
process of applying for asylum. At the same time, the law is designed 
to curtail the misuse of asylum regulations and to enable the more 
rapid repatriation of uncooperative refugees or those who enter the 
country without identity papers. The Government may refuse to process 
the application of an asylum seeker who cannot credibly justify not 
having identity papers. In such a case the applicant must submit an 
appeal to reactivate consideration of the application within 24 hours. 
NGO's contend that such a short time span does not constitute an 
effective remedy and therefore violates the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
    Some human rights NGO's have charged the authorities with abuses in 
connection with the implementation of a 1995 amendment to the Law on 
Foreigners. The amendment is aimed at asylum seekers or foreigners who 
live illegally in the country and who are suspected of disturbing the 
public order or avoiding repatriation. In particular these groups have 
alleged instances of abuse by police, including arbitrary detention as 
well as denial of access to established asylum procedures at the 
country's two main airports. They also charge that police officers use 
the law to detain or harass asylum seekers who were not suspected of 
having disturbed public order. Under the law, police actions are 
subject to judicial oversight, and the Federal Court overturned many 
cases in which it believed that there was insufficient regard for the 
rights of asylum seekers and foreigners. While NGO's claim that the 
situation with regard to arbitrary detention has improved, they contend 
that the denial of access to asylum procedures at the two airports is 
increasing.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. The Federal 
Office for Refugees estimated that in August the total number of asylum 
applicants and temporary residents living in the country was 143,000. 
(This included recognized refugees, persons granted temporary asylum, 
as well as those who either have a first asylum application pending, 
appealed against a rejection, or were currently awaiting repatriation.) 
A year earlier, in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the figure stood at 
182,000. Some 11,000 new applications for asylum were submitted by the 
end of August, 72 percent less than during the same period last year. 
Refugees whose applications are rejected are allowed to stay 
temporarily, if their home country is experiencing war or insurrection. 
The Government denies having forced persons to return to countries 
where they have a well-founded fear of persecution and insists that 
each case is examined carefully. However, NGO's including the well-
known Eyes Open organization have accused the Government of sometimes 
expelling rejected asylum seekers even though conditions in their 
native country remain unfavorable.
    In December the independent commission of experts under Professor 
Bergier published a supplement to its 1999 report. The commission found 
that the Government systematically expelled Roma (Gypsies) or turned 
them away at the border during much of the 20th century, including 
during World War II. Thus Switzerland refused asylum to Roma who faced 
persecution in Nazi-occupied territory. The commission report does not 
indicate the number of rejected applicants. In response to the Bergier 
report, the Government expressed to the Roma communities its deep 
regret over its policy prior to, during, and after World War II. In its 
statement the Government mentioned the foundation of ``A Future for 
Swiss Itinerants,'' a fund that it established in 1997 and endowed with 
$600,000 (1 million Swiss francs) to improve living conditions for 
Roma.
    In the same statement, the Government referred to its earlier 
statement following issuance of the Bergier commission report in 
December 1999, in which the Government apologized for its asylum policy 
during World War II, when thousands of Jewish refugees were refused 
entry to the country (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully (at local, cantonal, and federal levels), and 
citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and 
fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition 
initiative and referendum procedures provide unusually intense popular 
involvement in the legislative process. In April 1999 voters approved a 
new Constitution.
    Women remain underrepresented in government and politics. They were 
disenfranchised until 1971 at the federal level, but since then their 
participation in politics has continued to expand. In 1999 Ruth 
Dreifuss served as the first female President. Women occupy 55 of the 
246 seats in the Parliament, 2 of 7 seats in the Federal Council 
(Cabinet), roughly one-fourth of the seats in the cantonal government 
executive bodies, and one-fifth of the seats in the communal 
executives. In 1999 the electorate overwhelmingly rejected a popular 
initiative to mandate equal gender representation in all federal 
institutions by a ratio of four to one.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A large number of international and domestic human rights groups 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are 
cooperative and generally responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The Government 
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively, although some laws 
tend to discriminate against women. The new Constitution includes 
provisions for equal rights for the disabled and for minorities.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to a 1997 
government-funded study on domestic violence, one-fifth of all women 
suffer at least once in their lifetimes from physical or sexual 
violence, and about 40 percent suffer from psychological or verbal 
abuse. Another 1998 study estimates that over 100,000 cases of domestic 
violence occur each year.
    The law prohibits wife beating and similar offenses. Spousal rape 
is a crime in the Penal Code. Victims of domestic violence can obtain 
help, counseling, and legal assistance from specialized agencies or 
from nearly a dozen hot lines sponsored privately or by local, 
cantonal, and national authorities. Police have specially trained units 
to deal with violence against women, and victims legally are entitled 
to be heard exclusively by female police officers and judges. A total 
of 732 women and 722 children took refuge in 14 women's shelters across 
the country during 1999. Those in charge of the shelters estimate that 
nearly as many were denied access due to a lack of space and limited 
funding.
    The difficulty in gathering information about the number of 
prosecuted, convicted, or punished spouse abusers stems in part from 
the fact that legal cases are handled by each canton and data are often 
not up-to-date. According to 1998 police criminal statistics, 314 men 
were investigated for rape offenses, and 84 were sentenced.
    The Federation of Women's Organizations and numerous other women's 
NGO's have heightened public awareness of the problem of violence 
against women. In 1998 two government-supported women's organizations 
that fight for equal gender rights jointly conducted the first national 
campaign against violence in relationships. This campaign received 
extensive media coverage.
    Prostitution is legal; however, working by foreigners without a 
valid permit is illegal. The Penal Code criminalizes sexual 
exploitation and trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women is 
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Although the new Constitution prohibits all types of 
discrimination, and a 1981 amendment provides for equal rights, equal 
treatment, and equivalent wages for men and women, some laws still tend 
to discriminate against women. A 1988 federal marriage law provides 
that in the event of a divorce, assets accumulated during the marriage 
will be divided equally. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
primary wage earner must be left with sufficient income to remain above 
the poverty level. Since the man is the primary wage earner in most 
marriages, when the income is too low to support both parties, it is 
usually the wife (and children) who are forced to survive on public 
assistance. Statistics from 1999 show that nearly 70 percent of women 
who did not work outside the home while married fell below the poverty 
line immediately after a divorce. Although mandated by a constitutional 
amendment in 1945, no federal law on maternity insurance exists.
    Immigrant women married to a Swiss husband (or immigrants with 
long-term residence permits), who have lived in Switzerland for less 
than 3 to 5 years from date of marriage (length depends on country of 
origin, education, and income level), cannot divorce their husbands 
without the risk of having to leave the country. Their purpose for 
being in Switzerland officially is registered as ``stay with spouse'' 
until they receive their own long-term residency permits, and they are 
in danger of losing permission to remain if they divorce. NGO's argue 
that this prevents women with problems from being able to seek help--or 
leave their husbands--without serious consequences.
    A 1996 law includes a general prohibition on gender-based 
discrimination and incorporates the principle of ``equal wages for 
equal work.'' The law also includes provisions aimed at eliminating 
sexual harassment and facilitating access to legal remedies for those 
who claim discrimination or harassment.
    The Federal Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women and 
the Federal Commission on Women work to eliminate all forms of direct 
and indirect discrimination. In 1999 a federal level interdepartmental 
working group issued an action plan that outlined strategic goals and 
measures to improve the situation of women. These include measures in 
the areas of education, health, violence against women, the workplace, 
human rights, the media, and the environment. For example, the plan 
calls for financial support for child care facilities at colleges and 
universities to enable a larger number of women to obtain a higher 
education; continued education and support for specialists in the area 
of addiction prevention for women; and ongoing analysis and data 
collection on the issue of wage differences between men and women. The 
working group that issued the plan in 1999 is scheduled to reconvene in 
January 2001 to draft a report to Parliament due in 2002 on federal 
implementation of the action plan.
    On average women earn 20 to 30 percent less than men. A June study 
found that discriminatory behavior by employers accounts for 60 percent 
of the overall wage gap between men and women. Women also are promoted 
less often than men. Individual cases of denial of equal pay for equal 
work are subject to the 1996 law. In 1998, the most recent year for 
which data are available, 26.3 percent of women between the ages of 15 
and 61 were not in the work force; of those in the work force 50.5 
percent worked full time. Women hold 83 percent of all part-time jobs.
    The issue of pre-1970's forced sterilization of some women 
resurfaced in the media this year, when the Swiss Academy for Medical 
Science decided to review its guidelines for the practice (see Section 
1.f.).
    The law prohibits women from working during the 8 weeks after the 
birth of a child. Further measures also protect pregnant and breast-
feeding women. For example, pregnant women are not allowed to work 
night shifts during the 8 weeks prior to giving birth. The law does not 
provide for compensation; however, 72 percent of working women have 
negotiated maternity benefits with their employers. In June 1999 voters 
rejected a government proposal in a referendum for 14 weeks of paid 
maternity leave at 80 percent pay for working women. The plan would 
also have given low-income new mothers a one time premium. (The 
Parliament had passed draft legislation in December 1998 that provided 
for the maternity benefits mandated by the Constitution in 1945.) It 
was the third time that a maternity benefits scheme had been rejected 
in a popular referendum in 15 years. Hundreds demonstrated to protest 
the vote, and a new proposal appeared in the National Council in July 
2000. In alignment with the European Union, it again called for 14 
weeks of paid maternity leave and asked employers for full pay during 
the first 8 weeks as is consistent with the law prohibiting women from 
working in the first 8 weeks after birth. The new proposal leaves out 
the subsidy for nonworking mothers. The Council of States, the upper 
house of Parliament, followed the lead of the National Council in 
December, and obliged the Federal Government to work out a new 
maternity benefits scheme along the lines of the July 2000 proposal. 
Meantime, women in Geneva Canton will have paid maternity leave 
beginning in July 2001; on December 14 the cantonal parliament passed 
legislation providing for a 16-week leave following delivery at 80 
percent of salary for all women who previously worked in the canton for 
a minimum of 3 months. However, the law is still subject to federal 
approval.
    Children.--Despite the fact that the Government has no special 
program for children and that there is no special governmental office 
for children's matters, the Government demonstrates its strong 
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a well-funded 
public education system and need-based subsidies of health insurance. 
Schooling is free and compulsory for 9 years, from age 6 or 7 through 
age 16 or 17, depending on the canton. Some cantons offer a 10th school 
year. The Government subsidizes the health insurance premiums of low-
income families.
    The federal and cantonal governments, as well as about 80 NGO's 
that defend children's rights, have devoted considerable attention in 
recent years to child abuse, especially sexual abuse. For convicted 
perpetrators of the latter, the law provides for imprisonment of up to 
15 years. In 1997 amendments to the Federal Penal Code came into effect 
that provide for an increase in the statute of limitations in cases of 
child abuse from 5 to 10 years. In severe cases of sexual abuse, the 
statute is to begin to take effect only when the victim turns 18. There 
is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    To combat child pornography on the Internet, the Federal Office for 
Police provides an Internet monitoring service on its World Wide Web 
page. Individuals who find pornographic material involving children are 
asked to contact the Federal Office via e-mail. According to the Penal 
Code, the production, possession, distribution, or showing of hard 
pornography are punishable with fines or prison sentences. Any 
pornography involving children falls into this category. In March 1999 
an NGO published the first compilation of cases of child pornography 
and prostitution in the country. The study cited 60 cases. Most of the 
victims were girls between 13 and 17 years of age.
    With respect to child abuse abroad, the law provides for 
prosecution only if the act is considered a crime in the country in 
which it took place. Experts have proposed making such acts punishable 
in Switzerland regardless of where the crime took place, but there was 
no legislative action on the problem during the year.
    Parliament's 1997 ratification of the U.N. Convention on Children's 
Rights included five reservations, the most important of which 
concerned children of migrant seasonal workers who are not permitted 
automatically to join their parents. Children of foreigners working as 
migrant laborers are only permitted to visit on tourist visas for a 
period of 3 months at a time. After 3 months, they must return to their 
homeland for 1 month. The Government reexamined the necessity for these 
reservations and included its conclusions in its first report to the 
Committee on Children's Rights in November. All five reservations still 
apply.
    In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 forbidding the 
worst forms of child labor (including child prostitution, forced labor, 
and using children for illegal activities such as drug dealing).
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination 
directed at disabled persons in employment, education, and the 
provision of other state services. Advocates for the disabled have 
called for new measures to ensure greater protection for their rights, 
including easier access to buildings and public transportation. 
However, the Government has not mandated that buildings or 
transportation facilities be made accessible. Article 8 of the new 
Constitution (in effect as of January 1) provides for equal 
opportunities for the disabled. However, it does not include provision 
for making public buildings and facilities accessible. The upper house 
of Parliament discussed this addition in June and decided that the 
requirements for equal treatment as contained in the Constitution were 
sufficient to meet the demands of the disabled.
    A 1995 law exempts disabled men from the tax imposed on those who 
have not fulfilled their military duty.
    Religious Minorities.--In response to the issue of Holocaust era 
assets, the Government and private sector initiated a series of 
measures designed to shed light on the past, provide assistance to 
Holocaust victims, and address claims to dormant accounts in Swiss 
banks. The independent commission of experts under Professor Jean-
Francois Bergier, charged with examining the country's wartime history 
and role as a financial center, issued its report in December 1999 and 
found that there were more than 24,000 documented rejections of asylum 
seekers during the World War II period, including a large number of 
Jewish refugees who were refused asylum even after authorities were 
aware of the dangers that they faced from the Nazis.
    The Federal Council issued a statement that repeated its previous 
apology for policy errors made during World War II and stated that its 
asylum policy ``was marred by errors, omissions, and compromises.'' 
Also in December 1999, the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons 
under Paul Volcker released its report on ``dormant accounts of victims 
of Nazi persecution in Swiss banks.'' The report represents the 
culmination of a 3-year investigation into the fate of victims' 
accounts. The Volcker report recommended that the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission publish about 26,000 account holders' names, based on their 
probable or possible identity as Holocaust victims. The report also 
made recommendations on the means of resolving claims by victims of 
Nazi persecution or their heirs and the appropriate treatment of 
dormant accounts in the future.
    The Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims received 
approximately $190 million (323 million Swiss francs) in contributions 
from the private sector and the Swiss National Bank. By September the 
fund had allocated but not yet fully paid out an initial contribution 
to holocaust survivors in Israel, Australia, Germany, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe. In total some 310,000 persons, 88 percent of them 
Jewish, are expected to benefit from the fund. On March 31, 1999, the 
Government's World War II task force became the Switzerland-World War 
II Office, which remains engaged in supporting progress on resolving 
Holocaust assets issues. A $1.25 billion (2.12 billion Swiss francs) 
settlement of the class action lawsuit filed in the United States 
district court in Brooklyn, New York, against Swiss banks was announced 
in August 1998, completed in January 1999, and formally approved by the 
New York judge on July 26, 2000.
    A provisional plan of allocation and distribution was announced on 
September 11. The plan earmarks up to $800 million (1.36 billion Swiss 
francs) to cover outstanding claims against Swiss banks; the remaining 
sum is to be paid out to World War II forced laborers as well as 
refugees who were denied entry to or were harmed while detained in 
Switzerland. To be included in the settlement and thus avoid further 
class action suits, 37 Swiss industrial firms notified the New York 
court that their subsidiaries employed forced labor during World War 
II.
    The Swiss National Bank released a report in 1999 that stated that 
its officials ignored warnings that they were buying looted Nazi gold. 
The bank has contributed approximately $70 million (110 million Swiss 
francs) to the Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims.
    Two Swiss life insurers, both explicitly excluded from the $1.25 
billion settlement, participate in the ongoing efforts by the 
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims to establish 
a formula and just sum for compensating Holocaust victims or their 
families for policies they held. Both companies agreed to resolve 
outstanding claims of unpaid insurance policies submitted within a 
period of 2 years, starting in February and ending in 2002. The Federal 
Council is seeking legislation to establish a solidarity fund, which 
would assist victims of human rights violations, including those who 
suffered in the Holocaust. In May the Federal Council endorsed and 
returned to Parliament revised legislation concerning a Swiss 
Solidarity Foundation. Under the modified act, the foundation would 
dispose of the proceeds from the management of 500 tons of central bank 
gold reserves recently declared ``excess.'' The Solidarity Foundation 
act has yet to be approved by Parliament. The alternative use of the 
extra gold reserves will be subject to a mandatory referendum.
    In the context of the discussions over Nazi gold and Holocaust era 
assets, anti-Semitic slurs reportedly still remain a problem. 
Government officials, including the President, have spoken frequently 
and publicly against anti-Semitism. From 1995 when an antiracism law 
was enacted until the end of 1998, some 300 court cases were brought 
for violations of the law. Roughly half of them resulted in convictions 
by a court of first instance, but in many cases appeals are pending.
    According to the Government, 104 cases of violation of the Anti-
Racism Act were brought before the courts between 1995 (when the law 
was enacted) and the end of 1999. A total of 45 resulted in convictions 
(for anti-Semitism, revisionism, and racist oral or written slurs). 
Sentences for convictions included a 15-month prison sentence and a 
fine of $12,000 (20,000 Swiss francs) for the Holocaust denier Jurgen 
Graf. The human rights group Eyes Open was among the NGO's that 
expressed concern over the continued existence of anti-Semitic 
sentiment.
    In November 1998, the Federal Commission against Racism released a 
report on anti-Semitism in the country, which expressed concern that 
the recent controversy over the country's role during World War II had 
to some extent opened the door to expressions of latent anti-Semitism. 
At the same time, the Commission described the emergence of strong 
public opposition to anti-Semitism and credited the Federal Council 
with taking a ``decisive stand'' against anti-Semitism. The Commission 
also proposed various public and private measures to combat anti-
Semitism and encourage greater tolerance and understanding. In its 
initial response to the report, the Federal Council pledged to 
facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations.
    In December 1999, the Federal Council announced the creation of a 
Center for Tolerance in Bern. Planning under the chairmanship of a 
former parliamentarian is continuing, and financing will come from the 
public and private sectors. The center plans to produce exhibits 
designed to teach historical lessons, offer academic research 
opportunities, and host international symposia. A survey published in 
March showed that 16 percent of Swiss hold anti-Semitic notions. Among 
supporters of the rightwing Swiss People's Party the figure was 33 
percent. The study also found that the recent controversy over Swiss 
World War II behavior affected survey results, particularly among the 
older generation. Conversely, 92 percent of young persons polled 
harbored no anti-Semitic sentiments. The survey reflected 
inconsistencies. During the recent period of controversy over the Swiss 
World War II record, public opinion actually strengthened in support of 
antiracism laws. The case of a national councilor who made anti-Semitic 
remarks, but could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused to lift 
his immunity, led to an abortive attempt to restrict parliamentary 
immunity (see Section 2.a.).
    The Federal Court decided on June 7 to uphold a cantonal decision 
granting Scientologists the right to distribute leaflets in public 
areas. However, the court also affirmed that Scientology leaflets serve 
a ``commercial enterprise'' and that distributors must obtain a permit 
to use public areas for their dissemination. The court ruled that 
Scientology does not act as a religious organization in such cases. 
Scientologists previously distributed flyers without the necessary 
permits, protected by the Religious Freedom Act. Several cantons are 
likely to use the precedence of the Federal Court's decision to 
regulate the distribution of leaflets (see Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to NGO statistics, 
there were 56 reported incidents directed against foreigners or 
minorities in the first 6 months of the year, compared with 62 for the 
first half of 1999. These figures include instances of verbal and 
written ``attacks,'' which are much more common than physical assaults. 
Investigations of these attacks are conducted effectively and lead, in 
most cases, to the arrest of the persons responsible. Persons convicted 
of racist crimes commonly are sentenced to from 3 days' to 3 years' 
imprisonment with a fine of up to approximately $27,000 (40,000 Swiss 
francs).
    On March 12 the voters of Emmen, a small township in Canton Lucern, 
voted on local foreign residents' applications for citizenship. The 
voters rejected 48 applicants, almost all exclusively from southeast 
Europe, while approving 8 Italians' citizenship bids. Fearing the vote 
was a violation of the European Human Rights Convention, the Swiss 
Federal Council determined to look into the practice. The Emmen vote 
caused a national uproar and prompted several motions in Parliament. In 
response the Federal Council referred the issue to a working group set 
up in 1999, which examines the Government's naturalization practice.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners, 
have the freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice, 
and to select their own representatives. The Government does not hamper 
the exercise of these rights. About one-quarter of the work force is 
unionized.
    The right to strike is recognized legally and exercised freely, but 
a unique labor peace under an informal agreement between unions and 
employers--in existence since the 1930's--has meant fewer than 10 
strikes per year since 1975. The new Constitution provides specific 
protection for the right to strike. In a Basel laundry workers went on 
an almost unprecedented 5-day strike after management of the former 
state enterprise asked some workers to accept a ``industry standard'' 
wage of about $1,700 monthly (3,000 Swiss francs). The strike ended on 
December 4 after a tense scuffle between police and pickets and 
protracted negotiations between the two sides and Basel city officials. 
Management agreed to small wage gains and a cost-of-living adjustment 
mechanism that will increase wages gradually to about $2,000 (3,500 
Swiss francs). In the absence of a minimum wage law, labor leaders see 
the worker gains in this first major strike in a decade as a signal for 
revived recruiting and broader public opinion support for the labor 
movement's minimum wage campaign.
    A 1927 law bans public servants, as well as workers in state-owned 
bodies such as the postal service, from striking. However, in November 
voters approved a referendum on a new law concerning employees of the 
Federal Government that generally recognizes the right to strike. Only 
for reasons of national security, safeguarding national foreign policy 
interests, or providing the population with essential goods and 
services may the Government curtail or suspend the right to strike for 
certain categories of government employees. The new law will enter into 
force in steps for different categories of employees between January 
2001 and 2002.
    Unions are independent of the Government and political parties, and 
laws prohibit retribution against strikers or their leaders.
    Unions can associate freely with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--By law workers 
have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the law 
protects them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The Government 
fully respects these provisions. Periodic negotiations between employer 
and worker organizations determine wages and settle other labor issues 
at the local, or infrequently, at the industry sector level. Nonunion 
firms generally adopt the terms and conditions fixed in the unions' 
collective bargaining.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there is no 
specific constitutional or statutory ban on forced or compulsory labor 
in general, and on child labor in particular, such practices generally 
are not known to occur; however, trafficking in women for forced 
prostitution increased (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment of children is 15 
years, and children are in school until this age. Children over 13 
years of age may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 hours 
per week during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. The employment 
of youths between the ages of 15 and 20 is regulated strictly; they 
cannot work at night, on Sundays, or in hazardous or dangerous 
conditions. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs effectively 
enforces the law on working conditions.
    The Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded 
labor by children, although such prohibitions are included implicitly 
in the Labor Act. Such forms of labor are not believed to occur (see 
Section 6.c.). In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 
forbidding the worst forms of child labor (including child 
prostitution, forced labor, and using children for illegal activities 
such as drug dealing).
    Government officials inspect companies that employ children after 
having received complaints. Every year a few employers are fined or 
receive conditional imprisonment for violations of the law.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. The lowest wages fixed in collective bargaining are generally 
adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. However, the Swiss Association of Trade Unions in a 1999 study 
found that 60,000 full-time workers (or 3.4 percent) fall below the 
poverty line, defined as earning less than approximately $15,500 
(22,900 Swiss francs), which is half of the median wage.
    The 1964 Labor Act established a maximum 45-hour workweek for blue- 
and white-collar workers in industry, services, and retail trades, and 
a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law prescribes a rest 
period of 35 consecutive hours plus an additional half day per week. 
New labor legislation, which came into force on August 1, limits annual 
overtime to 170 hours for those working 45 hours per week and to 140 
hours for those working 50 hours per week.
    The law protects legal and illegal foreign workers. However, 
illegal foreign workers are not covered by mandatory health insurance 
in case of illness or accident. Wage discrimination against foreign 
workers is not permitted.
    The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive 
regulations to protect worker health and safety. There have been no 
reports of lapses in the enforcement of these regulations, but the 
degree to which enforcement is effective is unclear. A 1998 law is 
designed to increase flexibility in the workplace and remove 
restrictions on women working at night. A worker may leave a dangerous 
assignment without penalty.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code criminalizes sexual 
exploitation and trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons can 
result in prison sentence of up to 5 years; coercing someone into 
prostitution or restricting a prostitute's personal freedom can carry a 
sentence of up to 10 years in prison. According to a 1999 official 
report, the police are concerned about the growing number of foreign 
women subject to abuse in sex trafficking rings. In the past, victims 
came from Thailand, parts of Africa, or South America; recently an 
increasing number of women come from Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and 
other states of the former Soviet Union. Many victims are forced to 
work in salons or clubs to pay for the cost of their travel and forged 
documents and find themselves in a state of dependency. Traffickers 
sometimes seize victims' passports. Generally the victims do not read, 
write, or speak the country's languages, and are afraid to seek help 
from the authorities.
    Since 1905 the Government has had an office to combat the 
trafficking of girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. 
Over the years this office has evolved to include all forms of 
trafficking in persons. The office has existed in its present form 
since 1998 as part of the criminal intelligence unit of the Federal 
Department of Police. In 1998 the Government institutionalized an 
exchange of information on trafficking in persons with NGO's. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs helps fund programs intended to combat 
trafficking from Eastern Europe.
    Because the investigation, enforcement, and prosecution of 
individual trafficking and related cases is the responsibility of the 
cantonal police authorities, the federal human trafficking office also 
supports the cantonal prosecution authorities with information 
concerning trafficking abroad. In major cases the federal government 
establishes contacts with foreign government authorities.
    In March Neuchatel cantonal police announced the arrests of four 
persons, including two African women married to Swiss nationals, on 
trafficking-related charges. The arrests followed an investigation 
initiated when the Swiss consulate in Yaounde became suspicious about 
unusually large numbers of Cameroonian women travelling to Switzerland. 
The consulate informed the federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which 
alerted cantonal police authorities. After an investigation spanning 
several months, the police were able to uncover the organization and 
obtain valuable information on how the ring operated.
    Shortly after the arrests, a Zurich-based NGO submitted a petition 
to the Cabinet and both houses of Parliament that called urgently for 
the establishment of a protection program for trafficking victims. The 
petition was signed by 7,500 individuals, organizations, and 
parliamentarians. Their program would end the automatic expulsion of 
women arrested for illegal prostitution and legalize their stay for the 
duration of investigations and trials. Currently, most women are 
expelled within 96 hours. It would also provide shelter, protection 
from intimidation, counseling centers, and sensitivity training for 
police. The petition also calls for a change in the legal definition of 
trafficking to include not only women forced into prostitution but also 
women whose migration to Switzerland for marriage or domestic work puts 
them in a state of dependency. Parallel to the submission of the 
petition, a parliamentary initiative was launched calling for similar 
measures. The Federal Council (Cabinet) instructed an interdepartmental 
working group to assess the situation and to determine whether a 
revision of the relevant legal articles would be a useful step.
    In order to confront modern forms of trafficking in women, 
especially via the Internet, the federal police have increased the 
number of their agents. In 1997 4 persons were convicted of trafficking 
in women and 13 were convicted of sexual exploitation; and in 1997-98 
police uncovered a large Thai trafficking organization. Its leader was 
arrested, tried, and convicted. He later committed suicide in prison.
    Prostitution is legal; however, it is illegal for foreigners to 
work without a valid work permit. Official police figures estimate that 
approximately 7,050 women work as prostitutes, both legally and 
illegally, mostly in the major Swiss cantons. In March 1999 the 
Government introduced new visa requirements for applicants from four 
South American countries--Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The 
Office for Equality between Men and Women has a program to educate visa 
applicants in their native countries about the methods used by 
traffickers and the dangers of falling victim to them.
                               __________

                               TAJIKISTAN

    Tajikistan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that has established 
some nominally democratic institutions. President Emomali Rahmonov and 
an inner circle of fellow natives of the Kulyab region continued to 
dominate the Government; however, Rahmonov's narrow base of support 
limited his control of the entire territory of the country. Rahmonov 
won reelection in a November 1999 election that was flawed seriously 
and was neither free nor fair. As a result of 1997 peace accords that 
ended the civil war, some former opposition figures continue to hold 
seats in the Government. Rahmonov's supporters overwhelmingly won 
February parliamentary elections that were neither free nor fair, but 
were notable for the fact that several opposition parties were allowed 
to participate, and that one opposition party won two seats in 
Parliament. Although the Constitution was adopted in 1994 and amended 
in September 1999, political decisionmaking normally takes the form of 
power plays among the various factions, formerly aligned with the other 
side during the civil war, that now make up the Government. The legacy 
of civil war continued to affect the Government, which still faced the 
problems of demobilizing and reintegrating former opposition troops and 
maintaining law and order while rival armed factions competed for 
power. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, 
it is not independent in practice.
    The Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share 
responsibility for internal security, although the Government actually 
relies on a handful of commanders who use their forces almost as 
private armies. Some regions of the country remained effectively 
outside the Government's control, and government control in other areas 
existed only by day, or at the sufferance of local former opposition 
commanders. The soldiers of some of these commanders are involved in 
crime and corruption. The Russian Army's 201st Motorized Rifle 
Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained in the country and 
continued to have a major influence on political developments; however, 
the division began to transition into a new status on a permanent 
military base after the peacekeeping mandate ended in September. Some 
members of the government security forces and government-aligned 
militias committed serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is a state-controlled system making a difficult 
transition to a market-based one. Most of the work force is engaged in 
agriculture, part of which remains collectivized. Government revenue 
depends highly on state-controlled cotton production. The small 
industrial sector is dominated by aluminum production (another critical 
source of government revenue), although most Soviet-era factories 
operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale privatization is 
over 80 percent complete, but the level of medium to large scale 
privatization is much lower (approximately 16 percent) with the heavy 
industry, wholesale trade, and transport sectors remaining largely 
under state control. Many, but not all, wages and pensions are paid. 
The country is poor, with a per capita gross national product of 
approximately $290, according to World Bank data. The failure of the 
Soviet economic system has been accompanied by a rise in narcotics 
trafficking and other forms of corruption. This development has led to 
clear disparities of income between the vast majority of the population 
and a small number of former progovernment and opposition warlords, who 
control many of the legal and most of the criminal sectors of the 
economy.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor and the 
Government continued to commit serious abuses. The February 
parliamentary elections represented an improvement in the citizens' 
right to change their Government; however, this right remains 
restricted. Some members of the security forces committed extrajudicial 
killings. There were a number of disappearances. Security forces 
frequently tortured, beat, and abused detainees. These forces also were 
responsible for threats, extortion, looting, and abuse of civilians. 
Certain battalions of nominally government forces operated quasi-
independently under their leaders. Impunity remains a problem, and the 
Government prosecuted few of the persons who committed these abuses. 
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The Government 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention and also arrested 
persons for political reasons. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a 
problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often long 
delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to political and 
paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringed on citizens' right to 
privacy.
    The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of speech and 
the press and essentially controls the electronic media. The Government 
severely restricted opposition access to state-run radio and 
television; however, an opposition newspaper begun in 1998 continued to 
publish, and a number of small television stations were operated by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and 
association by exercising strict control over political organizations; 
it banned three opposition parties and prevented another from being 
registered. A number of parliamentary candidates were prevented from 
registering for the elections. There are some restrictions on freedom 
of religion and on freedom of movement. The Government still has not 
established a human rights ombudsman position, despite a 1996 pledge to 
do so. Violence and against women is a problem, as is discrimination of 
the disabled and religious and ethnic minorities. Child labor is a 
problem. There were some instances of forced labor, including children. 
Trafficking in women is a problem.
    Some former opposition troops committed serious abuses, including 
killings and abductions. There were credible reports that paramilitary 
units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian population.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Some members of the 
security forces committed extrajudicial killings; however, it was 
difficult to estimate the total number of such killings or to attribute 
responsibility in many cases. Some killings were committed by competing 
government factions for both political and economic motives.
    Harsh prison conditions and lack of food and adequate medical 
treatment resulted in a significant number of deaths of prisoners while 
in custody (see Section 1.c.). There were reports that a member of the 
banned Hizb ut-Tahrir movement died in police custody after being 
arrested (see section 2.c.).
    A number of local officials, businessmen, and professional figures 
were killed during the year, for a variety of political, economic, and 
ethnic reasons. A former Deputy Minister of Security and parliamentary 
candidate, Shamsullo Tobirov, was killed in an attack apparently aimed 
at the mayor of Dushanbe in February. Sirojiddin ``Sergei'' Davlatov, 
chairman of the Gharm district and a former deputy opposition field 
commander, was killed in May. The chairman of the State Radio and 
Television Committee, Saif Rahimov (Rahimzoda) also was killed in May. 
A correspondent for the Khovar state information agency, Aleksandr 
Olpatov, was killed in September. In addition, a number of high-ranking 
figures associated with various competing paramilitary factions were 
killed. For example, the brother of Mullo Abdullo, a former opposition 
field commander in the Karategin Valley, reportedly was killed in 
retaliation for the killing of Davlatov. In most cases, suspects were 
not identified. The competence of the investigators and their 
independence from official interference was questioned. A number of 
apparent murders essentially were concealed, with official news noting 
only that the individual died.
    Both the Government and the opposition used landmines during the 
civil war. Some unmarked mine fields in the Karetegin Valley probably 
killed innocent civilians. According to press reports, a total of 21 
persons were killed during the year by landmines laid along the 
northern segment of the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border, which winds 
throughout populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most 
places. The Government of Uzbekistan apparently laid the mines as part 
of a counterinsurgency campaign. Some killings were committed by former 
opposition forces and others by independent warlords answering to 
neither the Government nor the former opposition forces. The Government 
also has laid numerous minefields along the border with Afghanistan.
    A landmine brought on board a public bus on the outskirts of 
Dushanbe killed at least five passengers in February; the person who 
carried the mine aboard the bus was among those killed. It was not 
clear whether the mine detonated inside the bus by plan or by accident, 
and there were no developments in identifying the individual or group 
responsible for the incident.
    Terrorists bombed a Protestant church in Dushanbe in October, 
killing seven persons and injuring many more (see Section 1.c. and 5).
    There were reports of instances where Tajik border guards were 
killed on the Afghanistan border. It is unclear whether these cases 
were politically motivated or the result of narcotics trafficking.
    There were no developments in the 1999 murder case of British 
national Abdullah Mugharebi, a resident of Dushanbe and leader of 
Tajikistan's Baha'i community, who was widely believed to have been 
killed by Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalists. There were no 
developments in the 1997 killings of several Russian servicemen, or in 
the 1996 murder of the mufti of Tajikistan.
    There were no developments in the 1999 killings of Tolib Bobev, an 
official of the Popular Unity Party, or Jumakhona Khotami, Ministry of 
Interior press center chief.
    b. Disappearance.--There were a number of disappearances during the 
year; in at least one case security forces apparently were responsible. 
The driver and bodyguard of First Deputy Prime Minster Akbar 
Turajonzoda disappeared briefly in October and appeared in police 
custody. The taking of hostages for revenge or for bargaining purposes 
remained a common occurrence.
    Political pressures, the central Government's lack of control over 
violently competitive factions within and outside the Government, and a 
lack of professional resources hamper police efforts to investigate 
disappearances.
    The sister of Deputy Prime Minister Nigina Sharapovna disappeared 
in February; she later reappeared after ransom apparently was paid. The 
ethnic Uzbek mayor of a town in Khatlon District disappeared in 
September under mysterious circumstances.
    There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Zafar 
Rahmonov, the opposition cochairman of the Joint Commission on Cease-
fire Observation.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the Government uses it 
in practice. Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of 
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody and use systematic 
beatings to extort confessions. In contrast to the previous year, 
however, there were no public allegations that security forces 
mistreated or beat members of opposition parties or their relatives. 
Impunity remains a serious problem, and the Government has prosecuted 
few of the persons who committed these abuses.
    The Government has acknowledged that the security forces were 
corrupted by criminal elements, and that most citizens chose to keep 
silent in the face of official mistreatment rather than risk 
retaliation by the police. In the southern regions of the country, many 
border guards are involved in the drug trade, and the local population 
has made numerous complaints of harassment and human rights abuses 
committed by them.
    Members of Tajikistan's Afghan refugee population, sometimes 
regardless of social status or official connections, are singled out 
for mistreatment by law enforcement authorities. For example, a 
prominent Afghan refugee (a former official of the overthrown Communist 
regime in Afghanistan) credibly claimed that Ministry of Interior 
officers apprehended and beat him, apparently in retaliation for 
previous claims of abuse that were reported publicly abroad (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Journalists regularly risked beatings at the hand of law 
enforcement authorities (or at least armed individuals dressed as and 
claiming to be law enforcement authorities) (see Section 2.a.). For 
example, the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations reported that 
militiamen seized a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat 
in Dushanbe in August, forced him into a car, beat him en route to a 
militia station, where they beat him so badly that he suffered a 
concussion and hearing loss in one ear.
    There were a number of shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks 
that resulted in nonlethal injuries and serious property damage. The 
February bombing of a Dushanbe city bus left scores of passengers 
injured (see Section 1.a.). Also in February, the mayor of Dushanbe, 
Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, along with his driver and bodyguard, was 
injured seriously in a failed attempt on his life by terrorists; 
another passenger in the mayor's official vehicle was killed (see 
Section 1.a.). On February 25, 2 days before parliamentary elections, a 
bomb explosion in a parliamentary candidate's office in the town of 
Hissar caused three injuries. Following these events, the central 
Government cracked down on rogue paramilitary groups. This brought a 
greater sense of security to the capital city of Dushanbe. However, 
despite this effort, a Protestant church in Dushanbe was bombed in 
October, leaving approximately 70 persons injured, almost half of them 
seriously (see Section 1.a and 2.c.). The official vehicle of 
Democratic Party leader and presidential cabinet member Mahmadruzi 
Iskandarov was destroyed by a bomb in October; there were no injuries. 
An official vehicle of the European Commission Humanitarian Office was 
destroyed by a bomb in July; there were no injuries.
    According to credible counternarcotics law enforcement authorities 
in the central Government, Tajik and Afghan criminal groups engaged in 
narcotics smuggling across the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border 
threatened, harassed, and committed abuses against the border area 
populations.
    Prison conditions remain harsh and lifethreatening. They fail to 
meet minimum international standards. Prisons generally are 
overcrowded, unsanitary, and disease-ridden, producing a serious health 
threat. This problem reflects in part the self-funded status of most 
prisons, under which before 1992 prisoners grew much of their own food 
or made goods for sale. The general collapse of governmental programs 
and of the economy also meant the virtual disappearance of these 
programs. Some food production has resumed, but is still inadequate. 
Some prisoners die of hunger. Family members are allowed access to 
prisoners only after a guilty verdict, in accordance with the law.
    There was no official action against government forces responsible 
for the deaths of 26 prisoners when they retook Khojand prison in 1997 
after a prison revolt. Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of a 
political opponent of the President, was arrested in May 1997 on 
narcotics charges that appear fabricated and was sentenced to death in 
1998. Despite appeals for clemency based on a diagnosis of terminal 
cancer, Abdullojonov remained in prison and claimed to have been denied 
proper medical treatment. Government sources say that he was executed 
early in 1999, although other sources maintain that he simply died of 
cancer in prison.
    The Government does permit some prison visits by international 
human rights monitors, including an OSCE visit during the year, in 
which the OSCE found the conditions to be very poor. The Government 
invariably has denied requests by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) to make prison visits in a manner consistent with the 
ICRC's standard modalities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued 
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Criminal Code has not 
been amended significantly since independence, and it therefore retains 
many of the defects inherited from Soviet times. The Government claims 
that revision of the Criminal Code is a high priority, but due to the 
size and complexity of the code, the small parliamentary staff, and 
limited time in session for the Oli Majilis (Parliament) progress has 
been slow. There is no projected completion date, and there has been no 
indication of progress toward a comprehensive revision of the Criminal 
Code. Minor modifications to the code in 1999 increased punishment for 
crimes such as rape, theft, and illegal drug use. The system allows for 
lengthy pretrial detention and provides few checks on the power of 
procurators and police to arrest persons. Public order, which broke 
down during the civil war, has yet to be restored fully, and the 
virtual immunity from prosecution of armed militia groups has eroded 
further the integrity of the legal system.
    Police legally may detain persons without a warrant for a period of 
72 hours, and the procurator's office may do so for a period of 10 days 
after which the accused must be officially charged. At that point, the 
Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first 
3 months of detention are at the discretion of the local procurator, 
the second 3 months must be approved at the regional level, and the 
Procurator General must sanction the remaining time in detention. The 
Criminal Code specifies that all investigations must be completed 1 
month before the 15-month maximum in order to allow time for the 
defense to examine government evidence. There is no requirement for 
judicial approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge 
or detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and 
restricted to their place of residence pending trial. Once a case is 
entered for trial, the law states that it must be brought before a 
judge within 28 days. However, it is common for cases to be delayed for 
many months before trial begins. There is no provision for bail, and 
lengthy pretrial detention is a problem.
    The Government made politically motivated arrests, and there are 
credible allegations of cases of illegal government detention of 
members of rival political factions. For example, the bodyguard and the 
former driver of First Deputy Prime Minister Akbar Turajonzoda were 
detained in October, apparently as part of a campaign of intimidation 
by other elements of the Government against Turajonzoda. In most cases, 
the security officers, principally personnel from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Security, do not obtain arrest 
warrants and do not bring charges. Those released sometimes claimed 
that they were mistreated and beaten during detention (also see Section 
1.c.).
    The number of political detainees was not clear. Since the law 
precludes visits to persons in pretrial detention, and the Government 
denies the ICRC or other observers access to these persons, any 
estimate is uncertain.
    Human Rights Watch reported that by December 1999, the Government 
had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000 United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) fighters. There were reports of several UTO fighters in the 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast being arrested by local authorities 
despite this amnesty. The families of these fighters have appealed, and 
the leader of the Lal-I Badakhshan movement is pursuing their case.
    Border Force units routinely take family members of deserters 
hostage and hold them until the deserters return to duty (see Section 
1.e.).
    The Constitution states that no one can be exiled without a legal 
basis; no laws have been passed so far setting out any legal basis for 
exile. There were no reports of forced exile, although, some opponents 
of the Government are in self-imposed exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1994 Constitution states that 
judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and the 
law and prohibits interference in their activities; however, in 
practice the political leadership and, in many instances, armed 
paramilitary groups directly influence judicial officials at all 
levels. Under the Constitution, the President has the right, with 
confirmation by the Parliament, both to appoint and to dismiss judges 
and prosecutors. Judges at the local, regional, and national level are 
for the most part poorly trained and lack understanding of the concept 
of an independent judiciary. The Government made some progress in this 
respect by instituting regular examinations to screen unqualified 
candidates for judgeships. Bribery of prosecutors and judges appears to 
be a common practice.
    The court system, largely unmodified from the Soviet period, 
includes city, district, regional, and national levels, with a parallel 
military court system. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for the 
lower ones. The Constitution establishes additional courts, including 
the Constitutional Court, which began to function in 1997.
    According to the law, trials are public, except in cases involving 
national security or the protection of minors. The court appoints an 
attorney for those who do not have one. Defendants may choose their own 
attorney but may not necessarily choose among court-appointed 
defenders. In practice arrested persons often are denied prompt, and in 
some cases any, access to an attorney.
    The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all 
investigations of alleged criminal conduct. According to the law, both 
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government evidence, 
to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and testimony. No groups 
are barred from testifying, and all testimony theoretically is given 
equal consideration, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the 
witness. Ministry of Justice officials maintain that defendants benefit 
from the presumption of innocence, despite the unmodified Soviet legal 
statute that presumes the guilt of all persons brought to trial. In 
practice, bringing charges tends to suggest guilt.
    The obstacles to ensuring fair public trials were evident in the 
murder trial of Dilfuza Nimonova, a 21-year-old woman accused of 
murdering the man who raped her. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Tajikistan, which observed the 
trial, reported that the evidence presented by prosecutors against the 
defendant was poor, that the defendant's lawyer was denied access to 
his client, and that the politically well-connected family of the 
victim pressured the judges hearing the case. Members of the security 
forces tortured and beat Nimonova while she was in prison. Authorities 
also forced her to undergo an abortion while in prison. Nimonova was 
sentenced to death, although the Government later commuted her sentence 
to 16 years in prison after President Rahmonov received international 
appeals to intervene in the matter.
    There was no information during the year concerning Bahrom Sodirov, 
who was charged in the February 1997 kidnaping of the Minister of 
Security, 5 United Nations personnel, and 11 others. Sodirov was 
arrested soon after the hostages were released. His trial, from which 
observers were barred, was suspended in late 1997 and has not resumed.
    In contrast with the previous year, there were no new public 
allegations that the Government holds political prisoners. The 
Government and the UTO exchanged multiple lists of prisoners of war and 
political prisoners for exchange as a result of the 1997 inter-Tajik 
talks in Moscow. By November 1999, the Government had released all UTO 
prisoners named on lists submitted by the UTO, with the exception of 
six individuals, of whom the Government claimed no knowledge. The 
families of the six individuals continued to seek their whereabouts 
without success. The Government accepted the UTO's 1998 claim that it 
released all prisoners of war that it held.
    Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, whose arrest and unfair trial in 1997 were 
politically motivated, remained a political prisoner until his 
mysterious death early in 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home and prohibits interference with correspondence, telephone 
conversations, and postal and communication rights, except ``in cases 
prescribed by law''; however, authorities continued to infringe on 
citizens' right to privacy. Except for in some special circumstances, 
by law police may not enter and search a private home without the 
approval of the procurator. When they do enter and search without prior 
approval, they then must inform the procurator within 24 hours. 
However, police frequently ignored these requirements. There is no 
independent judicial review of police searches conducted without a 
warrant. Police also are permitted to enter and search homes without 
permission if they have compelling reason to believe that a delay in 
obtaining a warrant would impair national security.
    Security forces detained relatives of deserters in order to compel 
deserters to return to duty (see Section 1.d.). According to the OSCE 
mission in Tajikistan, the family of Dilfuza Nimonova (see Section 
1.e.) was harassed at the behest of her alleged murder victim's 
politically well-connected family after Nimonova's family sought 
international intervention in her case. There is also strong evidence 
that Nimonova, a rape victim, was forced to undergo an abortion while 
in prison ( see Section 1.e.).
    Some political parties remain banned. In some cases, the security 
services apparently created difficulties for persons associated with 
opposition parties who sought employment. Other persons were pressured 
to join the ruling party (see Section 2.b.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely 
restricts this right in practice. Journalists, broadcasters, and 
individual citizens who disagree with government policies are 
discouraged from speaking freely or critically. The Government 
exercises control over the media both overtly through legislation and 
indirectly through such mechanisms as ``friendly advice'' to reporters 
on what news should not be covered. The Government also controls the 
printing presses and the supply of newsprint and broadcasting 
facilities and subsidizes virtually all publications and productions. 
Editors and journalists fearful of reprisals carefully exercise self-
censorship.
    The number of independent and local newspapers is increasing, but 
only a handful of them attempt to cover serious news. Several are 
organs of political parties or blocs. The Government exerted pressure 
on newspapers critical of it. Najot, the new official paper of the 
Islamic Renaissance Party, which began weekly publication in October 
1999, continued to publish during the year. It experienced indirect 
government censorship in the early summer, apparently in retaliation 
for publishing a serialized translation of a foreign human rights 
report crtitical of the Government. It temporarily lost its access to 
state-run printing presses and has been forced to rely on a small, 
privately owned printing press to publish its editions.
    Journalists frequently are subject to harassment, intimidation, and 
violence. Sometimes the perpetrators are government authorities, as in 
the case of a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat, who 
was beaten severely by militiamen in August (see Section 1.b.), 
according to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations. In other 
cases, the perpetrators are criminal or terrorist elements who are 
believed to have narcotics trafficking connections, as in the cases of 
Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumankhon Hotami, who was shot 
and killed near Dushanbe in 1999, and Sergei Sitkovskii, a Russian 
national working for the newspaper Tojikiston, who was killed in a hit-
and-run car accident in 1999. Both were investigating narcotics 
trafficking at the time of their deaths. There were no developments in 
their cases by year's end.
    There is one Government-run television network; its several local 
stations cover regional and local issues from an official point of 
view. Opposition politicians have had little access to it, although in 
January and June it broadcast two political party debates organized by 
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. There are 36 
nongovernmental television stations, not all of which are operating at 
any one time and only a handful of which can be considered genuinely 
independent. The Islamic Renaissance Party was able to begin 
broadcasting a weekly television program on one such station. Some have 
independent studio facilities. These stations continued to experience 
administrative and legal harassment. To obtain licenses, independent 
television stations must work through two government agencies, the 
Ministry of Communications, and the State Committee on Radio and 
Television. At every stage of the bureaucratic process, there are high 
official and unofficial fees.
    The Government continued to prevent independent radio stations from 
operating by interminably delaying applications for broadcasting 
licenses. At least two independent radio stations in Dushanbe have had 
their license applications pending without explanation since the summer 
of 1998.
    Access to the Internet is limited partly by state control. The 
Government allowed a handful of Internet provider companies to begin 
operating during the year, but high fees and limited capacity put 
access to information over the Internet out of reach for most citizens.
    Academic expression is limited principally by the complete reliance 
of scientific institutes upon government funding, and in practical 
terms by the need to find alternate employment to generate sufficient 
income, leaving little time for academic writing.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
restricts this right in practice and exercises strict control over 
organizations and activities of a political nature. Nonpolitical 
associations, such as trade unions, are allowed to meet. Registered 
organizations must apply for a permit from the local executive 
committee in order to organize legally any public assembly or 
demonstration. Sometimes permits are granted, but the Government 
subsequently has been known to take reprisals against organizers. 
Because fear of reprisal is so widespread, public assemblies or 
demonstrations of a political nature were rare during the year.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice by exercising strict 
control over organizations and activities of a political nature. 
Although freedom of association is permitted for nonpolitical 
associations (including trade unions), this right is circumscribed 
further by the requirement in the Law on Nongovernmental Associations 
that all organizations first must register with the Ministry of 
Justice. This process often is slowed by the requirement to submit 
documents in both Russian and Tajik. The Ministry of Justice's 
verification of the text inevitably delays the granting of 
registration. The Minister of Justice made public statements in support 
of nongovernmental organizations (most of which are involved in social 
work, rather than political activity), and attempted to address 
problems that existing NGO's have experienced with registration and 
taxation. Once registered, an organization may apply for a permit to 
hold a public assembly or demonstration.
    There are five political parties and five ``movements'' registered 
with the Government. Three parties are banned officially: The Party of 
Popular Unity (banned in December 1998), the Agrarian Party (banned in 
April 1999); and the ``Tehran platform'' faction of the Democratic 
Party (banned in December 1999). The Party of Economic and Political 
Revival of Tajikistan was not allowed to register in March 1999 because 
of insufficient membership. The Party of Justice and Progress has not 
been allowed to register since the end of 1999 for unexplained reasons.
    In May 1998, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation 
of political parties with a religious orientation. The opposition UTO, 
international organizations, and foreign governments strongly 
criticized the law for violating the spirit and the letter of the 1997 
peace agreement. In June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special 
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute, which proposed 
compromise language for the law, banning political parties from 
receiving support from religious institutions. A new version of the law 
including the compromise language was passed in November 1998. 
Subsequently, parties of religious character were permitted to 
register; one such party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, has done so.
    The leadership of certain opposition parties reported threats and 
harassment by the authorities in their workplaces. Many others often 
were pressured to join the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the 
ruling party (see Section 1.f.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, there are some restrictions, and the Government monitors the 
activities of religious institutions to keep them from becoming overly 
political. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Islam, although 
only a small portion is observant: this does not appear to affect the 
religious freedom of the non-Sunni Muslim minority. President Rahmonov 
defends secularism aggressively and describes Islamists as a threat to 
national security. Government policies reflect a pervasive fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism, a fear shared by much of the general 
population.
    According to the Law on Freedom of Faith, the Committee on 
Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers registers religious 
communities and monitors the activities of the various religious 
establishments. While the official reason given to justify registration 
is to ensure that religious groups act in accordance with the law, the 
practical purpose is to ensure that they do not become overly 
political. In 1997 the Government subordinated the Council of the 
Islamic Center (the former Muftiyat) to the Committee on Religious 
Affairs; however, the observant Muslim community apparently did not 
object to this step.
    Although unregistered, recently organized religious communities, 
such as Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups, function with no apparent 
formal restriction. There were no developments in the murder case of a 
prominent member of the Baha'i community, who was widely believed to 
have been killed by Iranian-supported Islamic extremists (see Section 
1.a.). Members of the Baha'i community were occasionally confronted by 
the police guard outside Dushanbe's Baha'i Center and asked why they 
had forsaken Islam. Others were called in by the Ministry of Security 
and also asked why they had changed religious affiliation.
    In May 1998, Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation of 
political parties with a religious orientation (see Section 2.b.). The 
UTO, the largest component of which is the Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP, along with international organizations and foreign governments, 
strongly criticized the law for violating the June 1997 peace 
agreement, which included a government commitment to lift the ban on 
member parties of the UTO. The post-independence 1992-7 civil war was 
fought in part over differing views of the role of religion in the 
country. In early June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special 
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute. Later that month, the 
Commission reported that it had devised compromise language for the 
law, banning parties from receiving support from religious 
institutions. A new version of the law including the compromise 
language was passed in the November 1998 parliamentary session. A 
constitutional amendment passed in a September 1999 referendum states 
that the State is secular and that citizens can be members of parties 
formed on a religious basis. Two representatives from the IRP now sit 
in the lower house of the national Parliament.
    Aside from the registration requirement, there are few official 
constraints on religious practice, but government officials sometimes 
issue extrajudicial restrictions. For example, the mayor of Dushanbe 
has prohibited mosques from using microphones for the five daily calls 
to prayer. There are also reports that some local officials have 
forbidden members of the IRP from speaking in mosques in their region. 
However, this restriction is more a reflection of political than 
religious differences. Government printing houses reportedly are 
forbidden to publish texts in Arabic and as a rule do not publish 
religious literature. There are no longer restrictions on private 
Arabic language schools; however, restrictions on home-based Islamic 
instruction remain. These restrictions appear to be based on political 
concerns, but the effect on private religious instruction is also 
clear.
    The Government has banned specifically the activity of one 
religious faction, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist movement with 
origins in the Middle East, which has developed a significant following 
among the ethnic Uzbek population of northern Tajikistan. This movement 
operates underground and apparently calls for a nonviolent overthrow of 
established authority and the reestablishment of government along the 
lines of the six ``rightly-guided Caliphs'' of early Islamic history. 
According to the Ministry of Security, over 105 members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir were arrested during the year, and one reportedly died in police 
custody (see Section 1.a.). Fifty-seven of these persons were sentenced 
to between one and two years imprisonment.
    During the year there were three church bombings that occurred 
throughout Dushanbe (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    The Government continued to impose restrictions on the number of 
pilgrims allowed to go on the Hajj. Individuals were not permitted to 
travel in a personal vehicle; persons were required to travel by 
government-owned transportation, primarily buses. There were regional 
quotas on the number of pilgrims, which led to corruption as places 
were sold. Missionaries are not restricted legally and proselytize 
openly; however, the Government's fear of Islamic terrorists prompts it 
to restrict visas for Muslim missionaries.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on them.
    The Government has stipulated that both citizens and foreigners are 
prohibited from traveling within a 15-mile zone along the country's 
borders with China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. This restriction is not always enforced along the 
western part of the border with Afghanistan, but a special visa 
generally is required for travelers, including international workers 
and diplomats, to Gorno-Badakhshan. Travel to border areas near 
Uzbekistan in the southwest is not restricted significantly, except 
occasionally at the border, which was closed intermittently by 
Uzbekistan.
    The Ministry of Security inhibits freedom of travel by requiring 
citizens who wish to travel abroad to obtain an exit visa. This process 
sometimes includes lengthy interviews. The Ministry of Security 
sometimes withholds or delays exit visas when it believes that other 
ministries or NGO's are infringing upon its jurisdiction and have not 
adhered to its formalities for foreign travel.
    Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers who wish to remain in the 
city longer than 3 days are supposed to register with central 
authorities, and regulations require registration at the local Ministry 
of Interior office upon arrival and departure from a city. However, 
these regulations largely are ignored in practice. There are no legal 
restrictions on changing residence or workplace.
    There is no law on emigration. Persons who wish to migrate within 
the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of Interior of their 
departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the borders of the 
former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's 
embassy in order to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad 
are required to inform the Tajikistan embassy or Tajikistan interests 
section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
    Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may 
do so freely by submitting their applications to the embassy of 
Tajikistan or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian 
embassy or consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-
case basis. There is no indication that persons other than those who 
fled the country for political reasons after the civil war, are not 
permitted to return freely. Some persons currently active with the 
Tajik opposition, whose travel documents expired, at times have had 
difficulty obtaining new documents permitting them to return.
    A number of persons remained internally displaced as a result of 
the civil war, but their total number was difficult to estimate. The 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) no longer has estimates on 
the number of internally displaced persons (IDP's). These persons live 
throughout the country and are not concentrated in a single geographic 
area. The Government provides protection and modest assistance, and it 
actively cooperates with international organizations to resettle them. 
Resettlement is voluntary; IDP's are not returned forcibly to dangerous 
conditions.
    The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to persons who 
have entered the country seeking protection, in accordance with U.N. 
refugee criteria. Under the 1994 refugee law, a person granted refugee 
status is provided with the right to work and to move freely throughout 
the country. The State Migration Service (formerly the Department of 
Refugee Affairs) under the Ministry of Labor has responsibility for the 
registration of refugees.
    The State Migration Service handles the registration of Afghan 
refugees in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and Tajikistan's 1994 Law on Refugees. An unresolved 
problem stems from the unofficial government policy of denying official 
status to Afghan spouses of returning Tajik refugees. The UNHCR has 
aided their admission to the country (avoiding their being jailed as 
illegal immigrants); however, their legal status remains uncertain. 
There were no cases during the year. However, members of Tajikistan's 
Afghan refugee population, sometimes regardless of social status or 
official connections, are singled out for mistreatment by law 
enforcement authorities (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. According to the UNHCR, 176 asylum 
seekers submitted requests for refugee status to the State Migration 
Service during the first half of the year, of which 28 were granted by 
mid-year. However, the UNHCR does not have statistics on the number of 
refugees remaining in the country after receiving asylum because the 
majority of such persons use the country as a transit point en route to 
Western Europe. As in 1999, the Government faced the problematic issue 
of several hundred dependent family members and camp followers of 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants. As in a similar incident in 
1999, several hundred of these persons were sent in buses to 
Afghanistan. The Government did not consider them for refugee status 
and officially refused to acknowledge even the presence of these 
persons.
    After protests from the UNHCR, the Government cancelled its short-
lived ``Operation Foreigner,'' in which numerous Afghan refugees in 
Dushanbe were detained by security forces and reportedly slated for 
relocation to refugee camps elsewhere. However, government officials 
continued to maintain that Dushanbe was still ``off limits'' for Afghan 
refugees.
    It remained an question whether the Government would provide first 
asylum to a potential mass influx of refugees fleeing Taliban advances 
in northern Afghanistan; Government and Russian border officials made 
contradictory statements on this issue.
    Following the signing of the 1997 peace accords, all Tajik refugees 
from northern Afghanistan who wished to return, as well as thousands 
from the CIS, returned to the country. There was continued incremental 
progress during the year in returning occupied houses to their original 
UTO fighter owners. Problems remain, although they are almost entirely 
in the Khatlon region.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
Government peacefully and freely through elections of the President and 
members of Parliament; however, the Government restricted this right in 
practice. There was some improvement in the February parliamentary 
elections; however, the 1999 presidential election was seriously 
flawed. While the country made progress in its transition from a 
Soviet-model system to a more open and competitive one, the Government 
remained dominated by President Rahmonov and his inner circle from the 
Kulyab region.
    The 1999 Presidential election was flawed seriously. The 
Government's handling of preparations for the November presidential 
election cast doubt on the possibility that there could be a peaceful 
transfer of power through genuinely free and fair elections. Candidates 
had to contend with a cumbersome registration process requiring them to 
obtain large numbers of signatures during a short period of time. Only 
President Rahmonov, who used his political apparatus throughout the 
country for this purpose, probably ahead of time, was able to do so by 
the deadline. Prospective opposition candidates complained that local, 
progovernment administrators prevented them from gathering signatures. 
Days before the election, an apparently arbitrary Supreme Court 
decision allowed one of the three aspiring opposition candidates, 
Economics and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Davlat Usmon of the 
Islamic Renaissance Party, to register. Although Davlat announced that 
he would boycott the election unless the other two opposition figures 
also were allowed to run, the Central Election Commission included his 
name on the ballot. Davlat told journalists in Dushanbe on November 7 
that he believed that the outcome of the election was rigged and that 
only 20 to 30 percent of voters had participated. President Rahmonov 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly over mass media access, and there were 
obvious irregularities in the operation of polling places, such as 
multiple voting by pro-Rahmonov supporters. The Government claimed that 
98 percent of the electorate voted and that 96 percent of those voting 
supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked credibility.
    A joint mission of the U.N. and the OSCE observed February 27 
elections to the lower house of the new bicameral national Parliament. 
This joint observation mission noted that there were improvements in 
the process compared to previous elections. Six parties, including two 
former segments of the disbanded UTO, were allowed to participate in 
the electoral process. Two seats in the new Parliament are now held by 
members of an openly Islamic political party. However, the joint 
observation mission concluded that the elections failed to meet the 
minimum standards for equal, fair, free, secret, transparent, and 
accountable elections. There were particular problems with the 
independence of election commissions and the conduct of the vote count 
and tabulation of results. State organs, particularly regional and 
local administration officials, interfered in the preparations for and 
conduct of the elections in a manner not foreseen by law and in a way 
that contradicted international standards for democratic elections.
    During the course of the February 27 elections, joint U.N.-OSCE 
observers noted a variety of irregularities in a number of 
constituencies including proxy voting, unsealed ballot boxes, stuffed 
ballot boxes, votes added in favor of a particular party, lack of 
consistency between the sum of votes counted and the number of ballots 
issued, discrepancies between votes considered invalid during the count 
and the final result sheet, and blank copies of protocols signed before 
the counting of ballots and filled in with pencil during the count. The 
observers judged the conduct of the vote to have been ``very good'' 
(i.e., no irregularities) in only 13 percent of the 294 polling 
stations observed, while finding it ``good'' (i.e., hardly any minor 
irregularities) in 32 percent, ``acceptable, but not good'' (i.e., 
several minor irregularities) in another 32 percent, and 
``unacceptable'' (i.e. major irregularities) in 23 percent of the 
polling stations.
    While state television provided free broadcast time to parties 
competing in the election, it failed to provide balanced news and 
editorial coverage of the campaign. In general, both publicly and 
privately funded broadcasts as well as print media failed to provide 
voters with unbiased information.
    At least one prospective independent candidate for the lower house 
of Parliament was prevented from registering as a candidate in what 
Human Rights Watch called ``a wholly arbitrary candidate registration 
process.'' The decision to prevent this individual from registering 
appeared to have been politically motivated; he earlier had served as 
chairman of an opposition party that had been deregistered prior to the 
November 1999 presidential election.
    Local district assemblies elected the members of the upper house of 
the national Parliament in March, in elections that were not held under 
international observation.
    President Rahmonov's highly centralized People's Democratic Party 
of Tajikistan controls an overwhelming majority of seats in both houses 
of Parliament. This fact, combined with a lack of democratic culture, 
results in a legislative branch that is not genuinely independent of 
the executive branch.
    There are no formal barriers to women's participation in the 
electoral process; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Since the removal of Soviet-era quotas, the number of female 
deputies has declined. In the parliamentary election campaign, only 17 
out of the 365 registered candidates were women, and only 5 of the 17 
were elected. There are two female ministers in the Government.
    While ethnic Uzbeks make up some 25 percent of the total 
population, they are underrepresented in the political system.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government's record on dealing with international and 
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses was mixed. 
Fear of harrasment and abuse by government or paramilitary elements 
tended to discourage citizens from forming their own human rights 
organizations, although the Government did not block the registration 
of local NGO's dealing with human rights; several such organizations 
exist. The Government did prevent some citizens, especially government 
officials, from participating in international and local seminars 
sponsored by the OSCE, the ICRC, United Nations agencies, NGO's, and 
foreign governments on such topics as the rule of law, an independent 
judiciary, and international humanitarian law. Discussion at such 
seminars, including those held in Tajikistan, was frequently critical 
of the Government.
    The Government first stated the intention of forming a national 
human rights ombudsman position in 1996, and in 1998 agreed to 
establish a national human rights institution and ombudsman position 
with OSCE financial support; however, no institution or ombudsman 
position had been established by year's end.
    Within the Parliament, the Committee on Legislation and Human 
Rights is charged with monitoring human rights violations; however, 
like the rest of the Parliament, it is not independent in practice.
    The OSCE mission in Dushanbe continues to monitor human rights 
issues with the help of its five field offices. However, these field 
offices experienced varying levels of cooperation with local 
authorities. The Government allowed a joint U.N.-OSCE observation 
mission to monitor parliamentary elections in February (see Section 3). 
The mission reported that its team of experts was given every 
assistance and freedom of access that it requested. The joint mission 
issued a series of reports that severely criticized the conduct of the 
elections. The Government's reaction to the reports was mild, 
minimizing the critical aspects of joint mission statements and 
presenting the participation of international observers as evidence of 
a successful democratic exercise.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains a 
delegation in Tajikistan. The Government continued to refuse the ICRC 
unconditional access to prisons in accordance with standard ICRC 
modalities, despite letters received in the past from senior government 
officials that assured that such access would be forthcoming.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the rights and freedoms of every 
person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious 
beliefs, political persuasion, or social status and also explicitly 
states that men and women have the same rights; however, in practice 
there is some discrimination as a result of cultural traditions and the 
lingering hostilities from the 1992-97 civil war.
    Women.--Violence against women is widespread. Wife beating is a 
common problem. In both urban and rural areas, many cases of wife 
beating go unreported and many of those cases reported are not 
investigated. There is a widespread reluctance to discuss the issue or 
provide assistance to women in abusive situations, and the Government 
did not propose legislation on the issue. In addition, abduction of 
young women, who are raped or forced to marry their abductors, is 
widely reported.
    The Criminal Code prohibits rape; however, it is widely believed 
that most cases are unreported, and the problem is believed to be 
growing, particularly in urban areas. The threat of rape often is used 
to coerce women. There are no special police units for handling these 
cases. One rape crisis center was established by a local NGO in 
Dushanbe in 1993; there are now 10 such centers in the country. The 
situation is exacerbated by a continued lack of public order, so that 
in many cities, including Dushanbe, women exercise particular care in 
their movement, especially at night. There are no statistics on the 
number of rapists prosecuted, convicted, or punished each year. In one 
widely publicized case, Dilfuza Nimonova, an alleged victim of rape was 
convicted, in a trial of questionable fairness, of having killed the 
man who raped her. She was forced to undergo an abortion (see Section 
1.e. and 1.f.).
    The law prohibits keeping brothels, procuring, making, or selling 
pornography, infecting another person with a venereal disease, and 
sexual exploitation of women; however, prostitutes operate openly at 
night in certain urban areas.
    There are credible reports of trafficking in women (see Section 
6.f.).
    There have been reports of physical harassment of women by 
conservative Muslims in rural areas for not wearing traditional attire.
    According to the law, women have equal rights with men; however 
discrimination against women remains a problem. Articles in the 
Criminal Code protect women's rights in marriage and family matters. 
Girls often are pressured to marry men that they do not choose 
themselves, and polygyny is increasingly common, although it is 
illegal.
    Traditionally there has been a high level of female participation 
in the work force and in institutes of higher learning. There is no 
formal discrimination against women in employment, education, or 
housing; and in urban areas women can be found employed throughout 
government, academic institutes, and enterprises. However, women face 
diminishing opportunities for education and rising poverty. Some women 
hold the same jobs as men, although not in equal numbers. Women 
officially receive equal pay for equal work; however this regulation is 
not always enforced in practice. Divorce rates in urban areas are 
comparatively high, and women tend to carry the burden of child-rearing 
and household management, whether married or divorced. In rural areas, 
women tend to marry younger, have larger families, and receive less 
university education than women in cities. In rural and traditional 
areas, women receive less education in general, often leaving school 
after the eighth year. Due to the prevalence of large families, women 
in rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the home. 
Inheritance laws do not discriminate against women; however, in 
practice, inheritances may pass disproportionately to sons.
    Children.--The Government's lack of financial resources left it 
unable to fulfill its extensive commitments to children's rights and 
welfare, and the government social security network for child welfare 
appeared to have deteriorated. Women are provided 3 years of maternity 
leave and monthly subsidies for each child; health care is free (but 
the quality and quantity of medical services available has declined 
significantly since the Soviet era). Education is compulsory until age 
16; however, the law is not enforced. Public education is intended to 
be free; however, a lack of resources has caused the public school 
system to deteriorate to the point at which it barely functions. 
Parents who can afford to do so send their children to private schools 
(a number of which have been founded since the end of the Soviet 
period), or join together in groups that hire teachers to give their 
children lessons for a fee. Public education is intended to be 
universal; however, a significant number of school-age children--as 
many as one in eight, according to World Bank data--work instead of 
attending school. While most children are enrolled in school up to the 
completion of the secondary level, actual attendance may be lower 
because of the need to supplement family income by working in the home 
or in informal activities. The old Soviet practice, now illegal, of 
closing high schools at cotton harvest time and putting the students to 
work in the field continues in some areas.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1992 Law on Social Protection of 
Invalids stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and 
adequate medical care.
    However, in practice the Government does not require employers to 
provide physical access for the disabled. Financial constraints and the 
absence of basic technology to assist the disabled result, in practice, 
in high unemployment and widespread discrimination. There is no law 
mandating accessibility for the disabled. There are facilities for the 
mentally disabled; however, funding is limited and the facilities are 
in poor condition. Several international NGO's provide limited 
assistance to persons with disabilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups experience 
limited prejudice. There were no developments in the 1999 murder of a 
prominent member of Baha'i community (see Section 1.a.). Police made no 
arrests, although militant Islamists aligned with Iran are considered 
the likely perpetrators.
    The authorities continued to investigate the October bombing of a 
Protestant church in Dushanbe (see Section 1.a.). It is believed that 
the attack was meant to destabilize the political situation in the 
country. Prosecutors have charged three students from the Dushanbe 
Islamic Institute with terrorism in connection with the bombing. The 
students confessed to the bombing and stated their motive was 
religious. Investigators already have identified the remaining 
conspirators, and said that the three suspects claimed to be operating 
on their own and not on the orders of someone else. The Government 
believes that the act was independent and not associated with the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Hiz ut-Tahir.
    On December 31, two churches in Dushanbe were bombed, the Svyato-
Nikolskii Russian Orthodox Church and a Seventh Day Adventist Church. 
There were no injuries at either church, both of which were closed at 
the time. Government law enforcement and security agencies are 
investigating the bombings. It is believed that these events were 
carried out by religious extremists opposed to foreign missionaries in 
the country.
    Some Muslim leaders occasionally have expressed concern that 
minority religious groups undermine national unity.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Uzbeks make up 
approximately a quarter of the population but are substantially 
underrepresented in government service. The number of Uzbek language 
newspapers, television broadcasts, and schools has declined 
significantly since 1992. With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/
Uzbek/Russian) school structure, the Uzbek language has no official 
status. Although the Government permits a daily Uzbek radio broadcast, 
broadcast time is dominated by Tajik and Russian language programs. A 
weekly television broadcast in Uzbek, which ceased in 1999, resumed in 
2000.
    In practice Russian is the language of interethnic communication 
and widely used in government. Ethnic Russians and other Russian 
speakers, for example, Ukrainians, make up less than 2 percent of the 
population. While the Government repeatedly has expressed its desire 
for the ethnic Russian and Slavic populations to remain, economic 
conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local 
Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social 
attitudes toward them. A Slavic university and a Russian high school 
operate in Dushanbe with Russian as the language of instruction, but 
also include ethnic Tajik and Uzbek students. An agreement ratified by 
the Russian Duma in December 1996 allows for dual Russian and Tajik 
citizenship.
    Tensions persist between ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in some areas. 
Government officials have organized meetings at the local level to 
resolve conflicts; however, the authorities apparently have not 
arrested or prosecuted suspects in murders of ethnic Uzbeks in July 
1998. Since the signing of the peace treaty in 1997, there have been 
multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. Some of these 
cases appear to be a matter of retaliation by returned ethnic Tajik 
refugees for injuries done to them by ethnic Uzbeks during the civil 
war. As a result of these attacks, some ethnic Uzbek families have 
moved to other locations in the district where Uzbeks predominate or to 
neighboring countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Both the Law on Social Organization 
and the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees provide all citizens 
with the right of association, including the right to form and join 
associations without prior authorization, to organize territorially, 
and to form and join federations. According to official figures, 
approximately 90 percent of the labor force is organized.
    The Federation of Trade Unions, a docile holdover from the Soviet 
era, remains the dominant labor organization, although it since has 
shed its subordination to the Communist Party. The Federation consists 
of 19 professional trade unions and claims 1.5 million members, 
virtually all nonagricultural workers. The separate, independent Trade 
Union of Non-State Enterprises has registered unions in over 3,000 
small and medium-sized enterprises, totaling about 30,000 employees 
(according to 1998 figures). Many of the enterprises in which these two 
organizations nominally are present are not functioning because of the 
general economic crisis, and the membership of both has declined as a 
result. The Council of Ministers formally consults both organizations 
during the drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
    The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates 
arbitration before a union legally may call a strike. Depending on the 
scale of the labor disagreement, arbitration can take place at the 
company, sector, or governmental level. In the event that arbitration 
fails, unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have 
disavowed publicly the utility of strikes in a period of deepening 
economic crisis and high unemployment and have espoused compromise 
between management and workers.
    There were no official, union-sanctioned strikes, nor were there 
any wildcat strikes, the last which occurred in 1996).
    The law provides citizens but not unions with the right to 
affiliate freely with international organizations, including 
international labor organizations. It does not prohibit unions from 
affiliating with international organizations; however, there are no 
unions with international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is codified in the Law on Trade Union 
Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social Partnerships and Collective 
Contracts, and the Law on Labor Protection. Employees, members of the 
trade union, and management participate in collective bargaining at the 
company level. Negotiations involving an industrial sector include 
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's 
steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic 
situation worsens, it is increasingly difficult for enterprises to 
engage in effective collective bargaining.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, the use of sanctions to 
dissuade union membership, and the firing of a worker solely for union 
activity. Any complaints of discrimination against a labor union or 
labor union activist are considered first by a local labor union 
committee and, if necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court 
and investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an 
employer found guilty of firing an employee based on union activity to 
reinstate the employee.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, except in cases defined in the law; however, it 
persists in some cases. No labor laws have been passed since the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1994. Neither the Law on Labor 
Protection nor the Law on Employment, both predating the present 
Constitution, specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The 
Soviet practice of compelling students to pick cotton was banned 
officially in 1989; however, high school students in some regions still 
are sent to the fields to pick cotton, particularly in the Soghd 
(formerly Leninabad) area, sometimes with compensation. Residents of 
state or collective farms still may be required to pick cotton, 
although wages usually are not paid and these institutions no longer 
provide the services they once did.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, apart from traditional participation by children in 
family agricultural or home craftsman work, such practices are not 
known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to labor laws, the minimum age for the 
employment of children is 16, the age at which children also may leave 
school legally. With the concurrence of the local trade union, 
employment may begin at the age of 15. By law workers under the age of 
18 may work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per week. However, 
children as young as 7 years of age can perform household-based labor 
and participate in agricultural work, which is classified as family 
assistance. Many children under 10 years of age work in the bazaars or 
sell newspapers or consumables on the street. Trade unions are 
responsible for reporting any violations in the employment of minors. 
Cases not resolved between the union and the employer may be brought 
before the Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the 
manager of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and such 
practices generally do not occur, apart from family-based work (see 
Section 6.c.).
    The Government lacks the resources and ability to regulate 
effectively acceptable working conditions for youths, and there were no 
governmental or judicial initiatives to strengthen or enforce child 
labor legislation or regulations during the year. The Government does 
not have a comprehensive policy for the elimination of the worst forms 
of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The President, on the advice of 
the Ministry of Labor and in consultation with trade unions, sets the 
minimum monthly wage. The nominal minimum daily rate was approximately 
$0.03 (100 Tajik rubles). This rate fell far short of providing a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The Government 
recognizes this problem and has retained certain subsidies for workers 
and their families at the minimum wage. Although the Government adopted 
a wage indexation law in 1993 and inflation has been high, the law has 
not been implemented.
    Although slightly improved, the economy remained extremely weak 
during the year, with a majority of industrial operations standing 
idle. As factories and enterprises either remained closed or were shut 
down, workers were laid off or furloughed for extended periods.
    Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated 
their employees in kind with food commodities or with the products 
produced by the enterprise. The employee could then sell or barter 
those products in local private markets.
    The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours. Overtime 
payment is mandated by law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be 
paid at 1 1/2 times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime hours 
at double time.
    The Government has established occupational health and safety 
standards, but these fall far below accepted international norms, and 
the Government does not enforce them in practice. The enforcement of 
work standards is the responsibility of the State Technical Supervision 
Committee under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not 
available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing economic 
decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that over one-fifth of 
the population worked under substandard conditions, greatly 
underreported the number working under those conditions. Workers can 
leave their jobs with 2 months' notice, but, given the bleak employment 
situation, few choose to do so. The Law on Labor Protection provides 
that workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions without 
risking loss of employment; however, in view of the poor prospects for 
finding another job, few do so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and it is a problem. The criminal code prohibits the 
recruitment of minors for sexual exploitation. There are credible 
reports that trafficking is a growing problem with wide ramifications. 
The most common form of trafficking is in women, for ``export'' to the 
Gulf states, Turkey, and Russia. The OSCE has identified several rings 
of traffickers that recruit young women for prostitution abroad. The 
International Organization for Migration is leading an initiative to 
fully research the problem. The Government has taken no significant 
action against trafficking. There is no evidence of official, 
institutional government involvement in the trafficking of persons, but 
it is believed that some individual authorities are involved. It is 
believed that, due to the large number of female Afghan refugees, 
Afghan women may be the subjects of trafficking abroad using Tajikistan 
as the transit country.
                               __________

                                 TURKEY

    Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament, 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. In May 
it elected Ahmet Necdet Sezer President for a 7year term. After 1999 
parliamentary elections, Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP), 
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahceli, and former 
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a 
Government with Ecevit as Prime Minister. The military exercises 
substantial, but indirect, influence over government policy and 
actions--and politics--in the belief, shared by much of the population 
according to opinion polls, that it is the constitutional protector of 
the State. The Government generally respects the Constitution's 
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, various officials 
acknowledge the need for legislative changes to strengthen its 
independence.
    For over 15 years, the Government has engaged in armed conflict 
with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal until 
recently was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in 
southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues 
in four southeastern provinces that faced substantial PKK terrorist 
violence. Parliament in July lifted the state of emergency in Van 
province. The level of violence has been low since the second half of 
1999; according to the Government, the number of PKK-related terrorist 
incidents declined almost 90 percent from 1999. The state of emergency 
region's governor has authority over the provincial governors in the 
four provinces, and seven adjacent ones including Van, for security 
matters. Under the state of emergency, this regional governor may 
exercise certain quasi-martial law powers, including imposing 
restrictions on the press, removing from the area persons whose 
activities are deemed detrimental to public order, and ordering village 
evacuations. The state of emergency decree was renewed in Diyarbakir, 
Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November.
    The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for 
security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (Gendarmerie) carry out 
this function in the countryside. The armed forces, in support of the 
police and particularly the Jandarma, carry out operations against the 
PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby serving an internal 
security function. These operations have declined in number as the 
terrorist threat ebbed. Although civilian and military authorities 
remain publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, members of the security forces, including police ``special 
teams'' and anti-terror squads, other TNP personnel, village guards, 
and Jandarma committed serious human rights abuses such as torture.
    In December 1999, the Government adopted a 3-year disinflation and 
fiscal adjustment program. During the first year of this program the 
Government registered some significant improvements in the 
macroeconomic situation. Inflation was cut nearly in half, to 39 
percent. Economic growth increased significantly, after a recession in 
1999, to about 6 percent of gross national product. This growth 
included a strong increase in imports, fueled partly by an increase in 
world oil prices and the Turkish lira's appreciation against the euro, 
which led to a wider than expected current account deficit. This 
deficit, together with delays in the structural aspects of the reform 
program and other factors, resulted in a large loss of investor 
confidence and capital outflows in November and early December. 
Intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped to 
stabilize the situation in December, but the financial situation 
remained fragile at year's end. Another continuing problem is the 
projected deficit in energy sources, as energy demand grows at 9 
percent per year. To find new sources of imported oil and gas, the 
Government is negotiating supply and pipeline agreements with countries 
in the Caspian basin.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in a 
number of areas; however, its record was poor in several other areas, 
and serious problems remain. Extrajudicial killings continued, 
including deaths due to excessive use of force. Unlike the previous 
year, there were no deaths in detention due to torture and no reports 
of mystery killings and disappearances of political activists. Although 
the authorities failed to investigate adequately many past 
disappearances, ongoing investigation of the Turkish Hizbullah 
terrorist organization may lead to resolution of some cases. Torture, 
beatings, and other abuses by security forces remained widespread. 
Police and Jandarma often employed torture and abused detainees during 
incommunicado detention and interrogation. The lack of universal and 
immediate access to an attorney, long detention periods for those held 
for political crimes (especially in the state of emergency region), and 
a culture of impunity are major factors in the commission of torture by 
police and other security forces. In addition the general climate of 
violence engendered by the PKK insurgency and urban leftist and Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, combined with a confession-oriented trial 
system, have hampered past efforts to carry out legal prohibitions 
against torture. With the decrease in counterterror operations and 
overall detentions in the southeast, fewer cases of abuse of detainees 
were reported; however, the proportion of cases of abuse remained at 
high levels, and many cases go unreported.
    The rarity of convictions and the light sentences imposed on police 
and other security officials for killings and torture continued to 
foster a climate of impunity that remained the single largest obstacle 
to reducing torture and prisoner abuse. Investigations and trials of 
officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and often 
inconclusive. Some important cases dating back several years continued 
without resolution, including the case against police and security 
personnel charged with beating to death 10 prisoners during a prison 
disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996. However, the case against 10 police 
accused of torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995 concluded in 
November with the conviction of all of the accused police.
    Prison conditions remained poor. Clashes between prisoners and 
prison officials, especially over the issue of newly constructed small-
cell prisons, which would break up the current ward system, resulted in 
deaths and injuries. In December during government actions to break up 
prisoner hunger strikes and violent protests against small-cell 
prisons, 31 prisoners and 2 security officials perished. Police and 
Jandarma continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, although the 
number of such incidents declined. Prolonged pretrial detention and 
lengthy trials continued to be problems. Prosecutions brought by the 
Government in State Security Courts (SSC's) reflect a legal structure 
that protects state interests over individual rights. The Government 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained a serious 
problem. Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy, 
military, and judiciary argue that the State is threatened by both 
``reactionaries'' (Islamists) and ``separatists'' (Kurdish 
nationalists) and continued to call for parliamentary and judicial 
steps--many involving potential curbs on freedom of expression--to meet 
these threats. Consequently, authorities banned or confiscated numerous 
publications and raided newspaper offices, which encouraged continued 
self-censorship by some journalists.
    Police and the courts continued to limit freedom of expression by 
using restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and several laws, including 
the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist propaganda), Article 
312 of the Penal Code (incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious 
enmity), Article 159 (concerning insults to Parliament, the army, 
republic, or judiciary), Article 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic), 
Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), the Law to Protect 
Ataturk, and Article 16 of the Press Law. During the year there were no 
reports of journalists being returned to jail or trial for violating 
the 3-year ``parole'' following their release under the August 1999 
``suspension of sentences for journalists'' law. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned 
at year's end, compared with 18 in 1999, but some local journalists' 
groups dispute whether all of them are legitimate journalists.
    In September documents became public that allegedly demonstrated 
that senior military figures had debated a plan of action in 1998 to 
discredit Fazilet and HADEP parties, Human Rights Association (HRA) 
Chairman Akin Birdal, and several journalists. Many of the proposed 
actions described in the document did, in fact, occur.
    Prosecutors, courts, and the police continued to take actions 
against those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the 
State, generally on the basis of the constitutional restrictions on 
freedom of expression. In August the Government announced a decree that 
would have streamlined procedures for firing civil servants suspected 
of Islamist or separatist tendencies. President Sezer, in a popular 
decision widely viewed as upholding the rule of law, returned the 
decree and argued that Parliament must consider an issue of this 
weight. Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a 
statement in August reiterating the necessity of such measures and 
urging Parliament to pass appropriate legislation to dismiss civil 
servants who secretly support antistate, Islamist activities, but 
Parliament had not done so by year's end. Government pressure continued 
on the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), widely seen as supporting 
Kurdish cultural and political positions. This included a number of 
police raids and detentions. In June and November, HADEP Secretary 
General Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted of ``disseminating separatist 
propaganda'' and ``supporting an illegal organization;'' his cases are 
on appeal.
    The National Security Council (NSC), a powerful, constitutionally 
mandated advisory body to the Government composed of equal numbers of 
senior military officers and civilian ministers, which is chaired by 
the President, continued to urge the Government to fight against the 
perceived threat of radical Islam and accused Islamist media of 
extremism and undermining the State. In March Islamist former Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan was convicted under Article 312 of the Penal 
Code for ``promoting enmity'' along religious lines, for a speech he 
made in 1994 in which he referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' 
His appeal was turned down in July, and he was sentenced to 1 year's 
imprisonment. However, his prison sentence was suspended by the ``Law 
on Probation of Sentences and Deferment of Judgements.'' In August the 
Ankara SSC prosecutor filed an indictment against Fetullah Gulen, the 
leader of a moderate Islamic ``Tarikat,'' a Sufi religious order, on 
charges of plotting to overthrow the State by force. That investigation 
continued at year's end.
    Both HADEP and the Islamist Fazilet Party, whose predecessor 
parties the Government previously had closed, continued to be the 
subjects of closure cases during the year for alleged 
anticonstitutional activities. The cases were pending at year's end, 
and elected officials of both parties remained in office and were able 
to perform their duties.
    The state of emergency governor, courts, police, and the state 
broadcasting oversight body denied the Kurdish population, the largest 
single ethnic group in the southeast, the use of its language in 
election campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural 
activities. Kurdish language broadcasting remains illegal, although 
some senior government officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign 
Minister Ismail Cem, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, and the head of 
Turkey's intelligence service, have supported publicly the idea of 
legalizing such broadcasts, thereby opening public debate on the issue. 
The military has spoken out against this step. Although printed 
material in Kurdish is legal, the police continue to interfere with the 
distribution of some newspapers, and the governor of the emergency 
region banned some Kurdish-language publications in that predominantly 
Kurdish area. Kurdish music recordings are widely available, but bans 
on numerous songs and singers persist. Few radio stations play Kurdish 
music. The Government's broadcast monitoring agency closed some 
stations for playing banned Kurdish music. In all these cases, the 
Government's argument for doing so was the allegedly objectionable 
political content.
    The police and Jandarma continued to restrict freedom of assembly 
and association by strictly enforcing existing laws against unlawful 
meetings and demonstrations. The police beat, abused, detained, and 
harassed some demonstrators but showed restraint in other instances. 
For example, during the Kurdish holiday of Nevruz, authorities for the 
first time granted permission for a major celebration just outside of 
Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was peaceful, 
with no detentions, and the police interacted positively with the 
crowd.
    The Government continued to impose some restrictions on religious 
minorities and on some forms of religious expression, and, at times, 
imposed some limits on freedom of movement. The Government, which 
argues that some human rights groups pursue extremist political 
agendas, continued to harass, indict, and imprison human rights 
monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed in 
public forums. The Diyarbakir branch of the leading human rights 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), the HRA was able to reopen in April 
but the Government ordered it closed again within 3 weeks. It reopened 
in October. Other NGO branches have been closed, temporarily or 
indefinitely, especially in the southeast. The HRA office in Van was 
closed from May to August but has since reopened; however, four HRA 
offices were closed at year's end for activities related to prison 
protests. Former HRA President Akin Birdal returned to prison in March 
to serve out his 9-month sentence for ``inciting hatred and enmity'' in 
nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture. He 
was released in September.
    Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, remained a 
serious problem, and discrimination against women persisted. Abuse of 
children and restrictions on ethnic minorities remained serious 
problems. Child labor remained a serious problem, although to a 
diminishing degree.
    There are some restrictions on worker rights. Trafficking in women 
and girls to Turkey for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem.
    The situation in the southeast remained a serious concern. The 
Government has long denied the Kurdish population, who are a majority 
in the southeast, basic cultural and linguistic rights. The conflict 
between government security forces and separatist PKK terrorists slowed 
considerably, with only about 45 armed clashes during the year, 
according to the military. Past cases of extrajudicial killings went 
unsolved, and the police and Jandarma tortured civilians. The state of 
emergency authority abridged freedom of expression and association and 
put disproportionate pressure on Kurdish NGO's and HADEP. The number of 
villagers forcibly evacuated from their homes since the conflict began 
is estimated credibly to be between 380,000 and 1 million. There was 
one report of a village burning in October (see Section 1.e and 1.g). 
The Government gave permission for thousands of returns and initiated 
resettlement efforts; some villagers return by themselves. More than 
10,000 persons have returned to their villages or moved to 
``consolidated villages'' near their original homes.
    In January the Government suspended the sentence of execution for 
convicted PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, pending the results of his appeal 
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In December the ECHR 
accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding 
irregularities of his capture and trial in Turkey. Human rights 
observers, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR), had raised several due process concerns in the Ocalan case.
    The Government of Prime Minister Ecevit continued to place a strong 
emphasis on human rights issues; however, Parliament did not pass any 
human rights legislation in the first half of the year. In September 
the Cabinet debated and adopted, as a working and reference document, 
the ``Copenhagen Criteria'' report on steps Turkey must take to be in 
compliance with the European Union (EU)'s political criteria. The 
report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' is an ambitious and 
comprehensive work plan of constitutional, legislative, and 
administrative reforms that addresses questions of free speech and 
assembly, the composition and powers of the NSC, and the role of the 
judiciary. In December Parliament passed the ``Law on Probation of 
Sentences and Deferment of Judgements'' granting conditional release to 
thousands of prison inmates and suspending the trials of hundreds of 
others. Some persons jailed on charges related to free expression, or 
to non-violent ``support'' for outlawed organizations, will benefit 
from this measure. Those convicted of torture will not be released, but 
those convicted of mistreatment or murder of detainees may benefit from 
the law. Partly in the context of EU accession requirements, officials 
continued to participate in a wide-ranging public debate on democracy 
and human rights. Senior jurists, the President, politicians, and 
public figures discussed amending the 1982 postmilitary coup era 
Constitution in order to allow greater individual liberties. Public 
discussion of options for dealing with the southeast, particularly 
Kurdish cultural and linguistic issues, was vigorous. In addition the 
parliamentary Human Rights Committee issued a series of reports mid-
year that detail the existence of torture in prisons and places of 
detention.
    The armed forces emphasize human rights in training for officers 
and noncommissioned officers. Human rights groups attribute the limited 
number of human rights violations by military personnel to this effort. 
Human rights education in primary schools is mandatory, and it is an 
elective in high schools. Police and Jandarma also receive human rights 
training.
    PKK abuses, which were common during its violent 16-year campaign 
against the Government and civilians, slowed considerably and were no 
longer an important factor of daily life in the southeast. In recent 
years, military pressure significantly reduced the PKK's effectiveness, 
and some PKK members--although not all--are heeding Ocalan's call for 
an end to the armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey. Violence 
declined to the point where the public's freedom to travel at night no 
longer is restricted in parts of the southeast. Thousands of heavily 
armed, militarily organized PKK members remain encamped in neighboring 
countries close to Turkey's borders.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Credible reports of 
extrajudicial killings by government authorities continued. Although 
accurate figures were unavailable, figures were down from last year. 
For the first time in many years, the Human Rights Foundation (HRF) 
documentation center reported no deaths of detainees under torture. 
However, in December, 31 prison inmates and 2 security officials died 
following police intervention into widespread hunger strikes and other 
violent protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.). Over the year, 
another five detainees died under suspicious circumstances such as 
alleged suicide. Investigations in these cases were rare, and in some 
cases the prisoners' associates confirmed the case as a suicide. More 
than 20 persons were shot to death by police, Jandarma, and the 
military allegedly for not heeding a ``stop warning'' during arrest or 
commission of a crime, illegal entry into the country, or in accidental 
shootings. In September Jandarma shot and killed Yilmaz Ozcan, 
allegedly while trying to capture him. Ozcan had cut down a tree 
without permission and was supposed to turn himself in for a jail 
sentence. According to the HRF, in October three villagers allegedly 
were killed by soldiers in Hakkari province when they returned to their 
home village to collect walnuts. Relatives who retrieved the bodies 
alleged that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs.
    Some raids on criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe 
houses by security forces resulted in deaths, sometimes due to 
excessive force. More than 20 persons died during such raids; most were 
allegedly members of the Hizbullah extremist group. Several police also 
died during the raids. More than 25 persons--mainly children or 
military personnel--were killed by mines in the southeast; many more 
were maimed.
    The courts undertook investigations of most alleged extrajudicial 
killings; however, only a few yielded concrete results. The number of 
arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low compared with the 
number of incidents, and convictions remained rare. In November a 
police officer was arrested in Istanbul after fatally shooting a 14-
year-old bystander during the apprehension of an unarmed robbery 
suspect. Punishments, when handed down, were generally minimal. 
Jurisdictional questions, efforts by the police leadership to protect 
officers, prosecutors' failure to investigate and bring charges, and 
the failure of courts to hand down appropriate sentences were all 
obstacles to resolving the problem of apparent security force impunity 
for such deaths. In some cases, monetary fines have not kept pace with 
the high rate of inflation.
    After the Constitutional Court in January 1999 annulled part of the 
1996 Provincial Authority Law allowing security officers to ``fire 
directly and without hesitation'' at persons who ignored a warning to 
stop, the Government did not issue a new regulation. Therefore, the old 
law on police duties and authorities remains in force, stipulating that 
police must apply certain procedures before firing.
    In cases of past extrajudicial killings by police, Jandarma, or 
prison guards, 24 trials were begun during the year or continued from 
previous years. Another eight trials ended this year. Out of the 67 
police or Jandarma on trial in these 8 cases, 2 were convicted and 65 
were acquitted. In January the Court of Cassation reversed the 
Diyarbakir SSC's verdict that convicted six members of a Jandarma 
antinarcotics squad accused of killing a businessman in 1991. A new 
trial for the six officers began in May.
    The trial continued of six police officers who shot and killed two 
suspects in Adana in October 1999. Four of the officers face sentences 
of between 24 and 30 years, and the chief superintendent and another 
officer face 6 to 15 years in jail on charges of deliberate homicide. 
The officers remain on duty. Two of these officers also had been on 
trial for the January 1998 shooting deaths of three persons in Adana, 
along with another officer. The three were acquitted in April on the 
grounds of self-defense.
    Following an investigation of the September 1999 incident at 
Ulucanlar prison, where Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously 
injured others during a disturbance, a prosecutor ruled that no 
criminal prosecution of the security officials was necessary. A court 
upheld this decision in May. A trial also began in October in the case 
of 85 prisoners for the deaths of 5 other prisoners during the 
incident. In June the Ankara regional administrative court reversed the 
earlier ``nonprosecution'' decision, allowing a case to be opened 
against 150 Jandarma and soldiers. A report by the parliamentary Human 
Rights Committee into the Ulucanlar incident states that security 
forces ``fired with an intent to kill'' and inflicted torture. 
According to the report, medical treatment of prisoners involved in the 
incident was delayed or denied. Furthermore, autopsies of the prisoners 
who died indicated that some may have been shot at close range or 
tortured before being shot, contradicting the authorities' version of 
events. Then-committee chair Sema Piskinsut added publicly that since 
the autopsy findings did not meet international standards and some 
evidence such as prisoners' clothing was removed, the results were 
inconclusive.
    In September the Izmir security directorate police investigation 
board recommended that the policemen accused of killing Alpaslan Yelden 
in custody in July 1999, in an attempt to get his confession, should be 
expelled from the force. A complaint was filed against the policemen at 
the Izmir public prosecutor's office. A court case continues against 
three police officers accused of murdering trade unionist Suleyman 
Yeter in March 1999 while he was in custody at the Istanbul security 
directorate political police center. Yeter had been a plaintiff in an 
ongoing trial of eight police officers who allegedly had tortured and 
raped detainees in 1997.
    On January 20, a final Appeals Court upheld the sentences of 7 or 
more years' imprisonment for five police officers convicted of beating 
journalist Metin Goktepe to death in 1996. The court also ruled that 
the police superintendent on duty, Seydi Kose, should be tried for 
misuse of power rather than murder. In April, Kose was sentenced to 1 
year's imprisonment (8 months' imprisonment on this charge), relieved 
from public service for 5 months, and fined the equivalent of 1 dollar. 
He was released for time served during the trial. Goktepe, a 
correspondent for the left-wing newspaper, Evrensel, died from wounds 
inflicted while in detention in Istanbul in 1996. Police initially 
denied that he was detained, then later said that he died from a fall.
    The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 anti-terror police 
officers charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10 
prisoners while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir, continued 
into its fifth year.
    In March a Trabzon criminal court convicted two policemen for their 
role in causing the deaths of nine persons during riots in Gazi, 
Istanbul in March 1995. The trial, which began in November 1996, was 
moved from Istanbul for security reasons. The court sentenced one 
policeman to a total of 96 years' imprisonment (24 each for four 
victims) but reduced the sentence to 6 years and 8 months, in part 
because the victims had been acting illegally and because the defendant 
surrendered voluntarily. He was released for time served and suspended 
from public service for 4.5 months. Another policeman was given two 24-
year sentences, but these were reduced, for the same reasons, to 3 
years and 4 months (with a suspension from public service for 2.5 
months). He also was released for time served. The other 18 policemen 
were acquitted because the court ruled that there was no definitive or 
convincing evidence against them.
    The trial continued in Istanbul of policeman Abdullah Bozkurt for 
the 1994 shooting and killing of Vedat Han Gulsenoglu. Bozkurt has not 
appeared for trial sessions for a year, leading to continued 
postponements. According to the victim's lawyer, Bozkurt currently 
works as a policeman in Isparta. He is under a ruling of imprisonment 
in absentia for the duration of the trial. In July the court board 
decided to send a letter to the police station to locate the gun used 
in the incident, to initiate an investigation of why Bozkurt cannot be 
found, and to make a complaint against officials who did not carry out 
Bozkurt's arrest. There were no results of these actions at year's end.
    In November the Diyarbakir Provincial Administrative Board decided 
to refuse a request for prosecution of police officers who allegedly 
killed 18-year-old detainee Hamit Cakar in 1998. Cakar, detained 
following a hunger strike at Diyarbakir's HADEP provincial organization 
building, died in custody allegedly due to ``cardiac problems.'' 
Lawyers for Cakar's family have appealed to the Supreme Administrative 
Court (Danistay.)
    The ECHR ruled against Turkey on nine cases during the year in 
which persons had been killed in detention or taken into custody and 
then disappeared. In all of these cases, the court noted that domestic 
legal remedies were insufficient. However, in one case the court ruled 
that security forces were not responsible for the death of a Kurdish 
activist, and that the State had taken reasonable measures to find the 
real killers.
    According to human rights monitors, there were no killings of high-
profile, pro-Kurdish figures in the southeast or of proKurdish 
politicians, journalists, or lawyers. The HRF reported a nationwide 
total of 10 unsolved killings, some of which may have had a political 
component. In May the Diyarbakir Provincial Chairman for the right-wing 
National Action Party (MHP) was killed while walking near his home. In 
December a human rights activist in Eskisehir was allegedly abducted by 
persons claiming to be police officers, forced to drink pesticide, and 
left for dead (although he was found and taken to a hospital, where he 
recovered). According to information provided by the Governor of 
Eskisehir, the assailants were criminals posing as police officers.
    The PKK discontinued its practice of targeted political murders, 
but it remains armed and in some cases clashed with soldiers, Jandarma, 
and state-paid paramilitary village guards. According to the Turkish 
National Police, during the year, 35 security officials and 24 
civilians died in terrorist incidents, and 270 PKK members were killed 
by security forces (see Section 1.g.).
    In January police discovered evidence of the Turkish Hizbullah 
terrorist group's kidnaping and killing of moderate Islamic business 
figures, religious leaders, and intellectuals, including prominent 
Islamist feminist Konca Kuris. The Government captured dozens of 
alleged Hizbullah militants and in July indicted 21 for a number of 
murders, including those of Ahmet Taner Kislali and Ugur Mumcu. An 
unrelated suspect in Mumcu's killing had been held in custody since the 
previous year; he was released from custody but remains on trial.
    According to the office of the emergency region governor, over 
2,600 persons in that region alone were detained this year on suspicion 
of links to Hizbullah (see Section 1.g.). Some of these were teachers 
and imams. Many alleged Hizbullah members claim that they were tortured 
in custody, a claim that has been supported in some cases by medical 
evidence. Some murders from previous years, especially of moderate 
Kurdish leaders, may have been committed by Hizbullah. A Hizbullah 
suspect reportedly confessed in police custody that he murdered Ramazan 
Sat in 1992 for ``being a PKK member.''
    Far-left armed groups, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C), 
the Islamic Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), and the Turkish Workers 
and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO), continued to commit acts of 
terrorism, in some cases leading to deaths.
    b. Disappearance.--Unlike the previous year, there were no reports 
of disappearances of political activists. Accurate statistics on the 
disappearance of those previously under detention, or seen being taken 
into custody by security forces or law enforcement officials, are hard 
to confirm. However, the HRF claims that there were no such 
disappearances in 2000, compared with 36 of this type in 1999.
    In March a trial ended for two police officers in connection with 
the disappearance of suspect Mural Yildiz in 1995. The two were 
convicted of ``negligence of duty;'' a 3-month prison term was 
converted to a fine of about $2 (1.2 million TL). The judge apologized 
to Yildiz's mother for the fact that inflation had rendered the 
monetary fine meaningless.
    There was no new information available on the case of Aydin Esmer, 
who disappeared according to Amnesty International (AI) in September 
1999 while returning to his home in Diyarbakir province from Mus 
province.
    The body of Omer Cinar, who disappeared in Istanbul in November 
1999, was discovered in one of the ``grave houses'' where Hizbullah 
operatives killed and buried their victims. His body was found in the 
Beykoz district of Istanbul in January, along with nine other bodies, 
and police confirmed his identity.
    No charges have been filed in the 1998 disappearances from Izmir of 
editors Neslihan Uslu, Hasan Aydogan, Metin Andac, and Mehmet Mandal. 
The 1997 disappearances of Ilyas Eren and 73-year-old Fikri Ozgen, who 
allegedly were taken into custody by plainclothes police, were not 
resolved.
    The Government made efforts to investigate and explain some 
reported cases of disappearance. The Ministry of Interior operates the 
Bureau for the Investigation of Missing Persons, which is open 24 hours 
a day. Since 1996, according to the Ministry of Interior, 425 
applications of a political nature for missing persons were made. Of 
these, 88 were found alive, 18 were in prison, 46 died, and 273 were 
still missing at year's end. Most families of persons who disappeared 
hold the Government and security forces responsible and consequently 
avoid contact with the government office. AI criticizes the bureau's 
findings for falling short of the thorough and impartial investigations 
required in accordance with international standards. The Ankara police 
operate a telephone number through which the public can obtain 
information about detainees.
    The PKK's practice of kidnaping young men or threatening their 
families as part of its recruiting effort and abductions by PKK 
terrorists of local villagers and state officials has virtually ended, 
due to reduced PKK capabilities in the southeast and calls by its 
captured leader Ocalan for the PKK to withdraw from its former 
operating areas in the country.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, members of 
the security forces continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse 
persons regularly. Despite the Government's cooperation with 
unscheduled foreign inspection teams, public pledges by successive 
governments to end the practice, and government initiatives designed to 
address the problem, torture continues to be widespread. However, based 
on reports from a number of sources, the incidence of torture appears 
to have declined somewhat, especially in the southeast, where there 
have been fewer political detentions.
    Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture 
say that most persons detained for or suspected of political crimes 
usually suffer some torture at the hands of police and Jandarma during 
periods of incommunicado detention before they are brought before a 
court; ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture and 
mistreatment by police. The HRF estimates the number of credible 
applications by torture victims at its 5 national treatment centers to 
be approximately 1,030 in 2000, compared with some 700 in 1999. These 
figures include complaints stemming from previous years' incidents. The 
HRF believes that these numbers seriously underrepresent the actual 
number of persons tortured while in detention or prison. Human rights 
advocates believe that thousands of detainees were tortured during the 
year in the southeast, where the problem is particularly serious, but 
that only 5 to 20 percent report torture because they fear retaliation 
or believe that complaints are futile.
    Some of the factors affecting the rate of torture are the use of 
incommunicado detention and the number of detentions in general; 
reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials; 
and increased concern about the problem from many sources. Human rights 
monitors report improvement in some areas of the country, especially in 
the first 6 months of the year, but problems continued, especially in 
more rural areas. All report that torture remains widespread in the 
southeast and in large cities.
    Because the arresting officer is responsible for interrogating the 
suspect, officers frequently resort to torture to obtain a confession 
that would justify the arrest. There is allegedly a difference in 
police practice for those arrested for ordinary crimes (who are beaten 
until they give a confession) and those arrested for ``political'' 
crimes. If suspects detained under the Anti-Terror Law do not produce 
information and confessions, interrogators often allegedly shift from 
beatings to electric shock, cold water from high-pressure hoses, and 
other methods. Observers say that security officials often torture 
political detainees simply to express anger and to intimidate the 
detainees.
    Human rights monitors and medical experts say that security 
officials often use methods that do not leave physical traces, such as 
beating with weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. A new method that 
was reported is the application of electric shocks to a metal chair 
where the detainee sits, rather than directly to the body. Commonly 
employed methods of torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers 
include: Systematic beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposure to 
extreme cold or high-pressure cold water hoses; electric shocks; 
beatings on the soles of the feet (falaka) and genitalia; hanging by 
the arms; food and sleep deprivation; heavy weights hung on the body; 
water dripped onto the head; burns; hanging sandbags on the neck; near-
suffocation by placing bags over the head; vaginal and anal rape with 
truncheons and, in some instances, gun barrels; squeezing and twisting 
of testicles; and other forms of sexual abuse. In some cases, multiple 
torture methods (e.g., hanging and electric shocks) are employed at the 
same time. Other methods used are forced prolonged standing, isolation, 
loud music, witnessing or hearing torture, being driven to the 
countryside for a mock execution, and threats to detainees or their 
family members.
    Female detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less 
frequently, more severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to 
strip in front of male security officers, female detainees often are 
touched, insulted, and threatened with rape. A poll conducted by an NGO 
called the Legal Counsel Project Against Sexual Harassment and Rape 
(affiliated with the HRA) indicated that three-quarters of female 
detainees had experienced sexual violence, but only one-sixth of those 
who had undergone such violence reported it to the authorities.
    The deputy mayor of Diyarbakir, Ramazan Tekin, was detained in 
January and claimed that he was subjected to severe torture. As a 
result of testimony given during this detention, three HADEP mayors 
were arrested the following month for ``assisting the PKK'' (see 
Sections 2.b. and 4). According to news reports, in March the president 
of HADEP's women's commission in Mardin, Gulistan Durc, alleged that 
she was tortured while in detention. Durc, who was detained under 
suspicion of supporting the PKK, was sent to a Diyarbakir hospital for 
treatment following a medical exam. The governor refused permission to 
put the police officers involved on trial. The prosecutor opposed this 
decision and appealed it to the regional administrative court, which 
upheld the governor's ruling. The prosecutor then agreed to drop the 
case; Durc's lawyer has appealed to the Mardin penal court.
    In May the Izmir SSC acquitted Dr. Zeki Uzun of charges that he 
supported the PKK by providing medical treatment to two female 
terrorists. Uzun, a gynecologist who volunteers at the HRF Izmir 
treatment and rehabilitation center, was taken into custody in October 
1999 during a raid on his private clinic by anti-terror police. He 
credibly reported being tortured in detention. Uzun filed a formal 
complaint against the Izmir anti-terror department, but a prosecutor 
concluded that there were insufficient grounds to pursue a case. In 
August Dr. Uzun opened a compensation case against the Interior 
Ministry for his torture and against some newspapers for slander. His 
attorney applied to the ECHR with a complaint of prolonged detention, 
torture, and violation of Dr. Uzun's individual rights.
    In May the Public Prosecutor's Office in Mardin indicted seven 
police officers for allegedly raping and torturing a female suspect in 
1992. When preparing the indictment the prosecutor accepted an 
alternative medical report by the HRF's Istanbul torture treatment 
center. Prosecutors and courts have used such reports only a few times, 
since normally all medical reports come from state-employed doctors. 
The alleged victim was hospitalized several times during the period of 
her detention. The police officers remain on duty.
    Government officials admit that torture occurs but deny that it is 
systematic. In September State Minister for Human Rights Rustu Yucelen 
said publicly, after visiting a detention center in Icel, that the 
State was opposed to torture and that ``speculation'' that the police 
were using torture was initiated by powers acting against Turkey. In 
response to criticism from the HRA, he said that his remarks had been 
misunderstood and that torture was against state policy. The Ecevit 
Government was in regular dialog with the Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The Government accepted an 
unannounced visit by the CPT in July and invited members of the 
committee to help in the prison crisis in December, and allowed the 
publication of 1999 and 2000 CPT visit reports.
    Regulations on detention were supplemented in 1999 by a directive 
against torture from the Prime Minister, which called for public 
prosecutors to make unscheduled inspections of places of detention. The 
Parliamentary Human Rights Committee also has publicly called on 
prosecutors to carry out this aspect of their job more effectively. The 
Prime Minister asked for reports from prosecutors every 3 months on 
this process. According to officials at the Ministry of Interior, over 
a thousand inspections have been made and these reports are on file 
with the High Council for Human Rights Coordination. According to 
Minister for Human Rights Yucelen, from July to September, a total of 
2,309 inspections (at both police and Jandarma stations) were carried 
out. The reports were not made public. Although some provincial 
authorities said that the inspections uncovered no deficiencies, others 
claimed that they led to some improvements in practices. Human rights 
observers say that the inspections and reports are cursory at best, do 
not include any detainee interviews, and give a false impression of 
government attention to the problem. They also question prosecutors' 
ability to influence police practices. There is little public awareness 
of these visits.
    Private attorneys and human rights monitors continue to report 
uneven implementation of the right to immediate access to an attorney 
by those arrested for common crimes and access after 14 days of 
detention for those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. No immediate 
access to an attorney is provided for under the law for persons whose 
cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. This 
includes individuals suspected of drug trafficking, smuggling, and 
crimes under the Anti-Terror Law. The lack of early access to an 
attorney is a major factor in the occurrence of torture by police and 
security forces.
    State-employed doctors give all medical exams for detainees. The 
Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during 
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release; 
however, the examinations generally are exceedingly brief and informal, 
often lasting less than a minute. In some cases doctors were brought 
reports to sign, but no examinees. Former detainees assert that some 
medical examinations occur too long after the event to reveal any 
definitive evidence of torture. Lawyers contend that medical reports--
their only basis for filing a claim of torture--are not placed 
regularly in prisoners' files.
    Pressures against doctors continue. In 1999 the governor of 
Istanbul tried to get a doctor fired from her job at Istanbul 
University. The doctor, Sebnem Korur Fincanci, had certified that trade 
unionist Suleyman Yeter had been killed under torture while in 
detention (see Section 1.a.). Fincanci filed suit and a compensation 
trial against the governor opened in May at the Istanbul Penal Court. 
She claimed that he had accused her, in a letter to the university 
president, of ``having sympathy for illegal left-wing views'' and going 
to ``extreme'' lengths to prove that the police officers were guilty of 
Yeter's death. The court ruled that the trial could take place since 
writing the letter was outside the governor's official duties. However, 
in November the Penal Court decided not to pursue the case and 
forwarded the file to the Administrative Court for its consideration. 
Fincanci has appealed.
    Citing security reasons, members of security and police forces 
often stay in the examination room when physicians are examining 
detainees, resulting in the intimidation of both the detainee and the 
physician. Since September, however, Health Ministry regulations have 
allowed doctors to ask security force members to leave during 
examinations. However, some doctors claim that in practice they cannot 
do so because they could face disciplinary procedures or court cases. 
According to the Medical Association and other human rights observers, 
the presence of a security officer--at times the one allegedly 
responsible for torture--can lead physicians to refrain from examining 
detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report findings, or 
report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical inferences 
that torture occurred.
    The law mandates heavy jail sentences and fines for medical 
personnel who falsify reports to hide torture, those who knowingly use 
such reports, and those who coerce doctors into making them. The 
highest penalties are for doctors who supply false reports for money. 
In practice there are few such prosecutions. Dr. Nur Birgen, 
chairperson of a state forensic medical facility in Istanbul, was 
convicted in December of giving false medical reports and concealing 
evidence of torture. The court sentenced her to 3 months' imprisonment, 
less than the normal 6-month minimum sentence, and then commuted the 
sentence to a suspended $1.50 (1 million TL) fine. Birgen had been 
sanctioned in 1998 by the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, and her 
medical license was ordered suspended for 6 months. However, the 
Justice Ministry concluded that since Dr. Birgen is a state employee, 
the suspension fell under a September 1999 law that offered amnesty for 
administrative punishments for civil servants. The Medical Association 
filed suit objecting to this decision and the Ankara Administrative 
Court ruled that the Justice Ministry's action was illegal. Meanwhile, 
a trial continues against a lawyer who pressed for Birgen's suspension 
for insulting her by comparing her to the Nazi doctor Josef Mengele.
    The investigation, prosecution, and punishment of members of the 
security forces for torture or other mistreatment is rare, and accused 
officers usually remain on duty pending a decision, which can take 
years. According to the TNP, judicial action taken during the year 
against police charged with torture or mistreatment resulted in 72 
convictions, 273 acquittals, and 19 ongoing prosecutions. 
Administrative decisions determined that no trial was needed in 252 
other cases, and that no charges needed to be brought against 140 other 
officers accused of abuse. During the year, 63 police officers also 
were given administrative punishments, such as suspensions, for torture 
or mistreatment, while a decision not to investigate was given in 890 
cases. According to the Jandarma, 253 Jandarma were prosecuted during 
the year, resulting in 52 convictions, 53 acquittals, and 149 ongoing 
trials. No military personnel were prosecuted for torture; there is no 
new information on previous years' trials.
    According to the Justice Ministry, during the year 1,258 cases were 
brought to prosecutors against police and Jandarma, and of these, 664 
investigations are ongoing; 422 indictments were forwarded to the 
courts, and 172 cases did not go forward. The courts concluded 165 of 
the 422 cases they received, resulting in 71 convictions, 79 
acquittals, and 15 not authorized or improper jurisdiction decisions; 
another 257 cases were ongoing.
    Legal, administrative, and bureaucratic barriers impede 
prosecutions and contribute to the low number of convictions for 
torture. The December 1999 Civil Servant Prosecution Law has not 
resulted in an immediate change in approach by the State to allowing 
prosecutions, since civil servants are generally immune from direct 
prosecution unless their superiors grant permission to investigate 
them. The law authorizes prosecutors to begin collecting evidence 
immediately to substantiate claims of torture by security officials, 
but in practice this rarely occurs. Within a 30-day deadline, with a 
possible 15-day extension, a civil servant's supervisor supposedly must 
decide whether that employee can be prosecuted (or whether the employee 
is to be disciplined otherwise). In at least one high-profile case--
that of Ramazan Tekin, the deputy mayor of Diyarbakir--this deadline 
was not observed. This provision has been widely criticized. Many 
jurists as well as human rights observers have said that the new law 
still falls short of the needed reform. The law allows prosecutors to 
open investigations against persons suspected of falsely accusing a 
civil servant based on ``enmity, hatred or slandering.''
    The failure to enforce domestic and international bans on torture 
fosters a climate of official impunity that encourages the systematic 
abuse of detainees. Detainees state that prosecutors ignore their 
claims of abuse during interrogation. Some prosecutors believe that all 
allegations of torture are manipulated by political organizations such 
as the PKK and claim that detainees fabricate torture claims and injure 
themselves to accuse and defame the security forces.
    Under the criminal procedures law, prosecutors may initiate 
investigations of police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or 
mistreating suspects. In cases where township security directors or 
Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain 
permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice, 
because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of 
judges. Finally, in the state of emergency regions, any prosecution or 
legal action directed at government authorities must be approved by the 
state of emergency Governor. Approval is rare.
    In February the then-chair of Parliament's Human Rights Committee, 
Sema Piskinsut, and two other Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) led an 
unannounced early morning raid on an Istanbul police station. This 
unprecedented raid was based on tips that this particular police 
station was notorious for torture, gathered during a prison research 
trip from women and children who were prisoners. The M.P.'s seized 
several instruments of torture, including a so-called ``Palestinian 
hanger,'' and required the police chief to sign a statement affirming 
that these were found in his station. She showed the torture implements 
to the press and publicly called for an investigation. When the 
investigation appeared to be stalled, another M.P. on her committee 
pressed the Interior Ministry for action. According to the Turkish 
National Police, the many administrative processes necessary to 
investigate the subprovincial security director and the chief of the 
police station, were nearly complete at year's end. However, the public 
prosecutor decided not to pursue a judicial case against the two 
officials. The police station has been pulled down and a new station is 
being constructed, according to an Istanbul M.P. Soon after the raid, 
Interior Minister Tantan met with Parliament's Human Rights Committee 
and said publicly that ``it is a mistake to define human rights only as 
violations by security forces.''
    A higher court reversed a January decision by the Iskendurun chief 
public prosecutor not to prosecute anti-terror police accused of 
sexually harassing, raping with a truncheon, and torturing two female 
high school students arrested in March 1999. The trial of the four 
police officers began in March. However, at the same time, the 
conviction of the two girls on grounds of belonging to a terrorist 
organization and firebombing a bus--a conviction based solely on the 
confessions allegedly obtained under torture--was upheld by the Court 
of Cassation in June. The girls are serving 12-year and 18-year 
sentences.
    Five defendants in Istanbul have been jailed since 1995 without 
having been convicted (they are accused of being members of TIKKO). 
Their trial is pending the outcome of a case against five police 
officers accused of torturing them. At a September hearing in the case, 
none of the accused police officers appeared in court, the case was 
postponed again, and the detainees were sent back to jail.
    Songul Yildiz was acquitted in 1997 on charges of being a PKK 
member. In 1997 two policemen received 10-month suspended sentences for 
mistreatment and were suspended from the police force for 2.5 months; 
both were still on duty by year's end.
    A case against 12 policemen accused of torturing the September 1997 
``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees continues, but charges may be 
suspended under a new law (see Section 4).
    On November 15, the Manisa court sentenced 10 policemen to between 
5 and 10 years in jail for torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995. 
The court found that the students exhibited evidence of physical and 
psychological torture while under detention; lawyers for the teenagers 
said that their clients were tortured by means of beating, electric 
shocks, hosing with cold pressurized water after having been stripped, 
and sexual abuse. The policemen previously had been acquitted twice due 
to lack of evidence, but each time the appeals court overruled the 
acquittal and ordered a retrial. The policemen cannot appeal the 
November decision again, but have applied to the Court of Cassation to 
reduce their sentences. The case against the students at the State 
Security Court in Izmir ended with their acquittal in late November. 
The Court of Cassation had overturned the January 1997 convictions of 
10 of the students on charges of belonging to an illegal leftist 
organization; 4 other students originally were acquitted.
    Police harass, beat, and abuse demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). 
Police also harass and abuse journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    The ECHR ruled against Turkey in several cases of torture from 
previous years. In one case the victim had suffered brain damage. The 
ECHR noted that domestic legal remedies were insufficient because 
prosecutors had not taken adequate steps to investigate the torture 
claims.
    Prison conditions remain poor. With some exceptions (i.e., for 
high-profile political prisoners or for those with gang connections), 
prisons remain plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and very poor 
administration. Despite the existence of separate juvenile facilities, 
juveniles and adults sometimes are incarcerated together, and most 
prisons lack adequate medical care for routine treatment or even 
medical emergencies. Families often must supplement the poor quality 
food. Human rights observers estimate that at any given time, at least 
one-quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or the outcome of 
their trial.
    In most cases, prisons are run on the ward system. Prisoners with 
similar ideological views are incarcerated together and, in some cases 
indoctrinate and punish their own, resulting in gang and terrorist 
group domination of entire wards. The Ministry of Justice said publicly 
in December that it has not fully controlled the prisons since 1991. 
Efforts by the Ministry of Justice over the past year to construct and 
transfer inmates to a small-group ``F-type'' cell system were 
criticized strongly by human rights groups and prisoners' groups. 
Groups linked to terrorist organizations claimed that the ward system 
was a more humane form of incarceration. Critics of the F-type cells 
claim that these cells allow authorities to isolate single inmates or 
small groups of prisoners from other inmates, and to control prisoners' 
access to water, food, electricity, and toilets.
    In November and December, hundreds of prisoners, mostly affiliated 
with far-left terrorist groups, went on hunger strikes to protest F-
type prisons, claiming that they intended to starve themselves to 
death. The Government entered the prisons in December, after the fast 
had reached its sixtieth day and negotiations to end it had not been 
successful. During and after the government intervention, at least 31 
inmates and 2 Jandarma were killed. Weapons and other illegal materials 
were found in the cells during the operation. The cause of many of the 
deaths--including those who allegedly set themselves on fire on the 
order of their organization--is unclear. The Government, not following 
normal practice, refused to allow prisoner families or lawyers to see 
autopsy results. No open investigation has been planned, although there 
may be internal disciplinary proceedings for some prison officials. 
Some prisoners were transferred to newly-opened cell-system prisons. 
Two members of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee visited one of 
the new prisons at the end of the year. According to their report, 341 
prisoners from 5 other jails had been transferred to the new cell-
system prison. Some of them, as well as prisoners in other jails, 
continued their hunger strikes while many others complained of brutal 
handling by the authorities or inadequate medical treatment. Prisoners' 
strikes and demonstrations by supporters' groups and human rights 
organizations, particularly the HRA, continued and in many cases led to 
detentions. Four offices of the HRA were closed in November and 
December for activities relating to the prison protests (see Section 
4.)
    During an attempt to bring prisoners to their court appearances in 
July, prison authorities injured 61 inmates at Burdur Prison. One 
prisoner's arm was torn off by machinery used to break down a wall. 
Inmates alleged that they were tortured following the incident.
    In May and June, the Parliament's Human Rights Committee, under 
then-chairman Sema Piskinsut, released a series of comprehensive and 
highly critical reports on prison conditions throughout the country. In 
October Piskinsut was not re-appointed to chair the committee. Some 
critics of the Government claim that this was in response to her 
activism. She was replaced by Huseyin Akgul of the MHP. The reports 
were based on 2 years of visits by the committee (which includes 
members from all 5 political parties represented in Parliament) and 
interviews with over 8,500 inmates. The reports, which also included 
evaluations of some detention sites such as police cells, alleged that 
torture remains widespread in the prison system and that those in 
positions of authority, including prosecutors and provincial governors, 
were not doing enough to ensure adequate living conditions for inmates. 
AI noted that these reports represented a significant step forward by 
officials in documenting torture as well as prison conditions.
    The Government permits prison visits by representatives of some 
international organizations, such as the European Committee to Prevent 
Torture and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. The CPT visited in 
July, and again in December. However, the Government does not allow 
NGO's to visit prisons except for individuals acting in their capacity 
as lawyers. A delegation from AI visited in April and Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) conducted research into prisons over the course of the 
year. Delegations from AI and HRW met with Turkish officials as part of 
their research into prison issues; however, AI and HRW assert that 
during their return visits in December, following the prison crisis, 
government officials declined to meet with them.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention continued to be problems. To take a person into custody, a 
prosecutor must issue a detention order, except when suspects are 
caught committing a crime. The maximum detention period for those 
charged with individual common crimes is 24 hours, which may be 
extended by a judge to a maximum of 7 days; this period is longer for 
groups. In the state of emergency area, the use of a prosecutor's 
detention order is in practice extremely rare. According to the HRA, 
there was significant improvement in the first 8 months of the year in 
numbers of detentions (21,866) compared with the same period in 1999 
(40,380). However, the HRF claims that in the final 2 months of the 
year there was an upsurge in unregistered detentions in connection with 
prison protests.
    Under the Criminal Code, those detained for individual common 
crimes are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and may meet and 
confer with an attorney at any time. In practice, legal experts assert 
that the authorities do not always respect these provisions and that 
most citizens do not exercise this right, either because they are 
unaware of it, or because they fear possibly antagonizing the 
authorities. The court consistently provides attorneys only to minors 
or deaf-mutes who cannot represent themselves. By law a detainee's next 
of kin must be notified as soon as possible after arrest. In criminal 
and civil cases this requirement is observed.
    In state security cases, the pretrial detention period without 
charge is longer, and the law provides for no immediate access to an 
attorney. The lack of early access to an attorney is a major factor in 
the continued use of torture by security forces. Persons detained for 
individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a 
judge within 48 hours. Those charged with crimes of a collective, 
political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an initial 
period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's 
discretion and, with a judge's permission, which is almost always 
granted, for up to 7 days in most of the country and up to 10 days in 
the southeastern provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are 
allowed access only after the first 4 days.
    Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven 
implementation of these regulations, especially attorney access. AI 
asserts that lawyers rarely are permitted adequate access to their 
clients, even after the fourth day, although they may be allowed to 
exchange a few words during a brief interview in the presence of 
security officers. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
the secretive nature of arrests and detentions often leaves the 
detainee's lawyer and family members with no information about the 
detention, and police often refuse to disclose the place of detention 
or even the fact that the detainee is being held. Current regulations 
on detention and arrest procedures exempt the authorities from the 
obligation to inform relatives in the case of state security 
detentions. In addition legal limits on detention periods at times are 
circumvented by subjecting a detainee to successive charges or 
falsifying detention records. The police maintain 24-hour monitoring 
bureaus that are required to record detentions on computers. According 
to the HRA, in the state of emergency region the police detain, beat, 
and then release groups after the maximum period of detention in order 
to intimidate them.
    Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned by 
a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment the judge may 
release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as 
bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely 
to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence.
    The decision concerning early access to counsel in such cases is 
left to the public prosecutor, who often denies access on the grounds 
that it would prejudice an ongoing investigation. Although the 
Constitution specifies the right of detainees to request speedy 
arraignment and trial, judges have ordered that some suspects be 
detained indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many such cases involve 
persons accused of violent crimes, but there are cases of those accused 
of nonviolent political crimes being kept in custody until the 
conclusion of their trials.
    On several occasions, the police beat and detained peaceful 
demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). During a September protest 
over prison conditions officers beat the relatives of prisoners. The 
police also beat and detained members of political parties (see Section 
3). Students detained while making a press statement in Istanbul in 
June claimed that they were tortured, and one alleged that the police 
broke her arm.
    The Government does not use forced external exile. It retains the 
authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and in practice the general law courts generally 
act independently of the executive and legislative branches; however, 
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to 
strengthen the judiciary's independence. The Constitution prohibits 
state authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the 
exercise of judicial power; however, in practice the Government and the 
NSC periodically issue announcements or directives about threats to the 
State, which could be interpreted as instructions to the judiciary. The 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is appointed by the 
President and includes the Minister of Justice, selects judges and 
prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for oversight of 
those in the lower courts. The composition of the High Council could 
impact the independence of the judiciary; although the Constitution 
provides for security of tenure, the High Council controls the career 
paths of judges through appointments, transfers, promotions, and other 
matters, and its decisions are not subject to review. Various 
government and judicial officials during the year discussed the need to 
adopt legislative changes to strengthen the independence of the 
judiciary.
    The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military 
courts, the SSC's, and the Constitutional Court, the nation's highest 
court. The Court of Cassation hears appeals for criminal cases, 
including from the SSC's. The Council of State hears appeals of 
administrative cases or those between government entities. Most cases 
are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include civil, 
administrative, and criminal courts. Public servants, including police, 
can be tried only after administrative approval from the governor or 
subgovernor, which are centrally appointed positions.
    The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws, 
decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving 
the banning of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime 
ministers can be tried in the Constitutional Court as well. However, 
the Court may not consider ``decrees with the force of law'' issued 
under a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of war.
    Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases 
involving military law, members of the armed forces, and may try 
civilians who are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or 
undermining compliance with the draft.
    SSC's are composed of panels of five members: Three civilian judges 
and two prosecutors. SSC's sit in eight cities and try defendants 
accused of crimes such as terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug 
smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and espousing or 
disseminating ideas prohibited by law, such as those ``damaging the 
indivisible unity of the State.'' These courts may hold closed hearings 
and may admit testimony obtained during police interrogation in the 
absence of counsel. SSC verdicts may be appealed only to a specialized 
department of the Court of Cassation (Appeals Court) dealing with 
crimes against state security. During the year, the SSC's dealt mainly 
with cases under the Anti-Terror Law and Section 312 of the Criminal 
Code. Human rights observers cite prosecutions of leaders of the 
political Islamic movement, nonviolent political leaders associated 
with the Kurdish issue, and persons who criticize the military or the 
Government's practices as evidence that the SSC's often serve a 
primarily political purpose.
    PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, sentenced to death in 1999, remained in 
prison at year's end. Carrying out the death sentence still requires 
action and approval by the Justice Ministry, the Council of Ministers, 
Parliament, and the President. The Government in January decided to 
agree to the request of the ECHR to suspend the death sentence process 
until the court completes its judicial processes. In December the ECHR 
accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding 
irregularities of his capture and trial in the country.
    The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise the 
police during an investigation. Prosecutors complain that they have few 
resources to do so, and many have begun to call for ``judicial police'' 
who could help investigate and gather evidence. Human rights observers 
and Ministry of Justice officials note that problems can arise from the 
fact that the police report to the Interior Ministry, not to the 
courts.
    Prosecutors are charged with determining which law has been broken 
and objectively presenting the facts to the court. Defense lawyers do 
not have equal status with prosecutors. There is no jury system; a 
judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Trials for political 
crimes or torture frequently last for months or years, with one or two 
hearings scheduled each month. Proceedings against security officials 
often are delayed because officers do not submit statements promptly or 
attend trials. Illegally gathered evidence may be excluded by law. 
However, this rarely occurs and then only after a separate case 
determining the legality of the evidence is resolved. In practice a 
trial based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture may proceed 
and even conclude, before the court has established the merits of the 
torture allegations.
    In January a ``prisons protocol'' signed by the Ministries of 
Justice, Interior, and Health called for intensified searches of those 
entering prisons, including lawyers and prosecutors. The Bar 
Association claims that defense lawyers are searched intensively, in 
contrast to other personnel, and that the new rule permits prison 
officials to confiscate documents from prisoners that may relate to 
their defense. The State is required to return the documents if they 
are defense-related. The Government issued a second circular, in March, 
requesting that those who conduct the searches do so in a respectful 
manner and bear in mind the right of access and of private 
correspondence between a client and his attorney.
    Defense attorneys routinely are denied access to files that the 
State asserts deal with national intelligence or security matters, 
especially in cases heard by SSC's. Furthermore, attorneys defending 
controversial cases have been subject to legal charges, including 
spurious accusations that they are couriers for clients who are alleged 
terrorists. Hasan Dogan, a Malatya attorney who frequently defends 
suspects in SSC cases, was acquitted in 1999 of charges by an informer 
that he was a member of the PKK or assisted the organization. An 
appeals court reversed his acquittal and he was sentenced to 3 years 
and 9 months. He has appealed this verdict and the case was still 
pending. He also faces the same charge in another case, and was 
sentenced in December to 3 years, 9 months. He has applied for a 
suspension of this punishment. Another case was opened against him for 
insulting the military; results were still pending at year's end. The 
trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 and 1994 for aiding and 
abetting the PKK, and in a few cases with membership in a terrorist 
organization, continued at the Diyarbakir SSC (see Section 4).
    By law the Bar Association must provide free counsel to indigents 
who make a request to the court, except for crimes falling under the 
scope of the SSC's. In practice only a tiny percentage of defendants 
have lawyers. Bar Associations in large cities, such as Istanbul, have 
attorneys on call 24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the Association. 
Defense lawyers generally have access to the public prosecutor's files 
only after arraignment.
    In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate 
against minorities. Legal proceedings are conducted solely in Turkish 
with some interpreting available; however, some defendants whose native 
language is not Turkish may be disadvantaged seriously. Turkey 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the ECHR. During the year, Turkey lost 
23 cases to which it was a party, most of which pertained to free 
expression, deaths, past disappearances, and torture and was fined $1.2 
million (812 billion TL). In 11 additional cases, mostly relating to 
failure to ensure due process of law, Turkey accepted a friendly 
settlement and paid $150,000 (about 1 billion TL); and the court 
dismissed a further five cases.
    There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners 
in the country. The Government claims that alleged political prisoners 
are in fact security detainees convicted of being members of, or 
assisting, terrorist organizations.
    International humanitarian organizations are allowed access to 
political prisoners, provided the organization can obtain permission 
from the Ministry of Justice. With the exception of the Committee to 
Prevent Torture of the Council of Europe, which has good access, in 
practice few such permissions are granted.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a 
person's domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication; 
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. With some 
exceptions, government officials may enter a private residence or 
intercept or monitor private correspondence only after the issuance of 
a judicial warrant. These provisions generally are respected outside 
the state of emergency region. If delay may cause harm to the case, 
prosecutors may authorize a search. Searches of private premises may 
not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be damaging to the 
case or the search is expected to result in the capture of a prisoner 
at large. Other exceptions include persons under special observation by 
the security directorate general, places anyone can enter at night, 
places where criminals gather, places where materials obtained through 
the commission of crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and 
brothels. According to a 1999 law that permits wider wiretapping, a 
court order is needed to carry out a wiretap. However, in an emergency 
situation, a prosecutor can grant permission. The wiretap can last only 
3 months, with two possible extensions of 3 months each.
    In the provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of 
emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a 
warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses, 
associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association maintains 
that it is not constitutional for security authorities in these 
provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or 
documents. Seven provinces remain under ``adjacent province'' status, 
which authorizes the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for 
municipalities as well as rural areas, and grants the provincial 
governor several extraordinary powers. Due to the improved security 
situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased.
    With the diminution of PKK terrorism, the formerly widespread 
practice of evacuating villages to prevent their giving aid to the PKK 
has lessened; however, there was a report of one village re-evacuation 
occurring in October (see Section 1.g.).
    Some elements of society complain that a ban on the wearing of 
religious head coverings in government offices, other state-run 
facilities, and universities interfered with citizens' religious 
observance (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Since 1984 the PKK has waged a violent terrorist 
insurgency in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces 
and civilians. In response, police, Jandarma, village guards, and the 
armed forces conducted an intense campaign to suppress PKK terrorism. 
However, since 1999 almost all such violent activity by the PKK has 
ceased, although some armed clashes between the two sides continued to 
occur. Security forces continued to target active PKK units as well as 
those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK. 
There continued to be few reports of government and PKK human rights 
abuses committed against noncombatants. According to statistics from 
the governor of the state of emergency region, 23,415 PKK members, 
5,029 security force members, and 4,460 civilians have lost their lives 
in the fighting since 1987. During the year, 29 members of the security 
forces and 15 civilians died, according to the military.
    The Government's state of emergency, renewed in Diyarbakir, 
Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November, 
imposes stringent security measures in those four southeastern 
provinces. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor 
news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree 
provides for doubling the sentences of those convicted of ``cooperating 
with separatists.'' Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with 
the State may receive rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited 
judicial review of the state of emergency governor's administrative 
decisions is permitted.
    In October the governor of Tunceli formally abolished the food 
embargo in that region, the last large-scale rationing in the region. 
Food rationing also had been justified as a means of denying logistical 
support to the PKK. Provincial authorities deny villagers access to 
some high pastures for grazing, citing security concerns, but have 
allowed other villages access to their high pastures.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no credible allegations of 
serious abuses by security forces during the course of operations 
against the PKK.
    The Government organizes, arms, and pays a civil defense force in 
the region of more than 65,000 persons, which is known as the village 
guards. Participation in this paramilitary militia is mainly voluntary, 
but villagers faced danger from both the PKK and the Government when 
choosing whether or not to join the guard force. Village guards have a 
reputation for being the least disciplined of the Government's security 
forces and have been accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape, 
corruption, theft, and human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and 
compensation contribute to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma 
allegedly have protected village guards from prosecution. In addition 
to the village guards, Jandarma and police ``special teams'' are viewed 
as those most responsible for abuses. However, the incidence of 
credible allegations of serious abuses by security forces, in the 
course of operations against the PKK, is significantly lower than in 
the past.
    There was a report of one village re-evacuation during the year 
(see Section 1.e). Five residents of Akcapinar hamlet said Jandarma 
burned 16 tents, one home, and crops there in early October. Residents 
had apparently returned to the hamlet in May after having received 
permission from local officials but without the requisite permission 
from higher levels within the Government. Between 1984 and 1999, and 
particularly in the early 1990's, a large number of persons were 
displaced forcibly from villages. The practice was justified by the 
Government as a means of protecting civilians or preventing PKK 
guerrillas from obtaining logistical support from the inhabitants. 
Provincial authorities deny villagers access to some high pastures for 
grazing, citing security concerns, but have allowed other villages 
access to their high pastures. The Government reported that 378,000 
persons had ``migrated'' (it disputes the term ``evacuation'') from 
3,165 state of emergency region villages between 1994 and 1999; many 
left before that due to the fighting. The highest credible estimate of 
displaced persons is as high as 1 million. Voluntary and assisted 
resettlements have begun in the region. In some cases, persons may 
return to their old homes; in other cases, centralized villages have 
been constructed. Only a fraction of the total number of evacuees has 
returned, but there is a noticeable increase in the pace of returns.
    After the middle of the year, there appeared to be an upsurge in 
the rate of returns and return requests. About 10,000 persons returned 
to their villages between June and August, according to the state of 
emergency governor. In July he declared that 65,000 of the 131,000 
return requests filed with his office were ``appropriate.'' According 
to the Jandarma, over 28,000 persons returned to the OHAL region and 
adjacent provinces during the year. They state that there are an 
additional 238,900 applications for returns to 621 villages and 461 
smaller hamlets, but only about a third of these claims are appropriate 
(mainly for security reasons) at this time. A July HADEP ``migrant 
commission'' report claimed HADEP had over 23,000 additional requests 
for returns, each petition representing a family. However, some persons 
included on return petitions may not have been aware that a request had 
been made for them. Furthermore, many evacuees have neither the will 
nor the economic means to return.
    Despite the increased pace, returns to date represent a fraction of 
the number of persons who may wish to return. Governors continued to 
provide building materials to some returnees. Activists remain critical 
of government efforts to resettle villagers in government-constructed 
``central villages'' instead of original village sites. Local Jandarma 
impose limitations on some resettlement efforts. According to news 
reports, in January Jandarma prevented the return of 15 families to a 
village in Sirnak province. The families claimed that the village 
guards who currently occupy their village had burned their homes and 
cut down their orchards.
    The Government continues to deal with the problem of the hundreds 
of thousands of persons displaced from their villages and hamlets. 
According to the Government, its ``East and Southeast Anatolia Action 
Plan'' began in May. The Plan, as well as other government programs, 
has focused on providing assistance to displaced persons and support 
for return to villages or relocation to new, centralized villages. Over 
4,000 persons now live in centralized villages. From June to October, 
financial and other assistance (including young trees, animals, 
beehives, and looms) was provided to over 14,000 persons in 96 villages 
and 87 hamlets.
    Regional cities in the southeast have doubled and tripled in size 
in the past decade, without a commensurate increase in services such as 
schools. Many persons from the area went to major cities in the West of 
the country. A 1998 parliamentary committee investigation concluded 
that the State was partly responsible for the displacements and had 
failed to compensate adequately villagers who had lost their homes and 
lands in the region. However, regional officials report that flows of 
migrants nearly stopped during the year due to waning PKK activity in 
the countryside.
    In contrast to the national average of 45 children per classroom, 
there are typically 60 to 90 children per classroom in eastern and 
southeastern provinces and as many as 80 to 100 in Diyarbakir (most 
schools in the southeast employ a shift schedule for classes to 
accommodate the large numbers). According to the Government, in the 
southeast there was a noticeable improvement in the number of students 
able to attend classes, partly due to improved availability of teachers 
and schools, and partly due to the requirement for an 8-year education. 
During the 1999 to 2000 school year, there were 270,000 students in 
secondary education in the southeast, compared to 240,000 the year 
before. In the state of emergency region, 450 schools are closed, 
although none were closed during the year. Although the Government has 
built boarding schools in the region's larger towns, these new schools 
have not met the demand. Although schools remained open in most urban 
centers in the southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of 
city schools and chronic teacher shortages. Despite a longstanding 
tradition of boarding schools in the rural areas of the country, some 
ethnic Kurdish leaders have expressed concern that the Government 
constructed boarding schools, rather than rebuild local schools, in 
order to accelerate the process of Kurdish assimilation. According to 
press reports, soldiers in one command of the state of emergency region 
repaired 167 village schools in preparation for the 2000 to 2001 
academic year and during the past year spent about $700,000 (300 
million TL) on health, education, and infrastructure projects in the 
region.
    During the year, Turkish ground forces with air support conducted 
several operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. The Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan cooperated with 
the Turkish Government in shutting down certain PKK facilities in 
northern Iraq. Turkish government policy is to target only PKK fighters 
in northern Iraq; however, Turkish planes accidentally killed 38 
civilians in Sedakan, northern Iraq, during an operation in August 
against the PKK. The Government is taking steps to compensate the 
victims' families. At the end of the year, an operation against the PKK 
involving hundreds of Turkish soldiers continued in northern Iraq, 
according to press reports.
    In February Parliament renewed legislation allowing members of 
terrorist organizations (and criminal gangs) to apply for amnesty or 
reductions in sentences, if they provide useful information that helps 
lead to the dissolution of the organization. Government figures are not 
available for the number of persons who applied for the amnesty, but 
human rights attorneys speculate that the number is above 2,500. 
According to press reports, many applicants, including some who were 
members of Turkish Hizbullah, have obtained sentence reductions or 
release.
    The PKK remained almost completely inactive during the year. There 
were reports of internal divisions over jailed PKK leader Ocalan's call 
for ending the armed struggle, but by year's end no rival faction 
appeared to have gained control of the group. Apparently on orders from 
the PKK leadership, several groups of 8 to 10 former militants turned 
themselves in to the authorities, asking for amnesty. They are all 
currently standing trial for charges relating to membership in the PKK. 
Although PKK attacks against civilians and law enforcement personnel in 
the southeast have virtually ended, the military did engage the PKK, 
killing several alleged terrorists. Government authorities acknowledge 
that the level of violent conflict is considerably lower than in the 
past and that the main reason is an absence of PKK activity and the 
fact that the security forces were able to effectively end Hizbullah 
operations.
    Other terrorist organizations, most notably DHKP-C, conducted 
attacks mainly against police targets.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continued 
to limit these freedoms. The Constitution leaves open the possibility 
of restrictions to these freedoms on the basis of defense of the 
secular, unitary, state and protection of public order. The Government, 
particularly the judiciary, limits freedom of expression through the 
use of restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and numerous laws such as 
the following: Article 8 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating 
separatist propaganda); Penal Code Articles 312 (incitement to racial, 
ethnic, or religious enmity); 159 (insulting Parliament, the army, 
republic, or judiciary); 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic); 169 
(aiding an illegal organization); the Law to Protect Ataturk; and over 
150 articles of the Press Law (including a provision against commenting 
on ongoing trials). While prosecutors bring dozens of such cases to 
court each year, judges dismiss many charges brought under these laws. 
These cases constitute a form of harassment against writers, 
journalists, and political figures.
    Domestic and foreign periodicals that provide a broad spectrum of 
views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, are 
widely available. The newspaper business is extremely competitive. 
Government censorship of foreign periodicals is very rare.
    Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence, 
particularly that of television, is correspondingly great. According to 
the High Board of Radio and Television, there are 229 local, 15 
regional, and 16 national officially registered television stations, 
and 1,036 local, 108 regional and 36 national radio stations. Other 
television and radio stations broadcast without an official license. 
The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable television 
allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several Turkish-language 
private channels. The State owns and operates the Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation.
    Internet use is growing and faces no government restrictions; in 
fact, some banned newspapers can be accessed freely on the Internet. 
Parliament passed legislation in September 1999 suspending for 3 years 
the sentences of those convicted of crimes in the media, such as 
journalists, writers, and party officials who published articles. The 
Islamist opposition party Fazilet challenged the constitutionality of 
the law because it did not apply to those who committed similar crimes 
through speech. In September the Constitutional Court ruled that this 
complaint had merit and ordered the Government to correct the problem. 
In mid-December, the Government passed the ``Provisional Suspension of 
Sentence Law,'' which in addition to leading to the eventual release of 
thousands of ordinary criminals, may effect the release, and suspension 
of trials, of many persons prosecuted on charges related to free 
expression. The suspension only applies to those whose ``criminal act'' 
took place before April 23, 1999.
    Although hundreds of those prosecuted or convicted for free 
expression crimes had their sentences or trials suspended, some writers 
remain in jail. Esber Yagmurdereli, for example, remains imprisoned 
because his conviction in 1998 was for a speech, although his case may 
fall under the ``Provisional Suspension of Sentence Law.'' The CPJ 
reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned at year's end, compared 
with 18 in 1999. According to the Ministry of Interior, 43 journalists 
were in jail in July, of whom 26 had been convicted and the rest were 
still standing trial. The Chairman of the Press Council said, after 
studying the list, that his organization considered only four of these 
to be ``imprisoned for their journalistic practices.'' Other journalist 
associations note that some who are imprisoned for crimes in the media 
are political activists with only tenuous journalistic credentials.
    Under the suspension law, charges are dropped if the journalist or 
writer does not commit the same crime again during the 3-year period; 
if a second offense is committed during this time, the suspension is 
revoked. Human rights advocates, journalists, and other writers 
consider that the conditions for the suspension amount to censorship.
    The law makes it illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's 
unity or national security and limits the private broadcast of 
television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of 
Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private 
television and radio frequencies, monitors broadcasters and sanctions 
them if they are not in compliance with relevant laws. Parliament 
elects the RTUK members (divided between ruling and opposition parties) 
and provides its budget. Although nominally independent, the RTUK is 
subject to some political pressures. In December RTUK banned broadcasts 
of Ozgur Radio for 180 days, claiming that the station had slandered 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in a July broadcast.
    The RTUK penalizes private radio and television stations for the 
use of offensive language, libel, obscenity, instigating separatist 
propaganda, or broadcasting programs in Kurdish. Throughout the year, 
the RTUK penalized radio and television stations over 210 times for 
noncompliance with broadcast regulations, according to testimony given 
by the RTUK chairman to a Parliamentary committee in November. In 
general RTUK suspended television broadcasts for a day, and radio 
broadcasts for longer terms such as 3 to 6 months, usually for 
violating laws prohibiting the broadcast of ``terrorist organization 
declarations.'' The human rights monitoring group Mazlum-DER recorded 
closures of 26 television stations for a total of 208 closure days, and 
closures of 24 radio stations for a total of 3,725 days, while the 
Government provided RTUK closure figures of 62 television stations 
closed for 704 days, and 67 radio stations closed for 3,889 days.
    RTUK decisions may be appealed to the provincial administrative 
court and then to the Council of State (Danistay). In some cases, this 
is successful. In February the RTUK gave a 1-day closure punishment to 
CNN TURK, in response to a January broadcast in which a commentator 
asked a program guest if PKK leader Ocalan could be compared with 
former South African President Mandela. According to the RTUK, the 
broadcast ``threatened the existence and unity of the Turkish state'' 
and ``encouraged separatism.'' CNN TURK appealed the decision and won. 
Another RTUK closure order, against Channel 6 for its criticism of the 
Government's response to the August 1999 earthquake, was also 
overturned by the Danistay.
    Despite the Government's restrictions, the media criticize 
government leaders and policies daily and have developed a more 
adversarial role vis-a-vis the Government. Lively debates on human 
rights and government policies continued, especially on issues relating 
to Turkey's EU membership process; the role of the military; political 
Islam; and the question of ethnic Kurds as ``minorities.'' 
Nevertheless, persons who write or speak out on such highly sensitive 
topics risk prosecution.
    Government decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry, upon the request 
of the state of emergency regional governor, the authority to ban 
distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the 
region. In the event that a government warning is not obeyed, the 
decree provides for a 10day suspension of operations for a first 
offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. This and other pressures, 
such as RTUK suspensions, lead to self-censorship on some issues.
    SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of 
leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals and banned 
several books on a range of topics. Prosecutors closed numerous 
journals or suspended their operations during the year. The police 
frequently raid offices of small leftist publications, while 
distributors of the pro-Kurdish journals Evrensel and Yeni Gundem 
outside the state of emergency region claim regular harassment and the 
confiscation of their newspapers by the police.
    Journalists, including those from mainstream and western media, 
were harassed periodically and subjected to police abuse while covering 
stories. Two Swedish journalists were arrested, and their film 
confiscated, while visiting a small town near Diyarbakir in April. 
Their film was returned and they were released after the Swedish 
Government protested.
    The Government continued to restrict the free expression of ideas 
by individuals sympathetic to some Islamist, leftist, and Kurdish 
nationalist or cultural viewpoints.
    In April a group of 24 intellectuals sought to challenge legal 
restrictions on expression by republishing the formally banned book 
``Freedom of Thought'' under the new title ``Freedom of Thought--
2000.'' The group, which consists of well-known human rights activists, 
actors, journalists, and academicians, notified officials at the 
Istanbul SSC of their actions. The court indicted the group in May, 
demanding sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for 16 
persons on various charges, including supporting a terrorist 
organization and inciting hatred and enmity. The case was ongoing at 
year's end. In December musician and human rights activist Sanar 
Yurdatapan and Nevzat Onaran, Chairman of the Contemporary Lawyer's 
Association's Istanbul branch, each served 24-day sentences given by a 
military court in connection with the publication of a previous 
``Freedom of Thought'' pamphlet.
    Nadire Mater was acquitted in September of charges that she 
``insulted the military'' with her publication, ``Mehmet's Book.'' 
Copies of the book were seized in 1999 on order of the Istanbul SSC, 
and Mater and her publisher were charged under Article 159 of the Penal 
Code, with a possible prison sentence of 2 to 12 years. Since part of 
the acquittal was based on the Suspension of Sentences Law for the 
book's early editions, she faces a 3-year ``probation'' period, and if 
she commits the same crime she theoretically would face a resumption of 
her trial. The prosecutor appealed the acquittal, and the ban on the 
book continues. ``Mehmet's Book'' is a compilation of interviews with 
retired conscripts who had served in the southeast. The book records 
without commentary the soldiers' experiences in the field. These rank-
and-file stories allege corruption, drug abuse, and dishonest handling 
of the press. As many as 40,000 to 50,000 copies have been sold, and 
although the book remains banned it is available in some bookstores.
    The Istanbul SSC brought charges of ``supporting separatist and 
terrorist propaganda'' against the distributors of the CD-Rom version 
of National Geographic magazine's full collection in late 1999. The 
collection included a 1992 article on Kurds that showed a map of the 
region most populated most heavily by Kurds; the article was published 
and circulated in Turkey. In February the court suspended the case in 
line with the ``suspension of sentences'' law, because the publication 
date was before April 1999.
    In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was 
convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity'' 
along religious lines, for a speech he had made in 1994 in which he 
referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced to 1 
year's imprisonment, but his punishment was suspended under the 
``probational suspension of sentences law'' passed in December. Human 
rights groups and some politicians criticized the verdict as 
undemocratic, but the judiciary and many mainstream politicians 
defended it. Also in March, the chairman of the Islamic business-
oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment 
under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he referred to 
``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended.
    Abdurrahman Dilipak, a veteran columnist with the Islamist daily 
Akit, faced multiple charges during the year for articles criticizing 
the Government's policy, especially on religious head coverings and the 
alleged activities of a military group that reportedly monitors 
political Islam. He was convicted in January by the Malatya SSC and 
sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment related to a 1998 conference in 
Malatya. Appeals continued at year's end.
    Former chairman of the HRA Akin Birdal reentered prison in March 
after a 6-month release on medical grounds. He was released on 
September 23 after serving a total of over 9 months' imprisonment on 
charges related to free speech (see Section 4).
    Hasan Guzel, head of the small Rebirth Party and an outspoken 
former Education Minister under the pro-Islamist Refah Party 
government, was released from jail in May after serving 5 months of a 
1-year sentence for ``inciting religious and ethnic enmity,'' based on 
a controversial 1997 speech. In January he was convicted on the same 
charge in a different case relating to a 1998 speech.
    Poet Yilmaz Odabasi entered prison in March to serve a 7-month 
sentence for contempt of court, for having said that he was ``ashamed 
to live in the same age and country'' as the court that convicted him 
in 1997 for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' with his book 
``Dream and Life.'' He was released in June.
    Cases may be continuing against Dogu Perincek, chairman of the 
Workers' Party, for convictions concerning a 1994 speech delivered at 
the HRA general convention and slandering former Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller. In September Perincek was acquitted on charges of assisting the 
PKK and possessing secret state documents.
    The trial of Dr. Veli Lok, president of the HRF's Izmir branch, for 
violation of the press law, ended in June. Dr. Lok, Bahri Akkan 
(spokesman for the Izmir Democracy Platform), and Fikret Ilkiz (an 
editor at Cumhuriyet newspaper) were convicted on the basis of an 
article published in October 1999 in Cumhuriyet, in which Lok and Akkan 
were quoted regarding a trial involving other HRF members. Publicly 
commenting on an ongoing court case is forbidden under the Press Law. 
The Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the Izmir prosecutor in 
November 1999, asking him to review the Cumhuriyet article and 
determine if a crime had been committed. The indictment followed 
shortly. Lok and Akkan were sentenced to pay a fine of about $200 (120 
million TL); Ilkiz is to pay about $210 (124 million TL). Lok's 
sentence was suspended for 5 years, and he has appealed.
    In October a Syriac priest was charged under Article 312 for 
``inciting religious, racial and sectarian hatred'' for comments he 
made to the media about legislation under consideration at that time by 
the U.S. Congress that referred to Armenian genocide. The trial of the 
priest, who spoke in favor of the legislation, began in December. He 
spent one night under arrest but otherwise has been free to continue 
his pastoral duties.
    In April the pro-Kurdish daily Ozgur Bakis ceased publication, 
blaming government pressure (including closure orders, fines, 
investigations of 124 out of 370 editions, and court cases against 
editors). In its place Yeni Gundem newspaper began publication in May 
and was banned in the emergency region a week later. Also in April, the 
state of emergency governor banned four magazines (Ozgur Halk, Yasamda 
Genclik, Ozgur Kadinin Sesi, and Rewsen) from the emergency region. In 
May the governor banned distribution of four newspapers and eight 
journals, including Evrensel Kurdish-language weekly Azadiya Welate 
(which had been banned previously). However, these publications can be 
accessed in the emergency region on the Internet. Throughout the 
country some potential customers are afraid to purchase Kurdish-
language materials because the possession of such items may be 
interpreted as evidence of PKK sympathies.
    Kurdish-language cassettes and publications are available 
commercially, although the periodic banning of particular cassettes or 
singers continued, especially in the state of emergency region. 
Kurdish-language broadcasts of news, commentary, or discussion are 
illegal throughout the country. One radio station broadcasts in Kurdish 
but is widely believed to be government-sponsored. Kurdish music is 
played on radio and television programs with certain restrictions, 
especially in the emergency zone and adjacent provinces. The state of 
emergency regional governor frequently bans from the region Kurdish 
recordings that may be played legally elsewhere in the country. In 
August he issued an order banning the sale of 242 music recordings, 
most in Kurdish. Stations that play Kurdish songs not on the limited 
play list risk temporary bans or closure. Radio stations that mix small 
amounts of Kurdish songs into their predominantly Turkish broadcasting 
appear to face fewer problems.
    Pro-PKK Medya-TV, which is banned, broadcasts in Kurdish from 
Europe and nevertheless can be received via satellite dish. Another 
station, Kurdistan-TV, based in northern Iraq, can be received via 
satellite, and is not banned. The ECHR ruled against Turkey on some 
cases of free expression, such as the conviction of a newspaper editor 
for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' in 1993.
    The Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM), an NGO that seeks to 
promote Kurdish language and culture, continues to operate. Some 
officials alleged that the organization is linked to the PKK. The 
group's centers in the southeast remain closed. Police exert pressure 
against the groups and hinder their activities, and local officials 
monitor and often interrupt their cultural events. Some MKM branches 
report that they were prevented from selling Kurdish-language music 
cassettes and were warned against organizing cultural events. On 
December 30, however, for the first time the Governor of Hakkari 
province in the southeast allowed a Kurdish-language music concert, 
organized by an MKM-sponsored band. Five thousand persons attended the 
concert.
    The Kurdish culture and research foundation (Kurt-Kav) remained 
open and continued some activities, including Kurdish language training 
and a study of Kurdish oral tradition. In February Kurt-Kav was 
acquitted of charges alleging promotion of separatism for its 
sponsorship of scholarships for 30 Kurdishspeaking students. A second 
case on the same charges, based on cooperation with a Swedish 
university to promote study of the Kurdish language, still was pending 
in the courts at year's end.
    Academic freedom generally is respected; however, there is believed 
to be some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government often 
restricted this right in practice. The authorities may deny permission 
if they believe that a gathering is likely to disrupt public order. 
Significant prior notification of gatherings is required, and the 
authorities may restrict meetings to designated sites.
    The police beat, abused, detained and harassed some demonstrators, 
but showed restraint in other instances. The police appeared to be 
acceding to a November 1999 Security Administration directive that 
called for the use of minimum force in dispersing demonstrations. In 
February, following the arrests of three HADEP mayors in the southeast 
(see Section 3), supporters of the mayors held large, peaceful protests 
in Diyarbakir's center. Police allowed the demonstrations to continue 
even though they were not approved, and there was no violence. Police 
detained several dozen demonstrators during the 3-day protest period.
    In contrast to the previous year, the March 21 Kurdish Nevruz 
(``New Year'') celebrations were marked by calm and respectful behavior 
among participants and security forces. According to press reports and 
initial contacts with activists in the southeast, the police detained 
several hundred unauthorized demonstrators in Mersin, Sanliurfa, Siirt, 
and Adana, but there were reportedly no arrests nor excessive use of 
force (as there had been in the previous year). The authorities for the 
first time granted permission for a major celebration a few miles 
outside of Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was 
peaceful, with no detentions, and police treated the crowd well, 
according to a Kurdish activist. Istanbul municipal authorities denied 
permission for a celebration there because the organizers referred to 
``Newroz,'' on the grounds that since there is no letter ``w'' in 
Turkish, this was a Kurdish spelling.
    On World Peace Day, September 1, the authorities denied permission 
for peace demonstrations in Diyarbakir, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, and 
Antalya. In Diyarbakir the police reportedly broke up a gathering, 
detaining 30 participants and injuring 10. In Van the police detained 
27 persons, including the HADEP provincial chairman. In Mus the police 
reportedly detained, beat, and tortured the former district president 
of HADEP. In Tunceli a group of 200 persons was allowed to demonstrate, 
and in other cities events took place peacefully.
    In October police disrupted a professional conference in Izmir of 
the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) on the grounds that the meeting, 
which was to have discussed the issue of prison health, was illegal. 
International observers present for the conference noted that police 
officers demanded to videotape all of the proceedings. The TMA 
cancelled the conference.
    Police have detained and, on occasion, mistreated members of groups 
that protested prison conditions, the Ulucanlar prison incident in 
September 1999 (see Section 1.c.), and the installation of ``F-type'' 
small cells to replace the current ward system. In June the police 
broke up an anti-prison rally and detained 20 participants, including 
the chair of the Istanbul branch of the HRA, Erin Keskin; when critics 
started to protest those detentions, the police broke up that second 
rally and detained another 30 persons. However, in early August the 
Minister of Justice spoke to demonstrators in front of his Ministry and 
invited some of them to visit a new F-type prison, which they did the 
following day. In August an association of families of political 
prisoners left Istanbul for Ankara by bus to protest F-type prisons and 
warn against the potential of hunger strikes and violence in jails (see 
Section 1.c.). The group alleges that it was stopped while en route 
several times by police and Jandarma, and that some parents were beaten 
with clubs and had to be hospitalized. Hundreds of protesters were 
temporarily detained during the period of hunger strikes in the prisons 
in November and police intervention in December.
    In December, following a terrorist attack on a police bus that 
killed two anti-riot police, thousands of fellow officers staged 
protest marches in all of the country's major cities. The marches 
occurred over several days, despite efforts by senior police officials 
to bring them under control. Several hundred police officers have been 
charged with disobeying orders and marching without a permit; they 
faced disciplinary and judicial proceedings at year's end.
    Dr. Alp Ayan, a psychiatrist with the HRF Izmir Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Center; Gunseli Kaya, who also works at the Center; and 
66 others face charges of ``holding an unauthorized demonstration'' for 
participating in the funeral procession in October 1999 of one of the 
prisoners killed in the September 1999 Ulucanlar incident. Ayan, Kaya, 
and 12 others were held in detention for 3 months before being released 
at the start of their trial in January. The trial continued at year's 
end.
    Six school children, between the ages of 12 and 14 years, were 
acquitted in March of charges of holding an ``unauthorized 
demonstration'' in 1998. The children had held a sign that said ``We 
Want Teachers'' during a rally after no teachers came to school that 
day and previous days.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, 
associations and foundations must submit their charters for government 
approval, which is a lengthy and cumbersome process.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Turkey as a 
secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, 
and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and the Government 
generally observed these provisions in practice; however, it imposed 
some restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression 
in government offices and state-run institutions, including 
universities.
    The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education 
through its Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The Diyanet, 
which some groups claim reflects the beliefs of the Sunni Islamist 
mainstream to the exclusion of Alevi adherents, regulates the operation 
of the country's more than 70,000 mosques. Local and provincial imams, 
who are civil servants, are employed by the Diyanet. The Government 
states that the Diyanet treats equally all that request services. 
During the year, partly in commemoration of the Christian jubilee, the 
Diyanet sponsored several ecumenical events among major religious 
groups, including a meeting in Tarsus in May, which produced a document 
that called for intercommunal understanding.
    A separate government agency, the Office of Foundations (Vakiflar 
Genel Mudurlugu), regulates some activities of religious minorities, 
including those established under the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 (Greek 
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish), and their affiliated 
churches, monasteries, and religious schools. The Vakiflar, which dates 
back to the Ottoman Empire, must approve the operation of churches, 
monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious foundations, 
such as hospitals and orphanages. The Vakiflar oversees 160 minority 
religious foundations, including Greek Orthodox (about 70 sites); 
Armenian Orthodox (about 50); and Jewish (20); as well as Syrian 
Christians, Chaldoneans, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgians, and Maronis.
    In May a court allowed a Protestant church in Istanbul to establish 
itself as a ``foundation.'' Normally all ``religious'' foundations need 
to have been in existence since the early days of the republic in order 
to be deemed as such.
    The population is about 99 percent Muslim, primarily Sunni. In 
addition to the country's Sunni majority, an estimated 12 million 
Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and 
build ``Cem houses'' (Alawi places of worship). Some Alawis allege 
discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or 
beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis also charge that there 
is a Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and claim that the 
Directorate tends to view the Alawis as a cultural rather than a 
religious group. However, some Sunni Islamic political activists charge 
that the secular State favors and is under the influence of the Alawis. 
The Government periodically allocates funds to the Alawi community and 
funds Sunni activities.
    There are several non-Muslim religious minority groups; most are 
concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. These include an 
estimated 50,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians, 25,000 Jews, and roughly 
3,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. There are approximately 3,000 
Protestants; 10,000 Baha'is; an estimated 15,000 Syrian Orthodox 
(Syriac) Christians; and a small, undetermined number of Bulgarian, 
Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians. The number of 
Christians in the southeast has declined as the younger generation, 
especially among Syriacs, leaves the area to live in Istanbul, Europe, 
or North America. In December President Sezer issued a message to 
Turkey's minority religious groups on the occasion of Christmas and 
Hanukah.
    The military and judiciary, with support from other members of the 
country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public 
campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to 
the secular republic (see Section 3). The National Security Council 
(NSC)--a powerful military/civilian body established by the 
Constitution to advise senior leadership on national security matters--
categorizes fundamentalism as a primary threat to public safety and 
order. The armed forces regularly dismiss individuals whose official 
files reflect participation in Islamist fundamentalist activities. In 
October the military dismissed 44 officers suspected of sympathizing 
with Islamic groups or Kurdish rebels. At a meeting in March, the NSC 
discussed a report that claimed that fundamentalist Islamic elements 
had increased their activities in a number of areas, including 
infiltrating government ministries. However, the same NSC report noted 
that legislative measures have been taken on only 5 points of the 
February 1997 18-point program against fundamentalism. In August 
President Sezer twice refused to sign a ``decree with force of law'' 
that would have streamlined the procedures for firing civil servants 
suspected of fundamentalist or separatist tendencies, explaining that 
such a measure should be reviewed by Parliament.
    In a widely publicized August 30 ``victory day'' statement, armed 
forces Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a strong 
message to the Government to take action against Islamic 
fundamentalism. In a reference to the civil servants decree turned back 
twice by President Sezer, Kivrikoglu said that the Government and the 
Parliament should take immediate action to address the problem of 
``thousands'' of civil servants whose fundamentalist views were 
threatening the secular state. He noted that the military had an 
effective means of getting rid of suspected fundamentalists or 
separatists from its ranks and that the civil service should adopt 
similar measures. Kivrikoglu alleged that the leader of a moderate 
Islamic Tarikat, Fetullah Gulen, plans to undermine the state and said 
that 11 of the 44 officers recently dismissed by the military for 
fundamentalist proclivities were Gulen supporters. Kivrikoglu claimed 
that Gulen supporters had infiltrated the judiciary as well, a charge 
denied by the Minister of Justice.
    Tarikats and other mystical Sunni Islamic, quasi-religious, and 
social orders were banned in the 1920's but largely were tolerated 
until the 1997 call by the National Security Council for strict 
enforcement of the ban against Tarikats as part of its campaign against 
Islamic fundamentalism. However, prominent political and social leaders 
remain associated with Tarikats.
    In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was 
convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity'' 
along religious lines, for a 1994 speech in which he referred to 
Parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced in March to 1 year's 
imprisonment (see Section 2.a). Also in March, the chairman of the 
Islamic business-oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's 
imprisonment under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he 
referred to ``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended. 
The Istanbul SSC ordered the confiscation of the June 28 issue of the 
reportedly anti-Semitic newspaper Akit and the June 23-29 edition of 
its related weekly publication Cuma for ``inciting religious hatred,'' 
for its treatment of the death of a prominent military official known 
for his secular views. Akit had reported in its coverage that it ``did 
not forgive'' the official for his actions against imam-Hatip schools, 
Koran courses, and students who wear headscarves.
    Religious and moral instruction in state primary and secondary 
schools is compulsory for Muslims. Students who complete primary school 
may study the Koran in government-sponsored schools. The Government 
does not permit private Koran courses.
    Upon written verification of their non-Muslim background, 
minorities considered by the Government to be covered by the 1923 
Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are 
exempted by law from Muslim religious instruction. They may hold their 
own classes or if they want to attend Muslim courses, may do so with 
parental consent. Syriac and other Christians whom the Government does 
not consider to be an official Lausanne Treaty minority are not 
exempted. In August the Syriac community reiterated a 1995 appeal to 
the Government to be considered a Lausanne Treaty minority.
    Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine 
pertaining to minority religions, nor do they restrict the publication 
or use of religious literature. While the Government does not recognize 
the ecumenical nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, it acknowledges 
him as head of the Turkish Greek Orthodox community and does not 
interfere with his travels or other ecumenical activities.
    The authorities monitor the activities of eastern Orthodox churches 
and their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Istanbul consistently has expressed interest in reopening the seminary 
on the Island on Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been 
closed since 1971 when the State nationalized most private institutions 
of higher learning. Under current restrictions, including a citizenship 
requirement, religious communities remain unable to train new clergy. 
However, coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to 
assume leadership positions.
    By law religious services may take place only in designated places 
of worship, although non-Muslim religious services often take place in 
nondesignated places of worship. However, police disrupted several 
Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that they were being held 
in unauthorized locations. On May 24 in Istanbul, several persons 
(including non-Turks) were detained overnight following a police raid 
on a private apartment where a group was holding Protestant services. 
Most of the participants were released the next day and charges were 
dropped; two Turks were held for several days before being released. 
Currently the attendees face charges for unauthorized meetings and 
unauthorized establishment of an education center.
    Minority foundations, including those of religions recognized under 
the Lausanne Treaty, may not acquire property for any purpose, although 
they can lose it. If a community does not use its property because of a 
decline in the size of its congregation over 10 years, the Vakiflar 
takes over direct administration and ownership. There have been no 
reports of minority religions losing their houses of worship or other 
facilities during the year. If such minorities can demonstrate a 
renewed community need, they may apply legally to recover their 
properties. Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to 
historic preservation at times have impeded repairs to existing 
religious facilities. Restoration or construction may be carried out in 
buildings and monuments considered ``ancient'' only with authorization 
of the regional board on the protection of cultural and national 
wealth. Syriac Christians have been allowed to renovate their historic 
buildings in Mardin, although their efforts remain closely monitored by 
the authorities. In May Syriac Christians gathered in Elazig to 
celebrate the completed restoration of a 1,800-year-old church.
    The Baha'i community currently is fighting a legal battle against 
government expropriation of a sacred Baha'i site near Edirne. The site 
was granted cultural heritage status in 1993 by Edirne's board of 
natural and cultural riches, a branch of the Ministry of Culture. 
However, in January the Ministry of Education notified the Baha'i 
community that the property had been expropriated for future use by the 
adjacent primary school. The Ministry has deposited funds in the Baha'i 
community's bank account for the expropriated property. In April the 
local administration court in Edirne rescinded its temporary stay of 
execution and allowed the Ministry of Education to implement 
expropriation, although it has not done so. The Baha'i appeal of the 
expropriation continued at year's end.
    There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion 
recognized by the State, interfering with that religion's services, or 
debasing its property.
    No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; 
however, religious groups that proselytize occasionally are subject to 
government restrictions or harassment. There are no known estimates of 
the number and religious affiliation of foreign missionaries in the 
country. Many prosecutors regard proselytizing and religious activism 
on the part of evangelical Christians, and particularly Islamists, with 
suspicion, especially when such activities are deemed to have political 
overtones. The police sometimes arrest proselytizers for disturbing the 
peace; courts usually dismiss such charges. If the proselytizers are 
foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they are able to 
reenter the country easily. In a case in March, two Turkish Christians 
were detained for a month on the charge of ``insulting Islam'' by 
distributing Bibles; they were released in May at their first hearing 
when witnesses refused to stand by their signed statements. Their trial 
continued in one of four jurisdictions where cases were opened.
    The Government continued to enforce a more than 50-year-old ban on 
the wearing of religious head coverings at universities or by civil 
servants in public buildings. Some women who wear head coverings, and 
both men and women who actively have shown support for those who defy 
the ban, have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and 
teachers; some others were not allowed to register as university 
students. The Council of State (Danistay) ruled in a 1999 case that 
universities are public institutions and, as such, have an obligation 
to protect the country's basic principles, including secularism. In 
making its ruling, the Danistay referred to its understanding of a 
ruling by the ECHR in favor of Turkey, which noted that students had to 
abide by university dress codes, and that the wearing of a headscarf 
could be construed as pressure on other students. According to Mazlum-
DER, during the year 127 teachers lost their jobs for wearing head 
coverings and there were dozens of smallscale protests this school year 
against the headscarf ban.
    Merve Kavakci, elected an M.P. in April 1999 from the Islamist 
Fazilet (Virtue) Party, unsuccessfully sought in May 1999 to be sworn 
in to Parliament wearing an Islamist-style head covering. Kavakci's 
case highlighted the ongoing dispute over the ban on wearing religious-
style clothing in official settings. She later was stripped of Turkish 
citizenship on the grounds that she had assumed another country's 
citizenship without notifying proper authorities and lost her 
parliamentary privileges. She appealed the verdict on her citizenship, 
and in February the highest administrative court upheld the lower 
court's ruling. The issue of headscarves in Parliament, in terms of 
legislation that would give a final definition to the parliamentary 
dress code, remained unresolved.
    The case to close the Islamist Fazilet Party, which was filed in 
May 1999, was still pending at the Constitutional Court at year's end 
(see Section 3). Although religious affiliation is listed on national 
identity cards, there is no official discrimination.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally enjoy freedom of 
movement domestically and the freedom to travel abroad; however, at 
times the Government limited some of these rights. The Constitution 
provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only in 
the case of a national emergency, civic obligations (military service, 
for example), or criminal investigation or prosecution. As the security 
situation continued to improve in the southeast, security officials 
decreased use of roadblocks and vehicle and passenger searches.
    Although there is no legal internal exile, since 1990 the state of 
emergency region's governor in the southeast has had the authority to 
``remove from the region,'' for a period not to exceed the duration of 
the state of emergency (in place for 15 years), citizens under his 
administration whose activities ``give an impression that they are 
prone to disturb general security and public order.'' Teachers, party 
officials, and trade unionists have been affected by this provision in 
the past, and dozens of unionists were kept out of the southeast this 
year, according to press reports. In July security officials in Batman 
took the passports of two visiting British parliamentarians who were 
looking into the issue of the Ilisu dam, and also took documents of a 
Republican People's Party (CHP) official and some accompanying 
journalists.
    When Turkey ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which have the force of 
domestic law, it exercised the option of accepting the Convention's 
obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. Although it has 
not lifted subsequently the geographic limit of its treaty obligation, 
since 1994 the Government has granted temporary asylum to all those 
recognized as refugees. Asylum-seekers apply to the Government for 
temporary protection and to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) for resettlement. If both procedures recognize the asylum-
seeker as a refugee, UNHCR proceeds with resettlement and submits the 
case to other countries. European refugees are given temporary 
residence permits by the Government, renewable until they achieve 
resettlement or a durable solution.
    Furthermore, the UNHCR intervenes with government officials if it 
disagrees with their negative decisions about individual asylum claims. 
An appeal may be lodged within 15 days of a negative decision by the 
authorities. After the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are issued 
a deportation order that may be implemented after 15 days. According to 
the UNHCR, there were 5,681 asylum seekers during the year; out of 
these cases and some from previous years, UNHCR rejected the asylum 
applications of 4,471 and accepted 2,709.
    A regulation obliges asylum seekers to apply within 10 days of 
their arrival and submit proof of identity in order to register as an 
asylum-seeker. The time limit for registration in the Government's 
asylum program is implemented strictly and remains an obstacle to the 
full access of asylum seekers to refugee status determination 
procedures. During the year, 25 refugees and asylum-seekers were 
returned to a country where they feared persecution, compared with 46 
in 1999 and continuing a steady decline since 1995, according to the 
UNHCR. The obstacles inherent in the Government's asylum procedures 
lead to many refugees being considered as ``illegals.'' This year the 
UNHCR considered that there were approximately 100 refugees not 
registered with the Government. The UNHCR and government authorities 
continue to work to resolve this problem and to find ways to allow 
greater access of all asylum seekers to this procedure.
    If they comply with the asylum regulation's requirements, asylum 
seekers are registered by the Government and processed for eligibility 
determination. Late in the year, the Council of State confirmed 
administrative court rulings since 1997 that concluded that failure to 
submit an asylum claim within a fixed time limit could not be a reason 
not to address the application or grant asylum. The UNHCR has no 
information on discrimination by the Government on the basis of 
nationality. The UNHCR maintains a branch office in Ankara and field 
presences in Istanbul, Silopi, Van, and Agri.
    The mass influx in 1999 of 18,000 Kosovars fell under the 1994 
asylum regulation. The Government allowed Kosovars to enter the country 
freely and de facto allowed them ``first asylum''--to stay until they 
repatriate or resettle voluntarily. An estimated 2,000 persons from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and several hundred from Kosovo were granted a 
special temporary ``guest'' status; 42 Kosovars and 74 Bosnians still 
reside in former refugee camps. Because there are no visa requirements, 
thousands of Iranians remain in the country for extended periods. The 
Government generally does not allow similar mass influxes from Iraq but 
allows some individuals and families to settle in or transit the 
country en route to permanent resettlement.
    Cooperation between the UNHCR and the Government has continued 
since 1998 in the field of training border guards and other government 
officials responsible for asylum-seekers and refugees. During the year, 
approximately 150 officials received UNHCR-sponsored training in Bursa, 
Izmir, Antalya, Ankara, and Van. The training is very successful and 
has led to increased contact between UNHCR and local, military, and 
judicial authorities. The UNHCR works with local partners including the 
Turkish Red Crescent Society, the Association for Solidarity with 
Asylum Seekers and Migrants, and the Anatolian Development Foundation 
to integrate refugees into society.
    The country continues to be a transit and departure point for 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers of various nationalities en route 
to Europe, who travel in small groups utilizing land routes, boats, and 
ships.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice. 
Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which national 
elections are held at least every 5 years, with mandatory universal 
suffrage for all citizens 18 years of age and over. More than 30 
political parties are active (most of them minuscule), 5 of which are 
represented in Parliament. Parliament elects the President as Head of 
State every 7 years or when the incumbent becomes incapacitated or 
dies.
    In addition to these bodies, in accordance with the Constitution, 
the NSC, which includes both military and civilian government leaders 
and is chaired by the President, plays a significant role in shaping 
government policy.
    The Government neither coerces nor forbids membership in any 
political organization; however, the chief public prosecutor may bring 
cases seeking the closure of political parties before the 
Constitutional Court, which may close them down for unconstitutional 
activities. The chief public prosecutor opened cases in 1999 to close 
two significant parties, Fazilet and HADEP, alleging that they were 
centers of illegal activities. These cases were unresolved at year's 
end.
    Government pressure against HADEP continued, based on the 
Government's belief that many HADEP supporters had ties to the PKK or 
supported their agenda. Throughout the year, the police raided dozens 
of HADEP offices, especially in the state of emergency region, and 
detained provincial officials and elected HADEP mayors. For example, in 
September the chair of HADEP'S Sirnak branch and a dozen other 
executives were arrested, and police raided HADEP offices in Istanbul, 
Diyarbakir, Adana, Mersin, and Van. In June HADEP secretary general 
Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted under Article Eight of the Anti-Terror 
Law for ``separatism,'' for a speech he gave in October 1999; in 
November Demir was sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment and a fine of 
$1,168 (800 million TL), and in November he was convicted of ``making 
separatist propaganda'' in a 1998 speech and given another 1-year 
sentence, reduced to 10 months. He has not yet gone to jail for either 
conviction. During the year, the Government brought 10 cases against 
HADEP mayors, most for charges of ``separatist propaganda.'' A case 
against Cihan Sincar, Mayor of Kiziltepe, on the grounds that she had 
referred to ``Kurdistan'' in an interview with a Swedish newspaper, 
ended with her acquittal in November. In December the Ankara SSC opened 
an investigation against HADEP on the grounds that its November party 
congress had extended support for the PKK.
    In February Jandarma arrested the HADEP mayors of Diyarbakir, 
Siirt, and Bingol, mostly based on testimony by the deputy mayor of 
Diyarbakir who allegedly was tortured while in police custody (see 
Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 4). The mayors were charged under Article 169 
of the Penal Code with supporting an illegal organization (the PKK) 
through fundraising activities in Europe and Turkey. The mayors were 
held for 3 days, and the Interior Ministry removed them from office but 
reinstated them after peaceful public protests began. The mayors 
remained free and in office at year's end, pending the outcome of their 
trial, which began in April. They were allowed to travel outside the 
country, although some HADEP officials have been barred for years from 
international travel. In September another aide to the Diyarbakir mayor 
was arrested by the anti-terror police on charges of links to the PKK.
    The military and judiciary, with support from some other members of 
the country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public 
campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to 
the secular republic (see Section 2.c.).
    In August Islamist leader Fetullah Gulen was indicted for 
``separatism'' and ``forming a criminal gang;'' however, an Istanbul 
court annulled this indictment on appeal. Two weeks later Ankara SSC 
Prosecutor Nuh Mete Yuksel brought another indictment of trying to 
``change the characteristics of the republic as specified in the 
Constitution.'' Yuksel is seeking the maximum 10-year sentence against 
Gulen under the Anti-Terrorism Law and alleges that Gulen was trying to 
``infiltrate'' the military.
    The trial continued in Ankara of a group of 33 Islamist politicians 
and business figures who had formed a group called the National View 
Organization. The group, many of whom were members of the banned Refah 
Party, were charged in 1999 with attempting to impose a ``religious 
order'' in contravention of Article 146.1 of the Penal Code (forcibly 
trying to change the constitutional order); some of the defendants face 
the death penalty. The case continued at year's end.
    The Democratic Mass Party (DKP), which the Government closed in 
February 1999, had not yet had its closure decision published. Party 
members cannot legally form or join another party until the closure 
decision is officially published.
    Reports continued of corruption and the abuse of power in the 
security forces, including ties with illegal organizations. The 
Government mounted 21 operations in the final 3 months of the year into 
corruption in banking, exports/imports, rural affairs, drugs, and other 
areas, leading to hundreds of detentions and over 100 arrests. In June 
parliamentary committees cleared former Prime Ministers Yilmaz and 
Ciller of a range of corruption charges relating to their activities 
while in office. Some trials linked to corruption charges, involving 
former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and M.P. Sedat Bucak, began in 
1998 but were halted in April 1999 when both were elected to the new 
Parliament and gained automatic legal immunity (which had been lifted 
by the previous Parliament). During the year some M.P.''s proposed in 
Parliament that their immunity be lifted. In June Parliament also voted 
to clear Agar of charges of ``establishing a criminal gang'' relating 
to the 1996 Susurluk scandal. In September an alleged 1998 memorandum 
from senior military sources was made public by the media and human 
rights groups. The memo details a plan of discrediting government 
critics, including HADEP and Fazilet parties, the HRA, and specific 
politicians and journalists. In some cases, actions occurred that were 
similar to the memo's recommendations.
    In February a former Batman provincial governor admitted that 
during his 1993 to 1997 term, his office acquired weapons worth $2.6 
million (1.5 trillion TL) to equip extraordinary units fighting the 
PKK. He said that most were given to the Jandarma and some to the 
police; some allegedly were given to village guards as well. The then-
Prime Minister agreed to fund the purchase in order to ``protect the 
State,'' she explained, although the Ministry of Interior had not 
agreed. The foreignmade weapons entered the country without clearing 
customs. The extralegal aspects of the transaction fueled speculation 
that some weapons may have disappeared. There was no parliamentary 
investigation following the revelations. In December, however, a case 
was opened against four officials from the Foreign Trade 
Undersecretariat's General Directorate of Imports for ``allowing 
illegal importation of weapons by the Batman governate.'' The 
defendants face sentences of between 1 and 4 years.
    There are no legal restrictions on political activity by women, the 
Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women, and 
many women are active politically; however, women are underrepresented 
seriously in government and politics. There are only 22 women in the 
550-seat Parliament, there are no female ministers in Prime Minister 
Ecevit's 35-member Cabinet, and there are no female governors. However, 
one of the five major political parties is headed by a woman.
    There are no legal restrictions on political activity by 
minorities; however, some minorities are underrepresented in government 
and politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Nongovernmental organizations operate in many regions but face 
government obstruction and restrictive laws regarding their operations, 
especially in the four provinces that comprise the state of emergency 
region. The Associations Law governing the activities of most NGO's 
(some fall under the Law of Foundations, and others incorporate 
themselves as businesses) has restrictive provisions regarding 
membership, fundraising, and scope of activities.
    The nongovernmental HRA has branches nationwide and claims a 
membership of about 20,000 persons. In 1990 the HRA established the 
HRF, which operates torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, 
Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and Adana and serves as a clearinghouse for human 
rights information. Other domestic NGO's include the Istanbul-based 
Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy 
Foundation, the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, human rights 
centers at a number of universities, and Mazlum-DER, which is the 
Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples. 
Human rights organizations are represented on the Provincial Human 
Rights Councils currently being formed.
    Human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors involved in 
documenting human rights violations, continued to face detention, 
prosecution, intimidation, harassment, and formal closure orders for 
their legitimate activities. The HRA's Diyarbakir branch was reopened 
in April after having been closed for 3 years. However, several weeks 
later the state of emergency region governor's office ordered the 
branch closed for 3 months. Police allowed the reopening in August but 
within minutes revealed orders to close it for 3 months. The Diyarbakir 
governor allowed it to reopen 2 months later in October. The HRA branch 
in Van was also closed for 3 months in May but reopened in August 
without incident. In February the authorities closed the Malatya HRA 
branch indefinitely for possessing illegal publications (such as banned 
issues of otherwise legal newspapers). However, in April a court ruled 
that there were no criminal grounds for closure, and it reopened in 
June. At the end of the year, mostly for reasons linked to ongoing 
protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.), authorities closed HRA 
branches in Malatya, Gaziantep, Van, and Konya.
    Mazlum-DER's Sanliurfa branch reopened in April. The office had 
been closed since December 1998 after members had made allegedly 
``separatist'' statements in the press regarding the ban on headscarves 
in public buildings. The Malatya branch remained closed.
    In September an international summer program held by the Helsinki 
Citizen's Assembly (HCA) in Canakkale was closed by Turkish authorities 
two days after opening. Although no official reason was given for 
closure, it is possible that the participation of Armenian students may 
have played a role. The HCA generally has not experienced this kind of 
closure problem.
    The Mersin Migrants' Association (Goc-Der), which was shut down in 
1998, in February was given written permission by the Mersin governor 
to reopen. The Kurdish-led organization assists migrants from the 
southeast. Goc-Der had been closed pending a verdict in a case accusing 
its founders of several technical violations of Turkey's Associations 
Law and of possession of illegal publications. In December 1999, a 
court acquitted the defendants of all but one minor charge and fined 
them $2 (1.5 million TL).
    In May student associations at Diyarbakir's Dicle University and 
Van's Centennial University were closed for 3 months, along with two 
Diyarbakir ``cultural centers.'' In September the leaders of an Islamic 
youth organization (National Youth Foundation) said that the police 
ordered the closure of 28 regional offices of their organization. The 
National Youth Foundation is affiliated with the Islamist Fazilet 
party.
    The harassment of lawyers involved in political cases in the 
southeast continued. An increased number of attorneys are willing to 
defend politically sensitive cases and provide greater mutual support 
within the profession. However, attorneys still face criminal charges 
and other harassment, particularly if they defend clients accused of 
terrorism or illegal political activity, pursue torture cases, or seek 
prompt access to their clients (which police often view as 
interference).
    During the year, attorneys in several cases were charged with 
various offenses (such as acting on behalf of illegal organizations), 
and were detained, searched, or threatened. The lawyer for the 
teenagers tortured in Manisa (see Section 1.c.) was put on trial for 
allegedly showing pictures of the accused policemen to the media, 
although her lawyer claimed that the television cameras had viewed an 
open case file. In November attorney Zeki Ruzgar, who was convicted in 
December 1999 of ``membership in an illegal organization'' and 
sentenced to 15 years in jail, was acquitted of all charges by the 
Court of Cassation.
    The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers entered its sixth year at the 
Diyarbakir SSC, with prosecutors in October calling for significant 
sentences against some of the defendants, who were charged in 1993 to 
1994 with ``aiding and abetting the PKK'' and ``membership in an 
illegal terror organization.'' Allegations in the indictment include 
legal behavior such as filing a petition with the ECHR. Some 16 of the 
lawyers alleged that they were tortured while in incommunicado 
detention after their arrests. The lawyers were free pending trial at 
year's end. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is 
intended to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the 
Government and publicizing human rights violations in the southeast 
(see Section 1.e.).
    In Elazig two lawyers had not yet stood trial based on their 1999 
indictment for ``slandering government officials.'' The new Prosecution 
of Civil Servants law prohibits making false accusations against public 
employees based on ``enmity, hatred, or slandering;'' the lawyers are 
charged with having stated publicly that an alternative medical report 
showed that their client had been tortured by security officials. No 
new cases are believed to have been opened under this provision during 
the year.
    Dr. Seyfettin Kizilkan filed his second appeal to the Court of 
Cassation for a reversal of the Diyarbakir SSC's reconfirmed decision 
to sentence him to more than 20 years' imprisonment for ``assisting and 
sheltering an illegal organization.'' Dr. Kizilkan was the director of 
Diyarbakir's largest hospital and was arrested after police allegedly 
found bomb materials and PKK documents in his home. Dr. Kizilkan and 
his associates maintain that the police planted the evidence. He has 
been transferred out of the state of emergency region to a government 
hospital in the Black Sea region and was free pending the outcome of 
his appeal at year's end. The case against Dr. Zeki Uzun, who was 
accused of aiding illegal organizations by providing medical reports 
and treatment, ended with his acquittal in March (see Section 1.c.). 
Some observers claim that Uzun, and others associated with the Izmir 
HRF Torture Treatment Center, have been harassed for their work with 
torture victims.
    Former HRA Chairman Akin Birdal, who was released from jail in 
September (see Section 2.a.), faces additional charges in two cases. He 
is accused of ``insulting the moral being of the State'' based on a 
1998 speech in Urfa to the HRA, while the other trial is based on a 
1995 speech in Tarsus for ``inciting racial or religious enmity.''
    A court case was opened in 1998 against 12 policemen accused of 
torturing the September 1997 ``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees. The 
case was due to continue with the next trial session in March 2001, but 
may be suspended under the newly-passed law for probational release of 
prisoners since the charge was mistreatment (Penal Code Article 245) 
rather than torture (Article 243). Legal proceedings against some of 
the organizers ended in 1998 with an acquittal.
    Representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor human 
rights are free to speak with private citizens, groups, and government 
officials. Security police routinely place such official visitors in 
the southeast under visible surveillance for reasons that may include 
an effort to intimidate those they meet, as well as legitimate 
protection concerns. Visiting foreign government officials and 
legislators were able to meet with human rights monitors. 
Representatives of international governmental organizations were able 
to visit Leyla Zana and Akin Birdal in prison, in accordance with 
Turkey's international obligations. There were no public reports of 
officials representing foreign governments being denied permission for 
such visits.
    In May State Minister for Human Rights Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik 
resigned. He was replaced by Rustu Kazim Yucelen. In September Minister 
Yucelen began a series of meetings with governmental and civil society 
leaders. Ten meetings were held in provinces throughout the country and 
were designed to allow all provinces an opportunity to send 
representatives. The first meeting, in Tunceli, was attended by more 
than 200 government and NGO representatives who discussed human rights 
problems. Participants in other meetings noted the importance of 
establishing such a dialog, and a range of human rights groups took 
part. In late November, the Government passed regulations establishing 
permanent Provincial and Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils, which 
will institutionalize consultations among NGO's, professional 
organizations, and the Government. These councils are being formed and 
some have held introductory meetings.
    In February the High Council for Human Rights Coordination (HCHRC) 
drafted a report on the reforms needed in order for Turkey to comply 
with the EU'S ``Copenhagen Criteria'' of democratization and human 
rights. The report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' was adopted 
by the High Council (composed of representatives from the Justice, 
Interior, Education, Health, and Foreign Affairs Ministries, along with 
representatives of the security forces). The Cabinet adopted the report 
in September as a working and reference document. The report details 
dozens of constitutional, legislative, and administrative reforms 
necessary for compliance with EU political standards and underlines the 
immediate importance of reforms in the area of free expression.
    The mandate of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee is to 
oversee compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and 
international agreements, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare 
reports. The Committee undertook a review of systemic human rights 
problems, including but not limited to problems in prisons and other 
places of detention such as police stations (see Section 1.c.). In 
December the Committee formed permanent sub-committees on prisons and 
the Provincial/Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils.
    In August the Government signed two U.N. covenants, on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic and Social Rights. They had not yet 
been ratified by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state, regards 
all citizens as equal, and prohibits discrimination on ethnic, 
religious, or racial grounds; however, discrimination remains a problem 
in several areas. The Government officially recognizes only Eastern 
Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish adherents as minorities 
covered under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Spousal abuse is 
serious and widespread. According to the Family Research Institute in 
the Prime Minister's office, beating in the home is one of the most 
frequent forms of violence against women. Despite 1998 legislation that 
made spousal abuse illegal, complaints of beatings, threats, economic 
pressure, and sexual violence continue. According to a survey done in 
April by Istanbul University, at least 10 percent of women experience 
violence on a daily or weekly basis.
    Spousal abuse is considered an extremely private matter, involving 
societal notions of family honor. Few women go to the police, who in 
any case are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes and frequently 
advise women to return to their husbands. The 1998 law allows women to 
apply for restraining orders against their husbands and therefore to 
stay in their own homes. Observers and government officials note that 
this program has been very successful in some of the cities and rural 
areas of the country but less so in the more traditional southeast. The 
law is also limited to spouses, and therefore does not address some 
other sources of violence such as in-laws. Citizens of either sex may 
file civil or criminal charges for abuse but rarely do so.
    There are 9 shelters and 6 consultation centers for battered women; 
in addition the child protection and social services agency provides 
services to victims of domestic violence through its 19 social centers. 
Several private shelters that had previously been in operation closed 
due to lack of funds.
    Laws and ingrained societal notions make it difficult to prosecute 
sexual assault or rape cases. Although national police statistics show 
about 1,200 complaints of rape through November, there is no 
information on what percentage of rape incidents are reported. ``Honor 
murders''--the killing by immediate family members of women who are 
suspected of being unchaste--continue in rural areas and among recent 
immigrants to cities; according to media reports, there may be dozens 
of such murders every year. Under the law, killings that were 
``provoked'' (such as honor killings) can receive a lighter sentence 
than other types of murders. Because of further sentence reductions for 
juvenile offenders, observers note that young male relatives often are 
designated to perform the killing. Government authorities have tried to 
send a clear message of intolerance for this practice through the 
prosecution of those responsible for the murders, but it continues. 
Another dimension of this problem is suicides among young girls forced 
into marriage. Such suicides are most common in the southeast, where 
suicides have risen more than 50 percent since 1993 and where 80 
percent of suicides are by women. The traditional practice of 
``virginity testing'' continues, despite governmental regulations 
prohibiting it unless requested by the woman.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Some laws still discriminate against women. The Civil Code 
prohibits granting gender-based privileges or rights but retains some 
discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations. 
Because the husband is the legal head of household, he is authorized to 
choose the domicile and represents the conjugal unit. As parents, 
husband and wife exercise joint child rearing rights, but when they 
disagree, the husband's view often prevails. A single woman who gives 
birth to a child out of wedlock is not considered automatically to be 
the legal guardian of her child; a court decision may be required. 
Divorce law requires that the divorcing spouses divide their property 
according to property registered in each spouse's name. Because in most 
cases property is registered in the husband's name, this provision can 
create difficulties for women who wish to divorce. Under inheritance 
laws, a widow generally receives one-fourth of the estate, and her 
children receive the rest. According to a 1994 government survey, 
households headed by women have 50 percent less income than those 
headed by men.
    The literacy rate for women is 78 percent, compared with 94 percent 
for men, but in rural areas the rate can be as low as 50 percent for 
women, according to 1999 statistics. One reason for this is that men 
must serve in the army, and if they do not know how to read they are 
taught upon entry.
    Particularly in urban areas, women continue to improve their 
position, including in the professions, business, and the civil 
service. They constitute 35 percent of the students in universities. 
However, they continue to face discrimination to varying degrees. Women 
are generally underrepresented in managerial-level positions. Women 
generally receive equal pay for equal work in the professions, 
business, and civil service jobs, although a large percentage of women 
employed in agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors 
work as unpaid family help. Women may take the examination to become 
governors or subgovernors; several are subgovernors.
    Independent women's groups and women's rights associations continue 
to increase in number. There are many women's committees affiliated 
with local bar associations. Other organizations include the 
Association to Support Women Candidates (Ka-Der), ``The Flying Broom'' 
women's advocacy group, the Turkish Women's Union, and the Foundation 
for the Evaluation of Women's Labor. The concept of lobbying for 
women's rights, including greater elected representation, is gaining 
momentum. Women continue to be very active in ongoing debates between 
secularists and Islamists, especially with respect to the right to 
choose whether to wear religious head coverings in public places, such 
as government offices and universities.
    Children.--The Government is committed to furthering children's 
welfare and works to expand opportunities in education and health, 
including a further reduction in the infant mortality rate. The State 
Minister for Women's and Family issues oversees implementation of the 
Government's programs for children. During the year, the Government 
established a Children's Rights Monitoring and Assessment High Council 
to focus on children's rights issues.
    Government-provided education through the age of 14 or the eighth 
grade is compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas place a 
greater emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters; the 
relatively new 8-year compulsory education requirement (implemented in 
1998) was expected to allow more girls to continue their education. In 
practice in rural Anatolia, the literacy rate for girls is very low, 
and many do not complete primary school. The literacy rate for boys, 
most of whom complete primary school, is higher. Some continue on to 
high school, for which they generally must travel or live away from 
home (see Section 1.g.).
    The social security system aims to provide social security and 
health insurance for all its citizens, but there are still gaps in this 
coverage, leaving about 20 percent of families and their children 
without coverage, according to the June UNICEF report on ``The State of 
Women and Children in Turkey.'' Persons not covered by insurance may 
use a special program to access public health care. In terms of 
immunization, infant mortality, and malnutrition, Turkey's standards 
remain at levels that are not compatible with the level of development 
and resources in the country, according to the UNICEF report. 
Currently, only about 40 percent of children aged 12 to 23 months are 
fully immunized. Infant mortality has rapidly declined over the past 
decade, and as of 1998 stood at 43 per 1,000.
    Although the law provides special safeguards for children in police 
custody, police officers and prosecutors frequently circumvent or 
ignore these provisions. The law stipulates that the state prosecutor 
or a designated assistant should carry out interrogations of minors and 
that minors must be provided with lawyers; however, in practice police 
and prosecutors often deny minors access to lawyers and fail to inform 
parents. Children and juveniles detained under the Anti-Terror Law also 
often are held for up to 4 days in incommunicado detention. In 
September the Minister of Justice and the head of Ankara's Bar 
Association signed an agreement allowing the Bar Association to inspect 
two children's prison facilities in Ankara, the first such arrangement.
    Children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in the 
southeast. The migration--forced or voluntary--of many families, past 
terrorism against teachers, and school closings in the southeast have 
uprooted children and moved them to cities that are hard pressed to 
find the resources to provide basic, mandatory services such as 
schooling. Many cities in the southeast are operating schools on double 
shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (see Section 1.g.). 
The Government has built regional boarding schools to help deal with 
this problem, but they are insufficient in number.
    Instances of child beating and abuse are reported more frequently 
than in previous years, according to women's groups. The increase 
likely is attributable to greater public awareness of the problem.
    Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility 
to buildings and public transportation for the disabled. According to 
the June UNICEF report on women and children in Turkey, welfare 
institutions ``provide limited financial, employment and educational 
support to the handicapped.'' According to the report, the number of 
disabled persons is unknown. The Ministry of Education reports that 
there are 1.1 million disabled children in the country. Although there 
are many institutions for the disabled, most attention to disabled 
persons remains at the individual and family level. The Government 
established an ``Administration of Disabilities'' office under the 
Prime Ministry in 1997, with the mandate of developing cooperation and 
coordination among national and international institutions, and to 
conduct research into issues such as delivery of services. Certain 
categories of employers are required to hire disabled persons as 2 
percent of their employee pool, although there is no penalty for 
failure to comply.
    Religious Minorities.--Jews and numerous Christian denominations 
are generally free to practice their religions and report little 
discrimination in daily life. However, there are restrictions on 
clerical training and on the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul, and police 
disrupted several Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that 
they were being held in unauthorized locations.
    The Government restricts the Orthodox Patriarch by requiring that 
he be a Turkish citizen and that his selection be approved by the 
Government. In addition in 1971 the Government closed the only 
remaining Orthodox theological seminary in the country. As a result, 
Orthodox citizens have no access to theological training--requisite to 
become an Orthodox Priest--in Turkey.
    In May police raided a small Christian congregation in the Avcilar 
district of Istanbul and arrested six Turkish citizens, an American, 
and an Australian. They were charged with opening a Christian training 
institute without legal permission. The defendants were charged with 
violating Law 2911, which ``prohibits unauthorized meetings and 
demonstrations.'' The defendants maintained that they completed the 
required applications to hold meetings with the assistance of local 
police officials. The case is currently pending.
    Jews and numerous Christian denominations freely practice their 
religions and report little discrimination in daily life. Some 
incidents still occur, and extremist groups or individuals target 
minority communities from time to time. However, during the year no 
attacks were reported on minority community properties. No perpetrators 
have been arrested or charged in a 1998 arson attack on the Orthodox 
shrine, now a museum, at Saint Therapon where the custodian was killed; 
nor in the December 1997 bombing at the Orthodox Patriarchate. Police 
protection increased after the 1998 attack, and investigations 
continue. In June, 33 persons were convicted and given the death 
penalty for ``trying to change the constitutional regime,'' for their 
role in setting a July 1993 fire in which 37 secularist intellectuals 
(mainly Alawi Muslims) died.
    No laws prohibit religious conversion. Nonetheless individuals 
contemplating conversion, especially to Christianity, often face family 
and community pressures, and proselytizing remains socially 
unacceptable. Some members of religious minorities claim that they have 
limited career prospects in government or military service as a result 
of their religious affiliation. There are no non-Muslim senior officers 
in the military, according to a senior military official, because non-
Muslims do not apply to attend the military academy, and officers must 
be graduates.
    Many religious minority members, along with many in the secular 
political majority of Muslims, fear the possibility of Islamic 
extremism and the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics. 
Islamist journals frequently publish anti-Semitic material.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution does not 
recognize the Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority, although 
they are in fact the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority. 
There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political 
and economic affairs, and many M.P.''s, senior officials, and 
professionals are Kurds; however, Kurds who publicly or politically 
assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse using Kurdish in the 
public domain risk public censure, harassment, or prosecution. In March 
the Court of Cassation for the first time affirmed a lower court 
decision to allow a Turkish citizen to change registry records and give 
his daughter a Kurdish-language, rather than Turkish, first name. Kurds 
who are long-term residents in industrialized cities in the West are in 
many cases assimilated into the political, economic, and social life of 
the nation, and much intermarriage has occurred over many generations. 
Kurds currently migrating westward (including those displaced by the 
conflict in the southeast) bring with them their culture and village 
identity, but often little education and few skills.
    Private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish are legal; 
however, the use of minority languages, including Kurdish, in 
television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools 
is restricted by a plethora of laws and even articles of the 
Constitution (see Section 2.a.); these restrictions are invoked 
arbitrarily. Although some senior politicians, including the Prime 
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, 
and the head of the intelligence service have asserted that the 
Government should allow Kurdish broadcasting, no changes to the 
applicable laws were made.
    The Government circumscribes the activities of organizations such 
as the MKM, a corporation with branches in several cities outside the 
southeast, which was established to promote Kurdish language and 
culture (see Section 2.a.).
    The Ministry of Education tightly controls the curriculum in 
schools (except foreign-language schools not part of the Turkish 
system). The small numbers of Greek-language students have little 
opportunity to continue their education in Turkey, and consequently 
many go to Greece, often never to return.
    No accurate accounting of the Romani population exists, but it may 
be significant in regions near Bulgaria and Greece. No incidents of 
public or government harassment directed against Roma were reported. 
However, experts claim that Roma experience discrimination, for 
example, regarding employment. In June the head of the Diyanet issued a 
circular instructing muftis to educate the public about Turkish Roma 
and stressing that Islam considers all persons born equal and without 
any sins. The circular instructed muftis to dispel myths that lead to 
discrimination against Roma.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers, except police and military 
personnel, have the right to associate freely and form representative 
unions. This right encompasses civil servants, including 
schoolteachers.
    The Constitution stipulates that no one shall be compelled to 
become, remain a member of, or withdraw from, a labor union. The law 
states that unions and confederations may be founded without prior 
authorization based on a petition to the governor of the province of 
the prospective union's headquarters. Unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. They must obtain official permission 
to hold meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend their 
conventions and record the proceedings. The Constitution requires 
candidates for union office to have worked 10 years in the industry 
represented by the union. The Supreme Court in 1998 banned the Disk-
affiliated union in the leather sector, Deri-Is, because it violated 
this article in the Constitution and prohibited it from appealing to a 
higher court. It applied to the ECHR for redress. The International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association has stated 
that this provision is extremely prejudicial to the interests of the 
trade unions and has urged that it be repealed.
    Just over 13 percent of the total civilian labor force (15 years of 
age and above) are unionized. The labor force numbers around 22 
million, with approximately 43 percent employed in agriculture. There 
are four confederations of labor unions: The Turkish Confederation of 
Workers Unions (Turk-Is); the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade 
Unions (Hak-Is); the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK); 
and the National Confederation (Misk). There are also 3 public 
employees unions and 27 independent unions. Unions and their officers 
have a statutory right to express their views on issues directly 
affecting members' economic and social interests.
    Prosecutors may ask labor courts to order a trade union or 
confederation to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for 
serious infractions, based on alleged violation of specific legal 
norms. However, the Government may not dissolve a union summarily.
    The constitutional right to strike is restricted. For example, the 
Constitution does not permit strikes by civil servants, workers engaged 
in the protection of life and property, and those in the mining and 
petroleum industries, sanitation services, national defense, and 
education. The right to strike is suspended for the first 10 years of a 
company's operations in the nine free trade zones (see Section 6.b.).
    Collective bargaining is required before a strike. The law 
specifies the steps that a union must take before it may strike or 
before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the 
last of those steps. A party that fails to comply with these steps 
forfeits its rights. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary 
(solidarity), political, or general strikes, or in slowdowns. The 
employer may respond to a strike with a lockout but is prohibited from 
hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to perform jobs 
normally done by strikers. Article 42 of Law 2822, governing collective 
bargaining, strikes, and lockouts, prohibits the employer from 
terminating workers who encourage or participate in a legal strike. In 
sectors in which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through 
binding arbitration.
    The Government has the statutory power under Law 2822 to suspend 
strikes for 60 days for reasons of national security or public health 
and safety. Unions may petition the Council of State to lift such a 
suspension. If this appeal fails, and the parties and mediators still 
fail to resolve the dispute, the strike is subject to compulsory 
arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. The ILO's Committee of 
Experts and the Committee on the Application of Standards regard the 
Government's application of Law 2822 as too broad, and they have called 
on the Government to limit recourse to compulsory arbitration to 
essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Government 
asserts that the law does not contradict the Committees' principles.
    According to the Labor Ministry, from January through November 
there were 19 strikes in the public sector involving 11,879 workers and 
32 strikes in the private sector involving 6,565 workers. During the 
same period there were also 2 lockouts in the private sector involving 
2,483 workers.
    Public and private sector workers throughout the country went on 
strike during the summer to protest efforts by the Government and 
employers to keep pay raises in line with the Government's planned 
inflation rate of 25 percent.
    Some labor union members faced government limits on freedom of 
speech and assembly (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), while some civil 
service organizations continued to demonstrate for the right to strike 
and for higher salaries. Legislation providing the right to strike for 
civil servants was introduced in the last parliamentary session but was 
not adopted. Civil servants currently have the right to organize and 
engage in collective bargaining.
    All defendants were acquitted in the trial, begun in 1996, against 
Turk-Is Chairmanship Council officials who were charged with violating 
the Associations Law when Turk-Is announced support for political 
parties during the 1995 election. No action has been taken in a second 
trial against Turk-Is officials charged with holding illegal 
demonstrations in 1995 to protest a deadlock in collective bargaining.
    With government approval, unions may and do form confederations and 
join international labor bodies, as long as these organizations are not 
hostile to Turkey or to freedom of religion or belief. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which 
Turk-Is had been an affiliate for years, approved DISK as an affiliate 
in 1992; Hak-Is became a member in 1997.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All industrial 
workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and most 
industrial and some public sector agricultural workers are organized. 
The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union 
must represent not only 50 percent plus 1 of the employees at a given 
work site, but also 10 percent of all the workers in that particular 
industry. This barrier has the effect of favoring established unions, 
particularly those affiliated with Turk-Is, the confederation that 
represents nearly 73 percent of organized labor.
    The Ministry of Labor reportedly manipulated membership figures to 
prevent unions from acquiring bargaining rights or to rescind such 
rights. The ICFTU reports that, as a result of the law, workers in many 
sectors of economic activity are not covered by a collective agreement.
    The ILO has called on the Government to rescind this 10 percent 
rule, stating that it violates ILO Convention 98. However, both Turk-Is 
and the Turkish employers' organization favor retention of the 10 
percent rule, since each confederation has an established membership 
area and does not want the status quo upset. In 1994 the Government 
informed the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards that the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security proposed to remove the 10 percent 
numerical restriction and that it had communicated its proposal to the 
social partners. The ILO took note of the Government's statement that 
it continued to study removal of this requirement despite objections 
from employer and worker organizations. However, since then the 
Government has taken no further action.
    The law on trade unions stipulates that an employer may not dismiss 
a labor union representative without rightful cause. The union member 
may appeal such a dismissal to the courts, and if the ruling is in the 
union member's favor, the employer must reinstate him and pay all back 
benefits and salary. These laws generally are applied in practice.
    The ILO has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that workers have effective protection against antiunion 
discrimination. Some private sector employers continued to try to 
eliminate unions. A total of 414,000 workers in the public sector were 
dismissed within the last 2 years. As a result of the privatization of 
128 entities in 12 sectors, 10,746 workers were laid off.
    The continuing state of emergency in the southeast has resulted in 
restrictions on labor organizations in four provinces. A law enacted in 
1984 provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which are 
intended to attract domestic and especially foreign investment, and to 
promote international trade. There are nine such zones operating in 
Mersin, Antalya, the Aegean region, Trabzon, Istanbul (two), Eastern 
Anatolia, Mardin, and Rize. Union organizing and collective bargaining 
are permitted in the zones. However, the right to strike is suspended 
for the first 10 years of operation of a particular business in the 
zone. In the meantime, labor disputes that cannot be settled by the 
parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Workers inside the zones 
are paid in foreign exchange rather than in Turkish currency, giving 
them a hedge against inflation.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
statutes prohibit compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and the Government generally enforces these provisions in 
practice; however, trafficking in foreign women and girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution and labor laws forbid the full-time 
employment of children younger than age 15, with the exception that 
those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-time work if 
enrolled in school or vocational training. The Constitution also states 
that ``no one shall be required to perform work unsuited to his/her 
age, sex, and capacity.'' With this article and related laws, the 
Government undertakes to protect children from work unsuited to their 
age and capacity, such as underground mining and from working at night. 
According to Article 67 of the Labor Law, children who attend school 
can work no more than 7.5 hours a day, inclusive of school time. The 
Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these laws only in largescale 
industrial and service sector enterprises. Children working in 
agriculture, in household-based establishments, in establishments with 
three or fewer workers, in apprenticeship training centers, and those 
working as domestic servants are subject to the Code of Obligations, 
which fails to provide a minimum age of employment. However, according 
to Article 174 of the Code of Obligations, children between the ages of 
12 and 16 years may not work at night and may work for no more than 8 
hours a day.
    Child labor is widespread. According to a June United Nations 
Children's Fund report, 1.07 million children between the ages of 6 and 
14 and 2.4 million children between the ages of 15 and 17 are in the 
labor force. This represents about six percent of all children aged 6 
to 14, and 60 percent of those aged 15 to 17. According to an October 
1999 State Statistics Institute report, 961,000 children work in family 
businesses and do not receive wages, 257,000 are seasonal workers, and 
387,000 are wage earners. Some 1.1 million of the working children are 
boys. Child labor is used most often in small-sized enterprises. 
According to official data, 87 percent of working children are employed 
by small-sized enterprises having 1 to 9 workers, 7 percent work in 
medium-size enterprises (10 to 24 workers), and 6 percent are employed 
by large-scale enterprises (more than 25 workers).
    In practice many children work because families need the 
supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys 
at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls rarely are seen 
working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in 
handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs 
in rural areas and often is associated with traditional family economic 
activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire 
families to work together to bring in the harvest.
    The gradual elimination of child labor is a national priority. The 
seventh 5-year development plan, which ran through this year, committed 
the Government to enact legislation to restrict further child labor and 
to adopt legislation to conform to relevant international conventions. 
The Government recognizes the serious problem of child labor and works 
with the ILO to document its extent and to determine solutions.
    The Ministry of Labor, the ILO'S International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) government partner, actively has been 
combating child labor since 1992, when it established a child labor 
unit and trained Ministry of Labor inspectors specifically in child 
labor issues. In 1996 the Government and the ILO signed an agreement to 
extend IPEC until December 2001. Currently some 70 of the 700 field 
inspectors are trained to handle child labor issues, while the total 
number of establishments falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry is 4 million. Labor inspectors only cover areas that are 
defined in the labor laws. Many children are working in areas that are 
not covered by labor laws, such as agriculture or the informal economy 
and are therefore beyond the reach of the inspectorate.
    With the introduction in 1998 of the 8-year compulsory education 
program (previously, 5 years were compulsory), the Government expected 
the number of child workers to be reduced significantly, since children 
are required to attend school until age 14. As yet, no statistics are 
available concerning the impact of the mandatory 8-year education on 
child labor.
    Small enterprises prefer child labor because it is cheaper and 
provides practical training for the children, who subsequently are 
preferred for future employment in the same workplace. If children 
employed in these businesses are registered with a Ministry of National 
Education training center, they go to the center once a week for 
training, and the centers are obliged by law to inspect their 
workplaces. Currently there are 318 centers located in 80 cities. These 
centers provide apprenticeship training in 86 occupations. Only 22.8 
percent of working children take advantage of these schools.
    The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, including that 
performed by children, and the laws generally are enforced; however, 
trafficking in foreign girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is 
a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor is obliged 
legally to set minimum wages at least every 2 years through a minimum 
wage board, a tripartite government-industry-union body. In recent 
years, it has done so annually. However, during the year there were two 
adjustments: the nominal minimum wage was increased in January by 15 
percent and again in July by 10 percent, compared with an annual 
inflation rate of nearly 34 percent. Public workers who are part of 
collective labor agreements also received an inflationindexed increase 
and a 5 percent prosperity rate increase. The monthly gross minimum 
wage rates, which became effective in July, were approximately $180 
(118.8 million TL) for workers over age 16, and $110 (75 million TL) 
for workers under 16.
    The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. It would be difficult for a single worker, and 
impossible for a family, to live on the minimum wage without support 
from other sources. Most workers earn considerably more. According to 
the results of an August survey conducted by the Public Workers' Labor 
Union, a four-member family requires $834 (534 million TL) per month to 
live above the poverty line. Workers covered by the labor law, who 
constitute about one-third of the total labor force, also receive a hot 
meal or a daily food allowance and other fringe benefits that, 
according to the Turkish Employers' Association, make basic wages alone 
account for only about 37.3 percent of total compensation.
    The labor law sets a 45-hour workweek, although most unions have 
bargained for fewer hours. The law prescribes a weekly rest day and 
limits the number of overtime hours to 3 per day, for up to 90 days in 
a year. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor effectively 
enforces wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service, 
and government sectors, which cover about 12 percent of workers.
    The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations, but in 
practice the Government does not carry out effective inspection and 
enforcement programs. Law 1475 allows for the shutdown of an operation 
if a five-person committee, which includes safety inspectors, employee, 
and employer representatives, determines that the operation endangers 
workers' lives. In practice financial constraints, limited safety 
awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes result in scant 
attention to occupational safety and health by workers and employers 
alike. The law sets out procedures under which workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Government deals with the problem 
of trafficking in persons through laws relevant to prostitution and 
illegal immigration. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are 
responsible for the problem, and the police, especially the immigration 
and organized crime authorities, enforce antitrafficking laws. Under 
the Penal Code, it is illegal to abduct and detain a woman or child. 
However, this law relates more to the old custom of kidnaping a bride, 
in which punishment is suspended if adbuctor and abductee get married. 
A further provision prohibits enticement to prostitution; however, 
penalties are light (up to 2 years' imprisonment). A further article of 
the Penal Code makes it a crime to send a prostitute from one place to 
another by force or fraud. These laws, and those dealing with illegal 
immigration, are most relevant to trafficking in persons.
    Turkey is a major destination and transit country for trafficking 
in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and domestic NGO's 
stated that most trafficked women in the country are from Albania, 
Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Arrests (and in most cases, 
deportations) of nationals from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine rose from 
6,700 in 1998 to approximately 11,000 in 1999, according to IOM. 
According to the Turkish National Police, 232 Moldovan, 293 Romanian, 
and 175 Ukrainian women were extradited in 2000. African and Asian 
women use Turkey as a transit point to other countries in Europe.
    Organized crime groups appear to be the primary trafficking 
organizations. The Ministry of the Interior's organized crime 
department is responsible for combating trafficking. According to 
NGO's, victims of trafficking receive no governmental assistance and 
the trafficking cycle continues. Many women and girls come to the 
country believing that they have legitimate work as models, 
entertainers, governesses, or translators. In some cases, girls from 
Romanian orphanages have been kidnaped. Most of the activity occurs in 
Istanbul, Izmir, and Trabzon. Once in the country, the trafficked women 
and girls are in debt bondage to their traffickers, who are members of 
the mafia (mainly Russian). Women who attempt to escape often are 
beaten, gang-raped, or killed. The Government addresses this problem 
with laws relating to illegal migration and unregistered prostitution; 
registered prostitution is legal.
    Reportedly there is almost no trafficking in Turkish women or 
girls. There were no reports of trafficking in children for the purpose 
of forced labor; legislation in this area addresses the issue (see 
Section 6.d.).
    There is little formal interagency cooperation in dealing with the 
problem of trafficking. Representatives from the Ministries of 
Interior, Justice, and Health, among other ministries and NGO's, have 
met on this issue. The Alien's Department of the police is the most 
active governmental entity addressing this problem.
    The Government does not provide any formal protection, aid, or 
education to victims of trafficking. Since the women being trafficked 
are not usually from Turkey, preventive education is less applicable. 
Women's shelters are open to women regardless of citizenship.
                               __________

                              TURKMENISTAN

    Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president and his 
closest advisers, continues to exercise power in a Soviet-era 
authoritarian style despite Constitutional provisions nominally 
establishing a democratic system. The seriously flawed December 1999 
parliamentary elections and the passage of a law exempting President 
Saparmurat Niyazov from term limits were backward steps. Niyazov, head 
of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 (renamed the Democratic Party 
in 1992) and President of Turkmenistan since its independence in 1991, 
legally may remain in office until his death. Niyazov retained his 
monopoly on power, and the Democratic Party, the renamed Communist 
Party, remained the sole political party in the country. The Government 
registered no parties during the year and continued to repress all 
opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and gradual 
reform, official nation-building efforts focused on fostering Turkmen 
nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov. The 50-member 
unicameral Parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority, 
and in practice the President controls the judicial system.
    The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities 
formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB); namely, 
to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of 
society and repression of dissent. The KNB reportedly exercises wide 
discretion over issues such as exit visas and Internet access and works 
to limit personal freedoms. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs 
the criminal police, which works closely with the KNB on matters of 
national security. Both forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep raising, 
intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil and gas 
reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central planning mechanisms 
and state control, although the Government has taken a number of small 
steps to make the transition to a market economy. Agriculture, 
particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total 
employment. Gas, oil and gas derivatives, and cotton account for almost 
all of the country's export revenues. Negotiations between the 
Government and an international gas consortium concerning the 
construction of a gas export pipeline across the Caspian Sea--the 
Trans-Caspian Pipeline--stalled in the latter half of the year. While 
the idea for the pipeline still exists, the Government is focusing 
instead on negotiating large gas deals with Russia and Ukraine. It is 
also considering projects for pipelines through Iran and Afghanistan, 
as well as a pipeline to China.
    The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. The 
Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses, and the 
authorities in particular severely restricted political and civil 
liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government 
peacefully. In 1999 one political prisoner died in custody under 
suspicious circumstances. Security forces continued to beat and 
otherwise mistreat suspects and prisoners, and prison conditions 
remained poor and unsafe. Both the criminal police and the KNB operate 
with relative impunity and abused the rights of individuals as well as 
enforced the Government's policy of repressing political opposition. 
Arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, and 
unfair trials remained problems. Approximately 12,000 prisoners were 
amnestied and released during the year; 2 were political prisoners. An 
additional 2,000 received a reduction of sentence. Interference with 
citizens' privacy remained a problem. During the year, the Government 
demolished hundreds of private homes in and around Ashgabat with very 
little notice given to the owners in order to make room for large urban 
building projects such as luxury apartments, government buildings, and 
monuments; many displaced homeowners received little or no compensation 
for their loss.
    The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and does not 
permit freedom of the press. In May the Government withdrew the 
operating licenses of all private Internet providers, leaving only 
state-owned Turkmen Telecom as a service provider. The Government 
completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers and never 
permitting independent criticism of government policy. Criticism of 
officials is only permitted if it directed at those who have fallen out 
of favor with the President. The focus of the media on President 
Niyazov, around whom a personality cult has been built, intensified 
during the year. The President's father and mother have been 
incorporated more fully into the cult. Academic freedom has also 
declined. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and association. 
The Government imposes restrictions on nonregistered religious groups. 
The law on religion reaffirms a number of important religious freedoms 
but also tightens government control of religious groups. The 
requirement that religious organizations have at least 500 Turkmen 
citizens as members in a given locality to be registered legally has 
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from 
legally establishing themselves. Repression of religious minorities 
continued during the year, although it abated somewhat during the 
summer following a government decree against unlawful searches that was 
issued in April. At least 10 non-governmental groups were registered 
during the year; 8 were affiliated with Sunni Muslim. Government 
restrictions on travelling abroad, including for educational and 
training purposes, tightened during the year. The Government has also 
increased restrictions on internal travel, limiting travel of both 
citizens and non-citizens to border cities and regions. Domestic 
violence against women is a problem, and women experience societal 
discrimination. The Government generally gave favored treatment to men 
over women and to ethnic Turkmen over minorities.
    In January 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) opened an office in Ashgabat.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In September 1999, 
political prisoner and Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev was found 
hanged in his cell in the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. 
Following his death, the Government rejected requests in 1999 from the 
Russian Government and international human rights organizations for an 
investigation into the suspicious nature of Garayev's death (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1992 Constitution makes torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment illegal; however, there were widespread 
credible reports that security officials frequently beat criminal 
suspects and prisoners and often used force to obtain confessions. 
There were credible reports that political prisoners are singled out 
for cruel treatment. There were reports that prisoners needing medical 
treatment have been beaten on their way to and from the hospital. 
Security forces also used denial of medical treatment and food, verbal 
intimidation, and placement in unsanitary conditions to coerce 
confessions. In November four Protestants were tortured while in police 
custody and at least three of them subsequently had their homes and 
cars confiscated after being forced to sign a statement saying that 
they voluntarily had donated all they owned as a gift to the President 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are unsanitary, 
overcrowded, and unsafe. Disease, particularly tuberculosis, is 
rampant. Food is poor and prisoners depend on relatives to supplement 
inadequate food supplies. Those who do not receive food from relatives 
suffer greatly. Facilities for prisoner rehabilitation and recreation 
are extremely limited. Some prisoners have died due to overcrowding, 
untreated illnesses, and lack of adequate protection from the severe 
summer heat. In Turkmenbashy prison, inmates reportedly are housed 14 
to a cell and are permitted visits from relatives once every 3 months, 
who may bring food once every 2 months. In Kizlkaya prison, near 
Dashoguz, prisoners are forced to work in a kaolin mine under hazardous 
and unhealthy conditions (see Sections 2.b. and 6.c.). In September 
1999, a political prisoner was found hanged in his cell under 
suspicious circumstances (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions. The OSCE has repeatedly requested permission from the 
Government to visit prisons, but has received no response.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution states that citizens ``have 
the right to freedom of belief and the free expression thereof and also 
to obtain information unless it is a state, official, or commercial 
secret.'' However, in practice those expressing views critical of or 
different from those of the Government have been arrested on false 
charges of committing common crimes (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
    On January 5, the Government arrested Nurberdy Nurmamedov, the head 
of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement. Nurmamedov was convicted 
of hooliganism and making death threats on a business associate; he was 
given a 5-year term in a labor camp, but was amnestied on December 22. 
Nurmamedov's son, Murat, was also convicted of hooliganism and 
sentenced to 2 years of hard labor, but was put under house arrest 
instead of going to prison. The arrests of Nurmamedov and his son 
followed shortly after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December 
12, 1999, Mejlis elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint 
Niyazov president for life (see Section 2.a.).
    In November 1999, the Government sentenced Parahat Yklimov, the 
brother of Sapar Yklimov--a former government official who lives 
outside the country--to 11 years' imprisonment for financial 
misconduct. Prior to his arrest, he reportedly had been warned that his 
brother should cease his political activities abroad. His family 
reportedly was told by internal security organizations that he would be 
released if his brother returned to the country.
    The precise number of political detainees held at year's end was 
unknown. By law a person accused of a crime can be held in pretrial 
detention for up to 10 months. According to the Government, out of a 
total of 22,000 prisoners countrywide, some 12,000 prisoners were 
amnestied and released by year's end (see Sections 1.e and 3). Among 
those amnestied were political prisoners Nurbedy Nurmamedov and Pirkuli 
Tanrikuliev. A further 2,000 prisoners were granted a reduction in 
sentence. In January 1999, the Government released dissident Gulgeldi 
Annaniyazov.
    In January there were reports that a Baptist pastor and his wife, 
who were residing legally in the country, were deported to Ukraine. In 
February the family of jailed Baptist Shageldi Atakov was exiled to a 
small village outside of Mary (see Section 2.c.). In March the 
authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and 
their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section 
2.c.). Also in March, the Government arrested religious leader Hoja 
Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore down an unregistered mosque and religious 
school run by Orazgylychev and his followers; he subsequently was 
released and sentenced to internal exile in Tedjen (see Section 2.c). 
This occurred after he reportedly gave an interview to the Government 
that was critical of the President.
    In November 1999, President Niyazov announced plans to deport to 
remote areas any government officials who were found to have committed 
crimes. President Niyazov proposed that the officials, accompanied if 
they desired by their families, would work off their sentences in 
exile. Almost all prominent political opponents of the Government have 
chosen to move to either Russia, Sweden, Norway, or the Czech Republic 
for reasons of personal safety; none returned during year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
judicial independence; however, in practice, the judiciary is not 
independent. The President's power to select and dismiss judges 
subordinates the judiciary to the Presidency. The President appoints 
all judges for a term of 5 years. The appointments are without 
legislative review, except for the Chairman (Chief Justice) of the 
Supreme Court, and the President has the sole authority to remove all 
appointees from the bench before the completion of their terms.
    The court system has not been reformed since the Soviet era. It 
consists of a Supreme Court, 6 provincial courts (including 1 for the 
city of Ashgabat only), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city 
courts. A Supreme Economic Court hears cases involving disputes between 
state-owned enterprises and ministries, and, increasingly, commercial 
disputes. The Government abolished all military courts in 1997. 
Criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces are tried in 
civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the Prosecutor 
General.
    The law provides for the rights of due process for defendants, 
including a public trial, the right to a defense attorney, access to 
accusatory material, and the right to call witnesses to testify on 
behalf of the accused. In practice authorities often deny these rights, 
and there are no independent lawyers, with the exception of a few 
retired legal officials, available to represent defendants. When a 
person cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the court appoints one. 
A person may represent himself in court.
    Lower courts' decisions may be appealed, and the defendant may 
petition the President for clemency. The President released over 12,000 
inmates from prison in connection with general amnesties during the 
year (see Section 1.d. and 3). In practice adherence to due process is 
not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural areas. Even when 
due process rights are observed, the authority of the government 
prosecutor vis-a-vis the defense attorney is so great that it is very 
difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. The Government 
denied foreign diplomats access to several supposedly open court 
proceedings.
    At year's end, the Government held at least one political prisoner, 
Mukhametkuli Aimuradov. In January the Government released political 
prisoners Nurberdy Nurmamedov and Pirkuly Tanrikuliev as part of a 
general amnesty (see Section 1.d.). In September 1999, Russian citizen 
Khoshali Garayev, one of two persons convicted in secret before the 
Supreme Court in 1995 for antigovernment activities and planning 
terrorist actions against government officials, was discovered hanged 
in his cell at the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. The 
Government rejected all requests for an investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding Garayev's death (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). 
In December 1998, he and Mukhamedkuli Aimuradov were sentenced to 
additional concurrent terms of 18 years for allegedly attempting to 
escape from this prison.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of protection 
from arbitrary interference by the State in a citizen's personal life; 
however, government authorities violated this right. There are no legal 
means to regulate the conduct of surveillance by the state security 
apparatus, which regularly monitors the activities of opponents and 
critics of the Government. Security officials use physical 
surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the 
recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other 
people, report credibly that their mail is intercepted before delivery.
    In the past, the authorities have dismissed children from school 
and removed adults from their jobs because of the political activities 
of relatives. Internal security organizations reportedly pressured 
relatives of a former government official who left the country to 
convince him to return (see Section 1.d.). The relatives of a democracy 
activist convicted on charges of embezzlement lost a government job and 
access to the state-run university (see Section 2.b.). The authorities 
also threaten supporters of opposition political movements with loss of 
employment and homes (see Section 2.b.). In October President Niyazov 
called for background checks that would span three generations in order 
to determine the ``moral character'' of university students prior to 
entry (see Section 2.a.).
    During the year, the Government demolished hundreds of private 
homes in and around Ashgabat at very short notice in order to make way 
for large government building projects such as a new sports stadium, 
public monuments, and luxury apartments. Those who built their homes 
without the appropriate approval from the Government were not offered 
alternate accommodations despite their length of occupancy or degree of 
hardship. Some of these families continue to live outdoors, near their 
destroyed homes, for lack of any alternative. Others who had the proper 
building permission have been offered apartments or plots of land in 
compensation, but such compensation is often not at fair market value 
(i.e. desert plots with no amenities) or inadequate for large families.
    In April the President ordered the implementation of new procedures 
restricting searches of private homes (see Section 2.c.). The measures 
were formally approved by the legislature on June 15 and became 
effective immediately.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to hold personal convictions and to express them freely; however, 
in practice, the Government severely restricts freedom of speech and 
does not permit freedom of the press. Criticism of the Government can 
lead to personal hardship, including loss of opportunities for 
advancement and employment.
    The Government completely controls radio and television. It funds 
almost all print media. The Government censors newspapers and uses 
Turkmen language newspapers to attack its critics abroad; the Committee 
for the Protection of State Secrets must approve prepublication 
galleys. Russian-language newspapers from abroad are available by 
subscription only and are dated. Some Russian and other foreign 
newspapers are also available in several Ashgabat hotels. Owners of 
satellite dishes have access to foreign television programming. Use of 
satellite dishes in Ashgabat appears widespread, but the dishes are too 
expensive for poorer residents outside of urban areas.
    While Internet access is available, there is now only one provider 
for the whole country. On May 29, the Government withdrew the licenses 
of all private Internet providers, leaving state-owned Turkmen Telecom 
as the sole Internet provider for the whole country. There are credible 
reports that the Government took this measure in order to monitor 
Internet activity, especially electronic mail. Internet access is 
prohibitively expensive for most citizens. For normal usage, monthly 
fees average $20 (400,000 manat at the street rate), which is the 
amount of the minimum monthly wage.
    In June 1999, the tri-language daily Ashgabat dropped its English 
and Russian sections and now is printed in Turkmen only. There are no 
Russian-language radio broadcasts and only one short Russian-language 
news program on television each day. In order to regulate printing and 
copying activities, the Government ordered in February 1998 that all 
publishing houses and printing and copying establishments obtain a 
license and register their equipment.
    The Government prohibits the media from reporting the views of 
opposition political leaders and critics, and it never allows even the 
mildest form of criticism of the President in print. The focus of the 
media on President Niyazov, to the exclusion of objective news 
reporting, intensified during the year and amplified the cult of 
personality centered around the President. Public criticism of 
government officials is done almost exclusively by the President 
himself. The Government has subjected those responsible for critical 
foreign press items to threats and harassment.
    In January the Government arrested and sentenced Nurberdy 
Nurmamedov, the head of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement, for 
hooliganism and making death threats; his son Murat was sentenced for 
hooliganism, as well (see Section 1.d.). The arrests followed shortly 
after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December 12, 1999, Mejlis 
elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint Niyazov president 
for life.
    All foreign correspondents who had applied for accreditation, 
except the Reuters correspondent, had received it by year's end.
    In January 1999 the Government arrested human rights and democracy 
advocate Vyacheslav Mamedov for remarks on a Russian radio broadcast 
attributed to him that were critical of the Government's treatment of 
ethnic Russians. Mamedov was soon released but remained under 
investigation, and his nongovernmental organization (NGO) remained 
unregistered at year's end.
    Intellectuals have reported that the security organs have 
instructed them to praise the President in their art and have warned 
them not to participate in receptions hosted by foreign diplomatic 
missions. The Minister of Culture attends rehearsals of all theater 
productions to ensure that they do not contain antigovernment or 
antipresidential content. The Ministry of Culture must approve plays 
before they open to the public.
    The Government also significantly restricts academic freedom. It 
does not tolerate criticism of government policy or the President in 
academic circles, and it discourages research into areas it considers 
politically sensitive, such as comparative law, history, or ethnic 
relations. All publishing companies are state-owned and works by 
authors of fiction who write about particular periods of history or 
other topics that are out-of-favor with the Government are not 
published. The government-controlled Union of Writers has in the past 
expelled members who have criticized government policy; libraries have 
removed their works. The Government abolished the Academy of Sciences 
in 1998. No masters' degrees or doctorates have been granted in the 
country since that time.
    The Government increased restrictions on academic freedom during 
the year. Following remarks by President Niyazov on September 27, in 
which he criticized an elementary school history textbook for its 
portrayal of Turkmen history, all copies of the book were recalled from 
schools and most have been destroyed. Scholars are very reluctant to 
begin textbook projects. During the year, exit visas for study and 
training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more 
difficult to obtain (see Section 2.d.).
    President Niyazov called for background checks that would span 
three generations in order to determine the ``moral character'' of 
university students prior to entry (see Section 1.f.). The President 
also decreed that foreign languages would only be taught in special 
language centers located in specific schools.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
allows for peaceful assembly; however, the Government restricts this 
right in practice. Permits are required for public meetings and 
demonstrations. In the past, there were reports of spontaneous 
demonstrations; for example, over bread prices. According to Human 
Rights Watch, in August approximately 200 village women who aimed to 
bring their grievances before the President were prevented from 
entering Ashgabat by police forces. In September a group of 
approximately 30 students who had been accepted to study in Turkey but 
who had been denied exit visas demonstrated along with their parents in 
front of the cabinet of ministers building.
    The Constitution allows for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. Unregistered organizations 
with political agendas are not allowed to hold demonstrations or 
meetings. No political groups critical of government policy have been 
able to meet the requirements for registration. The Government uses 
laws on the registration of political parties to prevent the emergence 
of potential opposition groups. At present the only registered 
political party is the Democratic Party, the former Turkmen Communist 
Party.
    Social and cultural organizations without political aims are 
allowed to function, but have found it difficult to register as legal 
entities. However, during the year, the Government reportedly 
registered at least 10 NGO's: 8 groups affiliated with Sunni Islam (see 
Section 2.c.), 1 union of entrepreneurs and inventors, and 1 
educational support group. Two registered NGO's that had experienced 
legal difficulties and were in danger of being closed down by the 
Government earlier in the year had resolved their legal disputes by 
year's end. One of the NGO's was in the process of re-registration and 
the other, which had not previously been registered, was not registered 
but was operating normally.
    Theoretically citizens have the freedom to associate with whomever 
they please; however, the authorities have fired or threatened to fire 
supporters of opposition movements from their jobs, removed them from 
professional societies, and even threatened them with the loss of their 
homes. In addition some citizens with links to foreigners are subject 
to official intimidation. In July 1999, the Government arrested former 
parliamentarian and democracy advocate Pirkuli Tanrikuliev on charges 
of embezzlement after he discussed forming a new political party with 
Western diplomats. Thereafter the Government convicted him, sentenced 
him to 8 years in prison, and stripped him of his medical credentials. 
Shortly before his arrest, his daughter lost her government job and his 
youngest son was removed from the list of those accepted into the 
state-run university. He was released under the presidential amnesty in 
December.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and does not establish a state religion; however, the 
Government imposes restrictions on most religious groups. Citizens are 
overwhelmingly Muslim, but Islam does not play a dominant role in 
society, in part due to 70 years of Soviet rule. The Government pays 
the salaries of Muslim clerics.
    There is no state religion, but a modest revival of Islam has 
occurred since independence. The Government has incorporated some 
aspects of Muslim tradition into its efforts to define a Turkmen 
identity. Publication of the President's philosophical and spiritual 
guidelines on what it means to be Turkmen, known as ``rukhname,'' has 
been delayed several times. There is widespread concern over what 
rukhname might mean for individual freedom. The state-supported Council 
on Religious Affairs (CRA) is part of the government bureaucracy rather 
than an organ for promoting interfaith dialog. The Russian Orthodox 
council member wears presidential medals on his clerical vestments. 
According to a Keston News Service report, the Council appears to 
exercise direct control over the hiring, promotion, and firing of both 
Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, despite the fact that this 
role is not listed among the CRA's duties in the Law on Religion. 
During the year, the Government registered 10 new NGO's, 8 of which 
were affiliated with Sunni Islam (see Section 2.b.).
    While it affirms a number of important religious freedoms, the Law 
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which was amended 
in 1995 and again in 1996, also provides for significant government 
control of religion. Religious congregations are required to register 
with the Government and must have at least 500 Turkmen citizens over 
the age of 18 as adherents to be registered. This requirement has 
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from 
setting up legal religious organizations. Moreover the Government 
applies this 500-member standard on a local basis. A religious group 
must have at least 500 adherents in each city in which they wish to be 
registered.
    This restriction also has caused problems for a number of minority 
religions, including the Baha'i Faith, which was registered by the 
Government in 1994 only to be deregistered in 1997 when the threshold 
was raised to 500 adherents. Members of the Baha'i Faith have been 
prevented from conducting services since 1997 and, in 1997 and 1998, 
were questioned by internal security representatives for holding 
private prayer meetings in their homes. Although the local Baha'i 
community in Ashgabat was able to open its center for 1 day in March 
1999 to celebrate the Faith's Nowruz (spring) holiday, this year the 
community believed that they would not be permitted to open for Nowruz 
and therefore did not request permission to open. However, the local 
Baha'i community in Ashgabat was able to conduct a memorial service at 
a local restaurant in January. In January 1999, the Armenian community 
in Turkmenbashi applied to local authorities to use a church 
appropriated during the Soviet era as a cultural center pending 
registration as a religious organization; however, at year's end, it 
had not yet received a response from the Government. The Halk Maslahaty 
(People's Council) had not yet reduced the 500 person threshold by 
year's end.
    Although the law protects freedom of religion, the Government 
states officially that proselytizing by unregistered religions--i.e., 
everything other than Sunni Islam and Orthodox Christianity--is 
illegal. Government permission is required for any mass meetings or 
demonstrations for religious purposes. The Government also restricts 
the travel of clergy or members of religious groups to the country. 
Islamic religious literature is distributed through the mosques. 
Orthodox churches are permitted to offer religious literature. 
Unregistered religious groups face government harassment if they 
attempt to meet or distribute religious literature. In March border 
officials confiscated religious materials being brought into the 
country in bulk by a visiting group affiliated with an evangelical 
Christian organization.
    In August 1999, Shageldi Atakov, a prominent member of the Baptist 
faith, was sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined $12,000 (686 
million manats)--an astronomical sum considering average wages in the 
country amount to $30 (approximately 156,000 manats) a month--for an 
alleged illegal transfer of automobiles in 1994 that Atakov denied. On 
February 3, the local Committee of National Security (KNB) chief 
reportedly expelled Atakov's wife and children from Mary to Kaakha, 
where they were told not to leave the town (see Section 1.d.). In March 
the Government arrested Atakov's brother Chariyar on unknown charges 
and imprisoned him for 15 days. Credible press reports indicate that a 
series of efforts to intimidate Baptist congregations throughout the 
country took place at the beginning and end of the year, including 
raids of homes and confiscation of religious materials. In March the 
authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and 
their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section 
1.d). At year's end, there were many reports of Baptist churches in 
several cities having been harassed by the Government.
    The Government also harassed Pentecostals. On February 4, law 
enforcement authorities reportedly beat the Pastor and confiscated 
religious materials at a Pentecostal facility in Tejen. On February 6, 
agents from the KNB broke up a service at a Pentecostal house of 
worship in Ashgabat and recorded the names of all those present.
    Muslims were also the target of mistreatment. In March the 
Government arrested religious leader Hoja Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore 
down an unregistered mosque and religious school run by him and his 
followers. President Niyazov ordered that all copies of Orazgylychev's 
Turkmen translation of the Koran be burned. Orazgylychev subsequently 
was released and sentenced to internal exile (see Section 1.d.). He 
earlier had criticized President Niyazov for directing that Turkmen 
children dance around a Christmas tree during New Year's celebrations 
(see Sections 1.d.).
    In April President Niyazov ordered that Muslim madrassahs and other 
religious schools be closed and that only two such schools, functioning 
under the auspices of the government-controlled Muftiyat, be allowed.
    The President ordered the implementation of new procedures 
restricting searches of private homes in April, which the legislature 
approved in June (see Section 1.f.). The period following these 
measures reportedly saw a significant reduction of police harassment of 
some religious believers in their private homes and a reduction in the 
confiscation of religious property during the summer. However, there 
was an increase in such activity during the last 4 months of the year.
    In October KNB officials detained Seventh Day Adventist pastor 
Pavel Fedotov at a Bible reading in Turkmenabad and charged him with 
holding an unsanctioned meeting and confiscating videotapes; he was 
released several days thereafter. In November four Protestants were 
reportedly tortured by police because of their religious affiliations, 
and at least three of them had their homes and cars confiscated after 
being forced to sign a statement saying that they had voluntarily 
donated all they owned as a gift to the President (see Section 1.c.). 
Police continued to detain and harass the Protestants after the initial 
incident.
    The Seventh Day Adventist congregation in Ashgabat, whose church 
was demolished on short notice in November 1999 as part of a Government 
urban clearing project, has received neither compensation nor 
alternative premises for worship.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes restrictions both 
on freedom of movement within the country and on travel abroad. The 
Government has tightened restrictions on travel to border cities and 
regions, having declared large parts of the country closed. Throughout 
the year, the President repeatedly told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to maintain control over foreigners in the country. Citizens still 
carry internal passports. These documents are used primarily as a form 
of identification, rather than as a means of controlling movement. 
Residence permits are not required, although the place of residence is 
registered and noted in passports.
    The Government uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as 
a means of restricting international travel. Any citizen who wishes to 
visit a foreign country must obtain an exit visa, which can take up to 
5 weeks to process. Although not new, this policy became more onerous 
in June 1999 when the country withdrew from the visa agreement of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. The official reason given by the 
Government for this action was to secure the country's borders against 
foreign criminal elements. Most citizens are permitted to emigrate 
without undue restriction. During the year, exit visas for study and 
training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more 
difficult to obtain (see Section 2.a.).
    The government-funded Council of World Turkmen provides assistance 
to ethnic Turkmen abroad who wish to return to the country and apply 
for citizenship; however, the Government discourages immigration by 
ethnic Turkmen living in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries. 
Immigration of non-Turkmen from other areas of the former Soviet Union 
is discouraged by the unofficial policy of favoring employment of 
ethnic Turkmen.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1997 Law 
on Refugees establishes the procedures and conditions for recognizing 
refugee status and sets the legal, economic, and social rights of 
refugees. The country currently provides first asylum if the person is 
recognized under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). The Government has granted refugee or asylee status to some 
ethnic Turkmen from Afghanistan and has allowed some Tajik refugees and 
migrants to reside in the country. The Government cooperates with the 
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations that assist refugees. There 
were no confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of those having a 
valid claim to refugee status. There have been unconfirmed reports of 
small numbers of refugees being forcibly returned by individual border 
guards; however, according to the UNHCR, there is no clear pattern of 
abuse or forced expulsion of refugees, with the exception of such low-
level harassment.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have no real ability to effect peaceful change in the 
Government and have little influence on government policy or 
decisionmaking. The 1992 Constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a 
secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. It calls for 
the separation of powers between the various branches of government, 
but vests a disproportionate share of power in the Presidency. In 
practice President Niyazov's power is absolute, and the country remains 
a one-man state. Despite the appearance of decisionmaking by consensus, 
most decisions are made at the presidential level. In his address to 
the Halk Maslahaty in July 1998, President Niyazov called for local 
councils and village leaders to have greater power and authority to 
deal with local issues; however, in reality even local leaders are 
selected and dismissed by the President. In December 1999, the Halk 
Maslahaty proposed, and the newly elected Mejlis (Parliament) approved, 
a law making an exception to the constitutionally mandated maximum of 
two 5-year terms for the President, but only for Niyazov, as the 
country's first president, conferring on him a lifetime term in office.
    In November 1998, the President announced that any Turkmen citizen 
who would like to write to him with a complaint could do so directly. 
Special mailboxes were set up throughout the country and, in the first 
year, some 140,000 letters were received by the President. Citizens 
still apparently write to the President because these letters are often 
cited in the local media, but the numbers received during the year were 
not reported.
    In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was 
Saparmurat Niyazov, the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party. 
The Government announced the election barely a month before voting day, 
giving opposition groups insufficient time to organize and qualify to 
submit a candidate. A 1994 national referendum extended the President's 
term to 2002, obviating the need for the scheduled presidential 
election in 1997. According to the official results, 99.9 percent of 
those voting cast their ballots to extend his term. The policy of the 
Democratic Party, according to its leadership, is to implement the 
policy of the President. In August 1999, the Government changed the 
national oath to require that citizens swear personal allegiance to 
President Niyazov in particular, rather than just to the presidency as 
a general institution.
    The 50-member Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees and 
has no real independence. In the 1994 Mejlis elections, no opposition 
participation was permitted. The Government claimed that 99.8 percent 
of all eligible voters participated. President Niyazov promised in 1998 
that the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1999 for a 
reconstituted Mejlis would be ``free and fair'' and conducted on a 
``wide democratic basis''; however, the elections were seriously 
flawed. Although there were at least two candidates for each Mejlis 
seat, every candidate was selected by the Government, and there was no 
open discussion of the issues. The Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE declined to send an observation or 
limited assessment mission for the elections. In its public 
explanation, ODIHR cited serious concerns that the broad electoral 
framework in the country fell short of its OSCE commitments. The 
Government claimed that 98.9 percent of eligible voters participated. 
Diplomatic observers noted many empty polling stations, extensive use 
of mobile ballot boxes, and numerous instances of family voting.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or 
minorities in the political process; however, women are 
underrepresented in government and politics. Thirteen members of the 
50-member Mejlis are female, although women constitute over 50 percent 
of the population. Women serve in the following positions: Minister of 
Textiles, Prosecutor General, Chief of Presidential Protocol, Deputy 
Minister of Health, Deputy Minister of Social Welfare, Deputy Minister 
of Education, Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance, and Deputy 
Chairman for Textiles and Foreign Trade. No women serve as provincial 
governors. Minorities are represented in the Government, although 
preference is given to ethnic Turkmen. The Mejlis consists of 48 ethnic 
Turkmen, 1 ethnic Russian, and 1 ethnic Uzbek.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no local human rights monitoring groups, and government 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association would 
preclude any effort to investigate and criticize publicly the 
Government's human rights policies. Several independent journalists 
based in Russia report on these issues in the Russian press and have 
contact with international human rights organizations. On numerous 
occasions in the past, the Government has warned its critics against 
speaking with visiting journalists or other foreigners wishing to 
discuss human rights issues.
    In January 1999, President Niyazov signed a decree establishing a 
human rights commission that he heads. The commission oversees the work 
of law enforcement agencies, the military, and the judiciary, but it 
appears to have little real authority. The commission is subordinate to 
the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights under the 
President, which has been in operation since 1997. Its mandate is to 
support the democratization of the government and society and to 
monitor the protection of human rights. The Institute maintains four 
full-time staff members to receive and resolve citizen complaints of 
arbitrary action. Of the 2,590 complaints received during the year, 
some 35 percent concerned appeals, pardons, and abuses by law 
enforcement officials; 10 percent dealt with social and economic 
problems; and 24 percent concerned housing. The remainder were in the 
miscellaneous category. In general the Institute conducts a study of 
the complaint and returns its findings to the individual and the 
organizations involved. However, the Institute is not an independent 
body, and its ability to obtain redress is limited by government 
interests.
    In January 1999, the OSCE opened an office in Ashgabat. There was 
no further progress on negotiations on a memorandum of understanding 
between the Government and the OSCE.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for all, 
independent of one's nationality, origin, language, and religion. It 
further specifies equal rights before the law for both men and women. 
There is no legal basis for discrimination against women or religious 
or ethnic minorities. However, cultural traditions and the Government's 
policy of promoting Turkmen nationalism limit the employment and 
educational opportunities of women and nonethnic Turkmen.
    Women.--Anecdotal reports indicate that domestic violence against 
women is common, but no statistics are available. The subject is not 
discussed in society. There are no court cases available and no 
references to domestic violence in the media. One unofficial group to 
support battered women operates in Ashgabat.
    Women are underrepresented in the upper levels of state-owned 
economic enterprises and are concentrated in the health care and 
education professions and in service industries. Women are restricted 
from working in some dangerous and environmentally unsafe jobs. Under 
the law, women enjoy the same inheritance and marriage rights as men. 
However, in traditional Turkmen society, the woman's primary role is as 
homemaker and mother, and family pressures often limit opportunities 
for women wanting to enter careers outside the home and advance their 
education. Religious authorities, when proffering advice to practicing 
Muslims on matters concerning inheritance and property rights, often 
favor men over women.
    There is only one officially registered women's group, which is 
headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis and dedicated in honor 
of the President's mother. The Government has no program specifically 
aimed at rectifying the disadvantaged position of women in society, as 
it does not acknowledge that women suffer discrimination.
    Children.--The Government's social umbrella covers the welfare 
needs of children. The Government has not taken effective steps to 
address the environmental and health problems that have resulted in a 
high rate of infant and maternal mortality. In September 1999, the 
Government cut the number of years of basic education from 10 to 9 
years; however, children now in their eighth, ninth, or tenth year of 
education will be unaffected. There is little difference in the 
education provided to girls and boys. Education is free and compulsory.
    Class sizes in the country are increasing rapidly, facilities are 
deteriorating, and funds for textbooks and supplies are decreasing. In 
September the President called for a reduction in the number of 
teachers by 10,000 before the end of the year. Educators are concerned 
that this will further exacerbate crowded classrooms, overwork 
teachers, and further reduce the quality of education in the country. 
The ostensible reason for the reduction is to increase salaries for the 
remaining teachers. However, past similar promises have been 
unfulfilled, and teachers are routinely paid 2 to 3 months late. In 
1998 the Ministry of Education (MED) increased the number of students 
per class from 30 to 45. Wages for teachers and administrators are in 
arrears in many districts; this, added to the fact that salaries are 
low, has caused some teachers to leave the field and seek jobs in the 
private sector, leaving classrooms overcrowded.
    Bribery has become a main component of the admission process at 
prestigious departments in universities. Although officially free, 
admission to many faculties at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat 
reportedly costs between $2,000 and $4,000. Paying bribes for good 
grades is also a common practice. Furthermore, the MED has discouraged 
schools from having contacts with NGO's and international 
organizations.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. However, 
during the annual cotton harvest, some schools in agricultural areas 
are closed and children as young as 10 years of age work in the cotton 
fields for up to 2 months (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--Government subsidies and pensions are 
provided for those with disabilities, although the pensions are 
inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. Those capable of 
working generally are provided with jobs under still valid 
preindependence policies that virtually guarantee employment to all. 
According to existing legislation, facilities to allow access by the 
disabled must be included in new construction projects. However, 
compliance is inconsistent and most older buildings are not so 
equipped. Care for the mentally retarded and mentally ill is provided 
on the local level. Mentally retarded and mentally ill children are 
placed in boarding schools, with educational and future employment 
opportunities if their condition is mild. The psychological hospital in 
Bekrova and the psychological clinic in Gok Tepe were closed over the 
past year. To compensate a psychiatric hospital was opened in Dashoguz 
for those in need of in-patient care. There is also a hospital for the 
criminally insane in Lebap Velayat. Out-patient facilities exist in 
Ashgabat, Yoloten, and Tedjen. In theory patients receive food, 
clothing, and medical care at in-patient facilities but in practice, 
supplies are inadequate and services are poor.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for 
equal rights and freedoms for all citizens. Turkmen comprise 
approximately 77 percent of the population of about 5.2 million; 
Uzbeks, 9 percent; and Russians, 7 percent. There are smaller numbers 
of Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, and many other ethnic groups. Since 
independence the country has not experienced ethnic turmoil.
    As part of its nation-building efforts, the Government has 
attempted to foster Turkmen national pride, in part through its 
language policy. The Constitution designates Turkmen as the official 
language, and it is a mandatory subject in school, although it is not 
necessarily the language of instruction.
    The Constitution also provides for the rights of speakers of other 
languages to use them. While Russian remains in common usage in 
commerce and in everyday life, the Government has intensified its 
campaign over the past year for official business to be conducted 
solely in Turkmen. Some high-ranking government officials have been 
publicly criticized by the President for their failure to speak 
Turkmen. In accordance with his wishes, Russian language usage in 
newspapers has been cut back sharply during the past few years (see 
Section 2.a.). In June 1999, the Government switched one of the Russian 
language daily newspapers to Turkmen and reduced daily Russian news 
broadcasts on state-run television to 30 minutes. In October 1999, the 
state radio ceased entirely its daily 15-minute Russian language news 
broadcast. During the year, there were no Russian language radio 
broadcasts and only 15 minutes of news in Russian on television each 
day. Nonethnic Turkmen employees at government ministries reportedly 
were given until December 1999 to learn Turkmen, and there have been 
reports that some government employees, such as doctors and teachers, 
have been dismissed from their positions because they failed to learn 
the language. The most prominent example was the rector of the 
Polytechnical Institute in Ashgabat, who was dismissed from his 
position in 1999 for his inability to speak Turkmen.
    Non-Turkmen fear that the designation of Turkmen as the official 
language places their children at a disadvantage educationally and 
economically. They complain that some avenues for promotion and job 
advancement are no longer open to them. Only a handful of non-Turkmen 
occupy high-echelon jobs in the ministries, and there are reports that 
managerial positions were closed to non-Turkmen. As a result of these 
restrictions, more and more ethnic Russians view their situation in the 
country as deteriorating and are seeking Russian citizenship.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Turkmenistan inherited the Soviet 
system of government-controlled trade unions. There are no legal 
guarantees entitling workers to form or join unions. The Colleagues 
Union is the only legal central trade union federation permitted, and 
it claims a membership of 1.3 million; its member unions are divided 
along both sectoral and regional lines. Unions may not form or join 
other federations.
    While no law specifically prohibits the establishment of 
independent unions, there are no such unions, and no attempts were made 
to register an independent trade union during the year.
    The law neither prohibits nor permits strikes and does not address 
the issue of retaliation against strikers. Strikes are extremely rare 
and no strikes were known to have occurred during the year.
    There is no information available on union affiliation with 
international unions. The country joined the International Labor 
Organization in 1993.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does 
not protect the right to collective bargaining. In practice in the 
state-dominated economy, the close association of both the trade union 
and the state-owned enterprise with the Government seriously limits 
workers' ability to bargain, and workers often go months without pay or 
receive their paychecks late.
    The Ministry of Economics and Finance prepares general guidelines 
for wages and sets wages in health care, culture, and some other areas. 
In other sectors, it allows for some leeway at the enterprise level, 
taking into account local factors. The Government determines specific 
wage and benefit packages for each factory or enterprise.
    The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers 
against union members and organizers, and there are no mechanisms for 
resolving such complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, there were unconfirmed, anectodal 
reports of trafficking in women (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) and reports 
of prisoners being forced to work in a kaolin mine in Kizlkaya prison, 
near Dashoguz, under hazardous and unhealthy conditions (see Section 
1.c. and 2.b.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the 
exception of children who work in cotton harvesting in rural areas (see 
Section 5 and 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years; in 
a few heavy industries, it is 18 years. The law prohibits children 
between the ages of 16 and 18 years from working more than 6 hours per 
day (the normal workday is 8 hours).
    A 15-year-old child may work 4 to 6 hours per day but only with the 
permission of the trade union and parents. This permission rarely is 
granted. Violations of child labor laws occur in rural areas during the 
cotton harvesting season, when teenagers work in the fields and 
children as young as 10 years of age sometimes help with the harvest.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the exception of 
cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 5 and 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. In 
December 1999, the Government raised the average wage in the state 
sector to approximately $77 (400,000 manats) per month at the official 
rate. While the Government subsidizes the prices of many necessities 
and provides others free of charge, this wage falls short of the amount 
required to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and his or 
her family. Most households are multigenerational, with several members 
receiving salaries, stipends, or pensions. Even so, many people lack 
the resources to maintain an adequate diet, and meat is a luxury for 
most citizens.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours with 2 days off. 
Individuals who work fewer hours during the week or are in certain 
high-level positions may also work on Saturdays.
    The country inherited from the Soviet era an economic system with 
substandard working conditions--one in which production took precedence 
over the health and safety of workers. Industrial workers often labor 
in unsafe environments and are not provided proper protective 
equipment. Some agricultural workers are subjected to environmental 
health hazards. The Government recognizes that these problems exist and 
has taken some steps to address them, but it has not set comprehensive 
standards for occupational health and safety. Workers do not always 
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger 
their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are unconfirmed, anecdotal 
reports of women from Turkmenistan traveling to Turkey and the United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and working as prostitutes, especially before 
the U.A.E. tightened its entry visa requirements for young women over 
the past few years. The Government does not have programs in place to 
combat trafficking in persons, but cooperates in educational efforts on 
this topic. In November 1999, the Government and the International 
Organization on Migration hosted a 1-day seminar on illegal migration 
during which trafficking in women was discussed in detail.
                               __________

                                UKRAINE

    Ukraine is governed by a directly elected president and a 
unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), which is 
elected partially according to proportional representation and 
partially by direct constituency mandate. Incumbent President Leonid 
Kuchma was reelected after two rounds of voting on October 31 and 
November 14, 1999. There were some irregularities during the election 
campaign and during the balloting, including those cited in the March 7 
final report of the Office for Security and Cooperation of Europe/
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) which 
stated that the presidential elections of October and November 1999 
``failed to meet a significant number of the OSCE election related 
commitments.'' However, almost all observers agreed that the election 
results reflected the will of the electorate. Despite numerous flaws 
and irregularities, previous national elections in 1998 and 1994 also 
generally reflected the will of the electorate. The President appoints 
the Cabinet and controls government operations. In an April referendum, 
which observers described as flawed in several respects but probably 
reflected the will of the people, voters approved several changes to 
the Constitution which would expand presidential powers and increase 
executive branch influence over Parliament. The Constitutional Court 
later struck down two of the six proposed amendments; however, 
constitutional changes had not been implemented by year's end. The 
Constitution mandates an independent judiciary; however, the courts are 
funded through the Ministry of Justice, are subject to political 
interference and corruption, and are inefficient.
    The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (which controls the various police forces), and the Ministry of 
Defense have equal responsibility for internal security and report to 
the President through the Cabinet. The State Tax Administration also 
has law enforcement powers, which it exercises through the tax police. 
The armed forces largely have remained outside of politics. While 
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the 
security forces, institutional government corruption sometimes can lead 
to their improper use. The SBU and other government agencies have 
interfered indirectly in the political process through criminal and tax 
investigations of politicians, journalists, and influential 
businessmen. Members of the security forces committed human rights 
abuses.
    Ukraine is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned 
to a market-based economy. The private sector has continued to grow and 
now represents a substantial portion of the economy. For the first time 
since independence, the country experienced economic growth (5 
percent). Nevertheless, the country remains in a serious economic 
crisis. While the Government made some progress in key areas such as 
privatization, energy, and the state budget, the country lacks many of 
reforms needed to generate sustainable economic growth. Industrial 
output has suffered years of sharp decline. A 1999 presidential decree 
on agricultural reform led to a break-up of the Soviet-era state farm 
system. Legislation enabling the granting of land titles was passed; 
however, the property rights of former collective farm workers are weak 
and poorly defined. Production in key areas such as wheat was 
unreliable. The summer grain harvest was the worst since 1945, but the 
winter crop was the best in years. According to official statistics, 
about half of the work force is employed formally in manufacturing, 
with the balance divided between services and agriculture; however, in 
reality many industrial enterprises have reduced or stopped production. 
Exports are diversified and include metals, chemicals, sugar, and 
semifinished goods. The annual per capita gross domestic product for 
the year was approximately $669. However, millions of employees go 
months without being paid, and most individuals derive a significant 
proportion of their income from the shadow economy. Inflation was 19 
percent during the first half of the year, but averaged less than 0.5 
percent per month since June. Investment remains at low levels, with 
many potential investors discouraged by rampant corruption, onerous 
taxation, and arbitrary licensing practices. Unemployment has affected 
women disproportionately; 56 percent of those officially registered as 
unemployed are women. Wealth is concentrated in the political elite and 
among directors of state-dominated sectors such as metals, oil, and 
gas.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in some areas; 
however, the Government continued to respect the rights of its citizens 
in other areas. In previous years, police and military committed 
extrajudicial killings; however, there were no reports of such 
incidents during the year. A prominent journalist disappeared in 
September. In November a decapitated body believed to be his was found. 
Later that month, a prominent political opponent accused the President 
of complicity in the disappearance. Those charges have not been proved 
or disproved. The Government asserted that it is investigating the 
journalist's disappearance and conducting tests to determine the 
identity of the corpse; however, the case remains unsolved at year's 
end, and the authorities' poor handling of the investigation proved a 
source of great concern. Police and prison officials regularly tortured 
and beat detainees and prisoners, sometimes resulting in death. The 
beating of conscripts in the army by fellow soldiers was common and 
sometimes resulted in death. Prison conditions are harsh and life-
threatening. There were instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Lengthy pretrial detention in very poor conditions was common, and 
detainees often spent months in pretrial detention for violations that 
involved little or no prison time if convicted. Long delays in trials 
are a problem. The Government rarely punishes officials who commit 
abuses. The SBU, police, and Prosecutor's Office have drawn domestic 
and international criticism for their failure to take adequate action 
to curb institutional corruption and abuse in the Government. Many 
high-profile corruption cases have been dropped, ostensibly because of 
lack of evidence. Anticorruption legislation has been enforced 
selectively, mostly against government opponents and low-level 
officials. Political interference and corruption affect the judicial 
process. The judiciary is overburdened, inefficient, and lacks 
sufficient funding and staff. These factors undermine citizens' right 
to a fair trial. The criminal justice system has been slow to reform, 
due to both lack of government effort and strained economic resources. 
The Government continued to intrude in citizens' lives and infringe on 
their privacy rights. The Government interfered with the news media and 
restricted freedom of the press; however, a wide range of opinion is 
available in newspapers and periodicals. Government interference was 
particularly severe during the period preceding the April referendum on 
amendments to the Constitution that would expand presidential powers by 
limiting the power of the Parliament and in response to coverage of the 
scandal surrounding the disappearance of an opposition journalist. 
Self-censorship remained a significant problem. During the 1999 
presidential election campaign, government authorities interfered in 
the election process and stepped up pressure on the media through tax 
inspections and other measures. The national broadcast media came under 
particular pressure. There were some limits on freedom of assembly, and 
there were some instances of restrictions on freedom of association. 
Limitations on nonnative religious organizations constrained freedom of 
religion. The Government took steps to return to religious groups 
properties expropriated during the Soviet era. It returned two churches 
that were rebuilt with government funds. Some limits on freedom of 
movement, most notably the registration or ``propiska'' system, 
remained. The Government took steps to support the return and 
resettlement of exiled Tatars in Crimea. As many as 10 elected mayors 
from several regions reported government harassment stemming from their 
lack of support for President Kuchma during the 1999 presidential 
campaign. The SBU monitored the activities of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) during the year. Violence and discrimination 
against women; violence against children; societal anti-Semitism; and 
discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities are 
problems. The Government discourages some workers from organizing 
unions, and forced labor in the form of trafficking in women and girls 
for sexual exploitation is a significant problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government agents. In previous years, 
members of the police and military committed extrajudicial killings; 
however, there were no reports of such incidents during the year.
    There were reports in previous years that police beat persons at 
alcohol corrective treatment centers and sometimes killed them (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Members of the armed forces killed soldiers during violent hazing 
incidents in previous years (see Section 1.c.). According to a 
government official, in 1998 10 to 12 military personnel were beaten to 
death, and a total of 20 to 30 died as an indirect result of injuries 
sustained from hazing.
    Abuse of prisoners and detainees, and harsh prison conditions, 
sometimes led to death (see Section 1.c.). Statistics on prison deaths 
for this year were unavailable. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in 
prison and detention facilities, many due to harsh conditions.
    The pervasiveness of corruption, connections between government 
officials and organized crime, and the political activities of 
organized crime figures often blurred the distinction between political 
and criminal acts. Politicians, politically connected businessmen, and 
journalists have been the victims of possibly politically-motivated--
and sometimes fatal--attacks. There were allegations of government 
involvement in the disappearance and presumed death of opposition 
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze; however, those charges have not been 
proven (see Section 1.b.).
    No official statistics for contract killings during the year were 
available.
    The Government made no known progress in resolving a number of the 
high profile killings of past years. No progress was made in solving 
the 1999 murder of the security chief of the independent television 
station STB or the 1999 killings of the chairman of the regional 
arbitration court Borys Vihrov and the director of local television 
station Igor Bondar in Odessa. The Government also made no known 
progress in resolving the 1998 murders of former director of the 
national bank Vadym Hetman, deputy head of the Crimean government 
Aleksandr Safontsev, the mayor of Shakhtersk, or the campaign manager 
of a Kiev mayoral candidate. Nor was there any progress in resolving 
the 1997 murders of the governor of the Razoolnensky district, the 
Crimean deputy minister for tourism and resorts, the murder of 
prominent businessman Arkadiy Tabachnyk, or the bombing of the 
intensive care unit in Simferopol. In May police arrested a suspect in 
the 1995 killing of Member of Parliament Yevhen Shcherban.
    b. Disappearance.--On September 16, prominent journalist Heorhiy 
Gongadze disappeared. Gongadze was the editor of the on-line news 
journal Ukrainska Pravda and was a frequent critic of both the 
Government and leading business figures. In a July open letter 
addressed to the Prosecutor General, he complained of government 
harassment, including being followed and questioned by security forces. 
In early November, police found a decapitated body outside of Kiev, 
which Gongadze's friends and family believed was that of the missing 
journalist. The Government asserted that it is conducting a full-scale 
investigation of his disappearance. The body was sent to forensic 
experts for examination, yet no positive identification was made by 
year's end--authorities did not begin the process of conducting a DNA 
test until mid-December. On November 28, the leader of the Socialist 
Party, Oleksandr Moroz, accused the President and other senior 
government officials of complicity in the disappearance of Gongadze. He 
also released audio tapes purporting to be conversations between the 
President, his Administration Chief Volodymyr Lytvyn, and Minister of 
Internal Affairs Yuri Kravchenko discussing the desirability of 
Gongadze's abduction. The tapes, provided by a former Presidential 
security guard, were not authenticated officially by year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police and 
prison officials regularly tortured and beat detainees and prisoners, 
and there were numerous reports of such abuse. Amnesty International 
(AI) and other human rights groups continued to receive regular reports 
that Berkut (special militia units or riot police) troops tortured and 
beat inmates as part of regular training exercises. The media reported 
that police subjected detainees to the ``swallow,'' in which the 
detainee is placed on his stomach and his feet are tied to his hands 
behind him, forcing his back to arch. Another abuse is the ``baby 
elephant,'' in which a gas mask is placed on the prisoner's head and 
the flow of oxygen slowly reduced. Detainees also were subjected to a 
method called the ``monument,'' in which a prisoner is suspended by his 
hands on a rope and beaten. Requesting an attorney often leads to a 
worse beating, and detainees may be beaten until they waive their right 
to an attorney. There is no effective mechanism for registering 
complaints about mistreatment or for obtaining redress for such 
actions. Prisoners may address complaints to the Ombudsman, and that 
office has received widespread reports of torture in pretrial 
detention. However, the Ombudsman has no enforcement authority, and the 
Government made little effort during the year to end such practices or 
to punish officials who committed or abetted such abuses. According to 
the Office of the Ombudsman, most of the complaints that it received 
centered on human rights violations by law enforcement personnel. In 
1999 the Ombudsman was criticized for failing to investigate whether 
special police units beat prisoners during regular exercises in jail. 
During the year, the Ombudsman made the treatment of prisoners a 
priority and investigated conditions in at least two prisons. On 
December 1, 1999, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Criminal 
Code that prescribes up to 15 years' imprisonment for torture. However, 
human rights monitors reported little difference in the treatment of 
prisoners since adoption of this law.
    Police also abused Roma, particularly in the Transcarpathian 
region, and harassed and abused dark-skinned persons (see Section 5). 
Police also harassed journalists and refugees (see Sections 2.a. and 
2.d.). Police corruption also remained a serious problem.
    Reports continued of harsh conditions and violence against 
conscripts in the armed forces. Senior officers reportedly required 
malnourished recruits to beg for food or money. Senior conscripts often 
beat recruits, sometimes to death (see Section 1.a.). Punishment 
administered for committing or condoning such activities did not serve 
as an effective deterrent to the further practice of such abuses. 
Between 1991 and 1998, 450 soldiers were convicted of violent 
harassment of their colleagues; approximately 200 military personnel 
were prosecuted in 1998 for violent hazing (10 to 12 conscripts were 
beaten to death, and 20 to 30 died from injuries related to hazing).
    Some politically active individuals were wounded in violent 
attacks. In February unknown assailants beat parliamentarian Oleksandr 
Yeliashkevych near a hotel where several Members of Parliament live. 
Five suspects were charged in the October 1999 bombing in which 
presidential candidate Natalia Vitrenko was wounded slightly, and more 
than 30 others were injured. No progress was reported in resolving the 
April 1999 wounding by gunshot of Kiev municipal government official 
Mykola Pidmogylny or the November 1999 shooting of Vinnytsia Mayor 
Dmytro Dvorkis.
    Members of the press were hurt in violent incidents throughout the 
year. In July Anatoliy Zhuchynsky, a reporter for the Vinnytsia 
newspaper 33 Channel, was assaulted outside his home. He linked the 
attack to his political reporting. In August two men assaulted 
Valentyna Vasylchenko, a reporter for the Cherkassy newspaper Antenna, 
in the stairway outside her apartment. She attributed the attack to her 
coverage of criminal groups. In September Nikolay Severin, an editor of 
an independent paper in Luhansk, was attacked by brick-wielding 
assailants outside his home. He blamed the assault on his critical 
reporting.
    No progress was made in resolving the 1999 firebombing of the 
office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis in Simferopol or the 1999 bombing 
of the office of the Communist Party leader Leonid Hrach in Simferopol. 
Accusations by opposition presidential candidate Marchuk linking the 
presidential administration to a false bomb threat that disrupted a 
1999 meeting between Marchuk and local residents were never proven.
    In 1998 the Government created a penal department to oversee reform 
of the penal system and to serve as the administrative center of the 
penal system. The new department originally was placed under the 
oversight of the Ministry of Interior, but it was given the status of 
an independent government agency by presidential decree in 1999. 
However, human rights groups report that this change in status has not 
affected its practices. The Government failed to punish prison and 
police officials who committed or condoned violence against prisoners.
    There was no improvement during the year in prison conditions, 
which are harsh, life-threatening, and do not meet minimum 
international standards. Prison officials intimidated and mistreated 
inmates. Due in part to the severe economic crisis, prisons and 
detention centers were severely overcrowded and lacked adequate 
sanitation and medical facilities. According to official statistics, 
funding for prisons decreased by almost 14 percent over the last 3 
years. During the year, the Government announced a general amnesty for 
34,800 inmates intended to relieve overcrowding. Because the country 
lacks a well-developed system of suspended sentences, and the law does 
not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, at least one-third 
of inmates were convicted of only minor violations.
    Conditions in pretrial detention facilities routinely failed to 
meet minimum international standards. Inmates sometimes were held in 
investigative isolation for extended periods and subjected to 
intimidation and mistreatment by jail guards and other inmates. 
Overcrowding is common in these centers. For example, the pretrial 
detention center in Kiev, houses 3,500; it was constructed to hold 
2,850 persons.
    According to official sources, information on the physical state of 
prison walls and fences as well as pretrial detention blocks is 
considered to be a government secret. However, the press reported 
freely about harsh prison conditions. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths 
in prisons and detention facilities, which was more than 3 times the 
death rate of the general population. Poor sanitary conditions result 
in deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis and dysentery. There are 
frequent incidents of murder by fellow inmates and suicide.
    Conditions in the Interior Ministry's Corrective Labor and 
Treatment Centers for Alcoholics (LTP's), where violent alcoholics are 
confined forcibly by court decision, differ little from those in 
prisons. Virtually no treatment is available. According to statistics 
from March, 12 LTP's with some 3,000 inmates continued to operate. 
Although some centers were transferred to the Health Ministry during 
the year, the Government had not lived up to its earlier commitment to 
transfer all of the LTP's to the ministry. Police have the right to 
take forcibly any person appearing drunk in public to special sobering 
centers. Human rights groups reported cases of police mistreatment, 
robbing, or beating of detainees at such centers (see Section 1.a.). In 
August 1999, the Government issued a decree directing the closure of 
such centers by the end of this year; however, some centers remained 
open at year's end.
    The Government continued to allow prison visits from human rights 
monitors; however, these monitors reported that it can be difficult to 
obtain access to prisons. Cases were reported in which prisoners were 
not permitted correspondence and family visits were allowed only once 
per year. Prisoners may complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions 
of detention, but human rights groups reported that inmates were 
punished for initiating complaints.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The law provides that authorities may detain 
a suspect for 3 days without a warrant, after which an arrest order 
must be issued. The Constitution stipulates that only courts may issue 
arrest warrants, but under its transitional provisions, the 
Prosecutor's office retains the right to issue search and arrest 
warrants until 2001. The maximum period of detention after charges have 
been filed is 18 months, but the law does not limit the aggregate time 
of detention before and during a trial. The law permits citizens to 
contest an arrest in court or appeal to the prosecutor. The 
Constitution requires immediate notification of family members 
concerning an arrest, but this action often is not taken in practice.
    By law a trial must begin no later than 3 weeks after indictment, 
but this requirement rarely is met by the overburdened court system. 
Months may pass before a defendant finally is brought to trial, and the 
situation did not improve during the year. Complicated cases can take 
years to go to trial. Although the 1996 amendment to the Criminal 
Procedures Code provides for bail, it is used rarely. Restrictions on 
travel outside a given area sometimes are employed. Accused persons 
usually are held without bail in pretrial detention for several months. 
As of October, there were 228,000 prisoners, 48,000 of whom were 
persons held in pretrial detention. The Constitution provides 
compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or 
conviction, but there are no known cases in which this provision was 
invoked. Reports indicated that this inaction is a result of lack of 
faith in the judiciary rather than the absence of unlawful or arbitrary 
detentions.
    The law stipulates that a defense attorney be provided without 
charge to the indigent from the moment of detention or the filing of 
charges, whichever comes first. There are insufficient numbers of 
defense attorneys to protect suspects from unlawful, lengthy 
imprisonment under extremely poor conditions. Although the concept of 
providing attorneys from the state system exists in principle, public 
attorneys often refuse to defend indigents for the low government fee. 
While in custody, a suspect or a prisoner is allowed by law to talk 
with a lawyer in private; however, human rights groups reported that 
the client-attorney privilege occasionally was denied by prison or 
investigative officials. To protect the defendant, each investigative 
file must contain a document signed by the defendant attesting that the 
charges against him, his right to an attorney, and his right not to 
give evidence against himself or his relatives have been explained to 
him. An appeals court may dismiss a conviction or order a new trial if 
this document is missing. As defendants increasingly became aware of 
their rights, they insisted on observance of these procedures. However, 
many persons remained unaware of these safeguards.
    The Government occasionally charges persons who are openly critical 
of the Government (usually opposition politicians or editors and 
journalists from the opposition press) with criminal libel or tax 
evasion charges (see Section 2.a.). In August Oleksandr Tymoshenko, the 
husband of then-Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and a business 
associate were arrested on charges of embezzlement of state funds. 
Tymoshenko's efforts to reform the energy sector had drawn strong 
opposition, most notably from powerful businesspersons closely tied to 
the Government. Although the investigation of the men reportedly was 
underway for some time, some observers believed that timing of the 
arrests was intended to pressure Tymoshenko.
    In May 1999, police officers in Mukachevo detained some 70 persons, 
primarily Roma, in a local market for illegal trading. The detainees 
were held without charges for 2 days and forced to perform manual labor 
for police officers. In July 1999, three Romani women were detained for 
failing to produce identification. They were ordered to clean the 
police station but they were released when a leader of a Romani NGO 
intervened on their behalf. There were no reports of incidents 
targeting Roma during the year.
    Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document 
checks and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
    Official corruption is widespread. The Government apparently 
enforced anticorruption statutes selectively for political ends. While 
anticorruption statutes were applied increasingly against lower-level 
officials, such enforcement reportedly is lacking against high-level 
officials. In 1999 Vasylkiv Mayor Valeriy Popovych was detained briefly 
on corruption charges after complaining of government harassment due to 
his support for opposition candidate Moroz during the October 1999 
presidential election. Charges against Popovych were dropped in 
January; however, in February he resigned his post under pressure from 
regional authorities. In 1999 a number of persons arraigned on criminal 
and corruption charges claimed that they were victimized because of 
their support for the former Prime Minister, who is currently on trial 
abroad for money laundering, and government opponent Pavlo Lazarenko. 
Former government officials Petro Shkudun, Mykola Syvulsky, and Vasyl 
Koval claimed that their cases were motivated politically due to their 
links to Lazarenko. In December 1999, Koval was sentenced to serve five 
years in prison on corruption charges. In June Syvulsky again was 
arrested on corruption charges while serving as an aide to former 
Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had been associated with 
Lazarenko.
    The Government does not employ forced exhile.
    e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject 
to considerable political interference from the executive branch and 
also suffers from corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded 
through the Ministry of Justice, which allows the Government to 
influence the judicial process. The presidential administration also 
reportedly continues the old Soviet tradition of weighing in by 
telephoning justices directly.
    The establishment of an independent judicial system provided for in 
the Constitution still awaits the passage of implementing legislation. 
As a result, the judiciary continues to operate according to Soviet 
principles. Most judges and prosecutors were appointed during the 
Soviet era, and court officials are attuned closely to the Government's 
interests. The High Judicial Council, which approves the appointment of 
and disciplines judges, consists primarily of senior executive branch 
representatives, including the Prosecutor General and the Chairman of 
the State Security Service. Human rights lawyers claimed that the 
judiciary was not free from government influence, particularly at the 
regional and local levels. For example, court chairmen are appointed 
directly by the executive and wield considerable influence over the 
outcome of a case through case assignments, the control of staff and 
promotions, and the control of social benefits available to judges. 
Court chairmen reportedly deliberately overburden independent-minded 
judges with too many cases and then instigate disciplinary actions 
against them for not completing their casework. There are credible 
reports that court chairmen regularly followed executive instructions. 
The Ministry of Justice and court chairmen also controlled judges' 
housing. Judges whose rulings were not in accord with the executive 
branch were provided with apartments far from city centers or are 
ignored altogether when new apartments became available.
    The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, which engenders 
inefficiency and corruption. The court system receives all its funding 
from the Ministry of Justice. Budgetary funds allocated by the 
Government in 1999 covered only half of the judiciary's requirements 
for the year; funding levels for the year were said to be similarly 
inadequate. In 1999 the Supreme Court challenged in the Constitutional 
Court the legality of the Government's practice of arbitrarily limiting 
the judiciary's budget. In its petition, the Supreme Court complained 
that the district courts received only 51 percent of required funding, 
military courts 33 percent, and oblast courts 62 percent. In 1999 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Government's practice of limiting 
the judiciary's budget was unconstitutional. This attempt by the 
Government to cut the judiciary's budget, and similar attempts in 
recent years, demonstrated clearly the dependence of the court system 
on the executive and the Government's willingness to make use of that 
dependence.
    The authority and independence of the judicial system also are 
undermined by the poor record of compliance with court decisions in 
civil cases. Provisions calling for criminal punishment for 
noncompliance with court decisions rarely are used. Compliance is 
particularly poor if the decision clashes with government interests. 
The Prosecutor General, the head of the Supreme Court, the chairmen of 
regional courts, and the chairmen of the Kiev municipal court (or the 
deputies of these officials) can suspend court decisions, which leads 
to interference, manipulation, and corruption.
    Many local observers regard the Constitutional Court as the 
country's most independent judicial body. Human rights groups state 
that overall the Constitutional Court has maintained a balance of 
fairness. However, in March the Court ruled that the President's 
proposed referendum on expanding presidential authority was 
constitutional, although it threw out two of the six original 
questions. Observers believed that this decision indicated a 
propresidential bias.
    There has been little progress in implementing the provisions of 
the 1996 Constitution that provide for a thorough restructuring of the 
court system, to be accomplished by June 2001, including the 
introduction of appellate courts. In an effort to meet the June 2001 
deadline, the President established a council on judicial reform in 
August; however, the council has had little impact and at year's end, 
Parliament had not passed a new law on the judiciary. Pending the 
passage of the required enabling legislation, the court system still is 
organized along Soviet lines, with the exception of the Constitutional 
Court.
    The court system consists of the Constitutional Court, general 
jurisdiction courts, and arbitration and commercial courts. General 
jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts are organized on three 
levels: district courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court and 
Supreme Arbitration Court. General jurisdiction courts are divided into 
criminal and civil sections. Military courts only hear cases involving 
military personnel.
    The Constitutional Court consists of 18 members, appointed for 9-
year terms in equal numbers by the President, the Parliament, and the 
Congress of Judges. The Consitutional Court is the ultimate interpreter 
of legislation and the Constitution, and it determines the 
constitutionality of legislation, presidential edicts, cabinet acts, 
and acts of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The President, at least 45 
Members of Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, and the 
Crimean legislature can request the Constitutional Court to hear a 
case. Citizens may apply to the Constitutional Court through the 
Ombudsman, although in practice the Ombudsman has yet to exercise this 
right. In some limited cases, the Constitutional Court can interpret 
law for individual citizens, when the applying citizen provides 
compelling proof that a constitutional provision is violated, or that 
it is interpreted differently by different government bodies. However, 
of some 8,000 such petitions only 4 were accepted for review as of 
early 1999.
    Under the current court system, cases are decided by judges who sit 
singly, occasionally with two public assessors (``lay judges'' or 
professional jurors with some legal training), or in groups of three 
for more serious cases. The Constitution provides for public, 
adversarial trials, including a judge, public assessors, state 
prosecutor, defense, and jury (when required by law). With some 
qualifications, these requirements are upheld in practice. However, 
implementing criminal procedure legislation establishing juries has not 
been adopted. Complicated cases can take years to go to trial. In the 
interim, defendants usually wait in pretrial detention. The 1996 
amendment to the Soviet-era Criminal Procedures Code provides for bail, 
but to date it has been used rarely (see Section 1.d.).
    Organized crime widely is alleged to influence court decisions. The 
Justice Ministry reported that in 1997 135 judges were disciplined, 22 
dismissed, and 5 prosecuted for bribery. No higher court judge has been 
disciplined to date. Criminal elements routinely use intimidation to 
induce victims and witnesses to withdraw or change their testimony. The 
law requires that a special police unit protect judges, witnesses, 
defendants, and their relatives. However, the unit has not yet been 
formed, and trial participants are vulnerable to pressure. There is a 
witness protection law, but it is in abeyance because of lack of 
funding. Under a law adopted in March, the names and addresses of 
victims and witnesses can be kept confidential, if they request 
protection due to fear for their lives.
    Prosecutors, like the courts, also are organized into offices at 
the rayon, oblast, and republic levels. They are responsible ultimately 
to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Parliament for a 5-year term. Regional and district 
prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor General.
    Although by law prosecutors and defense attorneys have equal 
status, in practice prosecutors are much more influential. The 
procuracy, in its pretrial investigative function, acts in effect as a 
grand jury. A prosecutor may initiate investigation through his own 
office or conduct investigations initiated by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs or the SBU. Prosecutors also have the right to issue warrants 
without court approval and to suspend court decisions, thus effectively 
placing the procuracy above the courts in the legal hierarchy. In 
several cases, the procuracy has used its judicial review powers to 
annul court decisions unfavorable to the presidential administration's 
economic or political interests and ordered the case reexamined by a 
different court. The Office of the Prosecutor General practices 
selective prosecution and initiates investigations against the 
political or economic opponents of the President and his allies. The 
Prosecutor General ignores parliamentary and court requests for 
investigations into high-ranking persons if the accused is a 
presidential ally.
    The Constitution considerably curtails the prosecutor's authority, 
limiting it to prosecution, representing the public interest in court, 
oversight of investigations, and implementation of court decisions. 
However, in the absence of new criminal and criminal procedure codes to 
implement constitutional restrictions, the transitional provisions of 
the Constitution permit the prosecutor's office to conduct 
investigations and oversee general observance of the law. In November 
1997, the Constitutional Court interpreted the Procuracy Law, ruling 
that citizens can dispute prosecutors' decisions in court.
    The Constitution includes procedural provisions to ensure a fair 
trial, including the right of a suspect or witness to refuse to testify 
against himself or his relatives. However, pending passage of 
legislation to implement these constitutional provisions, a largely 
Soviet-era criminal justice system remains in place. While the 
defendant is presumed innocent, conviction rates have changed little 
since the Soviet era. Nearly all completed cases result in convictions.
    According to official statistics, in the first half of 1999, there 
were 114,600 convictions, between 36 and 39 percent of which resulted 
in prison sentences. A total of 494 defendants were acquitted, which is 
an increas of 11 percent from the corresponding period in 1998. In the 
first half of the year, there were 113,902 convictions and 375 
acquittals. However, as judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in 
conviction back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation'' 
(which usually leads to the dropping of the case), these statistics are 
somewhat misleading. Additionally evidence indicates that suspects 
often bribe court officials to drop charges before cases go to trial, 
to lessen sentences, or to commute them.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
Although the Constitution requires that courts issue search warrants, 
this provision has not yet been implemented, and prosecutors continue 
to issue search warrants. The SBU may conduct intrusive surveillance 
and searches without a warrant, with the consent of the Prosecutor 
General, who nominally oversees this function of the SBU. However, the 
extent to which the Prosecutor General utilizes his authority to 
monitor SBU activities and to curb excesses by security officials is 
unknown. The Constitution provides citizens with the right to examine 
any dossier on them in possession of the SBU and to sue for physical 
and emotional damages incurred by an investigation. However, this right 
does not exist in practice, because the necessary implementing 
legislation has not been passed.
    Some remnants of Soviet control mechanisms persist. There are no 
probable cause statutes, and police officials and militia personnel 
have the right to stop persons and vehicles arbitrarily to initiate 
extensive document checks and vehicle inspections. In February the 
Ministry of Interior ordered traffic police to end the practice of 
stopping vehicles without reason; however, the order had little effect 
in practice. Police may detain a person arbitrarily for up to 3 hours 
to verify identity. There have been reports that police sometimes 
abused this right.
    Journalists whose news reports are critical of the Government or 
who covered opposition politicians reported that frequently they were 
followed by SBU agents and that their telephones were wiretapped (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Under the current ``propiska'' registration system, all internal 
passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status 
(see Section 2.d.). The Government has indicated its intent to 
eliminate the propiska system, but little progress has been made to 
date.
    The Law on Public Organizations prohibits members of the police, 
SBU, and armed forces from joining political parties. Prior to the 1998 
parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--enrollment of public 
sector and government employees augmented the ranks of progovernment 
parties, particularly the People's Democratic Party (see Section 2.b).
    There were no reported cases of the political abuse of psychiatry; 
however, the press and human rights groups have reported several cases 
of abuse of psychiatry for economic reasons. Persons involved in 
property, inheritance, or divorce disputes were diagnosed wrongfully 
with schizophrenia and confined to psychiatric institutions. The 
disputes often entail the corruption of psychiatric experts and court 
officials. In February Parliament adopted a new Law on Psychiatry which 
bans abuse of psychiatry for political and nonmedical reasons and 
provides safeguards against such abuse. However, human rights monitors 
report that the law was not implemented by year's end, and the old 
Soviet system of classifying mental illness is still in use. Persons 
diagnosed with mental illness may be confined and treated forcibly, 
declared not responsible for their actions, and stripped of their civil 
rights without being present at the hearings or notified of the ruling. 
In the meantime, the 1988 old Soviet psychiatric regulation remains in 
force. There are some 1.2 million registered psychiatric patients in 
the country. Within 3 days after forcible confinement to a hospital, a 
patient must be examined by three doctors. Patients (including 
convicted prisoners) subsequently must be examined by the senior 
regional psychiatric commission within half a year. According to the 
Ukrainian Psychiatric Association, the Health Care Ministry has not 
always cooperated with human rights groups attempting to monitor abuse 
of psychiatry.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1991 law 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice 
the Government interfered with the news media and restricted these 
rights through the widespread use of tax inspections, libel cases, 
subsidization of friendly media, and intimidation of journalists. In 
addition journalists reported feeling more subtle forms of pressure, in 
particular to provide positive coverage of the President, which 
resulted in more self-censorship. The Government owns or controls most 
of the national radio and television channels, which is the primary 
source of information for most citizens. However, there is a wide 
variety of newspapers and periodicals available, which espouse 
different political points of view, and individuals can and frequently 
do criticize the Government without reprisal. Though limited in 
readership, internet publications, in particular Ukrainska Pravda, 
played a key role in covering the disappearance of Heorhiy Gongadze and 
the scandal surrounding allegations of Presidential involvement in the 
case (see Section 1.b.). Government attempts to control the press were 
reported by the media.
    The print media, both independent and government-owned, 
demonstrated a tendency toward self-censorship on matters that the 
Government and in particular the President deemed sensitive. Private 
newspapers have been established and are free to function on a purely 
commercial basis, although very few are profitable. However, they are 
subject to various pressures, such as control of access to affordable 
state-subsidized newsprint; dependence on political patrons who may 
facilitate financial support from the State Press Support Fund; close 
scrutiny from government officials, especially at the local level; and 
politically motivated visits by tax inspectors. In 1997 the President 
issued a decree on support of the press that requires the Cabinet to 
draw up a list of publications needing government support, including 
those published by central and local governments, public organizations, 
associations, unions, educational institutions, and newspaper 
employees. The journalistic community believed that this decree was 
intended to control the press by supporting loyal members. In December 
the President issued a decree defending freedom of the press; however, 
observers report it has had little impact. The dependence of much of 
the press on government patronage has inhibited criticism, particularly 
at the local level. The State Committee for Information Policy has 
warned some periodicals against fomenting ethnic tensions and 
conducting antistate propaganda and has applied to the Prosecutor's 
Office to open investigations into those newspapers. In December a 
court in Kharkiv fined the local chapter of PROSVITA, an organization 
that promotes Ukrainian language and culture, and ordered it to cease 
publication of its newspaper on the grounds that it had published an 
anti-Semitic article. The case presented the first time a court has 
punished a publication for anti-Semitic writings.
    The Committee on Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined 
powers over all media. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted a regulation that 
further defined state secrets to include information on executions, the 
state of prisons, pretrial detention blocks, and centers for the 
forcible treatment of alcoholics. (The ``state of prisons'' refers to 
the physical state of the prison walls and fences, not prison 
conditions.) The press is able to report about harsh prison conditions 
without any inhibition. Journalists report that, in general, the 
committee has not interfered with their activities (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government pressured media outlets to support an April 
referendum on amending the Constitution to increase presidential 
powers. In March the Tax Administration temporarily froze the accounts 
of the newspaper Silski Visti, (which opposed the referendum and 
supported Socialist candidate Oleksandr Moroz during the presidential 
election), and confiscated its paper stock. In September the Tax 
Administration fined Silski Visti more than $178,000 (1 million 
hryvnia) for tax evasion. In October Silski Visti temporarily suspended 
publication due to heavy financial pressures. The paper resumed 
publication, but continued to experience financial problems.
    In April the newly founded newspaper Itogi was subjected to 
eviction, disconnection of its phone lines, and tax inspections of its 
main investor after publishing an article critical of a senior 
government official. The newspaper went out of business after 
publishing only five issues.
    The Government, both central and local, regularly targeted 
opposition newspapers with unannounced tax inspections or fire and 
building code inspections. Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the 
Government forced at least one opposition newspaper, Polytyka, to 
close. Government officials initiated more than 20 criminal and civil 
libel cases against Polytyka's editor, Oleg Lyashko, asking more than 
$40 million (220 million hryvnia) in damages. Lyashko was acquitted in 
one of two criminal libel cases that charged him with slandering the 
President and his staff, but that acquittal was overturned in December 
1999. At a December hearing, Lyashko's trial was tentatively set for 
January 2001. In January the State Committee for Information Policy 
refused to register Lyashko's new publication Svoboda. In February the 
Committee reversed its decision, and Svoboda began publication. 
However, government officials subsequently pressured Lyashko to change 
the tone of coverage in Svoboda, and the newspaper has experienced 
financial difficulties that prevented its regular basis publication. In 
March Lyashko was assaulted in the entryway to his home after 
publishing an article critical of an Odesa businessman. Although he 
initially blamed the Government, Lyashko later accused the businessman 
of orchestrating the attack. There has been no further investigation 
into the case, and no one has been charged with the assault.
    The newspaper Den, which supported presidential candidate and 
former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk during the 1999 presidential 
campaign, was subjected to 25 tax inspections between January and July 
1999. After Marchuk joined the Government as Secretary of the National 
Security and Defense Council during the year, Den became less critical 
of the Government and the repeated tax inspections ceased.
    In 1999 the Parliament adopted a resolution on the media that 
called for investigations into all complaints of harassment of nonstate 
media outlets by the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor General's Office, 
or the presidential administration. Journalists reported that the 
resolution had little impact.
    Government officials also frequently use criminal libel cases or 
civil suits based on alleged damage to a ``person's honor and 
integrity'' to punish critics. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows 
anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated 
information is untrue or insults a person's honor or dignity. Article 
125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 3 years for 
libel. There is no distinction between private individuals and public 
officials (except for the President), nor is there a limit to the 
amount of damages that may be awarded. Consequently, any journalist who 
publishes an article critical of a public official risks being sued for 
damages.
    The Prosecutor General can file criminal libel charges. According 
to Ministry of Justice statistics, 123 persons were convicted in 1998 
for criminal libel. Of these seven cases resulted in prison sentences. 
According to the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, journalists lose two 
of every three cases against them in the courts. In 1999 approximately 
2,250 libel cases were filed. Exact figures for this year are not 
available; however, media analysts expect a similar number of cases for 
the year. Journalists complain that because the law does not limit 
damages, it can be used to drive opposition newspapers out of business.
    On occasion fines were so large that accounts were frozen and 
equipment confiscated by the Tax Inspectorate to enforce payment. It is 
clear that a large number of libel and personal dignity suits are 
motivated politically. Moreover, even when the actions of the Tax 
Inspectorate are overturned by subsequent court decisions, the damage 
to the newspapers' finances can be irreparable. Their accounts remain 
frozen until all appeals are completed. Independent newspapers face 
further financial pressure as they try to compete with propresidential 
newspapers, which are sold at a price significantly below cost. 
Newspapers aligned with the presidential administration reportedly 
often are financed by wealthy presidential allies. The threat of 
multiple lawsuits for large amounts of money also was used to pressure 
owners of opposition newspapers to sell their shares to their political 
opponents.
    In March the Lviv newspaper Express, which had been critical of the 
local government, was fined $26,785 (150,000 hryvnia) for libel. 
Journalists and students protested the decision, and in April the 
regional court overturned the lower court's decision. Journalists 
sometimes were subjected to physical attacks related to their 
professional activities. Some journalists reported threats of arrest or 
assaults when investigating crime and official corruption (see Section 
1.c.). The intermeshing of organized crime and many public officials 
makes it difficult to assess whether these attacks and threats were 
motivated politically.
    Despite government pressure and media self-censorship, the variety 
of newspapers and periodicals on the market, each espousing the view of 
its respective sponsor, provides a variety of opinion. Foreign 
newspapers and periodicals circulate freely.
    The broadcast media, the primary source of news and information for 
most citizens, are either state-owned or, in the case of private 
stations, subject to pressure from the Government, which took steps 
during the year to strengthen its control over this sector. In 1998 the 
Government transferred over state-owned broadcasting and transmission 
facilities from the Derzhteleradio (State Committee for Television and 
Radio) directly to the Information Ministry (later reorganized as the 
State Committee for Information Policy). The President and the 
Parliament each appoint half of the members of the National Council for 
Television and Radio Broadcasting, which issues licenses and allocates 
broadcasting time. President Kuchma did not name his half of the eight-
member board until June, after the Parliament replaced its original 
four members in May. In the absence of a functioning council, the 
Government had virtually unchallenged control over media licensing 
prior to the 1999 presidential election and in the lead-up to the April 
referendum.
    Other state agencies took advantage of the lack of a working 
council to harass opposition stations. For example, the frequency of 
arbitrary tax inspections increased considerably without a working 
council. The State Electro-Communications Inspectorate increased the 
fees for broadcast frequencies tenfold in 1999 without the prior 
approval of the council. Fee increases disproportionately affected 
independent stations, since state channels were permitted to ignore 
payment of their frequency fees. The law entitles private and foreign 
companies to obtain a license to establish and operate their own 
transmission facilities.
    Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the Government increased 
pressure on the broadcast media, using tax inspections and other 
measures, and forced at least five local television stations (four in 
the Crimea and one in Dnipropetrovsk) to close. Numerous sources 
charged that the administration continued to use government agencies, 
particularly the Tax Inspectorate, to pressure the opposition media and 
businesses supporting its political opponents. Prior to the 1999 
presidential election, the independent television station STB, one of 
the more balanced and independent media outlets, faced increasing 
harassment by government entities. It was threatened with closure and 
the arrest of its owners if it did not cede financial and editorial 
control to presidential supporters. Its staff suffered physical 
assaults, threatening phone calls, robbery, and lawsuits. In August 
1999, the State Tax Administration froze STB's bank accounts for 
failure to pay sufficient taxes. By October 1999, the station was sold 
and had changed its news programming to take a more pro-Kuchma 
approach. During the 1999 presidential election campaign, several 
regional television outlets were taken off the air by government 
authorities, allegedly to prevent coverage of opposition presidential 
candidates. The presidential campaign saw a marked imbalance in the 
coverage of candidates on national television and radio channels, with 
opposition candidates receiving very limited and often negative 
coverage at the national level. Opposition candidates had more success 
in obtaining access to smaller local and regional television channels.
    In the period leading up to the April referendum on constitutional 
amendments that would expand presidential powers, television coverage 
was overwhelmingly propresidential and proreferendum.
    There is no known government censorship of books, film, or theater.
    While major universities are state owned, they operate for the most 
part under full autonomy. However, academic freedom is an 
underdeveloped and poorly understood concept. Nepotism and bribery 
reportedly are common during entrance exams and also influence the 
granting of degrees. Administrators of universities and academic and 
research institute directors possess the power to silence colleagues by 
denying them the ability to publish, withholding pay and housing 
benefits, or directly terminating them. This atmosphere tends to limit 
the spirit of free inquiry. Restrictions by the Communications Ministry 
on the mailing of scientific documents also have caused concern.
    The State Secrets Committee maintains offices for the protection of 
state secrets in state scientific and research institutes, including 
those not conducting any classified research. An April 1998 
presidential edict allows only government-designated contractors to 
provide Internet access at state institutions that have such censorship 
offices. Human rights groups feared that this edit may limit the 
freedom of information for universities and scientific research 
institutes. A July presidential decree identified the development of 
the Internet as a priority of national information policy and 
instructed the Government to design a state program to develop the 
Internet network. A 1999 presidential decree sought to require that all 
communication companies and Internet providers be licensed and their 
equipment be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security 
services). However, the decree was blocked by Parliament in 1999.
    All private and religiously affiliated universities operated 
without any reported state interference or harassment.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice; however, there were some instances in 
which this right was restricted. The 1988 law on public assembly 
circumscribes freedom of assembly by stipulating that organizations 
must apply for permission to their respective local administration at 
least 10 days before a planned event or demonstration. The Criminal 
Code prescribes up to 6 months in prison, 1 year of corrective labor, 
or a fine for repeatedly staging unauthorized demonstrations. The 1996 
Constitution requires that demonstrators merely inform the authorities 
of a planned demonstration in advance; however, authorities insist that 
all demonstrations meet the restrictive requirements of the 1988 law. 
Under the 1988 law, demonstrators are prohibited from inciting violence 
or ethnic conflict and from calling for the violent overthrow of the 
constitutional order. In practice unlicensed demonstrations are common, 
and most but not all occur without police interference, fines, or 
detention. There were no reports of cases of interference during the 
year.
    Communist groups complain that the authorities failed to punish 
Ukrainian nationalist groups who harassed them during their 
demonstrations. Ukrainian nationalist groups in turn complained that 
the authorities do not protect them from harassment by Communist 
groups. On December 22, a local court ordered antipresidential 
protestors occupying a large square in central Kiev to vacate the area 
because of impending holiday celebrations. Demonstrations by the group 
outside of Parliament and other Government buildings also were banned. 
On the same day the court decision was reached, the demonstrators 
announced that they would dismantle all but one of the protest tents 
erected on the square, and would resume demonstrations after the 
holidays if warranted. The demonstrations ended peacefully December 23.
    The Constitution, law, and government regulations restrict freedom 
of association to varying degrees. These restrictions generally apply 
to organizations that are considered dangerous, such as those which 
advocate violence or racial and religious hatred, or which threaten the 
public order or health.
    A government requirement that a political party have 
representatives in at least half of the country's regions in order to 
register officially has limited the ability of Russian, Crimean, Tatar, 
and Romanian groups to organize (see Section 3).
    The Ministry of Justice, with the Prosecutor General's consent, has 
the authority to warn, fine, or suspend operations of political parties 
for illegal operations. Suspension can be for up to 3 months and can be 
extended for 6 months upon the Ministry's request.
    In 1998 the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1993 Crimean law 
on citizens' associations, thus outlawing regional Crimean parties. A 
1992 law on public organizations prohibits the Government from 
financing or materially supporting political parties. According to this 
law, political parties may not receive funds from abroad or maintain 
accounts in foreign banks. The law prohibits police authorities, 
members of the SBU, and armed forces personnel from joining political 
parties.
    Prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, the mass--perhaps 
coerced--enrollment of public sector and government employees augmented 
the ranks of progovernment parties, particularly the People's 
Democratic Party (see Section 1.f.).
    Freedom of association also is restricted through a strict 
registration requirement that lends itself to political manipulation 
and corruption; however, in practice such regulations seldom are 
employed to restrict this freedom. Groups must register with the 
Government to pursue almost any purpose. The Ministries of Internal 
Affairs, Justice, Economy, and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as 
the State Committees on Religion and Broadcasting and other government 
bodies have registration functions and used this power to limit freedom 
of association (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    For example, after almost a year of attempting to register as a 
national organization, a Luhansk-based group for the protection of gay 
rights, the Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center, succeeded in registering 
in November 1999. According to group representatives, local officials 
indicated that the group was not registered because it was a gay rights 
group. The group reported this year that it is functioning without 
problems.
    Groups must be registered with the Government to engage in almost 
any activity, whether commercial, political, religious, or 
philanthropic. Unregistered groups are prohibited from opening bank 
accounts, acquiring property, or entered into contracts.
    The registration law gives the Government the right to inspect the 
activities of all registered groups. This law requires that a party 
specify all its activities in its charter, but the party is not 
required to notify authorities of all its meetings. A change in the 
group's charter necessitates reregistration.
    A registered group may not duplicate any function or service that 
the Government is expected to provide. For example, human rights 
lawyers who wished to represent prisoners were prohibited from 
establishing an association because the Government is required by the 
Constitution to provide lawyers for the accused. However, this 
requirement is not always enforced. In the
    mid-1990's, AI was refused registration under the pretext that 
human rights protection is the function of the State. It continued to 
apply and eventually was registered.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide for separation of church and 
state and the right to practice the religion of one's choice and the 
Government generally respects these rights in practice, with the 
exception of some nonnative religions, which experienced difficulties 
registering, buying, or leasing property. The Government generally 
permits religious organizations to establish places of worship and to 
train clergy. The Government has continued to expedite allotment of 
land plots for construction of new houses of worship and to return 
religious buildings and sites to their former owners.
    Although in past years the Government's protection of religious 
freedom had deteriorated for nonnative religious organizations (defined 
as all organizations other than Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Jewish), 
nonnative religions reported less difficulty in obtaining visas and 
registering. The Government did not discriminate against individual 
believers of nonnative religions; however, their organizations faced 
ongoing difficulty in carrying out their activities during the year. 
Through burdensome licensing requirements and informal means, local 
authorities restricted nonnative religions as well as Christian 
denominations other than Greek Catholic and Orthodox. The Government 
took steps to return properties expropriated during the Soviet era to 
religious groups.
    A 1993 amendment to the 1991 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion restricts the activities of nonnative, foreign-based, 
religious organizations. The amendment narrowly defines the permissible 
activities of members of the clergy, preachers, teachers, and other 
foreign citizen representatives of foreign-based religious 
organizations. They may preach, minister religious ordinances, or 
practice other canonical activities ``only in those religious 
organizations which invited them to Ukraine and with official approval 
of the governmental body that registered the statutes and the articles 
of the pertinent religious organization.'' Although the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints had complained in 1998 that this 
restriction prevented the transfer of its missionaries between cities, 
church leaders subsequently have not reported any difficulties in 
transferring missionaries between cities.
    All religious organizations are required by the 1991 Religion Law 
to register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs. If a group 
chooses to register as a national organization, it must register with 
the central office of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, and 
each of its local groups must register with the local office of the 
State Committee in the region where it is located. Those groups that 
choose to register as local organizations must register only with the 
regional office of the State Committee. This status is necessary to own 
property or carry out many economic activities, such as publishing 
religious materials or opening bank accounts. This process is supposed 
to take not more than 1 month (or 3 months in cases in which either the 
central or regional committee decides that an expert opinion is 
necessary to determine the legitimacy of a group applying for 
registration). However, in practice this process generally exceeds 1 
month. The regional offices also supervise the compliance of religious 
organizations with the provisions of the law. Some nonnative religious 
organizations credibly reported that, especially at the local or 
regional levels, officials of the state committee refused to register 
their organizations for protracted periods, thus effectively delaying 
their activities and limiting freedom of association (see Section 
2.b.). However, there were fewer reports than in prior years of 
nonnative religious groups experiencing such registration problems.
    Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church in 
the central, southern, and eastern regions of the country and the Greek 
Catholic Church in the west, exerted significant political influence at 
the local and regional levels and pressured local officials not to 
register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent or 
purchase property. Each of the two dominant denominations, within their 
respective spheres of influence, also reportedly pressured local 
officials to restrict the activities of the other.
    The ongoing dispute among competing Orthodox Christian 
administrative bodies claiming to be ``the Ukrainian Orthodox Church'' 
remained deadlocked. The Government has been unable to stop 
disagreements between the Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics in the 
western part of the country where the two communities were contentious 
and often engage in bitter disputes over church buildings and property 
in over 600 localities. The Kiev Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church 
complained of harassment by local authorities in the predominantly 
Russian-speaking eastern region of the country, while the Moscow 
Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church complained that local governments 
ignored the appropriation of its churches in the Ukrainian-speaking 
western region. In 1999 Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of Kiev Patriarchate and his followers were assaulted by 
supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol (see Section 5).
    According to the State Committee for Religious Affairs, the 
transfer of most places of worship to their original owners according 
to a 1992 decree on restitution was nearing completion. In 1996 and 
1997, 105 buildings were returned; in 1998, 92 were returned; and in 
1999 103 were returned. About 40 buildings were returned during the 
first half of the year. There still were about 340 former houses of 
worship that were used for nonreligious purposes, but 275 of them were 
not claimed by religious groups. In the fourth quarter of 1999, local 
authorities in the oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia, 
Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi, as 
well as in Sevastopol, returned 42 former houses of worship to 
religious groups. In August the local Government returned a former 
Mosque to the Muslim community in Crimea.
    Numerous Jewish congregations have negotiated successfully with 
local authorities for worship space. In 1996 a Kiev arbitration court 
decided in favor of transferring the title of the former Kiev Central 
Synagogue, which in Soviet times was used as a puppet theater, to a 
Chabad Hasidic congregation. By December 1997, the puppet theater had 
vacated the building, and in the spring of 1998, the building reopened 
again as a synagogue. The synagogue was rededicated this year after 
extensive renovation. The decision set an important precedent for the 
judiciary's role in religious property restitution. According to Jewish 
community representatives, progress on restitution is generally 
satisfactory, although more could be done. In the first quarter of the 
year, two synagogues were returned to the Jewish community.
    The pace of restitution of Christian churches has slowed in recent 
years, since the buildings that remain in state possession tend to be 
prime properties currently being used as museums, concert halls, or 
city halls. All religions have enjoyed equal opportunity to regain 
control over former community property. Problems in obtaining 
restitution resulted from inadequate legislation, bureaucratic inertia, 
and the difficulty of locating alternative quarters for current 
occupants. In February 1999, a presidential order instructed all local 
governments to complete the handover of former religious property 
whenever possible by the end of 1999 and banned privatization of 
religious communities' property. However, restitution is not complete. 
The committee attributed delays in returning other properties to lack 
of funds and the difficulties involved in finding alternative space for 
current users.
    In July a dispute arose over efforts by a Jewish organization to 
build a memorial park at an ancient Jewish cemetery and holocaust 
massacre site in Sambor, a town in Lviv Oblast. City authorities 
deferred the project after local nationalist groups demanded that the 
site also commemorate non-Jewish victims of the Nazis buried on the 
site. Efforts to reach a compromise stalled when the Nationalists 
demanded that no Jewish symbols appear at the site, that no Hebrew be 
used on inscriptions, and that Christian crosses be displayed. 
Nationalist groups later installed make-shift crosses at the site. At 
year's end, work on the memorial had stopped, and the crosses remained.
    A number of religious properties were returned to Christian 
churches during the year. In the first quarter of the year, the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church received 17 buildings. In May the Kiev 
Patriarchate received the newly rebuilt, historic St. Michael's 
Cathedral in central Kiev for its exclusive use. The Cathedral, which 
had been destroyed by Stalin in 1936, was rebuilt with significant 
local government funding. In September the Moscow Patriarchate received 
for its use the newly rebuilt Uspensky Cathedral of the Lavra 
Monastery, which also was restored using government funds.
    In June four foreign public school teachers with religious 
affiliations were deported from Sevastopol after being accused of 
illegal religious activity incompatible with their work visa status. 
Although the central Government in Kiev offered to assist them with an 
appeal of this decision, the teachers decided voluntarily to depart the 
country.
    During the year, the Government made significant efforts to ensure 
that pilgrims of the Bratslav Hasidic sect were able to visit the tomb 
of their founding rabbi in the city of Uman on the occasion of the 
Jewish New Year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice; 
however, there are some limits. In particular the Government has not 
yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish mandatory registration--the 
propiska system--and replace it with an informational residence 
register (see Section 1.f.). Regulations impose a nationwide 
requirement to register at the workplace and place of residence in 
order to be eligible for social benefits, thereby complicating freedom 
of movement by limiting access to certain social benefits to the place 
where one is registered. For example, persons who move to other regions 
for work in the private sector may be denied formal access to free 
medical care and other services provided by the Government. Residence 
without registration carries a fine under the administrative code, but 
this provision rarely is enforced. Human rights groups reported cases 
of persons being stripped of their residence registration, evicted from 
their homes, and made homeless through criminal fraud or court error. 
Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document checks 
and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
    Citizens who wished to travel abroad were able to do so freely. 
Exit visas are required for citizens who intend to take up permanent 
residence in another country. There were no known cases of exit visas 
being denied to citizens during the year. The Government may deny 
passports to individuals in possession of state secrets, but denials 
may be appealed. A lapse in an Israeli-Ukrainian student exchange 
agreement in 1999 led to concerns about the ability of several hundred 
students to travel overseas for study in Israel. While negotiations 
continued between the Ukrainian and Israeli Governments over the 
renewal of the lapsed exchange agreement, the Ukrainian Government took 
steps to ensure that the students in question could travel to Israel. 
The exchange agreement was renewed in April.
    Citizenship law provides the right to citizenship for all 
individuals who were born or lived in the country before independence 
and to their descendants who lived outside the country as of November 
13, 1991. In order to be eligible, persons must not be citizens of 
other countries and must submit their application by year's end. An 
amendment to the law in April extended the application deadline to 2005 
for Ukrainians returning from the far north and east in Russia and for 
former military officers. Dual citizenship is not recognized. A 1997 
amendment to the Citizenship Law also provides the right to citizenship 
for deported victims of political oppression, such as the Crimean 
Tatars. Refugees can acquire citizenship if they have lived legally in 
the country for 5 years and can communicate in the Ukrainian language. 
Since independence over 1.5 million Ukrainians have returned to the 
country, while over 1 million persons, mostly ethnic Russians, have 
left the country.
    The Government has not supported a foreign-funded program to 
facilitate the travel to the country of some emigrants who qualify for 
resettlement as refugees. More than 260,000 Crimean Tatars have 
returned from exile to Crimea, mainly from Central Asia. According to 
government officials, as of September between 220,000 and 230,000 
Tatars had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Crimean Tatar leaders have 
complained that their community has not received adequate assistance in 
resettling and that an onerous process of acquiring citizenship has 
excluded many of them from participating in elections and from the 
right to take part in the privatization of land and state assets. 
However, the 1997 amendment to the Citizenship Law waives some of the 
usual residence and language requirements for returning deportees and 
expedites the acquisition of citizenship. The amendment facilitates the 
acquisition of citizenship by Crimean Tatars who were deported victims 
of political oppression. It allows deported persons, including Crimean 
Tatars, to acquire citizenship without a mandatory 5-year term of 
residence in the country and without Ukrainian language proficiency. In 
1999 the Rada further amended the Citizenship Law to allow deported 
persons or their descendents living in the country for 5 years to 
acquire citizenship automatically without having to renounce any 
foreign citizenship that they may possess. Previously Crimean Tatars 
had difficulty obtaining documents from Uzbekistan to confirm that they 
had relinquished their Uzbek citizenship.
    The 1993 Law on Refugees governs the treatment of refugees and 
entitles refugees to all of the benefits accorded to citizens. The 
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and refugee status initially is given for a 3month term and is 
subject to further extension. According to government statistics, 2,898 
persons (more than half of whom are Afghans) were granted refugee 
status between January and October. A commitment was made to award 
refugee status to all Afghans who arrived in the country before 1995. 
Under the new Citizenship Law, legally registered refugees can apply 
for citizenship after 5 years of permanent residence. Under the Refugee 
Law, refugees are entitled to material assistance. The Cabinet decided 
to start allocating funds in the 1999 national budget for payment of 
refugee pensions and small allowances for indigent refugees, plus 
transportation fare to a refugee center. In cooperation with the UNHCR 
in 1997, the Government established a refugee receiving center for 200 
persons in Vinnytsya. The Government planned to open four other centers 
elsewhere; however, no additional center had been opened by year's end.
    Instances of police harassment of certain categories of refugees 
apparently diminished during the year.
    According to the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, 
the Government has a first asylum policy. This means that persons who 
travel directly from their home country to Ukraine as refugees are 
assured refugee status. However, there were some problematic cases in 
1999.
    There were no reports during the year that persons were forced to 
return to a country where they feared persecution. In 1999, four 
Uzbeks, including two exiled Uzbek oppositionists, reportedly were 
arrested without a warrant, denied counsel, and deported forcibly to 
Uzbekistan without a hearing, despite protests by human rights groups. 
The four claimed to have been tortured and forced to give false 
testimony; nonetheless, they were sentenced later that year by an Uzbek 
court to between 8 and 15 years in prison.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right and the ability to change the government 
peacefully. The Constitution provides universal suffrage for citizens 
at least 18 years of age and for periodic elections every 4 years for 
the Parliament and every 5 years for the President. A presidential 
election was held on October 31 and November 14, 1999. Parliamentary 
elections took place in 1994 and in 1998.
    Power is divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. Although nominally independent, the judicial branch in 
practice is influenced heavily by the executive (see Section 1.e.). The 
President appoints the Prime Minister, who appoints the remainder of 
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as well as certain other appointments, 
such as the Prosecutor General, is subject to parliamentary approval. 
The Constitution grants the President limited power to pass binding 
decrees and directives that have the power of law.
    The voting process in connection with the April referendum on 
amendments to the Constitution that would increase presidential powers 
was conducted in a generally free and fair manner; however, there were 
some serious problems. While most observers agreed that there were few 
procedural irregularities on voting day, the period leading to the 
referendum was marked by unbalanced media coverage and inappropriate 
involvement of government officials in turning out the vote and 
influencing voters on behalf of President Kuchma. Voter turnout was 
reported to be higher than during the October 1999 presidential 
election, raising suspicions of manipulation on the part of the 
presidential administration. For example, an unusually high number of 
voters were allowed to vote before election day. Pollsters reported 
that exit poll results on turnout were notably lower than results 
reported by the Government. However, it is believed that the outcome of 
the referendum generally reflected the will of the people.
    In June by-elections were held to fill 10 vacant parliament seats. 
Opposition candidates complained of voting irregularities, a lack of 
access to the media, and government pressure on behalf of 
propresidential candidates. However, observers believed that it was 
unlikely that these problems significantly altered the outcome of the 
election.
    As many as 10 elected mayors reported continued harassment by the 
Tax Administration and law enforcement bodies, allegedly at the 
direction of presidentially appointed regional governors. The mayors 
attributed this pressure to their lack of support for President Kuchma 
during the 1999 presidential election. In February Vasylkiv Mayor 
Valeriy Popovych resigned under pressure after being detained and 
released on corruption charges. In September Myrhorod mayor Vasyl 
Tretetsky was removed from office by the city council. The press 
reported that the regional governor threatened council members with the 
loss of family members' jobs if they did not oust Tretetsky. In 
September Romny mayor Viktor Strelchenko resigned, reportedly after 
being told that the city would not receive heating fuel from regional 
authorities if he remained in office. Cherkasy mayor Volodymyr Olinyk, 
who ran for president in 1999 but dropped out in favor of another 
opposition candidate, was under criminal investigation and complained 
of SBU monitoring of his activities.
    International observers noted violations of election day procedures 
in the 1999 presidential elections, with more numerous and serious 
violations occurring in the second round of voting. However, the 
violations reportedly were not widespread nor systematic. The most 
serious problems were unbalanced media coverage and the coordinated and 
inappropriate involvement of government officials in both rounds of the 
election on behalf of President Kuchma. The OSCE also was concerned 
over pressure exerted on voters in prisons, hospitals, and educational 
institutions on behalf of President Kuchma. A representative of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that the 
elections were ``far from fair and democratic.'' OSCE observers noted 
that unauthorized persons, including SBU officers, present in polling 
stations, especially during the runoff election and had reports of 
militia involvement in campaigning. After the first round of voting, 
three regional administrators were dismissed, allegedly for failing to 
produce sufficient votes for President Kuchma in their districts. After 
the second round of voting, President Kuchma dismissed two oblast 
governors and six rayon (regional) heads in those regions were Kuchma 
received fewer votes than Communist Party rival Symonenko. Very high 
voter turnouts, particularly in western districts, aroused suspicion of 
ballot stuffing on President Kuchma's behalf in the second round of 
voting. However, observers concluded that it was unlikely that these 
problems significantly altered the final outcome of the election, in 
view of President Kuchma's 18-point margin of victory.
    In the 1999 preelection period, various forms of government 
pressure on the media served to limit the independence of the press 
(see Section 2.a.). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
found that state media coverage of the presidential campaign was biased 
strongly in favor of President Kuchma. The Government allegedly used 
official agencies, especially the Tax Inspectorate, to disrupt or 
eliminate the businesses of political opponents prior to the elections. 
Presidential candidate Yevhen Marchuk reported that police ordered a 
meeting with voters evacuated in Luhansk in August 1999, citing an 
anonymous bomb threat (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Political 
candidates also reported difficulty in renting meeting halls, closure 
of their local campaign offices by government officials, confiscation 
of campaign vehicles, and pressure on employees from directors of 
state-owned enterprises. Many opposition presidential candidates 
complained that the SBU overstepped its mandate and interfered in the 
campaign to the benefit of President Kuchma. These reports appear 
credible. There are confirmed reports that the SBU monitored NGO's 
engaged in nonpartisan political activity (see Sections 1.f. and 4). 
Presidential candidates complained about the presidential 
administration's dominance over the media and the illegal involvement 
of state officials in Kuchma's campaign. The Supreme Court declared in 
November 1999 that it did not have the right to question the decision 
of the Central Election Committee or to declare an election null and 
void but that it could only order recounts in specific polling 
stations.
    Women are active in government and politics, but are 
underrepresented and they hold a disproportionately small percentage of 
offices. Women hold 37 of the 450 seats in the Rada. Only two women 
hold ministerial posts. The 18-member Constitutional Court has two 
female members.
    Jews are well represented among the political elite and hold 
several parliamentary seats. Many Crimean Tatars are unable to 
participate fully in the political process, primarily due to 
citizenship problems (see Section 2.d.). The Government's requirement 
that a political party have representatives in at least half of the 
country's regions in order to register officially has limited the 
ability of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Romanian minority groups to 
organize (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups 
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally 
are cooperative and responsive to their views. However, human rights 
groups reported more difficulties in investigating penal conditions, 
which are a significant human rights concern. There are confirmed 
reports that the SBU monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political 
activity during the 1999 presidential election campaign (see Section 
3).
    A 1998 law created the Parliamentary Commissioner on Human Rights, 
which is a constitutionally mandated independent human rights 
ombudsman. Parliament elected the first Ombudsman in April 1998. The 
Ombudsman serves a 5-year term and, in principle, is invested by law 
with very broad powers. In November the Ombudsman delivered her first 
human rights report to Parliament. The report noted that despite 
legislative guarantees, the country lacks effective mechanisms for 
protection of human rights. The Ombudsman's office reported that it had 
received more than 100,000 letters since its inception; however, many 
of those letters were requests for information rather than complaints 
of human rights violations. The office's staff grew by 30 percent 
during the year to approximately 60 full- and part-time workers. 
However, the office was underfunded, and employees sometimes were 
unpaid.
    The law provides the Ombudsman with unrestricted and unannounced 
access to any public official, including the President; unrestricted 
access to any government installation; and the oversight of 
implementation of human rights treaties and agreements to which the 
country is a party. However, the law provides no penalties for those 
who obstruct the Ombudsman's investigations, nor does it create 
sufficient enforcement authority for the Ombudsman. The law required 
the Government to submit amendments to existing laws to provide the 
legal framework for the operation of the Ombudsman's office. The 
Ombudsman's office itself drafted some 70 amendments to this effect, 
but those amendments had not been enacted at year's end. All citizens 
and current residents can address their concerns to the Ombudsman. The 
Ombudsman also serves as the intermediary between citizens and the 
Constitutional Court, since citizens cannot address the Court directly. 
The Ombudsman made combating of trafficking in persons (see Section 
6.f.) and improving prison conditions a priority during the year.
    Citizens have the right to file appeals with the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations. 
According to one human rights expert, some 13,000 appeals were made to 
the court in 1998 and some 200 cases were accepted by the court for 
review.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, and other grounds; however, due in part to the absence of an 
effective judicial system, the Government does not enforce these 
provisions effectively. The Government has not prosecuted anti-Semitic 
acts, under the law forbidding the sowing of interethnic hatred.
    Women.--Violence against women is reportedly pervasive. While 
statistics compiled by the U.N. Development Program show that the 
number of reported rapes and attempted rapes decreased in recent years, 
surveys indicated that the majority of rapes and other cases of 
physical abuse went unreported. Past surveys by women's groups 
indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of women had been raped, and 
over 25 percent physically abused, in their lifetimes.
    The Criminal Code outlaws rape and ``forced sex with a materially 
dependent person,'' which may allow prosecution for spousal rape. 
Spousal abuse also is illegal, but authorities often pressure women not 
to press charges against their husbands. Separate statistics on 
prosecutions for wife beating or on average sentences are not 
available. In 1997, the last year for which statistics are available, 
1,510 criminal cases were opened for rape, 822 for sexual abuse, and 3 
for sexual compulsion. Information on convictions was not available.
    Violence against women does not receive extensive media coverage, 
despite the efforts of human rights groups to highlight the problem. 
Hot lines, shelters, and other practical support for victims of abuse 
are practically nonexistent, although there are some shelters run by 
private organizations. In 1998 Kiev municipal authorities opened the 
country's first state-funded women's center. In 1998 the Government 
announced plans to establish a network of shelters throughout the 
country, but by year's end, it had not yet begun to implement these 
plans.
    Ukraine is a significant source country for girls and women 
trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the Middle East for sexual 
exploitation (see Section 6.f.). A 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code 
imposes harsh penalties for--among other offenses--trafficking in human 
beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography; however, the 
effectiveness of this step has not yet been established. The 
authorities rarely prosecute men for engaging women in the rapidly 
growing sector of sexually exploitative work.
    Women's groups reported that there was widespread sexual harassment 
in the workplace, including coerced sex. Apart from the law that 
prohibits forced sex with a ``materially dependent person,'' which 
applies to employees, legal safeguards against harassment are 
inadequate. In the only known case of prosecution for sexual harassment 
in the workplace, Pravda Ukrayiny editor Oleksandr Horobets was 
convicted in 1999 of sexual harassment of a subordinate and sentenced 
to 7 months in prison. However, the fact that Horobets was the editor 
of an opposition newspaper calls into question the motives of the 
procuracy in prosecuting the case.
    Labor laws establish the legal equality of men and women, including 
equal pay for equal work, a principle that generally is observed. 
However, the economic crisis has harmed women disproportionately. Women 
are much more likely to be laid off than men. Women constitute 
approximately 56 percent of the unemployed population, and as much as 
90 percent of newly unemployed persons. Industries that are dominated 
by female workers are also those with the lowest relative wages and the 
ones that are most likely to be affected by wage arrears problems.
    The Constitution and the Law on Protection of Motherhood and 
Childhood prohibit the employment of women in jobs that are hazardous 
to their health, such as those that involved heavy lifting. However, 
despite implementation of a government program to combat dangerous 
labor, these laws remain poorly enforced. The Ministry of Labor 
estimated that 15 percent of working women are employed in hazardous 
jobs. Furthermore human rights groups maintained that management 
selectively observed the law only as necessary to lay off or fire 
female workers. Many women's rights advocates feared that the law may 
be used to bar women from the best paying blue-collar jobs. By law 
pregnant women and mothers with small children enjoy paid maternity 
leave until their children reach the age of three years. However, this 
benefit is a disincentive for employers to hire women for responsible 
or career track jobs.
    Few women attain top managerial positions in state and private 
industry. A March business survey found that half of private sector 
employees are women. According to the survey, women run 30 percent of 
private small businesses and 13 percent each of large and medium 
businesses. According to government statistics, 69.2 percent of the 
country's 213,000 state administration jobs were held by women, 
including 45.2 per cent of the managerial positions. However, of the 
highest ``first'' and ``second'' category offices, only 5.6 percent in 
central or local governments are filled by women. (These numbers do not 
include the ``power ministries"--the Ministries of Defense, Internal 
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the SBU, which have substantially more 
male employees at all levels.)
    Educational opportunities for women generally have been, and 
continue to be, equal to those enjoyed by men. However, the Government 
limited the number of women who can receive military officer training 
to only 20 percent of the total number of students accepted. The 
military limited the role of women to certain functions. This limited 
their chances for promotion and training opportunities and they were 
left with low-paying routine positions in the military.
    Children.--The Government is committed publicly to the defense of 
children's rights, but the deep economic crisis severely limited its 
ability to ensure these rights. The low priority that both the public 
and the Government attached to children's rights is reflected in the 
absence of groups that aggressively promote children's rights. For 
example, the widely acknowledged problem of growing violence and crime 
in and outside schools, especially the notoriously violent vocational 
schools, largely is ignored by the public and the Government.
    Education is free, universal, and compulsory until the age of 15. 
However, the public education system has deteriorated as a result of 
government financial disarray. Teachers often went unpaid for months. 
Increasing numbers of children from poor families dropped out of 
school, and illiteracy, which was previously very rare, has become a 
problem. Health care is provided equally to girls and boys, but 
economic problems have worsened the overall quality of the health care 
system.
    There were higher numbers of homeless children, who usually fled 
poor orphanage or poor domestic conditions. According to government 
statistics, 100,000 children are registered as homeless; of those, 14 
percent are under age 7. Although statistics were unavailable, drug use 
and child prostitution are widespread and received substantial media 
attention during the year. Several charity groups were formed to assist 
these children, but they have not been able to reduce the problem. In 
January President Kuchma issued a decree aimed at reducing homelessness 
among children; however, the effect of that decree is unknown. In 1997 
the All-Ukrainian Committee for Protection of Children released survey 
results that revealed that every fifth or sixth child of both sexes 
under age 18 suffered from sexual harassment (including every third 
girl), and that every 10th girl is raped.
    Deteriorating conditions in the state orphanages led the Government 
to encourage families to provide foster homes for orphans and to 
facilitate the establishment of private, government-supervised 
orphanages. There are 75 such orphanages with some 800 children. To 
curb illegal adoption, an April 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code 
prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment for trafficking in children and 
illegal adoption (see Section 6.f.). However, there had been no known 
successful cases of its application as of year's end.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
the disabled, but the Government has done little to support programs 
targeted at increasing opportunities for the disabled. The law mandates 
access to buildings and other public facilities for the disabled, but 
it is enforced poorly.
    Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism exists on an individual and 
societal basis. However, the central Government generally discouraged 
it. Some ultranationalist groups and newspapers continued to publish 
and distribute anti-Semitic tracts regularly. Anti-Semitic publications 
also are imported from Russia and distributed without the necessary 
state license. During the year, President Kuchma and Prime Minister 
Yushscenko repeatedly and publicly spoke about the need for the 
peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious groups. Authorities opened 
criminal cases against publications for fomenting interethnic hatred. 
Moreover, the Procuracy warned certain publications against publishing 
anti-Semitic material. In 1999 the Shimon Dubnov Ukrainian Academy of 
Jewish History and Culture filed suit against the nationalist newspaper 
Vechirniy Kiev for publishing anti-Semitic criticism of the Academy's 
collection of scholarly articles, ``Judeophobia Against Ukraine,'' 
which was published in 1998. The case still was pending at year's end.
    Anti-Semitic incidents continue to occur but, according to local 
Jewish organizations, have declined in number over recent years and 
they were concentrated in western regions of the country.
    In October large crosses were erected on prominent elevations near 
Sevastopol. In November the crosses were cut down. Although Orthodox 
religious leaders accused Tatars of dismantling the crosses, the Tatars 
denied involvement, and no one was held formally responsible for the 
act.
    During the year, there were no arrests made in the 1997 firebombing 
of the Kharkiv Israeli cultural center, nor have there been any 
prosecutions for the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in 1997.
    There were occasional statements by Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
officials (both Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates) denouncing the spread of 
nonnative religions and sharply criticizing their missionary 
activities. Evangelical Christian missionaries reported some instances 
of societal discrimination against members of their churches, such as 
salary cuts, layoffs, and public criticism for betraying ``native 
religions.''
    Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church and 
the Greek Catholic Church, pressured local and regional officials not 
to register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent 
or purchase property. Both these denominations also reportedly 
pressured officials to restrict the activities of the other.
    Tension also persists between the different branches of the 
Orthodox Church. In April 1999, a violent scuffle took place in the 
southeastern city of Mariupol between supporters of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage of Patriarch 
Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate). Filaret 
had come to Mariupol to consecrate a cross erected on the future site 
of a Kiev Patriarchate church. A scuffle broke out when opponents tried 
to pull down the cross. Filaret received minor injuries, and several of 
his followers were treated at a local hospital for concussions and 
minor injuries.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The frequent harassment of 
racial minorities is an increasing problem. The police routinely detain 
dark-skinned persons for arbitrary document checks (see Section 1.c.). 
In addition there were increased reports of racially motivated violence 
against persons of African and Asian heritage. Representatives of these 
groups claimed that police officials routinely ignored, and sometimes 
abetted, violence against them.
    Roma face considerable societal discrimination. Opinion polls have 
shown that among all ethnic groups, the level of intolerance is highest 
toward Roma. In the Transcarpathian region in particular, Roma continue 
to be subject to violence and abuse by police (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for the ``free development, use, and 
protection of the Russian language and other minority languages in 
Ukraine.'' This compromise builds on a 1991 law on national minorities, 
which played an instrumental role in preventing ethnic strife by 
allowing individual citizens to use their respective national languages 
in conducting personal business and by allowing minority groups to 
establish their own schools. Nonetheless, some pro-Russian 
organizations in the eastern part of the country complained about the 
increased use of Ukrainian in schools and in the media. They claimed 
that their children are disadvantaged when taking academic entrance 
examinations, since all applicants are required to take a Ukrainian 
language test. According to official statistics, there are 16,352 
Ukrainian schools, 2,399 Russian schools, 98 Romanian schools, 67 
Hungarian schools, 11 Moldovan schools, 9 Crimean-Tatar schools, and 3 
Polish schools in the country.
    In May a popular folk singer was killed at a cafe in Lviv, 
allegedly by Russian-speakers who objected to his singing Ukrainian 
songs. The murder sparked protests and prompted a national debate over 
the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages. In July the city council 
issued a decree banning the broadcast of ``amoral songs'' in public 
places, which some observers interpreted as a prohibition against 
Russian language music. However, the decree never was enforced and in 
August the local procuracy declared the decree unlawful. Ukrainian and 
Crimean Tatar minorities credibly complain of discrimination by the 
Russian majority in Crimea and demand that the Ukrainian and Tatar 
languages be given equal treatment to Russian. According to Tatar 
leaders, unemployment is as high as 50 percent in their community. In 
January 1999, the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis (the unofficial 
Tatar parliament) was firebombed in Simferopol. As of October, no one 
had been charged in the crime, though Tatars blamed Russian 
chauvinists. In May 1999, on the anniversary of Stalin's deportation of 
the Tatars to central Asia, 35,000 Tatars demonstrated for official 
recognition of the Mejlis, Tatar representation in the Crimean 
parliament, and for official status for the Tatar language. In response 
President Kuchma created a presidential Tatar advisory committee that 
included all members of the Mejlis. Tatar leaders reported that during 
the year the committee helped promote Tatar interests at the national 
level. Also in May 1999 Tatar protesters erected a tent camp in front 
of the Crimean government building. The camp was dismantled after the 
Crimean Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsyn agreed to the protesters' 
demands for the creation of a council to represent Tatar interests in 
the Crimean government, for the right of Tatars returning from central 
Asia to own land, and for the creation of Tatar schools. A 
demonstration held on the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean 
Tatars in May was much smaller and less politicized.
    The Crimean Government, pleading insufficient funds, did not assent 
to requests from the Crimean Tatar community for assistance in 
reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language 
publications and educational institutions. However, the central 
Government is working with the UNHCR, OSCE, and the International 
Organization for Migration on support for the Crimean Tatar community.
    The majority of the more than 260,000 Crimean Tatars who have 
returned to the country from exile in central Asia have received 
citizenship. According to Tatar leaders, approximately 30,000 to 40,000 
of them still lack citizenship, a decrease from 67,000 in 1999. Crimean 
Tatar leaders have complained that their community has not received 
adequate assistance in resettling, and that the onerous process of 
acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in 
elections and from the right to take part in the privatization of land 
and state assets (see Section 2.d.).
    Romanians called for university-level instruction in Romanian or 
the establishment of a Romanian technical college. There are 86 
Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast.
    Rusyns (Ruthenians) called for status as an official ethnic group 
in the country. At a congress held in Uzhhorod in 1999, representatives 
of the Rusyn community called for Rusyn-language schools, a Rusyn-
language department at Uzhhorod University, and for Rusyn to be 
included as one of the country's ethnic groups in the 2001 census. 
According to Rusyn leaders, more than 700,000 Rusyns live in the 
country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and 
economic interests.'' Under the Constitution, all trade unions have 
equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a 
trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes 
trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the 
activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish 
and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle all workers and 
civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to form 
unions. In practice the Government discourages certain categories of 
workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so. A 
new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was 
adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President in 1999. In 
January independent unions challenged the law. The grounds that it was 
as unconstitutional, and in late October, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that some provisions of the 1999 Labor Union Law were 
unconstitutional. The court rejected the requirement that unions must 
register with the Ministry of Justice and the condition that unions 
have a certain level of membership and regional representation in order 
to qualify for national status. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) has stated that the law violated ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of 
Association.
    The successor to the Soviet trade unions, known as the Federation 
of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun to work independently of the 
Government and has been vocal in advocating workers' right to strike. 
The FPU has supported the protests of miners and other professions over 
unpaid wages. However, as during the Soviet era, most FPU affiliates 
work closely with management. Following President Kuchma's 1998 
appointment of the head of the FPU-affiliated coal miners' union to be 
director of the national coal monopoly, the FPU ended support for 
striking miners. Enterprise managers are free to join the FPU. In 1997 
the FPU leadership created a political party, the All-Ukrainian Party 
of Workers, which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPU.
    Independent unions now provide an alternative to the official 
unions in many sectors of the economy. The Independent Miners' Union of 
Ukraine (NPGU), unions representing pilots, civil air traffic 
controllers, locomotive engineers, aviation ground crews, and other 
unions operate either independently or within one of three national 
confederations. While exact membership is unknown, estimates for 
independent union membership ranged from 100,000 to 300,000, while 
estimates for FPU-affiliated unions ranged from 17 to 23 million 
members. Independent unions have claimed unsuccessfully a share of the 
former Soviet trade unions' huge property and funds, especially the 
social insurance benefits fund, a Soviet-era legacy traditionally 
controlled by the official unions.
    Independent unions claimed that the new trade union law is more 
restrictive than the old Soviet legislation. To acquire national 
status, a union must have representation in more than half of the 14 
regions of the country, or in onethird of the enterprises in a 
regionally based sector, or have a majority of union members in the 
sector. National status and registration confer the right to acquire 
space, property, to maintain bank accounts, and to enter legally 
binding agreements. These new requirements are likely to make it 
difficult for miners and sailors to organize. Another contentious 
requirement is mandatory registration by the Justice Ministry. All 
unions were required to reregister with the Justice Ministry by April. 
As of October, nearly all FPU-affiliated unions and 14 independent 
unions were registered. The largest independent union, the Independent 
Miners Union, was not registered because it lacks the geographic 
presence necessary for national status. As of October, the Justice 
Ministry had not applied the administrative sanctions against 
unregistered unions that were foreseen in the new law. Registration 
determines participation of a union in the national collective 
bargaining agreement with the Government, as well as membership on the 
Social Insurance Fund Board (see Section 6.b.). Independent unions 
stated that the Justice Ministry denied registration to unions not 
loyal to the Government. They also reported that management in many 
enterprises cited the new law in refusing to deal with independent 
unions. Additionally management no longer is obligated to provide free 
accommodation and telephone lines to unions. However, the law gives 
unions a say in labor safety and division of newly built housing.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's 
economic and social interests.'' The Constitution states that strikes 
must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the rights and 
liberties of others. The law does not extend the right to strike to 
members of the procuracy, judiciary, armed forces, security services, 
law enforcement agencies, and public servants. However, a 1998 Law on 
Labor Disputes Resolution extends the right to strike to employees of 
``continuing process plants,'' for example, metallurgical factories, 
provided that they give 15 days' advance notice of their intent to 
strike. The law prohibits strikes that jeopardize life or health, the 
environment, or that can hinder disaster, accident, or epidemic-related 
operations. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) 1999 report, the law does not allow strikes in the 
transport sector. Workers who strike in prohibited sectors can receive 
up to three years imprisonment.
    The law does not prohibit specifically strikes based on political 
demands. The law prohibits strikes based on demands to change the 
constitutional order, state borders, or the administrative division of 
the country, as well as on demands that infringe on human rights. The 
Government has relied on the prosecutors and the courts to deal with 
strikes that it considered illegal. The law does not extend the 
immunity from discipline or dismissal to strikers who take part in 
strikes that later are declared illegal by the courts. A union that 
organizes an illegal strike is liable for strike-inflicted losses.
    According to official statistics, there were 15 strikes in the 
first quarter of the year. There are no official restrictions on the 
right of unions to affiliate with international trade union bodies. The 
NPGU is a member of the Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and 
General Workers' Union.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Law on 
Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should 
resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and 
duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of 
responsibility frequently impeded the collective bargaining process. 
The Government, in agreement with trade unions, established wages in 
each industrial sector and invited all unions to participate in the 
negotiations. The 1998 Law on Labor Disputes Resolution provides for 
the establishment of an arbitration service and a National Mediation 
and Reconciliation Service to mediate labor disputes. During the first 
4 months of the year, the service mediated 414 labor disputes. 
According to official statistics, in 1999 the service mediated 421 
labor disputes.
    The manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied 
prejudices the bargaining process against independent unions and favors 
the official unions (affiliates of the FPU). Most workers never are 
informed that they are not obligated to join the official union. 
Renouncing membership in the official union and joining an independent 
union can be bureaucratically onerous and typically is discouraged by 
management. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination. Under the law, disputes should be resolved by the 
courts. There have been cases in which such disputes have not been 
settled in a fair and equitable manner.
    Under the new trade union law, an independent union also can be 
removed easily from the collective bargaining process at the enterprise 
level. Under the old law, if several unions at an enterprise failed to 
agree on joint representation, the larger union, that is the FPU 
represented labor in the bargaining process. The new law failed to 
address this problem.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit forced and compulsory labor, and it generally 
is not known to occur; however, the country is a major source of girls 
and women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). 
The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, there were no reports of such practices, apart from 
victims of traffickers.
    Human rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of 
army conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing 
and building private houses for army and government officials. In 1998 
student groups protested against a presidential decree obliging college 
and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the 
Government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs 
for 3 years or to repay fully the cost of their education. Students 
described the decree as an anticonstitutional attempt to introduce 
compulsory labor, as the Constitution provides for free choice of job 
and one's agreement to work. The Government stated that the decree 
would cover only students who entered higher education institutions in 
1997 and thereafter. The extent of enforcement of the decree is 
unknown. In the past, human rights groups reported complaints from 
medical and law students that they had been forced to accept 
government-assigned jobs for 3 years to repay the cost of their 
education or not receive their diplomas. However, no recent complaints 
have been reported.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 17; however, in certain 
nonhazardous industries enterprises may negotiate with the Government 
to hire employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of 
one parent. The Constitution provides for general secondary education. 
School attendance is compulsory until the age of 15, a regulation 
vigorously enforced by the Ministry of Education. However, since the 
Soviet era, the number of dropouts has increased significantly, mostly 
because of rising poverty. The Criminal Code prescribes up to 5 years 
in prison for involving children in criminal activities, drinking, 
begging, prostitution, gambling, or other exploitation. The Government 
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but 
there were no reports that it occurred, apart from victims of 
traffickers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor in October.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage is 
$21.70 (118 hryvnia), and the minimum monthly pension is $4.70 (24.9 
hryvnia). The average monthly salary is $41.60 (228.8 hryvnia), which 
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. 
Moreover millions of persons go unpaid for many months because of 
shrinking budget revenue. In July Parliament declared the official 
subsistence level to be about $50 (270.1 hryvnia) per month. Although 
the practice of underreporting sources of income is widespread, it is 
estimated that in fact some 50 percent of the population effectively 
lives in poverty.
    The Labor Code provides for a maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24hour 
period of rest per week, and at least 24 days of paid vacation per 
year. Stagnation in some industries, for example, defense, 
significantly reduced the workweek for some categories of workers.
    The law contains occupational safety and health standards; however, 
these frequently are ignored in practice. Lax safety standards and 
aging equipment caused many serious accidents, resulting in 
approximately 47,000 work-related injuries in 1999. According to 
official statistics, these were 85 serious industrial accidents in 
which 141 workers were killed and 332 were injured occurred during the 
first half of the year. Mining accidents killed 212 miners during the 
first half of the year. In the coal mining sector, it is estimated 
there are 5.2 deaths for every million tons of coal extracted.
    In theory workers have a legal right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing continued employment; 
however, in reality, independent trade unionists reported that 
asserting this right would result in retaliation or perhaps dismissal 
by management.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls is a 
significant problem. The country is a major source and transit country 
of women and girls trafficked to Central and Western Europe, the United 
States, and the Middle East for sexual exploitation, and reports of 
trafficked women and girls from Ukraine also have come from Australia, 
Japan, and South Africa. The International Organization for Migration 
estimated in 1998 that 100,000 citizens had been trafficked abroad for 
this purpose since 1991. Between 1991 and 1997 Israeli authorities 
deported 1,500 Russian and Ukrainian women who had been trafficked 
there; and Italian officials estimated in 1999 that at least 30,000 
Ukrainian women were employed in Italy in exploitative situations. In 
Israel where many Ukrainian women are trafficked, the Government fails 
to protect the victims and routinely jails the Ukrainian women on 
charges of prostitution prior to their deportation.
    The Parliament passed an amendment to the criminal code in 1998 
that imposes harsh penalties for, among other offenses, trafficking in 
human beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography. In 
1999 the Government established special police units to investigate 
trafficking crimes; however, the effectiveness of these units and of 
the amended Criminal Code has not yet been established. In 1999 the 
Human Rights Ombudsman established a National Coordinating Council for 
the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings; however, the 
organization has yet to demonstrate its effectiveness. Trafficking is 
becoming a higher priority for law enforcement agencies, but these 
agencies often lack the financial and personnel resources to combat 
well-established criminal organizations that run trafficking 
operations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1999 established 
special antitrafficking units at the national and oblast levels. These 
units became operational this year; however, they have had limited 
impact. NGO's claimed that the local militia received bribes in return 
for ignoring this problem. Moreover, some reports allege that local 
public officials abeted or assisted organized criminal groups in 
trafficking women abroad.
    The authorities do not prosecute men routinely for engaging women 
in the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work. In the 
past three years, 37 criminal cases have been brought against alleged 
traffickers, most of which ended in acquittals. Sentences for those 
convicted of trafficking generally were not severe and usually consist 
of fines. In November a Greek man and two Ukrainian women were 
convicted of trafficking in human beings and sentenced to seven years 
and five years in prison, respectively. This case marked the first time 
convicted traffickers received jail sentences. In 1999 two women who 
were sentenced to 5-year suspended sentences and fined $150 (680 
hryvnia) for trafficking. In August 1999, authorities in the 
Netherlands arrested a Ukrainian national and three Dutch nationals for 
trafficking women to sex clubs in the southern Netherlands from 
Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania. No update on the results of 
these arrests were available at year's end. Also in 1999, a man was 
given a suspended sentence and fined for trafficking women to brothels 
in the former Yugoslovia and engaging them in prostitution, and three 
persons were arrested on suspicion of selling 200 young women and girls 
to be used as forced labor in night clubs or as prostitutes in Turkey, 
Greece, and Cyprus.
    Women who are trafficked out of the country often are recruited by 
firms operating abroad and subsequently are taken out of the country 
with legal documentation. They are solicited with promises of work as 
waitresses, dancers, or housemaids, or are invited by marriage agencies 
allegedly to make the acquaintance of a potential bridegroom. Once 
abroad the women find the work to be very different from what was 
represented to them initially.
    The Government, primarily due to lack of funds, is unable to assist 
victims effectively. Some NGO's, such as the domestic NGO La Strada, 
began offering some support services for victims of trafficking, but 
these groups also suffered from a shortage of funds. For example, La 
Strada described a case in February in which seven Ukrainian mothers 
contacted the NGO to request help for their daughters who were 
trafficked into prostitution in Montenegro. The NGO became frustrated 
with the lack of assistance from the Government because there was no 
central point of contact to address the situation or provide 
assistance. With foreign assistance, four regional trafficking 
prevention centers were opened in addition to the three already in 
existence. Centers now operate in Donetsk, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Chernyvtsy, Kherson, Rivne, and Zhytomyr. The centers offered job-skill 
training, have telephone hot lines, and serve as referral centers for 
health, legal, and psychological counseling. In addition to the three 
cities with trafficking prevention centers, hot lines operate in 
Luhansk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Ternopil, and Sevastopol. In the first half of 
the year, La Strada hot lines received 1,040 calls, 684 of which were 
from callers classified as potential victims. Winrock, an NGO also 
involved in antitrafficking efforts, reported more than 2,600 calls to 
its hot lines in the first quarter of the year.
    In September 1999, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national 
program for the prevention of trafficking in women and children, 
involving 20 ministries, local governments, international 
organizations, donors, and domestic and international NGO's. The 
program was to combat trafficking as well as to assist victims; 
however, severe budget constraints limited the ability of the 
Government to implement the program effectively. The Ombudsman made 
public statements that the issue of trafficking was a priority (see 
Section 4). The Ministry of Education introduced a curriculum on 
trafficking prevention and awareness in high schools. NGO's conducted 
general awareness programs.
                               __________

                             UNITED KINGDOM

    The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a 
longstanding constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary 
government. Some central government powers have been devolved to 
locally elected bodies in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The 
judiciary is independent, but Parliament may supercede its decisions 
through legislation.
    Throughout the country, police forces are under the effective 
control of civilian officials. The intelligence agency MI-5 has the 
authority to act in support of other law enforcement agencies in the 
prevention and detection of serious domestic crime, but information 
collected by that agency generally is not admissible as evidence in 
trials. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland has a 
complex and controversial role, due to the special and difficult 
circumstances in the region with respect to law and order. In some 
areas of Northern Ireland, because of the continuing threat of 
violence, army units operate to reinforce the RUC. Individual members 
of UK police forces committed human rights abuses in some instances.
    A highly developed, diversified, market-based economy with 
extensive social welfare services provides most residents with a high 
standard of living. Higher than average unemployment rates prevail 
among certain demographic groups, including youth and racial 
minorities, and in Northern Ireland, among Catholics.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Individual members of the police 
occasionally abused detainees. Prison conditions, including 
overcrowding and the number of prison suicides, also remained problems. 
There are some limits on freedom of assembly and association related to 
the security situation in Northern Ireland. The Government continued to 
take steps to combat violence against women. Societal discrimination 
against women, nonwhite minorities, and the Traveller (nomadic) 
community are problems, as are child abuse and occasional societal 
violence against minorities. Trafficking in women is an acknowledged 
problem. In October the Human Rights Act came into effect, allowing for 
the enforcement of provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in UK courts.
    In Northern Ireland, power was devolved in December 1999 under the 
terms of the Good Friday Agreement, which established local government 
institutions, including a legislative assembly and a power-sharing 
executive. In February 2000, due to the lack of progress on weapons 
decommissioning by republican paramilitary groups, the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) threatened to withdraw from the executive in protest. The 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the institutions in 
February in order to prevent UUP withdrawal. In May, after the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) pledged to put its weapons 
completely and verifiably beyond use, the Government lifted the 
suspension, allowing devolution to resume. In October Executive First 
Minister David Trimble of the UUP refused to allow executive ministers 
of the republican Sinn Fein Party to participate in meetings of the 
North-South Ministerial Council, because there had been no progress on 
the weapons issue. At year's end, Sinn Fein ministers were challenging 
Trimble's move in court.
    The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated a 
comprehensive consultation process on a bill of rights specific to 
Northern Ireland, as mandated by the Good Friday Agreement. The 
commission also provides legal advice and assistance to citizens. The 
HRC Chief Commissioner urged the Government to grant the commission 
additional funding and enhanced powers. Under the terms of its creation 
in 1999, the HRC can make the case for such changes in a report to the 
Government in 2001.
    The police force in Northern Ireland has had a complex and 
controversial role and under some circumstances continues to rely on 
support from British Army units. Approximately 13,000 British troops 
were stationed in Northern Ireland, the lowest number since the early 
1970's. The Good Friday Agreement mandated wide-ranging reforms in 
policing and criminal justice with the aim of developing fair, 
effective, and representative law-enforcement institutions that have 
the confidence of all parts of the community. In November Parliament 
passed a Northern Ireland Police Bill based on the recommendations of 
the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (commonly 
known as the Patten Commission). In March the criminal justice review 
mandated by the Good Friday Agreement publicly proposed as part of its 
findings reforms in the Northern Ireland prosecution system and in the 
procedures for making judicial appointments; its recommendations are 
expected to be implemented beginning in 2001.
    In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government in 
September completed the staged release of 433 prisoners affiliated with 
paramilitary organizations that maintain a complete and unequivocal 
cease-fire--although ``punishment'' attacks continued in areas under 
the influence of these groups. Several paramilitary dissident groups in 
Northern Ireland committed acts of violence aimed at disrupting the 
peace process. During the year, over 250 violent sectarian attacks took 
place in Northern Ireland. Loyalists carried out 86 punishment 
shootings and 72 punishment beatings, while republicans carried out 50 
punishment shootings and 54 beatings.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the Government.
    The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent watchdog 
organization, concluded its inquiry into the police investigation of 
the death of Roger Sylvester, a black man who died in 1999 after being 
restrained by police officers. The PCA certified that the circumstances 
had been investigated to its satisfaction and forwarded an 
investigation report to the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS). In 
November the CPS ruled that there was insufficient evidence to file 
criminal charges against the police officers involved in Sylvester's 
case. Sylvester's family called for an independent inquiry.
    In December the CPS also ruled out filing criminal charges against 
police officers involved in the 1999 shooting death of Henry Stanley. 
Amnesty International expressed concern over the CPS decisions not to 
prosecute in the Sylvester and Stanley cases, which the organization 
considers ``strong prima facie evidence'' cases.
    In May a London court set a February 2001 trial date for a police 
officer charged in the murder of James Ashley, who was shot and killed 
during a police raid on his home in 1998. In connection with the case, 
four other police officers face trial.
    According to the PCA's Annual Report, deaths in police custody fell 
to 47 during the 12 months ending in March 2000, compared with 65 
during the same period the previous year. The report states that 11 of 
the deaths occurred because of natural causes, 9 were due to alcohol or 
drugs, and 12 were suicides. The PCA supports the abolition of the 
offense of ``being drunk and incapable'' and recommends that drunks be 
dealt with by nurses and paramedics rather than by the police. 
According to the Home Office, the provisional number of deaths in 
police custody in England and Wales during the calendar year was 47; in 
Scotland it was 3.
    There also were a number of deaths in custody in prison due to 
suicide and natural causes (see Section 1.c.).
    The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is assisting the 
family of Jim McDonnell in the formal inquest into his death in 1996 in 
Northern Ireland's Maghaberry Prison. Fellow prisoners charged that 
prison staff beat him.
    In April the European Court of Human Rights declared admissible 4 
cases brought by the families of 12 individuals killed by the security 
forces (or with alleged security force collusion) in Northern Ireland 
in the 1980's and 1990's. The families contend that the Government 
violated, inter alia, Article 2 (the right to life) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and charge that the deceased were killed 
unjustifiably by the State or its agents through excessive use of force 
and that the State failed to comply with its procedural obligations by 
not effectively investigating the deaths. One of the cases had earlier 
been included in an inquiry into the use of lethal force (including 
allegations that the authorities sanctioned a shoot-to-kill policy) 
conducted in 1984-87 by John Stalker.
    In 1998 the Government opened a new judicial inquiry, presided over 
by a panel of three prominent judges from the UK and other Commonwealth 
countries, to establish the facts of the events of January 30, 1972, in 
Northern Ireland--"Bloody Sunday"--when 13 unarmed civil rights 
demonstrators in Londonderry were killed by British soldiers, but for 
which no member of the security forces was ever held accountable. The 
inquiry spent 2 years gathering testimony and evidence from other 
victims, journalists, and government officials. Formal hearings began 
in March in Londonderry. Following the August resignation from the 
panel of Sir Edward Somers due to personal reasons, the Government 
appointed John Toohey, a former judge on the Australian High Court. The 
disruption resulted in a 2-month delay in the proceedings, which 
resumed in November. The inquiry is expected to hear testimony from 
approximately 800 to 1,000 witnesses and continue for another 2 to 3 
years.
    David Copeland was convicted in June of a series of bombings in 
London in 1999 and sentenced to six life sentences. The bombings, 
motivated by racism and homophobia, killed three people.
    Under the criteria of the 1998 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 
the Government determined that the main republican and loyalist 
paramilitary groups were abiding by a cease-fire. Despite the fact that 
the groups are considered to be maintaining a cease-fire, killing and 
wounding by both republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland 
continued. The groups that the Government determined were not 
maintaining a total and unequivocal cease-fire are the Real IRA (RIRA), 
the Continuity IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Red 
Hand Defenders, and the Orange Volunteers.
    The PIRA was blamed widely for three May killings, including the 
killing of a dissident republican activist. While the PIRA did not 
comment or deny involvement, media reports attributed these crimes to 
the group.
    More than 10 deaths in Northern Ireland during the year were 
attributed to feuding among the principal loyalist paramilitary groups. 
Victims included reputed members of key loyalist paramilitaries, 
including Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) leader Richard Jameson.
    In August the feud between the UFF/UDA and the UVF intensified when 
a display of strength by the UFF/UDA on the Shankill Road in Belfast 
led to gunfire and attacks on houses. During the following week, Bobby 
Mahood and Jackie Coulter (the latter connected with the UFF) were shot 
and killed, as was Sam Rocket, a UVF supporter. In August the 
Government revoked the release of Johnny Adair, a leader of the 
loyalist UFF who had benefited from early release in October 1999, for 
his role in the violent feuding. Subject to the approval of the 
Sentencing Board, the Government is recommending that Adair serve the 
duration of his original prison term. In December the factions 
announced a ``truce.''
    Although a number of suspects were questioned, no one was charged 
with the murder of lawyer Rosemary Nelson, who died in a car bomb 
attack in 1999. The Red Hand Defenders, a loyalist splinter group, 
claimed responsibility, and human rights groups continued to express 
concern about alleged police collusion in the murder. Nelson, known for 
taking on high-profile civil rights cases, claimed as early as 1997 
that RUC officers made death threats against her.
    In December 1999, a coalition of six human rights organizations 
stated that Nelson's death constituted a failure by the Government to 
meet its international obligations to ensure that lawyers are able to 
perform their jobs without fear for their safety. These organizations 
called for a full public inquiry into all the circumstances of Nelson's 
murder. In his April 2000 report to the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers expressed concern over the extent and thoroughness of the 
official investigation into Nelson's complaints of RUC threats.
    Cognizant of the controversy surrounding Nelson's case, in 1999 the 
RUC appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk Colin Port to take over 
the investigation of the murder. Port's 80-member investigative team 
interviewed 7,000 potential witnesses. In March police made the first 
arrest of the case, questioning a man who was a member of the Royal 
Irish Regiment at the time of the murder; he was charged with an 
unrelated offense. In May the Independent Commission for Police 
Complaints (ICPC) ruled that there was ``insufficient evidence'' to 
discipline the RUC officers accused of threatening Nelson. In August 
Port appeared on the television program ``Britain's Most Wanted'' to 
appeal for individuals with information relating to the murder to come 
forward.
    No one has been charged in the UK for the 1998 bombing in Omagh 
that killed 29 persons. The RIRA claimed responsibility for the 
bombing. While authorities have collected information that identifies 
individuals alleged to be responsible for the bombing, much of it 
cannot be used as evidence. In October news organizations identified 
the alleged perpetrators, which prompted complaints from victims' 
families that a future trial could be jeopardized. Witnesses who could 
make prosecution possible have been reluctant to come forward. Family 
members of victims have criticized Sinn Fein for refusing to assist in 
the police investigation. While over 20 suspects were detained, only 1, 
Colm Murphy, was charged (for aiding and abetting the crime) and faces 
trial in the Republic of Ireland.
    In September a Belfast coroner conducted a public inquest into the 
Omagh bombing. Unlike inquests in England and Wales, coroner's courts 
in Northern Ireland do not reach verdicts apportioning blame, but 
instead make ``findings'' confined solely to the facts surrounding 
violent, sudden, or unexplained death. Human rights groups have argued 
in other inquests that this narrow definition shields wrongdoers, 
including soldiers and police officers, and unnecessarily keeps family 
members from learning the truth of the circumstances regarding their 
relative's death.
    Human rights groups continued to call for an independent inquiry 
into the December 1997 killing of Billy ``King Rat'' Wright, leader of 
the Loyalist Volunteer Force, in the high security Maze Prison by 
members of INLA. The facts of the killing call into question the 
prison's security standards: The watchtower in the courtyard where the 
killing took place allegedly was unmanned at the time, the perpetrators 
had weapons smuggled to them, and they apparently had knowledge of 
Wright's whereabouts. The jury at the coroner's inquest in February 
1999 stated that ``person or persons unknown and undetected'' were 
involved. In July the Government refused ``on security grounds'' to 
answer a parliamentary question about the identity the official in 
charge of the prison on the day of Wright's murder.
    In June a Belfast coroner abandoned plans for an inquest into the 
1997 death of Robert Hamill. Hamill's case received widespread 
attention because four RUC officers in a nearby vehicle allegedly did 
not act while Hamill was beaten to death by a mob. The coroner said 
that he feared that key witnesses would be in danger if they were 
called to give evidence. In 1999 one of the six suspects was acquitted 
of the killing but found guilty of a minor offense. The trial judge 
expressed concerns about the inaction of the police. Human rights 
groups argue that the RUC had intervened successfully in similar 
circumstances in the past. Moreover, they charge that the RUC's failure 
to intervene made the identification and prosecution of the murderers 
more difficult. The police ombudsman was directing the police 
investigation at year's end. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern called 
for an independent public inquiry. The family provided the Government 
with evidence that it says makes a definitive case for such an inquiry.
    The investigation into the 1989 murder of defense attorney Patrick 
Finucane continued. Finucane was killed in front of his family by 
members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). Human rights 
organizations have alleged security force collusion in the murder. In 
July two RUC officers were arrested and questioned about the murder, 
which was being reviewed in a third round of independent investigations 
by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir John Stevens. In 
August the inquiry seized documents related to the case from the 
British Army. William Stobie was arrested in 1999 and charged with the 
murder, although in August the charges were reduced to aiding and 
abetting murder. Stobie has claimed he was an RUC informer at the time 
of Finucane's murder and said he warned police of a ``hit'' by the UDA, 
although it was unclear whether he knew Finucane was the target. Human 
rights organizations, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence 
of Judges and Lawyers, and Finucane's family continued to press the 
Government for an independent public inquiry into the killing. They 
cited the possible existence of new evidence that would support charges 
of collusion between government officials and loyalist paramilitary 
groups in Finucane's murder.
    While British Army regulations normally bar from service those 
guilty of ``serious crimes,'' Scots Guards Jim Fisher and Mark Wright 
continued to serve in their regiment, to which they were reinstated in 
1998 after being convicted of and serving time in prison for the 1992 
murder of Peter McBride. In 1999 McBride's family won a judicial review 
against the British Army Board that sanctioned the soldiers' 
reinstatement. In November the board reaffirmed its decision, allowing 
the pair to remain in the service.
    Former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet left the UK on March 2 
after Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that he would not extradite 
Pinochet to Spain for alleged human rights abuses because he was too 
ill to stand trial.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains was established 
jointly by the British and Irish Governments in 1999 to facilitate the 
location of the remains of nine victims of IRA paramilitary violence 
from the 1970's. The commission succeeded in locating the remains of 
three persons in 1999, but suspended its work in May, pending the 
receipt of additional information from the IRA. Work had not resumed by 
year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment; however, individual members of the police 
occasionally abused detainees. Human rights organizations maintain that 
such abuse, while not widespread, is a matter of serious concern (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5). Detainees who claim physical mistreatment have 
the right to an immediate medical examination. A trial judge must 
examine such a claim. Confessions obtained by abusive treatment are not 
admissible in court, and judges can exclude even voluntary confessions.
    Reports by official bodies and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) have suggested that the public lacks confidence in existing 
procedures for making complaints against the police. According to a 
February 2000 Council of Europe committee report, more complainants 
have been taking their cases to the civil courts rather than filing 
complaints. The report states that even where complaints are filed and 
point to likely police culpability, criminal or disciplinary action 
against police officers has been rare, and convictions or disciplinary 
action even rarer; in many cases, police officers under investigation 
took medical retirement. According to the report, of 36,731 complaints 
recorded in the 1996-97 period studied by the committee, only 141 
resulted in legal or disciplinary action (latest statistics available). 
While accepting the need for reform of the complaint procedures, the 
Government disputed some of the conclusions reached in the report, 
pointing out that it omitted to mention over 1,000 disciplinary actions 
taken and the informal resolution of 32 percent of cases to the 
satisfaction of the complainants.
    Following these reports, the Government has engaged in an ongoing 
process to reform the police complaints system. In 1999 the Government 
phased in new complaint procedures. Among other things, the new 
procedures instituted a formal written warning procedure in serious 
cases and lowered the burden of proof in civil misconduct proceedings. 
In May 2000, the Home Office published a consultation document based on 
two separate studies conducted by a management consulting firm and a 
human rights group. The paper recommended that complaints against the 
police be handled by a new body, whose name would better reflect its 
independent nature than the current Police Complaints Authority. It 
also recommended that the new body have the ability to independently 
investigate the most serious complaints, including deaths in custody. 
The Home Office, after receiving and incorporating feedback on its May 
paper, issued a further report in December on its proposed framework 
for a new police complaints system, much of it based on the two groups' 
recommendations.
    Two RUC officers, Michael Magowan and Darren James Neill, were 
convicted and imprisoned in May for the 1998 assault on 18-year-old 
Bernard Patrick Griffin. Griffin, a Catholic, was arrested, beaten, 
verbally abused, and threatened. Griffin was then charged with assault. 
The truth emerged when a third officer present, Andrew Lea, confessed 
to his superiors; Lea was fined $1,600 (1,000 pounds). Magowan and 
Neill received 1- and 2-year sentences, respectively, and face RUC 
disciplinary charges of criminal conduct, which could result in 
dismissal.
    The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland began operation in 
November. The ombudsman has extensive powers to investigate complaints 
in Northern Ireland filed against the police or referred by the RUC 
Chief Constable, the Police Authority of Northern Ireland, or the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The ombudsman is to supervise 
automatically cases involving death or serious injury and may 
investigate other cases. The ombudsman can recommend to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) that charges be brought against officers, 
although the final decision rests with the DPP. The ombudsman can 
direct the Chief Constable to take disciplinary action against police 
officers. Unlike the ICPC, which must rely on the complaints and 
discipline branch of the RUC to provide investigators, the ombudsman 
has an independent investigative staff.
    Prior to being replaced by the ombudsman in November, the ICPC 
received 2,036 complaints; in November and December the ombudsman 
received about 540 complaints. In addition 2,396 cases were passed on 
from the ICPC to the ombudsman. Of the 2,390 cases completed by both 
organizations during the year, 7 led to informal disciplinary action 
and 9 led to formal criminal charges.
    Legislation implementing the 1999 Patten Report on Policing in 
Northern Ireland was enacted in November. The law changes the 
operational name of the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI), imposes hiring quotas to increase Catholic representation in 
the service (now only 8 percent of the total), and introduces new human 
rights standards and wider use of community policing practices. The law 
establishes a new policing board comprised of 9 public members and 10 
political party representatives from the Assembly. The reform remains 
controversial. Chris Patten, author of the original recommendations, 
has endorsed the bill and urged full participation in the new 
institutions. However, the nationalist parties object to the bill for 
not strictly following all recommendations of the Patten Commission, 
while unionist critics argue that reforms will undermine the 
effectiveness of the police. By year's end, the impasse over 
implementation had not been resolved.
    The Independent Assessor of Military Complaints continued to 
coordinate investigations into complaints of abuses committed by the 
Army in Northern Ireland. During the year, some 20 formal and 550 
informal complaints were received; most involved allegations of verbal 
abuse or excessive helicopter flights adjacent to residential areas.
    The police and military in Northern Ireland continued to use 
plastic bullets to quell civil disturbances. The Patten Commission 
recommended the use of plastic bullets ``only as a last resort, short 
of the use of firearms'' and recommended that the Government conduct 
research to find ``an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal 
alternative'' to plastic bullets. The Government accepted these 
recommendations. New guidelines mandate that plastic bullets only be 
used to avert the risk of loss of life or serious injury; formerly, 
their use was sanctioned to protect property or to preserve the peace. 
During disturbances in July, the police relied on water cannons to 
repel a disorderly crowd.
    In total the security forces fired 25 plastic bullets during the 
year, compared with 111 in 1999. According to RUC rules, plastic 
bullets should be aimed below the rib cage; nevertheless, the use of 
plastic bullets in prior years resulted in 17 deaths and numerous head 
and upper body injuries. Plastic bullet use in Northern Ireland is 
criticized severely by human rights monitors, although the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled in 1984 that using them to quell serious 
riots did not contravene the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
U.N. Committee Against Torture, the European Parliament, and human 
rights NGO's have called for a ban on their use.
    The Patten Commission recommended the closure ``forthwith'' of 
Northern Ireland's three holding centers used to detain and interrogate 
individuals suspected of terrorist offences. Human rights organizations 
have long called for their closure because of repeated complaints of 
police mistreatment during interrogations. One facility, at 
Castlereagh, was closed in 1999, and a second, Strand Road, was closed 
in September; the RUC contends that it cannot quickly close the third 
center, Gough, because it lacks the capacity in existing police 
stations to cope with the demands of questioning hundreds of terrorist 
suspects per year. Audio and video recordings are now made of all 
interrogations in the holding centers, and the number of complaints 
against the police by persons arrested under emergency legislation has 
diminished significantly.
    The independent commissioner for holding centers in Northern 
Ireland made unannounced visits to holding centers in order to observe 
interrogations and interview detainees. The number of complaints, 
generally for verbal harassment or ``technical assault,'' dropped 
substantially.
    David Adams was assaulted during his arrest and initial 
incarceration at the Castlereagh interrogation center in 1994. In 1998 
a Belfast court awarded Adams $48,000 (30,000 pounds) for exemplary 
damages. Adams later was sentenced to 25 years for conspiracy to 
murder. Following the court decision on damages, an independent inquiry 
into Adams's treatment was initiated by the assistant chief constable 
of Strathclyde. On the basis of his report, the DPP declined to pursue 
charges against any of the officers involved. An application by Adams 
for judicial review of the DPP's decision was denied in June.
    Police occasionally harassed Travellers and members of other 
minorities. Separate 1999 and 2000 reports pointed out that minorities 
are more likely to be stopped and searched than whites. In 1999 the 
Home Secretary ordered the police to recruit 8,000 officers from ethnic 
minorities within 10 years. In response the London Metropolitan Police 
increased recruitment of minority officers and hired additional 
recruits in 1999, which brought the total number of minority officers 
to less than 4 percent of the force. However, one-third of UK police 
forces have recruited no additional minorities.
    The armed forces have a procedure to handle complaints of 
harassment, racial and otherwise. Service personnel also have the right 
to submit complaints to employment tribunals. In 1998 the services 
entered into a 5-year partnership agreement with the Commission on 
Racial Equality (CRE) to promote racial equality practices. During the 
year, the armed forces registered 77 internal harassment complaints, 
including 28 for sexual harassment, 9 for racial harassment, and 31 for 
bullying or other harassment.
    Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland continued to intimidate or carry out ``punishment'' attacks on 
victims who live in areas under paramilitary influence. The attacks 
often are intended to maintain or extend the control of paramilitary 
groups in a given region. Targets include group members who have broken 
ranks or individuals accused of ``antisocial'' activities such as drug 
trafficking or carjacking. The attackers have used iron pipes, baseball 
bats, sledgehammers, and spiked clubs to beat their victims and shot 
them in the knees and legs. The authorities recorded over 200 such 
incidents during the year. Human rights groups say that available 
statistics underreport the true number of casualties because many of 
the victims are too intimidated to report paramilitary punishment 
attacks.
    A bomb damaged Hammersmith Bridge in London in June. In September 
terrorists fired a missile, believed to be a rocket propelled grenade, 
at the MI-6 building, headquarters of Britain's Secret Service. Neither 
attack resulted in injuries, and no one publicly claimed 
responsibility.
    Prison conditions generally met minimum international standards. 
The chief inspector of prisons' annual report expressed disappointment 
that prison management had failed to recognize and eliminate problems 
independently or to followup on negative reports in previous years. The 
inspector described the treatment of prisoners and the conditions in 
several prisons as unacceptable, but noted some improvements in other 
institutions. The Prison Service made attempts to correct the problems 
of overcrowding and poor facilities maintenance in its prisons, through 
an investment of some $1.72 million (1.1 million pounds) in maintenance 
projects during the 1999-2000 period and a reduction in the number of 
prisoners required to ``double up'' in cells through the addition of 
500 new places. In August the deputy governor at Feltham, a juvenile 
prison, resigned in protest over what he termed dangerous and 
antisocial conditions. An October Prison Service report criticized 
procedural failures at Felham in the case of Zahid Mubarek, an Asian 
man who was beaten to death by a fellow inmate, Robin Stewart. Stewart 
had been charged with racially motivated crimes and continued to write 
racist letters from prison, but nonetheless was housed in the same cell 
with Mubraek. In August four warders at the Portland Young Offenders 
Institute were suspended from their duties pending investigation of 
allegations of abuse over a 14 year period. The prison population in 
England and Wales as of December decreased by 2 percent over the same 
time the previous year from 65,279 inmates to 63,881.
    Prison suicides decreased during the last year. The Prison Service 
reported 139 deaths of prisoners in England and Wales during the year, 
compared with 148 such deaths in 1999. Of these deaths, 82 were self-
inflicted (91 in 1999) and 54 were due to natural causes (57 in 1999). 
The Scottish prison service reported 19 deaths in custody in 2000: The 
causes of 13 were unresolved pending the results of routine inquests, 5 
were suicides, and 1 was due to natural causes.
    Human rights groups have been particularly critical of Special 
Security Units (SSU's), which are used to hold prisoners deemed to pose 
an exceptional risk of escape. Citing small group isolation, the lack 
of adequate exercise, work, educational opportunities, and natural 
daylight, as well as strict enforcement of noncontact visits through a 
glass barrier, human rights groups maintain that SSU imprisonment 
violates international standards. At year's end, 7 prisoners remained 
in SSU's; none was imprisoned for Northern Ireland terrorist-related 
crimes.
    Separate and distinct prison regimes exist for Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, administered through the Northern Ireland Office and the 
Scottish Office.
    The number of female prisoners continued to rise. According to a 
1999 Home Office report, women now commit 20 percent of all crime, and 
the number of women sent to prison doubled in the previous 6 years. 
Implementing the recommendations of a 1999 report by its women's policy 
group, the Prison Service adopted new procedures governing admission to 
mother and baby units and standards for their management.
    Faced with a large increase in the number of asylum seekers, the 
Government in December housed 1,195 immigration detainees in regular 
prisons, where normally they are held separately from convicted 
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. According to human rights 
groups, 28 regular prisons house some immigration detainees. The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other groups cite a lack of 
specialized skills among regular prison officials in dealing with 
immigration detainees. The UNHCR, which regularly visits detention 
centers and has excellent relations with the Government and detention 
center officials, continues to criticize the Government's ``expectation 
of noncompliance'' by asylum seekers. In March the Government opened a 
new center to house asylum seekers for short periods while their cases 
are decided. The Home Office was also in the process of finalizing 
rules for the treatment of asylum seekers in detention centers, which 
has been called for by the chief inspector for prisons for England and 
Wales.
    The Prison Service stated that three prisoners were convicted in 
1999 of offenses related to the situation in Northern Ireland. The 
requests by all three for repatriation to the Republic of Ireland 
remained under consideration. Since the prisoners committed their 
offenses after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they are not 
covered by its provisions for the early release of prisoners.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons and 
immigration detention centers.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities can and 
often do make arrests or detain suspects without judicial warrants, 
especially in Northern Ireland, when they believe that they have 
reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. The 1994 Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act allows police officers to stop and search vehicles and 
pedestrians if a police officer of at least superintendent rank (or a 
chief inspector if no superintendent is available) ``reasonably 
believes'' it is expedient to do so to prevent acts of violence. The 
authorization is limited to a 24-hour period but is renewable under 
certain circumstances.
    In July Parliament enacted the 2000 Terrorism Act, which is 
scheduled to come into force in February 2001. The law reforms 
mechanisms and powers used to deal with terrorism relating to Northern 
Ireland and extends them to all forms of domestic and foreign terrorism 
across the United Kingdom. It replaces the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act of 1996 (Amended in 1998), and sections of the Criminal 
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998, incorporating many 
provisions of those acts into the new law. Certain other provisions of 
those laws, applicable only to Northern Ireland, are to be extended for 
a maximum of 5 years, based on the special security situation that 
continues to exist there.
    The new act widens the definition of terrorism to include actions 
or threats of action that are designed to influence the Government or 
intimidate the public to advance a political, religious, or ideological 
cause that involves serious violence against a person or serious damage 
to property, endangers a person's life, creates a serious risk to the 
health or safety of the public, or is designed to seriously interfere 
with an electronic system. It gives police the power to arrest and 
detain suspected terrorists for up to 48 hours without judicial review, 
or, under limited circumstances, legal representation. Under the law, 
the Government may ban organizations involved with any form of 
international or domestic terrorism and prosecute individuals who 
participate in or support such organizations. The law also enhances the 
Government's power to seize assets related to terrorist activities.
    The act also provides for special emergency powers applicable to 
Northern Ireland for a period of up to 5 years maximum--or less if the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland determines that the security 
situation allows it. These powers include special entry, arrest, 
search, and seizure authority without a warrant under certain 
circumstances, nonjury, single-judge ``Diplock Court'' trials for 
``scheduled'' offenses, and a lower standard of admissibility of 
confessions than in ordinary courts.
    Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have 
expressed objections over certain temporary and permanent provisions of 
the new act. These objections focus on the broad definition of 
terrorism employed in the law, the proscriptive powers of the state, 
and the powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation. They argue that 
the act effectively reverses the burden of proof in suspected terrorism 
cases and fails to provide adequate safeguards against abuse by law 
enforcement officials.
    Suspects arrested without warrants must be released within 24 hours 
(or 36 hours if a serious offense is involved) unless brought before a 
magistrates' court or arrested under Terrorism Act provisions. The 
court may authorize extension of detention by 36 hours and on further 
application by another 24 hours, versus the 48-hour scheme extant in 
Northern Ireland (see Section 1.e.).
    Defendants awaiting trial have a statutory right to bail unless 
there is a risk that they would flee, commit an offense, interfere with 
witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or unless they 
were on bail when the alleged offense was committed. Defendants who are 
remanded in custody are protected by statutory custody time limits, 
which restrict the period for which they can be held while awaiting 
trial to a maximum of 182 days, unless the court grants an extension. 
According to data supplied by the Home Office, at year's end 6,791 
defendants were in custody awaiting trial. Of those in custody, 6,094 
had been awaiting trial for less than 24 weeks, while 196 had been 
waiting longer than 48 weeks. On balance the time spent awaiting trial 
decreased from 1999. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act includes measures 
to reduce delays in criminal proceedings by introducing procedural 
reforms and further limiting the time allowed for the prosecution of 
cases.
    The law gives administrative detention power to immigration 
officers. There is no time limit to such detention and no right to have 
it reviewed by a court. At year's end, approximately 1,500 asylum 
seekers were detained. They are detained either in immigration 
detention centers or in regular prisons (where they are normally held 
separately from convicted prisoners and those awaiting trial). 
Occasionally they are held in police cells, if for no more than 48 
hours and pending removal from the country or transfer to another 
accommodation (see Section 1.c.).
    Unlike those accused of criminal offenses, asylum seekers are given 
no written statement about why they were detained, although the 
practice is to provide them with updates on the status of their claims 
and the time required for their adjudication. Asylum seekers do not 
have an automatic right to apply for bail, and bail application, which 
can be made to immigration appellate authorities, requires a relatively 
high level of surety.
    The Government does not use exile (also see Section 2.d.).
    Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland also continued to 
threaten individuals and families to compel them to leave the province. 
Estimates of the number of people who fled into exile since the signing 
of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 range as high as 800.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
provides citizens with a generally fair and efficient judicial process.
    There are several levels of courts. The vast majority of criminal 
cases are heard by magistrates' courts, which are managed by locally 
based committees. Their decisions may be appealed to the Crown Court, 
which also hears criminal cases requiring a jury trial, or to the High 
Court. Crown Court convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal, 
which may in turn refer cases involving points of law to the House of 
Lords. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which consists of 
senior judges and is functionally distinct from the legislative arm) is 
the final court of appeal. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) 
operates as an additional appellate body to investigate suspected 
miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It 
considers cases after the judicial appeals process is exhausted and 
where there is significant new evidence that casts doubt on the 
conviction. In Scotland similar appeals may be made to the Scottish 
Office.
    The law provides for a fair trial, and the authorities respect and 
enforce the law in this regard. Defendants enjoy a presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, the right to question witnesses against 
them, and the right to appeal to successively higher courts.
    The 1998 Human Rights Act took effect in October, bringing the 
European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (see Section 4). 
Under this law, all public bodies must act in a manner compatible with 
the convention. The law provides citizens with the right to take 
alleged violations of the convention by a public authority into British 
courts. The Government derogated from Article 5(3) of the convention, 
dealing with the prompt resolution of a case after arrest or detention 
and included this derogation in the Human Rights Act. NGO's criticize 
this derogation.
    In July Parliament passed the 2000 Terrorism Act, which replaced 
several other related laws (see Section 1.d.). Under the new law, the 
testimony of a senior police officer, corroborated by a suspect's 
silence under questioning, can be considered evidence of a suspect's 
membership in a terrorist organization. The act also criminalizes 
membership in a proscribed terrorist organization or the support of 
such an organization, including the provision of money or other 
property. The act allows for the seizure and forfeiture of assets 
belonging to a person convicted of fundraising or otherwise assisting 
or supplying property to be used for the purposes of terrorism. Human 
rights groups, including Liberty, have criticized the criminalization 
of membership in a terrorist organization as violating the right to 
freedom of expression and association.
    Under the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, judges have 
the power to instruct juries that they may draw an inference of guilt 
from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during interrogation or 
trial, although no conviction can be based solely on such an inference. 
Human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Committee sharply 
criticize this provision, which they consider an abrogation of the 
right against self-incrimination. A similar provision is in effect in 
Northern Ireland. Based on a 1996 European Court of Human Rights 
judgment, the 1999 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order codifies 
guidelines issued by the Attorney General that prohibited the drawing 
of inference from silence when a suspect is questioned before being 
permitted access to an attorney.
    Indigent defenders have the right to free counsel of their choice, 
with some exceptions. Criminal proceedings must be held in public 
except those in juvenile court and those involving public decency or 
security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may 
order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.
    In Northern Ireland, special ``emergency'' restrictions affect due 
process. The 2000 Terrorism Act extends the application of most 
provisions of the 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) 
for a year, subject to another 12-month extension. Trials for certain 
terrorist-related offenses are conducted automatically in ``Diplock 
courts'' without a jury unless they specifically are ``scheduled out'' 
to ordinary jury courts. Diplock courts were established to avoid cases 
being heard by juries that might make decisions along sectarian lines, 
as well as to protect jurors from intimidation. If judges decide to 
convict, they must justify the decision in a document that becomes part 
of the court record. An appellate court may overturn the decision on 
either factual or legal grounds. During the year, 89 persons were tried 
in Diplock courts, of whom 39 either pled or were found guilty. An 
internal review of the Diplock court system was completed in July. It 
concluded that, due to the risk of juror intimidation, the time was not 
yet right to achieve the Government's objective of resuming jury trials 
for all offenses. The Government accepted this conclusion. The Diplock 
courts, and the Government's latest decision to retain them, have been 
criticized widely by human rights groups.
    Provisions of the EPA extended under the Terrorism Act establish 
lower standards for the use of uncorroborated confessions in Northern 
Ireland than in normal cases, and such confessions have in the past 
been used as the sole basis for conviction. Additionally, these 
provisions permit the police to prevent any suspected terrorist from 
contacting legal counsel for up to 48 hours after arrest under certain 
circumstances, at the request of a police officer with the minimum rank 
of superintendent. After a detainee has asked to see a lawyer and has 
done so, this period is renewable in subsequent 48-hour increments 
until the detainee is charged or released. Human rights groups have 
criticized these provisions, arguing that a detainee is most likely to 
need counsel in the first few hours; lack of counsel during that time 
makes false or coerced confessions and the abuse of detainees more 
likely. According to the Northern Ireland office, 92 requests for 
access to lawyers were made through June, none of which were delayed.
    The 1996 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act reduced defense 
lawyers' access to potential evidence held by the prosecution, 
including information as to how the evidence was collected. According 
to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a local NGO, this 
practice may be contrary to U.N. guidelines on the role of prosecutors.
    In light of allegations of security force collusion in the killings 
of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson (see Section 1.a.), there is 
continuing concern about harassment of lawyers by members of the RUC. 
The Human Rights Commission and the Law Society (the solicitors' 
professional association) received complaints from attorneys during the 
year and were considering undertaking a study to assess the full extent 
of the problem, since there is evidence that the number of incidents is 
underreported. The RUC maintains that it has zero tolerance for 
misbehavior toward attorneys and specifically has addressed the issue 
in its new code of ethics.
    In March a nine-member panel of legal professionals, drawn from the 
civil service and private practice, issued the Northern Ireland 
Criminal Justice Review, which was mandated by the Good Friday 
Agreement. The review's 294 recommendations are intended to improve the 
criminal justice system so that it will enjoy the confidence of all 
parts of the community while delivering justice efficiently and 
effectively. The report recommends the creation of a single independent 
prosecuting authority called the Public Prosecution Service for 
Northern Ireland that would be responsible for all prosecutions, 
including minor offences that are now prosecuted by the police. The 
review also recommends creation of a nonpolitical Northern Ireland 
Attorney General to oversee the Prosecution Service. It calls for the 
establishment of a single minister-level Department of Justice once 
responsibility for justice is devolved to Northern Ireland. To ensure 
that judicial appointments faithfully reflect the composition of 
Northern Ireland society, the review recommends the establishment of a 
Judicial Appointments Commission, which would include input from the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, to introduce local political 
responsibility and accountability into the appointments process. The 
review also makes recommendations on restorative justice, juvenile 
justice, community safety, victims and witnesses, and sentencing and 
prisons.
    During a 6-month consultation period ending in September, the 
Government accepted comments on the review from human rights NGO's and 
political parties. In October the Government stated that it fully 
endorses the general approach taken in the report. Legislation is 
expected in 2001.
    In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government 
concluded the process of releasing prisoners affiliated with 
paramilitary organizations that maintained a cease-fire. By year's end, 
433 paramilitary prisoners, including 229 republicans and 193 loyalists 
(and 11 ``others'') had been released under the 1998 Northern Ireland 
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Warrants normally are required for a police search of 
private premises; however, under the 2000 Terrorism Act a police 
officer may enter and search ``any premises if he or she reasonably 
suspects a terrorist is to be found there.'' The Government compensates 
persons whose houses or property have been damaged during house 
searches.
    In July the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) became 
law. The RIPA allows the Government to monitor the content of private 
electronic communications after obtaining a warrant. In addition law 
enforcement agencies may require individuals and businesses to disclose 
encryption keys under certain circumstances. In October the Government 
enacted regulations under the RIPA allowing businesses to monitor the 
electronic communications of employees. The regulations are expected to 
be challenged under the Human Rights Act.
    In Northern Ireland, paramilitary attacks on the homes and families 
of police and politicians decreased significantly, but the security 
forces believe that such groups continue to conduct surveillance and 
retain the capability to target police and politicians.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Strongly held common-law 
tradition, an independent press, and a democratic political system 
combine to secure freedom of speech and of the press. Viewpoints 
critical of the Government are well represented.
    The print media are dominated by a handful of national daily 
newspapers, all privately owned and independent (although often 
generally aligned with a political party). About half of the electronic 
media are run by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is 
funded by the Government but enjoys complete editorial independence. 
Corporations under renewable government license run the remainder.
    In May Barry Michael George was charged with the 1999 murder of 
Jill Dando, a leading television personality. George, whose trial was 
scheduled for February 2001, was believed to have been obsessed with 
Dando.
    Press organizations and human rights groups continued to criticize 
the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which allows courts to order a 
journalist to disclose a source if it is deemed to be in the interests 
of justice. The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act also contains 
provisions that compel journalists to give evidence in cases where 
police can prove it is necessary to their investigation. The Official 
Secrets Act, another law cited by journalists as unduly restrictive, 
prohibits the defense that the information is already in the public 
domain or that its publication is in the public interest.
    In November Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act (FIA). 
The FIA provides for public access to information held by the 
government. Certain information, including information related to the 
Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service, is subject to an 
absolute exemption from disclosure. In addition, the Government may 
refuse to disclose other ``exempt'' information, including information 
relating to national security and the operation of any ministerial 
private office, if the public interest in maintaining the exemption 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Critics, including the NGO 
Campaign for Freedom of Information, charge that the exemptions are 
overly broad.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for the right of peaceful assembly, but that right is limited routinely 
where it would impose a cost on public convenience. Police dispersed a 
May 1 anticapitalist demonstration in London after participants rioted, 
stoned police, and damaged cars and businesses. Several persons were 
injured, and a number of protesters arrested.
    In Northern Ireland the annual ``marching season'' posed 
significant problems for the Government since the right of assembly 
conflicted with the concerns of local residents in some communities who 
perceived the parades as the celebration of Protestant ``triumphs'' in 
historical battles. The 1998 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 
transferred responsibility for ruling on disputed marches from the RUC 
to a Parades Commission. Of the 3,304 parades held during the year, 260 
were considered contentious. Of these the Parades Commission imposed 
restrictions on 188. The courts refused the Orange Order's bid for a 
judicial review of the act. The Orange Order claimed that the law's 
provisions violated the Human Rights Act's provisions for freedom of 
speech and assembly.
    In response to the Parades Commission's decisions in June and July 
not to allow the Orange Order parade down the nationalist Garvaghy Road 
in Portadown, the Orange Order called for widespread protests 
throughout Northern Ireland. Loyalist demonstrators blocked streets, 
and some hijacked and burned cars; the protests caused widespread 
disruption, and businesses were forced to close early. The two parades 
at Drumcree on July 2 and 9 took place relatively peacefully amid a 
massive security presence, but on several intervening evenings loyalist 
protesters on Drumcree Hill became violent and attacked police and army 
security forces. The Portadown Orange Lodge called for peaceful 
protests but did not condemn the violence. The Apprentice Boys' Siege 
of Derry parade on August 12 largely was peaceful.
    The law provides for freedom of association, but that right is 
sometimes limited. Under the 2000 Terrorism Act, it is an offense, 
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, to belong to or profess to 
belong to an organization proscribed by the Home Secretary. Individuals 
are also subject to prosecution for supporting or inviting support for 
a proscribed organization, arranging or addressing meetings by 
proscribed organizations, or wearing clothing or carrying or displaying 
articles that would reasonably arouse suspicion of membership in a 
proscribed organization. Amnesty International has expressed concern 
that these powers may infringe on the rights to freedom of association 
and expression.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Government policy provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
Members of all faiths and denominations enjoy freedom of worship. The 
Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Those who believe that their freedom to worship has been abrogated have 
the right to appeal to the courts for relief. The Church of England 
(Anglican) and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) have the status of 
state religions, although their status has come under increasing 
scrutiny. A January university report on religious discrimination 
commissioned by the Home Office claimed that the establishment of the 
Church of England causes ``religious disadvantage'' to other religious 
communities. The Home Office at year's end still was considering the 
report.
    The Church of Scientology asserts that it faces discrimination 
because the Government does not treat Scientology as a religion. 
Ministers of Scientology are not regarded as ministers of religion 
under prison regulations or for immigration purposes. In 1999 the 
independent Charity Commission rejected a Church of Scientology 
application for charitable tax status accorded to most religious 
groups, and concluded that it is not a religion for the purposes of 
charity law.
    The 1988 Education Reform Act requires that government schools hold 
a daily act of nondenominational Christian worship. A parental right of 
withdrawal exists for children who do not wish to participate, and 
safeguards exist for teachers who do not wish to participate in or 
conduct religious education. The act provides for alternative 
collective worship for other faiths. Teachers' organizations have 
called for government review of the act. Some ``voluntary schools'' 
provided by religious groups enjoy state support. While the majority of 
these schools are Anglican or Catholic, there are a small number of 
Methodist and Jewish schools.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country and in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. 
In 1997 the Home Secretary revoked all exclusion orders preventing 
individuals linked to terrorism in Northern Ireland from traveling to 
Great Britain. When the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed in 
1998, it did not include provisions for exclusion orders. However, the 
Home Secretary has the power to activate other statutes implementing 
exclusion orders at any time.
    The Government cooperates closely with the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum is 
provided under a temporary protection process. Applicants are given 6 
months' ``leave to enter the country'' on arrival. They then can apply 
for an automatic 3-year extension of their stay and may apply for 
refugee status at any time. Asylum applications are considered in 
accordance with the criteria set out in the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Some asylum 
seekers are detained while the Government reviews their cases (see 
Section 1.d.); some are detained in regular prisons (see Section 1.c.).
    Faced with growing numbers of asylum applicants, the Government 
passed legislation in 1996 and 1999 designed to deter illegal entrants 
and the abuse of the asylum process, streamline the appeals process, 
and restrict benefits provided to asylum seekers. In December the 
Government issued guidelines for use by the courts in considering 
asylum claims by women. Judges were urged to consider forms of 
persecution more likely to be faced by female asylum applicants, 
including female genital mutilation and forced prostitution. The 
Government's policy, and the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act in 
particular, have been criticized by the UNHCR and NGO's for being 
detrimental to refugee rights. In particular Amnesty International in a 
September report claims that the Government's practice of dispersing 
asylum seekers throughout the county and issuing them vouchers for the 
purchase of food and other items stigmatizes asylum seekers and denies 
them access to community services.
    At year's end, 66,195 asylum applications were outstanding, 
compared with 101,475 outstanding a year earlier. The Government 
decided on 110,065 initial asylum applications, granting asylum in 
10,185. Under a special program to clear the asylum backlog, the 
Government also granted leave to remain in 10,330 cases. An additional 
11,365 cases were refused asylum, but were granted ``exceptional leave 
to remain.''
    There were no reports that persons were forced to return to 
countries where they feared persecution.
    Feuding among loyalist paramilitary groups resulted in the 
expulsion of over 200 families from their homes in the Shankill region 
of West Belfast as each group sought to expel from the neighborhood 
families allegedly sympathetic to their rivals. This scale of violent 
eviction had not been experienced in Northern Ireland since 1972.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and freely 
exercise that right. The lower chamber of Parliament (the House of 
Commons, the center of legislative power) is elected in periodic, 
multiparty elections. The upper chamber (the House of Lords), with the 
power to revise and delay implementation of laws, is made up of 
hereditary and appointed life peers and senior clergy of the 
established Church of England. In the first stage of a government 
reform program, the House of Lords agreed in 1999 to remove all but 92 
of its over 900 hereditary peers who, with approximately 500 life peers 
and 26 clergy, make up the current House of Lords. Possible additional 
reforms are being debated, which would further reduce the size of the 
chamber, democratize selection of members, and add representatives of 
faiths other than Anglicanism as de jure members.
    The Government is formed on the basis of a majority of seats in the 
House of Commons, which are contested in elections held at least every 
5 years. Participation in the political process is open to all persons 
and parties. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote. As in the 
rest of the country, Northern Ireland has city and district councils 
but with fewer powers. England and Wales also have County Councils. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, and the Welsh 
Assembly have control over matters of regional importance, such as 
education, health, and some economic matters. Foreign affairs and 
defense continue to be the responsibility of the central government.
    Due to continuing problems with the decommissioning of paramilitary 
weapons, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive (established under 
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement) were suspended in February. The 
institutions were restored in May following intensive British-Irish 
talks with the parties and an initiative on weapons by the IRA.
    The small number of remaining UK overseas territories have an 
aggregate population of approximately 190,000. They enjoy varying 
degrees of self-government on the British model, with appointed 
governors.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they and minorities face no legal constraints on voting or holding 
office. Women constitute 18 percent of the members of the House of 
Commons and approximately 16 percent of those in the House of Lords. 
Some 28 Members of Parliament have identified themselves as members of 
minority ethnic groups.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
    A number of international nongovernmental human rights 
organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
are based in the country. The Government cooperates fully with 
international inquiries into alleged violations of human rights.
    The 1998 Human Rights Act, which incorporated the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, took effect in 
October 2000 for the entire United Kingdom. Proceedings under the Human 
Rights Act can be brought only by victims of a breach of convention 
rights by a public authority. The Home Office has a human rights unit 
to carry out human rights policy and legislation. NGO's have criticized 
the Government for its failure to create a government-wide Human Rights 
Commission. In Northern Ireland the Human Rights Commission was 
established as an outcome of the peace process. While cases still may 
be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, all domestic remedies 
under the 1998 act must be exhausted first.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1976 Race Relations Act prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin and outlaws 
incitement to racial hatred. These protections were extended to 
Northern Ireland in 1997. However, some groups continued to experience 
official and societal discrimination.
    The Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
religion by public authorities. Employment discrimination on the 
grounds of religious or political opinion was outlawed specifically in 
Northern Ireland by the Fair Employment Act. The 1998 Fair Employment 
and Treatment Order extended the prohibition on discrimination to the 
provision of goods, facilities, services, and premises. The Government 
respects and enforces all antidiscrimination laws, which concentrate on 
employment and the supply of goods and services. The Northern Ireland 
Equality Commission began operation in August 2000 to oversee 
antidiscrimination policy.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. In 1999 a 
government report, ``Living Without Fear,'' indicated that one in four 
women experience domestic violence at some stage in their lives, that 
reported incidents of rape more than tripled over the past 10 years, 
that two women per week are killed by their current or former partners, 
and that women fear personal attack more than any other crime. 
According to a February 2000 Home Office study, the 6,000 rapes and 
17,5000 indecent assaults recorded by the police yearly vastly 
underreport of the real scale of sexual violence against women. The 
study estimates the true number of rapes and assaults at between 
118,000 and 295,000. The research was released as part of a package of 
government grants and projects aimed at improving the conviction rate 
for rape and providing women with better protection against domestic 
violence. Reports of violence against women in Northern Ireland have 
increased.
    Criminal penalties for rape, including spousal rape, sexual 
assault, and domestic violence are substantial, and these laws are 
enforced strictly; however, conviction rates for rape tend to be lower 
than for other crimes. In the 12 months ending in September, 37,263 
sexual offences were recorded in England and Wales, a decrease of 0.4 
percent over the same period in 1999. The law provides for injunctive 
relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion orders 
(similar to restraining orders) for women who are victims of violence. 
The Government provides shelters, counseling, and other assistance for 
battery or rape and offers free legal aid to battered women who are 
economically reliant on their abusers.
    Criminal action for sexual harassment cases must be prosecuted 
under assault legislation since no law specifically prohibits sexual 
harassment. Women's groups have complained that civil suits concerning 
sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender sometimes 
take up to 3.5 years to appear before an industrial tribunal.
    The law provides for equal opportunity between the sexes, but women 
experience some discrimination in practice. The 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination in training, housing, and the provision of goods and 
services, as well as in employment. Women have equal rights regarding 
property and divorce. According to the Government's Equal Opportunities 
Commission (which supports persons who bring discrimination cases 
before industrial tribunals and courts and produces guidelines on good 
practice for employers), significant progress has been made towards 
equal opportunity for women since the commission was established in 
1975. The introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 was an 
important change in the effort to equalize pay. However, a February 
report for the Government's Women's Unit found that women in full-time 
work earn on average 84 percent of the earnings of male full-time 
workers.
    Trafficking in women is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Women's issues within the Government are represented at the cabinet 
level by the Minister for Women, who heads up the Women's Unit, which 
engages in dialog with women and advises the Government but has no 
authority for direct action.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its systems of public education 
and medical care. The Government provides free, compulsory education to 
age 16 and further education to age 18 if the student so desires.
    While there is no societal pattern of abuse directed against 
children, indications are, despite a lack of reliable data, that child 
abuse is nevertheless a problem. Since the paramilitary cease-fires, 
reports of violence against children in Northern Ireland have 
increased.
    Concern and publicity surrounding pedophiles is growing. As part of 
a government drive to protect the young from child abusers, previously 
secret registers of pedophiles are available to any employer who runs 
an organization where persons under age 18 could be at risk (schools, 
children's homes, or voluntary organizations). In addition suspected 
child abusers and convicted pedophiles are banned from working with 
children. Childcare organizations must consult a list before offering 
anyone a job, paid or otherwise, and it is illegal for them to hire 
anyone named on it.
    Various laws covering England and Wales stipulate that children 
have the right to apply for court orders, to give or withhold consent 
for medical treatment (for those capable of making an informed 
decision), to make complaints to the relevant local authority, to have 
their ethnic, linguistic, and religious background considered in 
decisions affecting them, to have reasonable contact with their 
families (usually applied in a circumstance where there was abuse), and 
in general to be consulted regarding their desires.
    In February rules were introduced in England and Wales to reduce 
the intimidation that young suspects may feel when tried in an adult 
court. The rules include a ban on robes and wigs and uniformed security 
officers in the courtroom and affect all defendants under age 18 who 
face serious criminal charges in crown courts. The changes were in 
response to a 1999 European Court of Human Rights ruling that two young 
boys' rights were violated by the intimidating nature of their trial.
    Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police can arrest and 
detain children as young as 10 years old for up to 7 days.
    In January the Government published a consultation document 
proposing that laws be amended to make it illegal for parents to hit 
their children with an implement or hit them on the head or face. It 
did not propose to outlaw completely spanking or hitting. The proposals 
are the result of a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1998 that 
a 9-year-old boy's rights were violated by his stepfather's caning. The 
1998 School Standards and Framework Act extended the ban on corporal 
punishment in state schools to private schools and nursery schools. 
Child welfare groups have called for all corporal punishment of 
children to be outlawed.
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health and has been illegal in the United Kingdom since 
1985, is practiced by immigrant populations from countries in which the 
practice is common. The extent to which the procedure is carried out in 
the UK is unknown, but the Government continues to work to eradicate 
it.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1995 People With Disabilities 
Discrimination Act outlaws discrimination against disabled persons in 
the provision of access to public facilities by employers of more than 
15 workers, service providers (apart from those providing education or 
running transport vehicles), and anyone selling or renting property. In 
addition all businesses are required to accommodate disabled customers. 
Adaptations must be ``reasonable,'' bearing in mind the circumstances 
and size of the business. The 1993 Education Act requires local 
education authorities to make provision for the special educational 
needs of disabled children.
    In April the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) was launched. The 
DRC provides a hot line for disabled people and employers, legal advice 
and support for individuals, and policy advice to the Government. The 
DRC also has the power to conduct formal investigations, arrange 
conciliation, require persons to adopt action plans to ensure 
compliance with law, and apply for injunctions to prevent acts of 
unlawful discrimination.
    Government regulations require that all new buildings meet the 
access requirements of all persons with impaired mobility and that all 
taxis be wheelchair accessible. In 1992 the Government promulgated 
similar regulations for sensory-impaired persons. However, while 
generally improved, access to many buildings, especially older 
buildings, including transportation centers, remains inadequate.
    Religious Minorities.--According to the NGO the Board of Deputies 
of British Jews, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Britain during 
the year was 398, compared with 270 in 1999 (adjusted figure). Public 
manifestations of anti-Semitism are confined largely to the political 
fringe, either far right or Islamist. In reaction to the October 
violence in the West Bank and Gaza, a number of synagogues were 
attacked by persons throwing bricks or other objects through the 
windows and anti-Semitic leaflets were posted in Manchester, 
Birmingham, and London. A Jewish man was stabbed in London in October 
in an apparent racist attack.
    Although there is some evidence that unemployment rates among 
Catholics remain higher than among Protestants in Northern Ireland, 
government programs and continued economic growth in the region have 
resulted in a decrease in the overall unemployment rate.
    The 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, as amended, aims 
to end even unintentional or indirect discrimination in the workplace, 
and a public tribunal adjudicates complaints. All public sector 
employers and all private firms with over 10 workers must report 
annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of 
their work force and must review their employment practices at least 
once every 3 years. Noncompliance can bring criminal penalties and the 
loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may 
sue for damages. Although critics of the act assert that its targets 
and timetables are too imprecise, most leaders of the Catholic 
community regard it as a positive step.
    While the active recruitment of Catholics by the Northern Ireland 
Civil Service produced rough proportionality in overall numbers, the 
service acknowledges that Catholics remain significantly 
underrepresented in its senior grades. Government efforts to increase 
the recruitment of Catholics into the police (currently 92 percent 
Protestant) and related security jobs in Northern Ireland have been 
hampered by widespread antipathy in the Catholic community to the 
security forces as well as by intimidation by republican organizations 
opposed to any cooperation with the police or security forces. Despite 
past efforts, the percentage of Catholic officers in the force has not 
changed significantly. The new policing bill mandates that a 50:50 
religious balance be maintained in new recruitment until the religious 
composition of the police reflects the mix in society at large. Critics 
of this approach contend that it will violate the UK's international 
commitments.
    The fear of intercommunal violence has, over the years, led to a 
pattern of segregated communities in Northern Ireland. Protestant and 
Catholic families have moved away from mixed or border neighborhoods.
    According to the RUC, there were 28 arson/bomb attacks and 3 other 
acts of violence directed at both Protestant and Catholic churches in 
Northern Ireland during the year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Despite legal prohibitions 
against race discrimination, persons of African and Afro-Caribbean, 
South Asian, or Middle Eastern origin and Travellers face occasional 
acts of societal violence and some discrimination. According to an 
official report in October, 21,700 racially related offenses were 
recorded in the 1999-2000 period. Incitement to racial hatred is a 
criminal offense punishable by a maximum of 2 years' imprisonment. The 
Government strictly enforces the laws and regulations in this area.
    In June David Copeland was convicted of a series of racially 
motivated bombings in London that killed three people (see Section 
1.a.). In November Robert Stewart, an inmate at the Felham young 
offender institution, was convicted of the March murder of his Asian 
cellmate, Zahid Mubarek. Prior to the commission of the murder, Stewart 
had been charged with racially motivated offenses, and had written a 
number of racist letters while in prison (see Section 1.c.).
    The government-appointed but independent Commission for Racial 
Equality provides guidelines on good practice, supports persons taking 
court action under the 1976 Race Relations Act, and may initiate its 
own court actions. After investigating a complaint, the CRE may issue a 
notice requiring that the discrimination be stopped. The CRE then 
monitors the response to its notice for 5 years.
    According to a February announcement by Scotland Yard, the number 
of black and Asian officers in the metropolitan police increased by 20 
percent since the release of the Lawrence Report. However, minority 
officers still represent only about 4 percent of the metropolitan 
police force. More than one-third of police forces did not increase 
minority recruitment, the rate of which is substantially below the 
level required to meet targets set by the Home Office.
    A series of reports in 1999 and 2000, both independent and 
commissioned by police, show that minorities are more likely to be 
stopped and searched by police than whites (see Section 1.c.).
    In March the Police Complaints Authority announced that it would 
conduct a new inquiry into the police handling of the death of Ricky 
Reel, a young Asian found drowned in the Thames River in 1997. His 
family believes that Reel was the victim of a racial attack and claim 
that police failed to investigate the crime properly.
    Travellers, nomadic populations consisting of Roma, Irish, and 
``new'' Travellers, estimated to number 100,000 persons, experience 
marginalization, educational discrimination, and police and societal 
harassment greater than that of the settled population, according to 
human rights groups. U.N. Committees on both the Rights of the Child 
and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have expressed similar 
concerns. In August 1997, the Government passed the Race Relations 
(Northern Ireland) Order, which for the first time gave specific legal 
protection to minority ethnic groups there, including the Traveller 
community. In January a study by Dundee University revealed 
institutionalized racism towards the Scottish Traveller community. In 
particular it showed that racist and intolerant attitudes among health 
professionals prevented Travellers from receiving proper medical care.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and 
join unions, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
1999 Employment Relations Act established the country's first 
procedures for statutory, as distinct from voluntary, union 
recognition. The Department of Trade and Industry began to promulgate 
implementing regulations during the summer of 2000. Additional 
regulations are being issued as they are completed. For example, 
beginning on September 4, 2000, workers are entitled to be accompanied 
at disciplinary and grievance hearings by a trade union 
representative--even if an employee's workplace is not unionized.
    Unions are free of government control. The Employment Relations Act 
affords significant new protection to union organizing efforts and, for 
the first time, confirms the statutory right to strike. The act sets 
minimum employment standards for the first time in labor law.
    Unions participate freely in international organizations. The 
general secretary of the International Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), the general secretary of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
workers' representative on the governing body of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) are all former British trade union leaders.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is longstanding and widespread, covering about 30 percent of 
the work force. Unionization is heaviest in the public sector. Under 
the Employment Relations Act, labor-management contracts are, for the 
first time, legally enforceable.
    Under the 1999 act, unions can file a request for recognition, 
identifying the proposed bargaining unit, to the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC). The act covers employers with more than 20 workers and 
encompasses an estimated two-thirds of all workplaces.
    Once the CAC determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it 
assesses whether a union is likely to have majority support. If union 
members already make up a majority of the bargaining unit, the CAC can 
issue a declaration that the union is recognized for collective 
bargaining without a ballot. In those instances where the CAC orders a 
ballot (typically, when the majority of bargaining unit employees are 
not already union members), the employer must cooperate by providing a 
list of names and giving the union access to the workplace to campaign. 
Unions win recognition when a majority of those voting agree, including 
at least 40 percent of those in the bargaining unit.
    Although the law encourages voluntary agreements between employers 
and unions, the CAC can, if necessary, impose a legally binding 
procedure for bargaining about pay, hours, and holidays. To date no 
union has filed a case before the CAC. This reflects the Trades Union 
Council's (TUC) explicit preference that its member unions should 
secure workplace agreements through negotiation rather than in the 
courts. The TUC acknowledged that the right to take a unionization 
dispute to the CAC has boosted its organizing efforts.
    Workers are protected against dismissal or other retaliation for 
campaigning or voting for or against recognition. Unions no longer are 
required to name members when initiating a strike ballot, to minimize 
opportunities for retaliation. The law also prohibits the compilation 
of lists of union members and labor activists for use by employers and 
employment agencies. This is aimed at ``blacklists,'' as operated in 
the past. Dismissed strikers are able to claim unfair dismissal if 
fired within 8 weeks of when they first undertook a legal strike.
    Union members are protected against ``being subject to any 
detriment'' due to union activity or membership. This protection goes 
further than the previous language of ``action short of dismissal taken 
against him as an individual.'' Heretofore, it was legal for employers 
to withhold fringe benefits otherwise available to nonunion employees.
    At the same time, the 1999 act retains key policies implemented by 
previous governments, notably ballots and notice before strikes, 
abolition of the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and prohibition 
against mass picketing.
    There are no export processing zones. The Employment Relations Act 
also extends its protection to contract and part-time workers in an 
attempt to close loopholes that previously allowed some employers to 
evade labor regulations. Foreign workers are protected to the full 
extent of the law.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited and is not 
practiced.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--School attendance until age 16 is compulsory. Children 
under age 16 are not permitted to work in an industrial enterprise 
except as part of an educational course. Forced and bonded child labor 
is prohibited, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition 
(see Section 6.c.). The UK ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor on March 23 and ILO Convention 138 on the minimum 
age for employment in June.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country's first minimum wage 
went into effect on April 1, 1999. As of October 1 the adult minimum 
wage was $5.50 (3.70). The youth wage was raised to $4.75 
(3.20) on June 1, 2000.
    When introduced in 1999, the new pay thresholds were expected to 
benefit some 1.5 million workers directly. However, according to 
government figures in October, nearly 300,000 workers still were paid 
less than the minimum wage a year after its introduction. Government 
departments aggressively are instructing employers that they must bring 
pay practices into compliance. The Board of Inland Revenue examined 
7,000 employers by October and had recovered $4 million (2.7 million 
pounds) on behalf of underpaid employees.
    Recognizing that the national minimum wage is a new institution, 
the Government asked the Low Pay Commission (incorporating academics, 
employers, and trade unions), created in 1998, to review the standard's 
implementation and make recommendations by July 2001.
    Currently the national minimum wage, by itself, does not provide a 
decent standard of living for most workers with families. But other 
elements of the welfare state fill the gap. Of nearly 28 million 
workers, some 6 million (21 percent) benefit from some social insurance 
scheme or another. This is in addition to free universal access to the 
National Health Service. The working families' tax credit and disabled 
person's tax credit--both implemented as of 1999--are designed to 
ensure a working family a weekly income of $320 (200 pounds), which 
constitutes a living wage.
    As of April, the Government also introduced a minimum income 
guarantee for low-income pensioners. This increases the basic state 
pension that all retired employees receive. And the Government also 
announced that, as of April 2001 the threshold of total personal assets 
will be raised to allow more low-income pensioners to avail themselves 
of this benefit.
    The Government introduced a working time directive in 1998 to bring 
domestic legislation into compliance with the European Union's 48-hour 
workweek. New 1999 legislation significantly raised the maximum 
compensation level for unfair dismissal claims from $19,200 to $80,000 
(12,000 to 50,000 pounds). Regulations from 1999 enhanced parental 
leave provisions for employees with more than a year's continuous 
service. The Human Rights Act, which came into force on October 2, 
2000, added additional rights in the workplace.
    The 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act stipulates that the health 
and safety of employees not be placed at risk. In practice the act is 
updated constantly. The Health and Safety Executive effectively 
enforces regulations on these matters and may initiate criminal 
proceedings in appropriate cases. Workers' representatives actively 
monitor enforcement of the act. Workers can remove themselves from 
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically criminalize 
trafficking in persons, which is a growing problem. A July Home Office 
report on reforming the law on sexual offences recommended the creation 
of a new crime of trafficking a person for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation. The police successfully prosecuted traffickers under 
other laws, such as those against procuring and living off of immoral 
earnings. Under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum act, persons found 
importing illegal immigrants can be fined $3,600 (2,000 pounds).
    A May Home Office report on trafficking in women estimated that up 
to 1,400 women were trafficked into the country in 1998. The report 
highlighted that police largely are unaware of the scale of the problem 
and do not treat it as a priority. The Government was considering the 
report's recommendations, which include the creation of a new crime 
category of ``sexual exploitation,'' allowing trafficked women to sue 
their exploiters, and a focus on prevention campaigns in host 
countries.
    On June 21, 58 ethnic Chinese suffocated in the back of a truck 
while attempting to enter the country illegally. Three persons were 
arrested and face trial in the UK in connection with the deaths.
                               __________

                               UZBEKISTAN

    Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The 
Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of 
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In 
practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch 
that serves him dominate political life. First chosen president in a 
1991 election that most observers considered neither free nor fair, 
Karimov had his stay in office extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite. 
Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's 
first term, thus making him eligible to run again in 2000. He was 
elected to a second term in January against token opposition with 92.5 
percent of the vote under conditions that were neither free nor fair. 
The Oliy Majlis (Parliament) consists almost entirely of regional 
officials appointed by the President and members of parties that 
support the President. Despite constitutional provisions for an 
independent judiciary, the executive branch heavily influences the 
courts in both civil and criminal cases.
    There is effective civilian control over the military. The Ministry 
of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces 
are responsible for most normal police functions. The National Security 
Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national 
security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and 
narcotics. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human 
rights abuses.
    The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual 
transition to a free market economy. However, continuing restrictions 
on currency convertibility and other government measures to control 
economic activity have constrained economic growth and led 
international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits. 
The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural 
processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It 
is also a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of 
copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government has made some 
progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government 
statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There 
are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be 
high and growing. The Government is taking some modest steps to reduce 
the host of formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent 
private sector.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the 
Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses. However, there 
were positive human rights developments in a few areas. Citizens cannot 
exercise their right to change their government peacefully. The 
Government has not permitted the existence of an opposition party since 
1993. Election and registration laws restrict the possibility that any 
real opposition parties form or mount a campaign. There were credible 
reports that security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of 
several citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces tortured, beat, and 
harassed persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained 
pious Muslims and other citizens on false charges, frequently planting 
narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on them. Prison conditions 
are poor, and detention can be prolonged. The judiciary does not always 
ensure due process and often defers to the wishes of the executive 
branch. Parliament passed a law on judicial reform that was awaiting 
presidential approval at year's end. The Government also demonstrated a 
commitment to permitting International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC) access to detained persons and prisoners. Police and NSS forces 
infringed on citizens' privacy, including the use of illegal searches 
and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented abuses rarely are 
punished.
    The crackdown that followed the explosion of five terrorist bombs 
in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, continued during 2000. Among those 
arrested and tried were persons with close links to avowed Islamist 
Uzbeks abroad who, the Government believes, were responsible for the 
bombings. However, other victims of the crackdown included members of 
the secular opposition, human rights activists, and thousands of 
overtly pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups. While 
it is not possible to estimate the number of those arrested, observers 
believe that the scale surpasses any previous such action. The Moscow-
based human rights group Memorial has documented over 1,400 cases of 
persons imprisoned between January 1999 and April 2000. The 
organization credibly estimates that the total number arrested and 
tried in that time frame was between 4,000 and 5,000. By year's end, 
well over 5,000 persons were in prison as a result of the crackdown.
    The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and the press, 
and an atmosphere of repression stifles public criticism of the 
Government. Although the Constitution expressly prohibits it, press 
censorship continues, and the Government sharply restricts citizens' 
access to foreign media. A 1999 decree requires all Internet service 
providers to route their connections through a government server. The 
primary purpose of this measure, according to the Government, is to 
prevent access to information that the Government considers harmful. 
Despite the law, private Internet providers have proliferated during 
the year.
    The Government limits freedom of assembly and association. The 
Government continues to ban unauthorized public meetings and 
demonstrations. The Government has not yet implemented a 1999 law that 
improves the formal legal framework for the formation, registration, 
and operation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The Government 
continues to deny registration to opposition political parties as well 
as to other groups that might be critical of the Government. For 
example, the Ministry of Justice has denied repeated applications for 
registration of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and the 
Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), citing 
technical deficiencies in the applications. Unregistered opposition 
parties and movements may not operate freely or publish their views. 
The Government restricts freedom of religion. The Government harassed 
and arrested hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable 
grounds, citing the threat of extremism. The Government tolerates the 
existence of minority religions but places strict limits on religious 
activities. Although the Government had registered over 174 minority 
religious communities by year's end, several others were prevented from 
registering by local officials. Unlike in 1999, university authorities 
did not expel students for wearing Islamic dress during the year.
    The Government continues to voice rhetorical support for human 
rights, but does not ensure these rights in practice. Although the 
election, religion, and media laws contain elements that theoretically 
support human rights, in reality the Government does not respect such 
provisions. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which was formed 
in 1997, reports that it is assisting hundreds of citizens in 
redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly 
unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. The 
Ombudsman's office issued reports identifying the most serious types of 
violations of human rights by government officials; however, most of 
the successfully resolved cases were relatively minor. The Government 
pardoned and released imprisoned human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova 
at year's end.
    Domestic violence against women is a problem, and despite a 
constitutional prohibition, there continues to be significant 
traditional, societal discrimination against women. The Government 
undertook cooperation with women's NGO's. Trafficking in women and 
girls for the purposes of prostitution occurs. Workplace discrimination 
against some minorities persists. There are some limits on worker 
rights.
    Beginning in August, insurgents from the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) conducted significant armed incursions in Uzbekistan 
and neighboring states. Over two dozen members of the Uzbek police and 
armed forces were killed in the conflict as were at least 30 
insurgents. During the conflict, the Government ordered the evacuation 
of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the border with 
Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp, the villagers 
were transferred in November to a newly constructed settlement more 
than 200 kilometers away, where they complained to international 
observers of poor conditions and abusive treatment.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces 
committed killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths 
of several prisoners in custody. According to human rights activists 
and other observers, many of those killed in custody were interned at a 
new prison near Jaslik in Karakalpakstan, where conditions were thought 
to be extremely harsh. Nearly all the inmates of this facility, which 
opened in the spring of 1999, were accused of religious extremism. 
Although there is specific information available on only a handful of 
deaths due to mistreatment in custody, human rights observers and 
relatives of prisoners claim that the number of such cases throughout 
the country during the year reached several dozen. Law enforcement 
officials warned families not to talk about their relatives' deaths. 
Government officials acknowledge that some inmates of Jaslik died, but 
attribute the deaths to illness and the extremely hot climate rather 
than mistreatment.
    The country's regulations require that every death in custody be 
investigated by a medical examiner. In most cases, deaths apparently 
due to beating are ascribed to heart failure. However, in June Batirjon 
Karimov, a guard at a prison in Almalyk, was convicted and sentenced to 
6 years in prison for beating a prisoner to death. The court convicted 
Karimov of Articles 103 and 104 of the Criminal Code: Driving someone 
to suicide and intentionally causing severe bodily harm, respectively. 
The victim, Akmal Latipov, who had just been brought to the prison, 
allegedly slashed his wrist with a razor when Karimov began to beat 
him, in order to escape the beating. A forensic medical examination 
established the cause of Latipov's death to be blows to the head 
inflicted by Karimov.
    According to the World Organization Against Torture, Rustam 
Norbaev, a possible member of the political Islamic movement Hizb ut-
Tahrir, was arrested on March 13 and died in pretrial detention in 
Yakkabaga on March 18, allegedly after being tortured. Officials 
claimed that Norbaev hanged himself.
    Negmat Karimov, who was sentenced in July 1999 to 20 years in 
prison for alleged involvement in the terrorist conspiracy behind the 
1999 Tashkent bombings, died in prison in Navoi on March 22. According 
to his parents, his body showed multiple signs of beating. Karimov also 
was convicted on charges related to religious extremism.
    In late December, Amanullah Nosirov, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
convicted in 1999, died in prison in Navoi. According to acquaintances 
of the deceased, he died of injuries sustained while being beaten. 
Nosirov was the brother of Haffezullah Nosirov, an alleged leader of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir who was convicted in March (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    Hazratkul Kodirov, a former resident of a village near the Tajik 
border that had been evacuated during clashes with the IMU, died near 
the end of December, allegedly from injuries sustained during police 
interrogation (see Section 2.d.). (According to other residents of the 
village, police used beatings to force up to 39 men to confess to 
collaborating with the IMU.) Kodirov's brother alleged that the body 
bore 50 small holes and that the genital area was ``destroyed.'' 
Hazratkul had given an interview to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) in November deploring conditions in the resettlement 
camp.
    Shukhrat Parpiev, who was sentenced in December 1998 to 15 years in 
prison, died in the Jaslik prison on May 5. According to an 
acquaintance, Parpiev was not religious, but had been arrested because 
he was seen with a known religious figure suspected of extremism. 
Parpiev's body allegedly was bruised badly, and had a broken clavicle, 
crushed skull, and broken ribs.
    In an open letter to the President, 33 Tashkent residents protested 
the military hazing death on June 13 of Dmitriy Popov, a recruit who 
suffered from heart problems. Popov was allegedly beaten by senior 
soldiers on June 7. The HRSU commented that such deaths were not 
uncommon in the military. At year's end, military prosecutors were 
planning on bringing a criminal case against five soldiers who 
allegedly participated in the beating.
    There were no reported politically motivated killings by the 
insurgent IMU, although there were casualties on both sides of the 
conflict. During and after the armed incursions of August and 
September, Uzbek military forces laid mines on the border with 
Tajikistan. Press reports indicate that such mines have killed at least 
13 Tajik civilians. The Ministry of Defense asserts that all minefields 
are clearly marked and that it has informed the Tajik Government of 
their locations in accordance with international norms.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of politically 
motivated disappearances.
    It is widely believed that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, missing since 
March 1998, fled the country to avoid arrest and was not abducted by 
security forces. There were no reported developments in the 1995 
disappearance of Imam Abduvali Mirzaev or in the 1997 disappearance of 
his assistant, Nematjon Parpiev. Most independent observers believe 
that the two missing Islamic activists are either dead or in NSS 
custody.
    There was one report of a person who has disappeared after being 
taken into custody. Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at the 
Alliance Francaise, was apprehended by plainclothes officers in front 
of witnesses on July 17. Authorities have not yet acknowledged that he 
is being held (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the law prohibits these practices, both police 
and NSS routinely beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain 
confessions, which they then used to incriminate the detainees. Both 
the frequency of allegations of torture and the alleged severity of the 
treatment increased during the reporting period.
    In December Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a major report on 
torture in Uzbekistan that details dozens of allegations based on 
interviews with victims and their families. The report claimed that the 
number of allegations and the degree of brutality of torture were 
increasing. The most common torture techniques are beating, often with 
blunt weapons, and asphyxiation with a gas mask. There were numerous 
unverifiable reports of interrogators raping detainees with objects 
such as bottles, and of threatening to rape both detainees and their 
family members.
    Although it is routine for police to beat confessions out of 
detainees, anecdotal evidence suggests that those suspected (sometimes 
only because of their piety) of Islamist political sympathies are 
treated more harshly than criminals.
    According to his family, noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, who 
claimed that he and five other defendants were tortured during 5 months 
of detention prior to his August 1999 trial, continued to suffer 
mistreatment in prison. Family visits to him in Jaslik prison in May 
and June revealed that his fingernails had been pulled out and that he 
was in generally very poor health. On July 4, the Interior Ministry 
said that Makhmudov's health was satisfactory and that he did not 
request medical treatment. In December acquaintances reported that 
Makhmudov nonetheless had been transferred to a hospital prison.
    In a trial concluded in the Akmol Ikramov regional court in 
Tashkent on September 6, 15 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir all alleged that 
they had been tortured during pretrial detention. According to those 
attending the trial (international monitors were barred from the 
courtroom), the defendants alleged that guards and interrogators had 
used beatings and electricity, and had forced them to sign blank 
statements. Several alleged that guards had raped them. The defendants 
were sentenced to between 12 and 16 years each.
    Prison conditions are poor, and worse for male than for female 
prisoners. Males and females are housed in separate facilities. Prison 
overcrowding is a problem. Human rights activists reported that the 
incarceration of 10 to 15 persons in cells designed for 4 is common. 
Tuberculosis and hepatitis are endemic in the prisons, making even 
short periods of incarceration potentially deadly. Reportedly there are 
severe shortages of food and medicines, and prisoners often rely on 
visits by relatives to obtain both. Brutal treatment by guards and an 
especially harsh and polluted desert environment were said to make 
conditions at Jaslik prison the worst in the country. By year's end, 
however, human rights observers had learned from witnesses that 
conditions in Jaslik had improved substantially. According to the 
Committee for the Legal Assistance of Prisoners, there are between 500 
and 800 total inmates at Jaslik. Although the law allows all prisoners 
to have occasional family visitors, the remoteness of Jaslik makes such 
visits rare and difficult. Most of the prisoners transferred to Jaslik 
were convicted for their alleged participation in unauthorized Islamic 
groups. The Government operates labor camps, where conditions of 
incarceration have been reported to be less severe than in prisons.
    An amnesty signed by the President on the occasion of the September 
1 Independence Day, may affect up to 25,000 of the country's 63,000 
prisoners, according to government press releases. The amnesty does not 
apply to those convicted of political crimes. While there was no 
official report on the number of prisoners actually released, human 
rights activists estimate it to be around 10,000.
    The Government in December decided it would permit prison visits by 
human rights monitors such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces 
continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrant 
or just cause. A Soviet-era detention law provides that police may hold 
a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end 
of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a 
suspect, charged with a crime, or released. A person officially 
declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges 
are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests, but not for 
detentions, prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal 
protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent 
the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential 
witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the 
length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set 
within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may 
be detained during this period. A defendant may not have access to 
counsel while in detention but only after the first interview with an 
investigator. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be 
violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No 
money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually 
must sign a pledge not to leave the city. In practice this procedure 
rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants 
are almost always kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to 
last as long as 2 years.
    In the March trial in Guliston of Hizb ut-Tahrir activist 
Haffezullah Nosirov and 11 others, the defendants were tried on average 
6 months after arrest. Many claimed that authorities used the interim 
period to torture them into signing confessions. The trial marked the 
first time since June 1999 that international observers were permitted 
to attend a trial of accused religious extremists.
    In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally are capable of 
identifying and arresting only those reasonably suspected of the crime. 
However, both the police and NSS are far less discriminating in cases 
involving perceived risks to national security. Prosecutors have 
brought charges against at least 140 persons in connection with the 
bombings, including at least 12 in during this year. All those tried 
have been convicted. Twenty of these were sentenced to death, with most 
reportedly already executed. Hundreds of other defendants have also 
been convicted of terrorism, most allegedly linked to those convicted 
of the bombings or other actions attributed to the IMU.
    It is common government practice to violate the human rights of 
both immediate and extended family members of those the Government has 
targeted. For example, Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at 
the Alliance Francaise, was detained and held incommunicado in the 
basement of the Ministry of the Interior on July 17. This is the fourth 
time that authorities have detained Khasanov. The security services' 
interest in Khasanov apparently stems from the fact that many in the 
Khasanov family are pious Muslims, although Bakhodir himself has 
claimed that he is not especially religious. Bakhodir's father and 
brother are both currently imprisoned. His brother Ismail was convicted 
in August 1999 for alleged links to Islamic extremists and was retried 
on additional charges of being involved in events in Yangiabad, 
although those events took place while he was in prison. In November 
1999, police arrested Khasanov's 70-year-old father after planting Hizb 
ut-Tahrir leaflets on him. He signed a confession after police forced 
him to watch them beating his son Ismail, and is now serving 3 years in 
prison.
    Kamoletdin Sattarov of Andijon was convicted of anti-State activity 
in July after police allegedly planted two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets on 
him. His brother Muradjon was jailed in 1999 for membership in Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Kamoletdin has admitted that Muradjon had gotten involved with 
the group but denied that he shared his brother's political or 
religious passions. Investigators in Kamoletdin's case found individual 
appeal forms of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in his home 
and used them as evidence against him (see Section 4).
    All male members of the family of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov 
remain in jail, and allegedly are beaten periodically by interrogators 
trying to learn Nazarov's whereabouts. Similarly, three brothers of 
exiled democratic opposition leader Mohammed Solikh are imprisoned 
because of their family ties (see Sections 1.c. and 3).
    Family members of missing Andijon Imam Abdu Kori Mirzaev reported 
that they were harassed and kept under constant surveillance.
    According to NGO reporting, Uzbek Imam Khadji Khudjaev was arrested 
by Russian police in August, apparently at the request of the Uzbek 
Government, and was extradited to Uzbekistan in November to face 
charges of involvement in the February 1999 Tashkent bombings.
    Police in Nukus allegedly planted drugs on a Baptist pastor in 
July, and held him without charge until his release in late September 
(see Section 2.b.).
    Police routinely planted small amounts of narcotics, weapons, 
ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest 
or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this illegal practice 
have been suspected members of nonofficial Islamic organizations such 
as Hizb ut-Tahrir. They usually were sentenced to between 15 and 20 
years in prison. The total number of those either tried and convicted 
or still in pretrial detention is unknown, but human rights activists 
contend that there are well over 1,000 and perhaps several thousand. 
Many of those in detention are political detainees.
    In December the Parliament passed judicial reform legislation, 
which, according to an international NGO that reviewed the laws, 
mandates notable, if incremental improvements. The reforms included 
modifications to the criminal justice system to make it adversarial and 
reduce the power of the procuracy, improvements in the appeals process 
to ensure greater access to the courts, and increases in the 
independence of the courts from the executive branch of government.
    In general, the Government does not hold political detainees 
indefinitely, but brings them to trial eventually. Because there is no 
free press or public record of arrests, it is not possible to determine 
the number of detainees awaiting trial. Estimates by human rights 
activists are usually in the range of several thousand.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judicial authority; however, the judicial branch takes its 
direction from the executive branch and has little independence in 
practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for 
5-year terms. They may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill 
their obligations. Power to remove judges rests with the President, 
except for Supreme Court judges, whose removal also must be confirmed 
by Parliament.
    The system of courts of general jurisdiction is divided into three 
tiers: District courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In 
addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws, 
decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the 
Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters 
that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts on 
the regional level that deals with economic cases between judicial and 
legal entities.
    Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction 
may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The 
Criminal Code has reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to 
murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes that 
were punishable by death in the former Soviet code. Officially, most 
court cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional 
cases, such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young 
defendants. However, except for the first trial in June 1999, all 
trials of those suspected of involvement in the February 16 terrorist 
bombings were closed to international observers and the public on 
security grounds. In similar fashion, many trials of alleged Islamic 
extremists have been closed. International trial monitors or foreign 
diplomats only rarely are permitted to observe court proceedings.
    State prosecutors play a decisive role in the criminal justice 
system. They order arrests, direct investigations, prepare criminal 
cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence does not agree 
with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has a right to 
appeal the sentence to a higher court. There is no protection against 
double jeopardy. Judges whose decisions have been overturned on more 
than one occasion may be removed from office. Consequently, judges 
rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As a result, defendants 
usually are found guilty.
    The Government still uses the Soviet practice of trial by a panel 
of three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve 
5-year terms and are selected from workers' collectives. The judge 
presides and directs the proceedings. However, in practice, judges 
often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other 
matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront 
witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides legal counsel 
without charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an 
attorney. In practice the right to an attorney often is violated and 
there are numerous examples of denial of this right.
    In a March trial of 48 alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Termez, 
the judge allegedly appointed the police investigator who developed the 
prosecution's case as the defense attorney for six of the defendants. 
Police allegedly tortured detained Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashhev on at 
least two occasions in August and September, to force him to sign 
statements refusing the services of defense attorneys.
    The Government typically held unannounced trials of large groups of 
those alleged to be extremists, and rarely let international observers 
attend. Human rights observers contended that these groupings of 
defendants were arbitrary, since the prosecution only occasionally 
argued that those on trial actually were connected to one another. 
Defendants often claimed that the confessions on which the prosecution 
typically based its cases were extracted by torture. Judges ignored 
these claims and invariably convicted the accused, handing down severe 
sentences--usually from 15 to 20 years' imprisonment. Torture and 
mistreatment of detainees are explicitly outlawed. Lawyers may, and 
occasionally do, call on judges to reject confessions thus extracted 
and to investigate claims of such treatment. There has been no report 
of a judge opening an investigation into claims of torture.
    In one such trial that ended on April 14 in Tashkent, 12 defendants 
were convicted of anti-State activity, belonging to illegal groups, and 
other charges. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years, and 
eight more to 17 years. One defendant, Abdulaziz Mavlianov, an employee 
of the Tashkent office of the ICRC, allegedly confessed only to having 
given about $15 (10,000 soum) and some publicly available information 
to the main defendant, alleged Islamist activist Toirjon Abdusamatov. 
At his trial, Mavlianov renounced that confession, which he had never 
signed. Despite the relatively innocuous nature of the alleged 
activities that led to his conviction, he was sentenced to 17 years in 
prison.
    In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their 
clients. Courts often do not allow all defense witnesses to be heard, 
and written documents are given more weight than courtroom witnesses. 
In the March trial of Haffezullah Nosirov and 10 other alleged members 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir, defendants were convicted in part on the basis of 
written testimony from Bakhrom Abdullaev, an alleged terrorist who 
reportedly had been executed in January. Furthermore, the judge in the 
case refused the defense's request to question the other (living) 
witnesses whose written statements formed the remainder of the 
prosecution's case. In his retrial, Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years 
in prison, which was 1 year more than his original sentence.
    In November the Government staged a trial of 12 alleged 
conspirators in the 1999 Tashkent bombings, 9 of whom were being tried 
in absentia. Since the court made no formal effort to notify the 
defendants directly of the charges against them, the proceedings 
violated the International Convention on Civil and Political rights. 
Although the State appointed lawyers for the missing defendants, they 
put up only a token defense, lasting less than 3 hours after a 2-week 
prosecution case. Several of the lawyers stated openly that they were 
unable to defend their clients because they had no opportunity to 
consult with them. Two of the absent defendants, IMU leaders Tohir 
Yuldashev and Jumaboy Khojiev (a.k.a. Juma Namangani), were sentenced 
to death. Other defendants received sentences of between 12 and 20 
years in prison.
    The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted; 
however, such proceedings usually are formalistic exercises that 
confirm the original conviction. For example, the appeal of Imam 
Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov on August 8 lasted only 20 minutes, and the 
judge did not permit testimony. Abdurakhmanov, who had been sentenced 
to 17 years in prison and reportedly was subjected to torture prior to 
trial, was not allowed to be present at the appeal. However, a judge in 
the Andijon regional court, after hearing an appeal in August, ordered 
a retrial of Kamoletdin Sattarov, on the grounds that he was not 
represented properly at the original trial earlier that month.
    Authorities arrested and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and 
members of opposition groups (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    In April the Moscow-based human rights organization Memorial 
published a list of over 1,400 individuals arrested and convicted for 
political and religious reasons from January 1999 to April 2000 (see 
Section 2.c.). The organization credibly estimates that, including 
those it can document, a total of between 4,000 and 5,000 such persons 
have been imprisoned. While most were convicted of conspiracy against 
the constitutional order, many were convicted of nonpolitical offenses 
such as tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, or illegal possession 
of narcotics or firearms. It is widely believed that in the latter 
cases, arresting officers planted the incriminating materials.
    On September 5, the Chairman of the Supreme Court claimed that 
there were 2,000 persons in jail for crimes against the State. At the 
same news conference and again the following day, the Minister of 
Justice explicitly rejected the notion that these or any other 
prisoners could be classified as ``political,'' on the grounds that all 
had been tried and convicted of crimes. However, the fact that nearly 
all convictions are based on forced confessions makes it impossible to 
determine what percentage of those convicted actually violated the law. 
Moreover, the alleged ``crimes,'' as interpreted by the courts, 
encompass criticism of the Government and possession of religious 
beliefs that the Government defines as extremist. Therefore, most of 
those convicted of crimes against the State are political prisoners.
    In December the Government proposed a draft agreement with the ICRC 
allowing the ICRC access to all prisoners. The draft agreement was 
modeled after the ICRC's own proposals and met all ICRC conditions for 
undertaking a program of prison visits.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities infringe on these rights. By law only a 
prosecutor may issue a search warrant or authorize electronic 
surveillance. There is no provision for a judicial review of such 
warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and 
employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in 
opposition political activities.
    A Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and 
other legislation (see Section 2.c.) prohibits private teaching of 
religion. Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for 
wearing religious dress were not allowed to reenroll in 2000 (see 
Section 2.c.). Unlike in 1999, students were not arrested for wearing 
religious dress during this year.
    Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects that 
they were seeking (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). Authorities also 
frequently forced relatives of alleged religious extremists to undergo 
public humiliation at neighborhood assemblies organized for that 
purpose. For example, the mother of IMU leader Juma Namangani was 
summoned to a school auditorium in late August where an assembly of 
neighbors confronted her. Relatives of soldiers killed in the 
insurgency insulted her and smeared her face with black paint. Local 
leaders shamed her for bringing Namangani into the world until she 
tearfully apologized and cursed her son.
    Both the wife and mother of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov were 
forced to undergo similar public humiliation in February and March.
    The Government does not allow general distribution of foreign 
newspapers and other publications. However, two or three Russian 
newspapers and a variety of Russian tabloids and lifestyle publications 
are available. A modest selection of other foreign periodicals is 
available in Tashkent's major hotels, and authorized groups can obtain 
foreign periodicals through subscription. The authorities do not permit 
rebroadcast of Russian programming that is critical of the Government 
(see Section 2.a.).
    In May postal authorities confiscated a package addressed to human 
rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov. The package contained documents from 
a Moscow human rights conference as well as copies of the Erk Party 
newspaper. In the notice sent to Ardzinov, authorities claimed that the 
material was confiscated on the basis of a statute prohibiting the 
mailing of items of artistic or cultural significance.
    In March police confiscated six copies of the Uzbekistan chapter of 
the 1999 HRW World Report from a HRW representative who was observing 
the trial of the 12 men on trial for membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir (see 
Section 1.d.). According to an international NGO, the presiding judge 
at the trial characterized the distribution of the report as the 
clandestine distribution of leaflets. In November customs authorities 
confiscated several copies of the journal of the unregistered Birlik 
Democratic Movement that had been mailed to a private citizen. Customs 
claimed that the material was illegal and anticonstitutional. In the 
same month, Customs opened mail sent from HRW's New York office to its 
Tashkent office and confiscated several copies of a published list of 
political and religious prisoners in Uzbekistan compiled by the Moscow-
based human rights organization Memorial. In explaining the 
confiscation, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told 
HRW that it took issue with the content of the Memorial report.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
``freedom of thought, speech, and convictions''; however the Government 
continues to restrict these rights severely.
    A 1991 law against ``offending the honor and dignity of the 
President'' limits the ability to criticize the President. Ordinary 
citizens remain afraid to express views critical of the President and 
the Government in public. The 1998 Mass Media law formally provides for 
freedom of expression, protects the rights of journalists, and 
reiterates the constitutional ban on censorship. Nonetheless, several 
articles of the law, and the lack of due process provided for in their 
implementation, allow the Government to use the law to silence critics. 
The law established an interdepartmental government commission which 
issues licenses to approved media outlets. In May a new law changed the 
term of validity of these licenses from 1 year to 5 years, a move 
welcomed by those in the media. The interdepartmental commission is 
empowered to revoke licenses and close media outlets without a court 
judgment.
    According to the Mass Media Law, journalists are responsible for 
the accuracy of the information contained in their news stories, 
potentially subjecting them to prosecution. The law prohibits stories 
that incite religious confrontation and ethnic discord or advocate 
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order (see Section 2.b.).
    The Constitution prohibits censorship; however, it is widely 
practiced and the Government tolerates little, if any, criticism of its 
actions. The last opposition newspaper to be published was that of the 
Erk Democratic Party, which has been banned within the country since 
1993 but is published sporadically abroad.
    There are no private publishing houses, and government approval is 
required for all publications. Newspapers are generally printed by 
state-owned printing houses, which refuse to print any edition that 
does not bear the prior approval of the Committee for the Protection of 
State Secrets. In these circumstances, journalists who want to ensure 
that their work is published practice self-censorship.
    In April authorities closed an independent Urgench newspaper, 
Panorama (circulation 500). Panorama's publisher, Konstantin Aksianov, 
had purchased his own presses and thus was able to produce and 
distribute the newspaper without censorship by the Committee for the 
Protection of State Secrets. However, private printing presses require 
licenses and in April, the State Press Committee, without explanation, 
revoked Panorama's license to print and warned other printers not to 
print the newspaper.
    Information remains very tightly controlled. The Uzbekistan 
Information Agency cooperates closely with the presidential staff to 
prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned news and information. 
Nearly all newspapers are organs of government ministries. Private 
persons and journalist collectives may not establish newspapers unless 
they meet the media law's standards for establishment of a ``mass media 
organ,'' including founders acceptable to the Government. A handful of 
private newspapers containing advertising, horoscopes, and similar 
features, but no news or editorial content, are allowed to operate 
without censorship. Limited numbers of foreign periodicals are 
available (see Section 1.f.).
    Four state-run channels that fully support the Government and its 
policies dominate television broadcasting. A cable television joint 
venture between the state broadcasting company and a foreign company 
broadcasts the Hong Kong-based Star television channels, including the 
BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Cable News Network world news, to Tashkent and 
a few other locations. Access to cable television is beyond the 
financial means of most citizens.
    There are between 30 and 40 privately owned local television 
stations and 3 privately owned radio stations. Generally, broadcasters 
practice self-censorship and enjoy some leeway in reporting critically 
on local government.
    The interdepartmental commission closed two television stations in 
1999. One of them was allowed to reopen in 2000. Officials claimed that 
the stations did not meet technical requirements for relicensing and 
that there was no political element to the closings. Foreign observers 
noted that the two were among the most independent in the country and 
interpreted the closings as a warning to other broadcasters to be 
careful of their content. Shukhrat Babajanov, the owner of ALC, a 
station in Urgench that has been prohibited from reopening, 
unsuccessfully sued the Government in February for damages resulting 
from the station's closing. He appealed and lost again in March. ALC 
had also lost its registration temporarily in 1997, allegedly for 
technical violations of regulations. It was believed widely at the time 
that the real reason for the 1997 closure was that the owner had been a 
member of the Erk political party in the early 1990s. Babajanov and his 
former employees were subjected to harassment and veiled threats by 
police during the summer.
    As these cases illustrate, enforcement of the registration and 
licensing requirements can be strict, and the Government's 
implementation of the media law does not function smoothly. Because the 
registration committee meets irregularly and because the annual re-
registration requirement has only recently been revised, up to one half 
of independent television stations have been forced to operate with 
expired licenses, making them vulnerable to a government shut down. 
During the 1999 election season, owners reportedly believed that the 
Government was intentionally delaying re-registration in order to 
ensure that the stations broadcast nothing unfavorable. However, in 
2000 most owners reported that tensions between them and the Government 
eased substantially.
    Private radio and television broadcasters formed an independent 
professional association in 1998. The association resisted both 
generous incentives and heavy pressure from the Government to elect the 
Government's candidate as chairman. Government officials openly 
threatened members of the group and the opposition candidate who was 
elected. Since that time, the Government has arbitrarily denied the 
group's registration application on seven occasions, three during the 
last year. In one unsuccessful effort to win registration, the 
association even changed its name from ANESMI to MEDIA. Ministry of 
Justice officials reportedly advised the group privately that it never 
would be registered. The lack of registration effectively restricts 
MEDIA's ability to attract international funding and operate legally.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America are not 
permitted to broadcast from within the country, despite the 
Government's 1992 contractual agreement to allow this activity. The 
Government allows both organizations to have correspondents in the 
country. The BBC World Service was required to broadcast on a very low 
FM frequency that most radios would not be able to receive, and then 
only after the BBC had agreed on paper to restrictions amounting to 
self-censorship. (However, observes agree that there is no evidence 
that the BBC actually engages in self-censorship.) The World Service is 
permitted to broadcast only 2 hours per day: Two 30-minute broadcasts 
per day in Uzbek, and two 30-minute broadcasts per day in Russian, 7 
days a week.
    Since February 1999, all Internet service providers have been 
required to route their connections through a state-run server. The 
avowed main purpose of this directive was to prevent the transmission 
of what the State considers to be harmful information, including 
material advocating or facilitating terrorism, material deemed hostile 
to the constitutional order, and pornography. By year's end, the 
Government had re-routed all but one provider, but did not yet possess 
the equipment and expertise necessary to complete implementation of the 
decree. The Government has issued regulations and taken technical steps 
to filter access to content that it considers objectionable. Despite 
these restrictions, the availability of Internet access has expanded as 
the number of service providers and Internet cafes have grown.
    The Government has granted academic institutions a degree of 
autonomy, but freedom of expression still is limited.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, it also states 
that the authorities have the right to suspend or ban rallies, 
meetings, and demonstrations on security grounds, and in practice the 
Government restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The Government 
must approve demonstrations but does not grant permits to demonstrators 
routinely. In November 1999, a group of 30 to 40 veiled Muslim women 
gathered in front of the office of the Tashkent hokim (local governor) 
to protest the incarceration of their relatives. The police ordered 
them to disperse after refusing their request to meet with the hokim. 
Some members of the group report that they have been under intermittent 
surveillance since that time. In August shopkeepers at a Tashkent 
bazaar spontaneously took to the streets to protest a rise in rental 
fees set by the Government. Police responded to contain the crowd, but 
no violence was reported.
    The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association; 
however the Government restricts the exercise of this right. The 
Government refuses to register opposition political parties and 
movements. The Constitution places broad limitations on the types of 
groups that may form and requires that all organizations be registered 
formally with the Government in accordance with procedures prescribed 
by law. A 1996 analysis by foreign legal observers concluded that, 
while the Law on Political Parties provides theoretical protections for 
minority parties and permits a wide range of fund raising, it also 
gives the Ministry of Justice broad powers to interfere with parties 
and to withhold financial and legal support to those opposed to the 
Government. There are no registered opposition parties (see Section 3).
    In the early 1990's, the Government repeatedly denied the attempts 
by the Birlik Movement and Erk Party to register. Harassment by 
security forces drove the leaders of these organizations into voluntary 
exile. These organizations made no attempt to register during the year, 
reportedly because their remaining adherents were afraid of government 
reprisals.
    The Constitution and a 1991 amendment to the law on political 
parties ban parties of an ethnic or religious nature. Authorities cited 
these statutes in denying registration to the Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) in 1992. In the early 1990's, opposition activists announced the 
formation of the religious Adolat-True Path Party but never pursued 
formal registration, claiming that their members were afraid of 
government reprisals. Leaders and members of these parties, denied a 
voice in the political process and forced to flee repression, now form 
the core of the IMU, which launched an armed insurgency in Uzbekistan 
and neighboring countries during the year.
    The Law on Public Associations as well as the Law on Political 
Parties prohibits registration of organizations whose purpose includes 
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order, as well as 
organizations whose names already are registered. In the past, 
officials have used the latter provision to block human rights NGO's 
and independent political parties from registering by creating another 
NGO or party with the identical name.
    The Government has refused to register the two principal 
independent human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society of 
Uzbekistan sought registration unsuccessfully four times between 1992 
and 1996. During the year, authorities refused to approve a visa to 
permit the HRSU's leader-in-exile to return to the country and to 
preside over a new founding convention, the required first step for a 
new registration application. In April authorities refused permission 
for the HRSU to host an international human rights conference in 
Tashkent (see Section 4).
    The Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), 
headed by longtime human rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, held its 
founding convention and filed registration papers in 1997, but the 
Government has not yet formally approved or denied the application. In 
both cases, the Government claims that the registration applications 
were not made properly and need to be resubmitted. Neither the HRSU nor 
the IHROU resubmitted applications during the year; there was no 
indication that they would be registered. The Government's repeated 
refusals to register these organizations appear politically motivated. 
The Government has approved the registration of only one human rights 
NGO, the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights, which was 
formed with government support in 1996.
    The process for government registration of NGO's and other public 
associations is also difficult and time-consuming, with many 
opportunities for obstruction. Although unregistered organizations 
often can disseminate literature, hold meetings, and use letterhead 
stationery without government interference, they do not exist as legal 
entities and have no real access to the media or government.
    A law on nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations passed in 
April 1999 provides a relatively benign legal framework for their 
registration and functioning. In particular the requirements for 
registration are simpler than they had been under previous legislation. 
However, the law contains several vaguely worded provisions that, in 
practice, may result in arbitrary enforcement of decisions harmful to 
NGO's. The real effect of the law depends on the implementing 
regulations, which had not yet been promulgated more than 1.5 years 
after passage of the law.
    Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually may 
register, although complicated rules and a cumbersome government 
bureaucracy often make the process difficult. Some evangelical 
Christian churches (see Section 2.c.) found it difficult to obtain 
registration.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and for the principle of separation of church and state; 
however, in practice the Government only partially respects these 
rights. The Government perceives unofficial Islamic activity as an 
extremist security threat and outlaws it. During the year, the 
Government arrested hundreds if not thousands of members of such groups 
and sentenced them to between 15 and 20 years in jail. The Government 
permits persons affiliated with mainstream religions, including 
approved Muslim groups, Jewish groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and 
various other denominations, such as Catholics and Lutherans, to 
worship freely and generally registers more recently arrived religions. 
However, the religion law forbids or severely restricts activities such 
as proselytizing and importing and disseminating religious literature.
    The Government is secular and there is no official state religion. 
Although the laws treat all religious confessions equally, the 
Government shows its support for the country's Muslim heritage by 
funding an Islamic university and subsidizing citizens' participation 
in the Hajj. The Government promotes a moderate version of Islam 
through the control and financing of the Spiritual Directorate for 
Muslims (the Muftiate), which in turn controls the Islamic hierarchy, 
the content of imams' sermons, and the volume and substance of 
published Islamic materials.
    In May 1998, the Parliament passed two laws that restrict religious 
activity. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations 
provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution, 
separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and 
train clergy. However, the law also severely limits religious activity. 
It restricts religious rights that are judged to be in conflict with 
national security, prohibits proselytizing, bans religious subjects in 
public schools, prohibits private teaching of religious principles, 
forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other 
than clerics, and requires religious groups to obtain a license to 
publish or distribute materials.
    The second legislative change enacted in May 1998 consisted of a 
series of revisions to the Criminal and Civil Codes that stiffened the 
penalties for violating the religion law and other statutes on 
religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such 
as organizing a banned religious group, persuading others to join such 
a group, and drawing minors into a religious organization without the 
permission of their parents.
    The Criminal Code was amended again in May 1999 with two changes 
that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a distinction between 
``illegal'' groups, which are those that are not registered properly, 
and ``prohibited'' groups, which are banned altogether. The first 
measure makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to 5 years in 
prison to organize an illegal religious group or to resume the 
activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration 
or being ordered to disband). Furthermore, the measure punishes any 
participation in such a group by up to 3 years in prison. The second 
measure sets out penalties of up to 20 years in prison and confiscation 
of property for ``organizing or participating'' in the activities of 
religious extremist, fundamentalist, separatist, or other prohibited 
groups. In practice, the courts ignore the theoretical distinction and 
frequently convict members of disapproved Muslim groups under both 
statutes.
    The Religion Law requires all religious groups and congregations to 
register and provides strict and burdensome criteria for their 
registration. In particular it stipulates that each group present a 
list of at least 100 Uzbek citizen members (compared with the previous 
minimum of 10) to the local branches of the Ministry of Justice. This 
provision enables the Government to ban any group simply by denying its 
registration petition. Government officials designed the law to target 
Muslims who worship outside the system of state-organized mosques. A 
special commission created in August 1998 may grant exemptions to the 
religious law's strict requirements and register groups that have not 
been registered by local officials. The commission has granted 
exemptions to 51 such groups, including congregations with fewer than 
100 Uzbek members. However, no formal procedures or criteria have been 
established to bring a case before this commission.
    In a February 29 roundtable on religious freedom, Government 
officials (from the Committee on Religious Affairs, Parliament, and the 
National Center for Human Rights) called for clarifications that would 
bring religion law and practice into line with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on May 25 President Karimov 
suggested that the Parliament consider improvements to the religion 
law. However, no action was taken by year's end.
    In August an expert from the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination noted the serious restrictions on freedom of 
religion in Uzbekistan, targeting primarily Muslims worshipping outside 
the state-organized mosques.
    Christian churches generally are tolerated as long as they do not 
attempt to win converts among ethnic Uzbeks. Christians who are ethnic 
Uzbeks are secretive about their faith and rarely attempt to register 
their organizations. Christian congregations that are of mixed ethnic 
background are reluctant to list their Uzbek members on registration 
lists due to fear of incurring official displeasure. Since the law 
prohibits participation in unregistered groups, some minority churches 
have not submitted registration applications because they know that 
they are unable to comply with the law's requirements and prefer not to 
identify themselves to the authorities. Although church leaders cite 
high registration fees and the 100-member rule as obstacles to 
registration, the most frequent problem is the lack of an approved 
legal address, which is required in order to submit an application. 
Some groups have been reluctant to invest in the purchase of a property 
without assurance that the registration would be approved. Others claim 
that local officials arbitrarily withhold approval of the addresses 
because they oppose the existence of Christian churches with ethnic 
Uzbek members.
    In August 1999, the central Government undertook to register 
minority religious groups whose applications had been blocked by local 
officials. Twenty churches received their registration immediately, and 
most new applications since that time have been approved; however, 
there have been exceptions. A Baptist congregation in Gazalkent 
attempted to register unsuccessfully throughout the year. 
Representatives of the group claimed that local officials were blocking 
its registration. The deputy mayor of Gazalkent allegedly told church 
leaders at one point that its application might be approved if it 
removed from its membership list all names of ethnic Uzbek origin. 
Another Baptist congregation in Guliston was denied registration in 
December ostensibly on the grounds that its proposed church was in a 
residential area. Although two Jehovah's Witness congregations are 
registered, eight others that have attempted to register during the 
last year were unsuccessful. Church officials believe that the fact 
that many members of these groups are Uzbek nationals is at the root of 
the bureaucratic obstructionism that they are facing. The Committee on 
Religious Affairs (CRA) denied the Greater Grace Christian Church of 
Samarkand permission to have a Finnish, rather than Uzbek, pastor. The 
church's application for registration was therefore blocked until this 
issue is resolved. The Tashkent International Protestant Church was 
denied registration because its members were not Uzbek citizens. 
However, the CRA gave permission for the church to meet and hold 
services. The church has appealed to the Presidential Commission on the 
Implementation of the Religion Law, which has authority to grant 
exceptions to the requirements of the law. By year's end, the 
Commission had not met.
    At year's end, the Government had registered 1,979 religious 
congregations and organizations, 1,805 of which were Muslim. The 174 
registered minority religious groups include 47 Korean Christian, 32 
Russian Orthodox, 30 Pentecostal (``full gospel''), 23 Baptist, 10 
Seventh-Day Adventist, 8 Jewish (1 Ashkenazy, 6 Bukharan, 1 mixed), 7 
Baha'i, 4 Lutheran, 3 Roman Catholic, 2 Jehovah's Witnesses, and 2 
Krishna Consciousness groups. Several of these congregations had fewer 
than the required 100 members but received exemptions from the 
requirement. An additional 335 applications had been denied, 323 of 
which were from Muslim groups. The number of mosques has increased 
significantly from the 80 or so permitted in the entire Soviet Union to 
1,800 registered currently, but has decreased from the 4,000 or more 
that opened after the country gained independence and before 
registration procedures were in place.
    Authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups, but often 
harass those that openly try to convert Muslims to Christianity. Police 
occasionally have broken up meetings of unregistered groups. Leaders of 
such groups have been assessed fines or even imprisoned. In August 
police allegedly detained a group of unregistered Baptists meeting in a 
private apartment in Chirchik for 2 days, during which police allegedly 
beat them. After a similar incident in October 1999 in Karshi, the 
Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that it took steps to ensure 
that police allow such Baptist congregations, which consider 
registration to be inconsistent with their religious beliefs, to meet 
undisturbed for worship.
    In July police in Nukus, Karakalpakstan, arrested Nikolai 
Rodzinski, pastor of a small unregistered Baptist group, after 
allegedly planting narcotics in his bicycle pack; he was released in 
late September. Rodzinski came to the attention of the police because 
members of his congregation participated in a summer youth camp 
sponsored by the registered Korean Christian church ``Mir.'' Karakalpak 
authorities closed the camp in July and in August ordered Pastor 
Vladimir Kim to close his church, on the grounds that the camp had 
taught religion to minors without parental consent, a violation of the 
religion law. Kim maintains that all parents had signed consent forms.
    The Nukus Full Gospel Church has not reopened since the August 1999 
presidential pardon of Pastor Rashid Turibayev, who had been imprisoned 
on religious and falsified narcotics charges. Nukus authorities have 
not returned the property confiscated in 1999 after Turibayev and two 
associates were convicted, and have not returned title to the church 
building to the Full Gospel Church headquarters in Tashkent. Local 
observers claim that after their release, the three were subjected to 
regular police harassment. Turibayev now lives in Kazakhstan where he 
is preaching to a Full Gospel congregation.
    Central government officials, as well as many Christian leaders, 
view these and other incidents of harassment as isolated cases of local 
officials misapplying the law.
    The Government's most serious abuses of the right to religious 
freedom were committed against Muslims. The Government's campaign 
against independent Muslim groups, begun in the early 1990's, resulted 
in numerous serious human rights abuses during the period covered by 
this report. The campaign has been directed at three types of Muslims: 
Alleged Wahhabists, including those educated at medrassas (schools) 
abroad and followers of missing imams Nazarov of Tashkent and Mirzaev 
of Andijon; those suspected of being involved in the 1999 Tashkent 
bombings or of being involved with the IMU, whose roots are in 
Namangan; and suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout the 
country.
    The line between the so-called Wahhabists and those suspected of 
being involved in the 1999 bombings and the IMU insurgency in 2000 is 
not always apparent, even to an unbiased observer. Both Wahhabism and 
the IMU stem from the growth of independent Islam that the Government 
has sought to suppress since the early 1990's. Based on the court 
record, the distinction is that the Government considers the Wahhabists 
to be extremists and potential terrorists and those suspected of 
involvement in the bombings to be active terrorists. The Government 
does not consider repression of these groups to be a matter of 
religious freedom, but instead to be directed against those who oppose 
and even may take up arms against the political order. However, 
authorities are highly suspicious of those who are more pious than is 
the norm, including frequent mosque attendees, bearded men, and veiled 
women. In practice this approach results in abuses against many devout 
Muslims for their religious beliefs.
    On September 5, President Karimov signed a decree promising full 
amnesty to repentant Uzbek citizens who have joined ``terrorist groups 
under the influence of religious extremists'' abroad, but who have not 
participated in the insurgency.
    Following both the December 1997 murder of police officials in 
Namangan and the February 1999 terrorist bombings in Tashkent, police 
detained hundreds and perhaps thousands of suspected Wahhabists. The 
majority of those detained were released after questioning and 
detention that lasted as long as 2 months. The police routinely planted 
narcotics, ammunition, and, beginning in 1999, religious leaflets, on 
citizens to justify their arrest.
    To determine whom to arrest, the Government used the local mahalla 
(neighborhood) committees as a source of information. Shortly after the 
February 1999 Tashkent bombings, President Karimov directed that each 
committee assign a ``defender of the people,'' whose job it was to 
assure that young persons in the neighborhoods were not joining 
independent Islamic groups. The committees identified for police those 
residents who appeared suspicious. In an interview with the Associated 
Press in September, an official of the Committee on Religious Affairs 
said that the mahallas had identified 10,700 persons with extremist 
tendencies. Asked how mahalla officials know who is an extremist, the 
official replied ``you can see it in their eyes.'' Human rights 
observers noted that in practice the committees often perceived as 
suspicious those same individuals who already had been detained by the 
police in the wake of either the 1997 murders of officials in Namangan 
or the 1999 Tashkent bombings, and who subsequently had been released 
because there was no evidence against them. There were dozens of cases 
involving persons who previously had been detained and released who 
were rearrested and tried during the year.
    The absence of a free press and the rarity of public trials make it 
impossible to determine how many persons have been incarcerated. 
Nonetheless, the Moscow-based human rights organization, Memorial, has 
compiled a list of over 1,400 documented cases of persons allegedly 
imprisoned for political and religious reasons from January 1999 to 
April 2000 (see Section 1.e.). Memorial estimated that the total number 
of such prisoners was between 4,000 and 5,000. Human Rights observers 
estimate credibly that from 30 to 50 persons were convicted for alleged 
Islamic extremism each week during the reporting period. The number of 
those in pretrial detention is unknown but is probably several hundred. 
Nearly all those listed were accused of being Muslim extremists. By the 
end of June of this year, the Government had convicted 128 persons for 
direct involvement in the bombing plot. Of these, at least 18 received 
death sentences, most of which reportedly have been carried out.
    Pavlonazar Khodjaev was sentenced to death in May for allegedly 
having links to the IMU and helping plan a terrorist action near 
Yangiabad. Khodjaev's father had been imprisoned in 1999, according to 
human rights activists, because of his refusal to divulge to 
authorities the whereabouts of Pavlonazar and another of his sons. The 
elder Khodjaev was beaten to death in Jaslik prison in July 1999.
    Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov, an independent Tashkent imam and follower 
of Imam Nazarov, was arrested on or about April 27. The Government held 
him in incommunicado and did not inform his family of his whereabouts. 
Abdurakhmanov had been fired from his job as leader of the Kokoldash 
Madrassa in 1996 and was arrested, severely beaten, and imprisoned 
briefly in 1998 after police claimed to have found narcotics and a 
false passport on him. After the recent arrest, officials questioned 
his wife and sister-in-law, accusing them of Wahhabism. He was 
convicted in July and sentenced to 17 years in prison. At his trial he 
claimed that he was tortured.
    A leading independent Muslim cleric, Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, has 
been missing since March 1998, when dozens of police and security 
agents raided and searched his home. Although his family claims that 
the security services abducted him, the Government and many observers 
believe that he fled to avoid arrest.
    There was one new development in the October 1999 release of 
leading Islamic figure Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashev, who was rearrested on 
July 23. Since his arrest he allegedly has been mistreated severely. He 
was held incommunicado for some 6 months and was twice beaten into 
signing documents refusing counsel. Another Islamic activist, Abdurauf 
Gafurov, remains free after his 1999 release.
    There were no reported developments in the 1995 disappearance of 
Imam Abduvali Kori Mirzaev or the 1997 disappearance of his assistant, 
Nematjon Parpiev; or the 1992 disappearance of Abdullah Utaev, leader 
of the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party.
    Several persons arrested for religious reasons apparently died from 
mistreatment in custody (see section 1.a.).
    Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for 
wearing religious dress were not allowed to re-enroll in 2000 (see 
Section 1.f.).
    Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education (long banned under the 
Soviets), Jewish cultural events, and the publication of a community 
newspaper take place undisturbed.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for free 
movement within the country and across its borders, and the Government 
generally respected these rights; however, at times it limited this 
right. Citizens must have permission from local authorities in order to 
resettle in a new city. The Government rarely grants this permission to 
those who wish to move to Tashkent. The Government requires citizens to 
obtain exit visas for foreign travel or emigration, but grants these 
permits routinely. All citizens have a right to a passport, and the 
Government does not restrict this right. The new passports serve as 
both internal identity cards and, when properly certified, as external 
passports. Every citizen must carry such a document when traveling 
inside or outside the country. Police occasionally confiscate these 
documents, severely restricting a person's right to travel.
    Movement within the country of foreigners with valid visas 
generally is unrestricted. However, in mid-year, mountainous regions in 
the South and East of the country were closed to traffic because of the 
IMU insurgency. Visitors require special permission to travel to 
certain areas, such as Termez, on the Afghan border.
    Several Uzbek human rights activists were able to leave and reenter 
the country without encountering problems from the Government. The 
Government has not returned the passport of human rights activist 
Mikhail Ardzinov which police had confiscated in June of 1999. This 
restricted his freedom of movement within the country and prevented him 
from attending international conferences.
    The law on citizenship stipulates that citizens do not lose their 
citizenship if they reside overseas. However, since Uzbekistan does not 
provide for dual citizenship, those acquiring other citizenship lose 
Uzbek citizenship. In practice the burden is on returning individuals 
to prove to authorities that they have not acquired foreign citizenship 
while abroad. There were reports during the year that some ethnic 
Russians attempting to return after residing abroad were denied 
residence permits and new passports.
    There is no law concerning the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers, and the Government does not recognize the right of first 
asylum. The Government does not adhere to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
considers asylum seekers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be economic 
migrants, and such individuals are subject to harassment and bribe 
demands when seeking to regularize their status. They may be deported 
if their residency documents are not in order. However, the Government 
agreed in August 1999 that it would not force those who have received 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate refugee status to 
leave the country. The UNHCR reports that the policy appears to be 
working, and that police rarely harass mandate refugees.
    The population includes ethnic Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, Germans, 
Greeks, and Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia by Stalin during 
World War II. These groups enjoy the same rights as other citizens. 
Although they are free to return to their ancestral homelands, 
absorption problems in those countries have slowed that return. 
Although there are no official statistics, observers including the 
UNHCR estimate that there are 30,000 Tajik and 8,000 Afghan refugees in 
the country. As of December 31, there were 1,351 UNHCR mandate 
refugees, with roughly 450 cases pending decision. According to the 
UNHCR there were no cases of forced repatriation of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
    During the August conflict with the IMU, the Government ordered the 
evacuation of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the 
border with Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp, 
the villagers were transferred in November to a newly constructed 
settlement over 200 kilometers away. Conditions in the settlement are 
reportedly extremely poor and residents are suffering from a shortage 
of food. Several of the residents have told international observers 
that police have detained and beaten most of the men in an effort to 
find those who may have collaborated with the IMU. Estimates of the 
number in police detention at year's end ranged from 39 to over 120. 
One resident, Hazratkul Kodirov, died in late December, according to 
his brother, from injuries sustained during interrogation (see Section 
1.a.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    While the Constitution provides for this right, in reality citizens 
cannot change their government through peaceful and democratic means. 
The Government severely represses opposition groups and individuals and 
applies strict limits on freedom of expression. No opposition groups 
participated in government or were allowed to function legally.
    The Government is highly centralized and is ruled by a strong 
presidency. President Karimov, formerly the first secretary of the 
Communist Party in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule, was elected in a 
limited multicandidate election in 1991. A 1995 Sovietstyle referendum 
and subsequent parliamentary decision extended Karimov's first term 
until 2000. He was reelected in January to a second term with 92.5 
percent of the vote. Karimov's opponent, Abdulhafiz Jalalov ran a token 
campaign, and admitted on election day that he himself had voted for 
Karimov. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
declined to monitor the presidential election on the grounds that the 
preconditions did not exist for it to be free and fair.
    President Karimov and the executive branch retain control through 
sweeping decree powers, primary authority for drafting legislation, and 
control of virtually all government appointments, most aspects of the 
economy, and the security forces.
    Most government officials are members of the People's Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), formerly the Communist Party and still the 
country's largest party. However, the party as such does not appear to 
play a significant role in the Government, and the President resigned 
his chairmanship of the party in 1996. There are four other parties; 
however, these were created with government assistance and are loyal to 
President Karimov. All five parties participated in the December 1999 
elections to the Oliy Majlis, during which 93 percent of the electorate 
reportedly cast their vote. However, parties that competed in the 
parliamentary elections, as well as the numerous independent 
candidates, were congenial to the Government and did not represent a 
real choice for voters.
    Because the voters lacked a choice, the OSCE and many international 
observers concluded that the December 1999 legislative elections fell 
short of adherence to accepted standards of free and fair elections. 
Local and regional hokims (governors)--who are appointed by the 
president--exerted a strong influence on the selection of candidates 
and the conduct of campaigns. Nearly half (110 out of 250) of those 
elected were not from party lists but were either hokims themselves or 
were nominated by the hokims' local assemblies. Only 16 of the 250 
winning candidates had been nominated by citizens' initiative groups. 
These candidates generally were allowed on the ballot only if the 
hokims approved them.
    The Oliy Majlis is constitutionally the highest government body. In 
practice, despite assistance efforts by international donors to upgrade 
its ability to draft laws independently, its main purpose is to confirm 
laws and other decisions drafted by the executive branch rather than to 
initiate legislation.
    New laws governing the conduct of parliamentary and presidential 
elections, as well as a law creating a Central Election Commission, 
came into effect in 1998. These laws, combined with the 1997 law on 
political parties, make it extremely difficult for opposition parties 
to come into being, to nominate candidates, and to campaign. The 
procedures to register a candidate are burdensome and the Central 
Election Commission has authority to deny registration. For example, a 
presidential candidate is prohibited from campaigning before being 
registered, but must present a list of 150,000 signatures in order to 
be registered. The Central Election Commission must deny registration 
of presidential candidates who are found to ``harm the health and 
morality of the people.'' The 1998 statutes deleted a previous 
provision allowing recourse to the Supreme Court to candidates whose 
parties are denied registration. The Ministry of Justice has the right 
to suspend parties for up to 6 months without a court order.
    Citizens initiative groups of 100 members or more may nominate 
candidates to the Parliament by submitting signatures of at least 8 
percent of the voters in the electoral district. Other interest groups 
are forbidden from participating in campaigns and candidates may meet 
with voters only in forums organized by precinct election commissions. 
The 1998 laws repeal the right of parties to fund their candidates' 
campaigns directly. Instead, parties must turn over all campaign money 
to the Central Election Commission, which then distributes the funds 
equally among the candidates. Only the Central Election Commission may 
prepare and release presidential campaign posters. In August 1999, the 
Parliament enacted minor modifications to the election laws, but these 
have had little practical effect.
    According to the Law on Political Parties, judges, public 
prosecutors, NSS officials, servicemen, foreign citizens, and stateless 
persons (among others) cannot join political parties. By law the 
Government prohibits formation of parties based on religion or 
nationality; those that oppose the sovereignty, integrity and security 
of the country and the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens; 
or those that promote war, or social, national, or religious hostility. 
Political organizations that seek to overthrow the Government, or sow 
national or racial hatred, are prohibited. Moreover, the Government has 
refused to register democratic political opposition organizations. 
Membership in unregistered political organizations is not forbidden 
officially, but membership in unregistered organizations with a 
prohibited goal or premise is forbidden.
    The Government continues to persecute members of unregistered, 
political opposition groups using such methods as arbitrary arrest, 
conviction on falsified charges, surveillance, and loss of employment. 
The leaders of the two largest unregistered opposition groups in the 
country--Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Democratic Party and Abdurakhim 
Polat of the Birlik Democratic Movement--were forced into exile in the 
early 1990's. After the February 1999 Tashkent bombings, persecution of 
members of these groups intensified. The Government repeatedly has 
accused Erk leader Solikh, who ran against Karimov for the presidency 
in 1992, of being a leader of the terrorist plot behind the bombings. 
Solikh was 1 of the 9 defendants-in-absentia in the November show trial 
of 12 alleged bombing conspirators. He was convicted and sentenced to 
15.5 years in prison. Two of Solikh's brothers (Rashid and Muhammed 
Bekhjanov) were imprisoned since soon after the bombings and were 
convicted on political charges in August 1999, along with noted poet 
and former Solikh associate Mamadali Makhmudov and another defendant 
affiliated with the Birlik party.
    Dozens of Erk and Birlik activists reported that after the bombings 
they were subjected to various forms of harassment: Frequent 
surveillance; restrictions on movement; searches of their homes; 
lengthy police interrogations; and, occasionally, detentions.
    Traditionally, women participate much less than men in government 
and politics, and are underrepresented in these areas. There are 17 
female deputies in the 250-member Parliament. There are 2 women (both 
with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister) among 28 members of the 
Cabinet; 1 is charged specifically with women's issues.
    There are nine ethnic Russians or Ukrainians, six Karakalpaks, 
three Kazakhs, one Korean, and one Armenian in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government restricts and harasses local NGO's working on human 
rights and refuses to register the country's two main human rights 
organizations. Both the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister 
of Justice accused publicly both local and international human rights 
organizations of giving support to the country's enemies.
    In the verdict in the case of Kamoletdin Sattarov in Andijon in 
July, the court ordered destroyed 17 individual appeal forms from the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights that police had found in 
Sattarov's home on February 3. Uzbek citizens exercising their right to 
free speech had filled out six of these forms; eleven were blank. The 
prosecution treated the forms, as well as two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets, 
as evidence of Sattarov's antistate activities. He was sentenced to 9 
years in prison. Upon appeal in August, the regional court voided the 
verdict of the Andijon court and ordered a new trial. In his retrial, 
Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years in prison, 1 year more than his 
original sentence. However, the judge ordered that the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights forms be returned to Sattarov's family. 
Sattarov's appeal of this verdict summarily reconfirmed the new 
sentence in December.
    Security forces continue to harass and abuse human rights 
activists. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, lives in 
voluntary exile. Neither the IHROU nor the HRSU resubmitted 
applications to register during the year. However, HRSU's attempt to 
hold a congress of its members, required in order to submit a new 
registration application, was blocked by local officials on December 22 
(see Section 2.b.)
    On December 21, President Karimov pardoned and released Mahbuba 
Kasimova, an IHROU human rights activist and member of the Birlik 
Democratic Movement. Kasimova, who had been sentenced to 5 years in 
prison in a 3-hour trial in July 1999, had received international 
attention as a political prisoner. There were no developments in the 
case of Ismail Adilov, another IHROU activist who was imprisoned in 
1999 on charges widely believed to be fabricated.
    One international human rights group, HRW, has permission to 
operate in the country and has had an office in Tashkent since 1996. 
The group operates independently and has no affiliation with the 
Government.
    The Government registered one human rights NGO in 1996. The 
registered NGO, the Committee for Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals, was formed with the support of the Government but also has 
ties to opposition figures. Some sources affiliated with other groups 
have questioned its independence from the Government. The organization 
acts as the Uzbek affiliate of the International Society for Human 
Rights based in Germany.
    Since 1997 there has been a human rights Ombudsman's office 
affiliated with the Parliament. The Ombudsman may make recommendations 
to modify or uphold decisions of state agencies, but the 
recommendations are not binding. The Ombudsman is prohibited from 
investigating disputes within the purview of courts. The Ombudsman 
replaced the parliamentary human rights commissioner, who had 
insufficient trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of 
human rights violations and did not vigorously pursue allegations 
against the police and security forces. The office of the Ombudsman 
increased its staff and received authorization to open regional offices 
throughout the country. The Ombudsman issues reports identifying the 
most serious types of violations of human rights by government 
officials. The office claims that it has assisted hundreds of citizens 
in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve 
allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police 
and local officials. Most of the successfully resolved cases appear 
relatively minor. In February the current Ombudsman, Sayora Rashidova, 
sponsored a roundtable to discuss problems with the country's religion 
law. Non-state attendees included the mufti, the Russian Orthodox 
Church, academics, an international NGO, the OSCE, and various 
diplomatic missions.
    The National Human Rights Center of Uzbekistan, created by 
presidential decree in 1996, has as its purpose to educate the 
population and government officials about the principles of human 
rights and democracy. The center's chief activity is to hold seminars 
and training, and it is not involved in human rights advocacy. The 
center has worked closely with international organizations such as the 
UNDP and the OSCE.
    The Government is willing to discuss human rights matters with 
organizations such as the OSCE, as well as with foreign embassies. The 
UN has not sent human rights commission members or special rapporteurs 
to the country. The Government is generally willing to hold an open 
dialog with international human rights NGO's, and held several high-
level discussions with representatives of HRW during 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language or Social Status
    Both the Constitution and the 1992 law on citizenship prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, language, or social 
status; however, societal discrimination against women persists.
    Women.--Spousal abuse is common, but both local activists and the 
police say they have no statistics on the issue. At a September 1999 
seminar on domestic violence, representatives of NGO's with crisis 
centers reported that the number of women seeking assistance is growing 
rapidly. Wife beating is considered a personal family affair rather 
than a criminal act, and thus such cases usually are handled by family 
members or elders within the community (mahalla) and rarely come to 
court.
    In December a U.S.-based NGO, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 
released a major study on Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan. While the 
lack of reporting prevented the authors from determining the number of 
cases annually, the study concluded that domestic violence is 
widespread and that the Government has failed to combat or even 
acknowledge the problem. Another U.S.-based NGO, Winrock International, 
which helps develop women's organizations in Uzbekistan, agreed with 
the conclusions of the study but noted that public officials were 
willing to speak openly about the problem of domestic violence in 
Uzbekistan.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution occurs, 
particularly to the Persian Gulf, Turkey and South Korea (see Section 
6.f.). Prostitution within the country is a growing problem stemming 
from the worsening economic situation.
    Due to tradition, women, particularly in rural areas, usually marry 
before age 20, bear many children, and confine their activities to 
within the family. In rural areas, women often find themselves working 
in the cotton fields during the harvest season. However, women are not 
impeded formally from seeking a role in the workplace. The barriers to 
equality for women are cultural, not legal, and women who open 
businesses or seek careers are not hindered legally.
    Although the law prohibits discrimination against women, 
traditional cultural and religious practices limit their role in 
everyday society. For these reasons, women are underrepresented 
severely in high-level positions. In 1995 President Karimov issued a 
decree on measures to increase the role of women in society, 
particularly extending their participation in state and social 
administration and coordinating the activities of ministries and social 
organizations as they relate to women's issues. In this connection, a 
deputy prime minister position was created in 1995 charged with 
furthering the role of women in society. This cabinet level official is 
also head of the National Women's Committee. The edict also mandated 
the formation of regional women's committees throughout the country, 
headed by government-appointed officials. In September the National 
Women's Committee sponsored a meeting commemorating the fifth 
anniversary of the Beijing Conference. According to NGO participants at 
this meeting, the Government for the first time showed a willingness to 
work together with NGO's on a common plan of action.
    The President declared 1999 to be the ``year of the woman.'' In 
April 1999 the Government promulgated a law extending additional rights 
to women; it reduced the workweek to 35 hours for female employees of 
the State and reduced the optional retirement age for women to 54 years 
(after 20 years of employment). Government-sponsored activities also 
included a series of seminars, newspaper articles, public service 
announcements, and television programs that increased awareness of 
women's issues.
    Several dozen NGO's address the needs of women. For example, the 
Businesswomen's Association in Tashkent, in addition to providing 
resources and information about developing small enterprises, operates 
a store that sells clothing and crafts. A center in Tashkent conducts 
seminars on sexual harassment, domestic violence, and the legal rights 
of women. Another center in Samarkand operates a crisis hot line and 
provides educational services on alcoholism, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and family counseling.
    In parts of the country, some women and girls resort to suicide by 
self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics on the extent of this 
problem, since most cases go unreported. However, representatives of 
women's groups continue to observe an increase in self-immolation. 
After marriage many women or girls move into the husband's home, where 
they occupy the lowest rung on the family social ladder. A conflict 
with the husband or mother-in-law, who by tradition exercises complete 
control over the young bride, usually is the stimulus for suicide.
    A 1997 research study indicated that the number of women enrolling 
in higher education was diminishing; for example, women's enrollment in 
the finance and banking institute dropped from 65 percent in 1991 to 
about 25 percent in 1997. Cutbacks in government funding to 
universities and the need for families to fund a higher percentage of 
educational costs leaves many families in the position of being able to 
fund the education of only one child, either a son or a daughter. The 
report stated that university faculty ``steer'' women into occupations 
traditionally performed by females and suggested that administrators 
may practice a policy of deliberately barring entrance to women in some 
fields.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating 
that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until 
they reach majority at age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the 
cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family 
live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary 
education and health care; however, in practice shortages and budget 
difficulties mean that some services must be paid for privately. The 
State grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of 
children. The country has a very high birth rate; over one-half of the 
population is under the age of 18.
    Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average 
length of schooling is over 11 years. The U.N. Development Program 
reports that 100 percent of children complete secondary school.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Trafficking in 
girls for the purpose of prostitution occurs (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--One of the country's first laws, adopted 
only 2 months after independence in 1991, provided support for the 
disabled. This law was aimed at ensuring that the disabled have the 
same rights as other citizens. However, little effort is made to bring 
the disabled into the mainstream. The State cares for the mentally 
disabled in special homes. The Government has not mandated access to 
public places for the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Government statistics dating 
from 1992 show that the population of approximately 23 million is about 
71 percent Uzbek, 8 percent Russian, 5 percent Tajik, 4 percent Tatar, 
and 3 percent Kazakh, with many other ethnic groups represented. The 
statistics may underestimate the actual number of ethnic Tajiks. The 
figures treat ethnic Tajiks whose mother tongue was Uzbek as ethnic 
Uzbeks. Moreover, some Tajiks choose for a variety of reasons to 
declare themselves to be ethnic Uzbeks.
    Ethnic groups other than Uzbeks, particularly Russians, frequently 
complain that job opportunities are limited for them. Senior positions 
in the government bureaucracy and business generally are reserved for 
ethnic Uzbeks, although there are numerous exceptions to this rule.
    The 1992 citizenship law does not impose language requirements for 
citizenship. Nonetheless, the language issue remains very sensitive. 
Uzbek has been declared the state language, and the Constitution 
requires that the President speak Uzbek. However, the language law 
provides for Russian as ``the language of interethnic communication.'' 
Russian is spoken widely in the main cities, and Tajik is spoken widely 
in Samarkand and Bukhara. The 1989 language law originally required 
that Uzbek would be the sole method of official communication by 1998, 
but subsequently was modified and now stipulates no specific date. The 
Government also is in the process of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet 
with the Latin alphabet. However, realizing the difficulties for Uzbeks 
and minorities alike, the Government has delayed the full transition to 
both the Uzbek language and the Latin alphabet to 2005.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 law on unions specifically 
provides that all workers have the right voluntarily to form and join 
unions of their choice, and that trade unions themselves voluntarily 
may associate territorially or sectorally. Membership in trade unions 
is optional. The law also declares all unions independent of the 
State's administrative and economic bodies (except where provided for 
by law), and states that trade unions should develop their own 
charters, structure, and executive bodies and organize their own work.
    However, in practice the overall structure of trade unions has not 
changed significantly since the Soviet era. Independence has eliminated 
subordination to Moscow but has not altered the centralized trade union 
hierarchy, which remains dependent on the Government. No alternative 
union structures exist.
    A few new professional associations and interest groups have been 
organized, such as a union of entrepreneurs, a union of renters, and an 
association of private physicians and pharmacists. Registered 
professional associations for judges and lawyers formed in 1997; both 
organizations are quasigovernmental. An association of broadcasters 
that formed in 1998 has failed to gain government registration (see 
Section 2.b.). The main activity of all registered associations is 
professional development. They do not license members and have no 
formal role in advocating the interests of members in relation to the 
Government.
    According to the law, the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions 
(CFTU) has a consultative voice in the preparation of all legislation 
affecting workers and is entitled to draft laws on labor and social 
issues. Trade unions are described legally as organizations that defend 
the right to work and to protect jobs. They have lost their previous 
role in state planning and in the management of enterprises. The 
emphasis now is on the unions' responsibility for ``social protection'' 
and social justice--especially unemployment compensation, pensions, and 
worker retraining.
    The trade union law does not mention strikes or cite a right to 
strike. However, the law does give the unions oversight for both 
individual and collective labor disputes, which are defined as those 
involving alleged violations of labor laws, worker rights, or 
collective agreements.
    There were no reports of strikes. This circumstance likely reflects 
the absence of truly representative trade unions, as the standard of 
living fell and growing unemployment raised social tensions. The 
absence of labor activism also reflects the Communist legacy of 
docility in the face of authority. However, both union and government 
officials assert that the lack of strikes reflects general support for 
the Government's policies and common interest in social stability.
    The 1992 law on unions provides that unions may choose their own 
international affiliations; however, none have done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions 
may conclude agreements with enterprises. Privatization is still in its 
very early phase. As a result, there is no experience with negotiations 
that could be described as adversarial between unions and private 
employers. The State is still the major employer, and the state-
appointed union leaders do not view themselves as having conflicts of 
interest with the State.
    The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance in consultation 
with the CFTU, set the wages for various categories of state employees. 
In the small private sector, management establishes wages or negotiates 
them with those who contract for employment.
    The law forbids discrimination against union members and their 
officers.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced labor, including by children, except as 
legal punishment or as may be specified by law; however, some abuses 
including trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution occur (see Section 6.f.). No statute specifically 
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and large-scale 
compulsory mobilization of youth and students (by closing schools) to 
help with the cotton harvest continues. Student labor is paid poorly, 
and students sometimes must pay for their food. Adults, including 
teachers and passersby in automobiles and busses, similarly are forced 
into the harvest effort.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years; 15-year-olds can 
receive state permission to work but have a shorter workday. In rural 
areas, younger children and the elderly often help to harvest cotton 
and other crops (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Ministry has an 
inspection service, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with 
these and other regulations governing employment conditions, and 
enforces them effectively.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by anyone, including 
children; however, trafficking in girls for forced prostitution and 
compulsory mobilization for the cotton harvest occur (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, in 
consultation with the CFTU, sets the minimum wage. As of September 1, 
it was less than $4 (2,450 soum) per month. The minimum wage is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family.
    The standard workweek is set at 41 hours and requires a 24-hour 
rest period. Some factories apparently have reduced work hours in order 
to avoid layoffs. Overtime pay exists in theory but is not always paid.
    Pay arrearages of 3 to 6 months are not uncommon for workers in 
state-owned industries. The problem appears to be growing.
    The Labor Ministry establishes occupational health and safety 
standards in consultation with the unions. There is a health and safety 
inspectorate in the Ministry. The local press occasionally published 
complaints about the failure of unions and government authorities to do 
enough to promote worker safety. Although written regulations may 
provide adequate safeguards, workers in hazardous jobs often lack 
protective clothing and equipment. Workers are permitted to leave jobs 
that are hazardous without jeopardizing their employability in other 
jobs; however, in practice, high rates of underemployment make such 
action difficult.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws relating specifically 
to trafficking in persons. Trafficking in women and girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution occurs, particularly to the Persian 
Gulf, South Korea, and Turkey (see Section 5). However, there are no 
reliable statistics on this problem, and it does not seem to be carried 
out on a large scale. Uzbekistan is a source country, but not a 
destination or transit point, for trafficking in persons. The 
Government has not had occasion to assist with international 
investigations of trafficking or to extradite citizens accused of 
trafficking in other countries.
    Anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young 
women from Uzbekistan who are forced into prostitution abroad is 
growing. The Government has not acknowledged the problem publicly, but 
has taken some measures to combat it. According to NGO representatives, 
the police force in Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in 
women in 1998, but the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of 
resources. Border guards at airports were directed to give more 
scrutiny to unaccompanied young women traveling to Turkey, the United 
Arab Emirates, and South Korea; they are authorized to deny such women 
permission to leave the country. There is no government program to 
educate or assist potential victims; however, the State University for 
World Economy and Diplomacy sponsored a series of lectures on domestic 
violence and trafficking in women during the year.
                               __________

                    FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 

    The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia \1\ (Yugoslavia), a 
constitutional republic consisting of the Republic of Serbia and the 
Republic of Montenegro, has a president and a parliamentary system of 
government based on multiparty elections. The new federal Government, 
which was formed on November 4, dropped any claim to being the sole 
successor state of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(which dissolved in 1992), and was recognized by the international 
community. Vojislav Kostunica was elected President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on September 24, and took office on October 7, 
after mass demonstrations by citizens protesting Slobodan Milosevic's 
attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and force a 
second election round led Milosevic to concede defeat. Prior to 
Kostunica's election, former Yugoslav President Milosevic had brought 
Serbia closer to open dictatorship than ever before. Immediately 
following the 1999 war in Kosovo, Milosevic moved to consolidate his 
weakened position in Serbia through a campaign of intimidation and 
violence against his political opponents, representatives of the 
independent media, student groups, civil society, and even, in certain 
cases, members of the regime. Prior to the September elections, 
Milosevic, who is also President of the Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS), continued to dominate all formal and informal governing 
institutions in the country. Although the SPS lacked majorities in both 
the Federal and Serbian Parliaments, it controlled key administrative 
positions. The SPS also controlled the governing coalition with the 
Yugoslav Left (JUL), controlled by Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic, and 
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), controlled by Vojislav Seselj, an 
extreme ultranationalist known for his radical politics during the wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia, who resigned from his government position in 
October. Milosevic also controlled the judiciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\  The report on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is discussed 
in three separate sections on Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro and 
addresses the human rights situations in each of these entities. Since 
federal authority was exercised effectively only over the Republic of 
Serbia throughout the year, the human rights situations in Kosovo and 
Montenegro are dealt with in separate sections following this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic until 
his electoral defeat effectively controlled the Serbian police, a 
heavily armed force of some 80,000 officers that is responsible for 
internal security. Having been forced to withdraw from Kosovo in 1999, 
the police then repressed opponents of the regime in Serbia. In 
addition, Milosevic ignored the constitutional role of the Supreme 
Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander in chief 
of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which, along with the police, was employed 
in the brutal campaign against the citizens of Kosovo in 1999. Several 
times in the past, Milosevic had purged those officers in both the 
police and military who either failed to follow his orders or who 
directly challenged his policies in Kosovo, Serbia, or Montenegro. The 
security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    Following the war in Kosovo, international economic sanctions 
remained in place much of the year. The international community began 
to remove those sanctions after Kostunica's election. The economy 
inherited by the new Government suffered from continued exclusion from 
international financial institutions and from the damage inflicted on 
infrastructure during 10 years of war. Economic performance is poor due 
to the general inefficiency in the economy, corruption, and continued 
resistance to reform and privatization. Unemployment and 
underemployment remain high, reaching at least 60 percent, as the 
Milosevic Government was unable or unwilling to introduce necessary 
restructuring measures. The Milosevic Government also failed to 
implement needed sweeping economic reforms to help the economy, 
including privatization, due to the influence of the regime's crony 
system.
    Under Milosevic the Government's human rights record remained 
extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. 
Milosevic attempted to prevent citizens from exercising their right to 
change their government. The police were responsible for numerous 
serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, 
torture, brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity 
for those who committed human rights abuses was a serious problem. 
Often, serious crimes such as murder remained uninvestigated and 
unsolved. The judicial system was not independent of the Government, 
suffered from corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. Under the 
Milosevic regime, there were many cases of political detainees and 
political prisoners. However, under Kostunica, the new Government 
released two prominent political prisoners--journalist Miroslav 
Filipovic in October and human rights activist Dr. Flora Brovina in 
November. In December Kostunica also pardoned opposition activist 
Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.'' Under the Milosevic regime, 
the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Milosevic 
Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press and 
used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure to control 
tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists continued to 
practice self-censorship. The Milosevic Government restricted freedom 
of assembly and association. Police repressed citizens who opposed the 
Milosevic regime and severely beat scores of democratic opposition 
protesters throughout Serbia, sending many to hospitals. The Milosevic 
Government infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and 
restricted freedom of movement. The regime enacted legislation to 
manipulate the electoral process, most recently in the summer, when 
Milosevic made changes to the Constitution that allowed him to be 
elected by popular vote to another term as President of Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic banned objective international observers from monitoring the 
September 24 elections for Yugoslav President and attempted to falsify 
election results. The Federal and Serbian Governments' record of 
cooperation with international human rights and monitoring 
organizations remained poor. The Milosevic Government routinely 
hindered the activities of local human rights groups.
    The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It 
again failed to meet its obligations under numerous U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions to comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, and 
failed to transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of 
persons on its territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes 
against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (These persons 
include Milosevic and four of his top aides, who were indicted in 1999 
for their role in the Kosovo war). Violence and discrimination against 
women remained serious problems. Police repression and official and 
societal discrimination against Muslims in the Sandzak region, Roma, 
and other minorities persisted. The regime limited unions not 
affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance worker 
rights. There was some child labor. Serbia is a source, transit, and 
destination country for trafficking in women and girls, and trafficking 
is a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed 
extrajudicial killings. In November the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
(DOS) Minister of the Interior, Bozo Prelevic, reported that he had 
received evidence suggesting that the head of the Republican State 
Security service, Rade Markovic, was involved in the April 1998 killing 
of Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of an independent Belgrade tabloid 
newspaper and weekly news magazine (see Section 2.a.).
    The number of political and extrajudicial killings increased, and 
there were many indications of complicity at the highest political 
levels. The targets of such attacks were not limited to opposition 
activists. Numerous deaths of persons close to the regime in the first 
half of the year suggested efforts on the part of the Government to 
consolidate its authority and remain in power. Typically no one was 
arrested for such killings.
    The most notable politically motivated killing was that of Zeljko 
Raznatovic, also known as ``Arkan"--a notorious paramilitary commander 
from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who was indicted by the ICTY. 
Raznatovic was killed inside Belgrade's Intercontinental Hotel in 
January. After his death, rumors began circulating of a falling out 
with the Milosevic regime. There was an official investigation into his 
death; however, it yielded no conclusive results.
    A number of other prominent political figures were killed during 
the year. In view of the high level of corruption among the political 
elite, the precise mix of criminal and political motives for these 
crimes was difficult to determine. Pavle Bulatovic, the former Yugoslav 
Minister of Defense and a close associate of the Milosevic family, was 
killed while dining in a restaurant in February. Another close 
Milosevic associate, Zika Petrovic, the head of Yugoslav Airlines, was 
shot and killed in April while walking his dog near Belgrade's central 
police station.
    Belgrade investigative judge Nebojsa Simeunovic was reported 
missing in early November. On December 3, police in Belgrade found his 
body washed up on the banks of the Sava River. Judge Simeunovic had 
refused to sign warrants for the arrest of DOS party leaders and 
striking miners during the October popular campaign to unseat 
Milosevic. He also was in charge of the investigation of several 
politically sensitive cases, including the 1997 killing of Radovan 
Stojicic-Bazda and the February killing of Pavle Bulatovic.
    Eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing Yugoslav forces 
and detained in prisons within Serbia died in detention during the year 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In March, criminals Branislav ``Dugi'' Lainovic and ``Bata'' 
Vucurovic were killed in Belgrade and Vojvodina, respectively. Neither 
apparently was involved in politics when killed, but both played 
significant roles in paramilitary operations in Croatia in the early 
1990's and had links to former Serbian State Security leaders.
    On November 21, two Serbian police officers were killed and several 
were wounded in an attack by the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, 
Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB), an offshoot of the disbanded Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA). On November 27, a 10-year-old boy was killed by 
an antitank mine planted by the Yugoslav army as his family fled the 
Presevo valley region for Kosovo. These incidents escalated tensions 
that had been building throughout the year in the region of 
southeastern Serbia that borders on Kosovo and encompasses the 
municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja. This region is 
populated by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. In November thousands of 
ethnic Albanians fled the region for neighboring Kosovo and Macedonia, 
due to fear of a buildup of Serbian police and military forces. 
Skirmishes between Serbian police and armed Albanian UCPMB members 
occurred throughout the year, resulting in the reported deaths of 
several Serbian police as well as some UCPMB members and a few 
civilians.
    b. Disappearance.--Police were responsible for disappearances.
    The most notable disappearance was that of former Serbian President 
Ivan Stambolic, who disappeared while on a daily jog in a park near his 
home in Belgrade in August. Many observers noted that the timing of 
Stambolic's disappearance (only a few weeks ahead of scheduled 
elections), and the fact that state-run media remained largely silent 
on the issue, suggested complicity by the Milosevic regime and the 
Serbian security service. The Serbian State Prosecutor's office began 
an investigation into the case in late November, but it had not yielded 
any results at year's end.
    In April Jan Svetlik, an opposition councilor from Zrenjanin, was 
abducted by two unknown assailants and kept outside of town for several 
hours during a session of the local parliament. The abduction allowed 
the ruling SPS to retain its parliamentary majority despite the fact 
that two of its own members earlier had defected to the opposition. 
Police failed to identify the assailants.
    Federal and Serbian government authorities have not cooperated 
fully with efforts to account for the thousands of disappearances of 
individuals from Kosovo during the first 6 months of 1999, nor have 
they allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or 
other international organizations access to many detention facilities. 
Some 5,500 persons are missing; some 700 are being detained in Serbian 
prisons (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Yugoslav and Serbian law prohibits torture and other cruel 
forms of punishment; however, security authorities regularly and 
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of 
abuse against citizens and members of the political opposition. The 
majority of cases of torture occurred before detainees were charged 
with offenses or during the period between the filing of charges and 
the commencement of the trial. Freed prisoners reported being subject 
to beatings with rubber batons, metal batons, and wooden bats, as well 
as use of electroshock, starvation, withholding of medical care, and 
having their hands bound tightly with plastic bands.
    On May 17 and 18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and 
used excessive force to disperse street protests against the 
Government's closing of television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see 
Section 2.b.). In June police beat four persons at a police station in 
Zajecar after they put up opposition posters.
    In July Bojan Aleksov, a human rights monitor who worked with the 
Safe House Project for Conscientious Objectors from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Women 
in Black Against War, was arrested by police in Belgrade after being 
removed forcibly from his car. During his 23-hour detention, Aleksov 
repeatedly was threatened with death and interrogated about his human 
rights work and his connections with the international community. The 
police tortured Aleksov severely, including by forcing him to stand on 
his toes while they beat him with a truncheon all over his body. 
Despite running a fever, the police denied him water for up to 5 hours 
and kept him awake throughout the night. On the following morning, 
three police officers beat Aleksov on the soles of his feet, the palms 
of his hands, and other parts of his body, using a baton. Aleksov 
finally was forced to write a 12-page confession dictated to him by an 
officer, which outlined his human rights work and his contacts and 
visits with international organizations and officials. Under threat of 
death, Aleksov then was forced to agree to work for the State Security 
Service. Finally, the police forced Aleksov to repeat parts of the 
signed statement on video and made him repeat his ``confession'' three 
times in order to appear convincing enough. In response to this case, 
Amnesty International (AI) called for an investigation and the 
temporary suspension of the officers suspected of beating Aleksov 
pending final results of that investigation. No investigation was 
conducted by year's end.
    In early September police also beat an Otpor activist, a minor, and 
forced him to eat one of the movement's posters. A lawyer representing 
the activist was prevented from attending the interrogation and was not 
able to contact the activist.
    In August police interrogated and beat 19-year-old Rom Sasa 
Mustafic and threatened his wife, Demira Gezvira, in Belgrade. Mustafic 
was arrested by police, accused of theft, and allegedly beaten with a 
stick and punched in the stomach, ribs, back, and head. On September 
26, a traffic police officer reportedly beat and threatened Skender 
Gasi, a 27-year-old Rom from Kosovo, in Belgrade. According to local 
NGO reports, Gasi did not file a complaint against the officer because 
he feared reprisals.
    In November in Vojvodina police beat and threatened a Hungarian 
journalist (see Section 5).
    In September police detained seven Bulgarian election observers who 
entered Serbia despite not receiving official credentials. Police beat 
three of the observers, in one case causing a ruptured eardrum, and 
confiscated mobile telephones, money, and personal belongings.
    Police beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    There were numerous beatings of members of the political opposition 
by unidentified groups of men, apparently State Security agents or 
thugs employed by the Milosevic regime. On February 26, several men 
attacked and severely beat student Milos Dosen as he pasted up a poster 
in Belgrade that belonged to Otpor (``Resistance''), a student-led, 
nonviolent political movement that opposes the Milosevic regime. 
Despite videotape that showed the attackers and their vehicle's license 
plates in clear view, police did not investigate the incident.
    On April 11, in Novi Sad, two unidentified men beat Radoje Cvetkov, 
secretary for urbanism in the Novi Sad executive council, which is 
controlled by an opposition party.
    In June police beat a 19-year-old Otpor activist for 3 hours after 
they found the student movement's material in his car in Lapovo.
    According to Human Rights Watch, on September 2, police beat Mile 
Milic, a DOS candidate for the Lajkovac municipal assembly, after 
arresting him for hanging DOS posters. On September 3 in Indjija, SPS 
activists severely beat a minor who was hanging DOS posters. AI 
reported that on September 4, police beat Darko Pavlovic, an Otpor 
activist who was arrested in Sabac while hanging DOS posters. On 
September 8 in Vladicin Han, police detained and beat six Otpor 
activists. After reportedly tying up the six activists, the police used 
their fists and batons to beat them on the genitals, kidneys, and 
heads. One activist, Aleksandar Radic, had a rope placed around his 
neck. Only after several hundred persons gathered in front of the 
police station were the activists allowed to leave and seek medical 
treatment. On September 15, AI reported that police beat two Otpor 
activists who were spraying antigovernment graffiti in Belgrade and 
arrested them. They both were sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment for 
``offenses against public peace and order.'' Lawyers representing the 
activists claimed that they were not granted access to their clients 
before the hearing, and were not permitted to be present while the 
arresting officer gave evidence.
    During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some 
demonstrators and used tear gas to control crowds (see Section 2.b.).
    Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic was wounded 
slightly after a bullet grazed his head in an attack in Montenegro in 
June by gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime (see Montenegro 
annex).
    In June a crowd that emerged from the offices of the ruling 
Socialist Party attacked activists distributing leaflets in Barajevo.
    In early March, unknown assailants damaged the car of Zarko Korac, 
leader of the Social Democratic Union.
    Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards. 
Torture and beatings were reported. There were reports that Albanians 
held in prisons included young children, the elderly, and persons who 
were blind and deaf (see Section 1.d.). Overcrowding and lack of food, 
medical care, and heating in winter all are problems.
    A total of eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing 
Yugoslav forces and detained in prisons within Serbia died in 
detention; two were confirmed to have died in August, reportedly one of 
a heart attack and one of cancer.
    A series of prison riots occurred in November. The unrest began in 
Sremska Mitrovica and spread to prisons in Nis and Pozarevac, as well 
as Padinska Skela prison near Belgrade and the juvenile penitentiary in 
Valjevo. Prison inmates demanded an improvement in prison living 
conditions and an expansion of a proposed amnesty bill for Kosovar 
Albanian prisoners in Serbia to include other Serbian criminals. 
Several inmates alleged that they were victims of severe beatings in 
prison by guards. Prisoners also alleged that they were denied access 
to health care. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians were evacuated from the 
Pozarevac prison after they were threatened by Serbs for not joining 
the protests. One Serb prisoner died after falling off the roof of the 
Nis prison and several persons reportedly were injured during the 
riots. In response, the Government pledged emergency funds to improve 
prison conditions and on November 10, authorities released 14 Serbs and 
1 ethnic Albanian from the Pozarevac prison. In exchange, inmates 
agreed to put down their weapons and to allow guards back in the 
prison.
    On December 14, a military court in Nis sentenced nine Serbian 
military policemen and one lawyer to prison terms totaling 7 years for 
extorting money from Kosovar Albanian prisoners.
    Although the Milosevic regime generally permitted some prison 
visits by human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to 
the whim of local officials, access generally was poor. On several 
occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC, 
were denied access to individuals reportedly held by Serbian police, 
especially draft evaders and Kosovar Albanians whom retreating security 
forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased. However, the 
ICRC had no access to or information about persons detained in military 
detention facilities at year's end.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention was common in Serbia under Milosevic, with such abuses aimed 
at opponents of the regime apparently on a daily basis.
    Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive 
delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening 
investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal 
basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by 
difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of 
official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody. 
In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the 
court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their 
responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members 
of the State Security Service and rarely questioned their accounts of 
the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were 
coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were 
used in court to convict defendants on fabricated charges.
    According to the Humanitarian Law Center, at least 10 Kosovar 
Albanian minors were being held in the country's prisons in January. 
These children were among the approximately 2,000 civilians removed 
from Kosovo when the Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces in 1999. Serbian 
authorities reportedly sold dozens of these prisoners back to their 
families in Kosovo for prices as high as $25,000 (DM 50,000). Numerous 
human rights groups have documented an open-air market in northern 
Kosovo where lawyers purporting to represent these prisoners go to 
strike deals with families or friends of those imprisoned to secure 
their release. Despite the exchange of large sums of money, the lawyers 
often are never seen again. Human Rights groups also noted that in 
those cases where prisoners are released, the extorted ``fees'' were 
divided between the lawyers, judges, and police involved in individual 
cases and prisons. Human rights organizations believe that the 
Government still holds approximately 700 Kosovar Albanian political 
prisoners and detainees. The Government claims that some of these 
prisoners and detainees were convicted of common crimes.
    Visits to political detainees were rare and often were supervised 
by police. Local human rights NGO's attempted to visit prisoners, with 
mixed results. The ICRC was able to visit many, if not all, of the 
approximate 700 Kosovar Albanian political detainees inside Serbia. 
However, it is not clear that the ICRC has been able to arrange more 
than an occasional visit.
    Opposition politicians faced harassment by police under the 
Milosevic regime. On February 29, Belgrade police detained and 
interrogated Ivan Kovacevic, the Serbian Renewal Movement spokesman and 
a member of the Serbian Parliament. In March a total of 42 members of 
Vojvodina's League of Social Democrats were arrested in Novi Sad. They 
were handing out flyers asking for citizens to assemble in front of a 
construction site, where the regime was blocking the city's efforts to 
begin rebuilding a bridge destroyed during the NATO bombing campaign.
    In May three members of Otpor--Momcilo Veljkovic, Radojko Lukovic, 
and Dusan Ignjatovic--were arrested after friends of Marko Milosevic, 
the President's son, beat them severely outside a cafe in Pozarevac, 
Milosevic's hometown. The Otpor activists claim that they were beaten 
after they came to the defense of another activist, Dragan Milovanovic, 
who was being pressured by Marko Milosevic's associates to join the 
Socialist Party of Serbia.
    The beating set off a wave of protests, and the opposition 
scheduled demonstrations in Pozarevac a week later, which it ultimately 
was forced to cancel due to intimidation by the Milosevic regime. As a 
part of its effort to intimidate and prevent the demonstrations, police 
arrested Nenad Canak, the President of the Vojvodina League of Social 
Democrats, as he drove to Pozarevac. Police also arrested and 
interrogated dozens of others, including journalists, opposition 
politicians, and Otpor activists across Serbia in Nis, Novi Sad, 
Kragujevac and Pozarevac.
    Several days later, Veljkovic and Lukovic were released by the 
district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who did not find grounds to 
prosecute. Papovic in turn was dismissed from his post by the 
Government, and the activists were rearrested and served a total of 2 
months in prison. The judge appointed by the Milosevic regime claimed 
that releasing the students earlier would ``upset the public.''
    In June police in Leskovac arrested 10 persons, including Igor 
Olujic, a leading human rights lawyer with the Belgrade-based 
Humanitarian Law Center, Dobrosav Nesic, president of the Leskovac NGO 
Council for Human Rights, and several opposition party activists. Those 
detained were protesting peacefully the arrest a few days earlier of 
Otpor activist Vladimir Stojkovic. During the arrest, police used 
excessive force against several persons, including Bojana Ristic, a 
representative from the Serbian Renewal Movement who also serves in the 
Parliament.
    Also in June 20 members of Otpor were arrested in Smederevska 
Palanka. Police in Ivanjica detained an 11-year-old boy for waiving an 
Otpor flag in public. Police also questioned the boy's father about his 
support for Otpor. In September police arrested Otpor activist Branko 
Ilic in Arilje for the 10th time during the year. By the end of June, 
Otpor announced that since the winter, more than 1,000 of its activists 
had been arrested by the police.
    Opposition candidates in the Sandzak region of Serbia reported that 
tactics of the Milosevic regime greatly interfered with campaigning. 
Police arrested Coalition Sandzak activists for handing out leaflets 
and banned opposition rallies from taking place.
    As the regime intensified its crackdown, in July Yugoslav Army 
members arrested four Dutchmen, two British citizens, and two Canadians 
near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with 
espionage. The British citizens charged that they were beaten by the 
police and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Officials of the arrestees' 
countries had difficulty obtaining consular access to them after their 
transfer to federal prison facilities in Belgrade. Following 
Milosevic's ouster, all were released, and the charges against all 
eventually were dropped (see Montenegro annex).
    Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects 
without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without 
charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law 
separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often 
combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period, 
police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may 
order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures, 
subsequent extensions of investigative detention of up to 6 months.
    Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reports of its 
use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts 
largely were controlled by the Milosevic regime and rarely challenged 
the will of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption also is 
widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be 
subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny 
a fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose 
the regime.
    Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life 
and are required to seek office periodically through election. This 
process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's 
candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes 
judges functionaries of the Government, who easily may be removed if 
they do not cooperate.
    The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at 
the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal 
Constitutional Court to which republic Supreme Court decisions, 
depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military 
court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal 
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to 
enforce its rulings.
    The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for 
abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of 
Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law, 
defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an 
attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also 
must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read 
into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the 
prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.
    Defense lawyers, especially those representing minority clients, 
have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of standard 
procedures, arguing that they undermine their clients' rights. Even 
when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the 
courts ignored or dismissed the complaints. For example, in Pozarevac, 
district prosecutor Bosko Papovic conceded that two Otpor activists 
were innocent of charges that they had conspired to kill associates of 
Marko Milosevic. Nevertheless, the two youth activists were imprisoned 
for 2 months, in May and June. Papovic, along with 15 other judges who 
defended his decision, subsequently was fired (see Section 1.d.).
    Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the 1998 Act on 
Lawyers, which they believe restricts the freedom of lawyers and 
interferes with the independence of lawyers in their dealings with 
clients. They believe that the law gives too much authority to the 
lawyers' chambers, both at the republic and federal levels, which the 
Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the Government to exercise 
stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian 
Constitutional Court judge, the law enabled the regime to interfere 
with the lawyer-client relationship, which even during the Communist 
era was upheld to a greater degree.
    In June the Government debated the passage of a law against 
terrorism in the Serbian Parliament. With its sweeping powers, the law 
would have allowed police essentially to arrest anyone, including NGO 
and media representatives, whom they deemed to be working for the 
removal of the Government. The law allowed for a minimum sentence of 3 
years' imprisonment in such cases. Finally, the law extended the period 
of detention during which police could conduct their investigation from 
3 to 30 days. Although the bill was not signed into law, the threat of 
its passage hampered many opposition activities against the Milosevic 
regime.
    Under Milosevic, the Government also violated norms of judicial 
fairness by pursuing cases previously brought against individuals and 
groups charged under the Yugoslav Criminal Code with jeopardizing the 
territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring or forming a 
group with intent to commit subversive activities (undermining the 
``constitutional order''). Most of the cases involved alleged 
violations under Article 136 of the Federal Penal Code related to 
``association to conduct enemy activity,'' or Article 125 concerning 
``terrorism.'' There is no clear estimate as to how many persons remain 
imprisoned on these specific charges.
    Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina who was 
transferred from Kosovo to a prison in Nis in July 1999. Dr. Brovina, 
who is known for her human rights work on behalf of women and children 
in Kosovo, was tried and convicted on terrorism charges and in December 
1999 sentenced to 12 years' incarceration. Dr. Brovina was freed on 
November 1 by a special pardon from President Kostunica.
    The Serbian court system convicted 143 ethnic Albanians in a mass 
trial in Nis in May. The men, who received sentences ranging from 7 to 
13 years' imprisonment, were convicted of being members of the KLA, 
terrorism, and attacking police. The trial was criticized widely by 
human rights groups because little effort was made to establish 
individual, as opposed to collective, guilt. In addition, defense 
witnesses were not allowed to testify, and the judge reportedly 
admitted that there could have been ``shortcomings'' in the 
prosecution's evidence.
    On July 6, six ethnic Albanians in Serbia accused of terrorism and 
supporting the KLA were sentenced to a total term of 46 years in 
prison. Human rights NGO's noted that the trial was unfair and that 
allegations of torture were widespread. The court failed to investigate 
the allegations of torture and accepted a filmed confession made while 
the men were in police custody, which already had been aired on Serbian 
State television. AI noted that this was in clear violation of the 
Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure.
    A spokesperson for the Serbian Judges Association stated that as of 
July, 50 of its members had been forced to resign due to pressure from 
the regime. This followed the dismissal by the Government of 16 judges 
for their alleged work with the political opposition, including Djordje 
Rankovic and district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who spoke out against 
the case of the two Otpor activists who were beaten by associates of 
Marko Milosevic in Pozarevac (see Section 1.d.).
    Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates 
Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire 
year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His 
lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was 
serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on 
May 17, 1999. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was 
unable to locate Hoti as of July 1999 and there was no further 
information at year's end.
    In December, President Kostunica pardoned opposition activist 
Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.''
    The Government continued to hold an estimated 700 ethnic Albanians 
as political prisoners. Visits to political prisoners are rare and are 
often supervised by police. Local human rights NGO's have attempted to 
visit prisoners, with mixed results. The ICRC has been able to visit 
many, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanian political prisoners inside 
Serbia.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Under the Milosevic Government, the authorities 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Federal law gives republic 
ministries of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor 
potential criminal activities, a power that is abused routinely. It is 
widely believed that the authorities monitor opposition and dissident 
activities, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and 
wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of federal and 
Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from abroad, 
ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
    The law includes restrictions on searches; however, officials often 
ignored them. Police raided the Belgrade and Mladenovac offices of 
Otpor in early September without a search warrant. The previous day, 
police raided Otpor's Novi Sad office. They confiscated computers, 
several thousand Tshirts, posters, buttons, and information about the 
movement's activists. Despite the law, the police did not leave any 
notification of the items they removed from Otpor's premises. The 
Serbian Helsinki Committee stated that the raids violated Article 21 of 
the Serbian Constitution, according to which police may enter a premise 
with a warrant or, if no warrant is obtained, in order to ``save people 
and property.'' Before the September 24 elections, as part of its 
crackdown on independent political activists, police also repeatedly 
raided the offices of CESID, a Serbian election monitoring NGO, 
confiscating files and computers.
    A government law requiring universal military service is enforced 
only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The 
informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic 
Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths 
during the year. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders living abroad 
at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40 percent were estimated 
to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflects the large number of 
conscription-age men in Yugoslavia's Albanian community. Leaders of 
Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that when 
forced compliance of these groups with universal military service did 
occur, it was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country. 
According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for 
whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were 
granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told 
that if they returned to Yugoslavia their cases would be reviewed on a 
``case-by-case'' basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among 
offenders. A law passed in October 1998 stated that draft dodgers who 
did not report for military service would forfeit their right to 
inheritance. In many cases Yugoslav officials have refused to issue 
proper travel documents to children born to asylum seekers (see Section 
2.d.). A new amnesty bill was pending at year's end. The proposed law 
would grant amnesty to draft evaders, deserters, those who refused to 
bear arms, and to most political prisoners convicted under Article 136 
of the Penal Code (association to conduct enemy activity), but not to 
political prisoners convicted under Article 125 (terrorism). Many 
ethnic Albanian political prisoners were reportedly convicted under 
Article 125, but the exact number is unknown.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--Federal law provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Milosevic regime 
severely restricted these rights in practice. The October 1998 Law on 
Public Information, which was used to silence the independent media 
during the Kosovo war, continued to be applied to journalists and 
members of the political opposition. The regime arrested dozens of 
journalists and levied the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in fines in apparent efforts to silence the independent media. 
The regime took over independent television and radio stations and shut 
down others. State-controlled media coverage was biased severely in 
favor of Milosevic's coalition parties, the SPS and JUL, particularly 
in early September. State media carried minimal coverage of opposition 
parties, and what was covered was cast in a negative light. The regime 
also severely restricted international media coverage of the September 
elections by denying entry visas to many foreign journalists and by 
placing travel restrictions within Serbia on others. In addition, 
during the preelection period the regime forced international news 
organizations to broadcast through state-controlled facilities where 
reports could be censored or blocked.
    The Milosevic regime also cracked down on opposition politicians 
and politically active NGO's, particularly in the months preceding the 
September elections. Police arrested almost a dozen DOS candidates and 
raided several DOS offices. In the Sandzak region, police arrested 
opposition activists for handing out leaflets (see Section 1.d.). Many 
observers suggested that the disappearance of former Serbian President 
Ivan Stambolic in late August was meant to be a threatening message to 
SPS politicians not to stray from Milosevic's party (see Section 1.b.). 
Police also brought over a thousand members of the Otpor movement into 
police stations for questioning. Some of these interrogations resulted 
in beatings (see Section 1.c.).
    While the media climate greatly improved after Kostunica's election 
victory, media independence remained a problem. Observers noted that 
after the DOS took control of state-owned Radio-Television Serbia, 
coverage leading up to the December 23 parliamentary elections strongly 
favored DOS candidates. Other media outlets also lack professionalism.
    In March an indictment was filed against Dusan Mihajlovic, an 
opposition party leader; however, the case was not pursued. Mihajlovic 
was charged with ``spreading false information and disturbance of 
citizens'' because of remarks he made on a television news program 
criticizing a Milosevic speech.
    In May independent journalist Miroslav Filipovic, who also worked 
closely with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and as a 
correspondent for the Belgrade-based daily Danas, was arrested on 
charges of ``espionage'' and ``spreading false information'' following 
a series of articles investigating Yugoslav Army abuses in Kosovo. 
Formal charges were not brought against Filipovic until June. A closed 
trial held in July was protested by human rights NGO's, as was the 7-
year sentence that Filipovic received. Both the prosecution and the 
defense appealed the sentence. The Filipovic case attracted significant 
attention from many international press and human rights groups. In 
addition over 300 journalists from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia 
signed a letter to Milosevic protesting the harsh sentence against 
Filipovic and demanding his release. On October 10, the Supreme 
Military Court in Belgrade overturned the guilty verdict against 
Filipovic on procedural grounds and sent the case back to court for a 
new trial. Kostunica pardoned Filipovic in October, and the charges 
against Filipovic were dropped.
    The Government fined the newspaper Glas Javnosti $5,000 (300,000 
dinars) under the Public Information Act, and Slavoljub Kacarevic, 
director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper, was fined $2,000 
(120,000 dinars) for an article published on June 14. Also in June, in 
Leskovac a car belonging to two independent journalists was vandalized 
outside the police station while the two were covering protests.
    In July independent publishers were forced to reduce the number of 
pages in their newspapers because the amount of paper supplied by the 
only domestic newsprint manufacturer was insufficient. The Federal 
Government turned down a request to import additional paper supplies 
even as leading Belgrade dailies Blic, Danas, and Glas Javnosti, and 
weeklies Vreme and NIN, used their last reserves of paper.
    According to the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) 
network, more than 140 radio and television stations were banned inside 
Serbia under Milosevic, and, as of April, more than $625,000 (37.5 
million dinars) in fines were imposed on independent media under the 
Public Information Act. Despite this repression, ANEM reported that 
dozens of independent radio and television stations still were 
broadcasting.
    In mid-January, broadcasting equipment was stolen from the Belgrade 
television station Studio B. As a result, over 2 million viewers were 
unable to receive the station's signal. Although no one was ever 
charged with the crime, ANEM believed that the theft was in direct 
response to Studio B's broadcast of opposition-related programming.
    In a controversial news conference in February, former Serbian 
Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj threatened violence against 
independent journalists.
    In March the police attacked a technician and security guard at 
Studio B and confiscated transmission equipment from the premises. In 
addition eight print and electronic media outlets were fined for 
alleged violations of the Law on Public Information. Six additional 
independent radio and television stations were closed in March.
    Foreign journalists were expelled from Serbia and denied entry 
visas periodically throughout the year, especially during the period 
prior to the September elections.
    Following the beating of the three Otpor activists in Pozarevac in 
May, there was a wave of arrests as independent journalists publicized 
the assault. Studio B and the independent dailies Blic and Danas were 
fined for ``false reporting'' after they informed the public of the 
attack.
    On May 17, police moved against four of the largest independent 
media outlets--Studio B, B2-92, Radio Index, and Blic--and closed down 
the building from which they all operated. Radio Pancevo remained the 
only source of independent information in the Belgrade area until later 
that same night when its transmission also was blocked. On May 17 and 
18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and used excessive 
force to disperse street protests against the Government's closing of 
television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    In June security guards beat Hanibal Kovac, a correspondent for 
Radio Free Europe, in Sabac in a recreation center controlled by a 
member of the Serbian Radical Party. The guards reportedly told Kovac 
that he was ``first on the list and that other reporters would get the 
same.'' Police also beat up a reporter in Novi Sad for wearing an Otpor 
T-shirt.
    On June 2, Dusika Radulovic, owner of a small independent newspaper 
Borske Novine was sentenced to 3 months in prison for publishing an 
article that allegedly libelled members of the local government. On 
June 9, satirist Boban Miletic was sentenced to 5 months in prison for 
ridiculing Milosevic during a public reading of his latest book.
    Also in June, a television crew from Radio Kraljevo was arrested 
along with Democratic Party officials and four Otpor activists in 
Kraljevo.
    In August journalist Zoran Lukovic was arrested and sent to prison 
to serve a 5-month sentence for ``spreading false information.'' 
Lukovic was convicted in March 1999 with another journalist, Srdjan 
Jankovic, and with Slavko Curuvija, editor of the Belgrade daily 
tabloid Dnevni Telegraf. Curuvija was murdered in Belgrade in April 
1999, allegedly by members of Milosevic's secret service (see Section 
1.a.). Lukovic was pardoned and released at the end of the year.
    In August the NGO Reporters without Borders protested the 
Government's jamming of radio broadcasts by opposition station Radio 
Jasenica and the private station Radio Globus. A press release issued 
by the organization pointed to ``a policy of increasing repression 
against independent media'' prior to the September election. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also 
highlighted media repression in the period prior to the elections.
    In August five cable networks in Novi Sad stopped broadcasting news 
from television stations in Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hungary 
following a Yugoslav Information Ministry ban on broadcasting 
``political propaganda programs.'' Critics charged that the ban was an 
attempt to prevent 200,000 viewers in the region from having access to 
independent media during the September election campaign.
    The Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) noted in 
August that ``repression of the authorities against the media in Serbia 
increased in the past few months.'' In addition the NUNS noted in its 
Dossier of Repression that the Information Act ``in the past few months 
has become an auxiliary means of carrying out repression.'' The NUNS 
confirmed ANEM's report that the independent media were charged the 
equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines by the regime.
    On November 27, two policemen beat Hungarian journalist Peter Aradi 
and threatened to kill him. Otpor reported that Aradi was taken to the 
police station in Senta, a town near the Hungarian border, where he was 
interrogated, beaten, and threatened before being released the 
following day (see Section 5). Also in November, three plainclothes 
police officers from the Serbian Interior Ministry detained Milos 
Antic, assistant editor of the Nedeljni Telegraf, and interrogated him 
for 2 hours at the police station in Belgrade. They pressured him to 
reveal his sources for an article he had written about Milosevic's 
alleged attempts to crack down on prodemocracy protesters during the 
October 5 demonstrations; the officers said they were acting under 
orders of a prosecutor preparing a case against Milosevic.
    In 1998 the Parliament passed the Universities Law. It severely 
curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government to appoint rectors 
and governing boards and hire and fire deans of faculties. Deans in 
turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking away tenure and 
promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The law also 
discourages political activism among students. After October 5, the new 
Government reinstated all previously dismissed professors.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Federal and 
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly; 
however, under Milosevic, the Serbian and Federal Governments severely 
restricted this right.
    In Kragujevac in February, Otpor was prevented from collecting 
contributions to assist the independent newspaper Nezavisna Svetlost in 
paying a fine levied against it under the Public Information Law.
    On April 14, police stopped buses with opposition supporters 
traveling to rallies in Belgrade. On May 9, police stopped an 
opposition rally in Pozarevac by blocking opposition supporters' access 
to the town. On May 17 and 18, police used excessive force to disperse 
opposition street protests in Belgrade (see Section 1.c.). Police 
banned opposition rallies in the Sandzak region (see Section 1.d.).
    During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some 
demonstrators and used tear gas.
    Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of 
peaceful association; however, under Milosevic the Serbian and Federal 
Governments severely restricted this right. By the end of the summer 
virtually anyone wearing an Otpor T-shirt was subject to arrest or 
harassment by the police.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The laws at both the federal and Serbian 
republic level provide for freedom of religion; however, under 
Milosevic, there were incidents of government infringement on freedom 
of worship by minority groups, and the legal system provided little 
protection for the religious rights of minority groups.
    Although in the past the Milosevic regime was allied closely with 
and gave preferential treatment to the Serbian Orthodox Church, a split 
between the two widened considerably during the year. The split began 
with the onset of violence in Kosovo and widened with the regime's 
continued repression of the political opposition.
    The Government repressed Muslims in the Sandzak region along the 
border between Serbia and Montenegro. Reports of harassment in the 
Sandzak region indicated that it was carried out mostly by federal 
Yugoslav army troops.
    The Government made no progress in the restitution of property that 
belonged to the Jewish community, despite Milosevic's past promises to 
resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic Churches have had 
similar difficulties with the restitution of their property confiscated 
by the Communist regime.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement; however, under Milosevic, the Federal and Serbian governments 
restricted this right in practice. The federal government makes 
passports available to citizens; however, the authorities under the 
Milosevic Government restricted Yugoslav citizens from reentering the 
country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of 
Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia to travel by 
holding up the issuance or renewal of passports for unusually long 
periods of time. It also reserved the option of prosecuting individuals 
charged previously with violating exit visa requirements. Throughout 
Milosevic's rule, opposition politicians and activists routinely were 
harassed and arrested as they traveled in Serbia. The Government placed 
travel restrictions on journalists. Freedom of movement was also 
restricted in travel between Serbia and Montenegro because of the trade 
blockade imposed by Serbian authorities.
    As Federal authorities had yet to repeal legislation targeting 
conscientious objectors and draft evaders from the war in Kosovo, many 
men could not travel freely throughout the country due to fear of 
arrest. Those conscientious objectors and draft evaders who fled Serbia 
could not return to the country for the same reason. Passports were 
denied as a matter of course to conscientious objectors and draft 
evaders. NGO representatives from 19 Serbian towns gathered in 
Montenegro in May and called for a general amnesty for conscientious 
objectors and draft evaders. AI and other NGO's noted that indictments 
continued to arrive at the homes of draft evaders and conscientious 
objectors. In several cases, trials against the men were conducted in 
absentia. After October 5, freedom of movement improved significantly. 
However, isolated incidents were reported late in the year of draft 
evaders from Montenegro stopped in Belgrade airport and sent back to 
Montenegro to face old charges in military courts. Draft evaders would 
be amnestied by a law being considered by the Federal Parliament at 
year's end.
    Following their exodus from Kosovo, there were reports that Serb 
refugees were prevented from traveling to Belgrade in 1999. Reports 
continue to indicate that their freedom of movement is restricted, with 
many of them being confined to Southern Serbia.
    Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional 
confiscation of passports. Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians 
complained of harassment at borders when reentering the country.
    Yugoslav embassies overseas generally are considered to apply a 
double standard when issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs 
have a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic 
minorities.
    Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts 
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have 
not been able to establish their citizenship in Yugoslavia, leaving 
them in a stateless limbo. The Government suspended the processing of 
citizenship applications during the NATO bombing. Government officials 
claimed that the country's citizenship application records were 
destroyed in the bombing, and did not resume processing applications.
    The conflicts that have occurred in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in 
recent years have led to widespread displacement of persons. Under 
Milosevic, the Government imposed numerous restrictions on free 
movement into and within Yugoslavia.
    Approximately half a million refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and 
some 220,000 more recent internally displaced persons from Kosovo, 
mainly Serbs and Roma, are living in the country. Unemployment among 
these groups is estimated at over 60 percent due to the country's poor 
economic climate. Up to 25 percent of the refugee population has moved 
more than three times since arrival in Serbia. Most Serb displaced 
persons from Kosovo are housed with host families; some 50,000 are in 
collective centers. A report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees 
describes collective centers for refugees as varying widely in quality 
and population density, ranging from ``decent'' to ``dismal, drafty, 
and crowded.''
    There are approximately 45,000 displaced Roma in Yugoslavia. Roma 
faced a difficult position during the Kosovo conflict. As neither Serb 
nor Albanian, the Roma in Kosovo tended to adapt to the ethnic group 
they perceived as dominant. As a result, many of Kosovo's Roma were 
perceived as Serb collaborators by returning ethnic Albanians, and many 
fled Kosovo for other areas of Yugoslavia (see Kosovo annex). Living 
conditions for Roma in Serbia are extremely poor. Local municipalities 
are often reluctant to accept Roma, hoping that if they refuse to 
provide shelter or assistance, the Roma may move on (see Section 5).
    The Yugoslav Government has been very slow to issue passports to 
refugees. This is a particular problem for parents who seek asylum. For 
example, Yugoslav officials in Germany refuse to issue passports to 
children born in Germany who have a German government document 
certifying their birth. When these asylum seekers who have been refused 
in Germany return to Yugoslavia with their children, the children 
travel on the basis of this document. Yugoslav authorities take the 
paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. The children 
then have no documentation in a country where documentation is a basic 
requirement.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997 
that the 1997 citizenship law would give the Ministry of Interior 
almost complete control over the granting of citizenship. The 
Government served notice that it plans to limit severely the granting 
of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. 
The Government also plans to revise the eligibility status of a large 
number of persons; refugees who have been granted citizenship since 
1992 may stand to lose their Yugoslav citizenship if they have acquired 
the citizenship of a former Yugoslav republic.
    Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents 
who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not 
be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian 
passports in the interim.
    The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right; 
however, in practice, under Milosevic, citizens in Serbia consistently 
were discouraged and often were prevented from exercising this right by 
the regime's domination of the mass media, control of the police, and 
manipulation of the electoral process. The regime persistently sought 
to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition leadership throughout 
Serbia through financial controls. In July Milosevic altered the 
Constitution to permit his candidacy in the September federal 
elections.
    Throughout the summer, the Milosevic regime continuously exerted 
undue pressure on persons and groups attempting to peacefully change 
their government (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In one such 
instance, police in August halted the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance by the Leskovac Human Rights Board, an organization that 
encouraged citizens to participate in September's elections.
    Kostunica came to power as President of Yugoslavia after mass 
demonstrations in early October by citizens protesting Slobodan 
Milosevic's attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and 
Constitutional Court to force a second round of elections. Kostunica 
ran against Milosevic in the September 24 elections under the DOS 
Party, an 18-party alliance. Milosevic banned international observers 
from monitoring the elections; the opposition reported election fraud 
in some areas, particularly in southern Serbia and the voting in 
Kosovo. In Kosovo many polling stations were not opened on the 
September 24 election day. Although the DOS claimed victory for 
Kostunica, the Yugoslav Federal Election Commission claimed that 
neither candidate had won an outright majority and called for a second 
ballot. This sparked citizen protests in Belgrade and a general strike 
in favor of the opposition beginning on October 2, which culminated in 
a mass demonstration on October 5 by half a million citizens calling 
for Milosevic to give up power. Kostunica declared himself President of 
Yugoslavia that night and 2 days later Milosevic conceded electoral 
defeat. A federal government was formed by the DOS and the SNP 
(Socialist People's Party). At the Serb republic level, a three-way 
interim power sharing government was formed by the DOS, the SPS 
(Socialist Party of Serbia), and the Serbian Renewal Movement until the 
December 24 republic elections. Milan Milutinovic remained President of 
the Republic of Serbia.
    There are no legal restrictions that hinder women's participation 
in government and politics, and women are active in political 
organizations; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and 
government offices, holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level 
positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. Until Milosevic's 
defeat, his wife Mira Markovic was an exception. She was the leading 
force in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party, through which she 
exerted extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers, 
including her husband. On November 27, female political activists 
announced that 10 DOS parties agreed to fill at least 30 percent of the 
places on the party list for the Serbian parliamentary elections with 
female candidates.
    There are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in 
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic 
Serbs and, to a certain extent, Montenegrins dominate the country's 
political leadership. Montenegro boycotted the September 23 elections. 
Few members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of 
government or the state-run economy; however, Rasim Ljajic, a Sandzak 
Muslim leader, was appointed the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs 
in November. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part in the 
electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level, including 
most recently in federal presidential elections in September. Serbs in 
Kosovo participated in the September elections, but with low voter 
turnout.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Milosevic regime routinely hindered the activities of and 
regularly rejected the findings of human rights groups.
    A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the 
country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and 
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and 
the Center for Antiwar Action research human rights abuses throughout 
the country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The 
Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes 
studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based 
Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the 
Sandzak region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim 
population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these 
organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.
    Throughout the summer, Serbian police cracked down on Belgrade's 
human rights NGO's, including the Helsinki Committee, the Center for 
Anti-War Action, and Women in Black Against War. Each organization 
reports that it was visited and harassed by police in an effort to 
intimidate the NGO's and document their sources of international 
support. In June police closed the offices of Women in Black Against 
War. In a related move, the premises of the Forum for Ethnic Relations 
also were shut and sealed.
    In August the Yugoslav Army announced that it would bring charges 
against Natasa Kandic, the head of the Humanitarian Law Center. The 
Yugoslav Army's Information Service alleged that Kandic breached the 
Law on Information when she published the article ``I Will Not Keep 
Quiet About Horrors'' in the independent newspaper Danas. Kandic 
published a defiant response to the army. The VJ did not initiate 
charges against Kandic, and threats and harassment against her stopped 
after October 5.
    Citing ``political activities,'' police in Leskovac removed the 
Human Rights Protection Committee from the register of social 
organizations and citizens' associations in the southern Serbian town 
in August. At the same time, criminal charges were filed against the 
director of the organization for the improper receipt of money.
    With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to international 
nongovernmental human rights organizations.
    In 1999 as a result of their actions in Kosovo, the ICTY formally 
indicted as war criminals former President Milosevic and four other 
senior officials, including Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, 
Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff of the 
Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of Internal 
Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic. President Kostunica has made public 
statements that he opposes the extradition of any indictees to the 
ICTY.
    On December 11, a court in Uzice convicted and sentenced nine men 
for ``kidnaping'' indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Stevan Todorovic 
and handing him over to NATO forces in Bosnia in September 1998. On 
December 13 in the Hague, Todorovic pled guilty to ethnic cleansing.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for 
all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social 
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in practice the 
legal system provides little protection to such groups.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem and the traditionally 
high level of domestic violence persisted. The few official agencies 
dedicated to coping with family violence have inadequate resources and 
are limited in their activity by social pressure to keep families 
together at all costs. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file 
complaints with the authorities. There is no trained police unit to 
provide protection or assistance to female victims of sexual or other 
violence. The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a 
rape and spousal abuse hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-
help groups. The Center also offered help to refugee women (mostly 
Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Criminal Code does not 
recognize spousal rape as a criminal offense; rape is defined as forced 
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married.
    The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for 
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women 
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional 
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be 
subservient to the male members of their family, long have subjected 
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among 
minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the 
ability to exercise their right to control property and children. Women 
legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to 
the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average 
wage is 11 percent lower than the average wage of men. Women are 
granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months 
available. Women are active in political and human rights 
organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or 
no official acknowledgement.
    Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational 
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory 
schooling. However, economic distress has affected children adversely 
in both the education and health care systems.
    Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into 
unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted 
in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in 
separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in private 
shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private 
homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict 
started, and the tension and division of society in general was 
replicated to the detriment of the children (see Kosovo annex).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for 
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities 
are inadequate and the Government did not make any efforts during the 
year to address the problem. The law prohibits discrimination against 
persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision 
of other state services. The law mandates access to new official 
buildings, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely 
intertwined as to be inseparable. Incidents of discrimination against, 
and harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in 
Serbian Sandzak.
    The Keston Institute reported that on September 26, a group of 13 
young men attacked 2 Romani women and one Romani man, all members of a 
Romani Pentecostal church in Leskovac, with sticks, bats, and chains. 
The attack took place 2 days after three young men interrupted the 
church's evening services and threatened the congregation, throwing 
firecrackers and shouting that they would force the Roma to leave town. 
The church reported the incidents to the local police, who advised them 
to file charges against the men. As of November 24, the attackers had 
not been found, but no further incidents had occurred.
    Societal violence against the Catholic minority in Vojvodina, 
largely consisting of ethnic Hungarians and Croats, was reported. In 
addition, Catholic churches frequented by the Croat minority were 
attacked, although there were few reports of this type of activity 
during the year.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Albanian leaders in the 
cities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja in southeastern Serbia 
complained of discrimination by Serbian authorities. Very few ethnic 
Albanians are employed by municipal governments in the region. In part, 
the problem is due to the refusal of Serbian authorities to recognize 
the credentials of ethnic Albanians who completed their higher 
education in Kosovo under the post-1989 parallel system.
    There were incidents of official discrimination against the Romani 
population and skinheads and police occasionally violently attacked 
Roma (see Section 1.c.). The European Roma Rights Center reported that 
a group of skinheads attacked two 15-year-old Romani boys in Vranje on 
April 29. The boys were punched and beaten with baseball bats; one boy 
reported two broken ribs. In Nis a group of skinheads beat a 15-year-
old Rom. Two of the attackers eventually were fined $10 (600 dinars). 
In May a 13-year-old Romani girl was attacked by a group of her fellow 
students and several skinheads with a knife. After the incident, police 
interrogated the girl and threatened to arrest her parents if she did 
not admit she was lying. In August several Romani families in Belgrade 
reported that skinheads repeatedly throw rocks at their houses, often 
breaking windows, shout racist insults, and threaten to set Romani 
houses on fire.
    Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small Romani parties 
in Serbia. One of the four deputy mayors In Kragujevac is a Rom. 
However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. For example, in Sabac, 
in western Serbia, Roma are barred from using a municipal swimming pool 
that is owned by the president of the local branch of the Serbian 
Radical Party. According to Human Rights Watch, on June 7, police 
leveled Roma homes in Belgrade, alleging that they were built in breach 
of zoning laws; police made racial insults and slapped and kicked some 
of the Roma who were forced out of their homes. Local authorities often 
ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
    In Vojvodina in November police beat and threatened Hungarian 
journalist Peter Aradi. Otpor reported that police dragged Aradi from a 
table in a pizzeria where he was dining, threw him to the floor, and 
placed a gun barrel in his mouth. He then was taken to the police 
station and beaten. Before Aradi was released, the police reportedly 
forced him to kneel, hold a Bible, and ``say something in Serbian.''
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and 
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions 
are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total 
labor force is approximately 2.3 million persons. The government-
controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati, 
or SSS) claims 1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to 1 
million in reality. The largest independent union is the United Branch 
Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000 
members. The third largest union is the Association of Free and 
Independent Trade Unions (AFITU), which has about 50,000 members. Most 
other independent unions are sector specific, for example, the 
Independent Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor 
state of the economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term 
mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in production. The 
independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not 
yet reached the size needed to mount countrywide strikes. The 
independent unions also claim that the Milosevic regime prevented 
effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which included 
preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the job 
security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors who 
support independent unions.
    The largely splintered approach of the independent unions has 
resulted in few achievements in terms of increased wages or improved 
working conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a 
result of its well-organized and tough bargaining positions during 
strikes of teachers and health workers in 1998 but has not led any 
strikes since then; it has focused instead on political action 
campaigns aimed at raising workers' political awareness. The official 
union lost credibility with some of its members because it ultimately 
accommodated the Milosevic regime's position on these strikes.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' 2000 Annual 
Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights alleges that Serbia's labor 
laws still favor the official trade union and heavily restrict the 
right to strike. The report also alleges that the independent union 
Nezavisnost continued to face discrimination.
    The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains 
constrained.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this 
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a 
rudimentary level of development. Individual unions continue to be very 
narrow in their aims, unable to join with unions in other sectors to 
bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism in the 
country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs of all 
workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of workers. 
Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric power 
industry employees have been ineffective in finding common denominators 
(e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards, universal 
workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result is a 
highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who relate to the 
needs of their individual union but rarely to those of other workers. 
Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the high rate of 
unemployment, limited workers' militancy.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a 
source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and 
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in 
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger 
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be 
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car 
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this 
practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking 
other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an 
actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers 
who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess 
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal 
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is 
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls 
who are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises, 
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies 
generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is 
approximately $15 (900 dinars). However, this figure is roughly 
comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is 
paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The 
actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net 
salaries, $50 (3,000 dinars) per month. The minimum wage is 
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The cost of food and utilities alone for a family of four is 
estimated to be $120 (7,200 dinars) per month. According to one report, 
workers' salaries fell 34 percent during the year. Private enterprises 
use the minimum wage as a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average 
wages.
    Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although 
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor 
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little 
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, 
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the 
competition for employment and the high degree of government control 
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work 
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons, and trafficking is a problem. There are laws 
that could be used to prosecute traffickers although the Milosevic 
regime showed little interest in addressing the problem. There 
continues to be little information available on trafficking, although 
Serbia is a source, transit, and destination country for women and 
girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution. 
There were no reports of individuals prosecuted for trafficking.
    Belgrade is a transit point, and to a lesser extent, a destination 
point, for trafficking in women and girls. Reportedly women from 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania are trafficked to and 
through the country. There were also reports that women were trafficked 
through the country to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and 
were forced to work as prostitutes or were trafficked to other 
countries. Women are trafficked to Italy, Greece, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, and other Western European countries. Women 
trafficked to Italy often are sent through Montenegro (see Montenegro 
annex).
    Women often are recruited to work abroad through advertisements for 
escort services, waitresses, and personal advertisements for marriage 
offers or lonely hearts columns, and then forced into prostitution. 
Federal legislation allows escort agencies to be registered and 
advertise; many of these agencies are involved in trafficking.
    There are no statistics available for children trafficked to other 
countries; however, the International Helsinki Federation for Human 
Rights reports that children, mostly Roma, are kidnaped and used for 
prostitution, begging, and stealing.
    There are no Government trafficking prevention programs or services 
for victims. A very small number of NGO's deal with trafficking issues. 
Awareness of human trafficking is low; however, the problem received 
some media attention.

                                 Kosovo

    Kosovo continued to be administered under the civil authority of 
the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution 
recognized the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) over Kosovo but also called for ``substantial 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration.'' UNMIK began to establish 
a civil administration in June 1999, following the conclusion of the 
NATO military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, 
police, and paramilitary forces from the province. The chief 
administrator of UNMIK during the year was the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. Bernard Kouchner. Within UNMIK the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was made 
responsible for institution building, democratization, and human 
rights. To provide for greater Kosovar inclusion in civil 
administration and to circumvent the risk of quasigovernmental or 
``shadow'' governmental entities, in February UNMIK established the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). Under the direction of 
the SRSG and his designated representatives, international and local 
experts shared policy and advisory responsibility for providing social 
services and collecting revenues. On October 28, UNMIK conducted 
elections throughout Kosovo for members of municipal assemblies with 
wide participation by both political parties and voters other than 
Serbs. Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of 
movement, declined to register and boycotted the elections. Although 
there were some logistical problems and voting irregularities, the 
elections were held without significant violence or obstacles. Election 
observers concluded that they were carried out in accordance with 
international democratic standards and met the criteria for credible 
elections. The elected municipal assemblies were sworn in and took 
their seats in November; the SRSG appointed members of municipal 
assemblies in three Serb-majority municipalities where there was no 
election, and these took their seats in December. UNMIK Regulation 
1999/24 established that applicable law in Kosovo would include UNMIK 
regulations and those laws in effect in Kosovo as of March 22, 1989, 
the code in effect before the regime of Slobodan Milosevic abolished 
the political autonomy of Kosovo. This created a complex and in some 
cases incomplete set of codes. UNMIK issued a series of interim 
regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of 
governmental entities and private individuals. UNMIK regulations bound 
all public officials, including judges, to respect international human 
rights law. The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the 
legacy of ethnic conflict and Yugoslav oppression was an obstacle to 
judicial independence, and some judges and prosecutors reportedly were 
subject to outside pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic 
disputes.
    The U.N.-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (Kosovo 
Force, or KFOR), which included forces from all 19 NATO countries and 
over 20 non-NATO members, maintained internal security and defense 
against external threats. KFOR also assisted UNMIK's multinational 
civilian police corps (U.N. International Police, or CIVPOL) in its 
role as uniformed and criminal police. Of 4,718 regular, border, and 
special police positions authorized for Kosovo, contributing countries 
deployed about 4,000. The OSCE-run Kosovo Police Academy trained over 
3,000 local police officers for the newly established Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS). The KPS partnered with CIVPOL in field training. CIVPOL 
later began to transfer basic policing functions to KPS in some areas, 
while continuing to provide oversight. Several hundred additional KPS 
recruits continued training, and the OSCE was on schedule to have over 
4,000 KPS trained by the spring of 2001. The Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), a civilian emergency preparedness service agency that 
incorporated disarmed former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), began training to respond to civil and medical emergencies. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated several 
dozen humanitarian projects for the KPC, often in collaboration with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Some members of KFOR, CIVPOL, 
and the KPC occasionally committed abuses.
    A long history of mismanagement by Yugoslav Federal and Serbian 
authorities left the economy in poor condition even before armed 
conflict resulted in the massive destruction of property and economic 
enterprises. Key industries before the conflict were mining, 
metallurgy, and related manufacturing enterprise. The prewar economy 
also had a substantial agrarian sector. Unemployment among the 
predominantly ethnic Albanian population was estimated at 62 percent. 
Unemployment rates were much higher among Serb and other minority 
communities, although some Serbs continued to receive stipends or 
pensions from Yugoslavia. International organizations and donors 
continued their programs to improve the infrastructure and provide a 
regulatory climate conducive to enterprise and investment. About 70 
percent of small and medium-sized private enterprises restarted 
activities. However, the instability of the region, coupled with the 
destruction of property records and a still weak legal and regulatory 
framework, caused private capital investment to lag. The privatization 
of state enterprises stalled pending the resolution of significant 
property issues. Domestic energy generation capacity was about 50 
percent of demand, and energy import arrangements remained uncertain. 
Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign aid were important 
sources of national income. Significant criminal economic activity took 
place, especially in the fuel sector. International financial 
institutions estimated gross domestic product at less than $400 per 
capita.
    UNMIK generally adhered to international human rights standards in 
its administration of the province; however, serious problems remained, 
largely as a result of ongoing interethnic tensions. A few killings 
resulted from attacks that appeared to be politically motivated. 
Citizens continued to be killed by landmines planted by combatants 
during the 1999 conflict. Some kidnapings and disappearances continued. 
Approximately 3,600 persons also were missing and unaccounted for as a 
result of the armed conflict in 1999, including approximately 2,750 
Albanians, 500 Serbs, and 300 members of other ethnic groups. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
exhumed 3,620 remains in 1999 and 2000, of which about 1,260 remains 
were still unidentified. There were some reports of the excessive use 
of force by KFOR and CIVPOL during arrests. Early in the year some KPC 
members were accused of committing incidents of intimidation and 
extortion. In the course of carrying out their law and order 
enforcement functions, KFOR and CIVPOL at times used arbitrary arrest 
and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. The 
judiciary was subject to bias and outside influence, particularly in 
interethnic cases, and did not always ensure due process. Some 
newspapers engaged in hate speech or printed articles providing 
personal details of alleged war criminals or collaborators. After some 
of those individuals were attacked, UNMIK issued a temporary regulation 
that prohibited articles that might encourage criminal activity or 
violence. Some observers in both the local and international media 
criticized this regulation as an infringement of freedom of the press. 
In order to prevent the potential for large, unruly gatherings, UNMIK 
occasionally limited freedom of assembly. There were some limits on 
freedom of movement. Over 150,000 Kosovar Albanians returned to the 
province during the year; only a few ethnic Serbs and other minorities 
returned. Rape, violence, and discrimination against women remained 
serious problems. Religious tension and violence continued. Ethnic 
Albanians destroyed approximately 20 Serbian Orthodox churches during 
the year, with a total of 100 destroyed since June 1999 in retaliation 
for Yugoslav troops' earlier destruction of mosques. Societal violence 
against ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities was widespread, but 
decreased somewhat during the year. A total of 245 civilians were 
killed and 522 cases of arson were reported during the year. Most 
murders of minorities were rooted in ethnic retaliation; other killings 
more often were connected to criminal enterprise, political 
factionalism, and private feuds. Societal discrimination continued to 
target Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with 
Serbs in the period before and during the NATO bombing campaign. The 
approximately 100,000 Serbs who remained in Kosovo live primarily in 
the north or in enclaves under the protection of KFOR. While a few 
Serbs and other minorities who left Kosovo in 1999 came back, security 
conditions did not permit large-scale organized returns. Worker rights 
are not developed fully, and child labor persists. Trafficking in women 
and girls to and through the province was a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--KFOR forces killed 
several individuals during operations. UNMIK and military authorities 
investigated these killings, but found no circumstances in which those 
responsible had acted improperly. On February 15, snipers wounded two 
KFOR soldiers. The soldiers responded by killing an Albanian and 
wounding at least four persons whom they said were firing at them from 
the rooftops. More than 35 other Albanians were detained on suspicion 
of involvement in the sniping. In August KFOR troops killed two 
Albanian males, claiming self-defense; some reports suggested that the 
two Albanians were shot in the back, and KFOR relieved at least one 
soldier of his duties pending investigation. On December 17, in 
Leposavic (Leposaviq), \2\ two Serbs were killed and one wounded after 
rioters protesting the arrest of a Serb man for the attempted murder of 
a KPS officer surrounded a U.N. police station guarded by KFOR soldiers 
and took seven KFOR soldiers hostage. One Serb was killed by gunfire; a 
KFOR commander reported that soldiers had fired warning shots that may 
have ricocheted and hit a protester. The other Serb died of a heart 
attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\  Throughout this report, dual town names are given: The Serb 
town name, followed by the Albanian name in parenthesis, except where 
towns universally are known by one name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January authorities accused a KFOR soldier, Sergeant Frank 
Ronghi, of raping and killing a 12-year old Albanian girl. A military 
tribunal subsequently convicted Ronghi and sentenced him to life in 
prison.
    In July 1999, KFOR arrested three members of a Kosovo Serb family 
for shooting and killing an Albanian man and wounding a second. In July 
the court trying the case heard credible evidence from KFOR that KFOR 
snipers were responsible for the shootings when called to the scene of 
an altercation (see Section 1.d.).
    Several killings appeared to be politically motivated. Some 
killings and attacks apparently were related to the October municipal 
elections. The majority of reported political intimidation attempts, 
which included drive-by shootings, kidnaping, and arson, were said to 
be aimed at representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 
led by Ibrahim Rugova, although other political parties subsequently 
reported nonlethal attacks as well. The LDK's rival, the Democratic 
Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci, the former head of the KLA, 
often was cited as being behind the attacks, although nonpolitical 
motives including clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for 
economic resources also were suspected in some cases. UNMIK police 
rarely were able identify perpetrators. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
reported that on June 15, two men wearing KLA badges killed senior LDK 
politician Alil Dreshaj. On August 4, the burned body of Shaban Manaj, 
an LDK politician and lawyer from Istok (Istog), was discovered 
following his disappearance 2 weeks earlier. On November 23, Xhemail 
Mustafa, cofounder of the LDK and President Rugova's press adviser was 
killed by unknown gunmen in the stairwell of his apartment building in 
Pristina. No arrests had been made by year's end. Attacks against LDK 
functionaries occurred in most other regions of the province as well.
    Unknown assailants killed two former KLA officers in April and May, 
respectively, shooting Besim Mala, also known as ``Commander Murrizi,'' 
in the streets of Pristina, and Ekrem Rexha, also known as ``Drini,'' 
in Prizren. UNMIK police attributed their killings to business 
disputes, rather than political motives. On July 12, a supporter of 
Ramush Haradinaj, a politician and former senior KLA commander, was 
murdered. On September 20, police found the body of Skender Gashi, a 
KPC officer and former KLA commander, in Orahovac (Rahovec); he had 
disappeared 2 days earlier. Local speculation included political, 
ethnic, and criminal motives for these killings, while the police 
attributed the murders to personal disputes.
    Unknown assailants killed one journalist, Shefki Popova, in 
September in Vucitrn (Vushtrri) (see Section 2.a.). Popova was listed 
as a Social Democratic Party candidate in Vucitrn (Vushtrri)'s 
municipal elections.
    The number of killings in the province decreased from the total 
recorded up to June 1999, when Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police 
withdrew from the province, and also from the total recorded in the 
second half of 1999, about 400 killings. According to available 
figures, there were 245 murders during the year, including 146 
Albanians, 55 Serbs, 9 Bosniaks, 12 Roma, and 23 of unknown or 
``other'' category, including 2 KFOR soldiers. U.N. police made arrests 
in only 2 to 3 percent of murder cases. Most murders of Serbs and other 
minorities were ethnically motivated (see Section 5), but the majority 
of murders of Albanians apparently were connected to family and 
economic rivalries and criminal activities.
    On February 29 in Srbica (Skenderaj), a Kosovar Albanian, Faton 
Hajrizi, killed a KFOR soldier. Hajrizi was arrested for the killing a 
number of times during the year and escaped from prison. He was 
rearrested in December and remained in custody at year's end. A second 
KFOR soldier was found dead, a presumed homicide, at the end of April; 
no perpetrator has been identified.
    Rexhep Luci, Pristina's director of urban planning, was killed in 
September. Kosovars and outside observers attributed the killing to 
Luci's role in heading up UNMIK's program to tear down illegal 
construction. Local commentators expressed grave concern that the 
killing would hinder efforts by Kosovar officials to establish civil 
order.
    On November 22, an explosion at the Pristina residence of Stanimir 
Vukicevic, the Yugoslav representative in Kosovo, killed one man and 
injured three others. The attack apparently was intended to protest the 
participation of Kosovo in the December Serbian parliamentary 
elections.
    In December 1999, an ethnic Albanian former judge was killed. He 
had worked in the Serbian judicial system.
    The International Crisis Group reported that in November 1999, five 
persons were abducted and killed by persons claiming either to be 
members of the Provisional KPC or the Policia Ushtarake, the KLA's 
military police, which was outlawed by UNMIK. Their bodies were found 
around the KLA compound in Lukare, north of Pristina. Four were 
identified; three as Roma, one as an Albanian woman. All four had been 
accused locally of having ``collaborated'' with Serb forces.
    Although there was credible evidence of Yugoslav agents and special 
forces teams in Kosovo, there were no confirmed reports of killings by 
Yugoslav or official Serbian forces inside the province.
    Some Kosovar Serbs continued efforts begun in 1999 to expel 
Albanians and other ethnic groups from the northern part of Mitrovica. 
In February, during an increase in violence in that city, groups of 
Serbs, reportedly including Serbian police, attacked ethnic Albanians 
on several occasions, killing eight civilians. The attacks were viewed 
as retaliation for a grenade attack on a U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) bus that killed two Serbs traveling from Mitrovica. 
During the month of February, over 1,500 Albanians, Muslim Slavs, and 
Turks fled their homes in the north side of the city, and Serbs 
withdrew from southern Mitrovica, where they were a minority (see 
Section 5).
    As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, certain rural areas of the 
province were filled with unexploded landmines and ordnance. Landmines 
and ordnance explosions killed 93 persons from June 1999 to April and 
injured more than 300. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) 
in Pristina accredited 16 international demining organizations in 
Kosovo. Well over 1,000 persons were involved in the demining effort in 
the province, clearing 8,980 mines, 4,932 cluster bomb units, and 5,774 
other ordnance. KFOR and MACC cleared over 16,000 houses, 1,165 
schools, 1,056 miles of roads, and 124 miles of rail tracks. 
International organizations and NGO's undertook a widespread public 
education campaign on mines.
    Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of the 
Milosevic regime's campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, with reports 
of dozens, sometimes hundreds, of civilians murdered in each town. 
Kosovo's still fragile investigative, judicial, and penal systems, in 
addition to ICTY, worked to ensure that perpetrators were identified 
and punished. Beginning in mid-1999, the ICTY began its program inside 
Kosovo, and carried out investigations in support of ongoing and future 
proceedings against presumed war criminals, including exhuming mass 
graves to permit the identification of victims of the war and ethnic 
cleansing. By year's end, the ICTY completed the exhumation of remains, 
begun in 1999, of some 529 graves, uncovering for identification the 
remains of 3,600 persons over the 2-season exhumation period. In May 
UNMIK issued a regulation establishing the Victim Recovery and 
Identification Commission (VRIC), primarily charged with identification 
of remains. Working with families on the basis of information they 
provided, details of the events, and the recovery of clothing and 
personal effects, the VRIC was able to positively identify victims. The 
remains of about 1,400 victims were unidentified at year's end.
    UNMIK suspended efforts to create a local Kosovo War and Ethnic 
Crimes Court due to lack of funding, concern over the scope of its 
mandate, and possible redundancy in view of the presence of 
international judges.
    Proceedings began in the Kosovo courts to adjudicate about 40 cases 
of alleged war crimes and genocide arising from the conflict, as well 
as murder cases dating from the period starting in June 1999. Of these, 
one war crimes case was decided on September 20, with the conviction in 
Gnjilane (Gjilan) of Kosovar Serb Milos Jokic for murder, attempted 
murder, and rape. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
    b. Disappearance.--Individual disappearances and kidnapings 
continued. In June an angry crowd of Serbs attacked UNMIK offices in 
Strpce (Shterpce) over the disappearance of a Serb shepherd. Marjan 
Melonasi, a journalist for Radio-Television Kosova who was half 
Serbian, disappeared in Pristina around September 9 (see Section 2.a.). 
Human rights organizations and police confirmed the kidnaping or 
disappearance of several young women each month. Most but not all of 
these victims reportedly eventually reappeared or were found, many 
after they were raped.
    As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, and despite the efforts of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ICTY, and 
other local and international organizations, the fate of over 3,600 
persons (2,750 Albanians presumed taken by Serbs, 500 Serbs presumed 
taken by Albanians, and 300 members of other ethnic groups) remained 
unknown at year's end. Withdrawing Yugoslav forces also took more than 
2,000 Albanian detainees with them into Serbia; Serbian authorities 
released over 1,300 by year's end, reputedly after payment to Serb 
middlemen by detainees' families in most cases.
    Both the ICTY and the VRIC, assisted by other international 
governmental and nongovernmental entities, continued their work to 
identify bodies exhumed from mass gravesites (see Section 1.a.). ICTY 
and other international experts did not expect to find many new mass 
graves. A clear gap continued between the 1,260 unidentified remains 
and the 3,600 persons reported to the ICRC as missing and unaccounted 
for at year's end. Efforts by governments, international organizations, 
and NGO's to determine the fate of these missing persons, including 
through pressure on Yugoslavia, did not lead to any results.
    In August the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights named a 
Special Envoy for Persons Deprived of Liberty in Connection with the 
Armed Conflict in Kosovo. In September the SRSG announced the 
establishment of an office in Pristina for detainees and missing 
persons.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of 
punishment, and CIVPOL and KFOR largely respected the law in practice; 
however, there were sporadic reports of the use of excessive force 
during arrests and other abuses. Military authorities reported in 
September that nine members of a KFOR unit, including four officers, 
were disciplined following an investigation into allegations of 
excessive force, beating of suspects, and sexual assault on women at 
checkpoints and while on patrol. KFOR used tear gas to disperse a 
peaceful demonstration in Mitrovica (see Section 2.b.).
    Some reports suggested that KPC members were responsible for 
incidents of intimidation and extortion, and in several zones such 
misconduct may have been organized and condoned by the local KPC 
leadership. In response UNMIK and KFOR put into place a KPC 
disciplinary code and a compliance enforcement framework, which 
assigned responsibility for investigating and disciplining KPC 
compliance violations and criminal actions. At KFOR's insistence, all 
six KPC zone commanders were rotated in October. By the end of the 
year, documented instances of KPC non-compliance had decreased 
significantly.
    International organizations reported that in the first half of 
1999, Serb forces subjected ethnic Albanian women to illegal 
confinement, rape and other forms of torture. ICTY has ruled that the 
definition of war crimes includes the Serb use of rape and sexual 
assault against ethnic Albanians. Kidnapings and mass rapes occurred in 
Djakovica (Gjakova), Pec (Peja), and Drenica, using local hotels and 
army camps as mass rape sites, and gang rapes of women occurred in 
their homes or on the side of the road. Assailants killed male family 
members who tried to intervene and women who tried to escape. According 
to credible information, individual KLA soldiers and other Albanians 
raped Serb and Roma women in the months following Yugoslavia's 
withdrawal in 1999. Since then, police have registered over 95 
individual rape and attempted rape complaints, but there has been no 
strong ethnic pattern, nor evidence to suggest organized sexual abuse 
of minority women. However, rape is underreported significantly due to 
the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families (see Section 
5).
    Numerous attacks on political figures, particularly members of the 
LDK, were reported, both before and after the October municipal 
elections (see Section 3). In most cases, no suspects were found; 
however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the rival PDK 
party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including clan 
rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also were 
suspected in some cases.
    In early December, unknown assailants attempted to kill Hajvas 
Berisha, a former commander of the KLA and a KPS member, in Pristina. 
UNMIK arrested three of the alleged assailants; however, because the 
case involved a family blood feud, no charges were filed against the 
assailants because the case was settled out of court through 
traditional Albanian feud mediation methods.
    KFOR arrested a group of Serbs in Gracanica in September in 
possession of a large cache of explosives and arms. The Serbs 
reportedly were planning terrorist acts against UNMIK and other 
international entities. Two were reportedly officers of a special 
forces unit of the Yugoslav Army (VJ).
    There were some reports of attacks and intimidation of UNMIK and 
KFOR officials. In February, a KFOR soldier was shot by unknown 
assailants while escorting Serb children from school in Gnjilane 
(Gjilan), apparently in retribution for the killing of two Albanian 
males by KFOR soldiers earlier in the year. On September 12, Vjosa 
Dobruna, the Kosovar co-chair of the Department of Civil Society and 
Democratic Governance, reported that her car was broken into and moved 
from its parking place; nothing was missing or stolen. On December 7, 
Serbs beat a U.N. policeman during an inspection of suspected weapons 
caches in northern Mitrovica. On December 19, unknown persons attacked 
the UNMIK building in Zubin Potok with automatic gunfire and grenades.
    Prison conditions meet prisoners' basic needs of food, sanitation, 
and access to medical care; however, facilities are in need of further 
refurbishment and repair. Some facilities are overcrowded. UNMIK 
established the Kosovo Correction Service (KCS), and the OSCE provided 
training for over 400 of a planned force of 700-plus corrections 
officers. The KCS, which included international corrections experts as 
interim administrators, operated 3 prisons in Prizren (with a capacity 
100 inmates), Dubrava (with a capacity of 520), and Lipljan (Lipjan). 
The latter is to be restricted to women and juveniles and eventually 
after further renovation is to offer space for mentally disturbed 
prisoners and detainees after further renovation. CIVPOL and KFOR 
operated four additional detention centers in Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec 
(Peja), and Gnjilane (Gjilan). KFOR also held detainees accused of war 
crimes and serious ethnic offenses at Camp Bondsteel, but planned to 
turn over all detention responsibilities to the KCS by early 2001. In 
the absence of currently suitable detention facilities for mentally 
disturbed prisoners, police released a visibly disturbed female 
detainee from the Mitrovica detention center on August 22; she 
reportedly committed suicide 3 days later.
    Male and female prisoners are separated, and there is a separate 
facility in Lipljan (Lipjan) for females and juveniles, but there have 
been cases of older youths who have been held with the general adult 
population.
    Prisons and detention centers permitted the ICRC full access to 
prisoners and detainees. In the absence of a formal agreement but 
pursuant to OSCE's mandate for human rights monitoring under UNSCR 
1244, they also offered ad hoc access to the OSCE human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under UNMIK regulation 
1999/24, issued in December 1999, which incorporated a local law in 
effect as of March 1989 and current practice, police may detain 
criminal suspects for up to 72 hours without charging them or granting 
them access to an attorney; however, in many cases, sources reported 
that CIVPOL used the 72-hour detention authority as a means of minor 
punishment with no intention of filing charges. The applicable rules of 
criminal procedure permit pretrial detention for up to 6 months, but 
UNMIK has decreed by regulation that this period may be extended by up 
to an additional 6 months in specific circumstances, in the case of 
crimes punishable by a sentence of over 5 years.
    In some instances, the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) intervened to 
continue the detention of persons ordered released by the courts but 
deemed an ongoing security threat. In July the prosecutor in Gnjilane 
(Gjilan) declined to press charges against Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic 
Albanian accused of shooting three Serbs in May, including a child, and 
an international judge complied with the order to release him (see 
Section 5). Given the ethnic sensitivity of the case, UNMIK asked KFOR 
to hold the accused pending review by an international prosecutor. The 
case has since gone before another panel of ethnic Albanian judges, and 
was found without merit. Zeqiri has not been released. COMKFOR also 
held until July two ethnic Albanians accused of killing two Serbs in 
July 1999, despite the fact that the Pristina district court ordered 
their release in November 1999. Some accused persons were held for 
several months pending the five district courts' becoming operational 
in January and February. For example, in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district, 12 
defendants accused of serious crimes were awaiting trial when the court 
began hearing cases in February; most of these had been in detention 
for some time, some as long as 7 months. In May 41 Serb and Roma 
prisoners in Mitrovica went on a hunger strike for several weeks to 
protest the delay in holding their trials.
    Some observers argued that ethnic bias played a significant role in 
abuses of due process. In July 1999, authorities arrested three members 
of the Serb Momcilovic family accused of killing an Albanian and 
wounding another. The newly appointed prosecutor for Gnjilane (Gjilan) 
indicted the three in January; their trial took place in April, 
subsequently was adjourned, and did not reconvene until the end of 
July. Although at that point there was evidence exonerating the 
defendants of murder, the court ordered further gathering of evidence 
before convicting them on weapons charges in August and sentencing them 
to time served. In the meantime, the other 11 (ethnic Albanian) 
defendants awaiting a functioning court in Gnjilane (Gjilan) were tried 
in February. Observers also argued that the Momcilovics' detention was 
prolonged unnecessarily due to the court's refusal in April to admit a 
video that tended to exonerate them, and to KFOR's failure to perform a 
sufficiently detailed investigation into the initial incident and 
transmit the evidence in a timely manner.
    Some 300 persons remained in pretrial detention in CIVPOL and KCS 
prisons and detention facilities and 57 persons remained in KFOR 
detention.
    At the end of the year, the Yugoslav authorities continued to 
detain approximately 700 Kosovar Albanians in prison in Serbia, charged 
with alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict. Federal and 
Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the 
Government, and terrorism are vague and were abused by the Milosevic 
regime. Yugoslav authorities released over 1,300 detainees, allegedly 
through the payment of bribes in some cases. The ICRC was able to gain 
permission for some family members to visit detainees in Serbia under 
restricted conditions.
    There were no reports of political detainees.
    Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reported 
instances of its use. However, the continued fear of ethnic Serbs and 
other minorities of revenge against them by Kosovar Albanians led large 
numbers to leave Kosovo (about 150,000 Serbs left during and after 
Yugoslavia's withdrawal), sometimes more or less voluntarily and 
sometimes under harassment by Albanians. The departure of Serbs and 
other minorities continued throughout the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Applicable law provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the legacy of ethnic conflict and years 
of Yugoslav oppression were an obstacle to judicial independence, and 
some judges and prosecutors reportedly were subject to outside 
pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic disputes.
    Supported by an Advisory Judicial Commission, UNMIK re-established 
a court system in Kosovo that included the Supreme Court, 5 district 
courts, 18 municipal courts, the Commercial Court, 13 offices of the 
Public Prosecutor, and a number of courts for minor offenses. Of those 
officials appointed by the UNMIK SRSG, 324 judges and 52 prosecutors 
began work, as well as 377 lay judges to assess the facts of the case. 
The judicial corps is almost exclusively Albanian; 8 of 12 Serbian 
appointees refused to serve. UNMIK also appointed members of other 
minorities, who are serving.
    Approximately 15 UNMIK-appointed international judges and 
prosecutors work in the district courts alongside local judges in 
sensitive ethnic cases. UNMIK planned for at least two international 
judges and one international prosecutor in each of the five judicial 
districts. UNMIK appointed 405 judges and prosecutorial personnel and 
refurbished judicial facilities. Courts in all five districts began 
operations.
    The law provides for the right of defendants to be present at their 
trials and to have legal representation, at public expense if 
necessary; however, local judicial and legal personnel by and large had 
not worked in the legal system since 1989, and the full exercise of 
defendants' rights was not ensured.
    The defense bar was weak and disorganized as well as rooted in a 
more passive approach to defense due to years of practice under 
Socialist and authoritarian codes. A program was underway to improve 
the bar at year's end. Legal personnel were in the initial stages of 
learning and applying international human rights laws and conventions. 
Since UNMIK and the Kosovar legal community have not approved a new bar 
examination, recent law students and legal personnel may not practice.
    Serb lawyers and judges refused to participate in the judicial 
system established by UNMIK, reportedly encouraged by the Milosevic 
regime not to accept the Kosovo system by participating in it. This 
practice effectively denied adequate representation and due process to 
Serb defendants.
    When they began hearing cases in January and February, the courts 
faced a high backlog of criminal cases of all kinds. By June the courts 
had tried 695 criminal cases, the vast majority of them petty crimes 
and crimes against property; only 13 of them were murder cases, and 
most resulted in fines or prison sentences under 6 months. An update on 
the number of cases tried was unavailable at year's end.
    There was a perception by human rights observers that in cases with 
Serb defendants or victims, a fair trial was unlikely due to ethnic 
bias. In July two Kosovar Albanians allegedly shot and injured three 
Serb Orthodox clerics (see Sections 2.a. and 5). Police arrested the 
accused, who were charged with attempted murder. When confusion and 
miscommunication led the victims missing a court date, the Albanian 
judge and prosecutor ordered the release of the defendants from 
pretrial detention. The court president subsequently rescheduled the 
hearing, and UNMIK assigned an international prosecutor to the case.
    After the NATO campaign and Yugoslavia's withdrawal from Kosovo, 
Kosovar Albanian judges were unanimous in rejecting Yugoslav and 
Serbian law. On December 12, 1999, UNMIK issued Regulation 1999/24, 
which defined applicable law in Kosovo to include both UNMIK 
regulations and legal codes in effect as of March 1989, when Kosovo 
lost its autonomy. Local legal and judicial personnel were enjoined to 
apply the Kosovo code in effect in 1989 first, and to proceed to the 
Yugoslav and Serbian codes to the extent that the first was incomplete. 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 bound all public officials to respect 
international human rights laws and conventions; although they 
initially largely were unacquainted with these, international 
organizations and NGO's implemented programs to increase awareness and 
application.
    Kosovar and European legal experts reviewed the compilation of 
applicable criminal law to ensure compliance with generally accepted 
international standards. Legal experts then reviewed a criminal code 
for Kosovo based on the regulation's guidance, but have not yet issued 
the new codes.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Under UNMIK, authorities generally respected these 
rights; however, individuals occasionally accused KFOR and U.N. Police 
of using excessive force and improper behavior in executing weapons 
searches in private homes, including breaking down doors and destroying 
personal property.
    In Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to 
seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house 
occupations during the summer months. Albanians in the southern part of 
Mitrovica continued to refuse Serbs access to their property there as 
well. Civilians were also responsible for the destruction, often 
through arson, of private property (see Section 5). There were a 
growing number of credible reports of violence and intimidation being 
used to force Serbs to sell their homes to Albanians at attractive 
prices.
    Respect for private property rights has proved problematic. 
Withdrawing Yugoslav forces destroyed most existing property records 
and this, combined with the disruption of 10 years of Serbian 
authoritarianism and discrimination and the massive property 
destruction during the conflict, cast doubt over how current occupants 
of vacated properties could remain where they were living, how owners 
could reclaim rightfully their property, where returnees and internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) could live and build, and how potential 
investors could gain title to land before investing significant sums. 
UNMIK created by regulation the Housing and Property Directorate and 
the Housing and Property Claims Commission responsible for resolving 
property issues and adjudicating disputes including claims for 
restitution of property lost through discrimination, requests for 
registration of informal property transaction, and claims by refugees 
and IDP's who lost their property. However, the Directorate and only 
had offices in Pristina, although with mobile teams heard disputes 
elsewhere. The regulation setting up the Housing and Property Claims 
Commission removed court jurisdiction over private (as opposed to 
commercial) property disputes. As a result, most property disputes 
remained unresolved. There were locally administered ad hoc solutions, 
and unregulated construction proceeded even as solutions for those 
persons without accommodation still were lacking.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--UNMIK regulations provide a 
framework for recognition of these rights, prohibit hate speech, and 
regulate media conduct; however, local media and some international 
media organizations and attorneys criticized UNMIK regulations on 
speech and the press as undemocratic and an infringement on the freedom 
of speech and of the press.
    UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 requires that public officials respect 
international human rights laws and conventions, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes freedom of 
speech and of the press. Through its regulation establishing the 
Department of Post and Telecommunications, UNMIK asserts control over 
broadcasting infrastructure; the OSCE oversees the Department of Media 
Affairs. In February UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/4, which prohibited 
hate speech and speech that incites ethnic violence.
    In June UNMIK issued Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37 on the conduct 
and organization of both broadcast and print media and established the 
office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) and the Media Appeals 
Board. The TMC is responsible for publishing a broadcast code of 
conduct and issuing licenses, for issuing temporary codes of conduct 
for print media, and for imposing sanctions, up to and including 
closing down offending media organs, in the event of violations of 
UNMIK regulations or published codes of conduct.
    Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were seven 
daily newspapers and seven weeklies or monthlies. All newspapers 
published in Kosovo were printed in Albanian; journals in Serbo-
Croatian were printed elsewhere and imported. The main dailies are 
aligned with different political parties. While flourishing, the print 
media often acted irresponsibly, publishing inflammatory articles that 
provided personal data including names and addresses of alleged war 
criminals or collaborators and inciting violence against political 
personalities. For example, the daily Dita published an article on 
Petar Topoljski, an UNMIK Serb employee who subsequently was murdered 
(see Section 5). In reaction UNMIK promulgated Regulations 2000/36 and 
2000/37, which prohibited the publication in both the print and 
broadcast media of personal information that would pose a threat to the 
life, property, or security of persons through vigilante justice or 
otherwise.
    In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The 
Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article 
depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked 
and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e. and 5). 
The newly appointed TMC fined the newspaper $12,200 (DM 25,000). In its 
decision on Dita's appeal of the fine, the Media Appeals Board ruled 
that since the situation in Kosovo approximated a state of emergency, 
UNMIK's regulation did not violate international human rights laws and 
that Dita's article violated the UNMIK Regulation. However, the Board 
decided that the TMC did not apply proper procedures in fining Dita, 
and overturned the penalty.
    At year's end, there were over 50 radio and 9 television stations. 
While the television broadcasts were exclusively in Albanian, several 
radio stations broadcast in Serbo-Croatian for a Serbian audience, and 
others, notably Radio Kontact (which also broadcast in Albanian, 
Turkish, and English) aimed at a broader multiethnic audience.
    There were some attacks on journalists. Radio Kontakt was the 
target of a grenade attack on April 17. On June 20, Valentina Cukic, an 
editor of Serbian language programming for Radio Kontakt, was shot and 
wounded in Pristina while wearing her KFOR press identification. Radio 
Kontakt previously had sought protection from CIVPOL, KFOR, and the 
OSCE in response to threats and violence against the station, which 
promotes multiethnic programming. In response, CIVPOL provided 
protection details for Radio Kontakt personnel, as well as security at 
the station premises. A writer for the daily Bota Sot claimed that an 
unknown assailant threw an explosive device into his yard in Prizren in 
August. In September unknown assailants shot, stabbed, and killed 
Shefki Popova, a newspaper reporter, outside his apartment in Vucitrn 
(Vushtrri). A radio journalist, Marjan Melonasi, disappeared the same 
weekend (see Section 1.b.). In October Dita reported that LDK 
sympathizers on their way to a rally near Urosevac (Ferizaj) beat a 
radio reporter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intimidation of 
journalists, like other public figures, is underreported due to 
concerns for personal safety.
    The University of Pristina was in full operation beginning with the 
2000-01 academic year, with new and pre-1989 staff. The university 
terminated and expelled six professors who cooperated with Yugoslavia 
by teaching after 1989, when Kosovo lost its autonomy and a shadow 
education system was established. UNMIK respected academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--UNMIK generally 
respected freedom of assembly; however, occasionally it limited this 
right.
    On February 11, in Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city 
violently forced Albanians out of their homes, killing eight in the 
process. Approximately 100,000 Albanian Kosovars marched in protest to 
Mitrovica from Pristina and other towns en route. Although the march 
itself was peaceful, KFOR prevented any attempt by the marchers to 
cross the bridge over the Ibar River into north Mitrovica and used tear 
gas to disperse those demonstrators who would not leave the bridge area 
at the end of the march.
    Several demonstrations protested against UNMIK and the 
international community for not doing enough to locate missing persons, 
including a May hunger strike by about 15 persons in Pristina. In 
September about 60 persons who had been released from detention in 
Serbia went on a hunger strike in Dubrava to protest the continued 
detention of ethnic Albanians by the Belgrade regime.
    In September local civil society representatives, joined by 
political parties and international representatives, organized a ``Day 
Against Violence'' as one element of reconciliation initiatives 
discussed at an overseas conference in July on reconciliation.
    In its regulations governing the definitions of and registration 
requirements for both political parties and NGO's, UNMIK stated 
specifically that such regulations did not affect the right to 
association and UNMIK generally respected this right.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--UNMIK respected the right to freedom of 
religion, and Regulation 1999/24 binds local officials to respect this 
right under international human rights laws and conventions.
    The effects of the Milosevic regime's oppression in Kosovo still 
are felt strongly. While the Milosevic regime and its local 
paramilitaries targeted persons and properties based largely on 
ethnicity, most Albanians are Muslims, and Yugoslav forces destroyed or 
damaged a number of mosques and other Islamic facilities prior to their 
withdrawal in June 1999. Given the strong association between Serbs and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, ethnic Albanians attacked churches as 
symbols of the Serbian regime. Following Yugoslavia's withdrawal in 
1999, over 100 Serbian Orthodox churches were burned or destroyed in 
retaliation (see Section 5). In light of societal violence against 
properties owned by the Orthodox Church, UNMIK authorities took steps 
in the months following the conflict to ensure that members of all 
religious groups could worship safely, including deploying KFOR 
security contingents at Orthodox religious sites throughout the 
province. Because the security situation improved at the end of the 
year, KFOR began transferring responsibility for security at a very 
limited number of Orthodox churches to CIVPOL and the KPS.
    In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The 
Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article 
depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked 
and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e., 2.a., and 
5).
    Kosovo's leading Orthodox cleric, Bishop Artemije, continued to 
reside in Gracanica, near Pristina, citing safety concerns, rather than 
in the diocesan seat in Prizren. Other leading Orthodox clerics also 
left their home parishes to reside in Gracanica.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Applicable law provides for freedom of 
movement; however, both the aftermath of war and practical obstacles 
restricted such movement in practice. Serbian and Yugoslav forces 
carried out a deliberate campaign of ``identity cleansing'' during the 
war, confiscating and destroying citizen identification documents and 
destroying the central and municipal archives and civil registers, with 
the result that many Kosovars had no documentation of identity. Some 
persons who retained Yugoslav passports found them invalid or 
unrecognized by neighboring countries due to the war. UNMIK published a 
regulation in March that authorized the Central Civil Registry to issue 
travel documents to any person registered as a habitual resident of 
Kosovo. The complexities of registering mass numbers of persons without 
any personal documentation drew out the process. In the interim, the 
SRSG issued individual travel letters in limited cases, but only a few 
countries recognized these documents. In September the U. N. submitted 
a sample travel document to member states for approval. However, 
because UNMIK was unable to issue identity cards until the end of the 
year, new travel documents were not issued.
    While precise figures are unavailable, substantial numbers of Serbs 
and Roma fled Kosovo following the conflict. Many displaced Serbs did 
not register with international agencies, but there are estimates of up 
to 150,000 Kosovar Serbs in Serbia, with an undetermined small 
additional number in Macedonia and approximately 30,000 displaced 
Kosovar Serbs, Roma, and other minorities in Montenegro. Numbers of 
displaced Roma are also difficult to estimate, although some sources 
report that as many as 25,000 Roma fled Kosovo in the aftermath of the 
conflict. Most did not return. Those who remained in Kosovo or who did 
return led lives restricted by the ethnic threats from some of their 
Albanian neighbors (see Section 5).
    After Milosevic withdrew Yugoslav troops in June 1999, the UNHCR 
oversaw the return of some 882,000 Kosovar refugees and IDP's from 
surrounding regions and other countries; about 150,000 have returned 
since the beginning of the year. While UNMIK and the international 
community were able to address many of the most pressing problems of 
the returnees, problems remained in obtaining sufficient housing, 
social services for the most vulnerable, property records, and 
education. Based on the establishment of a civil administration by 
UNMIK, several countries that had offered temporary refuge to ethnic 
Albanians forced by Milosevic to leave Kosovo ended their programs and 
began forcing the refugees to return to Kosovo, which tested the 
capacity of the province to absorb returnees. In October UNMIK asked 
countries to suspend returns until March of 2001.
    About 100,000 Serbs, 30,000 Roma, and 67,000 other minorities 
remained in Kosovo. Most of the 150,000 Serbs and about 30,000 Roma who 
fled when Yugoslav forces withdrew did not return, except in individual 
cases, due to fear of ethnic violence should they return without 
sufficient security safeguards and due to lack of economic opportunity, 
housing, and other basic services. UNMIK, the UNHCR, and the 
international community began a minority stabilization program to 
address some of these assistance needs. Although the high level of 
anti-Serb violence that characterized the period just after 
Yugoslavia's withdrawal decreased significantly, ethnically motivated 
violence and crime continued to be serious problems for minorities (see 
Section 5). Several villages that were once ethnically mixed have 
become almost entirely Albanian, with Serb residents moving to Serb 
villages elsewhere in Kosovo or leaving altogether. KFOR and UNMIK 
provided security to enclaves and minority settlements, and escorted 
minority members who left their residence areas to visit family, gather 
fuel, shop for food and other goods, attend school, and receive medical 
care. KFOR regularly escorted convoys of private vehicles, and the 
UNHCR provided buses to transport Serbs in larger numbers between 
enclaves and into Serbia. In February a rocket attack on a UNHCR bus 
killed two Serbs and wounded several more; as a result, the UNHCR 
suspended bus service for several weeks (see Section 5). Serbs 
throughout Kosovo and Roma in some areas reported that they were afraid 
to leave their enclaves due to fear of intimidation and attack by 
ethnic Albanians. On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed 
four displaced Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac 
(Dashevc) near Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were 
destroyed during the war (see Section 5). Most minorities--including 
Bosniaks, Egyptians, Ashkali, Gorani, and some Roma--lived alongside 
ethnic Albanians and reported that their security situation improved 
over the course of the year, although incidents of violence and 
harassment continued to occur and their freedom of movement is 
restricted in some areas of Kosovo. The Turkish community is more 
closely integrated with Albanians and is less threatened than other 
minorities. The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in 
enclaves and settlements and were dependent almost wholly on 
humanitarian aid.
    In April the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) endorsed a 
Declaration and Platform for Joint Action, under which key Albanian 
leaders visited those areas where local Albanians and Roma were trying 
to establish more cooperative interethnic relations, thus encouraging a 
climate conducive to the return of those who fled the province earlier. 
Roma still experienced difficulty in obtaining freedom of movement. The 
degree of harassment by neighboring Albanians varied, with a greater 
degree of difficulty for the Roma living in Kosovo Polje (Fushe 
Kosova), Obilic (Obiliq), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan (Lipjan), and 
Gnjilane (Gjilan) (see Section 5). However, there were areas, notably 
around Urosevac (Ferizaj) and Djakovica (Gjakova) where Roma, 
Egyptians, and Albanians reportedly cohabited without major incidents. 
Both Roma and Serb families were reluctant to send their children to 
school, citing security concerns.
    In early May UNMIK established the Joint Committee on Returns with 
participation from KFOR, the UNHCR, and the Serb National Council to 
facilitate and coordinate returns of minorities to Kosovo.
    In Mitrovica there were restrictions on freedom of movement due to 
ethnically based harassment (see Section 5).
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution during the year.
    UNMIK and local authorities cooperated with the UNHCR to assist 
returning refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    From 1989 until NATO's intervention, Kosovar Albanians expressed 
their frustration with the province's status within Serbia through a 
boycott of the political system and did not attempt to affect the 
Government through the electoral process. After the withdrawal of 
Yugoslav forces in 1999, UNMIK, the OSCE, and other international 
actors, including donors, began to prepare for municipal elections, 
with the aim of eventually organizing elections for a Kosovo-wide 
government. One of the most critical elements of the establishment of 
both a civil administration and an electoral process was the 
registration of Kosovo's legitimate residents, following Yugoslavia's 
``identity cleansing'' (see Section 2.d.).
    At the conclusion of the electoral registration effort by the OSCE, 
about 901,000 of an estimated population of over 1 million persons 
successfully registered. UNMIK established a Central Election 
Commission, which was charged with establishing electoral rules and 
with organizing the operational details of the elections; there were 
also municipal election commissions in each of the 30 municipalities 
where elections were held. Pursuant to a registration process 
established in March, 22 political parties, 1 coalition of 6 parties, 3 
citizens' initiatives (grassroots organizations formed for political 
purposes), and 16 independent candidates registered to run for office. 
Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of movement, did 
not participate in the registration process and boycotted the October 
municipal elections. Many Turks, due to a dispute with UNMIK over the 
use of the Turkish language in official documents and procedures also 
did not participate, although one Turkish political party did. Other 
minorities participated in registration and in the elections. Several 
fielded political parties and citizens' initiatives that won municipal 
seats in the vote or agreed to accept appointed seats after the 
elections.
    Campaigning for the municipal elections began officially on 
September 13. Earlier in the summer, there was an increase in violence 
that appeared to be related to the election. Political parties, 
especially the LDK but also the PDK and other parties, reported attacks 
on political figures, both before and after the October municipal 
elections (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In most cases, no suspects were 
found; however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the 
rival PDK party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including 
clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also 
were suspected in some cases. For example, in June an LDK official was 
beaten in Urosevac (Ferizaj). On July 18 and 21, LDK officials were 
attacked in Lipljan (Lipjan). On August 2, Sejdi Koca, an LDK leader in 
Srbica (Skenderaj), was shot; during that week an LDK official also was 
shot in Podujevo (Podujeva). On August 18, a bomb attack damaged the 
office of the Party of Democratic Action, Kosovo's Bosniak party. It 
was not clear whether the attack was directed at the party office, the 
office of a Turkish political party nearby where an employee was 
slightly injured, or the office of the Serb Center for Peace and 
Tolerance. Supporters of rival political parties challenged LDK 
activists in Lipljan (Lipjan) several times, once disrupting a rally by 
hurling objects. The PDK reported that unknown arsonists burned down a 
neighborhood office in Pristina on September 22. A local newspaper 
reported that LDK supporters beat a radio journalist. In mid-November, 
an unknown assailant shot and badly wounded Shkelzen Hyseni, the newly 
elected LDK assemblyman in Pec (Peja). On November 30, LDK branch 
committee member Ejup Visoka was shot twice in a drive-by shooting in 
Podujevo (Podujeva); he was wounded in the arms and stomach. Also in 
November, unknown assailants attacked the wife of Elez Nikqi, Rugova's 
bodyguard, cutting her across the throat.
    After investigating several of these incidents, on October 3 the 
OSCE's Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission (ECAC) imposed on 
political parties a series of penalties. These penalties included fines 
of up to $2,400 (DM 5,000) and, in one case, a candidate being stricken 
from the PDK list of candidates.
    Despite the violence in some areas prior to election day, the 
elections themselves were held on October 28 without significant 
violence. Voter turnout was high (about 75 percent). International and 
domestic observers reported some irregularities and logistical flaws. 
In Pristina a few underage persons were observed voting. Voters' lists 
were incomplete and cumbersome. Late polling station openings and a 
lack of crowd-flow systems at many stations resulted in long lines and 
occasional minor crowd unrest. Election officials were able to address 
most problems during the course of the day. The Council of Europe 
observer mission concluded that the elections were carried out in 
accordance with international democratic standards and met the criteria 
for credible elections. The LDK won 58 percent of the overall vote, 
compared with 27 percent for the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and 
less than 8 percent for the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). A 
number of small parties won the remaining votes. On November 27, newly 
elected municipal assemblies were sworn in. Members of the assemblies 
in three Serb-majority municipalities where elections were boycotted 
were selected and sworn in during December.
    Yugoslav authorities organized polling sites inside Kosovo for 
those who wished to vote in Yugoslavia's federal elections on September 
24. According to UNMIK, which did not itself support this electoral 
activity but which sent out several hundred ``witnesses,'' 
approximately 45,000 of roughly 60,000 eligible Kosovar Serbs turned 
out, but only a handful of Kosovar Albanians voted. The Yugoslav 
elections were peaceful; however, the voting was conducted in a 
disorganized, illegitimate, and fraudulent manner. The Serbian 
opposition alleged fraud and vote tampering in the northern part of the 
province, including one stolen ballot box in Leposavic and opposition 
election observers being denied access to polling areas. On December 
23, Serbian parliamentary elections took place throughout Serbia, 
including Kosovo. Although KFOR and CIVPOL monitored the security 
climate, there was no international ``witnessing'' effort. No security 
incidents were reported.
    Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, UNMIK established the Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) for Kosovo, intended not only 
to provide a joint U.N.-Kosovar administration of services and revenue 
collection but also to supplant self-appointed administrators and 
officials throughout the province. The JIAS includes the SRSG, the 
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), the IAC, and 20 administrative 
departments. The 36-member KTC is designed to reflect the pluralistic 
ethnic and political range of Kosovar society and is the highest level 
Kosovar advisory body. The eight-member IAC makes policy 
recommendations and serves as an executive board for the administrative 
departments and also includes minority representation. The departments, 
each with a Kosovar and an international co-head, provide social and 
administrative services, collect and manage revenues, and implement 
policies established by the other elements of the JIAS. The structure 
is mirrored on the municipal level, where municipal councils were 
elected on October 28.
    No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government 
and politics; however, they are underrepresented. According to women's 
groups, few women traditionally entered politics because of a lack of 
interest, money, education, and family support. Nonetheless, women held 
7 of the 36 KTC seats, women led at least 2 political parties, and the 
UNMIK electoral regulation required that party candidate lists for the 
municipal elections include a set quota of 30 percent women. However, 
the ``open list'' ballot apparently allowed voters to vote around 
female candidates, resulting in only 76 women elected to office in the 
October municipal elections, or 8.26 percent of total municipal 
assembly seats. In addition UNMIK appointed two women as co-heads of 
departments under the JIAS.
    No legal restrictions exist on participation by ethnic minorities 
in government and politics. The Kosovar co-head positions in JIAS 
departments are shared by minority groups, with two such positions 
reserved for Serbs and two for other minority members. A prominent Serb 
observer sits on the Interim Administrative Council; five Serbs hold 
positions and five other members of ethnic minorities hold positions on 
the KTC, as well as one Roman Catholic cleric. Although Kosovar Serbs 
boycotted the municipal elections, several ethnically based political 
parties registered candidates.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    UNMIK and the OSCE continued their encouragement of the development 
of civil society, including domestically based NGO's. A broad range of 
U.N. agencies and numerous international organizations and NGO's 
pursued operations in the province to assist with administration and to 
provide relief to all Kosovars as they faced the aftermath of war. This 
included assistance to hundreds of thousands of returning refugees, 
support for the search for the missing, and social services to 
ameliorate the effects of trauma. UNMIK issued a regulation in November 
1999 on NGO registration. Over 300 domestic NGO's are registered and 
active in the province.
    Human rights monitors including those of the OSCE, as well as some 
associated with domestically based NGO's, were active in documenting 
ethnically or politically motivated killings, disappearances, attacks, 
and incidents of intimidation. Monitors and observers also looked into 
reported abuses by members of the KPS, KPC, CIVPOL, and KFOR. The ICRC 
gained full access to prisons and detention centers throughout Kosovo 
in exercise of its humanitarian mandate (see Section 1.c.). UNSC 
Resolution 1244 gave the OSCE the mandate for human rights monitoring. 
Although UNMIK and the OSCE did not reach agreement on procedures, OSCE 
monitors generally were able to carry out their mandate on an ad hoc 
basis in most courts and gained limited access to prisons and detention 
centers.
    In June UNMIK established the office of Human Rights Ombudsperson 
to ensure Kosovars' rights under international human rights laws and to 
investigate allegations of abuses. Marek Nowicki of Poland was 
appointed to the position in August, and the Ombudsperson's office 
opened on November 21.
    UNMIK cooperated with the ICTY and ICTY investigators and field 
teams made numerous trips to the province to investigate alleged war 
crimes committed there and to gather data, particularly through the 
exhumation of victims, necessary to the prosecution of such crimes.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    UNMIK's regulation on applicable law specifically prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, or ethnic 
origin.
    Women.--Rape and a high level of domestic violence remained 
serious, persistent problems. There are no governmental agencies 
dedicated to coping with family violence. Applicable criminal law, as 
defined by UNMIK regulation, is incomplete in addressing both domestic 
violence and sexual crimes. Several domestic and international NGO's 
pursue activities to assist women, but they are constrained to some 
extent by a tradition of silence about domestic violence, sexual abuse, 
and rape. In Kosovo's traditionally male-dominated society, it is 
culturally acceptable for men to beat their wives; credible sources 
report that violence against women has increased in the post-conflict 
period. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file complaints with the 
authorities.
    Rape is underreported significantly due to the cultural stigma 
attached to victims and their families. Tradition prevents much 
discussion of the topic of rape among ethnic Albanians, since the act 
is seen as dishonoring the entire family. The prevalence of rape by 
Yugoslav and Serbian forces during the conflict has heightened the 
profile of rape as a form of war crime, but few individual women have 
come forward publicly. There has been a reluctance to file charges with 
the ICTY, for example. U.N. Police registered over 95 rapes and rape 
attempts in the province during the year. However, there is credible 
anecdotal evidence, supported by customary practice, that rape is 
underreported significantly.
    The province served increasingly as a transit point and destination 
for trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Women traditionally do not share status equal to men, and 
relatively few women obtain upper level management positions in 
commerce or government, although there is no legal restriction on their 
doing so. Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold 
that women should be subservient to the male members of their families, 
long have subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, women 
often are little more than serfs, without the ability to exercise a 
right to control property and children. Women widowed by the recent war 
risked losing custody of their children due to an Albanian custom 
requiring children to be given to the deceased father's family. While 
legally women and men equally are entitled to inherit property, it is 
customary that family property passes to men only. Particularly in 
rural areas, when a man dies, his widow often is returned to her birth 
family and his family assumes his land, leaving the widow without 
property.
    UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs worked to coordinate gender issues 
throughout the programs of all UNMIK offices. It identified a network 
of gender focal points in all JIAS departments and in UNMIK's regional 
and municipal offices that were responsible for initiating and 
implementing gender policy in their respective areas and for 
facilitating consultation between UNMIK and women's organizations. 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 binds government officials to abide by the 
provisions of international human rights law and conventions, but that 
requirement has not yet benefited women's lives in rural areas.
    In population centers, the presence of UNMIK and an unprecedented 
number of international and nongovernmental organizations has opened a 
large number of previously unavailable jobs to women. UNMIK police and 
the OSCE launched an aggressive campaign to recruit women for the 
Kosovo Police Service (they make up 17 to 20 percent of the force). 
Women are increasingly active in political and human rights 
organizations. Women led two political parties, and several 
professional women worked as NGO and human rights activists.
    Children.--UNMIK established the JIAS Departments of Education and 
Science and of Health and Social Welfare, which address concerns about 
children's education and health. Following Kosovo's loss of autonomy in 
1989, Albanian parents refused to send their children to Serb-run 
public schools and developed a ``shadow'' education system. The quality 
of education was uneven and the divisions inherent in society were 
replicated in children's schooling. In 1999 conflict and the Serb 
ethnic cleansing campaign disrupted the spring term of the school year. 
Although many schools reopened for the 1999-2000 academic year, 
extensive damage to many school buildings, a lack of educational 
materials, and persistent electrical power outages hindered the full 
functioning of the education system. Serb and Roma parents were 
reluctant to send their children to the reopened schools despite the 
efforts of the authorities to provide security. As the school year 
progressed, international organizations rebuilt and equipped schools 
and the numbers of students enrolled increased.
    All schools opened on time for the 2000-2001 academic year. UNMIK 
issued a regulation on August 30 making enrollment in public school 
compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 15 (with only minor 
exceptions). The regulation made no provision for a waiver due to 
ethnic concerns. At least one school, in Pones (Ponesh), enrolled 
Serbian in addition to Albanian children, but most minority children 
continued to attend separate schools. In rural areas, lack of 
transportation made families reluctant to send girls to school since 
the prospect of future employment was slim.
    Economic problems and the aftermath of the conflict also affected 
the health care system, with adverse consequences for children. The 
health situation for children remained particularly poor. Humanitarian 
aid officials blamed the high rate of infant and childhood mortality, 
as well as increasing epidemics of preventable diseases, primarily on 
poverty that led to malnutrition, poor hygiene, and the deterioration 
of public sanitation. The high levels of air and water pollution, as 
well as the environmental effects of the uncontrolled release of toxic 
substances, including lead at the Trepca industrial complex, likely 
contributed to poor health conditions as well.
    The province served as a destination and transit point for 
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    There was no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--Although the law prohibits 
discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, 
education, or in the provision of state services, inadequate facilities 
and the level of unemployment posed obstacles to the employment of the 
disabled. The law mandates access to new official buildings; however, 
it is not enforced in practice.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are intertwined so 
closely that it is difficult to clearly identify discriminatory acts as 
primarily religious in origin rather than ethnic. Kosovar Serbs, in 
particular, identify themselves with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which 
defines not only their religious but also their cultural and historical 
perspectives. However, the views of all ethnic groups have been 
influenced strongly by religion, and some instances of ethnic 
discrimination or tension may have religious roots.
    Although UNMIK continued to take steps to ensure that members of 
all religious groups could worship safely, Bishop Artemije, the leading 
cleric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, remained at a 
monastery in Gracanica, near Pristina, rather than at his seat in 
Prizren (see Section 2.c.). Despite the KFOR presence, there were 
attacks on Orthodox churches. In April in Mitrovica a crowd of rock-
throwing Albanians attacked Serbs and their KFOR escorts during a 
religious ceremony for Orthodox Easter. On April 28, unknown 
perpetrators rigged an antitank device that blew up the church in 
Grncar (Gerncar); since the Easter service was postponed, congregants 
were not harmed. After the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in 1999, 
ethnic Albanians attacked Serbian Orthodox churches and burned or 
otherwise destroyed over 100 of them, including 20 during the year. On 
December 22, unknown assailants threw a hand grenade at the only 
functioning Serbian Orthodox church in Pristina, breaking windows and 
causing other damage. The daily newspaper Dita published a story in 
July that alleged that Orthodox priests committed war crimes (see 
Section 2.a.), and assailants subsequently shot and wounded a Serbian 
Orthodox priest and two seminary students in a drive-by shooting.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the high level of 
retaliatory anti-Serb violence that followed Yugoslavia's 1999 
withdrawal dropped significantly, ethnically motivated violence and 
crime continued to affect minorities. Serbs, Roma, and other minorities 
were victims of murder, kidnaping, assault, and property crimes, 
especially arson.
    On February 2, unknown assailants killed Josip Vasic, a prominent 
doctor and member of the Serb National Council in Gnjilane (Gjilan). 
Also on February 2, unknown assailants fired on a KFOR-escorted, UNHCR 
bus traveling to Mitrovica from the Serb village of Banja carrying 49 
Serbs, and killed 2 persons. In Novo Brdo (Novoberde) district, unknown 
assailants stabbed the last remaining Serb in one village, a woman, in 
February. On February 18, a Serb man was found dead in Podujevo 
(Podujeva) with gunshot wounds to the mouth and eye and his identity 
card pinned to his chest. On March 11, the body of a Serb man was found 
near Gracanica Lake; he had been shot and killed. On April 3, the body 
of a Serb man was found, bound and shot, in Pristina. On May 16, police 
found the remains of Petar Topoljski, a Serbian UNMIK employee, 
following publication by the Pristina-based newspaper Dita of an 
article identifying Topoljski as a member of a Serb paramilitary unit 
(See Section 2.a.). On August 27, an 80-year-old Serbian farmer was 
shot and killed in Crkvena Vodica. On September 14, a Serb woman was 
shot and killed in her home in Kamenica. On October 4, the body of a 
60-year-old Serb shepherd with gunshot wounds was found near Strpce 
(Shterpce) after he was reported missing. Assailants killed Serbs in 
incidents throughout the year in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district. In March 
and April alone, 60 Serb families there sold their property and 
departed for Serbia.
    Serb children also were targeted. On August 18, 10 children were 
wounded by a grenade thrown from a passing car onto a basketball court 
in the Serb village of Crkvena Vodica. On August 27, a Kosovar Albanian 
intentionally ran over four Serbian children in two different villages, 
causing the death of one child and the serious injury of several 
others. On May 28, an ethnic Albanian male opened fire on a group of 
Serb men in front of a shop in Gnjilane (Gjilan), killing three 
persons, including a 4-year-old child (see Section 1.d.).
    Serbs were also victims of beatings, grenade attacks, and arson. A 
total of 522 cases of arson were reported during the year.
    In June local Serbs in Srbica (Skenderaj) allegedly attacked 
members of the Albanian Behrami family, killing two. In the village of 
Cubrelj (Cubrel), a group of Serbs killed two Albanians on June 12, the 
first anniversary of the conclusion of the NATO military campaign.
    Other minorities were also victims of violence. In January unknown 
persons killed four members of a Bosniak family in Prizren. In April 15 
Albanian men beat a 70-year-old Bosniak woman in Pec (Peja).
    On April 3, unknown assailants kidnaped Metodije Halauska, an 86-
year-old Czech man, from his home in Pristina, beat him, and shot him 
in the back of the head.
    On January 12, four members of a family of Torbesh (Muslim Slavs) 
were shot and killed in their home by an unknown assailant in Prizren.
    On May 24, an Albanian youth shot and wounded a Gorani woman in 
Pristina, reportedly because she did not speak Albanian. Minority 
communities in Prizren were subject to violent attacks, intimidation, 
and arson during the year.
    On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed four displaced 
Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac (Dashevc) near 
Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were destroyed during 
the war. Three members of an Ashkali family died in the Lipljan 
(Lipjan) area during the first week of August when a fire set off a 
grenade in their courtyard. It was not clear whether the grenade had 
been placed as a booby trap. In November in Urosevac (Ferizaj), unknown 
assailants murdered a 13-year-old Gorani boy and burned his body.
    There were reports of the ethnically motivated murder of Roma by 
unidentified Albanians. Roma were targeted because they are perceived 
as Serb collaborators by ethnic Albanians. On March 4, unknown persons 
shot and killed a 50-year-old Romani woman in Gusica and then set her 
house on fire. On March 27, a Rom was found strangled to death in Istok 
(Istog). On April 19, in Pec (Peja) two unidentified men shot and 
killed a Romani man. In April the European Roma Rights Center reported 
that two Romani boys and a Romani woman were killed by unknown 
assailants in Pec (Peja). In August three Roma were killed and one was 
injured by a mortar bomb tied to their fence in Mali Alas, near 
Pristina.
    Roma also were subject to beatings, harassment, and attacks on 
property. According to the European Roma Rights Center, on April 13, 
four armed men who represented themselves as members of the KLA, 
allegedly took a Romani man out of his house in Prizren, beat him, and 
threatened him. On May 17, an unidentified man beat a Rom in Trebovic. 
Numerous Roma were injured by hand grenades thrown at their houses. 
Unknown persons also burned Romani houses in Prizren, Gnjilane 
(Gjilan), Gorna Brnjica, Pec (Peja), Orahovac (Rahovec), and other 
cities.
    The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in enclaves and 
encampments and were almost wholly dependent on humanitarian aid to 
survive. In Kosovo Polje (Fushe Kosove), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan 
(Lipjan), and Gnjilane (Gjilan), there was some degree of harassment by 
neighboring Albanians, especially in the latter two towns. The UNHCR 
reported discrimination by Albanian hospital workers against Roma.
    Civilians were responsible for the destruction, often through 
arson, of private property. There was a growing number of credible 
reports of violence and intimidation being used to force Serbs to sell 
their homes to Albanians at attractive prices. Of the approximately 
120,000 homes damaged by Yugoslav and Serbian forces and paramilitaries 
from 1998 on, 50,000 houses were beyond repair and, despite the efforts 
of international organizations another 38,000 houses were not habitable 
(see Section 1.f.).
    Serbs and Roma who did not leave when Yugoslav forces withdrew 
lived primarily in enclaves, except for the Serbs in the north of the 
province, where Serbs and Albanians effectively partitioned Mitrovica. 
Serbs lived largely in the northern Kosovo municipalities of Leposavic, 
Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, and in the northern part of Mitrovica, and in 
scattered enclaves under KFOR protection elsewhere. KFOR and UNMIK 
provided security to these enclaves, settlements, and camps, and 
escorted minority members who left their residence areas as well as 
convoys of private Serb vehicles. The UNHCR provided buses to transport 
Serbs in larger numbers between enclaves and into Serbia to take care 
of personal business.
    In Mitrovica Serb and Albanian Kosovars restricted each other's 
freedom of movement (see Section 2.d.). After Serbian forces withdrew 
in 1999, many ethnic Serbs from throughout Kosovo fled to Mitrovica and 
occupied homes, including those belonging to ethnic Albanians in the 
northern part of that town. Ethnic Albanians who sought to return to 
their homes in the north were subject to violence and intimidation by 
ethnic Serbs, and about 1,500 who live in the northern section of town 
reported repeated harassment. For example, in April a group of Serbs 
set fire to 3 Albanian homes and damaged over 20 U.N. vehicles in north 
Mitrovica. Ethnic Serbs stationed near the bridges monitored persons 
who crossed the Ibar River from southern Mitrovica into the northern 
part of the town. Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to 
seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house 
occupations during the summer months. At the same time, ethnic Serbs, 
including some who owned property there, were unable to move freely in 
the southern part of the town without similar harassment from ethnic 
Albanians.
    Politically, both Serbs and Roma made some progress. The Serbs in 
particular, through the Gracanica-based Serb National Council (SNV), 
participated in the JIAS organs and negotiated with the international 
community for increased assistance and programs in addition to more 
effective security.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under Yugoslav law, workers had the 
right to join or form unions; however, in practice neither the official 
nor the independent unions were effective in protecting workers' 
rights. Applicable law, pending further agreed regulations and 
legislation, is that in effect in March 1989, when labor and employment 
law reflected socialist structures inappropriate to and unenforceable 
in existing conditions. In creating the JIAS Department of Labor and 
Employment, UNMIK included in its responsibilities policy 
recommendations on labor practices and the rights of workers and 
recognized labor as one element of an eventual tripartite commission 
but made no mention of a specific right of association.
    After the war, labor organizations, which had focused during the 
1990's on members' welfare, redirected their focus to traditional labor 
issues. The dominant group, the Confederation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Kosovo (BSKP), was founded in 1990 and its membership reached 
a high point of about 260,000 members in the mid-1990's. Its current 
president is a member of the KTC.
    With most Albanians unemployed during the period under Milosevic, 
the BSKP focused more on assisting its membership to survive than on 
collective bargaining. The organization is working with international 
entities, including the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), to rebuild 
its membership and its collective bargaining ability. Other trade union 
organizations include the Independent Trade Union of Miners and the 
Union of Education, Science, and Culture of Kosova, a rival educators' 
union to the one with membership in the BSKP. All three unions have 
expressed interest not only in participating in the drafting of labor 
legislation but also in the terms for privatization of state 
enterprises.
    The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains 
constrained in practice, although there are no legal impediments to 
their doing so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While draft 
labor legislation includes the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, no applicable law currently specifically addresses this 
right. Collective bargaining is at a rudimentary level of development. 
The history of trade unionism was centered not on bargaining for the 
collective needs of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a 
given group. Thus, workers in various sectors were ineffective in 
finding common denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum 
safety standards, universal benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. 
Given the poor state of the economy and the high unemployment rate, 
wages other than those paid by international and nongovernmental 
organizations rarely are paid on time, and there is little possibility 
for negotiation by labor organizations.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and is not 
generally known to occur; however, the province served as a 
destination, source and transit point for trafficking in women and 
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under labor law dating from before 1989, the minimum age 
for employment was 16, although in villages and farming communities it 
is not unusual to find younger children at work assisting their 
families. Moreover, children can be found in a variety of unofficial 
``retail'' jobs, typically washing car windows or selling newspapers 
and small items such as cigarettes. With an unemployment rate in excess 
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal 
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is 
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur; however, girls 
are trafficked to, from, and through the province for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--After the withdrawal of Yugoslav 
forces and authorities in June 1999, there was no effective minimum 
wage rate, as Kosovar Albanians refused to recognize the Yugoslav-
Serbian legal code. The unemployment level exceeded 60 percent, and the 
average wage paid to those who had work was insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. While many 
international agencies and NGO's paid wages adequate to support a 
worker and family, UNMIK determined that wages for any jobs that 
eventually would be part of the province's own governmental structure, 
even if funded by the international community at present, should be set 
at a level estimated to be supportable by the consolidated budget. 
Salaries under the Kosovo Consolidated Budget are barely enough to 
support a worker and a family.
    Reports of sweatshops operating in the province are rare, although 
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor 
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little 
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health standards, 
and focused their efforts instead on economic survival.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking is a serious and growing 
problem. Throughout the year, nothing in the applicable law, as defined 
by UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, provided an effective legal framework 
under which to address trafficking. The province was mainly a 
destination point, but it was also a transit point for women and girls 
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution.
    UNMIK police raided several brothels and nightclubs throughout the 
year in Pristina, Pec (Peja), and Prizren, and found more than 50 women 
of Ukrainian, Moldovan, Bulgarian, and Romanian origin working as 
prostitutes under slave-like conditions. There were also reports of 
trafficked women from Albania, Belarus, and African countries. Security 
authorities also reported that women and girls are being smuggled 
through Kosovo to Macedonia, Albania, and Italy. Evidence suggested 
that trafficking in women was an example of a coordinated effort 
between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, like other areas of organized 
crime. There were several kidnapings and disappearances of young women 
who subsequently were not located. Some local sources believed that 
these women were the victims of traffickers in some cases, although 
there is no clear evidence that this was the case. Pristina and Kosovo 
Polje (Fushe Kosova) are major centers for trafficking. In November 
UNMIK and KFOR arrested 7 Kosovar Serb men for kidnaping and operating 
houses of prostitution; 12 Moldovan women were found and brought to a 
local NGO.
    Women are recruited to work in cleaning jobs and are abducted and 
forced into prostitution. While some women were aware that they would 
enter the sex industry, they were not aware that they effectively would 
be imprisoned and unable to earn money. Trafficking victims have 
reported that they were subject to physical violence, rape, denial of 
access to health care, and confiscation of their passports.
    Because prostitution is punishable under provincial law, women are 
often afraid to report their traffickers due to fear of arrest. In 
Mitrovica one woman who was believed to be a trafficking victim was 
convicted of prostitution. However, UNMIK police have been active in 
investigating and intervening in incidents of trafficking.
    According to the IOM, the presence of a large international 
community that purchases sex services has contributed to the increase 
in the number of brothels that are involved in trafficking.
    Several international agencies and NGO's established programs to 
assist the victims of trafficking with material support in returning to 
their countries of origin or homes, if they so wished. The IOM launched 
an awareness campaign directed at UNMIK, KFOR, and local men who 
purchase the services of women who were most likely to be trafficking 
victims.

                               Montenegro

    Montenegro, constitutionally a constituent republic (together with 
Serbia) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), made 
progress in its efforts to build a multiparty, multiethnic, 
parliamentary democracy; however, a deeply rooted patronage system and 
corruption continued to be dominant features of political life. During 
the year, the Government increasingly was excluded from federal 
functions by then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The Government 
remains minimally subordinate to Yugoslavia in foreign affairs and 
defense matters. Units of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) are stationed in 
Montenegro. President Milo Djukanovic was elected in 1997 and until the 
end of December headed a reform coalition, which won power in 1998 
parliamentary elections that international election observers judged to 
be generally free and fair. Events during the year effectively steered 
the Government further away from the federal control of Milosevic's 
regime in Belgrade. Milosevic's attempts to deny Montenegro its 
constitutional voice in federal functions, in particular by closing 
Supreme Defense Council meetings to Djukanovic and by Milosevic's 
unilateral amendments of the Yugoslav Constitution on July 6, further 
undercut Montenegro's already weak role and authorities in the 
Federation. With Djukanovic's efforts to redefine Montenegro's 
relations with Serbia through political discussions rebuffed, 
Montenegro acquired a large degree of de facto independence, 
establishing its own currency, central bank, customs and diplomatic 
service, and an embryonic army. The Government respects the 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
    The republic police, under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior, has primary responsibility for internal security. However, 
the Yugoslav Second Army, which has federal jurisdiction in the 
republic and is under federal authority, not Montenegrin government 
control, made repeated attempts to usurp control over the civilian 
police. Some members of the security forces committed human rights 
abuses.
    The economic transition from a state-owned to a market-based system 
encountered delays and resistance. The industrial sector remains 
largely in the hands of the republic Government and is very 
inefficient. The economy suffered further as a result of NATO's air 
campaign against Serbia in 1999 and years of sanctions and isolation, 
although the Government reported that the economy grew during the year. 
Official unemployment remains significant, and rose to at least 42 
percent, but a large unofficial economy provides jobs for much of the 
officially unemployed. Economists estimate that actual unemployment 
averages 22 to 23 percent. At the same time, the Government's budgetary 
shortfall grew as it raised the minimum wage and strove to pay pensions 
on time to ensure social peace. The anticipated budget deficit during 
the year was expected to approximate the amount of assistance provided 
by foreign donors. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (including 
the unofficial economy) was forecast at $935 for the year.
    The republic Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. There 
were a number of political killings, including at least one allegedly 
linked to Milosevic and another linked to a VJ-supported paramilitary 
group. Police and VJ troops abused persons, and VJ troops harassed and 
intimidated citizens. VJ troops and Montenegrin police were responsible 
for numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions. Montenegrin police 
reportedly infringed on citizens privacy rights. Both republic and 
federal authorities restricted freedom of speech and of the press in 
some areas. Both VJ troops and Montenegrin police restricted freedom of 
movement. Violence and discrimination against women are problems. 
Discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities continued to be 
a problem. There were reports of harassment and intimidation of Muslims 
in the Montenegrin Sandzak region by paramilitary groups linked to the 
VJ. Trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of forced 
prostitution continued to be a problem; both federal and Montenegrin 
authorities allegedly are involved in such trafficking.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by agents of the 
republic Government; however, political killings occurred. On May 31, 
one of President Djukanovic's closest advisers, Goran Zugic, was shot 
and killed in front of his home in Podgorica by unknown assailants. No 
one claimed responsibility. The killing widely was considered to be the 
result of orders from of Milosevic; however, according to some 
accounts, Montenegrin criminal circles may have been responsible. There 
was no conviction in the case by year's end.
    Paramilitaries who served in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia and who 
were subordinated to the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro were a threat to 
the Djukanovic Government until Milosevic's downfall. There were 
widespread fears that Milosevic could order these forces to destabilize 
Montenegro at any moment. The paramilitaries, largely members of the 
Seventh Military Police Battalion, in one instance, killed a 
Montenegrin policeman outside a Podgorica bar on the eve of the 
September federal elections.
    In August Milenko Vujovic, a friend and business colleague of 
President Djukanovic's brother Alexsandar, was shot and killed in 
Herceg Novi. While the crime apparently was motivated by money, some 
accounts alleged that the killing was politically motivated.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of 
punishment; however, Montenegrin police reportedly at times abused 
persons. A member of the radical Yugoslav Left (JUL) party (founded by 
Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic) claimed that he was beaten by the 
Montenegrin police after being arrested for allegedly defacing public 
buildings in Podgorica on the eve of the September 24 federal 
elections. Other members of JUL complained of being detained without 
explanation and abused up by the police in Herceg Novi for putting up 
pro-Milosevic posters during the federal election campaign. In October 
masked assailants beat a member of a pro-Serbian political party. The 
police never located the assailants, and the Minister of Interior 
declined to appear before Parliament to discuss this or the previous 
incident in Podgorica. In Niksic police arrested and beat members of a 
local gang. After the arrests, police imposed a near blockade of the 
city in an effort to catch other members of the gang.
    The VJ's Seventh Military Police Battalion--known for its fierce 
loyalty to Milosevic--intimidated citizens and created a climate of 
fear. VJ troops reportedly beat religious worshippers early in the year 
(see Section 2.c.). Members of that battalion also harassed and 
intimidated Muslims in the Sandzak region. In June batallion members 
entered Bijelo Polje (a town in northern Montenegro with a large Muslim 
population) in armored vehicles to ``inspect'' the town's center. At 
about the same time, members of this unit surrounded the police station 
in Berane (another multiethnic northern Montenegrin town) to underscore 
their demands for the release of a colleague who was arrested the night 
before in a drunken brawl. Members of this unit reportedly engaged in 
similar activities in October in the towns of Kolasin, Danilovgrad, and 
Mojkovac. In Plav, a northern town with a large ethnic Albanian 
population, members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly 
regularly engaged in live fire practice near the Albanian quarter.
    In August VJ troops opened fire on a truck that failed to stop at a 
checkpoint near Bar. The driver managed to escape without injury.
    The Yugoslav Army held major exercises in areas adjacent to the 
Montenegrin capital before and during the June 11 local elections and 
the September 24 federal elections. These maneuvers and aggressive VJ 
patrolling of major tourist areas during the height of the tourist 
season were intended to intimidate the Djukanovic regime and its 
supporters.
    On June 15, gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime 
attempted to kill Vuk Draskovic, the leader of one of the principal 
opposition parties in Serbia, when he was vacationing at his apartment 
in Budva on the Montenegrin coast. Draskovic had survived a car 
accident in October 1999 that many believe was staged by the Serbian 
Security Service. There was no conviction in the case by year's end.
    Prison conditions reportedly meet prisoners' minimum needs, but 
problems remain.
    The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights 
monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times Montenegrin police 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and the Yugoslav Army on 
occasion also arbitrarily detained and arrested individuals.
    For example, in early February VJ forces arrested and detained two 
Montenegrins accused of desertion and draft evasion. In July VJ 
personnel arrested four Dutch, two British, and two Canadian citizens 
near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with 
espionage. The British citizens claimed they were beaten by the police 
and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Following Milosevic's removal, all 
were released, and the charges against all eventually were dropped by 
the federal authorities.
    The Montenegrin police harassed citizens by applying traffic laws 
selectively, based on the individual's political preferences. In at 
least one instance, police stopped a political opponent and known 
critic of Djukanovic, removed his license, and confiscated his vehicle 
for a minor traffic violation.
    Forced exile is prohibited and is apparently not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair 
judicial process; however, a backlog of cases, a lack of resources, and 
corruption remain problems. Furthermore, the judges are poorly paid 
patronage appointees. However, the Minister of Justice promotes legal 
reform actively and has made some progress in reforming the Criminal 
Code. The court system consists of local, district, and supreme courts 
at the republic level. There is also a military court system under the 
control of federal authorities.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial and, 
according to most observers, the judiciary makes an effort to enforce 
this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; however, police 
reportedly used surveillance and eavesdropping against members of the 
pro-Milosevic opposition Socialist People's Party, who charge that the 
Djukanovic Government both wiretaps their telephones and opens their 
mail. The intelligence service of the Yugoslav Army carries out 
electronic surveillance of key Djukanovic government telephones. The 
public dissemination of Yugoslav intelligence intercepts of cellular 
telephone conversations of Western diplomats in May made clear that the 
Yugoslav security service possesses and uses this capability.
    In November 1999, the Montenegrin assembly passed a law granting 
general amnesty to persons who evaded the draft from June 1998 to June 
1999. All persons reportedly received amnesty out of an expected 
14,000.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the republic Government 
and the federal authorities restricted this right in some areas. Media 
and information laws do not protect the press; to a large extent libel 
laws discourage a free press.
    The print media is not independent. Djukanovic effectively controls 
the print media, with the exception of the opposition daily, Dan, as 
well as the State public broadcasting station, Radio/TV Montenegro. A 
small, moderate, and pro-Yugoslav party that belongs to Djukanovic's 
coalition credibly charged that Djukanovic uses the media to promote 
independence sentiment while not permitting his coalition partner to 
make the case for remaining in a democratic Yugoslavia. However, during 
the year, the Government continued to take steps to encourage 
independent radio media by allocating more frequencies to independent 
radio stations and reducing the fees charged to them.
    Lack of professionally trained staff, low professional standards, 
and lack of funds all hinder the development of an independent media.
    Under Milosevic the Yugoslav federal authorities failed to respect 
the basic principles of freedom of the press in Montenegro. In early 
spring, the federal authorities, in conjunction with officials of the 
extreme left Yugoslav Left (JUL) party, set up transmitters on Yugoslav 
Army communications sites in Montenegro. They began broadcasting pro-
Yugoslav, anti-Montenegrin propaganda (the so-called YU-INFO TV) 
despite a federal law that delegates to each republic the 
responsibility to allocate broadcast frequencies. YU-INFO TV still was 
broadcasting in Montenegro at the end of the year. Subsequently in 
August, the Milosevic regime established a studio in a Yugoslav Army 
facility in downtown Podgorica that used military transmitters to 
rebroadcast pro-Milosevic programs produced by Serbian TV (RTS). These 
actions were taken without consultation with the Montenegrin 
authorities.
    In late summer, the Federal authorities also disconnected 
Montenegrin TV from the Serbian cable network in Vojvodina's capital 
city, Novi Sad.
    Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints 
are available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications from 
abroad. However, the supply is limited due to the economic situation 
and the relatively small demand.
    Academic freedom generally is respected, although faculty and 
students at Podgorica University, who favored the Belgrade regime or 
the preservation of the Federation, were reluctant to discuss political 
matters as tensions grew between Montenegro and Serbia.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right. On the Serbian New Year in mid-January, the 
Government permitted a large opposition gathering to take place but had 
large numbers of police standing by. In February the police broke up a 
small opposition rally when the demonstrators appeared to be moving on 
the main government building. The opposition held rallies without 
problems during the June and September local and federal election 
campaigns, respectively.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
    The Constitution specifically recognizes the existence of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, but not other faiths. The Montenegrin Orthodox 
Church lost its independence after the First World War, becoming part 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and was only recently re-established. 
The re-established Montenegrin Orthodox Church is registered with the 
Government of Montenegro Ministry of Interior in Cetinje, the former 
capital, as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The Government of 
Montenegro has been careful to remain neutral in the dispute between 
followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin Orthodox 
Church, but political parties have used this issue in pursuit of their 
own agendas. Pro-Serbian parties strongly support moves for the 
establishment of an official state religion, while proindependence 
parties have pushed for the official recognition of the Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church.
    Tensions between the unofficial Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church worsened during the year. Violence allegedly 
broke out between members of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in late 1999 when on November 21, 1999, Father 
Dragan Stanisic of the Serbian Orthodox Church reportedly hit 
Montenegrin Orthodox Metropolitan Mihajlo in the face during a 
confrontation on a road near Cetinje. According to press reports, 
Father Stanisic's followers then attacked Mihajlo's car, although 
Stanisic denies that the incident ever occurred. Approximately 250 
persons demonstrated to protest the incident in Cetinje, and 
authorities summoned riot police and reinforcements to prevent further 
incidents.
    The rift between the churches was highlighted again in January when 
a Serbian Orthodox priest delayed the traditional Christmas celebration 
by calling on the audience to leave the hall because Montenegrin 
Orthodox Metropolitan Mihailo was present. Police reportedly had 
prevented a parallel Montenegrin Orthodox celebration from taking place 
in a separate location in the town on the same day. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church then publicly protested the Government's tolerance of 
the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
    The Djukanovic Government sought to defuse tensions between the 
churches. However, there were reports that Yugoslav paramilitaries 
exacerbated such tensions. For example, in Niksic early in the year, 
several members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly 
intimidated a Montenegrin Orthodox priest in his church and beat 
several of his parishioners. On another occasion, Serbian nationalists 
near the former capital city of Cetinje beat up a Montenegrin Orthodox 
priest on his way to a church gathering, prompting retaliation from his 
supporters.
    The Montenegrin Orthodox Church has claimed holdings of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the 
dominant faith in Montenegro and has rejected the property claims.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The republic Constitution provides for 
freedom of movement, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice; however, the establishment of numerous police checkpoints 
that carried out document checks restricted this right.
    The Yugoslav Army restricted this right even more seriously. Army 
checkpoints close to the borders with Albania and Bosnia limited 
movement by residents. In the Herceg Novi, Niksic, and Pljevlja areas, 
VJ restrictions on freedom of movement in border areas generated 
antimilitary demonstrations and intervention by the republic's 
political authorities. However, these restrictions were not eased until 
the defeat of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
    There was no official mechanism by which refugees or foreign 
nationals could establish residency. A new citizenship law was passed 
in 1999. The new law, while stringent in its requirements, provides a 
legal and equitable means for persons to acquire Montenegrin 
citizenship.
    The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR reports that an estimated 60,000 
refugees and internally displaced persons live in the republic. The 
large influx of Albanian refugees from Kosovo largely has returned to 
Kosovo; however, a smaller but significant number of Serb and Roma 
refugees from Kosovo have replaced them. Conditions for refugees vary; 
those with relatives or property in the country have been able to find 
housing and in some cases employment. Roma refugees, on the other hand, 
live mostly in collective centers, with little or no access to health 
care or education.
    In September before the Yugoslav federal elections, Serbian 
Minister for Refugees Bratislava Morina promised financial aid for 
Serbs and Roma from Kosovo in what was perceived by observers to be an 
attempt to influence voters in favor of Milosevic.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Montenegrin Constitution provides citizens with the right to 
change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in 
practice with respect to republic institutions, but not with federal-
level institutions. In 1998 President Djukanovic became the first 
president popularly elected in elections that foreign observers 
considered generally free and fair. The republic government invited the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to observe 
both the presidential elections in 1997 and the parliamentary elections 
in 1998, which also were judged to be free and fair. The OSCE sent 
observers to monitor the June 11 local elections in Herceg Novi and 
Podgorica, and reported that these were well conducted. In Herceg Novi, 
Djukanovic's coalition was defeated by the pro-Milosevic opposition 
party. For most of the year, the Government enjoyed the support of a 
multiethnic coalition in the republic assembly.
    President Milosevic dominated Yugoslavia's political system until 
he lost power in the September federal elections. He sought to 
consolidate his power at the federal level at the expense of 
Montenegro, and by manipulating power within the Federation, Milosevic 
effectively forced Montenegro out of the Federation's institutions 
while leaving it open to the Federal Government's charges that its 
actions violated Yugoslavia's Constitution. President Djukanovic did 
not participate in the September 23 federal elections and called for 
citizens to boycott them. The Montenegrin Parliament declared the July 
6 amendments to Yugoslavia's Constitution, including one that allowed 
Milosevic to run for another presidential term, unconstitutional, and 
Djukanovic used this declaration as a basis for his decision not to 
participate in the elections. The Government did not impede voting and 
some 600 polling stations were set up in private homes, Socialist 
People's Party (SNP) offices, Serbian firms, and VJ establishments. 
However, overall voter turnout was low.
    Despite the Montenegrin Government's legal rights under 
Yugoslavia's Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's 
control continued to refuse to recognize the 20 Montenegrin members 
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the 
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including 
the Speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results 
of 1998 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. Moreover, in violation of 
past practice, Milosevic installed Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime 
Minister, ignoring the Montenegrin Government's desire to have a voice 
in the selection of the federal Prime Minister. Milosevic's control 
over the federal courts was demonstrated when the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled against the Montenegrin Government in 1999 
in disallowing the Montenegrin authorities' attempt to select all 20 
Montenegrin representatives to the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the 
Republics. The ruling was a reversal of a 1993 decision, which allowed 
Milosevic's ruling coalition in Serbia at the time to name all 20 
Serbian representatives to the upper chamber while he was the President 
of the Serbian republic.
    There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in 
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented greatly in 
party and government offices. There are no female ministers in the 
Government, and there are only five deputy ministers and three Members 
of Parliament. However, a woman plays a key role in the presidency of 
Djukanovic's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists.
    No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government 
and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic 
Montenegrins and Serbs dominate the republic's political leadership. 
Ethnic Albanians participate in the political process, and their 
parties, candidates, and voters participated in the 1997 and 1998 
elections. Ethnic Muslims also participate. Albanians and Muslims 
followed Djukanovic's call to boycott the September 24 federal 
elections. The area of the republic primarily inhabited by ethnic 
Albanians was established as a separate voting district in the 1998 
parliamentary elections and, in proportion to the region's population, 
five representatives were elected to the Parliament from the district. 
Ethnic Albanian parties captured two of the seats, with the multiethnic 
program of the pro-Djukanovic Coalition capturing the other three 
seats. Several ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the 
coalition government are held by ethnic Albanians and Muslims.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, and republic officials generally are 
cooperative and responsive to their views. Local NGO's include the 
Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the Center for Democracy and Human 
Rights, and S.O.S., a support group for abused women and children. In 
addition the Montenegrin Government's pledge to cooperate with the ICTY 
continues. The Chief prosecutor visited the country in August.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, or social status, and 
prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal system 
provides little protection to such groups.
    Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence 
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family 
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by 
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of 
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities.
    The country served as a transit point for trafficking in women for 
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the republic, and few 
women hold upper level management positions in government or commerce. 
Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women 
should be subservient to the male members of their family, long have 
subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly 
among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without 
the ability to exercise their right to control property and children. 
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and 12 
to 18 months of maternity leave. They are active in human rights and 
women's organizations.
    Children.--The Government attempts to meet the health and 
educational needs of children, but insufficient and inefficient 
resources impeded this goal. The educational system provides 8 years of 
mandatory schooling. When IDP's began arriving from Kosovo in 1998, the 
republic government initially refused to extend this educational 
benefit to Kosovar Albanians. However, after having consulted with and 
received promises of assistance from international organizations, the 
Government announced late in that year that displaced children soon 
also would be allowed to attend school. Although ethnic Albanian 
children have access to instruction in their native language, the 
Government came under criticism for not also developing a curriculum in 
which ethnic Albanians could learn about their own culture and history. 
This situation reportedly remains unchanged. Most Roma child refugees 
from Kosovo do not receive any education.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    The country served as a transit point for trafficking in girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Facilities for the disabled are 
inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in 
employment, education, or in the provision of state services. The law 
mandates access to new official buildings, and the Government enforces 
these provisions in practice.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely 
intertwined as to be inseparable.
    With the exception of tensions and incidents of violence (see 
Section 2.c.) between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church, relations with and between religious minorities are 
generally peaceful. Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox communities coexist 
within the same communities and often use the same municipally owned 
properties to conduct worship services.
    Seventh-Day Adventists and members of Jehovah's Witnesses are 
officially registered religions in the republic. However, their 
followers report that their efforts to build and renovate church 
buildings have been impaired by persons they believe to be loyal to the 
local Serbian Orthodox Church.
    Ethnic Minorities.--In 1999 the Government began a pilot program in 
ethnic Albanian communities, which devolved extensive authority, 
including taxation, to locally elected officials. An Albanian 
Democratic Union member also was appointed to the post of Minister of 
Minorities to ensure that equal representation and opportunities would 
exist for all ethnic groups. Members of the ethnic Albanian and Bosniak 
(ethnic Muslim) minorities are represented in the cabinet. However, 
societal discrimination against minorities exists. Harassment and 
intimidation against Muslims in the Sandzak region by Serbian 
nationalists and VJ troops continued (see Section 1.c.).
    In the week prior to the September 24 federal elections, there were 
reports that several hundred Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians from 
Montenegro left the country for Kosovo or Bosnia. There were no direct 
reports of violence or intimidation, but several families reported that 
they left because of an increase in military conscription and an 
increased military presence. Most of the families were able to return 
home within 1 week.
    There is no official discrimination against the Romani population; 
however, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Local authorities often 
ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and 
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Most if 
not all of the workforce in the official economy is organized. Both 
official, government-affiliated unions and independent unions exist. 
Because the independent labor movement largely is fragmented and access 
to international labor organizations is limited, there have been few 
tangible results in the form of improved working conditions or higher 
wages.
    Unions may affiliate with international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--This right is 
provided for under law, but collective bargaining remains at a 
rudimentary level of development. Instead of attempting to make 
progress on the collective needs of all workers, negotiations generally 
center on advancing the needs of a specific group of workers. Job 
security fears prevail, as a result of the high unemployment rate, and 
these fears limit the groups' militancy.
    One factor impeding the collective bargaining power of the workers 
was the weak economy, in which high unemployment gave employers the 
upper hand in setting wages and work conditions, as workers competed 
for whatever jobs existed.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, the republic served as a 
transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The official minimum age for employment is 16 years, 
although in farming communities, it is not unusual to find younger 
children assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a 
variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or 
selling small items such as cigarettes. The high unemployment rate 
ensures that there is little demand for child labor in the formal 
sector. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, girls are trafficked through 
the republic for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. 
and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises, 
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies 
generally observe the minimum wage standard, which is $47 (94 DM) per 
month. However, this figure is comparable to unemployment benefits or 
wages paid to those on mandatory leave. The gross average wage is 
approximately $175 (350 DM) per month, with a disposable average wage 
(after social contributions and payroll taxes) of approximately $90 
(180 DM) per month. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Data for 1999 (latest 
available) suggests that households spent almost all of their resources 
on basic needs, such as food, clothing, and housing.
    The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an 
economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, 
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In view of the 
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control 
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work 
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically forbids 
trafficking in persons; however, in practice trafficking is a growing 
problem and traffickers rarely are prosecuted. However, traffickers 
arrested in the spring during police raids on a brothel were 
prosecuted. The country is a destination and transit country for 
trafficked women and children. Women are trafficked from Romania, 
Ukraine, Moldova, China, and Russia, often through Belgrade and on to 
Western European countries and Kosovo. Trafficking has increased since 
the 1999 war in Kosovo, and Italian police weekly intercepted illegal 
immigrants from Montenegro. Many of these immigrants reported being 
victims of a trafficking scheme, some of whom were charged as high as 
$1,500 (DM 3,000) to be transported. This included a large number of 
women and girls who were trafficked to other parts of Europe for 
prostitution.
    Trafficked women often respond to employment advertisements for 
jobs abroad as babysitters, hairdressers, maids, waitresses, models, or 
dancers. According to the International Helsinki Federation, although 
some women may be aware that they are going to work in the sex 
industry, they are unaware of the slavery-like conditions they may 
face. Many women are sold several times in different countries to 
nightclub owners. Their passports often are confiscated. Women have 
reported being beaten and raped by their traffickers.
    The International Helsinki Federation reports that police and local 
authorities do little to stop trafficking and are often clients of 
nightclubs that keep trafficked women as prostitutes. Women found 
during police raids of bars and nightclubs during the year often were 
prosecuted for prostitution and deported. In some cases club owners 
were arrested and prosecuted for enabling prosecution; however, their 
sentences are generally short. The Government as a rule repatriates 
victims, but does not provide any other services, and there are no 
victim protection programs.
    A small number of NGO's work on trafficking. There is at least one 
shelter for victims. Awareness of the problem is low.
                       NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                                ALGERIA

    President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April 1999 to a 5-
year term. Bouteflika had served as Foreign Minister in a previous 
government. The President is the constitutional head of state, appoints 
and dismisses the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the legislature. 
According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet 
ministers; however, in practice the President has taken a key role in 
designating the members of the Cabinet. The military establishment 
strongly influences defense and foreign policy. Bouteflika was regarded 
throughout the 1999 election campaign as the candidate most favored by 
the dominant security establishment and the most likely winner. At the 
end of the campaign, the other six candidates withdrew, credibly 
charging massive fraud by the military, and Bouteflika was elected 
easily, although with a turnout as low as 30 percent. The presidential 
election campaign was marked by increased openness; however, 
international observers and political parties pointed out numerous 
problems with the conduct of the elections. A September 16, 1999 
national referendum, which asked citizens whether they agreed with 
Bouteflika's peace plan (which includes an amnesty program for the 
extremists fighting to overthrow the Government), was free of charges 
of fraud, and Bouteflika's peace plan won a reported 98 percent 
majority, with a reported 85 percent turnout. Bouteflika is not 
affiliated formally with any political party, but he has the 
parliamentary support of a seven-party coalition. In June 1997, Algeria 
held its first parliamentary elections since January 1992 and elected 
the first multiparty parliament in the country's history. The 
cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) was poised to win, suspended the democratization process and a 
transition to a pluralistic republic, and escalated fighting, which 
still continues, between the security forces and armed insurgent groups 
seeking to overthrow the Government and impose an Islamic state. The 
Government does not always respect the independence of the judiciary.
    The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air 
force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal 
guards, and local self-defense forces. All of these elements are 
involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and are 
under the control of the Government. The security forces committed 
serious human rights abuses, although allegations of such abuses 
continued to decline.
    The economy is slowly developing from a state-administered to a 
market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization 
policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state 
enterprises has made little progress, and there has been little 
progress on reform of the banking and housing construction sectors. The 
state-owned petroleum sector's output represented about a quarter of 
national income and more than 96 percent of export earnings during the 
year. Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the 
bulk of the nonhydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector, 
which produces grains, fruit, cattle, fiber, vegetables, and poultry, 
makes up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income 
country; annual per capita income is approximately $1,600. Officially, 
about 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed, and about 
70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot find adequate 
employment.
    Despite measurable improvements, particularly in addressing 
problems of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation 
was generally poor and serious problems persisted, including 
significant government restrictions on citizens' political and 
association rights and failure to account for past disappearances; the 
massacre of civilians by armed terriorist groups also continued. There 
are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their 
government. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, 
tortured, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested 
and detained, or held incommunicado, individuals suspected of 
involvement with armed Islamist groups; however, the incidence of such 
abuses by security forces continued to decline. Security force 
involvement in disappearances from previous years remains unresolved. 
Security forces sometimes reach the sites of massacres too late to 
prevent or halt civilian casualties; however, there were no reports 
that security forces were complicit in massacres that took place during 
the year. An international nongovernmental organization (NGO) noted 
during the year that the country's poor prison conditions improved 
during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial delays 
are problems, although the practice of detention beyond the legal limit 
appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict some of the 
judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect 
defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements 
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems.
    There was no overt censorship of information; however, while the 
print media is relatively free, news media practiced self censorship. 
Newspapers reported frequently on terrorist violence and on surrenders 
under the amnesty program, about which there was a wide range of views 
expressed in the media. The independent press commented openly and 
regularly on political matters and other significant issues. In some 
cases, newspapers represented specific political and economic 
interests. Electronic media continued to express only government 
policy. The Government also continued to restrict freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree 
than in the previous year. The Government also places some restrictions 
on freedom of religion. During the April 1999 presidential election, 
the candidates who ultimately withdrew from the election credibly 
reported irregularities, such as government ballot-box stuffing through 
manipulation of military votes. During the 1997 legislative, municipal, 
and provincial elections, there were credible reports of 
irregularities, such as government harassment of oppositionparty 
observers and fraud in vote-tally procedures. Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) visited the country during 
the year at the invitation of the Government. Domestic violence against 
women, the Family Code's limits on women's civil rights, and societal 
discrimination against women remained serious problems. Child abuse is 
a problem. Amazigh (Berber) ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights 
continue to be an issue, although these concerns are represented by at 
least two political parties with seats in Parliament. Child labor is a 
problem.
    Armed groups committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds 
of civilians. There was an increase in violence compared with 1999. 
Armed terrorists continued their widespread campaign of insurgency, 
targeting government officials, families of security-force members, and 
civilians. Many of the killings appeared to be related to opposition to 
the amnesty program. According to the Government, more than 5,000 
insurgents have availed themselves of the amnesty program so far, and 
the armed groups have become smaller; however, a hard-core insurgent 
force remains.
    Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in 
massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets 
killed and maimed persons indiscriminately. Some killings also were 
attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports 
estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security 
force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. The violence 
now seems to take place primarily in the countryside, as the security 
forces largely have forced the insurgents out of the cities. There were 
numerous instances in which armed groups kidnaped women, raped them, 
and forced them into servitude.
    After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a 
more accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the 
previous 8 years placed the total at about 100,000.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings, mostly during clashes with armed 
terrorist groups, although the number of such killings continued to 
decrease during the year. For example, in early March, the army found 
and killed 12 suspected terrorists 280 miles southwest of Algiers. On 
June 20, troops backed by gunships and artillery attacked guerrillas, 
killing 16 persons. Security force killings of terrorists decreased by 
approximately 10 percent compared to 1999. The Government maintains 
that security forces resort to lethal force only in the context of 
armed clashes with terrorists. The Government also contends that, as a 
matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken against soldiers or 
policemen who are guilty of violating human rights, and such 
disciplinary action reportedly was taken during the year. Human Rights 
Watch and other groups claim that security forces failed to intervene 
in some past situations to prevent or halt massacres of civilians, 
although there were no claims that this occurred during the year.
    One person died from the injuries he sustained in June after police 
rounded up and beat 200 persons who had been attending a local mosque 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In December 1999, one person died of a heart attack the day after 
being beaten by police who had responded to a terrorist attack in the 
town of Dellys. The case received considerable print-media attention, 
and the government-funded National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH) 
investigated the incident. After the investigation and ensuing trials, 
21 members of the security forces were prosecuted and the local 
commanders of 2 different security services were investigated and 
suspended from their duties.
    There were reports that progovernment militia killed one or two 
civilians during the year. The Government handled the killings as 
common murder cases.
    On November 22, 1999, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who 
had spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and 
killed in Algiers. On December 13, 1999, authorities arrested a 
suspect, who had the murder weapon in his possession. The Government 
completed its investigation into the incident, but had not made public 
the results by year's end.
    Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians, 
and such killings increased by approximately 20 percent compared with 
1999. In many cases, terrorists randomly targeted civilians in an 
apparent attempt to create social disorder. Armed groups killed 
numerous civilians, including infants, in massacres and with small 
bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets killed and maimed persons 
indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.). Some killings also were attributed 
to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. The violence now seems to take 
place primarily in the countryside, as the security forces largely have 
forced the insurgents out of the cities. Increasingly the killing of 
civilians appeared to be a result of opposition to President 
Bouteflika's amnesty program and to facilitate the theft of goods 
needed by the armed groups. As well as the use of small bombs, 
terrorist tactics included creating false roadblocks outside the cities 
by using stolen police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Press reports 
estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security 
force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. For example, on 
March 18, terrorists killed 19 persons, including 7 children, during 
the Eid festival. On May 4, militants killed 19 persons and injured 26 
when they reportedly opened fire on a bus after the driver refused to 
stop at a false roadblock 45 miles south of Algiers. There was an 
increase in violence during the summer. More than 200 persons 
reportedly were killed during July alone. On July 11, militants shot 
and killed 11 men who were sleeping in their tents while camping in 
Tipaza. At least nine persons were killed on July 17 when an armed 
group stopped their bus and sprayed it with machine-gun fire. On July 
28, 270 miles west of Algiers, militants killed eight civilians and 
wounded six in an attack on a nomad family, cutting the throats of six 
children between the ages of 6 months and 4 years. On September 20, six 
persons, including three children, reportedly were shot and killed 
during an ambush by militants. On December 16, armed intruders killed 
16 students and a security guard, and injured 5 other students at a 
high school dormitory in the town of Medea. On December 17, terrorists 
opened fire on a bus near the town of Tenes, killing 14 travelers. 
After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a more 
accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the previous 
8 years placed the total at about 100,000.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports during the year 
of disappearances in which the security forces were implicated. 
However, there have been credible reports of disappearances occurring 
over a period of several years, many of which involved the security 
forces. In September 1998, the Ministry of Interior established an 
office in each district to accept cases from resident families of those 
reported missing. In May the Ministry of Justice reported that it had 
received 3,019 complaints of disappearance and had clarified 1,146 of 
them. However, credible sources state that the offices have not 
provided any useful information to the families of those who 
disappeared. By year's end, the Ministry of Interior had agreed to 
investigate 4,700 cases. The Ministry reports that it has provided 
information to the families in 3,000 of those cases. In 1,600 of the 
cases, families have requested administrative action to obtain death 
certificates for their missing relatives. However, there were no 
prosecutions of security-force personnel that stemmed from these cases. 
Families of the missing persons, defense attorneys, and local human 
rights groups insist that the Government could do more to solve the 
outstanding cases. The Government asserts that the majority of reported 
cases of disappearances either were committed by terrorists disguised 
as security forces or involved former armed Islamist supporters who 
went underground to avoid terrorist reprisals.
    In September Amnesty International reported that more than 4,000 
persons had disappeared since 1994 after being detained by security 
forces. AI stated that some died in custody from torture or were 
executed, but that many others reportedly were alive. Local NGO sources 
state that a few of the persons who disappeared have been released from 
captivity by the security forces, but that there has been no public 
information about these cases, due to the fear of reprisal against 
those released. Human rights activists assert that a number of the 
persons who disappeared still are alive in the hands of the security 
forces, but offer no evidence to support this assertion.
    Terrorist groups continued to kidnap scores of civilians. In many 
instances the victims disappeared and the families were unable to 
obtain information about their fate. Armed groups kidnaped young women 
and held them captive for extended periods for the purpose of rape and 
servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to 
local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police at times 
resort to torture when interrogating persons suspected of being 
involved with, or having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups. There 
were no reports of torture during the year at the Algiers police 
facility called Chateau Neuf, as had been the case in the past.
    There continued to be reports of police abuse of detainees during 
the year. After its October visit (see Section 4), Amnesty 
International stated that although there were ``substantially fewer'' 
cases of torture ``in comparison to some years ago,'' such cases 
nevertheless ``continue to occur.'' Many victims of torture hesitate to 
make public such allegations due to fear of government retaliation. 
Accusations of torture were made by those accused of involvement in 
terrorist activities. The Interior Ministry and the ONDH have stated 
publicly that the Government would punish those persons who violated 
the law and practiced torture. Government officials reported in 
November that between 350 and 400 security officials had been punished 
for ``human rights abuses,'' although the Government provided no 
details regarding the abuses that such officials committed or the 
punishment that they received. There is no independent mechanism 
available to verify the Government's claims.
    In early August, the Government announced new policies concerning 
the Police Judiciaire (PJ), the officers who interrogate suspects when 
they first are arrested to determine whether there are grounds for 
prosecution. Local judges now are to grade the performance of PJ 
officers operating in their jurisdiction in an effort to ensure that 
the officers comply with the law in their treatment of suspects. In 
addition, any suspect held in preventative detention is to undergo a 
medical examination at the end of the detention, whether the suspect 
requests it or not.
    In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the 
authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators who were attempting to 
draw attention to the problem of persons who had disappeared. The 
Government arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations that 
occurred about a week apart; however, those arrested were released 
after a short time (see Section 2.b.). In June following a bomb blast 
in Dellys, police rounded up a group of 200 persons who had been 
attending the local mosque. The group was taken to police headquarters 
and beaten. One person died from the injuries he sustained. Members of 
the group took legal action against the police and, as a result, the 
local chiefs of the police and the Gendarmerie were fired and two of 
the offending officers were arrested. In November police used force to 
disrupt a march by families of persons who had disappeared, which 
coincided with a visit to that city by Amnesty International (see 
Section 2.b.).
    In December 1999, a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the 
town of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained 
more than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police 
officers beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made 
by the terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart 
attack the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the 
police to stop these actions. In response to complaints from the 
mistreated persons, the authorities suspended the local commanders of 2 
different security services and prosecuted 21 members of the security 
forces (see Section 1.a.).
    Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as 
beheading, mutilating, and dismembering their victims, including 
infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used bombs 
that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). 
Terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many of 
whom subsequently were murdered. There were also frequent reports of 
other young women being abducted, raped for weeks at a time by group 
leaders and other members, and forced into servitude (see Sections 
1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Prison conditions remain generally poor, with significant 
overcrowding. However, an international NGO stated during the year that 
conditions had improved considerably. A decrease in prison population 
reduced overcrowding somewhat. Moreover, prisoners were found generally 
to be in good health and benefiting from adequate food and expanded 
visitation rights. The provision of adequate medical treatment to 
prisoners still is limited, but the Government reportedly is addressing 
the issue.
    In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of 
prisons or detention centers. However, in October 1999, March and again 
in May, the Government allowed International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to visit prisons. The ICRC in April decided no longer to seek 
access to military prisons because it lacked any credible evidence that 
these prisons held civilians. The ICRC did not visit FIS leaders in 
prison or under house arrest.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces 
continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens. Human rights 
activists state that this practice continued to diminish during the 
year. The Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in 
criminal cases prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after 
which the suspect must be charged or released. According to the 1992 
antiterrorist law, the police may hold suspects in prearraignment 
detention for up to 12 days; they also must inform suspects of the 
charges against them. In practice the security forces generally adhered 
to this 12-day limit during the year.
    In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the Government 
arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about 
a week apart; however, those arrested were released after a short time 
(see Section 2.b.). In November police used force to disrupt a march by 
families of the disappeared, and arrested five persons. Four 
subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and convicted of 
attacking a security officer (see Section 2.b.).
    FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison in 1997, 
remains under house arrest and is allowed to receive visits only from 
members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he has made numerous 
press statements and conducted interviews while under house arrest. 
Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Benhadj, who had been 
held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, now is allowed contact with 
members of his family, who speak to the press on his behalf.
    The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the 
police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the 
police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense 
attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail 
to identify themselves as police and abuse those who ask for 
identification (see Section 1.f.). Police and communal guards sometimes 
detain persons at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.). There are reports of 
police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists in order to 
force the suspects to surrender. According to Amnesty International, on 
April 4, police arrested 73-year-old El-Hadj M'lik in front of several 
witnesses. He had been questioned previously concerning his sons, one 
of whom is believed to be a member of a terrorist group. Security 
officials reassured the family, on two separate occasions, that M'lik 
would be returned to them. However, he had not been returned by year's 
end, and the Government provided no information regarding his 
whereabouts.
    Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of 
crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials; however, long-term 
detention appeared to decrease somewhat during the past year (see 
Section 1.e.). Hundreds of state enterprise officials who were arrested 
on charges of corruption in 1996 remained in detention. Three or four 
of the higher ranking detainees were released during the year.
    Under the state of emergency, the Minister of Interior is 
authorized to detain suspects in special camps that are administered by 
the army. In 1995 the Government announced that it had closed the last 
camp and released the 641 prisoners there. Local human rights activists 
and NGO's state that no such camps now exist. They note that the 
Government continues to keep some former prisoners under surveillance 
and requires them to report periodically to police.
    Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to 
be practiced. However, there are numerous cases of selfimposed exile 
involving former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have 
been accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing 
government policies.
    One such case was resolved in September when Ali Bensaad, a 
professor at the University of Constantine, who had been in exile in 
Germany, returned to the country. The former exile was issued a limited 
(6-month) passport, which allowed him to return. Bensaad is pursuing 
redress in the court system for the ``machinations'' he claims were 
perpetrated against him by former high-ranking officials.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the Government does not 
always respect the independence of the judicial system. In November 
1999, President Bouteflika named a commission to review the functioning 
of the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve it. In August after 
the commission submitted its report, the President announced a massive 
reorganization of the judiciary. He replaced 80 percent of the heads of 
the 187 lower courts and 99 percent of the presidents of the 37 higher-
level courts. Most of the court heads were reassigned to new locations; 
however, a number were replaced outright. Whereas only a few courts 
previously were headed by women, 19 now have female heads.
    The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try cases 
involving civilians, and the military courts, which have tried 
civilians for security and terrorism offenses. There is also a 
Constitutional Council, which reviews the constitutionality of 
treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of 
the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found 
unconstitutional.
    Regular criminal courts try those individuals accused of security-
related offenses. Long-term detentions of suspects awaiting trial again 
appeared to decrease somewhat during the year.
    According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent 
until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and 
may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the 
right to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect 
all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to deny 
due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of individuals accused of 
securityrelated offenses, due to fear of retribution from the security 
forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have suffered 
harassment, death threats, and arrest.
    There are no credible estimates of the number of political 
prisoners; some estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown 
number of persons who could be considered political prisoners are 
serving prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and 
membership in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government 
released 5,000 political prisoners after Bouteflika's 1999 election.
    International humanitarian organizations did not request visits 
with political prisoners during the year; therefore, it is unclear 
whether the Government would permit such organizations to visit 
political prisoners. In general the Government does not permit 
independent monitoring of prisons or detention centers; however, over 
the past 18 months, it has permitted the ICRC to monitor general prison 
conditions in civilian prisons (see Section 1.c.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home, 
but the state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue 
exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces also entered 
residences without warrants. According to defense attorneys, police who 
execute searches without a warrant routinely fail to identify 
themselves as police and abuse those who ask for identification. 
Security forces deployed an extensive network of secret informers 
against both terrorist targets and political opponents. The Government 
monitors the telephones of, and sometimes disconnects service to, 
political opponents and journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 3). There 
are reports of police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists 
in order to force the suspects to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
    Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap 
residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After massacres that 
took place in their villages, numerous civilians fled their homes. 
Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of violence to extort 
money from businesses and families across the country.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--
Armed groups were responsible for numerous, indiscriminate, 
nonselective killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and 
other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of 
persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines, 
which often targeted security force personnel. For example, on 
September 29, a group of at least 100 armed men seized control of the 
roads leading into Bani Yassi, a small town 56 miles east of Algiers 
near Tizi Ouzou. The group then destroyed the barracks of the local 
communal police with an explosive device, entered the wreckage after 
the explosion, and killed those police officers who were not killed in 
the explosion. On November 4, one soldier was killed and two others 
were injured in a bomb blast at an electrical pylon in the mountainous 
region of Zaccar, about 40 miles southwest of Algiers. On December 5, 
three people were killed and 11 were injured in an explosion in Tiaret 
(200 miles west of Algiers).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricts this right in 
practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect 
``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the 
national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gives the Government 
broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action 
against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order. 
However, the Government did not enforce these regulations strictly, and 
the independent press reported regularly on security matters without 
penalty. Reporting by government-controlled press organs frequently 
included deflated numbers of civilians and government forces killed, 
and inflated terrorist casualty counts; however, there were no credible 
allegations of inflated terrorist surrenders under the amnesty program 
during the year, as had been the case in the past. Government 
discrepancies were noted frequently in independent newspapers.
    In March 1994, the Government issued an interministerial decree 
that independent newspapers could print security information only from 
official government bulletins carried by the government-controlled 
Algerian Press Service (APS). Independent newspapers openly ignored the 
directive, and the trend toward increased openness about security-force 
losses continued during the year. The Government continued to provide 
the press with more information than in the past about the security 
situation. Journalists deliberately did not report on current possible 
abuses by security forces to avoid difficulties with the Government, 
although there was significant coverage of NGO activity aimed at 
publicizing such abuses committed in the past. According to the 
Ministry of Health, it no longer forbids medical personnel from 
speaking to journalists, and such personnel spoke to the press during 
the year. The Government's definition of security information often 
extended beyond purely military matters to encompass broader political 
affairs. In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed from detention in 
1994 received direct orders from the Justice Ministry to make no 
further public statements. This ban remains in force. In general, 
journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing criticism of 
specific senior military officials.
    For a second consecutive year, there were no reports that the 
Government put journalists under ``judicial control.'' In previous 
years, the Government used this practice to harass journalists who 
wrote offending articles by requiring the journalists to check in 
regularly with the local police and preventing them from leaving the 
country. According to a Europe-based NGO that specializes in press 
freedom, the Government continued to refrain from harassing journalists 
under criminal defamation statutes during the year, as had been its 
practice in the past.
    There were no newspapers allied with Islamist political parties in 
print, due to government pressure; however, legal Islamist political 
parties have access to the existing independent press, in which they 
may express their views without government interference.
    The Government maintains an effective monopoly over printing 
companies and newsprint imports. However, at least two newspapers were 
in the final stages of negotiations with private firms to print 
newspapers and import newsprint, which would circumvent such government 
control. There was no abuse of the Government's power to halt newspaper 
publications during the year.
    The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent 
press through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in 
1996. All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in 
a newspaper must submit the item to the advertising company, which then 
decides in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state 
companies' output and government services still represent approximately 
two-thirds of national income, government-provided advertising 
constitutes a significant source of advertising revenue for the 
country's newspapers. Advertising companies tend to provide significant 
amounts of advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist 
editorial line and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political 
grounds, even if such newspapers have large readerships or offer cheap 
advertising rates.
    President Bouteflika stated in November 1999 that the media 
ultimately should be at the service of the State. Radio and television 
remained under government control, with coverage biased in favor of the 
Government's policies and the government-supported party, the National 
Democratic Rally (RND). Parliamentary debates are televised live. 
Satellite-dish antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens have 
access to European and Middle Eastern broadcasting. A five-member 
delegation from Reporters Without Borders visited the country in June. 
The group was allowed to meet freely with the interlocutors of their 
choice and concluded that the press enjoyed increasing freedom. 
However, the delegation also noted a number of continued barriers to 
full press freedom.
    Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the 
country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some 
continued to return during the year. There was a growing number of 
academic seminars and colloquiums that occurred without governmental 
interference. The Government continues to interfere in seminars that 
were political or economic in content (see Section 2.b.). The only 
reported strike at a university during the year occurred in October at 
Bab Izzouar University, where a small number of professors went on 
strike to protest work conditions. After a week, the teachers returned 
to work (see Section 6.a.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 emergency law and 
government practice sharply curtail this right. Citizens and 
organizations must obtain permits from the appointed local governor 
before holding public meetings. While the Government frequently grants 
licenses to political parties, NGO's, and other groups to hold indoor 
rallies, in most instances outdoor demonstrations are not permitted.
    Some unlicensed groups continue to be active, including groups 
dedicated to the cause of persons who have disappeared. Such groups 
continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings. 
However, in March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the 
authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators attempting to draw 
attention to the cause of persons who disappeared. The Government 
arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about 
a week apart. However, those arrested were released after a short time. 
In November police again disrupted a march by families of persons who 
had disappeared. In this instance, which coincided with a visit to that 
city by Amnesty International, the police used force, and arrested five 
persons. Four subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and 
convicted of attacking a security officer.
    The Government refused to permit, in the name of public order, a 
proposed march in October to protest the Israeli Government's actions 
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. 
When a group of protesters attempted to hold a rally despite the ban, 
they were dispersed in a nonviolent manner.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
the 1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it. 
The Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they 
may be established (see Section 3). In January the Government refused 
to approve the Wafa Party because of its perceived ties to the FIS. In 
August 40 members of Parliament petitioned the Government, demanding an 
explanation of the Government's refusal to recognize the Party. In 
November the Minister of Justice responded, stating that the Wafa Party 
would not be recognized because it included large numbers of members 
who belonged to the outlawed FIS. The Government closed the Party's 
offices on November 13. The Front Democratique, which is headed by 
former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, applied for registration but 
received no response within the time period specified by law for 
governmental decision on such cases (see Section 3). The Interior 
Ministry licenses all nongovernmental associations and regards all 
associations as illegal unless they have licenses. It may deny a 
license to, or dissolve, any group regarded as a threat to the 
Government's authority, or to the security or public order of the 
State. After the Government suspended the parliamentary election in 
1992, it banned the FIS as a political party, and the social and 
charitable groups associated with it. Membership in the FIS remains 
illegal, although at least one former FIS leader announced publicly 
that he intended to form a cultural youth group.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the 
state religion but prohibits discrimination based on religious belief, 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, 
there are some restrictions. Islam is the only legal religion, and the 
law limits the practice of other faiths; however, the Government 
follows a de facto policy of tolerance by not inquiring into the 
religious practices of individuals.
    The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a 
faith other than Islam. However, there are Roman Catholic churches in 
the country, including a cathedral in Algiers (the seat of the 
Archbishop), which conduct services without government interference. In 
1994 the size of the Jewish community diminished significantly, and its 
synagogue since has been abandoned. There are only a few smaller 
churches and other places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in 
private homes for religious services.
    Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system 
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens 
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in 
the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Private primary and secondary 
schools are not permitted to operate.
    The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general 
guidance on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for 
possible security-related offenses, and bars their use as public 
meeting places outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of 
religious affairs provides some financial support to mosques and has 
limited control over the training of imams.
    Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Because of 
safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, Muslim 
converts practice their new faith clandestinely. The Family Code, which 
is based on Shari'a (Islamic law), prohibits Muslim women from marrying 
non-Muslims, although this regulation is not always enforced. The code 
does not restrict Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.
    Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts 
the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution. 
Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the 
Bible, may be brought into the country. Non-Islamic religious texts and 
music and video selections no longer are difficult to locate for 
purchase. The Government prohibits the dissemination of any literature 
that portrays violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.
    Under both Shari'a and the law, children born to a Muslim father 
are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion. Islam does not allow 
conversion to other faiths at any age. In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) declared its intention to eliminate Jews, Christians, and 
polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet retracted that 
declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign Christian community 
tends to curtail its public activities.
    The country's 9-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed 
radical Muslims against the general Islamic population. Approximately 
100,000 civilians, terrorists, and security forces have been killed 
during the past 9 years. Extremist selfproclaimed ``Islamists'' have 
issued public threats against all ``infidels'' in the country, both 
foreigners and citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims, 
including missionaries. The majority of the country's terrorist groups 
do not, as a rule, differentiate between religious and political 
killings. During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the 
Government and civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic 
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at 
times restricts these rights. In the spring of 1999, the Government 
allowed travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing 
information on relatives who allegedly ``disappeared'' due to the 
actions of the security forces. These organizations, which were hosted 
by human rights NGO's, held public discussions on those who had 
disappeared.
    The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials 
from the banned FIS. FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from 
prison in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The 
Government also does not permit young men who are eligible for the 
draft and who have not yet completed their military service to leave 
the country if they do not have special authorization; such 
authorization may be granted to students and to those individuals with 
special family circumstances. The Family Code does not permit married 
females under 19 years of age to travel abroad without their husband's 
permission, although this provision generally is not followed in 
practice.
    Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the 
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons 
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricts 
travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon 
industry and many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance 
security in those areas.
    The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout 
the country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification 
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes 
detain persons at these checkpoints.
    Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, using stolen police 
uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash and 
vehicles. According to press reports, armed groups sometimes killed 
groups of civilian passengers at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.).
    The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum, and 
the Government occasionally grants asylum. The Government cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. For example, it 
cooperates with the UNHCR on programs to help refugee Sahrawis, former 
residents of the Western Sahara who left that territory after Morocco 
took control of it in the 1970's. The Government also has worked with 
international organizations that help the Tuaregs, a nomadic people of 
southern Algeria and neighboring countries. There were no reports of 
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government; however, there are significant limitations to this right in 
practice. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, supported by 
the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy, prevent 
citizens from exercising this right. The withdrawal of six presidential 
candidates in 1999 amidst credible charges of fraud, and the election 
of President Bouteflika highlighted the continued dominance of the 
military elite in the process of selecting the country's political 
leadership.
    President Bouteflika was elected in an April 15, 1999 presidential 
election that was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day before of 
all other candidates, who charged that the military already had begun 
to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika victory. Until 
those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been conducted fairly, 
with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and private 
media. The conduct of the campaign--although regulated as to the use of 
languages other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location and 
duration of meetings--was free, and all candidates traveled extensively 
throughout the country. One potential candidate was denied the ability 
to run because the electoral commission determined that he could not 
prove that he had participated in Algeria's war of independence against 
France, a legal requirement for candidates for President born before 
July 1942. With the withdrawal of the other candidates and the absence 
of foreign observers, it was impossible to make an accurate 
determination of turnout for the election, although it apparently was 
as low as 30 percent; the Government claimed a 60 percent turnout.
    Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by 
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit 
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was 
not in session. The President did not exercise such authority during 
the year. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, the 
National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National 
Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and 
provincial councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of 
the National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of 
threequarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must 
originate in the lower chamber.
    In June 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since 
elections were canceled in January 1992, and elected the first 
multiparty parliament in the country's history. Candidates representing 
39 political parties participated, along with several independent 
candidates. Under a system of proportional representation, the 
government-supported party, the National Democratic Rally, won a 
plurality of 154 seats out of a total of 371. In their final report, 
neutral observers stated that, of 1,258 (of the country's 35,000) 
voting stations that they assessed, 1,169 were satisfactory, 95 were 
problematic, and 11 were unsatisfactory. In November 1997, the 
provincial election commissions announced the results of their 
adjudication of the appeals filed by various political parties. The RND 
lost some seats but remained the overall victor in the Assembly 
elections.
    In 1997 the appointed previous legislature, the National Transition 
Council (CNT), changed the law that regulates political parties. Under 
the controversial law, potential parties require official approval from 
the Interior Ministry before they may be established. To obtain 
approval, a party must have 25 founders from across the country whose 
names must be registered with the Interior Ministry. A party headed by 
one of the six presidential candidates who withdrew from the April 
elections registered in September 1999. Two parties failed to receive 
registration. In January the Government refused to approve the Wafa 
party because of its perceived ties to the FIS (see Section 2.b.). The 
Front Democratique, which is headed by former Prime Minster Sid Ahmed 
Ghozali, applied for registration but received no response within the 
time period specified by law for governmental decision on such cases. 
No party may use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab heritage as a 
basis of organizing for political purposes. The law also bans political 
party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party financing 
and reporting requirements.
    The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide 
spectrum of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding 
rallies to printing newspapers. The Government continues to ban the FIS 
as a political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the 
leading progovernment party, the RND, and the Front de Liberation 
National (FLN), political parties sometimes encounter difficulties when 
dealing with local officials, who hinder their organizational efforts. 
The Government monitors private telephone communications, and sometimes 
disconnects telephone service to political opponents for extended 
periods (see Section 1.f.). Opposition parties have very limited access 
to state-controlled television and radio, although the independent 
press publicizes their views.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. The new 
cabinet, named in August, has no female members. Eleven of the 380 
members of the lower house of Parliament are women. In September 1999, 
President Bouteflika appointed the first-ever female provincial 
governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political 
parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
    The Amazighs, an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region, 
participate freely and actively in the political process. Two major 
opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region of the 
country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural 
concerns in the Parliament and the media. The two Amazighbased parties 
were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law 
that stipulate that political parties must have 25 founders from across 
the country.
    The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important 
role in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of 
thousands, and their nomadic existence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian 
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent 
organization that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not 
allowed access to the authorities or to prisons beyond the normal 
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less-active 
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization 
based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who 
follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional 
harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious 
surveillance and cutting off of telephone service.
    Unlike in previous years when such visits were banned, delegations 
from Amnesty International, the ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Freedom 
House, the FIDH, and Reporters Without Borders visited the country at 
the Government's invitation. Amnesty International visited in May and 
again in October, and, after its May visit, claimed that during the 
visit its delegation was ``able to move around the country freely and 
no restrictions were imposed'' on its activities. However, Amnesty 
International did not seek meetings with members of the FIS in prison 
or under house arrest. The organization stated that there had been ``a 
significant drop in the level of violence and killings, and the reports 
of arbitrary arrests, prolonged incommunicado detention, torture, 
disappearances, and unfair trials have also diminished significantly.'' 
However, Amnesty International maintained that many serious concerns 
had not been addressed, including resolving past abuses such as 
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, during its October 
visit, Amnesty International claimed that the Government was not 
cooperating adequately or providing the organization with quality 
information. The organization also claimed that the Government was 
staging demonstrations opposing the Amnesty International visit. In 
September and October, the ICRC conducted its third visit to the 
country to monitor general conditions in the civilian prisons. ICRC 
president Jakob Kellenberger commented during the visit on the 
constructive nature of the dialog between the ICRC and the Government. 
A delegation from Human Rights Watch met with government officials in 
May. The delegation stated that it was ``allowed to travel freely and 
meet with officials, lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, and 
victims and families of victims of abuses by the Government and armed 
groups.'' Freedom House visited July 3-10, and again in November, in 
order to assess the possibility of establishing programs involving 
support for the rule of law, including women's rights, freedom of the 
press, and judicial reform.
    The National Observatory for Human Rights was established by the 
Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the 
authorities. It prepares an annual report with recommendations to the 
Government.
    The Government has a national ombudsman, who receives individual 
complaints and presents an annual report to the President. Provincial 
representatives are designated to accept individual grievances and to 
make them known to the authorities. Most such complaints concerned 
bureaucratic unresponsiveness and lack of jobs and housing (see Section 
5).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race, 
sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition; however, women 
continue to face legal and social discrimination.
    Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is 
common, but there are no reliable statistics regarding its extent. 
Spousal abuse is more frequent in rural than urban areas, especially 
among less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal 
rape. Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under 
the law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman 
seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and there have been 
no reports of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must 
obtain medical certification of the physical effects of an assault 
before they lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of 
societal pressures, women frequently are reluctant to endure this 
process. There are very few facilities offering safe haven for abused 
women, and many more are needed. Women's rights groups have experienced 
difficulty in drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social 
problem, largely due to societal attitudes. There are several rape 
crisis centers run by women's groups, but they have few resources. In 
August 1998, the Government released figures indicating that the 
whereabouts of 319 women remain unknown, and that there were 24 reports 
by women of rape. Most human rights groups believe that the actual 
number is much higher. There is a rape crisis center that specializes 
in caring for women who are victims of rape by terrorists.
    Some aspects of the law and many traditional social practices 
discriminate against women. The 1984 Family Code, which is based in 
large part on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal 
guardianship of a husband or male relative. For example, a woman must 
obtain a father's approval to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to 
obtain except in cases of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a 
serious crime. Husbands generally obtain the right to the family's home 
in the case of divorce. Custody of the children normally is awarded to 
the mother, but she may not enroll them in a particular school or take 
them out of the country without the father's authorization. Only males 
are able to confer citizenship on their children. Muslim women are 
prohibited from marrying nonMuslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim 
women (see Section 2.c.).
    The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man 
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice. A 
wife may sue for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his 
intent to marry another woman prior to the marriage.
    Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in 
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an 
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers. 
According to Shari'a, such a distinction is justified because other 
provisions require that the husband's income and assets are to be used 
to support the family, while the wife's remain, in principle, her own. 
However, in practice women do not always have exclusive control over 
assets that they bring to a marriage or income that they earn 
themselves. Females under 19 years of age may not travel abroad without 
their husbands' permission (see Section 2.d.). However, women may take 
out business loans and are the sole custodians of their dowries. In its 
2000 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of 
Experts noted that the Government has stated that, despite 
incorporating equality between men and women into the legislative and 
regulatory texts governing the workplace, in practice women still are 
confronted with discriminations in employment resulting from 
stereotypes that exist regarding a woman's place in society.
    While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a 
career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural 
areas than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 10 percent of 
the work force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into 
contracts, and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law, 
education, the media, and the armed forces. About 25 percent of judges 
are women, a percentage that has been growing in recent years. 
President Bouteflika's changes to the judiciary in August increased the 
number of courts headed by women (see Section 1.e).
    Although the 1990 Labor Law bans sexual discrimination in the 
workplace, the leaders of women's organizations report that violations 
are commonplace. Labor Ministry inspectors do little to enforce the 
law.
    There are numerous small women's rights groups. Their main goals 
are to foster women's economic welfare and to amend aspects of the 
Family Code.
    During the year, extremists sometimes specifically targeted women. 
There were numerous incidents of women being killed and mutilated in 
massacres. Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young women and 
held them captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape and 
servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government is committed in principle to protecting 
children's human rights. It provides free education for children 6 to 
15 years of age, and free medical care for all citizens--albeit in 
often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has 
programs for children, but such programs face serious funding problems. 
Child abuse is a problem. Hospitals treat numerous child abuse cases 
every year, but many cases go unreported. Laws against child abuse have 
not led to notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. Legal 
experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children 
sufficient protection. NGO's that specialize in care of children cite 
an increase in domestic violence aimed at children, which they 
attribute to the ``culture of violence'' developed during the years 
since 1992 and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural 
families to the cities to escape terrorist violence. Such NGO's have 
educational programs aimed at reducing the level of violence, but lack 
funding.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate 
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled. 
Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force, generally ignore a 
law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of their jobs for the 
disabled. Social security provides for payments for orthopedic 
equipment, and some nongovernmental organizations receive limited 
government financial support. The Government also attempts to finance 
specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Amazighs are an ethnic 
minority centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists have 
sought to maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity while the 
Government's Arabization program continues. The law requires that 
Arabic be the official language and requires, under penalty of fines, 
that all official government business be conducted in Arabic. The law 
also requires that Arabic be used for all broadcasts on national 
television and radios for dubbing or subtitling all non-Arabic films, 
for medical prescriptions (although the law is not followed in 
practice), and for communications equipment. As part of the national 
charter signed in 1996, the Government and several major political 
parties agreed that the Amazigh culture and language were major 
political components of the country's identity. In September 1999 
President Bouteflika stated that the Amazigh language would never be an 
official language.
    There are professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of 
Tizi Ouzou. The government-owned national television station broadcasts 
a brief nightly news program in the Amazigh language. Amazighs hold 
influential positions in government, the army, business, and 
journalism.
    The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic 
existence and are relatively few in number.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish 
trade unions of their choice. About two-thirds of the labor force 
belong to unions. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the General 
Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which 
dates from the era of a single political party. The UGTA encompasses 
national syndicates that are specialized by sector. There are also some 
autonomous unions, such as syndicates for Air Algeria pilots (SPLA), 
airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNES).
    Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a 
union. The 1990 law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to 
approve a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Syndicates 
Confederation (CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the 
autonomous syndicates, but without success. The application that the 
CSA filed with the Labor Ministry still was pending at year's end, 
although the CSA continues to function without official status. The law 
prohibits unions from associating with political parties and also 
prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts 
are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities. The 
labor union organized by the banned FIS, the Islamic Syndicate of 
Workers (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because it had no license.
    Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to 
require workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their 
jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to 
the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14 
days of mandatory conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. The law 
states that arbitration decisions are binding on both parties. If no 
agreement is reached in arbitration, the workers may strike legally 
after they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public 
services must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
    In February the Agricultural Services Department went on strike for 
increased salaries. On March 28 and 29, The National Customs Union went 
on strike to demand the implementation of a previously negotiated 
agreement on salaries. On April 3, the air traffic controllers 
(Syndicat National des Personnels de la Circulation Aerienne) went on 
strike as a part of extended salary negotiations. In May steelworkers 
went on strike for assurances of job security. In that same month, the 
National Teacher's Union (Union National des Personnels de l'Education 
et de la Formation--UNPEF) went on strike for increased salaries and 
better housing. There also were various taxi strikes throughout the 
country during the year. The workers received varying numbers of 
concessions to their demands as a result of the strikes. In October a 
small number of professors at Bab Izzouar University went on strike to 
protest work conditions (see Section 2.a.).
    Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate 
with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign 
labor groups. For example, the UGTA has contacts with French unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government 
permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by 
employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms 
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by 
employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
    The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual 
rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including by 
children; however, while the Government generally enforces the ban 
effectively, armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnap young women and 
hold them captive for weeks at a time, during which group members rape 
them and force them into servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, 
and 6.f.).
    In its 2000 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts noted that the 
law that requires persons who have completed a course of higher 
education or training to perform a period of service of between 2 and 4 
years in order to obtain employment or work in an occupation, is not 
compatible with relevant ILO conventions dealing with forced labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors 
from the Ministry of labor enforce the minimum employment age by making 
periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public sector enterprises. 
They do not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private 
sectors. Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal 
employment, such as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall 
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific 
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the 
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government 
fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this 
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. The minimum wage is approximately $105 (8,000 dinars) per 
month. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement 
is inconsistent.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours. There are well-developed 
occupation and health regulations codified in a 1991 decree, but 
government inspectors do not enforce these regulations effectively. 
There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing 
themselves from hazardous working conditions. Because employment 
generally is based on very detailed contracts, workers rarely are 
subjected to conditions in the workplace that they were not informed of 
beforehand. If workers are subjected to such conditions, they first may 
attempt to renegotiate the employment contract and, that failing, 
resort to the courts.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons. Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped 
young women and held them captive for weeks at a time, during which 
group members raped them and forced them into servitude (see Sections 
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.). There is a rape crisis center in 
Algiers that specializes in caring for women who are victims of rape by 
terrorists.
                               __________

                                BAHRAIN

    Bahrain is a hereditary emirate with few democratic institutions 
and no political parties. The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled 
Bahrain since the late 18th century and dominates all facets of its 
society and government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as 
hereditary ruler. The Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, governs 
the country with the assistance of his uncle as Prime Minister, his son 
as Crown Prince, and an appointed cabinet of ministers. In 1975 the 
Government suspended some provisions of the 1973 Constitution, 
including those articles relating to the National Assembly, which was 
disbanded and never reinstituted. Citizens belong to the Shi'a and 
Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a constituting over two-thirds of 
the indigenous population. However, Sunnis predominate politically and 
economically because the ruling family is Sunni and is supported by the 
armed forces, the security services, and powerful Sunni and Shi'a 
merchant families. The political situation generally was calm during 
the year; there were a few incidents of low-level political unrest, but 
there has not been significant unrest since 1996. There are few 
judicial checks on the actions of the Amir and his Government, and the 
courts are subject to government pressure.
    The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It 
controls the public security force (police) and the extensive security 
service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against 
external threats. It did not play a role in internal security during 
the year. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Bahrain has a mixed economy with government domination of many 
basic industries, including the important oil and aluminum sectors. 
Possessing limited oil and gas reserves, the Government is working to 
diversify its economic base, concentrating on light manufacturing and 
the services sectors, particularly banking, financial services, and 
consulting. The Government has used its modest oil revenues to build a 
highly advanced transportation and telecommunications infrastructure. 
Economic growth is highly dependent on global oil prices, but the 
economy remains stable. The Government encouraged private national and 
international investment and moved to privatize some of its state-run 
industries. The country is a regional financial and business center. 
Tourism, particularly via the causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, 
is also a significant source of income. Citizens enjoy a high standard 
of living.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in 
some areas and improved in other areas; however, its record was poor in 
some areas, particularly workers' rights. The Government denies 
citizens the right to change their government; however, the political 
situation continued to improve due to the decrease in political and 
civil unrest compared to last year, and an effort by the Amir to 
develop relations with the Shi'a community. Security forces continued 
to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners. Impunity remains a 
problem; there were no known instances of any security forces personnel 
being punished for human rights abuses committed either during the year 
or in any previous year. The Government continued to use arbitrary 
arrest and detention, incommunicado and prolonged detention, and 
involuntary exile; however, in 1999 upon assuming power, one of the 
Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 400 prisoners, 
detainees, and exiles. During the year, the Amir pardoned a combined 
total of approximately 500 prisoners and detainees, some of whom had 
been detained for political reasons. The judiciary remains subject to 
government pressure, and there are limits on the right to a fair public 
trial, especially in the Security Court. The Government continued to 
infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The Government imposed some 
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press and restricted 
freedom of assembly and association. The Government also imposes some 
limits on freedom of religion and movement. Violence against women and 
discrimination based on sex, religion, and ethnicity remain problems. 
The Government restricts worker rights, and there were instances of 
forced labor.
    In December 1999, the Amir stated that all citizens are ``equal 
before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the BDF and the 
Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. These policies 
continued during the year.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no investigations or prosecutions of any security force 
personnel for alleged extrajudicial killings committed in previous 
years.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment are prohibited by law; however there are credible reports 
that prisoners often are beaten, both on the soles of their feet and 
about the face and head, burned with cigarettes, deprived of sleep for 
long periods of time, and in some cases subjected to electrical shocks. 
The Government has difficulty in rebutting allegations of torture and 
of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it permits 
incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There were no 
known instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses 
committed either during the year or in any previous year, and there is 
an appearance of impunity.
    Opposition and human rights groups allege that the security forces 
sometimes threaten female detainees with rape and inflict other forms 
of sexual abuse and harassment on them while they are in custody. Such 
allegations are difficult to confirm or deny. Young prisoners are 
housed separately until the age of 15.
    Credible observers say that the prisons generally meet minimum 
international standards. Local defense attorneys report that their 
clients continued to receive improved care and treatment. In addition 
the release of hundreds of detainees from jail, perhaps as many as 
1,200 in 1999 and 2000 (see Section 1.d.), and the reduced number of 
arrests during the year, eased overcrowding. At the Government's 
invitation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
continued the series of visits to prisons that it started in late 1996.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are serious problems. The Constitution states that ``no 
person shall be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or compelled 
to reside in a specified place . . . except in accordance with the 
provisions of the law and under the supervision of the judicial 
authorities.'' However, in practice, in matters regarding arrest, 
detention, or exile, the 1974 State Security Act takes precedence. 
Under the State Security Act, persons may be detained for up to 3 years 
without trial for engaging in activities or making statements regarded 
as a threat to the broadly defined concepts of national harmony and 
security, and the Government continued to arrest and detain citizens 
arbitrarily. The scope of the State Security Act extends to any case 
involving arson, explosions, or attacks on persons at their place of 
employment or because of the nature of their work. Detainees have the 
right to appeal such detentions after a period of 3 months and, if the 
appeal is denied, every 16 months thereafter from the date of the 
original detention.
    Government security forces used the State Security Act during the 
year to detain persons deemed to be engaging in antigovernment 
activities, including persons who attempted to exercise their rights of 
free speech, assembly, and association, or other rights. Activities 
that also may lead to detention, questioning, warning, or arrest by the 
security forces include: Membership in illegal organizations or those 
deemed subversive; painting antigovernment slogans on walls; joining 
antigovernment demonstrations; possessing or circulating antigovernment 
writings; preaching sermons considered by the Government to have an 
antigovernment political tone; and harboring or associating with 
persons who committed such acts. However, there was greater tolerance 
of activities such as public demonstrations during the year, and the 
number of persons detained was less than in 1999.
    In addition to overseeing the security service and police, the 
Ministry of Interior also controls the Office of the Public Prosecutor, 
whose officers initially determine whether sufficient evidence exists 
to continue to hold a prisoner in investigative detention. The Ministry 
is responsible for all aspects of prison administration. In the early 
stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys have no recourse to 
any authority outside the Ministry of Interior. The authorities rarely 
permit visits to inmates who are incarcerated for security-related 
offenses and such prisoners may be held incommunicado for months, or 
sometimes years. However, prisoners detained for criminal offenses 
generally may receive visits from family members, usually once a month.
    At the beginning of the year, security forces were estimated to be 
holding over 800 persons in detention for security-related offenses. 
During the year, some were arrested, released, and then arrested again. 
At year's end, the total number of persons detained was reduced; 
however, as many as 750 persons still remained in detention. During the 
year, the Government pardoned as many as 300 persons detained in 
connection with antigovernment activities. One of the Amir's first 
official acts was to pardon or release over 400 detainees, prisoners, 
and exiles. In January and April, the Amir pardoned an additional 223 
prisoners and detainees, some of whom had been detained for political 
reasons.
    Several Shi'a clerics were arrested in 1996 for signing a 1994 
petition to the Amir calling for the restoration of the National 
Assembly. Four of the clerics, Abdul Wahab Hussain, Hassan Mushaimaa, 
Hassan Sultan, and Haji Hassan Jarallah, remain in jail. The most 
prominent member of the group, Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, was pardoned in 
1999, although he is still subject to government restrictions (see 
Section 2.c.). On March 22, the Government rearrested Abdul Wahab 
Hussain only hours after a judge ordered his release (see Section 
2.c.).
    Abdul Jahil Abdula Khadim, a shop owner, remained in detention at 
year's end. He was detained in 1998 after a young man who worked in his 
store died from police mistreatment.
    While the authorities reserve the right to use exile and the 
revocation of citizenship to punish individuals convicted or suspected 
of antigovernment activity, there were no reports of exile orders 
issued during the year. In the past, the Government has revoked the 
citizenship of persons that it considered to be security threats. The 
Government considers such persons to have forfeited their nationality 
under the Citizenship Act of 1963 because they accepted foreign 
citizenship or passports, or engaged in antigovernment activities 
abroad. Bahraini emigre groups and their local contacts have challenged 
this practice, arguing that the Government's revocation of citizenship 
without due process violates the Constitution. The Amir pardoned 12 
exiles during the year. According to the emigre groups, as many as 450 
citizens continue to live in exile. This total includes both those 
prohibited from returning to Bahrain and their family members who live 
abroad with them voluntarily.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the courts are subject to government 
pressure regarding verdicts, sentencing, and appeals.
    The civil and criminal legal system consists of a complex mix of 
courts, based on diverse legal sources, including Sunni and Shi'a 
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and 
regulations. The 1974 State Security Act created a separate, closed 
security court system, which has jurisdiction in cases of alleged 
antigovernment activity.
    The Bahrain Defense Force maintains a separate court system for 
military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of 
Justice. Military courts do not review cases involving civilian, 
criminal, or security offenses.
    Defense attorneys are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs. Some attorneys and family members involved in 
politically sensitive criminal cases complain that the Government 
interferes with court proceedings to influence the outcome or to 
prevent judgments from being carried out. There are also occasional 
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
    In past cases, the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other senior 
government officials have lost civil cases brought against them by 
private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments are not always 
implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family are 
well represented in the judiciary and generally do not recuse 
themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
    A person who is arrested may be tried in an ordinary criminal court 
or, if recommended by the prosecution, in the Security Court. Ordinary 
civil or criminal trial procedures provide for an open trial, the right 
to counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the right to 
appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally do not appear to 
discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. However, 
there is credible evidence that persons accused of antigovernment 
crimes and tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Those 
accused were not permitted to speak with an attorney until their 
appearance before the judge at the preliminary hearing. Trials in the 
criminal courts for antigovernment activities are held in secret.
    Security cases are tried in secret by judges on the Supreme Court 
of Appeals, sitting as the Security Court. Family members usually are 
not permitted in the court until the final verdict is rendered. 
Procedures in the Security Court do not provide for even the most basic 
safeguards. The Security Court is exempt from adhering to the 
procedural protections of the Penal Code. Defendants may be represented 
by counsel, but they seldom see their attorneys before the actual day 
of arraignment. Convictions may be based solely on confessions, 
including confessions that may have been elicited under torture, and 
police evidence or testimony that may be introduced in secret. The 
defense may not review the evidence against the defendant prior to 
trial proceedings. Defense lawyers complain that they rarely are given 
sufficient time to find witnesses. There is no right to judicial review 
of the legality of arrests. There is no judicial appeal of a Security 
Court verdict, but the defendant may request clemency from the Amir. 
The Security Court tried one individual, Abdul Wahab Hussain, during 
the year (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    The number of political prisoners is difficult to determine because 
the Government does not release data on security cases; however, the 
total is believed to be less than 100. Such cases are not tried in open 
court, and visits to prisoners convicted of security offenses are 
restricted strictly. The Government denies that there are any political 
prisoners and claims that all inmates incarcerated for committing 
security offenses were convicted properly of subversive acts such as 
espionage, espousing or committing violence, or belonging to terrorist 
organizations.
    In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and grants 
amnesty to some prisoners, including individuals imprisoned for 
political activities, on major holidays. The Government reported that 
the Amir pardoned over 288 prisoners and detainees during the year, 
although it was uncertain how many such persons were political 
prisoners rather than common criminals (see Section 1.d.). The 
prisoners were expected to be released in small groups over the course 
of several months.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--During the year the Government infringed on citizens' 
right to privacy, using illegal searches and arbitrary arrests as 
tactics to control political unrest, although reports of such 
violations of citizens' rights to privacy continued to decline. Under 
the State Security Law, the Ministry of Interior is empowered to 
authorize entry into private premises without specific judicial 
intervention. Telephone calls and personal correspondence are subject 
to monitoring. Police informer networks are extensive and 
sophisticated.
    There were reports that security forces entered private homes 
without warrants and took into custody residents who were suspected of 
either participating in, or having information regarding, 
antigovernment activities. While conducting these raids, security 
forces confiscated, damaged, or destroyed personal property for which 
owners were not compensated by the Government. Security forces also set 
up checkpoints at the entrances to villages, requiring vehicle searches 
and proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. Whenever 
possible the Government jams, either in whole or in part, foreign 
broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary (see 
Section 2.a.). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access to 
Internet sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic (see 
Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
right ``to express and propagate'' opinions; however, citizens in 
practice are not free to express their public opposition to the 
Government in speech or writing. Press criticism of ruling family 
personalities and of government policy regarding certain sensitive 
subjects--such as sectarian unrest and the dispute with Qatar over the 
Hawar islands--is strictly prohibited. However, when the Amir assumed 
power in 1999, the Government allowed the press somewhat greater 
latitude. The Amir stated in his December 1999 National Day speech that 
the press and public have a duty to question the Government about 
developments in the country, and he repeated that sentiment on several 
occasions during the year in press interviews and in a meeting with the 
Bahrain Journalists Association (BJA) Board. Columnists and reporters 
wrote about several sensitive issues, criticizing the services offered 
by the Ministries of Interior and Defense and discussing the state 
budget, subjects that were off-limits in the past. However, later in 
the year, when some journalists tried to expand the scope of their 
criticisms to include political reform and reactivation of the 
Constitution, they were warned by the authorities to either support the 
government position or avoid the issues altogether.
    Local press coverage and commentary on international issues is 
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also is 
relatively unrestricted. Many individuals express critical opinions 
openly on domestic political and social issues in private settings but 
do not do so to leading government officials or in public forums.
    The Information Ministry exercises extensive control over all local 
media. Newspapers are owned privately, but they routinely exercise 
self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics, and defer to 
Information Ministry demands. In some cases, editors of privately owned 
newspapers also hold government positions. The Government does not 
condone unfavorable coverage of its domestic policies by the 
international media and occasionally has revoked the press credentials 
of offending journalists. Because the Ministry controls foreign 
journalists' residence permits, unfavorable coverage in some cases has 
led to deportation. However, there were no reports that the Government 
revoked press credentials during the year. The Government generally 
afforded foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit 
their contacts.
    In late September, the newly formed BJA elected its first board of 
directors. Some journalists view the lack of competition for the 
chairmanship of the board, and the preponderance of government 
employees accepted as BJA members, as a signal that it will not be a 
truly independent organization.
    The State owns and operates all radio and television stations. 
Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from neighboring 
countries and Egypt may be received without interference. However, 
international news services, including the Associated Press, United 
Press International, and Agence France Presse, sometimes complain about 
press restrictions. The Cable News Network is available on a 24-hour 
basis by subscription, and the British Broadcasting Corporation World 
News Service is carried on a local channel 24 hours a day free of 
charge. However, the Government generally jams, wholly or partially, 
foreign broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary 
(see Section 1.f.).
    Most senior government officials, ruling family members, and major 
hotels, as well as affluent private citizens, use satellite dishes to 
receive international broadcasts. Prior government approval to access 
satellite dishes and for the importation or installation of dishes is 
no longer required (see Section 3). Bahrain Television's satellite 
subscription service does not offer access to the Qatar-based Al-Jazira 
channel, which otherwise broadcasts widely throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa. Government officials believe Al-Jazira's news and 
talk shows are biased against the country.
    Access to the Internet is provided through the National Telephone 
Company (BATELCO). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access 
to sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic. The software 
used is unreliable and often inhibits access to uncontroversial sites 
as well. E-mail access to information is unimpeded, although it may be 
subject to monitoring (see Section 1.f.).
    Although there are no formal regulations limiting academic freedom, 
in practice academics try to avoid contentious political issues. 
University hiring and admissions policies appear to favor Sunnis and 
others who are assumed to support the Government rather than focusing 
on professional experience and academic qualifications. However, there 
continued to be some improvement in the hiring of qualified individuals 
in a nondiscriminatory manner during the year, and a few Shi'a 
professors, including women, were hired.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Despite the 
Constitution's provision for the right of free assembly, the Government 
prohibits all public political demonstrations and meetings and controls 
religious gatherings that may take on political overtones. Permits are 
required for most other public gatherings, and permission is not 
granted routinely. Unauthorized public gatherings of more than five 
persons are prohibited by law. The Government monitors any gatherings 
that might take on a political tone and frequently disperses such 
meetings. During the year, the Government authorized two 
demonstrations, one in Manama on October 6 and one at the University on 
October 7, to protest Israeli government actions against Palestinians 
in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. Demonstrations were 
held on October 13 without government approval.
    The Constitution provides for the right of free association; 
however, the Government restricts this right. The Government prohibits 
political parties and organizations. Some professional societies and 
social and sports clubs traditionally have served as forums for 
discreet political discussion, but they are restricted by law from 
engaging in political activity. Only the Bahraini Bar Association is 
exempt from the regulations that require that the charters of all 
associations include a commitment to refrain from political activity. 
The Bar Association successfully had argued that a lawyer's 
professional duties may require certain political actions, such as 
interpreting legislation or participating in a politically sensitive 
trial. In January 1998, after the Bar Association sponsored a lecture 
in which prodemocracy speakers publicly attacked the Government, the 
Government told current board members that they would not be allowed to 
stand for reelection. Although the decision has not been reversed, the 
Bar Association continues to operate without hindrance. Other organized 
discussions and meetings by the Bar Association no longer are 
discouraged actively.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that Islam is the 
official religion and also provides for freedom of religion; however, 
the Government does not tolerate political dissent, including from 
religious groups or leaders. The Government subjects both Sunni and 
Shi'a Muslims to control and monitoring. Members of other religions who 
practice their faith privately do so without interference from the 
Government. The Government funds, monitors, and closely controls all 
official religious institutions. These include Shi'a and Sunni mosques, 
Shi'a Ma'tams (ceremonial centers), Shi'a and Sunni Waqfs (charitable 
foundations), and the religious courts, which represent both the 
Ja'afari (Shi'a) and Maliki (Sunni) schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
While the Government rarely interferes with what it considers 
legitimate religious observations, it actively suppresses any activity 
deemed overtly political in nature. In the past, the Government 
occasionally has closed mosques and Ma'tams for allowing political 
demonstrations to take place on or near their premises and has detained 
religious leaders for delivering political sermons or for allowing such 
sermons to be delivered in their mosques. The Government also may 
appropriate or withhold funding in order to reward or punish particular 
individuals or places of worship. There were no reported closures of 
Ma'tams or mosques during the year.
    The High Council for Islamic Affairs is charged with the review and 
approval of all clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shi'a 
communities, and it maintains program oversight for all citizens 
studying religion abroad. Public religious events, most notably the 
large annual commemorative marches by Shi'a, are permitted but are 
monitored closely by the police. There are no restrictions on the 
number of citizens permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and 
holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. However, stateless residents who 
do not possess Bahraini passports often have difficulties arranging 
travel to religious sites abroad. The Government monitors travel to 
Iran and scrutinizes carefully those who choose to pursue religious 
study there.
    Proselytizing by non-Muslims is discouraged, anti-Islamic writings 
are prohibited, and conversions from Islam to other religions, while 
not illegal, are not tolerated well by society. However, Bibles and 
other Christian publications are displayed and sold openly in local 
bookstores that also sell Islamic and other religious literature. Some 
small groups worship in their homes. Notable dignitaries from virtually 
every religion and denomination visit the country and frequently meet 
with the Government and civic leaders. Religious tracts of all branches 
of Islam, cassettes of sermons delivered by Muslim preachers from other 
countries, and publications of other religions are readily available.
    In early July 1999, the Amir pardoned prominent Shi'a cleric Abdul 
Amir Al-Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. Since his release, 
the Government has monitored Al-Jamri's movements. It also has denied 
him the right to issue marital status certificates, a lucrative source 
of income for many clerics. Several other clerics associated with Al-
Jamri remain in jail. On March 22, the Government rearrested Shi'a 
cleric leader Abdul Wahab Hussain only hours after a judge released him 
following more than 4 years in detention without charge. The 
authorities neither brought charges against Hussain nor provided an 
explanation for his rearrest. Hussain remained incarcerated in a Manama 
jail at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on 
these rights. Citizens are free to move within the country and change 
their place of residence or work. However, passports may be denied on 
political grounds. Approximately 3 percent of the indigenous 
population, the bidoon, mostly stateless Shi'a of Persian-origin, do 
not have passports and are unable to obtain them readily, although they 
may be given travel documents as Bahraini residents (see Section 5). 
The Government occasionally grants citizenship to Sunni residents, most 
of whom are from the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.
    Citizens living abroad who are suspected of political or criminal 
offenses may face arrest and trial upon return to the country. Under 
the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject applications to 
obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the applicant has 
the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. The 
Government also has issued temporary passports, valid for one trip a 
year, to individuals whose travel it wishes to control or whose claim 
to citizenship is questionable. A noncitizen resident, including a 
bidoon of Iranian origin, also may obtain a laissez-passer (travel 
document), usually valid for 2 years and renewable at Bahraini 
embassies overseas. The holder of a laissez-passer also requires a visa 
to reenter the country.
    Although the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees, it has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. The Government usually does not accept 
refugees due to the country's small size and limited resources. 
However, in practice refugees who arrive are not repatriated to 
countries from which they have fled. Many Iranian emigres who fled Iran 
after the Iranian revolution have been granted permission to remain in 
the country, but they have not been granted citizenship.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their 
political system peacefully, and the Government controls political 
activity. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975, there 
have been no formal democratic political institutions. The Prime 
Minister makes all appointments to the Cabinet. The relevant ministries 
fill all other government positions. About one-third of the cabinet 
ministers are Shi'a Muslim, although they do not hold security-related 
offices. The Government continues to view most substantive reform as a 
threat to stability and has taken only halting steps to expand 
political participation. The ordinary citizen may attempt to influence 
government decisions through submission of personal written petitions 
and informal contact with senior officials, including appeals to the 
Amir, the Prime Minister, and other officials at their regularly 
scheduled public audiences, called majlises.
    In 1992 the Amir established by decree a Consultative Council 
(Majlis Al-Shura). Its 40 members are divided mainly between Sunni and 
Shi'a (20 Sunni and 18 Shi'a) who are appointed by the Amir. Majlis 
members are selected to represent major constituent groups, including 
representatives from the business, labor, professional, and religious 
communities. There are no members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family or 
religious extremists in the Majlis. In addition to legislation 
submitted for its review by the Cabinet, the Majlis may initiate debate 
independently on nonpolitical issues. The Majlis also may summon 
cabinet ministers to answer questions; however, its recommendations are 
not binding on the Government. The Majlis held its eighth session from 
October 1999 to May, and began a new session on October 3.
    During the year, the Majlis debated a number of contentious social 
and economic issues, including unemployment, privatization, child care, 
and education reform, and drafted proposals on these and other subjects 
for government consideration. In 1999 a Majlis Human Rights Committee 
was formed. The Committee's deliberations and its first report, which 
was presented to the Amir in a well-publicized event, have been closely 
held. According to the Speaker of the Majlis, the Government responded 
favorably to all of the Majlis's recommendations by incorporating them 
into legislation or by taking other appropriate actions.
    Women are greatly underrepresented in government and politics; 
however, there are now four women in the Majlis, whereas there had been 
none before. There still are no women at the ministerial levels of 
Government. The majority of women who choose to work in government do 
so in a support capacity, and only a few have attained senior positions 
within their respective ministries or agencies.
    In September the Amir appointed the first Christian and Jewish 
members to the Consultative Council; an ethnic Iranian Bahraini also 
was appointed.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no local human rights organizations. Because of the 
restrictions on freedom of association and expression, any independent, 
domestically based investigation or public criticism of the 
Government's human rights policies faces major obstacles. Several 
political opposition groups in exile report on the human rights 
situation. Such groups include the Damascus-based Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain, the London-based Bahrain Freedom 
Movement, the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, 
and the Copenhagen-based Bahrain Human Rights Organization. These 
groups are composed of small numbers of emigres living in self-imposed 
exile and reportedly receive funding from sources hostile to the 
Government.
    The Government maintains that it is not opposed to visits by bona 
fide human rights organizations. In recent years, the Government has 
allowed increased access by international human rights organizations. 
In June 1999, the Government received a delegation from Amnesty 
International, which issued a brief statement that noted that it was 
invited by the Government but was not allowed to meet with all persons 
to whom it requested access. Middle East Watch and Human Rights Watch 
representatives also visited the country in 1999. In 1996 the 
Government invited the ICRC to undertake visits to the country's 
prisons. The ICRC continued to visit the country's prisons throughout 
the year (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the 
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work 
for all citizens. However, in practice these rights are protected 
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or 
sex.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but incidents usually are 
kept within the family. In general there is little public attention to, 
or discussion of, the problem. During the year, a few articles appeared 
in the local press discussing violence against women and the need for 
laws to defend women who are abused. No government policies explicitly 
address violence against women. Women's groups and health care 
professionals state that spouse abuse is common, particularly in poorer 
communities. There are very few known instances of women seeking legal 
redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are 
not receptive to such cases.
    It is not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers to 
be beaten or sexually abused (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). Numerous 
cases have been reported to local embassies and the police. However, 
most victims are too intimidated to sue their employers. Courts 
reportedly have allowed victims who do appear to sue for damages, 
return home, or both.
    Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary 
according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as 
determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various 
contracts, including marriage, have been made.
    While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a 
divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local 
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases, 
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances 
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available 
in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and 
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the 
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In 
contrast, Sunni women--in the absence of a direct male heir--inherit 
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among 
brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
    In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women 
custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7, although 
custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those 
ages. In all circumstances except mental incapacitation, the father, 
regardless of custody decisions, retains the right to make certain 
legal decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property 
belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A noncitizen 
woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their 
citizen father.
    Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the 
permission of the male head of the household. Women are free to work 
outside the home, to drive cars without escorts, and to wear the 
clothing of their choice. Women increasingly have taken jobs previously 
reserved for men. The Labor Law does not discriminate against women; 
however, in practice, there is discrimination in the workplace, 
including inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for 
advancement. Women constitute about 20 percent of the work force. The 
Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to 
promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of 
women. The Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for 
equal work, and women frequently are paid less than men. Generally 
women work outside the home during the years between secondary school 
or university and marriage. Some women complain that admissions 
policies at the National University are aimed at increasing the number 
of male students at the expense of qualified female applicants, 
especially Shi'a women. Nevertheless, women make up the majority of 
students at the country's universities.
    There are women's organizations that seek to improve the status of 
women under both civil and Islamic law. Some women have expressed the 
view that, despite their participation in the work force, women's 
rights are not advancing significantly and that much of the lack of 
progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists. 
However, other women desire a return to more traditional values and 
support calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns of social 
behavior.
    Children.--The Government has stated often its commitment to the 
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and 
religious framework of this traditional society. It generally honors 
this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and 
extensive social welfare network. Public education for citizen children 
below the age of 15 is free; it is not available for the children of 
foreign workers. While the Constitution provides for compulsory 
education at the primary levels (usually 12 or 13 years of age), 
authorities do not enforce attendance. Limited medical services for 
infants and preadolescents are provided free of charge.
    The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion 
to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse is rare, as is 
public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities always has 
been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or 
religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against 
prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. 
Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned, or, if a 
noncitizen, deported. In the past, the authorities reportedly returned 
children arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to 
their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first 
offenses. There were no reports of child prostitution during the year. 
Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a 
separate juvenile court. However, other citizens insist that the 
protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and 
oppose greater government involvement. Independent and quasi-
governmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the 
Protection of Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society play an 
active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal 
assistance, advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support 
to distressed children and families.
    In 1998 there were numerous arrests and detentions of juveniles in 
connection with the political unrest. These children generally were 
released without charges within several days of their arrests. However, 
those juveniles charged with security offenses received the same 
treatment as adult prisoners, that is, incommunicado detention and 
trial before a State Security Court. There were very few reports of 
arrests and detentions of juveniles during the year, and apparently 
those who were arrested were released.
    People with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of the 
disabled and a variety of governmental, quasi-governmental, and 
religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled 
persons. The regional (Persian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the 
Blind is headquartered in the country, and a similar Center for the 
Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tends to 
view the disabled as special cases in need of protection rather than as 
fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the Government is 
required by law to provide vocational training for disabled persons who 
wish to work and maintains a list of certified, trained disabled 
persons. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of over 
100 persons must engage at least 2 percent of its employees from the 
Government's list of disabled workers; however, the Government does not 
monitor compliance. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs works 
actively to place the disabled in public sector jobs, such as in the 
public telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations 
require that access be provided to disabled persons. Greater emphasis 
has been given in recent years to public building design that 
incorporates access for the disabled; however, the law does not mandate 
access to buildings for persons with disabilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Although there are notable exceptions, the 
Sunni Muslim minority enjoys a favored status. Sunnis receive 
preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the 
managerial ranks of the civil service. While the defense and internal 
security forces are predominantly Sunni, Shi'a citizens now are allowed 
to hold posts in these forces; however, they do not hold significant 
positions. In the private sector, Shi'a citizens tend to be employed in 
lower paid, less skilled jobs.
    Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a 
neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are inferior to those 
found in Sunni urban communities. In an effort to remedy societal 
discrimination, the Government has built numerous subsidized housing 
complexes that are open to all citizens on the basis of financial need. 
In order to ease both the housing shortage and strains on the national 
budget, in 1997 the Government revised its policy in order to permit 
lending institutions to finance mortgages on apartment units.
    After demonstrations in support of Palestinians on October 13 (see 
Section 2.b.), several youths and men reportedly boarded a bus carrying 
Catholic parishioners and took Bibles from the parishioners throwing 
some of the Bibles out of bus windows.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A group of approximately 9,000 
to 15,000 persons, mostly Shi'a of Persian-origin but including some 
Christians, are stateless. Many are second- or third-generation 
residents whose ancestors emigrated from Iran. Although they no longer 
claim Iranian citizenship, most have not been granted Bahraini 
citizenship. Without citizenship, bidoon legally are unable to buy 
land, start a business, or obtain government loans, although in 
practice many do. The law does not address the citizenship rights of 
persons who were not registered with the authorities prior to 1959, 
which creates a legal problem for such persons and their descendants, 
and results in economic and other hardships. The Government maintains 
that many of those who claim to be bidoon actually are citizens of Iran 
or other Gulf states who have chosen voluntarily not to renew their 
foreign passports. Bidoon and citizens who speak Farsi rather than 
Arabic as their first language also face significant social and 
economic obstacles, including difficulty finding employment. There were 
unconfirmed reports that over 200 bidoon families received citizenship 
during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The partially suspended 1973 
Constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize; however, 
independent trade unions do not exist. The Constitution provides for 
``freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and 
for lawful objectives and by peaceful means,'' in accordance with the 
law, and states that ``no person shall be compelled to join or remain 
in any association or union.''
    Labor regulations permit the formation of elected workers' 
committees in larger companies. Worker representation is based on a 
system of Joint Labor-Management Committees (JLC's) that are 
established by ministerial decree. One JLC was established in November, 
bringing the total to 20.
    The JLC's are composed of equal numbers of appointed management 
representatives and worker representatives who are elected from and by 
company employees in elections organized by management. Each committee 
is chaired alternately by a management and worker representative. The 
selection of worker representatives appears to be fair. Under the law, 
the Ministry of Interior may exclude worker candidates with criminal 
records or those deemed a threat to national security, but the 
Government has not taken such action in recent years.
    The elected worker representatives of the JLC's select the 11 
members of the General Committee of Bahrain workers (GCBW), which was 
established by law in 1983, and which oversees and coordinates the work 
of the JLC's. The GCBW also hears complaints from Bahraini and foreign 
workers and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention 
of the Ministry of Labor or the courts. In 1998 elections were held for 
3-year terms for representatives to the GCBW. Workers from a variety of 
occupations were elected to the body, including Sunni and Shi'a 
Muslims, foreign workers, and one woman. The elections, which were by 
secret ballot, appeared to be free and fair.
    Although the Government and company management are not represented 
on the GCBW, the Ministry of Labor closely monitors the body's 
activities and a Ministry representative attends and supervises GCBW 
general meetings. It approves the GCBW's rules and the distribution of 
the GCBW's funds. Some senior JLC and GCBW officials have been 
harassed. The JLC-GCBW system represents nearly 70 percent of the 
country's indigenous industrial workers. Both the Government and labor 
representatives readily admit that nonindustrial workers and foreign 
workers clearly are underrepresented in the system. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs supports the formation of JLC's in all public 
and private sector companies that employ more than 200 workers, and a 
JLC was established in the textile sector in 1999.
    Although foreign workers constitute 67 percent of the work force, 
they are underrepresented in the GCBW. Foreign workers participate in 
the JLC elections, and five foreign workers currently serve on JLC's. 
However, none sits on the board of the GCBW. It is a long-term goal of 
both the Government and the GCBW to replace foreign workers with 
citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new jobs 
for citizens seeking employment.
    The Labor Law is silent on the right to strike, and there were no 
strikes during the year. Actions perceived to be detrimental to the 
``existing relationship'' between employers and employees or to the 
economic health of the State are forbidden by the 1974 Security Act. 
There were no recent examples of major strikes, but walkouts and other 
job actions have been known to occur in the past without governmental 
intervention and with positive results for the workers.
    Internationally affiliated trade unions do not exist. The GCBW 
represents workers in the Arab Labor Organization, but does not belong 
to any international trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--As in the case 
of strikes, the Labor Law neither grants nor denies workers the right 
to organize and bargain collectively outside the JLC system. While the 
JLC's are empowered to discuss labor disputes, organize workers' 
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and productivity, 
workers have no independent, recognized vehicle for representing their 
interests on these or other labor-related issues. Minimum wage rates 
for public sector employees are established by Council of Ministers' 
decrees. Private businesses generally follow the Government's lead in 
establishing their wage rates.
    There are two export processing zones. Labor law and practice are 
the same in these zones as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice the labor laws apply 
for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occur, particularly in 
the cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. The law also 
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces 
this prohibition effectively.
    Foreign workers, who make up at least 67 percent of the workforce, 
in many cases arrive in the country under the sponsorship of an 
employer and then switch jobs while continuing to pay a fee to their 
original sponsor. This practice makes it difficult to monitor and 
control the employment conditions of domestic and other workers; the 
Government took no substantive action during the year to stop the 
practice.
    Labor Law amendments passed in 1993 stiffened the penalties for job 
switching to include jail sentences of up to 6 months for the sponsor 
of every illegally sponsored worker; however, sponsors have not 
received jail sentences. In such cases, the workers involved usually 
are deported as illegal immigrants after the case is concluded. During 
the summer and fall of 1998, the Government conducted an amnesty 
program under which undocumented foreign workers were permitted either 
to legalize their status or leave the country without penalty. On 
October 1, the Government again gave illegal immigrants 3 months (until 
December 31) to legalize their status or leave the country.
    The sponsorship system leads to additional abuses. There are 
numerous credible reports that employers withhold salaries from their 
foreign workers for months, even years, at a time, and may refuse to 
grant them the necessary permission to leave the country. The 
Government and the courts generally work to rectify abuses brought to 
their attention, but they otherwise focus little attention on the 
problem, and the fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevents 
many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities (see 
Section 6.e.).
    Labor Laws do not apply to domestic servants. There are numerous 
credible reports that domestic servants, especially women, are forced 
to work 12- or 16-hour days, given little time off, and subjected to 
malnutrition, and verbal and physical abuse, including sexual 
molestation and rape. Between 30 to 40 percent of the suicide cases 
handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are foreign maids 
(see Section 6.e.).
    Foreign women employed as hotel and restaurant staff typically are 
locked in a communal house when not working and driven to work in a 
van. Many are involved in prostitution and reportedly trade sexual 
favors with hotel managers in exchange for time off from work (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age. 
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in 
hazardous conditions or at night and may not work more than 6 hours per 
day or on a piecework basis. Child labor laws are enforced effectively 
by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor 
outside that sector is monitored less effectively, but it is not 
believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses, and even 
in that sector it is not widespread. Some children work in the market 
areas as car washers and porters. While the Constitution calls for 
compulsory education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce 
attendance (see Section 5). The law prohibits forced and bonded child 
labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage scales, set by 
government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The 
minimum wage for the public sector is $278.25 (105 dinars) a month. 
Wages in the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For 
foreign workers, employers consider benefits such as annual trips home, 
housing, and education bonuses as part of the salary.
    The Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers, 
including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours 
per week) and occupational safety and health.
    The Ministry enforces the law with periodic inspections and routine 
fines for violators. The press often performs an ombudsman function on 
labor problems, reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases 
brought before the courts. Once a worker has lodged a complaint, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs opens an investigation and often 
takes remedial action. The Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over 
cases involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought 
before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled 
through arbitration by law must be referred to the Court within 15 
days. In practice most employers prefer to settle such disputes through 
arbitration, particularly since the court and labor law generally are 
considered to favor the employee.
    The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and 
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing. 
Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary 
scales, foreign workers legally can be paid lower regular wages than 
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or 
a greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday 
allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers are paid 
comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly 
greater for the former. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity 
leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women generally are 
paid less than men.
    In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the 
Amir, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be 
imposed upon private sector employers who fail to pay wages required by 
law. This law applies equally to employers of citizens and foreign 
workers and was intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers, who 
sometimes are denied the required salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law 
provides equal protection to citizen and foreign workers, but all 
foreign workers still require sponsorship by citizens or locally based 
institutions and companies. According to representatives of several 
embassies with large numbers of workers in the country, the Government 
generally is responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign 
worker complaints about unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign 
workers, particularly those from developing countries, often are 
unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and 
having to return to their native countries. Sponsors are able to cancel 
the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby 
block them for a year from obtaining entry or residence visas from 
another sponsor, although the sponsor may be subject to sanctions for 
wrongful dismissal. Foreign women who work as domestic workers often 
are beaten or sexually abused (see Section 5). Between 30 to 40 percent 
of suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are 
foreign maids (see Section 6.c.).
    Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves 
from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, many foreign workers become in essence indentured 
workers, and are unable to change employment or leave the country 
without their sponsors' consent (see Section 6.c.).
    Prostitution is pervasive among foreign women, especially among 
hotel and restaurant staff. Such women typically are locked in a 
communal house when not working and driven to work in a van. Many 
female hotel employees reportedly trade sexual favors with hotel 
managers in exchange for time off from work (see Section 6.c.).
                               __________

                                 EGYPT

    According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which 
Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which 
has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched 
position to dominate national politics and maintains an overriding 
majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially 
elected Shura (Consultative) Council. President Hosni Mubarak was 
reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum in 
September 1999. The Cabinet and the country's 26 governors are 
appointed by the President and may be dismissed by him at his 
discretion. The judiciary is independent; however, there is no 
appellate process for verdicts issued by the military or State Security 
Emergency courts.
    There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior, 
two of which are involved primarily in combating terrorism: The State 
Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations 
and interrogates detainees, and the Central Security Force (CSF), which 
enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations, and conducts 
paramilitary operations against terrorists. The President is the 
commander in chief of the military; the military is a primary 
stabilizing factor within society but generally does not involve itself 
in internal issues. The security forces committed numerous serious 
human rights abuses; however, the use of force in the campaign against 
suspected terrorists appeared more limited than in previous years.
    Egypt is in transition from a Government-controlled economy to a 
free market system. The Government continued its privatization program, 
although some key sectors of the economy (such as banking, oil/gas, 
insurance, and textiles) still are dominated by State-owned 
enterprises. Agriculture remains the largest employer and is almost 
entirely in private hands. The tourism sector generates the largest 
amount of foreign currency. Petroleum exports, Suez Canal revenues, and 
remittances from approximately 2 million citizens working abroad are 
the other principal sources of foreign currency. These income sources 
are vulnerable to external shocks. Over the past decade, the Government 
has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget 
deficit, stabilized the exchange rate, reduced inflation and interest 
rates significantly, and built up substantial reserves. However, low 
international oil prices, the 1997 Luxor terrorist attack, and the 
effects of the Southeast Asia economic crisis all negatively affected 
foreign exchange earnings in from 1997 through 1999, causing the trade 
and current account balance deficits to widen and negatively affecting 
the exchange rate. After initially attempting to stabilize the exchange 
rate by drawing down reserves, increasing interest rates, rationing 
foreign exchange, and implementing restrictive trade measures, the 
Government allowed the exchange rate to depreciate slowly in the second 
half of 2000. Continued progress in economic development depends 
primarily upon implementation of a wide range of structural reforms, 
the pace of which has slowed significantly over the past 1 to 2 years. 
The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,400 per year. 
Official statistics place 34.4 percent of wage earners in the 
agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers estimate that perhaps 
3 to 5 percent of those engage in subsistence farming. The annual 
population increase is 1.9 percent.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in some areas, and its record improved somewhat over the previous year, 
primarily due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic 
extremists; however, the Government's record was poor with respect to 
freedom of expression and its treatment of detainees, among other 
areas. The dominant role of the President and the entrenched NDP 
control the political scene to such an extent that citizens do not have 
a meaningful ability to change their Government. In parliamentary 
elections that were held between October 18 and November 15, the NDP 
won 172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition 
parties won 17 seats. However, many of the independents elected were 
former members of the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected, 
leaving the People's Assembly balance at 388 NDP members, 37 
independents, and 17 opposition party members out of 444 elected 
members, with two seats unresolved at year's end. Due to courtordered 
supervision by the judiciary of the voting and vote-counting, the 
process was fairer and more transparent than past parliamentary 
elections; however, there were significant problems, including the 
arrests of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the months 
before the elections.
    The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was 
renewed for another 3 years in June, continues to restrict many basic 
rights. The security forces continued to arrest and detain suspected 
members of terrorist groups. In combating terrorism, the security 
forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest 
and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and 
occasionally engage in mass arrests. In actions unrelated to the 
antiterrorist campaign, local police killed, tortured, and otherwise 
abused both criminal suspects and other persons. The Government took 
disciplinary action against police officers accused of abusing 
detainees, including prosecution of several offenders, but it did not 
pursue most cases or seek adequate punishments. The investigation that 
the Public Prosecutor reopened and expanded in 1999 regarding police 
brutality and torture during a 1998 police investigation of a double 
murder in the largely Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate, 
continued without resolution throughout the year.
    Prison conditions remain poor. The Ministry of Interior released 
more than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners, bringing the total 
number of detainees released since 1998 to more than 7,000. The use of 
military courts to try civilians continued to infringe on a defendant's 
right to a fair trial before an independent judiciary. During the year, 
the Government did not refer any new cases involving civilians to the 
military courts; however, the military court issued its verdict on 
November 19 in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
who were referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal 
political activity. Three of the defendants were sentenced to 5 years 
in prison, 12 were sentenced to 3 years, and five were acquitted. Most 
observers believe that the Government was seeking to undermine Muslim 
Brotherhood participation in the elections to professional syndicates 
and the People's Assembly.
    The Government used the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens' 
privacy rights. Although citizens generally express themselves freely, 
the Government partially restricts freedom of the press. The Government 
significantly restricts freedom of assembly and association. The 
Government places restrictions on freedom of religion. Despite 
difficulties due to an inadequate legal framework and periodic 
Government harassment, a number of local human rights groups are 
active. Although the Government does not recognize them legally, it 
allows these groups to operate openly.
    Domestic violence against women is a problem. Although the 
Government enforces the 1996 decree banning the practice of female 
genital mutilation (FGM), many families persist in subjecting their 
daughters to the traditional practice. Women and Christians face 
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law. Adult 
literacy rates are 63 percent for males and 34 percent for females. 
There were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during 
the year, but in incidents unrelated to terrorism 1 Christian was 
killed and 10 were wounded by Muslim extremists. New year's violence in 
Sohag governorate resulted in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1 Muslim. 
Child labor remains widespread, despite Government efforts to eradicate 
it. Exposure of workers to hazardous working conditions and other 
abuses of the law by employers continue, and the Government does not 
enforce the labor laws effectively. The Government limits workers' 
rights.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, police committed extrajudicial 
killings, and such killings also may have occurred in certain 
antiterrorist operations.
    Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in 
custody of the following eight persons during the year, all of whom 
allegedly were tortured while being detained by police under suspicion 
of criminal activity: Sami Hosni Ahmed, Ahmed Hassan Ahmed, Mohamed 
Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, Sayyed Kenawi Selim, Abdel Hamid Ramadan Abdel 
Hamid Zahran, Ahmed Mohamed Eissa, Haytham Mohamed Abdel Aziz, and 
Mohamed Islam Nasr Eddine (see Section 1.c.). In addition, several 
cases of death under police torture from previous years remain 
unresolved.
    Mohammed Mahmoud Hamouda died in prison during the year, reportedly 
due to diabetes and cardiac problems, during the Government's 
investigation of a case in which 16 persons were accused of heresy 
against Islam (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
    The London-based Islamic Observation Center announced on December 
22 that 37-year-old Mohammed Saad Osman Ahmad died in Tora prison in 
early December due to untreated leukemia. Ahmad allegedly had completed 
a 5-year prison sentence in 1998 but was not released.
    On June 6, the Banha Criminal Court (Daqahliyya governorate) 
sentenced police Captain Abdel Nasser Zeidan of the Shubra AlKheima 
investigations department to a 1-year suspended sentence for killing a 
suspected thief. The officer reportedly raided the home of 19-year-old 
Mosaad Ahmed Youssef in March without an arrest or search warrant and 
shot him three times in the back and head. On August 10, the Mansoura 
criminal court acquitted a police major and four other policemen in the 
April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah 
(see Section 1.c.).
    As part of ongoing antiterrorist campaigns, on October 19, security 
forces killed two members of the ``Islamic Group of Egypt'' (IG) in 
Aswan, including Alaa Abdel Razek Atiyya, who reportedly was in charge 
of IG armed operations in Qena, Sohag, and Luxor. There were no reports 
of killings of relatives of suspected extremists by security forces in 
apparent vendettas.
    A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim 
customer on December 31, 1999, escalated into violent exchanges between 
Muslims and Christians in Sohag governorate, resulting in the deaths of 
21 Christians and 1 Muslim. One trial concluded in September and 
another was ongoing at year's end (see Section 5).
    On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced four members 
of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout 
who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen and 
Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years' imprisonment at hard labor 
(see Sections 1.e. and 5.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of new cases of 
politically motivated disappearances.
    In November the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners 
reported on a total of 26 unresolved disappearances, including 3 
previously unreported cases of persons who disappeared in 1996 and 
1997. The Center learned that three persons previously reported missing 
are in prison, and that two disappearances did not involve police. The 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) continues to investigate 
30 previously reported disappearances. EOHR has provided these names to 
the U.N. Committee on Disappearances, but the Government reportedly has 
denied any involvement in these cases.
    On February 8, the Court of Cassation accepted an appeal by the 
Minister of Interior of a 1999 court decision ordering him to pay Bahaa 
Al-Amary, the wife of former Libyan Foreign Minister Mansur Kikhiya, 
$27,000 (100,000 Egyptian pounds). Kikhiya's family sued the Government 
following reports that he had been kidnaped from Cairo by Libyan 
agents, taken to Libya, and executed there in 1994. The court awarded 
the sum as compensation for the Ministry of Interior's inability to 
protect a foreign dignitary on Egyptian soil. The Court of Cassation 
ordered that the case be retried due to a technicality. The lower court 
had not tried the case by year's end.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or 
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however, 
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and 
prison guards is common.
    Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to 
torture are felonies punishable by hard labor or 3 to 10 years' 
imprisonment. If the defendant dies under torture, the crime is one of 
intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest 
without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is 
punishable by temporary hard labor. Abuse of power to inflict cruelty 
against persons is punishable by imprisonment of no more than 1 year or 
a fine of no more than $33 (125 Egyptian pounds). In addition, victims 
may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against the 
responsible Government agency. There is no statute of limitation in 
such cases.
    Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous credible 
reports that security forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports 
of torture and mistreatment at police stations remain frequent. While 
the Government has investigated torture complaints in criminal cases 
and punished some offending officers, the punishments do not conform to 
the seriousness of the offense.
    While the law requires security authorities to keep written records 
of detained citizens, human rights groups report that such records 
often are not available, not found, or that the police deny any 
knowledge of the detainee when inquiries are made about specific cases, 
effectively blocking the investigation of torture complaints.
    Human rights groups believe that the SSIS continues to employ 
torture. Torture takes place in SSIS offices, including its 
headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture 
victims usually are taken to an SSIS office, where they are handcuffed, 
blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious 
beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information, 
coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter 
others from similar activities.
    In January the EOHR released a report documenting in detail 13 
cases of torture that occurred in police stations during the latter 
half of 1999, 2 of which ended in death. Methods of torture employed by 
the police, as reported by victims, included: Being stripped and 
blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just 
touching the floor; beaten with fists, metal rods, or other objects; 
doused with hot or cold water; flogged on the back; burned with 
cigarettes; and subjected to electrical shocks. Some victims, including 
female detainees or family members of detainees, report that they have 
been forced to strip and threatened with rape.
    Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in 
custody of eight persons, reportedly under police torture, during the 
year (see Section 1.a.). All were being held on suspicion of criminal 
activity. The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners 
reported the death under torture of Ahmed Mohamed Eissa on February 10 
in New Valley Prison. Upon receiving a report of the death, the Public 
Prosecutor investigated the case and took testimony from inmates. The 
Public Prosecutor referred the Deputy Chief of Wadi Natroun Prison, a 
prison officer, and two policemen to the criminal court on charges of 
beating an inmate to death and forging a prison report stating that the 
death was from natural causes. The Shebeen El-Kom criminal court is 
reviewing the case, but no date for a court hearing had been set by 
year's end.
    The EOHR is investigating the following deaths in custody after 
receiving complaints from family members of the deceased, who believe 
they died under torture: Sami Hosni Ahmed, who died on February 9 at 
the Boulaq police station in Cairo, just hours after his arrest; Ahmed 
Hassan Ahmed, who died on March 2 at the Shubra Al-Kheima police 
station in Qalyubia, 4 days after his arrest; 17-year-old Mohamed 
Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, who died on March 5 in the Gamaliyya district of 
Cairo; Sayyed Kenawi Selim, who died on March 7 in the Imbaba district 
in Cairo, 10 days after his arrest on suspicion of theft; Abdel Hamid 
Ramadan Abdel Hamid Zahran, who died on March 11 at the Qalyub police 
station in Qalyubia, shortly after returning from interrogation in the 
Qalyub Security Directorate. An autopsy report in the Zahran case 
reportedly cited respiratory and cardiac failure as the cause of death 
and noted a blood clot in the brain, broken ribs, and bruises in the 
kidney area.
    In addition, the press reported the following deaths in custody, 
which reportedly were due to police torture or mistreatment: Haytham 
Mohamed Abdel Aziz, who reportedly died in Alexandria prison under 
suspicious circumstances (according to the press, a forensic postmortem 
showed several obvious bruises, as well as tuberculosis) and Mohamed 
Islam Nasr Eddine, a 49-year old Pakistani sentenced to life at hard 
labor for drug possession, who reportedly died in Qanatir prison from 
severe failure of the circulatory system. The latter incident was under 
police investigation at year's end.
    Regarding judicial action on previous cases of death under torture, 
on August 10, the Mansoura criminal court acquitted a police major and 
four other policemen in the April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed 
Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah. According to a human rights organization, the 
accused police major paid Abdallah's family to change their testimony, 
which led to the acquittal. On November 16, the Aswan Criminal Court 
ruled on case in which Mohei Eddin Ahmed Mohamed, who was suspected of 
theft at a construction site, was tortured for 3 days in a police 
station, which led to his death in March 1999. A fellow worker who 
reportedly tried to intervene on the suspect's behalf, Haroun Ahmed 
Hamdallah, also was tortured and left paralyzed. The court dismissed an 
Aswan police officer from the force and sentenced him to 7 years in 
prison, and dismissed an assistant officer and sentenced him to 3 years 
in prison. The Government took no action during the year on several 
outstanding cases of death under torture, including the case of Gamel 
Mohammed Abdallah Mustafa (in 1998), the case of a businessman in the 
province of Qalyubia (1997), and the case of Mohammed Badr Al-Din Gomah 
(1996). The Government also took no action regarding the appeal of 1-
year sentence given to a policeman convicted of engaging in torture in 
1994. No further government action appears likely in these cases.
    At year's end, the public prosecution continued to interview 
residents of the village of Al-Kush regarding a 1998 murder 
investigation, during which, according to local observers, dozens of 
suspects reportedly were tortured and mistreated. The public 
prosecution reopened and expanded the case in August 1999, 5 months 
after it had decided that medical evidence did not support allegations 
of police torture (see sections 2.c and 5.).
    Prison conditions remain poor. Government authorities reported the 
renovation or construction of 14 prisons during the past 6 years. 
Nonetheless, human rights groups report that overcrowding and unhealthy 
conditions continue. Cells are poorly ventilated, food is inadequate in 
quantity and nutritional value, drinking water often is polluted, and 
medical services are insufficient. Such conditions contribute to the 
spread of disease and epidemics. The use of torture and mistreatment in 
prisons continues to be common. In August 1999, the Public Prosecutor 
ordered his subordinates to visit prisons under their jurisdiction 
randomly at least once a month. He also instructed them to inspect 
prison records and to investigate complaints raised by prisoners. 
Inspections began after the announcement and continued during the year. 
Results of the inspections were unavailable.
    Relatives and lawyers often are unable to obtain access to prisons 
for visits. In January the Ministry of Interior opened to visits the 
Fayyoum prison, which had been closed since 1997. Prisons in Abu Zaabal 
and Tora remain closed to visits. During the year the Human Rights 
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners obtained 66 rulings by the 
Higher Administrative court to open the prisons for visits to 
individual prisoners; 30 other cases are pending before the courts. 
Human rights groups report that despite the rulings, visits continue to 
be refused at several prisons. At other prisons, restrictions have been 
placed on visits to prisoners who are incarcerated for political or 
terrorist crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed each prisoner 
and the total number of visitors allowed in the prison at any one time.
    In September the Ministry of Interior ordered that prisoners who 
have served their sentences be released directly rather than 
transferred to State Security Directorates for processing, which in the 
past resulted in delayed releases for some prisoners. The Human Rights 
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners reported that the policy had not 
been put into effect by year's end for political prisoners, who still 
were being transferred to State Security for processing after serving 
their sentences.
    In principle human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisoners 
in their capacity as legal counsel; however, in practice they often 
face considerable bureaucratic obstacles that prevent them from meeting 
with prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
does not have access to prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--As part of the 
Government's antiterrorist campaign, security forces conducted mass 
arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge. Police 
also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Under the 
provisions of the Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981, 
the police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior 
upon showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public 
order. This procedure nullifies the constitutional requirement of 
showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime to 
obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.
    The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual 
without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a 
court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may 
resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1month intervals thereafter. There 
is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge continues 
to uphold the legality of the detention order, or if the detainee fails 
to exercise his right to a hearing.
    In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the 
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must 
bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may 
detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months, pending investigation. 
Arrests under the Penal Code occur openly and with warrants issued by a 
district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code 
contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These 
provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading 
panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
    During the year, security forces arrested large numbers of persons 
allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Government 
has declared an illegal organization. Attorneys for those arrested say 
that during the year approximately 5,000 persons were arrested; a 
domestic human rights organization documented 694 arrests. Most of 
those arrested had been released by year's end. Public prosecution 
officials claim that none of the 5,000 was detained administratively 
and that those still in detention are being held pending investigation 
of specific charges. On November 19, a military court issued its 
verdict in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood 
referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal political 
activity. Three were sentenced to 5 years in prison, 12 were sentenced 
to 3 years, and 5 were acquitted. Most observers believe that the 
Government was seeking to undermine Muslim Brotherhood participation in 
the elections to the People's Assembly and professional syndicates (see 
Sections 1.e., 2.b., and 3).
    Police also detained students participating in demonstrations 
several times during the year. Approximately 75 students were arrested 
in May when protests at Al-Azhar University against the novel ``A 
Banquet for Seaweed'' turned violent (see Section 2.a.). In October at 
Cairo University and Ayn Shams University, police arrested 
approximately 40 students protesting Israeli actions against 
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According 
to human rights organizations, all those arrested in the two incidents 
had been released by year's end, some on bail pending investigation of 
charges.
    In contrast to previous years, there were no confirmed reports 
during the year that converts to Christianity were subjected to 
harassment by the security services. Hassan Mohamed Ismail Mohamed, one 
of four converts previously prevented from traveling, was able to 
travel abroad in August (see Section 2.c.).
    Human rights groups reported that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
persons detained under the Emergency Law have been incarcerated for 
several years without charge. The courts have ordered the release of 
several of these detainees, but prison officials reportedly have 
ignored the orders. The Ministry of Interior frequently reissues 
detention orders to return detainees to prison. During the year more 
than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners were released, bringing 
the total number of detainees released in the past 3 years to more than 
7,000. Following the releases, revised prison population estimates by 
local human rights organizations indicate that there are approximately 
15,000-16,000 political detainees; it is not clear how many among them 
are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving sentences, or 
detained without charge.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent; 
however, cases involving national security or terrorism may be handled 
by military or State Security Emergency courts, in which constitutional 
protections may not be observed. In addition, judicial orders sometimes 
are ignored by the authorities. The Constitution provides for the 
independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other 
authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The President 
appoints all judges upon recommendation of the Higher Judicial Council, 
a constitutional body composed of senior judges and chaired by the 
president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial 
promotions and transfers. In the last few years, the Government has 
added lectures on human rights and other social issues to its training 
courses for prosecutors and judges.
    In the civilian court system there are criminal courts, civil 
courts, administrative courts, and a Supreme Constitutional Court. 
There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts, 
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final 
stage of criminal appeal.
    The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition; hence, 
there are no juries. Misdemeanors that are punishable by imprisonment 
are heard at the first level by one judge and at the second level by 
three judges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment or execution 
are heard in criminal court by three judges. Criminal courts also have 
a State Security division to hear cases considered affecting state 
security; in these courts the defendant may appeal on procedural 
grounds only. The Court of Cassation hears appeals of criminal court 
rulings. Civil courts hear civil cases and administrative courts hear 
cases contesting government actions or procedures; both systems have 
upper-level courts to hear appeals. The Supreme Constitutional Court 
hears challenges to the constitutionality of laws or verdicts in any of 
the courts.
    A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does 
not have one. Appointed lawyers are drawn from a roster that is chosen 
by the Bar Association; however, expenses are incurred by the State. 
Any denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling. However, 
detainees in certain high security prisons alleged that they were 
denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed until trial, 
thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate defense. A woman's 
testimony is equal to that of a man's in court. There is no legal 
prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, although in practice no 
women serve as judges (see Section 5).
    Defense lawyers generally agree that the regular judiciary respects 
the rights of the accused and exercises its independence. In the past, 
criminal court judges have dismissed cases in which confessions were 
obtained by coercion. However, while the judiciary generally is 
credited with conducting fair trials, under the Emergency Law, cases 
involving terrorism and national security may be tried in military or 
State Security Emergency courts, in which the accused do not receive 
all the constitutional protections of the civilian judicial system.
    In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government 
began trying cases of persons accused of terrorism and membership in 
terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency 
Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and 
State Security Emergency courts under the Emergency Law since 1993 has 
deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right 
to be tried by a civilian judge.
    The Government defends the use of military courts as necessary in 
terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are 
protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable 
to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed that they 
fear of trying high visibility terrorism cases because of possible 
reprisal. The Government claims that civilian defendants receive fair 
trials in the military courts and enjoy the same rights as defendants 
in civilian courts.
    However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due 
process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are 
lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of 
Defense and subject to military discipline. They are neither as 
independent nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying the 
civilian Penal Code. There is no appellate process for verdicts issued 
by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other 
military judges and confirmation by the President, who in practice 
usually delegates the review function to a senior military officer. 
Defense attorneys have complained that they have not been given 
sufficient time to prepare defenses and that judges tend to rush cases 
involving a large number of defendants.
    During the year, the Government did not refer any civilians to the 
military courts. However, on February 24, the Government executed two 
members of the ``Jihad Group in Egypt'' who had been sentenced by 
military courts to death in absentia in 1994 and 1997. On November 19, 
a military court issued its verdict in a case that the Government 
referred to it in October 1999 involving 20 professional leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood charged with belonging to an illegal group. Fifteen 
of the defendants were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years, and 5 
were acquitted. The arrests and trial before the military courts 
coincided with preparations for elections to the boards of professional 
syndicates and to the People's Assembly; verdicts and sentencing took 
place after delays, and after the Assembly elections were over (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
    The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with 
military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President 
appoints judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chooses to appoint 
military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences are subject to 
confirmation by the President but may not be appealed. The President 
may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency court, 
including a decision to release a defendant.
    During the year, State Security Emergency courts issued verdicts in 
five cases. On April 13, a State Security Emergency Court, trying the 
case of 14 defendants alleged to be members of the Islamic Group, 
sentenced 1 defendant to death, 1 to life in prison, and the other 12 
to sentences ranging from between 3 and 10 years. On June 5, a State 
Security Emergency Court upheld an earlier ruling issued in absentia 
against Muhammad Mustafa Hassan, who allegedly was a member of the 
``Returnees from Afghanistan'' group. Hassan was sentenced to 10 years 
at hard labor. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced 
four members of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) city of 
Dairout who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen 
and Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years in prison. On September 
5, a State Security Emergency Court passed a verdict in the case of 16 
defendants led by Manal Wahid Mana'a who were accused of heresy against 
Islam (see Section 2.c.). The court sentenced Mana'a to 5 years' hard 
labor, three other defendants to 3 years' hard labor, seven defendants 
to 1 year hard labor, two defendants to 6 months in prison, and two 
defendants to a fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the 
defendants died in prison, reportedly from ill health during the 
investigation. On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court ruled 
in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of them women, accused of propagating 
extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999. The court 
sentenced two of the defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3 
years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the 
four women) to 1 year in prison.
    On November 18, the State Security division of the South Cairo 
criminal court (in which the defendant may appeal on procedural grounds 
only) began hearing the government's case against Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 
Director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies (see 
Sections 2.a. and 4).
    According to local human rights organizations, there are 
approximately 15,000-16,000 political detainees. It is not clear how 
many among them are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving 
sentences, or detained without charge (see Section 1.d.).
    International humanitarian organizations do not have access to 
political prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy 
of homes, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of 
communication; however, the Emergency Law abridges the constitutional 
provisions regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the 
Emergency Law to infringe on these rights. Police must obtain warrants 
before undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts have dismissed cases 
in which warrants were issued without sufficient cause. Police officers 
who conduct searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal 
penalties, although penalties seldom are imposed. The Emergency Law 
empowers the Government to place wiretaps, intercept mail, and search 
persons or places without warrants. Security agencies frequently place 
political activists, suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners, 
and writers under surveillance, screen their correspondence (especially 
international mail), search them and their homes, and confiscate 
personal property.
    The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues 
of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the 
grounds of protecting public order; it exercises this authority 
sporadically (also see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially 
restricts these rights. Citizens openly speak their views on a wide 
range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of 
Government officials and policies, but generally avoid certain topics, 
such as direct criticism of the President.
    Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for 
Development Studies, was put on trial November 18 in a case that most 
observers believe will have broad implications for freedom of 
expression. Local observers believe that Ibrahim was prosecuted because 
of public remarks that he made regarding high-ranking officials that 
exceeded unwritten limits regarding freedom of expression. Ibrahim was 
charged with violating the Penal Code by disseminating abroad false 
information about Egypt, bribing public officials in order to obtain 
media coverage of Ibn Khaldoun Center activities, misappropriating 
funds obtained from the European Union (EU), and falsifying documents 
in order to obtain funds. He also was charged with violating a 1992 
military decree prohibiting any citizen or domestic organization from 
accepting foreign funds without Government permission (his organization 
accepted $246,226 (261,000 Euros) from the EU). Twenty-seven employees 
of the Center also were charged with aiding and abetting Ibrahim in the 
alleged activities. The Government arrested Ibrahim and closed the Ibn 
Khaldoun Center on June 30. Ibrahim and the other defendants were 
released on bail on August 10, and Ibrahim was charged formally on 
September 26. At the November 18 opening session of Ibrahim's trial 
before a Higher State Security Court, the three-judge panel granted a 
defense request for continuance and postponed the next hearing until 
mid-January 2001.
    Observers remain concerned about several aspects of the ongoing 
trial, especially regarding questions of due process: First, Ibrahim 
and many of the other defendants were not served formally with their 
indictments or court papers prior to the trial; second, Ibrahim's 
request for discovery of the documents that were confiscated from the 
Ibn Khaldoun Center, which his lawyers claimed were necessary to 
prepare his defense, had not been granted by the judicial authorities 
by year's end; and third, Ibrahim is being tried in a State Security 
Court, from which defendants may appeal once only on procedural 
grounds, but may not appeal the verdict itself (see Section 1.e.).
    In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against 
EOHR secretary general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney 
Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with violating two 
articles of the Penal Code (dissemination of false information or 
inflammatory propaganda that harms public security or public interests 
and accepting foreign funds with the intent to harm national 
interests). The charges were dropped in February, and Abu Se'da instead 
was charged with violating a 1992 military decree prohibiting any 
Egyptian individual or organization from accepting foreign funds 
without Government permission, before the case ultimately was dropped 
altogether in May. The charges against Zidane also were dropped. The 
charges were based on an EOHR report that was critical of police 
conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag. The State Security 
Prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had accepted $25,000 from the British 
Embassy in Cairo to publish the critical report. In fact, the money was 
provided by the British Embassy to support a women's legal aid project 
begun in 1995 (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
    The Government owns stock in the three largest daily newspapers, 
and the President appoints their editors in chief. Although these 
newspapers generally follow the government line, they sometimes 
criticize government policies. The Government also holds a monopoly on 
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the 
opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of 
newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications.
    Opposition political parties publish their own newspapers but 
receive a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies 
from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers are weeklies, with the 
exception of the dailies Al-Wafd and AlAhrar, both of which have small 
circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish criticism of the 
Government. They also give greater prominence to human rights abuses 
than do state-run newspapers. All party newspapers are required by law 
to reflect the platform of their party. The Government suspended 
publication of the semiweekly newspaper Al-Shaab in May following a 
decision by the Political Parties Committee to withdraw recognition 
from the Islamist-oriented Socialist Labor Party (see Section 3).
    The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or 
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There 
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish 
their own newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any 
individual. In January 1998, the People's Assembly approved a law that 
requires newspapers managed by joint stock companies to obtain the 
approval of the Prime Minister prior to publishing. Given government 
restrictions, a joint stock company is the only feasible incorporation 
option for publishers.
    The Government permitted the establishment of one new publication 
during the year and allowed two others to resume publication. The 
Ministry of Culture began publishing a new weekly newspaper, Al-Qahira, 
using the existing license of another publication. In May the Court of 
Ethics ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to review a 
government appeal of a January 1999 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling 
on a 1981 decree that abolished a monthly publication called Al-Mawqif 
Al-Arabi, thus allowing publication of the monthly to resume after 
nearly 20 years. In August the Higher Administrative Court overturned a 
1999 government decision to revoke the license of the newspaper Sawt 
Al-Umma for alleged violations by the publisher of joint stock company 
regulations. The newspaper later resumed publication.
    Several other publications failed to obtain licenses or lost 
related court cases, thereby losing the right to publish. In June the 
Higher Administrative Court overturned a lower court decision that 
would have allowed the newspaper Al-Karama to be published, after the 
publisher contested the Prime Minister's refusal to act on his request 
for approval of a joint stock company formed to publish the paper. In 
June the Higher Administrative Court upheld a lower court decision to 
stop publication of the Liberal Party publication Akhbar Al-Beheira, 
based on an article in the Political Parties Law providing that no 
party with fewer than 10 members in parliament may publish a newspaper.
    Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license in Egypt, 
several publishers of newspapers and magazines developed for the 
country's market have obtained a foreign license. Most of these 
publications are printed in the free trade zone. Newspapers and 
magazines published under a foreign license may be distributed with 
government permission. However, the Department of Censorship in the 
Ministry of Information has the authority also to censor or halt 
distribution of publications printed in the free trade zone under a 
foreign license. In April the Ministry confiscated one issue of the 
foreign-licensed newspaper AlTadamun, reportedly due to an article it 
contained that supported Iraq. The English-language weekly newspaper 
the Middle East Times reported no government censorship of its articles 
during the year. The newspaper closed its offices and moved to Cyprus 
in October for financial reasons. The Center for Human Rights and Legal 
Assistance in 1999 organized a legal challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Information Ministry's censorship of offshore publications. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court began hearing the case in December, but 
had not issued a decision by year's end.
    The Penal Code, Press Law, and Publications Law govern press 
issues. The Penal Code stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism 
of the President, members of the Government, and foreign heads of 
state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to review the 
constitutionality of those articles of the Penal Code that specify 
imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted of libel. The case 
was scheduled to begin in January 2001. The Press and Publication Laws 
ostensibly provide protection against malicious and unsubstantiated 
reporting. Financial penalties for violations were increased 
substantially in 1996 when relevant provisions of the Penal Code were 
revised, but the judicial process remains long and costly, creating a 
bar to realistic legal recourse for those wrongly defamed. In recent 
years, opposition party newspapers have within limits published 
articles critical of the President and foreign heads of state without 
being charged or harassed. The Government continues to charge 
journalists with libel. In October 1999, the Public Prosecutor charged 
editor Mohamed Hassan Al-Banna and journalist Fouad Fawaz of the weekly 
newspaper Al-Khamis with insulting Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi. 
The case reportedly was settled out of court during the year.
    In 1996 the People's Assembly approved a revised Press Law 
following criticism of a more restrictive revision that had been 
approved in 1995. The People's Assembly also revised certain articles 
in the Penal Code pertaining to libel and slander. In addition in 1997 
the Supreme Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Article 195 
of the Penal Code under which an editor in chief could have been 
considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of 
the newspaper. The Court ruled that the correct standard of 
responsibility should be ``negligence.'' The courts subsequently 
applied this lesser standard.
    Courts tried several prominent cases of slander during the year. In 
April the Court of Cassation upheld a 1999 criminal court conviction of 
four journalists from the opposition daily newspaper Al-Shaab of 
libeling Youssef Wally, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Agriculture. Editor in chief Magdy Hussein and reporter Salah Bedewi 
were sentenced to 2 years in prison, and each was fined about $5,300 
(20,000 Egyptian pounds). Cartoonist Essam Hanafi received the same 
fine and a 1-year sentence. A fourth AlShaab journalist, Adel Hussein, 
was convicted of libel and fined the same amount. In a separate case in 
May, five journalists from Al-Shaab (Magdy Hussein, Essam Hanafi, 
Talaat Rumeih, Adel Hussein, and Amer Soliman) were given sentences 
ranging from fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds) to 6 months 
in prison for slandering businessman Hussein Sabour. Hussein, Bedewi, 
and Hanafi all were released by year's end. In April the Court of 
Misdemeanors sentenced five journalists from the newspaper AlAhrar 
(Salah Qabadaya, Hossam Soliman Moussa, Mohamed Abdel Fahim Aboul Nour, 
Hisham Mohamed Mustafa, and Nabil Sadek Rizkallah) to 6 months in 
prison at hard labor and fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds) 
each for slander against Egypt Air President Fahim ElRayyan. During the 
year the courts also acquitted six journalists of slander and dismissed 
one case. Journalist Ashraf Ayoub's 1-year sentence for libel in 1999 
was dropped during the year, after the newspaper that he worked for, 
AlAhali, published a retraction and the businessman who had charged 
Ayoub withdrew his complaint.
    On occasion, and based on authority granted to him by law, the 
Public Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication of news 
pertaining to cases involving national security in order to protect the 
confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is based on the 
length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its case. In 
contrast to 1999, the Public Prosecutor did not ban any news items 
during the year.
    The law provides penalties for individuals who disclose information 
about the State during emergencies, including war and natural 
disasters. The penalties include fines up to $1,700 (6,000 Egyptian 
pounds) and prison sentences up to 3 years. There were no reports in 
which the law was applied in practice during the year.
    In 1998 the People's Assembly approved a law that prohibits current 
or former members of the police from publishing workrelated information 
without prior permission from the Interior Minister.
    Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate 
books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. The Islamic 
Research Center at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor, 
but not to confiscate, all publications dealing with the Koran and 
Islamic scriptural texts. In recent years the Center has passed 
judgment on the suitability of nonreligious books and artistic 
productions. In 1995 an administrative court ruled that the sole 
authority to prohibit publication or distribution of books and other 
works of art is vested in the Ministry of Culture. This decision 
invalidated a 1994 advisory opinion by a judiciary council that had 
expanded Al-Azhar's censorship authority to include visual and audio 
artistic works. The same year, President Mubarak stated that the 
Government would not allow confiscation of books from the market 
without a court order, a position supported by the then-Mufti of the 
Republic, who is now the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar.
    The Islamic Research Center at Al-Azhar University ruled during 
1999 in favor of distribution of the book ``My Father Adam: The Story 
of the Creation Between Legend and Reality,'' written by Abdel Sabour 
Shahine. An Islamist lawyer sued the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and several 
other senior Islamic figures in an effort to block publication of the 
book; a court rejected the suit on February 28. The plaintiff's appeal 
of the decision was pending at year's end.
    The Islamic Research Center also issued a statement on May 17 
denouncing the novel ``A Banquet for Seaweed,'' by Syrian author Haidar 
Haidar, for insulting religious values. The novel, originally published 
in 1983, was reissued by the Ministry of Culture as part of a series on 
Arabic literature. Al-Shaab newspaper (of the pro-Islamist Socialist 
Labor Party) declared the book blasphemous for ridiculing Islam, and 
initiated a campaign against the book and against the Minister of 
Culture for reprinting it. Student demonstrations against the book at 
Al-Azhar University on May 8 turned violent, leading to the arrest of 
75 students (see Sections 1.d. and 3). The Minister of Culture 
initially defended his decision and later relented and agreed to recall 
the book, but by then copies reportedly had sold out.
    There were no court-ordered confiscations of books during the year. 
During the year, one author was tried and convicted for his writings. A 
State Security misdemeanor court sentenced author Salaheddine Mohsen to 
a 6-month suspended sentence in July for ``insulting heavenly 
religions'' in his book ``The Shivering Light.'' At the time of his 
arrest, police confiscated approximately 100 copies of Mohsen's books, 
which he had published himself. On December 23, Mohsen was arrested at 
Cairo airport for attempting to leave the country. Upon the appeal of 
the State Security Prosecutor, who claimed that the sentence was too 
lenient, the Government ordered that Mohsen be retried. The retrial was 
pending at year's end. An appeal to the Court of Cassation by author 
Ala'a Hamed still was pending at year's end. Hamed previously was 
convicted in 1998 for the alleged pornographic content of his book 
``The Bed.''
    The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscates leaflets and other 
works by Muslim fundamentalists and other critics of the State. During 
the year, hundreds of suspected members of the illegal Muslim 
Brotherhood were arrested (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In many cases the 
press reported that police confiscated written materials such as 
leaflets during the arrests. On November 19, 15 persons were convicted 
of offenses related to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, including 
possession of leaflets and other written materials related to the 
organization, and were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years in 
prison.
    The Ministry of Interior also has the authority, which it exercises 
sporadically, to stop specific issues of foreignpublished newspapers 
from entering the country on the grounds of protecting public order 
(also see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense may ban works about 
sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers may order the 
banning of works that it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental 
to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.
    The Ministry of Information owns and operates all domestic 
television and radio stations. The Government refuses to license 
private broadcast stations or to privatize the State's broadcast media. 
In addition to public television, the Government also offers several 
pay-for-view television channels. Government control and censorship of 
the broadcast media is significant.
    Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as 
scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that 
are highly critical of the Government and its policies are not 
censored. The Ministry of Culture also censors foreign films that are 
to be shown in theaters, but it is more lenient when the same films are 
released in videocassette format. Government censors ensure that 
foreign films made in Egypt portray the country in a favorable light. 
Censors review scripts before filming, are present during filming, and 
have the right to review the film before it is sent out of the country.
    An appeals court had not yet reviewed the case against the film 
``Birds of Darkness'' by year's end. The plaintiffs charge that it is 
insulting to lawyers. Two related cases against the movie were dropped 
in 1997.
    Moderate Muslims and secularist writers still are subject to legal 
action by Islamic extremists. Cairo University professor Nasr Abu Zeid 
and his wife continue to live abroad following the 1996 Court of 
Cassation ruling that affirmed lower court judgments that Abu Zeid is 
an apostate because of his controversial interpretation of Koranic 
teachings. In August the Supreme Constitutional Court rejected Abu 
Zeid's contestation of the constitutionality of the 1996 ruling.
    The Government does not restrict directly academic freedom at 
universities. However, some university professors claim that the 
Government tightened its control over universities in 1994 through a 
law authorizing university presidents to appoint the deans of the 
various faculties. Under the previous law, faculty deans were elected 
by their peers. The Government has justified the measure as a means to 
combat Islamist influence on campus. The Government also occasionally 
bans books for use on campuses.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
significantly restricts freedom of assembly. Under a 1923 law, citizens 
must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding 
public meetings, rallies, and protest marches. The Interior Ministry 
selectively obstructs meetings scheduled to be held on private property 
and university campuses (also see Section 4). In January security 
officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from 
conducting a planned seminar on Islamic groups. In October the 
Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies to 
hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab world, 
which the Government had prohibited in 1999.
    The Government significantly restricts freedom of association. In 
June the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned on procedural grounds 
Law 153 pertaining to the formation, function, and funding of non-
governmental organizations (NGO's) and private foundations, which had 
been passed by the People's Assembly in June 1999. The previous law 
governing NGO's, Law 32, was reinstated until a new law could be 
passed, which had not happened by year's end. Law 153 and the 
subsequent implementing regulations were controversial, and had drawn 
mixed reactions from local and international NGO's and activists, some 
of whom charged that the law and regulations placed unduly burdensome 
restrictions on NGO's. While many NGO's were registered under Law 153, 
its overturn and the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's 
that had not yet registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an 
unsettled status regarding registration. (Those that succeeded in 
registering under Law 153 still were considered registered after the 
law was overturned.) Three human rights organizations were registered 
as NGO's during the year: The Center for Human Rights Legal Assistance, 
the Center for Human Rights Studies and Information, and the Arab 
Organization for Human Rights. The Arab Organization for Human Rights 
had sought licensing since 1985. Several other human rights 
organizations that applied for registration, including the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the 
Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights 
Studies, were not registered by year's end. The EOHR sued to force the 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs to register the organization, 
because the Ministry had not replied to EOHR's application within 
limits mandated under both Law 32 and Law 153. There was no decision on 
the case by year's end. In September the security services barred 
Mamdouh Nakhla, a Coptic Orthodox lawyer and human rights activist, 
from membership on the board of the Youssef El-Rami Charity Society, 
for ``security reasons.'' Nakhla filed a lawsuit against the Ministers 
of Interior and Social affairs; no court date had been set by year's 
end.
    Under 1993 legislation governing professional syndicates, at least 
50 percent of the general membership of an association must elect the 
governing board. Failing a quorum, a second election must be held in 
which at least 30 percent of the membership votes for the board. If 
such a quorum is unattainable, the judiciary may appoint a caretaker 
board until new elections can be set. The law was adopted to prevent 
wellorganized minorities, specifically Islamists, from capturing or 
retaining the leadership of professional syndicates. Members of these 
syndicates have reported that Islamists have used irregular electoral 
techniques such as physically blocking polling places and limiting or 
changing the location of polling sites.
    On June 28, the Government postponed nationwide elections for the 
Lawyers' Syndicate that had been scheduled for July 1 on the grounds 
that syndicate offices were inadequate to allow voting by the 
syndicate's more than 85,000 members. Local observers believe the 
elections were postponed to prevent victories by Islamists and other 
oppositionists, as had occurred in previous syndicate elections. In 
October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld an earlier court decision 
to lift the Government sequestration of the Syndicate and to allow 
elections. Several Administrative Court rulings during the year 
supported the Syndicate's right to hold elections in its offices, but 
the elections had not taken place by year's end.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government 
places restrictions on this right. Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. 
There is a small number of Shi'a Muslims. Approximately 10 percent of 
the population, or 6 million of 64 million, are Christians, the 
majority of whom belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are other 
small Christian denominations, as well as a Jewish community that 
numbers approximately 200 persons.
    Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and 
primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that 
conflict with Shari'a (Islamic law) are prohibited. However, in Egypt 
the practice of Christianity or Judaism does not conflict with Shari'a 
and, for the most part, members of the non-Muslim minority worship 
without harassment and maintain links with coreligionists abroad.
    All mosques must be licensed, and the Government is engaged in an 
effort to control them legally. The Government appoints and pays the 
salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques, proposes themes for 
them, and monitors their sermons. In December the Minister of Awqaf 
announced that the Government now controls 52,000 mosques and 11,000 
mosques located in private buildings. (There are over 70,000 mosques in 
the country.) In an effort to combat extremists, the Government has 
announced its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its 
control by 2002.
    Neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibit 
proselytizing or conversion. However, during the past 2 decades, 
several dozen Christians who were accused of proselytizing or who had 
converted from Islam to Christianity have been harassed by police or 
arrested on charges of violating Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which 
prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or 
inciting sectarian strife. No such incidents occurred during the year; 
however, in June Aziz Tawfik, a Christian who allegedly was engaged in 
proselytizing activities, was detained briefly by State Security 
forces. He reportedly was mistreated during his detention. He was 
released the same day and reportedly has not been harassed since.
    There are no restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to 
Islam. However, in cases involving conversion from Islam to 
Christianity, authorities have charged several converts with violating 
laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances, 
converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register 
the change from Islam to Christianity, have altered their 
identification cards and other official documents themselves to reflect 
their new religious affiliation. There were no reports of such arrests 
or harassment during the year.
    In 1997 human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit seeking 
removal of the religious affiliation category from government 
identification cards. Naklah challenged the constitutionality of a 1994 
decree by the Minister of Interior governing the issuance of new 
identification cards. The court referred the case to the State 
Commissioner's Office, which in May issued an opinion noting that the 
legal challenge had not been filed within 60 days of the decree's 
issuance, as required by law. However, the advisory opinions of the 
State Commissioner's Office are not binding. The court now is expected 
to try the case, although no date has been set.
    An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to 
obtain what is now a presidential decree to build a place of worship. 
In addition, Interior Ministry regulations issued in 1934 specify a set 
of 10 conditions that the Government must consider prior to issuance of 
a presidential decree permitting construction of a church. These 
conditions include the location of the proposed site, the religious 
composition of the surrounding community, and the proximity of other 
churches. The Ottoman decree also requires the President to approve 
permits for the repair of church facilities.
    In response to strong criticism of the Ottoman decree, President 
Mubarak took several steps to facilitate church repairs. In December 
1999, President Mubarak issued a decree making the repair of all places 
of worship subject to a 1976 civil construction code. The decree is 
significant symbolically because it places churches and mosques on 
equal footing before the law. The practical impact of the decree has 
been to facilitate significantly church repairs. During the year, the 
Government issued 29 permits for church-related construction, including 
4 permits for the construction of new churches, 19 permits for churches 
previously constructed without authorization, and 6 permits for the 
demolition and reconstruction of existing churches. In addition, the 
Government reported that local authorities issued more than 350 permits 
for church-related repair during the year.
    However, the approval process for church construction is 
timeconsuming and insufficiently responsive to the wishes of the 
Christian community. Although President Mubarak reportedly has approved 
all requests for permits presented to him, Christians maintain that the 
Interior Ministry delays--in some instances indefinitely--submission to 
the President of their requests. They also maintain that security 
forces have blocked them from utilizing permits that have been issued. 
For example, a permit issued in 1993 to repair structural damage to a 
110-year-old church in a village next to Luxor remains unenforced due 
to ``security reasons.'' During the summer, newspapers published a May 
22 letter from the secretary general of Assiyut governorate to the head 
of the Assiyut counsel directing that all church repair requests be 
screened by security before approved.
    In January 1996, human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the Ottoman decree. In December 
1998, an administrative court referred Naklah's case to the State 
Commissioner's Office. In September the Office issued an opinion that 
the decree is unconstitutional, but that Naklah had no standing to file 
the suit. The opinion is not biding; the court had not ruled on the 
case by year's end.
    The Minister of Awqaf, Hamdy Zaqzouq, who is responsible for 
administering religious trusts, established in 1996 a committee to 
address a dispute with the Coptic Orthodox Church that originated in 
1952. At that time, the Government seized approximately 1,500 acres of 
land from the Church and transferred title to the Ministry of Awqaf. 
Based on the committee's recommendations, more than 800 acres have been 
returned to the Church. The committee continues to review claims to the 
remaining disputed property.
    The Constitution requires schools to offer religious instruction. 
Public and private schools provide religious instruction according to 
the faith of the student.
    The Government occasionally prosecutes members of religious groups 
whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs and whose 
activities are believed to jeopardize communal harmony. For example, on 
November 11, 1999, the State Security Prosecutor arrested 50 persons in 
Cairo suspected of heresy against Islam. On November 15, 1999, 30 of 
the detainees were released and the remaining 20 were charged with 
degrading Islam, inciting strife, and meeting illegally. The lead 
defendant, a woman named Manal Wahid Mana'a, was accused of attempting 
to establish a new Islamic offshoot. On September 5, a State Security 
Emergency Court in Boulaq sentenced 16 of the defendants, including 
Mana'a to 5 years' hard labor, 3 other defendants to 3 years' hard 
labor, 7 to 1 year of hard labor, 2 to 6 months in prison, and 2 to a 
fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the defendants died in 
prison, reportedly from ill health, during the investigation (see 
Sections 1.e. and 1.a.).
    On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court handed down a 
ruling in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of whom were women, accused of 
propagating extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999. 
The court sentenced two defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3 
years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the 
four women) to 1 year in prison (see Section 1.e.).
    In August 1999, the public prosecutor reopened and expanded an 
investigation of police torture of mostly Christian detainees that took 
place during the police investigation in August and September 1998 of 
the murder of Samir Aweda Hakim and Karam Tamer Arsal in the largely 
Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate. By October 
approximately 300 of 1,000 residents involved in the incident had been 
reinterviewed. It remains unclear whether religion was a factor in the 
actions of the police officers. Some human rights groups outside Egypt 
believe that religion was a factor in the Al-Kush murder investigation, 
but most human rights and Christian activists in Egypt do not. Police 
abuse of detainees is a widespread practice that occurs regardless of a 
detainee's religious beliefs (see Section 1.c.).
    On June 5, a criminal court in Sohag city convicted Shayboub 
William Arsal of the murder of Hakim and Arsal. The court sentenced 
Shayboub to 15 years in prison at hard labor. An appeal was pending at 
year's end. The Christian community of Al-Kush believes that Shayboub, 
a Christian resident of Al-Kush, was accused and convicted of the crime 
because of his religion. The public prosecution in Sohag has taken no 
action on charges of witness tampering in Shayboub's trial that were 
raised in 1998 against Bishop Wisa and Arch-Priest Antonious.
    On July 16, the Dar Al-Salaam court sentenced a Christian, Suryal 
Gayed Ishak, to 3 years' hard labor for ``insulting Islam'' during a 
public dispute. Ishak's attorney appealed the conviction, claiming that 
Ishak was accused falsely of instigating the new year's violence in Al-
Kush (see Section 5). The appeal was scheduled to be heard in January 
2001.
    Some Christians allege that the Government is lax in protecting 
Christian lives and property against extremists (see Section 5).
    In September the Maadi Community Church, an independent 
interdenominational Protestant church, obtained recognition from the 
Government, which allows the Church to buy property and hold services.
    In 1960 President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued a decree (Law 263 for 
1960) banning Baha'i institutions and community activities. All Baha'i 
community properties, including Baha'i centers, libraries, and 
cemeteries, were confiscated. This ban has not been rescinded.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners are free to 
travel within the country except in certain military areas. Males who 
have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or 
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed. 
Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their 
fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same 
permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the 
right to return.
    The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or refugee 
status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. Egypt 
grants first asylum for humanitarian reasons or in the event of 
internal turmoil in neighboring countries. The Government cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Asylum seekers generally are screened by UNHCR representatives, who 
issue a refugee identification card if the Ministries of Interior and 
Foreign Affairs approve. While recognized refugees are permitted to 
reside in Egypt legally, they may not acquire citizenship except in 
rare cases. During the year, approximately 6,400 recognized refugees 
resided in the country, including more than 2,500 Somalis and 2,400 
Sudanese. Although there is no pattern of abuse of refugees, during 
random security sweeps, the Government temporarily detained some 
refugees who were not carrying proper identification. Following 
intervention by the UNHCR, the refugees were released.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the 454-seat 
People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the mass 
media, labor, and the large public sector, and controls the licensing 
of new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations to such 
an extent that, as a practical matter, citizens do not have a 
meaningful ability to change their government.
    In September 1999 President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to 
a fourth six-year term in a national referendum. According to official 
results he received 94 percent of the vote. The referendum followed the 
constitutionally mandated nomination by the People's Assembly. Under 
the Constitution, the electorate is not presented with a choice among 
competing presidential candidates.
    During the year, Egypt held elections for the People's Assembly. 
Due to court-ordered supervision by the judiciary of the voting and 
counting, the process was significantly cleaner and more transparent 
than previous elections; however, there were a number of problems. The 
elections were held in stages between October 18 and November 15 in 
order to allow for supervision by a member of the judiciary at each 
polling place. Out of a total of 444 elected seats, the ruling NDP won 
172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition parties 
won 17 seats. Elections for two seats in Alexandria still had not been 
held by year's end due to a court-imposed delay because of procedural 
irregularities. Many of the independents elected were former members of 
the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected, thus leaving the 
People's Assembly actual balance at 388 NDP members, 37 independents 
(17 of them affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood), and 17 
opposition party members. Seven of those elected were women and three 
were Christians. President Mubarak also appointed 10 members to the 
Assembly, of whom 4 were women and 4 Christians.
    Despite the overall improvement in the electoral process, there 
still were problems affecting the elections' fairness, particularly in 
the period leading up to elections and outside some polling stations on 
election days. During the months preceding the elections, the 
Government arrested thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood on 
charges of belonging to an illegal organization. Most observers believe 
that the Government was seeking to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's 
participation in the People's Assembly and professional syndicate 
elections through intimidation. In addition previous convictions on 
such charges legally precluded many potential candidates from running.
    Violence among supporters of various candidates marred the 
elections at some polling places and resulted in the deaths of 9 
persons. At a few locations, the security presence was so heavy as to 
inhibit voters' access to the polls. There were also reports of voter 
harassment by security forces in jurisdictions in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood was expected to do well. The EOHR conducted a small-scale 
monitoring effort, but there was no systematic, large-scale independent 
monitoring of the elections.
    The People's Assembly debates Government proposals, and members 
exercise their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy. 
The executive initiates almost all legislation. Nevertheless, the 
Assembly maintains the authority to challenge or restrain the executive 
in the areas of economic and social policy, although it may not modify 
the budget except with the Government's approval. The Assembly 
exercises limited influence in the areas of security and foreign 
policy, and retains little oversight of the Interior Ministry's use of 
Emergency Law powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies 
are carried out by regulation through ministerial decree without 
legislative oversight. The military budget is prepared by the executive 
and not debated publicly. Roll-call votes in the Assembly are rare. 
Votes generally are reported in aggregate terms of yeas and nays, and 
thus constituents have no independent method of checking a member's 
voting record.
    The Shura Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, has 264 
members. Two-thirds of the members are elected popularly and the 
President appoints one-third. One half of the Shura seats are up for 
reelection or reappointment every 3 years. In 1998 the NDP won all 88 
seats up for election. One Coptic Christian, from Alexandria, won a 
seat. The President made 47 appointments (including an additional three 
over the 44 open seats to replace deceased members). Those appointed 
included nine women, eight Coptic Christians, and two members of 
opposition parties.
    There are 13 recognized opposition parties. The law empowers the 
Government to bring felony charges against those who form a party 
without a license. New parties must be approved by the Political 
Parties Committee, a semiofficial body that includes a substantial 
majority of members from the ruling NDP and some members from among the 
independent and opposition parties. Decisions of the Parties Committee 
may be appealed to the civil courts. If a court overturns a denial, the 
party is not registered automatically. Both the Committee and the 
People's Assembly sometimes ignore court decisions. During the year the 
Committee approved one party (the Nasserist ``National Accord'' party) 
and rejected the applications of two others. These rejected parties 
filed an appeal of the Committee's decision. Six other appeals were 
pending before the Administrative Court at year's end.
    The Political Parties Committee also may withdraw recognition from 
existing political parties. On May 20, the Committee withdrew 
recognition from the Socialist Labor Party and suspended publication of 
the party newspaper Al-Shaab. The Committee justified its decision by 
citing the emergence of several splinter factions within the party. 
Members of the Socialist Labor Party charged that the emergence of such 
factions was a Government-backed conspiracy to punish the party and 
newspaper for having instigated student demonstrations that turned 
violent at Al-Azhar University in early May (see Section 2.a.).
    The Muslim Brotherhood remains an illegal organization and may not 
be recognized as a political party under current laws, which prohibit 
political parties based on religion. Muslim Brothers are known publicly 
and openly speak their views, although they do not explicitly identify 
themselves as members of the organization. They remain subject to 
government pressure (see Section 1.d.). Seventeen independent 
candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood were elected to the 
People's Assembly in the fall parliamentary elections.
    Women and minorities are underrepresented in Government and 
politics. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for presidential 
appointees, and during the year President Mubarak included four 
Christians and four women among his appointees. In addition to the 
appointments, seven women and three Copts were elected in the fall. The 
ruling NDP nominated three Coptic candidates in the parliamentary 
elections. Two women and 2 Copts serve among the 32 ministers in the 
Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights organizations continue to face difficulties 
registering as legal organizations. In June the Supreme Constitutional 
Court overturned on procedural grounds Law 153 pertaining to the 
formation, function, and funding of non-governmental organizations 
(NGO's) and private foundations, which had been passed by the People's 
Assembly in June 1999. The previous law governing NGO's, Law 32, was 
reinstated until a new law could be passed, which had not happened by 
year's end. Law 153 and the subsequent implementing regulations, were 
considered controversial, and had drawn mixed reactions from local 
NGO's and international activists, some of whom charged that the law 
and regulations placed unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO 
operations.
    While many NGO's were registered under Law 153, its overturn and 
the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's that had not yet 
registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an unsettled status 
regarding registration (see Section 2.b.). Three human rights 
organizations were registered as NGO's during the year: The Center for 
Human Rights Legal Assistance, the Center for Human Rights Studies and 
Information, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Several other 
human rights organizations that applied for registration, including the 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the 
Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights 
Studies, were not registered by year's end (see Section 2.b.).
    Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups 
sometimes obtain the cooperation of Government officials. The 
Government allows EOHR field workers to visit prisons in their capacity 
as legal counsel, to call on some Government officials, and to receive 
funding from foreign human rights organizations. However, many local 
and international human rights activists have concluded that government 
restrictions on NGO activities, including limits on organizations' 
ability to accept funding, have inhibited significantly reporting on 
human rights abuses.
    In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against 
EOHR secretary-general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney 
Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with dissemination of 
false information or inflammatory propaganda that harms public security 
or public interests and with accepting foreign funds with the intent to 
harm national interests. The charges against Abu Se'da were dropped in 
February, and he was instead charged with violating a 1992 military 
decree prohibiting any Egyptian individual or organization from 
accepting foreign funds without Government permission, before the case 
ultimately was dropped altogether in May. The charges against Zidane 
also was dropped. The charges were based on an EOHR report that was 
critical of police conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag 
(See sections 2.a. and 2.c.).
    The case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center 
for Development Studies, who was put on trial beginning on November 18 
for charges that included disseminating abroad false information about 
the country and accepting foreign funds without government permission, 
also had a chilling effect on the work of human rights organizations, 
which exist largely on foreign funding (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.)
    In October the Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights to hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab 
world, which the Government had prohibited in 1999. In January security 
officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from 
conducting planned seminar on Islamic groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal 
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many 
traditional practices discriminate against women and Christians.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem 
and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. According to 
a national study conducted in 1995 as part of a comprehensive 
demographic and health survey, one of every three women who have ever 
been married has been beaten at least once during marriage. Among those 
who have been beaten, less than half have ever sought help. Smaller, 
independent studies confirm that wife beating is common. In general, 
neighbors and extended family members intervene to limit incidents of 
domestic violence. Due to the value attached to privacy in the 
country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely is 
discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce, but the law 
requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult condition 
to meet. Several NGO's offer counseling, legal aid, and other services 
to women who are victims of domestic violence. These activists believe 
that in general the police and the judiciary consider the ``integrity 
of the family'' more important than the well being of the woman. The 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs operates more than 150 family 
counseling bureaus nationwide, which provide legal and medical 
services.
    The Government prosecutes rapists, and punishment for rape ranges 
from 3 years in prison to life imprisonment at hard labor. If a rapist 
is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to execution; 
however, there were no reports of the execution of rapists. In 1999 the 
Government abolished an article of the Penal Code that permitted a 
rapist to be absolved of criminal charges if he married his victim. 
However, marital rape is not illegal. Although reliable statistics 
regarding rape are not available, activists believe that it is not 
uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. When ``honor killings'' (a 
man murdering a female for her perceived lack of chastity) occur, 
perpetrators generally receive lighter punishments than those convicted 
in other cases of murder. There are no reliable statistics regarding 
the extent of honor killings.
    Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal, but known to occur.
    The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the 
law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law, 
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their 
fathers to obtain passports and to travel; married women of any age 
require the same permission from their husbands (see Section 2.d.). 
Only males may confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that 
children who are born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are 
themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's 
in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as 
a judge, although in practice no women serve as judges. The Court of 
Cassation postponed to January 2001 the cases of two attorneys, Fatma 
Lashin and Amany Talaat, who are challenging the Government's refusal 
to appoint them as Public Prosecutors. (To become a judge, one must 
first serve as a Public Prosecutor.)
    Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to 
an individual's religion. In January the Parliament passed a new 
Personal Status Law that made it easier for a Muslim woman to obtain a 
divorce without her husband's consent, provided that she is willing to 
forego alimony and the return of her dowry. (The Coptic Orthodox Church 
does not permit divorce.) However, an earlier provision of the draft 
law that would have made it easier for a woman to travel without her 
husband's consent, was rejected.
    Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry 
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim 
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's 
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance 
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the 
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits 
all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social 
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance; 
however, this assistance is not always provided.
    Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, 
academia, the arts, and business. Labor laws provide for equal rates of 
pay for equal work for men and women in the public sector. According to 
Government figures, women constitute 17 percent of private business 
owners and occupy 25 percent of the managerial positions in the four 
major national banks. Social pressure against women pursuing a career 
is strong, and women's rights advocates say that Islamist influence 
inhibits further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other 
discriminatory traditional or cultural attitudes and practices, such as 
female genital mutilation and the traditional male relative's role in 
enforcing chastity and chaste sexual conduct.
    A number of active women's rights groups work in diverse areas, 
including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights, 
promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
    Children.--The Government remains committed to the protection of 
children's welfare and attempts to do so within the limits of its 
budgetary resources. Many of the resources for children's welfare are 
provided by international donors, especially in the field of child 
immunization. Child labor is widespread, despite the Government's 
commitment to eradicate it (see Section 6.d.). UNICEF has reported on 
the practice of poor rural families making arrangements for a daughter 
to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens 
(see Sections 6.c.).
    The Government provides public education, which is compulsory for 
the first 9 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The 
Government treats boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
    The Government enacted a Child Law in 1996. The law provides for 
privileges, protection, and care for children in general. Six of the 
law's 144 articles set rules protective of working children (see 
Section 6.d.). Other provisions include: A requirement that employers 
set up or contract with a child care center if they employ more than 
100 women; the right of rehabilitation for disabled children; a 
prohibition on sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to 
capital punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a 
prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive 
custody (although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an 
``observation house'' and be summoned upon request).
    Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is common despite the Government's commitment to 
eradicating the practice and NGO efforts to combat it. Traditional and 
family pressures remain strong; a study conducted during the year 
estimates the percentage of women who have ever been married who have 
undergone FGM at 97 percent. The survey showed that attitudes may be 
changing slowly; over a 5-year period, the incidence of FGM among the 
daughters (from ages 11 to 19) of women surveyed fell from 83 to 78 
percent. FGM generally is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 
12, with equal prevalence among Muslims and Christians.
    In 1997 the Court of Cassation upheld the legality of a 1996 decree 
banning FGM that was issued by the Minister of Health and Population 
Planning. In addition to attempting to enforce the decree, the 
Government supports a range of efforts to educate the public. A 
discussion of FGM and its dangers has been added to the curriculum of 
the school system. The Government broadcasts television programs 
criticizing the practice. Government ministers speak out against the 
practice, and senior religious leaders also support efforts to stop it. 
The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the most senior Islamic figure in the country, 
and the leader of the Coptic Orthodox community, Pope Shenouda, have 
stated repeatedly that FGM is not required by religious doctrine. 
However, illiteracy impedes some women from distinguishing between the 
deep-rooted tradition of FGM and religious practices. Moreover, many 
citizens believe that FGM is an important part of maintaining female 
chastity, which is a part of religious tradition, and the practice is 
supported by some Muslim religious authorities and Islamist political 
activists. A number of NGO's actively work to educate the public about 
the health hazards of the practice.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws specifically 
prohibiting discrimination against the disabled, but the Government 
makes serious efforts to address their rights. It works closely with 
U.N. agencies and other international aid donors to design job-training 
programs for the disabled. The Government also seeks to increase the 
public's awareness of the capabilities of the disabled in television 
programming, the print media, and in educational material in public 
schools. There are approximately 5.7 million disabled persons, of whom 
1.5 million are disabled severely.
    By law, all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for 
the disabled, who are exempt from normal literacy requirements. 
Although there is no legislation mandating access to public 
accommodations and transportation, the disabled may ride Government-
owned mass transit buses free of charge, are given priority in 
obtaining telephones, and receive reductions on customs duties for 
private vehicles. A number of NGO's are active in efforts to train and 
assist the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--The Constitution provides for equal public 
rights and duties without discrimination due to religion or creed. For 
the most part, the Government upholds these constitutional protections. 
However, discrimination against Christians exists. There are no 
Christians serving as governors, university presidents, and deans. 
There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services 
and armed forces. Although there was improvement in a few areas such as 
coverage of Christian subjects in the mass media, discriminatory 
government practices include: Suspected statistical underrepresentation 
of the size of the Christian population; bias against Christianity and 
Coptic history in the educational curricula; failure to admit 
Christians into public university training programs for Arabic language 
teachers (because the curriculum involves study of the Koran); 
discrimination against Christians in the public sector; and 
discrimination against Christians in staff appointments to public 
universities.
    The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians have been the objects 
of occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other 
terrorists. Some Christians have alleged that the Government is lax in 
protecting Christian lives and property (see Section 2.c.). However, 
there were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during 
the year. In incidents unrelated to terrorism, 1 Christian was killed 
and 10 were wounded in four assaults linked to Muslim extremists. Madgy 
Ayyad Mas'oud was killed on July 26 in a village in Giza by 
unidentified gunmen, reportedly because he built a church (with 
official approval) to which extremists objected. Two men were arrested 
on July 31 and charged with premeditated murder in connection with the 
case; the trial had not begun by year's end. On December 11, Father 
Hezkiyal Ghebriyal, a 75-year-old Coptic Orthodox priest, was stabbed 
and seriously wounded in the village of Bardis, near Sohag. Police 
arrested the suspected attacker, who remained in prison at year's end, 
pending an ongoing investigation. Several other Christians were wounded 
in sectarian disputes in other provinces.
    On April 15, the Tanta Criminal Court sentenced to 3 years in 
prison the assailant who stabbed a Christian priest in Mahalla in 
August 1999. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced to 
5 years' imprisonment with hard labor four members of a terrorist group 
from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout who were accused of 
murder and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early 
1990's. As of the end of the year, the Court of Cassation had not yet 
set a date to hear an appeal by the Public Prosecutor seeking a heavier 
sentence in the case of Ahmad and Ibrahim Nasir, who were sentenced to 
7 years in prison for the September 1999 murder of a monk in Assiut.
    A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim 
customer on December 31, 1999, in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag 
governorate, escalated into violent exchanges between Muslims and 
Christians in the area, resulting in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1 
Muslim on January 2, 2000. The violence also resulted in the injury of 
39 persons in Al-Kush and 5 persons in the neighboring municipality of 
Dar Al-Salaam. Approximately 200 businesses and homes in the area were 
damaged. Following the incident, President Mubarak sent the Minister of 
Local Administration to Al-Kush as his emissary. The Minister of 
Housing and the Public Prosecutor also visited Al-Kush to investigate. 
The Government subsequently provided $800 (3000 Egyptian pounds) to 
each of the families of those who were killed, and $130 (500 Egyptian 
pounds) to each person who was injured. The Government relocated and 
rebuilt 65 kiosks damaged in the riots; the placement of the kiosks had 
been a subject of longstanding dispute between Christian and Muslim 
merchants. The Christian community estimates that Christian residents 
and merchants lost $962,000 (3,609,400 Egyptian pounds) worth of 
merchandise and personal property during the looting. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs thus far has disbursed $14,000 (52,900 Egyptian pounds) 
in compensation. The Coptic Orthodox Church has provided $175,000 
(655,450 Egyptian pounds) in compensation. Several individuals and 
organizations have provided donations to the Christian community in Al-
Kush.
    Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda stated publicly that negligence on 
the part of the police and local leaders led to an increase in the 
number of victims and an escalation of the violence. Although rumors 
reportedly played a significant role in exacerbating the violence, no 
incitement charges were brought. The Government did not investigate 
police conduct; however, the director of State Security for Sohag 
governorate, Sa'id Abu AlMa'aly, was removed from his position in 
March.
    On March 11, the Public Prosecutor announced the indictment of 135 
persons for involvement in the sectarian violence in Al-Kush and Dar 
Al-Salaam, on charges ranging from unlawful assembly to murder. Charges 
initially raised against a local priest were dropped. On September 5, 
the Sohag criminal court handed down the verdicts in the cases of 39 
persons charged with crimes (including arson and theft but not murder) 
committed in Dar AlSalaam. Among 21 persons convicted, 4 were sentenced 
to 10 years in prison, 4 to 2 years, 12 to 1 year, and 1 to 6 months; 
the remaining 19 defendants were acquitted. On June 4, the Sohag 
criminal court began hearing the case of 96 defendants charged with 
crimes (including murder) committed in Al-Kush. Observers criticized 
the decision by the trial judge on December 7 to release on personal 
recognizance for the Ramadan and Christmas holidays 89 defendants (51 
Muslims and 38 Christians), who faced charges from inciting violence to 
murder. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
    There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam. 
Reports of such cases are disputed and often include inflammatory 
allegations and categorical denials of kidnapping and rape. Observers, 
including human rights groups, find it extremely difficult to determine 
whether compulsion was used, as most cases involve a Coptic girl who 
converts to Islam when she marries a Muslim boy. According to the 
Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her 
priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to 
convert. However, there are credible reports of Government harassment 
of Christian families that attempt to regain custody of their 
daughters, and of the failure of the authorities to uphold the law 
(which states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is 
prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal, without the 
approval and presence of her guardian) in cases of marriage between an 
underage Christian girl and a Muslim boy.
    There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to 
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. However, if a Christian 
woman marries a Muslim man the Coptic Orthodox Church excommunicates 
her. Ignorance of the law and societal pressure, including the 
centrality of marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her 
decision. Family conflict and financial pressure also are cited as 
factors. In addition conversion is a means of circumventing the legal 
prohibition on marriage between the ages of 16 and 21 without the 
approval and presence of a girl's guardian. Most Christian families 
would object to a daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian 
girl converts to Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers 
to a Muslim custodian, who is likely to grant approval. The law is 
silent on the matter of the acceptable age of conversion.
    Anti-Semitism is found in both the Government press and in the 
press of the opposition parties. The Government has criticized anti-
Semitism and advised journalists and cartoonists to avoid anti-
Semitism. There have been no violent anti-Semitic incidents in recent 
years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join trade unions but are 
not required to do so. A union local, or workers' committee, may be 
formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most union 
members, about 27 per cent of the labor force, are employed by 
stateowned enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative'' 
officials in Government and the public sector may not join unions.
    There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor 
federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts 
repeatedly has emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions to 
belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association. The 
Government has shown no sign that it intends to accept the 
establishment of more than one federation. The ETUF leadership asserts 
that it actively promotes worker interests and that there is no need 
for another federation. ETUF officials have close relations with the 
NDP, and some are members of the People's Assembly or the Shura 
Council. They speak vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public 
confrontations between the ETUF and the Government are rare. Disputes 
more often are resolved by consensus in private.
    The labor laws do not provide adequately for the rights to strike 
and to engage in collective bargaining. Strikers may face prison 
sentences of up to 2 years. Although the right to strike is not 
provided, strikes occur. The Government considers strikes a form of 
public disturbance and therefore illegal. According to a press report 
in March, the Minister of Military Production referred five striking 
workers from a Helwan arms factory to military prosecution.
    There were 17 strikes during the year. Strikes mainly were over 
issues of wage cuts, dismissals, and anticipated privatization. Most of 
the strikes took place in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Delta (northern 
Egypt), the country's industrial centers. Most of the strikes occurred 
in public sector companies and lasted for 1 day. Most strikes involved 
hundreds of workers, and in one instance more than a thousand workers 
were involved. Bonuses and incentives tied to the previous year's 
production typically are disbursed in January, and failure to disburse 
the bonuses often leads to a strike. ETUF or government officials 
successfully mediated most of the strikes.
    Some unions within the ETUF are affiliated with international trade 
union organizations. Others are in the process of becoming affiliated.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the law, 
unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector enterprises if 
the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions otherwise lack 
collective bargaining power in the state sector. The International 
Labor Organization (ILO) for years has claimed that the Labor Code 
undermines the principle of voluntary bargaining by providing that any 
clause of a collective agreement that is liable to impair the economic 
interest of the country is null and void. Under current circumstances, 
collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense because 
the Government sets wages, benefits, and job classifications by law.
    Firms in the private sector generally do not adhere to such 
Government-mandated standards. Although they are required to observe 
some Government practices, such as the minimum wage, social security 
insurance, and official holidays, firms often do not adhere to 
Government practice in nonbinding matters, including award of the 
annual Labor Day bonus. There are no legal obstacles to establishing 
private sector unions, although such unions are not common.
    Labor law and practice are the same in Egypt's six export 
processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, the Criminal Code authorizes sentences 
of hard labor for some crimes. Although the law does not prohibit 
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are 
not known to occur (see Section 6.d.). Domestic and foreign workers 
generally are not subject to coerced or bonded labor, although UNICEF 
has reported on the practice of poor rural families making arrangements 
for a daughter to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of 
wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under the 1996 Child Law (see Section 5), the minimum age 
for employment is 14 in nonagricultural work. The Labor Law of 1996 and 
associated ministerial decrees greatly limit the type and conditions of 
work that children below the age of 18 may perform legally. Provincial 
governors, with the approval of the Minister of Education, may 
authorize seasonal work for children between the ages of 12 and 14, 
provided that duties are not hazardous and do not interfere with 
schooling. Preemployment training for children under the age of 12 is 
prohibited. It is prohibited for children to work for more than 6 hours 
a day. One or more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included. 
Children may not work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8 
p.m. and 7 a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously. Education is 
compulsory, free, and universal for the first 9 academic years 
(typically until the age of 15).
    The Government takes seriously the problem of child labor, and took 
steps to improve the situation. For example, Prime Minister Atef Ebeid 
and First Lady Suzanne Mubarak are involved personally with the 
problems of working children through their leadership positions on the 
National Council for Children and Motherhood. The Government worked 
closely during the year with international organizations--in particular 
UNICEF and the International Labor Organization (ILO)--as well as 
international and domestic NGO's and labor unions to implement programs 
designed to address child labor and its root causes. However, in 
general the Government does not devote adequate resources to implement 
its child labor policies. Statistical information on the number of 
working children is difficult to obtain and often out of date. A 
comprehensive study prepared by the Government's statistical agency in 
1988 indicated that 1,309,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14 
were employed. In November 1999, the Minister of Social Affairs 
reportedly stated that 1 million children participate in agricultural 
labor, and NGO's estimate that up to 1.5 million children work. 
Government studies also indicate that the concentration of working 
children is higher in rural than urban areas. Nearly 78 percent of 
working children are in the agricultural sector. However, children also 
work as domestic servants, as apprentices in auto repair and craft 
shops, in heavier industries such as construction, in brickmaking and 
textiles, and as workers in tanneries and carpet-making factories. 
While local trade unions report that the Ministry of Labor adequately 
enforces the labor laws in state-owned enterprises, enforcement in the 
private sector, especially in the informal sector, is lax. Many of 
these children are abused, overworked, and exposed to potentially 
hazardous conditions by their employers, and the restrictions in the 
Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax enforcement on the 
part of the Government. There were only two reported cases during the 
year in which the Government enforced child labor laws. In September 
Ministry of Interior officials raided 16 electrical workshops in 
various Cairo neighborhoods and found 30 children between the ages of 6 
and 12 working there. In another case, authorities found 4 children 
working in a Cairo restaurant that serves alcoholic beverages. Both 
cases were referred to the Prosecutor General's office. According to 
Article 74 of the Child Law of 1996, establishment owners are subject 
to fines of $27 to $133 (100 to 500 Egyptian pounds) for each illegal 
child worker; in the case of repeat offenders the fines are doubled. 
Investigations into the cases were ongoing at year's end.
    Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded 
labor by children, UNICEF has reported on the practice of poor rural 
families making arrangements for a daughter to be employed as a 
domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--For Government and public sector 
employees, the minimum wage is approximately $34 (about 128 Egyptian 
pounds) a month for a 6day, 36-hour workweek, as compared to the same 
wages for a 42hour workweek in 1999. The minimum wage, which is set by 
the Government and applied nationwide, is enforced effectively by the 
Ministry of Administrative Development. The minimum wage does not 
provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and family; 
however, base pay commonly is supplemented by a complex system of 
fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's take-
home pay. The minimum wage also is binding legally on the private 
sector, and larger private companies generally observe the requirement 
and pay bonuses as well. Smaller firms do not always pay the minimum 
wage or bonuses.
    The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards, 
which also apply in the export processing zones; however, enforcement 
and inspections are uneven.
    The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working 
conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from 
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex 
tourism. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, 
within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                  IRAN

    The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a 
populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution 
ratified after the revolution by popular referendum established a 
theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of 
institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The 
Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution 
and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces, 
and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a 4-year term as 
President in a popular vote in February 1997. A popularly elected 290-
seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and 
passes legislation. All legislation passed by the Majles is reviewed 
for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles by a Council of 
Guardians, which consists of six clerical members, who are appointed by 
the Supreme Leader, and six lay jurists, who are appointed by the head 
of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides 
the Council of Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify 
candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of 
requirements, including the candidates' ideological beliefs. The 
judiciary is subject to government and religious influence.
    Several agencies share responsibility for internal security, 
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of 
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was 
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known 
as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers 
of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific members of 
the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the streets to 
intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and 
individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. Both regular 
and paramilitary security forces committed numerous, serious human 
rights abuses.
    Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export 
earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The 
Constitution mandates that all large-scale industry, including 
petroleum, minerals, banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power 
generation, communications, aviation, and road and rail transport, be 
owned publicly and administered by the state. Large charitable 
foundations called bonyads, most with strong connections to the 
Government, control the extensive properties and businesses 
expropriated from the Pahlavi family and individuals associated with 
the monarchy. The bonyads exercise considerable influence in the 
economy, but do not account publicly for revenue and pay no taxes. 
Basic foodstuffs and energy costs are subsidized heavily by the 
Government. Oil exports account for nearly 80 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings. Private property is respected. Although economic 
performance improved somewhat during the year due to the worldwide 
increase in oil prices, performance is affected adversely by government 
mismanagement and corruption. Unemployment was estimated to be at least 
25 percent, and inflation was an estimated 25 percent.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although 
efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human 
rights policies continued, serious problems remain. The Government 
restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic abuses 
include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances; 
widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly 
including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and 
detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Judicial 
proceedings were instituted against some government officials for 
misconduct. However, perpetrators often committed such abuses with 
impunity. A group of 20 police officials was brought to trial in March 
for their actions in an attack on a Tehran University student dormitory 
in July 1999. All but two were cleared, including the senior official 
involved. In December 18 former officials of the Intelligence Ministry 
were tried before a military court for the killings of four dissidents 
in 1998. The proceedings were closed and the results of the trial were 
not made public by year's end.
    The judiciary suffers from government and religious influence, and 
does not ensure that citizens receive due process or fair trials. The 
Government uses the judiciary to stifle dissent and obstruct progress 
on human rights. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights, 
and restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. The 
Government closed nearly all reform-oriented publications during the 
year and brought charges against prominent political figures and 
members of the clergy for expressing ideas viewed as contrary to the 
ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
continued to issue licenses for the establishment of newspapers and 
magazines, some of which challenged government policies. The Government 
restricts freedom of religion. Religious minorities, particularly 
Baha'is, continued to suffer repression by conservative elements of the 
judiciary and security establishment. In July 10 Iranian Jews were 
tried and convicted on charges of illegal contacts with Israel, and 
sentenced to between 2 and 13 years in prison. Three others were 
acquitted. The trial procedures were unfair, and violated numerous 
internationally recognized standards of due process. The selection of 
candidates for elections effectively is controlled by the Government. 
Intense political struggle continued during the year between a broad 
popular movement that favored greater liberalization in government 
policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and certain hard-
line elements in the government and society, which view such reforms as 
a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In many cases, this 
struggle is played out within the Government itself, with reformists 
and hardliners squaring off in divisive internal debates. Reformers and 
moderates won a landslide victory in the February Majles election, and 
now constitute a majority of that body; however, the Council of 
Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked much of the 
early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
    The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and 
continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Special 
Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence against women occurs, 
and women face legal and societal discrimination. The Government 
discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities and restricts 
important workers' rights, including freedom of association and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor persists. 
Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the 
Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social behavior 
through intimidation and violence.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government has 
been responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Human rights 
groups reported that security forces killed at least 20 persons while 
violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds that occurred in the wake 
of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader 
Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5). Human 
Rights Watch reported at least four student deaths in July 1999, when 
government-sanctioned agitators attacked a student dormitory during 
protests in Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the 
absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press 
stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in 
substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The U.N. 
Special Representative cited an estimated 130 executions from January 
through July, most of which were reported in the media. The Government 
has not cooperated in providing the Special Representative with a 
precise number of executions carried out in Iran. Exiles and human 
rights monitors allege that many of those executed for criminal 
offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, actually are political 
dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed to make up a large number 
of those executed each year. A November 1995 law criminalized dissent 
and applied the death penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against 
the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian 
officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against 
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' U.N. representatives, 
including the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran, and 
independent human rights organizations, continue to note the absence of 
procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Harsh punishments are carried 
out, including stoning and flogging (see Section 1.c.). However, cases 
of stoning apparently are declining, and the U.N. Special 
Representative reports no cases over the past year in which such a 
sentence was carried out. The law also allows for the relatives of 
murder victims to take part in the execution of the killer.
    The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent 
Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout 
the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period from 
October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush and 
Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh. 
Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period 
and never has been found (see Section 1.b.). In February after several 
senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders 
on ``foreign hands,'' it was revealed that active-duty agents of the 
Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of 
Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior 
deputies resigned their posts following these revelations.
    Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military 
Prosecutor's office. In June 1999, the Prosecutor's Office released an 
initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell within the 
Ministry of Intelligence led by four ``main agents'' as responsible for 
the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy 
Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the Government stated, had 
committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution 
several days prior to release of the Government's June report. The 
report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in connection 
with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation. 
In the early part of the year, the Government announced that 18 men 
would stand trial in connection with the killings. The trial began in 
late December in a military court. The proceedings were closed. 
However, news reports indicated that 15 defendants pled guilty during 
the opening stages of the trial. The identity of the defendants is 
still unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi has 
not been charged. Results of the trial had not been announced by year's 
end (see Section 1.e.).
    Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and 
doubt about the government's willingness to follow the case to its 
conclusion were frequent topics of criticism of the Government 
throughout the year, particularly by those advocating greater adherence 
to the rule of law. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural 
figures declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the 
case and speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at 
the highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including 
prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in 
connection with statements they have made about the case (see Sections 
1.c. and 1.e.). In December, just before Ganji's case went to trial, 
the Military Court arrested a lawyer for the family of one of the 
victims for violating a public ban on comments regarding the case.
    One organization in 1999 reported eight deaths of evangelical 
Christians at the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see 
Section 2.c.). In 1999 an investigative reporter alleged that officials 
within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of 
three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three 
female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had been convicted 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some 
allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no 
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone 
associated with his work, ``The Satanic Verses,'' despite the issuance 
of a fatwa against Rushdie's life in 1989. The announcement came during 
discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of full 
diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a number of 
Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's pledge and 
emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious ruling, by 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder. The 15 
Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established for the 
murder of Rushdie.
    The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an 
Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murders of Zahra Rajabi and 
Ali Moradi, both of whom were associated with the National Council of 
Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for 
several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special Representative 
reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their 
investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi, 
the NCR's representative in Italy.
    b. Disappearance.--No reliable information is available on the 
number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest, 
many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and 
family members.
    Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998 
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who 
later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to 
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism (see Section 
1.a.).
    A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian 
Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see 
Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to 
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The 
group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who 
disappeared were killed.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, 
there are numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison 
personnel continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison 
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel 
and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the 
Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in 
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and, 
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other 
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also 
have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete 
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete 
blindness. Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic 
Penal Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section 1.a.).
    In November investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on trial for 
statements he allegedly made during an April conference in Berlin on 
Iranian politics (see Sections 2.a. and 1.e.). He was arrested in April 
upon his return to Iran and held over the next 6 months for long 
periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the court that he was 
beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had written articles 
implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of murders of 
dissidents and intellectuals apparently carried out by security forces.
    In March a gunman shot and severely wounded newspaper editor Saeed 
Hajarian, a senior political advisor to President Khatami. The methods 
used raised widespread suspicions that the security forces were 
involved in the attack. The gunman later was arrested and sentenced 
along with four other defendants to 15-year prison sentences.
    On July 8, 1999, the Government and individuals acting with the 
consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a 
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, including reportedly 
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured 
in the incident. The U.N. Special Representative has noted numerous 
credible reports that students arrested following the demonstration 
were tortured in prison (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    In May 1999, Brigadier General Gholam-reza Naqdi, a senior Tehran 
police official, and several associates, who were accused of using 
torture to coerce confessions during the 1998 trial of former mayor of 
Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi, went on trial. It reportedly was the 
first prosecution of a government official for torture since the 1979 
revolution. The charges were based on the accusations of numerous 
Tehran municipality officials and district mayors that authorities had 
used torture to coerce admissions of guilt and statements that 
implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi was conducted in closed 
session before a military court. Naqdi was cleared of most charges and 
resumed his duties with the Tehran police force.
    In August 1999, President Khatami was quoted in public remarks as 
criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of prisoners as 
a legitimate concern based on ``Islam and human conscience.''
    Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary 
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force 
confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise 
tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family 
members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family 
members. The U.N. Special Representative reported receiving numerous 
reports of prisoner overcrowding and unrest. He cited a reported figure 
of only 8.2 square feet (2.5 square) of space available for each 
prisoner.
    The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by 
human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices 
remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit for 
incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the 
legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or 
in local Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable statistics are 
not available, international observers believe that between scores and 
hundreds of citizens are detained for their political beliefs.
    The security forces often do not inform family members of a 
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied visits by 
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed 
prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths. 
Those who do receive such information reportedly have been forced on 
occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
    Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the cultural rights of Azeris, 
was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups claim that Chehrangi was 
arrested to prevent his registration as a candidate in the February 
Majles elections (see Sections 3 and 5).
    In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested by security 
forces in the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were 
several prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a 
16-year-old boy. They were held for 14 months or more without formal 
charges until their trial began in May. The delay in clarification of 
charges appeared to violate Article 32 of the Constitution, which 
states in part that in cases of arrest ``charges with the reasons for 
accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the 
accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the 
competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the 
preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible.'' 
Ten of the 13 eventually were convicted of charges relating to illegal 
contacts with Israel. Governments around the world criticized the 
detentions and trial as unfair and in violation of due process (see 
Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
    As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student 
protests on July 8, 1999, and subsequent riots. Many of them remained 
in prison throughout the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
    Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained, 
jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing their writings during the 
year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a policy of 
intimidation toward members of the media that it considers to pose a 
threat to the current system of Islamic government.
    Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and 
detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a 
small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to 
the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 10 Baha'is 
are in prisons, including 2 who were convicted of either apostasy or 
``actions against God'' and sentenced to death. In March 1999, the four 
remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of 
Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict 
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious 
leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance 
with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the 
legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi, 
who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than 15 years; 
Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in Qom; and 
Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in 
Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the former 
designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains under 
house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section 2.a.). The 
followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of them junior 
clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in recent years and 
tortured by government authorities.
    Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war 
(POW's) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
war, adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in 
1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two 
governments was not achieved, despite such predictions by Iranian 
government officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report described 
joint Iran-Iraq search operations to identify the remains of those 
missing in action.
    The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and 
ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception 
of threat from the Government.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system is not 
independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It 
serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and 
reform in the society.
    There are several different court systems. The two most active are 
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in 
1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic 
Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics 
crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and 
official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged 
transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court 
investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security 
duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A 
press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers 
in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
    The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, 
to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic 
sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a 
cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned 
as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by 
Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and 
Prosecutor General also must be clerics.
    Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the 
civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a 
public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of 
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury 
system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not 
addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government 
advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and 
interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted 
during the Pahlavi monarchy.
    Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against 
national security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious 
for their disregard of international standards of fairness. 
Revolutionary Court judges act as both prosecutor and judge in the same 
case, and judges are chosen in part based on their ideological 
commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often is prolonged and 
defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and 
include undefined offenses such as ``antirevolutionary behavior,'' 
``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with global arrogance.'' Defendants 
do not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary 
trials of 5 minutes duration occur. Others are show trials that are 
intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession. In 1992 the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that ``the chronic abuses 
associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so 
entrenched as to be beyond reform.'' The Government has undertaken no 
major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that report.
    In October a former member of a vigilante group, Amir Farshad 
Ibrahimi, was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment for defamation after 
he stated in a videotape that Ansar-e Hezbollah vigilantes had received 
payments from senior clerics and conservative political figures to 
organize and carry out attacks on their political opponents. Two 
prominent lawyers active in civil liberties cases, Shirin Ebadi and 
Mohsen Rahimi, were given suspended sentences and prohibited from 
practicing law for 5 years for their role in distributing the tape.
    In November a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 16 writers, 
intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April 
conference in Berlin on the implications of the February Majles 
elections (see Section 3). The 16 defendants, who were arrested in Iran 
after the conference and charged with taking part in antigovernment and 
anti-Islamic activities, included investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, 
newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament Jamileh 
Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahji, 
opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali Afshari, 
and others, including a translator for the German Embassy in Tehran. 
The trial was ongoing at year's end.
    In late December, a military court began the trials of 18 persons 
in connection with the killings of several prominent dissidents and 
intellectuals in late 1998. The results of the trial had not been 
announced by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
    The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued 
to be a subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical 
courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and 
crimes committed by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the 
Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate 
outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged 
that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics for 
expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities 
outside the area of religion, including journalism.
    During the latter part of the year, a Special Clerical Court began 
the trial of Hojatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who 
participated in the Berlin conference, on charges of apostasy and 
``corruption on earth,'' which potentially carry the death penalty. 
Eshkevari has called for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law in 
certain areas. In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice 
President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-
year prison term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles, 
insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the 
United States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper 
that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of 
his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the 
SCC (see Section 2.a.).
    In April 1999, a branch of the SCC convicted Hojatoleslam Mohsen 
Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in 
prison for ``dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion'' in a 
series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar 
advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and 
criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview 
published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government 
officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes 
against the State. He also observed that such leaders ``mistake 
themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests 
of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from 
criticism.'' He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric 
Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.
    In July 1999, the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and 
indicted its publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of 
``violating Islamic principles,'' ``endangering national security,'' 
and ``disturbing public opinion.'' Khoeniha, a cleric, later was 
sentenced to a 5-year jail term. The charges involved the publication 
by Salaam of documents related to the unsolved murders of dissident 
intellectuals in late 1998, which indicated a possible connection to 
senior officials in the plotting of the murders. The closure of the 
newspaper led to peaceful protests by students at Tehran University 
that later grew into widespread rioting after aggressive 
countermeasures were taken by security forces (see Section 2.b.).
    It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A woman's 
testimony in court is worth only half that of a man's, making it 
difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
    The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities 
with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and 
conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for 
threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as 
head of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was 
an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this 
view (see Section 2.c.). The trial of 13 Iranian Jews on charges 
related to espionage for Israel was marked throughout by a lack of due 
process. The defendants were held for over 1 year without being charged 
formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed, and the 
defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers. Following the 
trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were threatened by 
judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients' guilt (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    In December 1999, authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime 
Minister and longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an 
interview with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam 
has spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being 
arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following 
the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in 
1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel 
and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was gathered 
from the overtaken U.S. Embassy and used against him. Since then he has 
appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has 
been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured 
eardrum due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from 
denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate 
condition. He reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a 
firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live. 
Amir-Entezam remained in prison at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy 
Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in 
1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the 
law, was released from prison in early in 1999; however, the Government 
banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. Human 
Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 sentence 
also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased authoring a 
monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights of women, 
since the time of his detention.
    In December Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an 
initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the 
country is ``still a long way off from having a reformed and developed 
judicial organization.'' He also announced that 40 judges, clerks, and 
``middle-men'' had been arrested on corruption charges.
    No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners. 
However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons 
on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when 
their actual ``offenses'' are political.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life, 
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as 
``provided by law;'' however, the Government infringes on these rights. 
Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes 
and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without 
court authorization.
    Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an organization of 
hardline vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate 
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and 
intimidate those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not 
observe dress codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct. 
This includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of 
the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail 
polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy 
newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics, 
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e 
Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked to 
individual members of the country's leadership.
    Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons considered too 
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes, 
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of 
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to remove 
television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings in which 
unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or 
other forbidden activities are offered or take place. Enforcement 
appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and 
the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are vulnerable to 
bribes in some of these circumstances.
    In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than 
500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having 
connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section 
2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office equipment, and 
other items of personal property were confiscated. The effort 
apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the Institute, 
which serves as the only alternative source of higher education for 
most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled university 
system.
    Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section 
1.c.). Opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of their 
relatives in the country.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to 
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;'' however, the 
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press in practice. 
After the election of President Khatami, the independent press, 
especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important 
role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the 
society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression are 
lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to arbitrary 
enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably the 
judiciary, which see in such debates a threat to their own hold on 
power.
    Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and 
social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the 
Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including 
criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law 
prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of 
subjects, including material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or 
``promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic.'' Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment 
on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the 
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme 
Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a 
supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic 
legal principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national 
security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics, 
including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and advocating rights or 
autonomy for ethnic minorities.
    Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press 
law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory 
Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a 
university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press 
licenses and for examining complaints filed against publications or 
individual journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the 
Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further 
action, including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints. Its 
hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury 
that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of 
government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to recommend to 
the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants and the 
severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these recommendations 
are not binding legally. In at least two cases in 1999 (against the 
newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations made by Press 
Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were disregarded by the 
presiding judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure. 
Perhaps because the judgments of the Press Courts have not been viewed 
as sufficiently strict by some government officials, alleged violations 
of the Press Law increasingly were referred to the Revolutionary and 
Special Clerical Courts, in which defendants enjoy fewer legal 
safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
    In March the outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law 
that gave the Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional 
power. The amendments allowed prosecution of individual journalists, in 
addition to their editors and publishers, for a broad range of ill-
defined political offenses. The new Parliament (which was seated in 
May), introduced a bill in August to reverse the restrictive 
amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei intervened with a letter 
to the Speaker demanding that the bill be dropped from consideration. 
Semiofficial vigilante groups appeared outside the Parliament, creating 
an atmosphere of intimidation. Despite some strongly worded objections 
from members, the bill was withdrawn.
    Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists, 
editors, publishers, and even rival publications. The practice of 
complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological 
lines. Offending writers are subject to lawsuits and fines. Suspension 
from journalistic activities and imprisonment are common punishments 
for guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to 
``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the 
Islamic Republic.'' Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e 
Hezbollah mobs attack the offices of liberal publications and 
bookstores without interference from the police or prosecution by the 
courts.
    The country's record on freedom of expression worsened during the 
year. It remained a central issue in the struggle between hardliners 
and political reformers. The Government continued its policy of issuing 
licenses for new publications, some of which engaged in open criticism 
of certain government policies. However, the Government issued such 
licenses at a greatly reduced rate during the year. Beginning in late 
April, the Press Court closed virtually all remaining newspapers 
associated with the reform-oriented press. Over the course of a few 
days, the 14 most prominent reform newspapers were ordered closed, 
without hearings. By year's end, more than 30 independent newspapers 
and journals were closed. A few mildly proreform newspapers continue to 
publish; however, these have been restricted as well. ``Hamshahri,'' a 
daily newspaper published by the Tehran municipality, was ordered to 
restrict its circulation to the Tehran city limits. Others continue to 
publish, but only with heavy self-censorship.
    Dozens of individual editors and journalists were charged and tried 
by the Press Court, and several prominent journalists were jailed for 
long periods without trial. Others have been sentenced to prison terms 
or exorbitant fines. Among those imprisoned were Mashallah 
Shamsolvaezin, the editor of a number of now-banned newspapers; Latif 
Safari, Shamsolvaezin's publisher; and independent journalists, such as 
Akbar Ganji, Ahmed Zeidabadi, Massoud Behnoud, Ebrahim Nabavi, and 
Ezzatollah Sahabi. In November Ganji went on trial for statements that 
he made at a conference in Berlin on Iranian politics (see Sections 
1.c. and 1.e.).
    The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of 
Iran's senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within 
the clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, 
a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual 
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the 
current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing 
intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by 
Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in 
Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the 
charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri at 
hearings of the Special Clerical Court in 1999 (see Sections 1.e.).
    The press reported throughout the year that several persons were 
jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In October 
it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer 
leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the Special Court for the 
Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention of 
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one of the 
charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former Interior 
Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Sections 1.e.). In December one of 
Montazeri's sons was arrested for distributing his father's writings.
    The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers, 
which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers 
to freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July 1999, the 
Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN, 
released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the 
murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari, 
Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh 
Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN had 
reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad 
Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and 
Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection 
with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's 
Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered, while 
signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
    The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all 
television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the 
Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers 
and other print media have a limited circulation outside large cities, 
radio and television serve as the principal news source for many 
citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts 
are forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the wealthy, own 
them. In May 1999, the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated 
in public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the 
satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate 
determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting, 
quickly criticized any potential change as amounting to ``surrender'' 
to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
    The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with 
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain 
offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the 
Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry inspects 
foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
    Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was 
convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the 
treatment of women under the law, was released from prison early in 
1999; however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical 
duties for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing (see Section 
1.e.).
    The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is 
the main source of funding for domestic film producers. Those producers 
must submit scripts and film proposals to government officials in 
advance of funding approval. However, such government restrictions 
appear to have eased since the election of President Khatami.
    President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government 
would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman 
Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work ``The Satanic Verses.'' 
However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15 
Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the 
murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
    Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the U.N. 
Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring about 
the ``Islamization of the universities,'' which appeared to be a 
movement to purge persons alleged to ``fight against the sanctities of 
the Islamic system.'' Government informers who monitor classroom 
material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission to 
universities is politicized; all applicants must pass ``character 
tests'' in which officials screen out applicants critical of the 
Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate with 
government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs 
disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose views do not 
conform with their own. In October 1999, a newspaper announced that a 
post-graduate philosophy course taught by Professor Abdolkarim Soroush 
at Tehran University was canceled due to threats to set fire to the 
classroom by unidentified persons.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the 
principles of Islam''; however, in practice the Government restricts 
freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure that they 
do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such gatherings 
include public entertainment and lectures, student gatherings, labor 
protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. A 
significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold a public 
gathering is whether it would be opposed by the semiofficial Ansar-e 
Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to disperse such 
assemblies.
    In August two leading reform intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar and 
Abdul Karim Soroush, were prevented by semiofficial club- and knife-
wielding vigilantes from addressing a student convention in 
Khorramabad. Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes 
resulted in the death of a police officer and injuries. The authorities 
arrested 150 persons.
    On July 8, 1999, students at Tehran University who were protesting 
proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and 
the Government's closure of a prominent reformoriented newspaper, were 
attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah 
thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated attacks 
against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights Watch reported 
that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed in the 
assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were detained. The 
demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to include many 
nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting began and 
spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups attempted to distance 
their organizations from these later acts, which they blamed on 
government-sanctioned agitators. The Government intervened to stop the 
rioting and announced a July 14 counter-demonstration of regime 
loyalists and off-duty government workers, many of whom were bussed in 
from other cities for the demonstration.
    In September 1999, the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, 
Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted as saying that 1,500 
students were arrested during the riots, 500 were released immediately 
after questioning, 800 were released later, and formal investigations 
were undertaken against the remaining 200. He also announced that four 
student leaders were sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for 
their role in the demonstrations. The death sentences reportedly were 
commuted to prison terms during the year. The Special Representative's 
report stated that about two-thirds of the students who initially were 
arrested subsequently were released, but noted that there has been no 
formal accounting of all the persons arrested in connection with the 
July 1999 demonstrations.
    The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in 
the aftermath of the July 1999 demonstrations. The party is a secular 
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a 
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of 
inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against 
``sacred values.'' Agents of the intelligence service in late 1998 
killed the former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush Forouhar, 
along with his wife (see Section 1.a.).
    In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action 
against members of the security forces for their violent assault on the 
student dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and 
political activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In 
August 1999, the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat 
Lotfian, was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his 
officers in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98 
officers were arrested for their actions. In February 20 police 
officers and officials were tried on charges of misconduct in 
connection with the demonstrations. The court found that misconduct had 
occurred, and ordered compensation for 34 injured students. However, 
the court released all but two of the accused officers.
    The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the 
wake of the February 1999 arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in 
Turkey. Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made several 
hundred arrests (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution 
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional 
associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious 
minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of 
``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,'' or question Islam as the 
basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami repeatedly has 
declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A newspaper 
reported in June 1999 that the Article Ten Commission, a government 
body responsible for reviewing applications for the establishment of 
political parties, guilds, societies, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's), released figures indicating that as of April, ``85 political, 
115 specialized, and 26 religious minority organizations and 
associations'' were active in the country.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of 
religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of 
Iran is Islam and the sect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver) 
Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' It also 
states that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full 
respect,'' and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's 
pre-Islamic religions) as the only ``protected religious minorities.'' 
Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not 
enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the 
nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no 
legal rights.
    The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is 
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including 
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the 
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
    Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious 
minorities are not required to register individually with the 
Government, although their community, religious, and cultural 
organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored 
closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a legitimate 
religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed political 
organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a police function. 
Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by government authorities to 
compile and hand over membership lists for their congregations. 
Evangelicals have resisted this demand. Non-Muslim owners of grocery 
shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the front 
of their shops.
    The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89 
percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs, 
Baluchs, and Kurds living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest). 
Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities compose less 
than 1 percent of the population. Sufi brotherhoods are popular, but 
there are no reliable figures available to judge their true size.
    Members of religious minorities are allowed to vote, but they may 
not run for President. All religious minorities suffer varying degrees 
of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of 
employment, education, and housing (see Section 5).
    The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct 
religious education of their adherents. This includes separate and 
privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These 
schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes 
certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the directors of 
these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at these schools is 
not mandatory for recognized religious minorities. All textbooks used 
in course work must be approved for use by the Ministry of Education, 
including religious texts. Religious texts in non-Persian languages 
require approval by the authorities for use. This requirement imposes 
sometimes significant translation expenses on minority communities. 
Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in 
non-Persian languages, but often come under pressure from the 
authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In particular, 
evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered harassment 
and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or delivery of 
sermons in Persian.
    Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to 
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports, or 
charitable associations that they finance themselves. This does not 
apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the 
right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative 
institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial of the 
right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened its 
existence in the country.
    University applicants are required to pass an examination in 
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction 
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious 
minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment 
similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
    Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system, 
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring 
heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry non-
Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
    The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims 
by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against 
Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the Baha'i 
community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a 
``misguided'' or ``wayward'' sect. The Government has fueled anti-
Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political purposes.
    The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or 
recant their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from 
Islam, may be punishable by death.
    Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of 
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of 
the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque 
in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize construction 
of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Sunnis also have accused 
the state broadcasting company of airing programming insulting to 
Sunnis. Numerous Sunni clerics have been killed in recent years, some 
allegedly by agents of the Government. For example, Human Rights Watch 
reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni prayer leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh 
Narouie in the province of Sistan va-Baluchistan in the southeast. This 
led to protests from the local community, which believed that 
government authorities were involved in the killing.
    Majdhub Alishahi, an adherent of the Sufi tradition, reportedly was 
executed on charges of adultery and homosexuality after a coerced 
confession in 1996. Sufi organizations outside the country remain 
concerned about repression by the authorities of Sufi religious 
practices.
    The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at 
nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith 
originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within 
Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a 
clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time joined to 
suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the Shi'a clergy 
to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are considered 
apostates because of their claim to a valid religious revelation 
subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith is defined 
by the Government as a political ``sect'' historically linked to the 
Pahlavi monarchy and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary. Historically 
at risk, Baha'is often have suffered increased levels of mistreatment 
during times of political unrest.
    Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links 
with coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters 
is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the 
founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then 
Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of 
``espionage on behalf of Zionism,'' in particular when Bahai's are 
caught communicating with or remitting monetary contributions to the 
Baha'i Faith headquarters.
    Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying 
them as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from 
abuse in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i cemeteries, holy 
places, historical sites, administrative centers, and other assets were 
seized shortly after the 1979 revolution. None of these properties have 
been returned and many have been destroyed. Baha'is are not allowed to 
bury and honor their dead in keeping with their religious tradition. In 
October 1998, three Baha'is were arrested in Damavand, a city north of 
Tehran, on the grounds that they had buried their dead without 
government authorization.
    In the past, Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the 
Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. As a 
result, children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate 
and, therefore, were denied inheritance rights. However, in April the 
Government announced the elimination of the requirement that citizens 
indicate religious affiliation at the time of registration of marriage. 
This may allow Bahai's to register their marriages officially, and 
thereby mitigate some of the legal obstacles that they face.
    Manuchehr Khulusi was arrested in June 1999 while visiting fellow 
Baha'is in the town of Birjand, and was imprisoned until his release in 
May. During his imprisonment, Khulusi was interrogated, beaten, held in 
solitary confinement, and denied access to his lawyer. The charges 
brought against him still are unknown, but they were believed to be 
related to his faith. The Islamic Revolutionary Court in Mashhad held a 
2-day trial in September 1999 and then sentenced him to death in 
February. Despite Khulusi's release, it is unclear if the conviction 
and death sentence against him still stand.
    Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having 
served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which 
arose from his allegedly having converted a Muslim woman to the Baha'i 
Faith. The woman claimed that her mother was a Baha'i and she herself 
had been raised a Baha'i. Rowhani was not accorded a public trial, and 
no sentence was announced prior to his execution.
    Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat Kashefi-
Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to death 
by a revolutionary court in Mashad for practicing their faith. The 
sentences were reduced during the year to jail terms of 7 and 5 years, 
respectively.
    Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take 
place in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and 
private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a 
particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has 
placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher education 
appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i community.
    The property rights of Baha'is generally are disregarded. Since 
1979 large numbers of private and business properties belonging to 
Baha'is have been confiscated. In 1999 three Baha'i homes in Yazd and 
one in Arbakan were confiscated because their owners were members of 
the Baha'i community. In September and October 1998, government 
officers plundered more than 500 Baha'i homes throughout the country 
and seized personal household effects, such as furniture and 
appliances. Seizure of personal property, in addition to the denial of 
access to education and employment, is eroding the economic base of the 
Baha'i community.
    In 1999 authorities in Khurasan intensified their efforts to 
intimidate and undermine Baha'i education. Two teachers in Mashhad were 
arrested and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. Their students were 
given suspended sentences, to be reinstated if the students again 
participated in religious education classes. Three more Baha'is were 
arrested in Bujnurd in northern Khurasan for participating in religious 
education gatherings. After 6 days in prison, they were released with 
suspended sentences of 5 years. The use of suspended sentences appears 
to be a new government tactic to discourage Baha'is from taking part in 
monthly religious gatherings.
    In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to 
disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning. Also 
known as the ``Open University,'' the Institute was established by the 
Baha'i community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities in 
higher education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the 
country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed Baha'i 
faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from teaching 
positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and conducted 
classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is. During the 
operation, which took place in at least 14 different cities, 36 faculty 
members were arrested, and a variety of personal property, including 
books, papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or confiscated. 
Government interrogators sought to force the detained faculty members 
to sign statements acknowledging that the Open University now was 
defunct and pledging not to collaborate with it in the future. Baha'is 
outside the country report that none of the 36 detainees would sign the 
document. All but 4 of the 36 persons detained during the September 
1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute had been released by November 1998.
    In March 1999, Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi, 
Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four 
remaining detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under 
Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from 3 to 10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of 
having establishing a ``secret organization'' engaged in ``attracting 
youth, teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the 
Islamic Republic.'' According to Baha'i groups outside Iran, the four 
taught general science and Persian literature courses. In July 1999, 
Mirzapanah, who had been sentenced to 3 years in prison, became ill and 
was hospitalized. Prison authorities allowed him to return home upon 
his recovery on the understanding that they could find him whenever 
necessary. The other three were released in December 1999.
    The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small 
number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at 
any given time. There were at least 10 Baha'is reported to be under 
arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 2 under sentence of 
death.
    Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal 
victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim plaintiffs 
are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. In practice, 
Baha'is continue to be denied most forms of government employment (see 
Section 5).
    In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a 
government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the directive, 
the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government agencies to 
block the progress and development of the Baha'i community, expel 
Baha'i students from universities, cut Baha'i links with groups outside 
Iran, restrict employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is ``positions of 
influence,'' including those in education. The Government claims that 
the directive is a forgery. However, it appears to be an accurate 
reflection of current government practice.
    In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended 
``that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it 
to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions, 
which are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully 
in its religious activities.'' In response to the Special Rapporteur's 
concerns with regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i 
Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is ``are not a religious 
minority, but a political organization that was associated with the 
Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engage in 
espionage activities.'' The Government asserted to the Special 
Rapporteur that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their 
beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as 
citizens.
    The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000, 
according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic 
Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and 
evangelical churches also are active, although non-ethnically-based 
groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their activities.
    The authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years 
in curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by 
evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian. 
Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered 
apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity 
by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of 
evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards, 
photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers 
are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside 
congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been 
restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have 
been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance 
before admitting new members to their congregations.
    As conversion by a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion may be 
considered apostasy under traditional Shari'a (Islamic law) practices 
enforced in the country, non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims 
without putting their own lives at risk. Evangelical church leaders are 
subject to pressure from authorities to sign pledges committing them 
not to evangelize Muslims or to allow Muslims to attend church 
services.
    One organization reported in 1999 the deaths of 8 evangelical 
Christians at the hands of authorities in the past 11 years, and 
between 15 and 23 disappearances between November 1997 and November 
1998.
    Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year. 
Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of 
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly 
of God congregation in the capital. Cited instances of harassment 
included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by 
Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering 
church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of 
worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed the 
cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity and 
lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz, who 
were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after 
continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that Alireza 
Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had been 
beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the orders 
of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. His 
wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of intimidation, principally 
through frequent and aggressive interrogation by government officials.
    Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from 
25,000 to 30,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction from 
the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country prior to 
the 1979 revolution.
    While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of 
official discrimination are frequent. The Government's antiIsrael 
policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements 
in Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel, 
create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community. Jewish 
leaders reportedly are reluctant to draw attention to official 
mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
    Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic 
propaganda in the official and semiofficial media as adding to the 
pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the 
periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals 
associated with hard-line elements of the Government. In 1986 the 
Iranian Embassy in London was reported to have published and 
distributed the Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published 
in serial form in the country in 1994 and again in January 1999. On the 
latter occasion they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly 
publication reportedly aligned with the security services.
    There appears to be little restriction or interference with 
religious practice or education; however, Jews were eased out of most 
government positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports 
and to travel outside the country; however, with the exception of 
certain business travelers, they are required by the authorities to 
obtain government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip 
abroad. The Government appears concerned about the emigration of Jews 
and permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish 
family to travel outside the country at the same time (see Section 
2.d.).
    In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of 
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis, 
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged 
acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death. 
The 13 were jailed for over 1 year, largely in solitary confinement, 
without official charges or access to lawyers. In April the defendants 
were appointed lawyers, and a closed trial commenced in a revolutionary 
court in Shiraz. Human rights groups and governments around the world 
criticized the lack of due process in the proceedings. The Special 
Representative characterized them as ``in no way fair.'' On July 1, 10 
of the 13, along with 2 Muslim defendants, were convicted on charges of 
illegal contact with Israel, conspiracy to form an illegal 
organization, and recruiting agents. They received prison sentences 
ranging from 4 to 13 years. Three were acquitted. Their lawyers filed 
an appeal and on September 21 an appeals court overturned the 
convictions for forming an illegal organization and recruiting agents, 
but upheld the convictions for illegal contacts with Israel. Their 
sentences were reduced to between 2 and 9 years' imprisonment.
    Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the March 1999 arrest of the 
13 Jewish individuals coincided with an increase in antiSemitic 
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hardline elements 
of the Government. Since the beginning of the trial, Jewish businesses 
in Tehran and Shiraz have been targets of vandalism and boycotts, and 
Jews reportedly suffered personal harassment and intimidation.
    Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish 
businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a 
public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that Kakhodah-Zadeh 
may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant, 
Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided powerof-attorney services for Jews departing 
the country.
    The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious 
leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious 
minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, ``confronting the 
regime,'' and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some restrictions 
on these rights. Citizens may travel to any part of the country, 
although there have been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during 
times of occasional heavy fighting. Roadblocks and security checks are 
common on routes between major cities. Citizens may change their place 
of residence without obtaining official permission. The Government 
requires exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's 
passport) for draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect. 
Some citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and 
who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit 
permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain religious 
minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.c.).
    Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and 
extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of 
antigovernment activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material, 
personal correspondence, and photographs are subject to confiscation.
    The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them 
the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The 
Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to 
travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience difficulty in 
obtaining passports. Women must obtain the permission of their husband, 
father, or other living male relative in order to obtain a passport. 
Married women must receive written permission from their husbands 
before embarking on a trip outside the country.
    The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Although the 
Government generally provides first asylum, the Government increased 
pressure on some refugees to return to their home countries, 
particularly as the economy has worsened.
    The country hosts a large refugee population, mostly Afghans who 
fled during the Soviet occupation. The Government and the UNHCR 
estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in 
the country. Most subsist on itinerant labor, often moving from place 
to place within the country. Between April and December, the government 
and the UNHCR operated a joint program intended to facilitate the 
repatriation of Afghans who did not have a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Approximately 133,000 Afghans returned voluntarily with 
UNHCR assistance, and another 50,000 returned with help from the 
Government. There were reports in late 1998 and early 1999 of a surge 
in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country by 
government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a 
worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998 
of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian 
Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were reports 
during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of Afghan 
refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths.
    The UNHCR estimates that there were about 386,000 Iraqi Kurdish and 
Arab refugees in the country at year's end. Many of these Iraqi 
refugees originally were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-
Iraq war because of their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous 
instances, both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments dispute their 
citizenship, rendering many of them, in effect, stateless. Other Iraqi 
refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
    Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of 
other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans, 
Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information 
about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The right of citizens to change their government is restricted. The 
Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life 
term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be removed 
by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is restricted to 
clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a 
list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and 
religion, and clerics dominate the Government. The Government represses 
any attempts to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's 
existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates for 
elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
    The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of 
six Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for 
consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also 
screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious 
suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state; 
clerics who disagree with government policies also have been 
disqualified.
    Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members 
of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former 
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by 
the Majles for ``liberalism'' and ``negligence,'' was elected President 
in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over 90 percent of 
the eligible population voted in that election. During the campaign, 
there was considerable government intervention and censorship. For 
example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238 candidates, including a 
woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to run. Three were clerics; all 
were men. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest 
support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The 
election results were not disputed, and the Government did not appear 
to have engaged in fraud.
    Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly 
of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates, 
which led to criticism from many observers that the Government 
improperly predetermined the election results.
    In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held 
for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures 
indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council 
seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous 
districts. The Councils do not appear to have been granted the autonomy 
or authority that would make them effective or meaningful local 
institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of 
the central Government.
    Iran held elections for its 290 seat Majles in February. Of over 
6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections by the 
Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease from the 
44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most of 
those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform, 
including some of the most prominent supporters of President Khatami. 
In addition, an Azeri activist was arrested in December 1999, 
reportedly to prevent him from registering to run in the elections (see 
Sections 1.d. and 5). However, candidates with a wide range of views 
were permitted to run. The elections resulted in a landslide victory 
for moderate and reform candidates, who now constitute a large majority 
in the Majles. Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various 
issues. However, the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the 
Government used constitutional provisions to block much of the early 
reform legislation passed by the Majles.
    Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 9 of 290 Majles 
seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997 President Khatami 
appointed the first female vice president (for environmental 
protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Ebtekar, 
following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance 
Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior post, Azam 
Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a woman to serve as 
Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
    Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially 
reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative noted in 
his September report frequent assertions that religious minorities are, 
by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative body 
(except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities), and from 
holding senior government or military positions. Religious minorities 
are allowed to vote, but they may not run for president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights 
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has 
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a 
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
    Various professional groups representing writers, journalists, 
photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in 
their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members 
of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize, and 
effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
    International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International are not permitted to establish offices in or 
conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Human Rights Watch 
and members of a European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted to 
send representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Iranian Jews on 
espionage charges (see Section 2.c.). However, they were not permitted 
to monitor the trial proceedings.
    The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However, the 
Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human 
Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. The Special 
Representative last was allowed entry into the country to gather 
information for his yearly report in 1996. However, the Special 
Representative corresponded with government officials during the year, 
and received several replies to his correspondence.
    The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995 
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board 
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights 
committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies lack 
independence. The U.N. Special Representative published statistics 
provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March 1998 to 
March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints received 
by the organization. Of those the highest number of complaints were 
related to the judiciary. Of a total of about 3,000 currently active 
files, approximately 1,000 were related to women and women's issues.
    In April 1999, Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the IHRC, stated in 
a press interview that illegal detention centers continue to exist in 
Iran. The press also reported that the IHRC sought permission from the 
Special Court for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen Kadivar 
in Evin Prison in March 1999 (see Section 1.e.). The request reportedly 
was never answered. Kadivar was released during the summer. In 1998 
Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use by police of ``special 
detention centers'' to conduct coercive interrogations of detainees 
(see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged widespread human rights violations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of 
race, disability, language, or social status. The Government does 
discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
    Women.--Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence 
against women occur, the statistics on such reports are not available 
publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom 
is discussed publicly. In May 1999, the President's Advisor on Women's 
Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that ``one cannot claim that 
violence against women does not take place in Iran.'' The Special 
Representative noted in his September report that media reporting on 
the situation of women has diminished, in part due to the closure of 
the reformoriented press (see Section 2.a.).
    Women have access to primary and advanced education; however, 
social and legal constraints limit their professional opportunities. In 
September the Majles approved a controversial bill to allow single 
women to travel abroad for graduate education. The legislation was 
under consideration by the Council of Guardians at year's end. Women 
are represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government 
has not prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated 
fields, including medicine, dentistry, journalism and agriculture. 
However, many women choose not to work outside the home. A 1985 law 
enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of paid maternity leave, 
and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their 
babies. Pension benefits for women were established under the same law, 
which also decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care 
facilities for young children of female employees.
    The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and 
prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to 
them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter 
public buildings, universities, and airports through separate 
entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events, 
although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally. 
While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress codes has varied 
with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of personal 
choice. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their 
dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to 
flogging or imprisonment for such violations. The law prohibits the 
publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media, 
including pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to 
observe Islamic dress codes at work (see Section 6.a.).
    Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through 
provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those 
sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979 
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a 
hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased 
rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system 
based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles passed 
legislation that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of 
medical care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female 
physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the 
quality of care that women could receive under such a regime, 
considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and 
licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
    In October the Parliament passed a bill to raise the legal age of 
marriage for women from 9 to 15. However, the Council of Guardians in 
November rejected the bill as contrary to Islamic law, although even 
under the current law, marriage at the minimum age is rare. All women, 
no matter the age, must have the permission of their father or a living 
male relative in order to marry. The law allows for the practice of 
Siqeh, or temporary marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl 
may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple 
and brief religious ceremony. The Siqeh marriage can last for a night 
or as little as 30 minutes. The bond is not recorded on identification 
documents, and, according to Islamic law, men may have as many Siqeh 
wives as they wish. Such wives are not granted rights associated with 
traditional marriage.
    The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of 
women and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under 
legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and 
regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on 
which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to 
cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Government issued a 
12-point ``contract'' to serve as a model for marriage and divorce, 
which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional 
interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract also recognized a 
divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples acquire 
during their marriage and to increased alimony rights. Women who 
remarry are forced to give up to the child's father custody of children 
from earlier marriages. In 1998 the Majles passed a law that granted 
custody of minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in 
which the father is proven unfit to care for the child (the measure was 
enacted because of the complaints of mothers who had lost custody of 
their children to former husbands with drug addictions and criminal 
records). Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a 
woman is worth only half that of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A 
married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before 
traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Children.--Most children have access to education through the 12th 
grade (it is compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care. 
There is no known pattern of child abuse.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no available information 
regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated 
accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network 
reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded 
children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed 
children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and 
without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this 
represents the typical treatment of the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Members of all religious minorities suffer 
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly 
in the areas of employment, education, and housing. Applicants for 
publicsector employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The 
law stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe 
``Islam's principles and rules.'' Article 144 of the Constitution 
states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an 
Islamic army,'' which is ``committed to an Islamic ideology,'' and must 
``recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the objectives 
of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of achieving its 
goals.'' Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to another religion, is 
punishable by death.
    The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer 
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly 
in the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see 
Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities generally 
are barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who convert to 
Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion from 
Islam to another religion, may be punishable by death.
    University applicants are required to pass an examination in 
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction 
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious 
minorities to higher education.
    Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system, 
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits and incurring 
heavier punishments than Muslims.
    Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish 
individuals in February and March 1999, as well as their subsequent 
trial during the year, coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic 
propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line 
elements of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the 
Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish 
communities outside Israel, had been under close surveillance by 
government authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the 
authorities against certain activities, such as the publication in 
Persian of scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
    In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a 
government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as 
places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in 
the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled. 
Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. However, other 
Government restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain ration 
booklets and send their children to public elementary and secondary 
schools. Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from government jobs 
in the early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and have been 
required to repay the Government for salaries or pensions received from 
the first day of employment. Those unable to do so face prison 
sentences (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds seek greater autonomy 
from the central Government and continue to suffer from government 
discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims is an aggravating 
factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated government. These 
tensions predate the revolution. Kurds often are suspected by 
government authorities of harboring separatist or foreign sympathies. 
These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting between 
government forces and Kurdish groups. Human Rights Watch reported in 
September 1997 that in the wake of the Gulf War and the creation of an 
autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, Iranian authorities increased 
their military presence in Kurdish areas of Iran, which often led to 
human rights abuses against Kurds. Abuses included destruction of 
villages, forced migrations, and widespread mining of Kurdish property. 
In 1994 government agents killed Dr. Abdul Rahman Gassemlou, a 
representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in Vienna.
    In the wake of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party 
leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in 
numerous cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security 
forces suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups 
reported at least 20 deaths and several hundred arrests during the 
violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but 
complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government 
traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an 
independent Azerbaijan. Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the 
cultural rights of Azeris, was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups 
maintain that the arrest was made to prevent his registration as a 
candidate for the February parliamentary elections (see Sections 1.d. 
and 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the 
right to establish unions; however, the Government does not allow 
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the 
Worker's House, founded in 1982, is the sole authorized national labor 
organization. It serves primarily as a conduit for the Government to 
exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House 
coordinates activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up 
of representatives of the workers and one representative of management 
in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35 
employees. These councils also function as instruments of government 
control, although they frequently have been able to block layoffs and 
dismissals.
    In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code that allowed 
employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue 
vocational licenses and help members find jobs.
    The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds 
with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a 
law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also prohibits 
government workers from having contacts with foreigners and stipulates 
penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at 
work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in increasing numbers 
as the economy has worsened. A European-based labor organization that 
follows Iranian labor issues reported 181 protests and strikes by 
workers in the period from March 1998 to March 1999. These reportedly 
included strikes and protests by oil, textile, electrical 
manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the unemployed.
    Newspapers in 1999 reported an ``unauthorized rally'' by thousands 
of workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy. 
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly are 
common.
    There are no known affiliations with international labor 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not 
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. No information is available on mechanisms used 
to set wages. It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in 
the export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the 
rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code 
provides that the Government may require any person who does not have 
work to take suitable employment; however, this does not appear to be 
enforced regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO 
Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no information available on the 
Government's policy on forced and bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15 
years of age and places special restrictions on the employment of 
minors under age 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law 
permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some 
small businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard 
labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to which 
these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no 
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded 
labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3 months 
of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing 
mothers to feed their babies.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the 
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each 
industrial sector and region. It is not known if the minimum wages are 
adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the 
minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a 
family and should take inflation into account. Under current poor 
economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or even 
three jobs to support their families. The daily minimum wage was raised 
in March 1997 to $2.80 (8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. Information on the percentage of the working population covered 
by minimum wage legislation is not available.
    The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum, 
with 1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid 
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
    According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by 
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting 
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28 
safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety 
committees established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons. 
Labor organizations outside the country allege that hazardous work 
environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands of worker 
deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's inspectors 
enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                  IRAQ

    Political power in Iraq\1\ lies exclusively in a repressive 
oneparty apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his 
extended family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that 
the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative 
authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister, 
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of 
the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime 
continued to refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ``referendum'' on 
his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This 
``referendum'' included neither secret ballots nor opposing candidates, 
and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible 
reprisal for a dissenting vote. Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi 
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis, and 
Armenians. The religious mix is likewise varied and consists of Shi'a 
and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including 
Chaldeans and Assyrians), Jews (most of whom have emigrated), and a 
small number of Mandaeans. Civil uprisings have occurred in recent 
years, especially in the north and the south. The Government has 
reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even 
question it. The judiciary is not independent, and the President may 
override any court decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The United States does not have diplomatic representation in 
Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government 
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to 
the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security 
forces play a central role in maintaining the environment of 
intimidation and fear on which government power rests. Security forces 
committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights abuses.
    The Government owns all major industries and controls most of the 
highly centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production. 
The economy was damaged by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and Iraq has 
been under U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Sanctions 
ban all exports, except oil sales, under U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 986 and subsequent resolutions (the ``oil-for-food'' 
program). Under the program, Iraq also is permitted, under U.N. 
control, to import food, medicine, supplies for water, sanitation, 
electricity, agricultural, and educational projects, and spare parts 
for the oil sector.
    The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. 
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
Government continued to execute summarily perceived political opponents 
and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that 
persons were executed merely because of their association with an 
opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison 
populations. The Government continued to be responsible for 
disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of--or related 
to persons suspected of--economic crimes, military desertion, and a 
variety of other activities. Security forces routinely tortured, beat, 
raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions are extremely 
poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention, 
prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and continued to deny 
citizens the basic right to due process. The judiciary is not 
independent. The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy 
rights.
    The Government restricts severely freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights and the U.N. General Assembly passed resolutions in April 
and November respectively criticizing the Government's suppression of 
these freedoms. Human rights abuses remain difficult to document 
because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, including its 
prohibition on the establishment of independent human rights 
organizations, its persistent refusal to grant visits to human rights 
monitors, and its continued restrictions designed to prevent dissent. 
Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur bases his reports on the 
Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent emigres from 
Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and others that have contacts 
inside Iraq, and on published reports. Violence and discrimination 
against women occur. The Government has enacted laws affording a 
variety of protections to women; however, it is difficult to determine 
the practical effects of such protections. The Government neglects the 
health and nutritional needs of children, and discriminates against 
religious minorities and ethnic groups. The Government restricts 
severely trade union rights. Child labor persists, and there were 
instances of forced labor.
    The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) have controlled most areas in the three northern 
provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniah since the Government 
withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from 
the area after the 1991 Kurdish uprising. The KDP and the PUK fought 
one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to 
unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 
1999. The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures have not 
been implemented. The KDP, PUK, and opposition groups committed human 
rights abuses. The PUK held municipal elections in February, the first 
elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992. Foreign and 
local election observers reported that the elections generally were 
fair.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government 
committed numerous political and other extrajudicial killings. The 
Government has a long record of executing perceived opponents. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur, the international media, and other groups all have 
reported a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq since 1997, 
assertions that are supported in detail by several sources in Iraq. The 
Special Rapporteur has stated that ``the country is run through 
extrajudicial measures.'' The list of offenses requiring a mandatory 
death penalty has grown substantially in recent years and now includes 
anything that could be characterized as ``sabotaging the national 
economy,'' including forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts, 
material, heavy equipment, and machinery. The Special Rapporteur also 
noted that membership in certain political parties is punishable by 
death, that there is a pervasive fear of death for any act or 
expression of dissent, and that there are recurrent reports of the use 
of the death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President 
or the Ba'th Party. ``The mere suggestion that someone is not a 
supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death penalty,'' 
the Special Rapporteur stated. Government killings occurred with total 
impunity and without due process.
    The regime periodically executed large numbers of political 
detainees en masse. During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued 
to receive reports referring to a ``prison cleansing'' execution 
campaign taking place in Abu Ghurayb, Radwaniyah, and other prisons. 
Opposition groups, including the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC), and others with a network inside the country 
provided detailed accounts of summary executions, including the names 
of hundreds of persons killed.
    On three occasions in January and February, prison officials 
reportedly executed 91 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb; some of the prisoners 
were accused of theft, some were accused of trafficking in drugs, and 
some reportedly were affiliated with a political opposition group. 
According to opposition groups, prison officials reportedly executed 58 
prisoners who were held in solitary confinement at Abu Ghurayb; 14 were 
charged with political crimes and 44 were charged with common crimes. 
According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and 
the Center for Human Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the 
Government executed nearly 200 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb prison between 
October and December 1999. The prisoners were detained originally for 
their opposition activities against the Government.
    The Government's motive for such high numbers of summary 
executions--estimated at over 3,000 since 1997--may be linked to 
reported intimidation of the population and reduction of prison 
populations. As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports 
that the regime continued to execute persons thought to be involved in 
plotting against Saddam Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions 
included high-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For 
example, according to various opposition groups, government officials 
reportedly executed Republican Guard Brigadier General Abd al-Karim al-
Dulaymi and between 25 and 38 other Republican Guard officers on 
suspicion of disloyalty during the year. According to Human Rights 
Watch, the Government executed four Special Security Forces officers, 
including staff Colonel Kadhim Jawad Ali and Ali Muhammad Salman. On 
December 28, 1999, the Government executed Captain Husayn Hashim Muhsin 
on suspicion of disclosing military information. On December 29, 1999, 
the Government executed by firing squad five members of the Republican 
Guard allegedly for participating in antigovernment activities.
    Government agents targeted for killing family members of defectors. 
For example, government agents reportedly killed Safiyah Hassan who 
allegedly criticized publicly the Government for killing her husband 
and two sons, Hussein and Saddam Kamal. Her husband and sons had been 
senior government officials; however, the brothers defected to Jordan 
in 1996. The Government offered the men immunity if they returned to 
the country; however, upon their return government agents killed them 
and their father.
    On June 3, the Government reportedly killed Jordanian citizen Dawud 
Sulayman al-Dalu and did not disclose information about the charges 
against him. According to the Iraqi National Party, government 
officials killed seven employees of the Central Computer Department in 
Baghdad because they allegedly purchased computer equipment from the 
UAE; the Government reportedly believed that the equipment would be 
used to send information abroad.
    In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women 
suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or 
covering up such activities (see Section 5). Security agents reportedly 
decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family members. 
According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's heads were 
displayed in front of their homes for several days. Thirty of the 
victims' names reportedly were published, including three doctors and 
one medical assistant.
    During the year, a former officer from the Mukhabarat reported that 
he participated in a 1998 mass murder at Abu Ghurayb prison following a 
Revolutionary Command Council directive to ``clean out'' the country's 
prisons.
    In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of leading Shi'a 
clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his 
concern to the Government that the killings might be part of a 
systematic attack by government officials on the independent leadership 
of the Shi'a Muslim community. The Government had not responded to the 
Special Rapporteur's letter by year's end.
    Observers attributed the August 1999 death of Iraq's chief 
architect Husam Bahnam Khuduri to poisoning. Although not widely used 
in recent years, the use of slow-acting poisons such as thallium (a 
radioactive substance that can be dissolved in drinking water) was a 
preferred method of political killings in the late 1980's and early 
1990's. Khuduri reportedly had extensive knowledge about the 
construction of Saddam Hussein's palaces, tunnels, and bunkers. While 
the official obituary did not state a cause of death, acquaintances 
reported that Khuduri showed signs of being under the effect of a slow-
acting poison several days before he died. Several weeks before Khuduri 
died, he was interviewed for a satirical documentary about the regime 
by French filmmaker Joel Solar; according to Solar, Khuduri appeared 
healthy during the interviews.
    Reports of deaths due to poor prison conditions continued (see 
Section 1.c.). Many persons who were displaced forcibly still live in 
tent camps under harsh conditions, which also results in many deaths 
(see Sections 2.d. and 5).
    The Government reportedly does not investigate political or 
extrajudicial killings, and no investigations were made into the 
hundreds of killings committed by security forces in 1999, or in 
killings from previous years.
    As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread 
killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the ``Anfal'' 
Campaign of 1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special 
Rapporteur and HRW have concluded that the Government's policies 
against the Kurds raise issues of crimes against humanity and 
violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
    Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the 
Kurdcontrolled north of the country. For example, unknown persons 
killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan, 
Sirbit Mahmud. In July unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy 
Osman Hassan. In July PUK forces killed 4 members of the Iraqi 
Communist Workers Party and KDP forces killed several members of the 
Turkoman Front.
    In June 1999, the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) 
reported that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, an 
Assyrian woman who had been missing for a month, was discovered. AINA 
concluded that the murder ``resembles a well-established pattern'' of 
complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks against Assyrian 
Christians in the north. However, the KDP reported that there did not 
appear to be a ``political or racial'' motive. In June 1999, the KDP 
appointed a commission to further investigate the killing. No results 
of the investigation were reported by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--The Special Rapporteur continued to receive 
reports of widespread disappearances. The whereabouts of journalist and 
Baghdad professor, Hashem Hasan, who was arrested as he attempted to 
leave the country in September 1999, remained unknown at year's end 
(see Section 2.c.). The status of six members of the Assyrian community 
of Baghdad, arrested in October 1996, is unknown. Hundreds still are 
missing in the aftermath of the brief Iraqi military occupation of 
Erbil in August 1996. Many of these persons may have been killed 
surreptitiously late in 1997 and throughout 1998, in the reported 
``prison-cleansing'' campaign (see Section 1.a.). Thirty-three members 
of the Yazidi community of Mosul, who were arrested in July 1996, still 
are unaccounted for. Sources inside the country reported the existence 
of special prison wards that hold individuals whose whereabouts, 
status, and fate is not disclosed (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to ignore the more than 16,000 cases 
conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the United Nations, as well as 
requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the 
whereabouts of those missing from Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, 
and from Iran on the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured 
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The majority of the 16,496 cases known to 
the Special Rapporteur are persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared 
during the 1988 Anfal Campaign. The Special Rapporteur estimated that 
the total number of Kurds who disappeared during that period could 
reach several tens of thousands. HRW estimates the total at between 
70,000 and 150,000, and AI at more than 100,000. The second largest 
group of cases known to the Special Rapporteur consists of Shi'a 
Muslims who were reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and 
early 1980's as their families were expelled to Iran due to their 
alleged Persian ancestry.
    In 1997 and 1999, AI documented the repeated failure by the 
Government to respond to requests for information about persons who 
have disappeared. The report detailed unresolved cases dating from the 
early 1980's through the mid-1990's, particularly the disappearances of 
Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassem, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad Ridha Al-Qazwini, 
Mazin Abd Al-Munim AlSamarra'i, the six Al-Hashimi brothers, the four 
Al-Sheibani brothers, and numerous persons of Iranian descent or of the 
Shi'a branch of Islam. The report concludes that few of these victims 
became targets of the regime for any crime; rather, they were arrested 
and held as hostages in order to force a relative, who may have escaped 
abroad, to surrender. Others were arrested due to their family's link 
to a political opponent or simply because of their ethnic origin (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to 
request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest 
of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his 
associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf. 
Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted 
for, and the Government refuses to respond to queries regarding their 
status. Similarly AI identified a number of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's 
aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to his killing in February 
1999 (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their whereabouts remain 
unknown. In its November 1999 report, AI identified eight aides of Al-
Sadr who disappeared.
    The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of 
Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained 
during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Government officials, including 
military leaders known to have been among the last to see the persons 
who disappeared during the occupation, have refused to respond to the 
hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the missing. Of 609 cases of 
missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Tripartite Commission on 
Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies 
having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records 
were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In a December report to the 
U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General criticized the 
Government's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations on the issue 
of the missing Kuwaiti citizens. Iran reports that 5,000 Iranian 
prisoners from the IranIraq War are unaccounted for by Iraq.
    In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances, 
human rights groups reported during the year that the Government 
continued to hold thousands of other Iraqis in incommunicado detention 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security 
services routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to 
former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks 
administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of 
fingernails, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from 
rotating ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of 
limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark 
and extremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm 
family members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was 
apparent when security forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture 
victims to their families. There are persistent reports that the 
families are made to pay for the cost of executions. Iraqi refugees who 
arrive in Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving 
governments, and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their 
claims. AI noted that Iraqi authorities have failed to investigate 
these reports.
    During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued to receive 
reports that arrested persons routinely are subjected to mistreatment, 
including prolonged interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, 
and various deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur has 
expressed concern about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the 
law, including amputations and brandings. During the year, authorities 
reportedly introduced tongue amputation as a punishment for persons who 
criticize Saddam Hussein or his family. In September government 
authorities reportedly amputated the tongue of a person who allegedly 
criticized Saddam Hussein. Following the amputation, authorities 
reportedly drove him around in an open truck and broadcast his alleged 
crime and punishment.
    Human rights organizations, and opposition groups continued to 
receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma 
after being raped while in custody. Security forces also reportedly 
assault sexually both regime officials and opposition members in order 
to blackmail them into compliance. Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-
Janabi reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical Operations 
Directorate, uses rape and sexual assault in a systematic and 
institutionalized manner for political purposes. The unit reportedly 
also videotaped the rape of female relatives of suspected 
oppositionists and used the videotapes for blackmail purposes and to 
ensure their future cooperation (see Section 1.f.).
    The security forces allegedly raped women who were captured during 
the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government 
never has acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, nor 
taken action against those who committed the rapes.
    There were reports that Uday Hussein ordered security forces to 
torture members of the country's national soccer team during the year. 
For example, three soccer players who lost an October game in the Asian 
Cup quarter finals reportedly were whipped and detained for three days. 
A former Iraqi international soccer player stated in August 1999 that 
he and his teammates were tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not 
winning matches. These claims lend credence to previous similar 
reports.
    KDP forces reportedly entered Assyrian villages on different 
occasions and beat villagers (see Section 2.d.). Assyrian groups 
reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims against 
Christians in the north in recent years (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions are extremely poor. There reportedly are numerous 
official, semiofficial, and private prisons throughout the country. 
Overcrowding is a serious problem. In May 1998, Labor and Social 
Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah stated in an interview that 
``the prisons are filled to five times their capacity and the situation 
is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from his post after the interview, 
and the government-owned daily newspaper Babel reiterated the 
Government's longstanding claim that it holds virtually no prisoners. 
It is unclear to what extent the mass executions committed pursuant to 
the ``prison cleansing'' campaign have reduced overcrowding (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Certain prisons are infamous for routine mistreatment of prisoners. 
Abu Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah, and other 
prisons reportedly have torture chambers. There are numerous mentally 
ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in Baghdad, which reportedly is 
the site of torture and a number of disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah 
detention center is a former prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and 
reportedly the site of torture as well as mass executions (see Section 
1.a.). This prison was the principal detention center for persons 
arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991.
    During the year, the Special Rapporteur reported receiving 
information about two detention facilities in which prisoners are 
locked in metal boxes the size of coffins that reportedly are opened 
for only 30 minutes each day. There also were reports that in Sijn al-
Tarbout prison and Quortiyya prison, prisoners are fed only liquids. A 
multistory underground detention and torture center reportedly was 
built under the general military hospital building close to the Al-
Rashid military camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for Human 
Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party stated that the complex includes 
torture and execution chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for 
prisoners in a ``frozen'' state--that is, those whose status, fate, or 
whereabouts are not disclosed.
    Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian 
origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the IranIraq 
war, reportedly are being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison. 
According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, such 
persons have been detained without charge for close to 2 decades in 
extremely harsh conditions. The report states that many of the 
detainees were used as subjects in the country's outlawed experimental 
chemical and biological weapons programs.
    Reports of deaths due to poor conditions in prisons and detention 
facilities also continued during the year. The Iraqi Communist Party 
reported that 13 prisoners died at Makaseb detention center in December 
1999 and January as a result of torture and poor prison conditions. The 
13 prisoners reportedly were among the Shi'a detained in the aftermath 
of the protests following the February 1999 assassination of Sheik Al-
Sadr (see Section 1.g.). In August the ICP reported that three 
political prisoners died from illnesses contracted in Abu Ghurayb 
prison. The prisoners reportedly were denied medical treatment.
    The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
    Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported that prisons in the three 
northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. According to the ICRC, 
regular and consistent improvement in conditions were observed on their 
weekly prison visits to declared prisons. However, both the PUK and the 
KDP reportedly maintain private, undeclared prisons, and both groups 
reportedly deny access to ICRC officials.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, 
the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special 
Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest 
and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a 
lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November 1999, AI report 
entitled, ``Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression,'' many thousands of 
persons have been arrested arbitrarily in recent years because of 
suspected opposition activities or because they are related to persons 
sought by the authorities. Those arrested often are taken away by 
plainclothes security agents who offer no explanation and produce no 
warrant to the person or family members (see Section 1.f.). The 
authorities deny detainees legal representation and visits by family 
members. In most cases, family members do not know the whereabouts of 
detainees and do not make inquiries due to fear of reprisal. Many 
persons are taken away in front of family members who hear nothing 
further until days, months, or years later, when they are told to pick 
up the often-mutilated corpse of their relative. There also were 
reports of the widespread practice of holding family members and close 
associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see Section 
1.f.).
    In April security forces reportedly arrested a number of Republican 
Guard and Special Security Forces personnel following what the 
Government claimed was a coup attempt.
    Mass arbitrary arrests and detentions often occur in areas where 
antigovernment leaflets have been distributed. Other arrests have no 
apparent basis. For example, in July 1999, Ahlam Khadom Rammahi, a 
housewife who left Iraq in 1982, traveled from London using her British 
passport to visit her mother. Police arrested Rammahi on August 5, 
1999. No reason was stated for the arrest, and government officials did 
not inform her family of her whereabouts. AI reported that Rammahi was 
released on September 1999 as a result of international pressure. She 
subsequently was able to rejoin her family in the United Kingdom.
    According to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners 
arrested arbitrarily in previous years also remain in detention.
    The Government reportedly targets the Shi'a Muslim community for 
arbitrary arrest and other abuses. Security forces arrested hundreds of 
persons in al-Najaf, Karbala, and the Shi'a section of Baghdad 
following an anonymous distribution of antigovernment leaflets. In the 
weeks preceding the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr 
and two of his sons, many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested, and their 
whereabouts still were unknown at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were arrested and the houses of many 
demolished in the weeks following the killing (see Section 1.g.).
    Although no statistics are available, observers estimate the number 
of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom 
have been held for decades.
    The Government announced in June 1999 a general amnesty for Iraqis 
who had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a 
specified period of time but failed to return after the period of exile 
expired (see Section 2.d.). No citizens are known to have returned to 
the country based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-
exiled citizens reportedly remain fearful of returning to the country.
    The PUK and the KDP reportedly hold approximately 500 political 
detainees in the north of the country. The KDP and PUK reached 
agreement for the mutual release of political prisoners in 1999. In 
March the KDP released 10 PUK prisoners and the PUK released 5 KDP 
prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent, 
and there is no check on the President's power to override any court 
decision. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur and international human rights 
groups observed that the repressive nature of the political and legal 
systems precludes application of the rule of law. Numerous laws lend 
themselves to continued repression, and the Government uses 
extrajudicial methods to extract confessions or coerce cooperation with 
the regime.
    There are two parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which 
try common criminal offenses, and the special security courts, which 
generally try national security cases but also may try criminal cases. 
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation, 
which is the highest court.
    Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving 
espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency 
exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special 
Rapporteur and other sources, military officers or civil servants with 
no legal training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret. 
Authorities often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit 
contact with lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by 
torture, which often serve as the basis for conviction. Many cases 
appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal to 
the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in any 
case that suits his political goals or personal predilection. There are 
no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts; however, regular courts are empowered 
to administer Islamic law in cases involving personal status, such as 
divorce and inheritance.
    Procedures in the regular courts theoretically provide for many 
protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts 
cases that, on their legal merits, would appear to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are 
public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at government expense 
in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the 
charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury 
system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
    The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged 
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit 
``honor crimes,'' a violent assault with intent to commit murder 
against a female by a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or 
alleged sexual misconduct (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants 
immunity from prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security 
forces who kill anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed 
but widespread reports indicate that this decree has been applied to 
prevent trials or punishment of government officials. The PUK declared 
during the year that ``honor crime'' immunity would not apply in the 
area under its control.
    It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners, 
because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or imprisonments, 
and families are afraid to talk about arrests. Many of the tens of 
thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in recent years 
originally were held as political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government frequently infringed on citizens' 
constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly 
involving national security. The law defines security offenses so 
broadly that authorities effectively are exempt from the legal 
requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants 
are commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional provisions 
designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic 
correspondence, and telephone conversations. The Government 
periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including 
those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party 
maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity 
and instill fear in the public.
    In November 1999, the Government expelled more than 4,000 families 
that had sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.
    In 1999 and previous years, the regime periodically sealed off 
entire districts in Kirkuk and conducted day-long, housetohouse 
searches, evidently as part of its ``Arabization'' campaign to harass 
and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomans from the region (see Sections 2.d. 
and 5). Government officials also take hostage members of minority 
groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions 
(see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 5).
    The authorities continued systematically to hold family members and 
close associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.). For example, former General Najib 
Al-Salahi, who fled to Jordan in 1995, reported that some of his 
relatives had been arrested and harassed since he left the country and 
criticized publicly the Government. In June General Al-Salahi 
reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female 
family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an 
intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being 
held and warned him to stop speaking out against the Government. The 
Special Rapporteur reported that security forces killed the mother of a 
prominent opposition leader.
    In the past, the authorities demolished the houses and detained and 
executed family members of Shi'a who protested government actions (see 
Section 1.g.).
    The Special Rapporteur noted that guilt by association is 
facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of 
deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example, 
relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for 
purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their 
residences, or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and 
December 1999 that authorities denied food ration cards to families 
that failed to send their young sons to the ``Lion Cubs of Saddam'' 
compulsory weapons-training camps (see Section 5). Conscripts are 
required to secure a guarantor to sign a document stating that the 
named conscript would not desert military service and that the 
guarantor would accept personal responsibility if the conscript 
deserted.
    The Special Security Office reportedly continued efforts to 
intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of citizens 
outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with the 
opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to warm 
them against participating in opposition conferences or activities 
during the year.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Following the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah 
Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were 
widespread reports of military assaults on protesters in areas of 
Baghdad heavily populated by Shi'a, and in cities with a Shi'a majority 
such as Karbala, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Basra, in which hundreds of 
persons were killed. While a funeral for Al-Sadr was prohibited, 
spontaneous gatherings of mourners took place in the days after his 
death. Government security forces used excessive force in breaking up 
these illegal gatherings, killing hundreds of persons. For example, in 
the Shi'a district of Al-Thawra in Baghdad, a crowd of tens of 
thousands was attacked by government security forces using automatic 
weapons and armored vehicles. The attack resulted in the deaths of 
approximately 25 mourners (although estimates range up to 400) 
including, according to one report, the imam of the Al-Thawra mosque. 
According to Shi'a sources, martial law was declared throughout the 
region in reaction to the Al-Sadr killing.
    Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr 
during the year. In February security officials reportedly executed 30 
religious school students who had been arrested after Al-Sadr's 
killing. In March numerous Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and 
earlier in the year, told HRW that security forces interrogated, 
detained, and tortured them. In May six other students who were 
arrested following the killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown 
whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end.
    As a reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the 
Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and 
sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
    The Government continued to ``Arabize'' certain Kurdish areas, such 
as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement 
of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement 
by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
    Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before 
1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid 
during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before 
it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted 
haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines also are a problem along the 
Iraq-Iran border throughout the central and southern areas in the 
country. There is no information on civilian casualties or the 
Government's efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under 
the central Government's control. According to reports by the U.N. 
Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian 
Peoples' Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed by landmines in the 
three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special 
Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation 
under the Landmines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of 
mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts 
to remove landmines from the area and increase awareness of the mine 
problem among local residents.
    In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing 
activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such 
activity to leave the country. In April 1999, a New Zealander working 
for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was shot and killed at 
close range by an unknown assailant. The KDP arrested a person who 
claimed to have killed the U.N. worker on behalf of Saddam Hussein's 
Fedayeen.
    After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war 
crimes perpetrated by the regime, including deliberate killing, 
torture, rape, pillage, and hostage-taking as directly related to the 
Gulf War. HRW and other organizations have worked with various 
governments to bring a genocide case at the International Court of 
Justice against the Government for its conduct of the Anfal campaign 
against the Kurds in 1988.
    No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish 
parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK 
agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations; however, 
little progress was made toward implementing the agreement. In October 
1999, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of 
measures, including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom 
of movement between their respective areas. Most of the measures were 
not implemented; however, the PUK and KDP conducted a small prisoner 
exchange in March (see Section 1.d.). In April the ICRC reported that 
IDP's on both sides still were living in tents or in open, unheated 
buildings (see Section 2.d.).
    Armed hostilities and resulting deaths were reported between the 
KDP and the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF), the PUK and the IWCP, the PUK 
and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the KDP and the PKK. There 
were a number of bomb attacks on civilian targets during the year in 
both the KDP- and PUK-controlled areas, which killed at least 12 
persons.
    KDP forces attacked the Erbil headquarters of the ITF in July, 
killing at least two persons and injuring several others. Tension 
between the KDP and the ITF had been building for months as the KDP 
leadership expressed frustration that the ITF failed to accept the KDP 
as the local authority. The ITF complained that the KDP interfered in 
its internal affairs.
    In July the PUK reportedly ordered all opposition groups to move 
their offices out of Sulaymaniah's city center following a number of 
bombings; the IWCP reportedly refused to move. PUK security forces 
subsequently killed at least six IWCP members and arrested several 
others at an IWCP office in Sulaymaniah. PUK forces also killed several 
IWCP members who were inside a car. In connection with this dispute, 
the PUK closed the IWCPaffiliated Independent Women's Organization and 
the Women's Protection Center in July and detained temporarily 12 women 
who had been staying at an abused women's shelter within the Center.
    There were repeated military incursions by Turkish security forces 
into northern Iraq during the year. In late 1999, the Turkish airforce 
targeted PKK positions in both KDP and PUK controlled areas. In April, 
May, and August, Turkish troops again were deployed to the region. In 
one incident, Turkish troops killed 38 Kurdish civilians. In July the 
PUK attempted to push the PKK out of its territory and fighting ensued. 
Both the PKK and the PUK suffered a number of casualties. In December 
hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed to the region, threatening to 
intervene on the PUK's behalf. Subsequently, the PUK and the PKK 
declared a cease-fire.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the 
revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;'' however, in practice 
the Government does not permit freedom of speech or of the press, and 
does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its control. In 
November the U.N. General Assembly criticized the Government's 
``suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information, 
association, and assembly.'' The Special Rapporteur stated in October 
1999 that citizens lived ``in a climate of fear'' in which whatever 
they said or did, particularly in the area of politics, involved ``the 
risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military 
intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that someone is not 
a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death 
penalty.''
    The Government and the Ba'th Party own all print and broadcast 
media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not 
report opposing points of view that are expressed, either domestically 
or abroad. A 1999 Freedom House report rated Iraqi press freedom at 98 
out of a possible 100 points, with 0 being the most free and 100 being 
the most controlled. Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of 
speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary Command Council 
Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression and 
stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President or 
other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which 
prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968 
Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific 
subjects, including those detrimental to the President, the 
Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party.
    According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under 
continuous pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the 
mandates of the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein. 
According to Iraqi sources, in 1999 Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of 
union members who had not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime 
sufficiently or often enough (see Section 6.a.). In September 1999, 
journalist and Baghdad University professor Hashem Hasan was arrested 
after declining an appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's 
publications. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) sent a 
letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate and 
whereabouts remain unknown (see Section 1.b.).
    The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically holds meetings 
at which they issue general guidelines for the press. Foreign 
journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building 
and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who 
reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to 
interact freely with citizens. Many Western news services are 
represented in Baghdad by bureaucrats who are based in the Ministry of 
Culture and Information.
    The Government regularly jams foreign news broadcasts (see Section 
1.f.). Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines are banned although 
some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999. Security forces 
reportedly raided homes of persons suspected of using satellite dishes 
during the year. In October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified 
all diplomatic missions and international organizations that they would 
need to obtain government approval before bringing ``any technical 
apparatus'' into the country. During the year, the Government opened 
five Internet cafes where persons are permitted to view websites 
provided by the Ministry of Culture and Information.
    Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry 
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends 
textbooks with proregime propaganda to Kurdish regions; however, Kurds 
routinely remove propaganda items from such textbooks.
    The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises 
strict control over academic publications. University staff are hired 
and fired depending on their support for the Government.
    In the north, many independent newspapers have appeared over the 
past 8 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts. The 
absence of central authority permits significant freedom of expression, 
including criticism of the regional Kurdish authorities; however, most 
journalists are influenced or controlled by various political 
organizations. Satellite services and related equipment for telephone, 
fax, Internet, and television services are available. Although the 
rival Kurdish parties in the north, the PUK and KDP, state that full 
press freedom is allowed in areas under their respective control, in 
practice neither effectively permits distribution of the opposing 
group's newspapers and other literature.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right in practice. Except in Kurdishcontrolled northern areas, 
citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the 
regime. The Government regularly orchestrates crowds to demonstrate 
support for the regime and its policies through financial incentives 
for those who participate and threats of violence against those who do 
not. Widespread military and paramilitary attacks on persons who 
violated restrictions on peaceful assembly were reported throughout the 
year (see Section 1.g.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls 
the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal 
affairs, and monitors their activities. New political parties must be 
based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious 
character. The political magazine Alef-Be, which is published by the 
Ministry of Culture and Information, reported in December 1999 that two 
political groups would not be permitted to form parties because they 
had an insufficient number of members. The magazine reprinted the 
conditions necessary to establish political parties, which include the 
requirement that a political group must have at least 150 members over 
the age of 25. A 1999 law also stipulates that new parties must ``take 
pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions, which created the republic 
and brought the Ba'th party to power. Several parties are outlawed 
specifically, and membership in them is a capital offense (see Section 
3). A 1974 law prescribes the death penalty for anyone ``infiltrating'' 
the Ba'th Party.
    In contrast, in the Kurdish-controlled north, numerous political 
parties and social and cultural organizations exist.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in 
practice. Islam is the official state religion.
    The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of 
worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all 
places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious 
literature.
    Over 95 percent of the population are Muslim. The (predominantly 
Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni 
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are 
Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni 
Turkomans). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians 
(Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox), 
Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Mandaeans.
    The Government does not recognize political organizations that have 
been formed by Shi'a Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups 
continued to attract support despite their illegal status. There are 
religious qualifications for government office; candidates for the 
National Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God'' (see Section 
3).
    Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs 
traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs 
are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, including 
civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not 
distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country 
alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'th 
Party, and Shi'a formed the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War.
    The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of 
murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the 
religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim 
population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the 
regime has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the 
Shi'a faith. Forces from the Mukhabarat, General Security (Amn Al-Amm), 
the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the 
Ba'th Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques 
and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil 
uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a 
religious education, and prevented Shi'a adherents from performing 
their religious rites. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all 
the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and search, harass, and arbitrarily 
arrest worshipers.
    The following government restrictions on religious rights remained 
in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal 
Friday prayer by Shi'a Muslims; restrictions on the loaning of books by 
Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on 
government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of 
Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral 
processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on 
other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; 
and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that 
commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured 
documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising, which 
listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Security forces 
reportedly still were encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf, 
one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and at the former Shi'a theological 
school in Al-Najaf; security forces have been there since 1991.
    In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the 
Government instituted a new program in the predominantly Shi'a 
districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where 
individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food 
program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are 
printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray 
at an unauthorized location. Shi'a sources outside the country who 
reported this policy believe that it is aimed not only at preventing 
unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a, but at stopping Shi'a 
adherents from attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, to which many 
pious Shi'a have turned since the closure of their own mosques.
    Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars 
being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in the past several 
years, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic 
center of Najaf. This followed years of government manipulation of the 
Najaf theological schools. AI reported that the Government deported 
systematically tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to 
Iran in the late 1970's and early 1980's, on the basis that they were 
of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and 
Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially, were prime 
targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during the IranIraq war, it was 
reported widely that the Government expelled and denied visas to 
thousands of foreign scholars who wished to study at Najaf. After the 
1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some restrictions on 
Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps believing that this would reduce 
popular anger over the arrests and executions of religious leaders. 
However, the revival of the schools appears greatly to have exceeded 
the Government's expectations, and led to an increased government 
crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment, including the 
requirement that speeches by imams in mosques be based upon government-
provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends. A campaign of 
arrests in Mosul against fundamentalist trends was reported in 
September 1999.
    Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr 
during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Two months prior to the 
anniversary of Al-Sadr's killing, security forces were deployed around 
shrines, mosques, and other religious institutions, and mosques were 
closed except during prayer time. In February security officials 
reportedly executed 30 religious school students who had been arrested 
after Al-Sadr's killing. In May six other students who were arrested 
following Al-Sadr's killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown 
whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end. As a 
reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the 
Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and 
sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
    The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with 
religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the 
Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims 
who travel to holy sites in the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Approval procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee 
require advance notification to regional air controllers and coalition 
military aircraft for flights undertaken for religious and humanitarian 
purposes that originate from and return to the country. In 1998 the 
U.N. Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and 
expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected 
this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds 
to cover Hajjrelated expenses via a neutral third party. The Government 
again rejected the opportunity. In both years, the Government insisted 
that these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to 
the central bank. As a result, in both 1998 and 1999, no Iraqi pilgrims 
were able to take advantage of the available funds. According to press 
reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the Hajj in 1999, despite the 
availability of 22,000 spaces.
    In 1999 the Government flew several airplanes full of elderly Hajj 
pilgrims unannounced to Saudi Arabia.
    Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram 
and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout 
the country and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to 
commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The 
Government for several decades has interfered with these ``Ashura'' 
commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 1998 
and 1999, violent incidents were reported between Iraqi pilgrims on one 
side and Ba'th party members and security forces enforcing the ban on 
the other. In May the Government prohibited persons from making the 
pilgrimage to Karbala. Security forces opened fire on persons who 
attempted to walk from Al-Najaf to Karbala (see Section 1.g.).
    The Government also has sought to undermine the identity of 
minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
    The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has 
engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and 
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from 
northern areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.). 
Most Assyrians live in the northern governates, and the Government 
often has accused them of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, 
Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military 
forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal 
Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians. Both 
major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government 
occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkomans, 
in expulsions from Kirkuk in order to attempt to Arabize the city (see 
Section 2.d.).
    The Government imposes some repressive measures on Yazidis (see 
Section 5). For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, 
arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for (see Section 1.b.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts movement within 
the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive 
border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to 
arrest. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
    The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government 
authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may 
not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad, 
citizens are required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon 
their return. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may 
be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside 
the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5). 
Prior to December 1999, every student who wished to travel abroad was 
required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student 
failed to return. In December 1999, authorities banned all travel for 
students (including those in grade school), cancelled spring and summer 
holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and 
weapons-use courses.
    In what appeared to be an effort to lure citizens living abroad 
back to the country, government radio announced in June 1999 an amnesty 
for teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly 
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty 
for all citizens who either had left the country illegally or who had 
failed to return after the period of exile had expired (see Section 
1.d.). The decree stated that ``charges of illegal departure, forging 
official documents towards this purpose, and disrupting public duties 
that were pressed before the issuance of this decree shall be dropped 
effective immediately.'' In October 1999, Justice Minster Shabib Al-
Maliki announced that authorities may seize assets belonging to Iraqis 
living outside the country who did not return in response to the 
amnesty decree. A special ministerial committee was formed to track and 
monitor Iraqis inside the country who received money from relatives 
living abroad.
    A November 1999 law placed additional penalties on citizens who 
attempt to leave the country illegally. Under the law, a prison term of 
up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable and immovable property'' 
is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to leave illegally. Similar 
penalties face anyone found to encourage or assist persons banned from 
travel, including health care professionals, engineers, and university 
professors. In January the director of the Real Estate Registration 
Department stated that pursuant to the decree, the Government 
confiscated the property of a number of persons.
    The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors, 
university professors, doctors, scientists, and all employees of the 
Ministry of Information. Security authorities interrogate all media 
employees, journalists, and writers upon their return from foreign 
travel. In December 1999, Captain Ammar Yasir Mahyush and retired Major 
Jasim Muhsin Ala reportedly were executed for their attempt to flee the 
country in February 1999.
    The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with 
religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the 
Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims 
to holy sites in Iraq (see Section 2.c.).
    Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in the country for 5 
years (1 year for spouses of government employees) are required to 
apply for naturalization as citizens. Many foreigners thus become 
subject to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance 
include, but are not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a 
substantial financial penalty, and repayment of any governmental 
educational expenses. The Government prevents many citizens who also 
hold citizenship in another country, especially the children of Iraqi 
fathers and foreign-born mothers, from visiting the country of their 
other nationality.
    The U.N. Secretary General estimates that there are more than half 
a million IDP's remaining in the three northern provinces (Erbil, 
Dohuk, and Sulaymaniah), most of whom fled government-controlled areas 
in early 1991 during the uprising that followed the Gulf War. As 
reported by the Special Rapporteur, the Government continued its 
``Arabization'' policy by discriminating against and forcibly 
relocating the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and 
Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Tuz, Khoramatu, 
and other districts. Most observers view the policy as an attempt to 
decrease the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk 
region, and thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area. For 
example, Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants 
are reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has 
been renamed Al-Ta'mim (``Nationalization''). The Revolutionary Command 
Council has mandated that new housing and employment be created for 
Arab residents who have been resettled in Kirkuk, while new 
construction or renovation of Kurd-owned property reportedly is 
prohibited. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes, except to 
Arabs, nor register or inherit property. In contrast, in September the 
Ta'mim Voice newspaper reported that a significant sum of money would 
be made available to Arab citizens of Kirkuk to fund construction.
    As part of the Arabization process, the Government continued to 
deport Kurdish and Turkoman families. Regional Kurdish authorities 
report that between January and June, 155 families (a total of 875 
individuals) were expelled to the Kurdish-controlled north. The 
authorities estimate that since 1991, more than 94,000 persons have 
been displaced. Persons may avoid expulsion if they relinquish their 
Kurdish, Turkoman, or Assyrian identity and register as Arabs. Persons 
who refuse to relinquish their identity may have their assets 
expropriated and their ration cards withdrawn prior to being deported.
    According to numerous deportees in the north, the Government 
generally uses a systematic procedure to evict and deport non-Arab 
citizens. Frequently, a security force official demands that a family 
change its ethnicity from Kurdish or Turkoman to Arab. Subsequently, 
security officials frequently arrest the head of household and tell the 
other family members that the person will be imprisoned until they 
agree to settle elsewhere in the country. Such families frequently 
choose to move to the north; family members must sign a form that 
states that the departure is voluntary and they are not allowed to take 
any property or their food ration cards issued under the U.N. oil-for-
food program. The Government frequently transfers the family's house to 
an Arab Ba'th Party member.
    Those expelled are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur 
reported in 1999 that citizens who provide employment, food or shelter 
to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. In order to 
encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, the 
Government reportedly has placed landmines in the area around Kirkuk, 
and has declared it a military and security zone. Roads into the area 
are fortified with military checkpoints. The Government denies that it 
expels non-Arab families.
    According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remain abroad. Apart from those 
suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government's 
suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are Kurds who fled 
during the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled 
following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly Kurds, 
have repatriated themselves to areas in the north, outside government 
control.
    The Government does not provide first asylum or respect the rights 
of refugees.
    Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in 
southeastern Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central 
Government. The UNHCR is treating such displaced persons as refugees 
until it reaches an official determination of their status.
    The KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement to begin 
returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that 
each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three 
northern provinces; however, little effort to implement the agreement 
took place during the year. In April the ICRC observed that the 
displaced persons in the north still were living in tents or in open, 
unheated public buildings (see Section 1.g.).
    In August 1999, the KDP reportedly imposed a blockade on eight 
Assyrian villages near Aqra. ICRC monitors reportedly intervened on the 
villages' behalf, and the blockade subsequently was lifted. However, 
KDP forces reportedly reentered one of the villages a couple of days 
later, rounded up the villagers, and publicly beat two of them. AINA 
reported that a similar raid occurred in another village. The KDP 
denied that the blockade or village raids occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
President wields power over all instruments of government. Almost all 
important officials either are members of Saddam Hussein's family or 
are family allies from his home town of Tikrit. Although the Government 
has taken steps to increase the perception of democracy, the political 
process still is controlled firmly by the State. The 1995 so-called 
referendum on Saddam Hussein's presidency was not free and was 
dismissed as a sham by most international observers. It included 
neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates, and many credible 
reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal if they cast a 
dissenting vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were arrested in 
Karbala, Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative ballots, 
and a member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed for 
refusing to vote for the President.
    There are strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by 
law the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old 
and ``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and 
socialism.'' Elections for the National Assembly were held in March; 
220 of the 250 parliamentary seats were contested and the 30 remaining 
seats were filled by presidential appointees. Out of the 250 seats, 165 
seats reportedly were won by members of the Ba'th Party, 55 by 
independents, and 30 were appointed by Saddam Hussein to represent the 
northern provinces. According to the Special Rapporteur, the Ba'th 
Party allegedly instructed a number of its members to run as nominally 
independent candidates.
    Full political participation at the national level is restricted to 
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to 
constitute about 8 percent of the population. The political system is 
dominated by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). The council is headed by President Saddam Hussein. 
However, the RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority. 
The RCC dominates the National Assembly, which is completely 
subordinate to it and the executive branch.
    Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely 
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is punishable by 
death. In October security forces reportedly executed eight persons on 
charges of forming an opposition organization (see Sections 1.a. and 
2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that theoretically authorized the 
creation of political parties other than the Ba'th Party. However, in 
practice the law is used to prohibit parties that do not support the 
President and the Government. New parties must be based in Baghdad and 
are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character. In 1999 
various media published articles claiming that Saddam Hussein 
instructed officials in October 1999 to consider the formation of new 
political parties, a state council, and a new constitution. However, a 
Ministry of Culture and Information magazine later reported that the 
only two groups that attempted to form a party were refused for having 
an insufficient number of members.
    The Government does not recognize the various political groupings 
and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians, 
Turkomans, or other communities. These political groups continued to 
attract support despite their illegal status.
    Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and 
politics. The law provides for the election of women and minorities to 
the National Assembly; however, they have only token representation.
    In the north of the country, all central government functions have 
been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the 
Government withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative 
personnel from the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament 
and local government administrators were elected in 1992. This 
parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de 
facto control of northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one 
another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify 
their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999. 
The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures were not 
implemented. The PUK held municipal elections in February, which were 
the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992. 
Foreign and local election observers reported that the elections 
generally were fair.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit the establishment of independent 
human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human 
rights groups abroad and in northern areas not under government 
control. Monitors from most foreign and international human rights 
groups are not allowed in the country. However, the Government allows 
several international humanitarian and aid organizations to operate in 
the country.
    The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. 
personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill 
relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices 
in the capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.).
    As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for 
information.
    In April and again in November, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
and the U.N. General Assembly criticized the ``systematic, widespread, 
and extremely grave violations of human rights'' by the Government, 
which resulted in ``all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained 
by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.''
    For the eighth consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N. 
Secretary General to send human rights monitors to ``help in the 
independent verification of reports on the human rights situation in 
Iraq.'' The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities made a similar request. The Government 
continued to ignore these calls.
    The Special Rapporteur nonetheless was able to gather more 
evidence, in part due to interviews with current and past government 
officials that illustrated the systemic nature of human rights 
violations. He dispatched members of his staff to Kuwait, Jordan, and 
other locations to interview victims of government human rights abuses.
    The Government operates an official human rights group that 
routinely denies allegations of abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for 
women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government 
systematically violates these rights.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known 
about its extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the 
tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the 
subject, and no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes 
grounds for divorce and criminal charges; however, suits brought on 
these charges reportedly are rare. Under a 1990 law, men who kill 
female family members for ``immoral deeds'' may receive immunity from 
prosecution for such honor crimes (see Section 1.e.).
    In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women 
suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or 
covering up such activities (see Section 1.a.).
    In April the PUK abolished in the Kurdish-controlled territories 
provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code that legitimized honor crimes.
    The Special Rapporteur has noted that there is an unusually high 
percentage of women in the Kurdish areas, reportedly as a result of the 
disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during the Anfal 
Campaign. The Special Rapporteur reported that the widows, daughters, 
and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent economically on 
their relatives or villages because they may not inherit the property 
or assets of their missing family members.
    Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign indicates that the 
Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing 
squads and in chemical attacks.
    The Government states that it is committed to equality for women, 
who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws to 
protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual 
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and 
police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land 
ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine the 
extent to which these protections are afforded in practice. Women are 
not allowed to travel outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
    There are several women's organizations in the PUK-controlled 
regions in the north.
    Children.--The Government claims that it has enacted laws to make 
education for girls compulsory. No information is available on whether 
the Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare 
of children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights 
groups have collected a substantial body of evidence indicating the 
Government's continued disregard for the rights and welfare of 
children. The evidence allegedly includes government officials taking 
children from minority groups hostage in order to intimidate their 
families to leave cities and regions where the regime wishes to create 
a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
    The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security 
Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions. 
There were widespread reports that food and medicine that could have 
been made available to the general public were stockpiled in warehouses 
rather than ordered, or diverted for the personal use of some 
officials. The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the 
oil-for-food program confirmed the insufficient placement of orders in 
a January letter to the Government, in which he expressed concern about 
the low rate of submission of applications in the health, education, 
water, sanitation, and oil sectors. He also stated that of the $570 
million worth of medicines and medical supplies that had arrived in 
Iraq through the oil-for-food program in 1998 and 1999, only 48 percent 
had been distributed to clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.
    The Government's management of the oil-for-food program did not 
take into account the special requirements of children between the ages 
of 1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary General's specific injunction 
that the Government modify its implementation procedures to address the 
needs of this vulnerable group. In 1999 UNICEF issued the results of 
the first surveys of child and maternal mortality in Iraq that have 
been conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted between February 
and May 1999, in cooperation with the Government in the southern and 
central regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities 
in the north. The surveys revealed that in the south and center parts 
of the country, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5 
years old are dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade 
ago. In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the 
Kurdishcontrolled north dropped in the period from 1994 to 1999. The 
Special Rapporteur criticized the Government for ``letting innocent 
people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.'' Had the 
Government not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in 
1996, he stated in October 1999, ``millions of innocent people would 
have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
    For the seventh year, the Government held 3-week training courses 
in weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and 
infantry tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for 
these ``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military 
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up 
under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of training that lasted 
for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the Iraqi opposition 
report that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to 
fill all of the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were 
threatened with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to 
enroll their children in the grueling course. The Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October 1999 that 
authorities were denying food ration cards to families that failed to 
send their young sons to Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps 
(see Section 1.f.). Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school 
examination results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen 
Saddam organization.
    People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the 
Government's policy towards the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--The country's cultural, religious, and 
linguistic diversity is not reflected in its political and economic 
structure. Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself 
constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled 
the Government since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious 
majority of the population, have long been economically, politically, 
and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and 
religious groups in the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been 
targeted for particular discrimination and abuse (see Section 2.c.).
    Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by 
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
    Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials 
frequently make anti-Semitic statements. For example, during the year, 
a Ba'th Party official stated that the ``lowly Jews . . . are 
descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel 
tyrant.''
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Arabs are denied equal 
access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are 
not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or 
inherit property. The Government continued to relocate forcibly the 
non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians living 
in Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct 
ethnic group, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest 
Christian communities. These communities speak a different language 
(Syriac), preserve traditions of Christianity, and have a rich cultural 
and historical heritage that they trace back over 2,000 years. Although 
these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government, without 
any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, 
evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated 
regime (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government does not permit education in languages other than 
Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced 
under a 1972 decree, never has been implemented. Thus, in areas under 
government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to 
attend classes in Syriac. In areas of the north under Kurdish control, 
classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising against 
the Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students were 
ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however, some 
Assyrian sources reported that regional Kurdish authorities refused to 
allow the classes to begin. Details of this practice (for example, the 
number of students prepared to start secondary courses in Syriac and 
the towns where they were located) were not available, and Kurdish 
regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a practice. In 
November 1999, the Kurdistan Observer reported that the central 
Government had warned the administration in the Kurdish region against 
allowing Turkoman, Assyrian, or Yazidi minority schools.
    Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by 
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years. Assyrians 
continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (KWP), a 
Turkish-based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous 
Kurds in northern Iraq. The Christians reported feeling caught in the 
middle of intraKurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported being 
pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign 
by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food 
supplies.
    Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Erbil in 1998 
and 1999. Although the bombings have not been linked to any particular 
faction or group, Assyrians believe that they are part of a terror 
campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north. The 
Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party, and other 
groups have criticized the investigation into these incidents conducted 
by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported arrests by 
year's end.
    In June 1999, the Assyrian National News Agency reported a ``well-
established pattern'' of complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks 
against Assyrian Christians in the north (see Section 1.a.).
    The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many 
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some 
would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct 
from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical 
basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the 
Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to 
join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured 
government documents included in a 1998 HRW report describe special 
all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal 
campaign to ``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. The Government imposes 
the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups (see Section 
2.c.).
    Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must 
carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable 
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of 
thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions independent of 
government control do not exist. The Trade Union Organization Law of 
1987 established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU), 
a government-dominated trade union structure, as the sole legal trade 
federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th Party, which uses it to 
promote party principles and policies among union members.
    Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees 
or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union 
committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions, 
which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
    In 1999 Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of 
the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the 
regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in 1999, Uday Hussein 
reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National Students 
Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action against 
students known for their criticism of the situation in the country.
    The 1987 Labor Law restricts the right to strike. No strike has 
been reported over the past 2 decades. According to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, severe restrictions on the right to 
strike include penal sanctions.
    The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of 
Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation 
of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector 
workers (the majority of employed persons) are set by the Government. 
Wages in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or 
negotiated individually with workers. Government workers frequently are 
shifted from one job and work location to another to prevent them from 
forming close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not 
protect workers from antiunion discrimination, a failure that has been 
criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO).
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor 
theoretically is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates 
prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and 
employees of state enterprises accused of breaches of labor 
``discipline,'' including resigning from a job. According to the ILO, 
foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their 
employment to return to their native countries because of government-
imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information 
available on forced and bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The employment of children under age 14 is prohibited, 
except in small-scale family enterprises. Children reportedly are 
encouraged increasingly to work in order to support their families 
because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates 
that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week 
than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10 
years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There 
is no information available on forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information 
available on minimum wages.
    Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour 
workweek. Hours for government employees are set by the head of each 
ministry. Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to 
individual employer-employee agreements. Occupational safety programs 
are in effect in state-run enterprises. Inspectors theoretically 
inspect private establishments, but enforcement varies widely. There is 
no information on workers' ability to remove themselves from work 
situations that endanger their health or safety, or on those who 
complain about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available on 
whether trafficking in persons is prohibited by law, or whether persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                  ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

    Israel \1\ is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system 
and free elections. There is no Constitution; a series of ``basic 
laws'' provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has 
the power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the 
executive branch. Labor and One Israel party leader Ehud Barak was 
elected Prime Minister in May 1999 and took office in July 1999 at the 
head of a broad centrist coalition Government. On December 9, following 
the breakdown of his coalition, Barak resigned as Prime Minister; prime 
ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February 6, 2001. 
The judiciary is independent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The human rights situation in the occupied territories is 
discussed in the annex appended to this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with 
most of its Arab neighbors. It concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in 
1979 and with Jordan in 1994, and a series of agreements with the 
Palestinians beginning in 1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel 
occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan 
Heights. The international community does not recognize Israel's 
sovereignty over any part of the occupied territories. Throughout its 
existence, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist attacks.
    An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the 
Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued 
with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration 
of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the 
Hebron Protocol and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye 
River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO 
signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive 
working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in 
July; however, the Government and the PLO did not reach an agreement. 
Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency 
(the ISA--formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known 
as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which is under the authority of the Prime 
Minister's office. The police are under the authority of the Minister 
of Internal Security. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are under the 
authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF includes a 
significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve 
status and plays a role in maintaining internal security. The Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviews the activities of 
the IDF and the ISA. Some members of the security forces committed 
serious human rights abuses.
    Israel has an advanced industrial economy, and citizens enjoy a 
relatively high standard of living, with a per capita income of over 
$17,000. Unemployment remained at about 9 percent during the year, but 
was substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among 
lower-skilled workers. The country's economic growth has been 
accompanied by an increase in income inequality. The longstanding gap 
in levels of income within the Jewish population and between Jewish and 
Arab citizens continues. The 14 towns with the highest unemployment 
rate in the country all are populated by Arab citizens. A heavy 
reliance on foreign workers, principally from Asia and Eastern Europe, 
is a source of social problems. Such workers generally are employed in 
agriculture and the construction industry and constitute about 6 
percent of the labor force. Since the implementation of an economic 
stabilization plan in 1985, the country has moved gradually to reduce 
state intervention in the economy through privatization of several 
state-owned companies and through deregulation. State-owned companies 
continue to dominate such fields as electricity generation and 
transmission, oil refining, shipping, and international air travel. 
However, individuals generally are free to invest in private interests 
and to own property. The Government owns and manages 77 percent of the 
country's land area, and as a matter of policy it does not sell land. 
The Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization established in 1897 for 
the purchase and management of land for the Jewish people, owns 8 
percent of the country's land area, including a considerable amount 
transferred directly from the Government, and manages another 8 percent 
on behalf of the Government. Foreigners and citizens of all religions 
are allowed freely to purchase or lease the 7 percent of land not 
controlled by the Government or the JNF. In March the High Court of 
Justice ruled that the Government's use of the JNF to develop public 
land was discriminatory, since the JNF's statute prohibits the sale or 
lease of land to non-Jews.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, its record worsened late in the year regarding its treatment 
of non-Jewish citizens. Historically, Israel's main human rights 
problems have arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied 
territories and from its fight against terrorism. However, in October 
police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations in the north of 
the country that coincided with the outbreak of violence in the 
occupied territories, killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g. of the annex for a discussion of 
casualties in the occupied territories). There also are credible 
reports that police failed to protect Arab lives and property in 
several incidents in which Jewish citizens attacked the homes of Arab 
citizens. A landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in September 
1999 prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including 
violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep 
deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to 
extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and 
international NGO's have been unable to substantiate sporadic 
allegations that security forces tortured detainees. There were 
numerous credible allegations that police beat persons in detention. 
Detention and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security 
detainees held in Israel do not provide inmates with sufficient living 
space, food, and access to medical care. Following the IDF withdrawal 
from its self-declared ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon in May and 
the concurrent collapse of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), all of the 
prisoners from the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where Lebanese 
guards routinely committed abuses, were released. The Government 
continued to detain without charge Palestinians, some of them for 
lengthy periods; the number of such detainees increased following the 
outbreak of violence in September. In April an Israeli High Court 
ruling declared illegal the holding of Lebanese detainees as 
``bargaining chips'' in Israeli prisons. Subsequently, authorities 
released 13 Lebanese prisoners, all of whom had been held without 
charge, or had already completed their terms. At year's end, there were 
approximately 20 Lebanese prisoners in custody, two of whom--Sheikh al-
Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani--were held without charge. Legislation 
that would enable Obeid and Dirani to be held as ``members of enemy 
forces not entitled to prisoner-of-war status'' passed a first reading 
during the year. Following the outbreak of violence in September, the 
Government detained without charge hundreds of persons in Israel, the 
West Bank, and Gaza, and imposed severe restrictions on the movement of 
persons and some restrictions on the movement of goods between Israel 
and the West Bank and Gaza and between cities in the West Bank and 
Gaza--i.e., closure, which has been in effect to varying extents since 
1993 (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
    The Government continued to fund shelters and crisis centers; 
however, violence and discrimination against women persists. 
Discrimination against the disabled persists. The Government made 
little headway in reducing institutionalized legal and societal 
discrimination against Israel's Christian, Muslim, and Druze citizens, 
who constitute just over 20 percent of the population, but do not share 
fully the rights provided to, and obligations imposed on, the country's 
Jewish citizens. Prior to October, the Government did not take tangible 
steps to improve the situation of the country's non-Jewish citizens, 
which was one of the main factors that contributed to large Israeli 
Arab demonstrations in October. The demonstrations and clashes between 
the police and Israeli Arabs brought renewed attention to the different 
treatment accorded to the Jewish and Arab sectors of the country. In 
October the Government approved a $975 million economic assistance plan 
for Arab citizens to be phased in over 4 years; however, some human 
rights groups criticized the plan as inadequate. The Knesset did not 
approve the plan by year's end. Trafficking in women for the purpose of 
forced prostitution is a continuing problem. In June the Government 
passed a law that prohibits the trafficking of persons for the purpose 
of prostitution.
    In early October, there were many instances of societal violence 
between Arab and Jewish citizens, which coincided with violent events 
in the country.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings during the year.
    In October police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations 
in the north of the country that coincided with the outbreak of 
violence in the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b. 
of the annex), killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring 300 with a 
combination of live ammunition and rubber-coated steel bullets (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Demonstrators did not have firearms; however, 
some demonstrators reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. International 
and domestic human rights groups assert that police used rubber-coated 
metal bullets and live ammunition against demonstrators who posed no 
imminent danger of death or serious injury to security forces or 
others.
    On September 28, opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple 
Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29, Palestinians 
held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of 
the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live 
ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and 
injuring about 200 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex). In 
response to this violence, Palestinians held demonstrations throughout 
the occupied territories and Israel. On October 1, Israeli Arab leaders 
called a general strike, which received widespread support from Arab 
citizens, thousands of whom demonstrated throughout the country. On 
October 1, police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal bullets 
to disperse demonstrations in Um-al-Fahem, killing two persons and 
injuring hundreds of others. On October 2, police killed six persons 
and injured numerous others during demonstrations in Jat, Nazareth, 
Arrabe, and Sakhnin. Police also used live ammunition and rubber 
bullets to disperse demonstrations in other towns and villages in the 
north of the country, injuring hundreds of demonstrators. On October 3, 
police killed three persons during demonstrations in Nazareth and Kfar 
Manda.
    In October and November, coinciding with violence in Israel and the 
occupied territories, there were numerous violent incidents along the 
Israel-Lebanese border. On October 7, IDF personnel reportedly killed 2 
persons and injured 25 during demonstrations along the border. On 
October 9, the IDF reportedly fired live ammunition on a group of about 
500 Palestinian demonstrators who were throwing rocks and Molotov 
cocktails, and trying to cross the border into Israel; IDF personnel 
reportedly killed 1 person and injured 10.
    On October 21, Prime Minister Barak proposed establishing a 
commission of examination to study the violence that occurred in early 
October. However, Israeli Arab leaders rejected Barak's offer and 
demanded that the Government establish a legal commission of inquiry, 
which would operate independently of the Government, have subpoena 
power, and automatically bestow immunity on anyone who testified before 
it. On November 8, in response to pressure from both Arab and Jewish 
citizens, Barak announced the establishment of the Legal Commission of 
Inquiry, which reportedly is to have considerable ability to collect 
information. The Commission is headed by a High Court justice, and its 
members include an Arab judge from a Nazareth court, and a professor 
from Tel Aviv University. In December the Legal Commission of Inquiry 
began its investigation; however, it did not reach any conclusions by 
year's end.
    There also are credible reports that police failed to protect Arab 
lives and property in several incidents in which Jewish citizens 
attacked Arab citizens. On October 7, a group of about 200 Israeli Jews 
attacked Arab homes in Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth), including the 
home of an Arab Member of the Knesset. On October 8, a group of about 
1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab homes in Nazareth. The attackers 
allegedly targeted Arab citizens due to their anger over the Hizballah 
kidnaping of three IDF soldiers and the attack on Joseph's Tomb in the 
West Bank in early October (see Sections 1.b. and 2.c. of the annex). 
Many of the Arabs exited their homes and attempted to defend themselves 
and their property (see Section 5). Police reportedly arrived at the 
scene late, did not take action beyond inserting themselves between the 
two groups, and fired live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas at 
the Arab citizens. Two Israeli Arabs were killed and approximately 50 
others were injured in these incidents. International and domestic 
human rights groups reported that the police were responsible for the 
deaths and injuries; however, some residents of Nazareth reported that 
some members of the Jewish crowd had firearms. Large crowds of Jews 
also attacked Arab homes, businesses, and two mosques in other areas of 
the country (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Arab protesters also attacked 
Jewish-owned businesses and at least one synagogue (see Sections 1.c. 
and 5).
    During the year, 22 Israelis died and 244 were injured in terrorist 
attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and 
the occupied territories (also see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the 
annex). For example, on November 1, a car bomb in Jerusalem killed two 
Israelis and injured eleven others, including four children. 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. On 
November 22, a car bomb in Hadera killed three Israelis and injured 61. 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for this attack.
    b. Disappearance.--On October 10, Hizballah guerrillas kidnaped 
three IDF soldiers. At year's end, the soldiers were believed to be 
held in Lebanon.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical 
abuse of detainees; however, security forces sometimes abused 
Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark decision by the 
High Court of Justice in September 1999 prohibited the use of a variety 
of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in 
contorted positions (``Shabbeh''), sleep deprivation for extended 
periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. Since 
the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been 
unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces 
tortured detainees.
    Prior to the High Court's 1999 decision, laws and administrative 
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not 
enforced in security cases. The head of the ISA was empowered by 
government regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate 
physical and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking) 
while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses. 
In November 1999, the Attorney General issued revised guidelines that 
denied blanket immunity from prosecution for interrogators; however, it 
remains theoretically possible that the State could decline to 
prosecute interrogators who used prohibited methods in cases of extreme 
urgency.
    In October police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal 
bullets to disperse demonstrators in the north of the country, killing 
13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300 (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). 
Demonstrators reportedly did not have firearms; however, in some cases 
they reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. On October 1, police beat 
severely a woman who screamed at a police officer during a 
demonstration. The incident was videotaped and broadcast on domestic 
and international television.
    There were numerous credible allegations from human rights groups 
that police beat persons in detention; reports of such beatings 
increased in October following demonstrations and the numerous 
subsequent police arrests of suspected or actual participants in the 
demonstrations (see Section 1.d.). For example, on October 26, police 
arrested an Arab citizen, Amneh Aqayleh, on suspicion of participating 
in demonstrations in Nazareth. Police brought Aqayleh to the Kishon 
detention center for interrogation where they reportedly beat him. 
Police also reportedly arrested and beat some Jewish demonstrators. For 
example, according to Amnesty International police arrested and beat 
Yoav Bar following a demonstration in Wadi Nisnas, breaking his hand, 
two of his ribs, and two of his teeth. According to Amnesty 
International, police also reportedly arrested and beat youths 
following demonstrations in the north of the country (see Section 
1.d.).
    According to local and international human rights NGO's, in some 
cases police reportedly delayed ambulances and medical personnel from 
entering Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the 
clashes (see Section 2.d.). According to police officials, the streets 
often were too crowded and volatile for the ambulances to enter the 
villages safely. According to some observers, local leaders broadcast 
requests over mosque loudspeakers that demonstrators return home in 
order to clear the way for ambulances.
    In early October, police failed to protect Arab lives and property 
when a group of approximately 1,000 Jewish citizens attacked Arab 
Israeli homes in Nazareth. Police fired live ammunition, rubber 
bullets, and tear gas at Arab citizens. Two persons were killed and 50 
persons were injured (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    During the year, 244 Israelis were injured in terrorist attacks 
carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and the 
occupied territories (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex).
    Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the 
occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison 
Service (IPS), the IDF, or the national police. IPS prisons, which 
generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually 
provide inmates with sufficient living space, food, and access to 
medical care. In general, IPS inmates are not subject to physical abuse 
by guards, and prisoners receive basic necessities. Inmates receive 
mail, have television sets in their cells, and receive regular visits. 
Prisoners receive wages for prison work and benefits for good behavior. 
Many IPS prisons have drug treatment, educational, and recreational 
programs. The IPS established a national police unit to investigate 
allegations of offenses committed by guards, including complaints about 
the use of force against inmates.
    Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the 
occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and 
held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories 
who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities 
within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually were held in 
the IDF's Megiddo prison, in IPS facilities, and in special sections of 
police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security 
reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities. 
They often are denied privileges given to prisoners convicted on 
criminal charges such as furloughs and some family visits. According to 
the Government, security detainees may receive financial assistance 
from the Palestinian Authority (PA), food from their families, and 
medical supplies from the ICRC and other aid organizations. Security 
detainees include some minors. Detention facilities administered by the 
IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees and are guarded by armed 
soldiers. The total number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel, 
approximately 1,354 at the beginning of the year, reached 1,832 by 
year's end. The number of administrative detainees (held without charge 
or trial) was between 10 and 15 at year's end, including one Israeli 
Arab (see Section 1.d.). Under the terms of the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum, the Government released a total of 350 Palestinian security 
prisoners in 1999 (in addition to the 250 prisoners released in late 
1998 pursuant to the Wye River Accords). On May 1, Palestinian 
prisoners throughout the country began a hunger strike to protest 
prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following 
negotiations with government and PA officials, the prisoners agreed to 
suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Government agreed to remove 
prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow family members to 
visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain from planning 
terrorist attacks from prison.
    Conditions at the Russian Compound, which is run by police and 
houses a combination of security and common prisoners and detainees in 
Jerusalem, were criticized in 1997 as ``not fit to serve as lock-up'' 
by High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak. Conditions in other 
IDF facilities have improved in some respects. For example, inmates are 
given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless, 
recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict 
limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented for 
long periods of time during closures.
    Conditions at some national police detention facilities are poor. 
Such facilities are intended to hold criminal detainees prior to trial 
but often become de facto prisons. Those held include some security 
detainees and some persons who have been convicted and sentenced. 
Inmates in the national police detention facilities often are not 
accorded the same rights as prisoners in the IPS system. Moreover, 
conditions are worse in the separate facilities for security detainees 
maintained both in police facilities and in IPS prisons.
    In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country's 
detention facilities. To date, there have been some improvements, 
including the opening of a model detention center near Netanya; 
however, problems, including dilapidation and overcrowding persist. The 
1997 Arrest and Detention law provided for the right to live in 
conditions that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee, 
access to adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee, 
and access to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. The Government 
has made significant strides towards implementing this legislation, 
though problems remain.
    Children's rights groups have expressed particular concern over the 
separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of 
children. Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social 
workers, and denial of visits by parents are among the key problems. In 
addition to some Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there are 
juveniles among Palestinian detainees. Children's rights activists had 
recommended the construction of a separate detention facility for 
children, and after a prolonged legal battle, separate prison 
facilities were built for Arab and Jewish children.
    All incarceration facilities are monitored regularly by various 
branches of the Government, by members of the Knesset, by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by human rights 
groups (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
    In September 1999, the Government acknowledged that it trained, 
debriefed, and paid the salaries of the Lebanese administrators and 
staff of the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where prisoners 
allegedly were tortured routinely. Following the IDF withdrawal from 
its self-declared ``security zone'' and the concurrent collapse of the 
SLA, all of the prisoners in Al-Khiam were released.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes 
this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven 
guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other 
procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits administrative, or 
preventive, detention (i.e., without charge or trial), which is used on 
occasion in security cases. In such cases, the Minister of Defense may 
issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year, though such orders may 
be extended. Within 24 hours of issuance, detainees must appear before 
a district judge who may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If 
the order is confirmed, an automatic review takes place after 3 months. 
Detention orders were confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees 
have the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal detention 
orders to the High Court of Justice; however, the security forces may 
delay notification of counsel with the consent of a judge. According to 
human rights groups and legal experts, there were cases in which a 
judge denied the Government's request to delay notification of counsel. 
At detention hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from 
defense lawyers on security grounds. The Government also may seek to 
renew administrative detention orders. However, the security services 
must ``show cause'' for continued detention, and, in some instances, 
individuals were released because the standard could not be met.
    In felony cases and in ordinary security cases, a district court 
judge may postpone for 48 hours the notification of arrest to the 
detainee's attorney. The postponement may be extended to 7 days by the 
Minister of Defense on national security grounds or by the police 
inspector general to conduct an investigation. Moreover, a judge may 
postpone notification for up to 15 days in national security cases.
    The 1997 Arrest and Detention Law more narrowly defined the grounds 
for pretrial detention in criminal and security cases and reduced to 24 
hours the length of time a person may be held without charge; however, 
this law does not extend to administrative detention cases. Human 
rights groups allege abuse of detention orders in cases in which they 
assert that the accused did not pose a clear danger to society. 
Children's rights activists have recommended separate legislation to 
define when and how a child may be arrested and how long children may 
be detained. According to media reports and children's rights groups, 
during and following the violence in the north, police sometimes beat 
youths while arresting them (see Sections 1.c.).
    Most of the protections afforded to Israelis are not extended to 
Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law 
even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment in the West 
Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all 
Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated 
in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
    Police arrested hundreds of persons mainly in the north of the 
country in connection with the demonstrations and disturbances that 
began in September; approximately two-thirds of the persons arrested 
were Arab citizens and about one-third were Jewish citizens. According 
to domestic and international human rights organizations, police 
continued to arrest Arab citizens whom they suspected of participating 
in the disturbances over a month after the demonstrations ended. On 
October 26, the Northern Police Commander announced to the press that 
his office compiled a list of hundreds of persons who participated in 
the demonstrations and that the police intended to arrest many of them. 
According to human rights organizations, police lacked any evidence 
against a significant number of Israeli Arabs that they arrested. There 
also were credible reports that police tricked some Israeli Arabs into 
confessing that they threw stones during demonstrations. Many of the 
persons arrested, including some minors, also reportedly were held 
without bail until the end of criminal proceedings against them. 
Several detainees brought appeals to the High Court of Justice; 
however, the Court upheld this practice on the grounds that calm had 
not yet returned to the country. According to Amnesty International, at 
least 10 Arab citizens detained in connection with the disturbances in 
October were denied access to counsel for up to 1 week.
    In December for the first time since 1994, the Government placed an 
Israeli Arab, Jhasan Athamnah, in administrative detention where he was 
being held on secret evidence at year's end.
    At year's end, the Government held 1,832 Palestinians in custody. 
Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative 
detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the 
ICRC access to one Lebanese citizen, Mustafa Dirani (held without 
charge since 1994). The Government granted the ICRC access to Sheikh 
Obeid (held without charge since 1989) for the first time in December 
1999, and allowed the ICRC four additional visits during the year. 
However, following the October kidnaping of IDF soldiers by Hizballah 
guerrillas (see Section 1.b.), the Government suspended ICRC access to 
Sheikh Obeid. In May 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that the 
Government was entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible 
exchange of hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who still may 
be held by hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that 
national security needs took precedence over the detainees' individual 
rights under Israeli and international law. However, in April the High 
Court declared illegal the detention of individuals to be used as 
``bargaining chips;'' the Government subsequently released 13 Lebanese 
prisoners. However, Obeid, Dirani, and approximately 18 other Lebanese 
prisoners remained in custody at year's end; the former are 
administrative detainees, and the latter have been charged and 
convicted of crimes. The Government claims that Obeid and Dirani are 
security threats and attempted to pass legislation that would allow the 
continued detention without charge of ``members of enemy forces not 
entitled to prisoner-of-war status.'' The bill had passed a first 
reading by year's end. Two legal advisors to the Knesset criticized the 
bill, claiming that it contravened domestic and international laws.
    Six Iraqis, held since they attempted to enter the country 
illegally from Jordan, were deported to Holland, Sweden, and Finland, 
where they obtained refugee status.
    The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government 
respects this prohibition in practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision. 
However, in the past the judiciary routinely acquiesced to the 
Government's position in security cases. The September 1999 landmark 
High Court of Justice decision barring the use of torture (see Section 
1.c.) marked a major change in this practice, as did the April ruling 
prohibiting the holding of detainees for use as ``bargaining chips.'' 
The judiciary generally provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is composed of civil, military, religious, 
labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of 
Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court of Justice 
is both a court of first instance (in cases involving government 
action) and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court). 
Each of the cited courts, including the High Court of Justice, have 
appellate courts or jurisdictions.
    The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by 
counsel, and authorities observe this right in practice. A regional and 
national system of public defenders operated by the Ministry of Justice 
was inaugurated in 1996 and now employs about 700 attorneys through 5 
regional offices. Under the system, economically disadvantaged persons 
who face sentences of 5 years or longer, and all persons who are 
accused of crimes with sentences of 10 years or longer receive 
mandatory legal representation. Judges also have discretionary power to 
appoint an attorney in all cases. Since the system was implemented, 
representation has increased to about 70 percent. All non-security 
trials are public except those in which the interests of the parties 
are deemed best served by privacy. Cases involving national security 
may be tried in either military or civil courts and may be partly or 
wholly closed to the public. The prosecution must justify closing the 
proceedings to the public in such cases, and the Attorney General 
determines the venue. Adult defendants have the right to be represented 
by counsel even in closed proceedings but may be denied access to some 
evidence on security grounds. Under the law, convictions may not be 
based on any evidence denied to the defense. In addition, convictions 
may not be based solely on a confession by the accused, although in 
practice security prisoners have been sentenced on the basis of the 
coerced confessions of both themselves and others.
    According to human rights organizations, the legal system often 
imposes far stiffer punishments on Christian, Muslim, and Druze 
citizens than on Jewish citizens. For example, human rights advocates 
claim that Israeli Arabs are more likely to be convicted of murder 
(which carries a mandatory life sentence) than Jewish Israelis. The 
courts reportedly also are more likely to detain Arab-Israelis until 
the conclusion of proceedings. The Government notes that the judicial 
system is independent and disputes the charge that the court system 
systematically discriminates against non-Jewish citizens. According to 
press reports, following the demonstrations that took place in 
September and October, 66 percent of those arrested were Arab Israelis, 
and 84 percent of those detained until the conclusion of proceedings as 
of late October were Arab Israelis (see Section 1.d.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Privacy of the individual and the home generally are 
protected by law; however, the Government uses laws that provide that 
authorities may interfere with mail and monitor telephone conversations 
in certain circumstances. In criminal cases, the law permits 
wiretapping under court order; in security cases, the order must be 
issued by the Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations, 
authorities may open and destroy mail on security grounds.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--In May Israeli forces withdrew from southern 
Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. Prior to 
the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May, violence continued 
there and in northern Israel. An estimated 20 Hizballah guerrillas, and 
25 Lebanese civilians were killed in southern Lebanon prior to the 
Israeli withdrawal. Israeli forces and the SLA responded to Hizballah, 
Amal, and Palestinian guerrilla attacks as all sides engaged in 
recurring violence. For example, on February 8, in response to 
Hizballah attacks, Israel conducted air strikes on electrical power 
transformer stations and other targets, injuring over 1 dozen 
civilians. In retaliation for Hizballah attacks in May, Israel shelled 
military and civilian targets in the south, killing two persons. 
Israeli forces conducted air strikes and artillery barrages on 
Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets, including civilian 
infrastructure, inside Lebanon. During the May IDF withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon and the concurrent collapse of the SLA, at least four 
Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli helicopter gunfire. In 
response to a Hizballah bombing in November, Israel launched airstrikes 
on Hizballah positions in the south, injuring one civilian.
    There were over 110 Lebanese civilian injuries prior to the IDF 
withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from 
shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of 
the injured.
    Attacks by Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerillas resulted in 
numerous deaths and injuries. An estimated 9 Israeli soldiers were 
killed in southern Lebanon and northern Israel by roadside bombs, 
ambushes, and cross border attacks. Additionally 40 Israeli civilians 
were injured in shelling and cross border attacks.
    On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the 
Sha'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted 
from the shelling. The shelling reportedly served as cover for the 
kidnaping of three IDF soldiers in the north (see Section 1.b.). In May 
Hizballah attacks in the north of Israel killed 1 person and injured 
12. On October 20, IDF fire repulsed a cross border infiltration 
attempt by unidentified Lebanese insurgents; two were killed and the 
third was injured.
    On November 26, Hizballah guerillas bombed an Israeli patrol 
station in the Sha'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In October 
Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the north 
of Israel, demanding that the Israeli government release all remaining 
Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons (see Section 1.b.). At year's 
end, the soldiers were believed to be held in Lebanon.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
the press, and the Government generally respects this right in 
practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material 
reported from Israel or the occupied territories regarded as sensitive 
on national security grounds. A censorship agreement signed in 1996 
between the Government and media representatives continued the trend of 
liberalization of the Government's censorship regime. The agreement, 
which now applies to all media organizations in the country, provides 
that military censorship is to be applied only in cases involving 
national security issues that have a near certainty of harming the 
country's defense interests. All media organizations can appeal the 
censor's decision to the High Court of Justice. Moreover, a clause 
prohibits the military censor from shutting down a newspaper for 
censorship violations and from appealing a court judgement against it. 
News printed or broadcast abroad may be reported without the censor's 
review, which permits the media to run previously censored stories that 
have appeared in foreign sources. Emergency regulations prohibit 
persons from expressing support for illegal organizations. On occasion 
in the past, the Government has prosecuted persons for speaking or 
writing on behalf of terrorist groups. No such cases were filed during 
the year. During the year, there were reports that the military censor 
intervened in several cases related to national defense.
    One Palestinian-owned newspaper is required to submit its entire 
contents, including advertising, to the military censor by 4:00 p.m. 
each day. The editor claims that this process caused his journalists to 
practice self-censorship. Journalists and professional journalist 
groups complained about limitations placed on their freedom of movement 
within the occupied territories, between the West Bank and Gaza, and 
between the occupied territories and Israel during the violent unrest 
in September (see Section 2.d.). One media organization reported that 
more than two dozen journalists were injured or harassed while covering 
events in the occupied territories in October and November (see Section 
2.a. of the annex). On October 5, during a demonstration in Jaffa, 
demonstrators acting outside of government control assaulted a foreign 
camera crew, injuring several journalists and breaking three cameras.
    Foreign journalists are required to sign an agreement to submit 
certain news stories and photographs for censorship; however, they 
rarely are challenged for not doing so.
    Individuals, groups, and the press freely address public issues and 
criticize government policies and officials without reprisal. Laws 
prohibit hate speech and incitement to violence. All newspapers are 
privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses are valid only for 
Israel; separate licenses are required to distribute publications in 
areas in the occupied territories still under Israel's authority. 
Sixteen daily newspapers are published in Israel. There are about 90 
weekly local newspapers and more than 250 periodical publications.
    Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel 
Broadcast Authority (IBA) controls television Channel 1 and Kol Israel 
(Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and information. 
The privately operated Channel 2, the country's first commercial 
television station, is operated by three franchise companies and 
supervised by the Second Television and Radio Authority, a public body 
that also supervises 14 private radio stations. There are five cable 
television companies that carry both domestic and international 
networks.
    The Government continued to attempt to close down the estimated 150 
pirate radio stations operating out of Israel and the West Bank.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice.
    During the year, there were a number of peaceful demonstrations 
against withdrawal from the Golan Heights and for and against peace 
negotiations with the Palestinians.
    In early October, thousands of Arab citizens throughout the country 
participated in demonstrations. In some cases demonstrators threw 
stones and Molotov cocktails. The demonstrators were reacting to events 
in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as against government 
and police discrimination against Arab citizens (see Section 5). Police 
killed 13 Arab citizens and injured over 300 others during 
demonstrations in several towns and villages in the north (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights groups noted that the only fatalities and 
serious injuries occurred in the north and criticized the Northern 
Police Commander for authorizing the use of excessive force.
    The law provides for the right of association, and the Government 
generally respects this provision in practice. After the Hebron 
massacre in 1994, the Cabinet invoked the 1948 ordinance for the 
prevention of terror to ban the ultranationalist Kach and Kahane Chai 
organizations, a ban that remains in effect. The decision provides for 
imprisonment for anyone belonging to, or expressing support for, either 
organization.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government generally respects this right. Approximately 80 
percent of citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members 
of other religions make up the remaining 20 percent. Each recognized 
religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of 
marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of 
inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to 
religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family 
status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be 
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts. 
Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be 
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts. 
Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters. 
Legislation passed in 1996 allows the rabbinical courts to sanction 
either party who is not willing to grant a divorce.
    Many citizens object to the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities' 
exclusive control over Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial. These 
authorities do not recognize marriages or conversions to Judaism 
performed in Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis. These issues have 
been a source of serious controversy within society, particularly in 
recent years, as thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union have brought with them family members not recognized as Jewish by 
Orthodox authorities.
    Many Jews who wish to be married in secular or non-Orthodox 
religious ceremonies do so abroad. The Ministry of Interior recognizes 
such marriages.
    Under the Government's current interpretation and implementation of 
Jewish personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to initiate 
divorce proceedings without her husband's consent; consequently there 
are hundreds of so-called ``agunot'' in the country who cannot remarry 
or have legitimate children because their husbands either have 
disappeared or refused to grant a divorce.
    In August Prime Minister Barak announced his plans to ``separate 
religion from politics'' by promoting a ``civil-social revolution'' 
consisting of a number of measures including: Drafting a constitution, 
folding the Ministry of Religious Affairs into the Ministry of Justice, 
lifting restrictions on transportation during the Sabbath, allowing for 
some form of civil marriages, eliminating the nationality clause from 
identification cards, and introducing a new core curriculum in all 
state-funded schools. These proposals triggered a national debate on 
religion and society. By year's end, none of these proposed reforms had 
been implemented.
    A January 1999 High Court ruling enabled Reform and Conservative 
rabbis to hold seats on the powerful municipal and religious councils. 
In 1998 the High Court ruled that draft exemptions for yeshiva students 
was illegal; however, it delayed implementation of the ruling several 
times and gave the Knesset until December 21 to pass legislation on the 
matter. On December 20, an 11-justice panel of the High Court rejected 
the Government's request for another extension; however, it stated that 
it would grant the IDF a ``reasonable period'' of time in which to 
implement the ruling.
    The Government provides proportionally greater financial support to 
institutions in the Jewish sector compared with those in the non-Jewish 
sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze. For example, only 2.4 
percent of the Ministry of Religious Affairs budget for 1999 was 
allocated to the non-Jewish sector, although Muslims, Christians, and 
Druze constitute 20 percent of the population. In 1998 the High Court 
of Justice ruled that the budget allocation constituted ``prima facie 
discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide 
adequate information about the religious needs of the various 
communities. The court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on 
the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the 
legislature. However, during the year, the court ordered the Government 
to allocate resources equitably to cemeteries of the Jewish and Arab 
communities.
    The status of a number of Christian organizations with 
representation in Israel heretofore has been defined by a collection of 
ad hoc arrangements with various government agencies. Several of these 
organizations seek to negotiate with the Government in an attempt to 
formalize their status.
    Missionaries are allowed to proselytize, although the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints voluntarily refrains from doing so 
under an agreement with the Government. A 1977 anti-proselytizing law 
prohibits anyone from offering or receiving material benefits as an 
inducement to conversion; however, there have been no reports of its 
enforcement. On December 6, a law prohibiting some missionary activity 
and the dissemination of some missionary material passed a first 
reading in the Knesset.
    Jehovah's Witnesses suffered verbal abuse, assaults, theft, and 
vandalism; however, they reported that the police response to their 
complaints improved significantly during the year.
    The Government has recognized only Jewish holy places under the 
1967 Protection of Holy Sites Law. The Government states that it also 
protects the holy sites of other faiths, and that it has provided funds 
for some holy sites of other faiths.
    A group of more than 100 Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform women 
continued a long legal battle to hold women's prayer services at the 
Western Wall during the year. In May the High Court ruled that women 
may read from the Torah and wear prayer shawls at the Western Wall. 
Both legislators and the state prosecutor's office sought to overturn 
the ruling; however, they were not successful as of year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice for citizens, except with 
regard to military or security zones or in instances where citizens may 
be confined by administrative order to their neighborhoods or villages. 
However, following the outbreak of violence in late September, the 
Government imposed some restrictions on the movement of persons within 
the country as well as between Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and 
between cities inside the West Bank and Gaza (also see Section 2.d. of 
the annex). The Government continued to restrict the movements of two 
Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to 
extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative 
orders issued by the IDF central command (see Section 2.d. of the 
annex).
    Citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they 
have no outstanding military obligations and are not restricted by 
administrative order. During the year, the Government generally 
continued to permit Muslim citizens to make the Hajj. However for 
security reasons, the Government imposes some restrictions on its 
Muslim citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be 
over the age of 30. The Government does not allow persons to return if 
they leave the country without formal permission. The Government 
justifies these restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remains 
officially at war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore 
is considered subject to security considerations.
    The Government states that non-Jewish female citizens who marry 
non-citizen men may retain their citizenship. The Government also 
asserts that the male spouses of non-Jewish citizens may acquire 
citizenship under the family reunification program, except in cases 
where the man has a criminal record or is suspected of posing a threat 
to security. However, Christian, Muslim, or Druze women who have 
married men from Arab states or the West Bank and Gaza have complained 
about losing their Israeli citizenship and right to reenter Israel.
    During the demonstrations and disturbances in late September, 
police reportedly closed roads and entrances to some Arab villages and 
cities around the country. According to human rights groups, police 
also sometimes delayed ambulances and medical personnel from entering 
Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the clashes (see 
Section 1.c.). Journalists complained about limitations placed on their 
freedom of movement during the violence in Israel and the occupied 
territories (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants, their Jewish or non-
Jewish family members, and Jewish refugees, on whom it confers 
automatic citizenship and residence rights under the Law of Return. 
This law does not apply to non-Jews or to persons of Jewish descent who 
have converted to another faith. Other than the Law of Return and the 
family reunification statutes there is no immigration law that provides 
for immigration to the country, or for political asylum or refugee 
status. The law does allow individuals to live in the country as 
permanent residents.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. The Government does not provide asylum to 
refugees from states with which the country remains in a state of war. 
The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution. Six Iraqis who had been held in detention found asylum in 
Europe during the year (see Section 1.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage for adult citizens. The last national elections were held in 
May 1999. On December 9, Ehud Barak resigned as Prime Minister; the 
next prime ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February 
6, 2001.
    Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty 
system in which a wide range of political views are represented. 
Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is 
among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. Elections are 
by secret ballot.
    There are no legal impediments to the participation of women and 
minorities in government; however, they are underrepresented. Women 
hold 15 of 120 Knesset seats, compared with 9 female members in the 
previous Knesset. There are 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the Knesset; most 
represent parties that derive their support largely or entirely from 
the Arab community. Of the Knesset's 12 committees, 2 (including the 
Committee on the Status of Women) are chaired by a woman. There are two 
women in the Cabinet, but no Arab ministers. However, there is an Arab 
Deputy Foreign Minister. Four women, but no Arab or Druze citizens, 
serve on the 14-member High Court of Justice. During the year, the 
Government appointed an Arab to a 6-month term on the High Court; the 
Government did not renew his appointment at the end of his term.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with 
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital 
status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and 
nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, religion, political 
beliefs, and age. Local human rights groups are concerned that these 
laws often are not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized 
discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or 
mechanisms for their enforcement, sometimes are lacking.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. There continued to be 
action, both in and out of Government, to reduce violence against women 
in Jewish and Arab communities. Funding to combat such violence 
increased significantly in 1998 and has remained level since. In 1998 
the Government appointed a commission to address the subject of 
domestic violence; on the basis of the commission's recommendations, 
the Government allotted a supplementary budget allocation to combat 
domestic violence during the year. Groups that focus on domestic 
violence include a committee established by the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs that includes Jewish and Arab NGO's as well as 
government representatives, and a coalition of human rights 
organizations; however, women's rights activists reported that most of 
the groups are funded privately. Twenty-three women were killed by 
their husbands or other male relatives during the year. According to 
one prominent women's group, between 150,000 and 200,000 women suffer 
from domestic violence each year, and some 7 percent of these are 
abused on a regular basis. According to women's organizations, 
approximately 2,800 women were assaulted sexually and approximately 
1,200 were victims of incest during the year; about 44 percent of the 
women were under age 18. Only a small percentage of the victims 
complained to the police.
    Arab human rights advocates also have formed a coalition to raise 
public awareness of so-called family ``honor killings,'' a term 
commonly used for the murder of a female by a male relative for alleged 
misconduct. At least 5 of the 23 women killed during the year by male 
relatives were killed in family ``honor'' cases; families often attempt 
to cover up the cause of such deaths.
    The Government provides partial funding for 12 shelters for 
battered women, including 1 exclusively for Arab women and 1 for ultra-
Orthodox Jewish women. Women's rights advocates consider this number 
inadequate. The Government also provides funding for 13 rape crisis 
centers. There are 25 domestic violence prevention and treatment 
centers, which mainly are funded privately.
    According to the 1991 Domestic Violence Law, a district or 
magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their 
property. Women's groups cooperate with legal and social service 
institutions to provide women's rights education. While sentences 
handed down to men convicted of rape have increased in recent years, 
women's rights activists argue that the penalties are not sufficiently 
harsh.
    Unlike in past years, there were no reports that Jewish religious 
extremists attacked physically women whom they considered to be dressed 
immodestly in public.
    Prostitution per se is not illegal; however, the operation of 
brothels and organized sex enterprises is outlawed.
    Trafficking in women has become a significant problem in recent 
years. According to recent studies, every year hundreds of women from 
the former Soviet Union are brought to Israel by well-organized 
criminal networks and forced to work illegally as prostitutes (see 
Section 6.f.).
    In 1998 Israel adopted a comprehensive sexual harassment prevention 
law; since that time several prominent cases have increased public 
awareness of the issue. For example, in July the Government lifted the 
immunity of then Transportation Minister Yitzhak Mordecai following 
complaints that he had sexually harassed three women. As of July, the 
Civil Service Commission had received 55 complaints of sexual 
harassment in the Ministry of Defense.
    Women's advocacy groups report that women routinely receive lower 
wages for comparable work, are promoted less often, and have fewer 
career opportunities than their male counterparts. Despite 1996 
legislation that provides for class action suits and requires employers 
to provide equal pay for equal work, including important side benefits 
and allowances, women's rights advocates charged that deep gaps 
remained. For example, the wage gap between men and women for year-
round, full-time employment is about 30 percent, and only 2 percent of 
women serve in positions of senior management in large companies. 
According to recent reports, 51 percent of doctoral students are women, 
but women compose only 23 percent of the senior faculty members at 
universities and only 9.5 percent of full professors.
    Legislation in 1993, reinforced by a 1994 ruling of the High Court 
of Justice, has increased the percentage of women on the boards of 
government-owned companies. Women currently occupy 39 percent of 
director slots, up from 28.8 percent in 1997.
    The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage 
and divorce is left to religious courts, where Jewish and Muslim women 
are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights (see Section 
2.c.). Under personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to 
initiate divorce proceedings without her husband's consent; 
consequently there are estimated to be thousands of so-called 
``agunot'' who cannot remarry or have legitimate children because their 
husbands either have disappeared or have refused to grant a divorce.
    The 1995 Rabbinical Courts Law allows rabbinical tribunals to 
impose sanctions on husbands who refuse to divorce wives who have ample 
grounds for divorce, such as abuse. However, in some cases rabbinical 
courts have failed to invoke these sanctions. In addition, there have 
been cases in which a wife has failed to agree to a divorce, but a 
husband has been allowed to remarry; this permission is not given to 
wives. Such imbalances have been used by husbands to extort concessions 
from their wives in return for agreeing to a divorce. Rabbinical courts 
also may exercise jurisdiction over and issue sanctions against non-
Israeli persons present in Israel.
    Religious law can be even more restrictive for Muslims: some 
Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request a 
divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is 
granted to a man.
    Jewish women are subject to the military draft; however, they have 
been barred from combat positions. In 1997 the Knesset passed 
legislation that opens all military professions, including combat 
positions, to women; however, the legislation was not implemented by 
year's end. In response to a High Court of Justice ruling, the Israeli 
Air Force (IAF) since 1996 has permitted women to enter pilot training. 
At year's end, three women were operating as navigators in F-4's and F-
16's and one woman was nearing completion of pilot training. Recent IAF 
rulings allow female flight surgeons to participate in combat rescue 
missions and permit women to serve as flight mechanics for combat 
helicopter patrols.
    In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law, which 
provides for equal rights for women in the workplace, the military, 
education, health, housing, and social welfare, and entitles women to 
protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and 
trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of 
children. However, in practice resources sometimes are insufficient, 
particularly with respect to low-income families. Government spending 
is proportionally lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish 
areas, which adversely affects children in Arab villages and cities. 
Education is compulsory to age 15, or until the child reaches the 10th 
grade, whichever comes first. Government ministries, children's rights 
groups, and members of the legislature often cooperate on children's 
rights issues. The Government provides an extensive health care program 
for children. There is a broad network of mother and child clinics, 
which provide prenatal care as well as postnatal follow-up.
    The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and 
psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive 
reporting requirements. Although there has been a sharp increase in 
reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists believe that 
this is largely due to increased awareness of the issue rather than a 
growing pattern of abuse. There are five shelters for children at risk. 
The Ministry of Justice formed a committee with police and NGO 
representatives that is attempting to assess the scope of child 
prostitution. Children's rights activists estimate that there may be 
several hundred prostitutes among the nation's children, and they warn 
that the phenomenon is unlikely to be eradicated until the social 
problems that give rise to it--including child abuse and schools that 
give up too readily on dropouts--are addressed.
    NGO's in the field of children's welfare concentrate their efforts 
on public education, on promoting the concept of children's rights as 
citizens, on improving legal representation for minors, and on 
combating the problems of poverty, which are most notable for the 
Bedouin children of the south. There has been concern about the 
children of the country's growing population of foreign workers, many 
of whom reside in the country illegally. Children of such families, 
believed to number in the thousands, exist in a legal and social limbo, 
without access to schools or adequate health services.
    Privately funded children's rights information centers have been 
established in some communities, and the Government assists in funding 
additional centers in other cities.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government provides a range of 
benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and 
transportation support for disabled persons, who constitute about 10 
percent of the population. Existing antidiscrimination laws do not 
prohibit discrimination based on disability, and these citizens 
continue to encounter difficulties in areas such as employment and 
housing. A law requiring access for the disabled to public buildings is 
not widely enforced. There is no law providing for access to public 
transportation for the disabled. A 1996 law extended disability 
assistance for deaf children from the age of 14 to maturity. Extended 
protests by disabled organizations 1999 led to an increase in 
government spending in support of the disabled.
    During the year, the Government implemented a law seeking to 
rehabilitate and integrate the mentally disabled into the community; 
however, government discrimination against the mentally disabled 
remained a problem. According to the Ministry of Health, there are 
between 60,000 to 80,000 mentally disabled persons in the country; 
however, only 4 percent of the Ministry of Health's $5 billion (20 
billion NIS) budget is allocated for mental health services. 
Additionally, 80 percent of the mental health budget is allocated to 
psychiatric hospitals where less than 6,000 of the mentally disabled 
reside; the remaining tens of thousands of mentally disabled persons 
live on their own with little or no government support to help them 
integrate into the community.
    Religious Minorities.--Tensions between secular and religious 
elements of society continued to grow during the year. The non-Orthodox 
Jewish community in particular has complained of discrimination and 
intolerance (see Section 2.c.).
    Evangelical Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Reform and 
Conservative Jews complained of incidents of harassment, threats, and 
vandalism directed against their buildings, and other facilities, many 
of which were committed by two ultraorthodox groups Yad L'Achim and Lev 
L'Achim. In civic areas where religion is a determining criterion, such 
as the religious courts and centers of education, non-Jewish 
institutions routinely receive less state support than their Jewish 
counterparts.
    During the demonstrations and disturbances in October, there were 
several incidents involving attacks on synagogues and mosques. In 
October Arab protesters attacked a synagogue in Shafar'am. Jewish 
protesters attacked mosques in Acco and Tiberias.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government does not provide 
Israeli Arabs, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the 
population, with the same quality of education, housing, employment, 
and social services as Jews. In addition, government spending is 
proportionally far lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish 
areas; on a per capita basis, the Government spends two-thirds as much 
for Arabs than for Jews. According to the National Insurance Institute, 
42 percent of Israeli Arabs live below the poverty line, compared with 
20 percent of the total population. The Government also follows a 
disproportionately restrictive policy on issuing building permits to 
Arab citizens, resulting in the issuance of proportionately more 
building demolition orders against Arab-built structures. Ministers in 
the Barak Government publicly acknowledged the continuing disparities 
in government funding for Israel's non-Jewish citizens. Following the 
demonstrations and disturbances in September and October (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.), the Government approved a $975 million (4 billion NIS) 
economic assistance plan for the country's Arab citizens to be phased 
in over 4 years. Most of the money included in the plan is allocated 
for education and new infrastructure development. Israeli Arab leaders 
and human rights groups criticized the plan because it was not based on 
a comprehensive survey of the economic and development needs of the 
country's Arab population and was considered inadequate to meet that 
population's needs. Critics also pointed out that only half of the 
total sum represented newly allocated money. The Government did not 
implement the plan by year's end, and according to newspaper reports, 
the Government's 2001 budget proposal did not include details about 
funding for the plan.
    The Government appointed an Arab citizen to the board of the Israel 
land authority in November 1999. This marked the first representation 
of non-Jews on this body, half of whose members represent organizations 
forbidden by statute to transfer land to non-Jews. In March the High 
Court of Justice ruled on an October 1995 petition brought by an Arab 
couple that was barred from buying a home in Katzir, a Jewish 
municipality, which was built on state-owned land. The High Court ruled 
that the Government's use of the Jewish National Fund to develop public 
land was discriminatory, since the fund's by-laws prohibit the sale or 
lease of land to non-Jews. The High Court noted that its ruling in the 
case would not affect previous land allocations and that 
differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in land allocation might be 
acceptable under unspecified ``special circumstances.'' Following the 
High Court's decision, the Government established an interministerial 
committee to examine the issues involved in implementing the decision. 
The Israel Lands Administration had not implemented the ruling in this 
case by year's end and the Ka'adan family still was not allocated a 
plot of land in Katzir. Israeli Arab organizations have challenged the 
1996 ``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as 
priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking 
the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds 
that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the Government continues 
to use this document for planning in the Galilee.
    Relative to their numbers, Israeli Arabs are underrepresented in 
the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher 
level professional and business ranks. Arabs constitute only 8.7 
percent of the students at major universities in the country. Well-
educated Arabs often are unable to find jobs commensurate with their 
level of education. Arab citizens hold only 50 of the country's 5,000 
university faculty positions. The Government states that it is 
committed to granting equal and fair conditions to Israeli Arabs, 
particularly in the areas of education, housing, and employment. A 
small number of Israeli Arabs have risen to responsible positions in 
the civil service, generally in the Arab departments of government 
ministries. In 1994 a civil service commission began a 3-year 
affirmative action program to expand that number, but it has had only 
modest results. Arab citizens compose 6.2 percent of the civil service 
and less than 2 percent of the positions in the four senior-most civil 
service grades. In October the Knesset passed a bill that minorities 
and underrepresented populations must be granted ``appropriate 
representation'' in the civil service, and on the boards of government 
corporations.
    In practice, few Israeli Arabs serve in the military or work in 
companies with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The 
Israeli Druze and Circassian communities are subject to the military 
draft, and although some have refused to serve, the overwhelming 
majority accepts service willingly. Some Bedouin and other Arab 
citizens who are not subject to the draft serve voluntarily. Those who 
do not serve in the army have less access than other citizens to those 
social and economic benefits for which military service is a 
prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies, 
and government or security-related industrial employment. Under a 1994 
government policy decision, the social security child allowance for 
parents who did not serve in the military and did not attend a yeshiva 
(including Arabs) was increased to equal the allowance of those who had 
done so.
    Israeli Arab groups allege that many employers use the prerequisite 
of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For example, a September 
1999 survey revealed that 40 percent of employment ads in one weekend 
newspaper listed ``army service necessary.'' Jobs included ice cream 
sales, typist, bus driver, and customer service.
    There are approximately 130,000 Bedouin in the Negev; of this 
number about half live in 7 state planned communities and the other 
half live in 45 settlements that are not recognized by the Government. 
The recognized Bedouin villages receive basic services from the 
Government; however, they are among the poorest communities in the 
country. The unrecognized villages were declared illegal by the 
National Planning and Building Law of 1965 when the lands on which they 
sit were rezoned as nonresidential and the Government claimed 
ownership. According to the Government, recognizing these villages 
would conflict with its attempts to establish new villages in ``an 
orderly manner, and would leave disputes over the land unresolved.'' 
Residents of the unrecognized villages pay taxes to the Government; 
however, they are not eligible for government services. Consequently, 
such villages have none of the infrastructure, such as electricity, 
water, and sewers, provided to recognized communities. The lack of 
basic services has caused difficulties for the villagers in regard to 
their education, health care, and employment opportunities. New 
building in the unrecognized villages is considered illegal and subject 
to demolition. Private efforts have supplied some unrecognized villages 
with water, and the courts have ordered the provision of limited health 
and education services. The Government has yet to fulfill its 
commitment to resolve the legal status of unrecognized Arab villages. 
Eight villages have been recognized officially since 1994, but nearly 
100 more, of varying size and with a total population of nearly 70,000 
persons, remain in limbo. Of the eight villages that have been 
recognized, the Government has yet to actually implement the decisions. 
In 1998 the High Court of Justice ordered the Ministry of Education to 
provide electricity to schools in several unrecognized villages in the 
Negev. In March 1999, the High Court ordered the Ministry of Health to 
provide within 2 months six permanent health clinics to serve the 
unrecognized villages; however, the clinics had not been built by 
year's end. In November the High Court ruled that the Government must 
build a school for the children in the unrecognized village of Beer 
Hadaj within 4 months. During the year, the Ministry of Interior and 
the Attorney General declared that residents of Husseinya, an 
unrecognized village, could list their village's name as their place of 
residence on their identification cards.
    Arab children make up about a quarter of the public school 
population, but Government resources for them are less than 
proportionate to those for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab 
communities are dilapidated and overcrowded, lack special education 
services and counselors, have poor libraries, and have no sports 
facilities. According to a report issued during the year, only 54 
percent of Arab students finish high school compared with 89 percent of 
Jewish students. According to 1998 statistics, 58 percent of the 
teachers in Jewish schools had university degrees compared with 39 
percent of the teachers in Arab schools. The disparity in government 
resources for education also affects Bedouin children from the 
unrecognized villages. Currently, preschool attendance for Bedouin 
children is the lowest in the country, and the dropout rate for Bedouin 
high school students is the highest. Arab groups also note that the 
public school curriculum stresses Israel's Jewish culture and heritage.
    Israeli Arab students also are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. A petition was filed with the High 
Court of Justice in May 1997 charging that the Ministry of Education's 
refusal to provide this program to Israeli Arab students was 
discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed that the policy 
constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for 5 years to 
expand the program to Israeli Arab students. The petitioners rejected 
this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings in the case 
twice in 1999; however, it still had not ruled on the proper 
implementation period by year's end.
    Unresolved problems of many years' standing also include claims by 
Arab groups that land expropriation for public use has affected the 
Arab community disproportionately; that Arabs have been allowed too 
little input in planning decisions that affect their schools and 
municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries belonging to the Islamic 
Waqf (religious endowment) have been neglected or expropriated unjustly 
for public use; and that successive governments have blocked the return 
to their homes of citizens displaced in the early years of the 
country's history. The Government has yet to agree with the pre-1948 
residents of the northern villages of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their 
descendants, regarding their long-term demand to be allowed to rebuild 
their houses. In 1997 a special interministerial panel recommended that 
the Government allow the villagers to return to Bir Am and Ikrit. The 
High Court has granted the Government several extensions for 
implementing the recommendation, including 2 extensions during the 
year. The Government stated that a special interministerial panel 
currently is examining economic aspects of the issue.
    In early October, there were many instances of societal violence 
between Arab and Jewish citizens which coincided with violent events in 
Israel and the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and the 
annex). For example, on October 3, an Israeli Arab shot and killed an 
Israeli Jew on a road in the north of the country. On October 7, a 
group of about 200 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in 
predominantly Jewish Upper Nazareth. On October 8, a group of about 
1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in Nazareth. Two persons 
were killed and approximately 50 persons were injured in these attacks 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Jewish citizens also attacked Arab homes, 
businesses that employed Arabs, and two mosques in other areas of the 
country. During the October disturbances, Arab protesters also attacked 
Jewish-owned businesses throughout the country, and in at least one 
case Arab crowds attacked a synagogue.
    In 1991 the Government launched Operation Solomon, which airlifted 
14,000 Ethiopian immigrants to the country. There were occasional 
reports of societal discrimination during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join and establish labor 
organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut (the General 
Federation of Labor in Israel), or to a much smaller rival federation, 
the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor). These 
organizations are independent of the Government. Histadrut members 
democratically elect national and local officers, and officials of its 
affiliated women's organization Na'amat, from political party lists of 
those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee members are 
elected individually. About 650,000 workers are members of Histadrut, 
and much of the non-Histadrut work force is covered by Histadrut's 
collective bargaining agreements.
    The right to strike is exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15 
days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the 
collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes occur. 
Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are protected by 
law. If essential public services are affected, the Government may 
appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the parties 
continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both the 
public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting the 
effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance 
arrangements often were the central issues of dispute.
    Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who worked in Israel 
were not able to join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions 
in Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not 
permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the 
annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector are 
entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance 
procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level 
workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments 
exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such 
committees is minimal.
    Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the 
Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizen workers 
fully exercise their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively. 
While there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion 
discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to 
contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion 
discrimination has been reported.
    Nonresident workers may not organize their own unions or engage in 
collective bargaining, but they are entitled to be represented by the 
bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements. 
They do not pay union membership fees, but are required to pay a 1 
percent agency fee, which entitles them to union protection by 
Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of Labor may 
extend collective bargaining agreements to nonunionized workplaces in 
the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor also oversees 
personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, specifically including child forced labor, 
and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel are 
generally subject to this practice; however, women are trafficked for 
the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Civil rights groups 
charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
workers' lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to 
involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who 
are liable to compulsory education under the compulsory education law, 
may not be employed unless they work as apprentices under the 
Apprenticeship Law. Notwithstanding these provisions, children who are 
14 years old may be employed during official school holidays. 
Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time 
for rest and education.
    There are no reliable data on illegal child workers. They are 
concentrated among the country's Arab population and its most recent 
Jewish immigrants. Illegal employment is found primarily in urban, 
light-industrial areas. Children's rights groups have called for more 
vigorous enforcement of child labor laws, combined with a parallel 
effort to deal with the causes of illegal child labor. The Government 
specifically prohibits forced child labor, and it generally does not 
occur.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation in 1987 established 
a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average wage, calculated 
periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At year's end, 
the minimum wage was about $700 (2,800 NIS) per month. The minimum wage 
often is supplemented by special allowances and generally is sufficient 
to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Union 
officials have expressed concern over enforcement of minimum wage 
regulations, particularly with respect to employers of illegal 
nonresident workers, who sometimes pay less than the minimum wage.
    By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a 
week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest, 
which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath. By 
national collective agreements, the private sector established a 
maximum 45-hour workweek in 1988. The public sector moved to a 5-day, 
42-plus hour workweek in 1989, while the military adopted it in 1993.
    Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident 
workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is 
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories 
are employed on a daily basis and, unless they are employed on shift 
work, are not authorized to spend the night in Israel. The Government 
has in the past considered, but not acted on, a change in this 
provision to allow Palestinian workers to remain overnight for a week 
at a time. Palestinians without valid work permits are subject to 
arrest. Due to security concerns, the Government stopped issuing 
permits for Palestinian workers following the outbreak of violence in 
October.
    Nonresident workers are paid through the employment service of the 
Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from 
employers. The Ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee and the workers' 
required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the 
agency that administers the Israeli social security system, 
unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions, 
Palestinian workers are not eligible for all NII benefits. They 
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel and the 
bankruptcy of a worker's employer. They do not have access to 
unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income 
supplements, or child allotments. By contrast, Israeli settlers in the 
occupied territories who work in Israel have the same benefits as other 
Israeli workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long 
criticized this inequality in entitlements. Since 1993 the Government 
has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected from Palestinian workers 
to the Palestinian Authority, which is to assume responsibility for all 
the pensions and social benefits of Palestinians working in Israel.
    There was increased public debate over the role in the workplace 
and society of foreign workers, who are estimated to number at least 
180,000, perhaps half of them undocumented and employed illegally. The 
majority of such workers come from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, 
and most are employed in the construction and agricultural sectors. The 
law does not allow such workers citizenship or permanent residence. As 
a result, they and their families live in a legal and social limbo. 
Government deportations of such workers take place without benefit of 
due process. In August press reports stated that the Government ordered 
an increase in deportations of undocumented foreign workers; however, 
the deportations were not carried out. Human rights groups argue that 
since foreign worker residency permits are tied to specific employment, 
workers have little leverage to influence their work conditions. In May 
the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that it had prevented labor 
organizations from distributing pamphlets on labor rights to foreign 
workers who arrived at the airport. Following the outbreak of violence 
in September, the Government implemented a closure policy, which 
prevented thousands of Palestinians from getting to their jobs in 
Israel (see Section 2.d.). On December 17, in response to pressure for 
additional workers from the construction and agricultural sectors, the 
Government announced that it would grant temporary permits to several 
thousand additional foreign workers.
    Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service 
enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although 
resource constraints affect overall enforcement. Legislation protects 
the employment rights of safety delegates elected or appointed by the 
workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates are 
responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
    Workers do not have the legal right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. 
However, collective bargaining agreements provide some workers with 
recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may 
challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal 
agencies.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women for the purpose of 
prostitution is a continuing problem. According to Amnesty 
International (AI), every year hundreds of women from the former Soviet 
Union are brought to Israel by well-organized criminal networks and 
forced through violence and threats to work illegally as prostitutes. 
According to some local NGO's, thousands of women are trafficked into 
the country annually.
    In June the Government enacted a law that prohibits the trafficking 
of persons for the purpose of prostitution. Prostitution per se is not 
illegal; however, the operation of brothels and organized sex 
enterprises is outlawed, as are many of the human rights abuses 
perpetrated by traffickers and pimps, such as assault, rape, abduction, 
and false imprisonment. Section 201 of the Penal Code stipulates that 
it is a criminal offense, punishable by between 5 and 7 years' 
imprisonment, to force or coerce a person to engage in prostitution. 
Section 202(b) of the Penal Code makes it a criminal offense to induce 
a woman to leave Israel with the intent to ``practice prostitution 
abroad.'' In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law (see 
Section 5); Section 6(b) of the law stipulates that every woman is 
entitled to protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual 
exploitation, and trafficking.
    Traffickers reportedly often lure women into coming to the country 
by offering them jobs in the service industry. In many cases, 
traffickers meet women at the airport and confiscate all of their 
official documents. Many trafficked women are forced to live and work 
under extremely harsh conditions and to give most of the money they 
earn to their bosses. The women reportedly often are raped and beaten, 
and often are afraid to report their situation to the police because 
they are in the country illegally.
    According to press reports, brothels are ubiquitous despite being 
illegal, and police officials estimate that there are 25,000 paid 
sexual transactions every day. Police often detain trafficked women 
following raids on brothels. The Minister of Interior has broad powers 
to deport illegal aliens and to hold them in detention pending 
deportation. The Ministry may issue deportation orders against any 
person who is in the country without a residence permit and may hold 
the deportee in detention following the issuance of a deportation 
order. The deportee can appeal the deportation order to the Ministry 
within 3 days of its issuance and also can challenge the order in the 
High Court. However, trafficked women often do not challenge a 
deportation order due to language barriers or a lack of information 
about the appeals procedure. Many trafficked women are detained for 
extended periods of time because of government orders that they stay in 
the country to testify in the criminal proceedings against their 
traffickers. Many women are reluctant or afraid to testify in trials 
due to threats and intimidation by their traffickers. According to AI, 
women refuse to testify in court in about 90 percent of all the cases 
that are prosecuted. Since 1997 police have arrested and deported 
approximately 1,200 women who were trafficked to the country for 
prostitution. According to AI, the Government does not attempt to 
determine whether or not a trafficked woman would be at risk for 
persecution if she is deported to her country of origin, even in cases 
in which the woman or girl has testified in criminal proceedings.

                       The Occupied Territitories

    (including areas subject to the jurisdiction of the palestinian 
                               authority)
    Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East 
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are now 
administered to varying extents by Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA). Pursuant to the May 1994
    Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement, 
Israel transferred most responsibilities for civil government in the 
Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the PA while retaining 
responsibility for external security; foreign relations; the overall 
security of Israelis, including public order in the Israeli 
settlements; and certain other matters.
    An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the 
Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued 
with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration 
of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the 
Hebron Agreement and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye 
River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO 
signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive 
working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in 
July; however, the Israeli Government and the PLO did not reach an 
agreement. On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon 
visited the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 
29, Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police 
in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal 
bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 
persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident, 
Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers, 
settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied 
territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes--known to 
Palestinians and many Israelis as the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''--between 
Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the 
year.
    Israel and the Palestinian Authority have varying degrees of 
control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel 
continues to control certain civil functions and is responsible for all 
security in portions of the occupied territories categorized as Area C, 
which includes the Israeli settlements and 4 percent of the total West 
Bank Palestinian population. In areas known as Area B, which includes 
41 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population, the PA has 
jurisdiction over civil affairs and shares security responsibilities 
with Israel. The PA has control over civil affairs and security in Area 
A, which includes 55 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population. 
The PA also has jurisdiction over some civil affairs in Area C, as 
specified in the Interim Agreement. Accordingly, this report discusses 
the policies and practices of both the Israeli Government and the PA in 
the areas in which they exercise jurisdiction and control.
    Israel continues to exercise civil authority in parts of the West 
Bank and Gaza through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of 
Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK, which 
replaced the now defunct Civil Administration (CIVAD) in 1995. The 
approximately 175,000 Israeli settlers living in Area C of the West 
Bank and in the Gaza Strip are subject to Israeli law and, as citizens, 
receive preferential treatment from Israeli authorities in terms of 
protection of personal and property rights and of legal redress. The 
body of law governing Palestinians in the territories derives from 
Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and Israeli 
military orders. Certain laws and regulations promulgated by the PA 
also are in force. The international community considers Israel's 
authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the 
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli Government 
considers the Hague Regulations applicable and states that it observes 
the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
    In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected 
Government in democratic elections that generally were well-conducted; 
the 88-member Palestinian Council (PC) and the Chairman of the 
Executive Authority were elected. The PA also has a cabinet of 30 
ministers. Chairman Yasir Arafat continues to dominate the affairs of 
government and to make major decisions. Most senior government 
positions in the PA are held by individuals who are members of, or 
loyal to, Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. The Council meets 
regularly and discusses a range of issues significant to the 
Palestinian people; however, it does not have significant influence on 
policy or the behavior of the executive. In Gaza the legal code derives 
from British Mandate law, Egyptian law, and PA directives and laws. In 
the West Bank, pre-1967 Jordanian law and PA laws apply. The PA states 
that it is undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank legal 
codes; however, it has made little progress to date. The PA courts are 
perceived as inefficient and the PA executive and security services 
frequently ignore or fail to carry out court decisions.
    Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); the Israel Security Agency (the ISA--
formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known as Shin 
Bet, or Shabak); the Israeli National Police (INP); and the 
paramilitary border police. Israeli military courts try Palestinians 
accused of committing security crimes in Israeli-controlled areas. 
Members of the Israeli security forces committed numerous serious human 
rights abuses, particularly following the outbreak of violence in late 
September.
    The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and 
includes the Palestinian Public Security Force; the Palestinian Civil 
Police; the Preventive Security Force (PSF); the General Intelligence 
Service, or Mukhabarat; the Palestinian Presidential Security Force; 
and the Palestinian Coastal Police. Other quasi-military security 
organizations, such as the military intelligence organization, also 
exercise de facto law enforcement powers. Palestinian police are 
responsible for security and law enforcement for Palestinians and other 
non-Israelis in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories are not subject to PA 
security force jurisdiction. Members of the PA security forces 
committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year.
    The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly 
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The economy relies primarily 
on agriculture, services, and, to a lesser extent, light manufacturing. 
Especially during periods of tension, Israel restricts the movement of 
persons and products into Israel and Jerusalem from the West Bank and 
Gaza, which frequently affects the ability of Palestinians to reach 
their jobs in Israel. Since 1993 Israel has required Palestinians and 
their vehicles to have Israeli permits to cross from the West Bank or 
Gaza into Israel and Jerusalem. Approximately 125,000 West Bank and 
Gazan workers, representing roughly 20 percent of the Palestinian work 
force, normally are employed at day jobs in Israel, Israeli 
settlements, and Jerusalem, making their employment subject to 
disruption. Since 1993 Israel has applied ``closures,'' or enhanced 
restrictions, on the movement of persons and products, often for 
lengthy periods, in response to terrorist attacks or other changes in 
the security environment. During periods of violent protest in the West 
Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that there is an increased likelihood 
of such unrest or of terrorist attacks, Israel imposes a tightened 
version of closure. Comprehensive, tightened closures also are 
instituted regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such 
closures, Israel cancels all travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem. 
Due to the ongoing unrest in the occupied territories, Israel imposed 
88 days of tightened, comprehensive closure during the year, compared 
with 15 days in 1999. In periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and 
Gaza, the Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns 
and villages within the West Bank--an ``internal'' closure--impeding 
the flow of goods and persons. During such internal closures, the 
Government also bans travel on the safe passage route between the West 
Bank and Gaza. Israel imposed at least 81 days of internal closure 
during the year, compared with no days of internal closure in 1999. In 
the past, Israel rarely imposed internal closure within Gaza; however, 
during much of November and December the Israeli Government imposed 
internal closure in Gaza. The prolonged periods of closure had a 
significant negative impact on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza.
    Israel's overall human rights record in the occupied territories 
was poor; although the situation improved slightly during the first 9 
months of the year, it worsened in several areas late in the year, 
mainly due to the sustained violence that began in September. Israeli 
security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses during 
the year. Security forces killed 307 Palestinians and four foreign 
nationals and injured at least 11,300 Palestinians and other persons 
during the year. Israeli security forces targeted for killing a number 
of Palestinians whom the Israeli Government stated had attacked or were 
planning future attacks on Israeli settlements or military targets; a 
number of bystanders reportedly also were killed during these 
incidents. Since the violence began, Israeli security units often used 
excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators. Israeli security 
forces sometimes exceeded their rules of engagement, which provide that 
live fire is only to be used when the lives of soldiers, police, or 
civilians are in imminent danger. IDF forces also shelled PA 
institutions and Palestinian civilian areas in response to individual 
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians or settlers; 7 Palestinians 
and 1 foreign national were killed, and 131 Palestinians were injured 
in these attacks. Israeli security forces abused Palestinians in 
detention suspected of security offenses. However, a September 1999 
landmark decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice prohibited the 
use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking, 
painful shackling in contorted positions, and prolonged exposure to 
extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have been unable to 
substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces tortured 
detainees. There were numerous credible allegations that police beat 
persons in detention. Three Palestinian prisoners died in Israeli 
custody under ambiguous circumstances during the year. Prison 
conditions are poor. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and 
infringements on privacy rights remained problems. Israeli security 
forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to 
Palestinian civilians. Israeli security forces destroyed Palestinian-
owned agricultural land. Israeli authorities censored Palestinian 
publications, placed limits on freedom of assembly, and restricted 
freedom of movement for Palestinians.
    The PA's overall human rights record was poor, and it worsened in 
several areas during the year mainly due to the sustained violence that 
began in late September. Palestinian security forces reportedly killed 
several Israeli security force members during violent clashes with 
Israeli soldiers or settlers. Members of Palestinian security services 
and Fatah's Tanzim participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians, 
some of them members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli 
civilians or soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian 
civilians; residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF 
retaliation for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed 
to prevent armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places 
in which Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or 
PA officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian 
security forces in October reportedly impeded the provision of medical 
assistance to an injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
    One Palestinian died in PA custody under ambiguous circumstances. 
PA prison conditions are very poor. PA security forces arbitrarily 
arrest and detain persons, and prolonged detention is a problem. Lack 
of due process also is a problem. The courts are perceived as 
inefficient, lack staff and resources, and do not ensure fair and 
expeditious trials. The PA executive and security services frequently 
ignore or fail to enforce court decisions. Lack of due process also is 
a serious problem in the PA's state security courts. PA security forces 
infringed on citizens' rights to privacy and restricted freedom of 
speech and of the press. The PA continued to harass, detain, and abuse 
journalists. PA harassment contributed to the practice of self-
censorship by many Palestinian commentators, reporters, and critics. 
The PA placed some limits on freedom of assembly and association. In 
February the PA police announced a ban on unlicensed public gatherings, 
but this action was invalidated by the Palestinian High Court 2 months 
later. Violence against women and ``honor killings'' persist. Societal 
discrimination against women and the disabled is a problem. Child labor 
is a problem.
    Israeli civilians, especially settlers, harassed, attacked, and 
occasionally killed Palestinians in the occupied territories. There 
were credible reports that settlers killed at least 14 Palestinians 
during the year. In one case, an Israeli civilian killed a Palestinian 
who previously had attacked a settlement and killed an IDF soldier. 
Settlers also caused economic damage to Palestinians by attacking and 
damaging greenhouses and agricultural equipment, uprooting olive trees, 
and damaging other valuable crops. The settlers did not act under 
government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government did 
not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general 
settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against 
Palestinians.
    Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories harassed, 
attacked, and occasionally killed Israelis, especially settlers. 
Palestinians killed at least 18 Israeli civilians during the year. A 
number of extremist Palestinian groups and individuals, including the 
militant Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ), continued to kill and injure Israelis. Five attacks and 
roadside bombings were carried out in Israel and the occupied 
territories. The PA made no arrests in any of these killings.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Israeli security 
forces killed numerous Palestinians in response to a sustained violent 
uprising late in the year. Most of the Palestinians were killed during 
demonstrations and other violent clashes, and others were targeted 
specifically by Israeli security forces.
    In May Israeli security forces killed six Palestinians and wounded 
up to 700 at demonstrations in which Palestinian demonstrators were 
protesting the continued incarceration of Palestinian prisoners in 
Israeli jails. Some protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and 
some demonstrators shot at Israeli settlers (see Section 1.c.).
    Deaths due to political violence increased significantly during the 
year due to the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' At least 365 persons were killed 
between late September and the end of December in demonstrations, 
violent clashes, and military and civilian attacks, including 325 
Palestinians, 36 Israelis, 3 Jordanian citizens, and 1 German citizen. 
Additionally, at least 10,962 persons were injured during this period, 
including 10,600 Palestinians and 362 Israelis (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.g.). On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited 
the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29, 
Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in 
the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal 
bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 
persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident, 
Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers, 
settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied 
territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes between 
Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the 
year.
    Between late September and the end of the year, Israeli security 
forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign nationals, and injured 
over 10,600 Palestinians during violent demonstrations. Palestinian 
demonstrators frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF 
soldiers. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also used firearms. 
According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in about 30 percent of 
the demonstrations between late September and mid-November. In 
response, Israeli security forces used a variety of means to disperse 
demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, and 
live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security forces used 
excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of their 
official rules of engagement (see Section 1.g.).
    Israeli Defense Force soldiers targeted for killing a number of 
Palestinians during the year. A senior Israeli official stated to the 
domestic press that the IDF deliberately targeted 10 Palestinians since 
the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' According to the IDF, the 
targeted persons were PA security officers or Fatah's Tanzim who 
previously had attacked or were planning future attacks on Israeli 
settlements or military targets. The Israeli Government stated that it 
only targeted persons against whom it had overwhelming evidence and 
only with the authorization of senior political leaders. PA officials 
and some human rights organizations claimed that a number of the 
targeted persons were not involved in the ongoing violence. IDF forces 
also killed 6 Palestinian bystanders and injured over a dozen others 
during these incidents (see Section 1.c.).
    On November 9, Israeli helicopters fired rockets at a car in Beit 
Sahour, killing Hussein Mohamed Salim Ubayyat, a Fatah official. Two 
Palestinian women walking on the road nearby were killed and seven 
other civilian bystanders were injured in the attack (see Section 
1.c.). An IDF spokesman later announced that Ubayyat had been targeted 
because of his prior involvement in a number of attacks against Israeli 
military and civilian targets.
    On December 31, IDF soldiers killed Dr. Thabet Ahmad Thabet, a 
high-ranking member of Fatah, while he was in his car near his home.
    There also were a number of instances in which is was unclear 
whether Israeli security forces targeted their victims. On November 17, 
IDF soldiers killed two Palestinian National Security Forces officers 
in Jericho. The IDF stated that the officers were part of a terrorist 
cell that previously had attacked IDF positions and some settlements. 
The PA stated that the two officers were killed while on duty and 
working to prevent Palestinian gunmen at a nearby refugee camp from 
shooting at Israeli positions.
    On November 22, IDF forces fired at 2 cars in Gaza, killing a 
senior Tanzim member, Jamal Abdel Raziq, and 3 other Tanzim members. 
The Israeli press reported that the 4 were terrorists who were 
attempting to infiltrate the Morag settlement and that security forces 
fired at the 2 cars after the drivers refused to stop at a road 
blockade. According to press reports, Israeli security sources later 
stated that the incident was an ``IDF-initiated operation'' against 
Raziq, who reportedly had been involved in attacks on Israelis in Gaza.
    On November 23, HAMAS member Ibrahim Abdel Karim Bani was killed 
when a bomb exploded in the borrowed car he was driving. Israeli 
security officials stated to the press that Bani Odeh was transporting 
explosives to carry out a terrorist attack that detonated prematurely. 
However, according to the PA and the Palestinian press, Bani Odeh was 
on a list of 10 Palestinians that the IDF planned to target for 
killing. PA security forces arrested Bani Odeh's cousin, who reportedly 
confessed to having provided information to the IDF about Odeh's 
whereabouts on the day he was killed.
    On November 26, IDF soldiers fired on nine Palestinian youths, 
killing five and injuring two. The Israeli press reported that the IDF 
refused an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) request to 
allow medical personnel access to the injured. Palestinian sources 
stated that the IDF subsequently fired on the injured persons with 
helicopter gunships. On November 27, Israeli radio, citing IDF sources, 
described the incident as a ``proactive'' IDF-initiated action that 
targeted known terrorists who had participated in previous attacks 
against Israeli civilian and military targets, including two attacks 
that took place earlier that day. The Israeli Government also stated 
that it had reason to believe that the Palestinian youths were planning 
an additional terrorist attack. Palestinian sources stated that the 
youths were on their way to visit friends when they were fired upon by 
the IDF.
    On December 10, IDF soldiers fired on two Palestinians who 
reportedly were planting a roadside bomb near Bethlehem, killing 
Mahmoud Mugrabi, a member of Fatah. According to press reports quoting 
a senior IDF official, Mugrabi's name was on a list of ten reputed 
terrorists that the IDF had targeted for killing.
    Israeli security force personnel killed several Palestinians in 
unclear circumstances. According to eyewitnesses and a credible 
Palestinian human rights organization, on October 6, an IDF soldier 
shot an unarmed 14-year-old boy on the porch of his home near Hebron; 
he later died. On December 11, Israeli security forces shot and killed 
Anwar Hmeiran, a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to 
Palestinian eyewitnesses, there were no clashes taking place at the 
time of the shooting. On December 16, Mohammad Fahed Maali was killed 
while reportedly walking past a clash between Israeli security forces 
and Palestinian demonstrators in Jenin; according to the Palestinian 
press, the Palestinian demonstrators did not use firearms in the 
demonstration. IDF soldiers killed Abbas Othman Ewaywi, a member of 
HAMAS. According to the IDF, Ewaywi was caught in crossfire between 
Israeli and Palestinian security forces. However, Palestinian media and 
eyewitnesses stated that there was no such exchange of gunfire when 
Ewaywi was shot. HAMAS issued a leaflet the same day vowing revenge for 
his death.
    On September 30, a journalist videotaped and broadcast 
internationally an exchange of fire between Israeli and Palestinian 
security forces at Netzarim junction that resulted in the killing of 
12-year-old Muhammad al-Dura. Many observers stated that the boy was 
killed by IDF fire; however, the IDF conducted an investigation and 
reported that it was not clear whether it was Israeli or Palestinian 
gunfire that killed al-Dura.
    The IDF generally did not investigate incidents in which security 
forces killed and injured Palestinians. The IDF stated that it did not 
investigate such incidents because of technical problems; because 
Israel does not have full control over the occupied territories, and 
the PA reportedly would not cooperate in investigations in Areas B and 
C, the IDF stated that it could not conduct such investigations. 
However, in certain high profile cases, such as the killing of Muhammad 
al-Dura and the injuring of a foreign journalist, the IDF agreed to 
investigate.
    In several incidents, following attacks on Israeli civilians, 
including settlers, IDF helicopters fired tank rounds and rockets from 
helicopters on towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and 
injuring a number of persons and causing significant damage to 
buildings (see Section 1.g.).
    Prior to the outbreak of violence in late September, members of the 
Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians at military 
checkpoints and roadblocks inside the occupied territories. In these 
instances, Israeli authorities stated that the individuals were shot 
after failing to obey orders to halt. Palestinian eyewitnesses disputed 
these accounts and charged that Israeli soldiers used excessive and 
unnecessary force. On March 20, Israeli soldiers killed Halima al-Aloul 
at the Kharas checkpoint near Hebron; al-Aloul was riding with her 
husband, who allegedly failed to stop at the checkpoint. On March 30, 
Murad al-Zaro was shot and killed by Israeli police officers near the 
Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem. Israeli police maintained that al-
Zaro failed to stop when ordered to do so; however, Palestinian 
eyewitnesses claimed that police shot al-Zaro after he already had 
stopped the car. On July 8, IDF soldiers killed a Palestinian woman in 
Gaza while she was riding in a car. According to the IDF, the soldiers 
fired because they believed that they heard shots fired from the car.
    On August 16, IDF security forces mistakenly killed Mahmoud Assad 
Abdullah al-Bazar in Surda village. According to the IDF, security 
forces surrounded his house in the mistaken belief that a wanted HAMAS 
terrorist was inside. According to his family members, al-Bazar went to 
his roof to investigate noises and fired one shot in the air to 
frighten presumed thieves. The IDF soldiers reportedly heard the shot 
and opened fire on al-Bazar.
    According to credible human rights organizations, Israeli security 
forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to sick 
and injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.); Palestinians claim that 
seven Palestinians died as a result. For example, on October 6, Israeli 
security forces delayed an ambulance from reaching a Palestinian who 
was wounded in a clash in Jerusalem; the Palestinian died later the 
same day. On October 14, IDF soldiers did not allow a father to bring 
his daughter into Nablus for medical treatment; she died the same day 
of a ruptured appendix. On October 16, IDF soldiers refused to allow a 
man into Nablus for kidney dialysis; he later died of kidney failure. 
According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical personnel 
sometimes used ambulances as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at 
Israeli civilians and soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
    In May Mohamad Abdel Jalil Fayez Saed from Askar refugee camp in 
Nablus died from wounds sustained in a 1991 confrontation with the IDF 
in which soldiers reportedly beat Saed for throwing stones at an IDF 
foot patrol, which left him paralyzed.
    Three Palestinian security detainees reportedly died in Israeli 
custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). On January 14, Lafi al-
Rajabi died in a detention center near Nablus; his body reportedly bore 
cuts and bruises. On June 19, Sami As'ad reportedly hanged himself in 
Kishon prison; according to newspaper reports he previously had 
attempted suicide. On August 11, Ramez Fayez Mohammed Rashing Elrizi 
died in al-Nafha prison under ambiguous circumstances. The Israeli 
Government did not publish official autopsies in these deaths.
    Palestinian security forces reportedly killed several Israeli 
security force members during violent clashes with Israeli soldiers or 
settlers. Members of Palestinian security services and Fatah's Tanzim 
participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians, some of them 
members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli civilians or 
soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian civilians; 
residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation 
for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed to prevent 
armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places in which 
Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or PA 
officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian security 
forces reportedly impeded the provision of medical assistance to an 
injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
    On September 29, a Palestinian policeman killed one Israeli border 
policeman and injured a second. The three police personnel were part of 
a joint patrol.
    On October 1, PA security forces shot a border policeman at 
Joseph's Tomb, and then delayed an ambulance from reaching him in a 
timely manner; the soldier bled to death.
    One Palestinian died in PA custody during the year. On June 6, 
Khalid Bahar was found dead in his prison cell; family members claim 
that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.c.). The PA 
publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that the 
prisoner had choked to death.
    More than 35 Israelis and Palestinians died in politically related 
violence perpetrated by individuals and groups during the year. Israeli 
settlers harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Section 1.c.). There were credible 
reports that settlers killed at least 14 and injured a number of 
Palestinians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their 
vehicles, which caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them 
with moving vehicles. For example, on October 1, unidentified Israeli 
settlers opened fire on a car holding Palestinians, killing an 18-
month-old baby. On October 17, two settlers from Itamar opened fire 
with machine guns on a group of Palestinians harvesting olives in a 
field near Nablus, killing one person and injuring four. The 
perpetrators of the attack were identified and taken into Israeli 
police custody, but subsequently were released because the police 
determined that the PA was not cooperating sufficiently with the 
investigation. The PA denied this charge. The settlers did not act 
under government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government 
did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general, 
settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against 
Palestinians.
    Palestinian civilians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed 
Israelis, especially settlers. During the year, Palestinians killed 18 
Israeli civilians and injured numerous others (see Section 1.c.). 
Palestinians frequently threw stones and fired guns at Israeli 
civilians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' On October 8, Palestinian 
civilians killed Israeli settler Hillel Lieberman from Elon Moreh. 
Lieberman had been missing since the morning of October 7, when he told 
a relative that he was going to ``pay a final visit'' to Joseph's Tomb 
in Nablus, after the IDF had announced that it would withdraw from the 
site. An unknown extremist group took responsibility for the killing.
    On October 12, a Palestinian mob killed two IDF reservists in a 
brutal attack in Ramallah. The mob attacked the soldiers' car until 
Palestinian police intervened and brought the soldiers to the civil 
police station. The mob followed, broke down the gate of the police 
station, and kicked, burned, and beat to death the two reservists. 
There were reports that Palestinian police personnel also participated 
in the beating.
    On October 30, unknown Palestinian gunmen killed one security guard 
and injured another at the National Insurance Office in Jerusalem. On 
November 9, Palestinian gunmen killed one woman and injured one man in 
their car. On November 13, Palestinian gunmen killed a settler and two 
IDF soldiers near Ramallah.
    Several Palestinian officials made public statements justifying 
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians, and the PA made no arrests in 
any of these killings. Additionally, Tanzim leaders made public 
statements urging Palestinians to continue the violence. Following 
Chairman Arafat's announcement on November 17 to stop firing on Israeli 
civilians or security forces from Area A, there was a short-lived 
significant decrease in the number of such incidents. Israeli observers 
noted that Arafat's statement did not address attacks in Areas B and C.
    Seven Israeli civilians were killed in bomb attacks and roadside 
bombs for which several Palestinian extremist groups claimed 
responsibility. For example, a roadside bomb near Kfar Darom settlement 
in Gaza was detonated on November 20 as a settler schoolbus passed. A 
teacher and a school maintenance worker were killed, and nine 
passengers were wounded, including several children (see Section 1.c.). 
Two Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility for the attack. 
On November 23, two IDF soldiers were killed and three were injured in 
2 separate bomb attacks in Gaza.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit the 
physical abuse of detainees; however, security forces abused in 
detention Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark 
decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice in September 1999 
prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent 
shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation 
for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme 
temperatures. Prior to the High Court's decision, Israeli laws and 
administrative regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees 
were not enforced in security cases (see Section 1.c. of the Israel 
report). The head of the then-GSS was empowered by government 
regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate physical 
and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking) while 
interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses. Since 
the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been 
unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces 
tortured detainees.
    Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are based 
on confessions. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until 
after interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The 
Government does not allow ICRC representatives access to detainees 
until the 14th day of detention. This prolonged incommunicado detention 
contributes to the likelihood of abuse. Detainees sometimes claim in 
court that their confessions are coerced, but judges rarely exclude 
such confessions. According to Palestinian human rights groups, some 
Palestinian detainees fail to make complaints either due to fear of 
retribution or because they assume that such complaints would be 
ignored. During the year, there were no known cases in which a 
confession was thrown out because of improper means of investigation or 
interrogation.
    Israeli security forces injured at least 11,300 Palestinians during 
violent demonstrations during the year (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 
1.g.). In May IDF soldiers and Israeli police injured up to 700 
Palestinians during protests in support of a hunger strike declared by 
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. During the ``al-Aqsa 
Intifada,'' Israeli security forces injured about 10,600 Palestinian 
demonstrators.
    The IDF injured several bystanders at demonstrations, including 
journalists (see Section 2.a.). According to a November report by the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 10 journalists were hit by 
IDF gunfire during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'', and 3 other journalists 
were hit by gunfire from an unknown source. In at least one case, a 
foreign photographer was hit by live ammunition during a demonstration 
in which no IDF personnel were under fire.
    Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an 
abusive manner at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical 
harassment. According to press reports, on September 6, Israeli border 
policemen physically abused three Palestinian workers near the village 
of Abu Dis outside of Jerusalem. The officers took photos of themselves 
with their victims; their trial was ongoing by year's end.
    The PA does not prohibit by law the use of torture or force against 
detainees, and PA security forces reportedly were responsible for 
torture and widespread abuse of Palestinian detainees. Such abuse 
generally took place after arrest and during interrogation. In 1995 the 
Gaza civil police commander issued to police officers in the West Bank 
and Gaza a directive forbidding torture during interrogation, and 
directing the security forces to observe the rights of all detainees. 
However, the directive does not have the force of law; Palestinian 
security officers have not been issued formal guidelines on the proper 
conduct of interrogations. The PA lacks adequate equipment to collect 
and use evidence, and convictions are based largely on confessions. The 
importance of obtaining confessions heightens the possibility of abuse.
    PA security officials torture and abuse prisoners by threatening, 
hooding, beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing 
them to stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and 
food, and burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments. 
Palestinians also alleged that they had been shaken violently while in 
PA custody. International human rights monitoring groups have 
documented widespread arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. These 
organizations state that use of torture is widespread and not 
restricted to those persons detained on security charges. Human rights 
groups state that Palestinians who are suspected of belonging to 
radical Islamic groups are more likely to be treated poorly. In 
February and March, the General Intelligence Service arrested, 
detained, and physically abused dozens of Bir Zeit University students 
who were arrested on charges of throwing stones at a foreign head of 
state during a campus demonstration (see Section 2.b.). Several human 
rights groups claimed that the students were tortured during detention.
    During the year, one Palestinian died in PA custody. Family members 
claim that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.a.). 
The PA publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that 
the prisoner had choked to death.
    Palestinian police and Tanzim members with firearms participated in 
violent demonstrations and attacks. Palestinian security forces 
sometimes fired at Israeli civilians or soldiers from within or close 
to the homes of Palestinian civilians; residents of the homes 
consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation for these attacks. 
Palestinian security forces also sometimes failed to prevent armed 
Palestinians from opening fire on Israeli civilians, soldiers, or 
military targets.
    In February Palestinian police failed to prevent an attack by a 
Palestinian crowd against PA judges and prosecutors in Bethlehem. A 
crowd of about 300 persons, mainly family members of one of the 
criminal suspects on trial, stormed the courthouse, locked the judge 
and prosecutors inside, threw stones, and demanded that the court 
revoke sentences against two defendants in a murder trial. Police 
officials were at the courthouse; however, they did not disperse the 
crowd or make any arrests.
    Israeli settlers harass, attack, and occasionally kill (see Section 
1.a.) Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were credible 
reports that settlers injured a number of Palestinians during the ``al-
Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their vehicles, which at times 
caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them with moving 
vehicles. Human rights groups received several dozen reports during the 
year that Israeli settlers in the West Bank beat Palestinians and 
destroyed the property of Palestinians living or farming near Israeli 
settlements. For example, according to Palestinian eyewitnesses, a 
group of Israeli settlers beat a 75-year-old Palestinian woman in 
April. At least five settlers from Brakha near Nablus reportedly 
assaulted the woman, who was picking wild herbs near the settlement; a 
passerby reportedly intervened and took the woman to a hospital. During 
the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there were numerous incidents in which 
Israeli settlers physically attacked Palestinians or threw stones at 
their homes and cars. Settlers also attacked and damaged crops, olive 
trees, greenhouses, and agricultural equipment, causing extensive 
economic damage to Palestinian-owned agricultural land. The settlers 
did not act under government orders in the attacks; however, the 
Israeli Government did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of 
violence. In general settlers rarely serve prison sentences if 
convicted of a crime against a Palestinian.
    According to human rights organizations, Israeli settlers sometimes 
attacked Palestinian ambulances and impeded the provision of medical 
services to injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.).
    Palestinians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed (see 
Section 1.a.) Israelis, especially settlers. During demonstrations in 
support of the Palestinian prisoner hunger strike in May, Palestinian 
demonstrators shot Israeli settlers in Beit El and Jenin in the West 
Bank. On May 21, an unknown Palestinian threw a Molotov cocktail at a 
car of Jewish settlers, critically injuring a child. Palestinians 
injured a number of Israeli settlers in attacks during the ``al-Aqsa 
Intifada.'' For example, on October 19, unidentified Palestinian gunmen 
shot at a large group of Israeli settlers who were hiking in an area 
near Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, where there had been fierce fighting the 
week before. One settler and one Palestinian were killed, and four 
Israelis and a dozen Palestinians were injured in an exchange of 
gunfire. Unidentified Palestinian gunmen fired on homes in Gilo, a 
Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem, for at least 13 nights between 
October and November, injuring seriously two persons. A number of 
Israeli civilians were injured in armed attacks or bombings, for which 
several Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility (also see 
Section 1.a.).
    Palestinian civilians attacked Israeli medical teams on several 
occasions. For example, on October 2, Palestinian civilians reportedly 
fired on an ambulance that was evacuating 4 IDF soldiers who had been 
injured in a violent clash; the ambulance reportedly was delayed for 
about 1 hour. Palestinian civilians also prevented the evacuation of 
injured Israelis in several incidents; in one such case, the injured 
person did not receive medical treatment and died from his wounds (see 
Section 1.a.). According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical 
personnel sometimes allowed ambulances and medical facilities to be 
used as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at Israeli civilians and 
soldiers (see Section 1.a.).
    Conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons are poor. Facilities 
are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
Palestinian inmates held strikes and protests in support of a number of 
causes and to protest prison conditions throughout the year. On May 1, 
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons began a hunger strike to 
protest prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following 
negotiations with PA and Israeli government officials, the prisoners 
agreed to suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Israeli Government 
agreed to remove prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow 
family members to visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain 
from planning terrorist attacks from prison. Three Palestinian 
prisoners died in Israeli custody under ambiguous circumstances during 
the year (see Section 1.a.).
    Israel permits independent monitoring of prison conditions, 
although human rights groups sometimes encounter difficulties gaining 
access to specific detainees.
    Prison conditions in PA facilities continue to be very poor. In 
many cases, facilities are overcrowded, old, dilapidated, and 
neglected. Food and clothing for prisoners are inadequate and must be 
supplemented by donations from families and humanitarian groups. 
Palestinian inmates held periodic strikes and protests throughout the 
year in support of a number of causes and to protest prison conditions 
and the practice of administrative detention. In some PA prisons, an 
effort is made to house religious prisoners together. Male and female 
inmates are housed separately. During the year, one Palestinian died in 
PA custody under ambiguous circumstances (see Section 1.a.).
    In August detainees held by the PSF in Ramallah staged a hunger 
strike demanding an improvement in detention conditions. The PSF agreed 
to meet the prisoners' demands. Prisoners in the PA-run Jneid Prison 
also staged a hunger strike to protest being held for an extended 
period of time without charge or trial (see Section 1.c.).
    The PA permits independent monitoring of its prisons, although 
human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers reported 
difficulties arranging visits or gaining access to specific detainees. 
Human rights organizations state that their ability to visit PA jails 
and detention centers varies depending on which security organization 
controls the facility. Human rights organizations state that the 
police, Preventive Security Force, and Mukhabarat generally were 
cooperative in allowing them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners 
and detainees. However, they said that the Military Intelligence 
Organization was less responsive to such requests. Human rights 
monitors state that prison authorities sometimes are capricious in 
permitting them access to PA detention facilities and they rarely are 
permitted to see inmates while they are under interrogation. Pursuant 
to an agreement signed in September 1996, the ICRC conducts prison 
visits but may be denied access to a detainee for 14 days. If abuses 
occur, they frequently happen during this 2-week period.
    Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence 
Organization in the West Bank and the police, have appointed officials 
to act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers meet with 
human rights organizations and members of the diplomatic community to 
discuss human rights cases.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli security 
personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person 
suspected of having committed a criminal or security offense in the 
occupied territories. Most of these arrests and detentions are for 
alleged security offenses. Persons arrested for common crimes usually 
are provided with a statement of charges and access to an attorney, and 
may apply for bail. However, these procedures sometimes are delayed.
    Israeli authorities intermittently issued special summonses for 
those suspected of involvement in or knowledge of security offenses. 
There were reports that some such summonses were issued immediately 
before and during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' Israeli military order 1369 
stipulates a 7-year prison term for anyone who does not respond to a 
special summons delivered to a family member or posted in the MATAK 
office nearest the suspect's home address. There were no reports during 
the year that anyone was convicted of failing to respond to a summons. 
Bail rarely is available to those arrested for security offenses. 
Although Israeli law does not allow Israelis under the age of 16 to be 
tried as adults, Israeli courts treat Palestinians over the age of 12 
as adults. Defense for Children International (DCI) reported that over 
420 Palestinian minors (below the age of 18 years) were arrested and 
detained in Israeli prisons during the year, and that at year's end, 
there were 200 minors in Israeli prisons. The IDF stated that 44 minors 
were held in Israeli security facilities at year's end.
    Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant 
for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued. 
Prearraignment detention may last up to 11 days for Palestinians 
arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and 
those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court 
order for longer administrative detentions--up to 6 months from the 
date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation 
purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although 
the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence 
against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the 
court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are 
not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite 
detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit 
detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have 
the right to appeal continued detention.
    Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a 
lawyer as soon as possible, in security cases authorities may delay 
access to counsel for up to 15 days. Higher-ranking officials or judges 
may extend this period. Access to counsel is denied routinely while a 
suspect is being interrogated, which sometimes can last several weeks. 
Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and 
whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact.
    A number of factors hamper contacts by Palestinians in Israeli 
prison and detention facilities with their lawyers, families, and human 
rights organizations. Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to 
post notification of arrest within 48 hours; however, Palestinian 
suspects often are kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if 
an arrest becomes known, it is often difficult to obtain information on 
where a detainee is being held or whether the detainee has access to an 
attorney. Palestinians generally locate detained family members through 
their own efforts. Palestinians may check with a local ICRC office to 
determine whether it has information on the whereabouts of a family 
member. A senior officer may delay for up to 12 days notification of 
arrest to immediate family members and attorneys. A military commander 
may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an 
unlimited period of time.
    The Israeli Government routinely transfers Palestinians arrested in 
the occupied territories to facilities in Israel, especially the prison 
in Ashkelon and the military detention center in Megiddo. Israeli 
authorities have been known to schedule appointments between attorneys 
and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another prison 
prior to the meetings. Authorities reportedly use such tactics to delay 
lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. Palestinian lawyers also 
have difficulty traveling to meet with their clients during Israeli-
imposed closures. Israel requires Palestinian attorneys to acquire 
permits to enter Israel to see their clients held in prisons there. 
Human rights groups say that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza Strip 
have a harder time obtaining these permits than their West Bank 
counterparts and that they are denied entry into Israel more frequently 
than West Bank lawyers.
    Male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and any family 
members with security records, generally are barred from visiting 
relatives in facilities in Israel. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners 
also complain that sometimes they only learn that visitation rights 
have been canceled when they arrive at the prison following a trip of 
many hours from the occupied territories. Following the outbreak of 
violence in late September, the Israeli Government banned all family 
visits for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. In November there 
were negotiations between the Israeli Government, the ICRC, and the 
Palestinian Prisoners' Society to restore visitation rights to 
Palestinian prisoners. The Government of Israel offered to allow 
spouses, children under the age of 10, and parents to apply for one-day 
visitation passes; however, Palestinian prisoners rejected these 
conditions.
    Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions is secret 
and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney during the hearings; 
the detainee and defense lawyer are required to leave the courtroom 
when secret evidence is presented. Israeli authorities maintain that 
they are unable to present evidence in open court because doing so 
would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence. In July 1998, 
the High Court of Justice ruled that only judges, rather than military 
officials, may renew administrative detention orders beyond a 6-month 
period. Detainees may appeal detention orders, or the renewal of a 
detention order, before a military judge, but their chances for success 
are very limited. During the year, some succeeded in persuading the 
courts to shorten their detentions.
    The overall number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative 
detainees in Israeli jails declined for the fourth straight year until 
mid-October, when the number increased. Human rights organizations 
attributed the decrease to the absence of major terrorist attacks; in 
the past, Israeli officials arrested Palestinians suspected of 
terrorist connections after major terrorist attacks. The Israeli 
Government released 16 Palestinian prisoners in March as a goodwill 
gesture. According to the IDF, in mid-October there were 1,307 
Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli prisons, military detention 
centers, and holding centers, compared with 1,354 at the end of 1999. 
According to the IDF, there were 1,402 Palestinian security prisoners 
in Israeli prisons and detention centers as of mid-December. According 
to human rights groups, 10 Palestinians were in administrative 
detention at year's end, compared with 18 at the end of 1999. Several 
have been held for more than 1 year. Many Palestinians under 
administrative detention during the past 3 years have had their 
detention orders renewed repeatedly without meaningful opportunity to 
appeal.
    PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 
PA does not have a uniform law on administrative detention, and 
security officials do not always adhere to the existing laws in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Laws applicable in Gaza, which do not apply 
to the West Bank, stipulate that detainees held without charge be 
released within 48 hours. These laws allow the Attorney General to 
extend the detention period to a maximum of 90 days during 
investigations. Human rights organizations and the PA Ministry of 
Justice assert that PA security officials do not always adhere to this 
regulation. Prevailing law in the West Bank allows a suspect to be 
detained for 24 hours before being charged. The Attorney General may 
extend the detention period.
    The PA Chairman has not signed the Basic Law, which was designed to 
limit executive branch abuses and to delineate safeguards for citizens, 
since it was passed by the Palestinian Council (PC) in 1996. The lack 
of safeguards has contributed to the tendency of PA security forces to 
refuse to carry out High Court of Justice orders to release detainees. 
In some cases, the High Court ordered the release of prisoners detained 
for years without trial, and PA security forces released the prisoners 
several months or a year later. In November 1997, the High Court 
ordered the release of HAMAS activist Mahmud Muslah; Muslah remained in 
detention at year's end. In February 1999, the High Court ordered the 
release of Wa'el Farraj, who has been detained without charges since 
1996; Farraj remained in detention at year's end. According to the 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens Rights, the High Court 
ordered 9 detainees released during the year, compared with 
approximately 60 detainees in 1999. The PA released approximately 60 
security prisoners during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''; however, human 
rights groups estimate that the PA has held approximately 150 prisoners 
for more than a year without charge. The total number of Palestinians 
in PA jails reached between 500 and 900 prisoners by year's end, 
including approximately 50 political and security detainees.
    In past years, Palestinian security forces sometimes detained or 
placed under house arrest the relatives of alleged security criminals. 
In the past, lawyers and PA judicial officials acknowledged that, in 
contravention of the law, PA security services sometimes arrested and 
detained persons without informing judicial officials.
    PA authorities generally permit prisoners--except those held for 
security offenses--to receive visits from family members, attorneys, 
and human rights monitors. PA security officials do not always permit 
lawyers to see their clients. In principle detainees may notify their 
families of their arrest, but this is not always permitted.
    Human rights organizations reported in the past that lawyers 
sometimes were denied access to their clients.
    PA security services have overlapping or unclear mandates that 
often complicate the protection of human rights. Under existing law in 
the West Bank, only the PA's civil police force is authorized to make 
arrests. In practice all security forces are known to detain persons at 
various times. The operating procedures and regulations for the conduct 
of PA security personnel in the various services still are not well 
developed and have not yet been made fully available to the public.
    There are many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation that 
complicates the ability of families, lawyers, and even the Ministry of 
Justice to track detainees' whereabouts and to determine their numbers. 
Security services, including Preventive Security, General Intelligence, 
Military Intelligence, and the Coast Guard have their own interrogation 
and detention facilities. In general these services do not, or only 
sporadically, inform families of a relative's arrest. Most PA security 
officers remain unaware of proper arrest, detention, and interrogation 
procedures, as well as basic human rights standards. Human rights 
groups have provided basic human rights training to a number of PA 
security services. During the year, at least 36 PA security officials 
participated in human rights courses, bringing the total number of 
security officials who have graduated from human rights courses to 
nearly 1,600 since the PA's establishment in 1994.
    PA security forces continued to harass and arbitrarily arrest and 
detain journalists, political activists, and human rights advocates who 
criticized the PA and its policies. A number of journalists were 
arrested and detained and television stations were shut down for 
expressing views or covering topics unacceptable to the Palestinian 
Authority (see Section 2.a.).
    In January PA security forces rearrested Abdel Sattar Qassem. 
Security forces had arrested Qassem and seven other signatories of a 
petition that accused the PA of corruption in November 1999. The PA 
released Qassem in July.
    On February 26, PA police arrested and detained for 1 week 
approximately 30 Bir Zeit University students who reportedly threw 
stones at a foreign head of state during a demonstration (see Section 
2.b.). In May PA security forces arrested 20 persons for participating 
in an anti-PA rally in Ramallah organized by the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) following the funeral of one of its 
members who died during clashes with the IDF near Ramallah (see Section 
2.b.).
    Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA forcibly deported anyone 
from the occupied territories during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision. 
Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in the occupied 
territories are tried in Israeli military courts. Security offenses are 
defined broadly and may include charges such as membership in outlawed 
organizations. Charges are brought by military prosecutors. Serious 
charges are tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried 
before one judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal 
verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept appeals 
based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or both. The right 
of appeal does not apply in all cases and sometimes requires court 
permission. The Israeli military courts rarely acquit Palestinians of 
security offenses, but sentences sometimes are reduced on appeal.
    Trials sometimes are delayed for several reasons: Witnesses, 
including Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the 
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys fail to 
appear, sometimes because they have not been informed of the trial date 
or because of travel restrictions on Palestinian lawyers. These delays 
add pressure on defendants to plead guilty to minor offenses; if they 
do, an ``expedited'' trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is 
drawn up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
    By law most Israeli military trials are public, although access is 
limited. Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions. 
Evidence that is not available to the defendant or his attorney may be 
used in court to convict persons of security offenses. There frequently 
is no testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses either for or against 
Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities maintain that this is due to 
the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate with the authorities. Physical 
and psychological pressures and reduced sentences for those who confess 
may induce security detainees to sign confessions. Confessions usually 
are given in Arabic but translated into Hebrew for the record because, 
authorities maintain, many Israeli court personnel speak Arabic but few 
read it. Palestinian detainees seldom read Hebrew and therefore often 
sign confessions that they are unable to read.
    Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client 
consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts. Appointments to 
see clients are difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often fail 
to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
    Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of 
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli law in 
the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges preside, and the 
standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are governed by 
the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers convicted in Israeli 
courts of crimes against Palestinians regularly receive lighter 
punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of similar 
crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians. In December the 
Jerusalem magistrates court ordered an Israeli settler to pay 
compensation of $17,500 to the family of a young Palestinian boy who 
reportedly was killed by the settler's negligence about a decade 
earlier.
    There were no reports that the Israeli Government held political 
prisoners.
    The PA courts are inefficient, lack staff and resources and, as a 
result, often do not ensure fair and expeditious trials, and the PA 
executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry out 
court decisions.
    The PA inherited a court system largely based on structures and 
legal codes predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. In the civil court 
system, cases initially are tried in courts of first instance. There 
are two appeals courts, one located in Gaza City and the other in 
Ramallah, which handle appeals from the lower courts. The appeals 
courts also function as the Palestinian High Court of Justice. The PA 
executive at times does not respect decisions of the High Court, and 
the Palestinian security agencies do not always enforce its rulings 
(see Section 1.d.). In 1995 the PA established state security courts in 
Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security issues. Three 
military judges preside over each court. A senior police official heads 
the state security court in Jericho, and three judges preside over it. 
There is no right of appeal, but the PA Chairman reviews the court's 
findings and he may confirm or reject the decision. The PA Ministry of 
Justice has no jurisdiction over the state security courts, which are 
subordinate only to the Chairman.
    The Gaza legal code derives from British Mandate law, Egyptian law, 
and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in the West 
Bank. Bodies of law in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been modified 
substantially by Israeli military orders. According to the Declaration 
of Principles and the Interim Agreement, Israeli military decrees 
issued during the occupation theoretically remain valid in both areas 
and are subject to review pursuant to specific procedure. The PA has 
stated that it was undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank 
legal codes, but it has made little progress. Human rights advocates 
claim that the PA's judiciary does not operate consistently.
    The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect; 
many of the problems predate PA jurisdiction. Judges and staff are 
underpaid and overworked and suffer from a lack of skills and training. 
Court procedures and record keeping are archaic and chaotic. The 
delivery of justice often is slow and uneven. The ability of the courts 
to enforce decisions is extremely weak, and there is administrative 
confusion in the appeals process. A heavy caseload exacerbates these 
systemic problems. The PA closed all civil courts in late September for 
several weeks.
    The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all civil judges for 10-year 
terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to the 
Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in both the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank. In the past, the Chief Justice had the 
authority to appoint all judges in the West Bank. Human rights 
organizations and judicial officials criticized the decision, saying 
that it contravened existing law, which stipulated that a higher 
judicial council should be responsible for appointing judges. During 
the year, the Chairman authorized the establishment of the High 
Judicial Council in accordance with legislation passed by the Council 
in 1998. Human rights advocates and lawyers believe that this step may 
enhance the judicial system.
    The PA's state security courts often fail to afford defendants due 
process. The PA usually ignores the legal limits on the length of 
prearraignment detention of detainees suspected of security offenses. 
Defendants often are brought to court without knowledge of the charges 
against them or sufficient time to prepare a defense. They typically 
are represented by court-appointed lawyers, who often are not 
qualified. Court sessions often take place on short notice in the 
middle of the night, and without lawyers present. In some instances, 
security courts try cases, issue verdicts, and impose sentences in a 
single session lasting a few hours.
    During the year, the state security courts sentenced three persons 
to death for committing murder. In two of the cases, the trials 
reportedly were hasty, and the defendants did not have adequate 
representation. For example, a state security court sentenced Raji 
Saqir to death on July 3 after a 1-day trial, which occurred 1 day 
after Saqir allgedly committed murder. Although no executions were 
carried out during the year, in February 1999, a Palestinian colonel 
was executed after the PA's state security court convicted him of 
raping a young boy. Human rights groups criticized the decision; they 
complained that the trial lasted for less than 2 hours, the defendant 
did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense, there was no 
appeals process, and the charges were ill-defined.
    The state security courts adjudicated cases that fell far outside 
the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition to ``security'' 
cases, the courts have on occasion dealt with tax cases and economic 
crimes, such as smuggling. In February the Chairman decreed that 
``serious'' crimes, including homicide, rape, and drug trafficking, be 
referred to state security courts. The decision prompted human rights 
organizations to issue statements requesting the abolition of state 
security courts and the referral of all cases to the regular civil 
courts.
    There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted 
for their political beliefs. A credible Palestinian human rights 
organization estimated that the PA held approximately 100 political 
prisoners before the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' in late 
September. In October the PA released most of the political prisoners. 
The PA stated that this action was in response to Israeli warnings that 
it would be bombing PA police facilities following the brutal killing 
of two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah (see Section 1.a.). A 
Palestinian human rights organization estimated that the PA held 10 
political prisoners at year's end.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities in areas of the West Bank 
under their control may enter private Palestinian homes and 
institutions without a warrant on security grounds when authorized by 
an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. In conducting 
searches, the IDF has forced entry and sometimes has beaten occupants 
and destroyed property. Israeli authorities state that forced entry may 
occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry is 
resisted. Authorities state that beatings and arbitrary destruction of 
property during searches are punishable violations of military 
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such cases. The 
Israeli Government states that it does not keep consolidated 
information on the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages 
resulting from IDF actions. In February IDF soldiers raided an elderly 
Palestinian woman's home, reportedly searching for stone throwers; the 
woman, who had been suffering from heart problems, died of a heart 
attack.
    Israeli security forces may demolish or seal the home (owned or 
rented) of a Palestinian suspected of terrorism without trial. The 
decision to seal or demolish a Palestinian's house is made by several 
high-level Israeli officials, including the coordinator of the MATAK 
and the Defense Minister. Residents of houses ordered demolished have 
48 hours to appeal to the area commander; a final appeal may be made to 
the Israeli High Court. A successful appeal generally results in the 
conversion of a demolition order to sealing. After a house is 
demolished military authorities prohibit the owner from rebuilding or 
removing the rubble. Israelis suspected of terrorism are subject to 
Israeli law and do not face the threat of home demolition. In August 
Israeli security forces demolished the home of Nidal Daghlas near 
Nablus, claiming that a HAMAS fugitive, Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, previously 
had hidden in Daghlas' home. Human rights groups stated that the home 
demolition was an arbitrary measure. On November 2, Israeli security 
forces demolished two homes in Gaza following a nearby explosion.
    In November 1999, the Israeli Government expelled 300 Bedouin 
farmers from their homes in caves near the Jewish settlement of Ma'on, 
stating that the area was a closed military zone. On March 29, the 
Israeli High Court of Justice ordered that the farmers be allowed to 
return to their homes. In April the IDF issued new deportation orders 
to returnees who were not party to the original legal suit.
    From late September through the end of the year, the IDF destroyed 
numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems 
on Palestinian-owned agricultural land in both the West Bank and Gaza. 
The IDF generally destroyed agricultural land following clashes at 
demonstrations, shootings aimed at settlers, or bombings. The IDF 
stated that it destroyed this land because Palestinian snipers 
reportedly were using it for purposes of concealment.
    The PA requires the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry 
and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security 
services frequently ignore these requirements. Police searched homes 
without the consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly 
entered premises and destroyed property.
    PA security forces sometimes detained or placed under house arrest 
the relatives of alleged security criminals (see Section 1.d.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Between late September and the end of the year, 
Israeli security forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign 
nationals, and injured over 10,600 Palestinians during violent 
demonstrations. Palestinian demonstrators frequently threw stones and 
Molotov cocktails at the IDF. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also 
used firearms. According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in 
about 30 percent of the demonstrations between late September and mid-
November. In response Israeli security forces used a variety of means 
to disperse demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal 
bullets, and live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security 
forces used excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of 
their official rules of engagement (see Section 1.a.). According to the 
IDF, it does not have a policy of indiscriminate or excessive use of 
force, and its rules of engagement establish a framework to deal with 
threats faced by Israeli civilians and armed forces.
    IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated metal bullets 
and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in immediate danger, 
to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent demonstration, or to 
fire on an individual unlawfully carrying firearms. According to human 
rights organizations, a number of Palestinian deaths and injuries 
reportedly occurred during demonstrations at which protesters did not 
use live firearms.
    According to IDF policy, soldiers are to direct fire at the legs 
only, and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a 
serious felony has occurred and that they have exhausted other means to 
apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of 
children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless 
there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life. 
Palestinian medical relief organizations reported that 59.5 percent of 
the gunshot wounds inflicted by Israeli security forces during 
demonstrations were in the head or torso, and estimated that about one-
sixth of the Palestinians wounded during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' 
likely would be disabled permanently. According to human rights 
organizations, a total of 82 Palestinians under the age of 18 years 
were killed in the demonstrations. During some demonstrations, 
bystanders, including journalists, medical personnel, and Palestinian 
civilians were killed or injured by IDF fire (see Sections 1.a. and 
2.a.).
    The IDF fired tank rounds and rockets from helicopters on cities 
and towns in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and injuring a number of 
persons and causing significant property damage (see Section 1.a.). For 
example, on October 12, in retaliation for the brutal killing by a 
Palestinian mob of two IDF reservists (see Section 1.a.), IDF 
helicopters attacked over 10 PA targets in Ramallah and Gaza, injuring 
more than 20 bystanders and destroying buildings. On October 23, the 
IDF shelled a neighborhood in Hebron, killing 1 person, in retaliation 
for an earlier shooting incident in the Israeli-controlled area of 
Hebron.
    For at least 13 nights between October and December, Palestinian 
gunmen from Beit Jala shot at homes in Gilo, a Jewish neighborhood in 
East Jerusalem (see Section 1.c.). Two Israelis were injured seriously 
in these attacks. In retaliation for these attacks, the IDF launched a 
series of counterattacks on residential neighborhoods in Beit Jala, 
Beit Sahour, and Bethlehem. One foreign national was killed and 36 
Palestinians were injured in these counterattacks.
    On October 31, in retaliation for the Palestinian killing of two 
Israeli security guards, the IDF attacked with helicopters PA offices 
in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza. On November 15, the IDF responded with 
force to many incidents involving Palestinian gunfire directed at Gilo 
from Beit Jala, killing a foreigner and injuring a number of 
Palestinians. On October 19, in response to Palestinians shooting at a 
group of Israeli visitors at Joseph's Tomb, the IDF used helicopters to 
attack a nearby Palestinian refugee camp, killing 1 person and injuring 
several others. On November 20, IDF helicopters launched a series of 
retaliatory attacks in the Gaza Strip in response to a bomb attack in 
Gaza that killed 2 persons and injured 9; 50 persons reportedly were 
injured in the IDF attacks and significant damage was done to a number 
of PA buildings. On November 24, the IDF fired two tank rounds at the 
town of Kufr Qalil in retaliation for shots fired on a nearby IDF post 
by unidentified Palestinian gunmen; two Palestinians were killed by the 
tank rounds.
    The Israeli Government's imposition of external and internal 
closures during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' contributed to intermittent 
shortages of basic food, medical supplies, and gasoline in the West 
Bank and Gaza.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli Government generally 
respects freedom of speech in the occupied territories; however, it 
maintains a low level of censorship and prohibits public expressions of 
support for Islamic extremist groups such as HAMAS and other groups 
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In March during the Pope's 
visit to the region and in October during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' the 
Israeli Government reportedly selectively enforced its standing 
prohibition on the display of Palestinian political symbols, such as 
flags, national colors, and graffiti in Jerusalem for the first time 
since 1994. Such displays are punishable by fines or imprisonment, and 
Israeli security forces reportedly detained and temporarily barred from 
Jerusalem several Palestinian youths for waving the Palestinian flag. 
Overall, Israeli censorship of specific press articles continued at a 
low level; however, the Israeli Government did censor some articles 
during the year. Israeli authorities monitor Arabic newspapers based in 
East Jerusalem for security-related issues. Military censors review 
Arabic publications for material related to the public order and 
security of Israel. Reports by foreign journalists also are subject to 
review by Israeli military censors for security issues, and the 
satellite feed used by many foreign journalists is monitored. The 
Israeli Government often closes areas to journalists when it imposes a 
curfew or closure. Israeli authorities have denied entry permits to 
Palestinian journalists traveling to their place of employment in 
Jerusalem during closures of the territories; however, the journalists' 
Israeli-issued press credentials have not been revoked.
    The IDF requires a permit for publications sold in the occupied 
territories still under its control. Publications may be censored or 
banned for content deemed anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Possession of 
banned materials is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. During the 
year, the Israeli Government refused to allow publications, including 
newspapers, into the Gaza Strip on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.
    At least 10 journalists reportedly were hit by IDF gunfire during 
the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' and 3 other journalists were hit by gunfire 
from an unknown source (see Section 1.c.). The IDF reportedly 
restricted the free movement of mainly Palestinian journalists (see 
Section 2.d.).
    On October 13, in retaliation for the mob lynching of two Israeli 
reserve soldiers (see Section 1.a.), the IDF launched rockets at the 
PA's Voice of Palestine radio transmitter in Ramallah. In November the 
IDF launched rockets against a PA-owned television transmitter in Gaza.
    The PA restricted freedom of speech and of the press. In a number 
of instances during the year, the PA took steps to limit free 
expression, particularly regarding human rights issues and allegations 
of corruption. Press freedom is subject to a 1995 press law that does 
not protect the press adequately. PA security services further stifle 
the independence of the press by closing down media outlets, banning 
publications or broadcasts, and periodically harassing or detaining 
members of the media (see Section l.d.). Palestinian commentators and 
human rights groups state that, as a result, the practice of self-
censorship by journalists is widespread.
    On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the leaders of a teachers' 
strike and temporarily closed down the radio station that broadcast an 
interview in which the leader accused the PA of inefficiency. The PA 
continued to detain the strike leader at year's end. On May 21, the PA 
closed the Watan and al-Naser television stations and the al-Manara 
Radio station in Ramallah for nearly 4 days, after the stations 
broadcast live coverage of an anti-PA demonstration in al-Bireh. On May 
31, the PA arrested Samir Qumsiah, chairman of the Union of Private 
Radio and Television Stations because he had issued a statement 
criticizing the closing of the stations; the PA released Qumsiah 3 days 
later.
    On May 27, PA officials arrested Fathi Barqawi, a director general 
of the news department at the Public Broadcasting Corporation in 
Ramallah after he criticized Chairman Arafat publicly. Barqawi was 
released a week later following intervention by prominent PA officials.
    On June 20, Palestinian police arrested Abd al-Fattah Ghanem, a 
presidential advisor on refugees, after he criticized the PA for 
failing to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Police held Ghanem 
incommunicado for 7 days and denied him access to legal counsel for the 
3 weeks that he was in detention.
    During the year, the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) stripped 31 
lawyers of their membership in the association, their right to practice 
law, and their ability to run in PBA elections. The lawyers reportedly 
all were outspoken critics of the PA. In May the Palestinian High Court 
temporarily reversed the decision to strip the lawyers of their PBA 
membership and their right to practice law. However, on May 17 the PBA 
placed the director of a West Bank NGO and candidate in the PBA 
elections on the ``non-practicing'' register of lawyers, purportedly 
because he worked for an NGO and not a law office (see Section 4).
    In June PA police officials in Ramallah detained Maher Alami, a 
West Bank journalist, for approximately 1 week. The PA police 
reportedly warned Alami against writing articles critical of the PA.
    After the October 12 brutal killing of two IDF reserve soldiers at 
a Ramallah police station (see Section 1.a.), Palestinian police 
confiscated film from several journalists who were at the scene. On 
October 4, a foreign journalist filmed three members of the Palestinian 
security forces distributing Molotov cocktails to several children. The 
security forces detained the journalist and his crew for several hours 
and destroyed the roll of film.
    On November 21, PA security officials detained a Palestinian 2 days 
after he criticized the peace process. After 21 days of detention, 
security officials asked him to agree not to speak out against the PA; 
he did not agree, but was released the same day.
    Israeli-imposed closures disrupted the operations of West Bank and 
Gaza universities, colleges, and schools during the year. Students and 
staff had difficulty traveling to educational institutions in cities 
and towns that were closed or placed under curfew by Israeli 
authorities (see Sections 2.d. and 5). The November 1999 opening of the 
southern safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank afforded 
Gazan students greater ability to pursue their education at West Bank 
educational institutions. However, during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' the 
Israeli Government closed the safe passage route, which impeded the 
ability of Gaza students to attend West Bank universities.
    The PA generally has authority over all levels of education in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and it controls the budgets of all public 
colleges. The PA did not interfere with education in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip during the year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli 
Government placed limits on freedom of assembly for Palestinians in the 
occupied territories, largely through the imposition of internal 
closures and curfews (See Section 2.d.). Israeli military orders ban 
public gatherings of 10 or more persons without a permit. Since the 
1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel has relaxed 
enforcement of this rule, except in cases of Palestinian demonstrations 
against land seizures or settlement expansions.
    Israeli security forces killed more than 225 Palestinian 
demonstrators and injured more than 11,000 during the year often in the 
context of violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    There were several large, peaceful demonstrations of Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem during the year.
    The PA imposes some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however, 
while it requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large 
cultural events, these permits rarely are denied. In Gaza police 
approval is required for ``political'' meetings at several specific 
large meeting halls. Written permission also is required for buses to 
transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities, 
the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and 
prohibits calls for violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans, 
although this is not always enforced.
    On February 29, students at Bir Zeit University staged a large 
protest against PA policies and practices at which several 
demonstrators threw stones at a foreign head of state. Following the 
protest, PA police arrested about 30 students (see Section 1.d.). The 
PA police commissioner also banned unlicensed public gatherings. 
Several human rights groups and political factions filed a petition 
with the Palestinian High Court protesting the action. On April 29, the 
Court suspended the police order and gave the police commissioner 8 
days to clarify the reasons for issuing the order. The police order had 
not been enforced by year's end. In March hundreds of Palestinians 
demonstrated in Ramallah to demand the release of the Bir Zeit 
university students.
    In May a number of persons participated in a PFLP rally in Ramallah 
following the funeral of one of its members who died in clashes with 
the IDF; Palestinian security forces arrested 20 demonstrators (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The Israeli Government generally respected freedom of association.
    The PA placed some limits on freedom of association. However, the 
PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
help organizations to operate. There were periodic complaints during 
the year from Palestinian political parties, social and professional 
groups, and other NGO's that the PA attempted to limit their ability to 
act autonomously. On April 21, the Preventive Security Force ordered 
the closure of a democratization group office in Gaza because the 
organization's by-laws reportedly were not in compliance with the NGO 
law. The office remained closed at year's end (see Section 4).
    The armed wings of several Palestinian political groups, including 
Islamic opposition groups, were outlawed. While it is not illegal to 
belong to the nonmilitary components of such groups, during times of 
heightened security concern the PA has harassed and even detained 
members of the political wings of these organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of 
worship, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
it does not ban any group on religious grounds. It permits all faiths 
to operate schools and institutions. Religious publications are subject 
to the Publications Laws. However, Israel's imposition of an internal 
closure on the West Bank and Gaza for 81 days during the ``al-Aqsa 
Intifada'' and total curfew on many Palestinian towns significantly 
impeded freedom of worship for Muslims and Christians. During periods 
of closure, Palestinians from the occupied territories were prevented 
from traveling to pray on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in 
Jerusalem, Islam's third holiest site. On several occasions the Israeli 
Government prevented worshippers under the age of 45 from attending 
Friday prayers on the Temple Mount; the Israeli Government stated that 
it did so due to security concerns.
    No PA law protects religious freedom; however, the PA generally 
respects freedom of religion. In past years, there were allegations 
that several converts from Islam to Christianity at times are subject 
to societal discrimination and harassment by PA officials. However, 
there was no pattern of PA discrimination and harassment against 
Christians (see Section 5).
    On October 7, following the IDF evacuation from the Jewish 
religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters 
entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an 
outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section 
5). Some Israeli Government officials criticized the PA for failing to 
prevent the attack. The PA began to refurbish the tomb the following 
day.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign 
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Israeli Government 
restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians. Since March 1993, 
Israel has required that all West Bank and Gaza residents obtain 
permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, Israel often denies 
applicants permits with no explanation, and does not allow effective 
means of appeal. In the past, Palestinian officials with VIP passes, 
including PA cabinet officials and members of the Palestinian Council, 
were subjected to long delays and searches at Israeli checkpoints in 
the West Bank, despite the fact that they were traveling on special 
passes issued by Israel. Prior to the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa 
Intifada'' in September, there was only one report that this occurred; 
however, in October and November Palestinian officials were delayed and 
searched frequently. In general Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip find it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit, study, or 
obtain medical care in Israel. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem 
sometimes are prohibited by Israeli officials from entering the West 
Bank, and they require written permits from Israel to travel to the 
Gaza Strip. Prior to the November 1999 opening of the safe passage 
route, residents of the Gaza Strip rarely were able to obtain 
permission to travel to the West Bank, or residents of the West Bank to 
enter the Gaza Strip; this was even true of residents of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip who regularly received permission to enter Israel. The 
PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
help organizations to operate. Israeli authorities permit only a small 
number of Gazans to bring vehicles into Israel and sometimes do not 
permit West Bank vehicles to enter Jerusalem or Israel. Except for 
senior PA officials, and those using the safe passage to the West Bank, 
Palestinians of all ages crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel are 
not permitted to travel by car across the main checkpoint. Instead, 
they must travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long. Israelis 
moving into and out of the Gaza Strip are permitted to use their cars.
    In November 1999, Israel and the PA implemented arrangements in the 
1995 Interim Agreement to establish a safe passage route across Israel 
between the Gaza Strip and the southern West Bank. A northern safe 
passage route, also called for by the Interim Agreement, never was 
established, despite several rounds of negotiations. The southern safe 
passage route facilitated the movement of Palestinians between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip to work, study, and visit, and alleviated some 
of the problems associated with freedom of movement for Palestinians. 
However, some Palestinian human rights groups criticized the safe 
passage agreement because it maintains significant limits on freedom of 
movement. The safe passage route was closed in October in response to 
the ongoing violence. As of the end of November, a total of 15,000 
Palestinians received approval to use the safe passage route and 2,900 
applicants were refused permits to use the route.
    Since March 1993, Israel also has applied varying levels of 
``closure,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of Palestinians 
and their goods, often for lengthy periods, in response to terrorist 
attacks and other changing security conditions. During periods of 
violent protest in the West Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that 
there is an increased likelihood of such unrest, the Israeli Government 
imposes a tightened version of closure, called ``comprehensive, 
external'' closure. Comprehensive closures also are instituted 
regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such closures, the 
Israel Government cancels travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem. 
During comprehensive closures, the authorities restrict severely the 
movement of goods between Israel and the occupied territories and 
between the West Bank and Gaza. On October 8, in response to increased 
violence, Israel imposed a prolonged comprehensive closure on the 
occupied territories. Israel imposed 88 days of tightened, 
comprehensive closure during the year, compared with 15 days in 1999.
    During periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and Gaza, the 
Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns and 
villages within the West Bank. These ``internal'' closures impede the 
flow of goods and persons. Israel imposed at least 81 days of total or 
near-total internal closure during the year, compared with no days of 
internal closure during 1999. In the past, Israel rarely imposed 
internal closure within Gaza; however, for much of November and 
December, the IDF closed major roads in central Gaza, which blocked 
transit from the north to the south and stranded thousands of workers 
and students. Beginning in October, the Israeli Government further 
constrained the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by 
imposing total closures on specific areas or villages, sometimes for 
weeks at a time, and by intermittently closing the Gaza Airport and the 
Allenby and Rafah crossing points to Jordan and Egypt. Israel also 
imposed a curfew in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron. During the 
curfews, Palestinians generally were confined to their homes for all 
but a few hours per week during which they were allowed to buy food and 
other provisions. The IDF did not impose a curfew on the Jewish 
settlers in Hebron. On December 10, the IDF further restricted freedom 
of movement by banning private Palestinian cars that contained only men 
(but no women) from traveling on main roads in Areas B and C. The 
prolonged closures and curfews imposed by Israel on Palestinian cities 
and towns during the year had a significant negative impact on every 
sector of the Palestinian economy. Israel's Ministry of Finance 
estimates that since the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there 
has been a 30 to 50 percent decline in economic output in the occupied 
territories. Unemployment of Palestinians nearly has quadrupled, the 
poverty rate has doubled, and income losses were estimated at over $500 
million.
    The prolonged closure also affected students' ability to attend 
school and university. In areas under curfew, all classes were 
cancelled (see Section 5). Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach 
their schools in different villages and towns, and university students 
were unable to travel between Gaza and the West Bank due to the closure 
of the safe passage route.
    Human rights groups reported that between late September and the 
end of the year, the IDF delayed or prohibited at least 94 ambulances 
from crossing checkpoints (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to 
the Israeli Government, Israeli ambulances and medical personnel 
reportedly facilitated the medical evacuation of over 180 Palestinians 
to Israel, Jordan, and other countries during the violent unrest.
    In 1998 the Israeli Government established a ``continuous 
employment program'' that allows selected Palestinian workers who have 
been approved by the Ministry of Defense and who are married, are over 
28 years old, and have worked in Israel for a long period of time, to 
enter Israel to work in the event of a tightened closure. The program 
was not implemented during the periods of tightened closure during the 
year.
    The Israeli Government continued to restrict the movements of 
several Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged 
to the extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of 
administrative orders issued by the IDF central command.
    The Israeli Government requires all Palestinian residents to obtain 
permits for foreign travel and has restricted the travel of some 
political activists. Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan may be obtained 
at post offices without a screening process. These restrictions on 
residence, reentry, and family reunification only apply to Palestinian 
residents of the occupied territories.
    Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied 
during the 1967 War, generally do not accept Israeli citizenship. 
Therefore, they are issued a residence permit or Jerusalem 
identification card by the Israeli Government. Israel applies the 1952 
Law of Permanent Residency and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem 
identification card holders. This law stipulates that a Jerusalem 
resident loses the right of residence if the resident leaves Israeli 
territory for more than 7 years, acquires the nationality of another 
country, or acquires permanent residence in another country. Such 
persons are permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are 
denied entry. The Israeli Government does not apply these same 
restrictions to Israeli citizens. In the past, invoking the 1952 law as 
legal justification, the Israeli Interior Ministry stripped residency 
rights from hundreds of East Jerusalem Palestinians. In the late 
1990's, the pace of revocations increased as the Ministry applied 
restricted policies, including a ``center of life'' test, which 
required extensive documentation of continuous residence within 
Jerusalem for the previous 7 years, to determine whether Palestinians 
were eligible to retain their identification cards. The Ministry's 
policy was the subject of numerous lawsuits, including one considered 
by the High Court of Justice in 1999. In October 1999, then Minister of 
Interior, Natan Sharansky announced that the Ministry no longer would 
apply the ``center of life'' criteria used previously to revoke the 
residency rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians. During the year, there 
were 7 identity card revocations, compared with 394 revocations in 
1999. In February the Israeli Ministry of Interior also published new 
instructions regarding residency rights in Jerusalem. According to 
these instructions, residents of Israel, whose identity cards had been 
revoked since 1995 and who returned to live in Israel since 1998 and 
had ``maintained proper contact'' were entitled to restoration of their 
identity cards. During the year, 67 identity cards were restored.
    Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family 
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the 
1967 War, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons 
since then, are not permitted to reside permanently with their families 
in Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and 
children of Palestinian residents also experience difficulty in 
obtaining permission to reside with their family members. For example, 
a Palestinian with a West Bank identification card must apply to the 
Israeli Government for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem-
resident spouse in Jerusalem. The Israeli Government occasionally 
issues limited-duration permits and also issues a limited number of 
Jerusalem identification cards as part of its family reunification 
program. Israeli security authorities single out young (often 
unmarried) Palestinian males for more stringent restrictions than other 
Palestinians, citing them as more likely to be security risks. They 
generally are prohibited from working in Israel.
    The PA issues passports and identification cards for Palestinians 
residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Bearers of Palestinian passports do 
not need special exit permits from the PA; however, when leaving Israel 
from Ben Gurion Airport they require permits in order to transit Israel 
to reach the airport.
    Palestinians who hold Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the 
Israeli Government, must obtain travel documents from the Israeli 
Government to travel abroad. Human rights groups report that 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often do not apply for Israeli 
travel documents because they fear that the application might prompt a 
reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of 
their identity cards. On request, the Jordanian Government also issues 
travel documents to Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
Palestinians who wish to travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli 
identification documents with Israeli authorities at the Allenby 
Bridge. There also is a requirement that Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem obtain a special permit to cross the Allenby Bridge, which 
may be purchased from the Ministry of Interior for $40 (125 NIS). 
Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are 
not allowed to cross between Israel and Jordan at the Sheikh Hussein or 
Arava crossings.
    Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required by 
the Israeli Government to exit and enter with a Palestinian passport. 
When Israel tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
during the year, the Government at times restricted the entry and 
departure of Palestinians, even those with passports from other 
countries.
    The PA generally does not restrict freedom of movement.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East 
Jerusalem chose their first popularly elected government in 1996. They 
elected an 88-member Palestinian Council and the Ra'iis (President or 
Chairman) of the Executive Authority of the Council. Yasir Arafat won 
almost 89 percent of the vote in a two-person race for Chairman. Some 
700 candidates ran for Council seats. Council members were elected in 
multimember electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members 
were independent candidates. International observers concluded that the 
election could reasonably be regarded as an accurate expression of the 
will of the voters, despite some irregularities. During the year, the 
Council debated numerous draft laws and resolutions. Some members of 
the Council complained of its relative lack of power in relation to the 
executive branch of government.
    The last municipal elections took place in 1986. Municipal 
elections were planned for June 1999; however, they did not take place. 
On August 22, the Fatah Central Committee (FCC) appointed a committee 
to devise a plan for holding local elections before year's end; 
however, the PLO Central Council did not ratify the plan.
    Most Palestinians in East Jerusalem do not recognize the 
jurisdiction of the municipality of Jerusalem. Only a very small 
percentage of Jerusalem's Palestinian population vote in the municipal 
council elections. No Palestinian resident of Jerusalem sits on the 
city council.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 5 
women in the 88-member Council, and 1 woman serves in a ministerial-
level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGO's monitor the Israeli 
Government's human rights practices. The Israeli Government generally 
cooperates with human rights and humanitarian NGO's; officials normally 
agree to meet with human rights monitors. The Israeli Government 
permits human rights groups to publish and hold press conferences. On 
April 4, the Israeli Government refused to allow a Palestinian human 
rights activist to travel to Cairo, Egypt for a regional meeting on 
human rights; however, several months later the Government allowed the 
activist to attend a meeting outside of the country (see Section 2.d.).
    On October 17, pursuant to the meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh, a fact-
finding committee was established to examine the causes of the violent 
events that began in late September, and to recommend ways to prevent 
their recurrence. The committee began its work in December.
    Local human rights groups, most of which are Palestinian, and 
several international organizations monitor the PA's human rights 
practices. The PA generally cooperates with these organizations, and PA 
officials usually meet with their representatives; however, there were 
instances in which it did not. Several Palestinian human rights 
organizations work privately with the PA to overcome abusive practices 
in certain areas. They also publish criticism if they believe that the 
PA is not responding adequately to private encouragement. Human rights 
groups state that the PA generally is cooperative when dealing with 
certain types of human rights issues. Human rights organizations 
reported that they sometimes were denied access to detainees in 
Palestinian prisons during the year (see Section 1.d.).
    The ICRC operates in the West Bank and Gaza under the terms of a 
memorandum of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC 
and the PLO. The memorandum accords the ICRC access to all detainees 
held by the PA and allows regular inspections of prison conditions. In 
accordance with the agreement, the ICRC conducts routine visits of PA-
run prison facilities and sees PA-held prisoners throughout the year. 
Other human rights groups, including the Palestinian Independent 
Commission for Citizens' Rights and the Mandela Institute, also visited 
PA prisons and detention centers on a regular basis. Some human rights 
and international humanitarian organizations reported that they 
occasionally were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons 
during the year (see Section 1.d.). PA officials reportedly are less 
responsive to queries regarding the PA's policies toward and treatment 
of members of Islamist opposition groups than to queries on other 
detainees.
    In 1999 Palestinian NGO's repeatedly called on the PA to ratify a 
law passed by the Council in December 1998, which would govern the 
activities of NGO's and their relations with the PA. Ratification of 
the law was delayed due to the PA's attempts to replace the Ministry of 
Justice with the Ministry of Interior as the agency responsible for the 
administration of NGO's. In January Chairman Arafat approved the NGO 
law. At least 150 NGO's had been issued with registration certificates 
by year's end.
    On April 21, PSF officials closed a democratization group office in 
Gaza because the NGO was not yet registered with the Ministry of 
Interior (see Section 2.b.). After repeated unsuccessful attempts to 
reopen the office, board members decided to close the office 
permanently.
    On May 17, the PBA placed the director of a West Bank NGO on the 
``non-practicing'' register of lawyers reportedly because he worked for 
an NGO and not a law office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the 
occupied territories, Palestinians are disadvantaged under Israeli law 
and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers. 
This includes discrimination in residency and land use.
    Women.--The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence 
related to ``family honor'' have gained greater attention in the 
Palestinian community as a result of a significant effort by 
Palestinian women's groups; however, public discussion generally 
remains muted. Victims often are encouraged by relatives to remain 
quiet and are punished themselves or blamed for the ``shame'' that has 
been brought upon them and their families. The brother of a 14-year-old 
girl who reportedly was raped and killed by her uncle and brother in 
1998 still was awaiting trial at year's end. Women's groups seek to 
educate women on these problems, but women's rights advocates claim 
that few resources are available to shelter the victims of violence 
because women's shelters are not accepted culturally in Palestinian 
society. They also maintain that society has not been receptive to 
providing counseling or outreach services to victims of violence, which 
these advocates see as more widespread than is acknowledged. According 
to women's groups, there are no reliable data on the incidence of 
violence against women. Spousal abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor 
killings'' occur, but societal pressures prevent most incidents from 
being reported and most cases are handled within the families 
concerned, usually by male family members. In prior years, leaders of 
HAMAS threatened and tried to intimidate Palestinian women who were 
involved in programs aimed at empowering women and helping abused 
women; there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
    Palestinian women endure various forms of social prejudice and 
repression within their own society. Because of early marriage, girls 
frequently do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural 
restrictions sometimes prevent women from attending colleges and 
universities. While there is an active women's movement in the West 
Bank, serious attention has shifted only recently from nationalist 
aspirations to issues that greatly affect women, such as domestic 
violence, equal access to education and employment, and laws concerning 
marriage and inheritance. Women who marry outside of their faith, 
particularly Christian women who marry Muslim men, often are disowned 
by their families and sometimes are harassed and threatened with death 
by members of their community. Local officials sometimes attempt to 
convince such women to leave their communities in order to protect 
themselves.
    A growing number of Palestinian women work outside the home, where 
they tend to encounter discrimination. There are no special laws that 
provide for women's rights in the workplace. Women are underrepresented 
in most aspects of professional life. Despite the fact that there is a 
small group of women who are prominent in politics, medicine, law, 
teaching, and NGO's, women for the most part are seriously 
underrepresented in the decisionmaking positions in these fields.
    Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For 
Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a 
(Islamic law), and the varied ecclesiastical courts rule on personal 
status issues for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a 
pertaining to women is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which 
includes inheritance and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit 
less than male members of the family do. The marriage law allows men to 
take more than one wife, although few do so. Women are permitted to 
make ``stipulations'' in the marriage contract to protect them in the 
event of divorce and questions of child custody. However, only an 
estimated 1 percent of women take advantage of this section of the law, 
leaving most women at a disadvantage when it comes to divorce or child 
custody. Ecclesiastical courts also often favor men over women in 
divorce and child custody cases.
    Children.--The PA requires compulsory education up to 12 years of 
age. However, early marriage in certain sectors of society frequently 
prevents girls from completing the mandatory level of schooling. 
Currently British Mandate, Jordanian, and military laws, from which 
West Bank and Gaza law is derived, offer protection to children under 
the Labor and Penal Codes. Existing laws designed to protect children, 
such as a law that sets the minimum employment age, are not always 
enforced. While there is no juvenile court system, judges specializing 
in children's cases generally sit for juvenile offenders. In cases in 
which the child is the victim, judges have the discretion to remove the 
child from a situation deemed harmful. However, the system is not 
advanced in the protection it affords children.
    The sustained closure imposed by Israel affected students' ability 
to attend school during the year. In areas under curfew, all classes 
were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their 
schools in different villages and towns (see Section 2.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no mandated accessibility to 
public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli or 
Palestinian authority. Approximately 130,000 Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza are disabled. Additionally, medical relief organizations 
estimated that approximately one-sixth of the 10,600 Palestinians 
injured during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' would be disabled permanently. 
Some Palestinian institutions care for and train disabled persons; 
however, their efforts are chronically underfunded. Many Palestinians 
with disabilities are segregated and isolated from Palestinian society; 
they are discriminated against in most spheres, including education, 
employment, transportation, and access to public buildings and 
facilities.
    Religious Minorities.--In the past, there were reports that a small 
number of Muslim converts to Christianity in the Palestinian community 
sometimes were subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA 
officials. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination and 
harassment against Christians (see Section 2.c.).
    On October 7, following the IDF withdrawal from the Jewish 
religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters 
entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an 
outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section 
2.c.). On October 12, Palestinian civilians reportedly burned a 
synagogue in Jericho.
    On November 21, Israeli settlers set a mosque on fire in Huwara, 
reportedly in reaction to the killing of an Israeli settler by a 
settler earlier in the day.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank came 
under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the Interim 
Agreement in September 1995. Until a new law being drafted by PA 
authorities comes into effect, labor affairs in the West Bank are 
governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by Israeli military 
orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. The law permits workers to 
establish and join unions without government authorization. The 
previous Israeli requirement that all proposed West Bank unions apply 
for a permit no longer is enforced. Israeli authorities previously 
licensed about 35 of the estimated 185 union branches now in existence. 
Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there 
now are 12 trade unions there.
    Palestinian workers in Jerusalem are governed by Israeli labor law. 
They are free to establish their own unions. Although the Government 
restricts Jerusalem unions from joining West Bank trade union 
federations, this restriction has not been enforced. Palestinian 
workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions affiliated 
with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
    West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut 
Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel 
or Jerusalem are not full members of Histadrut, but they are required 
to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations 
between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this 
fee to the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but 
funds have yet to be transferred.
    Palestinians who work in Israel are required to contribute to the 
National Insurance Institute (NII), which provides unemployment 
insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza 
are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. According to the 
Interim Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel and Jerusalem 
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the bankruptcy 
of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity leave.
    There are outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who have 
attempted to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but 
are unable to travel to the relevant courts because they are unable to 
receive the proper permits.
    The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the Palestinian 
General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU was involved in 
the completion of the negotiations with Histadrut regarding workers' 
fees. The reorganization of unions under the PGFTU is intended to 
enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to better represent the union 
members' interests; the reorganization had not been finalized by year's 
end.
    An estimated 92,000 workers in the West Bank are members of the 
PGFTU, the largest union bloc, which consists of 12 trade unions in the 
West Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization has about 46,500 members in 
Gaza. The PGFTU estimates actual organized membership, i.e., dues-
paying members, at about 30 percent of all Palestinian workers.
    No unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action 
during the year. Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to 
arbitration by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with 
the final arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges 
appointed by the PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be 
taken. There are no laws in the territories that specifically protect 
the rights of striking workers. In practice, such workers have little 
or no protection from an employer's retribution.
    For several months, teachers throughout the West Bank held a 
strike. On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the strike leaders and 
closed down the radio station that broadcast an interview in which the 
leader accused the PA of inefficiency (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). The 
teachers suspended their strike on May 17, despite the fact that none 
of their demands were met.
    The PGFTU has applied for membership in the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of 
workers in the occupied territories are self-employed or unpaid family 
helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in 
the territories consists of wage jobs, most with the U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA), the PA, or municipalities. Collective bargaining 
is protected. Labor disputes are adjudicated by committees of 3 to 5 
members in businesses employing more than 20 workers.
    Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection against 
antiunion discrimination.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--PA law does not 
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, including by 
children, but there were no reports of such practices during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza is 14 
years. Most observers agree that a significant number of Palestinian 
children under the age of 16 years work. Many children under the age of 
12 are engaged in some work activities. Most such employment is 
believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban 
street vendors. Some employment of children also is reported to occur 
in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories. 
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor by 
children, but there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    The PA's capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. It has only 
40 labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The 
International Labor Organization and UNICEF are working with the PA to 
study the nature and extent of the problem and to develop the capacity 
to enforce and update child labor laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There currently is no minimum 
wage in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The average wage for full-time 
workers appears to provide a worker and family with a decent standard 
of living.
    In the West Bank, the normal workweek is 48 hours in most areas; in 
Gaza the workweek is 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for 
salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum 
workweek laws.
    The PA Ministry of Labor is responsible for inspecting workplaces 
and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry 
of Labor states that new factories and workplaces meet international 
health and safety standards but that older ones fail to meet minimum 
standards. There is no specific legal protection afforded workers that 
allows them to remove themselves from an unhealthy or unsafe work 
setting without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, through, or from the occupied territories.
                               __________

                                 JORDAN

    The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled 
by King Abdullah II bin Hussein since the death of his father, King 
Hussein bin Talal, in February 1999. The Constitution concentrates a 
high degree of executive and legislative authority in the King, who 
determines domestic and foreign policy. In the King's absence, a 
regent, whose authority is outlined in the Constitution, assumes many 
of these responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other members of the 
Cabinet are appointed by the King and manage the daily affairs of 
government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate, appointed 
by the King, and the 80-member Chamber of Deputies, which is elected 
every 4 years. The lower house asserts itself only intermittently on 
domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997 parliamentary elections 
were marred by reports of registration irregularities, fraud, and 
restrictions on the press and on campaign materials. According to the 
Constitution, the judiciary is independent of other branches of 
government; however, in practice it is susceptible to political 
pressure and interference by the executive.
    General police functions are the responsibility of the Public 
Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID), and the military share responsibility for 
maintaining internal security, and have authority to monitor the 
activities of persons believed to be security threats. Elements of the 
security forces continue to commit human rights abuses.
    Jordan has a mixed economy, with significant but declining 
government participation in industry, transportation, and 
communications. The country has few natural resources and relies 
heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from citizens working 
abroad. During the year, the Government took steps to increase 
privatization and to improve the country's investment climate during 
the year. For example, in April the country acceded to the World Trade 
Organization, which entailed extensive legislative and regulatory 
reform. However, the economy continues to suffer from chronically high 
unemployment, and GDP growth has remained between 1 and 2 percent since 
1996. Price controls remain on bread, pharmaceuticals, gasoline, and 
animal feed. Wages remain stagnant. International sanctions against 
Iraq, historically the country's largest trading partner, continue to 
inhibit export growth. Violence in the occupied territories late in the 
year adversely affected the tourist industry, and many foreign 
investment projects were frozen. Per capita gross domestic product in 
1999 was approximately $1,542 (1,086 dinars). Many families, especially 
those in rural areas, are unable to meet basic needs to subsist.
    There continued to be significant problems in the Government's 
human rights record. There are significant restrictions on citizens' 
right to change their Government. Citizens may participate in the 
political system through their elected representatives in Parliament; 
however, the King has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to 
establish public policy. Other human rights problems include 
extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces, police abuse 
and mistreatment of detainees; allegations of torture; arbitrary arrest 
and detention; lack of transparent investigations and accountability 
within the security services; prolonged detention without charge; lack 
of due process of law and interference in the judicial process; 
infringements on citizens' privacy rights; harassment of members of 
opposition political parties and the press; and significant 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. 
The 1999 Press and Publications Law reduced somewhat the restrictions 
outlined in previous legislation on the ability of journalists and 
publications to function and report freely; however, significant 
restrictions continued to be in effect. The Government imposes some 
limits on freedom of religion, and there is official and societal 
discrimination against adherents of unrecognized religions. The 
evangelical Christian community reported fewer incidents of 
governmental harassment during the year. There are some restrictions on 
freedom of movement. Violence against women, restrictions on women's 
rights, and societal discrimination against women are problems. The law 
still allows for reduced punishments for violent ``honor crimes'' 
against women for alleged immoral acts. Child abuse remains a problem, 
and discrimination against Palestinians persists. Abuse of foreign 
servants is a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials; however, 
security forces committed several extrajudicial killings.
    In January police reportedly beat Mar'i Khalil Al-Jahran in a South 
Shuna police station, where he bled to death.
    In March security forces fired at a group of villagers of the Bedul 
Tribe near Petra, killing a 21-year-old man and 2 teenagers. The 
villagers were protesting the demolition of a home by members of the 
Petra Regional Authorities; the home reportedly was built illegally on 
government-owned land. The Ministry of Interior stated that security 
forces acted in self-defense after villagers, armed with sticks, 
stones, and firearms attacked a group of officials from the Petra 
Regional Council who were attempting to carry out the demolition order. 
Following the incident, the Government stated that it would investigate 
and punish those responsible for the violence; however, by year's end, 
the Government had not taken legal action against any party. The 
Government did not launch an official investigation of the incident; 
however, King Abdullah offered the villagers an extensive compensation 
package, including economic assistance and increased land for housing.
    In May police reportedly beat Musa Shalback in Hai Nazal after 
pursuing him for allegedly stealing a car and hitting two pedestrians. 
According to eyewitnesses, police handcuffed Shalback, severely beat 
him, and subsequently took him at a local hospital. Shalback was in a 
coma when he arrived to the hospital where he died from his injuries 10 
days later. The Government stated that Shalback died as a result of 
injuries sustained in a car crash that followed the pursuit. By year's 
end, the Government had not responded to diplomatic inquiries about 
this case.
    On October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse 
protesters in Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six others 
were injured during the protest. Protesters claim that police caused 
the death and injuries, while police personnel claim that the 
demonstrators caused the fatalities (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    On July 20, 16-year-old Amjad Salem Ahmad Smadi died at a police 
station in Ajloun 45 minutes after police officers placed him in 
custody for suspected robbery. Government officials initially reported 
that Smadi hanged himself; however, family members and other residents 
of Ajloun demanded an investigation into the death. In response the 
Government formed an ad-hoc parliamentary committee to look into the 
incident and transferred the police officers and the local prosecutor 
to another part of the country. An unpublished forensics report 
supported the original autopsy's conclusion that the death was a 
suicide; however, the report also stated that Smadi was beaten prior to 
his death. Human rights activists and family members believe that the 
boy died as a result of the beatings and subsequently was hanged to 
make it appear as if he had committed suicide. Neither diplomatic 
representatives nor human rights activists were able to uncover 
evidence to support either the family's claims or to refute the 
Government's position.
    The security services continue to be reluctant to conduct 
transparent investigations into allegations of wrongful deaths that 
occurred during police detention in previous years, thus promoting a 
climate of impunity.
    There were no developments in the investigation of the May 1999 
death of Mahmoud Rashid Qasem Mohammed Ishtayeh, who died in a hospital 
while in police custody. His family claimed that he died of injuries 
suffered during a beating; however, prison officials maintained that 
Ishtayeh died of natural causes.
    There were no developments in the investigation of the police 
officers who killed Maseed tribesmen in March 1998 or Mohammad Al-
Khattub and Ismail Suleiman Ajarmeh in February 1998.
    Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section 
5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law provides prisoners with the right to humane 
treatment; however, the police and security forces sometimes abuse 
detainees physically and verbally during detention and interrogation 
and allegedly also use torture. Allegations of torture are difficult to 
verify because security officials frequently deny detainees timely 
access to lawyers. The most frequently alleged methods of torture are 
sleep deprivation, beatings on the soles of the feet, prolonged 
suspension with ropes in contorted positions, and extended solitary 
confinement. Defendants in high-profile cases before the State Security 
Court claimed to have been subjected to physical and psychological 
abuse while in detention. Government officials deny allegations of 
torture and abuse.
    A number of cases of beatings while in police custody were reported 
to human rights activists during the year. Human rights activists 
believe that there were many more incidents that were not documented. 
Iraqi weightlifter Kazem Dashi claimed that he was beaten and 
intimidated during his April detention (see Section 1.d.). Musa 
Shalback died in a hospital in March 10 days after police reportedly 
beat him in Hai Nazal (see Section 1.a.). Periodic detentions of 
foreign workers continue and allegations of overcrowded cells and 
physical abuse by guards persist.
    Police on several occasions used force to disperse demonstrations 
during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). For example, in April 
newspapers reported that police used excessive force to disperse 
student demonstrations at Jordan University, injuring a number of 
protesters. The students were protesting the administration's recent 
changes to the university's student council law, which were designed to 
curb the influence of Islamists (see Section 2.c.).
    On several occasions in October, police used force to disperse 
large violent protests against the Israeli Government's actions in 
Israel and the occupied territories (see Section 2.b.). For example, on 
October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse protesters from 
Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six were injured during 
the protest (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). Protesters claimed that 
police caused the death and injuries, while police personnel claimed 
that the demonstrators caused the fatalities. On October 8, police used 
batons against at least five persons at a demonstration at Jordan 
University. On October 24, police used tear gas and water cannons to 
disperse a demonstration of between 20,000 and 30,000 persons who were 
approaching a heavily mined border area. Police injured a number of 
persons, including a journalist covering the protest (see Section 
2.a.).
    On August 7, a small group of Palestinians attacked an Arab member 
of the Israeli Parliament at the Baqaa refugee camp. Police personnel 
immediately escorted him away from the area. On November 19, an unknown 
assailant shot and injured an Israeli diplomat. On December 5, unknown 
gunmen shot and injured a second Israeli diplomat. In December police 
officials arrested seven persons allegedly connected to these attacks.
    Prisons and local police detention facilities are Spartan, and on 
the whole are severely overcrowded and understaffed. Human rights 
groups and prisoners complained of poor food and water quality, 
inadequate medical facilities, and poor sanitation in certain 
facilities. During the year, the Government opened a new prison 
facility in an attempt to alleviate somewhat the problem of 
overcrowding.
    The Government holds some of the prisoners who are detained on 
national security grounds in separate detention facilities maintained 
by the GID. The Government holds other security detainees and prisoners 
in regular prisons. Conditions in GID detention facilities are 
significantly better than general police detention facilities. The 
security prisoners often are separated from common criminals; however, 
conditions for them do not differ significantly.
    With some exceptions, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) is permitted unrestricted access to prisoners and prison 
facilities, including GID facilities. In 1999 the Government formally 
granted the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to 
prisoners. However, the Government did not inform the UNHCR of the 
presence of seven Libyan security detainees prior to their deportation 
from the country, which effectively denied the UNHCR access to the 
detainees (see Section 2.d.). Local human rights monitors are allowed 
to visit prisons, but complain that the authorities require them to 
undertake a lengthy and difficult procedure in order to obtain 
permission for such visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The security forces 
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. Under the Constitution, 
citizens are subject to arrest, trial, and punishment for the 
defamation of heads of state, dissemination of ``false or exaggerated 
information outside the country that attacks state dignity,'' or 
defamation of public officials.
    The Criminal Code requires that police notify legal authorities 
within 48 hours of an arrest and that legal authorities file formal 
charges within 10 days of an arrest; however, the courts routinely 
grant requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions as provided by 
law. This practice generally extends pretrial detention for protracted 
periods of time. In cases involving state security, the authorities 
frequently hold defendants in lengthy pretrial detention, do not 
provide defendants with the written charges against them, and do not 
allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly before trial. 
Defendants before the State Security Court usually meet with their 
attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial.
    The Government detains persons, including journalists, for varying 
amounts of time for what appear to be political reasons (see Section 
2.a.). Human rights sources reported that more than 500 persons were 
detained for security reasons and subsequently released within a short 
period of time throughout the year. This number likely underestimates 
the total number of political detainees. Human rights groups report 
that there are a smaller number of long-term political detainees.
    Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954 Preventing 
Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house arrest for 
up to a year without formally charging them (see Section 2.d.). House 
arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to a local police 
station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who violate the terms 
of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14 days.
    In April the GID arrested Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh and 
held him without charge, legal representation, or access to the 
government prosecutor for 20 days (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    On April 13, the GID allegedly detained without charge Iraqi 
weightlifter Kazem Dashi at the Al-Ruwayshid border point; the GID 
released Dashi the same day. Dashi claimed that he was beaten and 
intimidated during his interrogation in GID custody (see Section 1.c.). 
The Government denied the allegations.
    In July the GID detained 12 persons from Salt without charge, 
allegedly for security reasons. The Government stated that some of the 
detainees were arrested because they were ``religious individuals'' and 
that some were members of political parties. In December the Government 
released all of the detainees; 4 of the 12 were charged after admitting 
that they had planned terrorist activities and were required to post 
bail.
    In October following widespread protests against the Israeli 
Government's actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, police 
detained hundreds of persons. Police did not charge most of the 
demonstrators and released them within 1 day.
    The Government uses the threat of detention to intimidate 
journalists into practicing self-censorship (see Section 2.a.). In past 
years, police typically detained for 5 to 10 days numerous journalists 
who criticized government officials or policies; some of the 
journalists experienced abuse. When the Government did file charges, 
convictions were rare; however, some proceedings lasted several years 
with defendants required to appear in court regularly. During the year, 
police arrested at least one journalist because of an article he wrote 
(see Section 2.a.).
    There was no further information on Basil Abu Ghoshe, who continued 
to be detained despite having completed his sentence in 1998, 
ostensibly for his own protection due to threats from a rival tribe.
    The security services detained approximately 50 persons, described 
in the press as ``Islamists,'' during the year. These detentions were 
related to allegations of involvement in terrorist or strictly 
political activities.
    The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of any citizen, and the 
Government does not routinely use forced exile; however, in 1999 the 
Government allegedly expelled four HAMAS leaders, who subsequently 
filed an appeal to reverse the expulsion. On June 25, the High Court 
rejected on technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to 
reverse the alleged order of expulsion. The case was considered closed 
at year's end.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to 
pressure from the executive branch. A judge's appointment to, 
advancement within, and dismissal from the judiciary are determined by 
a committee whose members are appointed by the King. The Ministry of 
Justice has great influence over a judge's career and subverts the 
judicial system in favor of the executive branch. There have been 
numerous allegations that judges have been ``reassigned'' temporarily 
to another court or judicial district in order to remove them from a 
particular proceeding. Judges also complain of unlawful telephone 
surveillance.
    The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most 
criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals 
courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving 
sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and 
offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security 
Court. In 1997 the Parliament passed amendments to the law governing 
the State Security Court that effectively extended its mandate 
indefinitely. The amendments had been rejected earlier by the lower 
house's judicial committee as ``undemocratic'' and contrary to the 
principle of judicial independence.
    Shari'a (Islamic law) courts have jurisdiction over marriage and 
divorce among Muslims and inheritance cases involving both Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Christian courts have jurisdiction over marriage and 
divorce cases among Christians, but apply Shari'a law in inheritance 
cases (see Section 5).
    Most trials in the civilian courts are open. Defendants are 
entitled to legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right 
to appeal. Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment 
must be represented by legal counsel. Public defenders are provided if 
the defendant in such cases financially is unable to hire legal 
counsel. Shari'a as applied in the country regards the testimony of a 
woman to be equal to half that of a man. This provision technically 
applies only in religious courts; however, in the past it has been 
imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion.
    The State Security Court consists of a panel of three judges who 
may be either civilians or military officers. Sessions frequently are 
closed to the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court 
often are held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers, 
although they may be visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the 
State Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that 
defendants were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians 
regarding such allegations. The Court of Cassation has ruled that the 
State Security Court may not issue a death sentence on the basis of a 
confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants in the State 
Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of 
Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law. 
Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death penalty.
    In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of 
military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as 
contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. Military judges 
appear to receive adequate training in civil law and procedure.
    In the past, the press routinely carried details of cases tried 
before the State Security Court, despite 1998 provisions in the Press 
and Publication Law that prohibited press coverage of any case that was 
under investigation, unless expressly permitted by the authorities. The 
1999 Press and Publications Law permits journalists to cover court 
proceedings ``unless the court rules otherwise'' (see Section 2.a.). 
There was press coverage of trials in the State Security Court during 
the year.
    On September 18, the Security Court convicted 22 suspected members 
of the ``Al-Qaeda'' terrorist network of planning attacks at tourist 
sites around the country during millenium celebrations. The court 
sentenced 6 of those convicted to death and 16 to prison sentences 
ranging from 7 years to life.
    In 1999 the Government expelled four HAMAS leaders (see Section 
1.d.); there were credible reports of executive branch influence with 
respect to the verdict. On June 25, the High Court rejected on 
technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to reverse the 
order of expulsion. The case was considered closed at year's end.
    In late 1999, lawyers refused to represent an Israeli citizen who 
was accused of forging official documents. The court convicted him and 
he was sentenced to 1 year in prison.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain 
a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting 
searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security 
services generally respect these constitutional restrictions; however, 
in security cases, the authorities sometimes--in violation of the law--
obtain warrants retroactively or obtain preapproved warrants. Security 
officers monitor telephone conversations and Internet communication, 
read correspondence, and engage in surveillance of persons who are 
considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The 
law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order. 
Judges complain of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section 1.e.).
    In June the GID confiscated without a warrant a box of publications 
from Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh, detained him without charge 
for 20 days, then placed him under house arrest (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.d.).
    The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications (see 
Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposes 
some restrictions on these rights.
    The 1998 Press and Publications Law and the 1999 revisions to the 
law, combined with the 1998 Press Association Law, impose stringent 
restrictions on the operation of newspapers. The Government also 
intimidates journalists to encourage self-censorship. Private citizens 
may be prosecuted for slandering the royal family, the Government, or 
foreign leaders, and for ``sowing sedition.'' The Press and 
Publications Law and the law governing the Jordan Press Association 
(JPA) require membership in the JPA for persons to be considered 
``legal'' journalists or editors, thus potentially excluding dozens of 
practicing journalists from the profession. The JPA uses its authority 
to enforce bans on journalists receiving funding from foreign sources 
or having Israeli contacts (see Section 4). In August 1999, then Prime 
Minister Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh issued an order directing government 
offices to cooperate only with JPA members. Citizens generally do not 
hesitate to criticize the Government openly, but are more circumspect 
in regard to the King and the royal family.
    The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide 
discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order 
shutdowns, which enabled it to control the editorial content of 
newspapers. The law also prohibited reporting on criminal cases or 
crimes at any stage of the investigation without prior authorization 
from the public prosecutor. However, the 1999 amendments to the Press 
and Publications Law, limit somewhat the Government's discretion to 
issue fines, transfer the power to withdraw licenses to the judiciary, 
limit significantly the Government's power to order shutdowns, and 
allow journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules 
otherwise.'' The 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law also 
reduce the fine for violations at between $700 and $1,400 (500 to 1,000 
dinars), down from between $7,000 and $14,000 (5,000 and 10,000 dinars) 
under the 1998 Press and Publications Law (see Section 1.e.). It was 
illegal under the 1998 Press and Publications Law to publish news, 
opinion, information, reports, caricatures, or photos that disparage 
the King or the royal family, pertain to the armed forces or security 
services, harm national unity, disparage religion, offend an individual 
or harm his reputation, disparage the heads of friendly states, harm 
the country's relations with other nations, promote perversion or lead 
to moral corruption, shake confidence in the national currency, or 
feature false news or rumors. Although these restrictions were modified 
by the 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law, prohibitions 
on such activities still exist in the Penal Code and a number of other 
laws.
    According to the 1999 Press and Publications Law, all publications 
must be licensed by the Government. The law provides that those who 
seek to obtain a newspaper license must show proof of capital of 
$700,000 (500,000 dinars) for a daily newspaper, $70,000 (50,000 
dinars) for most other publications, and $7,000 (5,000 dinars) for 
specialized publications. The law also requires that the editor in 
chief of a newspaper be a citizen who permanently resides in the 
country and a member of the JPA for at least 4 years. This last 
provision reflects a reduction in the requirements from previous 
legislation but places the onus of regulation on the JPA.
    Persons accused of violating the Press and Publications Law are 
tried in a special court for press and copyright cases. Journalists 
also may be prosecuted for criminal and security violations in 
connection with their work. Although a substantial number of cases are 
dismissed before trial, many other cases linger in the courts for 
years. The Government routinely uses detention and prosecution or the 
threat of prosecution to intimidate journalists and thereby 
successfully encourages self-censorship (see Section 1.d.).
    The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any 
person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates 
``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks 
state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
    In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla 
Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, accusing 
him of affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and 
distributing illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.b.).
    On May 25, police arrested Basil Talluzi, a freelance journalist 
and short-story writer for the independent weekly newspaper Al-Mir'ah 
(The Mirror), for writing a satirical article about leaders in the Arab 
world (see Section 1.d.). Talluzi was released the next day and 
reported that he was not mistreated while in detention. The JPA claimed 
credit for obtaining Talluzi's prompt release.
    In October police reportedly beat and confiscated the film of a 
reporter covering a demonstration against the Israeli Government's 
actions in Israel and the occupied territories. The police officer 
reportedly apologized and returned the film to the journalist the next 
day (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    In September the JPA voted to expel Nidal Mansour, its own vice 
president and the president of a nongovernmental organization (NGO), 
the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CFJ). Mansour 
allegedly received foreign funding for CFJ activities (see Section 4). 
As a result of his expulsion from the JPA, Mansour was not permitted to 
keep his position as editor in chief of Al-Hadath newspaper. The Jordan 
Times, an English language newspaper, published an article criticizing 
the JPA's expulsion of Mansour. The JPA threatened the editor in chief 
of the Jordan Times with disciplinary measures; she subsequently 
published an apology letter. In October Mansour filed a complaint to 
the High Court of Justice; the court suspended the expulsion order 
pending review of the case.
    In 1999 a columnist of Al-Arab Al-Yawm newspaper wrote an article 
that was critical of the JPA. The JPA subsequently suspended for 2 
years the newspaper's editor in chief, Azzam Yunis, along with three 
other journalists. June Yunis appealed the action; however, his request 
was denied.
    In March the Government banned a book of poems written by Musa 
Hawamdeh due to pressure from radical Islamists. In June the Shari'a 
court charged Hawamdeh with apostasy. The complainant requested that 
Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements in his poem and 
requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce his wife and 
lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own wealth. The 
Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July both the 
Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges, without 
his retracting any portion of the poem (see Section 2.c.).
    According to local press reports, the Press and Publications 
Department also banned a book of poetry by Ziyad Al-Anani in April; the 
book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The 
authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani; the book was 
published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Some journalists complained about high taxes on the media industry 
and tariffs on paper, which they claim led them to reduce the size of 
their publications. They also criticized the Government for its policy 
of advertising predominantly in newspapers in which the Government owns 
shares.
    The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications. In 
January the Government passed a bill that grants foreign media 
operations ``absolute freedom of expression'' in the country. The bill 
reportedly was passed in order to encourage foreign investment. Some 
commentators criticized the Government for passing a bill that offers 
full autonomy for foreign journalists while maintaining laws that 
restrict freedom of expression for local journalists.
    Radio and television news broadcasts are more restricted than the 
print media. The Government is the sole broadcaster of radio and 
television programs. The Government has commercial agreements with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East 
Broadcasting Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allows it to simulcast 
regional programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television 
(JTV) reports only the Government's position on controversial matters. 
International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television 
broadcasts are available and unrestricted.
    In December due to widespread criticism of local media coverage of 
events in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, King Abdullah took steps to 
reform the state media. For example, the King appointed new members to 
the board of the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTVC) and 
reportedly instructed the new director to discontinue the traditional 
practice of placing items about the King first in the evening news 
lineup. The Minister of Information also announced a plan to create an 
independent regulatory commission.
    The GID actively investigates Internet reports of ``crimes against 
the king.''
    The Government limits academic freedom. No university professors 
were dismissed for their political views during the year; however, some 
academics claim that they receive frequent threats of dismissal. In 
March Jordan University granted the president of the university the 
authority to appoint half of the university's 80-member student 
council, including the chair (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public 
gatherings. Following a demonstration on October 6 in which one 
protester was killed and six were injured, the Government banned all 
demonstrations and public rallies. However, a number of demonstrations 
subsequently were held with government acquiescence despite the ban. 
Before the ban, the Government denied permits for public protests and 
rallies that it determined pose a threat to security.
    In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights 
activists to hold demonstrations to protest a parliamentary vote 
rejecting the repeal of Article 340, the so-called honor crimes law. 
However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin 
Mohammed, led more than 5,000 persons in a march to Parliament to 
demand the cancellation of Article 340. The Ministry of Interior denied 
permits for an Islamic Action Front (IAF) counterdemonstration. Some 
commentators criticized the Government for organizing and controlling 
the demonstration instead of allowing human rights activists to 
organize their own demonstration.
    In March Jordan University's administration amended the Student 
Council election law, granting the University president the authority 
to appoint half of the University's 80-member student council, 
including the chair. The amendment was viewed widely as an effort to 
curb the influence of campus Islamists. Many students, including non-
Islamists, objected to the University's decision, and staged several 
demonstrations throughout April to protest against the appointments. 
Police used physical force, water cannons, and tear gas to disperse 
demonstrations, injuring a number of students (see Section 1.c.).
    On July 1, the Higher Coordination Committee for Opposition Parties 
convened a rally to welcome home the three members of the Jordanian 
Professional Association who were shot by Israeli soldiers at a protest 
at the border between Israel and Lebanon.
    In August the Islamic Action Front organized several large 
demonstrations in support of Palestinian sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem. There was heavy police presence at these demonstrations; 
however, security forces did not prevent the demonstrations.
    In October there were numerous large demonstrations against the 
Israeli Government's actions in Israel and the occupied territories and 
in support of Palestinians. Police used force to disperse demonstrators 
during several violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    The Government restricts freedom of association. The Government 
requires, but routinely grants, approval for conferences, workshops, 
and seminars.
    The Government routinely licenses political parties and other 
associations. There currently are 25 licensed political parties. 
Membership in an unlicensed political party is illegal. The Government 
may deny licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of 
political and other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law. 
The High Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the 
Constitution or the Political Parties Law.
    In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla 
Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, reportedly 
due to his affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and 
because he allegedly distributed illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.a.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the 
safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in 
accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is 
inconsistent with public order or morality;'' however, the Government 
imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. Citizens may not 
always practice the religion of their choice. According to the 
Constitution, Islam is the state religion.
    Islamic institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Trusts, which appoints imams and subsidizes certain 
activities sponsored by mosques. Religious institutions, such as 
churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must 
apply to the Prime Ministry for registration. The Protestant 
denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the jurisdiction 
of one of the recognized Protestant churches for purposes of family 
law, such as divorce and child custody. The Government does not 
recognize a number of religions.
    Over 90 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, and according 
to official government statistics, approximately 6 percent are 
Christian. Government and Christian officials privately estimate the 
true figure to be closer to between 2 and 4 percent. The Government 
does not recognize religious faiths other than the three main 
monotheistic religions: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism. In addition 
not all Christian denominations have been accorded official government 
recognition. Officially recognized denominations include the Greek 
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox, 
Maronite Catholic, and the Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-Day 
Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other 
churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church, 
the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian 
Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as 
``societies'' but not as churches. There also are small numbers of 
Shi'a and Druze, as well as adherents of the Baha'i Faith. The 
Government does not interfere with public worship by the country's 
Christian minority. However, although the majority of Christians are 
allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as proselytizing or 
encouraging conversion to the Christian faith--both considered 
incompatible legally with Islam--are prohibited. Christians are subject 
to aspects of Shari'a (Islamic law) that designate how inheritances are 
distributed.
    The Government does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church 
of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each 
of these denominations is allowed to conduct religious services and 
activities without interference.
    The Government does not recognize the Baha'i Faith as a religion 
but does not prohibit the practice of the faith. However, Baha'is, who 
number approximately 800 citizens, face both official and societal 
discrimination. The Government does not record the bearer's religion on 
national identity cards issued to Baha'is, nor does it register 
property belonging to the Baha'i community. Adherents of the Baha'i 
Faith are considered as Muslims for purposes of family and inheritance 
law. Unlike Christian denominations, the Baha'i community does not have 
its own court to adjudicate personal status and family matters. Baha'i 
personal status matters are heard in Shari'a courts.
    Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operate in the country but are 
subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytize 
Muslims. Since late 1998, foreign Christian mission groups in the 
country have complained of increased bureaucratic difficulties, 
including refusal by the Government to renew residence permits.
    The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian 
training school for pastors and missionaries, which requested 
registration from the Ministry of Education in 1998, was not registered 
by year's end. Pending such registration, in 1999 authorities suspended 
renewal of the residence permits of all of the seminary's 36 foreign 
students and 2 members of the faculty. In 1998 and 1999, some non-
citizen Arab Muslim students were deported and asked to leave the 
country as a result of their association with JETS. To date the 
Ministry of Education's refusal to issue visas has affected 14 of 140 
students and 4 staff members of the school.
    In 1999 an employee of a small language school in Amman twice 
applied for a residence permit from the Ministry of Interior. His 
application was denied on both occasions, reportedly because government 
officials believed that he had been trying to convert Muslims to 
Christianity. He reapplied in April and was awaiting a response from 
the Government at year's end.
    In January GID officials contacted an official of Life Agape 
(formerly Campus Crusade for Christ)--an organization associated with 
the Baptist Church, which distributes Bibles and conducts Bible 
studies--and asked him to sign a letter stating that he would not 
``deal with Muslims.'' The GID officers told the official that if he 
did not sign the letter his office would be closed. In February police 
brought the letter to the Life Agape office, and escorted the official 
to the police station, and then to meet with the Governor of the Amman 
municipality. The following day, the Governor closed the Life Agape 
office; no reason was specified on the Governor's order.
    The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Baha'is) on 
the national identity card and ``family book'' (a national registration 
record issued to the head of every family that serves as proof of 
citizenship) of all citizens.
    The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to 
establish schools for the education of their own members ``provided 
that they comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject 
to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and 
orientation.''
    In February criticism of a poem entitled ``Yusef,'' which was 
included in a book of poems published in May 1999 by Muslim poet Musa 
Hawamdeh, began to circulate in mosques in Amman. Radical Islamists 
escalated the criticism of the poem and the poet, calling for the poet 
to be killed if he refused to recant the poem and for him to be 
divorced forcibly from his Muslim wife. Criticism of the poem from the 
Ministers of Religious Affairs and Information followed, and by the end 
of March, the Government banned the book in which the offending poem 
was published. In June Hawamdeh was summoned to a Shari'a court to face 
allegations of apostasy; he was charged by the head of court clerks 
with denying Koranic facts and defaming a prophet. The complainant 
requested that Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements 
in his poem and requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce 
his wife and lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own 
wealth. The Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July 
both the Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges, 
without requiring him to retract any portion of the poem (see Section 
2.a.).
    According to local press reports, the Press and Publications 
Department banned a second book of poetry, by Ziyad Al-Anani in April; 
the book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The 
authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani. The book was 
published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban.
    In June due to a dispute stemming from an intrachurch rivalry 
between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox 
Patriachate, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church in Amman 
that was aligned with the Antioch Patriarchate in Damascus, Syria. The 
Government closed the church following a request from local Orthodox 
hierarchy to enforce a 1958 law that grants the Jerusalem Patriarchate 
authority over all Orthodox churches in the country. On November 29, 
the Government gave permission to the church to open officially on 
December 14 despite the fact that the dispute over authority had not 
been resolved. The church opened as scheduled; however, the Government 
closed it down 1 week later, stating that the church was in violation 
of the 1958 law for associating itself with the Orthodox church. The 
Government reportedly stated that the church has permission to reopen 
under a different name.
    In December 1999, the municipality of Amman closed the Roy and Dora 
Whitman Academy--a nonprofit missionary school in Amman--on the basis 
that it was not registered with the Ministry of Education. In April the 
school received registration and reopened. In July the Ministry of 
Labor approved official work permits for the academy's staff.
    Shari'a in the country is applied in all matters relating to family 
law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father; all citizens, 
including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions 
regarding inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who 
converts to Islam are automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult 
children of a male Christian who has converted to Islam become 
ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not themselves 
convert to Islam. In cases where a Muslim converts to Christianity, the 
act is not recognized legally by the authorities, and the subject 
continues to be treated as a Muslim in matters of family and property 
law. The minor children of a male Muslim who converts to Christianity 
continue to be treated as Muslims under the law.
    The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims. 
Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a 
Muslim may not convert to another religion. Muslims who convert to 
other faiths complain of social and government discrimination. The 
Government does not recognize the legality of such conversions. Under 
Shari'a converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be denied 
their property and other rights. However, this principle is not 
applied. Converts from Islam do not fall under the jurisdiction of 
their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are 
considered Muslims under Shari'a, although the reverse is not true. 
Shari'a prescribes a punishment of death for conversion; however, there 
is no equivalent statute under civil law.
    The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being 
used for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to 
prevent Islamist parliamentarians from preaching in mosques.
    Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in 
public schools. Christian and Baha'i students are not required to 
attend courses in Islam.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of 
citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in 
designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on 
freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign 
women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male 
guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a Jordanian 
passport. During the year, there were several cases in which mothers 
reportedly were prevented from departing with their children because 
authorities enforced requests from fathers to prevent their children 
from leaving the country.
    The GID sometimes withholds passports from citizens on security 
grounds. Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954 
Preventing Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house 
arrest for up to a year without formally charging them (see Section 
1.d.). House arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to 
local police station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who 
violate the terms of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14 
days.
    In April after the GID released Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh 
following 20 days of detention without charge (see Section 1.d.), the 
governor of Amman, required Abu Hanieh to report to a local police 
station twice daily and to return home by 6:30 p.m. every evening. 
Officials did not bring charges against Hanieh and rescinded the house 
arrest in August.
    Jordanians with full citizenship receive passports that are valid 
for 5 years. Most Palestinians living in Jordan are citizens and 
receive passports that are valid for 5 years. However, the Government 
estimates that there are 150,000 Palestinian residents who are refugees 
or children of refugees who arrived from Gaza after 1967 do not qualify 
for citizenship. They receive 2-year passports valid for travel only. 
In the period following the country's administrative and legal 
disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the 
West Bank received 2-year passports valid for travel only, instead of 
5-year Jordanian passports). In 1995 King Hussein announced that West 
Bank residents without other travel documentation again would be 
eligible to receive 5-year passports. However, the Government has 
emphasized that these passports are for travel only and do not connote 
citizenship, which only can be proven by presenting one's ``national 
number,'' a civil registration number accorded at birth or upon 
naturalization to persons holding citizenship. The national number is 
recorded on national identity cards and in family registration books, 
which are issued only to citizens.
    The Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR) reported a small 
number of cases in which Jordanian embassies overseas refused to issue 
new passports to Jordanians of Palestinian origin who were domiciled in 
foreign countries. Such Palestinians consequently were unable to return 
to Jordan.
    The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of 
citizens. However, in July the High Court rejected an appeal 
challenging the alleged expulsion of four HAMAS leaders, all four of 
whom are citizens (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.).
    There were credible reports that, due to a ban on his entering the 
country, government officials stopped former Minister of Parliament, 
Yaqoub Qarrash, at the border in January when he tried to return from 
Saudi Arabia.
    There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of 
refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government generally cooperates 
with the office of the UNHCR. The UNHCR must resettle refugees in other 
countries. However, in April 1998, the Ministry of Interior signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR concerning the status and 
treatment of refugees. Under the agreement, the Government admits 
asylum seekers, including those who have entered the country 
clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's eligibility determinations 
under the refugee definitions set forth in the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The agreement 
provides protection against the forcible return of refugees from the 
country, and recognizes the legal definition of a refugee as set forth 
in the U.N. Convention. Since 1996 the UNHCR has held regular seminars 
to train law enforcement officials in international refugee law, 
including specialized courses for policewomen. The Government provides 
first asylum. According to UNHCR figures, 55,626 persons have sought 
asylum through the UNHCR since October 1990, and in approximately 8,389 
cases (approximately 15 percent), applicants have been accorded refugee 
status.
    The Government estimates that over 200,000 Iraqis reside in the 
country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status 
and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. During the 
year, 6,806 Iraqis applied for, and 641 were accorded, refugee status. 
Additionally 1,753 out of the total 1,868 refugees accorded status 
during the year were Iraqi nationals, reflecting applications from 
previous years. The UNHCR also received applications for refugee status 
during the year from Sudanese, Russians of Chechen decent, Somali, and 
Eritrean asylum seekers.
    For the 1999-2000 school year, the Government reverted to its 
policy of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless such 
children are legal residents of the country or recognized as refugees 
by the UNHCR.
    According to the Government, it deported eight Libyan nationals 
affiliated with ``international terrorist organizations'' in March. The 
Government did not inform the UNHCR of the presence of the Libyans 
prior to their deportation from the country. The Libyan Government 
reportedly executed three of the eight Libyans upon their return to 
Libya (see Section 1.c).
    Almost 1.6 million Palestinian refugees are registered in Jordan 
with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). 
The UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either displaced 
persons from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war, or 
returnees from the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    There are significant restrictions on citizens' right to change 
their government. Citizens may participate in the political system 
through their elected representatives in Parliament; however, the King 
has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish public policy. 
Appointments made by the King to high government posts do not require 
legislative approval. Executive power is vested in the King (or, in his 
absence, in the Regent), who exercises his power through his ministers 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
    In June King Abdullah dismissed then Prime Minister Abdul Raouf 
Rawabdeh and appointed Ali Abu Al-Ragheb as his successor. The King 
also appointed 19 new members to the 29-member Cabinet.
    The Parliament is composed of the 40-member Senate, appointed by 
the King, and the popularly elected 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The 
Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation, 
and it can approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the 
Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for 
consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and 
drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to 
the Parliament for its consideration. Opposition Members of Parliament 
have complained that attempts by members of the lower house to initiate 
legislation receive no response from the Government. The King proposes 
and dismisses extraordinary sessions of Parliament and may postpone 
regular sessions for up to 60 days. If the Government amends or enacts 
a law when Parliament is not in session, by law it must submit the law 
to Parliament for consideration during the next session; however, this 
does not always occur in practice.
    The Electoral Law and the distribution of parliamentary seats 
deliberately favor electorates in rural and southern Jordan, regions 
with populations known for their traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
    Over 500 candidates competed in the 1997 parliamentary elections, 
despite a boycott by Islamist and other parties. There were many 
reports of registration irregularities and fraud. Restrictions on the 
press and on campaign materials also had a negative effect on the 
campaign, which elicited much debate over the fairness of the Electoral 
Law and its implementation. Voter turnout was significantly lower in 
most urban areas than in rural areas. Centrist candidates with ties to 
major tribes dominate the Parliament.
    Municipal elections in July 1999 featured the participation of the 
parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however, 
low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The process 
generally was regarded as free and fair.
    The so-called one-man, one-vote amendment to the Electoral Law was 
ratified by Parliament in 1997, nearly 4 years after it was first 
enacted by royal decree. The amendment allows voters to choose only one 
candidate in multiple-seat districts. In the largely tribal society, 
citizens tend to cast their first vote for family members, and any 
additional votes in accordance with their political leanings. The 
amendment also limits representation in the largely Palestinian urban 
areas. As a result, the amendment in practice also has tended to limit 
the chances of other non-tribal candidates, including women, Islamists, 
and other opposition candidates to be elected.
    The next parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in 2001. 
The Islamic Action Front publicly declared that it would boycott the 
elections absent significant changes in the one-man, one-vote amendment 
to the Electoral Law.
    Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encourage women to 
vote and to be active in the political process; however, they are 
underrepresented at the national and local level. There is one female 
minister and two female senators, but no women hold seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies.
    Of the 80 seats in the lower house, 9 are reserved for Christians, 
6 for Bedouins, and 3 for the Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
    The Palestinian community, estimated to account for more than half 
of the total population, is not represented proportionately in the 
Government and legislature. Nine of 28 ministers, 6 of 40 senators, and 
11 of 80 lower house deputies are of Palestinian origin. There also are 
no Palestinians in any of the 12 governorships throughout the country. 
The electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a 
majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups investigate 
allegations of human rights abuses and publish and disseminate findings 
critical of government policy. However, the Press and Publications Law 
has restricted the publication of information about the military and 
security services, which, in effect prevented the publication by 
domestic groups of reports alleging torture and other abuses committed 
by the security services. The 1999 amendments to the Press and 
Publications Law removed these specific restrictions, but restrictions 
still exist in the Penal Code and other legislation (see Section 2.a.).
    The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights 
(AOHR), the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO), and the JSCR 
are registered with the Government. The groups drew public attention to 
alleged human rights abuses and a range of other political issues. They 
also have pressed the Government either to bring formal charges against 
political detainees or to release them promptly. The AOHR and the JSCR 
assert that the Government responds to only about 10 and 20 percent 
respectively of the complaints that they submit on behalf of 
individuals who allegedly were subjected to human rights violations by 
the authorities. However, the JSCR reported that the Government 
generally supported public workshops that it held in which citizens 
discussed their viewpoints on sensitive social and political topics. 
Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are not permitted to 
receive funds from foreign sources, and some NGO workers reported that 
they feared they would be accused of accepting illegal funds from 
abroad. In June the Jordan Bar Association (JBA) accused Asma Khadar of 
the Mizan Group, a local NGO, of accepting foreign funds and threatened 
to close the organization and disbar her. The JBA did not file formal 
charges against Khadar or close the Mizan Group and the case was 
considered closed by year's end.
    The Government generally cooperates with international NGO's. The 
ICRC usually is permitted full and unrestricted access to detainees, 
including those held by the GID and the military intelligence 
directorate (see Section 1.c.).
    In March the Government formed the new Royal Commission for Human 
Rights, which is chaired by Queen Rania. The mandate of the Commission 
is to present recommendations on reforming current laws and practices 
to King Abdullah and to institutionalize human rights in the country. 
In November the Commission sponsored two human rights awareness 
seminars with police and judicial officials in Amman and Aqaba. Members 
of the Commission also intervened in a number of individual cases of 
alleged human rights violations throughout the year.
    The Government also established the National Team for Family 
Protection and the Child Protection Center during the year (see Section 
5). The Government controls the Parliamentary Public Freedoms 
Committee, the Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Office at the Prime 
Ministry.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of race; 
however, women, minorities, and others are treated differently under 
the law and face discrimination in employment, housing, and other 
areas.
    Women.--Violence against women is common. Reported incidents of 
violence against women do not reflect the full extent of the problem. 
Medical experts acknowledge that spousal abuse occurs frequently. 
However, cultural norms discourage victims from seeking medical or 
legal help thus making it difficult to assess the extent of such abuse.
    Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against 
their spouses for physical abuse but in practice familial and societal 
pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is 
not illegal. NGO's, such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which has a 
telephone hot line for victims of domestic violence, provide assistance 
in such matters. Wife battering technically is grounds for divorce, but 
the husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the 
Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.
    The Criminal Code allows leniency for a person found guilty of 
committing a so-called ``honor crime,'' a violent assault with intent 
to commit murder against a female by a relative for her perceived 
immodest behavior or alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement 
treatment of men accused of ``honor crimes'' reflects widespread 
unwillingness to recognize the abuse involved or to take action against 
the problem. Twenty-one such murders were reported during the year in 
which the victims were strangled, stabbed, or shot several times. Human 
rights monitors believe that many more such crimes were committed but 
not documented as honor crimes. Moreover, most crimes of honor are not 
reported by the press. The actual number of honor crimes is believed to 
be significantly higher. One forensic medical examiner estimated that 
25 percent of all murders committed in the country are honor crimes. 
The police regularly imprison women who are potential victims of honor 
crimes for their own protection. There were up to 40 women 
involuntarily detained in this form of ``protective custody'' during 
the year.
    According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor'' 
defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises 
his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or 
fornication, in which case the perpetrator of the honor crime is judged 
not guilty of murder. Although few defendants are able to meet the 
stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense (the defendant 
personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in sexual 
relations), most avoid trial for the crime of murder, and are tried 
instead on the charge of manslaughter; even those convicted of murder 
rarely spend more than 2 years in prison. (In contrast to honor crimes, 
the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the maximum 
penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years.) Such defenses also 
commonly rely on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of 
passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged transgression, 
usually without any investigation on the part of the assailant to 
determine the veracity of the allegation before committing the assault. 
Defenses in such cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal Code. Women 
may not invoke these defenses for murdering a male relative under the 
same circumstances, nor may they use them for killing men who attempt 
to rape, sexually harass, or otherwise threaten their honor.
    On January 11, a 29-year-old woman, who was being treated for self-
inflicted burns at a local hospital, was shot several times and killed 
by her 28-year-old brother in an ``honor crime.'' An autopsy indicated 
that the woman was 6 months' pregnant at the time of her death. A 
criminal court originally sentenced the brother to death; however, the 
court subsequently commuted his sentence to 10 years in prison.
    After being released from protective custody on bail posted by her 
uncle in April, 40-year-old Fathieh Mohammad reportedly was shot and 
killed by her father, who subsequently turned himself in to the police, 
stating that he had killed his daughter to ``cleanse his honor.'' The 
police also apprehended one of Fathieh's brothers during the 
investigation and subsequently arrested both her father and brother for 
the crime. The case was pending at year's end.
    In December police arrested a man for beating to death his 19-year-
old sister in November for ``reasons of honor.'' Police were 
investigating a second brother for his suspected involvement in the 
killing at year's end. Police exhumed the woman's body from a cemetery 
in which she was buried illegally. Medical tests proved that the victim 
had not engaged in sexual activity.
    In February a criminal court sentenced Bassam Mahmoud to 15 years 
in prison with temporary hard labor for killing his sister in 1999 to 
``cleanse the honor.'' Mahmoud shot his 19-year-old sister Maysoon 21 
times after bringing her home from the police station where she had 
been charged with ``immoral'' behavior. Following his sentencing, 
Mahmoud's family dropped all charges against him, and the court 
subsequently reduced his 15-year sentence by half.
    Also in February, a tribunal of judges reduced the sentence against 
Samir Ayed, who in October 1999 had killed his sister in a ``fit of 
fury'' to ``cleanse his honor,'' to 6 months in prison. Most activists 
believe that even if Article 340 were repealed, honor crimes likely 
would persist with sentences continuing to be reduced under Article 98.
    In December 1999, the National Committee to Eliminate ``Crimes of 
Honor'' presented leaders of the upper and lower houses of the 
Parliament with a petition signed by 15,000 citizens demanding an end 
both to crimes of honor and the legislation that protects perpetrators 
of such crimes. In November 1999, the lower house rejected a 
government-supported amendment that would have eliminated Article 340; 
however, the upper house approved the same measure in December 1999. 
The amendment was returned to the lower house for reconsideration. In 
February the lower house again rejected the proposal to repeal Article 
340.
    In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights 
activists to hold demonstrations in protest of the lower house vote. 
However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin 
Mohammed led more than 5,000 persons in a march on Parliament to demand 
the cancellation of Article 340. On the same day, the press reported 
that the Islamic Action Front (IAF) issued a fatwa stating that the 
cancellation of Article 340 would contradict Shari'a and would 
``destroy our Islamic, social, and family values by stripping men of 
their humanity when they surprise their wives or female relatives 
committing adultery.'' The Ministry of Interior denied permits for an 
IAF counterdemonstration, which drew protests from both sides of the 
debate (see Section 2.b.).
    Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and 
social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of court 
testimony. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man (see 
Section 1.e.). The Government provides men with more generous social 
security benefits than women. The Government continues pension payments 
of deceased male civil servants to their heirs but discontinues 
payments of deceased female civil servants.
    Under Shari'a as applied in the country, female heirs receive half 
the amount of a male heir's inheritance, and the non-Muslim widows of 
Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives 
half of her parents' estate; the balance goes to designated male 
relatives. A sole male heir inherits both of his parents' property. 
Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who 
need assistance. Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than 
women. Marriage and divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by 
special courts for each denomination (see Section 2.c.). Married women 
are ineligible for work in the diplomatic service, and, until recently, 
most women in the diplomatic corps automatically were assigned to 
administrative positions. There are six female judges in the country.
    The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission 
to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women do not have the 
legal right to transmit citizenship to their children. Furthermore, 
women may not petition for citizenship for their non-Jordanian 
husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship after 
fulfilling a requirement of 15 years of continuous residence. Once the 
husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit the 
citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an application 
may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately still may be 
denied to the husband and children. Such children become stateless and 
lack the rights of citizen children, such as the right to attend school 
or seek other government services.
    Civil law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice 
this law often is ignored. Press and union leaders reported during the 
year that that some employers in the private sector reportedly paid 
their female employees well under the legal minimum wage, despite the 
fact that the women were under contract. In January the Jordanian Food 
Industry Factory reportedly fired a group of 28 women after they 
demanded to be paid the legal minimum wage. The women reportedly blamed 
their union and the Ministry of Labor for their inability to protect 
workers (see Section 6.e.).
    Social pressures discourage many women from pursuing professional 
careers. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many 
professions, including engineering, medicine, education, the military, 
and law. Women constitute approximately 16.5 percent of the work force 
and 50 percent of university students. According to local NGO reports, 
while female employees hold approximately 52 and 39 percent of jobs in 
the education and health sectors respectively, they constitute only 7.5 
percent of managerial posts and 10 percent of all jobs in the private 
sector. Women's groups stress that the problem of discrimination is not 
only one of law, but also of women's lack of awareness of their rights 
or unwillingness to assert those rights. The U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization reported in 1995 that women who work in agriculture 
average 15-hour days and earn less than men. The Jordanian chapter of 
the Business and Professional Women's Club gives seminars on women's 
rights and assists women in establishing small businesses. The chapter 
also provided several programs for potential female voters and 
candidates for the upcoming 2001 parliamentary elections. The 
University of Jordan launched a new graduate degree program in women's 
studies during the year to promote ``objective awareness between the 
sexes.'' Members of the royal family work actively to improve the 
status of women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government 
efforts in these areas are constrained by limited financial resources. 
Education is compulsory until the age of 16; however, no legislation 
exists to enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it, and 
children who do not attend school or attend infrequently are not 
considered truant. The law prohibits corporal punishment in schools; 
however, such punishment is known to occur. Since the beginning of the 
1999-2000 school year, the Government has denied Iraqi children 
admittance to school unless they are legal residents of the country or 
recognized as refugees by the UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
    Educational development, quality, and the relevance of education to 
job market demand have been on the Government's agenda since 1985, with 
few concrete results to date. Because there are government-run primary 
schools in virtually every village, most students in the country have 
access to primary education. The Government also grants fee reductions 
and food and transportation supplements to families with many children 
or to very poor families in order to make education more affordable.
    In March Queen Rania established the National Team for Family 
Protection (NTFP) to consolidate all issues concerning family safety. 
On August 20, the Government opened ``Dar al Amman,'' the nation's 
first child protection center. The facility provides temporary shelter, 
medical care, and rehabilitation for children ages 6 to 12 years who 
have suffered abuse.
    The Government attempts to safeguard some children's rights, 
especially regarding child labor. However, although the law prohibits 
most children under the age of 16 from working, child vendors work on 
the streets of Amman. The Ministry of Social Development has a 
committee to address the problem and in some cases removes the children 
from the streets, returns them to their families or to juvenile 
centers, and may provide the families with a monthly stipend. However, 
the children often return to the streets. Declining economic conditions 
have caused the number of these children to increase steadily over the 
last 10 years. Selling newspapers, tissues, small food items, or gum, 
these street vendors, along with the other children who pick through 
trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to sell, sometimes are the sole 
source of income for their families.
    Although the problem is difficult to quantify, social and health 
workers believe that there is a significant incidence of child abuse in 
families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse is significantly 
higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for abuses against 
children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of age carries the 
death penalty.
    The Family Protection Unit of the Public Security Department (PSD) 
works with victims and perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence. 
The unit deals primarily with child and spousal abuse, providing 
multiple in-house services, including medical treatment for patients. 
The unit cooperates with police to apprehend perpetrators of domestic 
violence, facilitates participation in education and rehabilitation 
programs, and refers patients to other facilities.
    Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law 
as legitimate children. However, in practice they suffer severe 
discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery or 
premarital sex. Most illegitimate children become wards of the State or 
live a meager existence on the fringes of society. In either case, 
their prospects for marriage and gainful employment are limited. 
Furthermore, illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by 
their fathers are considered stateless and are not given passports or 
identity numbers.
    Students must obtain a good behavior certificate from the GID in 
order to qualify for admission under the university quota system. 
Activists reported that the GID sometimes withholds these certificates 
from deserving students reportedly due to a family member's allegedly 
problematic record.
    Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), a procedure widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, rarely is practiced. However, one southern tribe 
of Egyptian origin in the small village of Rahmah near Aqaba reportedly 
practices FGM. One local Mufti issued a fatwa stating that FGM 
``safeguards women's chastity and protects them against malignant 
diseases by preventing fat excretions.'' However, the Mufti also stated 
that as FGM is not a requirement of Islam, women who do not undergo 
this procedure should not be embarrassed.
    People with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general 
population restricts job opportunities for disabled persons, estimated 
by the Ministry of Social Development to number 250,000. Thirteen 
percent of disabled citizens receive monetary assistance from the 
Government. The Government passed legislation in 1993 requiring future 
public buildings to accommodate the needs of the disabled and to 
retrofit existing public buildings; however, implementation has been 
slow. During the year, the Greater Amman Municipality established a new 
Special Buildings Codes Department for Special Needs Citizens to 
enforce the implementation of the 1993 law. Since 1993 the Special 
Education Department of the Ministry of Social Development has enrolled 
approximately 11,000 mentally and physically disabled persons in public 
and private sector training courses. It has placed approximately 2,000 
disabled persons in public and private sector jobs. The law requires 
that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved for the physically 
disabled. Private organizations and members of the royal family 
actively promote programs to protect and advance the interests of the 
disabled.
    Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic 
Bedouin and East Bank town dwellers, traditionally have been the 
backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy. As a result, 
they generally have enjoyed considerable influence within the political 
system. They are represented disproportionately in senior military, 
security, and civil service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin in rural 
areas are severely disadvantaged economically. Many persons of East 
Bank origin complain that the dynamic private sector largely is in the 
hands of the Palestinian majority.
    Religious Minorities.--In general Christians do not suffer 
discrimination; however, there were some instances of official and 
societal discrimination during the year (see Section 2.c.). Christians 
hold government positions and are represented in the media and academia 
approximately in proportion to their presence in the general 
population. Baha'is face some societal and official discrimination. 
Their faith is not recognized officially, and Baha'is are classified as 
Muslims on official documents, such as the national identity card. 
Christian and Baha'i children in public schools are not required to 
participate in Islamic religious instruction.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government granted 
citizenship to all Palestinians who fled to Jordan in the period after 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and 
displaced persons who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However, 
most refugees who fled Gaza after 1967 are not entitled to citizenship 
and are issued 2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 King 
Hussein announced that West Bank residents without other travel 
documentation would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports.
    However, the Government has emphasized that these passports are for 
travel only and do not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.). 
Palestinians residing in Jordan, who make up more than half of the 
population, suffer discrimination in appointments to positions in the 
Government and the military, in admittance to public universities, and 
in the granting of university scholarships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in 
some state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions. 
Unions must be registered to be considered legal. The law prohibits 
union membership for the country's approximately 1.5 million foreign 
workers. Over 30 percent of the work force are organized into 17 
unions. Although union membership in the General Federation of 
Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole trade federation, is not 
mandatory, all unions belong to it. The Government subsidizes and 
audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities. Union officials are elected 
by secret ballot to 4-year terms. Although the Government cosponsors 
and approves the timing of these elections and monitors them to ensure 
compliance with the law, it does not interfere in the choice of 
candidates.
    Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the 
Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval 
for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating 
tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or 
arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the 
Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal by 
agreement of both parties. The tribunal is an independent arbitration 
panel of judges appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of 
the panel are binding legally. If only one party agrees, the Ministry 
of Labor refers the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to 
Parliament. Labor law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker 
during a labor dispute.
    In April the Government refused a request by some 200 workers at 
the Jordan Telecommunication Company (JTC) to form their own union to 
safeguard their rights under the company's new privatized leadership. 
The Ministry of Labor justified the refusal by saying that the workers 
already were represented by the General Union for Public Workers, which 
includes artists, barbers, restaurant and hotel industry employees, and 
workers in social services.
    In 1999 Pepsi-Cola Company fired 225 employees who staged an 
illegal strike. The Ministry of Labor intervened and the company 
reinstated 115 of the employees in 1999. Despite significant efforts by 
the Ministry of Labor and the Food Workers Union, the company rehired 
less than 10 percent of the remaining former employees during the year.
    In January the Jordan Cable and Wire Company reinstated 20 of 220 
workers that a labor court ruled were dismissed illegally in 1999. 
However, the company subsequently forced the employees to take a paid 
vacation and fired them again upon their return. No further action was 
taken during the year.
    The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International 
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have, 
and exercise, the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution 
prohibits antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claims that the 
Government does not protect adequately employees from antiunion 
discrimination and that the Government has dismissed public-sector 
employees for political reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of 
antiunion discrimination with the Ministry of Labor, which is 
authorized to order the reinstatement of employees discharged for union 
activities. There were no complaints of antiunion discrimination lodged 
with the Ministry of Labor during the year. The national labor laws 
apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and Zarqa. Private sector 
employees in these zones belong to one national union that covers both 
zones and have the right to bargain collectively.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids compulsory labor except in a state of emergency such as war or 
natural disaster, and it generally is not practiced; however, foreign 
domestic servants often are subject to coercion and abuse and in some 
cases work under conditions that amount to forced labor (see Section 
6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory 
labor by children; however, such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from being 
employed, except as apprentices, and prohibits children under the age 
of 17 from working in hazardous jobs, including at restaurants, night 
clubs, and jobs involving heavy machinery and toxic materials. Children 
under the age of 18 may not work for more than 6 hours continuously, 
may not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., and may not work 
during weekends, religious celebrations, or national holidays. 
Provisions in the labor laws do not extend to the informal sector, 
which consists of agriculture, domestic labor, and family businesses. 
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section 
6.c.).
    In late 1999, the Ministry of Labor established a new division to 
deal with issues of child labor. The division was established to 
receive, investigate, and address child labor complaints and related 
issues; however, it was not staffed adequately by year's end. The 
Government also did not provide training for government officials who 
are responsible for enforcing child labor laws. All child labor 
enforcement responsibilities rest in the hands of 85 Ministry of Labor 
inspectors. According to the law, employers that hire a child under the 
age of 16 must pay a fine ranging from $140-$710 (100-500 dinars). The 
fine is doubled if the offense is repeated. However, the Government did 
not enforce laws regarding child labor during the year. Government 
officials claim that if children are barred from working in practice, 
they will lose important income on which their families depend, and may 
turn to more serious violations of law, such as drug trafficking and 
prostitution, for income.
    Basic education is free and compulsory for 10 scholastic years for 
citizens from the ages of 6 to 16. However, there are no provisions to 
enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it (see Section 5).
    The Government ratified International Labor Convention 182 on 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor; however, it has not 
provided adequate financial support to implement its provisions. 
Nonetheless, government policy has facilitated the work of NGO's in 
this area. The Ministry of Social Development has programs to improve 
conditions for indigent children and to rehabilitate children who have 
committed petty crimes, who constitute a segment of working children. 
There are no specific mechanisms for receiving, investigating, and 
addressing child labor complaints relating to allegations of the worst 
forms of child labor.
    The Ministry of Labor in conjunction with the National Task Force 
on Children and approximately 50 other local NGO's, developed a 
National Plan of Action (NPA) and adopted it in a national workshop 
held in 1998. The Ministry of Labor subsequently established a child 
labor unit in late 1999, which is responsible for conducting national 
research on child labor, adopting both preventative and remedial 
measures, developing a database on child laborers and their families, 
and training and monitoring Ministry of Labor inspectors about child 
labor issues. The Ministry began implementing some of the provisions of 
the NPA; however, the pace has been slow due to financial and 
logistical difficulties.
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that child labor, especially of child 
street vendors is more prevalent now than it was 10 years ago due to 
declining economic conditions (see Section 5).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage is 
$114 (80 dinars) per month for all workers except domestic servants, 
those working in small family businesses, and those in the agricultural 
sector. Workers earning the minimum wage find it difficult to provide a 
decent standard of living for their families. The Government estimates 
that the poverty level is at a monthly wage of about $125 (89 dinars) 
per month for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by the 
Ministry of Labor in July 1999 found that 18.7 percent of the 
population live at or below the poverty level; 1.5 percent live in 
``abject'' poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per 
month for a family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal 
assistance to at least 45,000 indigent families.
    The law prohibits most workers from working more than the customary 
48 hours per week. Hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees may work up 
to 54 hours per week; the law requires overtime payment for hours in 
excess of the standard workweek. Workers may not work more than 16 
hours in any continuous period or more than 60 hours of overtime per 
month. Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
    Labor law does not apply to the agricultural sector, small family 
businesses, or domestic servants. Domestic servants do not have a legal 
forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to sue in 
court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most of whom 
are foreign, is widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal 
confiscation of travel documents by employers is common. Complaints of 
beatings, insufficient food, and rape generally are not reported to 
officials by victims, who fear losing their work permits and being 
returned to their country. Domestic servants generally are not given 
days off and frequently are called upon to work at any hour of the day 
or night.
    In February the Ministry of Labor announced that it would require 
Egyptian workers to obtain work permits approved by the Governments of 
both Egypt and Jordan, and that the Government would start applying 
``more humane'' criteria when deciding whether to deport Egyptian 
workers.
    The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for 
workers, including the presence of bathrooms, drinking water, and first 
aid equipment at work sites. The Ministry of Labor is authorized to 
enforce health and safety standards. The law does not require employers 
to report industrial accidents or occupational diseases to the Ministry 
of Labor. Workers do not have a statutory right to remove themselves 
from hazardous conditions without risking the loss of their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in women; however, the practice is not known to occur. A 
1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no 
reports that persons were trafficked in, to, from, or within the 
country.
                               __________

                                 KUWAIT

    Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary amirate ruled by princes 
(Amirs), drawn from the Al-Sabah family. The Al-Sabahs have governed 
the country in consultation with prominent commercial families and 
other community leaders for over 200 years. The 1962 Constitution 
provides for an elected national assembly and details the powers of the 
Government and the rights of citizens, although it also permits the 
Amir to suspend any or all of its provisions by decree. Although the 
Amir suspended constitutional provisions from 1976-81 and from 1986-92, 
since the 1992 elections when the National Assembly resumed 
functioning, he has not taken this step. In May 1999, the Amir 
dissolved a gridlocked Parliament. This was followed by 
constitutionally mandated elections, which took place in July 1999. The 
election campaign generally was considered to be free and fair; 
however, there were some problems. Moreover only 14.5 percent of 
citizens (males over the age of 21) have the right to vote. The 
Constitution and law provide for a degree of judicial independence; 
however, the Amir appoints all judges, and renewal of most judicial 
appointments is subject to government approval.
    The national police, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and 
Kuwait State Security (KSS) are responsible for internal security under 
the supervision of civilian authorities of the Ministry of Interior. 
Members of the security forces committed a number of human rights 
abuses.
    With large oil reserves the economy is highly dependent on its 
energy sector. The Government owns the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
and, despite its stated emphasis on an open market, it dominates the 
local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned 
companies and equities. The Government has initiated a program of 
disposing of its stock holdings in private companies. According to 
government statistics, 93 percent of the indigenous work force is 
employed in the public sector, while foreigners constitute 98 percent 
of the private sector workforce. Citizens enjoy one of the highest 
standards of living in the world, and receive subsidized housing, 
childcare, food allowances, and free education. Foreign workers receive 
none of these benefits, and domestic servants and unskilled workers 
often live in poor conditions. During the October 1999 to 2000 fiscal 
year (FY), the country's estimated per capita gross domestic product 
was $13,176 (4,005 dinars), 14 percent more than FY 1999. The increase 
reflects the significant rise in oil revenues due to higher world oil 
prices. The estimated 1999-2000 budget deficit was $6.8 billion. For 
the current FY the budget surplus is estimated at $3 billion.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in many areas; however, its record was poor in some significant areas. 
Citizens cannot change the head of state. Although under the 
Constitution the National Assembly must approve the Amir's choice of 
Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), this authority is limited; if 
the National Assembly rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits 
three names from which the assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. 
The Crown Prince appoints the members of the Government. However, the 
elected National Assembly has demonstrated significant ability to 
influence or overturn decisions of the Government and has on occasion 
removed ministers through votes of no confidence or by forcing 
ministers to resign. The Government bans formal political parties, and 
women do not have the right to vote or seek election to the National 
Assembly. A law promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted 
by religious sects and tribes. Some police and members of the security 
forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Prisons remain 
overcrowded; however, the Government continued its renovation of 
existing facilities and construction of a new maximum security prison. 
The judiciary is subject to government influence, and a pattern of bias 
against foreign residents exists. The Government infringes on citizens' 
privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally monitor the 
activities of individuals and their communications. Men must obtain 
government approval to marry foreign-born women. The Government uses 
threats to induce informal censorship, and journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and 
association. The Government places some limits on freedom of religion 
and movement. Deportation orders may be issued by administrative order, 
and over 250 potential deportees are estimated to be held in detention 
facilities, some for up to 3 to 6 months. Violence and discrimination 
against women are problems. Discrimination against noncitizens 
persists. The Government restricts some worker rights. The Labor Law 
does not protect domestic servants regardless of citizenship, and their 
situation worsened during the year. Unskilled foreign workers suffer 
from the lack of a minimum wage in the private sector, from failure to 
enforce the Labor Law, and at times physical abuse; some work under 
conditions that, in effect, constitute indentured servitude. The 
Government acknowledges that a serious problem exists in the case of 
the ``bidoon,'' Arabs who have residency ties to the country--some 
going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who claim to 
have no documentation of their nationality. There are an estimated 
110,000 bidoon in the country, down from a pre-Gulf War level of 
220,000. In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that 
bidoon register with the Government to begin a process in which some 
could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register would be 
considered illegal residents. However, only 8,000 bidoon registered by 
the cutoff date (in addition to the 36,000 who registered during a 1965 
census). The Government maintains that many bidoon are concealing their 
true nationality. It reports that 12,000 were documented during the 
year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
The Government stated that it would take punitive action against those 
who did not rectify their stateless status by the deadline, and the 
number of bidoon purchasing fraudulent passports reportedly is on the 
rise.
    The country suffered under Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to 
February 1991, when an international coalition expelled Iraqi forces. 
Many human rights violations committed by the Iraqi army during this 
period remain unresolved, particularly the fate of 608 citizens and 
other residents taken by Iraq and still unaccounted for.
    Executive and legislative leaders continued to strengthen political 
institutions by resolving major disagreements within the framework of 
the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial measures.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no developments in the investigations into the 
extrajudicial killings that occurred during the chaotic period after 
the country's liberation in February 1991.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Iraqi authorities have not accounted for 608 citizens and other 
residents of the country taken prisoner during Iraq's occupation. There 
has been no significant development since 1994 in these disappearance 
cases. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with U.N. Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which stipulates the release of 
detainees. In 1999 Iraq ceased its participation in ICRC-sponsored 
talks on their fate. It has refused to cooperate with the U.N. 
Secretary General's high-level representative, Yuli Vorontsov, who was 
appointed in February, under UNSCR 1284, to report on compliance by 
Iraq with its obligations regarding these cases.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there 
continue to be credible reports that some police and members of the 
security forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Reported abuses 
include blindfolding, verbal threats, stepping on toes, and slaps and 
blows. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such 
abuse on noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on 
citizens.
    The Government states that it investigates all allegations of abuse 
and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the 
Government does not make public either the findings of its 
investigations or what, if any, punishments are imposed. This omission 
creates a climate of seeming impunity, which diminishes deterrence 
against abuse.
    Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they 
have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts 
frequently dismiss abuse complaints because defendants are unable to 
provide physical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces 
routinely do not reveal their identity during interrogation, a practice 
that further complicates confirmation of abuse.
    Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security 
offenses, meet minimum international standards in terms of food, access 
to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and 
opportunities for work and exercise. Continuing problems include 
overcrowding and the lack of specialized medical care. Approximately 
1,700 men and 250 women are serving sentences or awaiting trial in the 
central prison. In March the Talha deportation center formally was 
reconstituted as a minimum security prison and now holds approximately 
900 persons who have been convicted of financial or traffic crimes. 
Although Talha is no longer a deportation holding facility, deportees 
also are held there occasionally. Unlike in the past, there have been 
no reports of mistreatment of prisoners at Talha since its reopening. 
An estimated additional 250 prisoners were being held at the 
deportation facility in Shuwaikh; some of these detainees have been 
held for up to 3 to 6 months (see Section 1.d.).
    In March a new government directive was issued, which has improved 
prison conditions throughout the system. Following its provisions, the 
director of prisons increased prison staffing, ensured the steady 
progress of renovations at the central prison, and accelerated the 
construction of a new maximum-security prison. He also created a drug 
rehabilitation program for inmates. Drug-related offenders make up the 
majority of the prison population.
    The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored 
prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the 
ICRC access to all detention facilities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the 
Government occasionally arrests and detains persons arbitrarily. There 
also were incidents of prolonged detention.
    In general police officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state 
prosecutors or a judge before making an arrest (see Section 1.f.), 
although in misdemeanor cases the arresting officer may issue them. 
Security forces occasionally detain persons at checkpoints in Kuwait 
City (see Section 2.d.).
    Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than 4 
days without charge. Security officers sometimes prevent families from 
visiting detainees during this confinement. After 4 days, prosecutors 
must either release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed, 
prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21 
days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention 
pending trial.
    During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates 
were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of 
the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Sections 2.a. 
and 3); the sentence was not carried out and all charges were dropped.
    Of the estimated 2,200 persons serving sentences or being detained 
pending trial at the state security prison or state security detention 
facilities, approximately 60 are being held on security grounds, a 65 
percent reduction from last year. The other security prisoners and 
detainees were released during the year after completing their 
sentences, or after being acquitted or pardoned.
    Of the approximately 2,500 Egyptians arrested in the wake of the 
Kheitan riots in October 1999, all but 19 were released within a few 
days. The 19 were tried, with 18 of them being acquitted and 1 
sentenced to deportation.
    The Government may expel noncitizens (including bidoon, i.e., 
stateless residents of Kuwait, some of whom are native born or long-
term residents), if it considers them security risks. The Government 
also may expel foreigners if they are unable to obtain or renew work or 
residency permits. There are approximately 100 bidoon and foreigners 
held in detention facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some 
detainees have been held for up to 3 to 6 months. Many deportation 
orders are issued administratively, without the benefit of a trial. 
However, the Government does not return deportees to their countries of 
origin forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in detention. This 
practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees, particularly 
Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries. It also plays 
a role in the complex problem faced by bidoon deportees, who 
essentially remain in detention because their stateless condition makes 
the execution of the deportation order impossible (see Sections 2.d. 
and 5).
    The Talha deportation center, which had been criticized in previous 
years by human rights groups, formally was reconstituted as a minimum 
security prison in March. There were no allegations of the prolonged 
detention of deportees in the facility during the year (see Section 
1.c.).
    The law protects citizens from exile, and there were no reports of 
this practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to a fair trial and states that ``judges shall not be subject to 
any authority;'' however, the Amir appoints all judges, and the renewal 
of judicial appointments is subject to government approval. Judges who 
are citizens have lifetime appointments; however, the majority of 
judges are noncitizens. These noncitizen judges work under 1- to 3-year 
renewable contracts, which undermines their independence. The Ministry 
of Justice may remove judges for cause, but rarely does so. Foreign 
residents involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently complain 
that the courts show a bias in favor of citizens.
    The secular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The 
Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and 
Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective branches for 
family law cases. A Shi'a appellate court was established this year. In 
the secular courts no groups are barred from testifying; however, in 
all three court systems the testimony of one man is equal to the 
testimony of two women.
    Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal 
verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute 
all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be 
represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in 
criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to 
waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to 
provide counsel to indigent defendants.
    Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the 
High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied 
properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of 
Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to 
determine only whether the law was applied properly.
    In January Alaa Hussein, head of the Iraqi-installed 
``provisional'' government during the occupation returned to the 
country of his own volition to stand trial. A military court had 
sentenced him to death in abstentia in 1993. In May a court upheld his 
conviction for treason, as well as his death sentence. Hussein's trial 
received extensive media attention and appears to have been conducted 
in a fair and open manner. If the verdict stands after the case 
completes the appeals process, the Amir must ratify the execution or 
chose to commute the sentence. The appeals process was still underway 
at year's end.
    In January a court found two authors guilty of writing obscene, 
blasphemous books in a case brought by anonymous citizens (see Section 
2.a.).
    There were no reports of political prisoners. The Government 
continues to incarcerate 27 residents (10 Iraqis, 12 bidoon, 2 
citizens, 2 Palestinians, and 1 Syrian) convicted of collaboration with 
Iraq during the 1990-1991 occupation. During the year, 19 Iraqis, 5 
bidoon, and 2 Palestinians who had been held on the same charge were 
released by Amiri pardon. By law such collaboration is considered a 
felony. Most of the persons convicted in the Martial Law Court in 1991, 
and the Special State Security Court, which was abolished in 1995, did 
not receive fair trials. Amnesty International faulted the trials in 
general, and particularly noted the absence of any right of appeal of 
the verdicts. In 1999 the Amir pardoned the remaining eight Jordanians 
convicted by the martial law and state security courts.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and 
sanctity of the home, and the Government generally respects these 
rights in practice; however, the law, which generally requires police 
to obtain a warrant to search both public and private property, 
provides for a warrantless search if alcohol or narcotics are suspected 
on the premises or if police are in hot pursuit of a suspect fleeing 
the scene of a crime. A warrant may be obtained from the State 
Prosecutor or, in the case of searches of private property, from a 
judge. The security forces occasionally monitor the activities of 
individuals and their communications.
    The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men 
and requires men to obtain government approval to marry foreign-born 
women. Although the Government may advise men against marriage to a 
foreign national, there are no known cases of the Government refusing 
permission for such marriages. The Government advises women against 
marrying foreign nationals (see Section 2.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the 
conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with a few exceptions, 
citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in 
the media; however, journalists practice self-censorship. Several laws 
empower the Government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and 
the press. The effect of these laws diminished during the year as court 
cases overruled punitive sentences that accompanied earlier 
convictions. The Government, through the Ministry of Information, 
practiced informal censorship by placing pressure on individual 
publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line'' in 
attacking government policies and discussing issues deemed offensive to 
Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
    Newspapers are privately owned and free to publish on many social, 
economic, and political issues and frequently criticize government 
policies and officials, including the Crown Prince/Prime Minister.
    The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but 
journalists still censor themselves. The Press Law prohibits the 
publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government 
communications with other states, and material that serves to ``attack 
religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, creates hatred, or 
spreads dissension among the populace.''
    In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must 
obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information. 
Publishers may lose their license if their publications do not appear 
for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing 
sporadically--it is not used to suspend or shut down existing 
newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry 
of Information before publishing any printed material, including 
brochures and wall posters. The Government does not censor foreign 
journalists and permits them open access to the country.
    In February the Government threatened to shut down two newspapers. 
Al-Siyassa and Al-Watan were charged with publishing false information 
in an article about the Amir's decision regarding salaries for security 
services personnel, which embarrassed the Amir. The managing editor of 
Al-Siyassa was detained for 1 week, although never formally charged. 
The Cabinet ordered the cancellation of both newspapers' licenses and 
suspension of publication for 2 years. After significant public 
criticism, particularly from the National Assembly, the Government 
decided not to shut down the papers or penalize them further. The 
crisis led to the resignations of the Cabinet (none were accepted) and 
to proposals by members of the National Assembly to amend the article 
of the Constitution that permits the Government to suspend publication 
without review by the Assembly or the courts. No action was taken to 
amend the article by year's end.
    The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion 
(see Section 2.c.). In contrast to prior years, there were no 
prosecutions of print or broadcast journalists. There were two 
prosecutions of individuals related to book publications. Under the 
law, any citizen may initiate a court case against an author if the 
citizen deems that the author has defamed Islam, the ruling family, or 
public morals. Often these court cases are brought for political 
reasons. In January in separate cases brought by anonymous citizens, a 
court found two female authors, Leila Al-Othman and Alia Shuaib guilty 
of writing ``obscene and blasphemous'' books. The books had been 
published years ago. Both authors were sentenced to 2 months in prison 
or a $160 (50 dinar) fine. An appeals court overturned Shuaib's 
conviction in March and changed Al-Othman's sentence to a $3,000 fine 
(912 dinars) and also fined her publisher $3,000 (912 dinars) (see 
Section 1.e.).
    During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates 
were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of 
the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison, but the sentence 
was not carried out, and charges against all five were dropped (see 
Sections 1.d. and 3).
    The Government owns and controls the radio and television 
companies. Satellite dishes are widely available, and citizens with 
such devices are free to watch all available programming. In September 
state-owned Kuwait TV stopped telecasting certain women's Olympic 
sports, including synchronized swimming and gymnastics, after an 
Islamist National Assembly member criticized the station for showing 
``immoral and pornographic'' sports and called on the Ministry of 
Information officially to censor the Olympics. The Olympics continued 
to be broadcast in their entirety on cable and satellite stations.
    The Ministry of Information censors all books, films, videotapes, 
periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally offensive. 
While the Ministry announced plans to censor the Internet, the methods 
of enforcement and technical issues are still to be worked out. 
Internet providers and web sites practiced self-censorship. The 
Ministry has censored political topics as well and does not grant 
licenses to magazines with a political focus. The General Organization 
of Printing and Publishing controls the publication and distribution of 
informational materials.
    There is no government censorship of university teaching, research, 
or publication. However, academics are subject to the same restraints 
as the media with regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
affirms the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts this 
right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government 
approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that 
result in the issuance of a public statement. Informal weekly, family-
based, social gatherings of men, known as ``diwaniyas'' are protected 
by the Constitution. Practically every adult male, including the Amir, 
members of the Government, and members of the National Assembly hosts 
or attends diwaniyas, at which every possible topic is freely 
discussed. The diwaniya system contributes to the development of 
political consensus and official decisionmaking. Women are not 
precluded from holding diwaniyas; however, such diwaniyas are uncommon. 
By tradition women are barred from male diwanyas.
    The Constitution affirms the right of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government bans 
political parties. Several informal blocs, acting much like parties, 
exist and are active in the National Assembly. The Government has made 
no effort to constrain these groupings, which are organized on the 
basis of common ideological goals. Many may be categorized as 
``opposition'' groups.
    All nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) must obtain a license 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Government uses its 
power to license as a means of political control. The Ministry has 
registered 52 NGO's, including professional groups, a bar association, 
and scientific bodies. These groups receive government subsidies for 
their operating expenses. Their members must obtain permission from the 
Ministry before attending international conferences. However, since 
1985, the Ministry has issued only three new licenses. The Ministry has 
disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously 
established NGO's already provide services similar to those proposed by 
the petitioners (see Sections 2.d. and 4).
    In May 1999, in accordance with a 1993 decree that ordered 
unregistered NGO's to cease activities, the Government announced a 
crackdown on unlicensed branches of NGO's, whose activities it 
previously had overlooked, including unlicensed branches of Islamic 
charities, and required that they cease operations by mid-September 
1999. No further action was taken pursuant to the announced crackdown 
(see Sections 2.c. and 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion; although the 
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government places 
some limits on this right. The Constitution also provides that the 
State protect the freedom to practice religion in accordance with 
established customs, ``provided that it does not conflict with public 
policy or morals.'' The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law) 
is ``a main source of legislation.''
    The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups 
are unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official 
responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Nevertheless in reality 
officially recognized churches must deal with a variety of government 
entities, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (for visas 
and residence permits for pastors and other staff) and the Kuwaiti 
Municipality (for building permits). While there reportedly is no 
official government ``list'' of recognized churches, seven Christian 
churches have at least some sort of official recognition that enables 
them to operate openly. These seven churches have open ``files'' at the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, allowing them to bring in the 
pastors and staff necessary to run their churches. Further by tradition 
three of the country's churches are widely recognized as enjoying 
``full recognition'' by the Government and are allowed to operate 
compounds officially designated as churches: The Catholic Church (which 
includes two separate churches), the Anglican Church, and the National 
Evangelical Church of Kuwait (Protestant). The other four churches 
reportedly are allowed to operate openly, hire employees, invite 
religious speakers, etc., all without interference from the Government, 
but their compounds are, according to government records, registered 
only as private homes. The churches themselves appear uncertain about 
the guidelines or procedures for recognition. Some have argued that 
these procedures are purposely kept vague by the Government so as to 
maintain the status quo. All other churches and religions have no legal 
status but are allowed to operate in private homes.
    The procedures for the registration and licensing of religious 
groups also appear to be connected with government restrictions on 
NGO's, religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations 
were ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities. 
This order has never been enforced; however, since that time all but 
three applications by NGO's have been frozen. There were reports that 
in the last few years at least two groups have applied for permission 
to build their own churches, but the Government has not yet responded 
to their requests. The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's, 
including unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ceased early in the 
year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
    Shi'a are free to conduct their traditional forms of worship 
without government interference; however, members of the Shi'a 
community have complained about the scarcity of Shi'a mosques due to 
the Government's slowness or failure to grant approval for the 
construction of new Shi'a mosques as well as the repair of existing 
mosques. The community was particularly critical in May when the 
municipality rejected a 9-year-old petition for construction of a Shi'a 
mosque in the Al-Qurain area. Although the municipality apparently 
relented due to direct government intervention, there are still 
complaints about the lack of sufficient Shi'a mosques. There are 
approximately 30 Shi'a mosques compared with the 1,300 Sunni mosques in 
the country. However, Shi'a have noted some improvement in recent years 
in that a small number of approvals have been granted for the 
construction of Shi'a mosques.
    Shi'a leaders also have complained that Shi'a who aspire to serve 
as imams are forced to seek appropriate training and education abroad 
due to the lack of Shi'a jurisprudence courses at Kuwait University's 
College of Islamic Law. They also have expressed concern that certain 
pending proposed legislation within the National Assembly does not take 
beliefs specific to the Shi'a into account.
    The Roman Catholic, Anglican, National Evangelical, Greek Orthodox, 
Armenian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, and Greek Catholic Churches are 
able to operate freely on their compounds, holding worship services 
without government interference. These churches state that the 
Government generally has been supportive of their presence, even 
providing police security and traffic direction as needed. Other 
Christian denominations (including Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, 
Marthoma, and Indian Orthodox), while not recognized legally, are 
allowed to operate in private homes or in the facilities of recognized 
churches. Members of these congregations have reported that they are 
able to worship without government interference, provided that they do 
not disturb their neighbors and do not violate laws regarding assembly 
and proselytizing.
    Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Hindus 
and Buddhists, may not build places of worship, but are allowed to 
worship privately in their homes without interference from the 
Government.
    The Government prohibits missionaries from proselytizing to 
Muslims; however, they may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law 
prohibits organized religious education for religions other than Islam, 
although this law is not enforced rigidly. Informal religious 
instruction occurs inside private homes and on church compounds without 
government interference. However, there were reports that government 
``inspectors'' periodically visit public and private schools outside of 
church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching other than Islam 
takes place.
    The Government does not permit the establishment of non-Islamic 
publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless, 
several churches do publish religious materials for use solely by their 
congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their 
compounds, provide informal instruction to individuals interested in 
joining the clergy.
    A private company, the Book House Company Ltd., is permitted to 
import significant amounts of Bibles and other Christian religious 
material--including, as of early in the year, videotapes and compact 
discs--for use solely among the congregations of the country's 
recognized churches. The Book House Company is the only bookstore that 
has an import license to bring in such materials, which also must be 
approved by government censors. There have been reports of private 
citizens having non-Islamic religious materials confiscated by customs 
officials upon arrival at the airport.
    Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law 
passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However, 
citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families 
of such citizens since that date), are allowed to transmit their 
citizenship to their children.
    According to the law, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam when 
he marries a Muslim woman if the wedding is to be legal in Kuwait. The 
law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men (see 
Section 1.f.). A non-Muslim woman does not have to convert to Islam to 
marry a Muslim man, but it is to her advantage to do so. Failure to 
convert may mean that, should the couple later divorce, the Muslim 
father would be granted custody of any children.
    The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion 
(see Section 2.a.). During the year, Islamists used this law to 
threaten writers with prosecution for publishing opinions deemed 
insufficiently observant of Islamic norms. In January the Kuwaiti Court 
of Misdemeanors found two female Kuwaiti authors, Alia Shuaib and Leila 
Al-Othman, guilty of writing books that were blasphemous and obscene. 
Shuaib and Al-Othman were sentenced to 2 months in prison which could 
be suspended upon payment of a $160 (50 Kuwaiti dinars) fine. On March 
26, a Kuwaiti appeals court acquitted Shuaib of the charges of 
blasphemy and publishing works that ridicule religion. Al-Othman's 
conviction of using indecent language was upheld. The court's judgments 
represented the latest in a series of cases brought by Islamists 
against secular authors. The court did not provide explanations for its 
rulings (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.).
    Early in the year, a Vatican representative arrived in the country 
to establish a permanent mission. The mission, which currently is 
headed by a charge d'affaires who temporarily resides at the Roman 
Catholic Church, also is to represent Vatican interests in the smaller 
Persian Gulf States and Yemen. The Church views the Government's 
acquiescence to establishing relations with the Vatican as significant 
in terms of government tolerance of Christianity.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on 
freedom of movement. Citizens have the right to travel freely within 
the country and to change their work place as desired. Unmarried women 
21 years old and over are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad 
at any time. However, married women who apply for passports must obtain 
their husbands' signature on the application form. Once she has a 
passport, a married woman does not need her husband's permission to 
travel, but he may prevent her departure from the country by contacting 
the immigration authorities and placing a 24-hour travel ban on her. 
After this 24-hour period, a court order is required if the husband 
still wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country. All minor 
children must have their father's permission to travel outside of the 
country. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return. Security forces 
in Kuwait City occasionally set up checkpoints where they may detain 
individuals. The checkpoints are mainly for immigration purposes and 
are used to apprehend undocumented aliens.
    The Government has the right to place a travel ban on any citizen 
or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. The 
Government restricts the ability of members of NGO's to attend 
conferences abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 4). The Government severely 
restricts the ability of its bidoon population to travel abroad (see 
Section 5).
    There were no credible reports during the year that the Government 
enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers 
from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War.
    While the Government permits the ICRC to verify if deportees object 
to returning to their countries of origin, it detains those with 
objections until they either change their minds or make alternative 
arrangements to travel to a third country (see Section 1.d.).
    There is no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first 
asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim 
to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of 
political refugees. The Government states that it does not deport 
anyone who claims a fear of persecution in their home country, but it 
often keeps such persons in detention rather than grant them permission 
to live and work in the country (see Section 1.d.). The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains an office in the country 
and has access to refugees in detention. There were no reports of 
forced return of persons to counties where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens cannot change the head of state. Under the Constitution 
the National Assembly has a limited role in approving the Amir's choice 
of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir). If the Assembly rejects the 
Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three names from which the 
Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. Only about 14 percent of 
adult citizens have the right to vote. Women and citizens naturalized 
for less than 20 years may not vote or seek election to the National 
Assembly. Members of the armed forces, police, and other uniformed 
personnel of the Ministry of Interior are prohibited from voting or 
seeking election to the National Assembly.
    Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares 
legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister is 
appointed by the Amir and presides over a 16-member cabinet, which he 
chooses in consultation with the Amir. In accordance with the practice 
of the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime 
Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers 
the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir 
dissolved the National Assembly from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir 
effectively dissolved the Assembly by suspending the constitutional 
provisions on the Assembly's election. The Assembly remained dissolved 
until 1992, when elections were held. Since 1992 the constitutional 
provisions with respect to the Assembly have been observed. The 
Constitution provides that cabinet members sit in the National Assembly 
and may vote on legislation. There are 50 elected National Assembly 
members. Members serve 4-year terms, and National Assembly elections 
have been held on schedule. Since the Government prohibits political 
parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless 
informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. The 
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any Amiri 
decrees made during the dissolution, and the Assembly has done so in 
some cases.
    In May 1999, the Amir dissolved the National Assembly in response 
to the political gridlock that emerged between Parliament and the 
Government. Elections were held 2 months later as specified in the 
Constitution.
    The 1999 election campaign generally was free and fair; however, 
there were some problems. Five parliamentary candidates were arrested 
and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. Four of those 
arrested received nominal fines, had their cases postponed, or were 
acquitted. While the candidates were not required to withdraw from the 
election, the fifth candidate withdrew, subsequently was convicted of 
the charges in July, and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. The 
sentence was not carried out (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    In December a by-election was held to fill the seat of a deceased 
Assembly member. The election campaign was considered generally free 
and fair; however, there were allegations of vote buying.
    In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation that bans 
primaries previously conducted by religious sects and tribes. The 
National Assembly's objective in passing this legislation was to 
eliminate the process by which candidates were withdrawn from elections 
and votes concentrated on the remaining candidates from these groups.
    Charges filed against several hundred citizens in the Government's 
attempt to enforce the ban on tribal primaries during the July 1999 
elections were never brought to trial. During its fall session, the 
National Assembly declined to lift the parliamentary immunity of the 
two newly elected members the Public Prosecutor had sought to charge 
with violating the ban on tribal primaries.
    Women are disenfranchised and have little opportunity to influence 
government. A May 1999 Amiri decree gave women the right to vote, to 
seek election to the National Assembly beginning with the parliamentary 
election scheduled for 2003, and to hold cabinet office. In November 
1999, the Parliament vetoed the Amir's May decree on constitutional 
grounds. Shortly thereafter members of the Assembly introduced 
identical legislation, but it also was defeated. No new legislation has 
been introduced by either the Government or by Assembly members. Women 
do hold some relatively senior nonpolitical positions within some 
ministries.
    Members of the Shi'a minority generally are underrepresented in 
high government positions. There is only one Shi'a member of the 
Cabinet, the Minister of Commerce. Of 50 National Assembly members, 6 
are Shi'a, as is the armed forces chief of staff.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government continued its practice of preventing the 
establishment of new local human rights groups by not approving their 
requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). Since 1985 the Government has 
issued only three licenses. The Government has refused other license 
request on the grounds that previously established NGO's already 
provide services similar to those proposed by the petitions. It also 
continued to limit the ability of NGO members to attend conferences 
abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.). Their members must obtain 
permission from the Government before attending international 
conferences.
    The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's, including 
unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ended early in the year (see 
Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
    The Government permits international human rights organizations to 
visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations 
conduct fieldwork and report excellent communication with and 
reasonable cooperation from the Government. The Government has 
cooperated fully in the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteurs for Iran 
and Iraq and the high-level representative of the Secretary General on 
the issue of Kuwaitis missing in Iraq since the end of the Gulf War.
    The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which 
takes testimony from individuals about abuses, investigates prison 
conditions, and makes nonbinding recommendations for redress. Despite 
its designation as an advisory body, the Human Rights Committee has 
shown that, in practice, it is able to mobilize government agencies to 
address egregious human rights problems.
    In July the Government submitted its first periodic report on the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. After reviewing the presentation, a U.N. Human Rights Committee 
report on July 28 noted 23 principal subjects of concern. In 
particular, it cited discrimination against women in voting, marriage, 
and nationality; a range of abuses against bidoon; and restrictions of 
freedom of expression and association. The Committee urged immediate 
steps to ensure that law and practice meet the standards required by 
the covenant.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national 
origin, language, or religion. However, laws and regulations 
discriminate in some cases against women and noncitizens, who face 
widespread social, economic, and legal discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to some 
local experts, domestic abuse of women occurs in an estimated 15 
percent of all marriages. Each of the country's 50 police stations 
reportedly receives on average 1 to 2 complaints of spousal abuse each 
week, although this may be understated. Of the complaints received, 
approximately 60 percent involve spousal abuse of noncitizen women. The 
police and the courts generally seek to resolve family disputes 
informally and may ask the offending spouse to sign a statement 
affirming that he agrees to end the abuse. The police refer serious 
cases to the Psychiatric Department at the Ministry of Health. The 
courts have found husbands guilty of spousal abuse. ``Honor'' crimes 
occur very infrequently; there is no provision in the Criminal Code 
that allows for leniency in such cases. Rape and sexual assault remain 
a serious problem, particularly for foreign domestic servants or 
unskilled workers. There are no legally mandated restrictions on dress 
for women.
    In April the Government arrested seven men for allegedly beating a 
19-year-old woman for not wearing a ``hijab'' (head scarf). The 
Government acted quickly in bringing the seven men to trial, 
criticizing the assault as a vigilante action by extremists. The case 
prompted a lively debate in society and the press. Most citizens 
expressed outrage, viewing the attack as a direct assault on their 
personal freedoms, while Islamists urged against making hasty 
judgments. Conflicting versions of what exactly occurred and the 
motives involved emerged during the trial, and the criminal court 
acquitted the seven accused men in June, finding that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict them. In November the Court of Appeals 
overturned the acquittal of five of the seven, and sentenced four to 1-
year imprisonment and ordered them to pay $6,000 (2,000 dinars) each in 
compensatory damages. The fifth accused was ordered to pay $3,000 
(1,000 dinars) with no jail term.
    In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring the 
segregation of sexes at private universities. A 1996 law already 
requires the Government to segregate by sex the state-run university by 
2001.
    Some employers physically abuse foreign women working as domestic 
servants, and there are continuing reports of rape of these women by 
male employers and male coworkers. The local press gives the problem 
considerable attention, and both the police and the courts have taken 
action against employers when presented with evidence of serious abuse. 
Some rapes resulted in unwanted pregnancies. Reportedly 12 domestic 
servants killed children fathered by employers soon after birth. 
Foreign-born domestic employees have the right to sue their employers 
for abuse, but few do so fearing judicial bias and deportation. In July 
the Government reduced the operations of a specialized police facility 
designated to investigate complaints and provide some shelter for 
runaway maids, which resulted in a further deterioration of conditions 
for domestic employees (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
    In May a Sri Lankan maid was beaten severely with a plastic water 
pipe, strangled with a wire, and repeatedly tortured with a hot iron, 
allegedly by a Kuwaiti couple who employed her. She had worked for this 
family for over a year, during which time she reported that her 
employers did not feed her regularly and withheld her salary. The maid 
suffered permanent damage to her face, neck, ears, and arms. The case 
had not yet gone to trial by year's end. The woman accused of the 
assault was being held in jail; her husband, a policeman, remains free.
    In June five male citizens belonging to various state security 
organizations were arrested for the kidnap, rape, torture, and beating 
of four female domestic servants. The police seized videotapes of the 
crimes. The court hearing the case denied bail, and the five were 
awaiting trial at year's end.
    In August the criminal court postponed hearing the case of an 
Indonesian domestic worker who was beaten to death with a vacuum 
cleaner by her female employer. The entire family admitted to regularly 
beating her with hard objects for several months. The Kuwaiti woman was 
being held in prison without bail at year's end.
    The employers who beat to death their Sri Lankan maid in August 
1999 remained in jail awaiting trial at year's end. The case of the 
Kuwaiti women charged in 1999 in the beating death of her Indian maid 
had not gone to trial by year's end.
    Runaway servants, including many women alleging physical or sexual 
abuse, often seek shelter at their country's embassy for repatriation 
or a change in employers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
    Women continue to experience legal and social discrimination. Women 
are denied the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is not 
given equal weight to that of males in the courts (see Section 1.e.). 
Married women require their husbands' permission to obtain a passport 
(see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to confer citizenship; 
therefore, children born to citizen mothers and stateless fathers are 
themselves stateless. The Government forbids marriage between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men (see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.). Inheritance is 
governed by Islamic law, which differs according to the branch of 
Islam. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit 
all property, while Sunni women inherit only a portion, with the 
balance divided among brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the 
deceased.
    In February women attempted to register for the 2003 elections. 
Invoking the Government's denial of their registration attempt as a 
basis, women's suffrage supporters filed four court cases, three of 
which were rejected for ``lacking seriousness.'' An administrative 
court referred the fourth case (filed by a male citizen) to the 
Constitutional Court, which refused it on procedural grounds for 
incorrectly framing the appeal. After the decision, First Deputy 
Premier and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah stated that he respected the 
court's verdict, but that the Government would still push for women's 
suffrage.
    Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in 
society, and the law restricts women from working in ``dangerous 
industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all 
citizens work for the state in office jobs, and women are allowed into 
most areas of the bureaucracy, including even oil well firefighting 
units. Educated women maintain that the conservative nature of society 
limits career opportunities. Nonetheless an estimated 33 percent of 
women of working age are employed. The law provides for ``remuneration 
equal to that of a man provided she does the same work.'' This 
provision is respected in practice. Women work as doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, bankers, and professors. A few have been appointed to senior 
positions in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Planning, and 
the state-owned Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. There is one female 
ambassador and two female undersecretaries; however, there are no 
female judges or prosecutors.
    In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement 
payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to 
provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually 
is given to the mother. The law discriminates against women married to 
foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing 
subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires 
women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize 
marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands. 
Instead the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By 
contrast male citizens married to foreign-born women do not have to pay 
residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency 
derives from marriage.
    Polygyny is legal and is more common among tribal elements of the 
population. A husband is obliged to inform his first wife that he is 
taking a second wife. The husband is obligated to provide the first 
wife a separate household if that is her preference. A first wife who 
objects to a second marriage may request a divorce, but the court's 
determination of divorce and child custody would be made on grounds 
other than the fact of the second marriage itself.
    There are several women's organizations that follow women's issues, 
among the most active of which are the Women's Cultural and Social 
Society (WCSS) and the Women's Affairs Committee.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Both boys and girls receive a free education, which extends through the 
university level, including advanced degrees. The Government provides 
free health care and a variety of other services to all children. 
Citizen parents also receive a monthly government allowance for each 
child.
    The marriage of girls under the age of 17 is uncommon among the 
urban population but remains a practice of the Bedouins in outlying 
areas.
    There were cases of male youths, some as young as 8 years old, 
raped by men or gangs of other male youths.
    There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin, 
being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no institutionalized 
discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education, or in 
the provision of state services. Legislation passed by the National 
Assembly in 1996 mandates accessibility for the disabled to all public 
facilities, and provides an affirmative action employment program for 
the disabled. However, this law has not been implemented fully. The 
Government pays extensive stipends to disabled citizens, which cover 
transportation, housing, job training, and social welfare.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The plight of the 110,000 
bidoon remains a significant problem, and in June the Government 
instituted a new program to address the issue. The bidoon, a term 
meaning ``without,'' are Arabs who have residency ties to Kuwait--some 
going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who have no 
documention of their nationality. The bidoon have been the objects of 
harsh government policy since the mid-1980's. Since 1985 the Government 
has eliminated the bidoon from the census rolls, discontinued their 
access to government jobs and free education, and sought to deport 
many. In 1993 the Government decreed that bidoon males no longer would 
be allowed to serve in the military. Those presently in the armed 
forces are being replaced gradually. The Government does not issue 
travel documents to bidoon routinely, and if bidoon travel abroad 
without documentation, they risk being barred from returning to the 
country unless they receive advance permission from the immigration 
authorities. Marriages pose special hardships because the offspring of 
male bidoon inherit the father's undetermined legal status.
    In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that bidoon 
register with the Government by June 27 to begin a process in which 
they could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register 
would be considered illegal residents and subject to deportation. The 
law provides that up to 2,000 bidoon may be naturalized each year, but 
registration will not lead to citizenship for those who are judged to 
have insufficient ties to the country. Only 8,000 bidoon registered by 
the June 27 cutoff date, in addition to 36,000 who registered (or who 
are descended from those who registered) during a 1965 census. The 
Ministry of the Interior created an ``Executive Committee in Charge of 
the Bidoon'' to resolve the issue. The Government has yet to state the 
likely fate of the large majority of bidoon, who will be unable to 
provide documentation proving Kuwaiti nationality. The Government 
stated in March that it would take punitive action against those who do 
not rectify their status by the deadline. It maintains that many bidoon 
are concealing their true nationalities in order to remain in the 
country, become citizens, and enjoy the generous benefits provided to 
citizens. The Government has denied many bidoon official documents such 
as birth certificates, marriage certificates, civil identification, and 
drivers' licenses, and has pressured employers not to hire bidoon. 
There were no reports during the year that the Government decided the 
nationality of any bidoon without a hearing.
    The Government grants legal status and issues a residency visa to 
any bidoon who presents a passport, regardless of the country of 
issuance. This led some bidoon to acquire passports from countries with 
which they have no affiliation, but which have liberal ``economic 
citizenship'' programs, although this practice has declined sharply 
since 1997. The Government stated that 12,000 bidoon were documented 
during the year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi 
Arabia. Once documented, bidoon are able to obtain residency permits 
and other official papers. However, there also are credible reports of 
government authorities encouraging bidoon to purchase counterfeit 
passports in order to establish a claim to an alternate nationality. 
Purchasing a fraudulent passport allows bidoon to receive a residency 
permit and other civil documents, to marry, and to work. However, the 
bidoon have problems obtaining visas to travel abroad on these 
passports, as they are easily detected as fraudulent, and they may have 
difficulty renewing these passports when they expire.
    There were no credible reports during the year that the Government 
enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers 
from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War. In prior 
years since the end of the Gulf War, government policy had targeted 
workers whose leaders supported Iraq, especially Palestinians, 
Jordanians, and Yemenis. The Government argued that during the Iraqi 
occupation, many of these workers' governments sided with the Iraqi 
forces. The Government delayed or denied the issuance of work and 
residency permits to persons in these groups, and in many cases 
hindered those workers who were permitted to reside in the country from 
sponsoring their families to join them. Many of these nationals 
resorted to the purchase of third country passports in order to gain 
entry to, or legalize their status in, the country. A government policy 
to route the residency visas of these nationals through the State 
Security Service led to a sharp increase in renewal denials in the 
period immediately after the war (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). In 1999 
diplomatic relations were restored with Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan; and 
subsequently these policies apparently were relaxed (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to join 
unions. Nonetheless, the Government restricts the right of freedom of 
association by stipulating that there be only one union per 
occupational trade, and that unions may establish only one federation. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long criticized such 
restrictions.
    Approximately 50,000 persons, less than 5 percent of a total work 
force of 1,226,134, are organized into 14 unions, 12 of which are 
affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole 
legal trade union federation. The Bank Workers Union and the Kuwait 
Airways Workers Union consisting of approximately 4,500 workers, are 
independent of the KTUF. The law stipulates that any new union must 
include at least 100 workers, of whom at least 15 are citizens. Both 
the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) have criticized this requirement because it discourages unions 
in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the construction industry 
and the domestic servant sector. Despite past draft proposals and KTUF 
complaints, no new labor law was enacted during the year.
    The Government's pervasive oversight powers further erode union 
independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most 
union budgets, may inspect the financial records of any union, and 
prohibits any union from engaging in political or religious activities, 
which are vaguely defined. The law empowers the courts to dissolve any 
union for violating labor laws or for threatening ``public order and 
morals.'' Such a court decision may be appealed. The Amir also may 
dissolve a union by decree. By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor is authorized to seize the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO 
has criticized this aspect of the law. Although no union has been 
dissolved, the law subordinates the legal existence of the unions to 
the power of the State.
    According to government statistics, 997,338 foreign workers are 
employed in the country. They constitute over 80 percent of the work 
force but only 10 percent of the unionized work force. The Labor Law 
discriminates against foreign workers by permitting them to join unions 
only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF states that this 
requirement is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions 
regardless of their length of stay. In addition the law stipulates that 
foreigners may participate in unions only as nonvoting members. Unlike 
union members who are citizens, foreign workers do not have the right 
to elect their leadership. The law requires that union officials must 
be citizens. The ILO has criticized the 5-year residency requirement 
and the denial of voting rights for foreign workers. The KTUF 
administers an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to 
investigate complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free 
legal advice. Any foreign worker covered under the Labor Law may submit 
a grievance to the Labor Office regardless of union status. However, 
such services are not utilized widely.
    The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor 
disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and 
management cannot reach a solution (see Section 6.b.). The law does not 
have any provision ensuring strikers freedom from any legal or 
administrative action taken against them by the State. However, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins 
or protests by workers who face obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
    Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belongs to 
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly 
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain 
restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in 
the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in 
practice.
    The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers 
and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most 
agreements are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may 
petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If 
mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board, 
which is composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the 
Attorney General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor.
    The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining 
between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and 
conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by 
the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales 
after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil 
service unions. Union officials resolve most issues at the working 
level and have regular access to senior officials.
    The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who 
alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the 
judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees 
based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of 
antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union 
activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national 
emergency and with just remuneration;'' however, some foreign workers 
are treated like indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The Government 
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but 
such practices are not known to occur.
    Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission 
from their original sponsors unless they have been in the country for 
over 2 years. Domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses 
from this practice because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In 
many cases employers exercise control over their servants by holding 
their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and 
has acted to retrieve the passports of maids involved in disputes.
    Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South 
Asian workers, live much like indentured servants. They frequently face 
poor working conditions and may encounter some physical abuse (see 
Sections 5 and 6.e.). Domestic servants who run away from their 
employers may be treated as criminals under the law. However, the 
authorities usually do not enforce this provision. In some reported 
cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to 
cover the costs involved in bringing them to the country.
    There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a 
system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers 
outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800. 
Middlemen, generally foreigners, use the promise of Kuwaiti sponsorship 
to attract workers from economically depressed countries, taking a 
commission and remitting the rest to the nominal Kuwaiti sponsor. Once 
in the country, such workers are farmed out to the informal sector or 
find employment with parties that would otherwise be unable to sponsor 
them. Foreign workers who are recruited with these traded visas not 
only face possible prosecution for being engaged in illegal employment 
(i.e., working for an employer other than their sponsor), but also 
leave themselves extremely vulnerable to extortion by employers, 
sponsors, and middlemen. Government efforts to crack down on such 
abuses, such as by closing front companies for visa traders, have 
failed to realize significant progress. There are laws aimed at curbing 
visa trading, with penalties against both employers and visa traders, 
but the laws seldom are enforced. Visa trading has resulted in growing 
numbers of unemployed foreign workers who buy visas to enter the 
country and then cannot find work.
    For over 10 years, the ILO has criticized a 1979 legislative 
decree, which requires prior authorization for public meetings and 
gatherings, and provides for a penalty of imprisonment including an 
obligation to work. The ILO also is critical of a 1980 legislative 
decree respecting security, order, and discipline aboard ships, 
breaches of which also may be punished by imprisonment with an 
obligation to work.
    There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin, 
being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work, 
both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the 
ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Education is compulsory for 
children between the ages of 6 and 15. The Government does not prohibit 
forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known 
to occur (see Section 6.c.). There are reports of young boys, 
especially of South Asian origin, being used as camel jockeys (see 
Sections 5 and 6.c.). There also have been confirmed reports that some 
South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants are under age 18. 
Such underage workers reportedly falsify their ages in order to enter 
the country. Some small businessmen employ their children on a part-
time basis.
    Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that 
they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest 
period.
    In August Kuwait ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
tiered labor market ensures high wages for citizen employees, most of 
whom are in government white collar or executive positions, while 
foreign workers, even those in skilled positions, receive substantially 
lower wages. There is no legal minimum wage in the private sector. In 
the public sector, the monthly minimum wage is approximately $742 (226 
dinars) for citizens and approximately $296 (90 dinars) for 
noncitizens. The public sector minimum wage provides a decent standard 
of living for a worker and family. Wages of unskilled workers in the 
private sector do not always provide a decent standard of living. To be 
eligible to sponsor family members for residency, government workers 
must receive a minimum wage of $1,350 (450 dinars) a month, and private 
sector workers must make at least $2,135 (650 dinars) a month. The 
Council of Ministers approved a bill in August that would reduce this 
amount to $1,350 (450 dinars) for all workers.
    There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a 
system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers 
outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800 (see 
Section 6.c.).
    The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for both the 
public and the private sectors, with the oil industry treated 
separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribes additional conditions 
for the public sector. The Labor Law limits the standard work week to 
48 hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14 
workdays of leave each year, and establishes a compensation schedule 
for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who specifically are 
excluded from the private sector Labor Law, frequently work long hours, 
greatly in excess of 48 hours.
    The ILO has urged the Government to extend the weekly 24-
consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period 
of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than 
five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws 
establishing work conditions are not applied uniformly to foreign 
workers.
    Employers often exploit workers' willingness to accept substandard 
conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled 
South Asian workers, live much like indentured servants, are unaware of 
their legal rights, and generally lack the means to pursue a legal 
remedy. They frequently face contractual disputes and poor working 
conditions, and may face physical and sexual abuse (see Sections 5 and 
6.c.). Most are in debt to their employers before they arrive in the 
country and have little choice but to accept the employer's conditions, 
even if they contradict the contractual terms. It is not uncommon for 
wages to be withheld for a period of months, or to be decreased 
substantially. Many foreign workers are forced to live in ``housing 
camps,'' which generally are overcrowded and lack adequate cooking and 
bathroom facilities. Workers are housed 10 or more to a room in squalid 
conditions, many without access to adequate running water. The workers 
are only allowed off the camp compound on company transport or by 
permission of the employer. Foreign workers' ability to change their 
employment is limited, and, in some cases, employers' possession of 
foreign workers' passports allows them to exercise control over such 
employees (see Section 6.c). Many foreign workers go heavily into debt 
and cannot afford to return home.
    The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting 
their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administers 
an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to investigate 
complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice. 
However, these services are not utilized widely. Any foreign worker may 
submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union status.
    The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and 
compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-
related causes. The law also requires that employers provide periodic 
medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the 
job, such as chemicals and asbestos. Foreigners must pay high fees for 
medical care, both yearly and each time medical care is provided. Many 
employers deduct the medical fees from employees' salaries. Adequate 
and affordable health care remains a problem for many foreign workers. 
No health insurance system exists.
    The Government has issued occupational health and safety standards; 
however, compliance and enforcement appear poor, especially with 
respect to unskilled foreign laborers. To decrease accident rates, the 
Government periodically inspects installations to raise awareness among 
workers and employers, and to ensure that they abide by the safety 
rules, control the pollution resulting from certain dangerous 
industries, train workers who use new machines in specialized 
institutes, and report violations. Workers have the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their 
continued employment, and legal protection exists for workers who file 
complaints about such conditions.
    As noted domestic servants are not covered under the Labor Law. 
Those who flee their employers may be treated as criminals, although 
the authorities usually do not prosecute them. In some reported cases, 
employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the 
costs involved in bringing them to the country. It is also a common 
practice for employers illegally to withhold their passports. Maids pay 
the same amount or more than unskilled or semi-skilled workers for 
visas to work in the country.
    Runaway servants often seek shelter at their country's embassy for 
either repatriation or assistance in dealing with employers. The 
numbers in need of assistance increased substantially during the year 
as conditions for domestic employees worsened. Some embassies house 
runaway servants: The Sri Lankan Embassy has between 700-800 nationals 
in its care, the Indian Embassy 200, the Philippine Embassy 150, the 
Indonesian Embassy 100, and the Bangladeshi Embassy 60. The total of 
1,300 represents an increase of 1,000 in the past year. Although most 
of these workers sought shelter due to contractual or financial 
problems with their employers, some women also alleged physical and 
sexual abuse. The Sri Lankan, Indian, and Philippine Embassies all 
continue to report the steady occurrence of physical abuse and 
mistreatment involving domestic servants, including withheld salaries, 
overwork, and not being fed regularly or enough. Each government has 
attempted to register its nationals who arrive to work in the country 
as domestic employees and to regulate recruiting agents in their home 
countries, without much result. In July the reduction of services 
provided by the police facility designated to mediate between 
embassies, domestic workers, and employers made it very difficult for 
domestics to file complaints, receive withheld salary, and reach 
settlement in cases of mistreatment. Domestic servants must now deal 
with neighborhood police stations, whose personnel are untrained and 
inexperienced in handling their cases and often side with the employer 
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    Some countries either have warned their female citizens about such 
work conditions or banned them from working in the country as domestic 
servants. The Government of India officially banned its nationals from 
working in Kuwait as domestic employees, but Indian nationals still buy 
visas and enter Kuwait as domestic workers. Bangladesh has banned 
female domestic servants from working in Kuwait since 1998. In August 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister warned women seeking employment in all 
Persian Gulf countries to ``exercise caution'' and to avoid being 
forced into illegal activities.
    The courts found in favor of the employee in an estimated 90 
percent of the labor disputes they heard, but this success did not 
result in improved conditions for foreign workers. Currently, no legal 
mechanism exists for foreign workers to enforce settlements. There is 
no compulsion for employers to obey court rulings, and workers often 
did not receive court-ordered compensation. Employers also reportedly 
use illegal methods to pressure foreign employees to drop cases against 
them, such as withholding their passports, police intimidation and 
brutality, and filing criminal charges against them for theft and other 
crimes.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within or through the country.
                               __________

                                LEBANON

    Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the 
unwritten ``National Pact of 1943'' the President is a Maronite 
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. President Emile Lahoud took office 
in 1998 after an election heavily influenced by Syria. The Parliament 
consists of 128 deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim 
representatives. In parliamentary elections in August and September, 
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri defeated incumbent Salim Al-Hoss. 
President Lahoud named Hariri Prime Minister in October. According to 
international observers, the elections were flawed and the outcome was 
heavily influenced by the Syrian Government; however, there reportedly 
were fewer voting irregularities than in the 1996 parliamentary 
elections. The judiciary is independent in principle; however, it is 
subject to political pressure.
    Non-Lebanese military and paramilitary forces control much of the 
country. Approximately 25,000 Syrian troops are stationed in locations 
throughout the country, excluding the south. In addition, several armed 
Palestinian factions are located in refugee camps, although their 
freedom of movement is restricted significantly. The contingent of 
approximately 2,000 Israeli army regulars and 1,500 Israeli-supported 
militiamen that had controlled parts of the south withdrew from the 
region completely by May. All undermined the authority of the central 
Government and interfered with the application of law in the patchwork 
of areas not under the Government's control. In 1991 the Governments of 
Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that provided a 
framework for security cooperation between their armed forces. However, 
an undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence personnel in the 
country continue to conduct their activities independently of the 
agreement.
    In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi 
Arabia, to end the country's civil war. According to the Taif Accord, 
the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to determine the redeployment 
of Syrian troops from their position in Lebanon's coastal population 
areas to specified areas of the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal 
contingent upon subsequent agreement by both Governments. The Syrian 
Government has not carried out this partial redeployment, and strong 
Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and decisionmakers makes 
officials unwilling to press for a complete withdrawal. Since the Taif 
Accord was signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal 
of Syrian forces. The Government's relationship with Syria does not 
reflect the will of most of the country's citizens.
    Until May Israel exerted control in or near its self-proclaimed 
``security zone'' in the south through direct military action and 
support for its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). With the tacit 
support of the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction 
Hizballah, and, to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal 
and some Palestinian guerrillas were locked in a cycle of attack and 
counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. In May after 22 years of 
occupation, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops withdrew from the south 
and West Biqa', and the SLA disbanded. Following the withdrawal, the 
Government deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the former 
security zone. After the withdrawal, Hizballah guerrillas maintained 
observation posts and conducted patrols along the border with Israel. 
The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also increased 
its area of operations following the Israeli withdrawal. Palestinian 
groups operate autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country. 
The Government did not attempt to reassert state control over the 
Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizballah.
    The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 
which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforces laws, conducts searches 
and arrests, and refers cases to the judiciary; and the State Security 
Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on 
groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale 
is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the 
screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries, 
television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that 
address national security issues and ``morale.'' The security forces 
committed serious human rights abuses.
    Before the 1975-90 hostilities, the country was an important 
regional financial and commercial center. There is a market-based 
economy in which the majority of the private sector work force is 
employed in the services sector, such as banking and commerce. There is 
a small industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacture and 
food processing. The annual gross national product is estimated to be 
approximately $5,000 per capita. A reconstruction effort begun in 1992 
is moving forward. Substantial remittances from abroad offset the trade 
deficit and resulted in a balance of payment surplus. The economy has 
been in recession since 1998. Almost all economic indicators pointed to 
decline. The budget deficit stood at 46 percent of expenditure, 
compared with 37 percent for the corresponding period in 1999, and 
foreign investments dropped by 13 percent. The per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $4,700 and unemployment is 
estimated to be as high as 20 percent. The country has a substantial 
public debt of $22 billion (140 percent of the GDP).
    The Government's overall human rights record was poor, and serious 
problems remain, although there were some improvements in a few areas. 
The right of citizens to change their government remains significantly 
restricted by the lack of government control over parts of the country, 
shortcomings in the electoral system, and Syrian influence. The August 
and September parliamentary elections were flawed and suffered from 
Syrian government influence. Members of the security forces used 
excessive force and tortured and abused some detainees. Prison 
conditions remained poor. Government abuses also included the arbitrary 
arrest and detention of persons who opposed government policies. 
Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials are problems, and 
the courts are subject to political pressure. International observers 
reported that trials of former SLA personnel were not free and fair. 
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and continued 
surveillance of political activities during the year. The Government 
partially limited press freedom by continuing to restrict radio and 
television broadcasting in a discriminatory manner. Journalists 
practice self-censorship. The Government continued to restrict freedom 
of assembly, and imposes some limits on freedom of association. There 
are some restrictions on freedom of religion. The Government imposes 
some limits on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against 
women; abuse of children; discrimination against Palestinians; forced 
labor, including by children; child labor; and the mistreatment of 
foreign servants are problems.
    Until the IDF withdrawal and the collapse of the SLA, artillery and 
aerial attacks by the various contending forces in southern Lebanon 
threatened life and property. These forces committed abuses, including 
killings, bombings, and abductions. The SLA maintained a separate and 
arbitrary system of justice in the zone formerly controlled by Israeli 
forces, which was independent of Lebanese central authority. Prior to 
the SLA collapse, its officials arbitrarily arrested, mistreated, and 
detained persons, and sometimes expelled local residents from their 
homes in the zone. Palestinian groups in refugee camps maintain a 
separate, often arbitrary, system of justice for other Palestinians. 
Palestinians sometimes may appeal for legal recourse to Lebanese 
authorities, often through their agents in the camps. In the past, 
there were reports that members of the various groups that control the 
camps detained their Palestinian rivals and, in some instances, killed 
them; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the 
year.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government authorities during the 
year.
    Four persons died in custody during the year. In January a Sudanese 
asylum seeker died of malaria in Zahle prison. Prison officials 
reportedly did not offer him medical treatment before his death. An 
elderly SLA member died in custody in June allegedly because prison 
officials refused to provide him with his medicine, which was 
manufactured in Israel. In November one SLA detainee died of cancer and 
another SLA detainee died from high blood pressure. The Military Court 
initiated an investigation into the two deaths to determine whether or 
not the detainees received proper medical treatment; however, it had 
not reached conclusions by year's end. The Government subsequently 
announced that it would review the medical records of all former SLA 
detainees (see Section 1.c.).
    In October 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a 
Maronite church in Beirut (see Section 5).
    In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an 
ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted 
to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church 
bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a 
massive military operation against Sunni insurgents in the north. Five 
civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 insurgents were killed in the 
operation (see Section 5).
    The judicial system continues to suffer from a backlog of hearings 
into cases of death in custody, some as old as 6 years. Such cases 
sometimes involve individuals connected to political groups or accused 
of criminal activity.
    There were no new developments in the case of the June 1999 
killings of four judicial officials at a courthouse in Sidon. The 
perpetrators reportedly are members of the outlawed Palestinian group 
``Asbat al-Ansar''; however, government authorities did not arrest any 
of the suspected gunmen, who are believed to be hiding in the 
Palestinian refugee camp of Ain-Al Hilwah.
    A military tribunal in 1999 sentenced Captain Camille Yared to 10 
years in prison and 4 Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia 
for carrying out a 1996 bus bombing in Syria, which killed 11 persons. 
The court also sentenced 13 other Lebanese Forces members to 7 years in 
prison. An appeal in the case was scheduled to be held in January 2001.
    There were no developments in the 1996 beating death of Akram 
Arbeed, who allegedly was attacked while accompanying a candidate in 
the 1996 parliamentary election. The case is still pending.
    A court hearing in the 1998 appeal made by the prosecutor's office 
regarding the 1976 killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, Embassy 
officer Robert Waring, and their driver, Zohair Moghrabi, has not been 
scheduled following a court verdict declaring the suspect, Tawfiq 
Mohammad Farroukh, not guilty of murder for his role in the killings.
    The cycle of violence in and around the former Israeli controlled 
security zone decreased significantly following the IDF withdrawal in 
May. However, prior to the withdrawal, an estimated 20 Islamic 
resistance guerrillas, 8 Israeli soldiers, and 25 Lebanese civilians 
were killed in the south as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas 
on the one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged 
in recurring violence. For example, in May Hizballah attacks in the 
north of Israel killed 1 person and injured 12. In retaliation for 
these attacks, Israel shelled military and civilian targets in the 
south, killing two persons. Israeli forces conducted air strikes and 
artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets, 
including civilian infrastructure, inside Lebanon. For example, on 
February 8, in response to Hizballah attacks Israel conducted air 
strikes on electrical power transformer stations and other targets, 
injuring over one dozen civilians.
    There were over 110 civilian injuries prior to the May Israeli 
withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from 
shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of 
the injured.
    During the May IDF withdrawal from the south and the concurrent 
collapse of the SLA, Israeli forces killed at least four Lebanese 
civilians.
    On October 7, IDF personnel killed 2 persons and injured 25 along 
the Israeli-Lebanese border during demonstrations against Israeli 
government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (see Section 
2.b.). On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the 
She'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted 
from the shelling.
    On November 25, Hizballah guerrillas bombed an Israeli patrol 
station in the She'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In response, 
Israel launched airstrikes on Hizballah positions in the south, 
injuring one person.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Government did not take any judicial action against groups 
known to be responsible for the kidnapings of thousands of persons 
during the 1975-1990 civil war.
    In 1999 the Government established a military commission to 
investigate the fate of all those who disappeared during the civil war. 
In September the commission concluded that all persons who disappeared 
at least 4 years before the end of the civil war were dead. The 
Government endorsed the commission report and then-Prime Minister Salim 
al-Hoss called on all families to accept reality despite its 
bitterness;'' however, many of the family members of persons who 
disappeared rejected the commission's findings and called for the 
creation of a new commission.
    In October during violent clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza, Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the 
north of Israel, demanding that the Israeli Government release all 
remaining Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons. At year's end, 
Hizballah continued to hold captive the soldiers.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution, 
and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused 
detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups 
report that torture is a common practice. Violent abuse usually occurs 
during the preliminary investigations that are conducted at police 
stations or military installations, where suspects are interrogated in 
the absence of an attorney. Such abuse occurs despite laws that prevent 
judges from accepting any confession extracted under duress.
    The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA personnel 
who surrendered to authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the 
south in May (see Section 1.d.). Some former SLA detainees reported 
that they were abused or tortured. Amnesty International (AI) and other 
human rights organizations reported that some detainees were beaten, 
handcuffed, blindfolded, and forced to lie face down on the ground.
    In 1999 police officials allegedly tortured in detention a number 
of Sunni youths who were suspected in involvement in a series of church 
bombings (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
    In March ISF personnel used excessive force to disperse a 
demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's residence protesting the 
Government's expulsion of four Japanese Red Army members to Jordan. The 
officers injured at least one demonstrator and a journalist (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The Government took no action against the 
officers. Ten demonstrators were arrested but were released shortly 
afterwards.
    On April 17, in Beirut security forces used excessive force to 
break up a demonstration calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces 
from the country; 13 persons were injured, and 8 persons were arrested 
and subsequently tried and sentenced by a military court (see Sections 
1.d. and 1.e.).
    On numerous occasions following the May IDF withdrawal from the 
south, civilians threw rocks, hot oil, and Molotov cocktails at IDF 
soldiers across the border, which resulted in some injuries. Hizballah 
reportedly supported these cross-border attacks, and the Government did 
little to halt them. On several occasions IDF troops returned fire and 
sometimes injured civilians.
    Abuses occurred in areas outside the State's authority, including 
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that 
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their 
Palestinian rivals (see Section 1.d.).
    Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international 
standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total 
capacity of 3,840 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a 
total population of about 8,375. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet 
facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not budgeted 
funds to overhaul the prison system. In September the Beirut Bar 
Association organized a conference composed of local and international 
participants to underscore the need for local penal reform. The head of 
the Association described the country's prison facilities as ``unfit 
for animals.'' The Government made an effort to carry out 
rehabilitation for some inmates. Inmates at Roumieh prison participated 
in vocational activities such as computer training courses in order to 
provide them with skills upon release. In September 36 inmates in 
Roumieh prison received certificates of accomplishment following 
completion of a computer training program.
    Three SLA detainees died of natural causes in custody during the 
year; however, one detainee died allegedly because prison officials 
refused to provide him with his medicine, which was manufactured in 
Israel. One Sudanese detainee died of malaria during the year after 
prison officials reportedly refused to offer him medical assistance 
(see Section 1.a.). The Surete Generale, which mans border posts, 
operates a detention facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians 
and Sri Lankans, are detained there pending deportation. They 
reportedly are held in small, poorly ventilated cells.
    Former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four 
life sentences for the murder or attempted murder of various political 
figures during and after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement 
in a prison in the basement of the Ministry of Defense. He is permitted 
minimal exercise and allowed only periodic visits from his family and 
lawyers. He is not allowed to read newspapers or listen to the radio. 
Government officials stated that his solitary confinement is necessary 
for his own protection.
    Local journalists and human rights organizations had access to 
certain prisons during the year. Access to prisons controlled by the 
Ministry of Defense was not permitted. Following the Israeli withdrawal 
from the south, the Government did not grant independent monitors 
access to former SLA soldiers in custody. In December government 
officials stated that International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
representatives would be allowed to visit all SLA detainees; however, 
the Government did not sign a memorandum of understanding by year's 
end.
    Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Hizballah detained 
and reportedly mistreated SLA members and suspected agents at unknown 
locations. The SLA operated its own detention facility, Al-Khiam 
prison, and there were frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment 
of detainees (see Section 1.d.). Hizballah and the SLA occasionally 
released and exchanged prisoners.
    Hizballah did not permit prison visits by human rights monitors. 
Before its May dissolution, the SLA allowed representatives of the ICRC 
and family members of inmates to visit detainees at Al-Khiam prison.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government uses 
arbitrary arrest and detention. The law requires security forces to 
obtain warrants before making arrests; however, military prosecutors, 
who are responsible for cases involving the military as well as those 
involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion, 
make arrests without warrants. Arresting officers are required to refer 
a subject to a prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest, but frequently do 
not do so.
    The law requires the authorities to release suspects after 48 hours 
of arrest if no formal charges are brought against them. Some 
prosecutors flout this requirement and detain suspects for long periods 
in pretrial confinement without a court order. The law authorizes 
judges to remand suspects to incommunicado detention for 10 days with a 
possible extension for an additional 10 days. Bail is available only to 
those accused of petty crimes, not to those accused of felonies. 
Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-
funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office 
for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel on many 
occasions has asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for 
defendants.
    Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest. 
Security forces detained and interrogated scores of citizens, 
predominately Christian supporters of exiled General Michel 'Awn, and 
of the jailed commander of the disbanded Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'. 
These detentions and searches of homes took place without warrants, and 
detainees claim that they were not given access to lawyers. Most 
detainees were released after they were forced to sign documents 
stating that they would abstain from politics.
    In 1999 police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number 
of Sunni youths for suspected involvement in church bombings; however, 
the youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Sections 
1.a. and 5).
    On April 13, authorities detained students from the National Free 
Current, a pro-Awnist group, for distributing antigovernment and anti-
Syria leaflets (see Section 2.a.). In April ISF personnel arrested and 
subsequently released a number of demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.b.). In September authorities detained nine Lebanese Forces activists 
in connection with a rally protesting the Syrian presence in Lebanon 
(see Section 2.b.); authorities released these detainees after they 
paid a monetary fine.
    The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA members who 
surrendered to the authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the 
south in May (see Section 1.c.).
    The authorities often detain without charges for short periods of 
time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Most 
of the former senior government officials who were detained in 1999 on 
charges of embezzlement or misuse of power were released on bail, 
including former Minister of Petroleum Shahe Baroumian. The former 
officials were detained without charge for prolonged periods of time in 
Roumieh prison, in violation of due process. Legal actions still are 
pending against them; however, they are free to travel abroad.
    Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and 
harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, various militias, 
and rival Palestinians.
    There were no allegations during the year of the transfer of 
citizens by government authorities to Syria. In December the Syrian 
Government transferred 46 Lebanese citizens, 7 Palestinian residents of 
Lebanon, and 1 Egyptian citizen from Syrian prisons to Lebanese 
custody. The Government announced that it will review each case; 
persons who have completed their sentences will be released, and 
persons with outstanding prison time will continue to serve out their 
sentences. Human rights activists believe that there are remaining 
Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons; however, the exact number is 
unknown. Amnesty International reported in 1999 that ``hundreds of 
Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested, 
some over 2 decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret 
detention in Syria.'' According to AI, Syrian forces operating in 
Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of Lebanese 
nationals outside any legal framework.
    In August Syria released Shaykh Hashem Minqara, a radical Sunni 
member of the Islamic Unification Movement (``Tawheed''), who was 
arrested by Syrian forces in 1985 and transferred to Syria.
    Abuses occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including 
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that 
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their 
Palestinian rivals.
    Local militias, including Hizballah, continued to conduct arbitrary 
arrests in areas outside central government control. There were 
credible reports that Hizballah detained scores of former SLA 
militiamen before handing them over to government authorities for 
trial.
    Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, the SLA operated its own detention 
facility, Al-Khiam prison. There were frequent reports of torture and 
mistreatment of detainees. Following the disbandment of the SLA in May, 
all of the prison's 140 inmates were released. A number of former 
inmates publicly recounted incidents of abuse by prison officials (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In April the Israeli Government released 13 Lebanese detainees who 
were held without charge in Israel for as long as 14 years; the former 
detainees returned to Lebanon under the auspices of the ICRC. Israel 
continues to hold 21 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed Al-Karim 
Obaid and Mustafa Dirani.
    Exile as a form of punishment is not practiced regularly; however, 
in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel 
'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart the country 
and remain in exile for 5 years; 'Awn remained in France at year's end. 
'Awn was accused of usurping power. Former President Amine Gemayel, who 
lived in France in exile for the past 12 years, returned to the country 
in July.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent in 
principle; however, it is subject to political pressure. The 
Constitution provides for a constitutional council to supervise the 
constitutionality of laws and stipulates that judges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential 
politicians as well as Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers 
sometimes intervene to protect their supporters from prosecution.
    The judicial system is composed of the regular civilian courts; the 
Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and 
military-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national 
security cases; and the tribunals of the various religious 
affiliations, which adjudicate matters of personal status, including 
marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.
    The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges 
that adjudicates threats to national security. On the recommendation of 
the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case 
before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and 
may not be appealed.
    The Ministry of Justice appoints all other judges according to a 
formula based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A 
shortage of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged 
during years of internal conflicts. Trial delays are aggravated by the 
Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside of 
its control. Defendants have the right to examine evidence against 
them. The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.
    In April the military court sentenced eight students to between 10 
days and 6 weeks in prison following their participation in 
demonstrations against the presence of Syrian troops in the country 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). All of the students had been 
released by year's end.
    In June the Military Court began trying the cases of the 3,033 SLA 
militiamen who surrendered to the Government following the Israeli 
withdrawal from the south. Some of the former SLA militiamen were 
charged under Article 273 of the Penal Code for taking up arms against 
the State, an offense punishable by death; others were charged under 
Article 285 of the Penal Code for trading with the enemy, an offense 
punishable by a minimum of 1 year in prison. Domestic human rights 
groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported 
that the trials were open to journalists and members of the public, but 
were not fair. Amnesty International reported that ``such summary 
trials,'' with barely 7 minutes spent on each individual neither allow 
the innocent to be acquitted nor ensure the discovery of those who may 
be guilty of war crimes. According to AI, the court tried between 23 
and 43 persons each day. SLA lawyers who requested an adjournment to 
study the files of detainees were granted additional time. However, in 
most cases, defense lawyers received the file shortly before trial and 
consequently were unable to argue the cases individually. The standard 
defense presented by lawyers for the militiamen was that the Government 
had been unable to defend citizens living under Israeli occupation for 
the last 22 years. Therefore the residents had no choice but to work 
with the occupiers.
    By year's end, 2,035 former SLA members received sentences ranging 
from 1 week to life imprisonment. About one-third of the former SLA 
members received 1-year prison sentences and about one-third received 
sentences of 3 to 4 weeks under Article 273 of the Penal Code, which 
criminalizes taking up arms against the State. Two persons who were 
implicated in the abuse and torture of prisoners at Al-Khiam prison 
were sentenced to life in prison. The Military Prosecutor recommended 
the death sentence for 37 former SLA militiamen for allegedly killing 
members of ``the resistance'' (i.e., Hizballah). Twenty-one of these 
militiamen were tried while in government custody; however, 16 were 
tried in absentia. The Military Court denied every recommendation for 
the death sentence and handed down lighter sentences in each case. 
Following attacks by angry crowds on two former SLA members in their 
villages, the court amended the sentences of some persons, barring them 
from returning to their villages for several years. According to the 
Government, these bans were issued to protect the former SLA members 
and were difficult to enforce. There were no additional reports that 
former SLA members who returned to their villages were subjected to 
harassment. The Government released most of the 220 SLA militiamen who 
were tried following the June 1999 SLA withdrawal from Jezzine in the 
south; however, 9 remained in prison at year's end.
    Hizballah applies Islamic laws in areas under its control. 
Palestinian groups in refugee camps operate an autonomous and arbitrary 
system of justice. The SLA also maintained a separate and arbitrary 
system of justice before its May disbandment.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--While the authorities generally show little interest 
in controlling the personal lives of citizens, they readily interfere 
with the privacy of persons regarded as foes of the Government. Laws 
require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering houses except 
when the army is in hot pursuit of armed attackers; however, in 
practice the law is not respected.
    The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer 
networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their 
adversaries. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and 
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 2.b.). The 
Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security 
services, but claims that monitoring occurs only with prior 
authorization from competent judicial authorities. During September 
1999 parliamentary hearings, the Speaker of Parliament, the Minister of 
Interior, and the Surete Generale Director General publicly 
acknowledged that government officials frequently monitor citizens' 
private telephone conversations.
    Politicians and human rights advocates report increasing and more 
overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political 
meetings and political activities across the religious and political 
spectrum. In October 1999, the Parliament passed a law that authorized 
surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases, but banned 
its use against ministers and parliamentary deputies.
    Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of 
central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy 
rights. Various factions also use informer networks and the monitoring 
of telephones to obtain information on their adversaries.
    In August government officials raided the office of an Internet 
service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was 
distributing pornographic materials through the operation of a web site 
targeted for the homosexual community (see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press; however, the Government partially limits this 
right in practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and 
broadcasters into practicing self-censorship. In 1998 the Government 
rescinded a total ban on satellite news; however, it continues to 
censor television broadcasts on a case-by-case basis.
    The country has a long history of freedom of opinion, speech, and 
the press. Although there were repeated attempts to restrict these 
freedoms during the year, daily criticism of government policies and 
leaders continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals are 
published throughout the country, financed by various local and foreign 
groups. While the press is independent, press content often reflects 
the opinions of these financial backers.
    The Government has several tools at its disposal to control freedom 
of expression. The Surete Generale is authorized to approve all foreign 
magazines and non-periodical works, including plays, books, and films, 
before they are distributed in the market. The law prohibits attacks on 
the dignity of the Head of State or foreign leaders. The Government may 
prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications 
Court, a special tribunal empowered to try such matters.
    Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria 
contains a provision that effectively prohibits the publication of any 
information deemed harmful to the security of either state. In view of 
the risk of prosecution, journalists censor themselves on matters 
related to Syria.
    During the year, the Government did not bring charges against any 
newspaper. In 1999 President Lahoud announced that under his tenure no 
charges would be brought against any journalist because of his writings 
or opinions. However, in June the Surete Generale banned seven foreign 
publications for allegedly insulting the late Syrian President Hafez 
Al-Asad. The Surete Generale seized at the airport four newspapers and 
three magazines--The Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Liberation, the 
Financial Times, the Economist, Time, and Newsweek. The Surete stated 
that ``there were malicious attacks in some publications which were not 
about political thinking but only sought to defame Al-Asad and hurt the 
feelings of those upset by his death.'' In September the Government 
banned an edition of The Economist because it contained an article 
about Syria and the Middle East peace process, which was deemed 
insulting to the Syrian Government. In December the State Prosecutor's 
office questioned a journalist and two directors of An-Nahar newspaper 
about an article that was critical of both the Lebanese and Syrian 
security services. Following the interrogation, the State Prosecutor 
released all three persons.
    In April ISF personnel injured a journalist who was covering a 
protest (see Section 1.c.). On April 13, authorities detained persons 
for distributing antigovernment and anti-Syria leaflets. The Military 
Court subsequently sentenced eight students to varying lengths of time 
in prison. All of the students had been released by year's end (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    In May Dr. Muhammad Mugraby criticized the country's judicial 
system at a press conference. The State Prosecutor's office requested 
that the Bar Association lift Dr. Mugraby's immunity in order to 
prosecute him for defaming the judiciary, and the Bar Association 
complied with this request. However, Mugraby challenged the decision of 
the Bar Association; the case was pending at year's end.
    In June the Government cancelled the passport of a correspondent 
for Al-Hayat newspaper, allegedly because she ``fraternized with the 
enemy'' when she appeared publicly with an Israeli official. The 
Government reissued the journalist's passport shortly after the 
incident.
    In June the Military Court sentenced a man to 1 year imprisonment 
for calling on the public to celebrate the death of the late Syrian 
president Al-Asad.
    In August government officials raided the office of an Internet 
service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was 
distributing pornographic materials through operation of a website 
aimed at the homosexual community. The Government also pressed charges 
against the owner of the ISP and a human rights activist on national 
security grounds (see Section 1.f.).
    A court hearing remains pending in the case of An-Nahar journalist 
Pierre Attallah, who was charged in absentia in June 1998 for defaming 
the judiciary and entering Israel.
    The country has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a 
flourishing private educational system (a result of inadequate public 
schools and a preference for religious community affiliation). Students 
exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government 
usually does not interfere with student groups.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right. In 1998 the Government lifted its longstanding decree 
banning all demonstrations. Any group that wishes to organize a rally 
must obtain the prior approval of the Ministry of Interior, which does 
not render decisions consistently. Groups opposing government positions 
sometimes do not receive permits. Various political factions such as 
Amal, Hizballah, 'Awnists, and supporters of former Prime Minister 
Hariri held several rallies during the year; the 'Awnists demonstrated 
without a permit.
    In June police forces prevented some 200 supporters of exiled 
General Michel 'Awn from erecting two plaques at Nahr Al-Kalb, north of 
Beirut; one plaque commemorated the Israel withdrawal from Lebanon and 
the second plaque was left blank in anticipation of a withdrawal of 
Syrian troops.
    On several occasions during the year, military personnel used 
excessive force to disperse protesters, sometimes arresting protesters 
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    In October thousands of Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens 
demonstrated peacefully on numerous occasions against Israeli 
government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right and does not interfere with 
the establishment of private organizations; however, it imposes some 
limits on this right. The law requires organizations to obtain from the 
Ministry of Interior a receipt, which is essentially a permit, and may 
be withheld by the Ministry.
    The Ministry of Interior scrutinizes requests to establish 
political movements or parties and to some extent monitors their 
activities. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and 
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
    Syria does not allow groups that it considers openly hostile to 
operate in areas under its control.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, there are some restrictions. Discrimination based on religion 
is built into the system of government. There are no legal barriers to 
proselytizing; however, traditional attitudes and edicts of the 
clerical establishment discourage such activity.
    The State is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious 
rites provided that public order not be disturbed. The Constitution 
also provides that the personal status and religious interests of the 
population be respected. The Government permits recognized religions to 
exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status, such as 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion; 
however, politics are based on the principle of religious 
representation, which has been applied to every conceivable aspect of 
public life.
    A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and 
moral principles for government review to ensure that such principles 
do not contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must 
ensure that the number of its adherents is sufficient to maintain its 
continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain 
recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition 
conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to 
apply the recognized religion's codes to personal status matters.
    The unwritten ``National Pact'' of 1943 stipulates that the 
President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament be a 
Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shi'a Muslim, respectively. 
The Taif Accord, which ended the country's 15-year civil war in 1990, 
reaffirmed this arrangement but resulted in increased Muslim 
representation in Parliament and reduced the power of the Maronite 
President. The Accord called for the ultimate abolition of political 
sectarianism in favor of ``expertise and competence.'' However, little 
substantive progress has been made in this regard. A ``Committee for 
Abolishing Confessionalism,'' which was called for in the Taif Accord, 
has not yet been formed. Christians and Muslims are represented equally 
in the Parliament. Seats in the Parliament and Cabinet, and posts in 
the civil service, are distributed proportionally among the 18 
recognized groups (see Section 3).
    Each recognized religious group has its own courts for family law 
matters, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. 
State recognition is not a legal requirement for religious worship or 
practice. For example, although Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus are not 
recognized officially, they are allowed to practice their faith without 
government interference; however, their marriages, divorces, and 
inheritances in the country are not recognized under the law.
    The Government does not require citizens' religious affiliations to 
be indicated on their passports; however, the Government requires that 
religious affiliation be encoded on national identity cards.
    An individual may change his religion if the head of the religious 
group he wishes to join approves of this change. There are different 
personal status codes for each of the 18 officially recognized 
religious groups. Administered by representatives of the groups, these 
codes govern many areas of civil law, including marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and child custody. Many families have relatives who belong 
to different religious communities, and intermarriage is not uncommon; 
however, intermarriage may be difficult to arrange in practice between 
members of some groups because there are no procedures for civil 
marriage. An attempt in 1998 by then-President Elias Hrawi to forward 
legislation permitting civil marriage failed in the face of opposition 
from the religious leadership of all confessions.
    Article 473 of the Penal Code stipulates that one who ``blasphemes 
God publicly'' faces imprisonment for up to a year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice; 
however, there were some limitations prior to the Israeli withdrawal 
from the south. Travel to Israel is prohibited by law. All males 
between 18 and 21 years of age are subject to compulsory military 
service and are required to register at a recruitment office and obtain 
a travel authorization document before leaving the country. Husbands 
may block travel by their wives and minor children (see Section 5).
    The LAF and Syrian troops maintain checkpoints throughout much of 
the country. Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, the 
Lebanese Army, the IDF, and the SLA maintained tight restrictions on 
the movement of persons and goods in and out of Israel's self-declared 
security zone. Following the Israeli withdrawal, dozens of customs and 
military intelligence officers were dispatched to the south. In August 
the Government deployed approximately 1,000 ISF and LAF officers to the 
south; however the officers were not deployed to the border by year's 
end. The ISF assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in 
most of the region. Following the withdrawal, the Government announced 
that citizens no longer required permits to visit Jezzine. The U.N. 
Interim Forces in Lebanon also increased its area of operations in the 
country.
    There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to 
return. However, many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of 
political, economic, and social reasons. The Government encouraged the 
return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced during the 
civil war. In 1999 and continuing during the year, the Central Fund for 
the Displaced paid 13,500 squatter families approximately $65 million 
(97.5 billion Lebanese pounds) to move out of the homes they occupied 
and disbursed an additional $133 million (195 billion Lebanese pounds) 
for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes that were damaged 
during the civil war. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes 
abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced 
persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property. The 
resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints, 
destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, the lack of schools and 
economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security still is 
incomplete in some parts of the country. During the year, the Ministry 
of Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between 
Christian and Druze residents in eight villages throughout Chouf and 
Aley.
    Some 6,000 SLA militiamen and their families fled to Israel 
following the Israeli withdrawal and concurrent collapse of the SLA in 
May. Approximately 1,580 of these former SLA personnel returned to 
Lebanon, several hundred relocated elsewhere outside of Israel, and 
4,400 remained in Israel at year's end. The former SLA personnel who 
returned to Lebanon faced trial for taking up arms against the State or 
for trading with the enemy and most received prison sentences of 
varying lengths (see Section 1.e.). Those who remain in Israel 
reportedly wish to avoid facing trial or fear possible retribution. The 
Government publicly stated that the former SLA militamen are welcome to 
return to the country; however, they would face trial upon their 
return.
    Most non-Lebanese refugees are Palestinians. The U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) reported in 1999 that the number of Palestinian 
refugees in the country registered with the UNRWA was about 370,000. 
This figure, which includes only the families of refugees who arrived 
in 1948, is presumed to include many thousands who reside outside the 
country. Most experts estimate the actual number now in the country to 
be fewer than 200,000. Most Palestinian refugees are unable to obtain 
citizenship and are subject to governmental and societal 
discrimination; however, Palestinian women who marry Lebanese men can 
obtain citizenship (see Section 5).
    The Government issues laissez-passers (travel documents) to 
Palestinian refugees to enable them to travel and work abroad. In 
January 1999, the Government eased the tight travel restrictions that 
it previously imposed on Palestinians resident in the country and 
entering from other countries by revoking a decision that had required 
all Palestinian refugees who hold Lebanese travel documents to obtain 
entry and exit visas when entering or leaving the country. However, in 
March 1999, the Government stopped issuing visitors' visas to Jordanian 
nationals who were born in Lebanon and are of Palestinian origin.
    There are no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant first 
asylum. The Government grants admission and temporary (6 months) refuge 
to asylum seekers, but not permanent asylum. The Government generally 
cooperates with the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and UNRWA.
    There are nearly 3,600 non-Palestinian refugees (mostly Iraqi Shi'a 
and Kurds) residing in the country, according to the UNHCR. The Surete 
Generale periodically detains non-Palestinian refugees, primarily 
Iraqis and Sudanese, for illegal entry. Some of those detained are 
registered with the UNHCR and are eligible for resettlement outside the 
country. The Surete Generale denies UNHCR officials access to the 
detainees. There were credible reports that the Surete Generale 
detained Iraqi refugees and deported them back to Iraq.
    The Government granted political asylum to Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
member Kozo Okamoto, citing services rendered to the Arab cause and his 
physical incapacity; Okamoto led the massacre at Israel's Lod airport 
in 1972. The Government refused to grant asylum to four other JNA 
members and deported them to Japan.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change 
their government in periodic free and fair elections; however, 
effective lack of control over parts of the country, defects in the 
electoral process, and strong Syrian influence over politics and 
decisionmakers significantly restrict this right. There was some 
improvement in the parliamentary elections held in August and September 
in that there were fewer incidents of voter fraud and tampering with 
ballots than in the previous election; however, the electoral process 
was flawed by serious shortcomings.
    According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be 
held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every 
6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who, 
with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten 
``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite Christian, the 
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim (see 
Section 2.c.). Since the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in 
Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian 
to Muslim seats in Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between 
Christian and Muslim Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also 
increased the number of seats in Parliament and transferred some powers 
from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the 
religiously mixed Cabinet.
    Parliamentary elections in August and September were flawed. The 
Syrian Government heavily influenced the electoral law governing the 
process and also pre-approved all of the candidates on alliance slates 
who ultimately won seats in the Cabinet. Security officials promoted 
relatives and political allies, and government officials supervised 
voting. The Government also used the official television station, 
Teleliban to promote progovernment candidates and to denigrate the 
leading opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 
Officials applied inconsistent voting regulations, often favoring 
progovernment candidates. Officials of various security services became 
personally involved in promoting candidates who were political allies 
or relatives. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Hoss lost his seat in a 
contested election as did many progovernment candidates. Following his 
overwhelming victory in the Beirut electoral districts, former Prime 
Minister Hariri was appointed Prime Minister on October 23. Following 
consultation between the Government and senior Syrian officials, 
President Lahoud and Prime Minister Hariri reached an agreement on the 
composition of the new Cabinet.
    In 1998 the Parliament elected a new President after amending the 
Constitution on a one-time basis to permit senior government officials 
to run for office. (The Constitution prohibits senior government 
officials from running for president unless they resign at least 2 
years before the election. The amendment provided for a one-time 
exception to this provision.) There was substantial criticism of the 
Syrian role in influencing political leaders in the selection of the 
presidential candidate; however, there was broad public support for the 
new President, Emile Lahoud, who took office in November 1998. In 1999 
municipal elections were held in 39 villages and towns. Local observers 
reported that the elections were generally free and fair; however, they 
were characterized by a number of irregularities, including the absence 
of names from voting lists, the closure of the registration department 
on voting day, and the presence of security personnel in polling 
stations. By-elections in the areas formerly occupied by Israel are 
scheduled to be held in 2001.
    Women have the right to vote and there are no legal barriers to 
their participation in politics; however, there are significant 
cultural barriers, and women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. In September 3 
women were elected to the 128-seat Parliament.
    Palestinian refugees have no political rights (see Section 5). An 
estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in the country, generally 
organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in 
refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the 
refugees are not elected, but there are ``popular committees'' that 
meet regularly with the UNRWA and visitors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several local human rights groups operate freely without overt 
government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human 
Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights-Lebanon, and 
the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these 
groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of 
Lebanese citizens and took credit in part for the release of a number 
of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1998 (see Section 1.d.). The Bar 
Association and other private organizations regularly hold public 
events that include discussion of human rights issues. Some human 
rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by government, 
Syrian, Hizballah, and SLA forces.
    In July AI opened an office in the country.
    During the year, government officials discussed human rights 
problems with representatives of foreign governments and NGO's.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties 
and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism;'' 
however, in practice aspects of the law and traditional beliefs 
discriminate against women. Religious discrimination is built into the 
political system. The law gives preferences to the disabled for 
employment in government positions. Discrimination based on race, 
language, or social status is illegal and is not widespread among 
citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often are mistreated.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The press reports 
cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are thought 
to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative 
statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the 
problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In 
general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering for 
fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of 
misbehavior upon themselves. Some religious courts legally can compel a 
battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical abuse. Many 
women are compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of social 
and family pressures. Possible loss of custody of children and the 
absence of an independent source of income also prevent women from 
leaving their husbands. Doctors and social workers believe that most 
abused women do not seek medical help because of shame or inability to 
pay for treatment. The Government has no separate program to provide 
medical assistance to battered women; however, it provides legal 
assistance to victims of crimes who cannot afford it regardless of the 
gender of the victim. In most of the cases, the police ignore 
complaints submitted by battered or abused women. The Lebanese Council 
to Resist Violence Against Women, which was founded in 1997, has been 
active in working to reduce violence against women by offering 
counseling and legal aid, and raising awareness about domestic 
violence.
    Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and in some 
cases, raped. Asian and African female workers have no legal recourse 
available to them because of their low status and isolation from 
society and because the labor laws do not protect them (see Section 
6.e.). Because of such abuse, the Government prohibits foreign women 
from working if they are from countries that do not have diplomatic 
representation in the country.
    The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called 
``honor crimes.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife 
or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he 
demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially 
unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. However, in 
1999 the law was amended to increase the severity of the sentence for 
perpetrators of ``honor crimes.'' Several instances of honor crimes are 
reported in the media every year.
    Women have varying employment opportunities in government, 
medicine, law, academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business. 
However, social pressure against women pursuing careers is strong in 
some parts of society. Men sometimes exercise considerable control over 
female relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or 
their contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but 
often cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and 
because of family pressure. In 1994 the Parliament removed a legal 
stipulation that a woman must obtain her husband's approval to open a 
business or engage in a trade. Husbands may block foreign travel by 
their wives (see Section 2.d.). The testimony of a woman is equal to 
that of a man (see Section 1.e.). During the year, the Government 
amended some labor laws affecting women. For example, maternity leave 
was extended and women no longer are forbidden from working at night.
    Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. 
Accordingly, children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are 
not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on 
their minor children.
    Religious groups administer their own family and personal status 
laws (see Section 2.c.). There are 18 recognized religious groups, each 
of which differs in its treatment of marriage, family, property rights, 
and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For 
example, Sunni inheritance law provides a son twice the inheritance of 
a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do 
so only with the concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that 
permits civil marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside the 
country are recognized by the State. Only religious authorities may 
perform marriages.
    Children.--The plight of children remains a serious concern; 
however, the Government has not allocated funds to protect them. Many 
children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a young age to help 
support their families. In lower income families, boys generally 
receive more education, while girls usually remain at home to perform 
housework. Illiteracy rates have reached 37.5 percent. In 1998 the 
Government enacted a law making education free and compulsory until the 
age of 12. However, public schools generally are inadequate, and the 
cost of private education is a significant problem for the middle and 
lower class. The Government also raised the age of child employment 
from 8 to 13.
    An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused, 
exploited, and even sold to adoption agents. The normal procedure for 
adoption is through religious homes or institutions authorized to 
arrange adoption; however, the demand to provide infants for adoption 
abroad results in illegal international adoptions. There are no 
statistics available concerning the prevalence of the illegal adoption 
of infants. Poor children often are compelled by their parents to seek 
employment, and often take jobs that jeopardize their safety, including 
in industry, car mechanic shops, and carpentry (see Section 6.d.). 
Because of their ages, wages earned by such children are not in 
conformity with labor regulations. The Government does not have 
specific child protection laws to remove children from abusive 
situations and does not grant NGO's adequate legislative standing to 
litigate on behalf of abused minor children.
    There are hundreds of abandoned children in the streets nationwide, 
some of whom survive by begging, others by working at low wages. In 
1999 the first Center for Street Children was opened to house and 
rehabilitate street children. The Center has been active in gathering 
children from various regions and providing a home for them. The Center 
places disabled children in institutions and refers children with 
police records to juvenile courts.
    Juvenile delinquency is on the rise; many delinquents wait in 
ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although 
their number is small, there is no adequate place to hold delinquent 
girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in Ba'abda. 
Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate 
facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. The Government operates a 
modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir, which opened in 1998.
    The Committee for Children's Rights, formed in 1993 by prominent 
politicians and some local NGO's, has been lobbying for legislation to 
improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
oversees the Higher Council for Childhood and the National Committee 
for Literacy. The Higher Council for Childhood prepared legal studies 
and produced progress reports on national compliance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Ministry of Health requires 
the establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of 
age.
    People with Disabilities.--Over 100,000 persons became disabled 
during the civil war. Care of the disabled generally is performed by 
families. Most efforts to secure education, independence, health, and 
shelter for the disabled are made by some 100 private organizations. 
These organizations are relatively active, although poorly funded.
    The heavily damaged cities make few accommodations for the 
disabled. The Government does not mandate building code requirements 
for nongovernment buildings for ease of access by the disabled, 
although the Government in its rebuilding projects has constructed 
sidewalks in some parts of Beirut that allow access for the disabled. 
The private ``Solidere'' project for the reconstruction of downtown 
Beirut has self-imposed requirements for disabled access. This project 
is considered a model for future construction efforts around the 
country.
    During the year, the Parliament passed amendments to the law on 
disabled persons, which stipulates that at least 3 percent of all 
government and private sector positions should be filled by persons 
with disabilities, provided that such persons fulfill the 
qualifications of the position. The amendments provide the private 
sector with tax reduction benefits if the number of disabled that were 
hired exceeded the number specified in the law. The amendments also 
impose new building codes in all government buildings and require that 
public transportation be accessible for disabled persons.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religion is built 
into the system of government (see Sections 2.c. and 3). The amended 
Constitution of 1990 embraces the principle of abolishing religious 
affiliation as a criterion for filling government positions, but few 
practical steps have been taken to accomplish this aim. One notable 
exception is the Lebanese Armed Forces, which, through universal 
conscription and an emphasis on professionalism, has reduced 
significantly the role of religious sectarianism in that organization. 
Each religious group has its own courts for family law matters, such as 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
    On October 3, 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a 
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb. There were no arrests made 
in this case during the year.
    Throughout the fall of 1999, approximately six random bombings were 
carried out against Orthodox churches and shops that sold liquor; the 
bombings took place in the northern city of Tripoli and in surrounding 
areas. The Government suspected that radical Sunni extremists carried 
out the bombings in retaliation for Russian military operations in 
Chechnya. Police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number of 
Sunni youths for suspected involvement in these bombings; however, the 
youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Section 
1.d.).
    In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an 
ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted 
to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church 
bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a 
massive military operation against Sunni extremists in the north. Five 
civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 extremists were killed in this 
operation (see Section 1.a.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the United 
Nations, an estimated 370,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in 
the country (see Section 2.d.); however, it is believed that fewer 
actually reside there. Most Palestinian refugees live in overpopulated 
camps that have suffered repeated heavy damage as a result of fighting. 
The Government generally has prohibited the construction of permanent 
structures in the camps on the grounds that such construction 
encourages the notion of permanent refugee settlement in the country. 
Refugees fear that in the future the Government may reduce the size of 
the camps or eliminate them completely.
    The Government officially ended its practice of denying work 
permits to Palestinians in 1991. However, in practice, very few 
Palestinians receive work permits, and those who find work usually are 
directed into unskilled occupations. They and other foreigners may own 
a limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of 
five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but 
for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner 
disadvantageous to Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, to the 25,000 
Kurds in the country. The Government does not provide health services 
to Palestinian refugees, who rely on UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted 
hospitals.
    In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined as the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) closed many of its offices in the 
country, which formerly employed as much as 50 percent of the 
Palestinian work force. Palestinian children reportedly have been 
forced to leave school at an early age because U.N. relief workers do 
not have sufficient funds for education programs. The U.N. estimates 
that 18 percent of street children are Palestinian. Drug addiction and 
crime reportedly are increasing in the camps, as is prostitution, 
although reliable statistics are not available. In August 1999, the 
Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its operations in the Ain al-Hilwah 
refugee camp by opening security offices and hiring personnel to 
maintain order in the camps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except government 
employees, may establish and join unions and have a legal right to 
strike. Worker representatives must be chosen from those employed 
within the bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons form the active labor 
force, 42 percent of whom are members of 160 labor unions and 
associations. Twenty- two of the unions, with about 200,000 workers, 
are represented in the General Confederation of Labor (GCL).
    In general the Government does not control or restrict unions, 
although union leaders allege credibly that in the past, the Government 
has tried to interfere in elections for union officials.
    Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions; however, 
because of restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians 
participate actively in trade unions.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international federations and 
confederations, and they maintain a variety of such affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of 
workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and 
practice. Most worker groups engage in some form of collective 
bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtain 
significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted 
nonunionized workers. There is no government mechanism to promote 
voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers have no protection 
against antiunion discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is not 
prohibited by law. In the absence of a prohibition against it, children 
(see Section 5), foreign domestic servants, and other foreign workers 
(see Section 6.e.) sometimes are forced to remain in situations 
amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1946 Labor Code stipulates that workers between the 
ages of 8 and 16 may not work more than 7 hours a day, with 1 hour of 
rest provided after 4 hours. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor amended this 
law to define workers under the age of 13 as child labor, in accordance 
with international obligations. Children are prohibited from working 
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. The code also prohibits certain 
types of mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and 13, and 
other types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. In 1999 the 
Government passed legislation that prohibits children under the age of 
16 from working in jobs that jeopardize their health, safety, or morals 
and requires that employers give children at least 20 hours of annual 
leave. In June the Parliament passed amendments to the Labor Code that 
prohibit children under age 18 from working more than 6-hour days, with 
1 hour of rest for days of more than 4 hours of work, and from working 
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The proposed amendments would 
also entitle children to 20 hours of annual paid leave. The Ministry of 
Labor is responsible for enforcing these requirements; however, it does 
not apply the law rigorously. Forced and bonded child labor is not 
prohibited and sometimes occurs (see Section 6.c.).
    Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 0.6 percent of 
the labor force (5,936 children in total), according to 1996 figures. 
Most of these child laborers are Lebanese, but some are Syrian; they 
work predominantly in the industrial, craft, and metallurgical sectors. 
According to a 1995 UNICEF study, 60 percent of working children are 
below 13 years of age and 75 percent earn wages below two-thirds of the 
minimum wage. Nearly 40 percent of working children work 10 to 14 hours 
per day, and few receive social welfare benefits. In addition, 
approximately 52,000 children between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the 
active labor force; they are not eligible for the minimum wage until 
they reach the age of 21.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a legal 
minimum wage, currently about $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds) per month. 
The law is not enforced effectively in the private sector. In theory 
the courts could be called upon to enforce it, but in practice they are 
not. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Trade unions attempt to ensure the 
payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the large-scale 
private sector.
    The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours, 
with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the 
industrial sector work an average of 35 hours a week and workers in 
other sectors work an average of 30 hours a week. Foreign domestic 
servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often are mistreated, 
abused, and raped. The employment contract for a foreign worker is 
signed by a recruitment agency and the employer; workers rarely are a 
party to the contract or, if they are a party, do not know what the 
contract stipulates because it is written in Arabic. The passports of 
foreign domestic workers are confiscated by the recruitment agency or 
their employer when the workers arrive at the airport. Foreign domestic 
servants are not protected by labor laws. Domestic servants often work 
18 hours per day and, in most cases, do not receive time off for 
vacations or holidays. There is no minimum wage for domestic servants; 
their average wage is about $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per month. 
They have no entitlement to government financial assistance. Many 
foreign workers leave their jobs--which is not against the law--but 
their employers often report them as thieves to the police in order to 
locate them and force them to return.
    The law includes specific occupational health and safety 
regulations. Labor regulations require employers to take adequate 
precautions for employee safety. The Ministry of Labor is responsible 
for enforcing these regulations, and it does so unevenly. Labor 
organizers report that workers do not have the right to remove 
themselves from hazardous conditions without jeopardizing their 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any 
person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other 
means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' If forced 
prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result 
of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be 
sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. There were no reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 LIBYA

    The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship 
that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother 
Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a 
military coup to overthrow King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and 
pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects 
democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third 
way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing 
principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In 
theory Libya is ruled by the citizenry through a series of popular 
congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and 
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of 
1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle control political 
power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the 
Revolutionary Committees and the Comrades Organization--that exercise 
control over most aspects of citizens' lives. The judiciary is not 
independent of the Government.
    Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of 
several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal bodyguards, 
local Revolutionary Committees, and People's Committees, as well as the 
``Purification'' Committees, which were formed in 1996. The result is a 
multilayered, pervasive surveillance system that monitors and controls 
the activities of individuals. The various security forces committed 
numerous serious human rights abuses.
    The Government dominates the economy through complete control of 
the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export 
earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product. 
Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much 
of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and 
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire 
conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and 
encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be 
constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering 
prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The Government's 
mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation, 
increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has 
resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of 
citizens in recent years. Significant increases in the world price of 
oil boosted petroleum revenues this year, masking the negative domestic 
impact of the country's economic policy.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it 
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the 
right to change their government. Qadhafi has used extrajudicial 
killing and intimidation to control the opposition abroad and summary 
judicial proceedings to suppress it at home. Security forces torture 
prisoners during interrogations and as punishment. Prison conditions 
are poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and 
many prisoners are held incommunicado. Many political detainees are 
held for years without charge. The Government controls the judiciary, 
and citizens do not have the right to a fair public trial or to be 
represented by legal counsel. The Government infringes on citizens' 
privacy rights, and citizens do not have the right to be secure in 
their homes or persons, or to own private property. The Government 
restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and 
religion. The Government imposes some limits on freedom of movement. In 
September the Government reportedly expelled hundreds of sub-Saharan 
workers following incidents of mob violence against the workers; the 
authorities also were accused of responding slowly to the violence. The 
Government prohibits the establishment of independent human rights 
organizations. Violence against women is a problem. Traditional 
attitudes and practices continue to discriminate against women, and 
female genital mutilation (FGM) still is practiced in remote areas of 
the country. The Government discriminates against and represses certain 
minorities and tribal groups. The Government continues to repress 
banned Islamic groups and exercises tight control over ethnic and 
tribal minorities, such as Amazighs (Berbers), Tuaregs, and Warfalla 
tribe members. The Government restricts basic worker rights, uses 
forced labor, and discriminates against foreign workers. There have 
been reports of slavery and trafficking in persons.
    Colonel Qadhafi publicly called for violence against opponents of 
his regime after violent clashes between Islamic activists and security 
forces in Benghazi in September 1995. Outbreaks of violence between 
government forces and Muslim militants continued in the eastern part of 
the country. The Government encouraged reconciliation with opposition 
groups during the year and invited dissidents living abroad to return, 
promising that they would be safe. An opposition figure was appointed 
Ambassador to the Arab League, but few other opposition figures 
returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and the 
likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear.
    In April 1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of 
the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before a Scottish court 
seated in the Netherlands. As a result, U.N. sanctions against Libya 
were suspended. The full lifting of the U.N. sanctions will require 
that Libya cooperate with the investigation, accept responsibility for 
the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, and 
renounce terrorism.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Violent clashes 
between the security forces and militant Islamist opposition groups 
increased following a lull toward the end of 1999. In the past, the 
clashes were concentrated predominantly in the eastern region and 
resulted in an undetermined number of deaths. Since a 1996 prison 
mutiny in Benghazi and other attacks against the regime, the Government 
has maintained tightened security measures. In the years following the 
mutiny, the Government made hundreds of arrests, conducted military 
operations in the areas of insurrection, and killed a number of 
persons.
    The Government uses summary judicial proceedings to suppress 
domestic dissent and has used extrajudicial killings and intimidation 
to control the opposition abroad. Prior to 1994, there were reports 
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living 
abroad (see Sections 1.b. and 2.d.).
    The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya following 
the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed 
259 persons on board and 11 persons on the ground, and the bombing of 
UTA flight 772 over Chad in 1989, which killed 171 persons. In April 
1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the Pan Am 
bombing, which prompted the suspension of U.N. sanctions against Libya. 
The suspects are being tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court 
seated in the Netherlands. Following the conclusion of the UTA trial 
and the appearance in the Netherlands of the two Libyan suspects in the 
Pan Am 103 bombing, the full lifting of the now-U.S. and British 
investigations; accept responsibility for the actions of its officials; 
pay appropriate compensation; and renounce terrorism.
    In March 1999, a French court convicted in absentia the six 
defendants in the UTA bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. In 
July the Government paid the French Government $31 million (17 million 
dinars) to compensate the victims' families. Family members of the UTA 
772 victims now are seeking indictments of more senior officials, 
including Qadhafi.
    In late November 1999, the Government paid compensation to the 
British Government for the 1984 killing of British policewoman Yvonne 
Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London.
    In September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat 
hundreds of sub-Saharan expatriate workers, attacking and, in some 
cases, burning their places of residence and employment. Credible 
reports indicate that as many as 50 individuals were killed and 
hundreds of others injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population 
for increased crime and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security 
forces were criticized by many African governments for their slow 
reaction to these events (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
    Prison conditions reportedly are poor and caused an unknown number 
of deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--The regime in the past has abducted and killed 
dissidents in the country and abroad. Dissident Mansour Kikhiya 
disappeared from Cairo, Egypt in 1993. There is credible information 
that, following his abduction, Kikhiya was executed in Libya in early 
1994. There have been no reports of such abductions or killings since 
1994.
    Prisoners routinely are held in incommunicado detention (see 
Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law provides for fines against any official using 
excessive force; however, there are no known cases of prosecution for 
torture or abuse. Security personnel reportedly routinely torture 
prisoners during interrogations or for punishment. Government agents 
reportedly periodically detain and torture foreign workers, 
particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture are 
difficult to corroborate because many prisoners are held incommunicado. 
In April 1999, the U.N. Committee against Torture reported that it 
continued to receive allegations of torture and recommended that the 
authorities send a clear message to all its law enforcement personnel 
that torture is not permitted under any circumstances.
    Methods of torture reportedly include: Chaining to a wall for 
hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the 
back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing 
the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags, 
depriving of food and water, hanging by the wrists, suspending from a 
pole inserted between the knees and elbows, burning with cigarettes, 
attacking with dogs, and beating on the soles of the feet. In May three 
defendants, (two Bulgarians and one Palestinian) all health 
professionals in a much publicized case involving the HIV infection of 
nearly 400 Libyan children, claimed that their confessions had been 
obtained under duress (see Section 1.e.).
    Prison conditions reportedly are poor. According to Amnesty 
International (AI), political detainees reportedly were held in cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading conditions, and denied adequate medical care, 
which led to several deaths in custody. AI reported that Mohammad 'Ali 
al-Bakoush, detained since 1989 without charge or trial, died in Abu 
Salim prison in August 1999, reportedly as a result of poor conditions 
of detention. Inmates protesting poor conditions mutinied in July 1996 
at the Abu Salim prison. The prisoners went on a hunger strike and 
captured guards to protest the lack of medical care, overcrowding, and 
inadequate hygiene and diet provided at the facility. Security units 
were dispatched to suppress the uprising; as many as 100 persons were 
killed by security forces.
    The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces 
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. By law the Government may hold 
detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. It holds many political 
detainees incommunicado in unofficial detention centers controlled by 
members of the Revolutionary Committees. Hundreds of political 
detainees, many associated with banned Islamic groups, reportedly are 
held in prisons throughout the country (but mainly in the Abu Salim 
prison in Tripoli); many are held for years without charge. Hundreds of 
other detainees may have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4 
months) to permit confirmation by outside observers (see Section 1.c.).
    In 1998 security forces arrested suspected members and sympathizers 
of banned Islamic groups and monitored activities at mosques following 
violent clashes in eastern Libya. In June 1998, at least 100 
professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested 
on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support 
of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic 
movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some 
practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from 
security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan 
``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought 
with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats 
to the regime (see Section 2.c.).
    The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption, 
black marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. It has been enforced 
by the ``Purification'' Committees since June 1996 (see Section 1.f.). 
Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested 
arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and 
funding Islamic fundamentalist groups, and dozens of shops and firms 
have been closed. As part of the campaign to implement the Purge Law, 
the wealth of the middle class and affluent has been targeted as well.
    In March 1997, the Libyan General People's Congress approved a law 
that provides for the punishment of accomplices to crimes of 
``obstructing the people's power, instigating and practicing tribal 
fanaticism, possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and 
damaging public and private institutions and property.'' The new law 
provides that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns, 
villages, local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their 
entirety if they are accused by the General People's Congress of 
sympathizing, financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or 
refraining from identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment 
under the Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to 
utilities (water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies, 
official documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the 
termination of new economic projects and state subsidies.
    In May 1997, Qadhafi declared that if any member of a family was 
found guilty of an offense, the individual's entire family was to be 
considered guilty.
    The Government does not impose exile as a form of punishment, and 
it continued to encourage Libyan dissidents abroad to return, promising 
to ensure their safety; however, with the exception of the recently 
appointed Ambassador to the Arab League, formerly an opponent of the 
regime, few returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and 
the likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear. Prior to 1994, there 
were reports that security forces hunted down and killed dissidents 
living abroad (see Section 1.a.). Students studying abroad have been 
interrogated upon their return (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent 
of the Government.
    There are four levels of courts: Summary courts, which try petty 
offenses; the courts of first instance, which try more serious crimes; 
the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which is the final 
appellate level.
    Special revolutionary courts were established in 1980 to try 
political offenses. Such trials often are held in secret or even in the 
absence of the accused. In other cases, the security forces have the 
power to pass sentences without trial, especially in cases involving 
political opposition. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in 1996 a lack 
of fairness in trials of capital cases. In the past, Qadhafi has 
incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action against suspected 
opponents. In May the attorney defending 16 health professionals who 
were charged with infecting 400 Libyan children with HIV (see Section 
1.c.) complained that he had been allowed to meet with his clients only 
twice since their incarceration. The defendants (nine Libyans, one 
Palestinian and six Bulgarians) were arrested in January 1999.
    A large number of offenses, including political offenses and 
``economic crimes,'' are punishable by death. A 1972 law mandates the 
death penalty for any person associated with a group opposed to the 
principles of the revolution, as well as for other acts
    such as treason, attempting to change the form of government by 
violence, and premeditated murder. The ``Green Book'' of 1988 states 
that ``the goal of the Libyan society is to abolish capital 
punishment''; however, the Government has not acted to abolish the 
death penalty, and its scope has increased. In 1996 a law went into 
effect that applies the death penalty to those who speculate in foreign 
currency, food, clothing, or housing during a state of war or a 
blockade, and for crimes related to drugs and alcohol.
    In 1997 two civilians and six army officers were executed: The 
civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad. At least 
five others were given prison sentences, all convicted on charges of 
being American spies, committing treason, cooperating with opposition 
organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social 
goals. The eight executed men were arrested with dozens of others in 
connection with a coup attempt by army units composed of Warfalla tribe 
members in October 1993. The men were convicted by the Supreme Military 
Court and reportedly did not have lawyers for their trial. The 
convicted persons allegedly were kept in secret locations and tortured 
throughout their incarceration to obtain confessions of criminal 
activity.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions noted in 1996 ``the apparent lack of respect for fair trial 
standards in trials leading to the imposition of capital punishment in 
Libya.''
    The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members 
of the Secretariat of Justice.
    The Government holds a large number of political prisoners. Amnesty 
International estimates that there are hundreds of persons imprisoned 
for political reasons.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy. 
Security agencies often disregard the legal requirement to obtain 
warrants before entering a private home. They also routinely monitor 
telephone calls.
    The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversee an 
extensive network of informants; one credible foreign observer 
estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the population was engaged in 
surveillance for the regime. Libyan exiles have reported that family 
ties to suspected regime opponents may result in government harassment 
and detention. The Government may seize and destroy property belonging 
to ``enemies of the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with foreign 
powers. In the past, citizens have reported that the Government warned 
members of the extended family of any regime opponent that they, too, 
risk the death penalty.
    The law passed by the General People's Congress in March 1997 
formally codified the Government's previous threats of punishment for 
families or communities that aid, abet, or do not inform the regime of 
criminals and oppositionists in their midst (see Section 1.d.).
    The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets 
above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such 
undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.'' 
In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge'' 
or ``Purification'' Committees composed of young military officers and 
students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some 
``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and 
affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to 
be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to 
strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The 
activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The authorities tolerate some 
difference of opinion in People's Committee meetings and at the General 
People's Congress; however, in general they severely limit freedom of 
speech. This is especially true with regard to criticism of Qadhafi or 
his regime. The occasional criticism of political leaders and policies 
in the state-controlled media, which does occur is interpreted as a 
government attempt to test public opinion or weaken a government figure 
who may be a potential challenger to Qadhafi.
    The regime restricts freedom of speech in several ways: By 
prohibiting all political activities not officially approved, by 
enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be 
interpreted as illegal, and by operating a pervasive system of 
informants (see Section 1.f.) that creates an atmosphere of mistrust at 
all levels of society.
    The State owns and controls the media. There is a state-run daily 
newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local Revolutionary 
Committees publish several smaller newspapers. The official news 
agency, JANA, is the designated conduit for official views. The regime 
does not permit the publication of opinions contrary to government 
policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time, the International 
Herald Tribune, L'Express, and Jeune Afrique are available, but 
authorities routinely censor them and may prohibit their entry into the 
market.
    Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely 
available in Libya. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both are 
accessed easily in Tripoli.
    The Government restricts academic freedom. Professors and teachers 
who discuss politically sensitive topics face a risk of government 
reprisal.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Public assembly 
is permitted only with regime approval and in support of the regime's 
positions.
    Despite these restrictions, members of the Warfalla tribe staged 
several informal protests in 1995 against the regime's decision to 
carry out the death penalty against tribe members involved in the 1993 
coup attempt. The Government responded by arresting hundreds of tribe 
members and expelling others from the military and security forces. In 
January 1997, eight Warfalla tribe members arrested for involvement in 
the 1993 coup attempt were executed, and at least five others were 
given prison sentences for allegedly being American spies (see Section 
1.a.).
    The last display of public discontent and resentment towards the 
Government occurred when a riot broke out over a penalty called at a 
soccer match in Tripoli in 1996. The rare instance of public unrest 
began when a contentious goal was scored by the team that Qadhafi's 
sons supported, and the referee called the play in their favor. The 
spectators reportedly started chanting anti-Qadhafi slogans after the 
referee made the call, and Qadhafi's sons and their bodyguards opened 
fire in the air, then on the crowd. The spectators panicked and 
stampeded out of the stadium and into the streets, where they stoned 
cars and chanted more anti-Qadhafi slogans. The Government officially 
admitted that 8 persons died and 39 were injured as a result of the 
soccer riots, but there were reports of up to 50 deaths caused by the 
gunfire and the stampede of the crowd. There is speculation that this 
year's mob violence against sub-Saharan guest workers (see Sections 
1.a. and 5) reflects dissatisfaction with the Government's efforts to 
enhance ties to Africa, particularly the decisions to relax immigration 
controls on sub-Saharan workers and to funnel greater economic 
assistance to African nations.
    The Government limits the right of association; it grants such a 
right only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According to a 
1972 law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous 
is punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is 
``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of 
religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. In an apparent 
effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned 
the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic sect. In its place, Qadhafi 
established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the outlet for 
state-approved religion, as well as a tool for exporting the revolution 
abroad. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other religions, 
including Christian churches in the country. In 1992 the Government 
announced that the ICS would be disbanded; however, its director still 
conducts activities, suggesting that the organization remains 
operational. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at variance 
with the state-approved teaching of Islam are banned. Although most 
Islamic institutions are under state control, some mosques are endowed 
by prominent families; however, they generally follow the government-
approved interpretation of Islam.
    According to recent reports, individuals rarely are harassed 
because of their religious practices, unless such practices are 
perceived as having a political motivation. In June 1998, at least 100 
professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested 
on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support 
of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic 
movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some 
practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from 
security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan 
``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought 
with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats 
to the regime see Section 1.d.). Members of some minority religions are 
allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate openly and are 
tolerated by the authorities. The authorities reportedly have failed to 
honor a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican Church with 
alternative facilities when they took the property used by the Church. 
Since 1988 Anglicans have shared a villa with other Protestant 
denominations. Christians are restricted by the lack of churches; there 
is a government limit of one church per denomination per city. There 
are two resident Catholic bishops, and a small number of priests. In 
March 1997, the Vatican established diplomatic relations with Libya, 
stating that Libya had taken steps to protect freedom of religion. The 
Vatican hoped to be able to address more adequately the needs of the 
estimated 50,000 Catholics in the country.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict 
the internal movement of citizens but has imposed blockades on those 
cities and regions (primarily in the east) where antigovernment attacks 
or movements originate. In 1996 after the escape of some 400 
prisoners--during which residents purportedly harbored escapees--the 
town of Dirnah was sealed off by government troops and also had its 
water and electricity cut off.
    The Government requires citizens to obtain exit permits for travel 
abroad and limits their access to hard currency. A woman must have her 
husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 5). Authorities 
routinely seize the passports of foreigners married to citizens upon 
their entry into the country.
    The right of return exists. The regime has called on students, many 
of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad, to 
return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad have 
been interrogated upon their return. Prior to 1994, there were reports 
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living 
abroad (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government has expelled noncitizens arbitrarily (see Section 
6.e.). There were reports that in September the Government expelled 
hundreds of sub-Saharan workers following incidents of mob violence 
(see Section 1.a. and 5). Government authorities placed noncitizen, 
primarily sub-Saharan guest workers in hastily built camps pending 
their repatriation to their countries of origin. While there were no 
reports of mistreatment associated with these camps, sanitary 
conditions and access to health care reportedly were poor.
    In April 1998, the Government accused at least 10 Tunisians of 
suspected membership in, or support for, the Islamist group An-Nadha, 
which is banned in Tunisia for activities in opposition to the Tunisian 
Government, and forcibly returned them to Tunisia, where they 
reportedly were subjected to abuse. In 1995 the Government expelled 
approximately 1,000 Palestinian residents to indicate its displeasure 
with the signing of the Interim Agreement between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinians resorted to living 
in makeshift camps along the Egyptian border. The Government 
subsequently allowed them to return, but over 200 Palestinians elected 
to remain in the border camps, hoping to travel to the West Bank and 
Gaza or resettle in Egypt. The governments of Egypt and Israel refused 
to accept them, leaving them stranded in the deteriorating and squalid 
conditions of the once temporary border encampments. They were removed 
forcibly from their encampments to another location within the country 
by police and military authorities in April 1997.
    The Government expelled 132 Algerians in November 1997 (see Section 
6.e.).
    While the country has acceded to the 1969 Organization of African 
Unity Convention on refugees, the law does not include provisions for 
granting asylum, first asylum, or refugee status in accordance with the 
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and the Government does not grant such 
status. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 
by December, there were approximately 33,000 refugees in the country, 
including some 30,000 Palestinians, 3,000 Somalis, and 100 of other 
nationalities. During the year, UNHCR assisted approximately 1,000 of 
the most vulnerable refugees in the country and supported income-
generating programs for refugee women. The Government provided housing 
for approximately 850 Somali refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Major 
government decisions are controlled by Qadhafi, his close associates, 
and committees acting in his name. Political parties are banned. 
Qadhafi appoints military officers and official functionaries down to 
junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partially based on tribal 
origin, are major problems that adversely affect government efficiency.
    In theory popular political participation is provided by the 
grassroots People's Committees, which are open to both men and women, 
and which send representatives annually to the national General 
People's Congress (GPC). In practice the GPC is a rubber stamp that 
approves all recommendations made by Qadhafi.
    Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These 
bodies consist primarily of youths who guard against political dissent. 
Some Committees have engaged in show trials of regime opponents; in 
other cases, they have been implicated in the killing of opponents 
abroad. The Committees approve all candidates in elections for the GPC.
    There is no reliable information on the representation of women and 
minorities in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human 
rights organizations. Instead it created the Libyan Arab Human Rights 
Committee in 1989. The Committee is not known to have published any 
reports.
    The regime has not responded substantively to appeals from Amnesty 
International on behalf of detainees. In 1994 the regime characterized 
Amnesty International as a tool of Western interests and dismissed its 
work as neocolonialist; its representatives last visited Libya in 1988.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors; 
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions, 
particularly discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
    Women.--Although there is little detailed information on the extent 
of violence against women, it remains a problem. In general the 
intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit 
the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the family rarely is 
discussed publicly, due to the value attached to privacy in society.
    The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality. 
Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices 
prevail, and discrimination against women persists and keeps them from 
attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. A woman 
must have her husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
    Although their status is still not equal to that of men, most 
observers agree that, with the advent of oil wealth in the 1970's, the 
opportunity for women to make notable social progress has increased. 
Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education programs, and 
even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary government all have 
contributed to the creation of new employment opportunities for women. 
In recent years, a growing sense of individualism in some segments of 
society, especially among the educated young, has been noted. For 
example, many educated young couples prefer to set up their own 
households, rather than move in with their parents, and view polygyny 
with scorn. Since the 1970's, educational differences between men and 
women have narrowed.
    In general the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon: 
Urban women under the age of 35 tend to have more ``modern'' attitudes 
toward life and have discarded the traditional veil; at the same time, 
older urban women tend to be more reluctant to give up the veil or 
traditional attitudes towards family and employment. Moreover, a 
significant proportion of rural women still do not attend school and 
tend to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as women's 
subservient role in society.
    Employment gains by women also tend to be inhibited by lingering 
traditional restrictions that discourage women from playing an active 
role in the workplace and by the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist 
values. Some observers have noted that even educated women tend to lack 
self-confidence and social awareness and seek only a limited degree of 
occupational and social participation with men.
    Children.--The Government subsidizes education (which is compulsory 
to age 15) and medical care and has improved the welfare of children; 
however, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led 
to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some nomadic tribes 
located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation (FGM) 
on young girls, a procedure that is widely condemned by international 
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
    People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the 
Government's efforts to assist the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of 
mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constitute 97 percent of the 
population. The principal minorities are Amazighs and blacks. There are 
frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal status, 
particularly against Amazighs in the interior and Tuaregs in the south. 
The Government has manipulated the tribes to maintain a grip on power 
by rewarding some tribes with money and government positions and 
repressing and jailing members of various other tribes. The Government 
also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by pitting one against 
another.
    Foreigners constitute a significant part of the workforce. Sub-
Saharan Africans in particular have become targets of resentment, and 
in September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat 
hundreds of sub-Saharan workers, attacking and, in some cases, burning 
their places of residence and employment. Credible reports indicate 
that as many as 50 individuals were killed, and hundreds of others 
injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population for increased crime 
and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security forces were 
criticized by many African governments for their slow reaction to these 
events (see Section 5).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and 
professional associations are prohibited, and workers do not have the 
right to form their own unions. The regime regards such structures as 
unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working 
forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions' 
Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the 
People's Committee system. The Government prohibits foreign workers 
from joining this organization.
    The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. In a 
1992 speech, Qadhafi affirmed that workers have the right to strike but 
added that strikes do not occur because the workers control their 
enterprises. There have been no reports of strikes for years.
    The official trade union organization plays an active role in the 
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization 
of African Trade Union Unity. The Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation 
suspended the membership of Libya's trade union organization in 1993. 
The suspension followed reports that Qadhafi had replaced all union 
leaders, in some cases with loyal followers without union experience.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, because labor law 
requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its report this 
year, the Committee of Experts of the International Labor 
Organization's (ILO) stated that in Libya ``persons expressing certain 
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established 
political, social, or economic system may be punished with penalties of 
imprisonment,'' including ``an obligation to perform labor.'' The ILO 
report also noted that public employees may be sentenced to compulsory 
labor ``as a punishment for breaches of labor discipline or for 
participation in strikes, even in services whose interruption would not 
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of 
the population.''
    There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily 
has forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or 
has coerced them into performing subversive activities against their 
own countries. Libyans, despite the Penal Code's prohibition on 
slavery, have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, 
mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by 
Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18, although 
when Libya ratified ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age for Employment in 
1975, the minimum age specified was 15. Education is compulsory to age 
15. There is no information available on the prevalence of child labor, 
or on forced or bonded labor by children.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor force consists of 
approximately 1.2 million (1995 estimate) workers, including a 
significant, but unknown number of expatriate workers (in a population 
of 6 million). Wages, particularly in the public sector, frequently are 
in arrears. A public sector wage freeze imposed in 1981 remains in 
effect and has eroded real income significantly, particularly in the 
face of consistently high inflation. There is no information available 
regarding whether the average wage is sufficient to provide a worker 
and family with a decent standard of living.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. The Labor Law defines the 
rights and duties of workers, including matters of compensation, 
pension rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
    Although foreign workers constitute a significant percentage of the 
work force, the Labor Law does not accord equality of treatment to 
them. Foreign workers may reside in the country only for the duration 
of their work contracts and may not send more than half of their 
earnings to their families in their home countries. They are subject to 
arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and contracts, and 
have little option but to accept such changes or to depart the country. 
Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no protection.
    In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of 
disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of 
societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment 
of foreign laborers.
    The Government uses the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as 
leverage against countries whose foreign policies run counter to 
Libya's. The Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian 
residents in late 1995 to signal its displeasure with the agreement 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in 1996, 
the regime threatened to expel thousands of Palestinian workers for 
political and economic reasons (see Section 2.d.).
    Over 130 Algerians were expelled in 1997 (see Section 2.d.).
    Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for 
compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain 
industries, such as the petroleum sector, try to maintain standards set 
by foreign companies. There is no information on whether a worker can 
remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work situation without 
risking continued employment.
    In September mobs of citizens in several locations, reportedly beat 
hundreds of foreign workers from sub-Saharan African, attacking and in 
some cases burning their places of residence and employment. Many 
African governments criticized Libyan security forces for their slow 
reaction to these events (see Section 5).
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no information available 
regarding whether the law prohibits specifically trafficking in 
persons.
    There have been reports of trafficking in persons. Libyans have 
been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern 
Sudanese women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government 
troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
                               __________

                                MOROCCO

    The Constitution provides for a monarchy with a Parliament and an 
independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority rests with the King, 
who presides over the Council of Ministers, appoints all members of the 
Government, and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any 
minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for new elections, and rule by 
decree. The late King Hassan II, who ruled for 38 years, was succeeded 
by his son, King Mohammed VI, in July 1999. Since the constitutional 
reform of 1996, the bicameral legislature consists of a lower house, 
the Chamber of Representatives, which is elected through universal 
suffrage, and an upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose members 
are elected by various regional, local, and professional councils. The 
councils' members themselves are elected directly. The lower house of 
Parliament also may dissolve the Government through a vote of no 
confidence. In March 1998, King Hassan named a coalition government 
headed by opposition socialist leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi and 
composed largely of ministers drawn from opposition parties. Prime 
Minister Youssoufi's Government is the first government drawn primarily 
from opposition parties in decades, and also represents the first 
opportunity for a coalition of socialist, left-of-center, and 
nationalist parties to be included in the Government. The November 1997 
parliamentary elections were held amid widespread, credible reports of 
vote buying by political parties and the Government, and excessive 
government interference. The fraud and government pressure tactics led 
most independent observers to conclude that the results of the election 
were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. After 
a long appeals process, some of the results were overturned by the 
Constitutional Council during the year and new by-elections were held. 
In September the Government reported that various political parties had 
engaged in vote-buying and fraud during indirect elections to replace 
one-third of the 270 seats in the Chamber of Counselors, Parliament's 
upper house. The Government criticized the electoral corruption, 
indicating that it would investigate and prosecute those concerned; 
however, few of the cases involving electoral fraud had been presented 
before the courts or prosecuted by year's end. The judiciary 
historically has been subject to bribery and government influence; 
however, the Youssoufi Government continued to implement a reform 
program to develop greater independence and impartiality.
    The security apparatus includes several overlapping police and 
paramilitary organizations. The Border Police and the National Security 
Police are departments of the Ministry of Interior, the Judicial Police 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and the Royal 
Gendarmerie reports to the Palace. Some members of the security forces 
continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on large phosphate reserves, a diverse 
agricultural sector, fisheries, a sizable and growing tourist industry, 
a growing manufacturing sector (especially textiles), and a dynamic, 
deregulated telecommunications sector. There are considerable 
remittances from citizens working abroad. The illegal production and 
export of cannabis also is a significant economic activity, 
particularly in the north. Economic growth is highly dependent on 
agricultural output, which has been affected adversely by 2 consecutive 
years of worsening drought. According to the Government's statistics, 
the real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 0.7 percent in 1999. A 
similar outcome is estimated for 2000.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in 
most areas; however, the Government's record was generally poor in a 
few areas, and there were some notable setbacks. Citizens do not have 
the full right to change their government. While then-King Hassan II's 
appointment of a first-ever opposition coalition government in 1998 
marked a significant step toward democratization, officially recognized 
corruption and votebuying in the September Chamber of Counselors 
elections constituted a notable setback. There were reports of several 
suspicious deaths in police custody. Some members of the security 
forces occasionally tortured or otherwise abused detainees, and beat 
protesters on numerous occasions. Despite some progress by the 
Government, human rights groups continue to call for full disclosure of 
all available information concerning citizens abducted by the 
Government from the 1960's through the 1980's. Despite significant 
efforts by the Government, prison conditions remain harsh. Authorities 
sometimes arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. The judiciary 
historically has been subject to corruption and Interior Ministry 
influence; however, the Government continued to implement judicial 
reforms in order to increase the level of the judiciary's independence 
and impartiality. Nonetheless, human rights organizations and activists 
alleged a lack of due process in several high-profile court trials, 
including 2 controversial military court trials involving an air force 
captain who, after criticizing corruption in the military to a foreign 
news publication, ultimately was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for 
violating the Military Code; five Sahrawi youths who, after being 
arrested in Laayoune for throwing stones at police, were sentenced to 5 
to 10 years' imprisonment for forming a criminal association; and 
unemployed graduates who were detained during protests in Rabat in 
June. At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government's record on press freedom was inconsistent during the year. 
While the Government permitted extensive coverage of formerly taboo 
topics it systematically restricted press freedom on several specific 
topics that it considers sensitive, and on which journalists continue 
to practice self-censorship, including criticism of the Monarchy, 
Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. It 
appeared that the Government also increased restrictions on both 
domestic and international media to prevent reporting on some topics 
with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's international 
image. The Government censored and banned at least 12 domestic and 
foreign publications during the year. On December 2, Prime Minister 
Youssoufi used the highly controversial and longcriticized Article 77 
of the Press Code to ban three investigative weekly newspapers. The 
Government limited freedom of assembly and association. In numerous 
incidents during the year, police beat and violently dispersed 
demonstrators. The Government limited freedom of religion. Although 
non-Muslim foreigners may practice their religions freely, missionaries 
who proselytize face expulsion, and converts from Islam to other 
religions continue to experience social ostracism. The Government 
monitors the activities of mosques. During the summer, the Government 
prevented members of an Islamist group, whose leader has questioned the 
legitimacy of the Monarchy, from gaining access to campgrounds and 
beaches for group prayer sessions, and arrested and jailed some of the 
group's members. The Government at times restricts freedom of movement 
and withholds the granting of passports for foreign travel. Domestic 
violence and discrimination against women are common. Teenage 
prostitution is a problem in urban centers. Berbers face cultural 
marginalization, and continue to press the Government to preserve their 
language and culture. Unions are subject to government interference, 
child labor also is a problem, and the Government has not acted to end 
the plight of young girls who are subjected to exploitative and abusive 
domestic servitude.
    However, there was further progress on some important human rights 
issues during the year. In February and August, the courts sentenced to 
prison terms five members of the security forces who were convicted for 
their involvement in the beating deaths of prisoners. In order to 
implement reforms enacted into law in 1999, the National Prison 
Administration initiated a series of activities to improve living 
conditions inside prisons, including the construction of family 
visitation centers, manual skills training facilities, and visits by 
various entertainers. In July the Royal Arbitration Commission that the 
King established in 1999 to indemnify former political prisoners and 
their families, released an initial grant of compensation totaling 
approximately $14 million (140 million dirhams), which benefited 68 
victims or their families; some of the grant money went to Sahrawis 
from the Western Sahara who were in need of urgent provisional 
financial and medical aid. The July compensation also supplemented an 
initial Government allotment to the commission of roughly $4 million 
(40 million dirhams) in April that went to meet the urgent medical 
needs of 39 former prisoners and their survivors. The Government 
continued to clear a backlog of unenforced legal judgments from 
previous years. In May the Government allowed Islamist dissident Sheik 
Abdessalam Yassine to leave his home after 11 years of house arrest for 
refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of then-King Hassan II. 
The Constitutional Council overturned a number of election results 
considered fraudulent from the 1997 legislative elections, as well as 
results from a by-election held in June. The King appointed the 
Monarchy's first female royal counselor in March and confirmed the 
appointment of the first female minister in September. In May the 
Government accorded ``public utility'' status, which confers 
organizations with financial benefits as recognition of their serving 
the public interest, to two of the country's leading human rights 
organizations, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the 
Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH). In October the 
Government permitted an organization of former political detainees, as 
well as hundreds of human rights activists, to travel to and hold a 
remembrance ceremony at the notorious former secret detention center of 
Tazmamart, whose existence the authorities formerly denied. Throughout 
the year, the Human Rights Ministry held numerous human-rights-
awareness training sessions with teachers and some police personnel, 
and the Government increased its efforts to introduce human rights as a 
core subject of the national school curriculum. In September the 
Government hosted a human rights training seminar for representatives 
of Arab governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the 
Arab world. During her visit in April to attend an international 
conference on national human rights institutions and open a U.N.-
sponsored human rights information center, U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Mary Robinson said that while there were still problems to 
resolve, the country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human 
rights over the past 2 years. In January the Human Rights Ministry 
announced an agreement with the Moroccan Barristers Association to open 
a network of legal support centers for victims of domestic violence.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings. According to a report in the February 
newsletter of the AMDH, Ali Akzkane died on January 4 under suspicious 
circumstances, while in police custody in the southern town of Tiznit, 
after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In response to a 
January 13 newspaper article that called attention to the AMDH's report 
and its request for a government investigation, the Inspector General 
of the National Security Police in early March denied accusations of 
police malfeasance in the death. According to the Inspector General, 
Akzkane committed suicide in his jail cell 2 hours after being 
incarcerated, and authorities immediately notified the public 
prosecutor and regional doctor. An investigation ensued and, according 
to the Inspector General, discussions with Akzkane's family revealed 
that he had been suffering from depression. Results of the autopsy 
reportedly attributed Akzkane's death to suicide. According to the 
AMDH, it was contacted by the Government regarding the affair in 
September and told that the authorities were reviewing the case. There 
were no results in the investigation by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious 
circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji, after a Royal Armed 
Forces patrol took him and another citizen into custody at 2 a.m. on 
July 12; the press reported that security forces detained the two for 
public drunkenness and possession of illegal narcotics. According to 
the second citizen, the patrol took him and Najiaji to a ``bechouia'' 
(an administrative center under the jurisdiction of the Interior 
Ministry that contains holding cells) and beat them until 3 a.m. The 
security forces subsequently freed the second citizen after Najiaji 
fell down, lost consciousness, and stopped breathing. According to the 
AMDH report, at 4 a.m. the security forces at the bechouia notified the 
public prosecutor that they had found Najiaji dead in his cell from a 
suicide by hanging. The second citizen reportedly alleged in his 
testimony to the public prosecutor that Najiaji died from beatings at 
the hands of the security forces. According to the AMDH, the prosecutor 
general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy results to Najiaji's 
family, and the family's lawyer reportedly had access to the results; 
the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having been the victim 
of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed concern over the slow 
handling of the case, which reportedly was pending with the general 
prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's end. The Royal 
Armed Forces patrol members involved in the case were not yet charged 
by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
    On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to 
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern 
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one 
worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the 
death to either police abuse or ``natural causes'' (see Sections 1.c., 
1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.).
    In their annual human rights report for 1999, which was released in 
late January, the AMDH called on the Government ``to resolve 
definitively and urgently the issue of deaths inside and outside police 
stations and posts of the Gendarmerie.''
    A police officer and two members of the Interior Ministry's 
auxiliary forces were arrested in connection with the beating death of 
Farah Mohammed near Oujda in August 1999. The public prosecutor at 
Oudja's court of appeal subsequently ordered an investigation. Farah 
Mohammed was stopped by police authorities for questioning in 
connection with contraband trafficking of fuel across the Moroccan 
border with Algeria. Eyewitnesses said that the police beat and kicked 
him into unconsciousness at the time he was detained. He died in police 
custody. Farah Mohammed's parents lodged an immediate complaint with 
gendarmerie authorities as soon as they learned of their son's death, 
which led to the immediate arrest of the police and military auxiliary 
officers allegedly involved in the beating. The trial in the case still 
reportedly was pending at year's end.
    In August an appeals court in Settat (south of Casablanca) 
convicted an auxiliary member of the security forces to 12 years' 
imprisonment and a fine of approximately $6,000 (60,000 dirhams) for 
the beating death of mint vendor Abdelaziz Warret in June 1999. Two 
other auxiliary members of the security forces involved in the beating 
death were sentenced to 4 months in prison. According to press reports 
in June 1999, police in Berrechid arrested Warret, confiscated his 
merchandise, and beat him until he fainted. He died later at a 
hospital. When his family went to claim the body and to obtain a death 
certificate, doctors refused to issue one. No explanation was given for 
his arrest. An autopsy subsequently performed during the investigation 
into Warret's death revealed that he died from internal hemorrhaging 
caused by the beating.
    In February a court in Tangiers convicted two police officers of 
manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of a citizen returning from 
Holland. According to reports of witnesses, port police stopped Mohamed 
El-Feddaoui in Tangiers as he disembarked from a car ferry in his 
automobile. The witnesses claim that El-Feddaoui subsequently was taken 
to the police station and tortured to death by two police officers. The 
two officers reportedly had been instructed by the port's police 
commissioner to detain and torture Feddaoui. Both of the police 
officers received 10 years' imprisonment for violence resulting in 
manslaughter. The court sentenced the port police commissioner to 8 
years' imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of his complicity 
in the crime. The court also ordered all three to pay approximately 
$35,000 (350,000 dirhams) each to Feddaoui's estate. According to press 
reports, the AMDH principally was responsible for furnishing testimony 
in the case (see Section 1.c.).
    In September the court of appeal in Safi (south of Casablanca) 
resumed a long-delayed case and summoned three police officers charged 
with manslaughter in the 1996 death of Hassan Mernissi. According to 
Mernissi's family, he was killed by the three police officers while in 
incommunicado (``garde-a-vue'') detention in Safi's central police 
station. Police reportedly had stopped Mernissi for drunkenness. 
According to a lawyer representing Mernissi's family, witnesses present 
in the police station at the time alleged that Mernissi was beaten to 
death while in detention. The police officers maintained that the 
allegedly drunk Mernissi knocked his head against the bars of his cell 
until he died. The autopsy indicated that Mernissi bled to death. 
Before the case was heard by court of appeal in Safi in early 1999, it 
remained in the pretrial investigation stage for over 2 years. In 
consideration of the Ramadan holiday, in December the trial was 
postponed again until March 2001.
    Human rights groups allege that poor medical care in prisons 
results in unnecessary deaths; however, the Justice Ministry in 1999 
assigned more doctors to prisons in an effort to improve prison health 
facilities. However, resource constraints continue to contribute to 
harsh conditions, including extreme overcrowding, malnutrition, and 
lack of hygiene. Throughout the year, the National Prison 
Administration continued to allow numerous site visits by members of 
Parliament, the press, human rights groups, and foreign diplomats (see 
Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of confirmed 
disappearance for the fifth consecutive year; however, the AMDH claimed 
during the year that the continued practice of incommunicado detention 
without informing the family members of those detained (see Section 
1.d.) was evidence of the continued practice of forced disappearance. 
While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the 
Government and its policies occurred over several decades, the 
Youssoufi Government, upon taking office, pledged that such policies 
would not recur, and that it would disclose as much information as 
possible on past cases. Many of those who disappeared were members of 
the military who were implicated in attempts to overthrow the 
Government in 1971 and 1972. Others were Sahrawis or Moroccans who 
challenged the Government's claim to the Western Sahara or other 
government policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret 
detention camps. While the Government in recent years quietly released 
several hundred persons who had disappeared, including a release of 
about 300 such detainees in June 1991, and although in October 1998 it 
issued an announcement on those who disappeared, to this day hundreds 
of Saharan and Moroccan families do not have any information about 
their missing relatives, many of whom disappeared over 20 years ago. No 
explanation for their incarceration has ever been provided. Local human 
rights monitors have concluded that many others died while at the 
notorious Tazmamart prison, which the Government since has closed. The 
Government has acknowledged 34 of these deaths and has provided death 
certificates to the families of all but 1 of the 34 who died.
    In October 1998, in response to a directive issued by then-King 
Hassan II that all human rights cases be resolved ``within 6 months,'' 
the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) announced the 
release of information on 112 cases of disappearances. According to the 
Council, 56 of the 112 who disappeared were deceased; family members of 
33 of the deceased received death certificates from the Government. The 
Council added that eight persons believed to have disappeared were 
alive and living abroad, and that four were alive and in Morocco. Of 
the remaining 44, the Council stated that it had no further 
information. Human rights groups and families pointed out discrepancies 
between their lists and those of the Government, asked the Government 
for more data regarding these cases, and demanded full explanations of 
the causes and circumstances of these deaths and disclosure of the 
identities of those responsible. Some family groups claim that the 
Government is not divulging details on at least 50 more cases. In 
November 1998, the Council began meetings in various provinces with 
groups representing families of persons who had disappeared in order to 
collect data on their grievances and to conduct further research into 
the fate of those who remain missing. In April 1999, the Council 
announced that it would indemnify the 112 victims of politically 
motivated disappearances. Human rights NGO's disputed the Council's 
findings, claiming that they had compiled a list of over 600 potential 
cases of such disappearances from the 1960's through the 1980's. The 
NGO's called for the immediate release of all remaining political 
prisoners, disclosure of the fate of those whose cases the Council did 
not examine, delivery of the remains of the deceased to their families, 
compensation for victims and their families, and punishment for those 
responsible. On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of 
Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it 
estimated the number of persons who had disappeared in Morocco alone to 
be ``between nearly 600 and several thousand.'' The FIDH claimed that 
disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to 
1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation 
of this figure. In October the Government for the first time permitted 
an organization of former political detainees, as well as hundreds of 
human rights activists, to travel to and hold a remembrance ceremony at 
the notorious former secret detention center at Tazmamart, whose 
existence the authorities formerly denied (see Section 2.a.).
    In August 1999, in one of his first official acts, King Mohammed VI 
established a new royal commission responsible for increasing the 
Government's efforts to resolve the issue of those who had disappeared 
and to reach an accommodation with former political prisoners and 
members of their families. The new commission met with some family 
members and local human rights organizations and began to draw up 
guidelines for the resolution of issues involving individuals who had 
disappeared.
    Following up on the CCDH's December 1999 announcement to distribute 
advance partial compensation to the neediest victims of forced 
disappearance and arbitrary detention, Prime Minister Youssoufi 
declared before Parliament in January that his government would 
compensate financially the most urgent cases first. Youssoufi's 
announcement came after the passing of the Government's January 1 
deadline for receipt of compensation claims from former detainees and 
their survivors by the Royal Arbitration Commission working under the 
auspices of the CCDH. The number of claims filed totaled approximately 
5,900. Human rights organizations contested the nature of the 
compensation process, particularly the composition of the Arbitration 
Commission, which they claimed lacked independence; the lack of 
transparency in the commission's decision-making processes; and the 
condition imposed by the commission that those filing claims must 
accept the commission's findings as final, without appeal. In April the 
CCDH announced the Government's allocation of a provisional 
compensation fund totaling approximately $4 million (40 million 
dirhams), as well as initial provisional compensation for 31 of the 
neediest former prisoners who had been held in the notorious Tazmamart 
prison, and 8 of the prisoners' surviving family members. Each prisoner 
or surviving family member received up to approximately $14,500 
(145,000 dirhams), a sum designed to cover urgent medical and financial 
expenses caused by extended imprisonment. In July the Royal Arbitration 
Commission announced final compensation settlements for 68 cases 
(benefiting 354 persons, including some of those provisionally 
compensated in April) that totaled approximately $14 million (140 
million dirhams). Former prisoners or their survivors were designated 
to receive between $25,000 and $350,000 (250,000 and 3,500,000 
dirhams). In July the Arbitration Commission began distributing 
preliminary compensation payments to some of the Sahrawis from the 
Western Sahara who had disappeared or been detained, and their family 
members. As with the April allotment, the Government stated that it 
intended these initial payments as provisional compensation to cover 
urgent medical and financial expenses for needy Sahrawis or their 
surviving family members who appealed for compensation from the 
Commission by December 31, 1999. The Government announced that 
additional compensation in the form of final settlements could be 
distributed pending the review by the Commission of petitions submitted 
by Sahrawi claimants. Critics of the arbitration process continued to 
criticize the Commission, claiming that its composition lacked 
independence and that the Commission's stipulation that all of its 
decisions were final was unfair. Numerous former prisoners and their 
survivors refused to file a claim. Others criticized the small number 
of cases settled, citing that over 5,800 cases remained. In the absence 
of disclosure by the Government explaining its role in past 
disappearances, the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice (FMVE--created 
by victims of forced disappearance and their surviving family members) 
continued to argue that the compensation process alone was inadequate 
to redress past government actions; it requested the Government to go 
beyond compensation to facilitate conciliation between citizens and the 
Government through publicized investigations into disappearances and 
arbitrary detentions. After the July compensation settlement was 
announced, the OMDH issued a communique calling for more transparency 
during the arbitration process. According to the OMDH, ``the fact of 
not communicating these measures at the opportune time, even though the 
measures were limited, helped sow ambiguity and misinformation, which 
the issue could have done without.'' In speeches given in July and 
December, King Mohammed VI addressed criticisms of the compensation 
process by announcing imminent reform of the CCDH. According to the 
King, the CCDH's composition, responsibilities, and work structure 
would be changed. None of the King's proposed changes had been 
implemented by year's end.
    There were no developments in the disappearance of Abdullah 
Sherrouq, a student who reportedly was detained by security services on 
June 22, 1981. After 19 years, his family has been unable to learn 
anything of his whereabouts or his fate, despite appeals by Amnesty 
International (AI). In 1998 the CCDH listed Sherrouq as 1 of the 112 
cases of disappearance acknowledged by the Government; according to the 
council, Sherrouq disappeared in undetermined circumstances; he was 1 
of the 44 for whom the Government said it possessed no further 
information.
    Associations that seek information on those who have disappeared, 
including the FMVE, an executive coordinating committee of former 
Sahrawi political prisoners, and a group specifically representing 
Tazmamart prison survivors, operate openly, and call upon the 
Government for full disclosure of events surrounding cases that date 
back to the 1960's. Several front-page articles in newspapers 
affiliated with parties in the governing coalition called at various 
times during the year for full disclosure on all outstanding cases of 
disappearance. The associations also call for compensation to families 
of those who have disappeared, death certificates and the return of the 
remains of those who died, and prosecution of responsible officials. 
The Government has indicated that it would be more open about providing 
information on these past cases, and met with the FMVE on a number of 
occasions during the year to discuss its concerns. Throughout the year, 
FMVE leaders also met with the CCDH and leaders of national political 
parties. However, according to press reports in August, the FMVE's 
leadership claimed that political parties were hesitant to help them 
address the problem of past disappearances. Associations in the Western 
Sahara that seek information on disappearances do not operate free from 
government interference; there were reports that some members of these 
associations were harassed and intimidated while seeking information on 
missing Sahrawis. Some also continue to be denied passports (see 
Section 2.d.).
    Until July the Government paid a monthly stipend of $500 (5,000 
dirhams) to 28 former prisoners who survived 18 to 20 years in solitary 
confinement under harsh conditions at Tazmamart prison in connection 
with the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. After their release, the 
Government prohibited them from speaking out publicly about their 
detention. In exchange the Government gave the former prisoners 
assurances that it would help them find jobs and reintegrate them into 
society; however, none of them has obtained government assistance in 
this regard, and some complain of being denied voter cards and 
passports. After the final compensation settlement package from the 
Royal Arbitration Commission to the 31 former Tazmamart prisoners in 
July, the authorities ceased distributing the monthly stipends to the 
28 who had been kept in solitary confinement.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and the Government claims that 
the use of torture has been discontinued; however, some members of the 
security forces still torture or otherwise abuse detainees. The Penal 
Code requires capital punishment for perpetrators who commit acts of 
torture or ``acts of barbarity,'' provided that such acts occur during 
the commission of a crime. The Penal Code also stipulates sentences up 
to life imprisonment for public servants who ``use or oblige the use of 
violence'' against others in the exercise of their functions. By law, 
pretrial investigating judges must, if asked to do so or if they 
themselves notice physical marks that so warrant, refer the detained 
person to an expert doctor. However, according to legal experts, this 
obligation often is ignored in practice.
    In February the AMDH reported the death under suspicious 
circumstances of Ali Akzkane while he was in police custody in Tiznit 
on January 4 after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In 
response to the AMDH's request for a government investigation, the 
National Security Police denied accusations of malfeasance in Akzkane's 
death, and attributed his death to suicide likely brought on by 
depression. Results of an autopsy reportedly attributed Akzkane's death 
to suicide. According to the AMDH, which was contacted by the 
Government regarding the affair in September, the authorities were 
reviewing the case at year's end (see Section 1.a).
    In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune 
sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years 
for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged 
participation in a March 4 stone-throwing in the same city. One of the 
lawyers representing the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial police 
who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts, including 
torturing the youths during their detention (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 
and 1.f.).
    After his release from prison on May 4 after a royal pardon, Sadok 
El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the Istiqlal party's 
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), contacted the AMDH with 
accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured, 
and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his 
participation in a national truckers strike. El-Kihal alleged that 
security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate (Oujda province) 
tortured him for almost 24 hours, suspending him by his arms for 
extended periods while beating his fingers and feet. El-Kihal also 
alleged to AMDH that members of the Gendarmerie tied his hands behind 
his back, bent him backward on his knees, and applied pressure to his 
stomach while somebody forced their fingers down his throat. El-Kihal 
alleged that two adjutants in the Gendarmerie participated in his 
torture. El-Kihal said that his jailers wrote a false police report, 
which they forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without first 
allowing him to read it. El-Kihal alleged that it was this police 
report that formed the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of 
appeals, which sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. The Istiqlal 
party's Arabic-language daily, Al-Alam, published a UGTM communique on 
September 30, 1999, regarding El-Kihal's treatment. El-Kihal 
subsequently benefited from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see 
Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 6.a.).
    In June a foreign diplomat met with a Sahrawi student, who claimed 
to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected participation in 
May 17 to 18 demonstrations near the Marrakech University campus. There 
were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-scale 
demonstrations, during which mostly Sahrawi students clashed with 
dozens of Marrakech police in violent exchanges that involved the 
throwing of a Molotov cocktail by one student and the clubbing of 
students by security forces. During the detention, police allegedly 
attempted to force the student to inform on other Sahrawi students who 
had participated in the demonstrations. During the meeting, the student 
showed the foreign diplomat fresh burn marks that the police allegedly 
inflicted with cigarettes (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e).
    On May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14 students at Mohammed V 
University and charged them with arson, violence against the police, 
erecting barricades, and impeding free movement. The students, 12 of 
whom were Sahrawis, participated earlier in the day in a solidarity 
protest with fellow Sahrawi students who were arrested the same morning 
in Marrakech. According to a lawyer representing 13 of the accused 
students, one of his clients claimed that police took him to an 
unidentified location after his arrest, beat him severely, and 
interrogated him regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawis 
and human rights activists. Indicating his client's difficulty in 
speaking in court, as well as his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer 
requested the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical 
examination of his client, which the judge refused. After a series of 
hearings and delays, on November 17, the Rabat court of appeals 
acquitted and freed all 14 students who were detained in mid-May. 
According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the detained students 
denied before the court any involvement in the demonstration. The 
prosecution reportedly failed to produce any witnesses who could 
confirm the students' participation in the May 17 incident (see Section 
1.e.).
    The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious 
circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji after a Royal Armed 
Forces patrol reportedly took him and another citizen into custody on 
July 12; press reports stated that security forces detained the two for 
public drunkenness and possession of illicit narcotics. According to 
the AMDH report, the second citizen claimed that the patrol beat 
Najiaji to death while the security forces claim that they found 
Najiaji dead in his cell from suicide by hanging. The AMDH reported 
that the prosecutor general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy 
results to Najiaji's family and that the family's lawyer had access to 
the results; the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having 
been the victim of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed 
concern over the slow handling of the case; it reportedly was pending 
with the general prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's 
end, and the Royal Armed Forces patrol members have yet to be charged 
(see Section 1.a.).
    In August the media reported a case of alleged torture by police in 
a Casablanca police station. Abderrahmane Jamali alleged that police 
officers in the Ain Sebaa-Hay Al-Hassani station tortured him for 3 
days while he was detained in early August, once in the presence of a 
citizen who had filed a complaint against him. Press reports alleged 
that the incident began in late July when the plaintiff twice filed a 
complaint against Jamali for abuse of confidence and theft. After the 
prosecutor dismissed the first complaint for lack of proof, the 
plaintiff requested a reopening and more thorough investigation of the 
case. Press reports alleged that Jamali subsequently was detained, 
tortured for 3 days, and then convicted and sentenced by a Casablanca 
court to 5 months' imprisonment several days later. Jamali reportedly 
fainted during the sentencing hearing. Jamali became ill within days of 
his incarceration and, after his family sent a letter to the prison 
director requesting the director's intervention, was sent to various 
medical facilities. At Averroes hospital, doctors on August 11 detected 
an infection allegedly transmitted by parasites found on rodents. 
According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language 
daily newspaper Al-Bayane, doctors also found signs of ``physical 
cruelty'' on Jamali's body. The marks reportedly included contusions 
and bruises on his neck and knees, as well as a lesion on one of his 
lungs. A doctor at Averroes wrote a letter to Al-Bayane claiming that 
the infection Jamali contracted ``does not explain all of the signs 
that we observed during (his) clinical examination.'' Afterwards, 
Jamali filed complaints against three agents of the judicial police for 
torture; the Casablanca police department issued a communique on August 
18 stating that it had opened an investigation into the charges of 
torture. Some newspapers called for an investigation into the court of 
first instance's handling of the case because the judge and prosecutor 
allegedly failed to inquire into the detainee's fragile state of 
health, as required by law.
    In September the media reported on two cases of alleged torture by 
a deputy officer from the Royal Gendarmerie brigade in Zaio, in the 
northeastern part of the country. According to the reports, the officer 
tortured two persons in order to extort money from their family and 
friends. In one of the cases, a cafe owner alleged that in September 
the officer slapped him in front of his customers, used force to remove 
him from his establishment, and subjected him to various forms of 
torture at brigade headquarters. In the second case, an elderly woman 
brought suit against the same officer for torturing her son and 
extorting approximately $500 (5,000 dirhams) from her to stop the 
torture. After he was informed of the cases, Zaio's municipal president 
(who also is a Member of Parliament) reportedly referred the cases 
immediately to the national authorities. An investigation into the 
alleged torture was ongoing at year's end.
    At the October 27 trial of 10 students at the University of Hassan 
I in Settat, each of the students reportedly declared before the Settat 
court of first instance that they were forced under duress and torture 
to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements. According to a 
communique from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) political 
party, two of its members who were involved in the incident ``were 
victims of grave physical cruelty'' during their transfer to the police 
station and during their detention (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
    The OMDH filed a complaint on behalf of some of those who were 
detained and abused by the police at the end of September 1999, 
following several days of protests over a variety of social grievances 
in Laayoune in the Western Sahara (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and 
2.b.). There was photographic and other evidence to substantiate claims 
that the police systematically had beaten some of the persons they had 
detained in connection with the protests. An investigation was opened 
into the charges; however, after almost 15 months no police officials 
have been charged in connection with the force used to break up the 
protests, nor for the beatings inflicted on some of those detained by 
the police. (Some police officials allegedly responsible subsequently 
were transferred in 1999 and the chief of police in Laayoune was 
relieved of his duties there.)
    In its 2000 annual international human rights report released in 
June, Amnesty International acknowledged that security forces involved 
in several cases of torture had been arrested and prosecuted. However, 
the organization noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations 
were either not opened into complaints and allegations of torture ... 
or were opened but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
    Frustrated by what it perceived to be the Interior Ministry's slow 
implementation of measures to ensure a more humane Government with 
greater transparency, which were urged by King Mohammed VI in 1999, the 
OMDH in February publicized a memorandum it sent to Interior Minister 
Ahmed Midaoui in January calling for a dialog between Midaoui's 
ministry and human rights organizations. The OMDH appealed to the 
Interior Minister to implement a series of proposed measures, including 
measures reinforcing individual protections against torture through the 
full implementation of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, destroying police files 
on former political prisoners or exiles, and ending illegal punitive 
detention measures by local authorities.
    In 1999 the OMDH published a special newspaper in which it called 
on the Government to implement legislation that would criminalize the 
use of torture and would control the conditions under which detainees 
are kept in garde-a-vue detention and in prisons. The OMDH claimed that 
most cases of torture submitted to the justice system involved 
incidents that occurred in front of witnesses or in public areas. 
According to the OMDH, torture in detention largely continues to escape 
the notice of the judiciary. The OMDH noted that the implementation of 
judges' instructions on eliminating the use of torture has been 
``exceedingly slow.'' While the OMDH admitted that the use of torture 
has diminished over the years, it claimed that it has not disappeared. 
The OMDH alleged in its report that those who commit such abuses ``do 
so with impunity in almost all cases.'' The NGO called on the 
Government to harmonize domestic law with its responsibilities under 
the U.N. Convention Against Torture, to ensure full independence for 
the judiciary, and to punish those who resort to torture.
    In February Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar announced plans 
by the newly formed NGO Association for the Rehabilitation of Torture 
Victims (ARVT) to open a rehabilitation center in Casablanca designed 
to assist former torture victims in overcoming torture-related trauma. 
At an inaugural event, Prime Minister Youssoufi said that the center 
constituted a new milestone in the consolidation of the rule of law.
    Also in February, Mohammed Kholti, a retired secret police officer 
who tortured political dissidents during the 1970's and 1980's publicly 
asked for forgiveness in a letter sent to two national newspapers, 
which published his plea. Kholti's act marked the first time that a 
former member of the security forces had admitted to past use of 
torture.
    In April Reuter's news services reported the lifting of a 13year 
ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high security 
prison. According to author Abdelkader Chaoui, his book, ``The 
Unachieved Past,'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The 
book describes the harsh conditions in the Kenitra prison, in which the 
author was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his 
leftist political opinions and leadership role in a Marxist-Leninist 
organization. In November in Marrakesh, King Mohammed awarded Chaoui a 
literary prize for his most recent novel (see Section 2.a.).
    In May the Government permitted the local publication and sale of a 
comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and illustrated by 
Abdelaziz Mouride, a leftist student whom the authorities arbitrarily 
detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in prison, and then freed in 
1984, the comic book recounts in vivid detail the torture, injustice, 
and humiliation that the author and other political dissidents suffered 
at the hands of the authorities. Using the third person to narrate his 
experience, Mouride depicts the manner in which the authorities 
kidnaped dissidents, tortured them in secret detention centers, staged 
sham trials, and then incarcerated them in remote prisons, where some 
lost their sanity or died. Mouride secretly was able to send out 
drawings of his ordeals with visiting friends and relatives. Mouride 
said that human rights organizations played the principal role in 
securing his freedom in 1984 (see Section 2.a.).
    Also in May, a delegation from the International Center for the 
Rehabilitation of Torture Victims visited the country to discuss the 
Government's compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The 
delegation told Human Rights Minister Aujjar that it sought to hold its 
next world congress in Morocco.
    In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it 
distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for 
the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former 
torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary 
detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le 
Journal. Some of the listed names were high-ranking officials currently 
holding office, including the head of the Royal Gendarmerie and secret 
services. Former Interior Minister Driss Basri's name also was included 
in the list. In the letter, the AMDH called for ``the truth and pursuit 
of those responsible for disappearances.'' The AMDH also criticized the 
Justice Ministry for its alleged nonintervention in past cases of 
torture and disappearance (see Section 2.a.).
    In 1998 the Ministry of Justice and the prison administration 
implemented a law that makes autopsies routine for any death that 
occurs in detention, in order to allow allegations of torture to be 
evaluated. The autopsies take place at the request of the family, human 
rights NGO's, or the state prosecutor, and at the order of a judge. 
Autopsies were used to prove allegations of abuse in at least two cases 
during the year.
    In incidents throughout the year, police continued to use force to 
disperse several demonstrations by unemployed university graduates 
associated with the National Association of Unemployed Graduates (known 
by its French acronym, ANDC), an organization not recognized by the 
Government, and ``Group 314'' (a separate organization of unemployed 
state doctoral graduates of medicine and engineering), and other groups 
to a lesser extent. In numerous incidents throughout the country during 
the year, police beat demonstrators with batons in order to disperse 
them (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). On February 2, in the village 
of Tarmilet, security forces used force, including rubber bullets, tear 
gas, and water cannons, to remove striking workers who had blockaded a 
water-bottling factory to protest lay-offs (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 
2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). On June 18 in Rabat, security forces again 
resorted to force, using batons and tear gas to disperse ANDC 
demonstrators and to remove Group 314 hunger strikers from the local 
headquarters of an independent national union (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 
and 2.b.). On July 26 and again on September 12, police violently 
dispersed disabled, unemployed university graduates who were protesting 
the denial of their right to employment (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 
5). On October 8 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to 
3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's actions 
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall 
(see Section 2.b.). On October 23, security forces used violent means 
to break up a demonstration by students who were preparing to begin a 
march to protest transportation problems at Hassan I University in 
Settat (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). There were reports in the fall of 
violent clashes at university campuses around the county between 
security forces and JCO students engaged in student elections (see 
Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). On November 27, security forces reportedly 
used violent means to break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning 
factory in the southern city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted 
in the death of one worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections 
1.a., 1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.). During the weekend of December 9 to 11, 
security forces throughout the country used violent means to disperse 
human rights activists, members of the JCO, and unemployed graduates 
who separately gathered in Rabat and other large cities to demonstrate 
for different reasons (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
    In February a Tangiers court convicted two police officers of 
manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of Mohamed El-Feddaoui at the 
port of Tangiers, when the El-Feddaoui was returning from Holland. Both 
police officers received 10-year jail terms for violence resulting in 
manslaughter. The port police commissioner was sentenced to 8 years' 
imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of complicity in the 
crime (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions remain harsh; however, they have improved in 
recent years, due in part to reforms undertaken at the suggestion of 
the CCDH and the Minister of Justice, and to more transparency in the 
functioning of the National Prison Administration. In August 1999, the 
Government enacted new legislation designed to reform the prison 
system. The new legislation replaced a royal decree that had governed 
the prison system since 1915. Among the reforms in the legislation were 
provisions mandating compensation for work performed by prisoners. 
Prisoners with ``good conduct'' records also were accorded the right to 
a furlough to visit family members during important holiday periods. 
The new legislation outlawed the use of handcuffs, manacles, or other 
devices used for physical restraint, except as required to restrain 
violent prisoners and then only after consultation with prison medical 
authorities. Procedures were established to allow the prisons to be 
inspected by the press and human rights organizations, and members of 
both the press and human rights organizations visited prisons after the 
procedures were established. Visitors must receive authorization from 
the Director of the Prison Administration to conduct prison visits. 
Special provisions also accorded women the right to keep their children 
with them in prison until the children reach the age of 2 or longer 
with special permission from the Ministry of Justice. The new law 
contained provisions that extended the function of the prison system 
beyond that of punishment and incarceration to include rehabilitation 
and preparation for a return to society.
    Nonetheless, credible reports indicate that harsh treatment and 
conditions continue, often as a result of chronic overcrowding. Despite 
being designed to hold 4,000 inmates, Oukacha Central Prison in 
Casablanca currently holds more than 7,000 prisoners. Human rights 
groups allege that poor medical care in prisons results in unnecessary 
deaths. To address this problem, the Government provided special funds 
in the 1998-99 budget for the renovation of prison facilities, and 
added doctors and health facilities to prisons. In addition to extreme 
overcrowding, malnutrition and lack of hygiene continue to aggravate 
the poor health conditions inside prisons (see Section 1.a.).
    Press reports during the year called attention to the extremely 
harsh conditions inside the detention center of Ain Atiq outside of 
Rabat. While Ain Atiq's status as a detention or social center is not 
defined clearly, it often receives homeless, vagrant, and mentally 
disabled persons, in addition to juvenile delinquents. Negligence at 
Ain Atiq reportedly has led to serious problems, such as hygienic and 
nutritional deficiencies, and harsh general living conditions. The 
center also is reportedly underequipped and understaffed to provide 
adequate medical care. The AMDH reportedly is planning a study of the 
center in the hopes of encouraging improvements. During the year, the 
authorities used Ain Atiq to detain various demonstrators picked up 
during protests. In June, July, and September security forces forcibly 
dispersed unemployed, disabled protesters in downtown Rabat and 
reportedly took them to Ain Atiq, where some allegedly remained for 
over a month (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In the past, human rights 
organizations have called for Ain Atiq's closure, as well as of other 
similar centers.
    Some press reports during the year also raised the problem of drug 
trafficking and sexual abuse in prisons among inmates. The presence of 
cannabis is widely recognized as a problem, as is sexual abuse of 
inmates. In May prisoners in the Touchka prison at Errachidia allegedly 
rioted to protest against, among other problems, sexual abuse among 
inmates. Press reports during the year also raised the issue of some 
prisoners being allowed to pay for the right to occupy their own cells.
    In the first visit of its kind, Members of Parliament visited Sale 
prison in February 1999 to investigate prison conditions and 
allegations of overcrowding. Their visit followed that of the 2M 
television station, which broadcast an exclusive report on prisons in 
January 1999.
    Although the Government generally did not permit prison visits by 
human rights monitors in the past, since the tenure of the Youssoufi 
Government began there has been close collaboration between the Justice 
Ministry, the National Prison Administration, and human rights groups 
on prison visits, which now are authorized explicitly by law. 
Throughout the year, the National Prison Administration continued to 
allow numerous site visits by Parliament, the press, human rights 
groups, and foreign diplomats. The National Observatory of Moroccan 
Prisons (ONPM) made over 15 visits during the year, taking extensive 
notes of the numerous problems facing the prison system and recounting 
these in the press. In addition to noting the harsh conditions caused 
by chronic overcrowding (some estimates place the current inmate 
population at as high as 52,000), the ONPM recommended that some of the 
existing deteriorated penitentiaries dating from the 1920's be replaced 
or renovated. According to Mohamed Lididi, the Administrator of the 
National Prison Administration, 20 smaller prisons currently are being 
built to supplement and replace some of the existing 43.
    In addition to permitting an increasing number of visits, the 
National Prison Administration initiated a series of activities to 
improve living conditions inside prisons, including the construction of 
family visitation centers, manualskills training facilities, and prison 
visits by various entertainers. Early in the year, the civilian prison 
in El-Jadida (near Casablanca) was expanded, with the addition of a 
professional training center and a family meeting area. The training 
center provides courses and vocational studies to inmates interested in 
preparing themselves for post-prison employment. The family area allows 
inmates to meet directly with their family members, and is equipped 
with chairs, tables, and a small cafe. Telephone booths also were 
installed for use by inmates. The improvements at El-Jadida were 
duplicated inside other prisons, with the Prison Administration 
devoting more resources to improving living conditions and inmate 
rehabilitation. The ONPM received permission to organize an evening 
music and dance program for female inmates in Oukacha prison in 
Casablanca. In Sale prison near Rabat, the British Embassy and the 
Prison Administration sponsored a musical performance by African 
students. Several similar performances and cultural seminars occurred 
at other prisons.
    In November at Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane, the Justice 
Ministry hosted, in coordination with the Rabat-based organization 
British Council and the London-based Penal Reform International, an 
international seminar on reforming the prison system. The seminar was 
attended by eminent international jurists and focused on identifying 
constructive alternatives to incarceration. The director of the 
penitentiary system participated in the seminar, speaking on the 
evolution of the country's penal system. The new NGO the Moroccan 
Prison Observatory participated as well.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Police continued to use 
arbitrary arrest and detention. Although legal provisions for due 
process have been revised extensively in recent years, reports indicate 
that authorities sometimes ignore them. Although police usually make 
arrests in public and during the day, they do not always identify 
themselves and do not always obtain warrants. Garde-a-vue detention is 
limited to 48 hours, with one 24-hour extension allowed at the 
prosecutor's discretion. In state security cases, the garde-a-vue 
period is 96 hours; this also may be extended by the prosecutor. It is 
during this initial period, when defendants are denied access to 
counsel, that the accused is interrogated and abuse or torture is most 
likely to occur. Some members of the security forces, long accustomed 
to indefinite precharge access to detainees, continue to resist the new 
rules.
    Under 1991 changes to the law, the police are obliged to notify a 
person's next of kin of an arrest as soon as possible. However, lawyers 
are not always informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus are 
not always able to monitor compliance with the garde-a-vue detention 
limits. While the law provides for a limited system of bail, it rarely 
is granted. However, defendants sometimes are released on their own 
recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or its 
equivalent. Under a separate code of military justice, military 
authorities may detain members of the military without warrants or 
public trial.
    Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an 
initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five 
additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused 
person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year.
    During their February 2 operation to halt a strike at a 
waterbottling factory in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the 
capital), security forces reportedly arrested more than a dozen factory 
workers, as well as random passersby. According to sources in the 
Government, the workers and passersby later were released without 
charges. The Democratic Confederation of Workers trade union, which is 
aligned politically with the ruling USFP party, reported that security 
forces also detained two of its regional delegates 2 weeks following 
the February 2 incident. According to government sources, the two 
officials were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day) 
while an investigation into the incident was still underway (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.f., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.).
    In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune 
sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years 
for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged 
participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in the city. One of 
the lawyers who represented the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial 
police who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts, 
including unlawfully entering the homes of the youths and detaining 
them, torturing them during their detention, and forcing the youths to 
sign under duress police reports, which they were not allowed to read 
and which they claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed 
to the court of appeals in Laayoune and was reportedly before the 
Supreme Court in Rabat at year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and 
1.f.).
    On May 3, members of the ANDC and other unemployed persons in 
Meknes staged a sit-in before a local police station to protest the 
situation of the unemployed and alleged favoritism in local government 
hiring practices. According to press reports, city officials called in 
security forces, who used force to disperse the protesters. Twenty-
eight protesters were arrested and sent before the court of first 
instance on May 4. The court, without explanation, adjourned a morning 
hearing and sent the 28 back to the police station; the protesters were 
summoned to the court again in the afternoon, then released without 
charge (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In a May 17 communique, the OMDH 
criticized the Government's use of violence against unemployed 
graduates in various cities throughout the country, including at the 
Meknes sit-in.
    On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13 
students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in 
demonstrations on May 17-18 near the Marrakech University campus. The 
13, 8 of whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed 
gathering, assault with weapons, contempt of public servants exercising 
their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement. 
Two others were sentenced to 2 months in prison, and in June one more 
student was sentenced to 5 years in prison for setting fire to a public 
vehicle, damaging municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant 
exercising his duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained 
initially by police.
    Conflicting stories exist as to the origins of the large-scale 
demonstrations, in which large numbers of Marrakech police resorted to 
force to disperse dozens of mostly Sahrawi students, one of whom threw 
a Molotov cocktail that destroyed a police car. One of the detained 
students claimed to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected 
participation in the demonstrations, and displayed fresh cigarette 
burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections 
1.c., 1.e., and 2.b.).
    On June 13, police arrested two regional leaders of the independent 
Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT) outside the UMT's Rabat headquarters. 
Police arrested the leaders on the UMT's premises following a 
demonstration downtown by thousands of unemployed graduates associated 
with the ANDC (a group unaffiliated with the UMT, although some of its 
members also belong to the UMT). After security forces violently 
dispersed the ANDC demonstration and arrested 28 of the protesters, 
many ANDC members returned to the UMT's headquarters to regroup. 
Security forces then arrived, encircled the building, and restricted 
access to it. When the two UMT leaders left their union's building to 
observe the situation, they were taken away by police and reportedly 
held overnight. Both of the leaders later were released without charge. 
All 28 ANDC protesters who were arrested downtown earlier in the day 
later were released without charge.
    On June 18 in Rabat, security forces resorted to force, using 
truncheons and tear gas to disperse ANDC demonstrators and Group 314 
hunger strikers from the UMT's Rabat headquarters. Security forces 
reportedly arrested up to 100 protesters. Dozens of protesters were 
reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested were 
charged with ``using violence against agents of authority''; 19 
received suspended sentences and 3 received 2 months' imprisonment. 
Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an interministerial meeting on June 
19 to address the violence and condition of the unemployed population. 
Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the ANDC, which 
still is unrecognized by the Government. On July 5, the Group 314 
hunger strikers ended their 28-day strike after a meeting with the 
Government, in which both sides pledged to engage in a substantive 
dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    In early October, over the period of several days, the Government 
accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three 
French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who 
were reporting on a human rights demonstration at the notorious former 
secret detention center of Tazmamart (see Section 2.a.).
    There were confirmed reports that police arrested 21 strikers 
involved in a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in Agadir on 
November 27. All but one of the strikers later was released. Security 
forces reportedly used violent means to break up the strike, which 
reportedly resulted in the death of one worker and injuries to eight 
others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.b., and 6.e.).
    From December 9 to 11, security forces violently attacked human 
rights activists, JCO members, and unemployed graduates, who had been 
demonstrating in Rabat and other large cities for different reasons, 
and detained hundreds of persons. Most demonstrators were released 
shortly thereafter (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
    Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the 
Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted the AMDH during the year 
with accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, 
tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999, following 
his participation in a national truckers strike (see Sections 1.c., 
1.e., and 6.a.).
    In December 1999, Moroccan security forces who reportedly were sent 
from Rabat, detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune 
and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan and Agadir. 
Alleged to be spies for the Polisario, the three reportedly were held 8 
days before their appearance in an Agadir court and before their 
families were informed of their detention. Family members and the AMDH 
criticized the nature of the arrests, claiming them to be a violation 
of human rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances 
still occur in the country. In a public trial abruptly convened on May 
30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation, the 
three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the State 
and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison. In an appeals hearing on July 
5, all three were sentenced to 4 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). On 
September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained a fourth 
Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a flight. In 
August the Sahrawi was charged before the court of first instance in 
Agadir for spying for the Polisario Front and sentenced to 4 years in 
prison for threatening the internal security of the state (see Section 
1.e.).
    After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16. 
Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by Interior Minister 
Midaoui before Parliament that Yassine ``leaves and returns to his 
residence as he likes.'' Minister Midaoui also stated that Yassine was 
free to take his case to court if he felt that his rights were being 
abused. In February four members of Yassine's Justice and Charity 
Organization were arrested for distributing a defiant memorandum from 
Yassine to King Mohammed VI. All four were charged with ``violating the 
sacred institution of the Monarchy''; however, authorities later 
dropped the charges and released all four (see sections 2.a., 2.c., and 
2.d.).
    There are no known instances of forced exile. After King Mohammed 
VI took the throne in July 1999, formerly exiled political dissident 
Abraham Serfaty was allowed to return to the country in September of 
that year. Serfaty, a member of the (now defunct) Communist Party and a 
supporter of Western Saharan independence, was expelled from the 
country in 1991 after having spent 17 years as a political prisoner. In 
September Serfaty, a mining engineer by profession, was appointed by 
King Mohammed VI as counselor to the newly established office 
responsible for developing recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves in 
the eastern part of the country.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; although the courts historically have been and 
remain to some extent subject to extrajudicial pressures, including 
bribery and government influence, the Government continued to implement 
reforms intended to increase judicial independence and impartiality 
during the year. Despite such efforts, the Government was criticized by 
the Denmark-based Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the 
OMDH, and other groups for the slow pace of judicial reform. In January 
the Prime Minister announced plans to create an independent ombudsman 
that would investigate citizens' complaints and protect them from 
abuses involving the judiciary. The press reported in November, and the 
Ministry of Human Rights asserted, that the preparation of implementing 
legislation for the ombudsman post was nearing completion. According to 
press reports, in February Justice Minister Azziman reacted to 
accusations about the slow pace of reforms by calling upon the 
assistance of Supreme Court justices to increase and quicken the 
investigation of judges suspected of professional malfeasance. In March 
Azziman, through the High Council of the Magistrature, which often has 
been criticized by human rights organizations for the nontransparent 
nature of its deliberations, promoted a large number of judges whose 
records were considered exemplary, and disciplined a smaller number of 
judges. In November on public television Azziman reaffirmed the 
Government's commitment to reforming the judiciary. In 1998 Azziman had 
stated that judicial reform was his top priority, and addressed the 
issue of corruption by disbarring and disciplining a number of judges. 
With the encouragement of then-King Hassan II and the broad support of 
the business community, the Justice Minister in 1999 oversaw the 
creation of a system of commercial courts for business litigation to 
boost investor confidence. In the same year, the Ministry of Justice 
began to implement a 5-year reform plan that emphasized transparency, 
accountability, and professionalism as top priorities. During the past 
2 years, the administrative courts frequently have ruled against local 
governments that exceeded their authority.
    There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and 
district courts, courts of first instance, the Appeals Court, and the 
Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the 
Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special 
Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil servants who are 
implicated in corruption; administrative courts, which deal with the 
decisions of the bureaucracy; commercial courts, which deal with 
business disputes; and the military tribunal, for cases involving 
military personnel and, on certain occasions, matters pertaining to 
state security (although state security cases also may fall within the 
jurisdiction of the regular court system).
    Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary 
matters, family issues such as marriage, divorce, child support and 
custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges trained in Shari'a 
(Islamic law) as applied in the country. Judges considering criminal 
cases or cases in nonfamily areas of civil law generally are trained in 
the French legal tradition. All judges trained in recent years are 
graduates of the National Institute for Judicial Studies, where they 
undergo 3 years of study heavily focused on human rights and the rule 
of law. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and the 
majority of judges are not lawyers.
    In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first 
instance. If the infraction is minor and not contested, the judge may 
order the defendant released or impose a light sentence. If an 
investigation is required, the judge may release defendants on their 
own recognizance. According to reliable sources, cases often are 
adjudicated on the basis of confessions, some of which are obtained 
under duress.
    While appeal courts may in some cases be used as a second reference 
for courts of first instance, they primarily handle cases involving 
crimes punishable by 5 years or more in prison. In practice, defendants 
before appeals courts who are implicated in such crimes consequently 
have no method of appeal if a judgment goes against them. The Supreme 
Court does not review and rule on cases sent to it by courts of appeal; 
in its role as a court of cassation, the Supreme Court may overturn an 
appellate court's ruling on procedural grounds alone. The absence of 
appeals for defendants in such crimes therefore becomes more 
problematic given the fact that an investigation into the case by a 
``juge d'instruction'' (pretrial investigating judge) is only mandatory 
in those crimes punishable by sentences of life imprisonment or death.
    Justice Minister Azziman has stated that he would attempt to end 
petty corruption in the judiciary by increasing judges' salaries and 
ensuring punishment for bribe-takers, as well as attempt to end all 
informal and inappropriate influences on judicial decision-making in 
the court system. Nonetheless, the court system remains subject to 
extrajudicial pressures. Despite recent increases, salaries for both 
judges and their staffs remain modest; as a result, some observers 
allege that petty bribery remains a routine cost of court business. In 
some courts, especially in minor criminal cases, some observers allege 
that defendants or their families must pay bribes to court officers and 
judges to secure a favorable disposition.
    However, throughout the year, the national media reported on a 
number of arrests, convictions, and sentences of judicial officials for 
their role in petty corruption. Reports also indicated that the Special 
Court of Justice, despite its resource constraints, increasingly 
prosecuted public servants for corruption. In October at the 
recommendation of the Justice Ministry, the King approved new internal 
statutory regulations for the High Council of the Magistrature. 
According to press reports, the new regulations were implemented to 
strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
    After his appointment in 1997 by then-King Hassan II, Justice 
Minister Azziman began to reduce the judiciary's relationship with the 
Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, judges continue to work closely 
with the Interior Ministry's local network of officials, or ``caids'' 
(although as judicial police, caids technically fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry), who often legally are charged 
with the responsibility of questioning criminal defendants. Caids 
frequently prepare the written summary of an arrest and subsequent 
interrogation. The summary is admissible in court as an element of the 
evidentiary process and can carry great weight with the judge. After 
the new Justice Minister's appointment, the Ministry of Justice began 
to reassert its authority and control over judges.
    The law does not distinguish political and security cases from 
common criminal cases. In serious state security cases, communications 
between the Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct. At the 
Government's discretion, such cases may be brought before a specially 
constituted military tribunal, which is subservient to other branches 
of the Government, especially the military and the Ministry of 
Interior.
    Aside from external pressures, the court system also is subject to 
resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with 
less-serious offenses often receive only a cursory hearing, with judges 
relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government 
provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the 
offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed 
attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
    In 1999 Minister Azziman announced that in the preceding 12 months 
the judicial system had enforced judgments in 60,000 out of 100,000 
cases of civil litigation, which represented significant progress 
toward eliminating a persistent backlog. The Justice Ministry continued 
to make progress clearing this backlog during the year.
    In 1998 the OMDH issued a report that assessed the status of the 
judiciary. According to the OMDH, the Youssoufi administration took a 
series of steps to improve the court system, including rooting out 
high-level corruption, naming a new Director for Judicial 
Administration at the Justice Ministry, reactivating a Justice Ministry 
disciplinary body, publishing that body's deliberations and decisions, 
and organizing free and fair elections to that body. Nevertheless, the 
OMDH called for additional reforms, including changing laws to reduce 
the Justice Minister's prerogative to suspend judges through the High 
Council of the Magsitrature, revamping the Criminal Code (which the 
OMDH stated offers insufficient protection for a fair trial), 
strengthening the law on civil liberties, and compelling judges to 
place their assets in a blind trust. The OMDH also called on the State 
to punish those officials guilty of human rights abuses. Finally, the 
OMDH noted the lack of resources necessary for documentation tracking 
and for court facilities. At its fourth annual congress held in March, 
during which it distributed its annual human rights report for 2000, 
the OMDH called for the elimination of ``courts of exception'' 
(military tribunals, the Special Court of Justice, and the High Court), 
for the strengthening of judges' independence, and greater resources 
for the Justice Ministry.
    During the year, the courts handled an increasing number of cases 
that involved sensitive human rights issues, most of which were covered 
openly and extensively by national and international media. Trial 
subjects included freedom of the press, alleged Polisario Front 
espionage, and Sahrawi student demonstrations in the capital and 
Marrakech. Defense attorneys involved in these cases, most of whom were 
prominent human rights activists and members of the AMDH and OMDH, 
generally agreed that the majority of the judicial processes pertaining 
to the cases were marked by significant irregularities, and that these 
irregularities infringed on the rights to a fair trial for the accused.
    Mustapha Adib, a young air force captain, was incarcerated in 
December 1999 and tried before a military court for allegedly violating 
the Military Code and libeling the military. The authorities detained 
Adib after he spoke out against military corruption and harassment to a 
journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. On February 17, a 
military court convicted Adib after 4 days of proceedings during which 
the judge rejected nearly every legal motion advanced by the defense. 
The court denied the defense's requests that the court make the trial 
public, allow the defense to summon more than a dozen defense witnesses 
and present documentary evidence, and recuse one of the military 
judges, who was a former superior of Adib's. The judge whom the defense 
asked to be recused allegedly was responsible for blocking Adib's 
promotions after Adib made the allegations of corruption in a 1998 
letter to then-Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed (now King Mohammed VI).
    The military tribunal sentenced Adib to the maximum prison term of 
5 years and expelled him from the air force. Human rights activists 
criticized the unfair nature of the trial; the OMDH issued a report on 
February 21 contending that closed trials unjustly influenced the 
results and accused the court of partiality in refusing to recuse 
Adib's former superior. After deciding on a ``silent defense'' to 
protest the military court's conduct of the case, the attorney 
representing Adib characterized the trial as a ``travesty of justice.'' 
Following an appeal on procedural grounds lodged by Adib's attorney 
immediately following the end of the trial, and after Adib staged a 5-
day hunger strike in early May, the Supreme Court in June announced 
that it would review the case. On June 14, the Supreme Court overruled 
the military court and announced that the case would be retried by a 
new military tribunal composed of different judges. Adib's defense team 
called the decision a ``historic judgment.''
    A newly constituted military court in Rabat retried Adib's case in 
early October. After 3 days of hearings, during which the court again 
refused to hear witnesses requested by the defense and rejected 
multiple other defense motions, the military court found Adib guilty of 
the charges initially brought against him. The court reduced Adib's 
sentence to 2.5 years in prison and upheld his expulsion from the 
military. Adib's lawyer criticized the verdict as ``neither just nor 
equitable,'' and said that he would appeal the new verdict. On 
September 28, before the retrial began, the international NGO 
Transparency International recognized Captain Adib with one of its 
Integrity Awards for his courage in fighting corruption, which Adib's 
lawyer accepted for him in Canada. In early November, Amnesty 
International identified Adib as a ``prisoner of conscience.''
    On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of 
Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and 
10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their 
alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing event in Laayoune, 
which reliable sources say was spontaneous, unorganized, and lasted for 
only 5 minutes. The demonstration followed similar protests by Sahrawi 
students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities at the 
end of February and early March that security forces dispersed 
violently (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
    Attendees at the trial, including human rights activists and an 
attorney for the five defendants criticized the handling of the trial, 
particularly the court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who 
allegedly could have testified that at least two of the five defendants 
had been elsewhere at the time of the incident. In addition to the 
police reports, the court allegedly based its judgment on the testimony 
of two witnesses, one of whom reportedly could not positively identify 
the accused, and another who was not present at the trial, but who 
claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a youth throwing a bottle 
at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not present any physical 
evidence, nor did it present any witness who could testify that the 
five accused were the ones who had thrown the bottle. The authorities 
claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles, including one 
belonging to peacekeepers from the U.N. MINURSO contingent based in 
Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the youth were 
acquitted of the arson charge during the trial.
    A lawyer for the youths, who maintained the prosecution did not 
prove an incriminating act, said that ``the verdict had nothing to do 
with justice.'' The lawyer also alleged that the judicial police 
investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by unlawfully 
entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing the accused 
during their detention, and forcing the accused under duress to sign 
police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which they 
claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed to the court of 
appeals in Laayoune and then reportedly to the Supreme Court in Rabat; 
no final ruling had been made by year's end. Families of the five 
Sahrawi youth also sent a letter to the Royal Palace in May requesting 
a royal pardon (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
    On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13 
students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in a riot 
on May 17 and 18 near their university campus. The 13 students, 8 of 
whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed gathering, 
assault with weapons, contempt of public servants while exercising 
their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement. 
Two others were sentenced to 2 months, and in June one more student was 
sentenced to 5 years for setting fire to a public vehicle, damaging 
municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant exercising his 
duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained by police 
initially. According to one of the lawyers representing the students, 
judicial authorities showed little concern for the need to respect due 
process throughout the investigation of the events and the trial. There 
were no arrest warrants and no evidence was presented against any of 
those charged except the police statement of facts, which none of the 
defendants had signed (all had been forced to provide their thumbprint 
on the statement in lieu of a signature). The lawyers were not allowed 
to present evidence in court that could have exonerated their clients. 
For example, one of those convicted claimed that he had not been in 
Marrakech during the events. He was not allowed to present the 
testimony of friends in another city with whom he said he had been 
visiting.
    Students involved in the demonstrations and press reports claimed 
that after an initial encounter between students and police, both the 
police and students called in reinforcements to their respective sides. 
A sit-in of roughly 60 students (not all Sahrawis) in the public street 
in front of their residence then was held, which police reportedly 
broke up by force after negotiations failed. When another sit-in was 
organized, the police again forcibly dispersed students and arrested 
several dozen (not all Sahrawis). Lawyers for the 13 defendants 
appealed the court's conviction of their clients. According to Sahrawis 
and Sahrawi defense lawyers in Rabat, an appellate court in Marrakesh 
at the end of the summer upheld the original conviction. However, the 
court reduced all of the 3-year sentences by 1 year each. Among those 
detained by the police was a young Sahrawi student who claimed to have 
been tortured by two police officers in an isolated area near the 
university campus. The Sahrawi displayed fresh marks from cigarette 
burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections 
1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    During the late evening of May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14 
students at Mohammed V University and charged them with arson, violence 
against the police, erecting barricades, and impeding free movement. 
The students, 12 of whom were Sahrawis, had participated earlier in the 
evening in a solidarity protest for fellow Sahrawi students who had 
been arrested that morning in Marrakech. The detained students 
reportedly admitted to staging two sit-ins in solidarity with their 
peers in Marrakech, but denied, as alleged by the authorities, any use 
of force or violence against the police who arrested them. The police 
contended that the students refused to disperse, then threw rocks at 
them and their vehicles. According to students, near midnight the same 
evening, police squads returned to the university, entered it, set up 
checkpoints, detained students without identity cards, and broke into 
dormitories in search of those who participated in the sit-ins earlier 
in the day.
    According to a lawyer who represented 13 of the accused students, 
one of his clients said that police took him to an unidentified 
location after his arrest, beat him severely, and interrogated him 
regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawi and human rights 
activists. Noting his client's difficulty in speaking in court and 
drawing attention to his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer requested 
the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical examination of 
his client, which the judge refused. According to the lawyer, after 
their arrest, the students were held incommunicado longer than the 
legal limit of 48 hours, and nobody was informed of their whereabouts 
during this time, as required by law. At preliminary legal proceedings 
on May 22 at the Rabat court of appeals, all 14 of the accused 
reportedly denied violent acts during the demonstration; however, in 
three of the police reports submitted to the court, three of the 
accused allegedly had admitted to violent acts. None of the depositions 
by the accused were signed; all were marked only by the defendants' 
thumbprints. After a series of hearings and delays, on November 17, the 
Rabat court of appeals acquitted and freed all 14 students who were 
detained in mid-May. According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the 
detained students denied before the court any involvement in the 
demonstration. The prosecution reportedly failed to produce any 
witnesses who could confirm the students' participation in the May 17 
incident (see Section 1.c.).
    On October 27, 10 students at the University of Hassan I in Settat 
were tried for their involvement in the October 23 demonstrations that 
police broke up violently (see Section 2.b.). Each of the 10 students 
reportedly declared before the court that they were forced under duress 
and torture to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements. 
According to a PPS political party communique, two of its members 
involved in the incident ``were victims of grave physical cruelty'' 
during their transfer to the police station and during their detention. 
The defendants' lawyers unsuccessfully requested that the case be 
dropped on the grounds that the judicial police had not, as mandated by 
law, notified family members of the students' arrest. The court 
reportedly also refused the defense's request to have the students 
examined by a doctor, as is permissible by law if signs of physical 
distress are visible. At the end of the day-long trial, the Settat 
court of first instance found all 10 students guilty of the charges and 
sentenced them to from 3 to 5 months in prison (three were given 
suspended sentences). Following an appeal lodged by defense lawyers, on 
November 9, the Settat court of appeal reduced the sentences of the 
seven students sent to prison, reducing four of them from 5 to 3 months 
and three of them from 3 to 2 months.
    In an abruptly convened trial, 14 students who had been arrested 
during violent clashes between students and police at Mohammedia 
University on November 21 were convicted of disturbance of public order 
and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to 
$150 (500 to 1,500 dirhams). The alleged victims of the students' 
vandalism did not appear at the trial to testify or be cross-examined 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    The Government pressed charges against 33 human rights activists 
who were involved in a protest before Parliament on December 9: the 
trial was scheduled for February 2001 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 
2.b., and 4).
    In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were 
dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city 
of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan 
and Agadir. Alleged to be spies serving the Polisario Front, the three 
reportedly were held for 8 days before their appearance in an Agadir 
court and before their families were informed of their detention. 
Family members and the AMDH denounced the nature of the arrests, 
calling them a violation of human rights, due process, and proof that 
forced disappearances still occurred in Morocco. In a public trial 
convened on May 30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police 
investigation that was originally to be heard by a military tribunal, 
the three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the 
state and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison by Agadir's court of 
first instance. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at the request 
of the public prosecutor all three were given the same sentence of 4 
years. The abrupt convening of the public trial at the end of May also 
coincided with the decision of judicial authorities to change the 
jurisdiction of the case from the court of appeals to the court of 
first instance. (The court of first instance deals with lesser crimes 
punishable by sentences of 5 years and less; the court of appeals with 
serious crimes involving sentences of 5 years and more.) According to a 
lawyer representing the Sahrawis, during the trial the three accused 
denied any relations with the Polisario Front, contradicting 
confessions allegedly made during their detention (see Sections 1.b. 
and 1.d.). On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained 
a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a 
flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who 
witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away 
with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days 
later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and also was charged before the 
court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days 
later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for 
threatening the internal security of the state.
    Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the 
Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted AMDH during the year with 
accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured, 
and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his 
participation in a national truckers strike. Arrested and jailed on 
charges of forming a criminal gang and setting fire to a vehicle, El-
Kihal alleged that security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate 
(Oujda province) tortured him and wrote a false police report that they 
forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without allowing him to read 
it first. ElKihal contests that it was this police report that formed 
the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of appeals, which 
sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. El-Kihal subsequently benefited 
from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
and 6.a.).
    During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security 
forces attacked the UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314 
members were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. Using tear gas and 
batons, security forces violently cleared all demonstrators from the 
area, arresting up to 100 protesters and evacuating the hunger 
strikers, who had been forced out by tear gas. Dozens of protesters 
were reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested, 
most of whom were ANDC members, were charged with ``using violence 
against agents of authority.'' During their trial in July, 30 lawyers 
representing the 22 defendants withdrew after the tribunal refused 
their--and allegedly the prosecution's--request to summon witnesses. In 
a press conference following their withdrawal, the lawyers said 
``necessary conditions for a fair trial were absent.'' One lawyer 
defending the ANDC members said that there were multiple procedural 
errors in the conduct of the judicial investigation and the trial. The 
lawyer also claimed that all of the police statements regarding the 
defendants contained falsehoods, and that none of them had been signed. 
After the lawyers withdrew, the defendants refused to participate in 
the trial. The tribunal subsequently closed the proceedings to the 
public and proceeded to sentence all 22 defendants. Nineteen of the 
defendants received 2-month suspended sentences and $50 (500 dirhams) 
fines and three were sentenced to 2 months in prison and $50 (500 
dirhams) fines (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    During and following public demonstrations in the Western Sahara 
city of Laayoune in September 1999, more than 150 persons were detained 
by police authorities. Most were released within a matter of days; 
however, 26 persons were tried on criminal charges for actions in 
connection with the protests and sentenced to imprisonment for periods 
ranging from 10 to 15 years. The OMDH claimed that the trial of these 
persons was unfair and insisted that the defendants were not provided 
adequate legal counsel for their defense. By year's end, none of the 26 
persons convicted in 1999 had their sentences reduced or overturned 
(see Sections 1.f. and 2.b.).
    The Government continued to hold a number of political prisoners. 
According to the AMDH and OMDH, seven political prisoners remained in 
detention at year's end. In January King Mohammed VI pardoned 2,000 
prisoners, 1 of whom was Arsalan Samouzi, a political prisoner who was 
sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for insulting the royal family 
during the reign of King Hassan II. The official Moroccan press agency, 
MAP, quoted the Justice Minister as saying in a July 23 television 
interview that there are no more political prisoners in detention. In 
the past, the Ministry of Interior claimed that there were 55 Islamists 
serving sentences for offenses that ranged from arms smuggling in the 
1980's to participating in a bomb attack on a hotel in Marrakech in 
1994. In the past, there also were claims that some of these Islamists 
were imprisoned solely for calling for an Islamic state during the 
1980's. The AMDH claims that 2 members of the ``Group of 26,'' an 
Islamist group involved in smuggling arms into the country from Algeria 
in the mid-1980's, remain in prison. The other 24 members completed 
their sentences or otherwise were released at various times between 
1994 and the end of the year. Various international human rights 
groups' estimates of the number of persons in prison for advocating 
independence for the Western Sahara vary from none to 700. Amnesty 
International lists dozens of persons whom it considers to be political 
prisoners. According to several human rights organizations, achieving 
consensus on a definitively accurate number of political prisoners is 
extremely difficult, mainly because conditions in the Western Sahara 
complicate attempts to confirm whether Sahrawis were imprisoned solely 
for their political affiliation or open advocacy of Western Saharan 
independence, or whether they were imprisoned for other actions in 
violation of the law. The AMDH claims that it knows of no persons 
imprisoned for having overtly advocating Western Saharan independence.
    Although the Government claims that it no longer holds political 
prisoners, it permits international humanitarian organizations to visit 
prisoners whom such organizations consider to be imprisoned for 
political reasons.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable 
and that no search or investigation may take place without a search 
warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by 
a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignore these 
provisions. Security forces allegedly entered homes in pursuit of 
persons associated with a strike at a water-bottling factory in 
February (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). One of the 
lawyers representing five Sahrawi youths who were sentenced to jail 
terms for their alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing 
incident in Laayoune, alleged that the judicial police who investigated 
the affair committed several illegal acts, including unlawfully 
entering homes of the youths (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
    During protests in Laayoune in the Western Sahara in September and 
October 1999, police reportedly encouraged local thugs to break into, 
loot, and destroy private shops. Following the protests in October 
1999, police unlawfully entered homes to arrest persons associated with 
the demonstrations. Human rights NGO's claimed that such police actions 
created a ``climate of fear'' in the city, forcing some families to 
flee the city or change residences nightly to avoid such police 
actions. There reportedly was no official investigation into such 
government actions by year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 
2.a.).
    Government security services monitor certain persons and 
organizations, both foreign and Moroccan, and government informers 
monitor activities on university campuses.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression; however, the Government systematically 
restricted press freedom regarding a few topics that the Government 
considers sensitive, and appeared to increase restrictions on some 
other topics with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's 
international image. Nonetheless, newspapers and weeklies from across 
the political spectrum, from Socialist to nationalist to Islamist, 
publish freely, and the Government permitted extensive coverage during 
the year of formerly taboo topics.
    The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press 
(MAP), and the Arabic daily Al-Anbaa. The Government also supports two 
semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
language Assahra. In addition the Government provides subsidies to the 
rest of the press through price supports for newsprint and office 
space. A 1958 decree grants the Government the authority to register 
and license domestic newspapers and journals. Authorities may use the 
licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they 
believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending 
publications may be declared a danger to state security and seized, the 
publisher's license suspended, and equipment destroyed. The Ministry of 
Interior may control foreign publications by collecting ``banned'' 
publications after they have been distributed. There were multiple 
reports that authorities pressured domestic-based printers not to print 
several newspapers, including two belonging to the JCO. In addition, 
the administrators of the new weekly publication Demain alleged in 
April that the authorities attempted to block the printing of their 
publication because of its investigative editorial line. According to 
Demain's administrators, the alleged attempt to influence the 
magazine's editorial line led them to move the weekly's printing 
operations to Spain. The media continue to engage regularly in self-
censorship to avoid the Government's attention and possible sanctions.
    The Press Code empowers the Minister of Interior to confiscate 
publications that are judged offensive by the Government. Under the 
code, the Prime Minister may order the indefinite suspension of a 
publication. The Press Code also empowers the Government to censor 
newspapers directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or 
events. In most past instances, government control of the media 
generally has been exercised through directives and ``guidance'' from 
the Ministry of Interior. However, during the year, the Government 
fined several journalists for articles that they had published, and 
sentenced one to prison. The King subsequently pardoned the journalist 
who was sentenced to prison, and the fines issued against the other 
journalists allegedly later were dropped. The Government generally 
tolerates satirical and often stinging editorials in the opposition 
parties' dailies. However, both law and tradition historically have 
prohibited criticism on three topics: The Monarchy, Morocco's claim to 
the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam.
    There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign newspapers, 
magazines, and journals in circulation during the year.
    Prior to Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine's release after 11 years of 
house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of 
then-King Hassan II, the Government on February 5 temporarily 
confiscated from newsstands in major cities several newspapers that 
contained a 19-page memorandum addressed by Yassine in late January to 
King Mohammed VI, in which Yassine asked the King to return to the 
populace the wealth that he alleged that the King's late father had 
stolen from the country. However, the Government permitted the three 
publications to be put back on the newsstands the same day. On February 
8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari declared that the 
memorandum was not banned, that it was available on the Internet, and 
that the concerned newspapers were back in circulation. Messari 
reportedly said that the confiscation was ``incidental,'' and that 
censorship was absurd and no longer practiced in the country. Four 
members of the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the 
memorandum in Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were 
charged with ``violating the sacred institution of the Monarchy.'' 
According to the AMDH, by February 7 the authorities had dropped the 
charges and released all four (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.).
    The Government banned the distribution of the February 15-21 
edition of the Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent weekly magazine. The weekly 
contained a letter by a Moroccan political scientist living abroad, 
which criticized the reign of King Hassan II and challenged King 
Mohammed VI to devote greater effort to much-needed reforms. According 
to press reports, civilian authorities from a Casablanca commisariat 
asked the national distributor of Jeune Afrique in Morocco not to 
distribute the issue. In the main editorial column in the subsequent 
edition of Jeune Afrique, the editors stated that they interpreted the 
commissariat's request as a ban and decided to withdraw its 8,000 
copies from Morocco rather than wait for its local distributor to 
receive the written prohibition order it had requested from the 
authorities; the distributor reportedly never received the order. On 
February 16, Communication Minister Messari sent a letter to the 
distributor demanding to know who in the Government had banned the 
issue, claiming that the Communication Ministry was not involved. The 
Government never established who gave the order to the local 
commissariat.
    The Government banned the distribution of the March 4 issue of the 
French daily newspaper Le Figaro. The issue contained an article about 
the fate of the late Mehdi Ben Barka, former National Union of Popular 
Forces (UNFP--later to become USFP) party founding member and secretary 
general who reportedly was killed in Paris in 1965 by French thugs, 
allegedly at the request of the Moroccan secret service. The source of 
the article reportedly at the time was a physician of thenKing Hassan 
II. Although the Government gave no formal statement explaining the 
ban, on May 5 then-Communication Minister Messari commented at a U.N. 
Education and Science Organization (UNESCO)sponsored seminar on human 
rights that ``I banned the Le Figaro issue ... because it contained 
defamation threatening to a cause of our national history.''
    On April 15, police at Marrakech airport seized and prevented the 
distribution of two related leading weekly investigative newspapers, 
the French-language Le Journal and its Arabiclanguage counterpart 
Assahifa, after their arrival from printers in France. The two domestic 
publications were banned at the orders of Prime Minister Youssoufi 
after Le Journal published an interview that its editor in chief held 
with Mohammed Abdelaziz, leader of the Polisario Front. The 
Government's ban of the publications coincided with the visit to the 
country of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. The 
Government explained the ban in a Communication Ministry communique the 
same day, characterizing Le Journal's interview with Abdelaziz ``an 
event organized by certain milieus hostile to our country (and) in 
homage to the separatist (Sahrawi) impudence.'' The communique also 
cited as explanation ``the extension of constant excesses in the 
editorial line of the two publications with regard to the handling of 
the question of our territorial integrity.''
    Aboubakr Jamai, editor in chief of Le Journal, criticized the 
government decision to censor the newspaper, claiming that other 
Moroccan publications recently had published similar articles 
containing material from interviews with the Polisario Front leader. At 
a press conference convened on April 17 by Le Journal's and Assahifa's 
parent corporation, Mediatrust, Jamai expressed concern that the ban 
likely had more to do with his paper's aggressive reporting on other 
topics. On April 17, the board of directors of the state-run television 
station 2M fired the station's top three officials for, according to 
Communication Minister Larbi Messari, having made a ``professional 
mistake'' during an April 14 broadcast. The professional mistake is 
widely believed to have been the station's televised reference in its 
evening newscast to Le Journal's controversial interview with Polisario 
Front leader Abdelaziz. On April 29, government spokesperson Khalid 
Alioua apologized for the ban of Assahifa, calling it an error. Unlike 
in Le Journal, Assahifa contained no reference to the interview with 
Abdelaziz. On April 19, the AMDH reacted to the bans of the two 
newspapers and the firing of 2M's leadership by issuing a communique 
criticizing decisions that ``gravely threaten the freedom of the 
press.''
    On April 26, a Casablanca court convicted Mustapha Alaoui, the 
editor of the Arabic-language daily Al-Ousbou, of libel and defamation 
of Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa, for a controversial article 
Alaoui published that alleged financial misfeasance in a real estate 
matter involving Benaissa while the latter served abroad as an 
ambassador. The court sentenced Alaoui to 3 months in prison, forbade 
him to practice journalism for 3 years and ordered him to pay 
approximately $100,000 (1,000,000 dirhams) in damages to Benaissa and a 
$2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On April 27, Khalid Mechbal, the editor 
of the Tangiers-based weekly news publication Al-Shamal, also was 
convicted of libel and defamation in a case lodged by Benaissa for 
publishing a similar article. Mechbal received a 6-month suspended jail 
term, was forbidden from practicing journalism for 1 year, and was 
ordered to pay an approximately $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On May 3, 
another court convicted Alaoui of libel and defamation for an article 
he published concerning Fouad Filali, the estranged former brotherin-
law of King Mohammed VI; Alaoui was sentenced a 3-month suspended jail 
term and ordered to pay approximately $10,000 (100,000 dirhams) in 
damages and a $500 (5,000 dirhams) fine.
    Journalists and human rights activists protested the court's 
decision to invoke statutes from the Criminal Code--rather than the 
Press Code--to punish the editors and ban them from exercising their 
profession. The Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM) stated in an April 
27 communique that ``the pronouncement of prison terms in issues of 
publishing and the press flagrantly contradicts the rule of law and the 
freedom of expression.'' On May 3, human rights activists and 
journalists demonstrated in front of the Communication Ministry to 
express their concerns about the convictions and other press censorship 
cases. Mustapha Alaoui stated that ``not even in the time of the French 
protectorate had a Moroccan journalist ever been forbidden from 
exercising his profession.''
    After immediately appealing the Casablanca court's decision, Alaoui 
and Mechbal learned in late May that the King had pardoned them, and 
allowed them to return to their professions without serving time in 
jail. However, they still were obligated to pay the damages and the 
fines. On July 6, while Alaoui awaited an appellate hearing to 
determine the issue of damages and fines, the authorities banned 
Alaoui's newspaper from publication, and forbade Casablanca printers 
from printing it. According to press reports, on July 31, the 
Casablanca court of appeal accepted reciprocal requests from lawyers 
representing Alaoui and Benaissa to withdraw Alaoui's appeal and 
Benaissa's civil litigation. The press reports indicated that the court 
of appeal also reduced Alaoui's $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine to $100 
(1,000 dirhams); however, independent sources alleged that Alaoui's 
fine was dropped altogether, as were the damages that he originally was 
ordered to pay to Benaissa in April.
    On May 15, the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (Reporters 
Sans Frontieres--RSF) criticized Morocco for banning seven local and 
foreign newspapers, and appealed to King Mohammed VI to ensure press 
freedom. The International Committee to Protect Journalists also raised 
the same concerns in a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi in the 
spring.
    According to press reports in late May and early July, the 
authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers, Al-Adl 
Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa, associated with Sheikh Yassine's 
Justice and Charity Organization. The authorities reportedly ordered 
printers of the two newspapers to suspend their distribution (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.). In September the directors of the two 
publications delivered to human right organizations and the press a 
letter that claimed that government authorities had issued 
administrative orders against the publication and sale of the two 
newspapers. The directors also stated that various printers had been 
threatened and pressured not to print the newspapers.
    In its June 23-29 issue, the independent weekly Le Journal reported 
that the secretary general of RSF had written a letter to Interior 
Minister Midaoui protesting the Government's ``heavy surveillance'' of 
a visiting French journalist, and its confiscation of the reporter's 
videocassette tapes as he was leaving Rabat airport. The secretary 
general asked Minister Midaoui to ``provide him with explanations'' of 
the Government's actions. The French journalist allegedly was writing 
an investigative article about Mehdi Ben Barka, a leftist political 
leader allegedly kidnapped and murdered in Paris in 1965 by French 
thugs at the request of the Moroccan secret service.
    During a protest by disabled unemployed university graduates on 
September 12, police reportedly attempted to remove the camera 
equipment of one photojournalist covering the demonstration, and 
jostled and threatened other news correspondents on the scene (see 
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    In its September 23-29 edition, Le Journal reported that government 
authorities banned the distribution of a September issue of the London-
based magazine The Economist, which contained a report on Morocco's 
August announcement of new oil finds in the eastern part of the 
country. The Economist report questioned the scale of the findings as 
announced by the Government. A local representative of The Economist 
confirmed the banning.
    On October 4, at a press briefing convened by the Government, 
Interior Minister Midaoui publicly threatened Aboubakr Jamai, the 
director of Le Journal, warning against publishing sensitive stories 
related to Mohammed Abdelaziz, the leader of the Polisario Front. 
Midaoui threatened to ban Le Journal again if the newspaper conducted 
and published more such interviews. RSF responded to the incident with 
a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi, which related the NGO's concerns 
about the recent decline in press freedoms.
    In early October, over the period of several days, the Government 
accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three 
French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who 
were reporting on a government-authorized human rights demonstration at 
the notorious former secret detention center of Tazmamart. Despite 
their possession of two authorization papers from the Government to 
tape throughout the country, the journalists were stopped by security 
forces after they had taped the former detention center the morning 
before the October 7 demonstration. (Other domestic and international 
media later filmed the same footage without incident.) Local justice 
officials summoned the FR3 journalists to a nearby tribunal on October 
8, but the journalists refused the officials' request to hand over the 
material that had been taped at Tazmamart. The journalists then were 
placed under house arrest in the city of Er-Rachidia by security forces 
and kept under surveillance. During this time, the authorities 
confiscated the journalists' video material, passports, and personal 
belongings, and accused them of ``violating military secrets'' for 
videotaping Tazmamart (which became a military weapons depot after the 
secret detention center closed in 1991). After French officials 
intervened, the authorities released the three journalists on October 
9. Before leaving the country, the journalists signed a document 
agreeing to return to cooperate with the legal investigation of the 
affair. One of the FR3 journalists who was detained was Joseph Tual, 
the French journalist who had been monitored in June and whose video 
material then also was confiscated by security forces at Rabat airport.
    On November 4, the Government withdrew the accreditation and 
ordered the expulsion of Claude Juvenal, a Morocco-based French 
correspondent for Agence France Presse (AFP). According to MAP, a 
source from the Ministry of Culture and Communication stated that 
Juvenal had ``breached professional ethics by engaging in initiatives 
hostile to Morocco and its institutions.'' According to the 
semiofficial daily newspaper Le Matin du Sahara, Juvenal had ``for 
several years continually, and in sheer bad faith, cast doubt on, 
criticized and misrepresented every initiative and reform undertaken by 
Morocco.'' Juvenal's expulsion resulted in a strong negative reaction 
from domestic and international media. The SNPM issued a communique 
protesting the expulsion, stating that the authorities' justification 
for the expulsion ``remains ambiguous and hence unacceptable.'' The 
SNPM in its communiques and the RSF claimed that the expulsion 
illustrated growing intolerance by the authorities toward press 
freedom. A group of Morocco-based Spanish journalists wrote a letter to 
Minister of Culture and Communication Mohammed Achaari, in which they 
expressed their concerns that similar measures could be taken ``at any 
moment against other journalists'' and informed the Minister that they 
were seeking the protection of the Spanish Government and the European 
Union for themselves. Minister Achaari refused to explain the reasons 
for the expulsion when he was asked on national television.
    On December 2, Prime Minister Youssoufi banned indefinitely three 
independent weekly publications known for their politically sensitive 
investigative reports. The Prime Minister banned the French weekly 
publications Le Journal and Demain and the Arabic weekly Assahifa, a 
sister publication of Le Journal, after they published or commented on 
a 1974 letter alleging that Youssoufi had participated in coup plotting 
with other leftist leaders and the military against then-King Hassan II 
in 1972. In banning the three publications, Youssoufi used the highly 
controversial and long-criticized Article 77 of the Press Code, which 
allows both the Prime Minister and Interior Minister to ban any 
publication that ``threatens the kingdom's political and religious 
foundations.'' At their press conference on December 3, the three 
editors in chief of the banned publications criticized the banning as 
``a manifestation of intellectual terrorism.'' The SNPM denounced the 
ban and the application of Article 77, urging the Government to 
reconsider its decision and to reform the entire Press Code. The AMDH 
also protested the ban, calling it a violation of the Constitution and 
international conventions on human rights. International NGO's 
criticized the banning as well. RSF called attention to the fact that 
Youssoufi had promised to defend press freedoms upon assuming office in 
1998, including revision of the entire Press Code. In mid-December, two 
of the three weeklies filed a lawsuit against the government at the 
administrative court of Rabat. In the meantime, Le Journal filed 
paperwork to establish a new publication; approval of the application 
was still pending at year's end.
    Also in mid-December, the Government confiscated and prevented 
distribution of the December 14-20 printed issue of the international 
publication Courier International. The publication contained four pages 
of articles written by the editors in chief of the three domestic 
weeklies banned indefinitely by Youssoufi on December 2. In their 
articles, the editors in chief attacked the Prime Minister's decision 
to shut down their publications. The electronic versions of the 
articles were available in the country on Courier International's 
Internet web site.
    Police reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment 
during their December 9 and 10 violent dispersions of human rights 
activists and JCO members in Rabat and other large cities (see Sections 
1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., and 4).
    In general press articles containing unflattering material that 
routinely had been prevented from circulation in past years, with the 
exception of those related to the topics the Government still considers 
sensitive, were permitted free circulation during the year. These 
included reports on corruption in the Government and military, 
financial scandals at public institutions, sensitive human rights-
related court cases, torture, violence against women, the exploitation 
of child maids, prostitution, poverty, abandoned children, and harsh 
conditions inside prisons.
    In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it 
distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for 
the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former 
torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary 
detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le 
Journal. Agence France Presse then distributed the list of names abroad 
through its wire services. Some of the listed names were high-ranking 
officials currently holding office. In the letter, the AMDH called for 
``the truth and pursuit of those responsible for disappearances.'' The 
AMDH also criticized the Justice Ministry for its alleged 
nonintervention in past cases of torture and disappearance (see Section 
1.c.).
    Also in October, the Government lifted its 17-year ban on the book 
``For Bread Alone'' (``Le Pain Nu'') by the Moroccan writer Mohammed 
Choukri. The book had been banned during King Hassan II's reign 
reportedly for its sexually explicit overtones.
    Throughout the year, journalists, NGO's, and human rights activists 
increased their calls on the Government to enact a new public liberties 
law, which Prime Minister Youssoufi announced that he would enact when 
he assumed power in 1998. In January 1999, 42 NGO's addressed a 
memorandum to the Prime Minister proposing amendments to the law that 
governs the press, associations, and public gatherings. Their proposals 
were aimed at easing current restrictions and giving associations more 
freedom to organize and function. The present Public Liberties Law 
dates from 1958, and many legal observers agree that the sole amendment 
to the law, which was ratified in 1973, constituted a setback to civil 
liberties. The amendment apparently introduced restrictions that 
established firmer government control over the legal establishment of 
associations and the associations' scope of action once they are 
recognized legally and allowed to operate. In January before 
Parliament, Youssoufi announced his intention to open a debate on the 
law. However, unsatisfied with what it perceived to be the Government's 
slow handling of the issue, the NGO network Espace Associatif held a 
large roundtable conference in March in which it discussed reform of 
the law and urged the Government to act more quickly and transparently. 
In an April communique following the censorship of Le Journal and 
Assahifa, the AMDH demanded ``the immediate modification of the Public 
Liberties Law and abrogation of all constraints that hinder freedom of 
the press.'' At the same time, the OMDH issued a communique expressing 
frustration at the Government's slow progress with respect to the 
reforms that the OMDH had called for on numerous occasions. In May the 
Moroccan Barrister's Association also called for reform of the Public 
Liberties Law.
    In July and November, the King announced in two nationally 
televised speeches that the Government was preparing legislation for 
reforming the Public Liberties Law. Prime Minister Youssoufi's Cabinet 
discussed draft legislation and reviewed a draft in mid-December. The 
SNPM on December 19 rejected the draft Press Code contained in the 
three-part legislation on the grounds that the SNPM had not been 
consulted during the code's formulation. The SNPM claimed that the 
draft text still permitted the Government to seize, confiscate, and ban 
publications, and to punish those convicted of libel and defamation 
with jail sentences. Domestic media and human rights activists long 
have criticized these central provisions, which widely are perceived to 
repress and stifle the freedom of expression. No final decisions were 
made by year's end regarding the pubic liberties legislation. Before 
presenting the draft legislation to the Cabinet in December, Prime 
Minister Youssoufi presided over two interministerial discussions of 
the law in May and July.
    The Government controls Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM) 
broadcasts. Another major broadcaster is the French-backed Medi-1, 
which operates from Tangier and broadcasts throughout Morocco and other 
parts of North Africa. While nominally private and independent, Medi-1 
practices self-censorship, as do other media outlets. The Government 
owns the only television stations whose broadcasts may be received in 
most parts of the nation without decoders or satellite dish antennas. 
In 1996 the Government purchased a majority share in 2M, formerly the 
country's sole private station, which can be received in most urban 
areas. The ostensible reason for the Government's action was to save 2M 
from bankruptcy; the Government now owns 68 percent of 2M stock, and 
the Minister of Communication, by virtue of his position, has become 
the chairman of the board. A government-appointed committee monitors 
broadcasts. Privatization of these stations continued to be a major 
topic of political debate during the year, and the Government announced 
in 1998 that it was preparing a plan for 2M's resale to the private 
sector.
    In its October 28-November 3 issue, the independent magazine Demain 
reported that since July the Government had censored five broadcasts of 
a local news team that worked for the Qatari satellite television 
station Al-Jazira. According to Demain's and other press reports, 
spokesmen for the government-controlled television stations stated that 
the censored broadcasts (of domestic news items) were ``technical 
problems'' experienced during satellite transmissions. In late October, 
the SNPM criticized what it perceived to be a ban on the Qatari 
station, charging that the government-controlled television stations 
allowed other Arabic television stations to broadcast from the country. 
The Government had recalled its ambassador to Qatar in mid-July, 
allegedly in diplomatic retaliation for the Qatari Government's votes 
against Morocco's bid to host the 2006 World Cup and its bid for the 
presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The 
Government also allegedly was concerned over what it perceived to be 
several negative reports on Morocco that recently were produced by Al-
Jazira.
    For the past 13 years, the popular humorist Ahmed Snoussi (also 
known as Bziz) has been prohibited from performing in the country due 
to his satire of those in power. While the authorities allowed Bziz to 
perform at the Mohammed V Theater in Rabat during the summer, he still 
is prohibited from performing live on television. He also faces 
restrictions on performing on university campuses. In November the 
authorities reportedly prevented him from accepting students' 
invitations to perform at universities in both Rabat and Tangiers.
    In April Reuters news services reported the lifting of a 13-year 
ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high-security 
prison. According to the author, Abdelkader Chaoui, his book ``The 
Unachieved Past'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The 
book described the harsh conditions of the Kenitra prison in which 
Chaoui was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his 
leftist political opinions (see Section 1.c.). In November in 
Marrakesh, the King awarded Chaoui a literary prize for his most recent 
novel.
    After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16. 
Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by the Minister of 
Interior before Parliament that the Sheikh ``leaves and returns to his 
residence as he likes.'' The Minister also stated that Sheik Yassine 
was free to take his case to court if he felt his rights were being 
abused. Yassine's books, articles, and audio cassettes were sold only 
at some bookstores; however, editorials calling for his release prior 
to the Government's action were published without impediment (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.b., 2.c., and 2.d.).
    In May the wire service Agence France Presse and the French daily 
newspaper Le Monde reported that Government had banned the book 
``Letter from Morocco,'' which was written by Christine Serfaty, the 
wife of former political dissident Abraham Serfaty (who was allowed to 
return to Morocco in September 1999 after 8 years of exile and 17 years 
of imprisonment). According to the two sources, the preface of 
Serfaty's book allegedly caused advisors at the Royal Palace to ban its 
distribution; the preface referred to Serfaty's collaboration with a 
French author on a controversial book, ``Notre Ami Le Roi,'' which has 
been banned in Morocco since it was published in 1990 for its criticism 
of the rule of then-King Hassan II. In an interview given by Abraham 
Serfaty to Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent in September, the former exile 
claimed that his wife's book had not been banned, but rather 
``bookstores (in Morocco) that would like to import the book still 
cannot.'' In October Christine Serfaty claimed in an interview with 
Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent that she did not believe that a banning was 
in effect because she had received copies of her book from abroad 
through the postal system. However, she said that Moroccan bookstores 
that ordered her book still were waiting to receive it from the 
national distributor. The distributor reportedly sent the book to the 
government agency responsible for reviewing publications before their 
entry onto the market. The agency had yet to release the book to the 
distributor by year's end.
    Also in May, the Government permitted the local publication and 
sale of a comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and 
illustrated by Abdelaziz Mouride, a former leftist student whom the 
authorities arbitrarily detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in 
prison, and then freed in 1984, the comic book vividly recounts the 
torture, injustice, and humiliation that he and other political 
dissidents suffered at the hands of the authorities (see Section 1.c.).
    Dish antennas permit free access to a wide variety of foreign 
broadcasts and are available at low cost on the market. The antennas 
are in wide use throughout the country. Residents of the north are able 
to receive Spanish broadcasts with standard antennas. The Government 
does not impede the reception of foreign broadcasts or Internet access.
    The universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but 
are barred from open debate on the Monarchy, the Western Sahara, and 
Islam. Government informers monitor campus activities (see Section 
1.f.) and rectors are approved by the Ministry of Interior. Police and 
university students conducting elections clashed violently during the 
fall at university campuses throughout the country (see Sections 1.c., 
1.e., and 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the 
Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass 
gatherings, and at times police forcibly prevented and disrupted 
gatherings during the year. Most conferences and demonstrations require 
the prior authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for 
security reasons.
    Throughout the year, many meetings and marches took place 
peacefully without government interference; however, numerous 
demonstrations involving unemployed demonstrators were disrupted by the 
Government. Security forces often resorted to violent means to disperse 
and prevent from marching unemployed demonstrators, including the ANDC, 
the Group 314, disabled unemployed protesters, and other affiliated 
groups. Security forces also used violent means to disperse human 
rights activists and members of Islamist organizations late in the 
year. In early October, the Denmark-based organization EMHRN noted that 
``measures inspired by security police are still in existence; force is 
being used, outside the law, with protesters and, notably, with 
unemployed academics.''
    During their February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48 
miles from the capital), security forces used force to remove striking 
workers who had blockaded a water-bottling factory. The operation, 
which involved a large-scale military presence and reportedly was led 
by senior military officers, took place after a court order in January 
had ruled in favor of the factory owners who charged the protesting 
workers with interruption of means of production and obstructing the 
freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces 
were injured during the operation (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., 2.d., 
and 6.a.).
    On two consecutive days in February, security forces violently 
dispersed striking members of Group 314 (unemployed doctoral graduates 
of medicine and engineering). Members of Group 314 conducted a sit-in 
on February 10 at the Ministry of Employment and were dispersed by 
charging security forces, who beat the protesters with their hands, 
boots, and batons. Police arrested eight protesters, who later were 
released without charges. Seven protesters reportedly were injured. On 
February 11, approximately 300 members of Group 314 staged a sit-in 
before the Wilaya (regional office of the Interior Ministry) of Rabat 
to demand the release of the 8 members who were arrested the previous 
day. Approximately 200 members of the security forces intervened to 
disperse the demonstrators, again using violent methods. This time, 
police arrested four protesters, who also later were released without 
charges. Employment Minister Khalid Alioua denied during a February 10 
press briefing that abusive acts against the group had occurred (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On March 1, security forces in the Western Sahara city of Smara 
violently dispersed Sahrawi students and their families who were 
demonstrating in solidarity with Sahrawi students in the nearby 
Moroccan city of Agadir. Police had disrupted violently demonstrations 
by the Agadir students on February 28 and 29. The Agadir students were 
protesting the December 1999 incarceration of three Sahrawis accused of 
spying for the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.). The 
Sahrawi students and families in Smara organized a march toward the 
police station, which security forces subsequently broke up forcefully. 
Dozens of persons allegedly were injured, as were a dozen police 
officers. According to reports, nobody was arrested during the protest.
    Security forces used force to break up a May 3 demonstration in 
Meknes by members of the ANDC and other unemployed protesters (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On May 11, police violently broke up a peaceful demonstration in 
front of the Tunisian Embassy, where approximately 50 human rights 
activists had gathered to protest the Tunisian Government's treatment 
of a Tunisian journalist (he was on a hunger strike) and his family. 
After issuing an order to cease the demonstrations, police used force 
to disperse the activists, pushing them, beating their legs with 
batons, tearing up their posters, and pursuing them down side streets. 
Police reportedly injured six protesters.
    On May 12, at the Ministry of Finance, police used excessive force 
to disperse approximately 500 engineers who were preparing to hold a 
sit-in to protest their terms of employment. Police used batons to 
disperse the protesters, clubbing a regional leader from the 
independent Moroccan Workers Union, who was knocked unconscious and 
required hospitalization. When the protesters regrouped nearby, the 
police again pursued them, and used batons to disperse them. Some 
police reportedly entered a ministry building and clubbed innocent 
bystanders whom they mistook for protesters. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels issued a communique that 
denounced police for using brutal methods against the protesters and 
asked the Government ``to work to put an end to brutal attacks against 
peaceful trade-union demonstrations.'' On May 17, the OMDH issued a 
communique that strongly criticized the brutal police actions on May 11 
and 12, and questioned the Government about ``the objective of using 
violence against civil society'' at a time when royal speeches on human 
rights urged a new and more humane relationship of authority between 
the Government and citizens.
    On May 17 and 18, police violently broke up student demonstrations 
in Marrakech, initially detaining 30 to 40 mostly Sahrawi participants. 
There were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-
scale demonstriations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Within a 1-week period in June, security forces in the capital used 
excessive force to break up both a march by unemployed graduates 
associated with the ANDC and to evict 12 Group 314 hunger strikers from 
UMT's Rabat headquarters. According to eyewitnesses, on June 13, 
hundreds of security force members violently stopped up to 4,000 
members of the ANDC from staging a protest march at the Parliament. 
Security forces used batons, chased protesters down streets, and 
violently dispersed large groups of marchers who had gathered before 
the Parliament. Thirty-three protesters reportedly were injured during 
the violent dispersal, 2 of them seriously. Over 20 persons were 
arrested, all of whom later were released without charges. On the 
evening of June 13, authorities detained two union leaders not involved 
in the demonstrations and released them the following day without 
charges (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security 
forces attacked UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314 members 
were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. The attack allegedly began 
after ANDC demonstrators outside the headquarters threw rocks at 
security forces. Security forces then reportedly threw the rocks back 
at the demonstrators, breaking windows in the process, and fired tear 
gas into the building. They subsequently used force to clear all 
demonstrators from the area, arresting up to 100 persons. Security 
forces them removed the hunger strikers, who had been forced out by the 
tear gas. Later in the evening, the authorities cut the water and 
electricity supply to the UMT's headquarters, which they restored the 
following morning. Dozens of protesters were injured, some seriously. 
Twenty-two of those arrested were charged with ``using violence against 
agents of authority;'' 19 received suspended sentences and 3 received 2 
months' imprisonment. Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an 
interministerial meeting on June 19 to address the violence and 
condition of the unemployed population. The Government stated that it 
``affirms its choice of dialog and rejects all forms of pressure and 
tension.'' Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the 
ANDC. On July 5, the Group 314 hunger strikers ended their 28-day 
strike after a meeting with the Government, in which both sides pledged 
to engage in a substantive dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
    On July 26 in downtown Rabat, police violently dispersed disabled 
unemployed university graduates, who were protesting the denial of 
their right to employment. The protesters arrived in Rabat from 
throughout the country to meet the Secretary of State in charge of the 
disabled, whom they accused of reneging on promises to assist them. The 
police reportedly removed the disabled protesters to the Ain Atiq 
detention center, outside the capital. On September 12, police again 
used force to break up a protest by approximately 40 disabled graduates 
before the Parliament. There were reports of injured protesters and, 
according to a communique issued by an association of unemployed 
handicapped university graduates, police again removed uninjured 
handicapped protesters to the Ain Atiq detention center. Police 
reportedly attempted to remove forcibly camera equipment of one 
photojournalist covering the demonstration, and jostled and threatened 
other news correspondents on the scene. The SNPM issued a communique 
criticizing the police treatment of the journalists, claiming that it 
was not the first time security forces exhibited such behavior toward 
them (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5).
    On October 9 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to 
3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's use of 
force against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in 
September and October. Islamist leaders had asked for and were refused 
permission to hold the demonstration.
    On October 23, security forces used violent means to break up a 
demonstration by students preparing to begin a march to protest 
transportation problems at Hassan I University in Settat (southeast of 
Casablanca). Police intervened when the students were gathering on the 
edges of the university for a march toward the Wilaya of Settat. The 
police arrested 10 students, some of whom reportedly were not 
participating in the march, and accused them of disobedience, inciting 
disobedience, violence, and contempt of public servants while 
exercising their functions. Numerous students reportedly were injured 
in the violence, as well as two policemen. Press reports indicated that 
security forces intervened once students belonging to the Justice and 
Charity Organization inserted themselves into the march and began 
chanting anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans. Security forces 
reportedly clubbed students indiscriminately with truncheons, even 
entering neighborhood cafes and cafeterias to do so. After two of its 
youth members were detained in the incident, the political bureau of 
the PPS political party issued a communique on October 27, in which it 
claimed that security forces acted with ``unprecedented brutality'' in 
pursuing and attacking students indiscriminately within university 
grounds and in neighboring streets, and in conducting ``targeted 
arrests.'' At their trial on October 27, the 10 students were sentenced 
to between 3 and 5 months in prison (three were given suspended 
sentences); the students' sentences later were reduced on appeal (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    On November 5, security forces reportedly used violent force to 
break up a sit-in by ANDC members in the southern city of TanTan. The 
local ANDC branch had called for a march to protest the lack of 
employment opportunities in the city, irregularities in the region's 
hiring practices, the lack of dialog with the authorities, and the 
local governor's abusive treatment of ANDC members. The police 
reportedly injured 25 demonstrators, 3 seriously, during the attack.
    On November 21, security forces violently clashed with JCO students 
at Mohammedia University (in the Casablanca suburbs) as the latter 
prepared for annual student elections. According to news reports, over 
100 students were injured and 14 arrested. Police claimed that they 
responded because the students illegally remained on campus overnight 
and committed acts of vandalism. The students were sentenced to 2 
years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to $150 (500 to 1,500 
dirhams) (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Other reports indicated that 
similar although less violent clashes occurred between security forces 
and JCO students at other university campuses around the country 
engaged in student elections.
    On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to 
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern 
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one 
worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 
6.a.).
    During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the 
country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members 
of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who gathered separately in Rabat 
and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. The three 
groups decided to gather despite a prior Interior Ministry statement 
that the gatherings were unauthorized and would be forbidden. On 
December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and Forum for Truth 
and Justice (FMVE) gathered before the Parliament to demand trials for 
those responsible for past arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, 
and torture. Security forces violently attacked the demonstrators with 
truncheons and arrested about 40 persons. Security forces also 
reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment. After 
spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the detained protesters appeared before 
the court of first instance in Rabat the following day and were 
released that evening. The Government pressed charges against 33 of the 
demonstrators; the trial was scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's 
president Abderrahmane Benameur, who was among those arrested and 
released, condemned the use of violence by security forces, 
characterizing such violence as ``a step backward in human rights.'' On 
December 17, the AMDH filed a lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court 
against the Government for banning its demonstration. On December 10, 
the FIDH issued a communique, in which it expressed its ``extreme 
concern'' regarding the Government's suppression of peaceful 
gatherings.
    Later during the weekend, in Rabat and other large cities, security 
forces again resorted to violent force to break up public gatherings by 
members of the JCO. The JCO had called for peaceful nationwide protests 
in large cities to demonstrate against the Government's banning of 
their newspapers and to demand the legalization of their organization. 
At the Rabat train station, security forces used truncheons to disperse 
violently assembled JCO members, and arrested dozens of persons. The 
authorities again confiscated photography equipment, including that of 
demonstrators and of a British Broadcasting Company journalist. The 
authorities charged 18 of those detained with holding an unauthorized 
demonstration. Their trial was scheduled to take place in January 2001. 
Security forces violently dispersed a similar demonstration in 
Casablanca on the same day, arresting hundreds of additional JCO 
demonstrators; all of the Casablanca demonstrators had been released by 
year's end. Of the released demonstrators, 22 were scheduled to be 
tried in early 2001.
    On December 11, security forces used force to arrest members of the 
ANDC who had gathered before the Parliament to protest against 
Government inactivity regarding their unemployment. Those arrested 
later were released.
    During the year, there were no new developments related to the 
police excesses in the Western Saharan city of Laayoune in September 
and October 1999, in which police used brutal force to break up 
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and 
former Sahrawi political prisoners. Some who were detained during the 
police violence were subjected to systematic beatings and other forms 
of physical coercion. Most of those detained were released; however, 26 
persons were charged and sentenced to between 10 and 15 years in prison 
on charges of destruction of property during the protests. Despite 
appeals lodged by defense lawyers during the year, none of the 
sentences were reduced or overturned.
    In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI 
immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local 
police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to 
the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched 
quickly to the city by King Mohammed VI to explain to local residents 
proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which 
would allow local residents more of a choice in their affairs, and to 
propose elections to choose members to a royal advisory council on the 
Western Sahara.
    Despite these actions taken to restore confidence and order and to 
lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There 
were credible reports that police provoked the violence and there were 
further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully entered 
homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in September 
1999. Thirty-one persons reportedly were detained. Of these persons, 10 
reportedly were released within 24 hours and the remainder released 
within the following 2-week period.
    No investigation has been initiated into the excessive use of force 
by the police, nor have any charges against police been filed. There 
also was no progress during the year on local elections to choose 
members to the proposed royal advisory council on the Western Sahara.
    However, there also were numerous peaceful protests during the 
year. For example, on February 4, 60 Sahrawi students organized a sit-
in protest in front of the Ministry of Human Rights to protest what 
they claimed to be the illegal detention of 3 Sahrawis who were 
detained in December 1999 and accused of espionage activities on behalf 
of the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.e.). The sit-in 
proceeded peacefully. On February 18 and 19, teachers who were members 
of two different trade unions protested without disruption for 2 
consecutive days the freezing of family allowances and teacher 
promotions. On March 4, hundreds of supporters and members of the NGO 
Forum for Truth and Justice, which was created by former political 
prisoners and their survivors, staged a sit-in before the notorious 
Derb Moulay Cherif police station to demand an accounting for and 
details regarding over 30 years of forced disappearance and arbitrary 
arrest. Police did not intervene. On March 12, two large rallies took 
place in Rabat and Casablanca that collectively involved over 200,000 
persons. The march in Rabat was called by civil society in observance 
of the international day for women. The march in Casablanca was a 
counterdemonstration organized by Morocco's two major Islamist groups. 
In spite of the large numbers of demonstrators and the political 
sensitivity of the marches, they both proceeded peacefully and without 
intervention by security forces (see Section 5). To protest government 
inaction on their behalf, 115 members of Group 314 staged a 48-hour 
hunger strike on March 17 and 18. The hunger strike proceeded 
peacefully, without any incidents or intervention by security forces. 
On May 3, journalists and human rights activists peacefully 
demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Communication against several 
cases of press censorship. On October 7, hundreds of former political 
prisoners, their families, and human rights activists peacefully 
demonstrated at Tazmamart, the notorious former secret detention 
center. On October 8, several tens of thousands persons peacefully 
participated in a march in Rabat led by the Prime Minister to 
demonstrate their solidarity with Palestinians.
    On November 5, 1999, Prime Minister Youssoufi revoked an order 
issued earlier in the year by former Interior Minister Driss Basri to 
ban all public meetings from government-owned facilities unless they 
otherwise were authorized by the Government. Basri's decision triggered 
protests by human rights activists who asserted that such tactics 
constituted a serious violation of freedom of expression. Amid the 
protests caused by Basri's order, government spokesman Khalid Alioua 
stated that the Interior Ministry's decision had been ``badly 
interpreted,'' and applied only to meetings in municipal council and 
administration buildings, not to the public halls that routinely are 
used by unions, parties, NGO's, and other groups.
    According to Youssoufi's November 5, 1999 revocation, only a 
declaration of a public meeting would be necessary for public meetings 
to proceed. However, on November 25, 1999, several weeks following the 
Prime Minister's revocation of Basri's order, government spokesperson 
Khalid Alioua announced that--in apparent contradiction to the Prime 
Minister's revocation--both a declaration and authorization must be 
issued before public-venue meetings could proceed. Alioua attributed 
the Government's decision to a series of illegal sit-ins and protests 
in public spaces that had followed the revocation. Human rights 
organizations reacted negatively to the announcement. The OMDH issued a 
communique that criticized the decision as illegal. The OMDH cited the 
1958 Public Liberties Code and Youssoufi's November directive in 
asserting that a declaration alone suffices to proceed with a public 
meeting, and that meetings may be prohibited only if deemed a threat to 
public order. Since the Government's November 25 announcement, local 
observers generally agree that the authorities indiscriminately apply 
the authorization rule, allowing those demonstrations to proceed that 
it considers inoffensive.
    After violent police suppression of demonstrations in Rabat in 
October 1998, Basri agreed in December 1998 to recognize officially the 
ANDC, whose request for recognition had been pending for 7 years. Basri 
also agreed to grant members of the group 5,000 taxi licenses. Members 
of the ANDC also were invited by then-King Hassan II to a national 
conference on unemployment in December 1998. In June 1999, the 
Ministers of Interior and Employment toured the regions to instruct 
walis (regional and city leaders appointed by the Interior Ministry) 
and governors on how to take steps to reduce unemployment, and to 
listen to the needs of the unemployed. However, despite repeated 
meetings with the Ministers of Interior and Employment, the ANDC has 
not obtained official recognition, and the promised taxi licenses have 
not been issued.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government limits this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which 
was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil 
society organizations, persons who wish to create an organization must 
obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before holding 
meetings. In practice the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent 
persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from 
forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme Islamist and leftist 
groups have encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining official 
approval. Although there are over 20 active Islamist groups, the 
Government has prohibited membership in 2, the JCO and Jama'a Islamia, 
due to their perceived anti-Monarchy rhetoric. Political parties also 
must be approved by the Ministry of Interior, which has used this power 
to control participation in the political process. However, individual 
Islamists are not barred from participating in recognized political 
parties. The last known instance in which a proposed political party 
failed to receive such approval was in 1996, when an Islamist group's 
application was not approved. The group instead was permitted to 
present candidates for the 1997 elections under the banner of an 
existing party. One Islamist party, the Party for Justice and 
Development (PJD--formerly the Popular Democratic Constitutional 
Movement), won nine seats in Parliament in the 1997 elections. In by-
elections held in August, the PJD won two additional seats in 
Parliament.
    During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from 
gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions, 
and arrested and jailed some of the group's members (see Sections 1.d., 
2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are tolerated 
in practice. The Constitution provides that Islam is the official 
religion, and designates the King as ``Commander of the Faithful,'' 
with the responsibility of ensuring ``respect for Islam.'' In 1996 a 
small foreign Hindu community received the right to perform cremations 
and to hold services, and other foreign communities enjoy similar 
religious privileges. However, Baha'is face restrictions on the 
practice of their faith. The Government monitors the activities of 
mosques.
    The Government does not license or approve religions or religious 
organizations. The Government provides tax benefits, land and building 
grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the 
observance of the major religions.
    Islamic law and tradition call for strict punishment for any Muslim 
who converts to another faith. Citizens who convert to Christianity and 
other religions sometimes face social ostracism, and in the past a 
small number have faced short periods of questioning by the 
authorities. Voluntary conversion is not a crime under the Criminal or 
Civil Codes; however, the authorities have jailed some converts on the 
basis of references to Koranic law. Any attempt to induce a Muslim to 
convert is illegal. Foreign missionaries either limit their 
proselytizing to non-Muslims or conduct their work quietly. The 
Government cited the Penal Code prohibition on conversion in most cases 
in which courts expelled foreign missionaries.
    The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitors Friday mosque sermons and 
the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. The 
authorities sometimes suppress the activities of Islamists, but 
generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of Islam, 
education, and charity. Security forces commonly close mosques to the 
public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises 
for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controls 
authorization to construct new mosques. Most mosques are constructed 
using private funds.
    After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16. On May 
17, Sheikh Yassine then received at his home leading council members of 
his Justice and Charity Organization, attended a Sale mosque prayer 
service on May 19, and gave a May 20 press conference that was attended 
widely by domestic and foreign media representatives. In February prior 
to Sheikh Yassine's release, the Government temporarily confiscated 
several newspapers that printed a 19-page memorandum addressed by 
Yassine to King Mohammed VI asking for the King to return to Moroccans 
the wealth that Yassine alleged the King's late father had stolen from 
them. On February 8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari 
claimed that the memorandum was not banned, that it was available on 
the Internet, and that the concerned newspapers were back in 
circulation. Messari stated that the confiscation was ``incidental,'' 
and that censorship was absurd and no longer practiced. Four members of 
the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the memorandum in 
Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were charged with 
violating the ``sacred institution of the Monarchy.'' According to the 
AMDH, by February 7, the authorities had dropped the charges and 
released the four JCO members.
    According to press reports in late May and early July, the 
authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers--Al-Adl 
Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa--that were associated with the JCO, 
ordering printers to suspend their distribution. Yassine's books, 
articles, and audio cassettes were sold only at some bookstores, and 
editorials that had called for his release were published without 
impediment. The JCO has an active presence on university campuses and 
occasionally had organized protests of Yassine's house arrest. However, 
prominent members of the JCO are subject to constant surveillance and 
sometimes are unable to obtain passports and other necessary documents. 
During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from 
gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions, 
and arrested and jailed some of the group's members. In August two JCO 
members were sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment for their 
proselytizing activities on a beach in El-Jadida. During the same 
month, Interior Minister Ahmed Midaoui declared before Parliament that 
``we are one sole nation and nobody can impose upon others their own 
vision of Islam,'' and that ``people go to beaches for recreational 
purposes and we do not have Islamic beaches.'' He also added that ``we 
cannot tolerate the appearance of sectarianism in our society'' (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.).
    The teaching of Islam in public schools benefits from discretionary 
funding in the Government's annual education budget, as do other 
curriculum subjects. The annual budget also provides funds for 
religious instruction to the parallel system of Jewish public schools. 
The Government has funded several efforts to study the cultural, 
artistic, literary, and scientific heritage of Moroccan Jews. In 1998, 
the Government created a chair for the study of comparative religions 
at the University of Rabat.
    Since the time of the French protectorate (1912-1956), a small 
foreign Christian community has opened churches, orphanages, hospitals, 
and schools without any restriction or licensing requirement being 
imposed. Missionaries who conduct themselves in accordance with 
societal expectations largely are left unhindered. However, those whose 
proselytizing activities become public face expulsion.
    The Government permits the display and sale of Bibles in French, 
English, and Spanish, but confiscates Arabic-language Bibles and 
refuses licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of 
any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles reportedly have 
been sold in local bookstores. There were no known cases in which 
foreigners were denied entry into the country because they were 
carrying Christian materials, as occurred in the past.
    The small Baha'i community has been forbidden to meet or 
participate in communal activities since 1983; however, there were no 
reports during the year that the Government summoned members of the 
Baha'i Faith for questioning or denied them passports, as had occurred 
in previous years.
    There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for 
Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The 
family law courts are run, depending on the law that applies, by 
rabbinical and Islamic authorities who are court officials. Parliament 
must authorize any changes to those laws. Non-Koranic sections of 
Muslim law on personal status are applied to non-Muslim and non-Jewish 
persons.
    The Government organizes events to encourage tolerance and respect 
among religions. In April and May, the Government hosted the first 
meeting of the ``Traveling Faculty of the Religions of the Book'' at 
Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane.
    The Government annually organizes in May the ``Fez Festival of 
Sacred Music,'' which includes musicians from many religions. The 
Government has organized in the past numerous symposiums among local 
and international clergy, priests, rabbis, imams and other spiritual 
leaders to examine ways to reduce religious intolerance and to promote 
interfaith dialog. Each year during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, 
the King hosts colloquiums of Islamic religious scholars to examine 
ways to promote tolerance and mutual respect within Islam and between 
Islam and other religions.
    In late August, the King declared in a nationally televised speech 
that 100 mosques throughout the country would be used as teaching 
centers to fight illiteracy. In the first (and pilot) year of the 
announced program, 10,000 citizens between the ages of 15 and 45 were 
to receive literacy courses on Islam, civic education, and hygiene. If 
successful, the program was expected to be expanded to include a larger 
part of the population in subsequent years. The King designated 200 
unemployed university graduates to administer the literacy courses 
during the program's pilot stage, which began in September.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement; however, the Government restricts this right in certain 
areas. The gendarmerie maintains checkpoints throughout the country, at 
which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations are examined for 
validity. Although checkpoints have been maintained in the same places 
for years, the degree of inspections of motorists has relaxed, while 
the emphasis on inspecting trucks and buses continues. In addition 
while there are continuing allegations that gendarmes demand small 
bribes to clear vehicles, press reports indicate that gendarmes found 
guilty of such behavior are punished. In 1998 the Gendarmerie Royale 
began a campaign to combat such abuses within its ranks. In the 
Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, authorities restrict movement in 
areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
    The Ministry of Interior restricts freedom to travel outside the 
country in certain circumstances. In addition all civil servants and 
military personnel must obtain written permission from their ministries 
to leave the country. The OMDH and AMDH have compiled lists of 
individuals who reportedly have been denied passports or who have 
passports but are denied permission to travel. In February the AMDH 
reported in the French-language weekly Quotidien du Maroc on 33 past 
and previous cases in which the Interior Ministry has blocked the 
issuance of passports to former political prisoners. On February 26, 
the OMDH issued a communique protesting a lack of governmental action 
on outstanding passport cases. The OMDH contended that the Government, 
in resorting to arbitrary administrative delays, continues to harass 
former political prisoners who seek to resume normal lives. The OMDH 
also alleged that some citizens were forbidden by the Government to 
leave Moroccan territory during the year. The communique listed no 
names.
    In March the investigative French-language weekly Le Journal 
reported on two cases of former leftist political activists and 
political prisoners who were unable to renew their passports. Pardoned 
in 1992, Abdellah El-Harrif, the national secretary of a far-left 
political party unrecognized by the Government, discovered during a 
passport-renewal procedure that the authorities have sought his 
whereabouts since 1996. Despite numerous inquiries to the Government to 
determine the reason behind his particular status, El Harrif reportedly 
had not received a response by year's end. However, he remained free to 
continue his professional and political life without hindrance, and is 
free to travel within the country. El Harrif's deputy, Mostapha Brahma, 
reported similar difficulties. Brahma has been without a passport since 
1994, the year of his pardon, and has received no answer from the 
Interior Ministry, Human Rights Ministry, or the CCDH regarding the 
nonissuance of his passport. According to press reports in November, a 
former prisoner who was convicted in 1996 for ``threatening the sacred 
institution of the monarchy'' and freed 3 years later, still was 
waiting to receive his passport a year after submitting a passport 
request.
    According to press reports, before, during, and after their 
February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the 
capital) to remove striking workers from a water-bottling factory, a 
reported 1,000 security forces encircled and sealed off the village. 
Gendarmes erected blockades and strictly controlled access to the 
village. According to the AMDH, security forces maintained checkpoints 
near the village well after the February 2 confrontation with workers. 
The operation, which involved a large-scale military presence and 
reportedly was led by senior military officers, took place after a 
court order in January had ruled in favor of the factory owners, who 
had charged the protesting workers with interruption of means of 
production and obstructing the freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and 
members of the security forces were injured during the operation, in 
which security forces used rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons 
to remove strikers and their supporters from the factory and access 
areas (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
    After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine was permitted to leave his Sale home on May 16 (see 
Sections 1.d., 2.a, and 2.c.).
    Moroccans may not renounce their citizenship, but the King retains 
the power--rarely used--to revoke it. Tens of thousands of Moroccans 
hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more 
countries. While in Morocco, they are regarded as Moroccan citizens. 
Dual nationals sometimes complain of harassment by immigration 
inspectors.
    The Government welcomes voluntary repatriation of Jews who have 
emigrated. Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli 
citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The Government also encourages the 
return of Sahrawis who have departed Morocco due to the conflict in the 
Western Sahara, provided that they recognize the Government's claim to 
the region. The Government does not permit Western Saharan nationalists 
who have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. While Morocco has from time to time provided political asylum 
to individuals, the issue of first asylum never has arisen. There were 
no reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee 
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections 
notwithstanding, citizens do not have the full right to change their 
government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister, 
who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992, 
retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to 
nominate all government ministers, but the King has the power to 
replace any minister at will. The Parliament has the theoretical 
ability to effect change in the system of government. However, the 
Constitution may not be changed without the King's approval. The 
Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial governors and local caids 
(district administrative officials). Municipal and regional councils 
are elected.
    The Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi is the 
first government formed from the political opposition since the late 
1950's, and his 1998 appointment by then-King Hassan II marked a 
significant step toward increased democratization. With the support of 
the Monarchy, Youssoufi, who was sentenced to death in absentia in the 
1970's but subsequently received a royal pardon in 1980, has declared 
his intention to modernize the administrative and judicial structures 
and to liberalize the economic and political system. Of the 41 cabinet-
level posts in the Government that Youssoufi appointed in 1998, only 4 
posts (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Islamic Affairs) plus 
the Secretary General of the Government and the Minister-Delegate for 
Defense Administration were filled by holdovers from the former 
Government. In 1999 King Mohammed VI replaced one of the four 
holdovers, Interior Minister Driss Basri. In order to develop reforms, 
the King granted cabinet ministers a greater degree of responsibility 
for the management of their individual portfolios. In September Prime 
Minister Youssoufi consolidated his Cabinet to include fewer 
ministerial areas of responsibility. The Government now consists of 33 
cabinet-level posts, but still contains 6 ``sovereign'' ministerial 
posts directly appointed by the King (Interior, Foreign Affairs, 
Justice, Islamic Affairs, Defense Administration, and Secretary General 
of the Government).
    Morocco created a bicameral legislature in 1997. Fourteen parties 
have members in Parliament, and 7 are represented in the governing 
coalition. While opposition parties urged in 1996 and 1997 that all 
members of Parliament be elected directly by the citizenry, then-King 
Hassan II proposed in 1996 the creation of a bicameral legislature, in 
which all members of the lower house would be elected through universal 
suffrage and the upper house by various regional, local, and 
professional councils.
    In June 1997, Morocco held municipal council elections, followed by 
balloting for regional professional councils. In the wake of the June 
1997 elections, political parties accused each other of manipulation 
and vote-buying, and claimed government intervention on behalf of 
candidates. The Election Commission examined numerous petitions during 
the course of the electoral season in 1997 and recommended the reversal 
of over 60 municipal election results, including in Tangier, Khoribga, 
and Oujda, noted irregularities in four parliamentary races in 
Casablanca, Chefchaouen, and Fez, and called for the results to be set 
aside. The OMDH criticized the prominent role of the Interior Ministry 
in the June 1997 elections, as well as the numerous allegations of 
vote-buying, both by the Government and political parties, electoral 
list manipulation by the Government, and electoral card falsification.
    In August 1997, then-King Hassan II convoked a special session of 
Parliament to ratify two laws creating a bicameral assembly, and, in 
the same month, Parliament unanimously approved these laws, which 
created a 325-seat lower house, the Chamber of Representatives, to be 
filled by direct elections, and a 270seat upper house, the Chamber of 
Deputies, whose members would be elected by various directly elected 
professional and regional councils. There were widespread, credible 
allegations of votebuying and government manipulation in the November 
1997 legislative elections. The fraud and government pressure tactics 
led most independent observers to conclude that the election results 
were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. All 
opposition parties criticized the Government, and some called for a 
boycott of Parliament. Two winners renounced their seats, alleging 
unsolicited government interference on their behalf. The Election 
Commission concurred that irregularities had occurred in two Casablanca 
cases and recommended that new elections be held in those districts. 
After a long appeals process initiated by the losers of the seats, new 
elections for the seats were held on August 31, as well as elections 
for four other seats throughout the country. The new elections followed 
the formal invalidation of the six 1997 election results throughout the 
year by the Constitutional Council. Press reports indicate that the 
August 31 by-elections overall proceeded more fairly than in 1997, 
despite allegations that two of the races involved some cases of vote-
buying. Also in August, the Constitutional Council invalidated an 
additional by-election held in the Casablanca-Mechouar district in June 
that allegedly involved vote-buying. Despite the invalidations by the 
Constitutional Council throughout the year, the body continued to 
attract criticism for the alleged slow pace of its deliberations.
    On September 15, Morocco held indirect elections to replace, for 
the first time since the body's inception, one third of the 270 seats 
in the Chamber of Counselors. After the polls had closed, Interior 
Minister Midaoui reported in a nationally televised press conference 
that various political parties had engaged in votebuying and fraud. 
Criticizing the electoral corruption, Minister Midaoui claimed that his 
ministry had done everything it could to prevent fraudulent practices, 
including conducting investigations into 108 cases, at least 26 of 
which the Interior Ministry was certain involved fraud. The Interior 
Minister also reported that the Ministry had turned the cases over to 
the Justice Ministry for further action, and that the Government ``is 
going to do its duty.'' However, by year's end, few of the cases 
involving electoral fraud had been presented before the courts and 
prosecuted. According to press reports, the Constitutional Council also 
had received several hundred grievances relating to the election from 
throughout the country.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There is 1 
female minister delegate in the 33-member Cabinet. There are no women 
among the 325 members of the Chamber of Representatives, and only one 
woman in the 270-seat Chamber of Counselors. Women occupy only 84 out 
of 22,000 seats (or .34 percent) of local communal councils throughout 
the country.
    In March for the first time in the country's history, King Mohammed 
VI appointed a female royal counselor. In August the King also 
appointed a woman to head the National Office of Oil Research and 
Exploration, an office created as part of the Government's efforts to 
exploit newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the east. In September 
the King confirmed the first-ever female ministerial appointment; she 
is to be responsible for a newly reorganized ministry overseeing the 
status of women, the first time a ministry has been charged explicitly 
with the issue. In October the King appointed the first woman to head 
the National Office of Tourism.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are three nationally organized and officially recognized 
nongovernmental human rights groups: The Moroccan Organization for 
Human Rights, the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights 
(LMDDH), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights. A fourth group, 
the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH), was formed in 
1992 by former AMDH members. There are also numerous regional human 
rights organizations. The Government maintains close and collaborative 
relations with all of these groups.
    Founded in the 1979 and 1988, respectively, the AMDH and OMDH have 
spent years struggling to end human rights abuses. During this time, 
they were subjected to harassment and restrictions by the Government. 
Some of their former leaders now occupy high posts in the Youssoufi 
Government, particularly in the human rights field. In May the 
Government accorded the two organizations ``public utility'' status, 
which confers organizations financial benefits as recognition of their 
serving the public interest.
    In October the OMDH hosted a regional congress on protecting human 
rights defenders and promoting democracy in the Arab world. The 
congress was attended by Arab jurists and the Human Rights Minister. 
The congress called for constitutional reforms throughout the Arab 
world that would protect democracy and ensure public freedoms.
    During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the 
country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members 
of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who separately gathered in Rabat 
and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. On 
December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and FMVE gathered 
before the Parliament to demand trials for those responsible for past 
arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, and torture. Security forces 
violently attacked the demonstrators with truncheons and arrested about 
40 persons. Security forces also reportedly confiscated journalists' 
photography equipment. After spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the 
detained protesters appeared before the court of first instance in 
Rabat the following day and were released that evening. The Government 
pressed charges against 33 of the demonstrators; the trial was 
scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's president, Abderrahmane 
Benameur, who was among those arrested and released, condemned the use 
of violence by security forces, characterizing such violence as ``a 
step backward in human rights.'' On December 17, the AMDH filed a 
lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court against the Government for 
banning its demonstration. On December 10, the FIDH issued a communique 
in which it expressed its ``extreme concern'' regarding the 
Government's suppression of peaceful gatherings (see Sections 1.c., 
1.d., 1.e., 2.a., and 2.b.).
    Two new prominent national human rights NGO's, the FMVE and the 
ONPM, were formed in 1999. Created by victims of forced disappearance 
and surviving family members, the FMVE's principal goal is to encourage 
the Government to address openly the issue of past forced 
disappearances and arbitrary detention. It also lobbies for reparations 
for former political prisoners that extend beyond financial 
compensation. Created by lawyers, doctors, journalists, former inmates, 
and entertainment personalities, the ONPM's main purpose is improving 
the treatment and living conditions of prisoners. ONPM also supports 
penal reform efforts. Both the FMVE and the ONPM maintained 
collaborative relations and fairly regular contact with government 
authorities throughout the year.
    In March the Moroccan Barrister's Association opened a human rights 
center in Rabat. The Human Rights Minister and other government 
officials attended its opening. The barrister's association plans to 
use the center to train lawyers in human rights laws and standards. The 
center is to undertake studies on reforming existing legal texts to 
ensure harmonization with international human rights conventions. 
Additionally, the center intends to track and monitor court cases and 
verdicts with human rights implications.
    On December 8, the Government signed an agreement with the 
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM) to cooperate on gender 
equality programs.
    Amnesty International has local chapters in Rabat, Casablanca, and 
Marrakech. These chapters participate in AI international letter-
writing campaigns involving issues outside Morocco. In September AI 
held a national youth forum outside the capital that focused on human 
rights awareness training and children's rights. The Government hosted 
a visit by AI secretary general Pierre Sane in June 1999, during which 
Sane met with senior government officials and announced that AI would 
consider Morocco as a site for a regional office and would hold its 
International Congress in Marrakech later that year. However, later in 
June 1999, articles in the French and domestic press reported that the 
Government had decided not to host the conference, allegedly because of 
fears that AI delegates would organize protests in Rabat concerning the 
human rights situation in the Western Sahara. The conference was not 
held. Amnesty International chose Lebanon as the site for its regional 
office, which opened in the fall.
    In the latter part of the year, the Government and Amnesty 
International discussed and signed two cooperation agreements on human 
rights education and public awareness. In September Human Rights 
Minister Aujjar received an Amnesty International delegation from 
Norway, which presented a draft 10-year program on cooperation for the 
country's new focus on human rights education. Amnesty International 
and the Government still were negotiating an official agreement on the 
draft program at year's end. The Government and the Moroccan chapter of 
Amnesty International signed a similar cooperation agreement on a human 
rights public awareness program on December 9, the 52nd anniversary of 
the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
    According to the MAP news agency, the Paris-based International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues decided in March to hold its next 
world congress in Morocco, reportedly because of the country's progress 
in the area of human rights. FIDH officials visited the country in 
January to meet with Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar, Prime 
Minister Youssoufi, and other government officials, and to discuss 
preparations for the congress, which was scheduled to take place in 
January 2001. The FIDH's world congress reportedly is the first to be 
held by an international human rights organization in the Arab world.
    In Cairo in March, the Arab League Council chose the Moroccan 
academic and jurist Khalid Naciri as the next president of the Arab 
Commission for Human Rights. Naciri is to occupy the post for 2 years, 
heading the commission's review of human rights questions in the Arab 
world. Naciri was a founding member of the OMDH and once served as its 
president.
    In October at its general assembly session held in Cairo, the Arab 
Human Rights Organization (OADH) elected two Moroccans to serve 3-year 
posts on the organization's Council of Secretaries. The two Moroccans 
also are active members of the OMDH. Also in October, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, in collaboration with the Ministry of 
National Education and Boston University, conducted a pilot program to 
introduce the teaching of international humanitarian law to educators. 
The program is part of the Government's current efforts to reform the 
education system, including by integrating the teaching of human rights 
into the national curriculum.
    In April U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson 
visited the country to attend an international conference on national 
human rights institutions and to open a U.N.-sponsored human rights 
information center. During her visit, her second in as many years, 
Robinson said that while there still were problems to resolve, 
particularly with respect to unemployment and the plight of women, the 
country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human rights during 
the past 2 years.
    At the end of her stay, Robinson inaugurated the opening of a 
center for human rights documentation, training, and information. 
Cosponsored by the Human Rights Ministry, the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, and the U.N. Development Program, the center is intended to 
operate as an independent entity and to provide a framework for dialog 
between governmental and nongovernmental bodies concerned with human 
rights. The center's work is to be directed toward persons involved in 
the application and implementation of laws related to human rights, 
including police officers, judges, lawyers, and representatives of 
human rights advocacy NGO's.
    Prime Minister Youssoufi chairs a human rights commission that 
reviews cases of past and present human rights issues. The commission 
is composed of members of the Government, including the Ministers of 
Justice, Human Rights, and Interior.
    The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights, a 10-year-old 
advisory body to the King, counsels the Palace on human rights issues, 
and was the organization charged by the King to resolve cases related 
to persons who had disappeared. The CCDH is composed of five working 
groups responsible for promoting the protection of human rights. They 
include groups on penal law; prison conditions; communications with 
human rights NGO's; inhuman conditions of refugees in Polisario-
controlled camps in Tindouf, Algeria; and economic, social, and 
cultural rights. In his annual Throne Day speech on July 30 and again 
in a December 9 speech before the CCDH in commemoration of the 52nd 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, King Mohammed 
announced plans to reform the Council's structures, responsibilities, 
and working methods. Critics of the CCDH welcomed the King's 
announcements on the recomposition of the Council, which they have long 
maintained lacks true independence and the political will to address 
openly and fairly sensitive human rights issues. None of the announced 
reforms of the CCDH had been instituted by year's end.
    Throughout the year, the Human Rights Ministry held human rights 
awareness training sessions with educators and some police personnel. 
The sessions were directed at school inspectors at both the primary and 
secondary school levels. Up to 75 additional such training sessions are 
planned; the inspectors in turn are expected to transfer the training 
to teachers for integration into their teaching programs. Officials at 
the Human Rights Ministry state that some police officers and other 
enforcement officials also are being trained. The Government increased 
efforts to introduce human rights as a core subject of the national 
school curriculum during the year; in September Human Rights Minister 
Aujjar stated that the Government planned to establish an experimental 
phase-in program during the 2000-2001 school cycle, with plans for 
human rights to become a core component of the national curriculum 
within the next 2 years.
    In September the country cohosted a human rights training seminar 
for representatives of Arab governments and nongovernmental 
organizations in the Arab world. The seminar included discussions on 
education in human rights, education in democracy, and the rights of 
women in the Arab world.
    In January the Human Rights Ministry announced its intention to 
open, in collaboration with the Moroccan Barristers Association, a 
network of support centers charged with providing legal and 
psychological assistance to needy citizens. Targeted at children and 
women who have suffered physical or psychological violence, the centers 
are to be staffed by doctors, lawyers, psychologists, and teachers. 
Officials at the Human Rights Ministry say that the Ministry also 
intends to involve the participation of police officers at the centers. 
The primary mission of the centers is to provide quick, effective, and 
direct assistance to those in difficult situations, with an emphasis on 
clients' legal rights. The centers were scheduled to open in early 
2001.
    Also in January, Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for 
Social Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's 
plans, in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national 
center dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training, 
documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced 
the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be 
responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and 
promotion opportunities for women.
    At the end of October, the Ministry of Human Rights hosted a 
conference in Rabat on ``Human Rights, Cultural Identities and Social 
Cohesion in the Mediterranean Region,'' which represented a follow-up 
to a dialog initiated in 1995. Attended by Morocco's human rights 
community and European leaders, such as former Portuguese President 
Mario Soares and former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, the 2-
day conference focused on issues in the Mediterranean region such as 
human rights, migration, culture, and the impact of economic 
development on human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Although the Constitution states that all citizens are equal, non-
Muslims and women face discrimination in the law and traditional 
practice.
    Women.--Spousal violence is common. Although a battered wife has 
the right to file a complaint with the police, as a practical matter 
she would do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While 
physical abuse is a legal ground for divorce, a court only grants it if 
the woman is able to provide two witnesses to the abuse. Even medical 
certificates are not sufficient. If the court finds against the woman, 
she is returned to her husband's home. Consequently, few women report 
abuses to the authorities.
    The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted 
of rape or sexually assaulting a woman or a girl. The defendants in 
such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual 
assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss 
of virginity. While not provided for by law, victims' families may 
offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to 
preserve the honor of the family. The law is more lenient toward men 
with respect to crimes committed against their wives; for example, a 
light sentence may be accorded a man who murders his wife after 
catching her in the act of adultery. However, ``honor crimes,'' a 
euphemism that refers to violent assaults with intent to commit murder 
against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant behavior, are 
extremely rare.
    In February local police in the city of Azrou in the Middle Atlas 
region, initiated an operation against prostitution, which resulted in 
a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments of brothel leaders, and 
closings of brothels that previously had been tolerated (see Section 
6.f.).
    Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination. 
The civil-law status of women is governed by the Code of Personal 
Status (sometimes referred to as the ``Moudouwana''), which is based on 
the Malikite school of Islamic law. Although the Code of Personal 
Status was reformed in 1993, women's groups still complain of unequal 
treatment, particularly under the laws governing marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance.
    In order to marry, a woman generally is required to obtain the 
permission of her ``tuteur,'' or legal guardian, usually her father. 
Only in rare circumstances may she act as her own ``tuteur.''
    It is far easier for a man to divorce his wife than for a woman to 
divorce her husband. Under Islamic law and tradition, rather than 
asking for a divorce, a man simply may repudiate his wife outside of 
court. Under the 1993 reforms to the Code of Personal Status, a woman's 
presence in court is required in order for her husband to divorce her, 
although women's groups report that this law frequently is ignored. 
However, human rights activists reported that in one NGO-sponsored test 
in the late 1990's, officials refused to order a divorce without the 
wife being present, despite offers of bribes. Nevertheless, women's 
groups complain that men resort to ruses to evade the new legal 
restrictions. The divorce may be finalized even over the woman's 
objections, although in such cases the court grants her unspecified 
allowance rights.
    A woman seeking a divorce has few practical alternatives. She may 
offer her husband money to agree to a divorce (known as a khol'a 
divorce). The husband must agree to the divorce and is allowed to 
specify the amount to be paid, without limit. According to women's 
groups, many men pressure their wives to pursue this kind of divorce. A 
woman also may file for a judicial divorce if her husband takes a 
second wife, if he abandons her, or if he physically abuses her. 
However, divorce procedures in these cases are lengthy and complicated. 
In November 1998, the Minister of Islamic Affairs proposed the 
institutionalization of additions to the basic marriage contract that 
would outline the rights and duties agreed upon between husband and 
wife and permit legal recourse for the enforcement of the contract.
    Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same 
treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law, 
which is based on the Code of Personal Status. Under the Code of 
Personal Status, women inherit only half as much as male heirs. 
Moreover, even in cases in which the law provides for equal status, 
cultural norms often prevent a woman from exercising those rights. For 
example, when a woman inherits property, male relatives may pressure 
her to relinquish her interest.
    While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine, 
education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of 
their professions. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the 
work force, with the majority in the industrial, service, and teaching 
sectors. In 1998 the Government reported that the illiteracy rate for 
women was 67 percent (83 percent in rural areas), compared with 41 
percent for men (50 percent in rural areas). Women in rural areas 
suffer the most from inequality. Rural women perform difficult physical 
labor. Girls are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys, 
especially in rural areas, where the quality of schooling is inferior 
to urban areas and demands on girls' time for household chores often 
prevent school attendance. Some families also keep girls at home 
because of rural schools' lack of facilities. However, women who do 
earn secondary school diplomas have equal access to university 
education.
    The Government and the King continued to promote their proposal to 
reform the Personal Status Code in order to advance women's rights. 
Islamists and some other traditional segments of society firmly opposed 
the proposal, especially with respect to its more controversial 
elements, such as reform of women's legal status in marriage and family 
law issues. On March 12, an estimated 50,000 demonstrators marched 
peacefully in Rabat in observance of the International Day for Women 
and in support of political reform in the area of women's rights. On 
the same day, Islamist groups organized a peaceful counterdemonstration 
in Casablanca that drew an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons 
protesting such reform (see Section 2.b.). In October the Denmark-based 
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network repeated concerns expressed by 
domestic civil society organizations late in the year about the future 
of the proposal to reform the Personal Status Code. According to the 
EMHRN, the plan to integrate women into the development process that 
the Government prepared in its discussions with civil society ``has 
been pushed to one side.''
    According to press reports and reliable sources, in early July, an 
unspecified number of imams of state-administered mosques sermonized 
against the social work of Aicha Ech-Chenna, president of the NGO 
Feminine Solidarity, and attacked her character; during prayer 
services, one of these imams allegedly threatened Ech-Chenna. Ech-
Chenna's NGO primarily focuses on encouraging the social reintegration 
of marginalized and abandoned single mothers with illegitimate 
children. Some opposed to Ech-Chenna's work have characterized it as 
encouraging prostitution. After the reported attack on EchChenna's 
character and other threats, a group of domestic NGO's issued a 
communique in late July that criticized ``any attempt to use religion 
and mosques to subdue the voice of women.'' The communique also held 
the Government primarily ``responsible for anything that occurs within 
mosques.'' According to reliable sources, the Ministry of Islamic 
Affairs took disciplinary actions against the imam who had threatened 
Ech-Chenna, stripping him of his position and removing him from the 
mosque. In early November, at the beginning of the third annual 
``Solidarity Campaign'' to help impoverished and needy citizens, the 
King decorated Ech-Chenna for her social work.
    In January Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for Social 
Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's plans, 
in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national center 
dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training, 
documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced 
the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be 
responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and 
promotion opportunities (See Section 4). The national center was 
scheduled to open in Rabat in early 2001.
    According to a 1997 government survey, 76 NGO's work to advance 
women's rights and to promote women's issues. Among these are the 
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action, 
and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, which advocate 
enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGO's that 
provide shelters for battered women, teach women basic hygiene, family 
planning, and child care, and educate illiterate women.
    Children.--The law provides for compulsory education for children 
between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children between these 
ages attend school due to family decisions and shortfalls in government 
resources, and the Government does not enforce the law. The Government 
conducts an annual campaign to vaccinate children against childhood 
diseases.
    The Government has had difficulty addressing the problem of child 
labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as 
domestic servants. Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been 
estimated in the thousands by NGO activists (see Section 6.f.). The 
clientele consists of both foreign tourists and citizens. More young 
girls than boys are involved; however, young boys also work as 
prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). The practice of adoptive servitude, in 
which urban families employ young rural girls and use them as domestic 
servants in their homes, is prevalent. Credible reports of physical and 
psychological abuse in such circumstances are widespread. Some 
orphanages have been charged as knowing accomplices in the practice. 
More often parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters to 
wealthier urban families and collect the salaries for their work as 
maids. Adoptive servitude is accepted socially, is unregulated by the 
Government, and has only recently begun to attract public criticism. 
However, at the end of the year, the Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the 
National Observatory of Children's Rights (ONDE), presided by Princess 
Lalla Meryem, began a human rights awareness campaign regarding the 
plight of child maids. The campaign received widespread and extensive 
media exposure, including coverage in official publications.
    Another problem facing orphans of both sexes is their lack of civil 
status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth certificate, 
passport, or marriage license. In general men are registered at local 
government offices; their wives and unmarried children are included in 
this registration, which confers civil status. If a father does not 
register his child, the child is without civil status and the benefits 
of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register; 
however, the process is long and cumbersome. While any child, 
regardless of parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a 
court order is required if registration does not take place in that 
time. Abandoned children sometimes receive kafala (state-sponsored 
care).
    Several NGO's, including the Bayti Association and the Moroccan 
League for the Protection of Children, work to improve legal protection 
for children and to help at-risk children. In December the French 
Government awarded Najat Mjid, Bayti's president of 17 years, France's 
prestigious Human Rights Award in recognition of her activism on behalf 
of Moroccan children. Also in December, the United Nations nominated 
Mjid for the post of Special Rapporteur on the Traffic and Exploitation 
of Children. There are several shelters in the major cities that 
provide food and lodging for street children, while other NGO's work to 
reduce the exploitation of street children and to cure those street 
children with drug addictions.
    People with Disabilities.--A high incidence of disabling disease, 
especially polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high number of 
disabled persons. Current statistics from the Government estimate the 
number of disabled persons in Morocco at 2.2 million, or 7 percent of 
the population. While the Ministry of Social Affairs attempts to 
integrate the disabled into society, in practice this is left largely 
to private charities. The annual budget for the ministerial department 
in charge of disabled affairs is only .01 percent of the overall annual 
budget. Even nonprofit special-education programs are priced beyond the 
reach of most families. Typically, disabled persons are supported by 
their families; some survive by begging. The Government continued a 
pilot training program for the blind sponsored in part by a member of 
the royal family. In March the Government created a special commission 
for the integration of the disabled, presided over by Prime Minister 
Youssoufi. The commission is responsible for developing programs that 
facilitate societal integration of disabled persons. Also in March, the 
Government organized a ``National Day of the Disabled,'' which is aimed 
at increasing public awareness of issues affecting the disabled. On 
March 30, King Mohammed VI visited a center for disabled children in 
the Khemisset province and donated $720,000 (7,200,000 dirhams) to a 
project to expand the center's activities. There are no laws mandating 
physical changes to buildings to facilitate access by the disabled.
    On July 26 and again on September 12, police used force to break up 
protests by disabled, unemployed university graduates (see Sections 
1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution affirms, and 
the Government respects, the legal equality of all citizens. The 
official language is Arabic. Both French and Arabic are used in the 
news media and educational institutions. Science and technical courses 
are taught in French, thereby precluding the large, monolingualArabic-
speaking population from participation in such programs. Educational 
reforms in the past decade have stressed the use of Arabic in secondary 
schools. Failure to transform the university system to a similar extent 
has led to the disqualification of many students from higher education 
in lucrative fields. This especially is true among the poor, for whom 
French training is not always affordable.
    About 60 percent of the population claim Berber heritage. Berber 
cultural groups contend that Berber traditions and the Berber language 
(which consists of three dialects) rapidly are being lost. Their 
repeated requests to King Hassan II to permit the teaching of Berber 
languages in the schools led to a 1995 royal speech authorizing the 
necessary curriculum changes; however, such changes have not been 
implemented. Official media broadcast in the Berber language for 
limited periods each day.
    In 1996 a number of Berber associations issued a communique 
petitioning the Government to recognize their language as an official 
language and to acknowledge their culture as a part of Moroccan 
society. These associations claimed that the Government refuses to 
register births for children with traditional Berber names, discourages 
the public display of the Berber alphabet, limits the activities of 
Berber associations, and continues to Arabize the names of towns, 
villages, and geographic landmarks. The Government thus far has made no 
response to the petition, although Prime Minister Youssoufi 
acknowledged Berber culture as an integral part of Moroccan identity in 
a speech before Parliament in 1998. A full page of a major national 
newspaper is devoted on a monthly basis to articles and poems on Berber 
culture, which are printed in the Berber language, although with Latin 
script.
    On March 14, the Government prevented a sit-in before the 
Parliament by two Berber NGO's, Tamaynout and the Moroccan Association 
for Research and Cultural Exchange(AMREC). The two NGO's filed a 
declaration for the sit-in on March 13; however, they received a letter 
later the same day from the Wali of Rabat banning the sit-in on the 
grounds that it threatened public order and security.
    In late 1999, Tamaynout published a report on violations of the 
cultural rights of Berber. As evidence the report cited the refusal of 
the authorities to recognize Berber names and to use the Berber 
language in commercial advertisements, and threats by the authorities 
of physical abuse if shop owners displayed such advertisements in their 
establishments. According to Tamaynout, Massinisa, a related NGO based 
in Tangiers, was contacted by government authorities and threatened on 
the evening before its congress. The report also stated that the 
government television channel 2M did not broadcast any Berber-language 
programs, despite the fact that Berbers pay taxes for the channel in 
the form of payments for other government-provided services. In its 
report, Tamaynout asked for government recognition of the Berber 
language and an end to harassment of Berber associations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although workers are free to 
establish and join trade unions, the unions themselves are not 
completely free from government interference. About half a million of 
the country's 9 million workers are unionized in 17 trade union 
federations. Three federations dominate the labor scene: The Union 
Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the Confederation Democratique du Travail 
(CDT), and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UCTM). The 
UMT has no political party affiliation. The CDT is affiliated with the 
ruling Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Prime Minister Youssoufi, 
and the UGTM with the Istiqlal party, the second partner in the ruling 
coalition. It is widely believed that the Ministry of Interior has 
informants within the unions who monitor union activities and the 
election of officers. Sometimes union officers are subject to 
government pressure. Union leadership does not always uphold the rights 
of members to select their own leaders. There has been no case of the 
rank and file voting out its current leadership and replacing it with 
another.
    Workers have the right to strike and do so. Work stoppages normally 
are intended to advertise grievances and last 24 to 72 hours or less. 
In May a report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted 
that there were allegations of violations of the right of association 
and threats to freedom of opinion and speech. The report cited arrests 
and jailings of union members as examples of violations of the right of 
association. The report also noted allegations that the Government 
hampered collective bargaining by its civil servants.
    In addition to numerous short-term strikes intended to highlight 
grievances, there were a number of narrowly focused work stoppages 
during the year. During a February 2 operation in the village of 
Tarmilet (48 miles from the capital), security forces used force, 
including rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, to remove 
striking workers who had blockaded a water bottling factory to protest 
layoffs of temporary workers. The operation, which involved a large-
scale military presence and reportedly was led by senior military 
officers, took place after a court order in January had ruled in favor 
of the factory owners, who charged the protesting workers with 
interruption of means of production and obstructing the freedom to 
work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces were 
injured during the operation. Security forces also reportedly arrested 
random passersby in addition to more than a dozen factory workers. 
According to sources in the Government, the workers and passersby later 
were released without charge. The Democratic Confederation of Workers 
trade union, which is aligned politically with the ruling USFP party, 
reported that security forces also detained two of its regional 
delegates 2 weeks after the February 2 incident. The two officials 
reportedly were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day) 
while an investigation into the incident was still ongoing. The owner 
of the factory and others involved in the incident reportedly claimed 
that security forces resorted to force only after the protesters 
initiated violence against unarmed police (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
1.f., 2.b., and 2.d.).
    Arrested and jailed on charges of forming a criminal gang and 
setting a vehicle on fire during a national truckers strike in June 
1999, Sadok El Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the UGTM, 
contacted the AMDH after his May 4 release with accusations that he had 
been arrested, jailed, tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
    On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to 
break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern 
city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one 
worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the 
death to either police abuse or ``natural causes.'' There were 
confirmed reports that police arrested 21 of the strikers, 17 of whom 
were women, and ransacked the striking workers' dormitories inside the 
canning facility. All but one of the strikers later was released. The 
strikers were protesting their employer's alleged negligence in failing 
to pay its social security contributions. According to press reports, 
the striking personnel reportedly obeyed Labor Code regulations in 
filing an intent-to-strike notification 5 days before the November 22 
strike. Members of the striking workers' trade union and politicians 
affiliated with it called on the Prime Minister to initiate an 
immediate investigation into the incident and free those detained. 
According to the workers' trade union, within 1 week after the 
incident, the cannery already had hired 60 new workers to replace the 
strikers.
    In August during labor unrest near Casablanca, the nephew of a 
private transportation company owner drove a bus into a crowd of 
striking workers, killing 3 persons and wounding 12, in an attempt to 
end the occupation and obstruction of the company's bus depot. The 
workers were demonstrating to have their salaries increased to the 
level of the new national minimum wage and to compel the company to 
make its contributions to the national social security administration, 
as required by law. Government security forces arrested the nephew and 
son of the owner, the owner himself, and local thugs the company 
allegedly hired to intimidate the strikers. The owner's daughter also 
was charged in the case. An investigation into the affair was opened, 
and the Palace announced that it would offer $10,000 (100,000 dirhams) 
to the families of each of the victims. The AMDH and the OMDH issued a 
joint press release encouraging the Government to ensure due process 
and enforce the rule of law. Union leaders sent a letter to the King 
and the Cabinet criticizing the attack and seeking their intervention 
to salvage labor-management relations throughout the country. There 
were no further developments in the ongoing investigation by year's 
end.
    Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may sue 
unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their authority.
    Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties 
with international trade union secretariats. The UMT is a member of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional 
provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations. 
Trade union federations compete among themselves to organize workers. 
Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change 
union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent 
locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
    In general the Government ensures the observance of labor laws in 
larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy, 
such as in the family workshops-dominated handicrafts sector, employers 
routinely ignore labor laws and regulations, and government inspectors 
lack the resources to monitor violations effectively.
    The laws governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective 
bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some parts of the 
economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming more prevalent 
in the service sector, including banking, health, and the civil 
service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized workers 
generally are set in discussions between employer and worker 
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers are 
set unilaterally by employers.
    Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify 
the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases 
in which employers plan to replace dismissed workers, a government 
labor inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers 
who protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing 
a serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court 
hearing.
    There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination. 
Under the ostensible justification of ``separation for cause,'' 
employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities that are 
regarded as threatening to employer interests. The courts have the 
authority to reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings 
that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Ministry of Labor 
inspectors serve as investigators and conciliators in labor disputes, 
but they are few in number and do not have the resources to investigate 
all cases. Unions have resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve 
labor disputes.
    Labor law reform is such a controversial issue that a draft revised 
labor code has remained under discussion among the social partners and 
in parliamentary committee for more than 20 years.
    Labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export zone. The 
proportion of unionized workers in the export zone is about the same as 
in the rest of the economy, roughly 5 percent.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by royal decree, and when authorities become aware 
of instances of forced labor, courts enforce the decree; however, in 
practice the Government lacks the resources to inspect all places of 
employment to ensure that forced labor is not being used, and forced 
labor persists in the practice of adoptive servitude.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. The practice of adoptive 
servitude, in which families employ young girls and use them as 
domestic servants, is socially accepted, and the Government does not 
regulate it. Credible reports of physical and psychological abuse in 
such cases are widespread (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.). Forced 
prostitution occurs, especially in cities with large numbers of 
tourists (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In October the Government ratified ILO Convention 182, 
which prohibits the worst forms of child labor. Abuse of child labor 
laws is common, particularly in the informal sector. Education is 
compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13, although not all 
children attend school. Special regulations pertain to the employment 
of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In practice children often 
are apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the informal handicraft 
industry. The use of minors is common in the small family-run workshops 
that produce rugs, ceramics, wood work, and leather goods. Children, 
particularly rural girls, also are employed informally as domestic 
servants and usually receive little or no wages. Safety and health 
conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ children often 
are substandard. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; 
however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively (see 
Section 6.c.). The practice of adoptive servitude often is 
characterized by physical and psychological abuse (see Sections 5, 
6.c., and 6.f.). The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Health and with the support of UNICEF, is pursuing a 
strategy to ensure basic education and health services for child 
workers.
    Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child 
labor regulations, which generally are well observed in the 
industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the 
inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic 
servants. The Government maintains that the informal handicrafts sector 
is difficult to monitor.
    The Government lacks the resources to enforce laws against child 
labor, and there is general acceptance of the presumption that, to 
properly learn traditional handicraft skills, it is necessary for 
children to start working at a young age. In addition many citizens 
claim that having children working to learn a craft is better than 
having them live on the streets, where they sometimes turn to juvenile 
delinquency, prostitution, and substance abuse.
    In September authorities in Fez announced plans to open four 
centers for the protection of children handicraft workers. Cosponsored 
by UNICEF, the centers are to provide children's rights education to 
child workers, their families, and employers. The centers are to take 
in street children and provide them with handicraft training and 
recreational opportunities. Health services for children also are 
planned for each center. One center opened in late September and three 
others were scheduled to open by the end of March 2001.
    In 1997 the Government announced a new voluntary labeling system 
for carpet exports to certify that no child labor was involved in 
production. The system is cosponsored by German rug importers. However, 
the Government does not monitor nonparticipating handicraft producers 
that violate child labor laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The threat of a general strike 
in April led to negotiations among the Government, the Employers 
Association, and the labor confederations over increasing the minimum 
wage and improving health and social benefits. All three parties agreed 
to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage effective July 1, raising 
it to approximately $180 (1,800 dirhams) per month in the 
industrialized sector and to approximately $9 (90 dirhams) per day for 
agricultural workers; however, not all private sector businesses had 
implemented the agreed-upon wage increase by year's end. Neither the 
minimum wage for the industrialized sector nor the wage for 
agricultural workers provides a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family, even with government subsidies for food, diesel fuel, and 
public transportation. Unions continue to appeal unsuccessfully for a 
minimum wage of approximately $200 (2,000 dirhams). In many cases, 
several family members combine their income to support the family. Most 
workers in the industrial sector earn more than the minimum wage. They 
generally are paid between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses, 
each year.
    The minimum wage is not enforced effectively in the informal and 
handicraft sectors. However, as a result of the agreement reached in 
the April negotiations, the Government no longer pays less than the 
minimum wage to workers at the lowest civil service grades. To increase 
employment opportunities for recent graduates, the Government allows 
firms to hire them for a limited period through a subsidized internship 
program at less than the minimum wage.
    The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than 
10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid 
public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and 
safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As 
with other labor regulations and laws, these are not observed 
universally.
    Occupational health and safety standards are rudimentary, except 
for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous 
occupations. Labor inspectors attempt to monitor working conditions and 
accidents, but lack sufficient resources. While workers in principle 
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger 
health and safety without jeopardizing their continued employment, 
there were no reports of any instances in which a worker attempted to 
exercise this right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code, perpetrators are 
prosecuted either as scam artists, corrupters of minors, or persons who 
force others into prostitution.
    Prostitution is prevalent and forced prostitution occurs, 
particularly in cities with large numbers of tourists, as well as near 
towns with large military installations. In 1998 a case was reported in 
which a girl allegedly had been held against her will and forced to 
work for 5 years in a brothel in Hajeb until she escaped at age 19.
    According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language 
daily newspaper Al-Bayane, in February local police in the city of 
Azrou in the Middle Atlas region, initiated a surprise operation 
against prostitution there. Coming after the nomination of a new 
director to lead the Interior Ministry's regional security force, the 
operation resulted in a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments 
of brothel leaders, and closings of brothels that previously were 
tolerated. Al-Bayane claimed that Azrou is home to numerous brothels 
that lure vulnerable women in desperate situations (see Section 5.).
    Forced prostitution involving Moroccans also occurs abroad. In 1999 
a Moroccan woman who had been recruited to be a domestic servant in 
Saudi Arabia, escaped a prostitution ring there and informed police, 
which led to the arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended family 
group numbering about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans had been 
involved in organizing similar such activities throughout the Persian 
Gulf region.
    Voluntary teenage prostitution in urban centers has been estimated 
in the thousands by NGO activists. The clientele consists of both 
foreign tourists and citizens. More young girls than boys are involved; 
however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see Section 5).
    The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families employ young 
girls and use them as indentured servants, is prevalent and accepted 
socially, and the Government does not regulate it. Reports of physical 
and psychological abuse in such cases are widespread; reports of sexual 
abuse are less frequent. Some orphanages have been charged as knowing 
accomplices in providing these young child maids; however, more often, 
parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters as maids to 
wealthier urban families and collect their salaries (see Sections 5 and 
6.d.).
    Several domestic NGO's, as well as a branch of Terre Des Hommes, a 
Swiss-based international NGO, help victims of trafficking by assisting 
and rehabilitating street children, educating delinquents and runaways, 
assisting single mothers to become financially independent, educating 
youths and prostitutes about the dangers of unprotected sex, and 
advocating women's rights issues.
                               __________

                             WESTERN SAHARA

    The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a 
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, an 
organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan 
Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the 
Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975, and extended 
its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab after 
Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has 
undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara 
as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the 
territory.
    Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims of Spain, 
Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces 
fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment 
to the area of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent, known by its French 
initials, MINURSO.
    In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory 
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while 
some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties 
were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty'' 
between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added 
that it had not found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable 
U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the 
territory, and, in particular, the principle of selfdetermination for 
its people. Most Sahrawis (as the majority of persons living in the 
territory are called) live in the area controlled by Morocco, but there 
is a sizable refugee population near the border with Morocco in 
Algeria, and, to a lesser extent, in Mauritania. The majority of the 
Sahrawi population lives within the area delineated by a Moroccan-
constructed berm, which encloses most of the territory.
    Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the 
sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario 
Front. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.
    In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the U.N. plan for 
a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to decide between 
integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. The 
referendum was scheduled for January 1992, but was postponed because 
the parties were unable to agree on a common list of eligible voters--
despite the previous acceptance by both parties of an updated version 
of the Spanish census of 1974 as the base for voter eligibility. A 
complicated formula for determining voter eligibility ultimately was 
devised and, in August 1994, MINURSO personnel began to hold 
identification sessions for voter applicants.
    The initial U.N voter identification effort ended in December 1995 
and, after several fruitless efforts to persuade the two parties to 
cooperate, the U.N. Security Council formally suspended the 
identification process in 1996. The United Nations and friendly 
governments continued to urge the two parties to seek a political 
solution to the conflict. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his 
personal envoy to examine possible approaches for a peaceful 
settlement. Baker visited the region, and negotiations between the 
Moroccan Government and the Polisario began in May 1997. In September 
1997, representatives of Morocco and the Polisario met in Houston in 
the United States and consented to a series of compromise agreements on 
the 1991 U.N. settlement plan to hold a referendum under U.N. auspices. 
According to the Houston Accords, the identification of potential 
voters, the referendum campaign, and the vote were to take place by 
December 1998; however, operational considerations again delayed the 
scheduled referendum, and Annan's latest reports to the Security 
Council during the year expressed doubt that the referendum could be 
held before 2002.
    In August 1998, MINURSO completed identification of voters in all 
uncontested tribal groupings. In November 1998, the U.N. Secretary 
General visited the region to examine ways to achieve compromise on 
several contested elements of the settlement plan in order to move the 
referendum process forward. After his consultations, the Secretary 
General proposed a series of measures in December 1998 to both parties. 
The measures proposed were aimed at establishing procedures among the 
parties to allow MINURSO to begin the identification process of three 
``contested tribes.'' After agreement between the parties was reached 
on the contested tribes, MINURSO began the identification process of an 
additional 65,000 potential voters. The identification process of the 
three contested tribes was completed in December 1999. Only 4 percent 
of the applicants in this phase of the identification process were 
deemed eligible to vote in the referendum. Roughly 80,000 appeals also 
have been registered by those who were deemed ineligible to vote after 
the first round of the identification process. Approximately 50,000 
additional appeals were filed after the completion of the 
identification process for the 3 ``contested tribes,'' bringing the 
total number of appeals to nearly 130,000. MINURSO has not yet begun to 
adjudicate appeals from the identification process, due to continuing 
differences between the parties over who should be eligible to appeal, 
on what grounds, and by what process.
    As the end of MINURSO's mandate drew near in February, U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan urged a review of the situation. Annan 
requested Baker to consult the parties to explore ways to achieve an 
``early, durable and peaceful'' settlement to their dispute. Baker 
visited Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara in April to consult 
with all of the interested parties. Baker sought to reconcile 
differences over the U.N. Settlement Plan or find other approaches that 
might resolve the dispute. He returned without a consensus and 
described the process as being in the same position as in 1997 and 
1998. At the invitation of Annan, the Government of Morocco and the 
Polisario met in London in May and again in June in an attempt to 
resolve the parties' longstanding differences over the settlement plan, 
and to explore other avenues to resolve their dispute over the 
territory; however, little progress was made. In June Baker called on 
the parties to meet again, emphasizing that consideration should be 
given to finding a solution that reached a compromise between full 
independence for the territory and its full integration with Morocco. A 
technical meeting of the parties in Geneva in July to discuss the 
appeals process, confidence-building measures in the territory, and the 
fate of more than 1,600 Moroccan prisoner's of war (POW's) still held 
by the Polisario also failed to produce any breakthroughs. Annan made 
clear in three reports to the U.N. Security Council during the year 
that disputes between the parties over various issues in the Settlement 
Plan likely would delay the holding of the referendum for the 
foreseeable future.
    Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Layounne, Smara, and Boujdour 
have participated in local elections that are organized and controlled 
by the Moroccan Government. The southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab has 
participated in Moroccancontrolled elections since 1983. Sahrawis whose 
political views are aligned with the Moroccan Government fill all the 
seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
    The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan 
administration is subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign 
human rights groups maintain that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining 
Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of 
Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the 
police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against 
those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario Front. The 
Moroccan Government limits access to the territory, and international 
human rights organizations and impartial journalists sometimes have 
experienced difficulty in securing admission.
    After years of denying that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for 
Polisario-related military or political activity, the Government of 
Morocco released more than 300 such prisoners in 1991. Entire families, 
and Sahrawis who had disappeared in the mid-1970's, were among those 
released. The Government of Morocco has failed to conduct a public 
inquiry or to explain how and why those released spent up to 16 years 
in incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The former Sahrawi 
detainees have formed an informal association whose principal objective 
is to seek redress and compensation from the Government of Morocco for 
their detention. A delegation of this association continued to meet 
with various government officials, human rights organizations, members 
of the press, and diplomatic representatives in both Rabat and in 
Layounne during the year. They reported that little progress has been 
made in gaining the Moroccan Government's recognition of their 
grievances. However, in July the Government, through the Arbitration 
Commission of the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH), began 
distributing preliminary compensation payments to Sahrawis who had 
disappeared or been detained in the past, and their family members. The 
Government announced that it intended such initial payments to be 
provisional funds for Sahrawis with urgent medical or financial needs 
who had appealed for compensation by December 31, 1999, and that more 
compensation could be distributed pending the results of the 
Commission's review of petitions by Sahrawi claimants. However, only a 
small number of those Sahrawis who formerly had disappeared or been 
detained have filed compensation claims because of their perceptions 
that the process is flawed administratively and one-sided in favor of 
the Government.
    In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were 
dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Saharan city 
of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan 
and Agadir. The Government alleged that the three were spies for the 
Polisario Front. They reportedly were held for 8 days before their 
appearance in an Agadir court and before their families were informed 
of their detention. Family members and the Moroccan Association for 
Human Rights (AMDH) claimed that the arrests were a violation of human 
rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances still 
occur in Morocco. A public trial was convened abruptly on May 30 after 
a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation that originally 
was to have culminated in a proceeding before a military tribunal. 
However, the case ultimately was tried in Agadir's court of first 
instance, and the three Sahrawis were convicted of threatening the 
internal security of the State and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison. 
According to a lawyer who represented the Sahrawis, during the trial 
the three defendants denied any relations with the Polisario Front, 
contradicting government allegations that the three confessed during 
their postarrest detention. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at 
the request of the public prosecutor all three were given 4-year 
sentences. On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained 
a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a 
flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who 
witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away 
with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days 
later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and was charged before the 
court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days 
later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for 
threatening the internal security of the State.
    On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of 
Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and 
10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their 
alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in Laayoune. 
Reliable sources said that the incident was spontaneous, unorganized, 
and lasted only 5 minutes.
    The stone-throwing demonstration followed similar protests by 
Sahrawi students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities 
at the end of February and in early March, which security forces 
brutally dispersed in violent clashes. The February and March 
demonstrations came in response to the December 1999 incarceration of 
three Sahrawis accused of spying for the Polisario Front. Attendees at 
the trial, human rights activists, and an attorney for the five 
defendants criticized the handling of the trial, particularly the 
court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who allegedly could 
corroborate claims by at least two of the defendants that they were not 
present at the demonstrations. The court allegedly based its judgment 
on police reports and the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom 
reportedly could not identify positively the accused; the other was not 
present at the trial, but claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a 
youth throwing a bottle at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not 
present a bottle as evidence nor did it present a witness who could 
testify that any of the five accused had thrown the bottle. The 
authorities claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles, 
including one belonging to peacekeepers from the MINURSO contingent 
based in Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the 
youths were acquitted of the arson charge during the trial. An attorney 
for the youths, who maintained that the prosecution produced no 
evidence of an incriminating act, stated that ``the verdict had nothing 
to do with justice.'' The attorney also alleged that the judicial 
police investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by 
unlawfully entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing 
them during their detention, and forcing them under duress to sign 
police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which contained 
falsehoods. The decision was appealed before the court of appeals in 
Laayoune, which reportedly sent it to the Supreme Court in Rabat. A 
hearing on the case had not been held by year's end. Families of the 
five youths also sent a letter to the Moroccan royal palace in May 
requesting a royal pardon; however, the King took no action by year's 
end.
    In its annual human rights report released in June, Amnesty 
International noted that some members of the Moroccan security forces 
in Morocco and the Western Sahara who were involved in several cases of 
torture were arrested and prosecuted. However, the organization also 
noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations were either not 
opened into complaints and allegations of torture . . . or were opened 
but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
    During the year, there were no new developments related to police 
abuses committed in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune in September 
and October 1999, when police authorities there used brutal force to 
break up demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, 
miners, and former Sahrawi political prisoners who were protesting a 
variety of social grievances. Police detained roughly 150 persons 
during the protests in September 1999 and 31 in October 1999. Police 
subjected some of those who were detained during violence in September 
1999 to systematic beatings and other forms of physical coercion. Most 
of those detained were released; however, 26 persons were charged and 
sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison on charges of destruction of 
property during the protests. Despite appeals lodged by defense lawyers 
during the year, none of these sentences were reduced or overturned.
    In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI 
immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local 
police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to 
the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched 
quickly to Laayoune in early October 1999 to explain to local residents 
proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which 
would allow local residents more choice in their affairs, and to 
announce a new election to choose members to a proposed new royal 
advisory council on the Western Sahara.
    Despite the actions taken to restore confidence and order and to 
lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There 
were credible reports that the police provoked the violence, and there 
were further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully 
entered homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in 
September 1999. Police reportedly detained 31 persons. Of these 
individuals, 10 persons reportedly were released within 24 hours and 
the remainder released within the following 2-week period. There was no 
investigation during the year into the excessive use of force by the 
police during either September 1999 or October 1999. There was also no 
progress during the year on local elections to choose members to the 
proposed new royal advisory council on the Western Sahara that the King 
had announced in October 1999.
    A number of other Sahrawis remain imprisoned for peaceful protests 
supporting Saharan independence. Youths released in previous years 
report that the Moroccan police continue to monitor them closely.
    The Polisario Front claims that the Moroccan Government continues 
to hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and 
approximately 300 as POW's. However, the Government of Morocco formally 
denies that any Sahrawi former combatants remain in detention. 
Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
have stated that Morocco indeed has released all Polisario former 
combatants. A committee that represents former Sahrawi prisoners also 
believes that the Government of Morocco no longer holds any of those 
Sahrawis who were detained illegally during the 1970's and 1980's. The 
committee based this determination on interviews with family members of 
individuals who had been detained during that period.
    The Government of Morocco claims that 30,000 Sahrawi refugees are 
detained against their will by the Polisario in camps around Tindouf, 
Algeria. The Polisario denies this charge. According to credible 
reports, the number of refugees in Tindouf far exceeds 30,000, but the 
allegation that they wish to leave remains unsubstantiated.
    The ICRC reported that the Polisario now holds 1,481 Moroccan 
POW's. A group of 185 POW's was repatriated to Morocco in a 
humanitarian airlift conducted under ICRC auspices in November 1995. In 
April 1997, Polisario leaders offered to release 85 Moroccan POW's as a 
good will gesture during U.N. envoy Baker's first meetings in Tindouf, 
but Morocco and the Polisario could not agree on the conditions of 
their release. On February 25, the Polisario released 186 Moroccan 
POW's, many of whom had been in detention for more than 20 years. 
Another 201 were released to the ICRC and repatriated to Morocco on 
December 14. The U.N. settlement plan calls for the release of all 
POW's after the voter identification process is complete. Foreign 
diplomats and representatives of international organizations privately 
urged the Polisario throughout the year to release the remaining 
Moroccan POW's, and emphasized that their continued detention 9 years 
after the cessation of hostilities was a violation of their human 
rights. During visits to the POW camps outside Tindouf, Algeria in 
April and November, the ICRC determined that all the Moroccan POW's 
were in extremely bad health. There also are credible reports that the 
Polisario authority used the POW's in forced labor. The Polisario 
leadership has refused to comply with repeated requests that all of the 
POW's be released on humanitarian grounds, despite the fact that most 
of the POW's have been in detention for more than 20 years and that 
their health was deteriorating seriously due to the poor conditions 
under which they are held.
    There were no new cases of disappearance for the fourth consecutive 
year in that part of the Western Sahara under Moroccan administration. 
While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the 
Government of Morocco and its policies occurred over several decades, 
the Government in 1998 pledged to ensure that such policies do not 
recur, and to disclose as much information as possible on past cases. 
Many of those who disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged 
the Government's claim to the Western Sahara, or other government 
policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention 
camps. Although the Government released more than 300 such detainees in 
June 1991 and in October 1998 issued an announcement on those who had 
disappeared, hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families still do not 
have any information about their missing relatives, many of whom 
disappeared over 20 years ago (see Section 2.b. of the Morocco report). 
On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights 
Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it claimed that 
disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to 
1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation 
of this figure.
    Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association remain very restricted in the Western Sahara. According to 
Amnesty International, Moroccan authorities continue to deny the 
registration of the independent newspaper Sawt Al-Janoub.
    Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in 
militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the 
Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both 
Moroccan and Polisario security forces sometimes subject travelers to 
arbitrary questioning. There were no reports of detention for prolonged 
periods during the year.
    During the year, Amnesty International and news articles in 
Morocco-based media highlighted the deteriorating situation in 
Polisario Front camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, where 
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement 
remain very restricted.
    There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The 
same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-
controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in 
the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are not active. The 15 
percent of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any 
major population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding. 
The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor, is 
not active in the Western Sahara.
    A group of phosphate miners participated in the demonstrations in 
Layounne in September and October 1999. They claimed that the 
government-owned phosphate company, for which they work, has failed to 
respect a contract that had been negotiated between the miners and the 
company's former Spanish management when Spain withdrew from the 
territory and relinquished control of the mines to Morocco. The miners 
stated that they held a series of meetings in late 1999 with officials 
of the government-owned phosphate company after the demonstrations, but 
that no agreement was reached about enforcement of what they believed 
to be their contractually protected rights.
    There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining 
agreements during the year. Most union members are employees of the 
Moroccan Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85 
percent more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara as an 
inducement to Moroccan citizens to live there. Workers in the Western 
Sahara were exempt from income and value-added taxes and received 
subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and 
utilities.
    Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist 
in the Western Sahara.
    Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in 
Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common than in Morocco, 
primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ 
children, such as rug-knotting and other traditional handicrafts. A 
government work program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provides 
families with enough income that children need not be hired out as 
domestic servants. Children in the few remaining nomadic groups 
presumably work as shepherds along with other group members.
    The minimum wage and maximum hours of work are the same as in 
Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants 
may work as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the 
10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law. 
Occupational health and safety standards are the same as those enforced 
in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the 
employment of women in dangerous occupations.
                               __________

                                  OMAN

    The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al 
Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no 
political parties, but does have one representative institution, which 
is directly elected by voters selected by the Government. The current 
Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 1970. 
Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy 
issues, he has brought tribal leaders--even those who took up arms 
against his family's rule--and other notables into the Government. In 
accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much decisionmaking is by 
consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan established a 59-seat 
Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-shura, which replaced an older 
advisory body. Beginning with the September elections, Council members 
are chosen directly by the vote of 175,000 government-selected 
electors. The Council was expanded to 83 seats for the September 
elections. The Council has no formal legislative powers but may 
question government ministers, even during unrehearsed televised 
hearings, and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social 
policy, which sometimes leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In 
December 1997, the Sultan appointed 41 persons as members of the new 
Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which with the current Consultative 
Council forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of 
Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's 
``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for 
citizens' basic rights in writing for the first time. The courts are 
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence.
    The internal and external security apparatus falls under the 
authority of the Royal Office, which coordinates all intelligence and 
security policies. The Internal Security Service investigates all 
matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police, whose head 
also has cabinet status, performs regular police duties, provides 
security at airports, serves as the country's immigration agency, and 
maintains a small coast guard. In the past, there were credible reports 
that security forces occasionally abused detainees.
    Since 1970 Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive 
economic progress and improve public access to health care, education, 
and social services. The economy is mixed, with significant government 
participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The 
Government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private 
investment.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in 
some areas; however, its record was poor in other areas, particularly 
with respect to citizens' rights to change or criticize the Government. 
Human rights abuses have included mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary 
arrest, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due 
process; however, there were no reports of such abuses during the year. 
The Government restricted freedom of expression and association and did 
not ensure full rights for women and workers.
    The 1996 Basic Charter provides for many basic human rights, such 
as an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association, speech, and 
the press. The Basic Charter states that the Government was to strive 
to issue all enabling laws within 2 years of November 1996; however, 
this has not occurred. Only certain laws pertaining to the legal code 
for family and interpersonal relationships, to judicial reform, and to 
aspects of the Finance Ministry, had been enacted by year's end. There 
has been no public statement made by the Government noting the end of 
the 2-year period since issuance of the Basic Charter and proposing a 
new target date for implementation.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There have been allegations in the past that the security 
forces abused some detainees, particularly during interrogation. The 
abuse does not appear to have been systematic and often varied 
depending upon the social status of the victim, the official involved, 
and the location of the incident (for example, whether the abuse 
occurred in a rural or an urban area). The authorities have made 
efforts to prevent such abuse, and there were no confirmed incidents of 
such abuse in recent years. Unlike in previous years, there were no 
reports that detainees sometimes were left in isolation with promises 
of release or improved treatment as a means to elicit confessions or 
information. Judges have the right to order investigations of 
allegations of mistreatment. The 1996 Basic Charter, which has not yet 
been implemented in this area, specifically prohibits ``physical or 
moral torture'' and stipulates that all confessions obtained by such 
methods are to be considered null and void. There were no reports of 
torture during the year.
    On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force 
to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
    Prison conditions appear to meet minimum international standards. 
In the past, access to some prisoners was restricted severely.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police may obtain 
warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so. 
However, within 24 hours of arrest, the authorities must obtain court 
orders to hold suspects in pretrial detention, and the police are 
required to file charges or ask a magistrate judge to order continued 
detention. However, in practice the police do not always follow these 
procedures. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow 
investigation and may grant extensions if necessary. There is a system 
of bail. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for certain legal and 
procedural rights for detainees; however, these provisions have yet to 
be implemented.
    Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado 
detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a 
detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker--the worker's 
sponsor--of the detention. Sometimes notification is made only just 
prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous 
week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the 
accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court 
building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and 
family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to 
ensure that security officials allow such visits.
    On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force 
to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
    The Government does not practice exile as a form of punishment. The 
1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning 
exile have yet to be implemented.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the 
independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are 
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan 
appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in 
cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases. 
However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has 
overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial 
courts.
    The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate 
misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts, 
which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance, 
and which are administered by the Ministry of Justice; the commercial 
courts; the Labor Welfare Board; and the Rent Dispute Committee, which 
hears tenant-landlord disputes.
    The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984 
to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is 
independent and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional 
courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by 
individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central 
Magistrate Court in Muscat by a panel made up of the President of the 
Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel are 
final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to death. 
Death sentences must be approved by the Sultan.
    The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President 
of the Magistrate Court in Muscat, and includes the court's vice 
president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by 
all courts of first instance. In the past, specially trained 
prosecutors from the Royal Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained 
as policemen as well as prosecutors carried out the role of public 
prosecutor in criminal cases; however, as a step toward implementing a 
November 1999 Royal decree affirming the independence of the judiciary, 
prosecutors were made independent of the ROP.
    The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There 
are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering 
cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public 
trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents 
in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide 
defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are 
presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront 
witnesses. The prosecution and the defense direct questions to 
witnesses through the judge, who is usually the only person to question 
witnesses in court. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit 
right to be represented by counsel.
    The 1996 Basic Charter affirms both right to counsel and 
government-funded legal representation for indigents; however, these 
provisions have yet to be implemented, and the Government does not pay 
for the legal representation of indigents. Judges often pronounce the 
verdict and sentence within 1 day of the completion of a trial. 
Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines 
over the equivalent of $1,300 (480 rials) to a three-judge panel. 
Defendants accused of national security offenses and serious felonies 
do not have the right of appeal.
    A State Security Court tries cases involving national security and 
criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or 
especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided 
over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the 
Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present. 
The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not 
disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as 
strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists 
form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of leniency, 
including in political cases.
    The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, and 
apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Preliminary courts of first instance are located in each 
of the 59 ``wilayats,'' and are presided over by a single judge, or 
qadi. Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving 
prison sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $270 (100 
rials) must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of 
Appeals in Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of 
Appeal rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to 
the Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four 
members, including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the 
Sultanate.
    In 1997 the Government promulgated into law the provisions of the 
1996 Basic Charter pertaining to ``family law,'' i.e., law that falls 
under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of this new law has 
been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of 
corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system.
    The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD), 
better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal 
decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters. 
Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor 
disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes 
to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving 
private parties. The ASCD is financially and administratively 
independent of the Ministry of Justice and reports directly to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman, 
Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and 
members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard 
in regional courts for suits involving not more than $27,000 (10,000 
rials).
    In November 1999, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to 
establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of 
the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees 
formally established the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical 
system composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts 
(one located in each region), and, within the primary courts, 
divisional courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions 
to handle commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and 
personal cases (the latter under Shari'a). The general prosecutor, 
which currently falls under the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, is 
to become an independent legal entity. Implementation of these decrees 
is expected to take place in early 2001.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The police are not required by law to obtain search 
warrants. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops 
on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in 
both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. Such permission is not granted automatically. 
Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within 
Oman. Marriages in foreign countries can lead to denial of entry into 
Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming 
citizenship rights.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits criticism of the 
Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of 
government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely receives 
media coverage. The announced 1996 Basic Charter provides for freedom 
of opinion expressed in words, writing, or all other media within the 
limits of the law; however, these provisions have yet to be 
implemented.
    The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to 
censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information 
censors may act against any material regarded as politically, 
culturally, or sexually offensive. Journalists and writers generally 
censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editorials generally 
are consistent with the Government's views, although the authorities 
tolerate some criticism on foreign affairs issues. The Government 
discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic issues and 
seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals by 
subsidizing their operating costs.
    In late 1997, the Government began to permit the entry onto the 
market of foreign newspapers and magazines containing reports or 
statements deemed critical of Oman, including articles critical of the 
Sultan. The lifting of the boycott against Israel in December 1994 
eliminated prohibitions on publications from or about Israel that 
otherwise meet censorship standards. However, in August 1999, the 
Ministry of Information stopped distribution of a London-based, Arabic-
language magazine that contained an interview with a representative of 
the Israeli trade mission in Oman. Customs officials sometimes 
confiscate video cassette tapes and erase offensive material despite 
the fact that there are no published guidelines on what is viewed as 
``offensive.'' The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners. 
Government censorship decisions are changed periodically without 
apparent reason. There is a general perception that the confiscation of 
books and tapes at the border from private individuals and restrictions 
on popular novels have eased somewhat; however, it reportedly has 
become more difficult to obtain permission to distribute in the local 
market books that censors decide have factual errors about Oman 
(including outdated maps).
    The Government controls the local radio and television companies. 
They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government 
does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and 
television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has 
made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The 
Government, through its national telecommunications company, provides 
full, uncensored Internet access to citizens and foreign residents; 
however, as use of the Internet to express views not normally permitted 
in other media has grown, the Government has taken some steps to 
monitor and control its use. Warnings have appeared on web sites that 
criticism of the Sultan or personal criticism of government officials 
is likely to be censored; however, at least some of these sites have 
operated without apparent interference.
    The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos 
University, the police, or the relevant ministry, must approve public 
cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars. 
Most organizations avoid controversial issues due to fear that the 
authorities may cancel their events.
    Academic freedom is restricted, particularly regarding 
controversial matters, including politics. Professors may be dismissed 
for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not 
ensure freedom of assembly; all public gatherings require government 
sponsorship. The authorities do not always enforce this requirement, 
and gatherings sometimes take place without formal government approval. 
Over the course of 8 days in October, rare public demonstrations in 
support of the Palestinians and against Israeli and United States 
policies took place at Sultan Qaboos University and other venues. Most 
demonstrators were young men, and most demonstrations were peaceful. 
Some demonstrations included rock throwing and vandalism of private 
vehicles. On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical 
force to control demonstrations and some arrests were made. The 
Government, after 8 days of demonstrations, took quiet action to 
prohibit further demonstrations. Regulations implemented in 1994 
restricting most types of public gatherings remain in effect. The 1996 
Basic Charter provides for limited freedom of assembly, but these 
provisions have not yet been implemented.
    The law states that the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and 
Vocational Training must approve the establishment of all associations 
and their bylaws; however, some groups are allowed to function without 
formal registration. The Government uses the power to license 
associations to control the political environment. It does not license 
groups regarded as a threat to the predominant social or political 
views of the Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations is 
limited to a maximum of one association for any nationality. The 1996 
Basic Charter's provisions in this area--not yet in effect--regulate 
the formation of associations. In February a royal decree was 
promulgated that allowed for the formation of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) in the area of services for women, children, and 
the elderly.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, which is 
affirmed by the 1996 Basic Charter. The 1996 Basic Charter provides 
that Shari'a is the basis for legislation and preserves the freedom to 
practice religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that 
such freedom does not breach public order. Discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of religion or sect is prohibited. 
Implementing decrees for the 1996 Basic Charter in this area have not 
yet been established. Non-Muslim religious organizations must be 
registered with the Government and the Government restricts some of 
their activities.
    Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a 
minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to worship at churches 
and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There are many 
Christian denominations, which utilize two plots of donated land on 
which two Catholic and two Protestant churches have been built. Hindu 
temples also exist on government-provided land. Land has been made 
available to Catholic and Protestant missions in Sohar and Salalah.
    In June the departure from the country of a foreign Baha'i due to 
termination of his employment may have been hastened by the 
proselytizing activities of his wife. The authorities requested members 
of the Baha'i community to sign statements that they will not 
proselytize, in accordance with the country's law and custom.
    The Government prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. It also 
prohibits non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material, 
although religious material printed abroad may be brought into the 
country. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links 
with coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious 
purposes.
    The police monitor mosque sermons to ensure that the preachers do 
not discuss political topics and stay within the state-approved 
orthodoxy of Islam. The Government expects all imams to preach sermons 
within the parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the 
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel 
by citizens within the country except to military areas. Foreigners 
other than diplomats must obtain a government pass to cross border 
points. To obtain a passport and depart the country, a woman must have 
authorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative. 
However, a woman having an Omani identity card (which also must be 
authorized by a male relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries without a passport.
    Until the promulgation of the Basic Charter, the Government did not 
have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or 
undocumented aliens. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits the extradition 
of political refugees; however, this provision has not yet been 
implemented. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise 
during the year. Oman offered temporary refuge to several thousand 
Yemenis displaced by a civil war in 1994. They returned to Yemen after 
the war. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country 
effectively has screened out would-be refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Oman is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains the ultimate 
authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The country has 
no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not 
have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the political 
system.
    The Sultan promulgated the country's first defacto written 
constitution, known as the Basic Charter, in November 1996. Although it 
has immediate force of law, most laws and regulations to implement its 
provisions have not yet been enacted; it is expected that this process 
may take until 2001 or beyond to be completed. The law does not provide 
for political parties or direct elections. Citizens have indirect 
access to senior officials through the traditional practice of 
petitioning their patrons, usually the local governor, or wali, for 
redress of grievances. Successful redress depends on the effectiveness 
of the patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan 
appoints the governors. The Sultan makes an annual 3-week tour of the 
country, accompanied by his ministers. The tour allows the Sultan to 
listen directly to his subjects' concerns.
    In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis 
Al-shura. In 1994 he expanded the number of Council seats to 80 from 
the original 59, which resulted in the allocation of 2 members for 
districts with a population of more than 30,000. Due to the population 
increase from 1994 to 2000, the number of seats was expanded further to 
82 for the 1997 elections and to 83 for the September elections. Unlike 
in 1999, when the Government selected the Council members from several 
nominees who were elected only by prominent persons in each district, 
the Government established a new system beginning with the September 
elections under which council members, male and female, are elected 
directly by receiving the most votes from eligible voters in their 
districts. In the October 1997 elections, 55,000 men and women, 3 
percent of the total population, were eligible to nominate Council 
members in all districts throughout the country. In the September 
elections, the Government selected more than 175,000 men and women to 
register to vote, of whom 114,000 registered and 100,000 voted. The 
number of eligible female voters increased from 5,000 to 52,000. In 
August a royal decree abolished the prior procedure under which voters 
(or electors) had volunteered as candidates for Council seats, had 
their police records checked by the Government, and relied on 
government approval of their decision to run. If the Sultan decided not 
to appoint them, the nominees with the most votes did not win 
appointment to the Council. Under the new procedures, candidates are 
not subject to government scrutiny, and the Sultan no longer ratifies 
winning candidates. At least two sitting members of the Council were 
excluded from standing for reelection in September because of their 
criticism of ministers during previous council sessions.
    The Council has no formal legislative powers, which remain 
concentrated in the Sultan's hands; however, it serves as a conduit of 
information between the people and the government ministries. No 
serving government official is eligible to be a Council member. The 
Council may question government ministers in public or in private, 
review all draft laws on social and economic policy, and recommend 
legislative changes to the Sultan, who makes the final decision. During 
the year, the membership of the Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of State), 
which was established in 1997, was increased from 41 to 48 members. The 
precise responsibilities of the Council of State and its relationship 
to the existing Consultative Council have yet to be clarified. The 
Council of State and the Consultative Council together form the Majlis 
Oman, or Council of Oman. A royal directive issued in April prohibited 
members of the Council of Oman from serving more than two 3-year terms.
    The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both 
the public and private sectors; however, women remained 
underrepresented in government and politics. In the 1997 elections, the 
Government selected two women from among the nominees to serve on the 
Consultative Council. In December 1997, the Sultan appointed 4 women to 
the 41-member Majlis Al-Dawla; during the year he appointed 5 women to 
the now 48-member body. In 1999 the Sultan, for only the second time, 
appointed a woman to the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) 
board.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government prohibits the establishment of human rights groups. 
The existing restrictions on the freedom of speech and association do 
not permit any activity or speech critical of the Government. There 
were no known requests by international human rights organizations to 
visit.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, sect, place of residence, 
and social class; however, decrees to implement its provisions have not 
been promulgated. Institutional and cultural discrimination based on 
gender, race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
    Women.--There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse although 
observers say that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are 
not uncommon. Definitive information is scant and difficult to collect. 
Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or 
child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint 
with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them 
from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene 
to keep such problems out of public view. There have been reports that 
employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women 
employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses. 
Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have 
complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that 
government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to 
investigative procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals 
known to be abusing domestic servants are not always brought to account 
for their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask 
their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section 
6.e.).
    Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue 
to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women 
hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector 
of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government 
officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer 
to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. 
Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country (see 
Section 2.b.).
    Some aspects of Islamic law and tradition as interpreted in the 
country also discriminate against women. Shari'a favors male heirs in 
adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women are reluctant to take an 
inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family.
    Since 1970 conditions for women have improved dramatically in 
several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the most 
recent figures available from the Ministry of Education report an 
enrollment rate nearing 90 percent for all girls eligible for 
elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students 
constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students 
attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000 
students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 574 women and 497 men 
received bachelor's degrees as members of the 11th graduating class, 
while 2 women and 9 men received master's degrees. The university has a 
quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men 
studying certain specialties. Reportedly, women are being limited to 50 
percent of the seats in the medical department. Restrictions on women 
studying engineering and archeology were lifted in September 1998. The 
quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in 
some other departments.
    Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women 
have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the 
media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of 
these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors, 
women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The 
government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women, 
observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Many 
educated women still face job discrimination because prospective 
employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families. In 
the past, several female employees in the Government have complained 
that they have been denied promotion in favor of less capable men. 
Unlike the case in previous years, when government grants for study 
abroad were limited almost exclusively to males, such grants are now 
awarded based on merit, and in 1999 were divided evenly between men and 
women.
    Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The 
Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and 
funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community 
development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 25 chapters with an 
active membership of more than 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities 
include sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten 
services, and handicraft training programs. The OWA also provides an 
informal counseling and support role for women with divorce-related 
difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and 
girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's 
located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the 
quality of life for their families and to improve their contributions 
to the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology 
lectures, child care issues, and agricultural and traditional 
handicraft training programs.
    Children.--The Government has made the health, education, and 
general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school 
education is free and universal but not compulsory. Most children 
attend school through secondary school, to age 18. No significant 
sectors or groups within the population are prevented from receiving an 
education. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and 
comprehensive immunization rates have risen. There is no pattern of 
familial or other child abuse. Government officials have publicly 
called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse.
    A few communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still 
practice female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health. Experts believe that the number of such cases is 
small and declining annually.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has mandated parking 
spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private and government 
office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance is voluntary, yet 
widely observed. Students in wheelchairs have easy access to Sultan 
Qaboos University. The Government has established several 
rehabilitation centers for disabled children. Disabled persons, 
including the blind, work in government offices. While the Government 
now charges a small fee to citizens seeking government health care, the 
disabled generally are not charged for physical therapy and prosthetics 
support.
    Religious Minorities.--Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority 
claim that they face discrimination in employment and educational 
opportunities. However, some members of this same community occupy 
prominent positions in both the private and public sectors.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, citizens of east 
African origin complained that they frequently faced job discrimination 
in both the public and private sectors. Some public institutions 
reportedly favor hiring members of one or another regional, tribal, or 
religious group. However, no group is banned from employment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The current law stipulates that ``it 
is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for any reason.'' The 
Government has not yet promulgated a new labor law that was first 
drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 1994. In the 
last quarter of 1996, the Consultative Council recommended some changes 
to the draft, but the Government has not yet issued the new law. 
Government officials have stated that the new labor law is to be 
consistent with international labor standards.
    Labor unrest is rare. There have not been any known job actions 
within the last 7 years.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The current law 
does not provide for the right to collective bargaining; however, it 
requires that employers of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-
management committee as a communication forum between the two groups. 
The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness 
of these committees is questionable. In general the committees discuss 
such matters as the living conditions at company-provided housing. They 
are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of 
employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed 
individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the 
guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
    The current law defines conditions of employment for some citizens 
and foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction 
workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that 
expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50 percent 
of the work force and as much as 80 percent of the modern-sector work 
force.
    Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or 
more workers. Similarly any employer with 50 or more workers must 
establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company, 
any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the 
Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective 
grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower 
paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in 
such cases may be represented by legal counsel.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1973 Labor Law 
prohibits forced or bonded labor, and although the enabling laws have 
not yet been implemented, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms that forced or 
bonded labor for any person is prohibited; however, governmental 
investigative and enforcement mechanisms are lacking. Foreign workers 
sometimes find themselves in situations amounting to forced labor. In 
such cases, employers withhold letters of release (documents that 
release workers from employment contracts), which allow them to change 
employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker must continue to 
work for his current employer or become technically unemployed, which 
is sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign workers are not 
aware of their right to take such disputes before the Labor Welfare 
Board. Others are reluctant to file complaints for fear of retribution 
from unscrupulous employers. In most cases, the Board releases the 
worker from service and awards compensation for time worked under 
compulsion. Employers face no other penalty than to reimburse the 
worker's back wages.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and instances 
of forced or bonded child labor are unknown.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1973 Labor Law prohibits children under the age of 13 
from working. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor enforces this 
prohibition; however, in practice the enforcement often does not extend 
to some small family businesses that employ underage children, 
particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. Children 
between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed but must obtain the 
Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on weekends or 
holidays, or perform strenuous labor. Child labor does not exist in any 
industry.
    Although primary school education is not compulsory, most children 
attend school to age 18 (see Section 5).
    The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by children 
and it is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of 
workers. In July 1998, the Government raised the minimum wage for most 
citizens to about $270 (100 rials) per month, plus $54 (20 rials) for 
transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines do not apply to a 
variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that 
employ fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants, 
dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories 
of manual labor. Many foreigners work in occupations that are exempt 
from the minimum wage law, and the Government is lax in enforcing 
minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed 
in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers frequently are 
paid more than their Omani counterparts.
    The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual 
laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to 
permit savings to be sent home.
    The private sector workweek is 40 to 45 hours and includes a rest 
period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have 
a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days 
in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week 
and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week. 
Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced. 
Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a 
complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's rulings are 
not binding.
    Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the 
first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers 
provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with 
annual or biannual round trip tickets to their countries of origin.
    All employers are required by law to provide first aid facilities. 
Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered 
under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness 
sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The 
health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the 
Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As 
required by law, they make regular onsite inspections.
    There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have 
sexually harassed and abused foreign females employed in such positions 
as domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as 
domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their 
employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials 
have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to investigative 
procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals known to be 
abusing foreign domestic servants are not always held accountable for 
their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask their 
governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section 5).
    The law states that employers must not place their employees in 
situations involving dangerous work; however, the law does not 
specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous 
work without jeopardy to his continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 QATAR

    Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy with no 
constitution or political parties. Qatar is governed by the ruling Al-
Thani family through its head, the Amir. The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from his father in June 1995 with the 
support of leading branches of the Al-Thani family, and in consultation 
with other leading Qatari families. This transition of authority did 
not represent a change in the basic governing order. The Amir holds 
absolute power, the exercise of which is influenced by religious law, 
consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of 
any citizen to gain access to the Amir to appeal government decisions. 
The Amir generally legislates after consultation with leading citizens, 
an arrangement institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that 
assists the Amir in formulating policy. In 1999 the Amir convened a 
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would 
provide for parliamentary elections. The committee has met regularly 
and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. In March 
1999, citizens were permitted to participate in the election of a 
national body, the Central Municipal Council, for the first time. The 
judiciary is nominally independent, but most judges hold their 
positions at the Government's pleasure.
    The country has efficient police and security services. The 
civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, comprises 
two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public 
Security and the investigatory police (Mubahathat), which is 
responsible for sedition and espionage cases. The Interior Ministry has 
a special state security investigative unit (Mubahith) that performs 
internal security investigations and gathers intelligence. In addition, 
there is an independent civilian intelligence service (Mukhabarat). 
There were one or two allegations that members of the security forces 
tortured civilians in detention.
    The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail 
and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal 
natural resource, but the country's extensive natural gas resources are 
playing an increasingly important role. Rapid development in the 1970's 
and 1980's created an economy in which foreign workers, mostly South 
Asian and Arab, outnumber citizens by a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1. The 
Government has embarked on a program of ``Qatarization,'' which is 
aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers. Many government jobs 
are offered only to citizens and private sector businesses are 
encouraged to recruit citizens as well.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in 
many areas, and there were improvements in freedom of expression; 
however, its record was poor in areas, such as citizens' right to 
change the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change their 
government. There were one or two allegations that members of the 
security forces tortured civilians in detention during the year. 
Arbitrary detention in security cases, and restrictions on the freedoms 
of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and on workers' 
rights, continued to be problems. However, the Government continued to 
take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim 
religions. Despite female suffrage, in practice women's rights are 
restricted by social customs. Domestic servants are mistreated and 
sometimes abused. Noncitizens, who make up the majority of the 
residents of the country, face discrimination in the workplace.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Government officially proscribes torture; however, 
there were one or two reports of alleged torture. There were 
unconfirmed allegations in previous years that some of the defendants 
in the trial of the 1996 coup plotters (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.) had 
been tortured while in police custody; government officials have denied 
the allegations. The Government administers most corporal punishment 
prescribed by Islamic law but does not allow amputation.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    The Government does not permit domestic human rights groups to 
exist, and no international human rights organization has asked to 
visit the country or its prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest; however, the police have the discretion to arrest 
persons based on a low level of suspicion, and arbitrary detention in 
security cases remains a problem. The authorities generally charge 
suspects within 48 hours. Suspects generally are presented to the 
Attorney General within 24 hours of arrest. The Attorney General 
decides whether to hold the suspect up to a maximum of 4 days, after 
which time the suspect is presented before a judge, who may order the 
suspect released or remanded to custody to await trial. The accused is 
entitled to legal representation throughout this process. Suspects who 
are detained in security cases generally are afforded access to 
counsel; however, they may be detained indefinitely while under 
investigation. There were no known cases of incommunicado detention 
during the year.
    In 1998 Ministry of Education official Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi 
distributed a letter criticizing the Amir's decision to allow women to 
vote and run for office in the Municipal Council elections as well as 
other purportedly anti-Islamic actions. The Amir ordered the arrest of 
Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi, and he remains in detention.
    In September 33 of the persons arrested and tried for involvement 
in a February 1996 coup attempt, including Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin 
Hamad Al-Thani, who was named as the prime suspect in the coup bid, 
were found guilty and sentence to life in prison; 85 were acquitted. 
The 33 found guilty have appealed. Prosecutors had called for the death 
penalty for all those accused.
    The Government has used forced exile on rare occasions. There were 
no reported cases this year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally 
independent; however, most judges are foreign nationals who hold 
residence permits granted by the civil authorities, and thus hold their 
positions at the Government's pleasure. The number of citizen judges is 
increasing.
    The judiciary deals with the bureaucracies of three ministries. 
Civil (or Adlea) courts are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, and 
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts fall under the Ministry of Endowments and 
Islamic Affairs. The prosecutors fall under the Ministry of Interior.
    There are two types of courts: The civil courts, which have 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and the Shari'a courts, 
which have jurisdiction in family and criminal cases. There are no 
permanent state security courts; however, although there have been no 
cases before these courts since the Amir assumed power, they have not 
been abolished formally by law and remain an option. Defendants tried 
by all courts have the right to appeal. The original case and the 
appeal in Shari'a courts are no longer heard by the same judge, and 
procedural loopholes that permitted this practice in the past are to be 
closed as part of a pending judicial reform package.
    The legal system is biased in favor of citizens and the Government. 
A Muslim litigant may request the Shari'a courts to assume jurisdiction 
in commercial or civil cases. Non-Muslims are not allowed to bring 
suits as plaintiffs in the Shari'a courts; however, they may file suit 
in the civil courts. This practice prevents non-Muslim residents from 
obtaining full legal recourse. Trials in the civil courts are public, 
but in the Shari'a courts only the disputing parties, their relatives, 
associates, and witnesses are allowed in the courtroom. Lawyers do not 
play a formal role except to prepare litigants for their cases. 
Although non-Arabic speakers are provided with interpreters, foreigners 
are disadvantaged, especially in cases involving the performance of 
contracts. However, provided that the foreign defendant's sponsor or 
embassy agree, the defendant is entitled to legal representation 
throughout the trial and pretrial process.
    Defendants appear before a judge for a preliminary hearing within 7 
days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week 
at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations. Lengthy 
pretrial detention is not known to occur. Defendants in the civil 
courts have the right to be represented by defense attorneys but are 
not always permitted to be represented by counsel in the Shari'a 
courts.
    Shari'a trials usually are brief. Shari'a family law trials often 
are held without counsel. After both parties have stated their cases 
and examined witnesses, judges usually deliver a verdict after a short 
deliberation. Criminal cases normally are tried within 2 to 3 months 
after suspects are detained. Suspects are entitled to bail, except in 
some instances, such as in cases of violent crime. Bail may be provided 
by citizens or noncitizens. Foreigners who are charged with minor 
crimes may be released to a citizen sponsor. They are prohibited from 
departing the country until the case is resolved.
    After a public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the 
1996 coup attempt, trial judges sentenced 33 defendants to life 
imprisonment. Nine of them were tried in absentia. Another 85 
defendants were acquitted on all charges. A decision regarding the 
convicted defendants' appeal was pending at year's end. The trial was 
considered fair.
    There are no known political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of 
the home and the privacy of women provide a great deal of protection 
against arbitrary intrusion for most citizens and residents. A warrant 
must be obtained before police may search a residence or business, 
except in cases involving national security or emergencies. Search 
warrants are issued by judicial authorities. There were no reports of 
unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police and security 
forces are believed to monitor the telephone calls of suspected 
criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of selected 
foreigners.
    With prior permission, which is usually granted, citizens may marry 
foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits or 
citizenship for their spouses.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Government reduced 
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press in 1996 and 
permitted a noticeable expansion of press freedom, some restrictions 
still remain. The Government lifted formal censorship of the media in 
1995, and since then the press has been essentially free of government 
interference. However, journalists continue to practice self-
censorship, due to real or perceived social and political pressures. 
Some journalists reportedly were subjected to pressure by the 
Government during the year after they published articles critical of 
the Government. Although explicit criticism of citizens' public or 
private affairs is not common, a number of such reports have been noted 
in local newspapers, especially Arabic-language newspapers. One Arabic-
language newspaper even polled its readers to determine the most 
popular and least popular ministers. The Minister of Education was a 
frequent target of criticism; other criticism tended to be targeted at 
organizations rather than individuals.
    There were no reports of instances of political censorship of 
foreign news media or broadcasts of foreign programs on local 
television over the past year. The Censorship Office in the Ministry of 
Information was abolished (together with the Ministry) in 1996. 
Pornography and expressions deemed hostile to Islam still are subject 
to censorship, and censors still work at broadcast media under the 
overall supervision of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.
    Citizens enjoy broad freedom of speech but are restricted by the 
social and family restraints of a very traditional society. There is no 
apparent fear of government monitoring of private speech. However, the 
larger foreign population does not believe it enjoys the same freedoms 
and acts accordingly.
    Television and radio are state owned, but the privately owned 
satellite television channel Al-Jazeera operates freely. During the 
year, radio and television call-in programs and talk shows criticized 
the Amir for meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister at the U.N. 
Millennium Summit in September, and the Government was criticized for 
allowing the Israeli Trade Office to remain open prior to the November 
Islamic Summit. Various government ministers are regularly criticized 
on a popular radio talk show.
    A Ministry of Education official who wrote a letter in 1999 
critical of the Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for 
office in the Municipal Council elections remains in custody (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Customs officials screen imported print media, videocassettes, and 
other such items for pornography, but have stopped blocking the 
importation of non-Muslim religious items (see Section 2.c.).
    A growing number of citizens and residents have access to the 
Internet, which is provided through the state-owned telecommunications 
monopoly. Internet service is censored for pornographic content through 
a proxy server, which blocks those web sites containing certain key 
words and phrases. A user who believes that a site is censored 
mistakenly may submit the web address to the Internet service provider 
to have the site reviewed for suitability. The Government is responsive 
to such submissions.
    There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructors 
at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
severely limits freedom of assembly. The Government generally does not 
allow political demonstrations; however, it permitted one peaceful 
demonstration of about 3,000 participants in October, under the aegis 
of the Central Municipal Council, that protested the Israeli 
Government's actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza.
    The Government severely limits freedom of association. The 
Government does not allow political parties or membership in 
international professional organizations critical of the Government or 
of any other Arab government. Private social, sports, trade, 
professional, and cultural societies must be registered with the 
Government. Security forces monitor the activities of such groups.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no constitutional protection for 
freedom of religion. The state religion is Islam, as interpreted by the 
conservative Wahhabi order of the Sunni branch. The Government 
officially prohibits public worship by non-Muslims; however, it 
tolerates and protects services conducted privately with prior 
notification to the authorities. The Government allows Shi'a Muslims to 
practice their faith freely; however, community leaders have agreed to 
refrain from certain public practices, such as self-flagellation.
    The Government and ruling family are inextricably linked to the 
practice of Islam. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls the 
construction of mosques, the administration of clerical affairs, and 
instruction in the Koran. The Minister of Islamic Affairs is a member 
of the Amir's cabinet and participates in policymaking at the highest 
level. The only official government holidays aside from the 
independence day are the Eid Al-Fitr, following the holy month of 
Ramadan, and the Eid Al-Adha, which commemorates the end of the Hajj. 
The Amir participates in widely publicized ``Eid prayers'' and each 
year personally finances the Hajj pilgrimages of many who cannot afford 
to travel to Mecca.
    During the year, the Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox churches in 
effect received de facto official recognition. However, formal 
recognition apparently has not yet been granted. There reportedly is a 
verbal commitment by the Government to allow the churches to operate 
openly in a manner that apparently reflects de facto government 
recognition. For example, priests of the three churches have been asked 
to wear their clerical garb and may apply to be sponsors for visitor 
visas for other church representatives. In addition, church 
representatives may import reasonable amounts of Bibles and other 
religious literature for use by their congregations. In February the 
Government identified a parcel of land on which it plans to allow the 
construction of three churches, one each for the Catholic, Anglican, 
and Orthodox communities. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture met with 
diplomats and representatives of the churches to discuss initial design 
plans. The Government recognizes and allows marriages between non-
Muslims to be conducted by the Roman Catholic Church. Such progress for 
Christians is due, in large part, to their status as ``people of the 
book'' in that the Koran accords special status to Christians and Jews. 
The Government intends to permit Hindus and Buddhists neither to 
worship openly nor to establish temples because it claims that there is 
no Koranic justification for tolerance of polytheistic religions.
    Non-Muslims may not proselytize, and conversion from Islam is 
theoretically a capital offense. However, there is no record of an 
execution for such a conversion since independence in 1971.
    The Government formally prohibits the publication, importation, and 
distribution of Bibles and other non-Islamic religious literature. 
However, in practice individuals generally are not prevented from 
importing Bibles and other religious items for personal use. In 
previous years, there were sporadic reports of confiscation of such 
materials by customs officials. During the year, some Christian worship 
groups reported having no trouble importing instructional materials 
(i.e., Sunday school materials and devotionals) for use by the groups. 
Police provide traffic control for authorized Catholic masses, which 
may be attended by 1,000 or more persons at Easter and Christmas.
    There are no restrictions on non-Muslims providing religious 
instruction to their children; however, the public schools provide 
compulsory instruction in Islam. The public schools generally are 
closed to foreigners, most of whose children attend private schools.
    Practice of Islam confers advantage in civil life. For example, 
non-Muslims do not have the right to bring suit in the Shari'a (Islamic 
law) courts. These courts are utilized to settle the majority of civil 
claims; thus, non-Muslims are at a distinct disadvantage.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on internal 
travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. In 
general, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel. 
However, men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by 
providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure. 
Technically, women employed by the Government must obtain official 
permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known 
to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the 
Government face restrictions on their right to travel abroad.
    All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to 
immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local 
labor pool. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor 
(usually their employer) to enter and depart the country, but their 
dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign women who 
are married to citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for 
citizenship; however, they are expected to relinquish their foreign 
citizenship.
    The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter 
illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby countries, are 
refused entry. Asylum seekers who are able to obtain local sponsorship 
or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are 
employed.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the 
political system peacefully. The political institutions combine the 
characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern 
bureaucracy. Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must 
be chosen from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family. There are 
no political parties or organized opposition groups. However, in 1999 
citizens had the opportunity for the first time to choose officials for 
the Central Municipal Council in free and fair elections.
    The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including 
appointment of cabinet members. On March 8, 1999, citizens elected a 
29-member Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women 
age 18 and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates. 
The Council is a nonpartisan body that addresses issues such as street 
repair, green space, trash collection, and public works projects. Its 
role is to advise the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture. The 
Council cannot change policy on its own.
    In November 1998, the Amir announced his intention to form a 
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would 
provide for democratic parliamentary elections. The constitutional 
committee was inaugurated in July 1999 and includes a number of 
government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. In 
addition to subcommittees on the legislature, executive, and judiciary, 
it includes a subcommittee on human rights. The committee has met 
regularly and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. The 
Amir reiterated in his remarks to the committee members that he expects 
their efforts to lead to the establishment of an elected parliamentary 
body.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Women have 
the right to vote and run as candidates for the Central Municipal 
Council; none were elected to the Council in the 1999 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit local human rights organizations to 
exist. No international human rights organizations are known to have 
asked to investigate conditions in the country. However, Amnesty 
International and foreign embassies were invited to send observers to 
sessions of the public trial of those accused in the 1996 coup attempt. 
Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law proscribes discrimination in the workplace; however, 
institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender, 
race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
    Women.--According to the Family Development Center, the country's 
leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) on women's issues, violence 
against women is not widespread. Some foreign domestic servants, 
especially those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been 
mistreated by employers. In most cases, the mistreatment involves late 
or nonpayment of wages (see Section 6.c.), but also includes 
allegations of rape and physical abuse (see Section 6.e.). Foreign 
embassies provide shelter for maids who have left their employers as a 
result of abuse or disputes. According to Shari'a, all forms of 
physical abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The 
police actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the 
last few years, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to 
arrest and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders 
who are citizens usually receive lighter punishments than do 
foreigners. Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for 
fear of losing their jobs.
    The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of 
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent 
assault against a woman for perceived immodesty or defiant behavior; 
however, such honor killings are rare. In 1999 a former minister and 
Gulf War hero, Ali Saeed Al-Khayareen, was accused of killing his two 
half-sisters for their alleged sexual misconduct. Al-Khayareen was held 
for a few months at the Al-Rayyan detention center, but eventually the 
women's family decided to accept monetary compensation, and he was 
released late in 1999.
    The activities of women are restricted closely both by law and 
tradition. For example, a woman is prohibited from applying for a 
driver's license unless she has permission from a male guardian. This 
restriction does not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adheres 
to Shari'a as practiced in the country in matters of inheritance and 
child custody. Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their 
husbands. However, they inherit only one-half as much as male 
relatives. Non-Muslim wives inherit nothing, unless a special exception 
is arranged. In cases of divorce, Shari'a is followed; younger children 
remain with the mother and older children with the father. Both parents 
retain permanent rights of visitation. However, local authorities do 
not allow a noncitizen parent to take his or her child out of the 
country without permission of the citizen parent. Women may attend 
court proceedings but generally are represented by a male relative; 
however, women may represent themselves. According to Shari'a, the 
testimony of two women equals that of one man, but the courts routinely 
interpret this on a case-by-case basis.
    Women largely are relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker, 
but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the 
news media. Women appear to receive equal pay for equal work; however, 
they often do not receive equal allowances. These allowances generally 
cover transportation and housing costs. Increasingly, women receive 
government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities overseas. The 
Amir has entrusted his second wife, who is the mother of the Heir 
Apparent, with the high-profile task of establishing a university in 
Doha. In 1996 the Government appointed its first female undersecretary, 
in the Ministry of Education, and in March a woman was appointed vice 
president of Qatar University. Although women legally are able to 
travel abroad alone (see Section 2.d.), tradition and social pressures 
cause most to travel with male escorts. There also have been complaints 
that citizen husbands take their foreign spouses' passports and, 
without prior approval, turn them in for Qatari citizenship documents. 
The husbands then inform their wives that the wives have lost their 
former citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives report being 
forbidden by their husbands or in-laws to visit or to contact foreign 
embassies.
    There is no independent women's rights organization, nor has the 
Government permitted the establishment of one.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights through a well-funded, free public education system (elementary 
through university) and a complete medical protection program for the 
children of citizens. However, children of most foreigners are denied 
free education and have only limited medical coverage.
    Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background, 
have been used as jockeys in camel races. Little information is 
available on wages and working conditions for these children (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted 
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the 
disabled, who also face social discrimination. The Government maintains 
a hospital and schools that provide high-quality, free services to the 
mentally and physically disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Shi'a Muslims fill many positions in the 
bureaucracy and are prominent in business. However, they experience 
discrimination in employment in some sensitive areas, such as security.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminates 
against some citizens of non-Qatari origin. In the private sector, many 
citizens of Iranian origin occupy some of the highest positions. 
However, they rarely are found in senior decisionmaking positions in 
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right of association is limited 
strictly, and all workers, including foreigners, are prohibited from 
forming labor unions. Despite this restriction, almost all workers have 
the right to strike after their case has been presented to the Labor 
Conciliation Board and ruled upon. Employers may close a place of work 
or dismiss employees once the Conciliation Board has heard the case. 
The right to strike does not exist for government employees, domestic 
workers, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a public 
utility or health or security service may strike if such a strike would 
harm the public or lead to property damage. Strikes by expatriate 
workers are rare but do occur. The Conciliation Board is widely 
perceived to be objective, particularly with regard to the most common 
complaints of expatriate workers, the nonpayment of wages, and poor 
living conditions. The press reports work actions and grievances over 
these issues.
    The Labor Law provides for the establishment of joint consultative 
committees composed of representatives of the employer and workers. The 
committees do not discuss wages but may consider issues such as 
organization and productivity, conditions of employment, training of 
workers, and safety measures and their implementation.
    Since 1995 the country has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are 
prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. In general wages are 
set unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local 
courts handle disputes between workers and employers.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor. Three-quarters of the work force are 
foreign workers, who are dependent on a single employer for residency 
rights. This leaves them vulnerable to abuse. For instance, employers 
must give consent before exit permits are issued to any foreign 
employee seeking to leave the country. Some employers temporarily 
withhold this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer 
periods than they wish. Some unskilled workers and domestic servants 
are vulnerable to late payment of wages; it is government policy to 
assist laborers, usually through the Labor Board, under such 
circumstances. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however, 
some very young children work as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5 
and 6.d., 6.e., and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed with 
the approval of their parents or guardians and some children may work 
in small, family-owned businesses. However, child labor is rare. 
Education is compulsory for citizens through the age of 15. Very young 
children, usually of African or South Asian background, are used as 
jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Little 
information is available on wages and working conditions for these 
children. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children 
and generally enforces this prohibition effectively with respect to 
citizen children (see Section 6.c.).
    Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a 
week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and 
occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the 
employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health, 
safety, or morals of minors. Employers also must obtain permission from 
the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage, 
although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The average 
wage provides a decent standard of living for workers and their 
families. The law prescribes a 48-hour workweek with a 24-hour rest 
period, although most government offices follow a 36-hours-per-week 
work schedule. Employees who work more than 48 hours per week, or 36 
hours per week during the Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to 
overtime pay. This law is adhered to in government offices and major 
private sector companies. It is not observed with respect to domestic 
and personal employees. Domestic servants frequently work 7 days per 
week, and more than 12 hours per day with few or no holidays, and have 
no effective way to redress grievances against their employers.
    The Government has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and 
health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Energy and Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees 
safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has 
its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964, 
as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which 
compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and 
petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not 
specifically set rates of payment and compensation. Laborers who suffer 
work-related sickness or injuries receive free medical treatment 
provided by the Government.
    Foreign workers may enter the country on a visitors visa and then 
convert this visa to a work visa once in the country. A sponsor is need 
to convert a visitor's visa to a work visa, and the worker must have 
their sponsor's permission to depart the country. Any worker may seek 
legal relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic servants 
generally accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. The 
Government also penalizes citizen employers who violate residence and 
sponsorship laws. Some foreign domestic servants have been mistreated 
by their employers. Such mistreatment normally involves the nonpayment 
or late payment of wages but also may involve rape and physical abuse 
(see Section 5). It is not known if workers have the right to remove 
themselves from hazardous work conditions without fear of dismissal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons.
    On January 19, the Government arrested and repatriated several 
women from the former Soviet Union who were transported to the country 
to work as prostitutes.
    Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background, 
have been used as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
                               __________

                              SAUDI ARABIA

    Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative 
institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd Bin Abd Al-
Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the 
country in the early 20th century. Since the death of King Abd Al-Aziz, 
the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons, who 
themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. A 1992 royal 
decree reserves for the King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince. 
Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance since 
King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared the 
Islamic holy book the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the Prophet 
Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government bases its 
legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a rigorously 
conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in 
general accepts the concept of separation of religion and state. The 
Government prohibits the establishment of political parties and 
suppresses opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a Consultative 
Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, and similar provincial assemblies. The 
Majlis, a strictly advisory body, began holding sessions in 1993 and 
was expanded in 1997. The judiciary is generally independent but is 
subject to influence by the executive branch and members of the royal 
family.
    Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior are 
responsible for internal security. The Mutawwa'in, or religious police, 
constitute the Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, a 
semiautonomous agency that enforces adherence to Islamic norms by 
monitoring public behavior. The Government maintains general control of 
the security forces. However, members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The oil industry has fueled the transformation of Saudi Arabia from 
a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society to a rapidly 
urbanizing one, characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects, 
an extensive social welfare system, and a labor market comprised 
largely of foreign workers. Oil revenues account for around 55 percent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of government 
income. Agriculture accounts for only about 6 percent of GDP. 
Government spending, including spending on the national airline, power, 
water, telephone, education, and health services, accounts for 24 
percent of GDP. About 40 percent of the economy is nominally private, 
and the Government is promoting further privatization of the economy. 
In 1995 the Government began an aggressive campaign to increase the 
number of Saudi nationals represented in the public and private work 
forces. The campaign has restricted employment of some categories of 
foreign workers by limiting certain occupations to Saudis only, 
increasing fees for some types of work visas, and setting minimum wages 
for some job categories in order to increase the cost to employers of 
non-Saudi labor. In August 1998, the Government announced that citizens 
had to constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private 
sector companies by October 1998, an amount that, according to a 1995 
ministerial decree, should be 15 percent. Despite a crackdown on 
illegal workers and the citizens who employ or house them, the program 
has continued to fall short of its goal of increasing the Saudi 
percentage of the work force by 5 percent each year.
    The Government's human rights record remained generally poor in a 
number of areas; however, its record showed limited improvement in some 
areas. Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change 
their government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and 
prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate 
incommunicado detention; in addition there were allegations that 
security forces committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge 
is a problem. Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction 
to the law, but with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawwa'in 
(religious police, who constitute the Committee to Promote Virtue and 
Prevent Vice) continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and 
foreigners. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government prohibits or restricts freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, association, religion, and movement. However, during the year 
the Government tolerated a wider range of debate and criticism in the 
press concerning domestic issues. Other continuing problems included 
discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against 
ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker 
rights. The Government views its interpretation of Islamic law as its 
sole source of guidance on human rights and disagrees with 
internationally accepted definitions of human rights. However, during 
the year, the Government initiated limited measures to participate in 
international human rights mechanisms. For example, it invited to the 
country the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers and acceded to (with reservations) the U.N. Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 
Freedom From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings.
    In November 1998, several Mutawwa'in attacked and killed an elderly 
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a 
traditional Shi'a practice). Attempts by Mutawwa'in to cover up the 
killing were unsuccessful. After investigating the incident, the 
Government stated that medical reports indicated that the man's death 
resulted from a drop in his blood pressure because of old age. The 
Government stated that the death was not a criminal incident.
    The investigation of the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing, which killed 19 
U.S. servicemen, continued. The Government has not yet issued a report 
of its findings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were credible reports that the authorities abused 
detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials 
are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and 
sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture. 
Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has 
refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to 
investigate alleged abuses. In 1998 the Government pledged to cooperate 
with U.N. human rights mechanisms, and it announced in April the 
establishment of a committee to investigate allegations of torture 
pursuant to its obligations under the convention (see Section 4). 
However, although the Government asks for details of reports of torture 
and other human rights abuses made by international human rights 
groups, it does not permit international observers to investigate such 
reports. The Government's general refusal to grant members of 
diplomatic missions access to the Ministry of Interior detention 
facilities, or allow members of international human rights groups into 
the country, hinders efforts to confirm or discount reports of abuses. 
The Government's past failure to criticize human rights abuses has 
contributed to the public perception that security forces may commit 
abuses with impunity.
    The Mutawwa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens 
and foreigners of both sexes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.).
    The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation 
of Shari'a (Islamic law). Punishments include flogging, amputation, and 
execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities 
acknowledged 120 executions during the year, an increase from 100 in 
1999. Executions included 62 persons convicted of murder, 21 convicted 
of narcotics-related offenses, 22 convicted of rape, and 10 convicted 
of armed robbery. The executions also included two women for murder and 
three for drug trafficking. The men were executed by beheading and the 
women were executed by firing squad. The government of Nigeria 
criticized Saudi Arabia for the execution of seven Nigerians convicted 
of bank robbery. In accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish 
repeated thievery by amputation of the right hand. There were 27 
reports of amputations, including 7 reports of multiple amputations 
(right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery during the 
year. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol-
related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person 
of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.
    On April 16, the Associated Press reported that 5 persons had been 
sentenced to 2,600 lashes and 6 years in prison, and 4 persons to 2,400 
lashes and 5 years' imprisonment, for ``deviant sexual behavior.'' 
Amnesty International reported in July that six men were executed on 
charges of deviant sexual behavior, some of which were related to their 
sexual orientation. Amnesty International was uncertain whether the six 
men who were executed were among the nine who were sentenced to 
flogging and imprisonment in April.
    During the year, a court ordered that the eye of an Egyptian man be 
removed as punishment for an attack 6 years ago in which he was 
convicted of throwing acid on another Egyptian man. The victim, who 
lost his eye in the attack and suffered other disfigurement, had urged 
the court to implement Al-Qisas, the Shari'a provision stipulating that 
the punishment be commensurate with the crime. Press accounts stated 
that the convicted man's eye was removed at a hospital in August.
    Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. Prisons 
generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-
conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful 
patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are 
overcrowded and unsanitary. Authorities generally allowed family 
members access to detainees.
    Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a 
regional basis, were established by King Fahd in 1993. The members of 
these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners' 
files, and hear their complaints. However, the Government does not 
permit human rights monitors to visit prisons or jails. The Government 
does not allow impartial observers of any type access to specialized 
Ministry of Interior prisons, where it detains persons accused of 
political subversion.
    Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses 
former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the 
Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there was no systematic abuse 
of refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have 
surfaced in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing 
to investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The camp 
receives a high level of material assistance and is generally 
comfortable and well-run. However, the Government generally confines 
refugees to the camp, except in the event of approved emigration.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest; however, some officers make arrests and detain 
persons without following explicit legal guidelines. There are few 
procedures to safeguard against abuse, although the Government claims 
that it punishes individual officers who violate regulations. There 
have been few publicized cases of citizens successfully obtaining 
judicial redress for abuse of the Government's power of arrest and 
detention.
    In accordance with a 1983 Ministry of Interior regulation, 
authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than 3 days before 
charging them. However, serious exceptions have been reported. The 
regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also, 
authorities sometimes release detainees on the recognizance of a patron 
or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If they are not 
released, authorities typically detain accused persons for an average 
of 2 months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some 
foreigners, summarily deporting them. There is no established procedure 
providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.
    The Mutawwa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more 
than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress 
and behavior. However, they sometimes exceeded this limit before 
delivering detainees to the police (see Section 1.f.). Current 
procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawwa'in at the 
time of an arrest. Mutawwa'in generally complied with this requirement. 
During the year, in the more conservative Riyadh district, the number 
of reports received of Mutawwa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and 
detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards 
was comparable to 1999. The Jeddah district also received a similar 
number of reports as in the previous year.
    In January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians during a 
raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that the 
religious service was attended by such a large number of persons that 
it could not be considered private. All of the detainees subsequently 
were released and deported to the Philippines (see Section 2.c.). 
According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a Shi'a 
cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested in his 
home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since then 
(see Section 2.c.). In June the Government arrested an Indian Christian 
for possession of a videotape of a religious event. He was released 
after spending 2 months in jail and was deported to India (see Section 
2.c.). On November 30, the police detained five Christian worshipers 
for about an hour for questioning regarding their activities (see 
Section 2.c.). In December the authorities raided a worship service and 
arrested six Filipino citizens; three remained in custody at year's end 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of 
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service, 
commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial 
phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI 
allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or 
lawyers.
    The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly 
criticize the Government or may charge them with attempting to 
destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). In January the 
Government announced that it had released, under its annual Ramadan 
amnesty, 4,637 prisoners and detainees, including 1,807 foreigners. It 
is unclear whether there were any political detainees or prisoners 
among those released.
    There is no reliable information about the total number of 
political detainees.
    Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S. 
military facility in Saudi Arabia, authorities have detained, 
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a 
Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies. 
The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of 
Shi'a arrested in the aftermath of the bombing. Government security 
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in 
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation 
(see Section 2.c.).
    The Government did not use forced exile, and there were no reports 
that it revoked citizenship for political purposes during the year. 
However, it previously has revoked the citizenship of opponents of the 
Government who reside outside the country (see Section 3).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary 
is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however, 
judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch, 
particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are 
not required to appear before the courts. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of 
the courts.
    The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise 
jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base 
judgments largely on a code derived from the Koran and the Sunna, 
another Islamic text. Cases involving relatively small penalties are 
tried in Shari'a summary courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in 
Shari'a courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to 
the courts of appeal.
    Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against 
the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before 
specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the 
Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
    The Government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal 
tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.
    The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed 
personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of 
military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King 
review the decisions of courts-martial.
    The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse 
decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review 
lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for 
reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or 
remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
    The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of 
20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It 
establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in 
deciding cases.
    The law grants defendants the right to a lawyer and translator; 
however, defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge, 
who determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards. 
The courts generally do not provide foreign defendants with 
translators. Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before 
trial or may attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with 
Arabic. Public defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any 
person to represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court 
and the Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed.
    A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a 
man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two 
women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case 
of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for 
criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting 
authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse. 
Female parties to court proceedings such as divorce and family law 
cases generally must deputize male relatives to speak on their behalf.
    Sentencing is not uniform. Laws and regulations state that 
defendants should be treated equally; however, foreign residents 
sometimes receive harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a as 
interpreted and applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive 
harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of 
wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to 
relatives varies with the nationality, religion, age, and sex of the 
victim. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for 
punishments stipulated by the Koran.
    Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and 
reduce a judge's sentence. In general members of the royal family and 
other powerful families are not subject to the same rule of law as 
ordinary citizens (see Sections 1.a. and 3). For example, judges do not 
have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal 
family.
    The King and his advisors review cases involving capital 
punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and 
grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals. 
In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the 
murderer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the 
King.
    There is insufficient information to determine the number of 
political prisoners. The Government does not provide information on 
political prisoners or respond to inquiries about them. It does not 
allow access to political prisoners by international humanitarian 
organizations. Moreover, the Government conducts closed trials for 
persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained 
persons incommunicado for long periods while they are under 
investigation. Amnesty International estimates the number of political 
prisoners to be between 100 and 200.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. The sanctity 
of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most 
fundamental of Islamic precepts. Royal decrees announced in 1992 
include provisions calling for the Government to defend the home from 
unlawful intrusions, while laws and regulations prohibit officials from 
intercepting mail and electronic communication except when necessary 
during criminal investigations. Nonetheless, there are few procedural 
safeguards against government interference with one's privacy, family, 
home, or correspondence.
    The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain 
permission from the provincial governor before searching a private 
home; however, warrants are not required.
    Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for 
contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim 
religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials 
considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious 
videotapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also open mail and use 
informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters. 
Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
related offenses. Informants (know as ``mukhbir'') and ward bosses 
(known as ``umdas') report ``seditious ideas'' or antigovernment 
activity in their neighborhoods to the Ministry of the Interior.
    The Government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms, 
which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women may not marry 
noncitizens without government permission; men must obtain approval 
from the Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the 
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a, 
women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry 
Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
    Mutawwa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in 
different regions of the country but were most numerous in the central 
Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawwa'in and religious 
vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested, 
and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government 
requires the Mutawwa'in to follow established procedures and to offer 
instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawwa'in did not always 
comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized 
publicly abuses by Mutawwa'in and religious vigilantes but has sought 
to curtail such abuses.
    Mutawwa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior 
included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily 
prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of 
public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places. 
Mutawwa'in frequently reproached citizen and foreign women for failure 
to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found 
together who were not married or closely related.
    Some professors believe that informers monitor comments made in 
university classrooms (see Section 2.a.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limits 
freedom of speech and the press. However, the authorities allow the 
press some freedom to criticize governmental bodies and social policies 
through editorial comments and cartoons.
    The authorities do not permit criticism of Islam or the royal 
family, and criticism of the Government is limited. However, during the 
year the authorities tolerated increasing criticism of governmental 
bodies and social policies in editorial comments and cartoons. For 
example, some newspapers published criticism of specific cabinet 
ministries and ministers for their handling of a disease outbreak, 
while another published a column criticizing the Minister of Finance 
for lack of transparency in the Government's spending of oil revenues. 
One newspaper published a column in support of allowing women to drive 
by disputing the arguments of a member of the Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars who opposes such actions. The press also carried an extensive 
discussion on human rights following the publication of an Amnesty 
International report critical of government human rights practices. 
While nearly all media reports concurred with the Government's 
dismissive response to the Amnesty International report, one editorial 
that circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to 
criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section 4). 
Persons whose criticisms align them with an organized political 
opposition are subject to arrest and detention until they confess to a 
crime or sign a statement promising not to resume such criticisms, 
which is tantamount to a confession. Writer Zuheir Kutbi claims that he 
has been imprisoned six times for his writings. Due to his 
imprisonment, Kutbi has been deprived of employment and his passport, 
and lives under government surveillance.
    The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982 
media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the 
dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy 
statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote 
Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of the country. The 
Ministry of Information appoints, and may remove, the editors in chief. 
It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The 
Government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official 
government views.
    In November the Government approved a wide-ranging new press law 
that would permit the creation of professional journalism societies and 
permit the publication of foreign newspapers in the Kingdom. The new 
law states that local publications will be subject to censorship only 
in emergencies and pledges to protect free expression of opinion; 
however, the law obliges authorities to censor foreign publications 
that defame Islam and harm the interests of the state or the ``ethics 
of the people.'' It is not yet clear whether the implementation of the 
new law will change current practices regarding freedom of expression.
    Newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as 
crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when 
it has been authorized by a senior government official. Two Saudi-
owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are 
widely distributed and read in the country. Both newspapers tend to 
practice self-censorship in order to comply with government 
restrictions on sensitive issues. The authorities continue to censor 
stories about the country in the foreign press. Censors may remove or 
blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain 
issues of foreign publications from entering the market. However, the 
Ministry of Information continued to relax its blackout policy 
regarding politically sensitive news concerning the country reported in 
the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of 
domestic news remain very stringent. The Government's policy in this 
regard appears to be motivated in part by pragmatic considerations: 
Saudi access to outside sources of information, such as Arabic and 
Western satellite television channels and the Internet, is increasingly 
widespread.
    In February Information Minister Fuad Al-Farsi imposed a ban of 1 
week on the daily sports newspaper Ar-Reyadi because of a column by a 
popular sports journalist, Prince Abdulrahman bin Saud, that attacked 
another sports journalist. The ban was lifted after 2 days.
    The editors of two Yemeni newspapers, Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-
Arabi, claimed that actions taken against the newspapers by the Yemeni 
Ministry of Information, including filing a lawsuit, detaining a 
journalist, and suspending publication of one of the newspapers, were a 
direct result of pressure applied by the Saudi Government after the 
newspapers had published articles critical of Saudi Arabia.
    In December a newspaper reported that while one of its reporters 
was investigating a story about the illegal slaughtering of animals by 
a restaurant, local police arrested, fingerprinted, interrogated, and 
then released the reporter. In a front-page commentary, the newspaper 
stated that local police were protecting the restaurant's owners.
    The Government tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists 
into the Kingdom.
    The Government owns and operates the country's television and radio 
companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics, 
religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign 
programs and songs. There are well over 1 million satellite receiving 
dishes in the country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts. 
The legal status of these devices is ambiguous. The Government ordered 
a halt to their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders 
who objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite 
channels. In 1994 the Government banned the sale, installation, and 
maintenance of dishes and supporting devices; however, the number of 
dishes continues to increase, and residents legally may subscribe to 
satellite decoding services that require a dish.
    In December the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars ruled that 
watching the popular Ramadan television series ``Tash Ma Tash'' was 
contrary to proper Islamic conduct. The program, which was broadcast on 
a government channel, mildly parodied bureaucratic delays and social 
problems. The Government did not publicize the Council's ruling nor did 
it stop airing the program.
    The Government bans all books, magazines, and other materials that 
it considers sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of 
Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are 
prohibited from being sold in the country.
    Access to the Internet is available legally only through Saudi 
servers, which are monitored heavily by the Government. Some citizens 
attempt to circumvent this control by accessing the Internet through 
servers in other countries. The Government attempts to block all web 
sites that it deems sexual, pornographic, politically offensive, or 
``unIslamic.'' However, such web sites are accessible from within the 
country. According to Human Rights Watch, in April the Government 
closed a women-only Internet cafe in Mecca after a court complaint that 
the cafe was being used for ``immoral purposes.''
    The Government censors all forms of public artistic expression and 
prohibits cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except 
those that are considered folkloric.
    Academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study 
of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some 
professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and 
report to government and religious authorities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations 
as a means of political expression. Public meetings are segregated by 
sex. Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved 
by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold 
unsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation. The authorities 
monitor any large gathering of persons, especially of women. The 
Mutawwa'in dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as 
restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and 
social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are 
accompanied by a father, brother, or husband. However, in practice 
police often implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many 
occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from 
entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events 
and lectures. However, for several years authorities have allowed 
unescorted Saudi women to attend women-only cultural events hosted at a 
diplomatic mission.
    In October citizens took part in a number of illegal demonstrations 
protesting the Israeli Government's actions against Palestinians in 
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According to media 
accounts, the authorities did not interfere with two demonstrations 
conducted by women at universities and another outside a mosque; 
however, the authorities dispersed several other small, apparently 
spontaneous public demonstrations against Israel in Riyadh, AlJawf 
province, and elsewhere.
    The Government strictly limits freedom of association. It prohibits 
the establishment of political parties or any type of opposition group 
(see Section 3). By its power to license associations, the Government 
ensures that groups conform to public policy. The Government licenses a 
large number of humanitarian organizations and tribal and professional 
societies, such as the Saudi Chemists Society and the Saudi Pharmacists 
Society. The Government claims that such groups operate without 
government interference because they are not detrimental to public 
security.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam 
is the official religion and all citizens must be Muslims. The 
Government prohibits the public practice of other religions. Private 
worship by non-Muslims generally is permitted.
    Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy and the Government has declared 
the Islamic holy book, the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the 
Prophet Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government 
bases its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of the 
rigorously conservative and strict interpretation of the Hanbali school 
of the Sunni branch of Islam and discriminates against other branches 
of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in general accepts the 
concepts of separation of religion and state, and such separation does 
not exist.
    Islamic practice generally is limited to that of the Wahabi order, 
which adheres to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam as 
interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab, an 18th century Arabian 
religious reformer. Practices contrary to this interpretation, such as 
visits to the tombs of renowned Muslims, are discouraged. The practice 
of other schools of Sunni Islam is discouraged, and there is 
institutionalized discrimination against adherents of the Shi'a branch 
of Islam. The Government supervises almost all mosques in the country 
and funds their construction, maintenance, and operations.
    The Ministry of Islamic affairs directly supervises, and is a major 
source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all 
mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer 
leaders) and others who work in the mosques. A governmental committee 
is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. The Mutawwa'in 
are government employees, and the president of the Mutawwa'in holds the 
rank of cabinet minister. The spreading of Muslim teachings not in 
conformance with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam is 
prohibited. Writers and other individuals who publicly criticize this 
interpretation, including both those who advocate a stricter 
interpretation and those who favor a more moderate interpretation than 
the Government's, reportedly have been imprisoned and faced other 
reprisals.
    The Shi'a Muslim minority (roughly 900,000 persons) lives mostly in 
the eastern province, in which Shi'a constitute about one-third of the 
population. Members of the Shi'a minority are the objects of officially 
sanctioned political and economic discrimination. Prior to 1990, the 
Government prohibited Shi'a public processions during the Islamic month 
of Muharram and restricted other processions and congregations to 
designated areas in the major Shi'a cities. Since 1990 the authorities 
have permitted the celebration of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura in the 
eastern province city of Qatif, provided that the celebrants do not 
undertake large, public marches or engage in self-flagellation (a 
traditional Shi'a practice). The celebrations are monitored heavily by 
the police. No other Ashura celebrations are permitted in the Kingdom, 
and many Shi'a travel to Qatif or to Bahrain to participate in Ashura 
celebrations.
    Early in the year, a Shi'a sheikh was taken into custody, and three 
other sheikhs were arrested for unknown reasons near the border with 
Jordan. Human Rights Watch reported that at least seven additional 
Shi'a religious leaders reportedly remained in detention for violating 
restrictions on Shi'a religious practices.
    According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a 
Shi'a cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested 
in his home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since 
then (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a 
mosques. Shi'a have declined government offers to build statesupported 
mosques because the Government would prohibit the incorporation and 
display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques. The Government actively 
discourages Shi'a travel to Iran to visit pilgrimage sites, although 
Shi'a citizens are permitted to visit holy sites in Iraq.
    Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, authorities have detained, 
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a 
suspected of subversion (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). The Government 
reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of Shi'a who were 
arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing. Government security 
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in 
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation 
(see Section 1.d.).
    In April in the city of Najran, in the southwest region bordering 
Yemen, rioting by members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a eventually led 
to an attack by an armed group of Shi'a on a hotel that contained an 
office of the regional governor. Security forces responded, leading to 
extended gun battles between the two sides. Some press reports 
indicated that the rioting followed the arrest of a Makarama Ismaili 
Shi'a imam and some of his followers on charges of ``sorcery.'' Various 
other reports attributed the unrest to the closure of two Ismaili Shi'a 
mosques and the provincial governor's refusal to permit Ismailis to 
hold public observances of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura. Still other 
reports attributed the unrest to a local crackdown on smuggling and 
resultant tribal discontent. Officials at the highest level of the 
Government stated that the unrest in Najran was not the result of 
Shi'a-Sunni tension or religious discrimination. After the unrest ended 
the Government stated that 5 members of the security forces were 
killed, and Ismaili leaders claimed that as many as 40 Ismaili 
tribesmen were killed. There was no independent confirmation of these 
claims.
    Magic is widely believed in and sometimes practiced, often in the 
form of fortune-telling and swindles. However, under Shari'a the 
practice of magic is regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an 
offense for which no repentance is accepted, and which is punishable by 
death. There are an unknown number of detainees held in prison on the 
charge of ``sorcery,'' or the practice of ``black magic'' or 
``witchcraft.'' In a few cases, self-proclaimed ``miracle workers'' 
have been executed for sorcery involving physical harm or apostasy. In 
1999 the Al-Bilad newspaper reported that the Interior Ministry ordered 
the execution of a Sudanese man convicted of practicing magic in Jeddah 
for 3+ years. The man claimed to be an herbal medicine expert and had 
treated a number of women with tonics and potions; he reportedly 
possessed 16 spell books and related paraphernalia. The man reportedly 
confessed to conspiring with Jinns (beings made of fire that coexist 
with humans) in ``efforts to separate wives from their husbands.''
    During the year, foreign imams were barred from leading worship 
during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from 
delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The Government 
claims that its actions were part of its ``Saudiization'' plan to 
replace foreign workers with citizens.
    Under Shari'a conversion by a Muslim to another religion is 
considered apostasy. Public apostasy is a crime punishable by death if 
the accused does not recant.
    The Government prohibits public non-Muslim religious activities. 
Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and deportation for 
engaging in overt religious activity that attracts official attention.
    During the year, senior officials in the Government publicly 
reaffirmed the right of non-Muslims to engage in private religious 
worship. In an address to the 56th session of the U.N. Committee on 
Human Rights in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud Al-Kabir, 
Director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, stated that ``non-Muslims enjoy full freedom to 
engage in their religious observances in private'' (see Section 4). The 
media widely disseminated Prince Turki's speech and the media 
increasingly acknowledges the right to private non-Muslim worship. Such 
private non-Muslim worship occurs on a wide scale throughout the 
country, including on the premises of several foreign embassies.
    Other high-level officials have confirmed that the Government does 
not sanction investigation or harassment of such private worship 
services. These officials ascribe any residual harassment of private 
worship services or seizure of personal religious materials such as 
Bibles or icons to individuals and organizations acting on their own 
authority and in contradiction of government policy. Representatives of 
Christian denominations present in the country report that the 
Government is not interfering with private worship services as long as 
those services remain discreet.
    However, in January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians 
during a raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that 
the religious service was attended by such a large number of persons 
that it could not be considered private. After 6 weeks of detention, 
all of the detainees were released and deported to the Philippines. On 
November 30, religious police broke up a worship service of about 60 
Christians. Police seized Bibles, musical instruments, and documents 
relating to other Christian activities. Police detained five of the 
worshipers for questioning, then released them after they signed a 
confession. None of the worshipers was arrested. In June the Government 
arrested an Indian Christian for possession of a videotape of a 
religious event. He was released in August after spending 2 months in 
jail and then deported to India (see Section 1.d.). On December 8 in 
Riyadh, the authorities raided a gathering of 12 Filipino Christians 
after a worship service. The authorities arrested six of the 
individuals; two were released the same day, one subsequently was 
released, and three remained in custody at year's end.
    Proselytizing by non-Muslims is illegal, although there were no 
reports during the year of arrests for proselytizing. Persons wearing 
religious symbols of any kind in public risk confrontation with the 
Mutawwa'in. This general prohibition against religious symbols also 
applies to Muslims. A Christian wearing a crucifix or a Muslim wearing 
a Koranic necklace in public would be admonished. In certain areas, 
both the Mutawwa'in and vigilantes acting on their own harassed, 
assaulted, battered, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
    Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for 
contraband, including material that is deemed pornographic, and non-
Muslim religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored 
materials considered offensive, including Bibles and religious 
videotapes.
    Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools at all 
levels. All children receive religious instruction, which generally is 
limited to that of the Hanbali school of Islam.
    In accordance with Shari'a, Saudi women are prohibited from 
marrying non-Muslims, but Saudi men may marry Christians and Jews, as 
well as Muslims.
    The Government requires noncitizens to carry Iqamas, or legal 
resident identity cards, which contain a religious designation for 
``Muslim'' or ``non-Muslim.''
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the travel of 
Saudi women, who must obtain written permission from their closest male 
relative before the authorities allow them to board domestic public 
transportation or to travel abroad (see Section 5). In 1999 the 
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations were underway to issue 
identity cards to women, which would have been a step toward allowing 
women to establish independent legal identities from men and to secure 
greater rights in many areas, including travel. However, the Ministry 
announced in August that the current identification document system for 
women would be maintained for another 3 years and thus identity cards 
would not be issued. Men may travel anywhere within the country or 
abroad.
    Foreigners typically are allowed to reside or work in the country 
only under the sponsorship of a citizen or domestic business. The 
Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It 
does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their 
employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's 
permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be 
asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of 
permission from their employer or sponsor.
    Sponsors generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports. 
Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel 
abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with 
foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the 
employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved. 
Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in 
their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous 
reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in 
labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was 
resolved (see Section 5).
    The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and 
witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to 
them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some 
foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy 
periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the 
passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. The 
Government actively discourages Shi'a from traveling to Iran to visit 
pilgrimage sites. The Government still punishes Shi'a who travel to 
Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those 
suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to 2 years 
(see Section 5).
    Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship. 
Apart from marriage to a Saudi national, there are no provisions for 
foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are 
granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an 
influential patron.
    The 1992 Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political 
asylum if the public interest mitigates'' in favor of it. The language 
does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general 
the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other 
foreign workers: They must have sponsors for employment or risk 
expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war 
given refuge in the country at the end of the Gulf War, none has been 
granted permanent asylum; however, the Government has underwritten the 
entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees and continues 
to provide excellent logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR 
and other resettlement agencies.
    Approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi refugees had been 
resettled in other countries or voluntarily repatriated to Iraq at 
year's end. Most of the approximately 5,400 remaining refugees, as well 
as 160 Afghan refugees, are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The 
UNHCR has monitored over 3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq 
from Rafha since December 1991 and found no evidence of forcible 
repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in 
the country in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they 
were deported to their home countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There 
are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a 
voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The 
King rules on civil and religious matters within certain limitations 
established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain 
consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.
    The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as 
Deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in 
turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992 
the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In 
1997 the King expanded the council to 90 members. There are two Shi'a 
on the Council. The Council engages in debates that, while closed to 
the general public, provide advice and views occasionally contrary to 
the Government's proposed policy or recommended course of action. The 
Government usually incorporates the Majlis' advice into its final 
policy announcements or tries to convince it that the Government's 
policy is correct.
    The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to 
the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public policies 
for compliance with Shari'a. The Government views the Council as an 
important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's 
opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
    In June the press reported on the first meeting of a newly 
established ``Royal Family Council,'' which is composed of the Crown 
Prince and representatives of major branches of the extended royal 
family. The Council's stated purpose is to consider ``major decisions 
regarding the family.'' Its role in government, if any, is not clear.
    Communication between citizens and the Government usually is 
expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups 
such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory, any 
male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or air a 
grievance at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince, 
or an important national or local official. However, as governmental 
functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized, 
public access to senior officials has become more restricted. Since the 
assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Saudi kings have reduced the 
frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Ministers and 
district governors more readily grant audiences at a majlis.
    Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic 
delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or assistance, 
and criticism of particular acts of government affecting family 
welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or foreign 
policy--rarely are raised. Complaints about royal abuses of power are 
not entertained. In general journalists, academics, and businessmen 
believe that institutionalized avenues of domestic criticism of the 
regime are closed. Feedback is filtered through private personal 
channels and has affected various policy issues, including the Middle 
East peace process, unemployment of young Saudi men, and the 
construction of new infrastructure.
    The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an 
opposition group, was established in 1993. The Government acted almost 
immediately to repress it. In 1994 one of its founding members, 
Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United Kingdom, where he sought 
political asylum and established an overseas branch of the CDLR. In 
1996 internal divisions within the CDLR led to the creation of the 
rival Islamic Reform Movement (IRM), headed by Sa'ad Al-Faqih. Al-
Masari expressed the CDLR's ``understanding'' of two fatal terrorist 
bombings of U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 1996 and sympathy for 
the perpetrators. The IRM implicitly condoned the two terrorist attacks 
as well, arguing that they were a natural outgrowth of a political 
system that does not tolerate peaceful dissent. Both groups continue to 
criticize the Government, using computers and facsimile transmissions 
to send newsletters back to Saudi Arabia.
    Women play no formal role in government and politics and are 
actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis 
is restricted, although some women seek redress through female members 
of the royal family.
    Two of the 90 members of the Majlis Ash-Shura are Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no publicly active human rights groups, and the 
Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies 
would be permitted. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
reported that they have received no responses to their requests for 
access to the country. However, the press carried an extensive 
discussion on human rights following the publication in March of an 
Amnesty International report critical of the Government's human rights 
practices. While nearly all media reports concurred with the 
Government's dismissive response to the report, one editorial that 
circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to human 
rights criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section 
2.a.).
    The Government generally does not permit visits by international 
human rights groups or independent monitors. The Government disagrees 
with internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its 
interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect 
human rights. The Government generally ignores or criticizes as attacks 
on Islam citations by international monitors or foreign governments of 
government human rights abuses.
    However, during the year the Government initiated limited measures 
to participate in international human rights mechanisms, such as 
inviting the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers to visit the country and acceding to the U.N. Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with 
reservations regarding aspects of the convention that it considers 
contrary to Shari'a law (see Section 5). In an address to the 56th 
session of the committee in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud 
Al-Kabir, Director of the International Organizations Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Government welcomed the 
role of international human rights mechanisms. The media widely 
disseminated Prince Turki's speech.
    Although the Government has established a committee to investigate 
allegations of torture in the country pursuant to its obligations under 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, it has refused to recognize the authority of 
the Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses (see 
Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    There is legal and systemic discrimination based on sex and 
religion. The law forbids discrimination based on race, but not 
nationality. The Government and private organizations cooperate in 
providing services for the disabled. The Shi'a religious minority 
suffers social, legal, and sectarian discrimination.
    Women.--The Government does not keep statistics on spousal abuse or 
other forms of violence against women. However, based on the 
information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence 
against women, such violence and abuse appear to be common problems. 
Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of 
injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. Some foreign 
women have suffered physical abuse from their Saudi husbands. A Saudi 
man may prevent his wife and any child or unmarried adult daughter from 
obtaining an exit visa to depart the country (see Section 2.d.). 
Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers 
abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of 
countries with large domestic servant populations maintain safehouses 
to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that include 
forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other physical 
abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of female 
citizens. In general the Government considers such cases family matters 
and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its 
attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress 
in the courts, due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the 
women's own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for 
such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious 
associations to assist such women.
    By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own 
property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or 
male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and 
are not treated as equal members of society. There are no active 
women's rights groups. Women legally may not drive motor vehicles and 
are restricted in their use of public facilities when men are present. 
Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in 
specially designated sections. Women risk arrest by the Mutawwa'in for 
riding in a vehicle driven by a male who is not an employee or a close 
male relative. Women are not admitted to a hospital for medical 
treatment without the consent of a male relative. By law and custom, 
women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see Section 
2.d.). In 1999 the Ministry of Interior announced that preparations 
were underway to issue identity cards to women, which would have been a 
step toward allowing women to establish independent legal identities 
from men. However, the Ministry announced in August that the current 
identification document system for women would be maintained for 
another 3 years, and that identity cards therefore would not be issued.
    In public a woman is expected to wear an abaya (a black garment 
that covers the entire body) and to cover her head and face. The 
Mutawwa'in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa 
to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than they do Western 
women; nonetheless, in recent years they have instructed Western women 
to wear the abaya and cover their hair as well. During the year, 
Mutawwa'in continued to admonish and harass women to wear their abayas 
and cover their hair.
    Some government officials and ministries still bar accredited 
female diplomats in the country from official meetings.
    Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as 
interpreted in Saudi Arabia, which stipulates that daughters receive 
half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. In a Shari'a court, the 
testimony of one man equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.). 
Although Islamic law permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is 
becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic 
law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice such equality 
is left to the discretion of the husband. Some women participate in Al-
Mesyar (or ``short daytime visit'') marriages, in which the women 
relinquish their legal rights to financial support and nighttime 
cohabitation. Additionally, the husband is not required to inform his 
other wives of the marriage, and any children resulting from such a 
marriage have no inheritance rights. The Government places greater 
restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to non-Saudis and 
non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.). While Shari'a provides women with a 
basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often are 
constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and 
societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of 
movement.
    Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but 
men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men are required to 
pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the 
marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who 
demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still are entitled to this 
alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her 
children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys, 9 years 
for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband 
or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women 
continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their 
children after divorce.
    Women have access to free but segregated education through the 
university level. They constitute over 58 percent of all university 
students but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering, 
journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; women may do so 
only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative.
    Women make up approximately 5 percent of the formal work force and 
own about 4 percent of the businesses, although they must deputize a 
male relative to represent the business. Most employment opportunities 
for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in 
business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Despite 
limited educational opportunities in many professional fields, some 
female citizens are able to study abroad and return to work in 
professions such as architecture and journalism. Many foreign women 
work as domestic servants and nurses. In 1997 the Government authorized 
women to work in a limited capacity in the hotel industry. Women who 
wish to enter nontraditional fields are subject to discrimination. 
Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if there are no adult male 
relatives present with whom they may reside and who agree to take 
responsibility for them. Most workplaces in which women are present are 
segregated by sex. Frequently, contact with male supervisors or clients 
is allowed only by telephone or fax machine. In 1995 the Ministry of 
Commerce announced that women no longer would be issued business 
licenses for work in fields that might require them to supervise 
foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a regular basis 
with government officials. However, in hospital settings and in the oil 
industry, women and men work together, and, in some instances, women 
supervise male employees.
    In September Crown Prince Abdullah signed the U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with 
reservations regarding aspects of the Convention that the Government 
considers contrary to Shari'a law.
    Children.--The Government provides all children with free education 
and medical care. Children are not subject to the strict social 
segregation faced by women, although they are segregated by sex in 
schools, beginning at the age of 7. In more general social situations, 
boys are segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
    It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the 
Government currently keeps no national statistics on such cases. One 
major hospital has begun a program to detect, report, and prevent child 
abuse. In general Saudi culture greatly prizes children, and initial 
studies show that severe abuse and neglect of children appear to be 
rare.
    Trafficking in children for forced begging persists (see Sections 
6.c., and 6.f.).
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced among some foreign workers from East 
Africa and the Nile Valley. It is not always clear whether the 
procedure occurred in Saudi Arabia or the workers' home countries. 
There is no law specifically prohibiting FGM.
    People with Disabilities.--The provision of government social 
services increasingly has brought the disabled into the public 
mainstream. In October Riyadh governor Prince Salman Bin Abd Al-Aziz 
announced that the Government was implementing new regulations designed 
to integrate disabled persons into the mainstream of society; the 
regulations had not been implemented by year's end. The media carry 
features lauding the accomplishments of disabled persons and sharply 
criticizing parents who neglect disabled children. The Government and 
private charitable organizations cooperate in education, employment, 
and other services for the disabled. The law provides hiring quotas for 
the disabled. There is no legislation that mandates public 
accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings often include such 
access.
    Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported disabled 
children for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    Police generally transport mentally ill persons found wandering 
alone in public to their families or a hospital. However, there were 
reports that police pick up mentally ill persons for minor violations, 
detain them for a few weeks, and then release them, only to detain them 
again later for similar violations. Police officials recognize the 
problem but claim that according to Islam, family members should be 
taking care of such individuals.
    Religious Minorities.--Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in 
government and employment, especially in national security jobs. 
Several years ago the Government subjected Shi'a to employment 
restrictions in the oil industry and has not relaxed them. Since the 
1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion 
have been subjected periodically to surveillance and limitations on 
travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of 
a U.S. military installation, authorities have detained, interrogated, 
and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims, including 
Shi'a returning to the country following their travel to Iran (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
    In April in the city of Najran, riots took place that led to 
members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a community engaging in gun battles 
with security forces that reportedly resulted in a number of deaths. 
Conflicting unconfirmed reports attributed the unrest to religious 
differences, smuggling, or land seizures (see Section 2.c.).
    Under Saudi law, children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim, 
regardless of the country or the religious tradition in which they may 
have been raised. In some cases, children raised in other countries and 
in other religious traditions later taken by their Saudi fathers to 
Saudi Arabia reportedly were coerced to conform to their fathers' 
interpretation of Islamic norms and practices.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination 
is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or 
national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject to 
various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most 
difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay 
scales for identical or similar labor or professional services are set 
by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced 
foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied 
compensation based on their nationalities (see Section 6.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Government decrees prohibit the 
establishment of labor unions, and strikes are prohibited; however, 
several work stoppages were staged in Jeddah during the year by foreign 
hospital, food processing, and construction workers who had not been 
paid.
    In 1995 Saudi Arabia was suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is forbidden. Foreign workers comprise about two-thirds of 
the work force. There is no minimum wage; wages are set by employers 
and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of 
the worker (see Section 5).
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor pursuant to a 1962 royal decree 
that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor, 
gives them the force of law. However, employers have significant 
control over the movements of foreign employees, which results in 
situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote 
areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work.
    Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas 
to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against 
their employers for unpaid salaries (see Section 2.d.). Some sponsors 
also pressure foreign workers by refusing to provide them with a 
``letter of no objection'' that would allow them to be employed by 
another sponsor.
    The labor laws, including those designed to limit working hours and 
regulate working conditions, do not apply to foreign domestic servants, 
and such domestic servants may not seek the protection of the labor 
courts. There were credible reports that female domestic servants 
sometimes were forced to work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. 
There were numerous confirmed reports of maids fleeing employers and 
seeking refuge in their embassies (see Section 5). The authorities 
often forced runaway maids to return to their places of employment.
    There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to 
pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other 
promised benefits. Foreign workers with such grievances, except 
domestic servants, have the right to complain before the labor courts, 
but few do so because of fear of deportation. The labor system is 
conducive to the exploitation of foreign workers because enforcement of 
work contracts is difficult and generally favors employers. Labor 
courts, while generally fair, may take many months to reach a final 
appellate ruling, during which time an employer may prevent the foreign 
laborer from leaving the country. An employer also may delay a case 
until a worker's funds are exhausted and the worker is forced to return 
to his home country.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging 
rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or 
bonded child labor does not occur (see Section 6.d.). Children, mainly 
of South Asian and African origin, frequently are used for the purpose 
of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity of the Grand Mosque 
in Mecca during Islamic holidays (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years, which may be 
waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of a juvenile's 
guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-
oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as extensions 
of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service. The 
law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children, 
but it is not a problem, with the rare exception of forced child 
begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
    Children under the age of 18 and women may not be employed in 
hazardous or harmful industries such as mining or industries that use 
power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity 
responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children, 
the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in 
the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in 
general children play a minimal role in the work force.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage. 
Labor regulations limit the work week to 48 hours, including no more 
than 8 hours a day and no more than 5 hours without a break for rest, 
prayer, and food. The regulations allow employers to require up to 12 
additional hours of overtime per workweek at time-and-a-half pay. Labor 
law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on Fridays, although 
the employer may grant it on another day. The average wage generally 
provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    The ILO has stated that the Government has not formulated 
legislation implementing the ILO Convention on Equal Pay, and that 
regulations that segregate work places by sex, or limit vocational 
programs for women, violate ILO Convention 111.
    Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have 
complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented 
with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than 
originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed 
contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less 
favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end 
of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission 
to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes 
with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see 
Section 2.d.). A large number of female domestic servants often were 
subjected to abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    ``Saudiization'' is the Government's attempt to decrease the number 
of foreigners working in certain occupations and to replace them with 
Saudi workers. To accomplish this goal, the Government has taken 
several long-term steps, most notably limiting employment in certain 
fields to citizens, prohibiting renewal of existing contracts, and 
requiring that 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies 
be filled by citizen workers. The Government also requires firms to 
increase the proportion of citizen workers by 5 per cent each year. 
There is a limited number of persons, both influential and otherwise, 
who attempted to circumvent the requirements of the law. For example, 
employers have altered job descriptions or hired foreigners for 
nominally low-level positions but in fact had them fill positions 
reserved for citizens. In Jeddah fruit and vegetable vending jobs at a 
large open-air market were Saudiized in late 1999. However, by early in 
the year, the newly hired Saudi sellers had hired back many of the 
fired foreigners to run the stalls for them at lower wages than they 
had earned before the Saudiization occurred. Influential persons 
effectively may circumvent the law because the Ministry of Labor is 
reportedly unwilling to confront them.
    The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country 
has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegal immigrants 
largely work in low-income positions, which most Saudis consider 
unsuitable. In some cases, the campaign may have resulted in enhanced 
job security and wage stability for some legally employed immigrants in 
low-income positions. The Government is carrying out the campaign by 
widely publicizing its enforcement of existing laws against illegal 
immigrants and citizens who employ or sponsor illegal immigrants. In 
addition to deportation for illegal workers and jail terms and fines 
for citizens hiring illegal workers, the Government announced in 1998 
that houses rented to illegal aliens would be ordered closed. In 1997 
the Government offered an amnesty of several months' duration, which 
allowed illegal immigrants and their employers or sponsors to avoid the 
possibility of prosecution by voluntarily seeking expeditious 
repatriation. As of September 1999, as many as 1.1 million persons 
departed the country under terms of the amnesty or were deported for 
violating residence and labor laws. During this process, the Government 
yielded to domestic pressure and granted grace periods and exemptions 
to certain categories of illegal immigrants (such as domestic servants, 
drivers, and shepherds), thereby allowing many illegal immigrants to 
legalize their status without leaving the country. The Government 
announced in April that the grace period would expire in June and that 
anyone staying illegally could be subject to imprisonment, a fine, and 
questioning regarding who was assisting them. Illegal immigrants 
generally are willing to accept lower salaries and fewer benefits than 
legally employed immigrants. The departure or legalization of illegal 
workers reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby reduced 
the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and fewer 
benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants.
    Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from 
job-related hazards and disease. Foreign nationals report frequent 
failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen, 
domestic servants, and workers in family-operated businesses are not 
covered by these regulations. Workers risk losing employment if they 
remove themselves from hazardous work conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the 
smuggling of persons into the country.
    Children, mainly of South Asian and African origin, frequently are 
used for the purpose of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity 
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during Islamic holidays. There were 
reports that some of these children were smuggled into the country by 
organized rings.
    There were unconfirmed reports that women were trafficked into the 
country to work as prostitutes.
                               __________

                                 SYRIA

    Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic 
government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in 
the hands of the President. Former President Hafiz Al-Asad died on June 
10 after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad's death, the 
Parliament amended the Constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age 
of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar 
Al-Asad to be legally eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'th 
party. On July 10, Bashar was elected by referendum in which he ran 
unopposed, and received 97.29 percent of the vote. Key decisions 
regarding foreign policy, national security, internal politics, and the 
economy are made by the President, with counsel from his ministers, 
high-ranking members of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small 
circle of security advisers. Although the Parliament is elected every 4 
years, the Ba'th Party is ensured a majority. The Parliament cannot 
initiate laws, but only assesses and sometimes modifies those proposed 
by the executive branch. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary, but this is not the case in the exceptional (state of 
emergency) security courts, which are subject to political influence. 
The regular courts display independence, although political connections 
and bribery can influence verdicts. In general all three branches of 
government are influenced to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th 
Party, whose primacy in state institutions is mandated by the 
Constitution.
    The powerful role of the security services in government, which 
extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state 
of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The 
Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with 
Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian Military 
Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while 
General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the 
purview of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security 
services operate independently of each other and outside the legal 
system. Their members commit serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and 
government services. There is a generally inefficient public sector, a 
private sector, and a mixed public/private sector. The still-dominant 
state role in the economy, a complex bureaucracy, overarching security 
concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, a lack of modern 
financial services and communications, and a weak legal system hamper 
economic growth. The Government has sought to promote the private 
sector through investment incentives, exchange rate consolidation, and 
deregulation, especially with regard to financial transactions 
governing imports and exports. However, in recent years, diminished 
foreign aid, drought, fluctuating prices for oil and agricultural 
commodities, and regional recession have hurt the economy. Uncertainty 
about the Middle East peace process and sporadic tension over Iraq has 
diminished investor confidence in the region. Consequently, Syria 
posted negative gross domestic product (GDP) rates of 4.4 percent in 
1997, 1.2 percent in 1998, and an estimated 2 percent in 1999. A high 
population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode whatever 
economic gains are made. It is estimated that real per capita GDP again 
decreased in 1999. However, the Government has been very successful in 
controlling the money supply, with inflation remaining in the 2 percent 
range in 1998. Despite a 25 percent wage increase for public and 
private sector employees and a 20 percent increase for pensions, wage 
and benefits increases generally have not kept pace with cost of living 
increases. The gap between the rich and poor remained, with many public 
sector workers relying on second jobs to make ends meet.
    The human rights situation remained poor, and the Government 
continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there were 
improvements in some areas. The Ba'th Party dominates the political 
system, as provided for by the Constitution, and citizens do not have 
the right to change their government. The Government uses its vast 
powers so effectively that there is no organized political opposition, 
and there have been very few antiregime manifestations. Serious abuses 
include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison 
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without 
trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an 
inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times, 
political influence; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial 
of freedom of speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of 
censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of assembly and association; 
some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of movement.
    The Government does not officially allow independent domestic human 
rights groups to exist; however, there were reports that several 
domestic human rights organizations and civil society groups began 
meeting regularly during the year. Violence and societal discrimination 
against women are problems. The Government discriminates against the 
stateless Kurdish minority, suppresses worker rights, and child labor 
occurs. In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600 
political prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some 
nonpolitical prisoners and closed the Mazzah prison, which reportedly 
held numerous political prisoners and detainees. In December the 
Government transferred 54 Lebanese prisoners from Syrian to Lebanese 
custody.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings during the year.
    In November security forces killed 4 Bedouins during the 
Government's intervention in armed clashes between Bedouin shepherds 
and Druze residents of Suwayda Province (see Sections 1.c. and 5). In 
October 1999, government forces moved against a residential compound 
and boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-Asad. A 
number of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were 
sequestered in the compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed 
number of deaths, including government forces. The Government 
reportedly claimed that the clash was the consequence of enforcing 
``legal measures' that were taken against Rif'at and his supporters 
because of ``violations of civil and military laws.''
    There were reports in 1999 of corporal punishment of army recruits 
that led to injury or death (see Section 1.c.).
    In 1998 3 policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 10 
years of hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and 
killing of a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the 
first time since 1994 that members of the security forces were held 
accountable for their actions.
    There were no reports of deaths in detention; however, such deaths 
have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention have not been 
investigated by the Government, and the number and identities of 
prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remain unknown.
    In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members of the 
Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with carrying 
out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus. Eleven of the 18 
persons charged were in custody. There were no further developments in 
the case during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human 
rights organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered 
little new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who 
have been held incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known 
other than the approximate date of their detention, including 
Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens who reportedly were 
abducted from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war (see Section 
1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and 
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence 
that security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and 
detainees report that torture methods include administering electrical 
shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; 
beating, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling; 
hyperextending the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to 
asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim's spine. Although torture 
may occur in prisons, torture is most likely to occur while detainees 
are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various 
security services throughout the country, and particularly while the 
authorities are trying to extract a confession or information about an 
alleged crime or alleged accomplices.
    The Government has denied the use of torture and claims that it 
would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or 
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials 
who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations of 
excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the 
plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the 
alleged abuser.
    Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants who claim 
that they were tortured (see Section 1.e). There were reports in 1999 
of the corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or death 
(see Section 1.a.).
    There were credible reports of torture during the year, including 
one prisoner who alleged he had been tortured while held in solitary 
confinement for 3 months. The Government reportedly tortured some of 
the Islamist prisoners who were detained during the large-scale arrests 
in late 1999 and early 2000 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    In October police used teargas and batons to disperse several large 
demonstrations directed against diplomatic missions and international 
agencies in reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against 
Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; an indeterminate 
number of demonstrators and police personnel were injured (see Section 
2.b.).
    In November 200 persons were injured during clashes in Suwayda 
province involving Druze residents, Bedouin shepherds, and security 
forces (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not meet 
minimum international standards for health and sanitation. Facilities 
for political or national security prisoners generally are worse than 
those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many political 
and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely considered to 
have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities allow 
visitation, but in other prisons, security officials demand bribes from 
family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives. Overcrowding 
and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several prisons. 
According to Human Rights Watch, prisoners and detainees are held 
without adequate medical care, and some prisoners with significant 
health problems reportedly are denied medical treatment. Some former 
detainees have reported that the Government prohibits reading 
materials, even the Koran, for political prisoners.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison or 
detention center conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Emergency Law, which authorizes the 
Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides Penal Code 
provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including the need 
to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law is applied 
only in narrowly defined cases. Nonetheless, in cases involving 
political or national security offenses, arrests generally are carried 
out in secret, and suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged 
periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial 
determination for the pretrial detention. Some of these practices are 
prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities are not held 
to these strictures.
    The Government has been known to detain relatives of detainees or 
of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender 
(see Section 1.f.).
    Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right to bail 
hearings and the possible release from detention on their own 
recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national 
security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil 
cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or 
during questioning.
    Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces 
often do not provide detainees' families with information on their 
welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many persons who 
have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term 
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It 
appears that the number of new disappearances has declined in recent 
years, although this circumstance may be due to the Government's 
success in deterring opposition political activity rather than a 
loosening of the criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to 
trial have been held incommunicado for years, and their trials often 
have been unfair (see Section 1.e.). There were reliable reports that 
the Government did not notify foreign governments when their citizens 
were arrested or detained.
    Pretrial detention may be lengthy, even in cases not involving 
political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is 
backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in pretrial detention for 
months and may have their trials extended for additional months. 
Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused 
by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions 
for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section 1.e.).
    It is not known whether any Turkomen from among hundreds detained 
in 1996 remain in detention.
    There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and Palestinian 
Islamists between late December 1999 and February. Hundreds of persons 
allegedly were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, and 
Homs. Most of those arrested reportedly were released after signing an 
agreement not to participate in political activities; however, some may 
remain in detention.
    There were reliable reports that security forces arrested several 
minors on unspecified political charges during the year. The minors 
reportedly were held in adult facilities for 6 months, had no access to 
legal counsel, and were not allowed visits from family members.
    There were unconfirmed reports that a large number of Jordanian 
prisoners were released between May and July. However, according to 
Amnesty International (AI), only three of the released Jordanians had 
been held for political reasons.
    In May there were media reports that Communist Action Party leaders 
Aslan 'Abd Al-Karim and Fateh Jamous and oppositionist Randa Ayoubi 
were released from prison; they reportedly were not required to agree 
to abstain from participating in political activities. In August Sheikh 
Hashim Minqara, a leader of the Islamic Tawheed Movement who was 
arrested in Lebanon in 1985 reportedly was released.
    In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600 political 
prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some nonpolitical 
prisoners, including some who were held under the Economic Penal Code. 
The amnesty was covered in the media and reportedly was the first time 
that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political 
reasons. There are credible reports that the 600 detainees, including 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Party, the 
Communist Action Party, and some Kurds, are being released 
incrementally. The Government also closed the Mazzah prison in 
November, which reportedly held numerous political prisoners and 
detainees.
    In December the Government transferred 54 Lebanese political 
prisoners and detainees from Syrian to Lebanese custody (see Section 
1.e.).
    A prisoner amnesty that was announced in July 1999 is believed to 
have benefited some political prisoners and detainees. While the total 
number of those released is unknown, AI identified six prisoners held 
for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed reports suggest 
that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released. According to AI, 
hundreds of persons held for political reasons also were released in 
1998. Prior to the 1998-2000 releases, the last significant release of 
political detainees took place in late 1995, with approximately 2,200 
to 3,000 persons believed to have been released. Some former prisoners 
reportedly were required to sign loyalty oaths or admissions of guilt 
as a condition of their release. Most of those arrested in a mass 
crackdown in 1980 have been released; however, some may remain in 
prolonged detention without charge. Some union and professional 
association officials detained in 1980 may remain in detention (see 
Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI reported in 1998 that ``hundreds of 
Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested, 
some over two decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret 
detention.''
    The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. In June 
prior to the November prison amnesty, AI estimated that there were 
approximately 1,500 political detainees in the country; many of the 
detainees reportedly are suspected supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th party. There also are Jordanian, 
Lebanese, and Palestinian political detainees. According to Amnesty 
International, security forces also detain family members of suspected 
oppositionists (see Section 1.f.). Estimates of detainees are difficult 
to confirm because the Government does not verify publicly the number 
of detentions without charge, the release of detainees or amnestied 
prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison 
(see Section 1.e.).
    In October 1998, the Jordanian Government requested that the Syrian 
Government account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of whom 
Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of 
whom Jordan claims are imprisoned in Syria. Families of missing 
Jordanians allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian 
detention. According to press reports, government sources stated that 
the names provided by Jordan were being examined and that the 
Government would respond officially. To date there has been no 
published official response.
    Former prisoners are subject to a so-called ``rights ban,'' which 
begins from the day of sentencing and lasts until 10 years after the 
expiration of the sentence. Persons subject to this ban are not allowed 
to vote, run for office, or work in the public sector; they often also 
are denied passports.
    The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although the 
practice is prohibited by the Constitution. The Government refuses to 
reissue the passports of citizens who fled the country in the 1980's; 
such citizens consequently are unable to return to the country.
    There were no known instances of forced exile during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with 
alleged security cases are not independent of executive branch control. 
The regular court system displays considerable independence in civil 
cases, although political connections and bribery sometimes influence 
verdicts.
    The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts, 
military courts, security courts, and religious courts, which 
adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance. 
The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the constitutionality 
of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
    Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of 
Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to the legal 
representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for 
indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to 
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public, 
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may 
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to 
the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts 
do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared 
by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
    Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as 
military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is decided by a 
military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that the Government 
operates military field courts in locations outside established 
courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the formal 
procedures of regular military courts.
    The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court 
(SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the 
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial 
crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not ordinary 
law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding 
defendants' rights.
    Charges against defendants in the SSSC often are vague. Many 
defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights, 
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the 
prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,'' 
``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,'' 
or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the 
State.'' Nonetheless the Government contends that the SSSC tries only 
persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
    Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the 
preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the 
prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the public. 
Lawyers are not ensured access to their clients before the trial and 
are excluded from the court during their client's initial interrogation 
by the prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas rather than 
oral presentations. The State's case often is based on confessions, and 
defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that their 
confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which the court 
ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he was 
tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but the 
Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate. 
Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are 
reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter 
sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
    Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the SSSC is 
difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases are believed to pass 
through the court annually. Many reportedly involved charges relating 
to membership in various banned political groups, including the Party 
of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party. 
Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past. The 
Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a session of the SSSC 
in 1997; however there have been no visits by human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) since then (see Section 4).
    The Economic Security Court (ESC) tries persons for alleged 
violations of foreign exchange laws and other economic crimes. The 
prosecution of economic crimes is not applied uniformly, as some 
government officials or business persons with close connections to the 
Government likely have violated the country's strict economic laws 
without prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process 
for defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to 
prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on 
confessions. Verdicts may be influenced by high-ranking government 
officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not 
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may 
appeal to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for 
individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July 1999. 
Theoretically this amnesty may have benefited thousands of persons. In 
May late president Hafiz Al-Asad amended the Economic Penal Code to 
allow defendants in economic courts to be released on bail. The bail 
provision does not extend to those accused of forgery, counterfeiting, 
or auto theft; however, the amendment is intended to provide relief for 
those accused of other economic crimes, many of whom have been in 
pretrial detention for long periods of time. These amendments to the 
Economic Penal Code also limit the categories of cases that can be 
tried in the ESC. In November the Government approved a general pardon 
for nonpolitical prisoners and a reduction of sentences by one-third 
for persons convicted of economic crimes, with a provision to commute 
sentences entirely for persons who return embezzled funds to investors 
within 1 year of the law's effective date.
    Prisoner amnesties in July 1999 and November are believed to have 
benefited some political prisoners and detainees. The Government also 
transferred 54 Lebanese political prisoners and detainees from Syrian 
to Lebanese custody in December (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government has released virtually all of those arrested at the 
time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at least two persons 
arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite the 
expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
    The Government in the past denied that it held political prisoners, 
arguing that, although the aims of some prisoners may be political, 
their activities, including subversion, were criminal. The official 
media reported that the 600 beneficiaries of the November amnesty were 
political prisoners and detainees; this reportedly was the first time 
that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political 
reasons. Nonetheless, the Emergency Law and the Penal Code are so 
vague, and the Government's power so broad, that many persons were 
convicted and are in prison for the mere expression of political 
opposition to the Government.
    The exact number of political prisoners is unknown.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary 
interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to 
enter homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters, 
very broadly defined, are involved. The security services selectively 
monitor telephone conversations and fax transmissions. The Government 
sometimes opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents. 
It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August 
1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian 
newspapers (also see Section 2.a.).
    The Government continues its practice of threatening or detaining 
the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain 
confessions, minimize outside interference, or prompt the fugitive's 
surrender (see Section 1.d.). There have been reports that security 
personnel force prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in order to 
extract confessions. According to AI, security forces also detain 
family members of suspected oppositionists (see Section 1.d.).
    Security checkpoints continue to exist, although primarily in 
military and other restricted areas. There are few police checkpoints 
on main roads and in populated areas. Generally, the security services 
set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods, weapons, narcotics, 
and subversive literature. The searches take place without warrants. In 
the past, the Government and the Ba'th Party monitored and attempted to 
restrict some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and cultural 
centers.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing, but the 
Government restricts these rights significantly in practice. The 
Government strictly controls the dissemination of information and 
permits no written or oral criticism of the President, the President's 
family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of the regime. 
The Government also does not permit sectarian issues to be raised. 
Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion that 
violate these unwritten rules sometimes occur, although not as 
frequently as in the past.
    The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the 
publishing of ``false information,'' which opposes ``the goals of the 
revolution `` (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the Government has 
imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press restrictions. In 
May 1999, a defamation case filed against a journalist was reported 
widely in the press. The case was believed to be the first in which a 
journalist was tried for what he had published; he was cleared of guilt 
by the court. State security services are known to threaten local 
journalists, including with the removal of credentials, for articles 
printed outside the country. There were reports that journalists 
temporarily lost their credentials during the year after they allegedly 
reported on issues deemed sensitive by the military. For example, in 
September authorities revoked temporarily the credentials of a local 
journalist who wrote an article that the Government deemed politically 
sensitive.
    The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and 
National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They usually 
prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed threatening 
or embarrassing by the security services to high levels of the 
Government. Censorship usually is stricter for materials in Arabic. 
Commonly censored subjects include: The Government's human rights 
record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in 
drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic 
descriptions of sexual activity; material unfavorable to the Arab cause 
in the Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of 
the country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and 
writers practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative 
government reaction.
    Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship increased 
during the year. In his July inaugural speech, President Bashar Al-Asad 
emphasized the principle of media transparency. Since July both the 
print and electronic media at times have been critical of Ba'th Party 
and government performance and have reported openly on a range of 
social and economic issues. While this relaxation of censorship did not 
extend to domestic politics or foreign policy issues, it was a notable 
departure from past practice. Damascus-based correspondents for 
regional Arab media also were able to file reports on internal 
political issues, such as rumored governmental changes, new political 
discussion groups, and the possible introduction of new parties to the 
Ba'th Party-dominated National Progressive Front. In November the Ba'th 
Party Regional Command voted to amend the press law to allow 
constituent parties of the National Progressive Front to publish 
newspapers and to open party headquarters. In November the Prime 
Minister rescinded a 1986 ban on the printing of publications by public 
institutions without prior approval from the Prime Minister.
    A group of 99 Syrian intellectuals published a petition in a 
Lebanese newspaper in September calling for lifting martial law, ending 
the state of emergency in effect since 1963, releasing political 
prisoners, and expanding civil liberties in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. The Government did not respond directly 
to the petition by year's end; however, the Government did take several 
of the steps called for in the petition (see Section 1.d.). The 
Government did not take action against any of the intellectuals who 
signed the petition by year's end. In December a local human rights 
organization published an open letter in a Lebanese newspaper calling 
for the closure of the notorious Tadmur prison.
    The media broadened somewhat their reporting on regional 
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media 
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were 
reported selectively to buttress official views. The government-
controlled press increased its coverage of official corruption and 
governmental inefficiency. There are no privately owned newspapers, 
although foreign-owned, foreign-published newspapers circulate 
relatively freely. In August 1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on 
entry of Jordanian newspapers (also see Section 1.f.).
    The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and 
television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. The Ministry 
of Information closely monitors the radio and television news programs 
to ensure adherence to the government line. The Government does not 
interfere with broadcasts from abroad. Satellite dishes have 
proliferated throughout all regions and in neighborhoods of all social 
and economic categories, and in July the Government officially approved 
regulations permitting the importation of satellite receivers. Cellular 
telephone service was introduced early in the year, although 
prohibitive cost severely limits the number of subscribers. Internet 
access and access to e-mail is limited, although efforts are underway 
to provide greater Internet access, especially to universities and 
businesses. The Government blocks access to selected Internet sites 
that contain information deemed politically sensitive or pornographic 
in nature. The Government also blocks access to servers that provide 
free e-mail services. In 1999 and in September, telephone service to 
the offices and residences of several European embassies and the home 
of an American officer was disrupted, allegedly because the lines had 
been used to access Internet providers outside the country. Telephone 
service in 1999 was restored in response to diplomatic protest by the 
European embassies; however, diplomats and citizens continue to 
experience regular disruptions of telephone service. The Ministry of 
Culture and National Guidance censors fiction and nonfiction works, 
including films. It also determines which films may not be shown at the 
cultural centers operated by foreign embassies. The Government 
prohibits the publication of books and other materials in Kurdish; 
however, there are credible reports that Kurdish language materials are 
available in the country (see Section 5).
    The Government restricts academic freedom. Public school teachers 
are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy, 
although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at 
the university level.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of 
assembly does not exist under the law. Citizens may not hold 
demonstrations unless they obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Interior. Most public demonstrations are organized by the Government or 
the Ba'th Party. The Government selectively applied the law during the 
year, permitting some demonstrations. The Government applies the 
restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian refugee camps, where 
controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
    In October there were numerous demonstrations, most of which were 
permitted or organized by the Government, and some of which were 
directed against diplomatic missions and international agencies in 
reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against Palestinians 
in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. On October 4, police did not take 
adequate steps to protect diplomatic property during a violent 
demonstration. However, during a subsequent violent demonstration on 
October 6, police used tear gas, shields, batons, and threats of lethal 
force to disperse rock-throwing demonstrators and protect diplomatic 
property. Observers stated that the police acted with restraint. About 
50 police personnel and numerous demonstrators were injured in the 
demonstration (see Section 1.c.). The Government subsequently permitted 
additional demonstrations with a significant security force presence; 
such demonstrations remained peaceful.
    In November there were large demonstrations in Suwayda province 
following violent clashes between Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents 
of the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
    The Government restricts freedom of association. Private 
associations must be registered with the Government in order to be 
considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register, 
presumably because the Government views them as political, even though 
the groups presented themselves as cultural or professional 
associations. Unregistered groups generally may not hold meetings; 
however, there are credible reports that several domestic human rights 
organizations and civil society groups held regular meetings during the 
year. The Government usually grants registration to groups not engaged 
in political or other activities deemed sensitive. The authorities do 
not allow the establishment of independent political parties.
    In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its 
control, the executive boards of professional associations after some 
members staged a national strike and advocated an end to the state of 
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time 
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty 
members may serve on their executive boards. It is not known whether 
any persons detained in 1980 crackdowns on union and professional 
association officials remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, it imposes restrictions in some areas. The only advantage 
given to a particular religion by the Constitution is the requirement 
that the President be a Muslim. There is no official state religion; 
Sunni Muslims constitute the majority of the population.
    All religions and orders must register with the Government, which 
monitors fund raising and requires permits for all meetings by 
religious groups, except for worship. Recognized religious groups 
receive free utilities and are exempt from real estate taxes and taxes 
on official vehicles. There is a strict de facto separation of church 
and state. Religious groups tend to avoid any involvement in internal 
political affairs. The Government, in turn, generally refrains from 
becoming involved in strictly religious issues.
    The Government considers militant Islam a threat to the regime and 
follows closely the practice of its adherents. The Government has 
allowed many new mosques to be built; however, sermons are monitored 
and controlled, and mosques are closed between prayers.
    There were credible reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and 
Palestinian Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamic Salvation Party in late 1999 and early 2000. Some of the 
Islamist prisoners reportedly were tortured in detention. A number of 
these prisoners reportedly were released during the year (see Sections 
1.c. and 1.d.).
    Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the Government 
discourages such activity in practice, particularly when it is deemed a 
threat to the generally good relations among religious groups. Foreign 
missionary groups are present but operate discreetly. The Government 
banned Jehovah's Witnesses as a politically-motivated Zionist 
organization in 1964.
    Officially all schools are government-run and nonsectarian, 
although some schools are run in practice by Christian, Druze, and 
Jewish minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools, 
with government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are 
divided into separate classes for Muslim, Druze, and Christian 
students. Jews have a separate primary school, which offers religious 
instruction in Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although 
Arabic is the official language in public schools, the Government 
permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and 
Chaldean in some schools on the basis that these are ``liturgical 
languages.''
    Religious groups are subject to their respective religious laws on 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (see Section 5).
    Government policy officially disavows sectarianism of any kind. 
However, in the case of the Alawis, religion can be a contributing 
factor in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the 
President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security 
services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of 
the population, which is estimated to be 12 percent (see Section 3).
    For primarily political rather than religious reasons, Jews 
generally are barred from government employment and do not have 
military service obligations. Jews also are the only religious minority 
group whose passports and identity cards note their religion.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limits freedom of 
movement. The Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights. 
Travel to Israel is illegal. In November 1999, the Government eased 
many of its travel restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens 
to travel abroad. In December the Government lifted the ban on travel 
to Iraq. Exit visas generally no longer are required for women, men 
over 50 years old, and citizens living abroad. In the past, individuals 
have been denied permission to travel abroad on political grounds, 
although government officials deny that this practice occurs. The 
authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or 
travel abroad illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel. 
Women over the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the 
permission of male relatives. However, a husband may file a request 
with the Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the 
country (see Section 5). The Government's use of police checkpoints has 
been reduced (see Section 1.f.).
    In July the Government announced that emigres who did not complete 
mandatory military service can pay a fee to avoid being conscripted 
while visiting the country.
    In November the Government temporarily sealed access to parts of 
Suwayda province for several weeks to nonresidents following violent 
clashes between resident Druze and Bedouin shepherds (see Section 5).
    As of June 383,199 Palestinian refugees were registered with the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In 
general Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties 
travelling in and out of the country, as was the case in the past. The 
Government restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in the 
country. The Government does not allow Palestinian residents of Gaza to 
visit the country.
    Citizens of any Arab country may enter the country without a visa. 
However, citizens of Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia must demonstrate that 
they have an invitation from a business or individual citizen.
    There are no laws with provisions for dealing with refugees and 
asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first 
asylum but is selective about extending protection to refugees; 
approximately 2,455 persons sought asylum through the UNHCR during the 
first 9 months of the year. Although the Government denied any forced 
repatriation of those who may have had a valid claim to refugee status, 
in 1998 it apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian, and 
Libyan refugees. As of August 1999, there were an estimated 21,319 non-
Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were receiving 
assistance from the UNHCR, including 1,315 refugees of Iraqi origin.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and Members of 
Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The 
late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five 
times after taking power in 1970. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was 
confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July. Political opposition to 
the President is not tolerated. The President and his senior aides, 
particularly those in the military and security services, ultimately 
make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very 
limited degree of public accountability. Moreover, the Constitution 
mandates that the Ba'th Party is the ruling party and is ensured a 
majority in all government and popular associations, such as workers' 
and women's groups. Six smaller political parties also are permitted 
and, along with the Ba'th Party, make up the National Progressive Front 
(NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of 
legal political party participation for citizens. While created 
ostensibly to give the appearance of a multiparty system, the NPF is 
dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not change the essentially one-
party character of the political system. Non-Ba'th Party members of the 
NPF exist as political parties largely in name only and conform 
strictly to Ba'th Party and government policies. There were reports in 
the regional Arab media that the Government is considering legislation 
to expand the NPF to include new parties and several parties previously 
banned.
    The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the 
People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and 
modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over 
the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has allowed 
independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats 
in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF 
deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th 
Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's 
Council last took place in 1998.
    The Government is headed by a Cabinet, which the President has the 
discretion to change. In March former President Hafez Al-Asad accepted 
the resignations of all of the members of his Cabinet who resigned 
because the late President reportedly believed that the change would 
improve government and economic performance. On March 13, the late 
President appointed a new Cabinet consisting of 36 ministers; 26 Ba'th 
Party members, 6 NPF ministers, and 4 ``independents'' aligned with the 
Government.
    Persons who have been convicted by the State Security Court may be 
deprived of their political rights after they are released from prison. 
Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political 
activity, the denial of passports, and a bar on accepting government 
jobs and some other forms of employment. The duration of such 
restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former 
prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is mandated 
by the Penal Code; it has been in effect since 1949.
    Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population 
and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the political 
system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are underrepresented in 
Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers and 26 female Members 
of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not allow the existence of local human rights 
groups. One or two human rights groups once operated legally but 
subsequently were banned by the Government. However, there are credible 
reports that several domestic human rights organizations and civil 
society groups met regularly during the year.
    Amnesty International (AI) visited Syria for 2 weeks in 1997, the 
second major visit by an international human rights organization (after 
a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). These were the first such meetings 
held by government officials with an international human rights 
organization. There have been no such meetings since.
    As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges with 
international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses. It has 
not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit 
prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing to all 
inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the cases 
of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency 
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human 
Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to 
its request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens 
who were executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government 
usually responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign 
embassies on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question 
has violated national security laws.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity 
for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th Party or close 
familial relations with a prominent party member or government official 
can be important for economic, social, or educational advancement. 
Party or government connections can pave the way for entrance into 
better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative 
employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and 
the security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of 
provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members. Apart 
from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent patterns 
of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex, religion, 
disability, language, or social status. However, there are varying 
degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable 
statistics regarding the prevalence of domestic violence or sexual 
assault. The vast majority of cases likely are unreported, and victims 
generally are reluctant to seek assistance outside the family. There 
are no laws against spousal rape. One preliminary academic study 
suggested that domestic violence is the largest single reason for 
divorces, and that such abuse is more prevalent among the less-educated 
and person who live in rural areas. Battered women have the legal right 
to seek redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma 
attached to such action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services 
to battered wives to remedy individual family problems. The Syrian 
Family Planning Association also attempts to deal with this problem. 
Some private groups, including the Family Planning Association, have 
organized seminars on violence against women, which were reported by 
the government press. There are no specifically designated shelters or 
safe havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
    The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and 
equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has sought to 
overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and 
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet 
changed personal status, retirement, and social security laws that 
discriminate against women. Christians, Muslims, and other religious 
groups are subject to their respective religious laws on marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance (see Section 2.c.). In addition some secular 
laws discriminate against women. For example, under criminal law, the 
punishment for adultery is twice that as for the same crime committed 
by a man. ``Honor'' crimes (a euphemism that refers to violent assaults 
with intent to murder against a female by a male for alleged sexual 
misconduct) do occur.
    For Muslims personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a 
(Islamic law), and some of its provisions discriminate against women. 
For example, husbands may claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but 
wives face more difficulty in presenting the same argument. If a woman 
requests a divorce from her husband, she may not be entitled to child 
support in some instances. In addition under the law a woman loses the 
right to custody of boys when they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
    Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a. Accordingly Muslim 
women usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male heirs. 
However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial support to 
the female relatives who inherit less. For example, a brother who 
inherits an unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate is 
obligated to provide for the sister's well-being. If the brother fails 
to do so, she has the right to sue.
    Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of 
Muslim men.
    A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited 
(see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad 
with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has 
granted permission for the children to travel.
    Women participate actively in public life and are represented in 
most professions, including the military. Women are not impeded from 
owning or managing land or other real property. Women constitute 
approximately 7 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of 
teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university 
professors.
    Children.--There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls 
in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all children, 
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to the Syrian 
Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students through 
the secondary level are female.
    Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing 
interferes with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural 
areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
    The law emphasizes the need to protect children, and the Government 
has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare. Although there 
are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of abuse against 
children. The law provides for severe penalties for those found guilty 
of the most serious abuses against children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
the disabled and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work 
force. However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2 
percent of government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not 
implemented rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts 
regarding discrimination. There are no laws that mandate access to 
public buildings for the disabled. The Minister of Social Affairs 
announced plans during the year to offer vocational training for 
disabled persons through local NGO's and to mandate that the Government 
hire 4 percent of its workforce from the disabled population.
    Religious Minorities.--Although there is significant religious 
tolerance, religion or ethnic affiliation can be a contributing factor 
in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the 
President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security 
services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of 
the population. Nevertheless, government policy officially disavows 
sectarianism.
    There generally is little societal discrimination or violence 
against religious minorities, including Jews. However, on October 12, a 
group of Palestinians threw bricks, stones, and Molotov cocktails at a 
synagogue in Damascus, apparently in reaction to the Israeli 
Government's use of force against Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. No one was injured in the attack; however, the synagogue 
was damaged slightly and was closed for approximately 1 month. The 
Government took immediate steps to ensure that the Jewish community 
would be protected from further attacks, including arresting the 
perpetrators and posting guards around synagogues and the Jewish 
quarter of Damascus.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally 
permits national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional, 
religious, and cultural activities. However, the Government's attitude 
toward the Kurdish minority is a significant exception to this policy. 
Although the Government contends that there is no discrimination 
against the Kurdish population, it has placed limits on the use and 
teaching of the Kurdish language. It also restricts the publication of 
books and other materials written in Kurdish (see Section 2.a.), 
Kurdish cultural expression, and, at times, the celebration of Kurdish 
festivals. The Government tacitly accepts the importation and 
distribution of Kurdish language materials, particularly in the 
northeast region in which most of the Kurds in the country reside. Some 
members of the Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State 
Security Court for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or 
independence. Although the Asad Government stopped the previous 
practice of stripping Kurds in Syria of their Syrian nationality (some 
120,000 lost Syrian nationality under this program in the 1960's), it 
never restored their nationality. As a result, those who had lost their 
nationality and their children have been unable to obtain Syrian 
nationality and passports, or even identification cards and birth 
certificates. Without Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who 
according to UNHCR estimates number about 200,000, are unable to own 
land, are not permitted to practice as doctors or engineers or be 
employed by the Government, are ineligible for admission to public 
hospitals, and have no right to vote, according to Human Rights Watch. 
They also encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in school. 
Stateless Kurdish men legally may not marry Syrian citizens.
    In November there were violent clashes in Suwayda province, 
reportedly stemming from a longstanding dispute between Bedouin 
shepherds and Druze residents over grazing and property rights. There 
were large demonstrations following the killings (see Section 2.b.). 
The Government deployed 5,000 army troops and sealed off the area with 
military checkpoints, temporarily preventing nonresidents from entering 
the Suwayda province (see Section 2.d.). A number of Druze, Bedouin, 
and security force personnel were killed and injured during the 
clashes.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides 
for this right, workers are not free to establish unions independent of 
the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of 
Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is in 
fact a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an 
information channel between political decisionmakers and workers. The 
GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also 
conveys information to decisionmakers about worker conditions and 
needs. The GFTU provides the Government with opinions on legislation, 
organizes workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The 
GFTU president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy 
may attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls 
nearly all aspects of union activity.
    The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the agricultural 
sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from striking because of 
previous government crackdowns on strikers. In 1980 the security forces 
arrested many union and professional association officials who planned 
a national strike. Some of them are believed to remain in detention, 
either without trial or after being tried by the State Security Court 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab 
Trade Unions.
    In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under the U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the Government 
failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights 
to workers.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful 
sense. Government representatives are part of the bargaining process in 
the public sector. In the public sector, unions do not normally bargain 
collectively on wage issues, but there is some evidence that union 
representatives participate with representatives of employers and the 
supervising ministry in establishing minimum wages, hours, and 
conditions of employment. Workers serve on the boards of directors of 
public enterprises, and union representatives always are included on 
these boards.
    The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector, 
but any such agreement between labor and management must be ratified by 
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective veto power. 
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the Minister's power 
over collective contracts.
    Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and 
other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding 
arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle 
most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration. 
Management has the right to request arbitration, but this right seldom 
is exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a 
dispute over wages or severance pay.
    Since the unions are part of the Government's bureaucratic 
structure, they are protected by law from antiunion discrimination. 
There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
    There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the 
zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and 
firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety, 
hours, and sick and annual leave.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no law 
prohibiting forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children. There were no reports of forced labor involving children or 
foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor has been imposed as a 
punishment for some convicted prisoners.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation in 
the workplace. Independent information and audits on government 
enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law, 
there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due 
to the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. In 
December the Parliament approved legislation that raises the private 
sector minimum age for employment from 12 to 15 years for most types of 
nonagricultural labor, and from 16 to 18 years for heavy work. In all 
cases, parental permission is required for children under the age of 
16. The law prohibits children from working at night. However, all 
these laws apply only to children who work for a salary. Those who work 
in family businesses and are not technically paid a salary--a common 
phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The Government claims that the 
expansion of the private sector has led to more young children working. 
Education is compulsory for all children, male or female, between the 
ages of 6 and 12.
    The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors employment 
conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough 
inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the 
authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years 
of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are working 
do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without 
remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children under 
the age of 18 participate in the labor force, which amounts to 4.7 
percent of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal age 
to work do not differ from those established for adults. Children under 
the age of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum 
sites, or in other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift, 
carry, or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging 
purposes also is prohibited. The Labor Inspection Department performs 
unannounced spot checks of employers on a daily basis to enforce these 
regulations; however, the scope of these checks is unknown.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social 
Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public 
and private sectors. In August the Government increased public sector 
minimum wages by 25 percent to $57 (2,664 Syrian pounds) per month, 
plus other compensation (for example, meals, uniforms, and 
transportation). In October the Government increased private sector 
minimum wages by 25 percent to $53 (2,425 Syrian pounds) per month in 
urban areas and $49 (2,237 Syrian pounds) in rural areas. These wages 
still do not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. As a result, many workers in both the public and private 
sectors take additional jobs or are supported by their extended 
families. In the past, a committee of labor, management, and government 
representatives submitted recommended changes in the minimum wage to 
the Minister, and private sector salary increases matched those in the 
public sector.
    The statutory workweek for administrative staff is 6 days of 6 
hours each, and laborers work 6 days a week of 8 hours each. In some 
cases a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate 1 24-hour rest 
day per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an 
employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent 
from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a 
lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him, 
including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any 
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to 
appeal before a committee of representatives from the union, 
management, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the 
appropriate municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the 
employee. Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary 
benefits while the dispute is under consideration. No additional back 
wages are awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage 
penalties imposed in cases where the employer is not found at fault. 
The law does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to 
regulations on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ 
such workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent 
employees.
    The law mandates safety in all sectors, and managers are expected 
to implement them fully. In practice there is little enforcement 
without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite government 
efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations. Large 
companies, such as oil field contractors, employ safety engineers.
    The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code 
allowing employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as 11 
hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports of 
such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor inspect 
work sites for compliance with health and safety standards. Such 
inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in 
hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. The enforcement 
of labor laws in rural areas also is more lax than it is in urban 
areas, where inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints 
about health and safety conditions, with special committees established 
to adjudicate such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves 
from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that 
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country. Standard labor 
laws would be applied in the event of allegations of trafficking.
                               __________

                                TUNISIA

    Tunisia is a republic dominated by a single political party. 
President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD) party have controlled the Government, including the 
legislature, since 1987. This dominance was reaffirmed in an 
overwhelming RCD victory in the October 1999 legislative and 
presidential elections, although 1999 revisions to the Constitution 
allowed two opposition candidates to run against Ben Ali in 
presidential elections, the first multicandidate presidential race in 
the country's history. Approximately 20 percent of representation in 
the Chamber of Deputies is reserved for opposition parties (34 of 182 
seats), up from approximately 12 percent (19 of 163 seats) in the 
previous Chamber, which was elected in 1994. The President appoints the 
Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the 24 governors. The executive branch 
and the President strongly influence the judiciary, particularly in 
sensitive political cases.
    The police share responsibility for internal security with a 
paramilitary National Guard. The police operate in the capital and a 
few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties are shared 
with, or ceded to, the National Guard. Both forces are under the 
control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The security 
forces continued to be responsible for serious human rights abuses.
    Tunisia has made substantial progress toward establishing an 
export-oriented market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism, 
agriculture, and petroleum. The per capita gross national product for 
2000 was estimated to be $2,800, while real per capita income grew by 
an estimated 2.7 percent. Over 60 percent of citizens are in the middle 
class and enjoy a comfortable standard of living. The Government 
reported that only 6.2 percent of citizens fell below the poverty line, 
and that more than 80 percent of households owned their own homes. The 
country has a high level of literacy (91.1 percent of adults between 
the ages of 15 and 24 in 1999), low population growth rates (under 1.2 
percent in 1999), and wide distribution of basic health care. The 
Government devotes over 60 percent of the budget to social and 
development goals.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in 
some areas, particularly regarding the rights of women and children, 
and it also took modest steps to allow a greater diversity of views in 
the media; however, the Government's record remained poor in other 
areas, and significant problems remain. There are significant 
limitations on citizens' right to change their government. The ruling 
RCD Party is firmly intertwined with government institutions throughout 
the country, making it extremely difficult for opposition parties to 
compete on a level playing field. The October 1999 presidential and 
legislative elections marked a modest step toward democratic 
development, with opposition presidential candidates allowed to run for 
the first time, and opposition parties generally freer to campaign; 
however, while observers agree that the outcome of the elections 
generally reflected the will of the electorate, the campaign and 
election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there was wide 
disregard for the secrecy of the vote, in which Ben Ali won 99.44 
percent of the ballots cast for President.
    There were reports of two extrajudicial killings by police. Members 
of the security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and 
detainees. The Government asserts that police officials who commit 
abuses are disciplined, but there have been no documented cases in 
which security officials were disciplined for such abuse. Prison 
conditions range from Spartan to poor. Security forces arbitrarily 
arrest and detain persons. Lengthy pretrial detention and incommunicado 
detention are problems. Provisions enacted in 1999 to lower the maximum 
incommunicado detention period and require authorities to notify family 
members at the time of arrest are not enforced evenly. The judiciary is 
subject to executive branch control, lengthy delays in trials are a 
problem, and due process rights are not always observed; however, in 
July the Government set up a new court to oversee the proper 
administration of sentences. The Government infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights, including by intercepting mail and interfering with 
Internet communication. Security forces also monitored the activities 
of government critics and at times harassed them, their relatives, and 
associates.
    The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on 
freedom of speech and of the press, although there was limited easing 
of press restrictions during the year. Journalists practice 
selfcensorship. The Government demonstrated a pattern of intolerance of 
public criticism, using criminal investigations, judicial proceedings, 
and travel controls (including denial of passports) to discourage 
criticism and limit the activities of human rights activists. The 
Government continued to use the mandatory prescreening of publications 
and control of advertising revenue as a means to discourage newspapers 
and magazines from publishing material that it considered undesirable. 
The Government regularly seized editions of foreign newspapers 
containing articles that it considered objectionable. However, the 
Government eased its restrictions somewhat in a few areas; several 
foreign journals returned to newsstands during the year after being 
banned from sale following articles critical of the October 1999 
presidential and legislative elections. The Government also improved 
access to the Internet and continued to broadcast a monthly public 
affairs program that permitted citizens to debate issues with 
government officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and 
association. The Government limits partially the religious freedom of 
members of the Baha'i faith. The Government does not permit 
proselytizing. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of 
movement of government critics and their family members. The Government 
subjected members of the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and other 
human rights activists to harassment, interrogation, property loss or 
damage, and denial of passports. The Government closed the headquarters 
of the LTDH on November 27 and replaced its board with a judicial 
administrator pending a scheduled January 2001 hearing. Four LTDH 
members filed a complaint that the LTDH's national congress elections 
that were held in October did not follow LTDH by-laws and were illegal. 
The Government barred meetings by LTDH board members in the interim. 
The Government continued to meet with the LTDH, but still refused to 
approve the registration of the National Council for Liberties (CNLT) 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) and continued to prosecute CNLT 
members. CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year 
prison term for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of 
false news for writing a paper for a human rights conference held in 
Morroco that criticized the Government's National Solidarity Fund 
charity for lack of transparency. The Government permitted observers 
from several international human rights groups to attend trials of 
human rights activists. Violence against women occurs. The Government 
continued to demonstrate its strong support for the rights of women and 
children; however, legal discrimination against women continued to 
exist in certain areas, such as property and inheritance law, which is 
governed by Shari'a (Islamic law), and societal discrimination exists 
in areas such as private sector employment. The Government took strong 
measures to reduce official discrimination, including equal opportunity 
for women as a standard part of its audits of all governmental entities 
and state-owned enterprises; however, such measures are not extended to 
the private sector. Child labor persists. Child labor continues to 
decline, due principally to government efforts to address the problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, there were reports of a few 
extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces.
    According to the LTDH, on August 9 motorcycle police officers 
kicked and beat Chaker Azouzi to death for failure to stop for police. 
The Government stated that the police officer implicated in Azouzi's 
death is being held pending a judicial investigation.
    According to an LTDH communique, Riadh Ben Mohamed J'day was beaten 
to death while he was held in police detention on September 17. The 
Government claimed that J'day committed suicide by hanging himself by 
his shirt from the bars in his cell, and that he died on the way to the 
hospital.
    The LTDH reported that El-Aid Ben Salah's cellmates beat him to 
death on June 10 and that, despite his cries, prison guards did nothing 
to save him. The Government stated that it has opened an investigation 
into Ben Salah's death.
    There was no progress in the investigation of the 1999 case of 
Tahar Jelassi, who reportedly died as a result of torture by prison 
guards for refusing to take off his clothes during a routine search at 
Grombalia prison.
    There were no developments during the year in the case of former 
Islamist Tijani Dridi, who allegedly died in police custody in 1998. 
The Government maintains that Dridi died on July 21 from injuries 
sustained the previous day in a motorcycle collision.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, security 
forces routinely used various methods of torture to coerce confessions 
from detainees. The forms of torture included electric shock; 
submersion of the head in water; beatings with hands, sticks, and 
police batons; cigarette burns; and food and sleep deprivation. Police 
also reportedly utilized the ``rotisserie'' method: Stripping prisoners 
naked, manacling their wrists behind their ankles, and beating the 
prisoners while they were suspended from a rod. A 1999 CNLT report on 
prison conditions described other forms of torture, including the 
falaqa, which consists of suspending a prisoner by the feet and 
severely beating the soles of the feet; suspension of a prisoner from 
the metal door of his cell for hours on end until the prisoner loses 
consciousness; and confinement of the prisoner to the ``cachot,'' a 
tiny, unlit cell. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, who was released 
from prison in 1999, and the CNLT both reported cases in which 
prisoners committed self-mutilation in prisons to protest conditions 
and then, as punishment, prison authorities sutured the prisoners' 
self-inflicted wounds without anesthesia and put them into isolation or 
into ``cachot.'' In the April 28 trial of Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, the 
brother of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, presiding judges did not 
incorporate allegations of police brutality in their summary statements 
(which serve as the trial record), and refused to open an investigation 
into Zoghlami's claim that on April 26 police officers beat Zoghlami 
(breaking his nose), Sihem Bensedrine, Taieb Nooman, and Ali Ben Salem 
while holding them in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The four 
claimed that they were made to lay prostrate at a police station in the 
El-Manar suburb of Tunis while police stomped and kicked them, and that 
they subsequently filed a complaint of police brutality, which the 
judge refused to accept.
    According to Amnesty International (AI) and defense attorneys, the 
courts routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and 
mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under 
torture. In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others for membership 
in the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda, the presiding judges 
refused to investigate the claim by defendants that their confessions 
were extracted under torture, including a claim by Amari's attorney 
that he still bore physical signs of torture (see Sections 1.d. and 
1.e.).
    In a November 1998 report, the U.N. Committee Against Torture 
recommended that the Government reduce the prearraignment incommunicado 
detention period from 10 days to 48 hours, noting that most abuses 
occur during incommunicado detention. In August 1999, in order to 
address U.N. concerns, the Government enacted amendments to the Penal 
Code, which adopted the U.N. definition of torture, instructed police 
to inform detainees of their rights, including, notably, the right of a 
defendant to demand a medical examination while in detention, and 
increased the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of 
torture from 5 to 8 years. In 1999 the Government also shortened the 
maximum allowable period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from 
10 to 6 days and added a requirement that the police notify suspects' 
families on the day of their arrest. However, credible sources claimed 
that the Government rarely enforces the new provisions. In its annual 
report for 2000, Human Rights Watch stated that despite the reduction 
of incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days, torture continued to be a 
problem, due to a climate of impunity ``fostered by a judiciary that 
ignored evidence of torture and routinely convicted defendants on the 
basis of coerced confessions.'' In its March 2000 report on torture, 
the CNLT stated that ``torture continues to be practiced on a large 
scale'' and affects not only political prisoners but common criminals 
as well.
    Human rights advocates maintain that charges of torture and 
mistreatment are difficult to substantiate because government 
authorities often deny medical examinations until evidence of abuse has 
disappeared. The Government maintained that it investigates all 
complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the prosecutor's 
office and claimed that alleged victims sometimes publicly accused 
authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required to 
initiate an investigation. However, the CNLT stated in its March report 
on torture that police often refuse to register complaints and judges 
dismiss complaints lodged by alleged victims of torture with little or 
no investigation. For example, Abdelmounim Belanas, who was convicted 
in 1999 of membership in the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT) 
and was released in June, claimed that he filed two complaints against 
the Government for torture that he was subjected to in 1995, 1997, and 
1999, but that both of his complaints were dismissed (see Sections 
1.e., 2.b. and 4). Absent a formal complaint, the Government may open 
an administrative investigation but is unlikely to release the results 
to the lawyers of affected prisoners. There have been no documented 
cases in which security officials were disciplined for such abuse.
    Eight alleged members of the Islamist organization Ansar were 
convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to 17 
years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had been 
extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single government 
witness (see Section 1.d.).
    There were reports that security forces severely beat students 
during demonstrations in the south in February (see Section 2.b.). 
Credible sources reported that security forces beat university students 
during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the greater Tunis area in 
October (see Sections 2.b.).
    Credible sources reported that plainclothes policemen beat French, 
Algerian, and Moroccan journalists when they attempted to attend a 
press conference at the home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April 
(see Section 2.a.). On April 25, police attacked human rights activists 
and attorneys as they left the Saint Augustin Clinic where Ben Brik was 
holding a hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Police beat 
LTDH vice presidents Fadhel Ghedamsi and Khemais Ksila, Ksila's wife 
Fatma, attorney Chawki Tabib, and CNLT member Omar Mestiri in the 
attack. Khemais Ksila suffered a fractured vertebra and his wife 
suffered bruises to her back as she attempted to stop police from 
beating her husband, who was knocked unconscious from blows to the top 
of his spinal column. Attorneys claimed that they filed a complaint but 
that the judge refused to accept it. PCOT member Mohamed Hedi Sassi 
claimed that security police attacked and beat him in July outside his 
home and again in August after stopping his car. CNLT members Omar 
Mestiri and Mohamed Bechir claimed that in December plainclothes 
policemen beat them in front of the Ministry of Health, where they 
attempted to lodge a formal protest of CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki's 
July dismissal. Mestiri claimed that policemen drove him 60 kilometers 
from Tunis and dropped him by the side of the road without money, 
papers, or his glasses, and left him to return on foot. Sources also 
claimed that Nejib Hosni and Raouf Ayadi had been hit and slapped by 
plainclothes police, who prevented them from entering the CNLT 
headquarters in December (see Sections 1.f. and 4).
    According to defense attorneys and former prisoners, prison 
conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in some cases, did not meet 
minimum international standards. Credible sources reported that 
overcrowding continued to be a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners 
typically confined to a single 194-square-foot cell, and up to 140 
prisoners held in a 323-square-foot-cell. In a September 19 trial of 36 
defendants who were charged with belonging to the illegal Islamist 
organization An-Nahda, Zouer Yacoub stated that during his 3.5 year 
pretrial detention, he was confined with 270 inmates, who shared 1 
toilet and 1 sink, in a 323-square-foot cell (see Section 1.d.). 
Defense attorneys reported that prisoners in the 9th of April prison in 
Tunis were forced to share a single water and toilet facility with 
their cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems, and credible 
sources report that prison barbers use a single razor blade to shave 
every 10 prisoners.
    There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were 
harsher for political prisoners than for the general prison population. 
One credible report alleged the existence of special cell blocks and 
prisons for political prisoners, in which they might be held in 
solitary confinement for months at a time. Another credible source 
reported that highranking leaders of the illegal An-Nahda Islamist 
movement have been held in solitary confinement since 1991. Other 
sources alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved among 
jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult for the 
prisoners' families to deliver food to the prisoners. One prisoner 
reported that he was moved 3 times while serving his 6-month sentence; 
another reported serving his sentence in 10 different jails in 3 years. 
The wife of Taoufik Chaieb (who was released following a presidential 
pardon in August after serving a 4-year prison term for membership in 
the illegal An-Nahda party) claimed that her husband was transferred to 
five prisons during his 4-year prison term. The CNLT report alleged 
that inmates are instructed to isolate newly arrived political 
prisoners and are punished severely for any contact with them. Fethi 
Chemki, the president of the Assembly for an Alternative to 
International Development (RAID), who was convicted in June of 
defamation for printing a CNLT report on prisons, claimed that he was 
confined to a bunk bed located besides the cell's lavatories and 
isolated by other prisoners, except those prisoners who were instructed 
to provoke fights (see Sections 1.e, 2.a. and 4). Other prisoners, 
including LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, alleged that the 
authorities limited the quantity and variety of food that families of 
political prisoners could bring to supplement prison fare.
    Former National High Commissioner for Human Rights Rachid Driss, 
whose former organization is government-funded, had conducted 
bimonthly, unannounced prison inspections since 1996. Although Driss 
has declared that prison conditions and prisoner hygiene were ``good 
and improving,'' details of his inspections were not made public. Driss 
was replaced in December by Zakaria Ben Mustapha, a former Minister of 
Cultural Affairs.
    The Government does not permit international organizations or the 
media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. The LTDH announced in a 
1999 communique that it had been granted permission to resume prison 
visits; however, it made no visits during the year, and the 
Government's willingness actually to allow such visits remained 
uncertain.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The law authorizes the police to make 
arrests without warrants in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in 
progress. A 1999 Penal Code amendment, provides for a maximum 3-day 
detention period, renewable once (for a maximum of 6 days) by the 
prosecutor, thus reducing from 10 days to 6 the time that the 
Government may hold a suspect incommunicado following arrest and prior 
to arraignment. The 1999 amendments also require arresting officers to 
inform detainees of their rights and detainees' families of the arrest 
at the time of arrest, and to make a complete record of the times and 
dates of such notifications. Credible sources stated that the new law 
rarely is enforced with respect to either common criminals or political 
detainees. Detainees have the right to be informed of the grounds for 
arrest before questioning and may request a medical examination. 
However, they do not have a right to legal representation during the 6-
day incommunicado detention period. Attorneys, human rights monitors, 
and former detainees maintain that the authorities illegally extend the 
maximum limit of pre-arraignment detention by falsifying the date of 
arrest. Ahmed Amari and 23 other defendants who were extradited from 
Libya in July 1997 did not appear before a judge until April (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    On April 8, police arrested RAID members Fethi Chemki and Mohamed 
Chouarbi, as well as Iheb El-Hani, the owner of a photocopy shop, and 
charged the three with defamation, distribution of false news, 
disturbing the public order, and belonging to an unrecognized 
association in connection with their photocopying of the CNLT's March 
report on torture. The Government reportedly detained hundreds of 
secondary-level students and other youths in connection with two 
demonstrations held in February and April (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). 
On April 25, the police arrested CNLT members Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, 
Sihem Bensedrine, Ali Ben Salem, and Taieb Nooman during an altercation 
between police and foreign journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). 
The Government subjected the family members of Islamist activists to 
arbitrary arrest (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., 2.d., 4, and 6.a.).
    Detainees have a right to be represented by counsel during 
arraignment. The Government provides legal representation for 
indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate may decide to 
release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. The law 
permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may be paid by a 
third party. In cases involving crimes for which the sentence exceeds 5 
years or that involve national security, preventive detention may last 
an initial period of 6 months and be extended by court order for two 
additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the sentence may not 
exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-month pretrial 
detention by an additional 3 months only. During this period, the court 
conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and 
motions of both parties. In August 1999, the Government approved a law 
that gives persons indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their 
indictment before the case comes to trial; previously, this right was 
granted in civil cases only.
    A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets 
a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court 
may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal basis for a speedy 
hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting trial 
were common, and President Ben Ali publicly has encouraged judges to 
make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences. In a 
September 19 trial, the attorney for Zouer Yacoub and 35 other 
defendants extradited from Libya in 1997 and charged with belonging to 
the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda claimed that they had been 
held in pretrial detention for 3.5 years (see Section 1.c.). Detainees 
Abdelatif Bouhajila, Yassin Ben Zarti, Ridha Ben Ahmed, Fehra Fethi, 
Sofiane Ben Hamida, Yousef Mourru, and two others charged with 
conspiring with a foreign Islamist group (Ansar), held 3-month hunger 
strikes to protest their 26-month long pretrial detentions. All eight 
were convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to 
17 years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had 
been extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single 
government witness (see Section 1.c.).
    Human rights activists reported that security forces arbitrarily 
imposed administrative controls on former prisoners following their 
release from prison. Although the Penal Code contains provisions for 
the imposition of administrative controls following completion of a 
prison sentence, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner 
to register at a police station, and the law limits registration 
requirements to 5 years. Human rights activists allege that these 
requirements often are unreasonable and prevent former prisoners from 
being able to hold a job. Numerous Islamists released from prison in 
recent years have been subjected to these types of requirements. Radhia 
Aouididi, who served a 3-year prison sentence for possession of a 
fraudulent passport (having been refused a passport in 1996 because of 
her fiance's membership in An-Nahda), was released from all 
administrative controls in August. She had been subject to a 
requirement to sign in daily at a police headquarters 9 miles from her 
village for a 5-year period following her 1999 release (see Section 
2.d.). Defense attorneys reported that some clients must sign in four 
or five times daily, at times that are determined only the previous 
evening. When the clients arrive at the police station, they may be 
forced to wait hours before signing in, making employment impossible 
and child care difficult. A new court, created by a 1999 law to oversee 
the proper administration of sentences, began functioning in September. 
The law allows judges to substitute community service for jail 
sentences in minor cases in which the sentence would be 6 months or 
less.
    There likely are a sizable number of political detainees, although 
there is no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention 
practices and the lack of publicly available records of arrests.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition. According to reliable sources, some 
political opponents in self-imposed exile have been prevented from 
obtaining or renewing their passports in order to return. However, a 
Government official stated in June that the Government had returned 200 
passports and would return another 600 of citizens living abroad, many 
of whom have been without a passport for years (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the President 
strongly influence the judiciary. In practice the judicial branch is 
part of the Ministry of Justice and the executive branch appoints, 
assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers judges. In addition the 
President is head of the Supreme Council of Judges. This situation 
renders judges susceptible to pressure in politically sensitive cases.
    The court system comprises the regular civil and criminal courts, 
including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the 
Court of Cassation, the nation's highest court; as well as the military 
tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
    Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and 
civilians accused of national security crimes. A military tribunal 
consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military 
judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the Court of 
Cassation.
    The Code of Procedure is patterned after the French legal system. 
By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be represented 
by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts. However, in 
practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law permits 
trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the 
prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants may 
request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not 
impartial; however, in practice judges do not always permit this. For 
example, lawyers for Nejib Hosni, who was convicted in December for 
violating a courtordered 5-year suspension from practicing law, 
requested that the trial judge recuse himself because, attorneys 
claimed, he no longer was impartial because he already had found Hosni 
in violation of the court order the week before. The judge refused the 
defense's request. The Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on 
points of law as opposed to the facts of a case, is the final arbiter.
    Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of 
appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges 
dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to 
participate substantively. Defense lawyers contend that the courts 
often fail to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them 
time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted 
access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for 
example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one 
specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy 
material documents. For example, in the case of RAID president Fethi 
Chemki and two others, defense attorneys said that they initially were 
not permitted access to documents that were the basis of the 
Government's charge of defamation, then later were permitted to view 
documents only in the judge's chambers (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 
4). Defense lawyers also claimed that the judges sometimes refused to 
allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf, or to question 
key government witnesses. In the trials of both Jallel Ben Brik 
Zoghlami and Fethi Chemki, judges refused to permit defense attorneys 
to call witnesses or present evidence on their clients' behalf (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Lengthy delays in trials also are a 
problem (see Section 1.d.).
    Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from 
Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Federation, and 
other international human rights organizations to monitor trials. The 
observers reported that the Government permitted them to conduct their 
work freely (see Section 4). According to credible sources, throughout 
the year the Government brought correspondents of foreign press 
services in for questioning for attending and reporting on political 
trials, and for writing articles critical of the Government in the 
foreign press (see Section 2.a.).
    Amnesty International and defense attorneys report that courts 
routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment, 
and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see 
Section 1.c.). In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others charged 
with membership in the illegal organization Islamist An-Nahda, the 
presiding judge refused to investigate allegations of torture, despite 
defendants' testimony that their confessions were extracted under 
torture (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Defense lawyers and human rights 
activists claim that the length of court sessions sometimes prevents 
reasoned deliberation.
    There is no definitive information on the number of political 
prisoners. Human Rights Watch reported that there might be hundreds of 
political prisoners convicted and imprisoned for membership in the 
Islamist group An-Nahda and the Communist Workers Party, for 
disseminating information produced by these banned organizations, and 
for aiding relatives of convicted members. Reliable sources estimate 
that between 600 and 1,400 political prisoners were held in the prisons 
at the beginning of the year. The Government releases prisoners on 
national holidays, such as Independence Day or the anniversary of 
President Ben Ali's accession to power. Several political prisoners 
were released during the year, including PCOT members Fahem Boukkadous 
and Abdelmounim Belanas (released on June 10), An-Nahda member Taoufik 
Chaieb (released on August 30), RAID president and members Fethi Chemki 
and Mohamed Chouarbi (released conditionally in May after serving 30 
days in detention), and Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, brother of journalist 
Taoufik Ben Brik (released in May after serving 19 days in detention) 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 4). However, the Government 
does not provide details on the numbers or types of prisoners released. 
President Ben Ali stated in a July 28 speech to members of the RCD 
ruling party that all prisoners are common criminals convicted of 
crimes in accordance with the law.
    The Government does not permit international humanitarian 
organizations to visit prisons. In his February report, U.N. Special 
Rapporteur Abid Hussein stated that the Government did not permit him 
to visit any prisoners in the 9th of April prison in Tunis but 
permitted him to visit former Social Democratic Movement (MDS) 
secretary general Mohammed Moaada, who at the time was under house 
arrest and police surveillance pending a government investigation of an 
alleged meeting between Moaada and An-Nahda leaders in Europe in 1997.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person, the 
home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except in exceptional 
cases defined by law.'' The law requires that the police obtain 
warrants to conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignore the 
requirement if authorities consider that state security is at stake or 
that a crime is in progress. For example, human rights activist Mohamed 
Hedi Sassi claimed that his home was ransacked in January while he was 
held in police custody for failing to stop for an unmarked police car.
    Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify 
telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government 
interception of fax and computer-transmitted communications. The law 
does not authorize explicitly these activities, although the Government 
has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly gives 
investigating magistrates such authority. Many political activists 
experience frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of residential 
and business telephone and fax services. Human rights activists accuse 
the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with its broad but 
undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public order, to 
interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery of foreign 
publications. Local phone, fax, and copy shops require persons to turn 
over their identification cards when requesting to send faxes. Lawyers 
and activists stated that the Government has increased its practice of 
cutting off telephone service to activists; telephone service to the 
offices, homes, and relatives of prominent human rights lawyers and 
other activists frequently was cut off, sometimes for long periods. 
Human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni claimed that his telephone service has 
been disrupted since 1994 and human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui 
claimed that her telephone service was disrupted numerous times 
throughout the year (see Section 4). However CNLT member Moncef 
Marzouki and journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, who were without telephone 
service for prolonged periods, reported that their service was 
reinstated in May.
    The security forces monitor the activities of political critics, 
and sometimes harass, follow, question, or otherwise intimidate their 
relatives and associates. Members of the CNLT claimed that in December 
plainclothes police prevented persons from entering the building in 
which their headquarters were located, including neighbors who lived 
there (see Sections 1.c. and 4). Police place journalists who write 
articles critical of the Government, or who are active in human rights 
organizations, under surveillance (see Section 2.a.).
    Human rights activists, lawyers, and other political activists also 
reported that they were under police surveillance. Lawyer Radhia 
Nasraoui complained that police frequently follow and intimidate her 
children. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila reported that he continued 
to be subjected to government surveillance and harassment since his 
release in 1999. Although Ksila's telephone service was reconnected in 
May, he reported that his mail was monitored and only bills were 
delivered, and that he has been unable to work since 1996 (see Section 
4). On April 10, the Government closed CNLT member Sihem Bensedrine's 
publishing house, Aloes, and reopened it July 11. The Government stated 
that it closed the publishing house because it provided a venue for 
``disruptive activities'' when Bensedrine held a meeting in which 
Taoufik Ben Brik announced his hunger strike to protest his indictment 
for defamation for articles critical of the Government that he had 
written and published in the foreign press (see Sections 2.a. and 4). 
Bensedrine's telephone service was reconnected in July, after being out 
of service for 15 months, but again was disrupted the week before the 
December 25 LTDH hearing (see Section 4). Bensedrine reported that her 
home and family still are under surveillance, but that her children had 
not recently been the target of government harassment, as had been the 
case in the past.
    Human rights activists alleged that the Government subjected the 
family members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest, reportedly 
utilizing charges of ``association with criminal elements'' to punish 
family members for crimes committed by the activists. For example, one 
female medical doctor claimed that she has been unemployed since 1997 
because police pressure hospitals not to hire her because her husband 
was convicted of membership in An-Nahda. One man claimed that for 8 
years, the Government refused to issue him a passport because his 
brother was prosecuted for membership in An-Nahda. Human rights 
activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist activists who are 
in jail or living abroad were subjected to police surveillance and 
mandatory visits to police stations to report their contact with 
relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists' relatives were 
members or associates of the outlawed An-Nahda movement and that they 
were correctly subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting membership in 
or association with that organization. The Government also reportedly 
refused to issue passports to the family members of some human rights 
activists, including the wife and children of human rights lawyer Nejib 
Hosni.
    Human rights activists allege that security forces arbitrarily 
imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release 
from prison (see Section 1.d.) and confiscated national identity cards 
from numerous former prisoners. For example, one man claimed that his 
national identity card was confiscated when he left prison in June. A 
credible source claimed that the Government confiscated the national 
identity cards of as many as 10,000 persons who were either former 
prisoners convicted of membership in An-Nahda or relatives of An-Nahda 
members and their sympathizers.
    Police presence is heavy throughout the country and traffic 
officers routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine 
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section 
2.d.). The Government regularly prohibited the distribution of some 
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). The security forces often 
question citizens seen talking with foreign visitors or residents, 
particularly visiting international human rights monitors and 
journalists (see Section 2.a.). For example, police attempted to remove 
one man from a public trial for translating for a foreign observer.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and of the press; however, in practice, the 
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press. The Government 
relies upon direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and 
encourage a high degree of self-censorship. The Government also uses 
the Press Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion 
and defamation, to prosecute individuals who express dissenting 
opinions. In his February 2000 report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Abid 
Hussain stated that the Government ``still has a long way to go to take 
full advantage of its favorable economic context--and in particular the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression,'' and cited concern over 
the State's ``control of the national radio and television broadcasting 
system and the major dailies.'' The Government responded to the Special 
Rapporteur's report in a May/June Jeune Afrique article, stating that 
the Special Rapporteur's report ``infringes on the rules of ethics that 
are supposed to preside over missions executed within the framework of 
special procedures,'' and that ``the contents of the report confirm the 
clear impression, even the certainty, that the Special Rapporteur only 
reproduced allegations propagated by fringe political extremist and 
Islamic fundamentalist parties.'' In a speech before the RCD in July, 
President Ben Ali stated that although the Government must protect the 
right of citizens to hold dissenting opinions, those citizens who 
criticize the country in the international media were ``traitors'' who 
would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
    The Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member 
Mohamed Chouarbi of defamation under the Press Code for photocopying a 
report published by the CNLT (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., and 4). 
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, secretary general of the Democratic Forum, was 
investigated and detained for questioning in August on charges of 
defamation and belonging to an unrecognized organization for a 
communique that he distributed by e-mail, which criticized the 
Government (see Section 4). The criminal investigation of CNLT members 
Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, who were indicted in July 1999 for 
belonging to an illegal organization, remains pending (see Sections 
2.d. and 4). Charges brought against Marzouki in November and December 
1999 for defamation, belonging to an unrecognized organization, causing 
a public disturbance, and dissemination of false information, arising 
out of Marzouki's publishing and distributing two communiques on behalf 
of the CNLT, remained pending at year's end (see Section 4). In a 
separate case, Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year prison term on 
December 30 for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of 
false news for a paper that he wrote for a human rights conference in 
Morocco in September, which criticized the Government's National 
Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency (see Section 4). The 
criminal investigation of ousted MDS president Mohamed Moaada, which 
opened in 1997, is ongoing.
    The Government imposed a media blackout on coverage of student 
protests and related arrests in February and in April (see Section 
2.a.).
    Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including 
several opposition party journals--exist, the Government relies upon 
direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a 
high degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods is ``depot 
legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of 
all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Interior, and 
Ministry of Culture prior to distribution. The Government has not 
permitted the Tunisian Bar Association to publish its internal bulletin 
since July 1999. The Government delayed release from depot legal 
numerous editions of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique for periods of 
up to 9 days, and prohibited the sale of the October 24 issue, which 
contained an article by noted historian and Islamic scholar Mohamed 
Talbi in which Talbi described dissident journalist Taoufik Ben Brik as 
a ``national hero.''
    The Government since 1994 has refused to allow Amnesty 
International's Tunisia chapter to distribute textbooks on human rights 
written for high school students. However, the RSP party's sporadically 
published newspaper issued two editions with critical and extensive 
coverage of human rights issues. In a May statement in Jeune Afrique, 
the Government claimed that depot legal is a ``simple formality to 
preserve national cultural heritage'' and is not at all used to prevent 
all ``undesirable publications.''
    Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications printed 
abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and various ministries prior to their 
public release. While publishers need not wait for an authorization, 
they must obtain a receipt of deposit before distribution. On occasion 
such receipts reportedly are withheld, sometimes indefinitely. Without 
a receipt, publications may not be distributed legally. For example, 
publisher Sihem Bensedrine claimed that she deposited a request for 
publication of Kalima magazine in December 1999 and is still awaiting a 
receipt of filing. The Press Code contains broad provisions prohibiting 
subversion and defamation, neither of which is defined clearly. The 
code stipulates fines and confiscation for failure to comply with these 
provisions. The Government routinely utilized this method to prevent 
distribution of editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that 
contained articles critical of the country. For example, the Government 
prevented distribution of the French publications Figaro and 
L'Observateur, which were embargoed until February. Le Monde, Le Canard 
Enchaine, Le Point, and Liberation, which were banned in October 1999, 
once again were permitted to distribute copies in August. The 
Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Financial Times have been 
banned periodically since the October 1999 elections. The Government 
also reportedly withheld depot legal to remove from circulation books 
that it deemed critical of the Government. In addition the Government 
provided official texts on major domestic and international events and 
reportedly reprimanded publishers and editors for failing to publish 
these statements.
    The Government also relies on indirect methods, such as newsprint 
subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage 
self-censorship in the media. There were credible reports that the 
Government withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues, 
from publications that published articles that the Government deemed 
offensive. According to credible sources, Le Temps and As-Sabbah were 
forced to cease publication for 2 weeks in August due to financial 
problems resulting from the Government's withholding advertising 
orders.
    The Government exerted further control over the media by 
threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing 
permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and 
imposing police surveillance on those who wrote articles critical of 
the Government. Members of the security forces also reportedly 
questioned journalists regarding the nature of press conferences and 
other public functions hosted by foreigners that the journalists 
attended. According to credible sources, the Government throughout the 
year brought correspondents of foreign press services in for 
questioning for attending and reporting on political trials, and for 
writing articles critical of the Government in the foreign press (see 
Section 1.e.). The Government indicted journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in 
April for defamation for publishing articles critical of the Government 
in the foreign press. Charges subsequently were dropped in May after 
Ben Brik held a 6-week hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a., 
and 4). Other journalists active in human rights organizations reported 
that they were under police surveillance for weeks at a time (see 
Section 1.f.). Two journalists reported that they were fired in July 
due to government pressure after they wrote articles that the 
Government deemed offensive.
    On May 23, Le Monde's Tunisia correspondent, Riadh Ben Fadhl, was 
shot twice in the shoulder at 6 a.m., the morning after he published an 
article in Le Monde that was critical of President Ben Ali. The 
official news agency, TAP, reported the shooting in all major 
newspapers in an article that emphasized discrepancies in Ben Fahdl's 
testimony, implying that the shooting was a failed suicide attempt. On 
May 30, President Ben Ali appeared in a front-page photo with Ben 
Fadhl, accompanied by an article in which Ben Fadhl asked the president 
to open an official investigation into the shooting. The Government had 
not announced the result of its investigation by year's end.
    Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the publication associated with 
the outlawed An-Nahda movement, remained in jail, serving sentences 
that were imposed in the early 1990's. The Government maintains that 
the arrests, indictments, and convictions were carried out in full 
accordance with the law.
    Visiting foreign journalists sometimes complain of being followed 
by security officials. The Government confiscated cassette tapes of 
interviews, notebooks, and the address book of French journalist Daniel 
Mermet in February as he was departing the country after a week of 
interviews with members of the human rights community. The Government 
claimed that Mermet had failed to register his materials upon entering 
the country. Reliable sources alleged that plainclothes policemen beat 
French, Algerian, and Moroccan journalists and confiscated cameras and 
film when the journalists attempted to attend a press conference at the 
home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 
1.e., and 1.f.).
    On May 3, for the third year in a row, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists named President Ben Ali as one of its ``10 worst enemies of 
the press.'' In its Report 2000, Reporters Sans Frontieres stated that 
``journalists have adopted a habit of selfcensorship and those who 
venture to be independent pay a high price.'' Both reports focused on 
the presence of a restrictive atmosphere that leads to self-censorship 
and control exercised through advertising revenues. The Tunisian 
Newspaper Association remained expelled from the World Association of 
Newspapers (WAN). The WAN expelled the Association in 1997 for its 
failure to oppose repression of freedom of the press.
    The Government owns and operates the Tunisian Radio and Television 
Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news is taken 
directly from the official news agency, TAP. The Government banned the 
broadcast of the April 8 funeral of former President Habib Bourguiba; 
television and radio stations broadcast foreign soccer games and shows 
about wildlife instead. In May 1998, the ERTT began broadcasting a live 
public debate program entitled ``Face to Face,'' which gave ordinary 
citizens the opportunity to debate public affairs issues with 
government officials. Human rights activists described the program as 
progress toward greater freedom of expression. There are several 
government-owned regional radio stations and one national television 
channel. Bilateral agreements with France and Italy permit citizens to 
receive the French television channel France 2 and the Italian Rai-Uno; 
however, the broadcast of France 2 has remained suspended since October 
1999 because of its critical coverage of the 1999 elections. The 
Government stated that the broadcast was terminated as part of a long-
term plan to provide more broadcast time to Tunisian programming. 
Recent estimates place the number of satellite dishes (which have been 
legal since 1996) in the country at well over 100,000. The Government 
regulates their sale and installation.
    The Government encouraged greater use of the Internet and lowered 
Internet user fees and telephone connection fees again during the year. 
There are no customs duties on computers. By September 1, the 
Government reported that there were 35,000 subscribers (almost three 
times the number reported in 1999) and an estimated 250,000 users of 
the Internet. The Government used the Internet widely, with most 
government ministries and agencies posting information on readily 
accessible web sites. Some previously blocked sites, such as for the 
French journal Le Monde, became available during the year. However, web 
sites containing information critical of the Government posted by 
international NGO's and foreign governments frequently are blocked, 
including a report on Internet use in Tunisia by Human Rights Watch. 
The only two Internet service providers in the country remain under the 
control of the Tunisian Internet Agency, which was created in 1996 and 
which regularly must provide lists of subscribers to the Government. 
Human rights activists allege that the Agency regularly interferes with 
and intercepts their Internet communications. The Press Code, including 
the requirement that advance copies of publications be provided to the 
Government, applies to information shared on the Internet (see Section 
4).
    The Government limits academic freedom. Like journalists, 
university professors indicated that they sometimes practiced self-
censorship by avoiding classroom criticism of the Government or 
statements supportive of the An-Nahda movement. Professors alleged that 
the Government utilized the threat of tax audits, control over 
university positions, and strict publishing rules to encourage self-
censorship. The presence of police on campuses also discouraged 
dissent. A 1996 regulation requires professors to inform the Ministry 
of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the list of 
participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to be 
presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the 
Ministry in advance. In February police arrested secondary school 
students and others demonstrating in the south, and in April 40 other 
secondary students were arrested in Tunis (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government imposes some 
restrictions on this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting, 
rally, or march must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by 
applying no later than 3 days in advance of the proposed event and 
submitting a list of participants. The authorities routinely approve 
such permits for groups that support government positions, but often 
refuse permission for groups that express dissenting views. The 
Government permitted the Tunisia chapter of Amnesty International in 
May to hold a public conference in conjunction with the LTDH, the 
Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), and the Young Lawyers 
Association (AJA) in commemoration of International Freedom of the 
Press Day, to hold a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its 
annual congress in July. However, on two separate occasions in March 
and April, police forcibly broke up a seminar that AI attempted to hold 
in its Tunis headquarters regarding human rights violations in Saudi 
Arabia, physically abusing AI members (see Section 4). The Government 
claimed that AI failed to submit the appropriate request. The 
Progressive Socialist Assembly (RSP) opposition party reported that on 
July 1, it was refused permission to hold a conference on Liberty and 
Democracy at a Tunis hotel; it held the conference at RSP headquarters 
instead. According to the LTDH, secondary students, joined by other 
youths, held strikes during the second week of February in the southern 
towns of Jbeniana, El-Amra, Zarzis, and El-Hamma. The strikes began in 
schools, developed into marches and demonstrations, and in some cases 
resulted in confrontations with security forces. The Government 
reportedly arrested as many as 400 students in connection with the 
demonstrations, including some minors who were placed in juvenile 
detention centers (see Section 1.d.). The LTDH claimed that numerous 
persons reported to the presiding magistrate that they were victims of 
police brutality during detention (see Section 1.c.). Students involved 
in the February demonstrations were charged with damaging property and 
taking part in hostile demonstrations, and received sentences ranging 
from 1 to 6 months. Some were acquitted, nine received presidential 
pardons, and the remaining students served out their sentences. All had 
been released by year's end. The protests and arrests never were 
reported by the press.
    Over a 3-day period in April, the Government arrested a reported 40 
additional secondary-level students, mostly in the greater Tunis area, 
for protesting a communique issued by the Government that announced a 
change in the final exam week schedule. The Government later denied 
that the communique had existed and restored the original exam 
schedule. The students were released several hours later without 
charge. During a March 28 to 29 hunger strike held by Sihem Bensedrine 
and Fatma Ksila at ATFD headquarters to protest the confiscation of 
passports, security officials posing as municipal workers closed off 
the street to traffic and pedestrians, claiming that the building was 
off limits due to a gas leak. The Government also cut off the phone and 
fax lines to ATFD headquarters. Credible sources reported that security 
forces beat university students during pro-Palestinian demonstrations 
in the greater Tunis area in October (see Section 1.c.).
    Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the 
Government restricts this right by barring membership in political 
parties organized by religion, race, or region. On these grounds, the 
Government prosecutes members of the Islamist movement An-Nahda. For 
example, in an April trial, and five September trials, the Government 
indicted an estimated 75 alleged An-Nahda members, most of whom were 
extradited from Libya in 1997 and had been held in pretrial detention 
for over 3 years. In a September 19 trial, the presiding judge indicted 
Ahmed Amari, Yousef Khirri, and Choukri Gargouri on multiple counts of 
the same charge of membership in An-Nahda. The trial ultimately was 
postponed until February 2001 to allow attorneys to interview their 
clients and to have access to the Government's case against the 
defendants. Human rights activists alleged that the Government extended 
its prosecution of Islamist activists to include family members who 
were not politically active (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). A 
criminal investigation against former MDS party leader Mohamed Moaada 
remained open, a result of his alleged 1997 meeting with An-Nahda 
leaders in Europe (see Section 1.e.).
    The Government bans organizations that threaten disruption of the 
public order and uses this proscription to prosecute members of the 
PCOT. In July 1999, the courts convicted 17 students, professors, and 
labor activists of membership in the PCOT. The Government released 16 
of the PCOT members in 1999. The remaining PCOT prisoner, Fahem 
Boukkadous, along with Abdelmounin Belanas, who was convicted of PCOT 
membership in a separate trial in 1999, were released on June 10 after 
holding a 4-week hunger strike. Three other PCOT members, Hamma 
Hammami, Abdeljabbar Madouri, and Samir Taamallah, who were convicted 
and given 9-year sentences in absentia, remain in hiding (see Section 
1.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion. The 
Constitution provides for the free exercise of other religions that do 
not disturb the public order, and the Government generally observes and 
enforces this right; however, it does not permit proselytizing and 
partially limits the religious freedom of Baha'is.
    The Government recognizes all Christian and Jewish religious 
organizations that were established before independence in 1956. 
Although the Government permits Christian churches to operate freely, 
only the Catholic Church has formal recognition from the post-
independence Government. The other churches operate under land grants 
signed by the Bey of Tunis in the 18th and 19th centuries, which are 
respected by the post-independence Government.
    The Government controls and subsidizes mosques and pays the 
salaries of prayer leaders. The President appoints the Grand Mufti of 
the Republic. The 1988 Law on Mosques provides that only personnel 
appointed by the Government may lead activities in mosques, and 
stipulates that mosques must remain closed except during prayer times 
and other authorized religious ceremonies, such as marriages or 
funerals. New mosques may be built in accordance with national urban 
planning regulations but become the property of the State. According to 
human rights lawyers, the Government regularly questioned Muslims who 
were observed praying frequently in mosques.
    The Government allows the Jewish community freedom of worship and 
pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi. It also partially subsidizes 
restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues. In October 1999, 
the provisional Jewish community elected a new board of directors, its 
first since independence in 1956, which is awaiting approval from the 
governor of Tunis. Once approval is obtained from the governor, which 
reportedly is only a formality, the committee is expected to receive 
permanent status. The governor of Tunis still had not granted the 
committee permanent status by year's end. The acting board has changed 
its name to the Jewish Committee of Tunisia. The Government permits the 
Jewish community to operate private religious schools and allows Jewish 
children on the island of Jerba to split their academic day between 
secular public schools and private religious schools. The Government 
also encourages Jewish emigres to return for the annual Jewish 
pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba Synagogue on the island of Jerba.
    The Government regards the Baha'i Faith as a heretical sect of 
Islam and permits its adherents to practice their faith only in 
private. Although the Government permits Baha'is to hold meetings of 
their National Council in private homes, it reportedly has prohibited 
them from organizing local councils. The Government reportedly 
pressures Baha'is to eschew organized religious activities. There are 
credible reports that prominent Baha'is periodically are called in by 
police for questioning. The Government unofficially denied Baha'i 
requests during the year for permission to elect local assemblies. The 
Government also does not permit Baha'is to accept a declaration of 
faith from persons who wish to convert to the Baha'i Faith. There were 
credible reports that four members of the Baha'i Faith were 
interrogated by Ministry of Interior officials in 1999 and pressured to 
sign a statement that they would not practice their religion and would 
not hold meetings in their homes.
    In general the Government does not permit Christian groups to 
establish new churches, and proselytizing is viewed as an act against 
the public order. Foreign missionary organizations and groups do not 
operate in the country. Authorities ask foreigners suspected of 
proselytizing to depart the country and do not permit them to return; 
however, there were no reported cases of official action against 
persons suspected of proselytizing during the year.
    Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools; 
however, the religious curriculum for secondary school students also 
includes the history of Judaism and Christianity. The Zeitouna Koranic 
School is part of the Government's national university system.
    Both religious and secular NGO's are governed by the same law and 
administrative regulations on association that impose some restrictions 
on freedom of assembly. For example, all NGO's are required to notify 
the Government of meetings to be held in public spaces at least 3 days 
in advance and to submit lists of all meeting participants to the 
Ministry of Interior. There were credible reports that two Christian 
religious organizations did not attempt to register because they 
believed that their applications would be rejected, although they were 
able to function freely under the auspices of their respective 
churches. Neither group believed that it was a victim of religious 
discrimination. A third group, composed of foreign Christians mostly 
from Sweden and the United Kingdom, is active in providing medical and 
social services in the city of Kasserine in the west. Despite its 
ambiguous legal status, this group (with 15 to 20 members) reports that 
it has been free to pursue its social and medical work without 
interference and states that it does not believe that it has been 
subject to religious discrimination.
    Religious groups are subjected to the same restrictions on freedom 
of speech and the press as secular groups. Primary among these 
restrictions is ``depot legal,'' the requirement that printers and 
publishers provide copies of all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, 
the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Culture prior to 
publication (see Section 2.a.). Similarly, distributors must deposit 
copies of publications printed abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and 
various ministries prior to their public release. Although Christian 
groups reported that they were able to distribute previously approved 
religious publications in European languages without difficulty, they 
claimed that the Government generally did not approve either 
publication or distribution of Arabic-language Christian material. 
Moreover, authorized distribution of religious publications was limited 
to existing religious communities, because the Government views public 
distribution of both religious and secular documents as a threat to the 
public order and hence an illegal act.
    There was a credible report of a Muslim couple in Bizerte who had 
converted to Christianity, and since 1998 have not been permitted to 
renew their passports as a result of their conversion. Muslim women are 
not permitted to marry outside their religion. Marriages of Muslim 
women to non-Muslim men abroad are considered common-law, which are 
prohibited and thus void when the couple returns to the country. Non-
Muslim women who marry Muslim men are not permitted to inherit from 
their husbands, nor may the husbands and any children (who are 
considered to be Muslim) from the marriage inherit from the non-Muslim 
wife.
    Although civil law is codified, judges are known to override 
codified law with Shari'a (Islamic law) if codified law conflicts with 
Shari'a. For example, codified laws provide women with the legal right 
to custody over minor children; however, judges have refused to grant 
women permission to leave the country with minor children, holding that 
Shari'a appoints the father as the head of the family who must grant 
children permission to travel.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and persons are free to change their place of residence or work 
at will; however, in practice the Government restricts the freedom of 
movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
    Amendments to the passport law in October 1998 transferred power 
for canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts; 
however, the amended law contains broad provisions that permit passport 
seizure on undefined national security grounds and deny citizens the 
right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the 
judges' decision. The Ministry of Interior must submit requests to 
seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the Public Prosecutor to 
the courts.
    The Government arbitrarily withholds passports from citizens (see 
Section 1.f.); however, it issued passports to numerous persons during 
the year who had been denied them in the past. The Government returned 
passports to a number of citizens, including high-profile members of 
the human rights and Islamist communities, such as Sihem Bensedrine, 
Moncef Marzouki, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Radhia Nasraoui, Khemais Ksila, 
Fatma Ksila, Mohamed Hedi Sassi, Iman Darwiche, Radhia Aouididi, Saida 
Charbati, and Rachida Ben Salem (see Sections 1.d. and 4). According to 
reliable sources, there are many others who still have not received 
passports, including human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni, PCOT student 
Nourredine Ben N'tiche, as well as many members of the Islamist 
community. According to credible sources, some political opponents in 
self-imposed exile have been prevented from obtaining or renewing their 
passports in order to return (see Section 1.d.). However, the 
Government stated that it had returned passports to approximately 200 
citizens living abroad (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government restricts internal travel during criminal 
investigations. The Government dropped travel injunctions against human 
rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui, who traveled abroad in June, CNLT member 
Moncef Marzouki, who traveled abroad in June and September, LTDH vice 
president Khemais Ksila, who traveled abroad in June, and CNLT member 
Sihem Bensedrine. In October the Government lifted a court-ordered 
travel injunction from a 1998 criminal indictment on CNLT secretary 
general Omar Mestiri, which had prevented him from traveling outside 
Tunis city limits. The investigation into the 1998 indictment remains 
ongoing. In October Mestiri traveled abroad without hindrance. However, 
Mestiri claimed that upon his return to Tunis in November, customs 
officers searched him and confiscated all the books and documents in 
his possession, including a recently released book on torture in 
Tunisia, published by the Paris-based organization, the Committee for 
the Respect of Human Rights and Freedom in Tunisia (CRDHLT) (see 
Sections 2.a. and 4).
    Police routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine 
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section 
1.f.).
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. The Government 
acknowledged the UNHCR's determination of refugee status, which was 
accorded to 450 individuals during the year. Approximately 20 cases 
await determination by the UNHCR. The Government provides first asylum 
for refugees based on UNHCR recommendations. There is no pattern of 
abuse of refugees. Although a few refugees were deported during the 
year, none were forced to return to countries where they feared 
persecution. The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or 
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the 
President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however, 
there still are some significant limitations on citizens' right to 
change their government. In October 1999, President Ben Ali was 
reelected for a third 5-year term in the country's first multiparty 
presidential elections, winning 99.44 percent of the vote. According to 
the Constitution, this is to be his last term in office. The ruling RCD 
party won all 148 directly elected seats in the legislative elections. 
Observers agree that the outcome of the presidential and legislative 
elections generally reflected the will of the electorate; however, the 
campaign and election processes greatly favored the ruling party and 
there was widespread disregard for the secrecy of the vote. The ruling 
RCD party so dominates all levels of political activity that credible 
electoral challenges have been extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the 
results also reflected the general satisfaction of the vast majority 
with President Ben Ali's rule, which derives in large part from his 
success in promoting economic and social well-being. Opposition 
presidential candidates were allowed to run for the first time and 
opposition parties were able to campaign freely within the limits 
dictated by the Government; however, given the overwhelming dominance 
of the RCD, the playing field for the elections was not level. A 
presidentially appointed independent election monitoring group 
presented a confidential report to the President on the election 
process, which reportedly uncovered numerous irregularities alleged by 
opposition parties. In response, the Government enacted a law in April, 
just before the May municipal elections, that requires voters to bring 
copies of all party ballots (not just the ballot with ruling-party 
candidates) into the voting booth, in order to help preserve the 
secrecy of the vote.
    The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled 
the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the 
Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments. 
The President appoints the Cabinet and the 24 governors. The Government 
and the party are integrated closely; the President of the Republic 
also is the president of the party, and the party's secretary general 
holds the rank of minister.
    The Government amended the Constitution and Electoral Code in July 
1999 to allow party presidents who have been in office for at least 5 
years and whose parties were represented in the 1994 to 1999 Chamber of 
Deputies (and who met other requirements such as those regarding age 
and nationality) to run in the October 1999 presidential elections. 
These criteria were a one-time alternative to the more restrictive 
standing requirement that candidates for president must receive the 
endorsement of 30 sitting deputies or municipal council presidents to 
be eligible to run, and paved the way for the first multiparty 
presidential elections, as Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of 
the Popular Unity Front (PUP), and Abderrahman Tlili, secretary general 
of the Union of Democratic Unionists party (UDU), entered the race. 
Both candidates acknowledged flaws in the Electoral Code and criticized 
the fact that the narrowly written criteria made only two persons 
eligible to run against Ben Ali. At the same time, they stated that 
they wanted to advance pluralism by seizing the opportunity to run. 
However, after the elections, there were opposition complaints that, 
despite some progress in liberalizing the electoral process, problems 
remained, especially with regard to protection of the secrecy of the 
ballot and the accuracy of the vote totals.
    The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a 
counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it serves as an arena in 
which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to 
virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively 
and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies' 
questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy are 
not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber 
has a history of approving all government proposals. The Chamber that 
emerged from the October 1999 parliamentary elections was more 
pluralistic than the Chamber in place from 1994 to 1999, as October 
1998 changes in the Electoral Code reserved 20 percent of the seats for 
the opposition parties, distributed on a proportional basis to those 
parties that did not win directly elected district seats. Five 
opposition parties currently hold 34 of 182 seats, or nearly 19 
percent, compared with 4 opposition parties with 19 of 163 seats, or 12 
percent, in the previous Parliament. The remaining 81 percent of the 
seats were contested in winner-take-all, multiseat district races, in 
which the ruling party won all 148 directly elected seats, up from 144 
in the previous Parliament. Opposition politicians recognized that the 
electoral changes ensured them more seats than they could have won in a 
popular election. However, they also argue that the winner-take-all, 
multi-seat district system permanently favors the RCD and essentially 
freezes the opposition at the 20 percent level.
    All six legally recognized opposition parties fielded parliamentary 
candidates in the October 1999 elections. The Government provided 
public financing to political parties, as called for in legislation 
adopted in 1997. Under the legislation, each party represented in the 
Chamber of Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately 
$54,000 (60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $4,500 (5,000 
dinars) per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing 
that corresponded to the number of district lists that each party 
presented. Opposition politicians argued that the subsidy system 
reinforces the favored position of the ruling party because its 
dominance in the Parliament means that it receives the great majority 
of the government funding. Moreover, with funding based on the number 
of seats in Parliament, the opposition parties had no interest in 
forming coalitions against the RCD, but concentrated instead on 
competing with each other for the largest possible share of the 20 
percent of seats reserved for the opposition. During the elections, 
opposition parties found independent fundraising impossible, and those 
that published newspapers or magazines faced difficulties in obtaining 
paid advertisers.
    In the May municipal elections, the RCD won an overwhelming 
majority nationwide and retained the large majority of seats (and thus 
the mayoralty) in each of 257 municipal councils, although the number 
of opposition seats on the councils also increased significantly. The 
RCD won all seats in the 192 districts where it ran uncontested, and 94 
percent of the 4,128 seats nationwide. Opposition parties and 
independent lists won a total of 243 seats in 60 municipalities, up 
from a total of 10 seats nationwide in the 1996 elections. Opposition 
representation on the councils was enhanced by 1998 Electoral Code 
amendments, which provided that any party winning more than 3 percent 
of the vote in a district would win or share 20 percent of the seats on 
that council.
    Opposition parties noted improvements in the administration of the 
elections and conduct of the campaigns, although some opposition party 
members claimed that they did not receive voting cards from local 
authorities. The RCD campaign was far more restrained than in the 
October 1999 legislative elections, and press coverage of opposition 
parties was broader. The secrecy of the ballot generally was respected 
under a new law requiring voters to enter a voting booth, although some 
problems continued in that regard. While the Government's voter turnout 
estimates appeared to be inflated, the percentages won by opposition 
parties appeared credible, and opposition parties did well in a few 
areas, including traditional RCD party strongholds.
    Women participate in politics, but they are underrepresented in 
senior government positions. Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected in 
October 1999 were women, up from 13 of 163 deputies in the previous 
Chamber. There are four women in the Cabinet: Two full ministers (the 
Minister of Environment and Land Management and the Minister for Women 
and Family Affairs) and two junior ministers (the Secretary of State 
for Housing and the Secretary of State for Public Health).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Tunisian Human Rights League is the most active independent 
advocacy organization, with 41 branches located throughout many parts 
of the country. The organization receives and researches complaints and 
protests individual and systemic abuses. The Government continued to 
maintain the regular contact with the LTDH that it established in 1999. 
Minister of Interior Abdullah Kallel met with LTDH president Taoufik 
Bouderbala and other representatives of the League to address issues 
such as the return of passports and the release of PCOT prisoners 
Abdelmounim Belanas and Fahem Boukkadous (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and 
2.b.). However, LTDH officials reported that the Government still has 
not provided any written responses to LTDH inquiries since 1994.
    Although the Government permitted the League to hold meetings in 
its offices, it continued to place significant obstacles in the way of 
the League's effective operation. LTDH members and other human rights 
activists reported government harassment, interrogation, property loss 
or damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of passports. Several of 
the League's communiques appeared in independent newspapers during the 
year and its 2000 National Congress was discussed in a local weekly 
magazine, Realites, and independent daily journals. In January the LTDH 
hosted human rights training for secondary school teachers in 
conjunction with the Arab Institute for Human Rights. In May the LTDH 
attended a conference on freedom of the press with Amnesty 
International (see Section 2.b). However, in November a Tunis judge 
ordered closed the LTDH headquarters and replaced the newly elected 
board of directors with a judicial administrator pending the hearing of 
a complaint filed by four LTDH members, who claimed that the National 
Congress elections did not follow the League's by-laws and therefore 
were illegal. Since the closure of their headquarters, LTDH members 
claim that they have been under heavy police surveillance and that 
plainclothes police have prevented them from entering private homes, 
public restaurants, and buildings to meet. On December 25, the 
Government held a hearing and postponed the LTDH's civil trial until 
January 2001. On December 25, LTDH vice president Slahedine Jourchi was 
interrogated by the Public Prosecutor regarding a press release he 
published on December 11, but no charges had been filed against him by 
year's end.
    Although LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila was released in 
September 1999, he claims he still is harassed and under constant 
surveillance (see Section 1.f.). In a statement published in the May 
issue of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique, the Government claimed 
that it had completed its investigation of the February 1998 ransacking 
and burglary of the law office of human rights activist Radhia Nasraoui 
and had brought the perpetrators to justice. Human rights activists 
believe that security forces carried out the 1998 ransacking and 
burglary because some of the documents that the Government presented in 
the 1999 PCOT trial were among the documents stolen from Nasraoui's 
office. Although Nasraoui received a 6-month suspended sentence in the 
PCOT trial, she was prevented from leaving the country in May to attend 
an Amnesty International conference in Belgium. The Government claimed 
that she still was under a travel injunction from her 1999 suspended 
sentence. After verifying that Nasraoui's travel injunction had lapsed, 
the Government gave her permission to travel the following day, 
although Nasraoui ultimately decided not to travel because she already 
had missed the conference (see Section 2.d.). Nasraoui was permitted to 
travel out of the country in June.
    The Government continued to refuse to authorize the Tunisian 
National Council for Liberties to register as an NGO. The CNLT 
initially applied for authorization in 1998. The court has not yet 
acted on the March 1999 administrative appeal filed by the CNLT's 
founders. The Government stated that the case was submitted to a court 
of justice, and that the situation requires that the Government leave 
the matter to the judiciary. Although not recognized by the Government, 
the CNLT issued statements criticizing government human rights 
practices. The CNLT published a report in March describing a broad 
range of human rights abuses, and proclaimed 2000 as ``the year for the 
eradication of torture and the conquest of liberty.'' Government 
officials stated that, by publishing communiques in the name of an 
unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated the Publications Code (which 
requires that advance copies be provided to the Government), belonged 
to an illegal organization, and threatened public order. In June the 
Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member Mohamed 
Chouarbi of defamation for reproducing the CNLT's March report. Iheb 
El-Hani, a photocopy shop owner, who also was indicted in case, was 
acquitted of all charges (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and 2.a.).
    There were no developments in the Government's 1999 criminal 
investigation of the leader of the Tunisian Association of Young 
Lawyers for meeting with CNLT members in his office. A court indicted 
both CNLT members Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki in July 1999, and 
Marzouki again in November and December 1999, on several charges, 
including belonging to an illegal organization, violating the 
Publications Code, and spreading false information. There were no 
results during the year in the Government's investigation into the 
charges, and a trial had not begun by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In 
a separate case based on a September indictment, Marzouki was sentenced 
on December 30 to a 1-year prison term for maintaining an illegal 
organization and distribution of false news for writing a paper used at 
a human rights conference held in Morocco that criticized the 
Government's National Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency. 
Marzouki had 10 days to file an appeal of the ruling and had not been 
imprisoned by year's end. Marzouki and CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar, 
both doctors, allege that the Government prohibits them from treating 
patients in retaliation for their human rights activism. In July the 
Minister of Health fired Marzouki from his job as a doctor and 
professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Sousse University. The 
Government claimed that Marzouki submitted a fraudulent medical 
certificate to be excused for time off from his position when he 
traveled abroad in June. Marzouki claimed that he was fired because he 
made statements abroad that were critical of the Government. Marzouki's 
family also claims to have suffered from Marzouki's activism. Security 
police took CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar briefly into custody in 
August for interrogation. The Government also interrogated other 
persons who entered the CNLT headquarters throughout the year. On the 
weekend of December 10, plainclothes police barred entry to CNLT 
headquarters. Omar Mestiri claimed that the police struck lawyers Nejib 
Hosni and Raouf Ayadi in front of the headquarters when they attempted 
to enter.
    The Government issued passports to CNLT members Sihem Bensedrine, 
Moncef Marzouki, and Mustapha Ben Jaafar; however, other CNLT members 
were unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., and 2.d.).
    The Arab Institute for Human Rights, headquartered in Tunis, was 
founded in 1989 by the LTDH, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, 
and the Union of Arab lawyers. It is an information, rather than an 
advocacy, organization, and the Government supports its activities.
    Amnesty International continued to maintain a Tunisian chapter. Its 
members complained that the Tunis office suffered repeated loss of 
telephone and fax service. Persons who were considering joining AI's 
Tunisia chapter report that security officials discouraged them from 
doing so. AI officials reported that they were under periodic police 
surveillance. The Government denied two requests, one in March and 
another in April, for AI to hold a seminar on human rights in Saudi 
Arabia. The Government stated that AI had not submitted the appropriate 
request. On July 11, the Government refused entry to AI researcher 
Donatella Rovera, FIDH president Patrick Baudouin, and France-section 
AI president Hassina Giraud upon their arrival at Tunis-Carthage 
Airport. Although the Government gave no official explanation why the 
three were refused entry, government officials have accused Amnesty 
International of exaggerating reports of human rights violations in 
Tunisia. However, the Government permitted AI to hold a public meeting 
in Tunis in May in celebration of International Freedom of the Press 
Day and a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its annual 
meeting in July (see Section 2.b.). The Government permitted numerous 
foreign members of AI to enter the country and attend the July meeting.
    Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from AI, 
the International Human Rights Federation, and other international 
human rights organizations to monitor trials. The observers reported 
that the Government permitted them to conduct their work freely (see 
Section 1.e.). However, the Government reportedly blocked access to the 
Internet web sites produced by some of these organizations and those 
produced by the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Section 2.a.). 
Human rights activists and lawyers complain of frequently interrupted 
postal and telephone services (see Section 1.f.).
    Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body, 
the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, address and 
sometimes resolve human rights complaints. The Higher Commission 
submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. There is a 
Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, and Relations with the 
Chamber of Deputies, which is within the Prime Minister's office and is 
headed by Minister Afif Hendaoui. The first Minister for Human Rights, 
Daly Jazi, was dismissed on April 5 after less than 5 months in the 
position. The Government gave no reason for Jazi's dismissal. However, 
Jazi subsequently was appointed as an advisor to the President.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights 
and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government 
generally upholds these rights in practice. Legal or societal 
discrimination is not prevalent, apart from that experienced by women 
in certain areas, such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a. 
Shari'a provides that daughters receive only half the amount left to 
sons.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no 
comprehensive statistics to measure its extent. According to one family 
court judge, women file 4,000 complaints of domestic violence each 
year, but later drop approximately half of those complaints. The 
Tunisian Democratic Women's Association operates the country's only 
counseling center for women who are victims of domestic violence. The 
center, located in Tunis, assists approximately 20 women per month. 
Instances of rape or assault by someone unknown to the victim are rare. 
Battered women first seek help from family members. Police intervention 
often is ineffective because police officers and the courts tend to 
regard domestic violence as a problem to be handled by the family. 
Nonetheless, there are stiff penalties for spouse abuse. Both the fine 
and imprisonment for battery or violence committed by a spouse or 
family member are double those for the same crimes committed by an 
individual not related to the victim. Although previously treated as a 
taboo subject by the media, the Government in April presented a 
televised panel discussion on domestic violence and in August President 
Ben Ali ordered an investigation into the extent of domestic violence. 
The Government had not released a report by year's end.
    Women enjoy substantial rights and the Government has made serious 
efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of property-
ownership practices and support to divorced women. The 1956 Personal 
Status Code outlawed polygamy. A 1998 presidential decree created a 
national fund to protect the rights of divorced women, ensuring that 
the State would provide financial support to women whose former 
husbands refused to make child support and alimony payments. The 
Government has processed over 5,600 requests providing divorced women 
over $8 million (11 million dinars) since the fund's inception. 
Legislation requires civil authorities to advise couples on the merits 
of including provisions for joint property in marriage contracts. 
Nonetheless, most property acquired during marriage, including property 
acquired solely by the wife, still is held in the name of the husband. 
Inheritance law, based on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against 
women, and women still face societal and economic discrimination in 
certain areas, such as private sector employment. The Government took 
strong measures to reduce official discrimination, including adding 
equal opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits of all 
governmental entities and state-owned enterprises; however, it did not 
extend such measures to the private sector.
    Women are entering the work force in increasing numbers, employed 
particularly in the textile, manufacturing, health, and agricultural 
sectors. According to 1999 government statistics, women constituted 29 
percent of the work force; there are an estimated 2,000 businesses 
headed by women. Women constitute 37.1 percent of the civil service, 
employed primarily in the fields of health, education, and social 
affairs, at the middle or lower levels. Women constitute 60 percent of 
all judges in the capital and 24 percent of the nation's total jurists. 
Approximately 50.4 percent of university students enrolled in the 1999-
2000 academic year were women. The law explicitly requires equal pay 
for equal work. The Government includes equal opportunity for women as 
a standard part of its audits of all government ministries, agencies, 
and state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, while the rate of 
illiteracy has dropped markedly in both rural and urban areas, the rate 
of female illiteracy in all categories is at least double that of men. 
Among 10- to 14-year-old children, 5.5 percent of urban girls are 
illiterate, compared with 2.2 percent of urban boys, and 27 percent of 
rural girls compared with less than 7 percent of rural boys.
    Several active NGO's focus, in whole or in part, on women's 
advocacy, or research women's issues, and a cadre of attorneys 
represent women in domestic cases. Media attention focuses on women's 
economic and academic accomplishments, and usually omits reference to 
culturally sensitive issues. The Government funded several studies and 
projects designed to improve the role of women in the media. According 
to a government study, women represented 25.2 percent of professional 
journalists in 1998.
    There is a separate Ministry for Women and Family Affairs, with a 
relatively large budget to support its mission to ensure the legal 
rights and improve the socioeconomic status of women. The Government 
supports and provides funding to the National Women's Union, women's 
professional associations, and the Government's Women's Research 
Center.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
public education, which is compulsory until age 16. Primary school 
enrollment for the 1999-2000 scholastic year was slightly less than the 
preceding year's, reflecting a decline in the birth rate; secondary 
school enrollment showed an increase of 8 percent. The Government 
reported that 99.1 percent of children attend primary school full-time. 
The Government offers a maternal and child health program, providing 
prenatal and postnatal services. It sponsors an immunization program 
targeting preschool age children, and reports that over 95 percent of 
children are vaccinated.
    In 1995 the Government promulgated laws as part of a code for the 
protection of children. The code proscribes child abuse, abandonment, 
and sexual or economic exploitation. Penalties for convictions for 
abandonment and assault on minors are severe. There is no societal 
pattern of abuse of children. There is a Ministry for Children and 
Youths and a Presidential Delegate to Safeguard the Rights and Welfare 
of Children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based 
on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and 
private sector jobs be reserved for the disabled. All public buildings 
constructed since 1991 must be accessible to physically disabled 
persons. Many cities, including the capital, have begun to install 
wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. There is a general trend 
toward making public transportation more accessible to disabled 
persons. The Government issues special cards to the disabled for 
benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services, 
preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts.
    Indigenous People.--The Government estimates that the small Amazigh 
(Berber) minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the population. 
Some older Amazighs have retained their native language, but the 
younger generation has been assimilated into Tunisian culture through 
schooling and marriage. Amazighs are free to participate in politics 
and to express themselves culturally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
stipulate the right of workers to form unions. The Tunisian General 
Federation of Labor is the country's only labor federation. About 15 
percent of the work force, including civil servants and employees of 
state-owned enterprises, are members, and a considerably larger 
proportion of the work force is covered by union contracts. There is no 
legal prohibition against the establishment of other labor federations. 
A union may be dissolved only by court order.
    The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the 
Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that 
restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership includes 
persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists 
have been removed from union offices. There are credible reports that 
the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest 
union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While 
regional and sector-specific unions operate with more independence, the 
central UGTT leadership follows a policy of cooperation with the 
Government on its economic reform program.
    Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right 
to strike, provided they give 10 days' advance notice to the UGTT and 
it approves of the strike. However, this advance approval rarely is 
sought in practice. There were numerous short-lived strikes over pay 
and conditions, and over efforts by employers to impede union 
activities. While the majority of these technically were illegal, the 
Government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity, and 
the strikes were covered objectively in the press. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions has characterized the requirement 
for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker rights. The 
law prohibits retribution against strikers, but there have been cases 
of employers punishing strikers nevertheless, which forces the strikers 
to pursue costly and time-consuming legal remedies to protect their 
rights.
    Labor disputes are settled through conciliation panels in which 
labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional 
arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation 
fails.
    Unions are free to associate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in 
practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial 
negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven 
collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the 
private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector 
workforce. Each accord is negotiated by representatives of unions and 
employers in the area the accord encompasses. The Government's role in 
the private sector negotiations is minimal, consisting mainly of 
lending its good offices if talks appear to be stalled. However, the 
Government must approve (but may not modify) the agreements. When 
approved the agreements set standards for all employees, both union and 
nonunion, in the areas that they cover. The UGTT also negotiates wages 
and work conditions of civil servants and employees of state-owned 
enterprises. The Government is the partner for such negotiations. The 
1999 triennial negotiation ended in February 2000. The agreements 
signed provided for annual wage increases ranging from 4 to 6 percent.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. However, 
the UGTT is concerned about antiunion activity among private sector 
employers, especially the firing of union activists and the use of 
temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as 
textiles, hotels, and construction, temporary workers account for a 
large majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary 
workers, but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of 
permanent workers. The 1999 discussions on this issue between the UGTT 
and the Government failed to achieve any results. A committee chaired 
by an officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and including a 
labor representative and an employers' association representative, 
approves all worker dismissals.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor by either adults or children, and it is not 
known to occur. The Government abolished forced and compulsory labor in 
1989.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. The minimum 
age for light work in the nonindustrial and agricultural sectors is 13 
years. The law also requires children to attend school until age 16. 
Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must have 12 hours of rest per 
day, which must include the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Children 
between the ages of 14 and 16 in nonagricultural sectors may work no 
more than 2 hours per day. The total time that they spend in school and 
work may not exceed 7 hours per day. The minimum age for hazardous work 
is 18. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social Affairs examine the records 
of employees to verify that employers comply with the minimum age law. 
Nonetheless, young children often perform agricultural work in rural 
areas and work as vendors in urban areas, primarily during the summer 
vacation from school.
    Observers have expressed concern that child labor continues to 
exist disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft 
industry, and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them 
as household domestics in order to collect their wages. There are no 
reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an 
independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice concluded that 
hiring of underage girls as household domestics has declined with 
increased government enforcement of school attendance and minimum work 
age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the 
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a 
range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a 
commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs, 
Planning, Finance, and National Economy, in consultation with the UGTT 
and the Employers' Association. The President approves the commission's 
recommendations. On May 1, the industrial minimum wage was raised by 
6.32 dinars to $138 (186.992 dinars) per month for a 48-hour workweek 
and $121 (163.798 dinars) per month for a 40-hour workweek. The 
agricultural minimum wage is $4.30 (5.809 dinars) per day. When 
supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage 
provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but 
nothing more, as it covers only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a 
standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour 
rest period per week. The few foreign workers have the same protections 
as citizen workers.
    Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing standards. 
They inspect most firms about once every 2 years. However, the 
Government often encounters difficulty in enforcing the minimum wage 
law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
more than 240,000 workers are employed in the informal sector, which 
falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
    The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for enforcing 
health and safety standards in the workplace. There are special 
government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as mining, 
petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and 
standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in 
those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers are free 
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing 
their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, it prohibits slavery and bonded labor. There were 
no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through 
the country.
                               __________

                          UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

    The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates 
established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions 
or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has 
been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty 
to the tribal leaders. Political leaders in the emirates are not 
elected, but citizens may express their concerns directly to their 
leaders via traditional mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or 
council. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the seven emirate 
rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative 
and executive body. The Council selects a President and Vice President 
from its membership; the President in turn appoints the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. The Constitution requires the Council to meet annually, 
although individual leaders meet frequently in more traditional 
settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-day basis. A 
consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC), consisting of 
advisors appointed by the emirate rulers, has no legislative authority 
but questions government ministers in open sessions and makes policy 
recommendations to the Cabinet. Each emirate retains control over its 
own oil and mineral wealth, some aspects of internal security, and some 
regulation of internal and external commerce. The federal Government 
asserts primacy in matters of foreign and defense policy, some aspects 
of internal security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply 
of some government services. The judiciary generally is independent, 
but its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.
    Each emirate maintains its own independent police force. While all 
emirate internal security organs theoretically are branches of one 
federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable 
independence.
    The UAE has a free market economy based on oil and gas production, 
trade, and light manufacturing. The Government owns the majority share 
of the petroleum production enterprise in the largest emirate, Abu 
Dhabi. The Emirate of Dubai is likewise an oil producer, as well as a 
growing financial and commercial center in the Gulf. The remaining five 
emirates have negligible petroleum or other resources and therefore 
depend in varying degrees on federal government subsidies, particularly 
for basic services such as health care, electricity, water, and 
education. The economy provides citizens with a high per capita income, 
but it is heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least 
80 percent of the general population.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some 
areas and continued to improve in other areas; however, its record was 
poor in other areas, particularly with respect to its denial of 
citizens' right to change their government and its placement of 
limitations on the labor rights of foreign workers. The Government 
denied citizens the right to change their government. The Government at 
times abused persons in custody, denied citizens the right to a speedy 
trial and legal counsel during police investigations, and restricted 
the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion. The 
press continued to avoid direct criticism of the Government and 
exercised self-censorship. Women continue to make progress in education 
and in the work force. In April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued 
a directive allowing for the inclusion of women in the diplomatic 
corps. However, some discrimination against women persists, including 
informal restrictions on their ability to register businesses. The 
Government limits worker rights, and abuse of foreign domestic servants 
is a problem. There were reports of trafficking in persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment, 
and there were no confirmed reports of torture; however, there are 
consistent but unconfirmed reports from foreign prisoners of beatings 
and coerced confessions by police during initial detention. The 
Government conducted internal investigations of these reports, and 
maintained that they were groundless. According to unconfirmed sources, 
in March a Qatari journalist reportedly was subjected to sleep 
deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention after the 
authorities arrested him for publishing a series of satirical columns 
in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    Shari'a (Islamic law) courts frequently impose flogging (except in 
Dubai) on Muslims found guilty of adultery, prostitution, and drug or 
alcohol abuse. In practice flogging is administered in accordance with 
Shari'a in order as to prevent major or permanent injuries. The 
individual administering the lashing swings the whip using the forearm 
only. According to press accounts, punishments for adultery and 
prostitution have ranged from 39 to 200 lashes. Individuals convicted 
of drunkenness have been sentenced to 80 lashes. The federal Supreme 
Court ruled in 1993 that convictions in the Shari'a courts do not 
necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a penalties on non-Muslims, 
but such sentences have been carried out in a few cases.
    In February an Indonesian woman convicted of adultery by the 
Shari'a court in the Emirate of Fujairah, was sentenced to death by 
stoning after she purportedly insisted on such punishment. The sentence 
was commuted on appeal to 1 year in prison, followed by deportation. In 
June 1998, the Shari'a court in Fujairah sentenced three Omani 
nationals convicted of robbery to have their right hands amputated. The 
Fujairah prosecutor's office instead commuted the sentence to a term of 
imprisonment.
    In central prisons that hold long-term inmates, prisoners are 
provided with food, medical care, and adequate sanitation facilities, 
but sleep on slabs built into cell walls or on the floor. Each prisoner 
is provided with four blankets. Only some blocks of the central prisons 
are air-conditioned during the intense heat and humidity of the summer. 
The Government gradually is phasing air conditioning into the prisons. 
Currently, prisoners with medical conditions are placed in 
airconditioned rooms during the summer months. Prisoners not under 
investigation and not involved in drug cases may receive visitors up to 
three times each week and may also make occasional local telephone 
calls. In Dubai Emirate, most prisoners are allowed family visits and a 
number of telephone calls.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment, except in 
accordance with the law, and authorities generally respect these 
provisions in practice. The law prohibits arrest or search without 
probable cause.
    Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests 
within 48 hours to the Attorney General, who must determine within the 
next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention 
pending an investigation. The Attorney General may order that detainees 
be held for up to 21 days without charge. After that time, the 
authorities must obtain a court order for further detention without 
charge.
    Although the code does not specify a right to a speedy trial, 
authorities bring detainees to trial in reasonable time with the 
exception of drug-related cases, for which the authorities must inform 
the Office of the President in the Abu Dhabi Emirate (also known as the 
Diwan) of the charges. Trials may last a substantial period of time, 
depending on the seriousness of the charges, number of witnesses, and 
availability of judges. There is no formal system of bail, but the 
authorities temporarily may release detainees who deposit money or an 
important document such as a passport. The law permits incommunicado 
detention, but there is no evidence that it is practiced. Defendants in 
cases involving loss of life, including involuntary manslaughter, may 
be denied release in accordance with the law. However, bail usually is 
permitted, after a payment of ``diya,'' a form of financial 
compensation for death or injury cases.
    Review of criminal cases by the office of the President in Abu 
Dhabi and bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing them 
sometimes result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary time in 
the central prisons (see Section 1.e.). Some bureaucratic delays have 
kept prisoners incarcerated for as long as several months beyond their 
court-mandated release dates.
    According to unconfirmed sources, in March a Qatari journalist was 
subjected to sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week 
detention after the authorities arrested him for publishing a series of 
satirical columns in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.c. 
and 2.a.).
    The Crown Prince of Dubai in August granted an amnesty for 200 
citizen and 300 foreigner prisoners convicted of drug-related offenses. 
The foreign prisoners were deported upon release. To celebrate the 
success of the surgery performed in August on the President, the ruler 
of the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah ordered the release of 119 prisoners 
who had been convicted on charges relating to financial crimes. The 
release was followed by the issuance of amnesty orders by the ruler of 
Umm Al-Quwain, which allowed for the release of an unspecified number 
of prisoners, and by the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, ordering the release 
of 150 prisoners convicted of financial crimes.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to 
review by the political leadership.
    There is a dual system of Shari'a and civil courts. The civil 
courts generally are part of the federal system and are answerable to 
the federal Supreme Court, located in Abu Dhabi, which has the power of 
judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between 
emirates or between the federal Government and individual emirates. 
Courts and other elements of the judicial system in the Emirate of 
Dubai tend to maintain independence from the federal system.
    The Shari'a courts are administered by each emirate but also must 
answer to the federal Supreme Court. In 1994 the President decreed that 
the Shari'a courts, and not the civil courts, would have the authority 
to try almost all types of criminal cases. The decree did not affect 
the emirates of Dubai and Ras AlKhaimah, which have lower courts 
independent of the federal system. Dubai has a special Shi'a council to 
act on matters pertaining to Shi'a family law (see Section 5).
    Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under 
the new Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to counsel in 
all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment. Only 
the Emirate of Dubai has a public defender's office. If the defendant 
is indigent, the Government will provide counsel. However, in Dubai the 
Government provides indigents counsel only in felony cases. The Supreme 
Court ruled in 1993 that a defendant in an appeals case has a 
``fundamental right'' to select his attorney and that this right 
supersedes a judge's power to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
    The right to legal counsel is interpreted to provide that the 
accused is entitled to an attorney only after the police have completed 
their investigation. Thus, the police may question accused persons--
sometimes for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases--without the benefit 
of legal counsel.
    Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There are no 
jury trials. The number of judges sitting for a case depends on the 
type of crime alleged; three judges normally sit for criminal cases. 
All trials are public, except national security cases and those deemed 
by the judge likely to harm public morality. Most judges are foreign 
nationals, primarily from other Arab countries; however, the number of 
citizens serving as public prosecutors and judges, particularly at the 
federal level, continued to grow.
    Each court system has an appeals process. Death sentences may be 
appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed 
or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for 
criminal offenses in Shari'a courts may receive civil penalties at the 
discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims may 
be overturned or modified by a higher court.
    The Diwan, following the traditional prerogatives of a local ruler, 
maintains the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil 
offenses (such as alcohol use, drug-related cases, firearm use, cases 
involving personal injury, and cases affecting tribal harmony) before 
cases are referred to the prosecutor's office. However, this practice 
is not as prevalent as in past years, and such cases usually are 
referred directly to the prosecutor's office. The Diwan also reviews 
sentences passed by judges and reserves the right to return cases to 
the courts on appeal. The Diwan's involvement leads to long delays 
prior to and following the judicial process, causing prisoners to 
remain in prison after they have completed their sentence. Although 
there are reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in specific 
cases of personal interest, intervention does not appear to be routine.
    The military has its own court system based on Western military 
judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel. 
There is no separate national security court system. In Dubai convicted 
criminals are eligible for executive pardon, often based on 
humanitarian grounds, once they have served at least half of their 
sentence.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without 
the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Only police 
officers and public prosecutors carrying a warrant are permitted entry 
into homes. If the authorities enter a home without a warrant, their 
actions are considered illegal. In an August case in Dubai, a judge 
suppressed evidence that was obtained by police without a warrant. 
Officers' actions in searching premises are subject to review, and 
officers are subject to disciplinary action if they act irresponsibly. 
Local custom and practice place a high value on privacy, and entry into 
private homes without the owner's permission is rare. There is no known 
surveillance of private correspondence. However, foreigners have 
received sealed publications, such as magazines, through the 
international mail in which pictures of the naked human figure have 
been blackened over with a marking pen.
    Family law for Muslims is governed by Shari'a and the local Shari'a 
courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. Such 
a marriage may result in both partners being arrested and tried.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech; however, the Government limits this right in 
practice. Most persons, especially foreign nationals, refrain from 
criticizing the Government in public.
    All published material is subject to Federal Law 15 of 1988, which 
stipulates that all publications, whether books or periodicals, should 
be licensed by the Ministry of Information. The law also governs 
content and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Mindful of these 
provisions, journalists censor themselves when reporting on government 
policy, the ruling families, national security, religion, and relations 
with neighboring states. However, following an October 1999 interview 
with the semiofficial daily newspaper Al-Ittihad, in which Deputy Prime 
Minister Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan stated that uncovering 
inefficiencies in government was one of the duties of the press, 
newspapers began publishing articles critical of alleged inefficiencies 
in the delivery of services by the Ministries of Health, Education, and 
Electricity and Water. In August the English-language daily newspaper 
Gulf News featured a two-part expose on life in the Dubai women's 
central prison. A rare look into a women's correctional facility, the 
series included interviews with citizen and foreign prisoners, 
describing in depth a typical day in the prison. In December a new 
Arabic-language newspaper, Akhbar Al-Arab, owned by a member of the Al-
Nahyan ruling family, was established in Abu Dhabi.
    However, in March the Ministry of Information and Culture filed a 
lawsuit against the Dubai newspaper Gulf News in response to a series 
of sharply satirical columns that it published by Qatari journalist 
Abdul-Wahed Al-Mawlawi, which featured selfdeprecatory humor regarding 
stereotypes of alleged shortcomings of Gulf Arabs. The Government 
considered the articles to be offensive to Gulf citizens in general and 
to the country's citizens in particular. According to unconfirmed 
sources, the Government also arrested AlMawlawi about 1 week after the 
publication of the last of the columns, reportedly subjected him to 
sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention, then 
expelled him to Qatar (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Ministry 
withdrew the lawsuit after the editor of the newspaper agreed to 
publish on the front page of the Gulf News a one-page apology for 
having caused any offense. In September the Government briefly banned 
10 prominent citizens, including 4 university professors, from 
publishing opinion pieces in the country's Arabic- and English-language 
press. The Ministry of Information imposed the ban after the writers 
took up the cause in the press of over 100 employees who had been laid 
off by the government-financed Emirates Media Corporation. No official 
justification was given for the ban, which was lifted against all 10 
citizens by late October.
    In September 1999, Emirates Media, which publishes Al-Ittihad and 
owns Abu Dhabi's radio and television stations, issued a directive 
forbidding all its employees, including journalists, from speaking with 
representatives of foreign diplomatic missions without prior approval. 
Also in 1999, Dubai Emirate announced plans to open a press club as 
part of its effort to promote Dubai as a major regional communications 
hub. The club provides facilities for the international press, 
including access to information, and serves as a site for open 
discussions between political figures and journalists. The country's 
three English-language newspapers are privately owned, as are three out 
of its six Arabic-language newspapers; however, privately owned 
newspapers receive government subsidies. Foreign publications routinely 
are subjected to censorship before distribution.
    All television and radio stations, with the exception of Ajman 
Emirate's local television station, are government owned and conform to 
government reporting guidelines. These unpublished guidelines are not 
always applied consistently. In July 1999, Emirates Media purchased 
Ajman Emirate's satellite television station. Satellite receiving 
dishes are widespread and provide access to international broadcasts 
without apparent censorship. Censors at the Ministry of Information and 
Culture review imported newspapers, periodicals, books, films, and 
videos and ban any material considered pornographic, violent, 
derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain Israeli positions, unduly 
critical of friendly countries, or critical of the Government or the 
ruling families. In June the state telephone and Internet monopoly 
substantially lowered Internet prices for the third time in 3 years and 
sought to encourage greater use of the Internet. The Internet monopoly 
uses a proxy server that appears aimed, in most instances, at blocking 
material regarded as pornographic or as promoting radical Islamic 
ideologies. In most cases, the proxy server does not appear to block 
news services or political expression unrelated to radical Islam, or 
material originating from specific countries. However, the Internet 
monopoly solicits suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable'' 
sites and sometimes has responded by briefly blocking some politically 
oriented sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked. 
In October following the increase in violence in Israel, the West Bank, 
and Gaza, Etislat established a web page depicting images of the dead 
and injured, and containing a discussion forum and bulletin boards, in 
which persons accessing the page could post their opinions.
    The unwritten but generally recognized ban on criticism of the 
Government also restricts academic freedom, although in recent years 
academics have been more open in their criticism. Academic materials 
destined for schools in the country are subject to censorship. At Zayid 
University, the female students are banned from reading texts in which 
the human body is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
tightly restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public 
gatherings require a government permit. Each emirate determines its own 
practice on public gatherings. Some emirates are relatively tolerant of 
seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects. Citizens normally 
confine their political discussions to the numerous gatherings or 
majlis, which are held in private homes. There are no restrictions on 
such gatherings.
    In October the Government issued permits for demonstrations 
throughout the country to protest the Israeli Government's actions 
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the 
fall. These public marches, in which both citizens and foreigners 
participated, were peaceful in nature. Demonstrations, many of which 
were organized by female students, also took place at universities.
    The Government tightly restricts freedom of association. 
Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. All private 
associations, including children's clubs, charitable groups, and hobby 
associations, must be approved and licensed by local authorities; 
however, this requirement is enforced only loosely in some emirates. 
Private associations must follow the Government's censorship guidelines 
if they publish any material.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The federal Constitution designates Islam 
as the official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of 
all seven of the individual emirates of the federal union. The federal 
Constitution also provides for the freedom to exercise religious 
worship in accordance with established customs, provided that it does 
not conflict with public policy or violate public morals, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the 
Government controls all Sunni mosques and prohibits proselytizing.
    Virtually all Sunni mosques are government funded or subsidized; 
about 5 percent of Sunni mosques are entirely private, and several 
large mosques have large private endowments. The federal Ministry of 
Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributes weekly guidance to both Sunni 
and Shi'a sheikhs regarding religious sermons and ensures that clergy 
do not deviate frequently or significantly from approved topics in 
their sermons. All Sunni imams are employees of either the federal 
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs or individual emirate 
ministries. In 1993 the Emirate of Dubai placed private mosques under 
the control of its Department of Islamic Affairs and Endowments. This 
change gave the Government control over the appointment of preachers 
and the conduct of their work.
    The Shi'a minority, which is concentrated in the northern emirates, 
is free to worship and maintain its own mosques. All Shi'a mosques are 
considered private and receive no funds from the Government. The 
Government does not appoint sheikhs for Shi'a mosques. Shi'a Muslims in 
Dubai may pursue Shi'a family law cases through a special Shi'a council 
rather than the Shari'a courts.
    In April the Ras Al-Khaimah Shari'a court ruled that anyone found 
guilty of employing a magician to cast a spell on others would be 
sentenced to death. The ruling followed the sentencing of a citizen to 
4 months' imprisonment for allegedly hiring a magician to cast a spell 
on her former husband and sister.
    The Government does not recognize all non-Muslim religions. In 
those emirates that officially recognize and thereby grant a legal 
identity to non-Muslim religious groups, only a limited number of 
Christian groups are granted this recognition. While recognizing the 
difference between Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant 
Christianity, the authorities make no legal distinction between 
Christian groups, particularly Protestants. Several often-unrelated 
Christian congregations are required to share common facilities because 
of official limitations on the number of Christian denominations that 
are recognized officially. Non-Muslim and non-Christian religions are 
not recognized legally in any of the emirates. Partly as a result of 
emirate policies regarding recognition of non-Muslim denominations, 
facilities for Christian congregations are far greater in number and 
size than those for non-Christian and non-Muslim groups, despite the 
fact that Christians are a small minority of non-Muslim foreigners.
    Major cities have Christian churches, some that were built on land 
donated by the ruling families of the emirates in which they are 
located. In Sharjah a new Catholic church was opened in 1997 and a new 
Armenian Orthodox church in 1998, both with public ceremonies. The 
Government of Dubai Emirate donated a parcel of land in Jebel Ali in 
1998 for the construction of a facility to be shared by four Protestant 
congregations and a Catholic congregation. Also in 1998, land was 
designated in Jebel Ali for the construction of a second Christian 
cemetery, and Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the expansion of 
existing Christian burial facilities. In 1999 land was designated in 
Ras Al-Khaimah Emirate for the construction of a new Catholic church.
    Dubai permits one Hindu temple and two Sikh temples to operate. 
There are no such temples elsewhere in the country. There are no 
Buddhist temples; however, Buddhists, along with Hindus and Sikhs in 
cities without temples, conduct religious ceremonies in private homes 
without interference. In 1998 Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the 
establishment of the country's first Baha'i cemetery. There are only 
two operating cremation facilities and associated cemeteries for the 
large Hindu community, one in Dubai and one in Sharjah. Official 
permission must be obtained for their use in every instance, posing a 
hardship for the large Hindu community, and neither accepts Hindus who 
have died in other parts of the country for cremation or burial. The 
remains of Hindus who die outside Dubai and Sharjah in all cases must 
be repatriated to their home country at considerable expense.
    Non-Muslims in the country are free to practice their religion but 
may not proselytize publicly or distribute religious literature. The 
Government follows a policy of tolerance towards non-Muslim religions 
and in practice interferes very little in the religious activities of 
non-Muslims. Apparent differences in the treatment of Muslim and non-
Muslim groups often have their origin in the dichotomy between citizens 
and noncitizens rather than religious difference.
    The Government permits foreign clergy to minister to foreign 
populations, and non-Muslim religious groups are permitted to engage in 
private charitable activities and to send their children to private 
schools. Apart from donated land for the construction of churches and 
other religious facilities, including cemeteries, non-Muslim groups are 
not supported financially or subsidized by the Government. However, 
they are permitted to raise money from among their congregants and to 
receive financial support from abroad. Christian churches are permitted 
to advertise openly certain church functions, such as memorial 
services, in the press.
    The conversion of Muslims to other religions is regarded with 
extreme antipathy. While there is no law against missionary activities, 
authorities have threatened to revoke the residence permits of persons 
suspected of such activities, and customs authorities have questioned 
the entry of large quantities of religious materials (Bibles, hymnals, 
etc.) that they deemed in excess of the normal requirements of existing 
congregations, although in most instances the questions have been 
resolved and the items have been admitted.
    There have been reports that customs authorities are less likely to 
question the importation of Christian religious items than other non-
Muslim religious items, although in virtually all instances importation 
of the material in question eventually has been permitted.
    Although emirate immigration authorities routinely ask foreigners 
to declare their religious affiliation, the Government does not collect 
or analyze this information, and religious affiliation is not a factor 
in the issuance or renewal of visas or residence permits.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no limitations on freedom of 
movement or relocation within the country, except for security areas 
such as defense and oil installations.
    Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male 
citizens, except those involved in financial disputes under 
adjudication. A husband may bar his wife and children from leaving the 
country. All citizens have the right to return. There is a small 
population of stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the 
country for more than one generation. Many stateless residents are 
originally from Iran and South Asia; other stateless residents include 
Bedouins or the descendants of Bedouins who are unable to prove that 
they are of UAE origin. There is no formal procedure for 
naturalization, although foreign women receive citizenship by marriage 
to a citizen, and anyone may receive a passport by presidential fiat. 
Because they are not of the original tribal groups, naturalized 
citizens may have their passports and citizenship status revoked for 
criminal or politically provocative actions. Such revocations are rare.
    Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing employment. 
However, foreign nationals in specific occupations, primarily 
professional, may not change employers without first leaving the 
country for 6 months. During 1997 in an effort to liberalize employment 
regulations, the federal Government removed the 6month ban from some of 
these professions. Some foreign nationals involved in disputes with 
employers, particularly in cases in which the employee has signed a 
contract containing a clause not to compete, may be blacklisted by the 
employer with immigration authorities, effectively preventing their 
return for a specified period of time.
    The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. It may detain persons seeking 
refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await resettlement 
in a third country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    There are no democratically elected institutions, and citizens do 
not have the right to change their government or to form political 
parties. Although there are consultative councils at the federal and 
emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is in the hands of 
the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers, their extended 
families, and those persons and families to whom they are allied by 
historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most political 
power in their respective emirates. Decisions at the federal level are 
generally made by consensus among the sheikhs of the seven emirates and 
leading families.
    A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council, 
consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of each emirate. The FNC 
has no legislative authority but may question ministers and make policy 
recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions usually are open to the 
public.
    The choice of appointing a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling 
family in consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By 
tradition rulers and ruling families are presumed to have the right to 
rule, but their incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their 
leadership and their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate 
rulers are accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who have a 
problem or a request.
    Tradition rather than the law limits the political role of women. 
Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in 
senior positions. There are no female members of the FNC. In December 
President Zayid's wife, Sheikha Fatima, who is chairwoman of the 
Women's Federation, renewed her call for women to participate in the 
country's political life. In 1998 Sheikha Fatima had announced the 
Government's intention to appoint a number of women as special 
observers at the FNC. These observers are to learn the procedures of 
the FNC, and it is expected that some later may be appointed as 
members. The observers have not been named yet. In a number of press 
interviews, Sheikha Fatima has stated that women participate in the 
preparation of legislation dealing with social issues through 
recommendations made by the Women's Federation, and that women are only 
``steps away'' from full political participation. At the same time, she 
emphasized her view that the eventual appointment of women to the FNC 
and other government positions would be ``a responsibility rather than 
an honor,'' requiring careful prior preparation. Although the small 
Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have 
top positions in the federal Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no independent human rights groups. Government 
restrictions on freedom of the press and public association make it 
difficult for such groups to investigate and publicly criticize the 
Government's human rights restrictions. A human rights section exists 
within Dubai Emirate's police force to monitor allegations of human 
rights abuses. Informal public discussions of human rights, press 
reports of international human rights forums' activities, and media 
coverage of selected local human rights problems, such as foreign 
workers' conditions, are increasing public awareness of human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law with regard 
to race, nationality, religious beliefs, or social status. However, 
there is institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex, 
nationality, and religion.
    Women.--There are reported cases of spousal abuse. Police units are 
stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse may file 
complaints, or attending physicians may call upon the police to 
interview suspected victims of abuse. However, women sometimes are 
reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and economic 
reasons. When abuse is reported to the local police, authorities may 
take action to protect women. The laws protect women from verbal abuse 
or harassment from men, and violators are subject to criminal action. 
There continue to be credible reports of abuse of female domestic 
servants by some local and foreign employers (see Section 6.e.).
    Prostitution has become an increasingly open phenomenon in recent 
years, particularly in Dubai. Although no accurate statistics are 
available, substantial numbers of women appear to be arriving from the 
states of the former Soviet Union for temporary stays during which they 
engage in prostitution and possibly other activities connected with 
organized crime. Substantial numbers of prostitutes also appear to come 
from Africa and Central and South Asia. In 1999 Dubai police 
established special patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes in an 
effort to control the phenomenon. There were credible reports of 
trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
    Women play a subordinate role in this family-centered society 
because of early marriages and traditional attitudes about women's 
duties. There are no legal prohibitions against women owning property 
or businesses; however there are restrictions against female ownership. 
Women must inherit property or businesses from a father or husband, or, 
if unmarried, receive a grant of land from the ruling family in the 
emirate in which they reside. In the case of women who are married, the 
land must be granted to the husbands. Husbands may bar their wives and 
children from leaving the country (see Section 2.d.), and a married 
woman may not accept employment without her husband's written consent, 
although such permission usually is granted. Shari'a, according to the 
Maliki school of jurisprudence, is applied in cases of divorce. Women 
are granted custody of female children until they reach the age of 
maturity and are granted temporary custody of male children until they 
reach the age of 12. If the mother is deemed unfit, custody reverts to 
the next able female relative on the mother's side. A woman who 
remarries may forfeit her right to the custody of children from a 
previous marriage. Shari'a permits polygyny. In November the Government 
issued a new ruling granting a woman a divorce if it can be proved that 
her husband has deliberately stayed away from here for 3 months and has 
not paid for her upkeep, or for the maintenance of her children.
    There are no legal prohibitions against a woman owning her own 
business. Traditionally, professional women, including doctors, 
architects, and lawyers, have not faced restrictions in licensing 
businesses in their names. However, there are credible reports that 
women attempting to license businesses in the import-export sector, 
particularly in the Emirate of Dubai, encounter greater scrutiny than 
men. The Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce operates occasional programs to 
encourage small business entrepreneurship on the part of women. A 
woman's property is not commingled with that of her husband. Women who 
work outside the home do not receive equal benefits, such as housing, 
and may face discrimination in promotion. A draft 1998 law that would 
entitle women to maternity leave of up to 2 months, compared with the 
45 days granted under the current law, has yet to be approved by the 
Government. A number of women's groups have been pressing the 
Government to grant mothers 3 months of maternity leave at full pay and 
to provide day care facilities at the workplace.
    Opportunities for women have grown in government service, 
education, private business, and health services. Women constitute 15 
percent of the national workforce. The federal Government publicly has 
encouraged women to join the work force, ensuring public sector 
employment for all who apply. In April the Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs mandated the employment of women in the diplomatic 
corps. According to the available statistics, women constitute 100 
percent of nursery school teachers, 55 percent of primary school 
teachers, 65 percent of intermediate and secondary school teachers, 
54.3 percent of health care workers, and 39.8 percent of all government 
employees. Women also constitute 4 percent of the military. Cultural 
barriers and the lack of economic necessity have limited female 
participation. A symposium promoting the rights of women in the labor 
force was held in 1996. Participants called for increasing the rights 
granted to women, including the elimination of the requirement that a 
husband give approval before his wife may work.
    Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute 
over 75 percent of the student body at the National University in Al-
Ain, largely because women, unlike men, rarely study abroad. In 1998 
the Government established Zayid University, a second state-run 
university, with campuses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exclusively for 
women. However, academic materials are subject to censorship, and 
female students are banned from reading texts in which the human body 
is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 2.a.).
    Women officially are encouraged to continue their education, and 
government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and 
technical training courses. The federal armed forces accept female 
volunteers, who may enroll in a special training course that was 
started after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College recruits women, 
many of whom are deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's 
prisons. Over 200 women have graduated from the College so far.
    The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government 
may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of 
wedlock. In the event that the courts sentence women to prison for such 
an offense, local authorities, at the request of the prisoner, may hold 
the newborn children in a special areas within the confines of the 
prison or place them with a relative. In rare cases, children are held 
in other facilities until the mother's release. In Dubai Emirate, 
unmarried pregnant women must marry the father of the child; both 
parties are subject to arrest for fornication.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Children who are citizens receive free health care and education, and 
are ensured housing. A family also may be eligible to receive aid from 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters who are 
under the age of 18, unmarried, or disabled. There is no pattern of 
societal child abuse.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no federal legislation 
requiring accessibility for the disabled. However, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs sponsors centers that provide facilities and 
services to the disabled. Services range from monthly social aid funds, 
special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to 
the Special Olympics.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination based on 
national origin, while not legally sanctioned, is prevalent. 
Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as cultural 
attitudes towards foreign workers, are conditioned by national origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--There are no unions and no strikes. 
The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to 
strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk 
deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike.
    Since 1995 the UAE has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does 
not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it 
is not practiced. However, some professional associations are granted 
greater freedom to raise work-related concerns, to lobby the Government 
for redress, or to file a grievance with the Government. Workers in the 
industrial and service sectors normally are employed under contracts 
that are subject to review by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 
The Ministry of Interior's Naturalization and Residency Administration 
is responsible for reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as 
part of residency permit processing. The purpose of the review is to 
ensure that the pay satisfies the employee's basic needs and secures a 
means of living. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers 
must rely on conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs or on special labor courts.
    Labor laws do not cover government employees, domestic servants, 
and agricultural workers. The latter two groups face considerable 
difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve disputes with employers. 
While any worker may seek redress through the courts, this process puts 
a heavy financial burden on those in lower income brackets.
    In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as in the 
rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is illegal. However, some unscrupulous employment agents bring 
foreign workers to the country under conditions approaching indenture. 
There are credible reports that some women from Central Europe and 
Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for service 
sector employment, later are forced into prostitution (see Section 
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and 
generally enforces this prohibition effectively. However, the use of 
small children as camel jockeys is a problem. In September the Abu 
Dhabi police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old 
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in 
Pakistan and brought to the UAE to work as a jockey in camel races. In 
1999 authorities acting on information provided by the Pakistani 
Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who 
allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Police 
reportedly are investigating several such cases; however, to date no 
charges have been filed. There continue to be credible reports that 
hundreds of underage boys from South Asia, mainly between the ages of 4 
and 10, continue to be used as camel jockeys (See Sections 6.d. and 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor regulations prohibit employment of persons under the 
age of 15 and have special provisions for employing those 15 to 18 
years of age. The Department of Labor enforces the regulations. Other 
regulations permit employers to engage only adult foreign workers. In 
1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age of 15 
as camel jockeys and the use of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99 
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these 
rules. However, credible sources report that almost all camel jockeys 
are children under the minimum employment age (see Section 6.f.). 
Relevant labor laws sometimes are enforced against criminal trafficking 
rings, but not against those who own racing camels and employ the 
children, because such owners come from powerful local families that 
are in effect above the law. According to credible sources, there were 
at least 20 cases during the year of underage camel jockeys who were 
repatriated to their countries of origin. In September the Abu Dhabi 
police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old 
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in 
Pakistan and brought to the country to work as a camel jockey. Reports 
of underage camel jockeys continued to surface in the local press 
during the year. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided by 
the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8year-old Pakistani 
boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Also in 
1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh, who had been used as a camel 
jockey, was found wandering in the desert after being abandoned there 
by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the hospitalization 
of a 5-year-old, 44-pound (20-kilogram) abandoned Bangladeshi child who 
had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel. 
Police reportedly are investigating several of these cases; however, no 
charges have ever been filed.
    Otherwise, child labor is not tolerated. The Government prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.c.). The Government does not issue visas for 
foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is compulsory 
through the intermediate levels (approximately 13 to 14 years' old).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or 
administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation. 
However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there 
is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate that would afford a 
worker and family a minimal standard of living. The Labor and Social 
Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve any 
contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage (see Section 
6.b.).
    The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours per day, 6 days per 
week; however, these standards are not enforced strictly. Certain types 
of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer 
than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum 
of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious 
holidays. In addition manual workers are not required to do outdoor 
work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit.
    Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or 
housing allowances, medical care, and homeward passage from their 
employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of 
$1,090 per month (or $817 per month, if a housing allowance is provided 
in addition to the salary) required to obtain residency permits for 
their families. Employers have the option to petition for a 6-month ban 
from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job 
without fulfilling the terms of his contract.
    The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 
municipalities, and civil defense units enforce health and safety 
standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to 
employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is 
entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not observed 
uniformly in the housing camps that are provided for foreign workers. 
Workers' jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what 
they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers who 
were dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the 
right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, who make an effort 
to investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed 
and underbudgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
    Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and 
ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest 
for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries 
reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at 
the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work 
hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that it occurred; 
however, child smuggling, prostitution, and pornography are crimes.
    South Asian boys, generally from Pakistan and Bangladesh, are 
smuggled into the country by small, organized groups to be used as 
camel jockeys. Some of the smuggled children reportedly are kidnaped 
from their families in South Asia, but some apparently are sold to the 
smugglers by their parents. Hundreds of underage camel jockeys 
currently work in the country, many of them in the Abu Dhabi Emirate. 
The largest camel-racing tracks (and associated stables and training 
facilities) are in Al-Ain and Ghantoot in Abu Dhabi. The gangs provide 
the stables with the youths, who generally are between the ages of 4 
and 10. In May local authorities, working on information provided by 
the Pakistani Embassy, broke up a smuggling ring involved in illegally 
transporting underage Pakistani boys into the country to work as camel 
jockeys. Local authorities prosecuted the foreign smugglers in this 
case; however, the authorities did not investigate the citizens 
involved in the scheme. In September the Abu Dhabi police took into 
protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old Pakistani boy who 
allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in Pakistan and brought to 
the country to work as a camel jockey. In November the Abu Dhabi police 
rescued two young Pakistani boys, aged 4 and 6, from an Al-Ain camel 
farm where they had been forced to work as camel jockeys. The boys 
allegedly were kidnapped from Pakistan earlier in the year and 
transported illegally to the country through Iran on forged passports. 
Upon arrival in the country they reportedly were sold to a Pakistani 
agent for $5,500. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided 
by the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old 
Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel 
jockey. Also in 1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh who had been 
used as a camel jockey was found wandering in the desert after being 
abandoned there by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the 
hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 44-pound, abandoned Bangladeshi child 
who had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel 
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
    In 1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age 
of 15 as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99 
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these 
rules. However, few jockeys meet these requirements and relevant labor 
laws, while sometimes enforced against the criminal trafficking rings, 
are not invoked against those who own racing camels and employ the 
children, because such owners come from powerful local families that 
are in effect above the law (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
    Although no accurate statistics are available, substantial numbers 
of women appear to be arriving from the states of the former Soviet 
Union for temporary stays, during which they engage in prostitution and 
possibly other activities connected with organized crime. Substantial 
numbers of prostitutes also appear to come from Africa and Central and 
South Asia. While the vast majority of these women are in the country 
voluntarily, there are credible reports that some women from Central 
Europe and Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for 
service sector employment, later are forced into prostitution. It is 
unclear whether this activity is conducted with the full knowledge of 
the women's citizen sponsors, or whether the women's generally 
noncitizen agents are exploiting the sponsorship system to engage in 
illicit activity (see Section 5).
    In May three Central European women claimed that they were 
recruited to come work in the country in the hotel business. However, 
upon their arrival, their local sponsor seized their passports and 
locked them in a villa with iron gates on the windows. The women claim 
that they then were forced to work as prostitutes. The three women 
eventually escaped and obtained protection at their country's embassy 
in Abu Dhabi. They remained under their embassy's protection for 
approximately 1 month, after which their passports were returned and 
they were permitted to depart the country.
    The Kazakhstan Government reported in June that it broke up a 
trafficking ring that specialized in sending women to the UAE for 
prostitution. Five member of the ring were arrested while trying to 
board a woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai.
                               __________

                                 YEMEN

    The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern) Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody civil war 
in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based 
government. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the leader of the General 
People's Congress (GPC), which dominates the Government. He was elected 
by the legislature to a 5-year term in 1994, and was elected to another 
5-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential 
election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The 
Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote 
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election 
was generally free and fair; however, there were some problems, 
including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition 
the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because 
the candidate selected by the leftist opposition did not receive the 
minimum number of votes required to run from the GPC-dominated 
Parliament (the other opposition party chose not to run its own 
candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole 
opponent was a member of the GPC. The first Parliament elected by 
universal adult suffrage was convened in 1993. Parliamentary elections 
were held again in 1997, with the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), 
formerly the main party of the PDRY and a previous coalition partner of 
the GPC, leading an opposition boycott. The GPC won an absolute 
majority in the 1997 Parliament, with the opposition Islamist and 
tribal Yemeni Grouping for Reform (Islaah) as the only other major 
party represented. International observers judged the elections as 
reasonably free and fair, while noting some problems with the voting. 
The Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive 
authority, although it increasingly demonstrates independence from the 
Government. Real political power rests with the executive branch, 
particularly the President. The judiciary is nominally independent, but 
is weak and severely hampered by corruption, executive branch 
interference, and the frequent failure of the authorities to enforce 
judgments.
    The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security 
Organization (PSO), an independent agency that reports directly to the 
President. The Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police 
reports to the Ministry of Interior and conducts most criminal 
investigations and makes most arrests. The Central Security 
Organization (CSO), also a part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains 
a paramilitary force. The civilian authorities do not maintain 
effective control of the security forces. Members of the security 
forces, particularly the PSO, committed numerous, serious human rights 
abuses.
    Yemen is a very poor country; about 40 percent of the population 
live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy, despite a major 
economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive government 
interference and widespread corruption. Its annual per capita gross 
national product (GNP) fell from $377 in 1997 to $342 in 1998, but rose 
to $368 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22 percent of 
GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for 
approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign 
exchange. Other exports include fish, livestock, coffee, and 
detergents. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab Persian Gulf states) also are important. 
However, remittances were reduced sharply after Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf states expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni workers during the Gulf War 
because of the Government's lack of support for the U.N. coalition. The 
Gulf states also suspended most assistance programs, and much Western 
aid was reduced. Foreign aid has begun to reemerge as an important 
source of income. The unemployment rate is estimated at 35 percent, and 
is highest in the southern governorates, where, prior to unity, most 
adults were employed by the PDRY Government.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in 
some areas and continued to improve its human rights performance; 
however, its record was poor in several other areas, and serious 
problems remain. There are significant limitations on citizens' ability 
to change their government. Security forces committed a number of 
extrajudicial killings. Members of the security forces tortured and 
otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and detain citizens 
arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other persons 
regarded as ``secessionists.'' However, during the year, the Government 
issued directives intended to align the country's arrest, 
interrogation, and detention procedures more closely with 
internationally accepted standards, and such directives generally were 
implemented in practice. Prison conditions are poor, and some detainees 
were held in private prisons not authorized by the Government. However, 
during the year, with the cooperation of the Government, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross conducted a comprehensive 
inspection of the country's prisons. PSO officers have broad discretion 
over perceived national security issues. Despite constitutional 
constraints, security officers routinely monitor citizens' activities, 
search their homes, detain citizens for questioning, and mistreat 
detainees. The Government fails to hold members of the security forces 
accountable for abuses, and there were no convictions of security 
officials for abuses during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention is a 
serious problem, and judicial corruption, inefficiency, and executive 
interference undermine due process. The Government continued to 
implement a comprehensive long-term program for judicial reform. The 
law limits freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government 
frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists. However, 
harassment of journalists lessened during the year. Nonetheless, 
journalists practice self-censorship. The Government at times limits 
freedom of assembly. The Government imposes some restrictions on 
freedom of religion, and places some limits on freedom of movement. The 
Government adopted measures to decentralize government authority by 
establishing locally elected governorate and district councils. In 
February the Government hosted a major symposium of the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights (UNCHR), chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary 
Robinson, on the human rights aspects of international development. The 
Government displayed official receptiveness to and support for donor-
funded democracy and human rights programs. Violence and discrimination 
against women are problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is 
practiced on a limited scale, primarily along the coastal areas of the 
Red Sea. Although the practice is discouraged publicly, the authorities 
do not prohibit it. There is some discrimination against the disabled. 
Discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities is a 
problem. The Government influences labor unions. Child labor is a 
problem.
    There was a significant decrease in the number of kidnapings of 
foreigners, which was at least in part the result of the Government's 
establishment of a special court to try kidnapers and other violent 
offenders. The campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes were little 
more than noise bombs--that had continued for several years, 
particularly in the southern governorates, appears to have abated, 
although there were a few explosions during the year. Observers 
attribute these bombings to tribal disputes, religious extremists, and 
antigovernment political groups based in the country and abroad.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. There were some reports 
during the year that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured 
persons whom they believed were engaging in criminal activity and 
resisting arrest.
    In May security forces killed Ghassan Qasim Mani, a student in Al-
Dalah governorate, during a violent confrontation between security 
forces and armed citizens. Another student and four police officers 
were injured in the confrontation, which occurred while security 
officials were conducting a weapons search in the vicinity of Al-
Jalilah.
    In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in 
a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family 
claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of 
adultery. The director of Ibb security ordered that an autopsy be 
performed and called in the head of AlUdain's security office for 
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she 
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police 
custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of 
complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The 
investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section 
1.c.).
    One police officer was killed and eight others wounded after 
intervening to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in 
Aden governorate; several villagers were wounded, but none were 
reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's death were 
unclear (see Section 1.f.).
    No security officials were tried or convicted for abuses during the 
year.
    In July 1999, a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet governorate convicted 
the town's security chief and two police officers of first-degree 
murder for torturing to death a teenager taken into their custody on 
theft charges in March 1999. All three officials were fired. The 
security chief was sentenced to 10 years in jail and ordered to pay 
$19,000 (3,116,000 riyals) in compensation to the victim's family. The 
two police officers each were sentenced to 5 years in jail.
    There was credible evidence that security forces killed a prisoner 
in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia Al-Shaibani, a 22-year-
old who was arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in Aden, 
apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police 
facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate; they 
claimed that AlShaibani committed suicide. The Human Rights Committee 
of the Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President) in 
1998 investigated Al-Shaibani's death; however, it was unable to 
persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges 
against security officials.
    On October 12, terrorists in a small bomb-laden boat attacked the 
USS Cole, a U.S. naval ship, as it refueled in Aden harbor. The 
explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others. The investigation 
into the attack was ongoing, and 6 suspects were in custody at year's 
end.
    Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses, 
and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained 
limited. In addition, tensions between the Government and various 
tribes periodically escalated into violent confrontations (see Section 
5).
    Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings 
and shootings that occurred during the year. In most cases, it was 
impossible to determine who was responsible for such acts or why they 
occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility. The Government 
accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some incidents, but the 
opposition denied any involvement. Some cases appeared to have 
criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared to be cases 
of tribal revenge or land disputes. In June 1998, the President 
established a committee to study the phenomenon of revenge killings and 
to make recommendations on how to combat the problem. There was no news 
on the committee's work or its findings at year's end.
    In December 1998, a group of 16 Western tourists was kidnaped by 
terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next day, government 
forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue operation. Four of 
the hostages and three of the terrorists were killed. There were 
varying reports as to whether the government forces inadvertently 
killed any of the hostages in the crossfire. However, at least two 
apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers. The Government has 
stated that its decision to intervene was based on its belief that the 
hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial of the four 
surviving terrorists, including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) leader 
Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan), began in January 
1999, and in May 1999 they all were found guilty. Abu Hassan, who 
during his trial publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges 
against him, a second Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian, 
were sentenced to death; the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20 
years' imprisonment. The Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years' 
at the first appellate review, and the Supreme Court in October 1999 
commuted Al-Jundaydi's sentence to 20 years as well. Abu Hassan's death 
sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in October 1999 and approved 
by President Saleh. He was executed by firing squad on October 17, 
1999. There were no allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's 
trial or during the subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven 
additional AAIA members on terrorism charges began in October 1999 and 
ended in June; the group's leader and a second defendant were convicted 
and received jail sentences of 7 and 3 years; the remaining five 
defendants were acquitted (see Section 1.e.).
    b. Disappearance.--Members of the security forces continue to 
arrest and detain citizens for varying periods of time without charge 
or notification to their families. Many detainees are associated with 
the YSP or other opposition parties and are accused of being 
``secessionists.'' Such detentions are temporary; detainees typically 
are released within weeks or, at most, months. Those who are not 
released eventually are charged.
    In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations from the 
UNHRC and Amnesty International visited the country to investigate the 
whereabouts of persons who have ``disappeared'' in custody since 
unification. In 1997 the Government had promised AI that it would look 
into 27 cases of persons who died after they reportedly ``disappeared'' 
while in government custody during the violence associated with the 
civil war in 1994. In its follow-up report issued in July 1999, AI 
criticized the Government for not keeping this promise. The Government 
claims that it responded to AI and passed the results of its 
investigations to the UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was 
inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive action. Both the 
U.N. Committee on Disappearances and AI also continue to allege that 
there are hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the 
preunity period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil 
war. The Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for 
cases that took place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however, 
it has set up a computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations 
to track disappearances, including those dating from the preunity 
period. The Government states that the scarcity of records resulting 
from the country's lack of an effective national registry hindered its 
attempts during the year to create database files, especially for 
persons who disappeared in the PDRY in the 1970's. AI has received no 
credible reports of new disappearances in the last 6 years.
    Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic concerns to 
the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages. 
Foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists are the principal targets. 
During the year, eight foreigners were kidnaped (six men, one woman, 
and one child), as well as a much higher number of citizens. A total of 
159 foreigners have been kidnaped since 1992. The legal magazine Al-
Qistas, in a 1998 study, found that Sana'a, Marib, and Shabwa are the 
areas in which a foreigner is most likely to be kidnaped. Kidnaping 
victims rarely are injured, and the authorities generally have been 
successful in obtaining the negotiated release of foreign hostages. 
However, in June a Norwegian diplomat on vacation was killed near 
Sana'a during an exchange of fire between checkpoint police and his 
abductors.
    There has been a marked decline in tribal kidnapings of foreigners, 
from 13 cases involving 41 persons in 1997 to 10 cases involving 27 
persons in 1998 to 9 cases involving 21 persons in 1999 to 6 cases 
involving 8 persons during the year. Kidnapings had been a persistent 
problem in the past, due to the judiciary's frequent failure to impose 
sentences against accused kidnapers because some persons linked to 
kidnapings were members of prominent tribes or had links with such 
tribes. In most cases, the kidnapings were settled out of court, with 
no suspects facing trial; however, this practice has changed. In August 
1998, the Government issued by presidential decree a law that 
stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital punishment 
for persons involved in kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil 
pipelines, and other acts of banditry and sabotage. In October 1999, 
the Government announced the establishment of a special court in Sana'a 
to implement this law and created a special prosecutor to investigate 
and try those charged under its provisions. In May the court sentenced 
an individual who had kidnaped three German tourists in November 1999 
to 12 years in jail. In June the kidnaper of an American in 1997, and 
later a group of European tourists, received a 20-year sentence; in 
July two additional kidnapers received 15-year jail sentences. The 
arrests, trials, and convictions continue. The Government's prosecution 
of persons charged with kidnaping appears to have had a deterrent 
effect. There were no reports of tribal opposition or interference in 
the arrests or the judicial process connected with these cases.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel 
or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces tortured 
and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting authorities are 
known to use force during interrogations, especially against those 
arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are confined in leg-
irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998 outlawing this 
practice.
    The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place 
but has claimed that the use of torture is not government policy. 
Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to end the 
practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A government 
prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and 
security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue 
force in prisons; a human rights activist has suggested that corruption 
and pressure from superiors to produce convictions also plays a role. 
The immunity of all public employees from prosecution for crimes 
allegedly committed while on duty also hinders accountability; 
prosecutors must obtain permission from the Attorney General to 
investigate members of the security forces, and the head of the Appeals 
Court formally must lift their immunity before they are tried. Low 
salaries for police officers, about $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) 
per month, also contribute to corruption and police abuse.
    In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in 
a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family 
claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of 
adultery. The director of Ibb security directed that an autopsy be 
performed and called in the head of Al-Udain's security office for 
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she 
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police 
custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of 
complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The 
investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section 
1.a.).
    In July 1999, a court convicted three security force officials of 
murder for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.); however, 
there were no reported convictions of security officers for abuses 
during the year. In February Major Hisham Al-Ghazali, the most senior 
of three CID officials convicted of torture in 1998, was reassigned to 
investigative duties. Abdullah Al-Qaradi, the prosecutor for 
investigation and security for Sana'a governorate, objected to the 
reassignment, but he was overruled by the CID's Director General, 
Hussein Ali Haitham.
    In April 1999, Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji Saleh Al-
Khowlani for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring. Al-Khowlani 
was held for 2 months, during which time prison officials reportedly 
tortured him during regular nightly interrogation sessions in which 
officials would attempt to elicit a confession and extract information 
by burning him with a cigarette lighter. A medical report documented 
burn marks and other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body. No action was 
taken during the year to investigate this case.
    The trial of seven alleged members of the AAIA on terrorism 
charges, which began in October 1999, ended in June. The group's 
leader, Saleh Haidara Al-Atwi, and another defendant, Haidara Nasser 
Al-Mashraqi, were sentenced to 7 and 3 years in prison, respectively. 
The remaining five defendants were acquitted. Two of the defendants 
were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution coerced and 
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions 
(see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the 
publication of details about the trial.
    The eight Britons and two Algerians convicted in Aden in August 
1999 of possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to 
commit terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the 
year that they had been tortured; two claimed that they had been abused 
sexually (see Section 1.e.).
    In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in connection with a 
series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they had been 
tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while in 
custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested in 
connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings 
inflicted by security officials. According to eyewitnesses who also 
claimed to have been tortured, Wadia Al-Shaibani was beaten first in a 
criminal security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban 
police facility, where he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No 
charges have been filed against security officials.
    In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were accused of 
conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects 
claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured. 
Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove 
their clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the 
judge to view the films. The judge denied this request. In late October 
1998, the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one 
innocent, and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6 
to 10 years.
    The Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in 
accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been no reports of 
amputations since 1991. However, a small number of persons who have 
been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation remain in jail 
awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The Shari'a-based law 
permits physical punishment such as flogging for some crimes. For 
example, in July two individuals convicted of kidnaping were sentenced 
to 80 lashes (the penalty for the consumption of alcohol) in addition 
to a period of imprisonment because they had been intoxicated during 
the commission of their crime. In Ibb governorate in January, Mohamed 
Tahbit Al-Su'mi, after being tried and convicted, was stoned to death 
for the 1992 rape and murder of his 12-year-old daughter. Capital 
punishment usually is carried out by firing squad; stoning is almost 
unheard of, but was approved in this case due to the unusual brutality 
of the crime. In rare cases involving particularly egregious crimes, 
such as the rape and murder of children, the law permits the ritual 
display in public of the bodies of executed criminals. The ostensible 
purpose of this practice is to demonstrate to the families of victims 
that justice has been served and to prevent blood feuds between tribes.
    Police used excessive force in September when they intervened to 
settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
    Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, causing 
numerous deaths and injuries (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions are poor and do not meet internationally 
recognized minimum standards. Prisons are overcrowded, sanitary 
conditions are poor, and food and health care are inadequate. Inmates 
depend on relatives for food and medicine. Many inmates lack mattresses 
or bedding. Prison authorities often exact money from prisoners and 
refuse to release prisoners until family members pay a bribe. Tribal 
leaders misuse the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in 
jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect 
them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Refugees, 
persons with mental problems, and illegal immigrants sometimes are 
arrested without charge and placed in prisons with common criminals.
    Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, in which children 
likely are to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By custom and 
preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison with their 
mothers. Female prisoners sometimes are subjected to sexual harassment 
and violent interrogation by male police and prison officials. The law 
requires male members of the families of female prisoners to arrange 
their release; however, female prisoners regularly are held in jail 
past the expiration of their sentences because their male relatives 
refuse to authorize their release due to the shame associated with 
their alleged behavior. The Government's Supreme National Committee for 
Human Rights, working with the National Women's Committee, has 
developed a plan to establish a shelter in Sana'a that would house 50 
of these abandoned women and provide them with vocational education. 
The committee is seeking donor assistance and hopes to establish 
additional shelters in other governorates.
    Unauthorized ``private'' prisons are a problem. Most such prisons 
are in rural areas controlled by tribes, and many are simply a room in 
a tribal sheikh's house. Persons detained in such prisons often are 
held for strictly personal or tribal reasons and without trial or 
sentencing. There are credible reports of the existence of private 
prisons in government installations, although these prisons are not 
sanctioned by senior officials. In July Mohamed Naji Alao, a 
parliamentarian and founder of the human rights NGO the Organization 
for the Defense of Human Rights, discovered that several private 
prisons were being operated at government facilities in Sana'a. He 
reported them to the President, who immediately ordered the unlawful 
prisons closed, and the offenders arrested. In April 1999, the chairman 
of the Sana'a governorate prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, 
inspected several illegal prisons operated by the Sana'a governor's 
office and sent his findings to the Attorney General. According to Al-
Shaiba's findings, 19 individuals had been imprisoned beyond their 
legal sentence; several prisoners were being detained in handcuffs 
illegally; numerous individuals were being detained illegally in 
connection with civil or commercial cases or because they had disobeyed 
a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from one region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were 
being detained on the same charge (shooting at a truck). Al-Shaiba 
informed the Attorney General that he had requested then-Sana'a 
governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the illegally imprisoned individuals, 
but that the governor had taken no action. Later that year, Al-Shaiba 
reported being harassed by then-governor Al-Sufi. The Attorney General 
took no action on the findings of the inspection report. Al-Shaiba took 
a voluntary leave of absence from his post, and eventually left the 
country. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post in October 1999, but 
was never charged with a crime (see Section 1.e.).
    During the year, the Government issued directives intended to align 
the country's arrest, interrogation, and detention procedures more 
closely with internationally accepted standards. For example, the 
Ministry of Interior created new detention/interrogation centers in 
each governorate (including four in Sana'a), to prevent suspects from 
being detained with convicted criminals. The Government also formally 
instructed police and prison officials that detainees be provided 
adequate food, that prisoners be released upon completion of their 
sentences, and that juveniles (with the exception of those convicted of 
murder) be incarcerated in facilities separated from adults. In 
addition, the Government created a female police force and developed 
regulatory guidance for their activities to better respond to the needs 
of female prisoners and female victims of crimes. The Government's 
directives generally were implemented in practice.
    In January the Government's Supreme National Committee for Human 
Rights led a government initiative to establish and finance, along with 
private sector contributions, a special ``charity fund'' to be used to 
enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal or Islamic 
law, were being held in prison pending payment of restitution to their 
victims, despite having completed their sentences. The President 
celebrated the Islamic holy month of Ramadan by appointing a high-level 
interministerial committee, chaired by the Minister of Interior, to 
inspect all major prisons in the country, both to identify prisoners 
whom the fund could help and to investigate conditions. The inspection 
committee immediately released persons being held illegally, developed 
recommendations for reform, and arranged for the eventual release of 
over 1,000 prisoners who had been held beyond their sentences (in 
violation of the law) until they could pay restitution. The Human 
Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to conduct spot 
checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious release of persons 
held improperly.
    The Government tightly controls access to detention facilities by 
NGO's, although it sometimes permits local and international human 
rights monitors access to persons accused of crimes. During the year, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the 
Government's full cooperation, conducted a comprehensive inspection of 
the country's major prisons. While serious problems remain, the ICRC 
acknowledged the Government's commitment to penal reform and noted that 
the Government had made significant improvements since the last ICRC 
inspection (in 1995), especially with regard to the incarceration of 
mentally ill persons.
    The PSO does not permit access to its detention centers.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due 
process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and 
detain persons. Enforcement of the law is irregular and in some cases 
nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses. 
According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of 
arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform 
the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is 
required. In no case may a detainee be held longer than 7 days without 
a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal provisions, 
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge are common 
practices. In April Parliament passed a new Police Law, which 
established the mandate, duties, and procedures for police. Draft 
provisions would have permitted police to conduct searches without a 
warrant and to open fire on gatherings of five or more persons if 
police suspected imminent violence or criminal activity. Following a 
campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political parties, 
and the press, Parliament amended the law to remove the provisions.
    In September forces from the CSO used excessive force in attacking 
the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate, reportedly arresting 30 
persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.)
    During the year, journalists continued to be detained briefly for 
questioning concerning articles that they wrote that were critical of 
the Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see Section 
2.a.). However, there was a significant decrease in the number of such 
incidents from the previous year.
    The law provides detainees with the right to inform their families 
of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without an attorney 
present. There are provisions for bail. In practice many authorities 
abide by these provisions only if bribed.
    Defense lawyers claimed that the eight Britons and two Algerians 
arrested in December 1998 for possessing illegal weapons and explosives 
and conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Aden (see Sections 1.c. and 
1.e.) were denied their right to legal counsel. They also contended 
that defense doctors were not permitted to examine their clients in 
order to investigate allegations of torture and sexual abuse. Several 
months after the defense's request, the Government arranged for an 
independent physician to examine those arrested; however, it did not 
allow the defense to observe the examination and did not provide a 
report. The trial concluded in August 1999, although according to the 
law, the violation of the right to counsel should have suspended the 
case. The court sentenced the main suspects to jail terms of 7 and 3 
years, respectively. Five other defendants received jail terms ranging 
from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict. Two of 
the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released for 
time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered released 
for time served. The three returned to the United Kingdom in October 
1999.
    Citizens regularly complained that security officials did not 
observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects, 
particularly those accused of involvement in political violence. There 
also were complaints that private individuals hired lower-level 
security officials to intervene on their behalf and harass their 
business rivals. Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see 
Section 2.b.). In August 1999, then-governor of Sana'a Naji Al-Sufi 
reportedly ordered the arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing 
the opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends. 
In September 1999, he illegally detained judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a 
member of the Sana'a appeals court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.). The 
governor was relieved of his post in October 1999.
    In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security forces 
sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought. The 
detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate 
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the 
court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
    The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners 
are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The Ministry 
of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention facilities. A 
large percentage of the total prison population consists of pretrial 
detainees. There have been allegations that a large number of persons 
have been imprisoned for years without documentation concerning charges 
against them, their trials, or their sentences.
    Aziz Mohamed Musaid, who was arrested in Taiz in September 1998 and 
charged with intent to commit adultery, has not yet been brought to 
trial and remains in prison because the presiding judge, Abdul Jabar 
Taha Al-Kharasani, has refused to adjudicate the case. The charges did 
not appear to be supported by solid evidence, and the local press has 
characterized Al-Kharasani as corrupt. In October 1999, Al-Kharasani 
was ordered by the Minister of Interior to turn over his cases, 
including Musaid's, to another judge, but he has refused to do so.
    While some cases of those being held without charge have been 
redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups and 
government inspection missions (and some illegally detained prisoners 
released), the authorities have not investigated or resolved these 
cases adequately.
    Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas in which 
the Government does not exercise authority effectively. Persons 
detained in these prisons often are held for strictly personal reasons 
and without trial or sentencing (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    The Government does not use forced exile. However, at the end of 
the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior 
leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) 
who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they are 
subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16'' 
concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary 
is not fully independent, and is weak and severely hampered by 
corruption, executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of 
the authorities to enforce judgments. Judges are appointed by the 
executive branch, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed 
from office following rulings against the Government. For example, 
there were credible reports that in 1999 thengovernor of Sana'a Naji 
Al-Sufi repeatedly interfered with and attempted to intimidate members 
of the judiciary, including by assaulting a defense lawyer, detaining 
at least two judges, and harassing the chairman of Sana'a governorate's 
prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, after Al-Shaiba reported to 
the Attorney General that the governor's office was running illegal 
prisons (see Section 1.c.). Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post 
in October 1999, but no legal action was taken against him. Al-Shaiba 
has left the country. Many litigants maintain, and the Government 
acknowledges, that a judge's social ties and susceptibility to bribery 
sometimes have greater influence on the verdict than the law or the 
facts of the case. Many judges are poorly trained, and some closely 
associated with the Government often render decisions favorable to it. 
The judiciary is hampered further by the Government's frequent 
reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal elements sometimes threaten and 
harass members of the judiciary. For example, in August members of the 
Bani Dhubian tribe kidnaped judge Abdu Rahman Abu Taleb, who was 
presiding over a land dispute case involving the tribe.
    There are five types of courts: Criminal; civil and personal status 
(for example, divorce and inheritance); kidnaping/terrorism; 
commercial; and court martial.
    All laws are codified from Shari'a, under which there are no jury 
trials. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge, who plays an active 
role in questioning witnesses and the accused. Under the Constitution 
and by law, the Government must provide attorneys for indigent 
defendants; however, in practice this never occurs. Despite a 
stipulation that the Government provide (and fund) legal aid to 
indigent defendants, the law does not explicitly prohibit trying 
criminal defendants without a lawyer, and the judicial budget currently 
does not allow for defense attorneys. Judges sometimes ``appoint'' 
attorneys present in their courtrooms to represent indigent defendants; 
however, such attorneys are not required legally to take the case, 
although most accept in order to avoid displeasing judges before whom 
they must appear later.
    By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and independent of 
the Government; however, in practice prosecutors look upon themselves 
as an extension of the police. They do not receive the normal judicial 
training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal obligation to 
prosecute police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
    Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the 
court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in commercial 
courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials are public; 
however, all courts may conduct closed sessions ``for reasons of public 
security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in commercial disputes have 
complained of biased rulings. However, some foreign companies have won 
cases against local defendants, and some such decisions have been 
enforced.
    In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal 
adjudication for noncriminal issues, although in practice tribal 
``judges'' often adjudicate criminal cases as well. The results of such 
mediation carry the same if not greater weight as court judgments. 
Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not charged formally 
with a crime but stand publicly accused of their transgression.
    Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in 
southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil war, 
conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female 
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although several female 
judges continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in 
northern courts.
    The Government continued the program it began in late 1997 to 
reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform program is 
intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory 
independence of the judiciary by placing reform-minded personnel into 
the courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform 
project; publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme 
Court smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have 
offered to provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which 
the Government has accepted. While the program has not yet been 
completed, some attorneys cite improvements, including a reduction in 
the number of Supreme Court justices from 90 to 40, an increase in 
judges' salaries in order to deter corruption, an increase in the 
Ministry of Justice's budget, and participation by judges in workshops 
and study tours conducted by foreign judicial officials. However, the 
reform program's effect is not yet clear. In October 1999, the 
Government established a special court to try persons charged with 
kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil pipelines and other acts of 
banditry and sabotage (see Section 1.b.). Several persons tried in this 
special court have received lengthy jail sentences, which appears to 
have had a deterrent effect on tribal kidnapings.
    In February 1999, a U.N. Development Program (UNDP) team visited 
the country to conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis of a 
second judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in January 
and end in 2002. In March 1999, the team noted the Government's 
willingness to address long-standing issues of accountability and 
transparency, and to implement laws more effectively. The program's 
goals are to modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the 
country's legal libraries, provide special training for the Attorney 
General's office, enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and 
secure a building for the Supreme Court. The UNDP continues to seek 
donor funding for the program.
    Another judicial reform program, financed by international 
assistance, was initiated in January and is to last through March 2002. 
The program focuses on the Ministries of Justice and of Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs and is to provide training in business and 
commercial law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education 
curriculum; training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the 
country's commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies. 
The program is ongoing.
    The security services continued to arrest and prosecutors charge 
and try persons alleged to be linked to various shootings, explosions, 
bombings, and other acts of violence. Citizens and human rights groups 
alleged that the judiciary did not observe due process standards in 
these cases.
    Eight Britons and two Algerians who were arrested in December 1998 
were tried from February to August 1999 in Aden on charges of 
possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit 
terrorist acts. The 6-month trial did not meet minimum international 
standards for due process. Defense lawyers claimed that the prosecution 
lacked adequate evidence, and that the defendants were tortured, 
sexually abused, and denied access to their lawyers (see Section 1.c.). 
In August 1999, the court sentenced the main suspects, the 18-year-old 
stepson and 17-year-old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri, to 
jail terms of 7 and 3 years, respectively. The Government has accused 
Al-Masri, head of the London-based organization Supporters of Shari'a, 
of involvement with the AAIA, which has carried out at least one fatal 
terrorist act in Yemen. Five other defendants received jail terms 
ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict. 
Two of the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released 
for time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered 
released for time served in early summer 1999. Their release was 
delayed because both the defense and the prosecution appealed the 
verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the verdicts, and the three were 
released. They returned to the United Kingdom in October 1999.
    The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges, 
which began in October 1999, ended in June. Two were found guilty and 
given jail sentences; the remaining five were acquitted. Two of the 
defendants were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution 
coerced and tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and 
confessions (see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting 
the publication of details about the trial.
    The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners. 
Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally 
accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and 
members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
    At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned nearly all 
who had fought against the central Government, including military 
personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The Government 
denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of whom 
now is presumed dead), who fled abroad. The DRY leaders are subject to 
arrest if they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called ``16'' were 
tried in absentia on various charges, including forming a secessionist 
government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military. All but two 
were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of the 
defendants to death and 3 to 10 years in jail. Six persons received 
suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition figures 
have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received 
sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between the 
north and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial 
system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher 
court, but no judgment has yet been rendered.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government 
interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and 
private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise 
intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such 
activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial 
supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone conversations 
and interfere with the telephone service of government critics and 
opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of suspects (see 
Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings and assemblies 
(see Section 2.b.).
    The law prohibits arrests or the serving of a subpoena between the 
hours of sundown and dawn. However, persons suspected of crimes 
sometimes are taken from their homes in the middle of the night, 
without search warrants.
    In September forces from the CSO used excessive force when they 
intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in the 
Buraiqah district of Aden governorate. The dispute was between a 
businessman, who claimed to have purchased land in the adjacent 
mountains where he had built a quarry, and armed villagers, who claimed 
that they, not the Government, owned the land and were due 
compensation. During an initial confrontation, one police officer was 
killed and eight others wounded; several villagers were wounded, but 
none were reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's 
death were unclear. In response, CSU forces charged the village, 
reportedly arresting 30 persons, mistreating citizens, looting and 
destroying houses, and leaving 200 families homeless.
    Jews traditionally face social (but not legal) restrictions on 
their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
    According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may 
marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5). 
This regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be 
enforced irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised 
concerns about the regulation.
    An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons 
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on 
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions 
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the 
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service 
provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government 
blocks sexually explicit web sites; however, with the exception of 
mowj.com, which is the web site of the Yemeni National Opposition Front 
(MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented web sites. For example, 
Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. The Government 
claims that it does not monitor Internet usage, but some persons 
suspect their e-mail messages are read by security authorities. There 
have been no reports that the Government has taken action against 
Internet users.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution restricts freedom 
of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law,'' and the 
Government influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security 
officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening, 
harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are 
uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and foreign 
policies, some are cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism 
of the Government. The Penal Code criminalizes, with fines and up to 5 
years in jail, ``the humiliation of the State, the Cabinet, or 
parliamentary institutions,'' the publication of ``false information'' 
that ``threatens public order or the public interest,'' and ``false 
stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their 
relations with Yemen.''
    The relative freedom of the press permitted between unification 
(1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished. An 
atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party 
journals continues at a higher level than before the civil war. The 
international human rights group the Committee to Protect Journalists 
continued to criticize the Government for restrictions, harassment, and 
arbitrary detention directed at journalists.
    The Ministry of Information influences the media by its control of 
most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and by its 
ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only one 
newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its own 
press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news 
broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of 
the Government. However, during the 1999 presidential election 
campaign, the media extensively covered both candidates and reported in 
full the many critical comments made by the President's opponent. The 
Government televises parliamentary debates but may edit them 
selectively to remove criticism.
    In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 1990 Press 
Law. The new regulations specify that newspapers must apply annually to 
the Government for licensing renewal, and that they must show 
continuing evidence of about $4,375 (700,000 riyals) in operating 
capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations, saying that 
they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were designed to drive 
some opposition newspapers out of business.
    Although newspapers ostensibly are permitted to criticize the 
Government, journalists sometimes censor themselves, especially when 
writing on such sensitive issues as government policies toward the 
southern governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign 
governments, and official corruption. The penalties for exceeding these 
self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from employment, 
or extrajudicial harassment. Editors-in-chief legally are responsible 
for everything printed in their newspapers, regardless of authorship. 
Some journalists reported being threatened by security officials to 
change the tone and substance of their reporting. Journalists must have 
a permit to travel abroad, although there were no reports that this 
restriction was enforced during the year (see Section 2.d.).
    During the year, journalists continued to be detained for 
questioning for short periods of time for writing articles that were 
critical of the Government or that the Government considered sensitive 
subjects, primarily issues involving Saudi Arabia. However, there was a 
decline in the number of such incidents from the previous year, and 
most individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate agree 
that extralegal governmental harassment is less of a problem now than 
it was in the recent past. Some journalists claim that most harassment 
now comes from the police, in particular the CID, and no longer the 
PSO. Cases and ongoing trials involving journalists often are not 
resolved formally, but rather are settled through unofficial agreements 
between the Government and the journalists.
    Two cases during the year involved articles that criticized the 
Government of Saudi Arabia. In February the Ministry of Information 
filed a lawsuit against Dr. Qasim Sallam, the secretary general of the 
opposition Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the party's newspaper, Al-
Ihya Al-Arabi, for an article Sallam wrote entitled ``The Danger-dom of 
Saudi Arabia,'' which alleged that there were supporters of Israel in 
the Saudi leadership. The case was pending at year's end. In August 
1999, Jamal Ahmed Amer, a journalist for Al-Wahdawi newspaper and 
member of the opposition Nasserist Party, was detained and held 
incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of Yemeni-
Saudi relations. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also was called 
in for questioning. In February Amer was tried and found guilty of 
``harming national interests'' and ``publishing an article not based on 
accurate documents.'' The judge suspended publication of Al-Wahdawi for 
1 month, banned Amer from practicing journalism for 1 year, and fined 
Amer $31 (5,000 riyals). The editors of Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-Arabi 
claimed that the actions taken against them by the Ministry of 
Information were a direct result of pressure by the Government of Saudi 
Arabia. Amer's lawyer appealed the case, which was pending at year's 
end. Amer continued to write for another newspaper, Al-Usbu'. He has 
filed a suit against the Minister of Interior; this suit also was 
pending at year's end.
    In March Ali Al-Sarari, editor-in-chief of the YSP newspaper 
AlThawri, received a suspended 3-month prison sentence for publishing a 
story alleging that two soldiers were being held in the Mukallah 
prosecutors office on attempted rape charges. The Government claimed 
that the story was published to inflame north-south tensions.
    Also in March, a Sana'a court dismissed the cases brought against 
the Ministry of Information by the opposition Islaah, YSP, and 
Nasserist parties. The parties had claimed that the official media had 
neglected to broadcast the final communiques issued at the conclusion 
of their party meetings and conferences in violation of the 
Constitution's provision of equal media time for all political parties. 
The official media provides extensive coverage of the GPC.
    In May a CID officer destroyed journalist Khaled Al-Hammadi's 
camera as he attempted to photograph a student demonstration at Sana'a 
University, despite the fact that he had received permission to cover 
the event.
    Also in May, Hisham Ba Sharahil, the editor of Al-Ayyam, was 
charged with ``instigating the use of force and terrorism'' and 
``publishing false information'' for publishing an interview with 
Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri (see Section 1.e.) in August 1999. 
He also was charged with ``insulting public institutions'' for 
publishing an article critical of the Director of Aden Security. The 
trial was suspended to allow Ba Sharahil to undergo medical treatment. 
In February Ba Sharahil also was called in for questioning in 
connection with an article published in Al-Ayyam criticizing the Aden 
municipal government's allowing the destruction of a building that once 
had been a synagogue. He again was called in for question in April 
following publication in Al-Ayyam of a letter of support for Ba 
Sharahil in his dispute with the Director of Aden Security from the 
secessionist Movement of Self-Determination for South Arabia (HATAM).
    In June Al-Tajammu newspaper and its editor in chief, Abdulrahman 
Abdullah, were tried for an article published in November 1999, which 
accused the Supreme Court of corruption. Abdullah received a 6-month 
suspended sentence, and the newspaper was fined.
    In July security officials detained a journalist for Al-Balagh 
newspaper for 6 days for reporting that an Iraqi teacher had raped six 
female students in Amran governorate's College of Education. The story 
turned out to be false, and the newspaper later apologized for 
circulating it. Also in July, security officials harassed the 
correspondents of the London-based Arabic Sayyidaty and the United Arab 
Emirates-based Sahrat Al-Khalij magazines when they tried to report on 
alleged serial killings at Sana'a University's medical school (see 
Section 5).
    In August Saif Al-Hadhri, the editor in chief of Al-Shumu 
newspaper, was convicted of libel in connection with a series of 
articles reporting high-level corruption in the Ministries of 
Electricity, Agriculture, Education and Finance. The judge fined Al-
Hadhri $437 (70,000 riyals) and suspended him for 7 months. Al-Hadhri 
also was ordered to pay the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education's 
legal fees and $12,500 (2 million riyals) in compensation. Al-Hadhri 
appealed the judgment, and the case was pending at year's end. In July 
Al-Hadhri was abducted from his office for 1 day by 30 armed men, whom 
he claimed were security officials.
    In February 1999, the Ministry of Information closed Al-Shoura, the 
newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular Forces 
(UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper. The 
second version of Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in 
the UPF. Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one newspaper 
to use the same name. Some journalists allege that the Government 
financed the second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to shut down 
the outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court allowed the 
original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the suspension of 
the second Al-Shoura, but an appeals court later ordered the original 
newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's decision as 
to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. The original Al-
Shoura resumed publication in August.
    In August 1999, journalist and lawyer Nabil Al-Amoudi was brought 
before the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article critical of 
the Government and the human rights situation in the country. The case 
still was pending at year's end.
    In August 1999, security officials detained Jamil Al-Samit, a 
journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper Al-Jumhurriyah, for 
writing an article about the use of excessive force by the military in 
putting down a civilian protest in the village of Quradah. He was 
detained in prison for several weeks.
    The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and 
publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September it sponsored 
a symposium on the media and human rights. Critics claim that the 
Syndicate is ineffective because it has too many nonjournalist members 
who support government policy. In 1999 several independent and 
opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the Committee for 
the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of Hisham Ba Sharahil, 
the publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more vigorously 
journalists harassed by the Government.
    Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as 
pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political 
content. In April PSO officials in Taiz detained Faysal Said Fara'a, 
the director of a private cultural center, for a day of questioning 
following his alleged receipt of banned books dealing with the 
opposition. There were no reports during the year that the Ministry of 
Information delayed the distribution of international Arabic-language 
dailies in an effort to decrease their sales in the country, as had 
occurred in previous years. However, authorities monitor foreign 
publications, banning those that they deem harmful to national 
interests. For example in April the owner of a Sana'a bookstore was 
arrested by the PSO for selling banned copies of an edition of the 
London-based Arabic magazine Al-Magalah, which featured a cover story 
on President Saleh's son Ahmed, the Commander of the Republican Guard.
    An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to 
publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process is time-
consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of the book to 
the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read and endorse 
the text. It is then submitted to a special committee for final 
approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the 
Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not 
deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
    An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons 
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on 
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions 
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the 
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service 
provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the web site of the Yemeni 
National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically 
oriented web sites (see Section 1.f.).
    Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the extreme 
politicization of university campuses. A majority of professors and 
students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party or the 
opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the activities of 
the other. Top administrative positions usually are awarded to 
political allies of these two major parties. There were several clashes 
between GPC- and Islaah-affiliated students during the year, but no 
serious violence.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are no 
constitutional restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully; 
however, the Government limited this right in practice. The Government 
claims that it bans and disrupts some demonstrations to prevent them 
from degenerating into riots and violence. The Government requires a 
permit for demonstrations, but it issues them routinely. In August 
police in Aden briefly detained five members of the YSP who convened a 
political meeting without a permit. Government informers monitor 
meetings and assemblies. In September 1998, following violent 
demonstrations earlier that year, the Government sent a draft law to 
Parliament that would impose significant limitations on the right to 
assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by many 
lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The 
Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law. Draft 
provisions of a new Police Law would have permitted police to open fire 
on gatherings of five or more persons if police suspected imminent 
violence or criminal activity; however, the provisions were removed 
after a campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political 
parties, and the press (see Section 1.d.).
    Although it banned a similar demonstration in 1999, in April the 
Government allowed the opposition to organize a rally in Mukallah in 
Hadramaut governorate to commemorate the deaths of the two persons who 
were killed by police during violent demonstrations there in April 
1998. Five thousand persons reportedly attended the rally. Also in 
April, the Government detained 19 opposition activists in Abyan 
governorate for questioning for several days; the opposition claims 
this was done to prevent them from holding a similar rally. In May 
hundreds of persons in Al-Dalah governorate peacefully marched to 
protest Government security policies and to demand an investigation 
into the death of a student during a violent confrontation between 
security forces and armed citizens earlier in the month (see Section 
1.a.). During the year, the opposition organized mass demonstrations in 
Al-Dalah and Lahaj governorates and a number of smaller marches 
throughout the country. In May thousands of students at Sana'a 
University organized a peaceful march to protest the university 
administration's delay in investigating alleged serial killings at the 
medical school (see Section 5). In September 300 women demonstrated in 
Al-Ghaida in Al-Mahra governorate to protest the preface to a book of 
statistics on the governorate written by the governor, which they 
believed contained derogatory comments about residents of the 
governorate. In November an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 citizens, mostly 
women and children, peacefully demonstrated in Sana'a to protest 
Israeli actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza 
during the fall.
    There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom of 
association, and the Government generally respects this right in 
practice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Culture, which usually is 
a routine matter.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares that Islam is 
the state religion and also provides for freedom of religion, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there 
were some restrictions. Followers of other religions are free to 
worship according to their beliefs and to wear religiously distinctive 
ornaments or dress; however, the Government forbids conversions, 
requires permission for the construction of new places of worship, and 
prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. The Constitution states that 
Shari'a is the source of all legislation.
    Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is 
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports 
of cases in which the crime was charged or prosecuted by government 
authorities. In January the director of the Aden office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received a report that a Somali 
refugee, Mohammed Haji, who allegedly had converted from Islam to 
Christianity after his arrival in the country, had been arrested for 
apostasy. The UNHCR's investigation found that the refugee had been 
detained previously by police in Aden and at the UNHCR's Al-Jahin camp. 
The refugee was registered with the UNHCR under a Christian name but 
maintained an address in Sana'a under a Muslim name. He is married to a 
Muslim woman and has an Islamic marriage certificate. The UNHCR 
believed that authorities detained the refugee on criminal rather than 
religious grounds. In August Haji's case was dismissed, and he was 
remanded to immigration detention. Later that month, UNHCR resettled 
Haji and his family to New Zealand.
    Official government policy does not prohibit or provide punishment 
for the possession of non-Islamic religious literature. However, there 
are unconfirmed reports that foreigners, on occasion, have been 
harassed by police for possessing such literature. In addition, some 
members of the security forces occasionally censor the mail of 
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to 
prevent proselytizing.
    There are unconfirmed reports that some police, without the 
authorization or knowledge of their superiors, on occasion have 
harassed and detained persons suspected of apostasy in order to compel 
them to renounce their conversions.
    The Government does not allow the building of new non-Muslim public 
places of worship without permission; however, in 1998 the country 
established diplomatic relations with the Vatican and agreed to the 
construction and operation of a ``Christian center'' in Sana'a. The 
Papal Nuncio, resident in Kuwait, presented his credentials to the 
Yemeni Government in March. Yemen's ambassador to Italy was accredited 
to the Vatican in July 1999. President Saleh paid an official visit to 
the Vatican at the time of his state visit to Italy in April.
    Public schools provide instruction in Islam but not in other 
religions. However, almost all non-Muslims are foreigners who attend 
private schools.
    In February the Government revised its travel regulations to allow 
Yemeni-origin Jews on third-country passports to travel to Yemen, as 
well as Yemeni-origin Israelis with laissez-passer travel documents. 
The first such visitors arrived in March.
    The Government has taken steps to prevent the politicization of 
mosques in an attempt to curb extremism. Private Islamic organizations 
may maintain ties to pan-Islamic organizations and operate schools, but 
the Government monitors their activities.
    Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of 
property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the 
former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious 
organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property. 
However, implementation of the process, including for religious 
institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have 
been returned to any previous owner.
    Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has 
emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who 
remain, although there are traditional restrictions on places of 
residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on 
freedom of movement. In general the Government does not obstruct 
domestic travel, although the army and security forces maintain 
checkpoints on major roads. There were a few reports during the year 
that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they 
believed were engaging in criminal activity and resisting arrest (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man checkpoints 
alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers to 
physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
    The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign travel or the 
right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit 
to travel abroad. There were no reports that the restriction on 
journalists was enforced during the year (see Section 2.a.). Women must 
obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a passport 
or departing the country.
    Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often are 
required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that 
they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
    The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the 
Government continues to grant refugee status on a group basis to 
Somalis who have arrived in Yemen after 1991.
    In 1999 the Government offered asylum to 9,311 Somalis, who fled 
the fighting in that country. This brought the total number of 
registered Somali refugees in the country to 55,186. The Government 
also cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting refugees from Eritrea 
(2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,403 persons) and various other countries 
(362 persons). The Government permitted the UNHCR to monitor the 
situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
    Approximately 32,862 Somali refugees have been integrated into 
society and are no longer receiving food or financial assistance from 
the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for medical treatment at 
UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. In addition, the UNHCR provides 
small loans to refugee women who wish to initiate income-generating 
activities. Somali-language education is provided in urban areas of 
Aden.
    The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to 12,408 
Somalis and Ethiopians in a refugee camp at Al-Jahin in Abyan 
governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are 
eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a new 
UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate; the facility 
still was under construction at year's end. The UNHCR, in coordination 
with the Government, issues identification cards to Somali refugees and 
recognized refugees of other nationalities. The Government has 
developed plans to establish a national refugee commission composed of 
the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the Immigration 
Authority.
    The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it prior to 
returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order to 
avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of 
persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the 
voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well 
as the voluntary return of 1,856 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia 
that are considered safe. Additionally, the UNHCR in Yemen, in 
collaboration with several Western governments, resettles vulnerable 
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizen to Change 
        Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government; however, there are significant limitations in practice. The 
Government by law is accountable to the Parliament; however, the 
Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive 
authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the 
hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In addition, 
the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are 
contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or 
violate the country's international commitments.
    The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the 
Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is elected 
by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993. 
International observers judged the most recent parliamentary elections 
(held in 1997) as ``reasonably free and fair,'' despite some problems 
associated with the voting.
    Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was 
elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct 
presidential election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the 
vote. The Constitution provides that the President be elected by 
popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and 
the election was generally free and fair; however, there were some 
problems, including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In 
addition the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate 
because the candidate selected by the leftist opposition coalition did 
not receive from the GPC-dominated Parliament the minimum number of 
votes required to run (the other opposition party chose not to run its 
own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole 
opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no significant violence 
associated with the election.
    The President has the authority to introduce legislation and 
promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees 
must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In theory if 
a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a decree 
remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by 
Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to 
initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally 
is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has 
submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or blocks draft 
legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the 
President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected 
or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government, 
and on occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament 
also has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including 
the lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998. 
Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions, 
policies, or proposed legislation, although they may and sometimes do 
refuse to appear. Parliamentarians at times are sharply critical during 
these sessions. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff attended 
foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops designed to increase their 
independence and effectiveness.
    The President is advised by the 59-member Consultative Council, a 
board of appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The 
Council advises the President on a range of issues but has no 
constitutional powers.
    Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many 
citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about the inability of 
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions. 
Responding to these concerns, in January the Parliament passed the 
government-submitted Local Authority Law. The new law, considered by 
the Government as an important part of its ongoing democratization 
program, is intended to decentralize authority by establishing locally 
elected district and governorate councils. The councils would be headed 
by government-appointed governors. The first elections for the councils 
were scheduled for February 2001.
    On November 19, Parliament approved several amendments to the 
Constitution, including amendments that would extend the terms of 
Members of Parliament from 4 to 6 years and the President from 5 to 7 
years, allow the President to dissolve Parliament without a referendum 
in rare instances, abolish the President's ability to issue 
parliamentary recess decrees, and transform the Consultative Council 
into a presidentially appointed Shura Council with limited legislative 
and candidate approval powers. The amendments were to be approved in a 
national referendum scheduled for February 2001.
    In some governorates, tribal leaders exercise considerable 
discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central 
government authority in these areas often is weak.
    The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC dominates the 
Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of significance. All 
parties must be registered in accordance with the Political Parties Law 
of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have at least 75 
founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend that they are 
unable to organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal 
requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders. Twelve 
parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in 1993. 
The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997 elections, 
leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same parties also 
boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential election 
in September 1999. There was no significant violence associated with 
this election. Two new parties were established in 1999: The Yemeni 
Green Party and the Union of Democratic Forces.
    The Government provides financial support to political parties, 
including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers. However, the 
YSP claims that the Government has yet to return the assets it seized 
from the party during the 1994 civil war.
    Although women vote and hold office, these rights often are limited 
by cultural norms and religious customs, and women are underrepresented 
in Government and politics. Two women were elected to the Parliament in 
1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing number hold senior 
leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC. Voter 
registration of women is less than half that of men. Many Akhdam, a 
small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves, are 
not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to 
their inability to obtain citizenship. There no longer are any credible 
reports that citizen members of religious minorities are not permitted 
to participate in the political process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is 
relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the years since 
unification. Several groups held workshops and other activities during 
the year without government interference and often with government 
support.
    The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's complain that 
there is a lack of response to their requests from government 
officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in part 
by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the Government 
introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and activities 
of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed to replace, 
the proposal still contains significant limitations on such 
organizations. The Parliament again refused to take any action on the 
proposed new law during the year.
    The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training Center 
(HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected domestic human rights 
NGO, places particular emphasis on education and NGO training. During 
the year, the HRITC sponsored numerous public lectures, training 
workshops, and conferences, and participated in several meetings of the 
international human rights community. The HRITC publishes the quarterly 
human rights journal Our Rights and regularly prints and distributes a 
brochure entitled Know Your Rights. During the year, the HRITC also 
published several works, including a translation of international human 
rights documents and laws, a book on violence against women, and a 
study on the role of women in local NGO's. Several donors have 
supported the HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy, 
coordinated the series of events conducted by Penal Reform 
International from September 1998 to February 1999 (see Section 1.c.). 
The HRITC did not conduct any investigations into alleged human rights 
abuses during the year.
    The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group 
formed in 1999 by attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao, 
discovered that several illegal private prisons were being operated at 
government facilities in Sana'a. He reported them to the President, who 
immediately ordered the unlawful prisons closed and offenders arrested 
(see Section 1.c.).
    The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human 
Rights is based in Aden. Although the organization continued to suffer 
from a lack of funds, it actively publicized human rights abuses, 
particularly in the south, and provided support to new human rights 
NGO's.
    The activities of Al-Nushataa, or The Activists, a group formed in 
1999 by former members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO), 
were limited to organizing a children's parliament, which familiarized 
secondary school children with the country's legislature. The 
activities of the National Center for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development (NCHRDD) were limited to an inspection tour of several 
Sana'a police stations.
    In 1998 and 1999, Penal Reform International (PRI), a London-based 
NGO, conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen and, with the support of 
a foreign embassy and the HRITC, organized prison management training 
workshops for prison and security officials. PRI identified several 
issues of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of 
education and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and 
overcrowded conditions.
    Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the 
European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists observe the 
country closely. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
maintains a resident representative. The Government has given these 
groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee camps, 
and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses that were 
alleged in a 1997 Amnesty International report and rejected other 
allegations. Amnesty International's follow-up report, issued in July 
1999, criticized the Government for not keeping its promise to 
investigate some of these abuses. The Government claims that it 
responded to Amnesty International and passed the results of its 
investigations to the UNCHR, but that the information the organization 
provided was inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive 
action.
    In February the Government hosted a major symposium of the UNCHR, 
chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary Robinson, on the human rights 
aspects of international development. Robinson signed a Memorandum of 
Intent for a technical assistance grant of $300,000, half of which 
would be used to fund a resident UNCHR consultant who, working under 
the umbrella of the UNDP, would serve as an advisor to the Supreme 
National Committee on Human Rights and oversee UNCHR programs in the 
country.
    The YHRO is a local human rights group headquartered in Sana'a, 
with branches in seven other cities. It was founded by the Government. 
Oppositionists as well as some human rights experts have viewed its 
findings as unobjective. The head of the YHRO, a member of the 
judiciary, was transferred from his post as head of the Sana'a Court of 
Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in 1998. This was seen by some 
observers as a demotion or an attempt by the Government to marginalize 
the judge, who was seen as too independent on human rights questions.
    The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which was formed 
in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, is responsible for ensuring that the country meets its 
obligations with respect to implementing international human rights 
conventions and investigating specific instances of abuse. The 
Committee views using education as a means to effect cultural change as 
its highest priority. To this end, it continued during the year to seek 
donor support for a project to incorporate human rights education into 
secondary school curricula and to provide 1-day human rights workshops 
for police officers, which it began in 1999. The committee has been 
less active in investigating specific cases of abuse. Many persons 
alleged that it has not followed up on its stated commitment to 
investigate allegations of human rights violations. For example, the 
committee has not investigated the alleged torture of Naji Saleh Al-
Khowlani during detention by police in Sana'a in 1999 (see Section 
1.c.), and it declined to investigate the case of Wadia Al-Shaibani, 
who reportedly died in late 1997 while in the custody of security 
forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.). In the latter case, it accepted the 
official coroner's report of death by suicide. The committee conducted 
no investigations of alleged human rights violations during the year, 
claiming that it had received no such reports. The committee continues 
to be hampered by a lack of human and material resources.
    However, the committee has been active on prison reform. In January 
it led a government initiative to establish and, with the help of 
private sector contributions, to finance a special ``charity fund'' to 
be used to enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal 
or Islamic law, were being held in prison pending payment of 
restitution to their victims, despite having completed their sentences. 
The committee participated in the subsequent inspections conducted to 
identify prisoners whom the fund could help and to assess prison 
conditions (see Section 1.c.). Working with the National Women's 
Committee, the committee during the year developed a plan to establish 
a shelter in Sana'a that would house and provide vocational education 
for 50 abandoned women. The committee is seeking donor assistance and 
hopes to establish additional shelters in other governorates. In 1999 
following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the committee 
arranged for minors who were incarcerated with adults to be 
incarcerated separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 
18 years old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an 
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend 
school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4). 
The committee also initiated a project, with the support of local 
businessman, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still 
is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory 
(see Section 5).
    In October the Human Rights Committee of the President's 
Consultative Council, in cooperation with the NCHRDD, inspected several 
police stations in Sana'a to determine whether police were following 
proper procedures and to develop recommendations for the Minister of 
Interior on training for police officers. The Committee has had limited 
success in investigating human rights abuses and conducted no other 
investigations during the year.
    The Parliament's human rights committee in the past has 
investigated some reports of human rights abuses, but its activities 
during the year were limited to participating in various prison 
inspections. The committee's chairman claims that he would like to 
increase the activities of the committee, especially in the area of 
press freedoms, but cites lack of official and financial support as 
constraints. The committee has no authority except to issue reports.
    The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior 
parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members, 
but apparently was inactive during the year.
    The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the 
Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices, 
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little 
follow-up to the report.
    Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998. One delegation 
looked into what progress the Government had made on cases of 
``disappearances'' (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted an 
assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance, 
particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general 
rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity, 
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the 
law;'' however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to 
a lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes often 
prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
    Women.--Although spousal abuse reportedly is common, it generally 
is undocumented. Violence against women and children is considered a 
family affair and usually is not reported to the police. In the 
country's traditional society, an abused woman would be expected to 
take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the authorities), 
who should intercede on her behalf or provide her sanctuary if 
required. One survey conducted by Sana'a University and the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice found that nearly 50 percent of the 120 women 
interviewed stated that they had been beaten; 1 in 5 claimed to have 
been threatened with death. Despite the high incidence rates reported, 
only 3 percent of women had ever sought help from an outsider or the 
police. The laws pertaining to violence against women rarely are 
enforced. The only institutionalized aid for victimized women is a 
small battered-women's shelter in Aden. The press and women's rights 
activists only recently have begun to investigate or report on 
violations of women's rights. Violence against women was the subject of 
a women's conference held in Aden in July and of two conferences held 
in 1999, and the issue became a topic of heated public debate following 
rumors of serial killings of female students at Sana'a University's 
medical school. Rumors that 16 women were murdered now appear to be 
unfounded; police believe the Sudanese morgue attendant now on trial 
for the murder of two female students fabricated accounts of having 
killed more. However, the press' extensive coverage highlighted 
authorities' dismissive treatment of the female students' concerns and 
a lack of interest in their security. In May 5,000 students marched to 
protest the university administration's handling of the case (see 
Section 2.b.).
    The Penal Code allows for leniency for persons guilty of committing 
a ``crime against honor,'' a euphemism for violent assaults or killings 
committed against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant 
behavior. Legal provisions regarding violence against women state that 
an accused man should be put to death for murdering a woman. However, a 
husband who murders his wife and her lover may be fined or imprisoned 
for a term not to exceed 1 year. Despite the apparent sanctioning of 
honor killings, most citizens, including women's activists, believe the 
phenomenon is not widespread. Some Western NGO's claim that the 
practice is more prevalent, but admit to a lack of evidence to support 
such claims.
    Women face significant restrictions on their role in society. The 
law, social custom, and Shari'a discriminate against women. Men are 
permitted to take as many as four wives, although very few do so. By 
law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the law largely is not 
enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12. In 1998 some 
conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the ``minimum 
age'' requirement on the grounds that parents should decide when their 
daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law failed by a large 
majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 
also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates that the wife's 
``consent'' to the marriage is required; ``consent'' is defined as 
``silence'' for previously unwed women and ``pronouncement of consent'' 
for divorced women. The husband and the wife's ``guardian'' (usually 
her father) sign the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying 
governorates, the wife also signs. The practice of bride-price payments 
is widespread, despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
    The law provides that the wife must obey the husband. She must live 
with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the 
marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may 
divorce wives without justifying their action in court. A woman has the 
legal right to divorce; however, she must provide a justification, such 
as her husband's nonsupport, impotence, or taking of a second wife 
without her consent. However, the expense of hiring a lawyer is a 
significant deterrent, as is the necessity for rural women to travel to 
a city to present their case. A woman seeking a divorce also must repay 
the mahr (a portion of her bride price), which creates an additional 
hardship. As the mahr usually is in the hands of her family, the 
refusal by a family to pay the mahr effectively can prevent a divorce. 
The family's refusal to accept the woman back into the home also may 
deter divorce, as few other options are available to women. When a 
divorce occurs, the family home and older children often are awarded to 
the husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her father's home or 
to the home of another male relative. Her former husband must continue 
to support her for another 3 months, since she may not remarry until 
she proves that she is not pregnant.
    Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their 
husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. They also are 
expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However, enforcement of 
this requirement is irregular.
    Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or 
Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Yemeni 
women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born 
spouses; however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen 
of foreign-born fathers.
    According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who 
wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry. 
A Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her 
parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes 
to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good 
conduct and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There 
are no corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental 
approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although 
the regulation does not have the force of law and is applied 
irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
    The Government consistently supports women's rights and the 
expansion of the public role of women. The President frequently speaks 
publicly about the importance of women's political participation and 
economic development. In 1999 the Prime Minister mandated that all 
ministries must promote at least one woman to the director general 
level; at year's end, only the Interior Ministry had failed to do so, 
although it had initiated an aggressive campaign to recruit, train, and 
deploy female police officers. Several ministries have a number of 
female directors general. In March the Prime Minister established the 
Supreme Council for Women, an independent governmental body charged 
with promoting women's issues in the Government. With the Government's 
active support, bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-
term (1994-2004) projects worth $31 million (4.96 billion riyals) aimed 
at advancing vocational education and reproductive health for women and 
girls.
    According to the most recent Government statistics (1998), 64.15 
percent of women are illiterate, compared with approximately 31.25 
percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman. Most 
women have little access to basic health care. Only approximately 22 
percent of births are attended by trained health-care personnel. In 
some cases, where clinics are available, women do not use them because 
they are unable to afford them or reach them from their remote 
villages, have little confidence in them, or their male relatives or 
they themselves refuse to allow a male doctor to examine them. Donor-
funded maternal and child health programs attempt to address these 
issues through programs designed to train midwives who serve rural 
populations.
    In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are better 
educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than 
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war, the 
number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not 
only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure 
from the north.
    The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
independent women's association, promotes female education and civic 
responsibility through seminars and workshops and by coordinating 
donors' programs. The committee's chairwoman sits on the Prime 
Ministerial Supreme Council for Women. There are a number of recently 
formed NGO's working for women's advancement, including the Social 
Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational 
development for women; the Women and Children's Department of the 
Center for Future Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes 
studies on women and children; the Woman and Child Development 
Association, which focuses on health education and illiteracy; and the 
Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, which provides microcredit 
and vocational training to women.
    Children.--While the Government has asserted its commitment to 
protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure 
adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children. The 
UNDP estimates that 30 percent of children are malnourished. The infant 
mortality rate in 1999 was 75 deaths per 1,000 births, down from 105 
per 1,000 in 1998. Male children receive preferential treatment over 
female children; after the age of 1, male children have a 12 percent 
greater chance of survival than females, a result of the comparative 
neglect of female children.
    The law provides for universal free education for 9 years, which is 
compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many children, 
especially girls, do not attend primary school. Education for females 
is not encouraged in some tribal areas, where girls often are kept home 
to help their mothers with child care, housework, and farm work. 
According to UNICEF's ``Report on Children and Women in Yemen: 1998,'' 
an estimated 45 percent of primary-school-age children (ages 6 to 15) 
do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools for their 
school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance at 
school, the Government passed a law that eliminated school fees and the 
requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report, 
enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998. 
Enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because increasing numbers of 
older boys from poor families left school to work.
    In 1999 following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the 
Supreme National Committee for Human Rights arranged for minors who 
previously had been incarcerated with adults to be incarcerated 
separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years 
old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an orphanage 
run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend school and 
participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4). The 
Committee also initiated a project, with the support of local 
businessmen, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still 
is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory 
(see Section 4).
    Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires 
that a girl be 15 to marry, the law is not enforced, and marriages of 
girls as young as age 12 occur.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced by some citizens. According to a 
1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government, nearly one-fourth 
(23 percent) of women who have ever been married have been subjected to 
FGM. However, the prevalence of the practice varies substantially by 
region. Citizens of African origin or those living in communities with 
heavy African influence are more likely to practice FGM. For example, 
according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of women living in 
coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15 percent in 
mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert regions. 
The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with infibulation being 
practiced only among East African immigrants and refugees. FGM rarely 
is reported among Shaf'ai Sunnis, and the Zaydi Shi'a reputedly do not 
practice it at all. The Government's publication of the data on FGM was 
an important first step in addressing this problem; however, while some 
government health workers and officials actively and publicly 
discouraged the practice, the Government has not proposed legislation 
to outlaw it nor have local women's groups adopted the problem as a 
major concern.
    In January the Prime Minister established the Higher Council of 
Motherhood and Childhood (HCMC), a semi-autonomous inter-ministerial 
entity responsible for formulating policy and programs to improve the 
status of children. The HCMC participates in the World Bank's Child 
Development Program and the Arab Council for Childhood and 
Development's program for street children.
    People with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical 
disabilities face distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination 
in education and employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance 
of disabled students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and 
required that schools be made more accessible to disabled students; 
however, it is unclear to what extent these laws have been implemented. 
There is no national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for 
the disabled. Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support 
themselves. During the year, donors financed the establishment of three 
new schools for the disabled in Taiz governorate. Mentally ill 
patients, particularly those who commit crimes, are imprisoned and even 
shackled when there is no one to care for them. Persons with mental 
problems sometimes are arrested without charge and placed in prisons 
alongside criminals (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC, in cooperation with 
the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built and now staffs separate 
detention facilities for mentally disabled prisoners. These facilities 
are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and Taiz, and collectively are able to care 
for a population of 300 persons.
    The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO involved in 
assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in 13 
governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the Swedish 
organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the 
Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance 
and vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities 
for disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three 
teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the 
Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women 
were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society, 
activists in 1998 established with government support the Challenge 
Society. The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the 
ages of 6 and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational 
training. In March three disabled teenagers toured the country on 
specially adapted bicycles and, supported by the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports and private sector contributions, took their bike tour to 
several Arab countries.
    Religious Minorities.--Apart from a small but undetermined number 
of Christians and Hindus of South Asian origin in Aden, Jews are the 
only indigenous religious minority. Their numbers have diminished 
significantly--from several tens of thousands to a few hundreddue to 
voluntary emigration over the past 50 years. Although the law makes no 
distinction, Jews traditionally are restricted to living in one section 
of a city or village and often are confined to a limited choice of 
employment, usually farming or handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real 
property.
    Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed 
in teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the 
security authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail, 
ostensibly to prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.).
    In July 1998, a gunman killed three nuns belonging to the Sisters 
of Charity order in Hodeidah. The Government took swift action and 
immediately arrested the individual. The Government determined that he 
was deranged and committed him to a psychiatric institution.
    A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has experienced 
occasional harassment from local Islamic extremists who feared that the 
hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There have been no 
reports of threats of violence by extremists in several years.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens with a noncitizen 
parent, called ``muwalladin,'' sometimes face discrimination in 
employment and in other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a 
University or admission to the military academy by law must demonstrate 
that they have two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government 
officials, including members of Parliament and ministers, have only one 
Yemeni parent. In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent 
is sufficient to overcome the ``two-Yemeni-parent'' requirement.
    A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient 
Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen who later were enslaved, are considered 
the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants), they live 
in squalor and endure persistent social discrimination. Beginning in 
September 1999, the Government's Social Fund for Development (SFD) 
initiated a program for ``special needs groups,'' which focused 
particularly on the Akhdam. During the year, the SFD conducted an 
education project for Akhdam children in Hodeidah governorate, provided 
support to an NGO conducting field research on Akhdam needs in Sana'a 
governorate, and improved the quality of the water supply and built two 
classrooms for the Akhdam community in Taiz governorate.
    There have been reports by human rights groups that some immigrants 
of African origin have difficulty in securing Interior Ministry 
permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation 
requires that marriages of citizens and foreigners be approved in 
advance by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
    Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the 
Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for 
kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited. In 
January 22 persons were killed and 35 injured in tribal disputes in 
Shabwa and Al-Baida governorates. In one incident, 10 persons were 
killed and 3 injured when a fight at school between 2 children from 
different tribes escalated into violence. In another incident, a member 
of the Ba Haider tribe killed a fellow tribesman in retaliation for the 
killing of his father 20 years ago. The Nehm and Al-Haymah tribes also 
are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several persons have 
been killed. In February tribesmen from the Nehm blocked the Sana'a 
Highway, opening fire on and killing three of the police officers 
dispatched to dismantle the roadblock. Up to 16 persons reportedly were 
killed in the ensuing fighting. The Deputy Governor of Sana'a was shot 
to death in August in what police believe was a tribally related 
revenge killing. Tensions, which periodically escalate into violent 
confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan and 
other tribes in Marib governorate.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that 
citizens have the right to form unions; however, this right is 
restricted in practice. The Government seeks to place its own personnel 
in positions of influence inside unions and trade union federations. 
The 1995 Labor Law (amended in 1997) provides both for the right to 
form unions and for the right to strike.
    The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains the sole 
national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000 members in 15 
unions and denies any association with the Government, although it 
works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes through 
negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely would not 
tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation unless it 
believed such an establishment to be in its best interest.
    By law civil servants and public sector workers, and some 
categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the General 
Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions. The law provides equal labor 
rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of workers to associate. 
The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum membership for unions, nor 
does it limit them to a specific enterprise or firm. Thus, citizens may 
associate by profession or trade.
    Strikes are not permitted unless a dispute between workers and 
employers is ``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a prior attempt must have 
been made to settle through negotiation or arbitration). The proposal 
to strike must be submitted to at least 60 percent of all concerned 
workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor of the proposal. 
Permission to strike also must be obtained from the YCLU. Strikes for 
explicit ``political purposes'' are prohibited. In practice the law 
tends to discourage strikes.
    There were several small strikes during the year. In February a 
group of school teachers in Taiz governorate struck for a day because 
they had not received their January salaries. Also in February, Sana'a 
municipality garbage collectors struck for a day, demanding payment of 
overdue wages and a salary increase. In June the staff of Sana'a 
University struck for a week to demand an increase in their salaries 
and overdue bonus payments. In August the staff of Al-Thawra public 
hospital in Sana'a struck for 10 days for higher wages. In September 
workers at the Yemen Hunt Oil Company in Marib governorate struck for a 
wage increase. There were no reports of violence in connection with 
these strikes.
    The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions 
and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995 Labor 
Law provides workers with the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. The Government permits these activities; however, it 
seeks to influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and 
organizations. All collective bargaining agreements must be deposited 
with and reviewed by the Ministry of Labor, a practice criticized by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO). Agreements may be 
invalidated if they are ``likely to cause a breach of security or to 
damage the economic interests of the country.'' Despite these 
restrictions, several such agreements exist in fact. Unions may 
negotiate wage settlements for their members and may resort to strikes 
or other actions to achieve their demands. Public sector employees must 
take their grievances to court.
    The law protects employees from antiunion discrimination. Employers 
do not have the right to dismiss an employee for union activities. 
Employees may appeal any disputes, including cases of antiunion 
discrimination, to the Ministry of Labor. Employees also may take a 
case to the Labor Arbitration Committee, which is chaired by the 
Ministry of Labor and also consists of an employer representative and a 
YCLU representative. Such cases often are disposed favorably toward 
workers, especially if the employer is a foreign company.
    There are no export processing zones in operation; an EPZ is 
planned for Aden.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of its 
practice. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children 
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is common, especially in rural areas. Many 
children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the 
poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in stores 
and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law does not 
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the private 
sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit, children between 
the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government rarely enforces these 
provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The Government also 
does not enforce laws requiring 9 years of compulsory education for 
children, and many school-aged children work instead of attending 
school, particularly in areas where schools are not easily accessible.
    The results of the 1994 national census showed that 231,655 
children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all 
children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the 
number has increased since 1994.
    After the Government ratified the ILO's Convention 182 on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor in July, the Consultative Council adopted the 
ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems. 
A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses 
the strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing 
child labor laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
    In June the Ministry of Labor signed a $1.3 million agreement with 
the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor 
(IPEC). Under the program, the Ministry will establish a child labor 
department, train teachers to make school curricula more relevant to 
rural children, mobilize media to discuss child labor, establish a 
microenterprise program to help families establish businesses that will 
allow their children to stay in school, and seek the support of civil 
society to remove children from hazardous jobs. In addition the 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs has developed a plan to 
establish six centers for street children over the next 5 years.
    The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in the major 
population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack the resources 
to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However, since a great 
percentage of the country's underage work force is in the agricultural 
sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the Government to 
protect most child workers.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum 
wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall 
not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker 
should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.'' 
According to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil 
servants is approximately $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) per month. 
Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, earn a far 
higher wage. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. A combination of inflation and the loss 
of government-provided subsidies continued to erode wages.
    The law specifies a maximum 48-hour workweek with a maximum 8hour 
workday, but many workshops and stores operate 10- to 12hour shifts 
without penalty. The workweek for government employees is 35 hours: 7 
hours per day Saturday through Wednesday.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for regulating workplace 
health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for regulating 
occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but enforcement is 
weak to nonexistent. Many workers regularly are exposed to toxic 
industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
owned companies as well as major Yemeni manufacturers implement higher 
health, safety, and environmental standards than the Government 
requires. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous 
work situations and may challenge dismissals in court.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               SOUTH ASIA

                              ----------                              


                              AFGHANISTAN

    Afghanistan \1\ continued to experience civil war and political 
instability for the 21st consecutive year. There was no functioning 
central government. The Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic 
movement known as the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of 
the country, including the capital of Kabul, and all of the largest 
urban areas, except Faizabad. A Taliban edict in 1997 renamed the 
country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah 
Omar as Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. There is a six-
member ruling council in Kabul, but ultimate authority for Taliban rule 
rested in Mullah Omar, head of the inner Shura (Council), located in 
the southern city of Kandahar. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani 
claimed to be the head of the Government, controlled most of the 
country's embassies abroad, and retained Afghanistan's United Nations 
seat after the U.N. General Assembly again deferred a decision on 
Afghanistan's credentials during the September General Assembly 
session. Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood, both 
Tajiks, also maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik territory 
in the country's northeast. Masood's forces were within rocket range of 
Taliban-held Kabul until late July 1999, but since then the Taliban has 
pushed them back, capturing large areas. In 1999 the Taliban summer 
offensive pushed Masood's forces out of the Shomali plain, north of 
Kabul. Towards the middle of June, the Taliban resumed its offensive, 
and captured the northeastern city of Taloqan. Commander Masood and 
commanders under the United Front for Afghanistan (UFA), also known as 
the Northern Alliance, continue to hold the Panjshir valley and 
Faizabad. The U.N. Secretary General's Personal Representative to 
Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell engaged in extensive discussions with 
various Afghan parties and interested nations throughout the year, but 
there has been little visible progress in ending the conflict. A group 
of representatives from the six nations bordering Afghanistan plus the 
United States and Russia met several times during the year to explore 
ways to end the conflict. During the year, a process to convene a Loya 
Jirga, or Grand Assembly of traditional leaders, which was focused 
around former King Zahir Shah and based in Rome, slowly began to gather 
support. Other initiatives, such as the Bonn process and the Cyprus 
process, began to cooperate with the Rome-based initiative. A number of 
provincial administrations maintained limited functions, but civil 
institutions were rudimentary. There is no countrywide recognized 
constitution, rule of law, or independent judiciary. In 1999 the 
Taliban claimed that it was drafting a new constitution based on 
Islamic law, but during the year there were no further announcements 
regarding a constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ *The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons 
since January 1989. Information on the human rights situation is 
therefore limited. This report focuses on the over 90 percent of the 
country under Taliban control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Taliban remained the country's primary military force. Taliban 
and members of other warring Afghan factions committed numerous serious 
human rights abuses in areas they occupied.
    Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, was 
the mainstay of the economy. For the second year in a row, the country 
was the largest opium producer in the world. The agriculture sector 
suffered a major setback due to the country's worst drought in 30 
years. Experts estimate that the drought may affect more than half of 
the population, with 3-4 million severely affected. The drought has 
affected all areas of the country, causing an increase in internal 
displacement, loss of livestock, and loss of livelihood. The crop loss 
in some areas was estimated to be 50 percent. Approximately 80 percent 
of the livestock of the Kuchi nomads reportedly has perished, and the 
Argun reservoir which supplied water to 500,000 farmers and to Kandahar 
has run dry, as have 8 rivers in the region. In addition to the 
drought, the agricultural sector continues to languish because of a 
lack of resources and the prolonged civil war, which have impeded 
reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads, and 
replanting of orchards in some areas. The presence of millions of 
landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country has restricted 
areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who are needed 
to rebuild the economy. Trade was mainly in opium, fruits, minerals, 
and gems, as well as goods smuggled to Pakistan. There were rival 
currencies, both very inflated. Formal economic activity remained 
minimal in most of the country, especially rural areas, and was 
inhibited by recurrent fighting and by local commanders' roadblocks in 
non-Taliban controlled areas. The country also is dependent on 
international assistance. Per capita income, based on World Bank 
figures, is about $280 per year. Reconstruction was continuing in 
Herat, Kandahar, and Ghazni, areas that are under firm Taliban control. 
Areas outside of Taliban control suffered from brigandage.
    The overall human rights situation remained extremely poor, and the 
Taliban continued to commit numerous serious and systemic abuses. 
Citizens were unable to change their government or choose their leaders 
peacefully. The Taliban carried out summary justice in the areas they 
controlled, and reportedly were responsible for political and other 
extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, summary 
executions, and deaths in custody. There were allegations that Taliban 
forces were responsible for disappearances. The Taliban imposed strict 
and oppressive order by means of stiff punishments for crimes in the 
areas that they controlled. The Taliban's Islamic courts and religious 
police, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of 
Vice (PVSV), enforced their ultra-conservative interpretation of 
Islamic law. The PVSV has carried out punishments such as stoning to 
death, flogging, public executions for adultery, murder, and homosexual 
activity, and amputations of limbs for theft. For lesser infractions, 
Taliban militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out 
punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. Prison conditions were 
poor. The Taliban arbitrarily arrested and detained persons and 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Taliban's military offensive 
and capture of Taloqan forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee 
their homes. Taliban forces were responsible for indiscriminate 
bombardment of civilian areas. Civil war conditions and the unfettered 
actions of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of 
speech, press, assembly, and association. Freedom of religion is 
restricted severely and Taliban members vigorously enforced their 
interpretation of Islamic law. Freedom of movement is also limited. 
Years of conflict have left approximately 258,600 citizens internally 
displaced, while more than 2.8 million of the country's population of 
approximately 25.8 million live outside the country as refugees. 
Although the continued fighting has discouraged many refugees from 
returning to their country, 133,600 refugees voluntarily returned from 
Iran during the year under a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees-Iran 
agreement on voluntary repatriation. An additional 50,000 are estimated 
to have returned outside the framework of this agreement. All factions 
have harassed domestic and international NGO's.
    The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence 
against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and 
girls were subjected to rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage. Taliban 
restrictions against women and girls remained widespread, 
institutionally sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict 
dress codes and prohibited women from working outside the home except 
in limited circumstances in the health care field and in some 
humanitarian assistance projects. Despite these formal restrictions, 
the treatment of women and girls in Taliban-controlled areas improved 
slightly for the second year in a row, mainly due to lack of 
enforcement. Although girls were prohibited formally from attending 
school, several organizations were able to run elementary schools and 
home schools with girls in attendance despite the formal prohibition. 
Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely accepted societal 
discrimination against women and girls throughout the country. The 
Taliban detained persons because of their ethnic origins. Worker rights 
were not defined. Child labor persists.
    The human rights situation in areas outside of Taliban control also 
remained extremely poor, and Masood's forces and the Northern Alliance 
members committed numerous, serious abuses. Masood's forces continued 
sporadic rocket attacks against Kabul. Anti-Taliban forces bombarded 
civilians indiscriminately. Various factions infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. Armed units of the Northern Alliance, local commanders, 
and rogue individuals were responsible for political killings, 
abductions, kidnapings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, 
and looting.
    During the year, a degree of ``enforcement fatigue'' seems to have 
led to an informal easing of various restrictions. Reports suggest that 
activities such as nonformal education for girls and women working in 
self-employed sectors increasingly are tolerated if engaged in quietly. 
Many households in urban areas own television sets. Significantly, the 
Taliban forces did not engage in the scorched earth policy of previous 
campaigns when they burned homes, killed livestock, uprooted orchards, 
and destroyed irrigation systems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Taliban forces 
committed a large number of political and other extrajudicial killings, 
both within the country and in the refugee community in Pakistan during 
the year. In June Amnesty International (AI), reported that over the 
previous 2 years more than a dozen prominent citizens advocating an end 
to the war and establishment of a government representing all ethnic 
groups have been arrested and killed by the Taliban.
    Much of the political and extrajudicial killing in Afghanistan 
during the year occurred during the renewed conflict between the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance during the summer, which was 
characterized by sporadic indiscriminate shelling and bombing. On 
February 14, indiscriminate bombing by the Taliban in the Panjshir 
valley killed eight civilians. In mid-June, the Taliban began 
offensives in the Shomali and Kunduz areas, using aircraft to support 
ground troops. On July 1, the Taliban launched large-scale attacks near 
the towns of Baghram and Charikar, approximately 30 miles north of 
Kabul. Civilians continued to be the primary victims of the fighting. 
On July 1-2, the Taliban carried out air raids on the towns of Charikar 
and Jabal-as Saraf, reportedly claiming civilian lives. In mid-July, 
there were reports--denied by the Taliban--of summary executions of 
prisoners by the Taliban forces in the conflict areas. On July 23, 
Taliban aircraft bombed several towns and villages in northern 
Afghanistan, reportedly killing three and wounding seven civilians. On 
July 30, the Taliban used heavy artillery and aircraft to bomb the town 
of Nahreen before capturing it.
    From August 9 through September 5, when the Taliban captured it, 
there was intense fighting around and in the town of Taloqan. During 
the offensive to capture Taloqan, Taliban aircraft bombed the city many 
times. No statistics are available on civilian casualties in Taloqan, 
but 60,000 to 75,000 persons left their homes in Taloqan and other 
areas in the northern part of the country to flee the fighting. AI 
reported in July that during the fighting in Taloqan the Taliban 
bombarded a village, burned all of the houses there, and killed some of 
the villagers. It was also reported that the Taliban cut the throat of 
one man in front of his relatives.
    In previous years, the Taliban used swift summary trials and 
implemented strict punishments in accordance with Islamic law. Public 
executions, which sometimes took place before crowds of up to 30,000 
persons at Kabul Stadium, are not known to have occurred during the 
year. Similarly, death by stoning for adultery, and by toppling walls 
on offenders for homosexual transgressions are not known to have 
occurred.
    Political killings and harassment of moderate Afghan leaders and 
Afghan intellectuals residing in Pakistan continued during the year; 
many believed that these killings and harassment occured at the 
direction of the Taliban. AI notes that over the last 2 years dozens of 
Afghans living in Pakistan have received death threats, and several of 
them have been killed. In 1999 a number of moderate activists relocated 
out of Pakistan to other countries, in part as a reaction to killings 
in Pakistan in 1998 and 1999. On June 1, a hooded gunman shot and 
wounded Mohammad Enam Wak, an Afghan author, at his home in Peshawar. 
By year's end, no action had been taken in the case. The shooting may 
have been in response to a book Wak just had published examining the 
idea of an Afghan federation on the basis of ethnic groups.
    Many Taliban soldiers reportedly were killed and injured by 
landmines laid by the Northern Alliance as they advanced in the Shomali 
plains.
    Opposition forces fired rockets into Kabul on a number of 
occasions. In many of these attacks, civilians were killed or injured.
    In other areas, combatants sought to kill rival commanders and 
their sympathizers. The perpetrators of these killings and their 
motives often were difficult to identify, as political motives often 
are entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade, 
and personal vendettas. A long-running feud among Northern Alliance 
members led to a number of killings of prominent commanders, including 
Bahadur in November 1999 and Abdul Chesik in December 1999. On December 
4, United Front Commander Abdullah Jan Wahidi reportedly was killed in 
an ambush.
    On August 5, seven deminers working for the U.N.-funded 
Organization for Mine Clearance and Rehabilitation were ambushed, 
killed, and burned in Badghis Province; one of the deminers may have 
been alive at the time he was burned. It is not clear who was 
responsible, but the group that waylaid the deminers was reportedly 
large, well-organized, and well-armed.
    When the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in 1999, there were reports 
that Taliban forces carried out summary executions upon entering the 
city. AI reported that hundreds of men, and in a few instances women 
and children, were separated from their families, taken away, and 
killed (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). There has been no investigation by 
the Taliban of these widely publicized allegations.
    The Taliban also has taken no action and conducted no investigation 
into allegations by AI that dozens of noncombatants were systematically 
killed by Taliban forces when they captured most of the Shomali valley 
in late July 1999.
    The Taliban has used excessive force against demonstrators. In 
December 1998, two students at Nangarhar medical college reportedly 
were killed by members of the Taliban when they fired upon a crowd of 
students who were protesting their dean's misappropriation of hostel 
funds. Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered an investigation of the 
incident, but it is not known whether an investigation took place or 
what the results of any investigation may have been.
    In 1998 the Taliban reportedly executed as many as 189 prisoners it 
captured during fighting near Mazar-i-Sharif in order to avoid 
exchanging them with the Northern Alliance. The Taliban denied these 
allegations; by year's end, there had been no investigation into these 
alleged killings.
    In 1998 the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the 
massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, which 
contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent 
investigations of these mass and other killings, including killings by 
the Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the 
unwillingness of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the 
areas in question. The Taliban leadership has indicated in several of 
these cases that investigations were under way or that investigations 
would be permitted. However, according to neutral observers, no real 
progress was made by the Taliban in facilitating investigations; mass 
and other killings from 1997 and 1998 have not been investigated fully.
    There has been no investigation into the 1998 killing of Lieutenant 
Colonel Carmine Calo, an Italian serving with the U.N. Special Mission.
    b. Disappearance.--The strict security enforced by the Taliban in 
areas under its control has resulted in a decrease in abductions, 
kidnapings, and hostages taken for ransom. However, there have been 
allegations that the Taliban maintains private prisons to settle 
personal vendettas and that the Taliban was responsible for 
disappearances in areas under its control. AI reported that hundreds of 
persons were separated from their families in the Taloqan area during 
the Taliban summer offensive, and that these persons were taken away 
and believed to have been killed (see Section 1.a.). There were 
unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be 
foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Taloqan area 
during fighting from June through October. There also were reports of 
the abduction of women by the Taliban in August 1999 when the Taliban 
retook the Shomali plains; women reportedly were taken in trucks from 
the area of fighting and were trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab 
Gulf states. In 1998 there were credible reports that the Taliban 
detained hundreds of persons, mostly ethnic Hazaras, after the takeover 
of Mazar-i-Sharif; the whereabouts of many such persons remained 
unknown at year's end. There were unconfirmed reports that some Taliban 
soldiers abducted girls and women from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-
Sharif in 1998; the whereabouts of some of these women also were 
unknown at year's end (see Section 5). Since 1998 persons who have 
disappeared include: General Abdul Rahman; General Farooq; Moulvi 
Shabuddin; Waliullah Dagarwal; General Syed Agha Rayees; Engineer Nabi 
Shah; and Wolaswal Ismail.
    There have been credible reports of some instances where Taliban 
soldiers have arrested Hazara men to extract ransoms. Abductions, 
kidnapings, and hostage taking for ransom or for political reasons also 
occurred in non-Taliban areas, but specific information was lacking. In 
northern areas, women were at risk of being raped and kidnaped, 
according to the U.N. There have been unconfirmed reports that local 
commanders were kidnaping young women. Some of the women reportedly 
then were forced to marry their kidnapers. Others simply remained 
missing. To avoid this danger, some families reportedly sent their 
daughters to Pakistan or to Iran (see Section 5).
    Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving 
in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POW's). Most 
were thought to be dead or to have assimilated voluntarily into Afghan 
society, though some are alleged to be held against their will. A 
number of persons from the former Soviet Union missing since the period 
of the Soviet occupation are presumed dead.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Taliban is believed to have used torture against 
opponents and POW's. Torture does not appear to be a routine practice 
in all cases. The Taliban reportedly beats some persons detained for 
political reasons. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in 
Afghanistan met in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail 
Khan, and two of his colleagues. The three stated that they were 
detained in a Kandahar prison on political grounds for 3 years prior to 
their escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells, shackled 
the entire time (see Section 1.d.). The General's colleagues reported 
that they were tortured by the prison authorities, and all three 
reported the torture of other prisoners; including being hung upside 
down by the legs while being beaten with cables.
    The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled, 
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems, based on its 
understanding of Islamic justice. Taliban courts imposed their extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary 
trials. Murderers were subjected to public executions, a punishment 
that at times was inflicted by the victims' families. Thieves were 
subjected to public amputations of either one hand, one foot, or both. 
Adulterers were stoned to death or publicly given 100 lashes. On 
September 26, a man convicted of adultery was publicly stoned in 
Maymana in Fariab province. The woman with whom he was convicted of 
engaging in adultery was sentenced to 100 lashes, but the sentence was 
postponed because she was pregnant. A second woman, who was convicted 
of arranging this adultery, was sentenced to 39 lashes. The punishment 
for those found guilty of homosexual acts is to have walls toppled over 
them. Although there were no known instances of such punishment during 
the year, this punishment was carried out on at least one occasion in 
1999, and seven times in 1998 (resulting in five deaths).
    In the past, there have been credible reports that Taliban forces 
threatened and beat women for what they considered immodest dress. They 
threatened and beat men for immodest dress and for incorrect beard 
length. There were no such credible reports this year.
    During the year, there were credible reports that the Taliban 
detained and tortured persons who they believed were being helpful to 
Western journalists. In July a Western journalist observed his Afghan 
associate being severely beaten. The associate was subsequently 
detained and beaten routinely until he was able to escape from prison 
(see Section 2.a.).
    All Afghan factions are believed to have used torture against 
opponents and POW's, though specific information generally is lacking. 
Torture does not appear to be a routine practice in all cases. Some of 
Masood's commanders in the north reportedly used torture routinely to 
extract information from and break the will of prisoners and political 
opponents. At least one of the alleged killers of Commander Abdullah 
Jan Wahidi (see Section 1.a.) reportedly was tortured prior to being 
executed.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners held by some factions are not 
given food, as normally this is the responsibility of prisoners' 
relatives, who are allowed to visit to provide them with food once or 
twice a week. Those who have no relatives have to petition the local 
council or rely on other inmates. Prisoners live in overcrowded, 
unsanitary conditions in collective cells.
    In the past, there have been credible reports that torture occurred 
in prisons under the control of both the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance. Local authorities maintain prisons in territories under their 
control and reportedly established torture cells in some of them. The 
Taliban operates prisons in Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-
Sharif, Pul-i-Khumri, Shibarghan, Qala-e-Zaini, and Maimana. The 
Northern Alliance maintains prisons in Panjshir and Faizabad. According 
to one credible report, prison authorities routinely used rubber and 
plastic bound cables in beatings in Badakhshan province. According to 
AI, there have been reports that the Taliban forced prisoners to work 
on the construction of a new story on the Kandahar prison and that some 
Taliban prisoners held by Masood were forced to labor in life-
threatening conditions, such as digging trenches in mined areas.
    There were reports that an Afghan human rights organization visited 
a Taliban prison in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1999. Intensified 
fighting and poor security for foreign personnel limited the 
International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) ability to monitor 
prison conditions, especially in and around Mazar-i-Sharif after that 
city fell to the Taliban. However, the ICRC's access improved toward 
the end of 1999. The ICRC visited 5,621 detainees, including 49 women 
and 414 minors in 51 different places of detention during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of formal 
legal and law enforcement institutions, justice was not administered 
according to formal legal codes, and persons were subject to arbitrary 
detention. There are credible reports that both Taliban and Northern 
Alliance militia extorted bribes from civilians in return for their 
release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and police procedures 
varied from locality to locality. Little is known about the procedures 
for taking persons into custody and bringing them to justice. In both 
Taliban and non-Taliban areas, the practices varied depending on the 
locality, the local commanders, and other authorities. Some areas have 
a more formal judicial structure than others.
    On July 9, the Taliban's PVSV jailed for several days a foreign aid 
worker, who had lived and worked in Afghanistan for over 30 years, and 
a number of her Afghan associates. The aid worker and her associates 
promoted home-based work for women and home schools for girls. She was 
expelled from the country shortly after her release on July 12. She 
returned to Kabul in late September after receiving a visa in Pakistan 
but within days was ordered to leave the country; she departed on 
October 6. No reason was given by the Taliban for her arrest and 
deportation.
    On July 23, in Kabul, the Taliban arrested 40 members of a local 
group advocating a peaceful settlement of the conflict on charges of 
trying to destabilize the country. There were reports that another 
member of this group was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Peshawar, 
Pakistan.
    AI reported that the Taliban has taken children hostage in an 
effort to compel their fathers to surrender; the fathers of such 
children generally are reported to be political opponents of the 
Taliban. The families of these children have been told that the 
children would be released when their fathers surrender to the Taliban.
    A respected physician, Dr. Ayub, who headed the Shuhada Hospital in 
Jaghoray, was taken into custody during the Bamiyan military action in 
1999 and remains in Taliban custody without charges.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan met in 
July in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail Khan, and 
two of his colleagues. The three said that they were detained in a 
Kandahar prison on political grounds for three years prior to their 
escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells and shackled for 
the entire time. The General's colleagues reported their own torture by 
the prison authorities, and all three reported the torture of other 
prisoners, including being hung upside down by the legs while being 
beaten with cables (see Section 1.c.).
    A number of persons arrested by the Taliban in 1998 for political 
reasons were believed still to be in detention at year's end.
    All factions probably hold political detainees, but no firm numbers 
are available. Both the Taliban and Masood hold thousands of POW's. 
Masood reportedly holds a number of Pakistanis, along with several 
hundred Taliban soldiers, as POW's. In June the Taliban and the 
Northern Alliance sent delegations to inspect each other's prisoners in 
advance of an exchange of prisoners. Lists were reportedly prepared 
amid allegations that the Taliban had executed as many as 189 prisoners 
captured in 1998 during the fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif in order to 
avoid exchanging them (see Section 1.a.). The Taliban has denied this, 
and there has been no investigation. The prisoner exchange initiative 
ended as fighting resumed in June.
    There was no information available on forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide 
judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on 
some interpretation of Islamic law and traditional tribal codes of 
justice. There is no independent judiciary.
    The Taliban has Islamic courts in areas under their control to 
judge criminal cases and resolve disputes. According to the U.N., the 
Taliban asserts that there is a lower court and a higher court in every 
province, and a Supreme Court in Kabul. In 1999 Mullah Omar promulgated 
a decree ordering the Supreme Court and military courts not to 
interfere with one another, according to press reports. The courts 
meted out punishments including execution and amputation and reportedly 
heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes. The courts 
reportedly dealt with all complaints relying on the Taliban's extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments, as well as on 
traditional tribal customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving 
murder and rape, convicted prisoners generally were ordered executed, 
although relatives of the victim could instead choose to accept other 
restitution. Decisions of the courts were reportedly final. According 
to AI, some judges in these courts were untrained in law and at times 
based their judgments on a mixture of their personal understanding of 
Islamic law and a tribal code of honor prevalent in Pashtun areas.
    Defendants do not have the right to an attorney.
    Little is known about the administration of justice in the areas 
controlled by the Northern Alliance. The administration and 
implementation of justice varied from area to area and depended on the 
whims of local commanders or other authorities, who summarily execute, 
torture, and mete out punishments without reference to any other 
authority.
    All factions probably hold political prisoners, but no reliable 
estimates of numbers are available.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Interfactional fighting often resulted in the homes 
and businesses of civilians being invaded and looted by the opposing 
forces--whether victor or loser. Some armed gunmen reportedly acted 
with impunity given the absence of any legal protection or a responsive 
police force. It was unclear what authority controlled the actions of 
the Taliban militiamen who patrolled the streets of cities and towns. A 
number of incidents were reported in which Taliban soldiers, persons 
masquerading as Taliban, or foreign sympathizers fighting alongside the 
Taliban, entered private homes without prior notification or informed 
consent. In Kabul the soldiers allegedly searched homes for evidence of 
cooperation with the former authorities or for violations of Taliban 
religion-based decrees, including the ban on the possession of 
depictions of living things (including photographs, stuffed animals, 
dolls, etc.). At various times, the Taliban also has banned certain 
traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying and playing 
chess (see Section 2.c.). Members of the PVSV, the Taliban's religious 
police, beat individuals on the streets for infractions of Taliban 
rules concerning dress, hair length, and facial hair, as well as for 
the violation of the prohibition on women being in the company of men 
who were unrelated to them. The Taliban required women to wear a burqa, 
a tent-like outer garment that covers a woman from head to toe, when in 
public (see Section 5). Men are required to have beards of a certain 
length or longer, not to trim their beards, and to wear head coverings. 
Men whose beards did not conform to the guidelines on beard length set 
out by the Taliban were subject to imprisonment for 10 days and 
mandatory Islamic instruction. According to AI, the Taliban have taken 
children hostage in an effort to compel their fathers to surrender (see 
Section 1.d.). The Taliban reportedly also has required parents to give 
their children ``Islamic'' names.
    In 1998 the Taliban prohibited television sets, satellite dishes, 
videocassette recorders, videocassettes, and audio cassettes as part of 
an effort to ban music, television, and movies (see Section 2.a.). The 
ban continues, although televisions reportedly are widely sold, and 
their use generally is ignored unless reported by a neighbor (see 
Section 2.a.).
    During the late summer offensive to retake Taloqan, the Taliban 
reportedly burned a village and killed several villagers (see Section 
1.a.). On October 19, the Northern Alliance alleged that the Taliban 
forced the residents of Humber Koh and Hazrab villages near Taloqan to 
leave their homes before burning the dwellings. There were reports 
during 1999 and during the year that the Taliban forcibly expelled 
ethnic Hazara and Tajiks from areas controlled by the Taliban, and that 
the Taliban harassed these minorities (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
    There were reports that some prisoners of the Taliban, including 
the sons of families that had opposed Taliban social restrictions, had 
been drafted forcibly and sent to the front. There were also reports 
that the Taliban forcibly conscripted or attempted to forcibly 
conscript persons in 1997 and 1998; some of these reports were 
unconfirmed.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to 
the efforts of international aid organizations to deliver food aid and 
other humanitarian assistance. U.N.-led negotiations to obtain Taliban 
permission for delivery of food and nonfood aid across the front lines 
into the Panjshir Valley and the Dara-i-Suf area remained at an impasse 
at year's end. The Taliban permitted limited deliveries to Panjshir in 
December 1999 to reach the large community of displaced persons, which 
had fled the Shomali plains during the summer 1999 offensive. Limited 
supplies have reached Dara-i-Suf (where the U.N. has received reports 
of starvation), but only at great expense aboard donkey caravans. The 
French NGO Solidarite has sent similar donkey caravans into nearby 
Balkhab District.
    The continuing internal conflict resulted in many instances of the 
use of excessive force. When fighting resumed in June, the Taliban 
bombed cities held by the Northern Alliance, such as Taloqan, Charikar, 
Nahreen, and Jabal-as Saraf. The Taliban's aerial bombing of civilian 
areas has resulting in the deaths of civilians, property damage, and 
the displacement of residents.
    The conflict leading up to the fall of Taloqan in September 
displaced 60,000 to 75,000 people. Taloqan itself was evacuated, but 
families quickly returned once it became clear that the Taliban was not 
following the scorched earth policy it had pursued in previous years.
    In May 1999, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan. There were reports of 
systematic killings and summary executions by Taliban forces, as well 
as reports of hundreds of persons being taken away in Taliban trucks. 
Taliban forces reportedly also took hundreds of persons after the 
capture of Yakaolang the same month. In the late summer of 1999, 
refugees from the Taliban offensive in the Shomali plain reported 
summary executions of noncombatants. The number of those killed or 
detained in fighting by the Taliban in 1999 is unknown. In August 1998, 
the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif. There were reports that as many as 
5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians, were massacred by the 
Taliban after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif. In September 1998, the 
Taliban captured Bamiyan; during the fighting an estimated 200 
civilians were killed. There were also credible reports of a massacre 
of 45 civilians in a village near Bamiyan by Taliban commanders in 
September 1998. AI reported that the Taliban massacred 70 Hazara 
civilians, including children, in Qezelabad, near Mazar-i-Sharif in 
1997. There were also reports that Taliban forces in Faryab province 
killed some 600 civilians in late 1997.
    In general independent investigations of alleged killings were 
hindered by continuing warfare and the unwillingness of local 
commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in question (see 
Section 1.a.). The Taliban denied charges that its forces massacred or 
committed atrocities against civilians and claimed that civilian 
deaths, if any, resulted from combat.
    Prior to its summer offensive, the Taliban claimed that the 
Northern Alliance bombed Shekhar Darra and Gol Darra, killing an 
unspecified number of civilians.
    The discovery of mass graves near Shibarghan in the northern part 
of the country in 1997 was widely reported. The graves allegedly 
contained 2,000 corpses, reportedly those of Taliban forces captured 
near Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-1997 and executed by Northern Alliance 
forces (see Section 1.a.).
    There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the 
northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan 
from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and 
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid (see Section 4). 
There were no reports of such behavior during the year, and, on the 
contrary, the Masood forces appeared welcoming to NGO's.
    Continued warfare also resulted in massive forced displacement of 
civilians. Over the course of the year, it is estimated that up to 
75,000 persons may have fled the fighting, although a majority of them 
reportedly have returned to their homes. An estimated 500,000-750,000 
Afghans remain internally displaced following years of conflict. More 
than 2.4 million Afghans are living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. A 
much larger number over the past 21 years has sought refuge abroad. 
Women and children constituted the majority of those in need of 
humanitarian assistance.
    Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world, 
according to U.N. mine-clearing experts. The U.N. estimates that there 
are 5 to 7 million landmines and over 750,000 pieces of unexploded 
ordnance throughout the country, sown mainly during the Soviet 
occupation. However, some NGO's estimate that there may be less than 1 
million mines. There have been claims that 162 of 356 districts are 
mine-affected. The most heavily mined areas are the provinces bordering 
Iran and Pakistan. The landmines and unexploded ordnance cause deaths 
and injuries, restrict areas available for cultivation, and slow the 
return of refugees. At the end of 1999, according to the NGO Halo 
Trust, mines covered more than an estimated 420 square miles, including 
over 285 square miles of grazing land; over 100 square miles of 
agricultural land; almost 25 square miles of roads; 7.5 square miles of 
residential area; and over 2 square miles of irrigation systems and 
canals. From 1995-97, new mines are believed to have been laid over 90 
square miles of land, reportedly mainly by the Northern Alliance in the 
western provinces of Badghis and Faryab. Additional newly mined areas 
were reported but not confirmed during the year in the conflict areas 
north of Kabul. The Northern Alliance reportedly laid these in response 
to the Taliban's summer offensive. Taliban leader Mullah Omar 
reportedly banned the use, production, trade, and stockpiling of mines 
in 1998. Despite the general prohibition on the depiction of living 
things, the Taliban allowed the visual depiction of persons in demining 
educational materials.
    An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by 
landmines. Currently casualties caused by landmines and unexploded 
ordnance are estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the 
country, including in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of 
households are affected by the presence of landmines. An estimated 96 
percent of civilian mine and unexploded ordnance casualties are male. 
Approximately 53 percent of mine and unexploded ordnance casualties 
occur in the 18 to 40 age group, while 34 percent of the casualties 
involve children, according to the U.N. Mine Action Center. Landmines 
and unexploded ordnance resulted in death in approximately 30 percent 
of cases and in serious injuries and disability, including amputation 
and blindness, in approximately 20 percent of cases.
    With funding from international donors, the U.N. has organized and 
trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operate throughout 
the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared are in productive 
use, and approximately 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced 
persons have returned to areas cleared of mines and unexploded 
ordnance. Nevertheless the mines are expected to pose a threat for many 
years. In 1997 the 4,000 mine clearers suffered from an accident rate 
of 1 per week. However, clearance rates and safety have increased for 
clearance teams assisted by dogs. U.N. agencies and NGO's have 
instituted a number of mine awareness campaigns and educational 
programs for women and children in various parts of the country, but 
many were curtailed as a result of Taliban restrictions on women and 
girls.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--There are no laws that effectively 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and senior officials of 
various warring factions allegedly attempted to intimidate journalists 
and influence their reporting. There are fewer than 10 regular 
publications in the country. All other newspapers are published only 
sporadically. Newspapers for the most part are affiliated with 
different factions. Various factions maintain their own communications 
facilities. The Taliban selectively bans the entry of foreign 
newspapers into their territory. Many foreign books are prohibited. The 
Taliban radio station, the Voice of Shariat, broadcasts religious 
programming and Taliban pronouncements.
    The Taliban has arrested more than 25 journalists since it took 
control of Kabul in September 1996. In July a Western journalist, while 
being detained, observed his Afghan associate being severely beaten. 
The journalist subsequently was expelled from the country, and his 
associate was detained and beaten routinely, until he escaped from 
prison (see Section 1.c.). On August 11, three foreign journalists were 
arrested by the PVSV and accused of taking pictures of a soccer match 
in Kabul. The journalists were interrogated for 2 hours, after which 
their film was confiscated. The PVSV officials confirmed that it is 
forbidden to take pictures of living things.
    All factions have attempted to pressure foreign journalists who 
report on the conflict. The Taliban initially cooperated with members 
of the international press who arrived in Kabul but later imposed 
restrictions upon them. Foreign journalists were forbidden to film or 
photograph persons or animals, were not allowed to interview women, and 
were required to be accompanied at all times by a Taliban escort to 
ensure that these restrictions were enforced. In 1998 foreign 
journalists were not permitted into Mazar-i-Sharif after the Taliban 
took the city and reportedly massacred as many as 5,000 persons (see 
Section 1.g.).
    In August the Taliban introduced strict regulations governing the 
work of foreign journalists in the country. A list of 21 points ``to be 
respected'' is given to foreign journalists upon arrival. The list 
includes an item asking journalists ``not to offend the people's 
feelings.'' Journalists are required to tell the Taliban authorities 
when they travel outside of Kabul and to stay out of prohibited areas 
outside of Kabul. Journalists may work only with approved interpreters 
and local assistants, must renew their work permits every year, and 
must register all of their professional equipment. The Taliban also 
require most journalists to stay at the Intercontinental Hotel in 
Kabul, allegedly for security and economic reasons.
    In August 1998, Iranian journalist Mahmoud Saremi was killed after 
being abducted by Taliban soldiers in Mazar-i-Sharif, along with eight 
Iranian diplomats. Saremi was the Afghanistan bureau chief for the 
official Iranian news agency, IRNA. Taliban officials stated that those 
responsible for Saremi's killing were not acting under official orders 
and would be punished; however, no action was known to have been taken 
regarding the case by year's end.
    There have been numerous threats to Afghan journalists working in 
exile in Pakistan; the UNHCR has assisted approximately 10 Afghan 
journalists in relocating to Western countries from Pakistan. Many 
believe these threats are directed by the Taliban authorities in 
response to unfavorable columns by the journalists. On July 4, Inayat-
ul-Haq Yasinin, a journalist in Peshawar, received death threats for 
publishing the results of an opinion poll on Afghan refugees living in 
Peshawar. In 1998 in Peshawar, two men fired at Abdul Hafiz Hamis 
Afizi, an ethnic Tajik Afghan journalist writing for two Peshawar 
Afghan daily newspapers. Also in 1998, Mohammad Hashim Paktianai, a 
journalist related to former president Najibullah was killed at his 
home in Hayatabad.
    The Taliban continue to prohibit music, movies, and television on 
religious grounds. In August 1998, television sets, videocassette 
recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite dishes were 
outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, televisions 
reportedly are sold widely, and their use generally is ignored unless 
reported by a neighbor.
    The Taliban severely restricts academic freedom, particularly 
education for girls (see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Civil war, 
tenuous security, and likely opposition from local authorities 
seriously inhibited freedom of assembly and association.
    It is unknown whether laws exist that govern the formation of 
associations. Many domestic NGO's continue to operate in the country, 
and many international NGO's also continue to operate (see Section 4). 
There were reports that the Taliban required NGO's to go through 
burdensome registration procedures in order to be allowed to operate 
and attempted to exert control over NGO staffing and office locations, 
especially in Kabul. All factions continue to harass and interfere with 
the operations of domestic and international NGO's, including aid 
organizations (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted 
severely. Due to the absence of a constitution and the ongoing civil 
war, religious freedom is determined primarily by the unofficial, 
unwritten, and evolving policies of the warring factions. In most parts 
of the country, the Pashtun-dominated, ultraconservative Islamic 
movement known as the Taliban vigorously enforced its extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban claimed in mid-1999 that it 
was drafting a new constitution, based upon the sources of Islamic 
religious law (Shari'a): the Koran, the Sunna, and Hanafi 
jurisprudence. A Taliban spokesman stated that the new constitution 
would ensure the rights of all Muslims and of religious minorities. 
However, custom and law require affiliation with some religion, and 
atheism is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. The small 
number of non-Muslim residents who remain in the country may practice 
their faith but may not proselytize.
    The country's official name, according to the Taliban, is the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; according to the umbrella organization 
of various smaller, anti-Taliban groups, the Northern Alliance, it is 
the Islamic State of Afghanistan. These names reflect the desire of 
both factions to promote Islam as the state religion. Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar carries the title of Commander of the Faithful. 
Traditionally Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence has 
been the dominant religion. The Taliban also adheres to the Hanafi 
school of Sunni Islam, making it the current dominant religion in the 
country.
    The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled, 
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems. The Taliban 
established Islamic courts in areas under its control to judge criminal 
cases and resolve disputes. Taliban courts imposed their extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary 
trials (see Section 1.e.).
    The Taliban seeks to impose its extreme interpretation of Islamic 
observance in areas that it controlled and has declared that all 
Muslims in areas under Taliban control must abide by the Taliban's 
interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban announces its proclamations 
and edicts through broadcasts on the Taliban's ``Radio Shariat'' and 
relies on a religious police force under the control of the PVSV to 
enforce rules regarding appearance, dress, employment, access to 
medical care, behavior, religious practice, and freedom of expression. 
Members of the PVSV, which was raised to the status of a Ministry in 
May 1998, regularly check persons on the street in order to ascertain 
that individuals are conforming to such Taliban edicts. Persons found 
to be in violation of the edicts are subject to punishment meted out on 
the spot, which may include beatings and detention. In practice the 
rigid policies adopted both by the Taliban and by certain opposition 
groups have a chilling effect on adherents of other forms of Islam and 
on those who practice other faiths. Enforcement of Taliban social 
strictures is much stricter in the cities, especially in Kabul, and 
looser in rural areas, where more is left to local custom.
    Reliable data on the country's population is not available. 
However, informed sources estimate that 85 percent of the population 
are Sunni Muslim; most of the remaining 15 percent are Shi'a. The 
Hazara ethnic group is predominantly Shi'a; Shi'a are among the most 
economically disadvantaged persons in the country. The Shi'a minority 
want a national government that would give them equal rights as 
citizens. There are also small numbers of Ismailis living in the 
central and northern parts of the country. Ismailis are Shi'a but 
consider the Aga Khan their spiritual leader. In the past, small 
communities of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Christians lived in the 
country, but most members of these communities have left. Almost all 
members of the country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once 
numbered about 50,000 persons, have emigrated or taken refuge abroad.
    Licensing and registration of religious groups do not appear to be 
required by the authorities in any part of the country.
    According to Human Rights Watch, in September 1999, the Taliban 
issued decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship 
but allowed them to worship at existing holy sites, forbade non-Muslims 
from criticizing Muslims, ordered non-Muslims to identify their houses 
by placing a yellow cloth on their rooftops, forbade non-Muslims from 
living in the same residence as Muslims, and required that non-Muslim 
women wear a yellow dress with a special mark so that Muslims could 
keep their distance. These decrees followed earlier reports that Hindus 
were required to wear a piece of yellow cloth attached to their 
clothing to identify their religious identity and that Sikhs were 
required to wear some form of identification as well. This system of 
identification allegedly was imposed to spare non-Muslims from the 
enforcement of rules that are mandatory for Muslims and from harassment 
by agents of the PVSV, but the identification system reportedly no 
longer is enforced.
    There also are unconfirmed reports that the Taliban has occupied 
and ``cleaned'' Shi'a mosques for the use of Sunnis, including a Shi'a 
mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998. The sections of the country's 
educational system that have survived over 20 years of war put 
considerable emphasis on religion.
    In Taliban controlled areas, the Taliban has decreed that all 
Muslims must take part in five daily prayers. Those who are observed 
not praying at appointed times or who are late attending prayer are 
subject to punishment, including severe beatings. There were reports in 
1998 that PVSV members in Kabul stopped persons on the street and 
quizzed them to determine if they knew how to recite various Koranic 
prayers.
    Publishing and distribution of literature of any kind, including 
religious material, is rare.
    Proselytizing by non-Muslims is prohibited. A small number of 
foreign Christian groups are present in the country, but they focus on 
relief work since they are forbidden to proselytize. Conversion from 
Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. There was no 
information available about converts or about restrictions on the 
training of clergy.
    Since taking control of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban reportedly has 
committed numerous human rights violations, particularly against the 
Hazaras. In September 1997, the Taliban reportedly massacred 70 ethnic 
Hazara civilians in Qezelabad. There were reports of mass arrests by 
the Taliban in Hazara neighborhoods of Kabul in January 1998. There 
also were credible reports of the massacre of thousands of civilians 
and prisoners by the Taliban during and after the capture of Mazar-i-
Sharif in August 1998; this massacre reportedly was aimed at ethnic 
Hazaras. In September 1998, approximately 500 persons were killed as 
the Taliban gained control of the city of Bamiyan. The Hazaras regained 
control of Bamiyan in April 1999 following prolonged guerrilla-style 
warfare; however, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in May 1999 and 
reportedly killed a number of Shi'a residents. There were reports 
during 1999 and 2000 that there were forced expulsions of ethnic 
Hazaras and Tajiks from areas controlled or conquered by the Taliban, 
as well as harassment of these minorities throughout Taliban controlled 
areas.
    The Ismaili community fought for the Northern Alliance against the 
Taliban and suffered when the Taliban occupied territories once held by 
Ismaili forces. There were reports of mistreatment of Ismailis at the 
hands of the Taliban.
    The Taliban, following its extreme interpretation of Shari'a 
(Islamic law), required women to don a head-to-toe garment known as the 
burqa, which has only a mesh screen for vision, when in public. While 
in some rural areas this was the normal garment for women, the 
requirement to wear the burqa represented a significant change in 
practice when imposed in urban areas. According to a decree announced 
by the religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were 
not covered properly would be punished severely, along with their 
family elders. In Kabul and elsewhere, women found in public who were 
not wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles 
properly, were beaten by Taliban militiamen. According to Taliban 
regulations, men's beards must protrude farther than would a fist 
clamped at the base of the chin. Men also must wear head coverings and 
must not have long hair. A man who has shaved or cut his beard may be 
imprisoned for 10 days and be required to undergo Islamic instruction. 
Several civil service employees reportedly were fired in 1997 for 
cutting their beards. All students at Kabul University reportedly are 
required to have beards in order to study there (no female students are 
allowed). There also are credible reports that Taliban members gave 
forced haircuts to males in Kabul. At various times, the Taliban has 
banned certain traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying 
and playing chess. Dolls, stuffed animals, and photographs are 
prohibited under the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions 
against representations of living beings; in search of these objects, 
Taliban soldiers or persons masquerading as Taliban members reportedly 
have entered private homes without prior notification or informed 
consent. The Taliban reportedly has required parents to give their 
children Islamic names (see Section 1.f.).
    The Taliban continues to prohibit music, movies, and television on 
religious grounds in Taliban-controlled areas. In 1998 television sets, 
videocassette recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite 
dishes were outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, 
subsequent reports indicate that many persons in urban areas around the 
country own such electronic devices despite the ban (see Section 1.f. 
and 2.a.).
    In November 1998, Taliban officials accepted responsibility for the 
defacing of one of two historic statues of Buddha near Bamiyan during 
their takeover of that city earlier in the year. The Taliban claimed 
that the vandalism was the result of an unauthorized act by one of 
their soldiers and that the statutes were being protected by the 
Taliban from further harm. While some Taliban leaders have claimed 
tolerance of religious minorities, there reportedly have been 
restrictions imposed upon Shi'a Muslims in Taliban-controlled 
territory, although not necessarily on a uniform basis. However, the 
Taliban allegedly has ordered Shi'a to confine their Ashura 
commemorations during the month of Muharram to their mosques and to 
avoid the public processions that are an integral part of Ashura in 
other countries with Shi'a populations.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although in principle citizens have the 
right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their 
ability to travel within the country was hampered by warfare, 
brigandage, landmines, a road network in a state of disrepair, and 
limited domestic air service, complicated by factional threats to air 
traffic. Some Afghans reported difficulty in receiving necessary 
permits to leave the country for tourism or business purposes, while 
others reported no such difficulty. The Taliban's restrictions on women 
further curtail freedom of movement (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Despite 
these obstacles, many persons continued to travel relatively freely, 
with buses plying routes in most parts of the country. However, due to 
intermittent fighting in various areas, international aid agencies 
often found that their ability to travel, work, and distribute 
assistance was hampered severely. International travel continued to be 
difficult as both the Taliban and Masood threatened to shoot down any 
planes that flew without their permission over areas of the country 
that they controlled.
    Commercial trade was impeded in certain non-Taliban areas, as local 
commanders and criminals continued to demonstrate their control over 
the roads by demanding road tolls and sometimes closing roads. There 
were reports in 1998 that some Taliban commanders, who previously 
gained popularity by sweeping away the checkpoints that local warlords 
used to shake down travelers, were setting up checkpoints themselves 
and demanding tolls for passage, but there were no such reports during 
the year.
    There also have been instances in the past of the forcible 
expulsion of individuals on ethnic grounds, but there were no known 
instances of this during the year.
    Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee 
populations. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
approximately 2.8 million Afghans remain outside the country as 
registered refugees: 1.4 million in Iran, 1.4 million in Pakistan, and 
some in Russia, India, and the central Asian republics. Women and 
children constitute 75 percent of the refugee population. In addition 
there are 500,000 to 750,000 Afghans who are internally displaced 
following years of fighting. A total of 4,069,000 Afghan refugees have 
been repatriated since 1988, with over 1.5 million returning to the 
country in the peak year of 1992. During the year, 133,600 refugees 
were voluntarily repatriated from Iran under an UNHCR-Iran program, and 
another 50,00 are estimated to have returned outside the program. 
Refugees in Pakistan are known to cross the border back and forth 
routinely.
    There was no available information on policies regarding refugees, 
asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
    On June 21, Pakistan deported Professor Mohammad Rahim Elham, a 
prominent Afghan scholar, back to Afghanistan. Professor Rahim had 
called for a stop to Pakistani interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan. There is concern that he may face detention, torture, or 
extrajudicial execution in Afghanistan. According to an AI report, 
Professor Rahim was granted asylum in another country late in the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    There was no functioning central government in the country. The 
continuing struggle for political power among the major armed groups 
prevented citizens from changing their government or choosing their 
leaders peacefully. Most political changes came about through shifting 
military fortunes. No faction held elections or respected citizens' 
right to change their government peacefully.
    The Taliban movement's authority emanates from its leader, Mullah 
Omar, who carries the title Commander of the Faithful, and from the 
Taliban's military occupation of most of the country. Governmental 
functions are exercised through the key Taliban governing body, the 
Inner Shura (Council) based in Kandahar, and by ministries based in 
Kabul.
    The Northern Alliance, headed by nominal President Rabbani, holds 
power with de facto Defense Minister Masood as Rabbani's primary 
military backer. Rabbani received nominal support from General Dostam 
and a faction of the Shi'a Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat. Another faction of the 
Hezb-i-Wahdat nominally allied with the Taliban early in 1999. Rabbani 
and Masood control the northeastern, largely Tajik, portion of the 
country, including the strategic Panjshir valley north of Kabul.
    Discontent with the Taliban's strictures and rural village values 
was strong in large, non-Pashtun cities such as Herat, Kabul, and other 
northern cities. The Taliban's military successes did not encourage the 
group's leaders to engage in meaningful political dialog with 
opponents. Efforts in 1998 to convene a national body of Muslim 
scholars (ulema) to discuss the future of the country broke down when 
both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance disagreed over the possible 
membership and sequence of the talks. Peace talks convened in April 
1998 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, but broke down quickly. Moderate and 
neutral Afghans, mostly living outside of the country, continue their 
efforts to organize a traditional Grand National Assembly (Loya Jirga) 
and held meetings in Rome in July and November 1999. The former King 
supports this process. Other moderate groups exist in Bonn, Cyprus, and 
Teheran.
    The U.N. and the international community continued their efforts to 
help Afghans reach a political settlement. The U.N. Secretary General's 
Personal Representative for Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell has continued 
to explore ideas for a peace process with the warring factions. A group 
of six nations bordering the country, the U.S., and Russia met several 
times during the year to explore ways to resolve the conflict 
peacefully.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are many NGO's, both domestic and international, in the 
country. Some are based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with 
branches inside the country; others are based in Afghan cities and 
rural areas. The focus of their activities is primarily humanitarian 
assistance, rehabilitation, health, education, and agriculture.
    The Afghan League of Human Rights operates both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; it produces an annual report. The Cooperation Center for 
Afghanistan (CCA) is an Afghan NGO that operates in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The CCA maintains an office in Peshawar, where it produces 
a monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. It also 
monitors and documents the human rights situation from several offices 
in both Taliban-controlled and Northern Alliance-controlled cities. The 
National Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan began operations 
during 1998 in Pakistan, conducting seminars on human rights issues, 
issuing press statements criticizing specific instances of human rights 
abuses, and placing articles in Pashtu and Dari newspapers. The 
Afghanistan Commission for Human Rights, founded in 1997 after 
discussions with Taliban authorities on Islamic aspects of human 
rights, also started activities in Pakistan in 1998, focused on the 
plight of Afghan prisoners in Pakistani prisons and on children's 
rights. However, the civil war and lack of security continued to make 
it difficult for human rights organizations to monitor adequately the 
situation inside the country.
    On July 6, the Taliban issued an edict banning women's employment 
(except in the health care sector) by U.N. agencies and NGO's. 
Implementation remains erratic, but the U.N. and NGO's kept their 
female staff at home to avoid open confrontation with the Taliban. On 
August 16, the Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food 
Program's (WFP) 25 widows' bakeries, which provide food to the neediest 
citizens, including many war widows and other female-headed households. 
On August 17, the Taliban reversed the previous day's decision to close 
the widows' bakeries, apparently accepting the WFP's explanation that 
the female staff of the bakeries were not direct hire WFP employees and 
therefore not subject to the July 6 edict. The arrest in July of a 
foreign aid worker long resident in the country (see Section 1.d.) and 
the sudden closure of the widows' bakeries, served as reminders to the 
international relief community that their programs are at constant risk 
of closure by the Taliban.
    In September the Taliban refused a visa to the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan.
    During the year, the Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to 
the international aid community's efforts to deliver food aid and other 
humanitarian assistance to citizens (see Section 1.g.).
    The Taliban continued to harass domestic and international NGO's. 
The Taliban has interfered consistently with the operation of the U.N. 
and NGO's. Tactics used have included threatening to impound the 
vehicles of NGO's that do not work on projects preferred by the 
Taliban, threatening to close projects that do not include Taliban 
supervisors or workers, and, in the case of one local NGO, the 
detention of its director and the impounding of all of its equipment in 
an effort to increase Taliban control of the organization. The Taliban 
announced in March 1998 that foreign Muslim women, including U.N. 
workers, would be allowed to perform their jobs only if accompanied by 
a male relative, a move that continued to hamper NGO and relief 
operations. The U.N. withdrew its personnel from southern Afghanistan 
in late March 1998 to protest the assault on a U.N. worker by the 
Taliban governor of Kandahar Province and the interference with its 
work by the Taliban. After reaching agreements with local officials, 
the U.N. returned to Kandahar in May 1999. In April 1998, Taliban 
authorities rejected the participation of a U.N. official on the U.N. 
team selected to negotiate with the Taliban on the travel restrictions 
for foreign Muslim women and other issues, because he was perceived to 
be ``anti-Taliban.'' In June 1998, the Taliban required all NGO's in 
Kabul to relocate to a single location in a bomb-damaged former school; 
those who refused were threatened with expulsion from the country. 
However, the order was not enforced. In November 1998, the U.N. World 
Food Program accused the Taliban of looting 1,364 tons of food, 
stealing trucks from the WFP's compound in Bamiyan, and occupying WFP 
offices in Bamiyan and Yakaolang.
    On June 15, 1999, staff members of an international NGO were 
detained and beaten by members of the Taliban in Bamiyan Province. 
After the June 1999 incident, Mullah Omar issued an edict stating that 
any person causing annoyance to a foreign worker could face punishment 
of up to 5 years in prison. However, in November 1999 U.N. properties 
were targeted in organized demonstrations in several cities when U.N. 
sanctions related to terrorism were imposed on the country. Certain key 
issues, including the mobility of international female Muslim staff and 
access by Afghan women and girls to programs, remain largely 
unresolved.
    There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the 
northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan 
from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and 
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid. There were no 
such reports during the year (see Section 1.g.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    There is no functioning constitution, and therefore there are no 
constitutional provisions that prohibit or protect against 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or 
social status. It is not known whether specific laws prohibit 
discrimination; local custom and practices generally prevail. 
Discrimination against women is prevalent throughout the country. Its 
severity varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's 
attitude towards education for girls and employment for women and on 
local attitudes. Historically the minority Shi'a faced discrimination 
from the majority Sunni population. There has been greater acceptance 
of the disabled as the number of persons maimed by landmines increased, 
and the presence of the disabled became more widespread. In 1998 and 
1999, the Taliban on several occasions sought to execute homosexuals by 
toppling walls on them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.); however, this is 
not known to have occurred during the year.
    Women.--As lawlessness and interfactional fighting continued in 
some areas, violence against women occurred frequently, including 
beatings, rapes, forced marriages, disappearances, kidnapings, and 
killings. Such incidents generally went unreported, and most 
information was anecdotal. It was difficult to document rapes, in 
particular, in view of the social stigma that surrounds the problem. 
Although the stability brought by the Taliban to most of the country 
acted in general to reduce violence against women, particularly rapes 
and kidnapings, Taliban members continued to threaten or beat women to 
enforce the Taliban's dress code for women. There were unconfirmed 
reports that the Taliban or foreign ``volunteers'' fighting alongside 
the Taliban abducted women during the military offensive on Taloqan. 
There were also unconfirmed reports that Taliban soldiers or foreign 
volunteers abducted women in the offensive in the Shomali plains in 
1999 and that they raped and abducted women from Hazara neighborhoods 
in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998. The whereabouts of some of these 
women were unknown at year's end. The enforced seclusion of women 
within the home greatly limited the information available on domestic 
violence and marital rape. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it is 
likely that domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
    Women accused of adultery also are subjected to violence. Adultery 
is punishable by death through stoning. At least one accused adulteress 
was sentenced to 100 lashes during the year; a female accomplice was 
sentenced to 30 lashes.
    Overall, the situation of women and girls remained mostly 
unchanged, as the Taliban generally continued the application of its 
ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic law.
    In 1992 a new government was installed and the previous trend 
towards increasing numbers of women working outside of the home was 
reversed. Since the advent of the Taliban in 1994, the trend towards 
excluding women from employment has intensified.
    The treatment of women under Taliban rule has been particularly 
harsh, although there was marginal improvement in some areas during the 
year. In the areas where it took control, the Taliban initially 
excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the 
traditional work of women in agriculture; women were forbidden to leave 
the home except in the company of a male relative. In urban areas, and 
particularly after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forced 
almost all women to quit their jobs as professionals and clerical 
workers, including teachers, doctors, nurses, bank tellers, and aid 
workers. In a few cases, the Taliban relented and allowed women to work 
in health care occupations under restricted circumstances. The 
prohibition on women working outside of the home has been especially 
difficult for the large numbers of widows left by 20 years of civil 
war; there are an estimated 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. In August the 
Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food Program's 25 
widows' bakeries but reversed the decision on the following day (see 
Section 4). Many women reportedly have been reduced to selling all of 
their possessions and to begging to feed their families.
    However, during 1999, restrictions on women's employment reportedly 
eased somewhat. The Taliban allowed women to work in the medical sector 
as doctors and nurses, treating only other women. Medicins Sans 
Frontieres and other international NGO's reported that they were able 
to recruit both male and female health care staff without 
administrative obstacles and that the main difficulty faced in 
recruitment of medical staff was the lack of qualified female 
personnel. In 1999 there were reports that the Taliban reopened schools 
for doctors and nurses and that women were allowed to attend women-only 
institutions. A limited number of women were allowed to work for 
international agencies and NGO's, but they were not allowed to work in 
the offices of their employers; they were required to go directly from 
their homes to the project sites on which they worked. A Taliban edict 
issued in 1999 allowed needy widows with no other means of support to 
seek employment; but many widows reportedly were unaware of the change, 
and there was little work available. Women reportedly were allowed to 
claim international assistance directly rather than through their close 
male relatives, as a 1997 edict stipulated. However, male relatives 
still were required to obtain the permission of the PVSV for female 
home-based employment.
    Girls formally were prohibited from attending school. Formal 
restrictions against the education of girls remain, apart from 
instruction provided in mosques, which is mainly religious in content. 
However, there are a growing number of girls educated by international 
NGO's in formal schools, community-based schools, and home schools.
    Most citizens lack any access to adequate medical facilities, and 
the provision of health care under Taliban rule remains poor. Life 
expectancy rates are estimated at 44 years for women and 43 years for 
men. In most regions, there is less than 1 physician per 10,000 
persons. Health services reach only 29 percent of the population and 
only 17 percent of the rural population. Clean water reaches only about 
12 percent of the population. Health care for both men and women was 
hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, which caused the 
destruction of public education posters and made the provision and 
dissemination of health information in a society with high levels of 
illiteracy more difficult. Tuberculosis rates for women and maternal 
mortality rates are extremely high. The Taliban significantly reduced 
women's access to health care, although it has since loosened 
restrictions somewhat. In 1997 the Taliban announced a policy of 
segregating men and women in hospitals; this policy reportedly 
continued at year's end. In 1997 in an attempt to centralize medical 
care for women, the Taliban also directed most hospitals in Kabul to 
cease services to women and to discharge female staff. Services for 
women were to be provided by a single hospital still partially under 
construction, which resulted in a drastic reduction in access to, and 
the quality of, health care for women. Later, women were permitted to 
seek treatment from female medical personnel working in designated 
women's wards or clinics; since June 1998 they have been permitted to 
seek treatment from male doctors only if accompanied by a male 
relative. In practice women were excluded from treatment by male 
physicians in most hospitals. These rules, while not enforced 
universally, made obtaining treatment extremely difficult for most 
women, and especially for Kabul's widows, many of whom have lost all 
such male family members. Further, even when a woman was allowed to be 
treated by a male doctor, he was prohibited from examining her except 
if she were fully clothed in Taliban-approved garb and from touching 
her, thus limiting the possibility of any meaningful treatment. The 
participants in a 1998 survey of 160 Afghan women reported little or no 
access to health care in Kabul. Most of the participants also reported 
a decline in their mental health. However, there were credible reports 
that the restrictions on women's health care were not applied in 
practice and that there were some improvements in access to health care 
for women during the last 2 years. By the end of 1999, all Kabul 
hospitals apart from the military hospital reportedly treated women. 
Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul provided a full range of health 
services to women, but there was only one maternity hospital in the 
country.
    The Taliban decreed what women could wear in public. Women in 
public spaces were required to wear a burqa, a loose, head-to-toe 
garment that has a small cloth screen for vision. While in many, 
particularly rural, areas of the country, the burqa was the customary 
women's outer garment, the requirement for all women to wear the burqa 
represented a significant change in practice for many women, 
particularly in urban areas. According to a decree announced by the 
religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were not 
covered properly would be punished severely along with their family 
elders. In Kabul and elsewhere women found in public who were not 
wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles properly, 
reportedly have been beaten by Taliban militiamen. Some women cannot 
afford the cost of a burqa, and thus are forced to remain at home or 
risk beatings if they go out without one.
    During 1999 there were reports of differences in the enforcement of 
the requirement for women to wear the burqa. Enforcement reportedly was 
relatively lax in rural and non-Pashtun areas, and there were reports 
that some women in Herat and in rural areas cover their heads with 
large scarves that leave the face uncovered and have not faced 
reprisals. The Taliban's dress code for women apparently is not 
enforced strictly upon the nomad population of several hundred thousand 
or upon the few female foreigners, who nonetheless must cover their 
hair, arms, and legs. Women in their homes must not be visible from the 
street; the Taliban require that homes with female occupants have their 
windows painted over.
    Women were expected to leave their homes only while escorted by a 
male relative, further curtailing the appearance and movement of women 
in public even when wearing approved clothing. Women appearing in 
public without a male relative ran the risk of beatings by the Taliban. 
Some observers reported seeing fewer and fewer women on the streets in 
Taliban-controlled areas. Women are not allowed to drive, and taxi 
drivers reportedly are beaten if they take unescorted women as 
passengers. On October 19, taxi drivers were warned by the PVSV not to 
pick up unaccompanied female passengers or risk a ban on their driving 
privileges. Women only may ride on buses designated as women's buses; 
there are reportedly not enough such buses to meet the demand, and the 
wait for women's buses can be long. In December 1998, the Taliban 
ordered that bus drivers who take female passengers must encase the bus 
in curtains and put up a curtain so that the female passengers cannot 
see or be seen by the driver. Bus drivers also were told that they must 
employ boys under the age of 15 to collect fares from female passengers 
and that neither the drivers nor the fare collectors were to mingle 
with the passengers.
    AI has reported that the Taliban have ordered the closure of 
women's public baths.
    Women are also forbidden to enter mosques or other places of 
worship unless the mosque has separate sections for men and women. Most 
women pray at home alone or with other family members. Women also 
reportedly have been prohibited from appearing on the streets for 
certain periods during the month of Ramadan.
    The Taliban's restrictions regarding the social behavior of men and 
women were communicated by edicts and enforced mainly by the PVSV. The 
U.N. and numerous other interlocutors noted that the edicts are 
enforced with varying degrees of rigor throughout the country. The 
restrictions were enforced most strictly in urban areas, where women 
had enjoyed wider access to educational and employment opportunities 
before the Taliban gained control.
    After her 1999 visit, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women noted some improvements in the status of women, including 
the existence of home schools as well as limited primary educational 
institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in Kabul; 
increased access of women to health care; and the permission for widows 
to work. The Special Rapporteur also noted continuing violations of the 
physical security of women and the practice of lashings and public 
beatings, violations of the rights to education, health, employment, 
freedom of movement, and freedom of association, and of family rights, 
including the existence of polygyny and forced marriage. She also noted 
that minority women sometimes were subject to forced displacement and 
that there were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance 
organizations undertook to ensure children's welfare to the extent 
possible; however, the situation of children is very poor. Infant 
mortality is 250 out of 1,000 births; Medicins Sans Frontieres reports 
that 250,000 children per year die of malnutrition. One fourth of 
children die before the age of 5. Approximately 45 percent of the 
population is made up of children age 14 or under. The Taliban's 
restrictions on male-female medical treatment have had a detrimental 
effect on children. Physicians for Human Rights reported that children 
sometimes are denied medical care when the authorities do not let male 
doctors visit children's wards, which may be located within the women's 
ward of a hospital, or do not allow male doctors to see children 
accompanied only by their mothers. A UNICEF study also reported that 
the majority of children are highly traumatized and expect to die 
before reaching adulthood. According to the study, some 90 percent have 
nightmares and suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen 
acts of violence, including the killing of parents or relatives.
    Taliban restrictions on the movement of women and girls in areas 
that they controlled hampered the ability of U.N. agencies and NGO's to 
implement effectively health and education programs targeted to both 
boys and girls.
    The educational sector currently is characterized by limited human 
and financial resources; the absence of a national educational policy 
and curriculum; the unpreparedness of the authorities to rehabilitate 
destroyed facilities; and discriminatory policies banning the access of 
females to all levels of education, according to a report by the Gender 
Advisor to the U.N. System in Afghanistan. Female literacy is 
approximately 4 percent, compared with an overall literacy rate of 30 
percent. There have been reports that the ban on women working outside 
of the home has hampered the education of boys, since a large 
percentage of the country's teachers were women prior the advent of 
Taliban rule.
    The Taliban have eliminated most of the formal opportunities for 
girls' education that existed in areas that they have taken over; 
however, some girls' schools still operate in rural areas and some 
towns. Some girls also are receiving an education in informal home 
schools, which are tolerated to varying degrees by the Taliban around 
the country. During the year, there were reports that the number of 
children that these home schools reach was increasing and that there 
was an increase in the attendance of girls in various educational 
settings, including formal schools. However, in June 1998, more than 
100 NGO-funded girls' schools and home-based women's vocational 
projects were closed by the Taliban in Kabul. In 1998 the Taliban also 
stated that schools would not be allowed to teach girls over the age of 
8, that schools teaching girls would be required to be licensed, and 
that such schools would be required to limit their curriculums to the 
Koran. However, the Taliban's implementation of educational policy is 
inconsistent and varies from region to region, as well as over time.
    In September 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women noted the existence of home schools and also of limited primary 
educational institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in 
Kabul. The Taliban told the Special Rapporteur in 1999 that primary 
education is available to girls between the ages of 6 and 10 and that 
this was dispensed in mosque schools under the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. About three-fourths of the curricula in the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs schools reportedly deals with religious and moral 
subjects. Taliban-sponsored public schools, at both the elementary and 
secondary levels, provide education only to boys and also emphasize 
religious studies. However, schools run by NGO's and international 
donors mostly are open to both boys and girls.
    Despite the limitations on education and the Taliban's restrictions 
on female education, approximately 25 to 30 percent of boys were 
estimated to be enrolled in school and up to 10 percent of girls were 
estimated to attend school, whether NGO-run, mosque schools, or home 
schools, according to UNICEF. This represents a modest increase in both 
boys' and girls' school enrollment over the last 5 years. Prior to the 
Taliban takeover in 1996, more than 100,000 girls reportedly attended 
public school in Kabul in grades kindergarten to 12, according to a 
U.N. survey. During 1999 approximately 300,000 to 350,000 school-age 
children attended schools run or funded by various assistance agencies 
and NGO's. In 1999 the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) reported 
that it served 175,000 students in 567 schools; most of these were 
formal schools, but 39 were home schools. In a few areas, over 50 
percent of students reportedly were girls. The SCA reported that 20 
percent of the students in its formal schools, mostly located in rural 
areas, were girls. Many boys also were being educated in home schools, 
because of administrative problems in the Taliban-run schools, 
including problems in the payment of teachers' salaries. A high 
proportion of the students in Northern Alliance-controlled territory 
reportedly were girls. In 1999 in areas newly captured by the Taliban, 
some communities successfully petitioned Taliban representatives to 
reopen the schools. In Herat, which was captured by the Taliban in 
1995, girls' schools have remained closed except in the refugee camps 
maintained by international NGO's. Nonetheless, approximately 5 percent 
of girls were enrolled in school in Kandahar; approximately 20 percent 
of girls were enrolled in Herat. Some families have sent girls abroad 
for education in order to evade the Taliban's prohibitions on females 
attending school.
    There have been unconfirmed reports that the Taliban uses child 
soldiers. In the past, there have been some cases of trafficking in 
children (see Section 6.f.).
    The Taliban have banned certain recreational activities, such as 
kite flying and playing chess. In October the Taliban banned youths 
from playing soccer in Kabul on Fridays. Dolls and stuffed animals are 
prohibited due to the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions 
against representations of living beings.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no measures to protect the 
rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate 
accessibility for them. Victims of landmines continued to be a major 
focus of international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted 
resources to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and 
rehabilitation therapy to amputees. It is believed that there was more 
public acceptance of the disabled because of the increasing prevalence 
of the disabled due to landmines or other war-related injuries. There 
are reports that disabled women, who need a prosthesis or other aid to 
walk, are virtually homebound because they cannot wear the burqa over 
the prosthesis or other aid.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--During the year, there were 
reports of harassment, extortion, and forced expulsion from their homes 
of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks by Taliban soldiers. The Taliban is 
Pashtun-dominated and has show little tolerance for accommodation with 
ethnic minorities.
    It is estimated that the Taliban may have killed thousands of 
members of the ethnic Hazara minority in 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
    In the past, there were reliable reports that individuals were 
detained by both the Taliban and Northern Alliance because of their 
ethnic origins and suspected sympathy with opponents. Ethnic Hazara, 
who are overwhelmingly Shi'a, reportedly have been targeted for 
ethnically-motivated attacks, in particular by the overwhelmingly Sunni 
and ethnic Pashtun Taliban forces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Little is known about labor laws and 
practices. There were no reports of labor rallies or strikes. Labor 
rights are not defined, and in the context of the breakdown of 
governmental authority there is no effective central authority to 
enforce them. Many of Kabul's industrial workers are unemployed due to 
the destruction or abandonment of the city's minuscule manufacturing 
base. An insignificant fraction of the work force ever has labored in 
an industrial setting. The only large employers in Kabul are the 
governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries and local 
and international NGO's.
    Workers in government ministries reportedly have been fired because 
they received part of their education abroad or because of contacts 
with the previous regimes, although certain officials in previous 
administrations still are employed under the Taliban. Others reportedly 
have been fired for violating Taliban regulations concerning beard 
length.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The country 
lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining. There are no 
known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor disputes. 
Wages are determined by market forces, or, in the case of government 
workers, dictate.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Little information 
is available on forced or compulsory labor, including child labor. 
There have been reports that the Taliban has forced prisoners to do 
construction work at Kandahar prison and that the Taliban used forced 
labor after its takeover of the Shomali plains area in the summer of 
1999. There have been credible reports that Masood forced Taliban 
prisoners to work on road and airstrip construction projects under 
life-threatening conditions (such as requiring them to dig in mined 
areas). There were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no evidence that authorities in any part of the 
country enforce labor laws, if they exist, relating to the employment 
of children. Children from the age of 6 often work to help support 
their families by herding animals in rural areas and by collecting 
paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or collecting scrap metal 
among street debris in the cities. Some of these practices expose 
children to the danger of landmines.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no available 
information regarding a statutory minimum wage or the enforcement of 
safe labor practices. Many workers apparently are allotted time off 
regularly for prayers and observance of religious holidays. Most work 
in the informal sector.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no available information 
regarding legislation prohibiting trafficking in persons. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women reported that there were 
some cases of trafficking in women and children (see Section 5). There 
were reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be 
foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Shomali 
plains during fighting in August 1999. Women taken in trucks from the 
area of fighting in the Shomali plains reportedly were trafficked to 
Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf states.
                               __________

                               BANGLADESH

    Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers 
exercised by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the 
leader of the Awami League, which came to power in 1996 in national 
elections deemed to be free and fair by international observers. There 
is an active political opposition. Violence is a pervasive feature of 
politics, including political campaigns, and elections frequently are 
marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging. The major 
opposition political parties have abstained from Parliament since July 
1999, diminishing Parliament's effectiveness. The opposition parties 
accuse the Awami League Government of abusing its parliamentary 
majority to prevent real debate on legislation and national issues. The 
higher levels of the judiciary display a significant degree of 
independence and often rule against the Government; however, lower 
judicial officers fall under the executive, and are reluctant to 
challenge government decisions.
    The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary 
forces, which bear primary responsibility for maintaining internal 
security. The Government frequently uses the police for political 
purposes. There is widespread police corruption and lack of discipline. 
Police officers committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
    Bangladesh is a very poor country. Annual per capita income among 
the population of about 130 million is approximately $350. Slightly 
more than half of all children are chronically malnourished. Seventy 
percent of the work force is involved in agriculture, which accounts 
for one-fourth of the gross domestic product. The economy is market-
based, but the Government still plays a significant role. The 
industrial sector is growing, albeit slowly, based largely on the 
manufacture of garments and textiles by privately owned companies. A 
small, wealthy elite controls much of the private economy, but there is 
an emerging middle class. Foreign investment has increased 
significantly in the gas sector and in electrical power generation 
facilities. Foreign aid still is significant, but has diminished 
somewhat in relative importance vis-a-vis increased earnings from 
exports and remittances from workers overseas. Efforts to improve 
governance and economic growth through reform have been unsuccessful, 
and were blocked by bureaucratic intransigence, vested economic 
interests, endemic corruption, and political polarization. The 
Government's commitment to economic reform is weak. Periodic natural 
disasters, including a severe flood in 1998, also hamper development; 
nevertheless, the economic growth rate during the last fiscal year was 
about 5.5 percent.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in some areas; however, its record remained poor in many other 
significant areas, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Police 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons died in 
police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely used 
torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating 
suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators. The Government rarely 
convicts and punishes those persons responsible for torture or unlawful 
deaths. Prison conditions are extremely poor for the majority of the 
prison population. Rape of female detainees in prison or other official 
custody has been a problem; however, there were no reports of this 
during the year. The Government continued to arrest and detain persons 
arbitrarily, and to use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow for arbitrary arrest and 
preventive detention, to harass political opponents and other citizens 
by detaining them without formal charges. The Government encourages 
violence by urging retaliation against opposition members who attack 
government supporters. The Government filed numerous criminal cases 
against opposition leaders and activists; in at least some of these 
cases, the charges likely were false. The newly-enacted Public Safety 
Act (PSA) gives the police even greater opportunity to abuse their 
powers. Much of the judiciary is subject to executive influence and 
suffers from corruption. A large case backlog slowed the judicial 
process, and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Police searched 
homes without warrants, and the Government forcibly relocated slum 
dwellers. Virtually all journalists practiced some self-censorship. 
Attacks on journalists and efforts to intimidate them by government 
officials, political party activists, and others increased. The 
Government limited freedom of assembly, particularly for political 
opponents, and on occasion limited freedom of movement. The Government 
generally permitted a wide variety of human rights groups to conduct 
their activities, but it continued to refuse to register a local 
chapter of Amnesty International. Abuse of children and child 
prostitution are problems. Violence and discrimination against women 
remained serious problems. Discrimination against the disabled, 
indigenous people, and religious minorities was a problem. There was 
occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya religious minority. 
The Government continued to limit worker rights, especially in the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZ's), and, in general, is ineffective in 
enforcing workers' rights. Some domestic servants, including many 
children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and many suffer 
abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers remained widespread and 
serious problems. However, a 1995 agreement between the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) that has eliminated about 95 
percent of child labor in the export garment sector, the main export 
industry, was extended in June. Trafficking in women and children for 
the purpose of forced prostitution and at times for forced labor 
remained serious problems. Both ruling and opposition political parties 
and their activists often employed violence, causing deaths and 
numerous injuries; however, the number of deaths has declined, likely 
due to fewer general strikes during the year. Vigilante justice 
resulted in numerous killings, according to press reports.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Police committed a 
number of extrajudicial killings.
    Security forces sometimes used unwarranted lethal force. On 
February 9, police officers shot and killed Mohammad Ahmed Hossain 
Sumon, while trying to arrest him. Police officers also shot and 
wounded Sumon's brother and 12-year-old niece. Family members began to 
drive the victims to the hospital in a van, at which time the police 
again shot at them, breaking the van's windshield. No action was taken 
against the policemen involved in the killing. On May 3, police 
officers shot and killed two workers in the Savar EPZ, as police 
stormed a factory that disgruntled workers had taken over; another two 
persons later died from stab wounds sustained during the seizure (see 
Sections 1.c. and 6.b.). On September 18, police officers brandished 
weapons at persons attempting to rescue Mahbub Hasan Khan Oli, who was 
drowning in a Dhaka pond into which he had jumped to evade police 
capture. Oli drowned. In March 1999, police officers in Dhaka drowned 
college student Mujibur Rahman, and in July 1999, three policemen in 
Dhaka allegedly severely beat Mohammed Shahjada Tuku, then threw him 
into a canal where he drowned; as of year's end, none of the officers 
involved had been held accountable.
    According to government figures, 134 persons died in prison and 
police custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). According to an 
independent human rights organization, 70 persons died in police, 
prison, court custody, and army camps during the year.
    Most police abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of 
impunity remains a serious obstacle to ending police abuse and 
extrajudicial killings. However, in some instances where there was 
evidence of police culpability for extrajudicial killings, the 
authorities took action. In March 1999, four police officers were 
charged with manslaughter after a body was found in the rooftop water 
tank of the Detective Branch in Dhaka. The case is ongoing. The case 
against a police sergeant for killing a rickshaw puller in July 1999 in 
Agargaon remained pending at year's end.
    Court proceedings continued against 14 persons, including 13 police 
officers, arrested and charged after a college student in police 
custody was beaten to death in July 1998. At year's end, nine of the 
accused persons were in custody, and proceedings in the case were 
continuing (see Section 1.c.).
    In 1995 the Government charged former President Hossain Mohammad 
Ershad with ordering the 1981 murder of the alleged assassin of 
President Ziaur Rahman. Ershad, leader of the Jatiya party, was granted 
bail in 1997. In late 1998, immediately after Ershad took a stronger 
stance against the Government, the Prime Minister made remarks implying 
that the Government might accelerate the case. Subsequently Ershad 
entered into an alliance with other opposition parties to pressure the 
Government to step down by calling hartals and boycotting Parliament. 
On August 24, in a case concerning alleged misuse of power and 
corruption during Ershad's tenure as President, a High Court panel 
sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine of $1 million (about 
55 million Taka) (see Section 1.e.). After Ershad's surrender to the 
court and subsequent incarceration on November 20, an appellate panel 
of the Supreme Court ruled that Ershad could be released from prison 
after payment of the fine, or after serving 6 months if the fine is 
unpaid. As of year's end, Ershad remained in jail. Ershad may be barred 
from politics for 5 years.
    In 1998 a judge convicted and sentenced to death 15 persons for the 
1975 murder of then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) and 21 of his family members (see Section 
1.e.). On June 28, the High Court began hearing an appeal of the 
verdicts and a review of the sentences. On December 14, a 2-judge High 
Court panel confirmed 10 of the convictions and death sentences. On the 
remaining five convictions, the two judges released split opinions, and 
those cases were pending further High Court review at year's end (see 
Section 1.e.).
    The Government continued to imprison eight persons accused of 
perpetrating the November 1975 murders of four senior Awami League 
leaders who then were in jail (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On October 
12, charges were filed against these individuals and 13 others who are 
not in custody. At year's end, the court was scheduled to begin hearing 
testimony in the case on January 24, 2001.
    Vigilante violence against criminals by private citizens occurs. 
The Government reported that, by year's end, vigilantes killed 1 
person, compared to 20 persons during the first 9 months of 1999. 
Authorities rarely arrest and punish those responsible for vigilante 
violence.
    Press reports of vigilante killings by mobs are common. Tallying 
these reports, a newspaper estimated that mobs had beaten to death at 
least 14 persons in May and had killed at least 10 persons in June. 
Press editorials and commentaries opinioned that the increasing mob 
violence reflected a breakdown of law and order and a popular 
perception that the criminal justice system does not function. Human 
rights groups and press reports indicate that vigilante violence 
against women who are accused of having committed moral offenses is 
common, particularly in rural areas, and that religious leaders 
sometimes lead it (see Section 5).
    Mob violence also occurs. On August 18, Alfred Soren, a leader of 
the Santal tribe in the northern part of the country was killed and 
dozens of others were injured, in a mob attack, reportedly carried out 
by Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land dispute (see 
Section 5).
    Violence, often resulting in killings, is a pervasive element in 
the country's politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of 
different political parties, and often supporters of different factions 
within one party, frequently clash with each other and with police 
during rallies and demonstrations. According to government figures, 15 
persons were killed and 56 others were injured in politically motivated 
violence during the year. Awami Leaque supporters, often with the 
connivance and support of the police, violently disrupted rallies and 
demonstrations of the opposition parties (see Sections 2.b. and 3). 
Opposition parties also used armed violence and intimidation to enforce 
general strikes. During the year, four persons died in violence related 
to general strikes (hartals); five others were killed when run over by 
recklessly-driven vehicles that were violating the hartal.
    One person was killed in an explosion at opposition BNP 
headquarters just hours before the beginning of a hartal on February 2. 
The Government accused the opposition of manufacturing bombs; the 
opposition alleged that the explosion was a government plot designed to 
discredit the opposition. During the February 2 hartal, another person 
was killed by a bomb in Dhaka. During the February 16 hartal, a 
businessman was killed in the old section of Dhaka. On August 30, a BNP 
youth front leader was killed during a hartal by unidentified persons 
in the old section of Dhaka.
    During an opposition-called hartal in 1999, eyewitnesses saw Maqbul 
Hossain, an Awami League Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the Dhanmondi 
area of Dhaka, order the killing of two young BNP activists who had 
been seized by Hossain's armed followers. Members of Hossain's 
entourage then shot at point-blank range one of the men, BNP activist 
Sajal Chowdhury, who subsequently died; the other person was beaten. 
About a dozen police officers who were standing nearby in riot gear 
made no effort to intervene or to apprehend the gunmen, nor did the 
Government later take action against those persons responsible. 
However, police summoned for repeated interrogations the family of 
Chowdhury, which had filed a murder complaint against M.P. Hossain and 
the armed men. One Chowdhury family member was arrested on criminal 
charges, then detained under the SPA after a judge granted him bail 
(see Section 1.d.). In December 1999, police submitted their final 
report on the case to the court, stating that the evidence did not 
support the murder charge. Subsequently, the court accepted the police 
report and dismissed the case against Hossain. Hossain then served 
legal notice on the victim's family, demanding that they explain why 
they should not be charged with criminal defamation.
    Political killings continued during non-hartal periods as well. On 
July 16, Shamsur Rahman, a well-respected journalist who wrote articles 
on smuggling and terrorism in the southwestern region, was killed in 
Jessore. The Home Minister blamed the opposition for the killings; 
others blamed members of the ruling party who are connected with the 
smugglers. Numerous other journalists were killed or attacked by 
government or societal forces throughout the year (see Section 2.a.). 
On August 11, S.M.A. Rab, a prominent Awami League leader in Khulna, 
was killed. A Maoist group claimed responsibility. However, Rab's son 
blamed the killing on his father's rivals inside the ruling party who 
were upset by the Prime Minister's announcement that Rab would be the 
party's nominee for the Khulna mayoral post. On August 16, rival 
political party activists in the old section of Dhaka killed Awami 
League leader Kamal Hossain. On August 20, a pro-BNP attorney, Habibur 
Rahman Mandal, was shot and killed in the old section of Dhaka while on 
his way to court. The same morning a pro-Awami League attorney, Kalidas 
Boral, was shot and killed in Bagerhat (near Kulna), allegedly by 
rivals within his own party. A mourning procession for the two slain 
attorneys was fired upon, resulting in injuries (see Section 1.c.).
    On July 21, a large bomb was unearthed near the site of a public 
meeting at which the Prime Minister was to speak the following day. On 
July 23, a second bomb was discovered near a helicopter pad that she 
had used the previous day (see Section 1.c.).
    In March 1999, two persons were killed while making bombs at ruling 
party M.P. Mohammed Mohibur Rahman Manik's residence in the Sylhet 
region. Newspaper speculations that the bombs were to have been used if 
local intraparty conflicts were contested. Police arrested Manik in May 
1999 for involvement in bomb making. The court charged the M.P. on 
February 29; at year's end, Manik remained free on bail. On August 16, 
Manik was injured, along with approximately 50 others, in a gun battle 
between 2 factions of the Awami League in Sunamganj, Sylhet Division. 
On March 7, 1999, 2 bombs exploded in Jessore, killing 10 persons who 
were attending a performance of the leftaffiliated cultural group 
Udichi Shilpa Gosthi. On July 19, 24 individuals were charged in 
connection with the bombing(s), including former minister and BNP 
leader Tariqul Islam. As of year's end, Islam and 2 others accused in 
the case were free on bail, 18 individuals were in jail, and 3 are not 
in custody. While awaiting trial, Islam and the two others on bail 
appealed to have the charges dismissed, saying that they were not 
involved in the case. The High Court stayed the order until February 
14, 2001. On February 16, 1999, masked gunmen shot and killed Jatiya 
Samajtantrik Dal leader Kazi Aref Ahmed and four others as they were 
addressing a public rally in a village near Khushtia. On July 11, 29 
individuals were charged in connection with the incident; 25 of them 
are in custody. As of year's end, the case was continuing.
    Violence also is endemic between the student political wings of the 
major national parties, and between rival factions within the parties. 
In an escalation of political violence, on July 12, gunmen fired 
automatic guns at a van in Chittagong, killing eight persons, including 
six members of the ruling party's student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra 
League (BCL). The Govenment accused the student wing of the opposition 
JamaateIslami Party of being responsible for the attack. The Prime 
Minister challenged her supporters and the police to retaliate for the 
murders of her student supporters, declaring that there should be 10 
opposition bodies for each one from the ruling party. An anti-Jamaat 
campaign following the July 12 killings resulted in the deaths of at 
least 2 Jamaat activists, the injury of many others, and the arrests of 
hundreds more (see Section 1.d.). The opposition asserts that the 
attack on the van was a continuation of a shoot-out the previous day 
between rival factions of the BCL that left three BCL activists dead. 
Published photographs of an August 20 clash between two factions of the 
BCL at Kabi Nazrul College in the old section of Dhaka showed a BCL 
activist wielding a pistol in the presence of a policeman. The ruling 
Awami League temporarily suspended the operations of its youth front 
wing in Dhaka. On December 15, many major newspapers published a photo 
of a man pointing a gun during the riot that ensued after the court 
issued a split verdict in the murder case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 
his family (see Section 1.e.). The man was identified as Hemayetuddin, 
a well-known BCL leader. No police action was taken against him. The 
main opposition BNP suspended activities of the central unit of its 
student wing, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, following the killing of two 
persons in a factional dispute at Dhaka University on July 2.
    Extortion from businesses and individuals by persons with political 
backing was common, and businessmen on several occasions went on 
strikes to protest the extortion. On May 25, several young men shot and 
killed Iftekhar Ahmed Shipu, owner of a cellular telephone shop in 
Dhaka, after Shipu refused to give them a free telephone. A ruling 
party parliamentarian's son and several others were charged with the 
killing in a case filed by Shipu's relatives. According to press 
accounts and a subsequent investigation by a human rights organization, 
a gang led by Sumon, son of an influential local Awami League leader, 
abducted two young men on September 15 and demanded a ransom of about 
$1,000 (50,000 Taka), which the parents did not pay. The dismembered 
bodies of the two victims were found in a drain the following day. The 
human rights organization report asserts that the police did not 
intervene to rescue the two young men, but rather shared drinks and 
cigarettes with the gang members as they were holding the two victims. 
Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the local police station was 
transferred, and the police arrested several members of the gang.
    b. Disappearance.--During the night of September 18, Nurul Islam, 
the BNP Organizing Secretary for Laxmipur district, was abducted from 
his home. According to reports from neighbors and from BNP sources, the 
General Secretary of the local chapter of the Awami League was behind 
this abduction and suspected killing. Police subsequently searched the 
General Secretary's residence for evidence relating to the abduction. A 
case was filed against the General Secretary, 2 of his sons, and 12 
others, but neither the General Secretary nor his sons were arrested.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment; however, police routinely employ physical and 
psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and 
interrogations. Torture may consist of threats, beatings and, 
occasionally, the use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicts 
or punishes those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity 
allows such police abuses to continue. After several Dhaka policemen 
were arrested in 1998 for allegedly beating to death a college student 
in police custody (see Section 1.a.), the deputy commissioner of the 
Dhaka police detective branch publicly defended the use of physical 
coercion against suspects, saying that the practice was necessary in 
order to obtain information.
    Nasir Uddin Pintu, a leader of the opposition student group 
Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), alleged that he was tortured in police 
custody with beatings, sleep deprivation, and dousing with water. He 
also reported that he was denied proper food and water while in custody 
from December 1999 to January. One human rights organization reported 
that, after conducting a field investigation, it had confirmed that on 
June 13, police officers in Jhenidaha arrested a 12-year-old boy named 
Belal, hung him nude from a tree, tied a brick to his genitals, and 
beat him with sticks, allegedly for teasing a beggar. The human rights 
organization reported that the family was too intimidated to file a 
criminal report on this incident. Subsequently, one police officer from 
the nearby Betai Police Camp was suspended temporarily; other policemen 
from the Camp were transferred.
    Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody has 
been a problem, as the Chief Justice of the Bangladesh Supreme Court 
acknowledged in a March speech when he observed that rapes and killings 
in police custody frequently occurred (see Section 1.a.). Some well-
publicized reports of rape in police custody in prior years resulted in 
a widespread public outcry. While there were no reports of such rapes 
during the year, it is unclear whether the situation has improved after 
public condemnation, or whether rapes continue and simply are not being 
reported.
    According to human rights groups and media reports, police engaged 
in violence and looting during the July 1999 raid of the Tanbazar and 
Nimtali brothel districts, allegedly attacking residents as well as 
over 40 female human rights activists who were protesting the eviction 
(see Section 1.f.). The evicted sex workers were detained in vagrant 
centers, where guards and fellow inmates subjected them to sexual 
assault and harassment. According to two human rights organizations, 
fewer than a dozen prostitutes remained in the vagrant homes at year's 
end.
    Police sometimes rape women who are not in custody. The Government 
reported that in May a police constable raped a woman who was not in 
police custody. After an investigation, the constable was charged with 
rape and placed under suspension. The case was pending at year's end. 
During the first 9 months of the year, one human rights organization 
documented nine cases of police raping women who were not in custody. 
In addition after women report that they are raped (or are involved in 
family disputes), they frequently are detained in ``safe custody,'' 
where they endure poor conditions, and sometimes are abused or, as has 
been reported in prior years, are raped (see Sections 1.d. and 5). 
Citing statistics from prison officials, one human rights organization 
asserted that as of September, 307 females (including adults and 
minors) and 114 male children were in ``safe custody.'' Government 
figures showed that 353 persons, including 139 women, were in safe 
custody at year's end.
    The police often employ excessive, sometimes lethal, force in 
dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3). 
Before a scheduled rally of former Awami League M.P. Kader Siddiqui in 
May, police stopped Siddiqui in front of his house, fired gunshots into 
the sky to scare his followers, and beat him so severely that he 
required hospitalization. Four of his party activists were detained 
under the PSA. On August 6, police broke up a rally of the four-party 
opposition alliance using tear gas, rubber bullets and batons. At least 
25 persons were injured seriously. On October 5, security personnel 
blocked a road in the southwestern part of the country to prevent 
opposition leader Begum Khaleda Zia from visiting floodaffected areas 
and addressing a scheduled rally. Awami League student activists, 
assisted by the police, dismantled the dais that had been erected for 
Zia's rally. Government leaders said Zia's scheduled rally was at the 
same venue as a rally the Prime Minister was slated to address. A 
formal clarification from the Government stated that this ``unfortunate 
situation'' would not have occurred had the opposition scheduled its 
program before or after the Prime Minister's. The opposition protested 
that its rally had been announced before the Prime Minister's program, 
and that it had assured the authorities that its program would be 
finished well ahead of the Prime Minister's arrival. In November 
approximately 100 persons were injured in Chittagong after police tried 
to break up a 500-person march of Jamaat-e-Islami party members. Police 
fired tear gas and blank shots to disperse the marchers, who retaliated 
with homemade bombs and bricks. Police arrested more than 100 
protestors; 40 still were in custody at year's end. In a separate 
incident, no action was taken against police in the 1999 beating of 
Shafiul Alam Prodhan, president of the Jatiya Gonotantrik Party.
    On May 3, police officers injured numerous persons in the Savar 
EPZ, as police stormed a garment factory that disgruntled workers had 
taken over. Four persons died and more than 20 persons were injured in 
the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 6.b.).
    According to a May Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, Rohingya 
refugees living in camps continue to suffer abuses, including beatings 
and other forms of physical abuse, and in the past have been coerced by 
camp administrators trying to secure their return to Burma (see Section 
2.d.).
    The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged 
violations of others (see Section 1.f.).
    Police corruption remains a problem and there were credible reports 
that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in women and 
children (see Section 6.f.).
    Both opposition and ruling parties routinely use actual or 
threatened violence to achieve political ends. Violence is a common 
feature during rallies, demonstrations, and general strikes. In an 
incident witnessed by a member of the foreign diplomatic community, on 
February 13, a joint procession of the four-party opposition alliance 
came under attack in Dhaka from unknown assailants. In retaliation some 
individuals from the procession damaged dozens of vehicles parked on 
the street. On August 7, members of an Awami League student wing 
procession fired upon a BNP torch procession in Narayanganj. The BNP 
demonstrators threw their torches at the Awami League student activists 
and stoned the police. As the police chased the BNP demonstrators, the 
Awami League activists ransacked the local BNP office. On August 16, 2 
ruling party factions fought a gun battle in Sylhet Division, injuring 
some 50 persons. Also in August, a mourning procession for two slain 
attorneys was fired upon by unidentified assailants, injuring four 
persons, including two policemen (see Section 1.a.).
    In the past, some opposition political activities, especially 
hartals, allegedly were staged with the intent of provoking violent 
clashes, in order to embarrass the Government and galvanize public 
opinion. However, the overall incidence and severity of hartals 
decreased significantly during the year.
    On December 22, after the BNP announced a new central committee for 
its youth wing, the Jatiyabadi Chhatra Dal, JCD activists opposed to 
the new leaders attacked the houses of two BNP leaders, damaged 
vehicles, and ransacked properties to protest the new committee, 
alleging that the new leaders were well-known terrorists, not students 
(see Section 1.a.).
    Members of the Ahmadiya religious minority were attacked at several 
places in the country (see Section 5).
    In rural areas, human rights groups and press reports indicate that 
vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurs, 
and may include humiliating, painful punishments such as whipping (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5). Rejected suitors, angry husbands, or those 
seeking revenge sometimes throw acid in a woman's face (see Section 5).
    On July 21, in Kotalipara village, Gopalganj district, a large bomb 
was found near the rostrum where Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was 
supposed to make an appearance the following day. On July 23, a second 
bomb of similar size was found buried near the helipad prepared for the 
Prime Minister's use at the same site. No one was hurt. The Government 
accused the opposition of plotting to kill the Prime Minister, and 
several dozen persons, including members of Jamaat-e-Islami and other 
proIslamic groups, were arrested or picked up for interrogation. On 
September 13, 20 persons were accused of being involved in the 
assassination attempt. Of those, 11 later were charged. At year's end, 
four were in custody; several others remained unapprehended (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions are extremely poor for most prisoners. The 
Supreme Court Chief Justice told a seminar on August 10 that prisoners 
live a ``subhuman'' life. Official figures indicated that 134 persons 
died in prison and police custody during the year (see Section 1.a.). 
According to credible sources, poor conditions were at least a 
contributing factor in many of these deaths. Most prisons are 
overcrowded and lack adequate facilities. According to government 
figures, the current prison population of 63,489 roughly is 265 percent 
of the official prison capacity. Of those, 16,393 were convicted and 
47,096 were awaiting trial or under trial. In some cases, cells are so 
crowded that prisoners sleep in shifts. The Dhaka Central Jail 
reportedly houses over 8,000 prisoners in a facility designed for fewer 
than 3,000 persons. A 1998 judicial report noted the poor physical 
condition of jails and unhygienic food preparation. Drugs are abused 
widely inside the prisons. The treatment of prisoners in the jails is 
not equal. There are three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common 
criminals and lowlevel political workers generally are held in C cells, 
which often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality food. 
The use of restraining devices on prisoners in these cells is common. 
Conditions in A and B cells are markedly better; A cells are reserved 
for prominent prisoners. The Government has begun construction of 
additions to jail facilities in an effort to alleviate overcrowding.
    In general the Government does not permit prison visits by 
independent human rights monitors (see Section 4). Government-appointed 
committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality 
monitor prisons monthly, but do not release their findings. District 
judges occasionally also visit prisons, but rarely disclose their 
findings.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued 
to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national 
security legislation (the SPA or PSA) to detain citizens without formal 
charges or specific complaints being filed against them. The 
Constitution states that each person arrested shall be informed of the 
grounds for detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice, 
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the 
magistrate authorizes continued detention. However, the Constitution 
specifically allows preventive detention, with specified safeguards, 
outside these requirements. In practice authorities frequently violate 
these constitutional provisions, even in non-preventive detention 
cases. In an April 1999 ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized 
the police force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers.
    Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may 
be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a 
magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section 
54 subsequently are charged with a crime, while others are released 
without any charge. According to the Government, 10,582 persons were 
arrested under Section 54 during the year. Of those, 3,915 subsequently 
were charged with criminal offenses. In 1998 the Home Minister 
acknowledged that police abuse Section 54. The Government sometimes 
uses Section 54 to harass and to intimidate members of the political 
opposition and their families. In a Government crackdown on the Jamaat-
e-Islami after the July 12 killings of Awami League student supporters 
in Chittagong (see Section 1.a), the police arrested 38 Jamaat students 
at Rajshahi University on July 15 under Section 54. After an August 6 
clash between student activists of the ruling Awami League and the 
Jamaat-e-Islami at the Islamic University in Kushtia, the police 
detained 30 Jamaat-e-Islami supporters under Section 54. In addition 
police commonly detain opposition activists prior to and during general 
strikes without citing any legal authority, holding them until the 
event is over. Newspapers sometimes report instances of police 
detaining persons to extract money or for personal vengeance.
    Under the SPA the Government or a district magistrate may order 
anyone detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely 
``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to 
the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The 
Government (or magistrate) must inform the detainee of the grounds for 
detention within 15 days, and the Government must approve the grounds 
for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. In practice 
detainees sometimes are held for longer periods without the Government 
stating the grounds for the detention or formally approving it. 
Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant 
early release.
    An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are 
qualified to be, high court judges and one civil servant are supposed 
to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. If the Government 
adequately defends its detention order, the detainee remains 
imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. Appellate courts 
sometimes order authorities to release SPA detainees after finding that 
the Government is unable to justify the detention. If the defendant in 
an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in Dhaka, 
the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant. However, many 
defendants are either too poor or, because of strict detention, are 
unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby move the case beyond the 
magistrate level. Magistrates are subject to the administrative 
controls of the Establishment Ministry and are less likely to dismiss a 
case (see Section 1.e.). Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers, 
although usually not until a charge is filed. They are not entitled to 
be represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may 
receive visitors. While in the past the Government has held 
incommunicado some prominent prisoners, there were no known cases of 
incommunicado detention during the year.
    According to a study carried out by a parliamentary subcommittee 
and released on September 7, successive governments have detained 
69,010 persons since the SPA was enacted in 1974, and have released 
68,195 persons, following orders from the High Court. The study 
asserted that the SPA cases generally are so weak and vague that the 
court had no alternative but to grant bail.
    The Government cites a significant reduction in the number of 
persons held under the SPA as evidence that it is minimizing its use of 
the act; some observers assert that use of the recentlyenacted Public 
Safety Act (PSA) explains the reduction of persons held under the SPA. 
According to the Government, 801 persons were under SPA detention at 
year's end: 416 for terrorism, 301 for smuggling, and 84 for anti-
social activities. This was 180 fewer than the 981 persons under 
detention as of January 1, and a substantial decrease from the 
approximately 2,000 persons under SPA detention in mid-1997. According 
to the Government, authorities detained 1,331 persons under the SPA and 
released 1,511 SPA detainees during the year.
    In response to a deteriorating law and order situation, Parliament 
passed the restrictive new PSA in January; the law became effective in 
February. The law established special tribunals to hear cases under the 
act, and made such offenses non-bailable. Opposition leaders expressed 
fears that the law would be used to arrest political opponents of the 
ruling party, as the law, like the SPA, allows police to circumvent 
normal procedures designed to prevent arbitrary arrest, and precludes 
detainees from being released on bail, which often is the result of 
arrests based on little or no concrete evidence (see Section 2.b.). 
According to the Government, 1,350 persons were arrested under the PSA 
during the year: 445 for interfering with tenders and 905 for damaging 
vehicles or obstructing traffic. Of those, 450 persons were released, 
140 within 1 month, 301 within 3 months, and 9 within 6 months of 
detention. According to a human rights organization, 3,763 persons were 
accused under the PSA from February through August 10. Of these 
persons, 1,285 eventually were arrested. Another human rights 
organization reports that from June 1 to September 15, 1,166 persons 
were accused under the PSA, of whom 90 belonged to the BNP, 29 to the 
Awami League, and 32 to the the Jamaat-e-Islami.
    Opposition leaders claim that the Government used the new PSA to 
intimidate them. There are credible reports from human rights monitors 
and political activists that the Awami League Government uses both the 
SPA and the new PSA as tools to harass and intimidate political 
opponents and others. In November police searched the residence of 
Bahauddin, editor of an opposition newspaper, to arrest him on charges 
of sedition for publishing a parody of the national anthem that mocked 
the Prime Minister (see Section 2.a.). When police could not find 
Bahauddin, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead, under the 
Special Powers Act (see Section 1.f.). Mainuddin spent 16 days in jail 
and then was released under court order.
    On December 26, BNP Member of Parliament Morshed Khan went to a 
shop to inquire about the identity of some youths who had attacked his 
son over a minor traffic incident. According to Khan, a mob of several 
dozen youths with weapons and sticks gathered around the shop to attack 
him. He quickly left. After the incident, a PSA case was filed against 
Khan and his son for allegedly stealing cash from the shop. In contrast 
no PSA case was filed against any member of the Awami League student 
front, the BCL, when they incited a riot on December 14 after 
announcement of the split verdict in the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman murder 
case (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). BCL activists had taken to the 
streets, smashing and burning hundreds of vehicles, and one auto-
rickshaw driver was shot and killed. No PSA charges were filed against 
BCL leader Humayetuddin, whose photo appeared in numerous newspapers, 
wielding a gun during the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.), nor 
against others identified as participants in this violence.
    There is a system of bail for criminal offenses. Bail is granted 
commonly for both violent and nonviolent crimes. However, some 
provisions of the law preclude the granting of bail. The Women and 
Children Repression Prevention Act provides special procedures for 
persons accused of violence against women and children. Persons 
arrested under this act cannot be granted bail during an initial 
investigation period of up to 90 days. Some human rights groups express 
concern that a large number of allegations made under the act are 
false, since the non-bailable period of detention is an effective tool 
for exacting personal vengeance. According to government figures, 7,565 
persons were detained under this act during the year. At year's end, 
there were 2,139 persons detained under this law. A total of 201 
persons were convicted under this law during the year. In January 
Parliament passed The Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, 
which amended and superseded the old law of the same name. The new law 
calls for harsher penalties, provides for compensation to victims, and 
requires action against investigating officers for negligence or 
willful failure in duty (see Section 5). In a radio interview on July 
26, the Prime Minister called the courts ``safe havens'' for criminals, 
and criticized the courts for being too liberal in granting bail, even 
to known criminals. The Prime Minister's remarks led to protests from 
lawyers and the filing of three contempt of court petitions against 
her. If bail is not granted, the law does not specify a time limit on 
pretrial detention.
    Prisons often are used to provide ``safe custody'' for women who 
are victims of rapes or domestic violence (see Sections 1.c. and 5). 
One study conducted by the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers 
Association (BNWLA) found that nearly half of the women in Dhaka's 
Central Jail were crime victims being held in safe custody, not 
criminals (see Sections 1.c. and 5). While women initially may consent 
to this arrangement, it often is difficult for them later to obtain 
their release, or to gain access to family or lawyers. While there have 
been reports in prior years of police raping women in safe custody, 
there were no reports that this occurred during the year (see Section 
1.c.).
    A major problem with the court system is the overwhelming backlog 
of cases, which produces long pretrial delays. The Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court on May 19 told a gathering organized by the Law Ministry 
that about 1 million cases were pending in criminal, civil, and 
appellate courts. More than 47,000 persons, or about 75 percent of the 
country's prison population, were awaiting trial or under trial. 
According to research by one human rights organization, most prison 
inmates never have been convicted and are awaiting trial. The 
Government explains that many convicted persons who are appealing their 
cases sometimes mistakenly are counted as ``pretrial detainees.'' 
Government sources report that the period between detention and trial 
averages 6 months, but press and human rights groups report instances 
of pretrial detention lasting several years. One human rights 
organization asserted that the average time in detention before either 
conviction or acquittal is in the range of 4 to 7 years. Reportedly 
some prisoners awaiting trail have been in prison longer than the 
maximum sentence they would receive if convicted. In one case reported 
by a human rights group, a suspended bank officer in Chittagong was 
arrrested in 1985 on corruption charges. Bail was granted in 41 of the 
45 cases filed against him. The bail petitions in the remaining four 
cases have yet to be heard, and trials on the merits of any of the 
charges have not begun. If convicted of the charges against him, his 
maximum sentence would be no more than 10 years, yet he already has 
served 15 years in pretrial detention. In another case, the BNP 
government in 1993 arrested a 10-year-old boy in connection with an 
Awami League demonstration. He remained in jail without a hearing until 
this year, when a prominent Dhaka attorney took up his case and won his 
release on bail. Trials often are characterized by lengthy 
adjournments, which considerably prolong the incarceration of accused 
persons who do not receive bail.
    Citizens who are not political opponents sometimes also are 
detained arbitrarily. Newspapers and human rights activists report 
numerous cases in which a person is arrested in order to force family 
members to pay for his or her release. In a 1999 judgment criticizing 
the police for abuse of detention powers, the High Court commented that 
the police had become a law breaking agency. Most persons detained 
under the SPA ultimately are released without charges being brought to 
trial (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
    The Government sometimes uses serial detentions to prevent the 
release of political activists. A former Jamaat-e-Islami M.P. was 
released on bail on October 3 and immediately redetained under the SPA. 
National Socialist Party member Mahmud Hasan Shachchu, an elected 
leader of a local government unit in Kushtia, was jailed in June 1999. 
After the High Court declared his detention illegal in April, the local 
magistrate detained Shachchu again under the SPA.
    Numerous court cases have been filed against opposition M.P.'s and 
activists, on charges ranging from corruption to murder. In June 1999, 
the Prime Minister told Parliament that more than 70 current BNP M.P.'s 
were under investigation for alleged corruption during the previous 
administration. Most of these corruption cases still were under 
investigation and a few had been completed by year's end. Obaidur 
Rahman, a BNP M.P., remained in prison. Rahman and two other political 
figures were arrested in October 1998 for alleged complicity in the 
1975 ``jail killings'' of four senior Awami League leaders. The 
Government continued to hold eight persons accused of perpetrating 
these murders. On October 12, the court filed charges against these 
persons. The deposition of witnesses in the jail killing case was 
scheduled to begin on January 24, 2001.
    Some opposition activists were detained or charged in questionable 
cases. On July 21, a Jamaat-e-Islami leader in Chittagong was arrested 
and accused in five cases; he subsequently was detained under the SPA. 
On September 11, the High Court found his detention invalid and ordered 
his release.
    In a case that appears to be politically-motivated, a senior leader 
of the opposition Islami Oikkyo Jote was detained from September 5 to 
November 7 under the SPA on the basis of his alleged involvement in 
undefined ``anti-State activities.''
    It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for 
political reasons. In some instances criminal charges may apply to the 
actions of activists, and many criminals claim political affiliations. 
Because of crowded court dockets and magistrates who are reluctant to 
challenge the Government, the judicial system does not deal effectively 
with criminal cases that may be political in origin. There is no 
independent body with the authority and ability to monitor detentions, 
or to prevent, detect, or publicize cases of political harassment. Most 
such detentions appear to be for short periods, such as several days or 
weeks. Defendants in most cases receive bail, but dismissal of wrongful 
charges or acquittal may take years.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary'' 
provision of the Constitution, some subordinate courts remain part of 
the executive and are subject to its influence. The higher levels of 
the judiciary display a significant degree of independence and often 
rule against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically 
controversial cases; however, lower level courts are more susceptible 
to pressure from the executive branch. There also is corruption within 
the legal process, especially at lower levels.
    In a case concerning alleged misuse of power and corruption during 
President Hossain Mohammad Ershad 's tenure as President, a High Court 
panel on August 24 sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine 
equivalent to about $1 million (approximately 55 million Taka). Ershad, 
who leads the Jatiya party, was sent to prison after he surrendered to 
the court on November 20. Meanwhile the appellate panel of the Supreme 
Court reduced his sentence to either payment of the fine or 6 months in 
jail. However, Ershad may be banned from Parliament for 5 years. In 
another case in 1995, the Government charged Ershad with ordering the 
1981 murder of the alleged assassin of President Ziaur Rahman (see 
Section 1.a.).
    There continued to be tension between the executive and the 
judiciary during the year. In 1999 the Government charged that the High 
Court granted bail to criminals indiscriminately, crippling efforts to 
combat crime. In January Parliament hastily passed the Public Safety 
Act, citing the ready availability of bail for criminal offenses as one 
of its motivations (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In October the court 
dismissed a case of contempt of court against Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hasina for her criticism of the court, but cautioned her against making 
statements not based on fact.
    On December 14, the High Court issued a split verdict in the murder 
case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder of the country and father of the 
Prime Minister, along with 21 members of his family. The senior judge 
in the case upheld the convictions and death sentences of 10 of the 15 
previously convicted persons, while the junior judge upheld the 
convictions and death sentences of all 15 of the convicted. The Prime 
Minister expressed her disappointment that both judges did not uphold 
the death sentences for all 15, and ruling party Chhatra League 
activists rioted in the streets, smashing and burning hundreds of cars 
in protest of the split verdict (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
    The court system has two levels: The lower courts and the Supreme 
Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of 
magistrates, who are part of the administrative branch of government, 
and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The 
Supreme Court is divided into two sections, the High Court and the 
Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews cases 
from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear 
appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court. 
Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
    Trials are public. The law provides the accused with the right to 
be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call 
witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State-funded defense attorneys 
rarely are provided, and there are few legal aid programs to offer 
financial assistance. In rural areas, individuals often do not receive 
legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel generally is 
available if individuals can afford the expense. However, sometimes 
detainees and suspects on police remand are denied access to legal 
counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA, the PSA, and the Women and 
Children Repression Prevention Act, are similar to normal trials, but 
are tried without the lengthy adjournments typical in other cases. 
Under the provisions of the PSA and the Women and Children Repression 
Prevention Act, special tribunals hear cases and issue verdicts. Cases 
under these laws must be investigated and tried within specific time 
limits, although the law is unclear as to the disposition of the case 
if it is not finished before the time limit elapses.
    Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely is done. In 
November 1998, 15 of the 19 defendants tried for the 1975 killing of 
then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 21 of his family members were 
convicted and sentenced to death, and 4 persons were acquitted. 
Fourteen of the defendants were tried in absentia, and 12 of them were 
convicted. In April when the High Court began its automatic review of 
the death sentences, the first two judges assigned to the case recused 
themselves, declaring that they were unable to hear the cases 
impartially, prompting heavy criticism from the Government. After the 
second recusal, government supporters marched to the High Court 
Building wielding sticks and clubs, and called for the execution of the 
sentences issued at the trial. Some members of the Cabinet, including 
the Home Minister, participated in a rally that threatened action 
against the judges for their failure to take on the case. The Prime 
Minister expressed sympathy with those persons protesting against the 
judiciary. Many observers believe that the High Court judges recused 
themselves because government interest in and pressure regarding the 
case were not conducive to a neutral judicial review of the trial; 
however, the judges have not explained their decisions, and there is no 
direct evidence to substantiate such allegations. The High Court is to 
rule simultaneously on appeals filed by four defendants present in the 
country. There is no automatic right to a retrial if a person convicted 
in absentia later returns. Absent defendants may be represented by 
state-appointed counsel (as was done in the Sheikh Mujib case), but may 
not choose their own attorneys, and, if convicted, may not file appeals 
until they return to the country.
    A major problem of the court system is the overwhelming backlog of 
cases, and trials under way typically are marked by extended 
continuances while many accused persons remain in prison (see Section 
1.d.). These conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial 
process, effectively prevent many persons from obtaining a fair trial 
or justice. According to one independent sample survey conducted by 
Transparency International Bangladesh, over 60 percent of the persons 
involved in court cases paid bribes to court officials. Because of the 
difficulty in accessing the courts and because litigation is time 
consuming, alternative dispute resolution by traditional village 
leaders, which is regarded by some persons to be more transparent and 
swift, is popular in rural communities. However, these mechanisms also 
can be subject to abuse.
    The Government states that it holds no political prisoners, but the 
BNP and human rights monitors claim that many opposition activists have 
been arrested and convicted under criminal charges as a pretext for 
their political activities. It is not clear how many such prisoners 
actually are being held (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial 
warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights 
monitors, police rarely obtain warrants, and officers violating the 
procedure are not punished. In addition the SPA permits searches 
without a warrant.
    The Government sometimes forcibly resettles persons against their 
will. In 1999 police forcibly removed 267 sex workers from a large 
brothel district in Tanbazar and Nimtoli, Narayanganj. Authorities 
claimed that the women wished to be rehabilitated, but credible 
eyewitnesses said that the women refused the offer. The 267 women were 
confined in a center for vagrants, where some alleged that they were 
abused. By December fewer than a dozen remained in the vagrant homes 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In 1999 police and paramilitary troops forced more than 50,000 
persons from their homes in 6 Dhaka slum areas. The Government 
continued its slum clearances during the year. On April 15, the 
Government demolished 700 homes in the Segunbagicha slum area. On April 
30, police officials demolished the Paribagh slums, leaving 1,100 
persons without shelter. After police announced the destruction of the 
railway slum in Kawran Bazar, residents protested the 1-day notice. 
Police used rubber bullets and batons to subdue the protesters, 
injuring 30 persons. Police and hired laborers set fire to 20 huts, but 
were unable to dislodge the slum dwellers (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged 
crimes of others (see Section 1.c.). According to one human rights 
organization and a published account by one of the victims, on the 
evening of June 17, police raided a house in the Khilgaon section of 
Dhaka, and after failing to locate their intended target, arrested his 
parents and beat his sisters. In November when police could not find 
Bahauddin, editor of an opposition paper, to arrest him under charges 
of sedition, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead. Mainuddin 
was not connected with the sedition charge; however, police arrested 
him under the SPA (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    The Special Branch division of the police, National Security 
Intelligence, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) 
employ informers to report on citizens perceived to be political 
opponents of the Government and to conduct surveillance of them. 
Political leaders, human rights activists, foreign NGO's, and 
journalists report occasional harassment by these security 
organizations. For example, representatives from one human rights 
organization report that police harassed their representatives in 
Comilla and Chittagong.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable 
restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with 
foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit 
defamation or incitement to an offense; however, there were numerous 
examples of the Government limiting these rights in practice. Some 
government leaders encouraged violence against journalists by ruling 
party members.
    The press, numbering hundreds of daily and weekly publications, is 
a forum for a wide range of views. While most publications support the 
overall policies of the Government, several newspapers report 
critically on government policies and activities, including those of 
the Prime Minister. In addition to an official government-owned wire 
service, there is one privately-owned wire service affiliated with a 
major international company.
    Newspaper ownership and content are not subject to direct 
government restriction. However, if the Government chooses, it can 
influence journalists through financial means. Government-sponsored 
advertising and allocations of newsprint imported at a favorable tariff 
rate are central to many newspapers' financial viability. Government-
sponsored advertising is the largest source of revenue for many 
newspapers. In allocating advertising through the Department of Films 
and Publications, the Government states that it considers circulation 
of the newspapers, wage board implementation, objectivity in reporting, 
coverage of development activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit 
of Bangladesh's War of Liberation.'' Commercial organizations often are 
reluctant to advertise in newspapers critical of the Government due to 
fear of unspecified governmental or bureaucratic retaliation.
    Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and efforts to intimidate 
them by government leaders, political party activists, and others 
frequently occurred. Such attacks by political activists are common 
during times of political street violence, and some journalists also 
were injured in police actions (see Section 1.c.).
    On January 4, two unidentified persons threw a bomb at the building 
that houses the Bangla-language daily Dainik Azadi, causing no major 
damage; however, a few minutes later, another bomb blast damaged the 
managing editor's car. On January 5, the leader of the local Jatiyabadi 
Chhatra Dal (the student wing of the BNP in Munshiganj), attacked Zakir 
Hossain Sumon-Srinagar, a correspondent for the ``Ajker Kagoj,'' 
reportedly because he published a news item criticizing the student 
group. When Sumon was attacked, a senior journalist, Shafi Uddin Ahmed, 
tried to rescue him and also was attacked by the student group. No one 
was held accountable in either incident.
    On January 15, three unidentified persons shot and killed 
journalist Mir Illais Hossain in Jhenaidah. The journalist, also the 
leader of a leftist party, allegedly had received death threats a few 
weeks before the killing and had requested police protection. Four 
persons were arrested for their suspected involvement in the murder. By 
year's end, charges had not been filed. On February 27, a court in 
Narayanganj issued an arrest warrant for the editor and other officers 
of the opposition daily Dinkal on the basis of a complaint lodged by a 
ruling party M.P., who accused the newspaper of publishing false, 
malicious and inaccurate reports about him. On March 8, police officers 
raided the newspaper's office, threatening journalists and damaging 
furniture. The police withdrew after about 1 hour. On May 20, activists 
from the ruling party student front, the BCL, assaulted two Dhaka 
University correspondents and threatened to kill one of them.
    On July 16, two men entered the Jessore office of the Bangla-
language daily Janakantha and shot and killed reporter Shamsur Rahman 
(see Section 1.a.). Rahman had been reporting on the activities of 
criminal gangs in the southwest part of the country, and the 
relationship of those gangs to the national political parties. By 
September 15, 12 persons had been arrested in connection with the 
murder. By year's end, charges had not been filed.
    According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, on October 20, a 
group of Jubo League activists, the youth wing of the ruling party, 
threatened Sohrab Hossain, a reporter with the regional ``Loksamaj,'' 
after he wrote an article about problems with the Government's relief 
efforts in the flood-ravaged district of Satkhira. On October 25, State 
Minister for Social Welfare Mozammel Hossain (the person in charge of 
overseeing relief operations in Sathkira district) reportedly actively 
encouraged ruling party members to attack physically the press by 
saying ``Wherever you will find journalists, break their bones.'' On 
October 26, a group led by local Awami League leader Nurul Islam 
ransacked the office of the local daily ``Satkhirar Chitro'' and 
assaulted Anisur Rahim, the newspaper's editor, with knives and a 
revolver, hospitalizing him. The attack followed the newspaper's report 
on the alleged misappropriation of disaster relief funds (see Section 
1.c.). One person was arrested for his involvement in the attack on the 
editor following the state minister's remarks, but by year's end, no 
charges had been filed.
    According to the International Freedom of Expression Exchange, on 
October 27, Monwar Islam, senior journalist and secretary-general of 
the Dhaka Reporters Unity (an organization for reporters working in 
Dhaka) narrowly escaped an abduction attempt, allegedly because of his 
reporting. By year's end, no investigation had been conducted, and 
Islam had fled the country.
    Virtually all print journalists practice self-censorship to some 
degree, and are reluctant to criticize politically influential 
personalities in both the Government and the opposition; however, some 
journalists do make such criticism. Many journalists cite fear of 
possible harassment, retaliation, or physical harm as a reason to avoid 
sensitive stories. For example, in March the Laxmipur correspondent of 
a leading Bangla-language newspaper was arrested under the PSA, 
following a report he published on police involvement in mass cheating 
during high school examinations. The journalist was released in 
November as the Government failed to prove the charge against him in 
the PSA Tribunal. On May 28, Aminur Rahman Taj, a reporter from ``Ajker 
Kagoj,'' a leading Bangla-language newspaper, was arrested without a 
warrant and later was accused of defamation of character. Earlier his 
paper had published an article asserting that the wives of a prominent 
minister and a senior police official were involved in corrupt 
practices. After the reporter's arrest, fellow journalists strongly 
protested, and the police threatened to file PSA cases against the 
journalists. The protesting journalists went to the High Court for 
protection, and no PSA charges were filed against them.
    In June a leading English-language newspaper ran a story about 
three sons of M.P.'s who were allowed to leave the country after being 
implicated in criminal cases. When the story was quoted in foreign 
newspapers, an official from the Prime Minister's Office pressured the 
newspaper's management to fire the author of the story. The author 
resigned under pressure a few days later. On August 6, a daily 
newspaper in Chittagong issued a notice retracting a story it had run 
the previous day, implying that a ruling party faction was involved in 
the July 12 murders of eight persons in a van (see Section 1.a.). The 
reporter who authored the original story was fired. According to press 
reports, the General Secretary of a local Awami League chapter declared 
at a public rally in Laxmipur on October 4, that he would ``chop off 
the hands and legs'' of journalists who continue to write about him 
(see Section 2.a.). He threatened to ``throw opposition activists into 
the river'' if they came out against him, and to take action against 
the police if they tried to arrest him. An Awami League Presidium 
member and government minister was ``chief guest'' at this Laxmipur 
rally. Two days later, armed men in Laxmipur injured a newspaper 
reporter in an attack.
    Journalists and others potentially are subject to incarceration as 
a result of criminal libel proceedings filed by private parties. Ruling 
party M.P.'s filed separate criminal libel suits against several 
newspapers after articles were published that the politicians viewed as 
false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received 
anticipatory bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to 
trial. Sedition charges filed against a Bangla-language newspaper in 
February 1998 remained pending, and those persons accused remained on 
bail. In November a new sedition charge was filed against the same 
editor, Bahauddin, for publishing a parody of the national anthem 
mocking the Prime Minister. When the police arrived at Bahauddin's 
residence to arrest him, he was not there, so they arrested his brother 
Mainuddin instead (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). Mainuddin was arrested 
under the PSA, and therefore was not eligible for bail. Mainuddin was 
not charged; after 16 days he was released. Charges against editor 
Bahauddin remain pending in both sedition cases.
    Feminist author Taslima Nasreen, whose writings and statements 
provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in 1993 and 1994, left 
the country for Europe in 1994. Nasreen returned to the country in 
September 1998, and then departed again in January 1999. She remains 
abroad in self-imposed exile, and both criminal and civil cases against 
her for insulting religious beliefs remain pending. However, a private 
citizen filed similar charges in 1994, and a judge issued an arrest 
warrant in that case after Nasreen's September 1998 return. The warrant 
never was executed, and Nasreen later requested and received 
anticipatory bail from the High Court. In August 1999, the Government 
banned the import, sale, and distribution of Nasreen's latest book, 
citing the likelihood that the book would inflame passions and offend 
the religious sentiments in the Muslim community (see Section 5).
    On June 29, the Government banned a book written by Matiur Rahman 
Rentu, a former aide to Awami League president and current Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina, on the grounds that it contained materials that 
could provoke hatred and malice toward the Government. The author was 
shot and injured by unidentified assailants in Dhaka after his book 
first was released.
    The Government owns and controls radio and television stations. The 
activities of the Prime Minister occupy the bulk of prime time news 
bulletins on both television and radio, followed by the activities of 
members of the Cabinet. Opposition party news gets little coverage. In 
its 1996 election manifesto, the Awami League called for autonomy for 
the state-controlled electronic media. A government committee 
subsequently recommended measures for authorizing autonomy for radio 
and television broadcasts, but the Government has yet to implement this 
recommendation. However, the Prime Minister on September 20 reiterated 
her earlier commitment to grant autonomy whereby the responsibility for 
funding still would come from the Government but the stations would be 
run by independent bodies without government interference. The Ministry 
of Information has authorized one private radio station and one private 
television station. That private television station, named Ekushey 
Television (ETV), went on the air in early March and began full 
commercial broadcasts on April 14. ETV broadcasts to 70 percent of the 
country via land transmission and to the entire country via satellite. 
On November 6, programming duration was extended from 10 to 12 hours 
per day. ETV broadcasts two Bangla-language news bulletins of its own 
and rebroadcasts the state-owned and run, BTV, English-language news 
bulletin. ETV news bulletins cover opposition events without any 
apparent interference from the Government. Moreover, the station also 
carries a feature program that addresses various social problems and 
calls for government action to redress these issues. ETV's proprietor 
owns the private radio station. As a condition of operation, both 
private stations are required to broadcast for free some government 
news programs and speeches by the Prime Minister and President.
    Foreign publications are subject to review and censorship. 
Censorship most often is used in cases of immodest or obscene 
photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and 
objectionable comments about national leaders. The September 18 issue 
of the international news magazine ``Newsweek,'' published in 
Singapore, was banned in the country because it featured a photograph 
of Koranic verses on the sole of a human foot.
    A government Film Censor Board reviews local and foreign films, and 
may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order, 
religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or 
plagiarism. During the year, the Film Censor Board banned 14 English-
language films on the grounds of obscenity and 13 Bangla-language 
films, although after 2 months the ban on the Bangla-language films was 
lifted. The Government also banned the screening of any English-
language films in approximately 10 movie theaters that regularly do not 
comply with the Censor Board. Cable operators generally function 
without government interference, but on August 15 (the anniversary of 
the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nation's founder and 
father of the current Prime Minister), the Government asked them to 
suspend their operations for the day, and the operators complied. Video 
rental libraries provide a wide variety of films to their borrowers, 
and government efforts to enforce censorship on these rental films are 
sporadic and ineffectual. The Government does not limit citizens' 
access to the Internet.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom. Although 
teachers and students at all levels largely are free to pursue academic 
assignments, research on extremely sensitive religious and political 
topics is forbidden.
    The situation on public university campuses remains volatile, 
seriously inhibiting the ability of students to receive a university 
education and of teachers to teach. Armed clashes between student 
groups of different parties or of different factions within a 
particular party resulted in temporary closures of colleges and 
universities in Chittagong, Sylhet, and other localities. A woman on 
the Dhaka University campus was partially stripped during New Year's 
Eve celebrations on December 31, 1999. After a week of heavy criticism 
by the press, three members of the student wing of the ruling party 
were arrested but later freed on bail. A ruling party M.P. made a 
statement in Parliament that demanded the punishment of the victim for 
violating Muslim social values by being on the streets to celebrate New 
Year's Eve (see Sections 2.c., 2.d., and 5). Campus violence has little 
to do with ideological differences, and more to do with extortion 
rackets run by nonstudent party activists, including those based on 
physical control of dormitories. As a result of widespread violence and 
campus closures, it takes nearly 6 years to earn a 4-year degree. 
However, several private universities that were established during the 
1990's are not affected by student political violence.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the 
interest of public order and public health; however, the Government 
frequently limits this right. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code allows the Government to ban assemblies of more than four persons. 
According to one human rights organization, the Government imposed 
Section 144 bans 33 times during the first 9 months of the year. The 
Government sometimes uses Section 144 to prohibit rallies for security 
reasons, but many independent observers believe that such explanations 
usually are a pretext. Supporters of the ruling party frequently will 
schedule their own rallies for the same venue and time as scheduled 
opposition rallies and meetings, thus providing the Government a basis 
for imposing Section 144 for security reasons. The Krishak Sramik 
Janata League of former Awami League stalwart and present opposition 
figure Kader Siddiqi had to cancel a scheduled rally at Karimganj on 
May 14, because the ruling party's student wing announced a rally at 
the same time and place, prompting the local administration to impose 
Section 144. The BNP youth front could not hold its planned rally at 
Muladi in Barisal on June 29, because the local administration imposed 
Section 144 following a simultaneous rally by a ruling party 
organization at the same location.
    Authorities also permit ruling party activists to blockade roads 
and take other steps to disrupt opposition events. During nationwide 
general strikes called by the opposition, ruling party activists 
routinely intimidate opposition supporters and seek to coerce 
shopkeepers and drivers to ignore the strike.
    Ruling party supporters, often with the connivance and support of 
the police, violently disrupted rallies and demonstrations of the 
opposition parties. On August 6, at least 22 persons were injured 
during a gunbattle on the Islamic University Campus between activists 
of the ruling party student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, and 
the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Jamaat-e-
Islami. According to one human rights organization that cites campus 
sources, the shooting began when a procession of ruling party 
supporters opened fire on an ICS procession. On August 6, police 
officers attacked a joint opposition rally led by the BNP that was held 
to protest the Government's failure to eradicate the mosquitoes that 
carry dengue fever. Using teargas, rubber bullets, and lathis (heavy 
sticks), the police broke up the rally and procession. More than 100 
persons were injured during the incident (see Section 2.a.).
    Thirteen full or part days of opposition-called hartals (general 
strikes) took place during the year at the national or local levels. In 
addition there were a number of local hartals to demand the 
Government's resignation, and to protest the enactment of the PSA (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), attacks on opposition rallies and processions, 
rising fuel prices, and the killing of a pro-BNP lawyer (see Section 
1.a.). Localized hartals were frequent occurrences in some parts of the 
country.
    Four persons died in violence during the hartals, and many were 
injured, including opposition activists, police, and many ordinary 
citizens (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3).
    Local ruling party groups sometimes also call local general 
strikes. Party activists enforce these strikes through threatened or 
actual violence against strikebreakers. Those persons who are opposed 
to or neutral toward the strike are coerced into observing prohibitions 
against vehicular transport and normal operation of businesses. Both 
opposition and ruling party activists mount processions during general 
strikes. Police rarely interfere with ruling party processions on such 
occasions; police and ruling party activists often work in tandem to 
disrupt and to discourage opposition processions.
    The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form 
associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of 
morality or public order, and in general the Government respects this 
right. Individuals are free to join private groups.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the 
state religion but also stipulates the right--subject to law, public 
order, and morality--to practice the religion of one's choice, and the 
Government respects this provision in practice. However, although the 
Government is secular, religion exerts a powerful influence on 
politics, and the Government is sensitive to the Muslim consciousness 
of the majority of its citizens. Approximately 88 percent of the 
population is Muslim. Some members of the Hindu, Christian, and 
Buddhist minorities continue to perceive and experience discrimination 
toward them from the Muslim majority (see Section 5).
    Religious organizations are not required to register with the 
Government; however, all nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), 
including religious organizations, are required to register with the 
NGO Affairs Bureau if they receive foreign money for social development 
projects. The Government has the legal ability to cancel the 
registration of an NGO or to take other action against it; such powers 
rarely are used and have not affected NGO's with religious 
affiliations.
    Religion is taught in schools, and children have the right to be 
taught their own religion.
    The law permits citizens to proselytize. However, strong social 
resistance to conversion from Islam means that most missionary efforts 
by Christian groups are aimed at serving communities that have been 
Christian for several generations or longer. The Government allows 
various religions to establish places of worship, to train clergy, to 
travel for religious purposes, and to maintain links with co-
religionists abroad. Foreign missionaries may work in the country, but 
their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution. Some 
missionaries face problems in obtaining visas.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move 
freely within the country and to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to 
repatriate; however, there were instances in which the Government 
restricted these rights. In August 1999, immigration authorities seized 
the passport of Jatiya Party Secretary General Naziur Rahman Monzur. A 
High Court ruling ordered the passport to be returned to Monzur, and 
the Supreme Court rejected government appeals against the ruling. 
However, the passport had not been returned by year's end. Then-leader 
of the opposition Jamaat-e-Islami, Ghulam Azam, in December 1999 
submitted his passport to immigration authorities for renewal, but it 
was not renewed. Azam filed a writ petition with the High Court on 
March 13, challenging the Government's refusal to renew his passport. 
On June 8, the Court ordered the Home Secretary to renew the passport 
within 15 days and return it to Azam. The Government filed a delayed 
appeal with the Supreme Court. The case was pending at year's end. In 
late 1999 immigration authorities seized the passport of Jatiya Party 
chairman and former president H.M. Ershad and subsequently returned it 
under court orders. However, on June 5, the Government barred Ershad 
from going to London for medical treatment, and immigration authorities 
at the airport in Dhaka seized his passport again. A High Court bench 
dismissed Ershad's writ petition, challenging the restriction on his 
travel and the seizure of his passport. However, the appellate panel of 
the Supreme Court on August 17 ordered the Government to return the 
passport to Ershad. The Government has yet to comply with this order; 
Ershad also had not yet received a certified copy of the court's order 
to return the passport by year's end. Bangladeshi passports are invalid 
for travel to Israel.
    The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylum 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 
Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. The law does not provide for first asylum or resettlement of 
asylum seekers. However, in practice the Government grants temporary 
asylum to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR has interviewed and 
recognized as refugees on a case-by-case basis. At the UNHCR's request, 
the Government allowed about 125 refugees and asylum seekers, including 
non-Rohingya Burmese, Somalis, Iranians, and Sri Lankans, to remain in 
the country pending durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation 
and resettlement to other countries.
    Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps 
throughout the country; they have been in the country since 1971 
awaiting settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who 
emigrated to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition 
of British India. Most supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's 1971 War 
of Independence. They later declined to accept Bangladesh citizenship 
and asked to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan 
historically has been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
    Approximately 251,000 Rohingya refugees (Muslims from the northern 
Burmese state of Arakan) crossed into southeastern Bangladesh in late 
1991 and 1992, fleeing repression. Since 1992 approximately 232,000 
Rohingyas have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma, nearly 22,700 
have left the camps and are living among the local Bangladeshis, more 
than 32,200 children have been born to the refugees, 7,700 have died, 
and more than 20,800 refugees remain in 2 camps administered by the 
Government in cooperation with the UNHCR. After blocking further 
repatriation in August 1997, Burma allowed repatriation to resume in 
November 1998, but at such a slow rate that births in the camps 
outnumbered repatriations. In April 1999, the UNHCR urged the 
Government to allow any refugees who could not return to Burma to be 
allowed to work in the country, benefit from local medical programs, 
and send their children to local schools. The Government refused these 
requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees must remain in the camps 
until their return to Burma. According to HRW, there are reports of 
violence by refugee camp officials against Rohingyas (see Section 
1.c.). Despite senior level interaction with the Burmese Government, 
the Bangladesh Government remains unable to win Burmese agreement to 
accelerate the rate of repatriation.
    According to media reports, several thousand more Rohingyas arrived 
during the year, but recent arrivals avoided the camps and attempted to 
settle in the southeastern areas of the country. HRW reports that more 
than 100,000 Rohingyas who have entered the country since 1991 live in 
precarious circumstances in the country outside the camps with no 
formal documentation. The Government effectively denied first asylum to 
the new arrivals it encountered by categorizing them as illegal 
economic migrants and turned back as many persons as possible at the 
border. According to UNHCR, which has interviewed some of these 
migrants, at least some of them are fleeing persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Bangladesh is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which 
elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage. 
M.P.'s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300 
elected members, with 30 additional seats for women, who are chosen by 
Parliament. Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general 
parliamentary elections are presided over by a caretaker government, 
led by the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or, 
if he is unfit or unwilling, another senior retired justice or other 
neutral figure. Domestic and international observers deemed the last 
general election, held in June 1996, to be generally free and fair. The 
high voter turnout of 75 percent set a new record.
    Due to continuing opposition from the opposition parties, the 
Election Commission did not schedule upazila (subdistrict) elections. 
In July Parliament passed the zila (district) council law, which 
provides for indirect election of the district council chairman by an 
electoral college of elected lower level representatives. The law 
empowers the Government to appoint these chairmen until the indirect 
elections can be held. The Government has not made such appointments. 
The Chittagong City Corporation election was held on January 3; 
however, the opposition parties boycotted it, and the Awami League 
incumbent mayor was reelected unopposed. On the national level, the 
opposition parties continued to demand the immediate resignation of the 
Government and elections under a caretaker regime.
    Elections often are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and 
vote rigging. The Government and activists of major political parties 
frequently use violence and harassment against political opponents, 
practices that intensify in the period prior to elections. On July 31, 
Food Minister and Awami League Presidium member Amir Hossain Amu won a 
by-election, which was boycotted by the opposition. International and 
domestic observers as well as the media witnessed widespread 
intimidation of voters and abuse of authority in support of the winning 
candidate. The dispute over the November 15, 1999, byelection in 
Tangail remained unresolved and the ruling party candidate, although 
declared the victor, could not take his oath of office.
    Political activists also reportedly engage in extortion from 
businesses and individuals (see Section 1.a.).
    Under constitutional amendments enacted in 1991, the country 
changed from a presidential system to a parliament-led system. The 
changes stipulated that an M.P. who resigns from his party or votes 
against it in Parliament automatically loses his seat. BNP member Major 
(retired) Akhtaruzzaman lost his seat in Parliament as he joined the 
parliamentary session in violations of his party's decision to abstain. 
In practice this provision solidifies the control of Parliament by the 
Government and the Prime Minister. The lack of democracy within the 
political parties that have formed governments since 1991 has resulted 
in a concentration of political power in the office of the Prime 
Minister, regardless of which party is in power. In practice the Prime 
Minister usually decides on major governmental policies, with little or 
no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's effectiveness as a 
deliberative body is undermined further by the country's narrow, 
partisan politics. Since July 1999, the major opposition parties have 
abstained from parliamentary sessions. However, members of the 
opposition continue to participate in parliamentary standing committees 
on government ministries, which were formed in 1998. These committees 
are headed by M.P.'s rather than the ministers concerned, increasing 
the committees' effectiveness in overseeing government work.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Thirty 
parliamentary seats are reserved for women chosen by majority vote in 
Parliament; critics charge that these seats act far less to empower 
women than to enhance the ruling party's majority. The constitutional 
provision that provides for these 30 reserved seats expires in April 
2001, unless a new parliament sits before that date. A Government-
sponsored bill to extend this provision cannot be passed unless the 
opposition ends its ongoing boycott of Parliament and supports the 
bill. In addition to these seats, women are free to contest any seat in 
Parliament. Seven current women M.P.'s were elected in their own right.
    Seats are not specifically reserved for other minority groups, such 
as tribal people. Of the 300 elected M.P.'s, 3 are Tribal Buddhists 
from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and 5 are Hindus. The rest are Bengali 
Muslims. The Jamaat-i-Islami, the country's largest Islamic political 
party, had 18 seats in Parliament after the 1991 elections, but only 3 
after the 1996 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally permits human rights groups to conduct 
their activities. A wide variety of groups publish reports, hold press 
conferences, and issue appeals to the Government with regard to 
specific cases. While human rights groups often are sharply critical of 
the Government, irrespective of the ruling party, they frequently 
practice self-censorship, particularly on some politically sensitive 
cases and subjects. In the past, the Government has consulted with 
human rights groups on some draft legislation and taken their views 
into account. In January after discussions between the Government and 
some women's rights groups and NGO's, Parliament passed the Women and 
Children Repression Prevention Act. However, the Government continues 
to refuse to register the Bangladesh Section of Amnesty International, 
which since 1990 has applied several times for registration under the 
Societies Registration Act. Without this registration, a voluntary 
organization cannot receive funding from abroad.
    The Government is defensive about international criticism regarding 
human rights issues. However, the Government has been open to dialog 
with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions 
regarding issues such as trafficking in women and children. Legislation 
to establish a National Human Rights Commission remained in abeyance 
for yet another year. Earlier the Government formed a cabinet 
subcommittee to review the draft legislation.
    In the past, the Government has put pressure on individual human 
rights advocates, including by filing charges that are known to be 
false. Such pressure also has included long delays in issuing re-entry 
visas for international human rights activists. Missionaries who 
advocate human rights have faced similar problems.
    In the past, human rights organizations have reported that the 
Government has put pressure on them usually in the form of harassment 
by the intelligence agencies and threats from activists of the ruling 
party.
    During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal before the 
law and are entitled to equal protection by the law.'' However, in 
practice the Government does not enforce strongly laws aimed at 
eliminating discrimination. In this context, women, children, minority 
groups, and the disabled often confront social and economic 
disadvantages.
    Women.--Violence against women is difficult to quantify because of 
unreliable statistics, but recent reports indicated that domestic 
violence is widespread. A report released by the U.N. Population Fund 
in September asserted that 47 percent of adult women report physical 
abuse by their male partner. The Government, the media, and women's 
rights organizations have fostered a growing awareness of the problem 
of violence against women.
    Much of the violence against women is related to disputes over 
dowries. According to a human rights group, there were 81 dowry-related 
killings during the year. Human rights groups and press reports 
indicate that incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by 
religious leaders--at times occur, particularly in rural areas. These 
include humiliating, painful punishments, such as the whipping of women 
accused of moral offenses. Assailants who fling acid in their faces 
disfigured numerous women. One human rights organization reported that 
181 women suffered acid attacks during the year. The most common 
motivation for acidthrowing attacks against women is revenge by a 
rejected suitor; land disputes are another leading cause of the acid 
attacks. Few perpetrators of the acid attacks are prosecuted. Often the 
perpetrator flings the acid in through an open window during the night, 
making cases difficult to prove. Some arrests have been made, and one 
person has been given the death sentence.
    The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no 
specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. A total of 3,516 rapes 
and 3,523 incidents of spousal abuses were officially reported during 
the year. Of the spousal abuse cases, 2,814 were related to disputes 
over dowry. Of the 2,130 alleged rapists that were prosecuted, 63 
persons were convicted. The Government reports that other rape cases 
are under trial. During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. The Government also has enacted laws 
specifically prohibiting certain forms of discrimination against women, 
including the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the Cruelty to Women 
Law of 1983, and the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of 
1995, which was replaced by the Women and Children Repression 
Prevention Act of 2000 (see Section 1.d.). However, enforcement of 
these laws is weak, especially in rural areas, and the Government 
seldom prosecutes those cases that are filed. According to a human 
rights organization, there are 7 government-run and 13 privately-run 
large shelter homes available for use by women who are victims of 
violence. Some smaller homes also are available for victims of 
violence. However, these are insufficient to meet victims' shelter 
needs. As a result, the Government often holds women who file rape 
complaints in safe custody, usually in prison. Safe custody frequently 
results in further abuses against victims, discouraging the filing of 
complaints by other women, and often continues for extended periods 
during which women often are unable to gain release (see Sections 1.c. 
and 1.d.).
    There is extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia (see 
Section 6.f.).
    For the most part, women remain in a subordinate position in 
society, and the Government has not acted effectively to protect their 
basic freedoms. Literacy rates are approximately 26 percent for women, 
compared with 49 percent for men. In recent years, female school 
enrollment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and 
secondary school students are female. Women often are ignorant of their 
rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal 
educational opportunities, and strong social stigmas and lack of 
economic means to obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from 
seeking redress in the courts. Many NGO's operate programs to raise 
women's awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in 
exercising those rights.
    Under the 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less 
than male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than 
husbands. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this 
right rarely is exercised. Laws provide some protection for women 
against arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by 
husbands without the first wife's consent, but the protections 
generally apply only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas 
often are not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the 
law, a Muslim husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3 
months, but this rarely is enforced.
    Employment opportunities have been stronger for women than for men 
in the last decade, which largely is due to the growth of the export 
garment industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Eighty percent of the 1.4 
million garment sector workers are women. Programs extending micro-
credit to large numbers of rural women also have contributed to greater 
economic power for them. However, women still fill only a small 
fraction of other wageearning jobs. According to a report by the Public 
Administration Reforms Commission publicized in October, women hold 
only 12 percent of government jobs, and only 2 percent of senior 
positions. The Government's policy to include more women in government 
jobs only has had limited effect. In recent years, about 15 percent of 
all recruits into government service have been women.
    The garment and shrimp processing industries are the highest 
employers of female laborers. Forty-three percent of women work in the 
agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of them 
are unpaid family laborers. Many women work as manual laborers on 
construction projects as well, and constitute nearly 25 percent of all 
manufacturing workers. Women also are found in the electronics, food 
processing, beverage, and handicraft industries.
    Children.--The Government undertakes programs in the areas of 
primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts are 
supplemented by local and foreign NGO's. While much remains to be done, 
these joint efforts have allowed the country to make significant 
progress in improving health, nutrition, and education; however, 
slightly more than half of all children are chronically malnourished. 
For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the 
country's largest NGO, provides primary education to more than 1.2 
million children. In cooperation with the NonFormal Education 
Directorate of the Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is 
implementing a program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily 
working) children in urban slum areas around the country. In addition 
the ILO has undertaken education/social welfare programs for more than 
50,000 children (see Section 6.d.). The Government made universal 
primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years mandatory in 1991, 
but stated that it lacked the resources to implement the law fully. 
According to Education Ministry figures, approximately 81 percent of 
children between the ages of 6 and 10 years are enrolled in school, 
including 83 percent of girls. Attendance rates drop steadily with age; 
according to the Government, about 70 percent of all children complete 
grade 5. To reach the maximum number of children with limited 
facilities, most schools have two shifts. As a result, most children in 
grades one and two spend 2.5 hours a day in school; children in grades 
3 to 5 are in school for 4 hours. The Government provides incentives 
for rural female children between the ages of 12 and 16 years to remain 
in school. These incentives have been effective in increasing the 
number of girls in school.
    Because of widespread poverty, many children are compelled to work 
at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children, 
mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service 
(children who work in domestic service may work in conditions that 
resemble servitude) and prostitution (see Section 6.c.); this labor-
related child abuse occurs commonly at all levels of society and 
throughout the country (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights 
monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking 
for prostitution continue to be serious and widespread problems. There 
is extensive trafficking of children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and 
destinations within the country, largely for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.f.). UNICEF has estimated that there are 
about 10,000 child prostitutes in the country. Other estimates have 
been as high as 29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 
18 years of age and with government certification. However, this 
minimum age requirement commonly is ignored by authorities, and is 
circumvented easily by false statements of age. Procurers of minors 
rarely are prosecuted, and large numbers of child prostitutes work in 
brothels. There were credible reports that police facilitated or were 
involved in trafficking in of women and children (see Sections 1.c., 
6.c., and 6.f.). The law stipulates a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment for persons found guilty of forcing a child into 
prostitution.
    During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and to the U.N. 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment and 
freedom from discrimination for the disabled; however, in practice, the 
disabled face social and economic discrimination. The Government has 
not enacted specific legislation or otherwise mandated accessibility 
for the disabled. Facilities for treating the mentally ill or the 
retarded are inadequate. Unless a family has money to pay for private 
service, a mentally ill person can find little treatment in the 
country.
    Indigenous People.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to 
influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord has been in effect for 3 
years, and has ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT, although law 
and order problems continue. Former insurgent leader Jotirindrio 
Bodhipriya Larma, alias Shantu Larma, has publicly questioned whether 
the Peace Accord has been implemented properly, and has urged prompt 
government action to implement all provisions of the Accord. Confusion 
continues over the overlapping responsibilities of the various central 
and local government bodies involved in the Hill Tracts. The Land 
Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribals and 
Bengali settlers does not yet function effectively in addressing 
critical land disputes. Tribal leaders also have expressed 
disappointment at the lack of progress in providing assistance to 
tribals that left the area during the insurgency.
    Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to 
Bengali settlers, including land that was claimed by indigenous people 
under traditional concepts of land ownership. This led to the 
displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and Marmas. 
Bengali inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of the region's 
population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the area's population 
of 1 million persons in 1997. The Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group, had 
waged a low-level conflict in the CHT from the early 1970's until the 
signing of the peace agreement with the Government in December 1997. 
During the periods of violence, all those involved--indigenous tribes, 
settlers, and security forces--accused each other of human rights 
violations. The terms of the 1997 pact provided for a strong local 
government, consisting of mostly tribal representatives, including the 
chairperson; reduction of the military presence in the CHT region; and 
a substantial compensation package for displaced tribal families.
    Alfred Soren, a leader of the Santal tribe in the northern part of 
the country, was killed and dozens of others were injured in an August 
18 attack. According to one human rights organization, the perpetrators 
of the attack were Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land 
dispute. Ninety persons were charged for involvement in the attack, but 
only four were arrested by year's end. Court proceedings were scheduled 
to begin at the end of January 2001.
    Tribal people in other areas also have reported problems of loss of 
land to Bengali Muslims through questionable legal practices and other 
means. The Garos of the Modhupur forest region in the north-central 
part of the country continue to face problems in maintaining their 
cultural traditions and livelihoods in the face of deforestation and 
encroachment by surrounding Bengali communities. The pressure on the 
Garo community has resulted in greater migration to urban areas and to 
the Indian state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of an already 
small community estimated at only 16,000 persons. The Government had 
indicated in 1995 that it would establish a national park of 400 acres 
in the Mymensingh district. Part of the land would be taken from the 
Garo tribals. Action still is pending on that proposal. The Government 
has not ruled out moving the tribals from the land.
    Religious Minorities.--Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists constitute 
about 12 percent of the population.
    Local thugs and gang leaders sometimes attack religious minorities, 
perceiving them to be weak and vulnerable. The Government sometimes has 
failed to criticize, investigate, and prosecute the perpetrators of 
these attacks. The Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider 
heretical, have been the target of continued attacks and harassment. In 
March neighboring Muslims attacked and damaged 40 houses belonging to 
Ahamdiyas at Krora and Nasirabad (Brahmanbaria district); they also 
captured a local Ahmadiya mosque. The mosque was returned to the 
Ahmadiyas after a month-long negotiation. In 1999 in Kushtia mainstream 
Muslims captured another Ahmadiya mosque, which remains under police 
control, preventing Ahmadiyas from worshipping. In November 1999, Sunni 
Muslims ransacked an Ahmadiya mosque in the western part of the 
country. In October 1999, a bomb killed 6 Ahmadiyas and injured more 
than 40 others who were attending Friday prayers at their mosque in 
Khulna; the case remained unresolved at year's end.
    Religious minorities are disadvantaged in practice in such areas as 
access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in the 
government services often lack minority group representation.
    Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because 
of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested 
Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a 
contentious issue since partition in 1947, when many Hindus fled, and 
again in 1971 when Bangladesh achieved independence, and many Hindus 
lost land holdings because of anti-Hindu discrimination in the 
application of the law. Prior to its 1996 election victory, the Awami 
League promised to repeal the Vested Property Act, the law used to 
deprive Hindus of their property. On September 4, the Cabinet decided 
in principle to return vested property to its original owners and 
formed a subcommittee to draft a law to this effect. At year's end, the 
draft was awaiting cabinet approval. In past years, there have been 
cases of violence directed against religious minority communities that 
also have resulted in the loss of property. The last such major 
incidents occurred in 1992, although there also were some minor 
incidents of this type during the period surrounding the 1996 
elections. Such intercommunal violence reportedly has caused some 
religious minority members to depart the country.
    Feminist author Taslima Nasreen left the country in January 1999, 
due to concerns about her personal security. She lives abroad in self-
imposed exile (see Section 2.a.). The Government banned her latest book 
in 1999 for fear of offending the country's Muslim community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a 
union. Approximately 1.8 million of the country's 5 million workers in 
the formal sector belong to unions, most of which are affiliated with 
the various political parties. (The total work force is approximately 
58 million persons.) There is a large unreported informal sector, for 
which no reliable labor statistics exist.
    For a union to obtain and maintain its registration, 30 percent 
workplace participation is required. Moreover, would-be unionists 
technically are forbidden to engage in many activities prior to 
registration, and legally are not protected from employer retaliation 
during this period. Labor activists have protested that this 
requirement severely restricts workers' freedom to organize, and the 
ILO has requested the Government to amend the 30 percent provision on 
the same grounds. The ILO also has requested the Government to amend 
legislative provisions that bar registration of a union that is 
composed of workers from different workplaces owned by different 
employers. About 15 percent of the approximately 5,450 labor unions are 
affiliated with 25 officially registered National Trade Union (NTU) 
centers. There also are several unregistered NTU's.
    With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph, 
and telephone departments, civil servants, police, and military 
personnel are forbidden to join unions in large part because of the 
highly political nature of those unions. Many civil servants who are 
forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have formed 
associations that perform functions similar to labor unions, that is, 
providing for members' welfare, offering legal services, and airing 
grievances. However, collective bargaining is prohibited. Some workers 
have formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and 
workers in the construction and transport (both public and private) 
industries. The Government banned trade union activity in the 
Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, in early 1998. The ban 
followed an incident in which some labor unionists affiliated with the 
ruling party's trade union assaulted a senior bank official, after 
which there were clashes between members of rival unions. In September 
numerous associations of private school teachers went on strike, 
demanding that the Government, which pays private school teachers 80 
percent of their basic salary, pay 100 percent of it. The strikes ended 
after several weeks when the Government agreed to raise its part of the 
payment to 90 percent. In 1999 the ILO Committee of Experts stated that 
the Government's rejections of several applications for registration by 
trade unions in the textile, metal, and garment sectors were on 
unjustified grounds. The Ministry of Labor contends that these cases 
lacked the necessary documentation.
    The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but 
strikes are a common form of workers' protest. In addition political 
opposition parties use general strikes to pressure the Government to 
meet political demands (see Section 2.b.). Workers at Chittagong port, 
the country's major harbor, conducted several work stoppages to protest 
a proposed new private container port. Some employees organized in 
professional associations or unregistered unions also went on strike 
during the year. Wildcat strikes are illegal but frequently occur, with 
varying government responses. Wildcat strikes in the transportation 
sector are particularly common.
    The Essential Services Ordinance permits the Government to bar 
strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declares essential. During 
the year, the Government applied this ban against employees of the 
Power Development Board. In the past, the Government has applied this 
ban to national airline pilots, water supply workers, shipping 
employees, and electricity supply workers. The ban may be renewed for 
3-month-periods. The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or 
lockout at any time before or after the strike or lockout begins and to 
refer the dispute to the Labor Court. Mechanisms for conciliation, 
arbitration, and labor court dispute resolution were established under 
the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. Workers have the right to 
strike in the event of a failure to settle. If a strike lasts 30 days 
or longer, the Government may prohibit the strike and refer the dispute 
to the Labor Court for adjudication. This has not happened since 1993. 
The ILO has criticized the provisions of the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance that require three-quarters of a worker's organization to 
consent to a strike and that grant the Government authority to prohibit 
a strike at any time if it is considered prejudicial to the national 
interest or if it involves a public utility service.
    There are no legal restrictions on political activities by labor 
unions, although the calling of nationwide general strikes (hartals) or 
transportation blockades by unions is considered a criminal rather than 
a political act and thus is forbidden.
    While unions are not part of the government structure, they are 
highly politicized, and are strongest in state-owned enterprises and in 
institutions like the government-run port in Chittagong. Virtually all 
the NTU centers are affiliated with political parties, including the 
ruling party and the major opposition parties. Some unions are militant 
and engage in intimidation and vandalism. Illegal blockades of public 
transportation routes by strikers frequently occurred during the year. 
Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions regularly 
occurred. Fighting often is over the control of rackets or extortion 
payoffs and typically involves knives, guns, and homemade bombs.
    Workers are eligible for membership on their union's executive 
staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of 
union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of 
a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions 
were known to have been taken during the year.
    There are provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the 
immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability. 
Enforcement of these provisions is uneven. In past illegal work 
actions, such as transportation blockades, police officers have 
arrested union members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
    There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor 
organizations, and unions and federations maintain a variety of such 
links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to 
travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were 
denied during the year. In addition in April 1999, immigration 
officials at the airport in Dhaka prevented 11 members of the 
Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation (BIGUF) from 
departing the country to participate in an AFL-CIO-organized study tour 
in the Philippines, citing a requirement for government clearance. In 
October the Ministry of Labor issued the clearance, but it was too late 
for the BIGUF representatives to participate in the study tour.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining by workers is legal on the condition that they be 
represented by unions legally registered as collective bargaining 
agents by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Labor unions are affiliated 
with the various political parties; therefore, each industry generally 
has more than one labor union (one or more for each political party). 
To engage in collective bargaining, each union must nominate 
representatives to a Collective Bargaining Authority (CBA) committee, 
which the Registrar of Trade Unions must approve after reviewing the 
selection process. Collective bargaining occurs on occasion in large 
private enterprises such as pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but, 
because of high unemployment, workers may forgo collective bargaining 
due to concerns over job security. Collective bargaining in small 
private enterprises generally does not occur. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has criticized the country 
for what it views as legal impediments which hamper such bargaining.
    Public sector workers' pay levels and other benefits are set by the 
National Pay and Wages Commission, whose recommendations are binding 
and may not be disputed except on the issue of implementation.
    The Registrar of Trade Unions has wide powers to interfere in 
internal union affairs. He has the authority to enter union premises 
and inspect documents; however, there were no reports during the year 
that the Registrar of Trade Unions had abused these powers.
    Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable 
leeway for discrimination against union members and organizers by 
employers. For example, the ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of 
workers suspected of union activities or termination with payment of 
mandatory severance benefits (2 weeks' salary). In practice private 
sector employers usually discourage any union activity, sometimes 
working in collaboration with local police. The Registrar of Trade 
Unions rules on discrimination complaints. In a number of cases, the 
Labor Court has ordered the reinstatement of workers fired for union 
activities. However, the Labor Court's overall effectiveness is 
hampered by a serious case backlog, and in the past there have been 
allegations that employers have corrupted some of its deliberations.
    In 1998 Zafrul Hassan, the General Secretary of the Bangladesh 
Jatiyatabadi Sramik Dal (BJSD), filed a complaint that 76 persons, most 
of whom were active union leaders, were discriminated against through 
transfers and harassment by the Bangladesh Water Board. This case had 
not been resolved by year's end.
    In June 1999, the ILO received a complaint from the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Farm Labor Federation that the Government had not 
introduced legislation that would extend the protections of the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance to a greater number of agricultural 
workers. In July the ILO sponsored a seminar where this issue was 
raised to create awareness about agricultural laborers. Officials from 
various ministries, including the Ministry of Labor, attended. Farm 
laborers, such as those employed in the aquaculture sector (shrimp 
hatchery, harvesting and processing) are covered by the labor law and 
can form trade unions. However, most agricultural laborers are migrant 
workers, and thus are not employed by any particular individual or 
group. The Government had not taken steps to extend labor laws to cover 
these migrant workers.
    The country's two EPZ's are exempted from the application of the 
Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act of 1965, the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance of 1969, and the Factories Act of 1965. Among other 
provisions, these laws establish the freedom of association and the 
right to bargain collectively, and set forth wage and hour and 
occupational safety and health standards. While substitutes for some of 
the provisions of these laws have been implemented through EPZ 
regulations, which the Bangladesh EPZ Authority is charged with 
enforcing, professional and industry-based unions are prohibited in the 
zones. A small number of workers in the EPZ's have skirted prohibitions 
on forming unions by setting up associations. The Government has not 
implemented its 1992 commitment to end restrictions on freedom of 
association and formation of unions by 1997, and to apply all sections 
of labor law in the EPZ's by 2000. No collective bargaining occurs in 
the EPZ's. However, on December 12, the Government agreed to allow full 
freedom of association in the EPZ's by January 2004. Approximately 
93,000 persons are employed in EPZ's, primarily in the textile and 
apparel, electronics component, and leather industries. During the 
year, the EPZ's experienced several strikes, some of which turned 
violent. In one case, four workers were killed when the police stormed 
a factory that had been taken over by the disgruntled workers. During 
the incident, police shot and killed two persons; two others later died 
from stab wounds sustained in the violence. The workers were angered by 
a 15 percent cut in piece rates and the subsequent firing of 33 workers 
who had joined in protests against the pay-cut (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.).
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, the Government does not enforce this prohibition 
effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act, both 
passed in 1965, established inspection mechanisms to enforce laws 
against forced labor; however, these laws are not enforced rigorously, 
partly because resources for enforcement are scarce. There is no large-
scale bonded or forced labor; however, numerous domestic servants, 
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and 
many suffer physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. In the past, 
the Government has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse 
domestic servants. There is extensive trafficking in both women and 
children, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution, although in some 
instances for labor servitude outside of the country (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of 
children, and child labor is a serious problem. Some laws prohibit 
labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act of 1965 bars 
children under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also 
stipulates that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a 
maximum 5-hour day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The 
Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 prohibits the employment of 
children younger than the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The 
Employment of Children Act of 1938 prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 15 in the railways or in goods handling within ports.
    Coverage and enforcement of these rules is inadequate. Because of 
widespread poverty, many children begin to work at a very young age. 
According to a 1996 labor force survey by the Government, the country 
has 6.3 million working children between the ages of 5 and 14 years who 
work for compensation and are not enrolled in school. Also, children 
often work alongside other family members in small-scale and 
subsistence agriculture. Previous UNICEF and ILO surveys indicate that, 
of children 6 to 17 years of age, 21 percent of boys and 4 percent of 
girls work in paid employment. Hours usually are long, the pay usually 
is low, and the conditions sometimes are hazardous. Children drive 
rickshaws, break bricks at construction sites, carry fruit, vegetables, 
and dry goods for shoppers at markets, work at tea stalls, and work as 
beachcombers in the shrimp industry. Many children work in the beedi 
(hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years old 
sometimes work in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry. 
Children routinely perform domestic work. Cases of children being 
abused physically and occasionally killed by the head of the household 
where they work are reported in the press. In the past, the Government 
has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse domestic 
servants. Some children are trafficked domestically or overseas, often 
for prostitution, and child prostitution is a serious problem (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.). Under the law, every child must attend school 
through the fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However, the 
Government continues to maintain that it does not yet have the 
resources to implement this law effectively.
    Protracted negotiations led to the July 1995 signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and the ILO to 
eliminate child labor in the garment sector. Under the MOU, the garment 
sector was to become child labor free by October 1996, with former 
child laborers enrolled in UNICEFsponsored schools and follow-up 
inspections of factories by ILO-managed inspection teams. Under the 
program, former child employees received a small monthly stipend while 
attending school to help replace their lost income. On June 16, the MOU 
was renewed for 1 year. Violations of the ban on child labor in the 
garment export sector dropped slightly from 5 percent as the year 
progressed to 4.7 percent of the factories inspected. According to ILO 
inspectors, 90 percent of the factories where violations were found had 
one to three child laborers, and the remaining ten percent had more. 
However, a BGMEA arbitration committee, which is tasked with imposing 
fines on violating factories, functions slowly. The number of children 
working in nonexport, or nonfactory garment production, is unknown.
    The Government did not grant the Ministry of Labor additional 
resources to enforce its commitment as a member of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation to eliminate hazardous child labor 
by 2000, and to eliminate all child labor by 2010; the existing small 
corps of labor inspectors continues to be ineffective against all labor 
problems because of inefficiency and corruption.
    In cooperation with the Non-Formal Education Directorate of the 
Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is implementing a ``hard-to-
reach'' program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily working) 
children in urban slum areas around the country. Working with the 
Government, NGO's, and some trade unions, ILO/IPEC has 20 action 
programs, targeting about 6,000 children in hazardous conditions, 
designed to ensure that children receive an education, rather than 
removing children from work. In addition ILO has undertaken education/
social welfare programs for more than 50,000 children.
    The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including 
that performed by children; however, the Government does not enforce 
this prohibition effectively, and some children work as domestic 
servants in conditions that resemble labor servitude or are trafficked 
for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). 
There were credible reports that police facilitated or were involved in 
trafficking of women and children.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. Instead the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years, 
sets wages and benefits industry by industry. In most cases, private 
sector employers ignore this wage structure. For example, in the 
garment industry, legal minimum wages are not paid by many factories, 
and it is common for workers of smaller factories to experience delays 
in receiving their pay, or to receive ``trainee'' wages well past the 
maximum 3 months. The declared minimum monthly wage for a skilled 
industrial worker is approximately $63 (3,400 Taka) for a worker in an 
EPZ and approximately $49 (2,650 Taka) for a worker outside an EPZ, and 
is sufficient to provide an individual with a minimal standard of 
living, but is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family.
    The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A 
60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is 
allowed. The law is enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and 
ready-made garments.
    The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and 
safety standards. The law is comprehensive but largely is ignored by 
employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the 
garment industry. Many factories are located in structures that were 
not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation 
of large work forces. Twelve garment factory workers died on August 27 
when they were unable to escape from a factory fire due to locked 
exits. A Civil Defense Department report cited lack of adequate safety 
measures as the cause of the fatalities. In addition numerous factories 
have insufficient toilet facilities (for example, 1 toilet for 300 
employees). Workers may resort to legal action for enforcement of the 
law's provisions, but few cases actually are prosecuted. Enforcement by 
the Labor Ministry's industrial inspectors is weak, due both to the low 
number of labor inspectors (100 for about 300,000 covered 
establishments), and to endemic corruption and inefficiency among 
inspectors. Due to a high unemployment rate and inadequate enforcement 
of the laws, workers demanding correction of dangerous working 
conditions or refusing to participate in perceived dangerous activities 
risk losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons and trafficking is a serious problem. There is extensive 
trafficking in both women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan, 
and destinations within the country, mainly for the purpose of forced 
prostitution, although in some instances for labor servitude. Some 
children also are trafficked to the Middle East to be used as camel 
jockeys.
    Trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution carries a 10 to 
20 year sentence or the death penalty. Trafficking in children for 
immoral or illegal purposes carries the death penalty or life 
imprisonment. However, few perpetrators are punished. Human rights 
monitors also credibly report that police and local government 
officials often ignore trafficking in women and children for 
prostitution, and easily are bribed to look the other way (see Sections 
1.c., 5, and 6.c.). According to one antitrafficking organization, 
during the year four new trafficking cases were filed, and the trials 
of two cases filed earlier were concluded. In one case, a trafficker 
was sentenced to death in absentia; in the second, two individuals were 
sentenced to life in prison. Exact numbers of those persons arrested 
for trafficking are difficult to obtain as charges against traffickers 
usually are for lesser crimes, such as crossing borders without proper 
documents.
    The exact number of women and children trafficked for purposes of 
forced prostitution is unknown; however, human rights monitors estimate 
that more than 20,000 women and children are trafficked from the 
country for such purposes annually. Most trafficked persons are lured 
by promises of good jobs or marriage, and some are forced into 
involuntary servitude outside of the country. Seeing no alternative for 
breaking the cycle of poverty, parents often willingly send their 
children away. Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of the normal 
family support system also are susceptible. Traffickers living abroad 
often arrive in a village and ``marry'' a woman, only to dispose of her 
upon arrival in the destination country, where women are sold by their 
new ``friends'' or ``husbands'' into bonded labor, menial jobs, or 
prostitution. Criminal gangs conduct much of the trafficking in and 
smuggling of persons. The border between Bangladesh and India is 
loosely controlled, especially around Jessore and Benapole, making 
illegal border crossings easy.
    The number of child prostitutes is difficult to determine. 
Prostitution is legal, but only for those persons over 18 years of age 
with government certification; however, this minimum age requirement 
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false 
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large 
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels.
    Children, usually young boys, also are trafficked into the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf States to work as camel jockeys. It is 
estimated that there are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South 
Asian camel jockeys currently working in the United Arab Emirates 
alone; while many come from India and Pakistan, a growing number come 
from Bangladesh. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The 
majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who 
receive as much as $200 (10,000 Taka) for their child's labor, although 
a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing the 
jockeys earn approximately $150 (7,500 Taka) a month from the labor of 
each child. The usual procedure used for bringing these children into 
the Middle East is to have their names added to the passport of a 
Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Middle East; 
the children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. During the 
year, police made arrests in several incidents for trafficking in young 
boys to the Middle East.
    The Government has developed a set of policies and plans regarding 
the trafficking issue. The Government has been involved in ongoing 
efforts to engage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) on the issue. The Government also frequently sends 
representatives to conferences, seminars, and workshops on the 
trafficking problem. In addition the Government has initiated a program 
across a number of ministries to address the problem. However, 
government capacity to address with this issue remains limited.
    In June the Government signed a 3-year, $2 million (108 million 
Taka) project with the Norwegian government aid organization, NORAD, to 
develop an intraministerial infrastructure for addressing the 
trafficking problem. This project, based in the Department of Women and 
Children's Affairs, plans to be the focal point for addressing the 
prosecution, protection, and prevention activities carried out by the 
Government. A goal of the project is for the Government to become more 
involved in arresting and prosecuting traffickers. However, because the 
Government does not keep records of births and marriages at the village 
level, it is very difficult for authorities to detect false claims of 
marriage or family ties.
    The Government has expressed concern about the problem and has 
worked with NGO's, donor countries, and international organizations 
against trafficking. Some of these projects include conducting 
awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation 
programs. While the Government provides support for returning 
trafficking victims, governmentrun shelters generally are inadequate 
and poorly run. Increasing shelter capacity and rehabilitation programs 
is one of the features of the NORAD project.
    Throughout the country, a variety of NGO's and community-based 
organizations are working on the trafficking problem through prevention 
efforts, research, data collection, documentation, advocacy, awareness 
creation and networking, cross-border collaboration, legal enforcement, 
rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration, income generation and low-
interest loan programs, vocational training, and legislative reform. 
Among the NGO's that have been active in addressing the problem, the 
Association for Community Development conducted a study on trafficking 
issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed at reaching 
potential victims of trafficking before they are trafficked. The 
Bangladesh National Women Lawyer's Association (BNWLA) conducts 
awareness programs aimed at alerting poor persons to the dangers of 
trafficking through leaflets, stickers, and posters. The BNWLA also 
provides legal assistance to trafficking victims, and initiates legal 
action against traffickers. The BNWLA runs a shelter home for 
trafficked women and children that provides health care, counseling, 
and training. The Center for Women and Children (CWCS) has networks to 
monitor trafficking across the country, conducts awareness meetings, 
and has a pilot project to make police aware of the rights of women and 
children. Awareness of trafficking is increasing, and the topic 
receives frequent press coverage. Two umbrella organizations of anti-
trafficking NGO's exist, and are seeking to improve coordination and 
planning of efforts against the problem.
                               __________

                                 BHUTAN

    Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye 
Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly and a 
Council of Ministers; there is no written constitution to protect 
fundamental political and human rights. Since ascending to the throne 
in 1972, the King has continued efforts toward social and political 
modernization begun by his father. In the last few years, Bhutan has 
improved rapidly services in education, health care, sanitation, and 
communications, with parallel but slower developments of the role of 
representatives in governance and decision making. In recent years, 
Bhutan has adopted some measures to transfer power from the King to the 
National Assembly. The judiciary is not independent of the King.
    Approximately two-thirds of the government-declared population of 
600,000 persons is composed of Buddhists with cultural traditions akin 
to those of Tibet. The Buddhist majority consists of two principal 
ethnic and linguistic groups: the Ngalongs of the western part of the 
country and the Sharchops of the eastern part of the country. The 
remaining third of the population, ethnic Nepalis, most of whom are 
Hindus, live in the country's southern districts. Bhutanese dissident 
groups claim that the actual population is between 650,000 and 700,000 
persons and that the Government underreports the number of ethnic 
Nepalese in the country. The rapid growth of this ethnic Nepalese 
segment of the population led some in the Buddhist majority to fear for 
the survival of their culture. Government efforts to institute policies 
designed to preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic 
group, to change citizenship requirements, and to control illegal 
immigration resulted in political protests and led to ethnic conflict 
and repression of ethnic Nepalese in southern districts during the late 
1980's and early 1990's. Tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese left the 
country in 1991-92, many of whom were expelled forcibly. According to 
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 98,269 ethnic 
Nepalese in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal as of late June; upwards 
of 15,000 reside outside of the camps in the Indian states of Assam and 
West Bengal. The Government maintains that some of those in the camps 
never were citizens, and therefore have no right to return. In 1998 the 
Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of 
the country on land in southern districts vacated by the ethnic 
Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal, which some claim will 
complicate any future return of the ethnic Nepalese. A National 
Assembly resolution adopted in 1997 prohibits still-resident immediate 
family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding jobs with the 
Government or the armed forces. In early 1998 the Government 
implemented the resolution, and already had dismissed 429 civil 
servants by November 1998, when implementation of the resolution was 
discontinued.
    The Royal Bhutan Police (RBP), assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army, 
including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard, and a national 
militia, maintain internal security. Some members of these forces 
committed human rights abuses against ethnic Nepalese.
    The economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the 
main livelihood for 90 percent of the population and account for about 
half of the gross domestic product (GDP). Agriculture largely consists 
of subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Cardamon, citrus fruit, 
and spices are the leading agricultural exports. Cement and electricity 
are the other important exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link 
the economy closely to that of India. Hydroelectric power production 
potential and tourism are key resources, although the Government limits 
foreign tourist arrivals because of inadequate tourist infrastructure 
and environmental concerns. Tourist arrivals also are limited by means 
of pricing policies. Bhutan is a poor country. The gross national 
product per capita is estimated to be $470.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and problems 
remain in several areas. The King exercises strong, active, and direct 
power over the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change 
their government. The Government discourages political parties, and 
none operate legally. There were reports that security forces beat 
ethnic Nepalese refugees who entered the country to demonstrate. 
Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems, and reports of torture 
and abuse of persons in detention continue. Impunity for those who 
commit abuses also is a problem. Judges serve at the King's pleasure, 
and the Government limits significantly the right to a fair trial. 
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a 
legal code established in the 17 century and revised and modernized in 
1958 and 1965. In late 1998 the Government formed a special committee 
of jurists and government officials to review the country's basic law 
and propose changes. In April the Government established a Department 
of Legal Affairs, which is projected to be functioning fully by mid-
2001; it is a result of the review of the Basic Law. Programs to build 
a body of written law and to train lawyers are progressing. For 
example, the Government sends many lawyers to India and other countries 
for legal training. The Government limits significantly citizens' right 
to privacy. The Government restricts freedom of speech, the press, 
assembly, and association. The Government launched the country's first 
indigenous television service in June 1999, modifying a ban on private 
television reception that had been in place since 1989. Citizens face 
significant limitations on freedom of religion. In July 1998, the 
Government initiated steps to renew negotiations with the Government of 
Nepal on procedures for the screening and repatriation of ethnic 
Nepalese in the refugee camps, and the two governments held a series of 
meetings during the second half of that year. After a 3-year hiatus, 
ministerial-level bilateral talks resumed in September 1999. The 
Government restricts worker rights.
    The Government claims that it has prosecuted government personnel 
for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990's; however, public 
indications are that it has done little to investigate and prosecute 
security force officials responsible for torture, rape, and other 
abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during 
the year. Human rights groups allege that in 1998 a government official 
shot and killed Gomchen Karma, a Buddhist monk arrested in October 1997 
during a peaceful demonstration in the eastern part of the country. The 
Government stated that the shooting was accidental, that the official 
responsible has been suspended from duty and charged in connection with 
the incident, and that his case was being heard as of September.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and abuse; however, human rights 
advocates state that in practice security forces ignore these 
provisions. No one was prosecuted in connection with violating 
prohibitions against torture during the year. There were reports that 
security forces captured numerous ethnic Nepalese refugees attempting 
to return to the country, beat them, and sent them back across the 
border. Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan report 
that in 1998 and 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several 
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the marchers to 
Nepal (see Section 5). In the past, there have been reports that ethnic 
Nepalese refugees who attempted to return to the country were tortured. 
Refugee newspapers published in Nepal allege that Nima Gyaltsen, a 
prisoner detained since 1997 without charge or trial in Zilnon 
Namgyeling jail in Thimphu, died in 1999 after being subjected to 
torture during his incarceration.
    Refugee groups credibly claim that persons detained as suspected 
dissidents in the early 1990's were tortured by security forces, who 
also committed acts of rape. During those years, the Government's 
ethnic policies and the crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political 
agitation created a climate of impunity in which the Government tacitly 
condoned the physical abuse of ethnic Nepalese. The Government denies 
that these abuses occurred but also claims that it has investigated and 
prosecuted three government officials for unspecified abuses of 
authority during that period. Details of these cases have not been made 
public, and there is little indication that the Government has 
investigated adequately or punished any security force officials 
involved in the widespread abuses of 1989-92.
    Prison conditions reportedly are adequate, if austere. In 1993 the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a program of 
visits to prisons in the capital, Thimphu. In 1994 a new prison in 
Chemgang was opened. Together, these events contributed to a 
substantial improvement in conditions of detention over those that 
existed previously. However, Bhutanese human rights groups active 
outside the country maintain that prison conditions outside of Thimphu 
remain oppressive.
    The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of 
Understanding in September 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits 
program for another 5 years. The ICRC conducted two prison visits 
during the year, as it has done for each of the past 6 years, and 
received unhindered access to prisons during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. Under the Police Act of 1979, police may not 
arrest a person without a warrant and must produce an arrested person 
before a court within 24 hours of arrest, exclusive of travel time from 
place of arrest. However, legal protections are incomplete, due to the 
lack of a fully elaborated criminal procedure code and to deficiencies 
in police training and practice. Incommunicado detention is known to 
occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious 
problem in 1991 and 1992, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits and 
the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and family 
members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in 
connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in 
1991-92, 1,685 persons were ultimately amnestied, 58 are serving 
sentences after conviction by the High Court, 9 were acquitted by the 
High Court, and 71 were released after serving prison sentences.
    Human rights groups allege that in July and August 1997, the Royal 
Bhutan Police in and around Samdrup Jongkar town in the east arrested 
some 50 suspected supporters of a Bhutanese dissident group active 
outside the country. The Government states that only 16 persons were 
arrested during this period and that they have been charged with 
involvement in seditious activities and are awaiting trial. Many were 
said to be supporters of one-time Druk National Congress (DNC) and 
United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) leader Rongthong Kunley 
Dorji, who was arrested in India in April 1997, following the issuance 
of an extradition request by Bhutanese authorities. Dorji faces 
extradition proceedings in India and possible return to Bhutan to face 
charges of fraud, nonpayment of loans, and incitement to violence. The 
original Bhutanese extradition request included a third charge, 
``antinational activities,'' but this later was dropped when it became 
clear that Indian law would preclude his extradition to face political 
charges. Human rights groups contend that the charges brought against 
Dorji are politically motivated and constitute an attempt by the 
Government to suppress his prodemocracy activities. In June 1998, an 
Indian court granted Dorji bail, but placed restrictions on his 
movements. Dorji's extradition case still is pending in the Indian 
courts. According to an Amnesty International report released in 1999, 
30 persons were detained in 1998, most of them on suspicion of being 
members or supporters of the DNC.
    Amnesty International has reported that some of those arrested are 
feared to be at risk of torture (see Section 1.c.). Bhutanese human 
rights groups outside the country claim that the arrests, including 
those of several Buddhist monks, are aimed at imposing Ngalong norms on 
the eastern, Sharchop community, which has a distinct ethnic and 
religious identity. The Government denies that it has such a policy; 
many government officials, including both the former Head of 
Government, Foreign Minister Jigme Thinley, and the Chief Justice of 
the High Court Sonam Tobgye, are Sharchops.
    Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan charge that 
in 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several demonstrators, and 
then arrested and deported all of the marchers to Nepal (see Section 
5). By one estimate, approximately 100 marchers were arrested and 
deported in 1999. The Government acknowledged that 58 persons whom it 
described as terrorists were serving sentences at the end of 1998 for 
crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. It stated that a total of 
134 persons were arrested in connection with the October 1997 
disturbances in the east; of that number, more than one-half either had 
been tried and acquitted or had been released after serving short 
sentences.
    Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for 
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by 
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section 
1.e.).
    Although the Government does not use formally exile as a form of 
punishment, many accused political dissidents freed under Government 
amnesties say that they were released on the condition that they depart 
the country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in 
Nepal. The Government denies this.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution, 
and the judiciary is not independent of the King.
    The judicial system consists of district courts and a High Court in 
Thimphu. Judges are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the 
Chief Justice and may be removed by the King. Village headmen 
adjudicate minor offenses and administrative matters.
    The Department of Legal Affairs, which was established in April, is 
projected to be fully functional by mid-2001. At a future date, the 
Government expects to create a Ministry of Law and Justice and an 
Attorney General's office within the Department of Legal Affairs. At 
present, the Department is composed of a Legal Services Division (which 
eventually is to become the Ministry of Law and Justice) with domestic, 
international, and human rights sections; and a Prosecution Division 
(which eventually is to become the Attorney General's office), with a 
criminal section and a civil section.
    Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under 
a legal code established in the 17 century and revised in 1958 and 
1965. For offenses against the State, state-appointed prosecutors file 
charges and prosecute cases. In other cases, the relevant organizations 
and departments of government file charges and conduct the prosecution. 
Defendants are supposed to be presented with written charges in 
languages that they understand and given time to prepare their own 
defense. However, this practice is not always followed, according to 
some political dissidents. In cases where defendants cannot write their 
own defense, courts assign judicial officers to assist defendants. 
There were reports that defendants receive legal representation at 
trial, and that they may choose from a list of 150 governmentlicensed 
and employed advocates to assist with their defense; however, it is not 
known how many defendants actually receive such assistance. A legal 
education program gradually is building a body of persons who have 
received formal training in the law abroad. Village headmen, who have 
the power to arbitrate disputes, make up the bottom rung of the 
judicial system. Magistrates, each with responsibility for a block of 
villages, can review their decisions. Magistrates' decisions can be 
appealed to district judges, of which there is 1 for each of the 
country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is the country's 
supreme court. Its decisions can be appealed to the King.
    Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make 
a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegates the decision to 
the Royal Advisory Council. Trials are to be conducted in open 
hearings; however, there are allegations that this is not always the 
case in practice.
    Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption, 
traditionally are resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist 
tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for 
the ethnic Nepalese; however, the Government states that there is one 
formal law that governs these matters.
    Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for 
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by 
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section 
1.d.).
    On December 17, 1999, the King pardoned 200 prisoners to mark 
National Day; all reportedly were released. Among them were 40 persons 
convicted of ``antinational'' offenses, including prominent ethnic 
Nepalese dissident and internationally recognized political prisoner 
Tek Nath Rizal. Tek Nath Rizal was arrested in 1988 in Nepal and 
extradited to Bhutan, where he was held in solitary confinement in 
Wangdiphodrang military prison until his 1992 conviction for 
antinational crimes, including writing and distributing political 
pamphlets and attending political meetings. He was convicted under the 
1993 National Security Act, although at the time of his conviction the 
act had not yet been passed. However, a U.N. Human Rights Commission 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that visited the country in 1994 
at the Government's invitation determined that Rizal had received a 
fair trial and declared his detention ``not to be arbitrary.'' During 
the latter part of the year, Rizal was granted permission to leave 
Bhutan to receive medical treatment in Calcutta, India. He had not left 
Bhutan by year's end.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights. The 
Government requires all citizens, including minorities, to wear the 
traditional dress of the Buddhist majority when visiting Buddhist 
religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices, and in schools 
and when attending official functions and public ceremonies. According 
to human rights groups, police regularly conduct house-to-house 
searches for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal 
justification.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom 
of speech and of the press.
    The country's only regular publication is Kuensel, a governmentrun 
weekly newspaper with a circulation of 10,000. Human rights groups 
state that government ministries regularly review editorial material 
and have the power to suppress or change content, which they regularly 
do. They allege that the board of directors nominally responsible for 
editorial policy is appointed by and can be removed by the Government. 
Kuensel, which publishes simultaneous editions in the English, 
Dzongkha, and Nepali languages, supports the Government but does 
occasionally report criticism of the King and Government policies in 
the National Assembly. Nepalese, Indian, and other foreign newspapers 
are available, but they sometimes can be withheld from circulation if 
they carry news that the Government deems critical of the country.
    In 1989 the Government banned all private television reception and 
ordered that television antennas and satellite dishes be dismantled. 
Many homes in Paro and Thimphu nonetheless have satellite dishes and 
receive signals from international broadcasters. In June 1999, the 
Government introduced locally produced television service with the 
inauguration of the Bhutan Broadcasting Service. The service broadcasts 
4 hours of programming daily: 2 hours of locally produced programming 
in Dzongkha, and 2 hours of English-language programming produced 
outside of the country (such as from the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and the Cable News Network (CNN)). In late 1999 the 
Government began licensing cable operators to provide service in 
Thimphu and Paro, and cable television is available. The Government 
radio station broadcasts each day in the four major languages 
(Dzongkha, Nepali, English, and Sharchop). The Government inaugurated 
the country's first Internet service provider, Druknet, in June 1999.
    English is the medium of instruction in schools and the national 
language, Dzongkha, is taught as a second language. The teaching of 
Nepali as a second language was discontinued in 1990.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in 
peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the 
Government. Although the Government allows civic and business 
organizations, there are no legally recognized political parties. The 
Government regards parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the 
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and the Bhutan National Democratic Party 
(BNDP)--as well as the Druk National Congress--as ``terrorist and 
antinational'' organizations and has declared them illegal. These 
parties do not conduct activities inside the country. They seek the 
repatriation of refugees and democratic reform.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government limits freedom of religion. 
The Drukpa branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana Buddhism is the 
state religion. About two-thirds of the population practice either 
Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism. The Drukpa branch is practiced 
predominantly in the western and central parts of the country, which 
are inhabited mainly by ethnic Ngalongs (descendants of Tibetan 
immigrants who predominate in government and the civil service, and 
whose cultural norms have been declared to be the standard for all 
citizens). The Ningmapa school is practiced predominantly in the 
eastern part of the country, although there are adherents in other 
areas, including the royal family. Most of those living in the east are 
ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of those thought to be the country's 
original inhabitants. The Government subsidizes monasteries and shrines 
of the Drukpa sect and provides aid to about one-third of the Kingdom's 
12,000 monks. The Government also provides financial assistance for the 
construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and 
shrines. In the early 1990's, the Government provided funds for the 
construction of new Hindu temples and centers of Sanskrit and Hindu 
learning and for the renovation of existing temples and places of Hindu 
learning. The Drukpa branch enjoys statutory representation in the 
National Assembly (Drukpa monks occupy 10 seats in the 150 member 
National Assembly) and in the Royal Advisory Council (Drukpa monks hold 
2 of the 11 seats on the Council), and the Drukpa branch is an 
influential voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly 
Hindus, enjoy freedom of worship but may not proselytize. Under the 
law, conversions are illegal.
    The King has declared major Hindu festivals to be national 
holidays, and the royal family participates in them. Foreign 
missionaries are not permitted to proselytize, but international 
Christian relief organizations and Jesuit priests are active in 
education and humanitarian activities. According to dissidents living 
outside of the country, the Government restricts the import into the 
country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts are 
allowed to enter. These dissidents also state that Buddhist religious 
teaching, of both the Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa sects, is permitted 
in schools; the teaching of other religious faiths is not. The 
passports of members of minority religions cite the holder's religion, 
and applicants for government services sometimes are asked their 
religion before services are rendered.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions are 
required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration check 
points, which in some cases are located at a considerable distance from 
what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty, citizens may 
reside and work in India.
    Bhutan is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (See Section 5 regarding 
the ethnic Nepalese refugee situation).
    The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in 
accordance with international refugee law; however, it has no official 
policy regarding refugees, asylum, first asylum, or the return of 
refugees to countries in which they fear persecution. According to one 
credible human rights source, until recent years the Government 
systematically used to arrest and imprison Tibetan refugees crossing 
the country's border from Tibet. This policy was followed in deference 
to China's wishes. So invariable was this policy that Tibetan leaders 
advise refugees not to use routes of escape through Bhutan. Tibetan 
refugees have not done so for several years. This virtually is the only 
refugee population seeking first asylum in Bhutan, thus, the issue of 
first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Bhutan 
is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. In June 1998, 
the King introduced term limits for his Council of Ministers and 
proposed measures to increase the role of the National Assembly in the 
formation of his Government. The National Assembly elected a new 
Council of Ministers and Government in July 1998 to a 5-year term. 
There are elected or partially elected assemblies at the local, 
district, and national levels, and the Government claims to encourage 
decentralization and citizen participation. These elections are 
conducted in much the same way as National Assembly elections. Since 
1969 the National Assembly has had the power to remove ministers who 
the King appoints, but it never has done so. Political authority 
ultimately resides in the King and decisionmaking involves only a small 
number of officials. Officials subject to questioning by the National 
Assembly routinely make major decisions, but the National Assembly is 
not known to have overturned any decisions reached by the King and 
government officials.
    Political parties do not exist legally, and the Government 
discourages their formation as unnecessarily divisive. The Government 
prohibits parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese (see Section 
2.b.).
    The National Assembly, established in 1953, has 150 members. Of 
these, 105 are elected indirectly by heads of household, 10 are 
selected by a part of the Buddhist clergy, and the remaining 35 are 
appointed by the King to represent the Government. The National 
Assembly, which meets irregularly, has little independent authority. 
However, there are efforts underway to have the National Assembly meet 
on a more regular basis, and in recent years the King and the Council 
of Ministers have been more responsive to the National Assembly's 
concerns.
    The procedures for the nomination and election of National Assembly 
members are set out in an amendment to the country's Basic Law proposed 
by the King and adopted by the 73 session of the National Assembly in 
1995. It provides that in order to be eligible for nomination as a 
candidate for election to the National Assembly, a person must be a 
citizen of Bhutan, be at least 25 years of age, not be married to a 
foreign national, not have been terminated or compulsorily retired for 
misconduct from government service, not have committed any act of 
treason against the King, the populace, and country, have no criminal 
record or any criminal case pending against him, have respect for the 
nation's laws, and be able to read and write in Dzongkha (the language, 
having different dialects in the eastern and western areas of the 
country, spoken by Bhutanese Buddhists).
    Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of 
villages. Each village is permitted to nominate one candidate but must 
do so by consensus. There is no provision for selfnomination and the 
law states that no person...may campaign for the candidacy or canvass 
through other means. If more than one village within a constituency 
puts forward a candidate, an election is conducted by the district 
development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple majority of 
votes cast is declared the winner. Individuals do not have the right to 
vote; every family in a village is entitled to one vote in elections. 
The law does not make clear how a candidate is selected if none 
achieves a simple majority. However, it does state that in case of a 
tie among the candidates in the election, a selection shall be made 
through the drawing of lots. The candidate whose name is drawn shall be 
deemed to be elected.
    Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens 
have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative is 
when they are asked for consensus approval of a village candidate by 
the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus approval 
by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who in turn 
take their direction from the central Government. Consensus approval 
takes place at a public gathering. Human rights activists state that 
there is no secret ballot.
    The Assembly enacts laws, approves senior government appointments, 
and advises the King on matters of national importance. Voting is by 
secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure. The 
King may not formally veto legislation, but may return bills for 
further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejects the King's 
recommendations or delays implementing them, but in general, the King 
has enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve legislation 
that he considers essential or to withdraw proposals he opposes. The 
Assembly may question government officials and force them to resign by 
a two-thirds vote of no confidence; however, the National Assembly 
never has compelled any government official to resign. The Royal Civil 
Service Commission is responsible for disciplining subministerial level 
government officials and has removed several following their 
convictions for crimes including embezzlement.
    In June 1998, the King issued a decree setting out several measures 
intended to increase the role of the National Assembly in the formation 
and dissolution of his Government. The decree, later adopted by the 76 
session of the National Assembly, provided that all cabinet ministers 
are to be elected by the National Assembly and that the roles and 
responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out. Each 
cabinet minister is to be elected by simple majority in a secret ballot 
in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the King. 
The King is to select nominees for cabinet office from among senior 
government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The King 
is to determine the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms will be 
limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in 
the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally, the decree 
provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no 
confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the 
next in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the National 
Assembly elected a new cabinet of ministers consistent with the decree. 
Human rights groups maintain that since only the King may nominate 
candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National Assembly 
is not a significant democratic reform. The King also removed himself 
as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1998; Foreign Minister Jigme 
Thinley was elected to that position by the National Assembly for 1 
year, and was replaced by Minister for Health and Education Sangay 
Ngedup in July 1999.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they have made small but visible gains. Three women hold seats in the 
National Assembly.
    All major ethnic groups, including ethnic Nepalese, are represented 
in the National Assembly. There are 16 ``southern Bhutanese'' (also 
known as Lhotshampas) in the National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no legal human rights nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) in the country. The Government regards human rights groups 
established by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Human Rights Organization of 
Bhutan, the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, and the 
Association of Human Rights Activists--Bhutan--as political 
organizations and does not permit them to operate in the country. 
Amnesty International visited Bhutan in 1992 to investigate and to 
report on the alleged abuse of ethnic Nepalese. In late November 1998, 
Amnesty International again sent a delegation to the country and later 
released a report.
    ICRC representatives continue twice yearly prison visits, and the 
Government has allowed them unhindered access to detention facilities, 
including those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The 
chairman and members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention made a second visit to the country in May 1996 
as a follow-up to an October 1994 visit. In addition to meetings with 
government officials, members of the working group visited prisons and 
interviewed prisoners in Thimphu, Phuntsoling, and Samtse.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted 
in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group 
restrict cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the late 1980's 
and early 1990's, the Government instituted polices designed to 
preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic group. It also 
committed many abuses against the ethnic Nepalese, which led to the 
departure of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese from the country; 
many ethnic Nepalese were expelled forcibly, and almost 100,000 of them 
remain in refugee camps in Nepal. At the time, the Government claimed 
that it was concerned about the rapid population growth of and 
political agitation by the ethnic Nepalese. The Government claims that 
ethnic and gender discrimination in employment is not a problem. It 
claims that ethnic Nepalese fill 22 percent of government jobs, which 
is slightly less than their proportion of the total population. 
Bhutanese human rights groups active outside the country claim that 
ethnic Nepalese actually make up about 35 percent of the country's 
population and that the Government underreports their number. Women are 
accorded respect in the traditions of most ethnic groups; however, 
persistence of traditional gender roles apparently accounts for the low 
proportion of women in government employment. Exile groups claim that 
ethnic and gender discrimination is a problem.
    Women.--There is no evidence that rape or spousal abuse are 
extensive problems. However, there are credible reports by refugees and 
human rights groups that security forces raped large numbers of ethnic 
Nepalese women in the southern area of the country in 1991 and 1992. 
According to Amnesty International, some women reportedly have died as 
a result. In one independent survey of 1,779 refugee families, 26 
percent of the respondents cited rape, fear of rape, or threat of rape 
as a prime reason for their departure from the country. The Government 
has denied these reports.
    Rape was made a criminal offense in 1953, but that law had weak 
penalties and was enforced poorly. In 1993 the National Assembly 
adopted a revised rape act with clear definitions of criminal sexual 
assault and stronger penalties. In cases of rape involving minors, 
sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be 
imprisoned for life.
    Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate 
freely in the social and economic life of the country. Approximately 43 
percent of enrollment in school is female, and 16 percent of civil 
service employees are women. Inheritance law provides for equal 
inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional inheritance 
practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed if the heirs 
choose to forego legal challenges. Dowry is not practiced, even among 
ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups, inheritance practices 
favoring daughters reportedly account for the large numbers of women 
among owners of shops and businesses and for an accompanying tendency 
of women to drop out of higher education to go into business. However, 
female school enrollment has been growing in response to government 
policies. Women increasingly are found among senior officials and 
private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the tourism industry. Women 
in unskilled jobs generally are paid slightly less than men.
    Polygamy is sanctioned provided the first wife gives her 
permission. Marriages may be arranged by the marriage partners 
themselves as well as by their parents. Divorce is common. Recent 
legislation requires that all marriages must be registered; it also 
favors women in matters of alimony.
    Children.--The Government has demonstrated its commitment to child 
welfare by its rapid expansion of primary schools, health-care 
facilities, and immunization programs. The mortality rates for both 
infants and children under 5 years have dropped significantly since 
1989. The Government provides free and compulsory primary school 
education, and primary school enrollment has increased at 9 percent per 
year since 1991, with enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher 
rate. In 1995 the participation rate for children in primary schools 
was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of completion of 7 years of 
schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59 percent for boys. There is 
no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending school. However, 
most of the 75 primary schools in southern areas heavily populated by 
ethnic Nepalese that were closed in 1990 remain closed today. The 
closure of the schools acts as an effective barrier to the ability of 
the ethnic Nepalese in southern areas to obtain a primary education. 
Children enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from 
international development programs focused on maternal and child 
welfare. Amnesty International reported that at least 23 students, 
between 7 and 21 years of age, whose relatives had been arrested for 
supporting the prodemocracy movement, were expelled from school in 
eastern Bhutan in 1998. Amnesty International also reported that 19-
year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled from school in March 1998 and was 
tortured by members of the Royal Bhutanese police after his arrest in 
Thimphu in July 1998.
    A study by UNICEF found that boys and girls receive equal treatment 
regarding nutrition and health care and that there is little difference 
in child mortality rates between the sexes. Government policies aimed 
at increasing enrollment of girls have increased the proportion of 
girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 1995.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of official 
discrimination toward disabled persons but the Government has not 
passed legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Societal 
discrimination against the disabled is a problem.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in 
the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of 
economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx 
of additional ethnic Nepalese. In the late 1980's, concern over the 
increase in the population of and political agitation among ethnic 
Nepalese prompted aggressive government efforts to assert a national 
culture, to tighten control over southern regions, to control illegal 
immigration, to expel ethnic Nepalese, and to promote national 
integration. Early efforts at national integration focused on 
assimilation, including financial incentives for intermarriage, 
education for some students in regions other than their own, and an 
increase in development funds in the south.
    Beginning in 1989, more discriminatory measures were introduced, 
aimed at shaping a new national identity, known as Drukpa. Drukpa is 
based on the customs of the non-ethnic Nepalese Ngalong ethnic group 
predominant in the western part of the country. Measures included a 
requirement that national dress be worn for official occasions and as a 
school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as a second language in all 
schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali as a second language 
(English is the language of instruction in all schools). Also, 
beginning in 1988, the Government refused to renew the contracts of 
tens of thousands of Nepalese guest workers. Many of these workers had 
resided in the country for years, in some cases with their families.
    During the mid- and late 1980's, citizenship became a highly 
contentious issue. Requirements for citizenship first were formalized 
in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which granted citizenship to all adults 
who owned land and had lived in the country for at least 10 years. 
However, in 1985 a new citizenship law significantly tightened 
requirements for citizenship and resulted in the denaturalization of 
many ethnic Nepalese. While citizenship previously was conferred upon 
children whose father was a citizen under the 1958 law, the 1985 law 
required that both parents be citizens in order to confer citizenship 
on a child, and that persons seeking to prove citizenship through their 
own or their parents' residency in 1958 be able to prove residency in 
the country at that time. In many cases, persons were unable to produce 
the documentation necessary, such as land tax receipts from 1958, to 
show residency nearly 30 years before. The law permits residents who 
lost citizenship under the 1985 law to apply for naturalization if they 
can prove residence during the 15 years prior to that time. The 
Government declared all residents who could not meet the new 
citizenship requirements to be illegal immigrants.
    The 1985 Citizenship Act also provides for the revocation of the 
citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech 
to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and 
people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry, in a circular notification in 
1990, advised that ``any Bhutanese nationals leaving the country to 
assist and help the antinationals shall no longer be considered as 
Bhutanese citizens . . . such people's family members living in the 
same household will also be held fully responsible and forfeit their 
citizenship.'' Human rights groups allege that these provisions were 
used widely to revoke the citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who 
subsequently were expelled or otherwise departed from the country. 
Beginning in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of ethnic 
Nepalese through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
    Outraged by what they saw as a campaign of repression, ethnic 
Nepalese mounted a series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, in 
September 1990. The protests were spearheaded by the newly formed 
Bhutan People's Party, which demanded full citizenship rights for 
ethnic Nepalese, the reintroduction of Nepali as a medium of education 
in the south, and democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP as a 
``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the authorities 
cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of local 
Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several were 
raided or bombed by dissidents. Many ethnic Nepalese schools reportedly 
were turned into Army barracks. There were credible reports that many 
ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in custody, 
and that security forces committed acts of rape. There also were 
credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked and 
killed census officers and other officials, and engaged in bombings. 
Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression to coerce 
ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and to 
emigrate.
    Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern areas of 
the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many were 
expelled forcibly. According to Amnesty International, entire villages 
sometimes were evicted en masse in retaliation for an attack on a local 
government official. Many ethnic Nepalese were forced to sign 
``voluntary migration forms'' wherein they agreed to leave the country, 
after local officials threatened to fine or imprison them for failing 
to comply. By August 1991, according to NGO reports, 2,500 refugees 
already were camped illegally in Nepal, with a steady stream still 
coming from Bhutan. The UNHCR began providing food and shelter in 
September of that year, and by year's end, there were 6,000 refugees in 
Nepal. The number of registered refugees grew to approximately 62,000 
by August 1992, and to approximately 80,000 by June 1993, when the 
UNHCR began individual screening of refugees. The flow slowed 
considerably thereafter; there were no new refugee arrivals from Bhutan 
to the camps during the year. According to UNHCR, there were 98,269 
ethnic Nepalese refugees in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal, as of 
June 30. Much of this increase since 1993 is the result of births to 
residents of the camps. An additional 15,000 refugees, according to 
UNHCR estimates, are living outside the camps in Nepal and India.
    Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the 
revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens 
of thousands of former residents of Bhutan. They also complain that the 
new laws have been applied selectively and make unfair demands for 
documentation on a largely illiterate group in a country that only 
recently has adopted basic administrative procedures. They claim that 
many ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for 
generations were expelled in the early 1990's because they were unable 
to document their claims to residence. The Government denies this and 
asserts that a threemember village committee--typically ethnic Nepalese 
in southern districts--certifies in writing that a resident is a 
Bhutanese citizen in cases where documents cannot be produced.
    The Government maintains that many of those who departed the 
country in 1991-92 were Nepalese or Indian citizens who came to the 
country after the enactment of the 1958 Citizenship law but were not 
detected until a census in 1988. The Government also claims that many 
persons registered in the camps as refugees may never have resided in 
the country. A royal decree in 1991 made forcible expulsion of a 
citizen a criminal offense. In a January 1992 edict, the King noted 
reports that officials had been forcing Bhutanese nationals to leave 
the country but stressed that this was a serious and punishable 
violation of law. Nevertheless, only three officials ever were punished 
for abusing their authority during this period (see Section 1.c.). 
According to the UNHCR, the overwhelming majority of refugees who have 
entered the camps since screening began in June 1993 have documentary 
proof of Bhutanese nationality. Random checks and surveys of camp 
residents--including both pre- and post-June 1993 arrivals--bear this 
out. The Government contends that some ethnic Nepalese left the country 
voluntarily, thus renouncing their Bhutanese citizenship. However, 
human rights organizations credibly dispute this claim.
    A Nepal-Bhutan ministerial committee met seven times between 1994 
and 1996, and a secretarial-level committee met twice in 1997 in 
efforts to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. In 1998 Foreign 
Minister Jigme Thinley took office with a mandate to resolve the 
refugee issue, and several meetings were held with representatives of 
the Nepalese Government, the UNHCR, and NGO's. However, the dialog lost 
momentum in 1998 and was suspended by the Bhutanese Government pending 
the formation of a new government in Nepal in 1999. After a 3-year 
hiatus, the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan met in September 1999 
in Kathmandu to resume discussions on the refugee issue. Bilateral and 
multilateral discussions have continued, including a ninth round of 
ministerial level talks held in May. During the year, U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata visited the country, as did at 
least one high-ranking foreign official. In late December, Bhutan and 
Nepal agreed upon a system to verify the nationality of Bhutanese 
refugees in Nepal in preparation for their for return to Bhutan. 
Refugee verifications were scheduled to begin in January 2001. At 
year's end, approximately 98,000 Bhutanese refugees remained in Nepal. 
The resettlement of persons onto the land once occupied by refugees 
continues to represent an obstacle to a negotiated resolution of the 
refugee problem.
    In March 1996, refugees began a series of ``peace marches'' from 
Nepal to Bhutan to assert their right to return to Bhutan. Bhutanese 
police immediately detained and deported the marchers who crossed into 
Bhutan in August, November, and December 1996. In the December 1996 
incident, police reportedly used force against the marchers. Such 
marches also were held in 1998 and 1999; the marchers charge that the 
police assaulted them during each march, injuring several 
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all marchers. A 
resolution adopted by the National Assembly in July 1997 prohibits the 
still-resident family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding 
jobs with the Government or in the armed forces. Under the resolution, 
those holding such jobs were to be retired involuntarily. The 
Government made clear that for the purposes of this resolution, a 
family member would be defined as a parent, a child, a sibling, or a 
member of the same household. The Government states that 429 civil 
servants, many of them ethnic Nepalese, were retired compulsorily in 
accordance with the July 1997 National Assembly resolution, and that 
the program was terminated in November. The Government states that 
those forced to retire were accorded retirement benefits in proportion 
to their years of government service. The Government also began a 
program of resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of the 
country on land in the southern part of the country vacated by the 
ethnic Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal. Human rights 
groups maintain that this action prejudices any eventual outcome of 
negotiations over the return of the refugees to the country. The 
Government maintains that this is not its first resettlement program 
and that Bhutanese citizens who are ethnic Nepalese from the south 
sometimes are resettled on more fertile land in other parts of the 
country. The failure of the Government to permit the return of ethnic 
Nepalese refugees has tended to reinforce societal prejudices against 
this group, as has the Government's policy on forced retirement of 
refugee family members in government service and the resettlement of 
Buddhists on land vacated by expelled ethnic Nepalese in the south.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are not permitted, and 
there are no labor unions. Workers do not have the right to strike, and 
the Government is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no 
collective bargaining in industry. Industry accounts for about 25 
percent of the GDP, but employs only a minute fraction of the total 
work force. The Government affects wages in the manufacturing sector 
through its control over wages in state-owned industries.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
abolished its system of compulsory labor taxes in December 1995. 
Laborers in rural development schemes previously paid through this 
system now are paid regular wages. There is no evidence to suggest that 
domestic workers are subjected to coerced or bonded labor. The law does 
not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years 
for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested 
that children as young as 11 years sometimes are employed with road-
building teams. The Government provides free and compulsory primary 
school education, and 72 percent of the school-aged population is 
enrolled (see Section 5). Children often do agricultural work and 
chores on family farms. There is no law barring ethnic Nepalese 
children from attending school. However, most of the 75 primary schools 
in southern areas heavily populated by ethnic Nepalese that were closed 
in 1990 remain closed today. The closure of the schools acts as an 
effective barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in southern 
areas to obtain a primary education. In the early 1990's, children who 
failed their school examinations were compelled to join the armed 
forces (despite the fact that the minimum age of recruitment is age 
18). This practice of conscription has ended. The law does not 
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular effective in February 
1994 established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor recruiting 
agencies, and regulations for payment of workmen's compensation. Wage 
rates are revised periodically, and range upward from a minimum of 
roughly $1.50 (50 ngultrums) per day for unskilled and skilled 
laborers, with various allowances paid in cash or kind in addition. 
This minimum wage provides a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family in the local context. The workday is defined as 8 hours with a 
1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid at one and one-
half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled 
to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of leave annually. 
The largest salaried work force is the government service, which has an 
administered wage structure last revised in 1988 but supplemented by 
special allowances and increases since then, including a 25 percent 
increase in July 1997. Only about 30 industrial plants employ more than 
50 workers. Smaller industrial units include 69 plants of medium size, 
197 small units, 692 ``mini'' units, and 651 cottage industry units. 
The Government favors a family-owned farm policy; this, along with the 
country's rugged geography, and land laws that prohibit a farmer from 
selling his last 5 acres and that require the sale of holdings in 
excess of 25 acres, result in a predominantly self-employed 
agricultural work force. Workers are entitled to free medical care 
within the country. They are eligible for compensation for partial or 
total disability, and in the event of death, their families are 
entitled to compensation. Existing labor regulations do not grant 
workers the right to remove themselves from work situations that 
endanger health and safety without jeopardizing their continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 INDIA

    India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral 
parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) led a 17-party coalition, took office in October 1999 and 
heads the Government. President K.R. Narayanan, who was elected by an 
electoral college consisting of Members of Parliament and members of 
state assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency 
powers. The judiciary is independent.
    Although the 28 state governments have primary responsibility for 
maintaining law and order, the central Government provides guidance and 
support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country. 
The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary 
forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police 
service; it provides training for senior police officers for the 
stateorganized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian 
control. Security forces committed numerous significant human rights 
abuses, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern 
states.
    The country is in transition from a government-controlled economy 
to one that largely is market oriented. The private sector is 
predominant in agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods 
manufacturing, and some heavy industry. Economic liberalization and 
structural reforms begun in 1991 continue, although momentum has 
slowed. The country's economic problems are compounded by population 
growth of 1.7 percent annually with a current population of more than 1 
billion. Income distribution remained very unequal, with the top 20 
percent of the population receiving 39.3 percent of national income and 
the bottom 20 percent receiving 9.2 percent. Twenty percent of the 
urban population and 30 percent of the rural population live below the 
poverty level.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in some areas; however, numerous serious problems remain, despite 
extensive constitutional and statutory safeguards. Significant human 
rights abuses included: Extrajudicial killings, including faked 
encounter killings, deaths of suspects in police custody throughout the 
country, and excessive use of force by security forces combating active 
insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several northeastern states; 
torture and rape by police and other agents of the Government; poor 
prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in 
Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention throughout the 
country of thousands arrested under special security legislation; 
lengthy pretrial detention; prolonged detention while undergoing trial; 
occasional limits on freedom of the press and freedom of movement; 
harassment and arrest of human rights monitors; extensive societal 
violence against women; legal and societal discrimination against 
women; female bondage and forced prostitution; child prostitution and 
infanticide; discrimination against the disabled; serious 
discrimination and violence against indigenous people and scheduled 
castes and tribes; widespread intercaste and communal violence; 
societal violence against Christians and Muslims; widespread 
exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor; and trafficking in 
women and children.
    Many of these abuses are generated by a traditionally hierarchical 
social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many 
ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and 
the authorities' attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods 
and training. These problems are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where 
judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed counterinsurgency 
tactics, the refusal of security forces to obey court orders, and 
terrorist threats have disrupted the judicial system. The number of 
insurgencyrelated killings in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast by 
regular security forces increased from the previous year. In the 
northeast there was no clear decrease in the number of killings, 
despite negotiated ceasefires between the Government and some insurgent 
forces, and between some tribal groups.
    The concerted campaign of execution-style killings of civilians by 
Kashmiri militant groups, begun in 1998, continued, and included 
several killings of political leaders and party workers. Separatist 
militants were responsible for numerous, serious abuses, including 
killing of armed forces personnel, police, government officials, and 
civilians; torture; rape; and brutality. Separatist militants also were 
responsible for kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and the 
northeastern states.
    In July one of the largest Kashmiri militant groups announced a 
unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir and offered to open a dialog 
with the Government. The Government responded by instructing its 
military forces to reciprocate the ceasefire, accepting the offer of 
dialog, and beginning talks. The ceasefire and talks ended abruptly in 
August when the militants demanded the start of tripartite talks 
between themselves, the Government of India, and the Government of 
Pakistan. During the same period, Pakistan-backed militants opposed to 
the ceasefire attacked and killed more than 100 civilians, many of them 
Hindu religious pilgrims, at several locations in Jammu and Kashmir. On 
November 26, the Government instituted its own unilateral suspension of 
offensive action for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in Jammu and 
Kashmir and offered to initiate dialog with militant groups that wished 
to come forward for talks. The Government extended the ceasefire on 
December 20, and it remained in force at year's end. The Government 
also continued to pursue a dialog with Kashmiri militant groups, but no 
formal talks had begun by year's end.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Extrajudicial 
killings by government forces (including deaths in custody and faked 
encounter killings) continued to occur frequently in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir and several northeastern states, where separatist 
insurgencies continued. Security forces offered bounties for wanted 
militants brought in dead or alive.
    Official government figures indicate that security forces killed 
1,520 militants in encounters in Jammu and Kashmir as of September, 
compared with 1,082 militants killed by about the same time in 1999 
(Kashmir has been at the center of a territorial dispute between India 
and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947; 
both claim Kashmir). Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such 
``encounters'' are faked and that suspected militants offering no 
resistance are executed summarily by security forces. Statements by 
senior police and army officials confirm that the security forces are 
under instructions to kill foreign militants, rather than attempt to 
capture them alive. Human rights groups allege that this particularly 
is true in the case of security force encounters with non-Kashmiri 
militants who cross into Jammu and Kashmir illegally. According to 
press reports and anecdotal accounts, those persons killed typically 
were detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple 
bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or 
otherwise were discovered shortly afterwards. For example, on the night 
of April 29, police took into custody Said Hafeez Mehraj, an alleged 
militant, at a public telephone booth in Srinagar; the police delivered 
Mehraj's body to his family the following day. Family members allege 
that the police killed Mehraj while in police custody. However, the 
police claim that they took Mehraj to Rajouri Kedar in downtown 
Srinagar so that he could help them uncover an arms cache, and that 
militants fired on the police party, killing Mehraj. On August 16, 
authorities reported that security forces killed two members of the 
Hizbul Mujahideen militant group during a raid on a ``safe house'' used 
by the group in Walurhama-Magam, Kupwara district. Authorities claim 
that the two men, Nazir Ahmad Wani and Muhammad Sadiq Mir, began 
shooting at the forces and that troops killed them while firing back. 
However, the Hizbul Mujahideen claims that the two men surrendered, and 
alleges that the security forces later killed them while in custody.
    Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) active in Jammu and Kashmir 
claimed that in January, Mohammad Tahir Shah of Kapipora was killed 
soon after being taken into custody by security forces, which earlier 
had killed Shah's two sons, alleging that they were members of a 
militant organization. Shah was buried in Tral town. His relatives were 
not permitted to recover the body for burial in Kapipora, according to 
an NGO. Another NGO reported that on March 29, security forces killed 
Gulab Muhammad Chechi in an encounter in Beerwah. Authorities claim 
that he was a foreign militant and that security forces killed him 
during a gunfight. However, his relatives say that Chechi was a beggar 
native to Beerwah. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a 
government-appointed and financed investigative body (see Section 4), 
directed that all alleged encounter deaths be investigated immediately 
by an independent agency; however, members of the security forces 
rarely are held accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may 
inquire into alleged security force abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, but 
does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations if it 
is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Authorities 
generally have not reported encounter deaths that occur in Jammu and 
Kashmir to the NHRC. Human rights groups allege that during the year 
security forces killed a number of captured non-Kashmiri militants in 
Jammu and Kashmir. During conflicts with armed militants, security 
forces allegedly respond indiscriminately to gunfire.
    According to official figures, in Jammu and Kashmir security forces 
killed 1,520 militants during the year; 762 civilians and 397 members 
of the security forces were killed during the same period. According to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 1999 in Jammu and Kashmir security 
forces killed 1,082 militants, captured 744, and 109 surrendered to 
authorities. During the same period, 821 civilians and 356 security 
force members were killed in insurgency-related incidents in the state, 
according to the Home Ministry. Home Ministry figures state that in 
1999, 584 civilians, 439 militants, and 205 security force members were 
killed in insurgencies in the northeastern states. The Home Ministry 
reported that in 1998, 881 civilians, 374 militants, and 182 security 
force members were killed in the northeastern states.
    The security forces also killed civilians during military 
counterinsurgency operations. For example, on March 25, security forces 
shot and killed 5 men in Pathribal village, south of Srinagar, alleging 
that these men were responsible for the March 20 massacre of 35 Sikh 
civilians in Chattisinghpura village (see Section 5); however, the 
victims' family members claim that all of the men were innocent 
civilians whom the police killed, burned, and buried. A Home Ministry 
spokesman, announcing an investigation into the killings of the five 
men, later admitted that Jammu and Kashmir police may have 
``overreacted'' in shooting the civilians. On April 3, the Special 
Operations Group (SOG) of the Kashmir police and the Central Reserve 
police force fired into a group of several hundred unarmed Muslim 
protesters in Brakpora, Anantnag district, killing 8 persons and 
injuring at least 15 others. The demonstrators were protesting the 
March 25 Pathribal village killings. On April 18, the Jammu and Kashmir 
government opened a judicial inquiry, under the leadership of retired 
Supreme Court Justice S.R. Pandian, to investigate the Anantnag 
incident. On October 31, Jammu and Kashmir's Chief Minister reported 
that the Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the 
SOG of the Jammu and Kashmir police force were guilty of using 
excessive force during the April 3 Brakpora incident. While some 
members of the police special task force were indicted in connection 
with the Brakpora killings, trials had not begun by year's end.
    Human rights activists in Jammu and Kashmir allege that members of 
the Border Security Force shot and killed Ashraf Bazaz and his wife in 
Srinagar. Security forces allegedly killed the couple, who was 
traveling in a taxi through Malka Chowk in the capital of Kashmir, 
after stopping them for questioning. The authorities maintain that the 
couple was killed in crossfire between the Border Security Force and a 
group of militants. On August 9, security forces reportedly opened fire 
on a group of protesters in the town of Rajori near the Jammu border 
with Pakistan, killing 1 person and injuring 15 others; allegedly, the 
shooting occurred because the protesters tried to stop an army convoy.
    Accountability remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights 
violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial 
killings, disappearances, and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). 
Despite this record of abuse, between January 1990 and September 1998, 
only 295 security force members were prosecuted and punished for any of 
these crimes, and no compensation was paid to the victims or their 
families, according to the Union Home Ministry. During the same period, 
113 security force members were punished for human rights abuses in the 
northeastern states. Punishments ranged from reduction in rank to 
imprisonment for up to 10 years. According to Amnesty International, 
the army stated in January that it had investigated 822 of the 955 
complaints of human rights violations that it received in 1999 and 
found that only 24 were of substance.
    In the past, scrutiny by the NHRC and international human rights 
organizations, when permitted (see Section 4), and the persistence of 
individual magistrates, resulted in somewhat greater accountability for 
abuses committed by security force members in Jammu and Kashmir; 
however, in July 1998, the Government rejected the NHRC's 
recommendations to bring the army and paramilitary forces under closer 
scrutiny by allowing the NHRC to investigate complaints of their 
excesses. The majority of complaints during the year involved 
individual cases; while there have been complaints of individual houses 
being destroyed, there were no reports of entire villages being burned 
by armed forces or of mass killings, as in past years. The NHRC 
continues to receive complaints alleging human rights violations by the 
security forces, especially from Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern 
states.
    There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces 
in the northeast engage in abduction, torture, rape, arbitrary 
detention, and the extrajudicial execution of militants (see Sections 
1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.g.). The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 
1958 and the Disturbed Areas Act of 1976 remained in effect in several 
states in which active secessionist movements exist, namely, in Jammu 
and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura. The 
Disturbed Areas Act gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and 
detention, which, according to human rights groups, allow security 
forces to operate with virtual impunity in areas under the act. The 
Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 provides search and arrest 
powers without warrants (see Section 1.d.).
    Human rights monitors allege that, as in Jammu and Kashmir, 
government reports of deaths during ``encounters'' between insurgent 
groups and security forces in northeastern states actually are staged, 
and that those insurgents who were reported dead were killed after 
being detained by security forces. More than 30 encounters occurred 
between security forces and militant groups in Tripura alone during the 
first 9 months of the year. In March Assam chief minister Prafulla 
Kumar Mahanta told the press that 1,439 persons had been killed during 
the state's conflict; of these, 430 were security force members. There 
were at least 60 insurgency-related killings in Assam between January 
and June, according to an informal estimate from press reports. For 
example, on April 7, army personnel killed six suspected United 
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants in an encounter in the 
Manasdiga Forest, Bongaigaon district. The People's Union for Civil 
Liberties (PUCL) credibly reported that army troops killed 12 members 
of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN(I-M)) 
in an encounter on July 11 along the Assam-Manipur border close to the 
Jiri River at Bolapunj in Assam's northern Cachar district. There were 
no army casualties in the encounter. The district administration in 
Meghalaya ordered an investigation of an August 24 police shooting in 
which two Khasi student union leaders were killed. The two students 
allegedly were members of the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council 
(HNLC) and were suspected of having killed three nontribal laborers in 
Meghalaya in 1999. The South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center 
(SAHRDC) credibly reported that on September 10, members of the 17th 
Battalion of the Assam Rifles, led by Major Rawal, took Khundrakpam 
Tomcha, Surjit Chongthamcha, Ito Tongbram, and Robin Thokchom into 
custody in the home of Naorem Dwijamani at Chingamthak, Thokchom 
Leikai, Imphal, Manipur; authorities detained Dwijamani later the same 
day. It is believed that the Assam Rifles took the five persons to 
their headquarters in Kangla. On September 12, police found a bullet-
riddled body, which subsequently was identified as that of Khundrakpam 
Tomcha, on a bank of the Imphal River near Singjamei, Thokchom Leikai, 
Imphal. On September 12, the Assam Rifles stated that security forces 
had killed Khundrakpam Tomcha in crossfire between security forces and 
insurgents during an operation against insurgents on September 11. 
However, witnesses allege that the body also bore marks of torture. On 
September 13, the 17th Battalion Assam Rifles released to police Naorem 
Dwijamani and Robin Thokchom into police custody. According to press 
reports, Thokchom had been tortured (see Section 1.c.). Dwijamani 
subsequently was released on bail, but as of November, Thokchom 
remained in the central Imphal jail, facing charges under the National 
Security Act (NSA).
    Since 1980 clashes between police members and Naxalite Maoist 
Revolutionaries of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) have occurred in 
northwestern Andhra Pradesh. During the late 1990's, hundreds of 
policemen and suspected Naxalites were killed, according to press 
reports and human rights organizations. According to police, 101 PWG 
Naxalites were killed in armed ``encounters'' during the first 8 months 
of the year. Twenty years of guerrilla-style conflict have led to 
serious human rights abuses committed by both sides. Human rights 
groups allege that ``encounters'' often are faked by the police to 
cover up the torture and subsequent killing of Naxalite suspects, 
sympathizers, or informers. According to police, the PWG killed 31 
police officers and 80 civilians, including the former home minister of 
the state, from January 1 to December 14. In PWG-dominated areas, 
villagers complain of regular harassment and arbitrary detention by 
police (see Section 1.d.). Police officials rarely, if ever, are held 
accountable for human rights abuses.
    The state government offers a financial package to surrendered PWG 
militants, a program that has prompted hundreds of Naxalites to leave 
the movement in recent years. According to human rights activists and 
journalists, a few surrendered militants have been allowed to retain 
their weapons and now are working for the police as anti-PWG hitmen, 
residing in police camps and barracks. On November 23, four assailants 
killed human rights lawyer and former PWG militant Purusuotham in 
Hyderabad. Police arrested four suspects a few days later, two of whom 
were identified as ex-PWG militants. The two persons confessed to the 
killing at a press conference that was quickly organized by the police. 
Police attributed the killing to feuds dating back to the victim's time 
spent in the PWG.
    An ``encounter'' death occurred in Tamil Nadu on January 10, when 
police shot and killed a Naxalite, Ravindran, in Dharmapuri district. 
Police claimed that they opened fire after Ravindran and three other 
Naxalites ambushed a police patrol. A factfinding team of human rights 
NGO's, citing inconsistencies in the police reports and the testimony 
of another Naxalite who was taken into custody during the same 
incident, alleged that Ravindran was arrested on January 7, tortured, 
and later executed (see Section 1.c.). On July 20, Andhra Pradesh 
police killed seven Naxalites in Karimnagar district. According to 
police, the Naxalites began firing at police officers who were 
surrounding a safehouse used by the extremists, and the seven were 
killed in the ensuing return of fire by police. However, human rights 
NGO's allege that police deliberately set fire to the house before the 
outbreak of gunfire and then fired bullets into the structure for 
several hours, killing the Naxalites. On October 30, police surprised 
an armed group of seven female Naxalites in Gadampalli, Andhra Pradesh. 
Police opened fire while the women were bathing in a stream, killing 
all seven. No policemen were injured or killed in the encounter. On 
November 2, police officers killed Jadhav Subash, a former Naxalite, in 
Dantepalli village, Andhra Pradesh. According to human rights lawyers 
who interviewed village eyewitnesses, a squad of policemen dragged 
Subash from a village tea shop and then shot and killed him.
    As evidence that ``encounters'' often are faked by police, human 
rights groups cite the refusal of police officials to turn over the 
bodies of suspects killed in ``encounters.'' The bodies often are 
cremated before families can view them. The NHRC is investigating about 
285 reported cases of socalled ``fake encounter deaths'' allegedly 
committed by the Andhra Pradesh police in connection with anti-Naxalite 
operations. In its 1996-97 report, the NHRC stated that the evidence on 
record did not reveal any prior police attempt to arrest the persons 
before they were killed. The report observed that in none of these 
encounters did police personnel receive any injury. The Commission 
further observed that ``no attempt whatsoever'' was made to ascertain 
the identity of the police officers who fired the weapons, and that no 
attempt was made to investigate the circumstances under which the 
police opened fire. ``As this appeared to be the pattern of the 
procedure followed by the police,'' the report concluded, ``the 
Commission felt it necessary to conclude that the procedure followed by 
them was opposed to law.'' According to the Andhra Pradesh Civil 
Liberties Committee, the NHRC has evidence of police culpability in 
several cases of ``encounter deaths'' involving suspected Naxalites. 
However, such cases have not been adjudicated in the courts or 
otherwise have not been acted on by the state government. For example, 
of six cases referred by the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee 
to the NHRC in 1994, evidence of police culpability was found in five. 
In 1994 the NHRC directed the state government to investigate the 
cases; however, the state never has taken any action. The state 
government's failure to act expeditiously in these cases has 
discouraged local human rights groups from filing additional 
``encounter death'' cases with the NHRC.
    The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts 
in Andhra Pradesh for over 3 years. Human rights groups allege that 
security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in 
parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act. They further allege that Andhra 
Pradesh police officers train and provide weapons to an armed vigilante 
group known as the ``Green Tigers,'' whose mission is to combat 
Naxalite groups in the state. Little is known about the size, 
composition, or activities of this group.
    Police also used excessive force indiscriminately against 
demonstrators, killing many citizens. For example, according to Amnesty 
International, on January 31, police killed two ``Dalit'' (formerly 
``untouchable'') men in Jethuke village, Bhatinda district, Punjab, 
when they opened fire on hundreds of persons demonstrating over high 
bus fares and the detention of four leaders of the Bharatiya Kisan 
Union (Indian Farmers Union), who were representing villagers in 
negotiations with the district administration regarding the issue (see 
Section 2.b.). On May 8, in Dibrugarh, Assam, police killed two persons 
when they opened fire on the funeral procession of a businessman and 
his son--who allegedly were killed by surrendered ULFA militants 
working at police behest. On May 10, police fired 23 rounds of bullets 
into a mob of Karbi People's Front (KPF) supporters in Jalpaiguri, West 
Bengal, killing 1 person and injuring 5 others. During the year, a 
government commission completed its investigation of the drowning 
deaths of 17 persons in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. The deaths occurred in 
July 1999, when thousands of demonstrators ran into a river to escape 
police beatings. The demonstrators were demanding government 
intervention in a labor dispute at a local coffee estate and the 
release of 652 estate workers imprisoned after a previous 
demonstration. Human rights groups in Tamil Nadu criticized the 
commission's findings, claiming that the commission exonerated senior 
police officials, and implied that the demonstrators themselves were 
responsible for the drownings. No charges in connection with the 
drownings had been brought against any police official by year's end.
    On April 4, police in Mau district, Uttar Pradesh, confronted a 
group of 20 to 25 women staging a sitdown strike to demand the removal 
of a liquor-vending stall from their village, according to PUCL. After 
failing to persuade the women to disperse, police charged the group 
with bamboo poles. When this failed to move the women, the police 
opened fire on the unarmed protesters, killing one of them. On December 
18, police in Keshori village, Gondia district, Maharashtra, fired on a 
crowd of persons, killing 5 persons and injuring 31 others. The 
villagers asserted that the police firing followed an altercation that 
arose when villagers objected to some drunken policemen sexually 
harrassing a village woman. Police initially claimed that they had 
fired in self-defense. The entire police contingent later was 
transferred to another district. On December 31, police in Rayagada 
district, Orissa, fired on villagers protesting the attempt of a 
multinational company to set up an aluminum plant in the predominantly 
tribal area; three persons were killed.
    Throughout the country, numerous accused criminals continue to be 
killed in encounters with police. For example, the Institute of 
Objective Study in its ``Human Rights Today'' bulletin of winter 1999-
2000 reported that on January 14, police in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, shot 
and killed 20-year-old Meerut College student Smita Bhaduri. Three 
police officers--Inspector A.K. Kaushik, Constables Surendra, and 
Bhagwan Sahay of Daurala police station--were told that ``gangsters 
were prowling'' Sewaya village on the outskirts of Meerut. After 
arriving at the village, the three officers shot at an automobile, 
believing it to be the gangsters' vehicle, killing Bhaduri. The 
officers allegedly reported that Bhaduri was killed by ``crossfire'' 
during an ``encounter'' with gang members.
    According to the Government, 542 civilians and 96 police officers 
died in gunfire exchanges involving police in 1998.
    Security forces also held persons in incommunicado detention; on 
occasion, as in the 1996 case of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi, 
such missing persons later were found dead (see Sections 1.b. and 4). 
As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death 
still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and 
Kashmir (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    While extrajudicial killings continued in areas affected by 
separatist insurgencies, the press and judiciary also continued to give 
attention to deaths in police custody. According to the NHRC, 1,114 
persons died in prisons between April 1998 and March 1999, many from 
natural causes that in some cases aggravated by poor prison conditions 
(see Section 1.c.). Human rights groups allege that many deaths in 
prisons are due to torture. There were numerous examples of prison 
deaths due to torture throughout the year (see Section 1.c.).
    The NHRC has focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing 
district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial 
custody and stating that failure to do so would be interpreted as an 
attempted coverup. Magistrates appear to be complying with this 
directive. However, the NHRC has no authority to investigate directly 
abuses by the security forces, and security forces therefore are not 
required to--and do notreport custodial deaths in Jammu and Kashmir or 
the northeastern states. In August the NHRC ordered an investigation 
into the death in police custody of Rajan Singh in September 1995 in 
Agra district jail. Police stated that Singh, who was being transported 
to court for trial in a police truck, died of injuries sustained when 
he jumped from the vehicle in an effort to escape. The autopsy revealed 
that Singh had undergone shock and hemorrhaging prior to his death. The 
NHRC found that the postmortem results were inconsistent with the 
police explanation of the death and believed that the claim of Singh's 
attempted escape from custody was fabricated and that a more likely 
explanation was that Singh ``could have been subjected to severe 
beating in the police vehicle.'' The NHRC ordered Uttar Pradesh state 
to pay $10,990 (500,000 rupees) in compensation to Singh's next of kin 
and recommended disciplinary action against the police officers 
involved in the incident. Also in August, the NHRC directed the 
Karnataka government to pay compensation of $4,395 (200,000 rupees) to 
the family of Thimmaiah, who died in the Mulbagal police station, Kolar 
district, Karnataka. The police maintain that Thimmaiah hanged himself 
in his cell; however, the postmortem and inquest reports forwarded by 
the Karnataka government do not substantiate this claim. The Commission 
concluded that the death ``had been caused by police,'' and ordered the 
government of Karnataka to bring charges against the police officers 
involved in the incident.
    According to the PUCL, on February 17, Nathan died in police 
custody in Chennai. Police assert that they arrested Nathan on February 
16 on suspicion of theft and that he confessed to that crime in court 
the same day. They further maintain that Nathan complained of diarrhea 
and vomiting the following morning; he later was taken to a nearby 
hospital and declared dead. However, the PUCL alleges that Nathan 
actually was arrested on February 10, 6 days before the recorded 
arrest, and that police tortured him to death in an effort to recover 
stolen money. The Tamil Nadu government initiated an official inquiry 
into the death and suspended six police personnel, including an 
inspector, after the incident. Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) reported that on April 20, police in Gujarat beat to death 
Colonel Pratap Save, an activist with the Kinara Bachao Samiti (Save 
the Coast Committee), which was protesting the construction of a port 
in Gujarat. Members of the State Reserve Police allegedly arrested 46 
demonstrators, including Save, following the protest, and beat 6 of 
them at a local police station (see Section 1.c.). Save suffered a 
brain hemorrhage and died at a hospital in Mumbai. All of the other 
protesters were released on bail within 48 hours. The Karnataka branch 
of the PUCL alleged that police in Moodabidri town, Mangalore district, 
Karnataka, were responsible for the custodial death of Sudath Kumar 
Jain, a 40year-old local film projectionist. The human rights group 
alleges that police took Jain from his home for questioning shortly 
after midnight on May 30. Two hours later, his relatives were informed 
that he had been admitted to a hospital; his relatives found Jain 
unconscious and bleeding from his mouth. Jain was transferred to a 
second hospital late that morning where he died 3 hours later. The PUCL 
concluded that police had tortured Jain to death (see Section 1.c.). 
After the investigation results, the superintendent of police, South 
Kanara district, filed a criminal case against the arresting officer.
    Human rights groups allege that police in Adilabad district, Andhra 
Pradesh tortured and then hanged Chandraiah, an unarmed suspected 
Naxalite, on June 10. Angry villagers forced one of the police 
officials to confess to the hanging. Based on his confession, human 
rights activists filed a formal complaint with the NHRC. The NHRC has 
directed the Andhra Pradesh government to investigate. The PUCL 
reported that Krishna Pada Seal, his wife, and his son were imprisoned 
in Sakchi Jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar on July 25. According to the PUCL, 
prison officials tortured them, allegedly because they intended to 
extort money from the family (see Section 1.c.). Seal and his family 
were granted bail on August 4, following the intercession of the PUCL. 
On his release, Seal could not walk, and died as he was being carried 
to a waiting car. According to credible reports, on August 3, 
Lalrinchana, a 25-year-old Chin refugee, died from torture in the 
Mizoram Aizawl central prison. Reportedly, village defense persons 
first arrested and tortured Lalrinchana, and then turned him over to 
the Mizoram police (see Section 2.d.). In August the Karnataka High 
Court convicted eight police officers who served in Nanjangud Police 
Station in Karnataka in 1996 for fabricating official records following 
a custodial death. The Karnataka police oversaw the entire 
investigation and presentation of evidence.
    In its 2000 annual report, Amnesty International expressed concern 
about the torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh. On September 18, 
1999, police beat Devinder Singh, Sapinder Singh, and Karnail Singh 
(three Sikh brothers), in a police courtyard in Punjab, apparently to 
exact a confession from them that they possessed an assault rifle. 
Allegedly, police pulled their legs open 180 degrees, applied gasoline 
to their genitals, and beat them badly. Devinder Singh died as result 
of his injuries. A police subinspector subsequently was charged with 
Devinder Singh's murder.
    An army major was arrested in 1998 for the 1996 killing of human 
rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. The case still was being heard at year's 
end, but human rights workers alleged that the central Government and 
Jammu and Kashmir state both were attempting to subvert the judicial 
process by withholding evidence, and that there were no court actions 
during the year. There were no developments in the 1996 killing of 
human rights monitor Parag Kumar Das, who allegedly was killed by a 
militant who previously had surrendered and was supported by the 
Government (see Section 4).
    Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by 
progovernment countermilitants continued to be a significant problem in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who 
have surrendered to government forces, but who have retained their 
weapons and paramilitary organization. Government agencies fund, 
exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants 
as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to 
search persons at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard extensive 
areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. The Government, 
through its sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant 
activities, is responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses 
committed by these militant groups. Perhaps as many as 3,000 
individuals continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in 
the countryside, outside major towns. The Hizbul Mujahideen, a Kashmiri 
militant group, stated in June 1998 that progovernment countermilitants 
had killed 350 of its members. According to Pakistani newspaper 
accounts, Indian security forces had killed 438 Pakistani members of 
insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir during 1999. Of this number, 200 
were members of the LashkareTayyaba, 123 were members of the Al-Badr 
Mujahideen, 69 were members of the Harkat-Ul-Mujahideenand, and 46 were 
members of the Hizbul Mujahideen. However, these numbers have not been 
confirmed, and only include the four largest militant groups in the 
state. The Government stated that security forces had killed 1,520 
militants in the state during the year, compared with 1,082 in 1999. 
The Government recruited countermilitants into the Special Operations 
Group of the Jammu and Kashmir police and into the Border Security 
Force.
    Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir increasingly targeted members 
of the security forces and civilians during the year. In January 
militants allegedly killed two soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir; the 
soldiers retaliated with arson. On February 28, militants killed five 
Hindu truck drivers on the SrinagarJammu Highway (see Section 5). 
According to HRW, in February militants allegedly shot and killed three 
police officers in the busy market area of Lal Chowk, Srinagar; 
security forces retaliated by beating nearby civilians with sticks and 
rifle butts and by burning cars in Srinagar (see Section 1.c.). On 
March 20, militants massacred 35 Sikh inhabitants of Chatisinghpura 
town, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir, in what appeared to be a 
well-planned attack. The militants, dressed in military uniforms, 
separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and 
children, gathered the men in a school complex a short distance from 
their homes, and summarily executed them. It was the first known attack 
on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir by militants, and it appeared 
intended to drive other members of that community from the Muslim-
majority state (see Section 5).
    On March 24, militants invaded a Muslim family's home and killed 
five family members in Kot Budhan village, Udhampur district. The 
militants stormed into the house in the early morning, beat family 
members, and then shot them at point-blank range; three other family 
members, including a child, were wounded in the attack. According to 
HRW, on April 17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in 
Kot Dara village, near Rajouri. They fired on the unarmed civilians, 
killing six persons and injuring six others (see Section 5). On August 
1 and 2, militants launched 8 separate and coordinated attacks in Jammu 
and Kashmir, killing approximately 99 persons. In one of the attacks, 
at Pahalgam, armed militants descended on a camp of Hindu religious 
pilgrims making the annual pilgrimage to Amarnat, in the northern part 
of the state. The militants fired automatic weapons at the pilgrims' 
tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, their local porters and 
guides, and nearby army personnel, killing 32 persons, primarily 
unarmed civilians. Similar attacks throughout the night of August 1 to 
2 appeared to have been intended to halt the nascent effort of the 
Hizbul Mujahideen militant group and the Government to observe a 
ceasefire and initiate a dialog. An army-headed commission investigated 
the August 1 Phalagam massacre and reported on October 31, that the 
Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force and the SOG of the Jammu 
and Kashmir police force used excessive force; however, there were no 
charges brought in connection with this use of excessive force. On 
August 17, militants from Harkat-ul-Jehade Islami reportedly killed six 
Hindu villagers and seriously wounded seven in the Rajouri district in 
Jammu (see Section 5). According to HRW, on August 18, militants killed 
three elderly men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when 
they fired automatic weapons at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur (see 
Section 5). On September 12, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen 
militants wearing army uniforms entered an army camp at Beerwa, Budgam 
district, and fired automatic weapons at the sleeping soldiers; 11 
soldiers were killed. Two of the attackers were killed in the ensuing 
gun battle. In early December, militants killed two members of a 
policeman's family and wounded two others when they barged into a house 
in the border district of Poonch and opened fire. Militants also 
carried out attacks on security forces that killed numerous persons 
(see Section 1.g.). On December 22, six militants with concealed 
weapons entered Delhi's Red Fort, an historic monument that also houses 
an army unit, during a regularly scheduled sound and light show for the 
public. The militants opened fire on the crowd, killing a soldier and 
two civilians. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant group later claimed 
responsibility for the attack. On December 26, city police raided a 
Delhi apartment and shot and killed Abu Shamal, whom they claimed to be 
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant involved in the Red Fort attack.
    Killings of security force members by militants in Jammu and 
Kashmir increased for the third year in a row. According to official 
statistics, 397 security force personnel were killed in the state 
during the year. The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 356 
security force members were killed in the state in 1999 and that 232 
members died in Jammu and Kashmir in 1998.
    Insurgency and increased ethnic violence took a heavy toll in the 
northeastern states. Extensive, complex patterns of violence continued 
in many of the seven northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in 
the northeast include two factions of the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland (NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and 
the Bodo security force in Assam; and the All Tripura Tiger Force 
(ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura. 
The proclaimed objective of many of these groups is to secede from the 
country, creating new, independent nations. Their stated grievances 
against the Government range from charges of neglect and indifference 
to the widespread poverty of the region, to allegations of active 
discrimination against the tribal and nontribal people of the region by 
the central Government (see Section 5). The oldest of these conflicts, 
involving the Nagas, dates back to the country's independence in 1947. 
On August 1, 1997, a ceasefire between the Government and the Isak-
Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM) entered into effect. The ceasefire 
was extended in January until July 31, 2001. In April another Naga 
insurgent group, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang 
(NSCN-K), announced a formal ceasefire. Security forces were not 
operating against either of the two NSCN factions and both generally 
were observing the ceasefire with security forces. However, in April 
week-long fighting between the 2 NSCN factions left over 45 persons 
dead, and 4,500 persons were forced to flee 15 villages in Mon district 
(see Section 2.d.). Negotiations to widen the area of application of 
the ceasefire were handicapped when NSCN(I-M) leader Thuingaleng Muivah 
was arrested in Thailand on January 19 for travelling on a forged South 
Korean passport. On August 25, a joint group of Thai and Indian 
citizens appealed to the central Government to secure the release of 
the NSCN(IM) leader in the interest of Naga peace talks. He was 
released on bail in September.
    Elsewhere in the northeast, Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which 
began in April 1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000 
persons live under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's 
Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of the 
ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals. The killings of ULFA 
leaders' family members during the year renewed concerns about the 
situation in Assam.
    Militant groups in Manipur, Tripura, and Assam continued to attack 
civilians.
    In Tripura on January 3, the NLFT killed three persons, including 
Ravi Kumar Devbarma, a Communist Party of India (Marxist)CPI(M)-leader, 
in Kashichandrapara. Prior to the April 30 to May 3 elections for the 
Tripura tribal autonomous district council, ultras (militants) 
threatened to harm seriously persons who voted in favor of any 
candidate not belonging to the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura 
(IPFT). During the period before the election, more than 1,500 
nontribal families from 3 villages were left homeless as tribals backed 
by militants intensified their offensive to cleanse autonomous district 
council areas of Bengalis. On April 14, the NLFT killed four nontribal 
villagers in Ramdulapara, north Tripura. Reportedly, the NLFT was 
retaliating for a United Bengali Liberation Force (UBLF) attack nearby 
on March 8 in which a villager was killed and six tribals were injured 
seriously. On April 15, the NLFT killed at least 12 villagers in Khas 
Kalyanpur, West Tripura. On May 4, NLFT militants shot three family 
members of Kishore Debbarma, an NLFT deserter. On May 15, NLFT 
militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and 
south Tripura (see Section 1.b.). CPM sources allege that all of the 
victims were CPM supporters and that the NLFT was punishing them for 
voting for the CPM in the council polls. On May 19, NLFT insurgents 
killed seven nontribals--including CPM workers' family members--and set 
fire to several houses in south and west Tripura. On May 20, at least 8 
persons were killed and more than 20 others were injured in Kalyanpur, 
west Tripura. On May 21, 15 persons were killed in Teliamura and 
Kalyanpur in attacks on tribals by non-tribals. NLFT insurgents killed 
40 villagers in west Tripura on May 21, including 19 nontribals who 
were massacred at a relief camp in Kalyanpur. On May 22, NLFT 
insurgents killed three nontribals in Gandachhara. On May 25, NLFT 
members raided the house of a CPM leader in west Tripura, and burned 
alive his 8-year-old son. On May 26, ATTF rebels killed a tribal person 
and kidnaped four others (see Section 1.b.). On May 28, the NLFT shot 
and killed two farmers in Raiabari. On June 6, ATTF ultra's hacked a 
person to death in Warengtubari. On June 13, two persons, including a 
paramilitary officer, were killed in an ethnic clash in Telaimura, in 
which a Bengali mob, angered at a killing by tribals, turned violent. 
On June 23, NLFT militants kidnaped and killed a person in Anandapur 
village. On June 26, four persons were injured in ethnic clashes 
between tribals and Bengalis in Teliamura. On July 9, NLFT militants 
shot and killed Dhirendra Roy, a CPM leader at Salema. On July 14, 
tribals set fire to more than 150 houses, injured 3 persons, and 
kidnaped another in Teliamura. On July 22, rebels of the Bru National 
Liberation Front (BNLF), a group of Reang tribals, shot 12 NLFT 
activists at Saikarbari. On July 25, tribal rebels killed Roman 
Catholic priest Victor Crasta near Bongsul village. The same day UBLF 
activists set 25 houses on fire in west Tripura. On August 17, 
militants killed a villager at Panisagar and abducted three persons 
from Manu (see Section 1.b.). On August 26, NLFT insurgents killed one 
tribal youth in Sidhai, a fisherman at Jarulbachai, and a plantation 
worker in Narendrapur Tea Estate. On August 27, Bengalis in Tripura 
State Rifles uniforms hacked to death three tribal women in Durga 
Charan Para village. NLFT ultra's killed a priest as he was exiting a 
Kali temple in Jirania on August 27 (see Section 5). On November 19, 
NLFT members killed six Bengali settlers, including two children, in 
the remote Barahaldi area of Tripura; a few hours later, Bengali 
settlers killed seven tribals in retaliation.
    In Assam, on April 9, United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) 
militants lined up 11 non-Karbi laborers in the Dhansari Reserve Forest 
in Karbi Anglong district, and shot at them. (The UPDS is a Karbi 
radical group fighting for greater autonomy for the Karbis, and Karbis 
are tribal peoples native to KarbiAnglong district.) On April 19, UPDS 
militants killed 11 Nepalis at East and West Umplapher villages. On 
April 24, UPDS militants killed six Bihari laborers in Akhoiputua as 
part of their ethnic cleansing drive in Karbi Anglong district. In 
April alone, the Karbis killed 29 persons. In an ambush near Haflong, 
Dima Halam Daoga (DHD), militants killed an executive magistrate and 
five others on May 18. On June 3, ULFA militants at Srijangram in 
Bongaigaon killed two Assam policemen. On June 20, two CRPF personnel 
and a top People's United Liberation Front (PULF) leader were killed in 
an encounter at Motinagar. On June 25, surrendered ULFA leader Tarun 
Phukan was found dead; it is believed that ULFA activists killed him at 
Sivsagar. On July 16, UPDS activists in Karbi Anglong district shot 10 
nontribals, mostly women and children. On July 18, migrant Biharis 
killed six Karbi villagers in Karbi Anglong. On July 26, DHD militants 
opened fire in a marketplace at Herangajao, killing two traders and 
injuring six others. On August 20, suspected National Democratic Front 
of Bodoland (NDFB) militants killed Bodo Sahitya Sabha President 
Bineswar Brahma in Guwahati. On August 21, at Bijni, NDFB rebels killed 
eight persons including a Peoples Democratic Front Legislator, Mohini 
Basumatary. On August 22, Bodo militants killed a former All Assam 
Students Union Leader. On August 27, a man affiliated with the People's 
United Liberation Front (PULF) killed a 7yearold Muslim boy in Cachar 
for unknown reasons, generating protests from Muslim organizations such 
as Nadwadoot Tamir and the Cachar Koumi Madrassa Students' Association. 
On December 7, in Sadiya, Assam, more than 20 ULFA militants killed 28 
persons after intercepting 3 trucks carrying non-Assamese, mainly 
Nepali settlers, from a nearby market.
    On June 10, unidentified militants killed noted playwright and 
social worker Arambam Somorendra at Khurai Salanthong. On June 28, 
unknown assailants killed 10 passengers in a car on the Imphal-Jiri 
stretch of National Highway 53. On July 30, unidentified militants 
killed four security personnel and injured many others in an ambush 
near Mao, bordering Nagaland. In mid-November suspected militants of 
the People's Liberation Army of Manipur shot and killed five army 
personnel in the Mutukhong area of east Imphal district.
    Many members of the Hmar Revolutionary Force (HRF) in Mizoram 
accepted the state government's offer of amnesty in return for 
surrendering their arms. On June 6, 16 HRF members relinquished arms 
before state Home Minister Tawnluia. They received $215 (10,000 rupees) 
each for rehabilitation. In Assam more than 2,000 extremists 
surrendered their arms during the year. A new Assam government package 
for insurgents attempted to rehabilitate rural and urban ultras 
separately, through various economic development and training programs. 
On February 6, ``organizing secretaries'' of the ULFA Khairul Hussain 
and Phukan Ali and ``medical-in-charge'' Tajuddin Ahmed surrendered to 
the army in lower Assam. On March 21, 22 ULFA members surrendered 
before Sonitpur district administration in Tezpur. On April 4, 532 
Assam militants (436 ULFA members, 77 Karbi National Volunteers, and 19 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland) surrendered at Rang Ghar. On 
April 18, 48 ULFA and NDFB militants surrendered before village elders 
in lower Assam's Darrang district. On May 2, 75 militants (54 ULFA, 12 
Rabha National Security Force, 8 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of 
Assam, and 1 Koch Rajbangshi) surrendered in Goalpara before the 
district administration. On May 30, 25 ULFA militants relinquished arms 
before the army at Bongaigaon.
    The kidnaping of NGO environmental monitor Sanjay Ghosh in 1997 and 
his death at the hands of his ULFA captors continued to attract wide 
public criticism. In August 1997, ULFA confirmed that Ghosh died in 
captivity after being ``arrested and tried.'' ULFA still has not 
produced Ghosh's body. In June 1999, the CBI filed murder charges in 
connection with the case against ULFA leader Paresh Arua and 10 other 
ULFA members. During the year, surrendered ULFA militant Lohit Deuri 
told the police that ULFA has kept one of the killers of development 
worker Sanjoy Ghosh in ``solitary confinement'' since 1999. The alleged 
killer, Khirod Gohain, is serving a ``sentence'' for indiscipline.
    Naxalite Maoist revolutionaries of the PWG killed dozens of 
persons, declaring them ``class enemies'' or police informers. On 
September 3, three PWG members shot and killed a former Naxalite, 
Krishnan, in Nizamabad district, Andhra Pradesh. Krishnan had 
surrendered to police earlier. The militants left a note accusing him 
of being a police informant. On May 30, PWG Naxalites shot one person 
and blew up a government guesthouse in a village in Andhra Pradesh. In 
areas under their control, Naxalites dispense summary justice in 
``People's Courts,'' which in some cases condemn to death suspected 
police informers, village headmen, and others deemed to be ``class 
enemies'' or ``caste oppressors'' (landlords); the Naxalites also 
extort money from these groups, as well as businesses. Naxalite 
violence has plagued Andhra Pradesh since the early 1980's, and has 
claimed more than 500 civilian and police victims since 1996 alone (see 
Sections 1.g. and 5).
    In November 1997, an independent commission of inquiry established 
by Parliament in 1991 to investigate the May 21, 1991 assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled an interim report of its 
findings in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament). The report 
blamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as clearly 
responsible for the assassination but was inconclusive on the question 
of whether the LTTE had received assistance in carrying out the murder. 
It criticized the then-government for its alleged failure to provide 
comprehensive security for the former Prime Minister. On January 28, 
1998, a designated lower court in Chennai sentenced to death all 26 
persons accused in the assassination. The CBI originally charged 41 
persons in the case; 12 since have died, and 3 have evaded capture 
(including LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan). Many of those 
sentenced, who include both Indian and Sri Lankan nationals, allegedly 
were involved only peripherally in the assassination plot, but the 
court upheld the CBI contention that all of them were aware that they 
were conspiring in a common cause. Having heard an appeal of the 
convictions, the Supreme Court in May 1999, acquitted 19 of the 26 
accused persons and upheld the convictions of 7 persons (see Section 
1.e.). It sustained the death sentence in the case of four of the 
convicted persons and changed the sentence of three others to life 
imprisonment.
    Nearly 50 persons were killed in election-related violence 
throughout the country in September and October (see Sections 1.g. and 
4).
    Religiously and ethnically motivated violence caused numerous 
deaths (see Section 5).
    Mob lynchings of tribal people occur in many states (see Section 
5).
    b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups, 
unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants 
continued in Jammu and Kashmir; however, the Government has not 
released any recent figures.
    The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 744 suspected militants 
were arrested in 1999 and 109 persons surrendered. In comparison, 
according to the Jammu and Kashmir police, 1,228 suspected militants 
were arrested in 1998 and 187 persons surrendered. Human rights 
organizations allege that the decline in the number of militants 
arrested from 1998 to 1999 is consistent with reports that security 
forces are killing many militants captured in ``encounters'' (see 
Section 1.a.); that pattern continued during the year. Of those 
arrested and who surrendered in 1998, 529 persons were released after 
preliminary questioning, 457 persons were charged under special 
security laws, and the remaining persons were released at a later stage 
of judicial review. In addition the Jammu and Kashmir police stated 
that in 1998 it held 514 persons under the Public Safety Act (PSA). 
According to an Amnesty International report that was released during 
the year, there are between 700 and 800 unsolved disappearances in 
Kashmir since 1990. The Home Ministry reported that security forces in 
the northeastern states arrested 1,413 suspected militants in 1999; an 
additional 1,080 militants surrendered during that year. In comparison 
1,485 suspected militants were arrested and 267 persons surrendered in 
1998. The Government was unable to provide complete statistics for the 
number of persons held under special security laws in the northeastern 
states, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in detention under the 
National Security Act as of December 31, 1998. Although the Government 
allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention) Act (TADA) 
to lapse in 1995, human rights organization credibly reported that more 
than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting prosecution under the 
law. Several thousand others are held in short-term (1 day to 6 months 
duration) confinement in transit and interrogation centers.
    Human rights groups maintain that several hundred more persons are 
held by the military and paramilitary forces in long-term 
unacknowledged detention in interrogation centers and transit camps in 
Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern states that nominally are 
intended for only short-term confinement. Human rights groups fear that 
many of these unacknowledged prisoners are subject to torture and 
extrajudicial killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to one 
NGO, there were 1,300 writs of habeas corpus pending in the Jammu and 
Kashmir High Court in 1999. In August Amnesty International reported 
that the fates of up to 1,000 persons reported missing in Jammu and 
Kashmir since 1990 remain unexplained by authorities. The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Torture reported in 1997 that more than 15,000 habeas 
corpus petitions have been filed in the country since 1990, ``but that 
in the vast majority of these cases the authorities had not responded 
to the petitions.'' In 1999 the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) transmitted 33 newly reported cases of disappearance to the 
Government, 14 of which reportedly occurred in 1998. The Government 
submitted information on eight cases of disappearance to the working 
group in 1999.
    HRW reported that M. Akbar Tantray, an imam of a mosque in 
Rafiabad, Jammu and Kashmir, was reported missing on February 8. 
Shortly after his January 30 arrest by an army unit, unit officials 
told family members that Tantray was not in their custody. In February 
the NHRC issued a notice to the Union Defense Secretary requiring him 
to report on the whereabouts of Abdul Rasheed Wani of Bemina, Jammu and 
Kashmir. According to family members, an army patrol arrested Wani near 
the Srinagar fruit market on July 7, 1997 and he has not been seen 
since. In August Amnesty International appealed to the Government to 
investigate the growing number of disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir. 
The organization estimated that as many as 1,000 persons had 
``disappeared'' in the state since 1990. In September the NHRC issued a 
notice to the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police in Jammu 
and Kashmir and the Secretaries of the Union Home and Defense 
Minisitries requiring them to report on missing persons in the state 
within 8 weeks; however, there was no public information regarding the 
authorities complied with the directive.
    In one prominent case in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government 
responded to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions in 1997, states that human rights monitor Jalil 
Andrabi was not arrested by security forces, as alleged by human rights 
groups, but was abducted by ``unidentified armed persons.'' Andrabi 
last was seen alive in the presence of countermilitants and members of 
the security forces on March 8, 1996, in Srinagar. Despite the 
Government's statement, the army in February 1996 identified to a 
Srinagar court a major with a temporary commission as the individual 
primarily responsible for Andrabi's death. Security forces allegedly 
dumped Andrabi's body into the Jhelum River. His case also is the 
subject of an inquiry by the NHRC. In 1998 an army major was arrested 
for the killing of Andrabi. There was no progress in the case by year's 
end, and the accused major no longer is in detention (see Sections 1.a. 
and 4). In April 1998, the Government stated that it would investigate 
the fate of eight persons who reportedly disappeared in Jammu and 
Kashmir during 1997: Fayaz Ahmad Beigh, Fayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdula Rashid 
Wahid, Mohammed Ashraf Dar, Mohammed Afzal Shah, Nisar Ahmad Wani, 
Manzoor Ahmad Dar, and Bilal Ahmad Sheikh. In September 1998, the 
Government accounted for only one of the eight persons, claiming that 
Fayaz Ahmad Beigh had escaped from police custody on September 9, 1997, 
and was believed to have crossed the line of control into Pakistan. By 
year's end, no new information was available on any of these cases. As 
of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death still 
were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and 
Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    The Government maintains that screening committees administered by 
the state governments provide information about detainees to their 
families. However, other sources indicate that families are able to 
confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards. 
For example, in May the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) 
published an appeal by Sunita Majumdar, the mother of Partha Majumdar, 
who was taken from his home by police in District 24 Parganas, West 
Bengal, in September 1997, and has not been seen since. Police have 
provided no information in the case despite a request from the State 
Human Rights Commission. Partha Majumdar was a witness to an alleged 
police shooting that left one person dead. In May the State Human 
Rights Commission recommended that a criminal investigation be 
initiated against police involved in the incident; however, it is not 
known whether the requested criminal investigation was initiated. A 
program of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), which began in October 1995, is designed in part to help 
assure communications between detainees and their families. During the 
year, the ICRC visited approximately 1,000 detainees in about 20 places 
of detention. All acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir 
and Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country were visited. However, 
the ICRC is not authorized to visit interrogation centers or transit 
centers, nor does it have access to regular detention centers in the 
northeastern states (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
    In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early 
1990's appears to have ended. Hundreds of police and security officials 
were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed 
during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps were taken 
against a few such violators. The CBI claims to be pursuing actively 
charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the ``mass 
cremations'' case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly disposed 
of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been abducted and 
extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the knowledge or 
consent of their families. The CBI in its report to the Supreme Court 
in December 1996 stated that Punjab police secretly had cremated over 
2,000 bodies in Tarn Taran; of these, 585 bodies had been identified 
fully, 274 had been identified partially, and 1,238 were unidentified. 
Most reportedly were killed by Border Security Force personnel while 
they were attempting to enter the country from Pakistan, were 
unidentified victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes 
between militant factions. However, 424 persons apparently were 
militants killed in the interior of the district, 291 of whom 
subsequently were identified. These numbers demonstrate the extent of 
the violence during those years and, given the pattern of police abuses 
prevalent during the period, credibly include many persons killed in 
extrajudicial executions. The NHRC is seeking to obtain compensation 
for the families of those victims whose remains were identified, but 
the Government has challenged the NHRC's jurisdiction in the cases. In 
September 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the NHRC to 
investigate the cases. In August 1998, the Committee for the 
Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab (CCDP) member and former 
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh presented the Chief Minister of 
Punjab with a list of approximately 3,000 persons who either were 
missing or had died in encounters with security forces during the 
period of unrest in Punjub. Former Justice Singh also announced that 
the CCDP would form a threemember commission to investigate the mass 
cremations. The Commission received little cooperation from state 
government authorities and made little progress during the year (see 
Section 4).
    Amnesty International in its April report on human rights defenders 
in the country expressed concern that Punjab police officials continued 
to obstruct the judicial inquiry into the death of human rights monitor 
Jaswant Singh Khalra, hindering efforts to probe the Tarn Taran 
cremations. Khalra was investigating the cremation of unidentified 
bodies by Tarn Taran police. Several witnesses observed Punjab police 
officials arrest Khalra outside his Amritsar home in September 1995. 
Police officials subsequently denied that they had arrested Khalra, and 
he has not been seen since. In July 1996, following its investigation, 
the CBI identified nine Punjab police officials as responsible for 
Khalra's abduction and recommended their prosecution. One of the 
suspects subsequently died, reportedly by suicide; none of the others 
were charged by year's end. One human rights organization credibly 
alleged that police intimidated a witness in the case in August, 
threatening to kill him if he testified against them. These events 
prompted extended public debate over the accountability of Punjab 
police for abuses committed while suppressing a violent insurgency. 
According to human rights monitors in Punjab, approximately 100 police 
officials either were facing charges, were prosecuted, or were under 
investigation for human rights abuses at year's end.
    There are credible reports that police throughout the country often 
do not file required arrest reports. As a result, there are hundreds of 
unsolved disappearances in which relatives claim that an individual was 
taken into police custody and never heard from again. Police usually 
deny these claims, countering that there are no records of arrest. In 
Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha of Thoubal district has been 
missing since soldiers arrested him in February 1998. The army 
reportedly detained him because of his alleged links with insurgent 
groups. The All-Manipur Students' Union petitioned the Guwahati High 
Court for Sanamacha's release. The Court ordered the army to produce 
the boy, but it failed to do so and his whereabouts remain unknown. On 
May 5, 1999, police in Siliguri, West Bengal, arrested 14-year-old 
Pinter Yadav and his 9yearold cousin. According to local human rights 
monitors, the boys were beaten and, when Pinter began to vomit blood, 
he was taken to a local police station. He has not been seen since, and 
efforts by family members to petition police for information were 
unsuccessful.
    Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states 
continued to use kidnapings to terrorize the population, seek the 
release of detained comrades, and extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped 
persons later were killed (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to 
government figures, there were 634 kidnapings in the northeastern 
states during 1999. There were no significant new developments in the 
case of the 1995 kidnapings of American, British, German, and Norwegian 
nationals, despite police cooperation with foreign diplomats.
    On April 15, the BNLF abducted two officials of the Mizoram Public 
Health Engineering Department. The rebels released the captives on May 
16, after the intervention of three local church leaders. On April 19, 
members of the Reang ethnic minority abducted a teacher in Aizawl, 
Mizoram. On May 13, NLFT guerillas abducted two tea garden staff from 
Kailashahar. On May 14, NLFT militants injured three persons and 
abducted three others in Udaypur (see Section 1.c.). Also on May 14, 
tribal guerillas abducted three persons and set a number of houses on 
fire in Radhakishorpur and Kanchanpur, Tripura. On May 15, NLFT 
militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and 
south Tripura (see Section 1.a.). CPM sources allege that all of the 
victims were CPM supporters, and that the NLFT was punishing them for 
voting for the CPM in the council elections. On May 17, the NLFT shot 
two villagers whom they had kidnaped from Manu on February 28. On May 
23, NSCN(K) supporters abducted seven persons in Borduria village, 
Tirap district, Arunachal Pradesh. On May 26, ATTF killed a tribal 
person and kidnaped four other persons (see Section 1.a.). On May 31, 
an NLFT militant abducted CPM worker Ajit Debbarma from Jampuijala, 
West Tripura. On June 6, in the Andaman Islands, Tamil immigrants from 
Sri Lanka abducted and took hostage Manoranjan Bhakta, a former 
Congress Party Member of Parliament, for more than 24 hours on Katchal 
Island. On June 14, the Manipur based Hmar People's Conference (HPC) 
released the two engineers and four technicians of the Northeastern 
Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) who were abducted on March 31 from 
Mizoram. On June 22, NLFT rebels kidnaped a tribal family in Khowai. On 
June 29, tribal militants abducted seven nontribals in Melaghar, 
Gandacherra and Brahmacherra. On July 3, North Tripura tribal 
guerrillas kidnaped a nontribal youth; in retaliation a mob killed an 
elderly tribal woman and burned down a number of houses. Also on July 
3, NLFT militants abducted the manager of Golakpur Tea estate in north 
Tripura. On July 4, tribal militants in Dhalai, Tripura, kidnaped a 
health department official. On July 14, tribals set fire to more than 
150 houses, injured 3 persons, and kidnaped another in Teliamura. On 
July 23, NLFT militants kidnaped four tribals from a Garo colony in 
South Tripura. On August 16, nine Tripura villagers were kidnaped in 
Brahmachhara Udaypur subdivision. On August 17, militants abducted 
three persons from Manu and killed a villager at Panisagar (see Section 
1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by 
force generally are inadmissible in court; however, torture is common 
throughout the country, and authorities often use torture during 
interrogations. In other instances, they torture detainees to extort 
money and sometimes as summary punishment.
    In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the 
security forces systematically torture persons in Jammu and Kashmir in 
order to coerce them to confess to militant activity, to reveal 
information about suspected militants, or to inflict punishment for 
suspected support or sympathy with militants. Information is not made 
public regarding instances of action taken against security force 
personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of torture.
    In May the NHRC ordered the government of Jammu and Kashmir to pay 
$4,395 (200,000 rupees) to the family of Ghulam Rasool, following its 
investigation into Rasool's 1996 death while in police custody in 
Kathua, Jammu and Kashmir. Police arrested Rasool in Kathua on October 
31, 1996. He was found dead in his cell the following day. The autopsy 
showed that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest arising 
from the dislocation of the spine. It also showed that Rasool had 
suffered injuries to his scalp, face, back, left eye, and both arms and 
legs. The NHRC concluded that police had tortured Rasool to death. It 
further directed the Jammu and Kashmir government to initiate legal 
proceedings against the police officials responsible. Human rights 
monitors maintain that there is a similar pattern of security force 
abuses in the northeastern states. On July 28, members of the Assam 
Rifles arrested Khuraijam Pranam of Bishenpur, Manipur and allegedly 
tortured him for 2 days before turning him over to local police. Pranam 
survived and underwent treatment in Imphal Hospital. On August 18, the 
Guwahati High Court directed the Manipur government to ensure that 
Pranam was not harmed in the hospital, and to allow family members to 
visit him. Police abuses against indigenous people include torture (see 
Section 5).
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted in 1997 that methods 
of torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a 
wooden roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks. 
Because many alleged torture victims die in custody, and others are 
afraid to speak out, there are few firsthand accounts, although marks 
of torture often have been found on the bodies of deceased detainees. 
The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings 
renewed their requests to visit the country during the year, but the 
Government did not permit them to do so (see Section 4).
    The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities 
throughout the country is supported by the number of cases of deaths in 
police custody (see Section 1.a.). Delhi's Tihar jail is notorious for 
the mistreatment of prisoners, with 1 of every 11 custodial deaths 
occurring there. Police and jailers typically assault new prisoners for 
money and personal articles. In addition police commonly torture 
detainees during custodial interrogation. Although police officers are 
subject to prosecution for such offenses under Section 302 of the Penal 
Code, the Government often fails to hold them accountable. On April 20, 
police in Gujarat allegedly beat to death Colonel Pratap Save in a 
local police station (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL reported that police 
tortured to death Sudath Kumar in Moodabidri police station, Karnataka, 
on May 30 to 31 (see Section 1.a.). Human rights groups allege that 
police in Andhra Pradesh tortured and then hanged an unarmed suspected 
Naxalite, Chandraiah, on June 10 (see Section 1.a.). On August 4, 
Krishna Pada Seal died, just after he and his family were released from 
prison; according to the PUCL, prison officials tortured them during 
detention (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL alleged that police in Mangalore 
district, Karnataka, were responsible for the August 29 custodial death 
of Sudath Kumar Jain, a 40yearold local film projectionist who died in 
a hospital after sustaining injuries (see Section 1.a.). During the 
year, Amnesty International expressed concern about the September 1999 
torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh (see Section 1.a.).
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture stated in 1997 that, in 
Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly have 
had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued 
instructions not to open a case without permission from higher 
authorities. In addition the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special 
Powers Act provides that unless approval is obtained from the central 
Government, no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be 
instituted . . . against any person in respect of anything done or 
purported to be done in exercise of the powers of the act.'' This 
provision allows the security forces to act with virtual impunity.
    There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see 
Section 2.a.), demonstrators (see Section 2.b.), and Muslim students 
(see Section 2.c.). Police also committed abuses against tribal people 
(see Section 5).
    The rape of persons in custody is part of the broader pattern of 
custodial abuse. Limits placed on the arrest, search, and police 
custody of women appear effectively to limit the frequency of rape in 
custody, although it does occur on occasion. According to HRW, in 
February in Tamil Nadu, 12 women were detained illegally, tortured, and 
repeatedly sexually assaulted in custody, because of their ties to a 
suspected robber who had himself died in police custody. In addition to 
the 12 women, police detained and beat the young sons of suspected 
robbers, according to a local human rights organization. The same 
organization reported that the victims declined to press charges 
against the police. On September 3, Captain Ravinder Singh Twatir of 
the 12th Battalion, Rashtriya Rifles, was sentenced to 7 years of 
rigorous imprisonment and dismissed from the army for raping a girl in 
Naugam village, Doda district, Jammu and Kashmir on February 14. As of 
September no action had been taken against an alleged accomplice in the 
rape, special police officer Bharat Bhusan. The NHRC received a report 
of only one case of custodial rape between April 1997 and March 1998. 
The 24-hour reporting requirement applies to custodial rape as well as 
custodial death. However, the requirement does not apply to rape by 
policemen outside police stations. NGO's claim that rape by police, 
including custodial rape, is more common than NHRC figures indicate. 
Although evidence is lacking, a higher incidence of abuse appears 
credible, given other evidence of abusive behavior by police and the 
likelihood that many rapes go unreported due to a sense of shame and a 
fear of retribution among victims.
    Human rights monitors allege that on July 19, central reserve 
police force personnel raped a tribal housewife in Lamdam village, 
Manipur. They allege that the rape was committed in retaliation for an 
attack carried out on a CRPF patrol by People's Liberation Army 
militants the previous day (see Section 1.g.).
    There is a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and 
Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among 
noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but it 
is not included in NHRC statistics because it involves military forces.
    From April 1998 to March 1999, the NHRC received 1,297 complaints 
of custodial death (1,114 in judicial custody and 183 in police 
custody), no cases of custodial rape, and 2,252 complaints of other 
police abuses. By year's end, the NHRC had not released the statistics 
of its actions against police during this time period. However, from 
April 1997 to March 1998, the NHRC received 1,012 complaints of 
custodial death (819 in judicial custody and 193 in police custody), 1 
case of custodial rape, and 1,413 complaints of other police excesses. 
As a result of NHRC action during this earlier period, criminal 
prosecutions were brought against 43 persons; departmental action was 
taken against 60 officers, 51 of whom were placed under suspension; and 
monetary compensation in amounts ranging from $1,100 (50,000 rupees) to 
$2,100 (100,000 rupees) were recommended for payment in 20 cases.
    According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as 
domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections 
5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Police corruption undermines efforts to combat trafficking in women 
and children (see Section 6.f.).
    Security forces killed and injured numerous militant group members, 
many in so-called encounter deaths, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir 
and the northeastern states (see Section 1.a.).
    Militant groups sometimes used automatic weapons, hand grenades, 
bombs, landmines, and other weapons in political violence in Jammu and 
Kashmir and the northeastern states; numerous security forces and 
civilians were killed and injured.
    Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and 
injuries as well as damage to property (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 
5).
    Some militant groups in the northeast have used rape as a tactic to 
terrorize the populace; however, no cases are known to have been 
reported during the year.
    Prison conditions are very poor. Prisons are severely overcrowded, 
and the provision of food and medical care frequently is inadequate.
    Prisons operate above capacity because of thousands of prisoners 
awaiting hearings (see Section 1.d.). For example, in Bihar 80 percent 
of prisoners are unconvicted remand prisoners awaiting completion of 
their trials. Delhi's Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300 
persons, houses 9,000 prisoners. Birsa Munda jail in Ranchi, Bihar, 
designed to hold 364 persons, houses more than 1,800 male and female 
prisoners. In May the PUCL visited Sakchi jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar, 
following complaints of abuse of prisoners. The human rights activists 
found that the prison, designed to hold 200 prisoners, housed 786 
persons, of whom only 55 had been convicted; the rest were at various 
stages of the judicial process. Amnesty International reported that 
overcrowding in Arthur jail, Mumbai, led to rioting on June 19. 
Designed to hold 50 prisoners, Arthur jail has 180 inmates. Prison 
guards reportedly attacked inmates with razors and wooden poles to 
quell rioting that erupted following a fight between two prisoners. 
Forty inmates were injured in the incident. An August 3 report from 
Aizawl, Mizoram, stated that its central jail, designed to house 500 
prisoners, had 846 inmates. The NHRC reported in February on its 
November 1999 visits to jails in Guwahati and Shillong. In Guwahati the 
commission found 780 inmates in a district jail designed to hold 507 
(see Section 1.d.). In Shillong the commission found 374 inmates in the 
central jail, which was designed to hold 150 persons. One of the 
inmates was a 10- or 11-year-old girl awaiting trial. The Government 
prepared a national prison manual during the year to facilitate reform. 
It also continued to provide financial aid to the states. However, the 
Prison Act of 1894 remains unamended. According to the SAHRDC, in the 
poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265 police stations have no lock-
up facilities, the lack of prisons led police to shackle prisoners to 
trees. An NHRC investigatory team visiting Meerut jail in Uttar Pradesh 
in 1998 found about 3,000 inmates in a facility designed to hold 650 
persons. As a result of this and other jail visits, the NHRC hired a 
consultant to draft the prison reform bill to be submitted to the 
Government. The draft bill, meant to be enacted by the national 
Parliament, encountered opposition from state governments asserting 
that prison management is the responsibility of the states. No new 
initiatives were taken on the bill during the year. The 1,114 deaths in 
judicial custody in 1998-99, occurring in a prison population of 
approximately 246,000 persons, many of whom are held for years, include 
a large proportion of deaths from natural causes that, in some cases 
were aggravated by poor prison conditions (see Section 1.a.). A study 
conducted by the NHRC in 1997-98 found that tuberculosis was the cause 
of death in 76 percent of deaths in judicial custody. Deaths in police 
custody, which typically occur within hours or days of initial 
detention, more clearly imply violent abuse and torture. The NHRC has 
no authority to investigate abuses by security forces directly, and 
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states are 
not required to report custodial deaths to the Commission.
    With the exception of an agreement with the ICRC for visits to 
detention facilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government does not 
allow NGO's to monitor prison conditions (see Section 4). However, 15 
states and union territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct 
surprise check-ups on jails. Although custodial abuse is deeply rooted 
in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary 
questioning provide evidence of growing public awareness of the 
problem. The NHRC has identified torture and deaths in detention as one 
of its priority concerns. In 1998 it created a ``Special Rapporteur and 
Chief Coordinator of Custodial Justice'' to help implement its 
directive to state prison authorities to ensure that medical check-ups 
are performed on all inmates. In June the country's first women's 
correctional facility was opened in the Tihar complex in New Delhi.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the early 1980's, 
the Government implemented a variety of special security laws intended 
to help law enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgencies, and 
there were credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and 
detention under these laws during the year.
    Although the law that had been subject to the most extensive abuse, 
the TADA, lapsed in May 1995, 1,502 persons previously arrested under 
the act continued to be held as of January 1, 1997, in a number of 
states, according to the NHRC's 1996-97 report. Human rights sources 
estimate that about 1,000 persons remained in custody under TADA or 
related charges at year's end. A small number of arrests under the TADA 
continued for crimes allegedly committed before the law lapsed. In 1997 
the Government asserted that every TADA case would be reviewed. 
However, few persons have been released as a result of the review. 
Criminal cases are proceeding against most of those persons still held 
under the TADA, with more than 3,000 charged under other laws in 
addition to the TADA. In 1996 the Supreme Court eased bail guidelines 
for persons accused under TADA, taking into account the large backlog 
of cases in special TADA courts. In March 1999, the state minister for 
home affairs told the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly that 16,620 
persons had been detained under the TADA in the state since 1990; of 
these, 1,640 were brought to trial and 10 were convicted. TADA courts 
use abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel is not permitted 
to see witnesses for the prosecution, who are kept behind screens while 
testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under duress are 
admissible as evidence. The special task force established by the state 
police forces of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to capture a bandit hiding in 
forests in the border area between the 2 states had arrested some 121 
persons under the TADA prior to the law's lapse; 51 of these persons 
were in custody at year's end.
    During the year, the Government sent a draft Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill, 2000 to the Law Commission of India for review and 
possible introduction in Parliament. The bill is similar to the TADA, 
in that it would permit summary trials and the hearing of testimony 
exacted under duress. It also would allow witnesses to testify in 
camera, without having to disclose their identities to the defense at 
any stage of the proceedings. In addition it would compel journalists 
to disclose to authorities any information regarding terrorist groups 
or actions, or face charges of terrorism against them. Finally, the 
bill would require the law to be reviewed every 5 years, instead of 
every 2, which was the case with TADA. In August the NHRC issued an 
opinion stating that the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill was not 
necessary. Commenting on these and other provisions of the bill, the 
NHRC wrote: ``These provisions would seriously affect human rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution and violate basic principles of 
criminal jurisprudence as internationally understood.'' Similar bills 
are pending in the Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies. 
If enacted they would provide for special courts to try offenses, place 
the burden of proof at the bail stage on the accused, make confessions 
to a police officer of the rank of superintendent of police admissible 
as evidence, extend the period of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set 
mandatory sentences for terrorism-related offenses. The Maharashtra 
state assembly enacted TADA-like legislation in November 1999. On 
September 6, the Mumbai Sessions Court issued the first conviction 
under the act, the Organized Crime (Control) Act. The court sentenced 
three alleged gang members to death on charges of conspiracy to murder 
former Mumbai mayor Milind Vaidya. The three persons have appealed 
their convictions to the Mumbai High Court. As of year's end, their 
case had not been heard.
    The Constitution permits preventive detention laws in the event of 
threats to public order and national security. Under Article 22 of the 
Constitution, an individual may be detained--without charge or trial--
for up to 3 months, and detainees are denied their rights or 
compensation for unlawful arrest or detention. In addition to providing 
for limits on the length of detention, the preventive detention laws 
provide for judicial review. Several laws of this type remain in 
effect.
    The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits the detention of 
persons considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country 
(except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions. 
Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without 
charge or trial for as long as a year on loosely defined security 
grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which 
is reviewed by an advisory board of three High Court judges within 7 
weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family 
members and lawyers, and must be informed of the grounds for their 
detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances). 
According to the Government, 1,163 persons were being held under the 
NSA at the end of 1997. The NSA does not define ``security risk.'' 
Human rights groups allege that preventive detention may be ordered and 
extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority 
and after advisory board review. Any court may not overturn such a 
decision.
    The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers 
corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in 
Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. Jammu and Kashmir police 
reported that 514 persons were being held under the PSA as of December 
1998. In September and November 1999 alone, the Jammu and Kashmir 
police arrested 25 members of the Kashmiri separatist All Parties 
Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The arrests followed a series of terrorist 
attacks in the state for which members of this group allegedly were 
responsible (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 4). On April 4, the 
Government released 3 of the 25 persons; in May it released 11 more of 
the APHC detainees and attempted to initiate a dialog with the APHC. By 
year's end, all of the remaining APHC detainees were released; no 
charges were brought against any of them. In December 1999, Shabir 
Shah, president of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, was 
released. At the time of Shah's release, Amnesty International 
expressed concern about the 25 arrested leaders of the APHC and 
explicitly suggested that the charges were politically motivated.
    The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be 
informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel, 
and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a 
magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the 
accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released. 
The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. The accused must be 
informed of their right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless 
held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The police 
must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail to do 
so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
    In November 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional 
validity of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958. In a 
representation made to the NHRC, the SAHRDC asserted that the act's 
powers were ``too vast and sweeping and pose a grave threat to the 
fundamental rights and liberties of the citizenry of the (disturbed) 
areas covered by the act.'' The SAHRDC asserted that the powers granted 
to authorities under Section 3 of the act to declare any area to be a 
``disturbed area,'' and thus subject to the other provisions of the 
act, were too broad. Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that Section 4(a) of 
the act empowers any commissioned officer, warrant officer, 
noncommissioned officer, or any other person of equivalent rank in the 
armed forces to fire upon and otherwise use force, even to the point of 
death, if he believes that it is necessary for the maintenance of law 
and order. Further, Section 6 of the act states that ``no prosecution, 
suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted, except with the 
previous sanction of the central Government against any person in 
respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of 
powers'' conferred by the act.
    The court system is extremely overloaded, resulting in the 
detention of numerous persons awaiting trial for periods longer than 
they would receive if convicted. Prisoners may be held for months or 
even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a reply to a 
parliamentary question in July 1994, more than 111,000 criminal cases 
were pending in the Allahabad High Court, the most serious case backlog 
in the country, of which nearly 29,000 cases had been pending for 5 to 
8 years. A statement to Parliament in July 1996 indicated that criminal 
and civil cases pending before the country's high courts numbered 
nearly 2.9 million in 1995, roughly the same as in 1994, but an 
increase from 2.65 million in 1993. According to the Union Home 
Ministry, the total number of civil and criminal cases pending for 3 or 
more years in all courts throughout the country was 5,116,895 on 
December 31, 1998. In its most recent report, the NHRC reported that 
nearly 80 percent of all prisoners held between April 1996 and March 
1997, were so-called ``undertrials,'' i.e., unconvicted remand 
prisoners awaiting the start or conclusion of their trials. In its 
1997-98 report, the NHRC stated that it ``remains deeply disturbed by 
the presence of a large number of under trial prisoners in different 
jails in the country.'' In March 1999, the chairman of the NHRC said 
that 60 percent of all police arrests were ``unnecessary and 
unjustifiable,'' and that the incarceration of those wrongly arrested 
accounted for 43 percent of the total annual expenditure on prisons. 
The NHRC reported in February on its November 1999 visits to jails in 
Guwahati (see Section 1.c.). The Commission found that 90 percent of 
the 780 inmates were unconvicted prisoners awaiting completion of 
trial. On February 27, the NHRC directed the Orissa government to pay 
$1,000 (50,000 rupees) as interim relief to a 16-year-old boy who was 
victim of illegal detention and torture by police at Kandhamal. Accused 
of theft, the boy was sent to a regular prison to await trial, rather 
than a juvenile home. In March the NHRC reported that it had directed 
the West Bengal government to pay $1,000 (50,000 rupees) in 
compensation to the court guardian of a 12year-old girl who was in the 
custody of the West Bengal police for nearly a decade because she was 
the sole witness to her parents' murder. On July 9, Bihar police 
registered a case against then-Bihar Minister of State for Cooperatives 
Lalit Yadav, his cousin, and four others for alleged illegal detention 
and torture of a truck driver and cleaner at the minister's residence. 
The complaint alleges that Yadav kept the two men in wrongful 
confinement for a month, beat them, and tortured them. The two men's 
toenails allegedly were pulled out and they were forced to drink urine. 
Yadav was dismissed from his state government post and from his 
political party membership.
    On November 28, the Government announced that it was allocating 
$108.15 million (5.03 billion rupees) to state governments for the 
creation of 1,734 additional courts during 2000-2005, in order to hear 
more cases and reduce the number of remand prisoners.
    In June 1997, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, a Bhutanese dissident, was 
placed in judicial custody pending review of an extradition request 
from the Government of Bhutan on charges that included political 
offenses as well as financial malfeasance. On June 12, 1998, Dorji was 
released on bail following the New Delhi High Court's decision to deny 
a government appeal and let stand a lower court's order to grant bail 
in the case. Dorji still awaits conclusion of his extradition hearing.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is an independent judiciary 
with strong constitutional safeguards. Under a Supreme Court ruling, 
the Chief Justice, in consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive 
voice in selecting judicial candidates. The President appoints judges, 
and they may serve up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up 
to the age of 65 on the Supreme Court.
    Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district 
levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high 
courts and by the national-level Supreme Court, which also rules on 
constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and 
district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the 
recommendation of the federal law ministry, with the advice of the 
Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of 
the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing 
before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly 
from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the 
basis of seniority.
    When legal procedures function normally, they generally assure a 
fair trial, but the process often is drawn out and inaccessible to poor 
persons. Defendants have the right to choose counsel from attorneys who 
are fully independent of the Government. There are effective channels 
for appeal at most levels of the judicial system, and the State 
provides free legal counsel to the indigent.
    The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most 
cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official 
secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the 
state might be made, or under provisions of special security 
legislation. Sentences must be announced in public.
    Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters 
involving Muslims, including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The 
Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the 
minority communities, with the result that personal status laws that 
discriminate against women are upheld.
    In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functions due to 
threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family 
members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed 
antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security 
forces to obey court orders. Courts in Jammu and Kashmir are reluctant 
to hear cases involving terrorist crimes, and fail to act expeditiously 
on habeas corpus cases, if they act at all. There were a few 
convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu High Court during the 
year. Many more accused militants have been in pretrial detention for 
years. On April 1, the Jammu and Kashmir Home Minister submitted a 
written statement to the state assembly acknowledging that 115 foreign 
militants (primarily from Pakistan, but reportedly also from 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan) jailed in the state and elsewhere had not 
been tried, despite the fact that many of them had been imprisoned for 
10 years (see Section 1.d.).
    Criminal gangs in all four southern states have been known to 
attack rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court 
premises, denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused 
persons have been attacked while being escorted by police to the 
courts.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary 
requested to visit the country during the year, but the Government did 
not grant the Rapporteur permission to do so.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and 
seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches 
without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the 
searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over 
the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam 
have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
    The government Enforcement Directorate (ED), which is mandated to 
investigate foreign exchange and currency violations, searches, 
interrogates, and arrests thousands of business and management 
professionals annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED 
ultimately convicts very few persons. In 1997 only 28 persons out of 
thousands arrested were convicted, according to the Times of India.
    The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of 
communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and 
intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the 
interest of the public safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government 
has used these powers, as has the central Government.
    In early January, soldiers set fire to 47 shops in an open market 
in Pattan Town, northern Kashmir Valley, in retaliation for a nearby 
ambush in which militants killed 2 soldiers. The army used gasoline to 
spread the blaze and shot at fire trucks that arrived on the scene. 
Human rights activists were unaware of any effort to hold security 
force members accountable for the rampage in Pattan Town; government 
information on action against suspects was unavailable.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Government forces continue to commit numerous 
serious violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces 
are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in 
the Kashmir valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security 
forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed 
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July 
1990, security force personnel have extraordinary powers, including 
authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those persons disturbing 
the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants 
or arms.
    The Union Home Ministry was unable to estimate how many civilians 
were killed in crossfire by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir during 
the year. It reported that 84 such deaths occurred in Jammu and Kashmir 
in 1996-1997. The security forces continue to abduct and kill suspected 
militants; the security forces have not accepted accountability for 
these abuses. Many commanders' inclination to distance their units from 
such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer 
of some of these abuses to government-supported countermilitants.
    According to credible reports, in addition to harassment during 
searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.) security forces 
abduct and sometimes use civilians as human shields in night patrolling 
and searching for landmines; the abuses so far have occurred mostly in 
the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's inaccessibility, the 
abuses there allegedly have been underreported greatly.
    The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed 
forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control new 
Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir resulted in an increased 
counterinsurgency campaign, accompanied by repressive offensive 
measures. According to a credible government source, as of early 
December 1999 over 450 militants had been killed since the Kargil 
conflict began. That trend continued, with official sources reporting 
that security forces had killed 1,062 militants during the first 9 
months of the year. In September 1999, then-chief of army staff Gen. 
Ved Malik said that security forces were killing 150 to 160 militants 
every month in Jammu and Kashmir.
    Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses.
    Militants carried out several execution-style mass murders of Hindu 
(Pandit), Sikh, and Buddhist villagers in Jammu and Kashmir (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5). On March 20, suspected militants killed 35 Sikhs 
in Chatisinghpura village, Anantnag district (see Sections 1.a. and 5). 
On April 26, militants invaded a home in Golgam village and killed four 
members of a Hindu family. On July 30, militants hurled a hand grenade 
into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near Gulmarg, killing one 
person and injuring five others (see Section 5).
    In addition to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of 
politicians and civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.), 
insurgents engaged in extortion and carried out acts of random terror 
that killed hundreds of Kashmiris. Many of the militants are not 
citizens but Afghani, Pakistani, and other nationals. Since the 1990's, 
the militants have made liberal use of timedelayed explosives, 
landmines, hand grenades, and snipers. Militants previously had 
restricted landmine use to army convoys traveling outside of major 
cities, but during the year they began using command detonated 
landmines in Srinagar city. There was a significant upsurge in militant 
violence against security forces, and a tendency to use heavy weapons 
such as hand grenades and rockets. Militants killed and injured 
numerous security personnel and destroyed a great deal of security 
force property; many civilians also were killed. On January 3, a bomb 
explosion in a Srinagar market killed 16 persons, including 3 security 
force members. On February 10, militants planted a bomb on a Calcutta-
bound train. The bomb exploded near Vijaypur, Jammu district, killing 
two persons and injuring four others. On March 27, militants hurled 
hand grenades at a police patrol in Bandipora town, killing 3 civilians 
and injuring 11 others. On April 12, militants exploded a powerful car 
bomb in Rawalpora on the outskirts of Srinagar as an army convoy was 
passing by; one civilian was injured in the blast. On April 19, a 15-
year-old boy recruited by militants died in an explosion when he 
attempted to drive an explosivesladen car into army headquarters, 
Badamibagh Cantonment, Srinagar; four soldiers and three civilians were 
injured in the attack. Also on April 19, in Baramulla, 2 students, aged 
17 and 11, were killed and 20 passersby were injured when militants 
hurled a hand grenade at a security force vehicle convoy and missed; 
the hand grenade exploded in a market in Sopore town. On April 22, a 
group of militants attacked an army post in Punch district, killing two 
soldiers. On April 26, militants detonated a homemade bomb in 
Gharanarial, Jammu, killing five Border Security Force members. On 
April 29, an 18-year-old student was killed and four police personnel 
were injured when militants detonated an explosive device in Sher Bagh, 
Anantnag district. On May 10, four soldiers were killed when their 
vehicle hit a landmine planted by militants at Nihalpura village, 
Baramula district. On May 15, Ghulam Hasan Bhatt, Minister of Power, 
Jammu and Kashmir state, his driver, two body guards and radioman were 
killed when militants detonated a landmine under their passing vehicle. 
On May 16, one soldier was killed and two others were injured when 
militants fired rockets at an army camp in Sudru village, Banihal. 
Sixteen persons were killed, including 11 militants, 3 civilians, and a 
soldier, when militants armed with rockets and hand grenades attacked 
an army camp at Khundroo, Anantnag on June 1. On August 10, in 
Srinagar, a car bomb explosion set by militants killed 10 persons and 
injured approximately 30 others. The car bomb explosion occurred just 
minutes after police and journalists had rushed to, and civilians had 
vacated, the site of a hand grenade attack. On August 21, a landmine 
blast in Kupwara district killed three security force personnel, 
including a senior-level brigadier. On August 24, a landmine injured 
five security force personnel when a vehicle drove over it in Puthkhai, 
northern Kashmir. On September 23, two bomb explosions killed seven 
civilians in Sangalsan village, Udhampur. On October 8, three Border 
Security Force members were injured when their bus struck a landmine 
planted by militants near Khooni Nala village. On October 20, two 
soldiers were killed in Udhampur district when militants detonated an 
improvised explosive device that they had strapped to a mule and sent 
into the army camp. On November 28, shortly after the beginning of the 
Government's unilateral ceasefire for the holy month of Ramadan, a 
landmine blew up an army truck, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 12 
others; Hizbul Mujaheddin claimed responsibility. On December 5, a 
landmine explosion in the Adipora area of Baramulla district injured 
three soldiers.
    Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast claimed many 
lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted to 
destroying bridges, and the laying time bombs on roads, on railway 
tracks, and in trains. On February 27, Assam Minister for Public Works 
and Forests Nagen Sharma and four others were killed when suspected 
ULFA militants detonated an explosive device as the minister's vehicle 
passed a near NijBahjani, Nalbari district. On March 5, suspected ULFA 
militants attempted to kill a second Assam minister, Hiranya Konwar. 
They detonated an improvised explosive device as the minister's car 
neared Rongali Doegarh, Sivasagar district; no persons were injured in 
the attack. On May 20, 5 persons were killed and 11 others were injured 
when militants threw a hand grenade into a passing jeep at 
Manikerbasti, west Tripura. Also on May 20, UBLF militants lobbed bombs 
at a passenger jeep from north Maharanipur in Khowai, killing 5 tribals 
and injuring 11 others. On May 21, 15 persons were killed when 
suspected NLFT militants threw hand grenades at Bengali villagers in 
Baghber village, Tripura. The militants then attacked villagers with 
machetes and set fire to 60 homes in the village. On October 23, 
suspected ULFA militants killed 15 persons and wounded 8 others in 2 
separate attacks. The first occurred in the Kakogam Market, Tinsukia 
district, where militants fired automatic guns at civilians, killing 11 
persons. The second attack occured at Naoholia, Dibrugarh district 
where militants indiscriminately fired at civilians, killing four 
persons and injured five others.
    On February 12, a Naxalite mine blast killed 21 persons in Bihar 
(see Section 5). On March 7, Naxalites killed Andhra Pradesh minister 
for local government A. Madhava Reddy in a landmine explosion near 
Hyderabad. Reddy was returning from a political rally. As home minister 
in the state from 1994-95, Reddy had overseen anti-Naxalite operations. 
In a letter to the PUCL, G.N. Saibaba, general secretary of the All 
India People's Resistance Forum; Varavara Rao, executive member of the 
Revolutionary Writers Association; and Gadar, general secretary of the 
All India League for Revolutionary Culture alleged that police had 
summarily executed three unarmed members of CPI(M) on February 1. The 
three writers alleged that police detained the three victims--Kumar, 
Sujanta and Venkanna--in the Musmi village, Warangal district. The PUCL 
alleges that police killed five women in an April 27 encounter in the 
Chandragiri Hills, Warangal district, Andhra Pradesh. According to the 
human rights organization, police surrounded the women and lobbed hand 
grenades at them, killing them.
    During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of 
involvement in previous terrorist attacks and brought charges against 
some suspects. Charges also were brought against persons accused of 
involvement with human suicide bomb attacks to advance Sikh separatism, 
as well as against dozens of captured separatist insurgents in Jammu 
and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and acts of sabotage.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, there are some limitations. 
A vigorous and growing press reflects a wide variety of political, 
social, and economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines regularly 
publish investigative reports and allegations of government wrongdoing, 
and the press generally promotes human rights and criticizes perceived 
government lapses.
    Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict 
publication of sensitive stories; however, while the Government at 
times interprets this power broadly to suppress criticism of its 
policies, the Government nonetheless introduced a right to information 
bill in the 2000 Monsoon Session of Parliament. However, during the 
year the bill lapsed; it must be reintroduced if Parliament is to take 
any further action on it.
    The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act remains in effect 
in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district magistrate may prohibit 
the press from publishing material resulting in incitement to murder or 
any act of violence. As punishment the act stipulates that the 
authorities may seize newspapers and printing presses. Despite these 
restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, 
report in detail on alleged human rights abuses by the Government, and 
regularly publish press releases of militant Kashmiri groups. The 
authorities generally allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in 
Jammu and Kashmir, where they regularly spoke with militant leaders and 
filed reports on government abuses.
    In Assam the state government has attempted to impede criticism by 
filing a number of criminal defamation charges against journalists.
    In October 1998, the Manipur government announced curbs on the 
publication of insurgency-related news. The publication of insurgents' 
press releases, public invitations to slain militants' funerals, and 
calls to boycott Republic Day and Independence Day functions were 
prohibited. Penalties for violating the prohibition included arrest and 
criminal prosecution of newspaper owners and editors, and cancellation 
of newspapers' registration. These restrictions continued during the 
year.
    The Press Council of India is a statutory body of journalists, 
publishers, academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by 
the Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the 
press, it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets 
a code of conduct for publishers. This code includes a commitment not 
to publish articles or details that might incite caste or communal 
violence. The Council publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it 
believes have broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted 
by the press community, carry no legal weight.
    At the state level, regional political parties have the ability to 
control regional media. In some instances, allegations of violence 
against journalists have been made against state governments. According 
to Reporters Without Borders, on July 6, a magistrate in Sibsagar town, 
Assam, beat Parag Saikia, a journalist of the daily newspaper Aji. The 
magistrate reportedly had summoned the journalist for publishing a July 
1 article about the local authorities' alleged involvement in 
corruption. The journalist later was admitted to the hospital with 
various injuries. Between July and August, in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, state police obstructed or attacked journalists and 
photographers in at least 10 different cities as they attempted to 
report on civil disturbances resulting from protests over power tariff 
hikes. The Andhra Pradesh Journalists' Union claims that the state 
chief minister of Andhra Pradesh played a role in the dismissal of the 
editor of the Telugu daily newspaper Andhra Prabha. The editor 
reportedly was fired for publishing stories critical of the state 
government's power policy.
    Nonviolent pressure on journalists comes from official sources as 
well: the editor of the vernacular daily newspaper Naharolgi Thoudang 
was arrested on charges of indulging in anti-national activities. He 
was released after a court ruled that the allegation was baseless. In 
Assam a similar incident occured as police intercepted the editor of 
the largest circulating Assamese daily in April, accusing him of having 
participated in a function organized by a militant organization. In 
April the Assam Human Rights Commission requested the police to report 
on the detention of Asomiya Pratidin editor Haider Hussain for visiting 
an ULFA camp in Bhutan; police detained Hussain in the first week of 
March. The Commission cited the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression; Hussain was released several days later. Some newspapers 
receive more than $1.29 million (60 million rupees) annually in 
advertising revenue from the state government. The threat of losing 
this revenue contributes to self-censorship by smaller media outlets, 
which heavily rely on government advertising.
    In Calcutta the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) often 
threatens journalists; however, as the power of the party diminishes, 
journalists find it easier to criticize the government. At least nine 
journalists were injured while attempting to give a deputation to the 
director of information. The alleged assailants were state information 
officers, government employees owing allegiance to the Marxist 
government. In July alleged members of the CPI(M) severely beat a team 
of three reporters and a cameraman of ETV, a new vernacular cable 
television channel. Another reporter was injured severely in state 
finance minister Asim Dasgupta's constituency during municipal 
elections (see Section 3). On numerous occasions, CPI(M) supporters 
beat reporters of another Bengali cable channel, Khas Khobor. Earlier 
in the year, CPI(M) officially requested its supporters to boycott the 
channel. The matter was resolved when a former CPI(M) activist replaced 
the editor.
    In the northeast part of the country, violence against journalists 
has become a problem and results in significant self-censorship. On 
August 20, two unknown assailants shot and killed Thounaojam Brajamani 
Singh, the editor of the Manipur News, a daily newspaper published in 
Manipur. According to Reporters Without Borders, two men on a 
motorcycle followed Singh after he left the newspaper office. They 
overtook Singh and shot him in the head at point-blank range; Singh was 
the only employee whom they targeted. Singh had received anonymous 
death threats on August 15. No one had claimed responsibility for the 
murder, and police investigations were ongoing by year's end. On August 
26, militants bombed a newspaper office owned by an NGO at Konung 
Lampak, Manipur. Altogether, at least seven journalists have been 
killed in Assam over the past decade. There was no further information 
on the 1996 killing of journalist and human rights activist Parag Das 
in Assam (see Sections 1.a. and 4).
    On July 31, V. Selvaraj, a journalist with the biweekly Nakkeeran, 
was shot and killed in Perambalur, Tamil Nadu. Thirteen persons were 
charged in connection with Selvaraj's killing. A motive for the killing 
has not been established; however, local police maintain that there was 
personal enmity between Selvaraj and his 13 assailants. The trial had 
not begun by year's end.
    Intimidation by militant groups also causes significant 
selfcensorship. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 
January English-language newspapers throughout Gujarat received written 
notice from the Bajrang Dal, a radical Hindu nationalist group, 
threatening them with dire consequences if they continued to publish 
exaggerated reports of antiChristian violence (see Sections 2.c. and 
5). In 1999 Kashmiri militant groups threatened journalists and editors 
and even imposed temporary bans on some publications that were critical 
of their activities.
    The Government maintains a list of banned books that may not be 
imported or sold in the country; some--like Salman Rushdie's ``Satanic 
Verses'' because they contain material government censors have deemed 
inflammatory.
    On February 16, customs agents at the Calcutta airport blocked the 
distribution of 3,000 issues of Time magazine because they contained a 
1-page interview with the brother of Mohandas Gandhi's assassin, which 
they deemed would be defamatory and derogatory to national prestige.
    Television no longer is a government monopoly, but this is due more 
to technological changes than to government policy. Private satellite 
television is distributed widely by cable or dish in middle-class 
neighborhoods throughout the country. These channels have been 
providing substantial competition for Doordarshan (DDTV), the national 
broadcaster, in both presentation and credibility because DDTV 
frequently is accused of manipulating the news for the benefit of the 
Government; however, cable operators are not free of criticism. In some 
parts of the country, to varying degrees, satellite channel owners use 
their medium to promote the platforms of the political parties that 
they support.
    In late summer the Government proposed measures to control 
objectionable content on satellite channels--specifically, tobacco and 
alcohol advertisements--that would hold cable distributors liable under 
civil law. As a result, cable operators in New Delhi and some other 
areas held a 3-day blackout during the Olympic Games to demonstrate the 
gravity of their concern. The Government since has clarified its 
position, stating that the (often foreign) satellite broadcasters, 
rather than the domestic cable operators, fall within the scope of the 
regulation.
    AM radio broadcasting remains a government monopoly. Private FM 
radio station ownership was legalized during the year, but licenses 
only authorize entertainment and educational content. Licenses do not 
permit independent news broadcasting.
    A government censorship board reviews films before licensing them 
for distribution. The board censors material deemed offensive to public 
morals or communal sentiment. During the year, Hindu fundamentalist 
groups resorted to violence and disrupted the shooting of ``Water,'' a 
film involving the exploitation of widows, as they claimed it offended 
Hindu sentiments. A 1999 film by the same producer/director and cast, 
``Fire,'' which dealt with lesbianism and which had been cleared by the 
censor board, was not allowed to be screened in most states; only 
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal took proactive steps to allow the film 
to be shown. At times offended Hindu mobs, led by members of the Shiv 
Sena, a Hindu fundamentalist political party, provoked violence at 
movie theaters that were able to show the film. The fact that the lead 
actress of both films was a Muslim exacerbated tensions. Producers of 
video newsmagazines that appear on national television are required to 
submit their programs to Doordarshan, the government television 
channel, which occasionally has censored stories that portrayed the 
Government in an unfavorable light. This has led to self-censorship 
among producers so that DDTV rarely has to exercise its power of 
censorship.
    The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
    Arundhati Roy's book ``The Greater Common Good,'' which discusses 
the socio-environmental costs of the Sardar Sarovar dam, was serialized 
in magazines in the country during the year. In 1999 political parties 
in favor of the Narmada project burned copies of the book and 
successfully threatened bookstores in Gujarat to remove it from their 
shelves.
    Citizens enjoy academic freedom, and students and faculty espouse a 
wide range of views. In addition to about 10 national universities and 
256 state universities, states are empowered to accredit locally run 
private institutions.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes 
require permits and notification prior to holding parades or 
demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to 
protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist 
parties routinely are denied permits for public gatherings. During 
periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or 
impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
    Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally came 
under curfew, but more often were affected by strikes called by 
militants.
    On March 27, Calcutta police beat primary school teachers 
participating in a peaceful procession to the legislative assembly, 
after holding a meeting on demands they had made of the state 
government. On August 13 and 14, police killed 2 persons and injured 3 
others after they fired on a crowd of 1,500 Muslims in Agra. The crowd 
had gathered to protest efforts by majority Hindus to prevent them from 
using a plot of land close to a Hindu temple. The minority community 
wanted to use the land, which was under the supervision of Muslim 
religious authorities, as a graveyard. Police allege that the 
protesters turned violent, throwing bombs and bottles filled with acid 
at police. The police maintain that they fired at the crowd with live 
ammunition only after efforts to quell the disturbance with tear gas 
and rubber bullets had failed. Some of the protesters told reporters 
that the police actions were unprovoked (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    According to Amnesty International, in August the Gujarat 
government detained approximately 600 persons who were planning to 
attend a hearing on the Narmada dam (see Section 2.d.). The police 
charged the protestors with disturbing the peace and released them 
shortly after their arrests.
    The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and 
the Government generally respected this right in practice.
    In 1999 the Government introduced and enforced a new requirement 
that NGO's secure the prior approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
before organizing international conferences. Human rights groups 
contend that the new requirement provides the Government with 
substantial political control of the work of NGO's, abridging of their 
freedom of assembly and association.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice; however, 
it sometimes does not act effectively to counter societal attacks 
against religious minorities and attempts by state and local 
governments to limit that freedom. India is a secular state in which 
all faiths generally enjoy freedom of worship; government policy does 
not favor any religious group. However, tension between Muslims and 
Hindus, and to an increasing extent between Hindus and Christians, 
continues to pose a challenge to the secular foundation of the State 
(see Section 5). In addition governments at state and local levels only 
partially respect religious freedom.
    Although the law provides for religious freedom, enforcement of the 
law has been poor, particularly at the state and local levels, where 
the failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup conflict 
and with local disturbances has abridged the right to religious 
freedom. In particular, some Hindu extremist groups continued to attack 
Christians during the year. In many cases, the Government response was 
inadequate, consisting largely of statements criticizing the violence 
against Christians, with few efforts to hold accountable those persons 
responsible or to prevent such incidents from occurring (see Section 
5). Throughout the year, the Government generally described the 
violence and attacks as a series of isolated local phenomena, in some 
states calling for a national debate on conversions, which Hindus had 
advocated being banned.
    The Government is led by a coalition called the National Democratic 
Alliance, which has pledged to respect India's traditions of secular 
government and religious tolerance. However, the leading party in the 
coalition is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist 
political party with links to Hindu extremist groups that have been 
implicated in violent acts against Christians and Muslims. The BJP also 
leads state governments in Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar 
Pradesh. Many BJP leaders and party workers are members of the 
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and share some of its ideology. 
However, the BJP is an independent political party and the degree of 
RSS influence over its policy making is not clear. The RSS espouses a 
return to Hindu values and cultural norms. Members of the BJP, the RSS, 
and other affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of 
violence and discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and 
RSS officially express respect and tolerance for other religions; 
however, the RSS in particular opposes conversions from Hinduism and 
believes that all citizens should adhere to Hindu cultural values. The 
BJP officially agrees that the caste system should be eliminated, but 
many of its members are ambivalent about this. Most BJP leaders also 
are RSS members. The BJP's traditional cultural agenda includes calls 
for construction of a new Hindu temple to replace an ancient Hindu 
temple that was believed to have stood on the site of a mosque in 
Ayodhya that a Hindu mob destroyed in 1992; for the repeal of Article 
370 of the Constitution, which grants special rights to the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, the country's only Muslim majority state; and for 
the enactment of a uniform civil code that would apply to members of 
all religions. In mid-October, the RSS held a 3-day rally in Agra, 
which more than 75,000 Hindus reportedly attended. Speaking at the 
rally, RSS chief K.S. Sudarshan sparked controversy when he called for 
banning foreign churches and creating a national Christian Church based 
on the Chinese model. Sudarshan reportedly also encouraged Christian 
citizens to free themselves from the strong influence of foreign 
countries by setting up Indian nationalistic churches. Of particular 
concern for minority groups was Home Minister L.K. Advani's highly 
publicized participation at the Agra rally and vocal support of the RSS 
on his return to New Delhi. All of these proposals are opposed strongly 
by some minority religious groups. The BJP-led national Government took 
no steps to implement these controversial measures and has promised 
that it would not do so during its tenure.
    Human rights groups and others have suggested that the response by 
authorities in these states to acts of violence against religious 
minorities by Hindu extremist groups has been ineffective, at least in 
part because of the links between these groups and the BJP, and have 
noted that the ineffective investigation and prosecution of such 
incidents may encourage violent actions by extremist groups. Some 
Chrisian groups also claim that BJP officials at state and local levels 
have become increasingly uncooperative. The Government also has been 
criticized for not attempting to restrain the country's radical Hindu 
groups.
    The degree to which the BJP's nationalist Hindu agenda is felt 
throughout the country with respect to religious minorities varies 
depending on the region. In some states, governments took pains to 
reaffirm their commitment to secularism. In others, mainly in the 
south, religious groups allege that since the BJP's rise to power in 
the national Government, some government bureaucrats have begun to 
enforce laws selectively to the detriment of religious minorities. The 
situation in the east varied. For example, the Orissa government in 
November 1999 notified churches that religious conversions could not 
occur without notification of the local police and district magistrate. 
The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act of 1967 contains a provision 
requiring a monthly government report on the number of conversions, but 
this provision previously had not been enforced. After a conversion has 
been reported to the District Magistrate, the report is forwarded to 
the authorities and a local police officer conducts an inquiry. The 
police officer may recommend in favor of or against such intended 
conversion, often as the sole arbitrator on the individual's right to 
freedom of religion; if conversion is judged to have occurred without 
permission or with coercion, the authorities may take penal action. In 
Tripura there were reports of attacks on non-Christians by Christians.
    No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated 
benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined 
by their religion.
    There are many religions and a large variety of denominations, 
groups, and subgroups in the country, but Hinduism is the dominant 
religion. According to 1999 statistics (based on the 1991 census), 
Hindus constitute 82.4 percent of the population, Muslims 12.7 percent, 
Christians 2.3 percent, Sikhs 2.0 percent, Buddhists 0.7 percent, Jains 
0.4 percent, and others, including Parsis, Jews, and Baha'is, 0.4 
percent.
    The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it a 
criminal offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to 
use temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes. While 
specifically designed to deal with Sikh places of worship in Punjab, 
the law applies to all religious sites. The state of Uttar Pradesh 
passed the Religious Buildings and Places Act during the state assembly 
budget session of March-May. The act requires a state government-
endorsed permit before construction of any religious building may 
commence in the state. During the year, West Bengal's government 
implemented 15year-old legislation that requires any person desiring to 
construct a place of worship to seek permission from the district 
magistrate; any person intending to convert a personal place of worship 
to one for the community must obtain the district magistrate's 
permission.
    The current legal system accommodates minority religions' personal 
status laws; there are different personal laws for different religious 
communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage, 
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status 
law governs many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including 
family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the 
religious communities sometimes discriminate against women. Under 
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and 
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also 
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry. Under 
the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman may demand divorce 
only in cases of spousal abuse and certain categories of adultery; for 
a Christian man, adultery alone is sufficient. In May 1997, the Mumbai 
High Court recognized abuse alone as sufficient grounds for a Christian 
woman to obtain a divorce.
    The Government was reviewing the legislation on marriage and 
drafted the ``Christian Marriage Bill'' during the year. The bill would 
replace the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, which is widely criticized as 
biased against women. If enacted it would place limitations on 
interfaith marriages and specify penalties, such as 10 years' 
imprisonment, for clergymen who contravene its provisions. The current 
form of the bill states that no marriage in which one party is a non-
Christian may be celebrated in a church. The bill was not introduced 
during the most recent Parliament session in March-May due to the 
strong objections and reservations of the Christian community.
    There is no national law that bars proselytizing by Christian 
citizens. Foreign missionaries generally may renew their visas, but 
since the mid-1960's the Government has refused to admit new resident 
foreign missionaries. New arrivals currently enter as tourists on 
short-term visas. During the year, as in the past, state officials 
refused to issue permits for foreign Christian missionaries, as well as 
other persons, to enter some northeastern states, on the grounds of 
political instability in the region. This restriction is not levied 
specifically against Christians. Many foreigners, including diplomats, 
are refused permits to the country's northeastern states on the grounds 
of political instability in the region. Missionaries and religious 
organizations must comply with the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) 
Act (FCRA), which restricts funding from abroad and, therefore, the 
ability of certain groups to finance their activities. The Government 
is empowered to ban a religious organization if it has violated the 
FCRA, has provoked intercommunity friction, or has been involved in 
terrorism or sedition. There is no ban on professing or proselytizing 
religious beliefs; however, speaking publicly against other beliefs is 
considered dangerous to public order, and is prohibited.
    A January decision by the Gujarat state government to revoke the 
ban on the participation of government employees in Rashtriya 
Swayamsewak Sangh activities was criticized widely by those who felt 
that this would lead to the spread of RSS influence within the 
government services, as was the well-publicized participation of the 
state's chief minister at an RSS rally that month. In March the 
government of Gujarat convinced a BJP legislator to withdraw a bill 
that sought to regulate Christian missionary activity within the state; 
the bill was written to prohibit ``forced'' or ``induced'' conversionsa 
crime that would have been punishable by a fine and up to 3 years in 
prison. In May the Gujarat government withdrew permission for state 
government workers to engage in RSS activities. Despite these steps by 
the state and national governments to address communal concerns, many 
in the minority communities continued to express unease about BJP rule.
    In August 1999, a bill was introduced in Gujarat that would allow 
harsh punishment for anyone in the state found guilty of converting 
someone to another religion through the use of force, provision of 
material benefits, or fraud. Human rights groups feared that if passed 
the bill--called the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill, 1999--could be 
used to restrict the fundamental right to choose one's religion. 
However, the Gujarat state assembly took no action on the Freedom of 
Religion Bill, allowing it to lapse. It must be reintroduced to be 
further considered.
    Violent attacks against Christians by Hindus, which began in late 
1998, continued during the year. Attacks on religious minorities no 
longer appear to be confined to Gujarat and Orissa. There were several 
attacks by Hindu groups against Christian institutions in Uttar Pradesh 
in April (see Section 5). These incidents were the first signs of 
Hindu-Christian violence in Uttar Pradesh in over 6 years. The 
Government dispatched the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) to 
investigate the attacks in the north, but the NCM's findings that the 
attacks were not ``communal in nature'' sparked widespread criticism in 
the minority community (see Section 5). There is strong evidence that 
the NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claim that the victims 
themselves are satisfied entirely that there was no religious 
motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the 
local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks. 
The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh initiated an investigation by 
intelligence agencies into the June 21 custodial killing of a witness, 
Vijay Ekka (see Sections 1.a. and 5); the government also announced 
plans to set up a judicial inquiry by a sitting judge from the state 
High Court. The Mathura superintendent of police was transferred 
because of the Ekka killing; however, no further information was 
uncovered and no other persons were held accountable by year's end.
    On June 26, the National Human Rights Commission ordered states 
affected by Hindu-Christian violence to provide written reports 
detailing the violence against Christians and the actions taken by 
state governments. No reports were made public by year's end, and 
according to human rights activists, states had not submitted them.
    On occasion, Hindu-Muslim violence led to killings and a cycle of 
retaliation. In some instances, local police and government officials 
abetted the violence, and at times security forces were responsible for 
abuses. Police sometimes assisted the Hindu fundamentalists in 
perpetrating violent acts (see Section 5). Following riots in 
Ahmedabad, Gujarat from August 5 to 7, some police officers allegedly 
forced some Muslim residents to sing the Sanskrit anthem to prove that 
they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 5). Government officials 
allegedly also subjected Christian-affiliated foreign relief 
organizations to arbitrary roadblocks; many of these organizations are 
not engaged in religious activities (see Section 4). In a few 
instances, state governments investigated and sometimes arrested 
suspects in cases of anti-Christian violence. For example, after an 
Australian missionary was murdered in Orissa (see Section 5), several 
suspects were arrested. In another instance, the governments of 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh investigated a series of 6 church bombings 
in June and July (see Section 5); the investigations led to the arrest 
of 45 persons and concluded that members of the Deendar Anjuman, a 
Muslim group, carried out the bombings. In general government response 
has been poor with respect to such incidents.
    On July 14, the Maharashtra government announced its intention to 
prosecute Bal Thackeray, leader of the rightwing Hindu organization 
Shiv Sena, for his role in inciting the Mumbai 1992-1993 riots in which 
over 700 persons, the vast majority of whom were Muslim, were killed 
(see Section 5). On July 25, amid rioting by Shiv Sena supporters, 
Thackeray was arrested; a few hours later a judge ruled that the 
statute of limitations relating to the incitement charges had expired, 
and Thackeray was released.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country except in certain border areas where, for security 
reasons, special permits are required. Under the Passports Act of 1967, 
the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ``may or is 
likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the 
sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government uses this 
provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government critics, 
especially those advocating Sikh independence and members of the 
violent separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. On April 9, the 
Government prevented four members of a Kashmir human rights 
organization from traveling to the 56th U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) meeting in Geneva (see Section 4). Abdul Majid Banday, Mohammad 
Tufail, Mohannad Amin Bhat and Abdul Rashid Lone, had valid passports 
and letters of accreditation as members of a U.N.-recognized NGO, but 
authorities prevented them from boarding their flight.
    Vehicle checkpoints, at which Border Security Forces routinely 
search and question occupants, are a common feature throughout most of 
Jammu and Kashmir. It also is common for police to block entry and exit 
points in preparation for gathering young males for police lineups. 
These searches tend to focus on troubled areas, as opposed to the mass 
searches that were common in the past. According to a credible source, 
such search operations seldom yield any results.
    In September the PUCL reported that Bangalore police arrested 30 
persons peacefully demanding access to public information on 
construction of the Bangalore-Mysore information corridor. The 
Karnataka government has proposed acquiring more than 20,000 acres of 
land in 168 villages. Those arrested were concerned about the status of 
farmland and homes in the village resutling form the continued planned 
government construction of an expressway between the two cities.
    On October 18, the Supreme Court ruled that construction of the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in Gujarat could begin 
immediately, reaching a height of 90 meters, and could proceed in 
stages thereafter up to a finished height of 138 meters. The ruling 
stipulated that those displaced by the dam would be compensated. 
However, many human rights advocates and NGO's continued to allege that 
the construction of the dam would displace 40,000 families without 
adequately compensating those who are resettled (see Section 2.b.). 
(Opposition to the Narmada project was greatest during the early 
1990's, resulting in prolonged financial and legal delays.)
    Citizens may emigrate without restriction.
    Since 1990 more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many 
from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of 
Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued 
during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup 
of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that was conducted by the 
Maharashtra government in 1998. The Government estimates that there are 
10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country. On August 28, 
the Supreme Court gave the central Government until January 2001 to 
repeal the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal (IMDT) Act of 
1985. The court ruled that the law, which is largely aimed at illegal 
Bangladeshi immigrants, is being applied only in Assam, and therefore 
is discriminatory. Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which began in April 
1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000 persons live 
under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, 
and adjoining districts as a result of the ongoing violence between 
Bodos and Santhals.
    The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed 
forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around 
Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military 
campaign to repel the intrusion forced as many 50,000 residents of 
Jammu and Kashmir from their homes, a number of whom took refuge on the 
Paskistani side of the line of control. Many had their homes destroyed. 
Since that conflict, artillery shelling of the region by Pakistan has 
kept many of the internally displaced persons from returning and driven 
others from their homes. On October 12, Jammu and Kashmir home minister 
Mustaq Ahmad Lone told the State Assembly that 43,510 persons remained 
displaced (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
    In a number of northern states, most notably Orissa, Bihar, and 
West Bengal, hundreds of thousands of persons were displaced 
temporarily due to severe flooding and cyclonic storms during the 
monsoon season.
    The law does not contain provisions for processing refugees or 
asylum seekers in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor is there a clear 
national policy for the treatment of refugees. The Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has no formal status, but the 
Government permits the UNHCR to assist certain groups of refugees 
(notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and Sudanese). The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, visited the country in 
May (see Section 4).
    The Government has not permitted the UNHCR to assist other refugee 
groups, including Sri Lankan Tamils, to whose camps in Tamil Nadu the 
Government continued to bar access by the UNHCR and NGO's (see Section 
4). The Government provides first asylum to some refugees, most notably 
in recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this 
policy is applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some 
border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those 
claiming refugee status occasionally has resulted in individuals or 
groups being refused admittance. This has occurred in recent years in 
cases involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma, and Afghans who 
entered the country through Pakistan. Refugees are not required to make 
claims in other countries. Cramped and unhygienic conditions reportedly 
exist in some of the camps for Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu.
    The Government recognizes certain groups, including Chakmas from 
Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans as refugees and 
provides them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement 
areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were 
approximately 98,000 Tibetans, approximately 64,989 Sri Lankan Tamils 
in 131 camps, and perhaps as many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside 
of the camps living in the country at year's end. The refugees in the 
camps are permitted to work, and the state and central governments pay 
to educate refugee children and provide limited welfare benefits. Many 
Chakmas from Bangladesh have been repatriated voluntarily, including 
all of the estimated 56,000 persons who had been residing in Tripura. 
Some 80,000 Chakma permanent residents remain in Arunachal Pradesh and 
Mizoram; the Supreme Court has upheld their right to citizenship. 
However, the Supreme Court's order to extend citizenship to this group 
still had not been enforced by year's end. The UNHCR reported that 
13,390 Afghans, 747 Burmese, 139 Iranians, 105 Somalis, 50 Sudanese, 
and 56 others, including Iraqis and Ethiopians, were receiving 
assistance from the UNHCR in the country as of August 31. Although the 
Government formally does not recognize these persons as refugees, it 
does not deport them. Instead, they received renewable residence 
permits or their status was ignored. Increasingly during the year, some 
of these groupsAfghans, Iraqis, and Iranians in particular--were not 
granted renewal of their residence permits by the authorities on the 
grounds that they were not in possession of valid national passports. 
Due to financial and other reasons, many refugees were unable or 
unwilling to obtain or renew their national passports, and therefore 
were unable to regularize their status in the country.
    The Tamil Nadu government provides educational facilities to Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central Government provides some 
assistance and channels assistance from NGO and church groups. The 
central Government generally has denied NGO's and the UNHCR direct 
access to the camps. NGO's report refugee complaints about deteriorated 
housing, poor sanitation, delayed dole payments, and inadequate medical 
care in the Tamil refugee camps. The NHRC has intervened to uphold the 
right of several Sri Lankan Tamils detained in so-called ``special 
camps'' to remain in the country. The Government uses these camps to 
hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist organization. Human rights 
groups allege that inmates of the special camps sometimes are subjected 
to physical abuse and that their confinement to the camps amounts to 
imprisonment without trial. They allege that several of those acquitted 
by the Supreme Court in May 1999 of involvement in the assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (see Section 1.a.) remain confined 
in these special camps. Some 1,399 new refugees arrived from Sri Lanka 
during the first 9 months of the year. Human rights groups allege that 
the Government did not permit 30 to 40 families, whom alien smugglers 
left stranded on sand bars in the shallow Palk Strait, to enter the 
country; however, during the year some 180 persons similarly marooned 
were permitted to enter.
    Ethnic Chins are among the nonrecognized refugees in the 
northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Chins and Chakma refugees 
have been targeted by student-led demonstrations protesting their 
presence in Mizoram. During the year, tensions between security forces 
and Chin National Force (CNF) insurgents operating in Burma allegedly 
resulted in the detention, interrogation, and expulsion of some persons 
associated with the CNF to Burma, where they credibly feared 
persecution. Human rights monitors allege that about 1,000 Chin 
refugees had been arrested in Mizoram and some 200 had been repatriated 
forcibly to Burma between July and September. According to one NGO, on 
August 3, a 25-year-old Chin refugee died in the Aizawl central police 
station, Mizoram (see Section 1.a.). An estimated 40,000 to 50,000 
Chins live and work illegally in Mizoram.
    Mizoram human rights groups estimate that some 41,000 Reangs, a 
tribal group from Mizoram that has been displaced due to a sectarian 
conflict, presently are being sheltered in 6 camps in North Tripura; 
conditions in such camps are poor and the Tripura government has asked 
the central Government to allot funds for their care. Reang leaders in 
the camps say that their community would return to Mizoram if they were 
granted an autonomous district council, allotted a set number of seats 
in the Mizoram Assembly, and granted financial assistance for 
resettlement. The Mizoram government rejected these demands and 
maintained that only 16,000 of the refugees had a valid claim to reside 
in the state. On August 7, following his meeting with Tripura chief 
minister Manik Sarkar, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani announced that 
an initial group of Reang refugees would be resettled in Tripura by 
October 31, and that repatriation of the entire group would be 
completed by year's end. However, while an NHRC staff member also 
visited Tripura to inquire into the situation of the Reangs, by year's 
end nothing had been done to repatriate them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The country has a democratic, parliamentary system 
of government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A 
Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections, 
except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State 
governments are elected at regular intervals except in states under 
President's Rule.
    On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a 
state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event 
of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's 
Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's 
constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court in May 1995 upheld the 
Government's authority to suspend fundamental rights during an 
emergency.
    Some 50 persons were killed in election-related violence in state 
assembly polling in Gujarat, Bihar, and Manipur (see Section 1.a.), and 
there were localized allegations of voter fraud.
    During the February 12 Bihar State Assembly election, extremists of 
the Maoist Coordination Center (MCC) and the PWG killed 21 persons, 
including 12 members of the security forces and 2 election officials. 
The extremist groups had warned voters to remain at home during the 
polls, or face attack. Seventeen more persons were killed in the second 
phase of voting in the state on February 22. On September 17 in 
Ahmedabad, Gujarat, police killed 6 persons and injured 15 others when 
they fired on a crowd of about 2,000 persons (see Section 1.a.). The 
crowd had rampaged through a Muslim-minority section of the city after 
reports that ballot boxes had been tampered with in the city's 
municipal corporation elections. In West Bengal, clashes between 
supporters of the Trinamul Congress Party and the CPI(M) left 71 
persons dead in the first 9 months of the year (see Section 1.g.). 
Voting irregularities in the West Bengal election--such as fraud, 
delaying tactics, and intimidation--were reported widely.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no 
legal impediments hinder their participation in the political process. 
A large proportion of women participates in voting throughout the 
country (with turnout rates slightly lower than those of men), and 
numerous women are represented in all major parties in the national and 
state legislatures. There are 66 women among the 790 Members of 
Parliament, including the Deputy Speaker of the upper house, and there 
are 8 women in the 74-member Cabinet. The 1993 passage of the 
``Panchayati Raj'' constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of 
seats in elected village councils (Panchayats) for women, which has 
brought more than 1 million women into the political life at the 
grassroots level. In September debate over the Women's Reservation 
Bill, which was designed to reserve one-third of parliamentary seats 
for women, subsided when the Government failed to introduce the bill 
during the monsoon session of Parliament. The bill was introduced but 
not debated in the winter session of Parliament. The Women's 
Reservation Bill first was introduced in late 1998.
    The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state 
legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in 
proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people 
actively participate in national and local politics, but their impact 
depends on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states, 
indigenous people are a large proportion of the population and 
consequently exercise a dominant influence in the political process. In 
comparison, in Maharashtra and Gujarat, tribal people are a small 
minority and have been unsuccessful in blocking projects that they 
oppose.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Independent human rights organizations operate throughout most of 
the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings; 
however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups 
face some restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir have 
been unable to move around the state to document human rights 
violations due to fear of retribution by security forces and 
countermilitants. Since 1992 several individuals closely involved in 
the documentation of violations in Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers 
and journalists, have been attacked and in some cases killed. 
International human rights monitors have had difficulty in obtaining 
visas to visit the country for investigation purposes. For example, 
during the year the authorities continued to deny HRW and Amnesty 
International permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir; however, some 
foreign diplomats gained improved access to some prisons in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The Government also continued to deny the U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial Killings permission to visit 
the country, despite their repeated requests. Moreover, the police and 
security forces have arrested and harassed human rights monitors. In 
May U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata was allowed to 
visit the country (see Section 2.d.).
    In September 1999, the Ministry of Home Affairs sent a notice to 
several prominent NGO's asking them to justify their status as 
nonpolitical organizations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) 
Act. According to HRW, the notice effectively was a threat to cut off 
foreign funding. The NGO's, many of which worked on women's rights, 
communal violence, and Dalit and tribal issues, publicly had criticized 
the policies of the BJP-led government and the antisecular activities 
of the Sangh Parivar, a collective of rightwing Hindu organizations of 
which the BJP is a member.
    On May 24, an agent of the intelligence bureau visited and 
questioned the director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation 
Center (SAHRDC) about his travel earlier in the month to Geneva to 
participate in the meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. In 1998 
the Andhra Pradesh government issued a directive to faculty members of 
state universities not to associate with the Andhra Pradesh Civil 
Liberties Union (APCLC), a well-respected human rights organization. 
Following protests by faculty organizations, the directive was 
rescinded.
    On April 9, the Government prevented four members of a Kashmir 
human rights organization from traveling to the 56th annual meeting of 
the UNCHR in Geneva (see Section 2.d.).
    According to HRW, on April 20, a mob of local residents and 
politicians raided the Almora and Jageswar offices of an NGO working 
primarily on women's health and empowerment in Uttar Pradesh. The 
attack allegedly was in response to a pamphlet that the NGO had 
published in 1999 on HIV transmission, which contained purportedly 
sexually offensive material. Police and protestors assaulted staff and 
trainees, and a number of persons were detained for a short period.
    According to Amnesty, the chief judicial magistrate in Srinagar 
released on bail Ghulam Mohiuddin Najar, a political activist and 
teacher; however, immediately upon release, members of the Special 
Operations Group, a unit of the state police, shot and killed him at 
the court gate. According to Amnesty International, in February 
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir pointed guns at journalists who 
were attempting to investigate the killing of Najar.
    Amnesty International reported the November killing of human rights 
defender T. Puroshottam in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. A group of 
unidentified men wielding knives attacked Puroshottam, the Joint 
Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, in a local 
shop. Puroshottam was involved in numerous investigations of alleged 
human rights violations by the police including torture and 
extrajudicial executions, had been attacked previously, and had 
received persistent threatening telephone calls. There has been no 
independent investigation into Puroshottam's killing.
    There was no definitive resolution in the case of abducted and 
murdered Kashmir human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. Human rights 
workers allege that the state is attempting to subvert the judicial 
process by withholding evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). In Assam 
the investigation into the 1996 murder of human rights monitor and 
journalist Parag Das has yielded no definitive information on the 
identity of his killer. The assailant allegedly was a militant who 
previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government (see 
Sections 1.a. and 2.a.).
    Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, non-evangelical) 
international relief agencies stated that, during the year, their work 
in delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult 
due to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, 
physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see 
Sections 2.c. and 5).
    The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993 
with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment, 
and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition the NHRC is 
directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of 
human rights NGO's. The Government appoints the members and finances 
the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC is seriously understaffed and 
prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of abuse 
involving army and paramilitary forces.
    From April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999 (the most recent reporting 
year), the NHRC received 40,724 new complaints of human rights 
violations. The Commission had 13,512 cases awaiting consideration at 
the beginning of the reporting period. Of the 54,236 cases before it in 
the 1998-99 year, the Commission reviewed 53,711, leaving 525 awaiting 
review at the end of the year. Of the 53,711 cases considered during 
the year, 32,172 were dismissed; 10,718 were transmitted to other 
governmental authorities for disposition; 3,395 were concluded, and 
7,426 were pending. In the previous 12-month period (April 1997 to 
March 1998), the Commission received 36,791 complaints. The increased 
number of complaints in the most recent reporting year is believed to 
be the result of the Commission's increased visibility.
    The NHRC has sought to encourage a culture respective of human 
rights by fostering human rights education in schools and universities, 
by offering assistance and encouragement to human rights NGO's, by 
supporting training programs for the police, military forces, and 
paramilitary forces, and by making recommendations to the central and 
state governments. During the year, the NHRC carried out, with the 
assistance of NGO's, a human rights training program for state police 
that included stress counseling. The NHRC also has influenced the 
legislative process, particularly by issuing a formal opinion that a 
new Prevention of Terrorism Act is not needed, and by proposing Prison 
Reform Legislation. State Human Rights Commissions exist in Assam, 
Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, 
Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and Rajasthan; Uttar Pradesh took 
legal steps to establish a commission but has yet to appoint members. 
In addition special courts to hear human rights cases have been 
established in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. The 
courts in Uttar Pradesh are not functioning, despite a September 1999 
court order that they be reactivated. The NHRC also encouraged the 
establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in the 
states.
    The NHRC also was involved in programs to eliminate child labor 
(see Section 6.c.).
    The state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir 
by an act of the state legislature, in 1997, has no power to 
investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by 
security force members. Credible human rights monitors say that the 
Jammu and Kashmir Commission has not yet demonstrated effective, 
independent protection of human rights in the state.
    A People's Commission that was established in 1998 by retired 
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than 
2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest 
in Punjab (see Section 1.b.) continued to receive little cooperation 
from state government authorities.
    The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by the ICRC, 
initiated in October 1995, continued during the year (see Section 
1.c.). ICRC representatives also continued training police and Border 
Security Force personnel in international humanitarian law.
    The Government continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for 
access to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section 
2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social status
    The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity, 
religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to 
prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and 
cultural practices have a profound discriminatory impact. According to 
the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
caste clashes are frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.
    Women.--Domestic violence is common and a serious problem. 
According to a 1996 survey in Uttar Pradesh, 30 percent of married men 
acknowledged physically abusing their wives. In a survey of 10,000 
women released during the year, more than half of the women said that 
violence was a normal part of married life. The Health Ministry 
released a different survey during the year that indicated that, of 
90,000 women surveyed, more than half acknowledge being battered. Dowry 
disputes also are a serious problem. In the typical dowry dispute, a 
groom's family members harass a new wife whom they believe has not 
provided a sufficient dowry. This harassment sometimes ends in the 
woman's death, which family members often try to portray as a suicide 
or kitchen accident; recent research suggests that a significant 
percentage of kerosene attacks also are due to domestic violence. 
Although most ``dowry deaths'' involve lower and middle-class families, 
the phenomenon crosses both caste and religious lines. According to 
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, 6,917 dowry deaths 
occurred in the country in 1998, including 2,229 dowry deaths in Uttar 
Pradesh, 1,039 in Bihar, 598 in Madhya Pradesh, 500 in Andhra Pradesh, 
420 in Maharashtra, 200 in Karnataka, 176 in Tamil Nadu, and 21 in 
Kerala.
    Under a 1986 amendment to the Penal Code, the court must presume 
that the husband or the wife's in-laws are responsible for every 
unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years of marriage--provided 
that harassment is proven. In such cases, police procedures require 
that an officer of deputy superintendent rank or above conduct the 
investigation and that a team of two or more doctors perform the 
postmortem procedures. According to human rights monitors, in practice 
police do not follow these procedures consistently.
    The issue of rape has received greater political and social 
attention than in earlier years. In July the NHRC directed the Andhra 
Pradesh government to pay $1,100 (50,000 rupees) in compensation to 
each of four Dalit women who were raped in Godavari district. The NHRC 
overturned a state ruling that had denied the women monetary 
compensation because the victims and their attackers were members of 
low caste and tribal communities. The press consistently reports that 
such violence against women is increasing, although local women's 
organizations claim that there simply has been increased reporting. 
Only 10 percent of rape cases are fully adjudicated by the courts, and 
police typically fail to arrest rapists, thus fostering a climate of 
impunity. In May the Central Bureau of Investigation initiated an 
inquiry into the alleged gang rape of three women by police officials 
in Pilibhit district, Uttar Pradesh in August 1998. According to a 
complaint filed by a witness, three officers of the Madho Tanda police 
station in Pilibhit district entered the victims' home late on the 
night of August 16-17 and raped the three women. On May 30, a court in 
Jalpaiguri, West Bengal sentenced Kashinath Tripathy and Bhuson Barua 
to life imprisonment for the 1982 rape of a girl in Jalpaiguri.
    In September in Kulkul village, Orissa, a group of villagers hacked 
to death a 60-year-old tribal woman, Namsi Ho, allegedly for practicing 
witchraft. Police arrested four persons in connection with the killing. 
On October 16 and November 19, in Ganjam district, Orissa, villagers 
accused Kumari Behera, of sorcery, and tortured and branded her with 
hot iron rods. Five persons were arrested in connection with the 
assaults.
    According to NCRB statistics, in 1998 there were 15,031 reported 
rapes, 16,381 abductions of women, 6,917 dowry deaths, 41,318 reported 
cases of torture of women, 31,046 cases of molestation, and 8,123 cases 
of sexual harassment. The NCRB recorded 131,338 crimes against women in 
1998, compared with 121,265 in 1997. In 1997, 678 cases of gang rape 
were recorded. Gang rapes often are committed as punishment for alleged 
adultery or as a means of coercion or revenge in rural property 
disputes and feuds. On February 1, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) expressed concern that ``there is a high incidence of 
gender-based violence against women, which takes even more extreme 
forms because of customary practices such as dowry, sati (the burning 
alive of widows on their husbands' funeral pyre) and the Devadasi 
system (the practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent 
girls to a Hindu deity or temple as servants of God. Devadasis, who 
generally are Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families 
and are required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste 
Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels'' (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The committee further stated that 
``discrimination against women who belong to particular castes or 
ethnic or religious groups also is manifest in extreme forms of 
physical and sexual violence and harassment.''
    Higher female mortality at all age levels, including female 
infanticide and sex selective termination of pregnancies, accounts for 
an increase in the ratio of males to females to 107.9 males per 100 
females in 1991, from 104.7 males per 100 females in 1981, and from 
102.9 males per 100 females at the turn of the century. In some 
districts of Tamil Nadu, female infanticide occurs despite government 
and NGO programs intended to counter the practice. In July the district 
collector of Dharmapuri, Tamil Nadu, formed a team to investigate the 
murder of a girl in Pararrapatti village. The team exhumed the buried 
body and arrested the girl's father and another accomplice. In August 
the maimed body of a newborn girl was found under a bridge in 
Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. Police believe that the child's mother 
abandoned her in the public place hoping that someone would take her 
in. On February 1, CEDAW expressed concern that ``India has not yet 
established a comprehensive and compulsory system of registration of 
births and marriages. The Committee notes that inability to prove those 
important events by documentation prevents effective implementation of 
laws that protect girls from sexual exploitation and trafficking, child 
labor and forced or early marriage.''
    Numerous laws exist to protect women's rights, including the Equal 
Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati 
(Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However, 
the Government often is unable to enforce these laws, especially in 
rural areas in which traditions are deeply rooted. According to press 
reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases is high, and 
because of court backlogs it takes 6 to 7 years on average to rule on 
such cases. On February 1, CEDAW noted that ``there is an urgent need 
to introduce comprehensive [legislative] reform to promote equality and 
the human rights of women.''
    Prostitution is widespread, with an estimated 2.3 million 
prostitutes in the country, some 575,000 of whom are children. Many 
indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation (see 
Section 6.c.). In Assam's Chars River islands, some women work as 
prostitutes in exchange for as little as $0.23 (10 rupees). In 1998 
prostitutes began to demand legal rights, licenses, and reemployment 
training, especially in Mumbai and New Delhi.
    In 1997 Karnataka's government made sexual harassment a criminal 
offense.
    The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination 
for many thousands of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
    Literacy rates for women are significantly lower than rates for 
men; the 2000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) Report for India found 
that 38 percent of women were literate, compared with 66 percent of 
men.
    The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement 
is inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women get lower wages 
than men for doing the same job. Women experience economic 
discrimination in access to employment and credit. This acts as an 
impediment to women owning a business, and the promotion of women to 
managerial positions within businesses often is slower than that of 
males. State governments have supported micro-credit programs for women 
that have begun to have an impact in many rural districts.
    The personal status laws of the religious communities discriminate 
against women. Under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman 
may demand divorce only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of 
certain categories of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is 
sufficient. In 1997 the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as 
sufficient grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce. Under 
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and 
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also 
allows polygyny (under which a man may have up to four wives) but 
prohibits polyandry (under which a woman may have muliple husbands). On 
February 1, CEDAW noted that ``steps have not been taken to reform the 
personal laws of different religious and ethnic groups, in consultation 
with them, so as to conform with the Convention. The Committee is 
concerned that the Government's policy of non-intervention perpetuates 
sexual stereotypes, son preference and discrimination against women.''
    The Hindu Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for 
Hindu women, but married daughters seldom are given a share in parental 
property. Islamic law recognizes a woman's right of inheritance but 
specifies that a daughter's share only should be one-half that of a 
son.
    Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do 
not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of 
assets and land accord women little control over land use, retention, 
or sale. However, several exceptions exist, as in Ladakh and Meghalaya, 
where women may have several husbands and control the family 
inheritance.
    Thousands of grassroots organizations work for social justice and 
the economic advancement of women, in addition to the National 
Commission for Women. The Government usually supports these efforts, 
despite strong resistance from traditionally privileged groups.
    Children.--The Government does not provide compulsory, free, and 
universal primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of 
children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend school. Of a primary 
school-age population of approximately 203 million, about 120 million 
children attend school. No significant sectors or groups actively are 
excluded, but the economic reality is that children of wealthier 
families are more likely to attend school than those of poor families. 
According to a UNDP study conducted in 1993, the dropout rate from 
primary school was 34 percent. A significant gender gap exists in 
school attendance, particularly at the secondary level. According to 
UNICEF, 59 percent of boys and 38 percent of girls were enrolled in 
secondary school.
    The central Government spends approximately 5.9 percent of its 
overall budget on education. The state governments also spend part of 
their budgets on education, but no comprehensive figure of combined 
federalstate expenditure is available. A 1993 study commissioned by the 
UNDP estimated that about 3.7 percent of the country's gross national 
product is devoted to education. On February 23, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child of the UNHRC expressed concern ``at the prevailing 
poor situation in the state party with respect to education, which is 
characterized by a general lack of infrastructure, facilities and 
equipment, insufficient numbers of qualified teachers and a drastic 
shortage of text books and other relevant learning materials. There is 
serious concern regarding the striking disparities in terms of access 
to education, attendance at primary and secondary levels and drop-out 
rates between: different states, rural and urban areas, boys and girls, 
the affluent and the poor, and children belonging to scheduled castes 
and tribes.''
    Child welfare organizations estimate that there are 500,000 street 
children nationwide living in abject poverty.
    A coalition of about 50 NGO's conducted a detailed survey in the 
Calcutta municipal area and identified 145,000 children who were not 
attending school. Not all of them were street children. The NGO's 
received UNICEF assistance in training teachers to conduct transitional 
education for a target group of 45,000 5 to 9year-old children. The 
course work is intended to allow these children to enter mainstream 
schooling. UNICEF has contributed $94,000 (4.4 million rupees) for this 
activity; the West Bengal government has provided technical advice; the 
central Government contributed nothing to the project. By year's end, 
300 teachers had received training and 235 centers are functioning. 
About 5,875 children are attending transitional education sessions at 
these centers.
    Child prostitution occurs in the cities, and there are an estimated 
575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. Trafficking in children for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.). On February 23, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of 
the UNCHR expressed concern ``about the sexual abuse and exploitation 
of children, especially those belonging to the lower castes and from 
poor urban and rural areas, in the contexts of: Religious and 
traditional culture; child domestic workers; children living and/or 
working on the streets; communal violence and ethnic conflict; abuse by 
security forces in areas of conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the 
northeastern states; and trafficking and commercial exploitation, 
especially girls form neighboring countries, particularly Nepal. It is 
also concerned about the lack of adequate measures to combat this 
phenomenon and the lack of adequate rehabilitation measures.''
    According to an International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate, 15 
percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are 
children.
    A working group on child prostitution set up by the NHRC includes 
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department 
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet 
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal 
prohibitions.
    Runaway children, especially in larger cities, are at high risk for 
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often work 18- to 20-hour 
days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and suffer 
sexual and mental abuse. In addition schoolteachers often beat 
children.
    The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has set up a 
24-hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress 
in nine cities. Run by NGO's with government funding, the child help 
line assists street children, orphans, destitutes, runaway children, 
and children suffering abuse and exploitation. During one 6-month 
period, the help lines received 25,000 calls, including 2,190 seeking 
medical assistance for children, 1,056 seeking shelter, 138 reporting 
missing children, and 125 reporting physical or sexual abuse of 
children.
    As part of its ongoing effort, the NHRC seeks to examine conditions 
in juvenile homes and recommend improvements. In 1999 the Commission 
issued directions to all state governments to report within 24 hours 
any instance of death or rape in such institutions. The Commission 
reported that it had undertaken this initiative following receipt of 
reports of a young boy's death in such a home in Delhi in 1996. In 
March 1999, NHRC member Justice V.S. Malimath said that cases of abuse 
and torture of children confined to juvenile homes had been reported. 
In some cases, the Commission had acted to transfer oversight of homes 
to private voluntary organizations ``after the (state) government 
failed to provide a healthy environment to children in these homes.'' 
In its February 23 concluding observations regarding the country, the 
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of the UNCHR expressed 
concern about ``numerous reports of routine ill-treatment, corporal 
punishment, torture and sexual abuse of children in detention 
facilities, and alleged instances of killings of children living and/or 
working on the streets by law enforcement officials.'' The Committee 
also expressed concern ``at the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions 
of detention of children, including detention with adults; lack of 
application and enforcement of existing juvenile justice legislation; 
lack of training for professionals, including the judiciary, lawyers 
and law enforcement officers, in relation to the Convention (On the 
Rights of the Child), other existing international standards and the 
1986 Juvenile Justice Act; and the lack of measures and enforcement 
thereof to prosecute officials who violate these provisions.''
    The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1929, as amended in 
1978, prohibits child marriage, a traditional practice in the northern 
part of the country. The act raised the age requirement for marriage 
for girls to 15 from 18 years, but the Government does not enforce it. 
According to one report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are married by age 16. NCRB statistics show 
that only 56 cases were registered under the Child Marriage Restraint 
(Amendment) Act during 1998. The NHRC, in consultation with the 
National Commission for Women and the Department of Women and Child 
Development, recommended in 1997 that a new draft ``Marriage Bill'' be 
enacted to strengthen the prohibitions of the 1929 act; however, the 
bill had not yet been introduced in Parliament by year's end. The NHRC 
in its 1996-1997 report, criticized the Government for rejecting this 
suggestion, a response that the Commission concluded amounted, 
``essentially, to a total disinclination to strengthen or alter the 
law, in any respect, or indeed to see to its better implementation in 
any manner.''
    The traditional preference for male children continues. Although a 
law passed in 1994 prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram 
tests for sex determination, the Government does not enforce the law. 
The tests are misused widely for sex determination, and termination of 
a disproportionate number of pregnancies with female fetuses occurs. In 
the 12 years since the southern state of Maharashtra passed a law 
banning the use of such tests for sex determination, the state 
government only filed charges against one doctor, who he was acquitted. 
Human rights groups estimate that at least 10,000 cases of female 
infanticide occur yearly, primarily in poor rural areas. Parts of Tamil 
Nadu (Dharmapuri, Salem, and Madurai districts) still have high rates 
of female infanticide. According to statistics compiled by the 
Dharmapuri office of the Directorate of Health Services, 1,260 female 
infants were killed in the district in 1997. Police have not 
investigated these cases. In 1998 the Tamil Nadu Human Rights 
Commission suggested that a separate mandatory police investigation 
into the death of every female infant become mandatory, but there is no 
legislation that requires such action and none has been taken. In 
addition parents often give priority in health care and nutrition to 
male infants. Women's rights groups point out that the burden of 
providing girls with an adequate dowry is one factor that makes 
daughters less desirable. Although abetting or taking dowry 
theoretically is illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it 
still is practiced widely.
    Bonded and unbonded child labor continues to be a serious problem 
throughout the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--According to regional NGO's, there are 
over 90 million disabled persons in the country. Neither law or 
regulations require accessibility for the disabled. With the adoption 
of the Persons with Disability (Equal Opportunities, Protection of 
Rights and Full Participation) Act in 1995, a nascent disabled rights 
movement slowly is raising public awareness of the rights of the 
disabled. Although the act provides equal rights to all persons with 
disabilities, most disabled-related organizations admit that its 
practical effects so far have been minimal, in part due to a clause 
that makes the implementation of programs dependent on the ``economic 
capacity'' of the Government. To a large degree, physical impediments 
still limit mobility, legislation prevents equality, and societal 
discrimination maintains the status quo of the disabled.
    The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget 
provision of more than $38 million (1.65 billion rupees) for the 1998-
99 fiscal year for a number of organizations and committees at the 
national, regional, and local levels. The Ministry delivers 
rehabilitation services to the rural population through 16 district 
centers. A national rehabilitation plan commits the Government to 
putting a rehabilitation center in each of more than 400 districts, but 
services still are concentrated in urban areas. Moreover, the impact of 
government programs has been limited. Significant funding is provided 
to a few government organizations such as the Artificial Limbs 
Manufacturing Corporation of India, the National Handicapped Finance 
and Development Corporation, and the Rehabilitation Council of India. 
Each entity provides specific services or training, including producing 
aids and prosthetics, promoting disabled-oriented economic development 
activities, offering training to health-care professionals and 
vocational instructors concerning disabled-related issues, and 
providing comprehensive rehabilitation services to the rural disabled.
    Additional mini-grants are offered to NGO's that coordinate 
programs for the disabled to facilitate their physical, social, and 
psychological rehabilitation and integration into mainstream society. 
During 1998-99, $3 million (130.5 million rupees) was available. 
However, only half of this amount was allocated due to funding 
restrictions placed on each providing organization and the small number 
of them that exist.
    Two significant programs to benefit the disabled are the National 
Project to Integrate Mentally Retarded in Family and Community and the 
National Institute for the Multiple Disabilities. The first project, 
launched in six states in 1998, primarily focuses on children from the 
economically weaker sectors and promotes awareness concerning the 
mentally disabled, their problems, and their rights. The second is the 
Ministry of Welfare, which provides rehabilitation services to the 
disabled and is fostering greater awareness among communities 
throughout the country. As a result of the passage of the Persons with 
Disabilities Act, there now is a Disabilities Commissioner who oversees 
implementation of the act and its protections for the disabled.
    According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of 
positions in official offices and state-owned enterprises must be 
reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities. 
The Government provides special railway fares, education allowances, 
scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the Ministry of 
Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist the disabled. 
However, implementation of these entitlements is not comprehensive. 
Although the Government has taken significant steps toward improving 
the plight of the disabled, its involvement has been insufficient. The 
majority of responsibility for caring for disabled persons still lies 
with family members and voluntary groups.
    The NHRC continues to receive complaints relating to harassment, 
intolerance, and discrimination against the disabled. It currently is 
gathering information on these cases and forwarding assessments to 
concerned NGO's and government entities. However, this process is slow, 
and its effects so far have been minimal.
    The NHRC continued its efforts to improve conditions in mental 
hospitals and enhance awareness of the rights of those with mental 
disabilities during the year. In 1997 it commissioned an assessment of 
conditions at mental hospitals throughout the country, to be conducted 
by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuroscience. The 
assessment, whose results the NHRC released in July 1999, found that 
conditions in mental institutions were unsatisfactory and in need of 
reform. The rights of the mentally ill and mentally disabled are 
provided for in the Constitution and the Mental Health Act of 1987. 
However, the NHRC noted that despite these protections, conditions in 
many mental hospitals are unsatisfactory. They continue to embody old 
concepts of mental health care and essentially function as custodial 
rather than therapeutic institutions. Overcrowded and serving as 
``dumping grounds'' for desperate relatives, some mental hospitals lack 
even basic amenities and have poor medical facilities. In August 1999, 
the NHRC reported that it had assumed the management of mental 
hospitals in Ranchi, Bihar, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Gwalior, Madhya 
Pradesh, at the direction of the Supreme Court. In February NHRC 
Chairman Justice J.S. Verma asked chief ministers of all the states and 
administrators of all the union territories ``to issue clear directions 
to the inspector generals of prisons to ensure that mentally ill 
persons are not kept in jail under any circumstances.'' However, there 
was little follow-up to the NHRC direction.
    Indigenous People.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the 
British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights 
in most of the northeastern border states. They are in effect in 
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, but not in Tripura, 
in which the tribal population has been reduced to 30 percent of the 
total population due to increased Bengali migration since partition. 
These regulations prohibit any person, including citizens from other 
states, from going beyond an inner boundary without a valid permit. No 
rubber, wax, ivory, or other forest products may be removed from the 
protected areas without prior authorization. No outsiders are allowed 
to own land in the tribal areas without approval from tribal 
authorities.
    The 1991 census, the last conducted, showed that 8.08 percent of 
citizens belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian 
Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of 
the tribal population live below the poverty level. In May 1998, the 
NHRC established a panel to investigate the condition of the country's 
20 million denotified tribal people, who in 1871 the British colonial 
government labeled as belonging to ``criminal tribes''). During the 
year, the panel prepared a report for the NHRC on their condition and 
advised the NHRC in other ways. Denotifed tribal peoples are tribal 
people The colonial act listing these tribes was repealed in 1951, but 
the stigma remains and many of these tribal people still are 
discriminated against actively. On February 15, the NHRC recommended 
that the ``Habitual Offenders Act,'' aimed at the denotified and 
nomadic tribes, be repealed. According to the ICITP, more than 40,000 
tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar, have been forced into 
situations of economic and sexual exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.); many come from tribes that were driven off the land by national 
park schemes. Special courts to hear complaints of atrocities committed 
against tribal people were to have been established under the 
protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, but this never was 
accomplished.
    Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups 
in the eastern parts of the country often are ignored. Indigenous 
people suffer discrimination and harassment, have been deprived wrongly 
of their land, and have been subject to torture and to arbitrary 
arrest. There has been encroachment on tribal land in almost every 
eastern state, including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by 
businesses that illegally have removed forest and mineral products. 
Moreover, persons from other backgrounds often usurp places reserved 
for members of tribes and lower castes in national education 
institutions. Mob lynchings, arson, and police atrocities against 
tribal people occur in many states (see Section 1.c.). For example, on 
January 31, local landowners attacked the tribal village of Ghutewadi, 
Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra, killing a 60-year-old tribal woman 
and injuring 10 other women and a child. On July 4, a mob killed a 90-
year-old tribal woman and set 16 houses on fire following the abduction 
of a nontribal youth from Futotip village in North Tripura. On August 
17, a mob attacked Jatindra Kumr Jamatya, a tribal activist and member 
of the ruling CPI(M)in Nagrai, South Tripura.
    In the Andaman Islands in 1999, the local government implemented a 
policy of permitting development of the Jawara tribal area, which 
threatens the indigenous group's way of life. The construction of a 
road through the forest that is inhabited by this group and the 
encroachment of Indian settlers have impacted negatively this 
indigenous group's cultural vitality, economic self-sufficiency, and 
physical and mental health. These integrative policies have been 
motivated partly by humanitarian concerns, although interest in 
commercial exploitation of virgin forests that we inhabited by tribal 
people is another strong factor behind these policies. A manifestation 
of this negative trend was a destructive outbreak of measles that 
affected about 30 persons among the Jawara tribal people, which was 
reported in the press in September 1999.
    Such violations led to numerous tribal movements demanding the 
protection of land and property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar 
and Orissa, and the Bodo Movement in Assam, reflect deep economic and 
social grievances among indigenous people. In the Jharkhand area, 
tribal people complain that they have been relegated to unskilled 
mining jobs, have lost their forests to industrial construction, and 
have been displaced by development projects. During the year, the 
Government introduced and Parliament passed legislation creating new, 
largely tribal-populated states from the Jharkand area of Bihar and the 
Chhatisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh. The Chhatisgarh State came into 
existence on November 1 and the Jharkhand State came into existence on 
November 15.
    There also is some local autonomy in the northeast. In Meghalaya 
tribal chiefs still wield influence in certain villages. The Nagaland 
government controls the rights to certain mineral resources, and 
autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya control 
matters such as education, rural development, and forestry in 
cooperation with the state governors.
    Religious Minorities.--The potential for renewed Hindu-Muslim 
violence remains considerable and both sides committed human rights 
abuses during the year. Hindus and Muslims continue to feud over the 
construction of mosques several centuries ago on three sites where 
Hindus believe that temples stood previously. In 1998 the Sri Krishna 
Commission, established by the Government to inquire into the cause of 
Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in December 1992 and January 1993, 
released its report (see Section 2.c.). The riots, which followed the 
destruction of an historic mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, left 
more than 1,000 persons, mostly Muslims, dead. Maharashtra's BJP-Shiv 
Sena ruling coalition rejected the report, which laid responsibility 
for much of the violence on leaders from both parties. That government 
fell and was replaced by a Congress Partyled government, which 
submitted an affidavit to the Supreme Court in August promising to 
implement the Commission's recommendations. The same government 
established a special task force to implement the recommendations of 
the Sri Krishna Commission report. The recommendations included 
prosecuting the 31 police officials and several Shiv Sena, BJP, and 
Congress Party politicians found to have abetted the anti-Muslim 
rioting in Mumbai in 1993.
    On January 30, Muslim and Hindu crowds in Bangalore clashed and 
threw stones at each other after an idol was desecrated in a Hindu 
temple. Two persons were injured in Hindu-Muslim clashes in Ahmedabad, 
Gujarat, from August 5 to 7. Human rights groups allege that following 
the riots, the state reserve police officers forced some Muslim 
residents of the city to sing the Sanskrit anthem ``Vande Mataram'' to 
prove that they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 2.c.). On 
August 31, several hundred angry Hindus pelted Muslim houses with 
stones and tried to set fire to several homes after a Muslim eloped 
with a Hindu in a town in Vadodara district, Gujarat. On September 12, 
Muslim-Hindu violence in Nanded, a city 300 miles southeast of Mumbai, 
left approximately 60 persons injured. The attacks occured during the 
annual Ganesh festival when a procession of Hindus passed by a mosque. 
According to some reports, Muslims in the mosque threw stones at Hindu 
worshippers whom they claim offended the mosque by making too much 
noise. The Maharasthra government ordered a judicial inquiry. On 
October 16, a gang entered Tahira village, Siwan district, Bihar, and 
murdered five members of a Muslim family. Police suspect unknown 
persons in nearby Mohajirpur village committed the killings in 
retaliation for the killings of Hindu villagers a few days earlier. On 
December 3, a group of men in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, attacked and 
killed a Muslim preacher with crude bombs and sickles. No one was 
convicted in connection with the August 26, 1999 mob mutilation and 
burning to death of a Muslim cattle trader in Padiabeda village, 
Orissa; about 400 persons witnessed the killing.
    Attacks by Muslim militants seeking to end Indian rule in Jammu and 
Kashmir, and contining political violence, has driven almost 95 percent 
of Hindus in the Kashmir valley (Pandits) to seek refuge in camps in 
Jammu, with relatives in New Delhi, or elsewhere, during the last few 
years. Throughout the year, militants carried out several execution-
style mass killings of Hindu villagers and violently targeted Pandits, 
and in one instance the Sikh minority, in Jammu and Kashmir (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). On February 28, militants killed five truck 
drivers on the Srinagar-Jammu highway. The militants systematically 
halted commercial trucks traveling along the route and questioned the 
unarmed drivers and cleaners on board. Those persons identified as 
Hindus were taken out of the trucks and shot. On March 20, 17 
unidentified gunmen in army uniforms killed 35 Sikh men in Chati 
Singhpura (near Anantang in south Kashmir). The incident was the 
largest single massacre of civilians during the past 11 years of 
militancy, and at year's end, the only mass killing in Kashmir to have 
involved the Sikh community. According to various reports, militants 
separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and 
children, gathered the men a short distance from their homes, and 
killed them with automatic weapon fire. It was the first known attack 
on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.). On March 
25, security forces shot and killed five men, alleging that they had 
been responsible for the March 20 massacre. According to HRW, on April 
17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in Kot Dara 
village, near Rajouri. They fired on unarmed civilians, killing six 
persons and injuring six others. On July 13, militants killed three 
Buddhist monks in Rangdum, Kargil district. On July 30, militants 
hurled a grenade into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near 
Gulmarg, killing one person and injuring five others. On August 1 to 2, 
militants entered a camp of Hindus making the annual pilgrimage to 
Amarnath in the northern part of the state and fired automatic weapons 
at tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, the pilgrims' local 
porters and guides, and army personnel nearby. A total of 32 persons 
were killed in the attack, all of them unarmed civilians. Similar 
attacks occurred throughout the night of August 1 to 2, killing some 
100 persons in various places in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.). 
On August 17, militants reportedly killed six Hindu villagers and 
seriously wounded seven others in Jammu (see Section 1.a.). On August 
18, militants entered a Hindu village in the Koteswara area near 
Rajauri and indiscriminately fired at villagers, killing four persons 
and injuring six others. On August 18, militants killed three elderly 
men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when they fired 
automatic guns at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur. On August 20, a 
person shot and injured a Hindu telephone kiosk operator in Qazi Gund, 
near Anantnag. Also on August 20, militants entered the Hindu village 
of Indeh, Udampur district and killed four members of a Hindu family 
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, about 51,000 Pandit 
families fled their homes in Jammu and Kashmir due to the violence. Of 
these, 4,674 families are living in refugee camps in Jammu, 235 
families are in camps in Delhi, and 18 families are in Chandigarh. The 
rest still are displaced, but are living on the economy in Jammu and 
Delhi. The Pandit community criticizes bleak physical, educational, and 
economic conditions in the camps and fears that a negotiated solution 
giving greater autonomy to the Muslim majority might threaten its own 
survival in Jammu and Kashmir as a culturally and historically 
distinctive group. On August 18, the Jammu and Kashmir government 
adopted a proposal designed to facilitate the return of Pandits to the 
Kashmir valley and rehabilitation of the Pandits. However, various 
Pandit groups criticized the proposal for failing to address the 
political aspirations of Pandits, failing to provide economic 
guarantees, failing to provide adequate security for returning Pandits, 
and creating special economic zones that would aggravate communal 
tensions. The proposal abandoned during the year. The NHRC released a 
39-page report in June 1999, in response to a petition from Hindu 
Pandits alleging that genocide had been committed against them. The 
NHRC found that the crimes against the Pandits ``fall short of the 
ultimate crime: Genocide,'' but stated that compensation to the 
community had been inadequate. As a result, the Government's monthly 
subsistence payment to Pandit families was increased.
    There were numerous attacks against Christian communities and 
Christian missionaries during the year. In August the SAHRDC stated 
that there had been 57 such attacks during the first 7 months of the 
year. The SAHRDC stated the attacks had taken three forms: Attacks on 
priests and nuns; attacks on evangelists and disruption of prayer 
meetings; and attacks on churches, hospitals, and other charitable 
institutions. Attacks occurred in Tamil Nadu, Goa, Punjab, Karnataka, 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. There were a series of 
incidents in Uttar Pradesh in April. On April 6, an angry mob, 
demanding a decrease in school fees and an increase in the number of 
passing students, harassed the principal of Sacred Heart school in 
Mathura. The principal disputed an allegation that the harassment was 
because of school fees, saying that she was harassed and chased by a 
group of young men (not parents of students) who also asked her 
questions about the religious texts read at the school. On April 10, 
Father Joseph Dabre, principal of St. Dominic's school in Mathura, was 
beaten by six young men who went to the school on the pretext of 
inquiring about admissions. On April 11, in Kosi Kalan near Mathura, 8 
to 10 assailants attacked Father K.K. Thomas at St. Theresa's school 
when he rushed to the assistance of a servant girl and 3 nuns whom the 
assailants were attacking. Thomas was injured seriously; his attackers 
had not been found by year's end.
    Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee asked Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Ram 
Prakash Gupta for a detailed report on the incidents in the Mathura 
area. State officials also ordered police to monitor closely churches, 
missionary centers, and other places of worship after the attacks near 
Mathura. On April 26, the NCM visited the sites of the attacks at 
Sacred Heart school, St. Dominic's school, and St. Theresa's school, 
and issued a report on April 27. The report, which claimed that the 
Sacred Heart case had ``no communal tinge,'' and that the Kosi Kalan 
case was a ``case of robbery and nothing else,'' was criticized widely 
by the minority community. Several members of the Lok Sabha openly 
questioned the report's validity, and there is strong evidence that the 
NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claims that they 
themselves are entirely satisfied that there was no religious 
motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the 
local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks. 
These attacks on Christians in Uttar Pradesh were the first in the 
state in 6 years.
    Following the violence in April in the vicinity of Mathura, on May 
5, six missionaries who were distributing Bibles and other literature 
in Vivekanandnagar, Ahmedabad, were injured severely. Some evangelists 
and some Bajrang Dal activists attacked each other in this 
Vivekanandnagar when the Bajrang Dal activists forbade distribution of 
Christian literature. Both groups filed police complaints alleging that 
the other group attacked them. A Hindu bystander who attempted to 
intervene had his finger cut off, according to newspaper reports. On 
May 22, 30 persons were injured when a powerful bomb exploded during a 
Christian meeting at Machlipatnam in the southern state of Andhra 
Pradesh. The central Government and the state governments of Andhra 
Pradesh and Karnataka maintain that the bombing were carried out by a 
Muslim extremist organization, Deendar Anjuman. Following investigation 
by the Central Bureau of Investigation, on October 21, police in 
Karnataka arrested 31 persons in connection with the bombings in that 
state, including 4 persons who reportedly were Pakistani nationals (see 
Section 2.a.). The governments later made more arrests, and by year's 
end, they had filed charges of conspiracy, violating the Explosives 
Act, and fomenting religious hatred against approxiamately 45 suspects 
in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. On June 7, a Catholic priest, Brother 
George Kuzhikandum, was killed on the campus of Brother Polus Memorial 
School near Mathura. On June 21, Vijay Ekka, the prime witness to the 
June 17 killing of Brother George, died in police custody (see Sections 
1.a. and 2.c.). In June in northern Punjab state, the Rev. Ashish 
Prabash Masih, age 23, reportedly was murdered and his body burned. 
Although police ruled out any communal undertones, the Punjab Christian 
Association stated that the murder was part of a concerted campaign 
against its community by Hindu nationalists. In April three nuns said 
that they were run down deliberately by a motor scooter in the northern 
state of Haryana on their way to a midnight Easter Mass. One of the 
nuns was injured seriously. The Christian Forum stated that the attack 
was the fifth on nuns and priests in Haryana in the year, but both the 
NCM and the Catholic Bishop's conference stated that the incident could 
have been an accident. On May 9 in Maharashtra, approximately 150 
suspected activists of the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(World Hindu Council, or VHP) attacked the 45th Annual Convention of 
the Evangelical Alliance Christian Church and the Nashik District 
Church Council, set fire to three vehicles, and ransacked a bus 
carrying religious literature. Four persons were hospitalized. Rural 
police said that they arrested 33 persons, all of whom belonged to 
Bajrang Dal or VHP. Although political leaders from Maharashtra's 
ruling party criticized the attack, the Minister of State for Dairy 
Development joined a group of BJP, RSS, and VHP activists who traveled 
to meet and congratulate the accused when they were released from 
prison on bail. On May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw 
stones and attempted to set fire to one church, while vandalizing two 
other churches.
    On January 23, 1999, Australian missionary Graham Staines and his 
two young sons were killed. The three were asleep in their car in 
Manoharpur, Keonjhar district, Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu 
slogans set fire to their car. Police arrested 51 suspects in 
connection with the crime and sought others. Dara Singh was arrested on 
January 31 and charged with the murders of Staines and his two young 
sons (see Section 2.c.); he also was charged with the murders of 
another Christian and a Muslim. Singh remained in custody and the 
charges against him and 14 others still were pending at year's end. On 
September 30, a special court in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, convicted a 13-
year-old boy of complicity in the killing of Staines and his two sons. 
He was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The Wadhwa Commission 
established to investigate the Staines murder presented its findings in 
August 1999. The report concluded that Dara Singh masterminded the 
killing and effectively exonerated the Hindu organizations and 
political parties that had been accused of complicity. The National 
Commission for Minorities, other human rights groups, and some 
Christian groups criticized the Commission's findings as a coverup. The 
National Commission for Minorities, separate inquiry found evidence 
suggesting that the Bajrang Dal was involved in the Staines murders. On 
June 2, a Hindu priest reportedly ``reconverted'' 72 tribal Christians 
in the same village in which Graham Staines and his sons were killed.
    The burning of churches continued during the year. For example, on 
May 12, a hut used as a prayer cottage by Christians in Katiguda 
village was burned by what the local police referred to as ``anti-
socials.'' Also on May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw 
stones, attempted to set fire to one church, and vandalized two other 
churches. On May 16, a cottage in Dharakote village that was used as a 
place of congregation for local Christians was set on fire. Armed 
police officers were deployed to the area, but by year's end no arrests 
had been made. On June 8, bombs exploded in four churches in Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Goa. The blasts occurred in a Baptist Church in 
Ongole, Andhra Pradesh; a Catholic church in Tadepalligudem, Andhra 
Pradesh; a Catholic church in Wadi, Karnataka; and a church in Vasco, 
Goa. The bombs reportedly blew out windows and damaged pews; three 
persons in Ongole and two in Wadi received minor injuries. During the 
last week of June, a mosque in Gunter, Andhra Pradesh was bombed. None 
of the localities had a history of serious communal tensions before the 
blasts. In Karnataka police patrols reportedly were increased at all 
places of worship, and a special investigative unit was formed to 
investigate the bombings. By June 20, nine persons reportedly were 
arrested in connection with the blasts in Andhra Pradesh, including a 
leading member of a Shi'a Muslim organization (see Section 2.c.). A 
bomb exploded in the early hours of July 7 at a Lutheran church in 
Hubli, northern Karnataka, causing minor damage. On the evening of July 
8, across town, a bomb exploded at Saint Peter and Paul Church, 
breaking windows; there were no injuries.
    Since 1998 there has been increased harassment of Christian aid 
workers. Many report having been hampered in their work through 
threats, bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, physical attacks 
on their workers. Several Christian relief organizations have reported 
difficulty in obtaining visa renewal for foreign relief workers (see 
Sections 2.d. and 4).
    The NHRC expressed its concern at the upsurge of violence against 
Christians in the first 6 months of the year, demanding that the 
Government announce the steps that it was taking to protect the 
Christian community. Speaking in Parliament August 18 on the series of 
church bombings, Home Minister L.K. Advani said that ``the Center, in 
consultation with the affected states, will take stern action against 
those found guilty of instigating attacks against Christians.''
    Members of militant Hindu organizations (including members of the 
Hindu Jagran Manch, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Bajrang Dal) 
reportedly are concerned about Christian efforts to convert Hindus. 
They claim that missionaries are forcing or inducing Hindus to convert 
to Christianity, including economically disadvantaged Dalits and 
tribals. In some cases, Hindus allegedly have reconverted, at times by 
force, tribals and Dalits belonging to other religions. However, many 
tribals follow traditional religious practices, and many Christian 
tribals were not Hindu prior to becoming Christian, although they often 
are considered Hindu by the Government and others. In September 1999, 
Vishw a Hindu Parishad working president Ashok Singhal called for 
enactment of a law banning forced conversions. Missionaries have been 
operating schools and medical clinics for many years in tribal areas, 
including the Dangs district in Gujarat. Tribals, such as those 
attacked in the Dangs district in 1998, and Dalits are outside of the 
caste system and occupy the very lowest position in the social 
hierarchy. However, they have made socioeconomic gains as a result of 
the missionary schools and other institutions, which have increased 
literacy among the lowest castes, among other achievements.
    Other incidents affecting religious minorities during the year 
occurred in Tripura, at which Christian militants imposed bans on Hindu 
and Muslim festivals, and in Assam, in which Hindu concern over the 
continued influx of illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh has grown 
over the past year (see Section 2.d.). On April 17, the secretary of 
the Noapara Baptist Church in Tripura was arrested with explosives in 
his possession. He allegedly was intending to take them to the NLFT.
    The practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent girls to 
a Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God'' (also known as 
Devadasis), is reported by HRW to continue in several southern states, 
including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Devadasis, who generally are 
Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families and are 
required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste Hindus 
(see Section 6.c.). Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban 
brothels. In 1992 the Karnataka state passed the Karnataka Devadasi 
(Prohibition) Act and called for the rehabilitation of Devadasis, but 
this law suffers from a lack of enforcement and criminalizes the 
actions of Devadasis. Since Devadasis are by custom required to be 
sexually available to higher caste men, it reportedly is difficult for 
them to obtain justice from the legal system if they are raped.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system has 
strong historic ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social strata, 
assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social roles to 
each caste and subcaste. Members of each caste--and frequently each 
subcasteare expected to fulfill a specific set of duties (known as 
dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste through rebirth. 
Dalits (formerly called untouchables) are viewed by many Hindus as 
separate from or ``below'' the caste system; nonetheless, they too are 
expected to follow their dharma if they hope to achieve caste in a 
future life. Despite longstanding efforts to eliminate the 
discriminatory aspects of caste, the practice remains widespread.
    The practice of untouchability (``untouchables''--now called 
Dalits--along with tribals occupy the lowest strata of the caste 
system) was outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil 
Rights Act, but it remains an important aspect of life. 
``Untouchability'' refers to the social restrictions imposed on persons 
because of their birth into certain Hindu castes. Dalits are considered 
unclean by higher caste Hindus and thus traditionally are relegated to 
separate villages or neighborhoods and to low paying and often 
undesirable occupations (such as scavenging, street sweeping, and 
removing human waste and dead animals). Many rural Dalits work as 
agricultural laborers for higher caste landowners. By custom Dalits may 
be required to perform tasks for upper caste Hindus without 
remuneration. The majority of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section 
6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest of citizens, generally do not own 
land, and often are illiterate. They face significant discrimination 
despite the laws that exist to protect them, and often are prohibited 
from using the same wells and from attending the same temples as higher 
caste Hindus, and from marrying persons from higher castes. In addition 
they face segregation in housing, in land ownership, on roads, and on 
buses. Dalits tend to be malnourished, lack access to health care, work 
in poor conditions (see Section 6.e.), and face continuing and severe 
social ostracism. In contrast the highest caste, the Brahmin, with 3.5 
percent of the population, holds 78 percent of the judicial positions 
and about 50 percent of parliamentary seats. NGO's report that crimes 
committed by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often go unpunished, 
either because the authorities do not prosecute vigorously such cases 
or because the crimes are unreported by the victims, who fear 
retaliation. In recent years, groupsincluding some that use violence--
have organized to protect Dalit rights.
    The Constitution gives the President the authority to identify 
historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and ``tribals'' (members of 
indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These 
``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes are entitled to affirmative 
action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special 
development funds, and special training programs. The impact of 
reservations and quotas on society and on the groups they are designed 
to benefit is a subject of active debate. According to the 1991 census, 
scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent and scheduled 
tribes 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846 million. 
Christians historically have rejected the concept of caste. However, 
because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu families, many 
continue to suffer the same social and economic limitations that low 
caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low caste Hindus who 
convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for affirmative action 
programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do not. In some states, 
government jobs are reserved for Muslims of low caste descent.
    The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act of 1989 lists new offenses against disadvantaged 
persons and provides stiffer penalties for offenders. However, this act 
has had only a modest effect in curbing abuse. The NCRB reported that 
25,638 crimes against scheduled castes and 4,276 crimes against 
scheduled tribes were recorded in 1998. This compares with 27,944 
crimes against scheduled castes and 4,644 crimes against scheduled 
tribes recorded by the NCRB in 1997. However, human rights NGO's allege 
that caste violence actually is on the increase.
    Intercaste violence claims hundreds of lives annually; it was 
especially pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. According to HRW, on April 25, 
upper caste Rajputs shot and killed four Dalits and seriously injured 
three others in Rohtas district, Bihar. Subsequently, Rajputs burned 
down the entire Dalit village, leaving all 25 families homeless, 
reportedly in retaliation for an earlier attack. On March 12, a mob of 
upper caste men entered Kambalapalli village, Karnataka, where they 
reportedly believed that the killer of an upper caste person had taken 
refuge. The mob surrounded and set fire to one of the homes in the 
predominantly Dalit village; seven members of a Dalit family were 
killed in the blaze. On May 12, a group of men entered Lakhisarai 
village, Bihar, and indiscriminately shot at villagers, killing 11 
persons, including 10 low-caste laborers. Police suspected that a 
criminal gang was responsible for the killings. On May 17, upper caste 
youths stripped two lower caste women and paraded them naked through 
their village of Rasoolabad, Kanpur district, Uttar Pradesh. The 
women's allged crime was to have allowed an upper caste woman to spend 
one night in their home. On June 3, approximately 50 armed men 
suspected of belonging to an upper caste private army, the Ranvir Sena, 
killed 5 low-caste persons, including a woman and a child, in Rajebigha 
village, Bihar. The killings reportedly were perpetrated because the 
assailants suspected that the villagers had voted against a candidate 
favored by the upper caste community in February state assembly 
elections in Bihar (see Section 3). Police occasionally have arrested 
Ranvir Sena members after similar incidents in Bihar. However, 
generally members of the Ranvir Sena who are arrested were released on 
bail shortly thereafter, and none were convicted during the year in 
connection with attacks on low-caste villagers. According to HRW, 
police make little effort to prevent such killings, despite the fact 
that the Ranvir Sena often publicly announces its intentions days 
before each attack; allegedly, police also fail to provide protection 
for villagers in the aftermath of such attacks. On October 22, the NHRC 
directed the Tamil Nadu government to pay about $10,990 (500,000 
rupees) to 36 Dalit women and children. The Commission found police 
wrongly attacked and beat the women and children after entering their 
Ogalur village, Perambalur district, on November 30, 1998. The NHRC 
further found that police illegally detained the victims for 18 days. 
In issuing the order, NHRC chairman justice J.S. Verma wrote, ``the 
present case is an instance of lawlessness on the part of the police 
even in discharging their duties.''
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of association. Workers may establish and join unions of their 
own choosing without prior authorization. More than 400 million persons 
make up the country's active work force. Some 30 million of these 
workers are employed in the formal sector. The rest are overwhelmingly 
are agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban nonindustrial 
laborers. While some trade unions represent agricultural workers and 
informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13 to 15 
million union members are part of the 30 million member formal sector. 
Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent are 
members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union 
centrals. All major trade union centrals are affiliated to a greater or 
lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions have 
stressed their independence and in some cases are attempting to sever 
previously tight party control.
    Trade unions often exercise the right to strike, but public sector 
unions are required to give at least 14 days notice prior to striking. 
Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector 
industries to give notice of a planned strike.
    The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban 
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified 
``essential'' industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the 
assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of this act. 
However, the essential services never have been defined in law. The act 
thus is subject to varying interpretations from state to state. The 
Maharashtra government passed a law in February 1999 banning strikes in 
essential services, including transport services, milk supply services, 
the electricity department, and hospitals. The Industrial Disputes Act 
prohibits retribution by employers against employees involved in legal 
strike actions. This prohibition is observed in practice.
    The Kerala High Court declared in July 1997 that all general 
strikes (bandhs) were illegal and all organizers of protests would be 
liable for losses caused by shutdowns. Later in the year, the Supreme 
Court upheld the verdict drawing attention to the difference between a 
complete closedown of all activities (bandh), and a general strike 
(hartal). While it is likely that the ruling was introduced in relation 
to political strikes, unions stated that it remained a potential threat 
to their activities. Other court rulings during 1997 also declared 
strikes illegal and made striking workers pay damages because consumers 
and the public suffered during strikes.
    According to Ministry of Labor statistics, as of June there had 
been 127 strikes and lockouts throughout the country during the year, 
involving 39,265 workers. In all, 63,000 ``person-days'' were lost due 
to strikes and 900,000 ``person-days'' were lost due to lockouts during 
this period. For example, in February over 100,000 workers of a 
colliery in Andhra Pradesh went on a 13-day strike demanding better 
wages and other benefits. The company later agreed to some of the 
workers' demands. In addition, during the year approximately 80,000 
workers went on strike for about 2 weeks in Uttar Pradesh to protest 
the government's plans to reorganize the state electricity board along 
corporate lines. The government succeeded in reorganizing the 
electicity board along corporate lines despite the workers' protest.
    When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate 
trade union activities, are perpetrated against nationally organized or 
other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities 
generally respond by prosecuting and punishing those persons 
responsible. Unaffiliated unions are not able, in all instances, to 
secure for themselves the protections and rights provided by law.
    In June the Government announced its intention to modify the Trade 
Union Act. The Government convened the Indian Labor Conference, which 
brought together government and trade union representatives to discuss 
modification of the Trade Union Act, but the conference took no 
substantive action on the act and it remained unchanged at year's end.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union 
organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha are affiliated with the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), while the All India Trade Union Congress is 
affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
bargain collectively has existed for decades. The Trade Union Act 
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and 
employers are penalized if they discriminate against employees engaged 
in union activities.
    Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and 
settling disputes in unionized plants in the organized industrial 
sector. Trade unions vigorously defend worker interests in this 
process. Although a system of specialized labor courts adjudicates 
labor disputes, there are long delays and a backlog of unresolved 
cases. When the parties are unable to agree on equitable wages, the 
Government may establish boards of union, management, and government 
representatives to determine them.
    In practice legal protections of worker rights are effective only 
for the 30 million workers in the organized industrial sector, out of a 
total work force of more than 400 million persons. Outside the modern 
industrial sector, laws are difficult to enforce. Union membership is 
rare in the informal sector, and collective bargaining does not exist.
    There are seven Export Processing Zones (EPZ's). Entry into the 
EPZ's ordinarily is limited to employees. Such entry restrictions apply 
to union organizers. All companies bus their workers directly to and 
from the factory. While workers in the EPZ's have the right to organize 
and to bargain collectively, union activity is rare. In addition unions 
have not pursued vigorously efforts to organize private-sector 
employees anywhere in the years since EPZ's were established. There 
have been efforts to organize workers in the EPZ's and unions have 
complained that such attempts were suppressed in Kerala and Gujarat. 
The fact that organizers are barred from EPZ's and workers are bused to 
EPZ's helps prevent unions from forming. Women constitute the majority 
of the work force in the EPZ's. The ICFTU reports that overtime is 
compulsory in the EPZ's, that workers often are employed on temporary 
contracts with fictitious contractors rather than directly by the 
company, and that workers fear that complaints about substandard 
working conditions would result in their being fired. In March 1999, 
the Union Ministry of Commerce announced its intention to convert all 
EPZ's into free trade zones and eliminate government interference in 
their functioning. Because of trade unions' and the Union Ministry of 
Labor's opposition to this change, the Government did not implement the 
plan. In June the Government announced its intention to establish 
special economic zones patterned on the Chinese model, and on November 
1, four out of seven existing EPZ's were converted without significant 
oppostion. These zones are not exempt from labor legislation.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the 
Constitution and specific statutes prohibit forced or compulsory labor, 
and bonded labor, as a form of compulsory labor, also is prohibited by 
statute; however, such practices are widespread. The Bonded Labor 
System (Abolition) Act of 1976 prohibits all bonded labor, by adults 
and children. Offenders may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison, 
but prosecutions are rare. Enforcement of this statute, which is the 
responsibility of state and local governments, varies from state to 
state and generally has not been effective, due to inadequate resources 
and to societal acceptance of bonded or forced labor. Labor inspectors 
at the state and local level have overwhelming case loads, and in many 
cases, do not receive adequate support or protection to challenge 
employers, who often have direct access to government officials. On the 
occasions when inspectors refer violations for prosecution, long court 
backlogs and inadequate funding for legal counsel frequently result in 
acquittals. NGO's estimate that there are 5 to 40 million bonded 
laborers in the country, including a large number of children (see 
Section 6.d.). According to HRW, the majority of bonded laborers are 
Dalits (see Section 5), and bondage is passed from one generation to 
the next.
    A Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less than 
the minimum wage, which usually is set by the state governments. Under 
this definition, which differs from that of the ILO, forced labor is 
widespread, especially in rural areas.
    Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship 
whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must 
work off the debt plus interest, is illegal but widespread. The 
Government estimates that between enactment of the Bonded Labor 
(Abolition) Act in 1976 and March 1999, 280,340 bonded workers were 
released from their obligations. Other sources maintain that those 
released constituted only one-twentieth of the total number of bonded 
laborers. State governments provide a sum of money to workers freed 
from bondage for their rehabilitation. In response to the 1997 Supreme 
Court decision requesting the NHRC to oversee implementation of the 
Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, the NHRC formed a high-level 
``Central Action Group,'' which reviews compliance routinely. The NHRC 
also appointed a special rapporteur to work in Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and report on compliance. In addition 
the NHRC briefed state governments on their responsibilities and 
instituted a system for receiving regular reports from the states. The 
NHRC also assessed the bonded labor problem, identifying districts in 
which it especially is acute. It identified and evaluated NGO's working 
in these areas, and conducted training in bonded labor law enforcement 
for district officials in the acutely affected areas. In November 1996, 
the Supreme Court directed each state to undertake a survey of bonded 
laborers. The surveys were carried out and identified 28,916 bonded 
laborers throughout the country. In Feburary 1997, the Supreme Court 
required state governments to file detailed affidavits on the status of 
bonded laborers. Some press reports indicate that Tamil Nadu alone has 
an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers, in response to which the state 
government began implementing and continues to work on rehabilitation 
plans. In 1999 alone, it allocated $1.25 million (54.4 million rupees) 
for these plans. According to Union Ministry of Labor Statistics, from 
1976 to March 31, the Tamil Nadu government identified and released 
63,894 bonded laborers. Government officials worked to release other 
bonded laborers in many of the country's states. In West Bengal, 
organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi immigrants is a source of 
bonded labor (see Section 6.f.).
    The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the 
workplace often amount to bonded labor. Children sent from their homes 
to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in order 
to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, have no choice in 
the matter. There are no universally accepted figures for the number of 
bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human 
rights organizations estimate that there may be as many as 300,000 
children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded 
labor. Officials claim that they are unable to stop this practice 
because the children are working with their parents' consent. In 
addition there is a reasonable basis to believe that products were 
produced using forced or indentured child labor in the following 
industries: Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks; 
footwear; hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped 
matches; hand-broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-
loomed silk cloth; hand-made bricks; and beedis (hand-rolled 
cigarettes). A number of these industries expose children to 
particularly hazardous work conditions (see Section 6.d.). In its first 
attempt to address the issue of domestic child labor, during the year 
the Government issued a notification prohibiting government employees 
from hiring children as domestic help. Those employers who failed to 
abide by the law would be subject to penalities provided by the Bonded 
Labor System (Abolition) Act (such as fines and imprisonment), but also 
to disciplinary action at the place of work.
    In 1998 an HRW team headed by the Karnataka state labor 
commissioner conducted surprise inspections on silk twining factories 
in and around the town of Magadi. The team found 53 child workers under 
the age of 14 years working in the plants, forbidden to talk to each 
other, and beaten for slow work. The labor commissioner estimated that 
there were 3,000 bonded child laborers in the Magadi silk twining 
factories. In response UNICEF has started a non-formal education 
program for the estimated 3,000 bonded child laborers working in the 
industry. By year's end, about 260 children had been enrolled. In 
addition UNICEF began a micro-credit program for the parents of these 
children to create income-generating opportunities as an alternative to 
child labor.
    Female bondage, forced prostitution, and trafficking in women and 
children for the purpose of forced prostitution are widespread problems 
(see Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison officials have 
used prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners to 
brothels (see Section 1.c.). Devadasis, prepubescent girls given to a 
Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God,'' are taken from their 
families and required to provide sexual services to priests and high 
caste Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels 
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    In Punjab persons routinely are sold in an organized trade in 
weekend bazaars for the purposes of forced domestic labor and forced 
sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in connection with this 
human trade. He later was released on bail.
    In December 1999, domestic media reported that child laborers were 
being sold in an organized ring at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in 
Bihar. According to these reports, children of impoverished families in 
surrounding districts are brought to the fair and sold. One reporter 
talked to a buyer, a shopkeeper, who paid $21 (900 rupees) for a 12-
year-old child. Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery (see 
Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    NGO's such as the Bonded Labor Liberation Front worked to release 
bonded laborers throughout the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Article 24 of the Constitution and the Child Labor 
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 are the principal protections 
against the exploitation of children in the workplace. Provisions for 
the protection of children in the workplace also are made in the Beedi 
and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) Act of 1966, the Factories 
Act of 1948, the Mines Act of 1952, the Motor Transport Workers Act of 
1961, the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, and the Minimum Wages Act of 
1948. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    The enforcement of child labor laws is the responsibility of the 
state governments. Enforcement is inadequate, especially in the 
informal sector in which most children who work are employed. The 
continuing prevalence of child labor is attributed to social acceptance 
of the practice, to the failure of the state and federal governments to 
make primary school education compulsory, and ineffective state and 
federal government enforcement of existing laws.
    Work by children under 14 years of age is barred completely in 
``hazardous industries,'' which include passenger, goods, and mail 
transport by railway; carpet weaving; cinder picking; cleaning of ash 
pits; cement manufacturing; building and construction; cloth printing; 
dyeing and weaving; manufacturing of matches, explosives, and 
fireworks; catering within railway premises or port limits; beedi 
(cigarette) making; mica cutting and splitting; abattoirs; wool 
cleaning; printing; cashew and cashew nut descaling and processing; and 
soldering processes in electronics industries. In January 1999, the 
Government added 6 occupations and 33 processes to the list of 
occupations and processes in which children are barred from working by 
the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act. The additions 
brought the totals to 13 occupations and 51 processes in which children 
are prohibited from working under the act.
    In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child 
labor (see Section 6.c.), there is evidence that child labor is used in 
the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing; 
leather goods; and sporting goods.
    In occupations and processes in which child labor is permitted, 
work by children is permissible only for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7 
p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
    The BJP-led coalition Government continued its predecessors' plan 
to eliminate child labor from hazardous industries and eventually from 
all industries, but it did not repeat the previous government's pledge 
to accomplish the former by 2000 and the second by 2010. This program, 
for which approximately $56.69 million (2.64 billion rupees) has been 
budgeted since 1992, includes the enhanced enforcement of child labor 
laws, income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in 
areas which child labor is concentrated, and a public awareness 
campaign. The Government continued efforts initiated in 1987 to enhance 
enforcement of the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 
and other laws prohibiting and regulating child labor. In 1988 the 
Government started the National Child Labor Project (NCLP) to release 
children from hazardous work places and provide them with transitional 
schooling leading to mainstreaming in regular schools, and other forms 
of assistance. In addition government programs assist working children 
in rural development, women and child development, health, and adult 
job-creation programs. The NCLP targeted 12 districts in which child 
labor was prevalent at its inception in 1988. The NCLP has grown to 
cover 91 districts in 10 states. From April 1999 To January 31, 145,725 
children participated in the NCLP. Since its inception, the program is 
estimated to have helped more than 500,000 children leave work and 
start school. During their participation in the NCLP, the children's 
families are given a small stipend--usually $2.15 to $4.30 (100 to 200 
rupees) per month. Nevertheless, government efforts to eliminate child 
labor have affected only a small fraction of children in the workplace. 
A 1996 Supreme Court decision raised penalties for employers of 
children in hazardous industries to $430 (20,000 rupees) and 
established a welfare fund for formerly employed children. According to 
the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS), authorities are 
pursuing some 6,000 cases against employers. The Supreme Court ruling 
also has helped make local government officials more aware of the 
prohibitions against child labor in hazardous industries. This in some 
cases, has helped improve cooperation between local offcials and NGO's 
like SACCS that are removing children from hazardous workplaces. One 
recent example of such cooperation occurred on December 29, in Bhadohi 
district, Uttar Pradesh, in which SACCS and local law enforcement 
officials released 11 child laborers from work on looms for the 
production of hand-knotted carpets and initiated legal proceedings 
against the employer. During the year, SACCS helped release about 135 
child laborers in Bhadohi district alone. According to the Tamil Nadu 
Labor Department, 155 child laborers were freed from illegal workplaces 
between April and October 1999, out of the 10,118 child laborers 
identified in 2 surveys carried out in the state in 1997. State labor 
officials acknowledged that many more child laborers exist in the 
state.
    Estimates of the number of child laborers range widely. The 
Government census of 1991 puts the number of child workers at 11.28 
million. The ILO estimates the number at 44 million, while NGO's state 
that the figure is 55 million. Interpolation of census figures by the 
National Labor Institute indicates that of a total of 203 million 
children between the ages of 5 and 14, 116 million are in school, 12.6 
million are in full-time employment, and the status of 74 million is 
unknown. Most, if not all, of the 87 million children not in school do 
housework, work on family farms, work alongside their parents as paid 
agricultural laborers, work as domestic servants, or otherwise are 
employed. A Supreme Court-ordered survey of child labor throughout the 
country was completed during 1997 and documented the existence of some 
126,665 wage-earning child laborers. When this figure was challenged as 
patently low, the states conducted a second survey, in which an 
additional 428,305 child laborers in hazardous industries were found. 
However, even the combined total of the two surveys understates the 
true dimension of the problem.
    According to the ILO, labor inspectors conducted 13,257 inspections 
in 1997-98, finding 958 violations of the Child Labor Prohibition Act, 
prosecuting 676 of these cases, and obtaining 29 convictions. Those 
convicted of violating the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 
are fined $460 (20,000 rupees) for each child employed. The Government 
is required to find employment for an adult member of the child's 
family or pay $108 (5,000 rupees) to the family instead. According to 
the Government, in 1996-97, labor inspectors conducted 35,886 
inspections, over twice as many as the following year. Between 1993 and 
the end of 1997, the Government released about 8,000 children from 
illegal workplaces and brought charges against approximately 4,000 
employers. In the hand-knotted carpet producing area of Uttar Pradesh, 
the NHRC and NGO's have worked with the state government to establish a 
task force for the elimination of child labor. SACCS reported freeing 
some 135 child laborers in the hand-knotted carpet industry during the 
year from Bhadohi district in Uttar Pradesh alone.
    Employers in some industries also have taken steps to combat child 
labor. The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi-governmental 
organization that receives funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a 
membership of 2,500 exporters who have subscribed to a code of conduct 
barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been 
produced with child labor. The CEPC conducts inspections to insure 
compliance, and allows members to use voluntarily a government-
originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark, 
which is a private initiative, operates a similar voluntary label 
scheme. Rugmark has 228 exporter members who buy carpets from the 
28,118 looms registered with Rugmark. However, the CEPC states that 
even with the program it is impossible to ensure that a carpet has been 
produced without child labor, given the difficulties of monitoring a 
decentralized and geographically dispersed industry. A privatesector 
research and consulting firm conducts the inspections, which cover only 
10 percent of registered looms. The inspectors have difficulty locating 
unregistered looms. The Government also cooperates with UNICEF, UNESCO, 
the UNDP, and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child labor. Since 
1992 it has participated in the ILO's International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children were 
removed from work and received education and stipends through IPEC 
programs since the start of its program in 1992.
    NGO's also have helped to free children from the work force. For 
example, since 1999 SACCS has freed over 34,000 children from the work 
force; it also operates an education and training center for children 
in New Delhi. From 1999 through year's end, SACCS freed 541 child 
laborers throughout the country through raids with law enforcement 
authorities on illegal workplaces. SACCS's intervention with parents 
resulted in the release of an additional 2,758 children, and its 
referral of cases to law enforcement agencies resulted in the release 
of 3,994 more child laborers over the same period. In many cases, 
charges were brought against the employers under the 1986 Child Labor 
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act.
    The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO 
programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family 
income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The 
NHRC also intervened in individual cases.
    Primary school education is not compulsory, free, and universal 
(see Section 5).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the 
Constitution declare that ``the State shall endeavor to secure . . . to 
all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent 
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural 
opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and 
health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work 
generally are observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but 
largely are unenforced elsewhere and do not ensure acceptable 
conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to 
the Factories Act.
    Minimum wages vary according to the state and to the sector of 
industry. Such wages provide only a minimal standard of living for a 
worker and are inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the 
Factories Act receive much more than the minimum wage, including 
mandated bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a 
separate minimum wage for agricultural workers but do not enforce it 
effectively. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear 
industries, do not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states 
in which such industries operate.
    The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour 
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards 
generally are enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector, 
but tend not to be observed in older and less economically robust 
industries. State governments are responsible for enforcement of the 
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a 
small number of factory inspectors and the inspectors' limited training 
and susceptibility to bribery result in lax enforcement.
    The enforcement of safety and health standards also is poor. 
Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely, in 
general state and central government resources for inspection and 
enforcement of standards are adequate. However, as awareness grows, the 
courts have begun to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
    Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to improper 
enforcement. Chemical industries are the most prone to accidents. 
According to the Director General of Mines' safety rules, mining 
companies must seal the entrances to abandoned underground mines and 
opencast mines are to be bulldozed and reforested. These rules are 
obeyed seldom, if ever. According to the Coal Ministry, between 1995 to 
1999, 1,201 persons were killed in registered mines and oil fields, 822 
(68 percent) of whom died in coal mines, mostly underground; 
approximately 3,000 persons were injured in mining accidents. Illegal 
mining is rampant. For example, Oswal Fertilizer Ltd.'s (OFL) new 
Diamonium Phosphate fertilizer plant at Paradip, Orissa, began 
operations in May. Eleven workers died during the plant's construction; 
an additional 6 persons were killed and 51 others were injured in a 
series of accidents at the plant from May to September. None of the 
workers was using safety equipment. Seven criminal cases have been 
brought against OFL in connection with the accidents.
    Safety conditions tend to be better in the EPZ's.
    The law does not provide workers with the right to remove 
themselves from work situations that endanger health and safety without 
jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a significant source, 
transit point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons, 
primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution and forced labor.
    The country's legal code generally is technically adequate for 
dealing with the problems of trafficking, violence against women, and 
prostitution. The Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act (PITA) of 1986 
superseded and strengthened the All-India Suppression of Immoral 
Traffic Act (SITA). The PITA sought to toughen penalties for 
trafficking in children, particularly by focusing on traffickers, 
pimps, landlords, and brothel operators, while protecting underage 
girls as victims. The PITA requires police to use only female police 
officers to interrogate girls rescued from brothels. The PITA also 
requires the State to provide protection and rehabilitation for these 
rescued girls. In addition the PITA grants a form of quasi-toleration 
of prostitution, as prostitution, per se, is not a crime under the 
PITA, which criminalizes only solicitation or practice in or near a 
public place. Some NGO's note that this ambiguity, which is intended to 
protect trafficking victims, has been exploited to protect the sex 
industry. Due to the selective implementation of the PITA, the 
``rescue'' of sex workers from brothels often leads to their 
revictimization. On June 25, 14 underage rescued sex workers fled the 
government shelter in Mumbai, citing poor conditions and ``inhuman 
treatment.'' On August 31, the Mumbai High Court instructed the 
Maharashtra government to improve conditions in its rescue homes.
    The country's prostitution and trafficking laws fail to impose on 
the clients and organizers of the sex trade the same penalties imposed 
on prostitutes found soliciting or practicing their trade in or near 
(200 meters) public places. Using the PITA's provisions against 
soliciting or practicing, police regularly may arrest sex workers, 
extort money from them, evict them, and take their children from them. 
The client by comparison largely is immune from any law enforcement 
threat, as he has committed a crime only if he is engaged in sex with a 
sex worker in a public place or is having sex with a girl under the age 
of 16 years (statutory rape). Similarly, although the intention of the 
1986 PITA was to focus enforcement efforts against the traffickers, 
pimps, and border operators, the opposite currently is the reality; a 
Calcutta NGO reports that an average of about 80 to 90 percent of the 
arrests made under the PITA in West Bengal state in the 1990's are of 
female sex workers. Police implementation of the PITA similarly is 
inadequate throughout the country; only a small fraction of arrests 
made under the PITA involve the trafficker. Implementation of the 
PITA's provisions for protection and rehabilitation of women and 
children who are rescued from the sex trade is extremely poor. NGO's 
familiar with the legal history of prostitution and trafficking laws 
regard the failure of the judiciary to recognize this inequity in the 
law's practice as a continuing ``blind spot.'' Over the last several 
years, arrests and prosecutions under the PITA have remained relatively 
static, while all indicators suggest a growing level of trafficking 
into and within the country.
    NGO's allege that ignorance of trafficking, a lack of political 
resolve to tackle it, and corruption at the enforcement level 
perpetuate the problem. Although the police are charged with enforcing 
the country's laws on prostitution and trafficking in women and 
children, NGO's, observers, and sex workers uniformly view police 
actions as part of the problem. Sex workers in Mumbai and Calcutta 
claim that harassment, extortion, and occasional arrests on soliciting 
charges usually characterize police intervention. The police seldom are 
seen as a positive force that addresses the violence of pimps and 
traffickers while protecting underage girls from bonded sex labor. A 
commonly held view among sex workers and NGO's is that local police and 
politicians responsible for the red light areas receive bribes from 
organized crime networks to protect the lucrative sex trade.
    Over 1 million girls and women are believed to be forced into the 
sex industry within the country at any given time. Women's rights 
organizations and NGO's estimate that more than 12,000 and perhaps as 
many as 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the country 
annually from neighboring states for the sex trade. According to an ILO 
estimate, 15 percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes 
are children. The traffic is controlled largely by organized crime.
    There is a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes from 
Nepal. According to one estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 children, mostly 
between the ages of 10 and 18, are drawn or forced into this traffic 
annually. Girls as young as 7 years of age are trafficked from 
economically depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural 
areas of India to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta, 
and Delhi. Currently there are about 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls 
working in brothels in Mumbai and 40,000 to 100,000 in Calcutta. In 
Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers began when they were 
under 18 years of age; half are from Nepal. A similar profile is 
believed to exist among female sex workers in Calcutta, although the 
vast majority of women who are trafficked there come from Bangladesh, 
as opposed to Nepal. NGO's in the region estimate that about 6,000 to 
10,000 girls are trafficked annually from Nepal to Indian brothels, and 
that a similar number are trafficked from Bangladesh.
    Within the country, women from economically depressed areas often 
move into the cities seeking greater economic opportunities, and once 
there are victimized by traffickers who force or coerce them into the 
sex trade. However, in some cases family members sell young girls into 
the sex trade. For example, according to a local NGO researcher, in one 
village in Uttar Pradesh, girls 1 to 2 years of age are purchased from 
their parents and adopted by persons who train them for the sex trade 
through the use of pornographic materials, and sell them into the sex 
trade when they are 7 to 12 years old.
    Many indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation. 
According to the Indian Center for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
(ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar, 
were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many come from 
tribes that were driven off their land by national park schemes. In 
Punjab persons of both sexes are sold in an organized trade in weekend 
bazaars, ostensibly as farm labor; many instead are purchased for the 
purposes of forced sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in 
connection with the trade. He was released later on bail.
    The number of women being trafficked out of the country to other 
countries is comparatively low. In July authorities cooperated with 
U.S. investigators seeking evidence in the prosecution of Lakreddy Bali 
Reddy, a U.S. citizen of Indian birth, who was indicted for trafficking 
minor girls for sexual exploitation from a rural area of Andhra Pradesh 
to the U.S. Reddy allegedly paid the airfares and expenses of 350 to 
400 young men and women aged approximately 13 to 18 years, mostly from 
low castes, and obtained their passports and visas--ostensibly to work 
as specialty cooks or laborers in his restaurants or apartment 
business. However, upon arrival in the U.S., the girls reportedly were 
put to work in a prostitution ring. Some of the girls claimed that 
Reddy had sex with them in India after their parents sold them; at 
least one victim was 12 years old.
    In a study published in 1996, the National Commission for Women 
reported that organized crime plays a significant role in the country's 
sex trafficking trade, and that women and children who are trafficked 
frequently are subjected to extortion, beatings, and rape. How women 
are trafficked varies widely: some are abducted forcibly or drugged, 
while others are made false offers of marriage, employment, or shelter. 
Poverty, illiteracy, and lack of employment opportunities contribute to 
the trafficking problem, although organized crime is a common element 
in all trafficking incidents, as is police corruption and collusion.
    Trafficking of persons within and into the country for forced labor 
also is a significant problem. In December 1999, the media reported 
that an organized ring was selling children from surrounding areas for 
labor at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. There was a report 
that a 12-year-old child was purchased for $21 (900 rupees). In July a 
Mangalore, Karnatakabased NGO reported that tribal children were being 
auctioned in the Dakshina-Kanara district of the state primarily for 
use as domestic servants. The Karnataka Department of Social Welfare 
initiated an investigation, which it completed during the year (see 
Sections 5 and 6.c.). It found that the children were not being 
auctioned, but that better-off families in the district were employing 
many of them as domestic servants. The Department of Social Welfare 
suggested that more efficient implementation of ongoing development 
programs for tribal people in the district offered the best remedy for 
the child labor problem.
    In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi 
immigrants is a source of bonded labor. In June police in Krishnagar, 
West Bengal detained 8 Bangladeshi women and 14 children transiting the 
distict by bus. Agents allegedly smuggled the group from Jessore, 
Bangladesh across the border at Bongaon by offering them employment in 
Mumbai. Calcutta is a convenient transit point for traffickers who send 
Bangladeshis to New Delhi, Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia. 
Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery.
    Many boys, some of whom are as young as age 4, are trafficked to 
West Asia or the Persian Gulf States (especially the United Arab 
Emirates), and end up as riders in camel races. Some such boys end up 
as beggars in Saudi Arabia during the hajj. It is estimated that there 
are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South Asian camel jockeys 
(from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) currently working in the United 
Arab Emirates alone. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The 
majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who 
receive as much as $200 (9,300 rupees) for their child's labor, 
although a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing 
the jockeys earn approximately $150 (6,975 rupees) per month from the 
labor of each child. The usual procedure used for bringing the children 
to the Gulf States is to have their names added to the passport of a 
Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Gulf; the 
children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. Girls and women 
trafficked to the Persian Gulf States end up either as domestic workers 
or sex workers.
    NGO's and others allege that when police take action against 
brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids 
often are planned poorly and seldom are coordinated with NGO's or 
government social agencies. Therefore, the police action often worsens 
the situation of the girls and women indebted to traffickers and 
brothel owners. Girls rescued from brothels are treated as criminals 
and often are abused sexually by their police rescuers or by the staff 
of government remand centers, where they are housed temporarily before 
being brought back to the brothels as a result of the bribes paid by 
brothel operators, or legally released into the custody of traffickers 
and madams posing as relatives. In these cases, the debt owned by the 
girls to the brothel operators and traffickers further increases as the 
costs of bribing or legally obtaining release of the girls is added to 
their labor debt. NGO's invariably indicate the 1996 police roundup of 
476 sex workers in Mumbai as an illustration of the consequences of 
forced sweep rescues. Police in Mumbai carried out no such sweeps 
during the year.
    As was the case in the 1996 raids, NGO's claim that they seldom are 
given advance notice of police raids on brothels and therefore are not 
able to lend valuable assistance in identifying and interviewing 
underage victims. Moreover police do not seek advice or assistance from 
NGO's in planning law enforcement action to protect the victims during 
raids. Although over 400 girls and women were arrested in the 1996 
raids, few pimps or brothel managers were arrested, and none were 
prosecuted to conviction. The NGO's found themselves caught off guard 
by the large-scale police action and were illprepared to cope with a 
sudden huge demand for shelter for the rescued sex workers. As a 
result, many of the girls were sent to government centers known for 
their harsh conditions and considered by many to be in a worse state 
than the brothels. Ultimately, some of the girls died in state 
detention and many returned to the sex trade voluntarily, given their 
lack of options. Success stories from the 1996 raids were rare.
    Some NGO's know about trafficking conditions in the brothel areas 
such as Kamathipura, including identification of traffickers and 
locations of girls being held captive by brothel owners. However, 
because of the lingering effects of the 1996 raids, most of these NGO's 
are reluctant to trust the police with this information. Cooperation 
among NGO's in sharing information and assessing out the magnitude and 
scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been significant to 
date, although it continues to improve. Some Mumbai NGO's have worked 
aggressively to sensitize, train, and create awareness of trafficking 
among local authorities. The case of the NGO Prerana, which has been 
working closely with government officials, is a good example. During 
the year, a Prerana pilot program trained employees of a large 
Maharashtra government enterprise to identify and assist trafficking 
victims during their daily bus commute; Prerana also has enlisted the 
assistance of state police, who help train the workers. Conversely, 
other NGO's working to rescue women and girls from forced sexual work 
report that complaint-based police rescues are quite effective. Unlike 
the sweep type rescues such as the one carried out in Kamathipura in 
1996, these are focused attempts to rescue a small number of women and 
girls using specific information about the victim's location, names and 
appearance, often supplied by NGO's; police responses in such cases 
frequently have resulted in the rescue of the women and girls involved.
    Similar efforts to improve NGO coordination are being made in 
Calcutta, where some 10 NGO's meet monthly as part of the ``Action 
Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children'' forum. Every 
3 months the group attempts to meet withits Bangladeshi and Nepalese 
counterparts. Calcutta NGO's such as Sanlaap also are seeking to build 
stronger working relationships with local police. As a result of this 
coordination, Sanlaap has built stronger working relationships with 
police and other law enforcement officials in Calcutta. It has 
organized and sponsored meetings between representatives of the sex 
workers and police to discuss such issues as violence against women and 
trafficking. The seminars have helped sensitize police to the fact that 
many of the sex workers are the victims of organized traffickers. 
Sanlaap invariably is the first organization Calcutta police turn to 
when they have rescued a trafficked sex worker. The NGO has been 
allowed to place a counselor at the West Bengal Remand Home for Women, 
where rescued trafficking victims are housed. It also has been 
permitted to place counselors in police stations within Calcutta's red 
light district and has convinced the courts to release young 
trafficking victims into its custody, instead of sending them to the 
remand home.
    There are roughly 80 NGO's in 10 states around the country working 
for the emancipation and rehabilitation of women and children 
trafficked into the sex trade.
    A group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes 
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department 
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet 
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal 
prohibitions.
                               __________

                                MALDIVES

    The Republic of Maldives, which comprises 1,190 islands (less than 
200 of which are inhabited), with a population of approximately 
270,000, has a parliamentary form of government with a very strong 
executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of the 
judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives 
additional influence from his constitutional role as the ``supreme 
authority to propagate the tenets'' of Islam. Political parties are 
officially discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral legislature, 
the People's Majlis, run as individuals. The Majlis selects a single 
presidential nominee who is approved or rejected in a national 
referendum. President Gayoom was approved for a fifth 5-year term in 
October 1998. The Majlis must approve all legislation and is empowered 
to enact legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is 
subordinate to Islamic law, but civil law generally is applied in 
criminal and civil cases. The judiciary is subject to executive 
influence.
    The National Security Service (NSS) performs its duties under 
effective civilian control. The NSS includes the armed forces and 
police, and its members serve in both police and military capacities 
during their careers. The police division investigates crimes, collects 
intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest.
    Fishing, small-scale agriculture, and tourism provide employment 
for over one-half of the work force. Tourism accounts for over one-
quarter of government revenues and roughly 40 percent of foreign 
exchange receipts. Manufacturing accounts for 6 percent of gross 
domestic product.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in a number of areas; however, its record was poor in some other areas, 
particularly with regard to political and religious freedoms. The 
President's power to appoint a significant portion of the Parliament 
constrains citizens' ability to change their government. The Government 
limits freedom of assembly and association. There are significant 
restrictions on the freedom of religion; in the past, the Government 
has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners for proselytizing and 
detained citizens who converted. Although the Government has undertaken 
a number of programs addressing women's issues, women face a variety of 
legal and social disadvantages. Some of these disadvantages are linked 
to the Government's observance of Shari'a (Islamic law) and other 
Islamic customs. The Government also restricts worker rights. 
Nonetheless, in recent years there has been some progress in certain 
areas. The Majlis has assumed a more active political role in recent 
years, and its members routinely differ with government policy on many 
issues. The courts were reorganized in 1997, and a new Constitution, 
which provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights, went 
into effect at the beginning of 1998. In addition procedural rules 
limiting indefinite police detention were instituted in 1998, and the 
presidential nominating process involved competition among candidates 
for the first time in 1998. A continued easing of government 
restrictions and the Press Council's balanced handling of issues 
related to journalistic standards allowed a greater diversity of views 
in the media, although most media outlets are controlled by persons 
friendly to the Government or by the Government itself.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were no reports of beatings or other mistreatment of 
persons in police custody during the year; however, convicted criminals 
may be flogged under judicial supervision when this punishment is 
prescribed by Islamic law as interpreted in the country (i.e., only 
when the criminal confesses to the crime and only for the offenses of 
marital infidelity and alcohol abuse). There were no public floggings 
during the year. In 1998 there were two private floggings (carried out 
without public spectators) due to the confession of an extramarital 
affair. The man was subsequently banished, and the woman was placed 
under house arrest for 12 months. Punishments usually are confined to 
fines, compensatory payment, house arrest, imprisonment, or banishment 
to a remote atoll. The Government generally permits those who are 
banished to receive visits by family members.
    The country's prison was destroyed by fire in 1999. Following the 
fire, the Government transferred prisoners to a temporary facility on 
Maafushi, which houses a fluctuating population of approximately 300 
inmates (including 20 women who are housed in a separate compound). 
Children also are housed in separate center for juveniles. Prison 
conditions at the current facility, including food and housing, 
generally are adequate. Prisoners are allowed to work in prison and 
given the opportunity for regular exercise and recreation. Spouses are 
allowed privacy during visits with incarcerated partners. However, 
Amnesty International (AI) reported that in 1998, in the since-
destroyed prison, prisoners were mistreated. The Government is 
surveying prison facilities in other countries to incorporate 
international standards and improvements in the reconstruction of the 
prison, and it has requested training for prison guards.
    The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats. 
The issue of visits by human rights groups is not known to have arisen.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1997 Constitution 
states that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24 
hours without being informed of the grounds for arrest or detention; 
however, in 1998 authorities arbitrarily detained foreign Christians 
for allegedly proselytizing and detained citizens who supposedly 
converted (see Section 2.c.). Police initiate investigations based on 
suspicion of criminal activity or in response to written complaints 
from citizens, police officers, or government officials. They are not 
required to obtain warrants for arrests. Based on the results of police 
investigations, the Attorney General refers cases to the appropriate 
court. The authorities generally keep the details of a case 
confidential until they are confident that the charges are likely to be 
upheld. In the past, persons have been held for long periods without 
charge.
    Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, be detained 
in prison, or placed under house arrest for 15 days during 
investigations. The President may extend pretrial detention for an 
additional 30 days, but in most cases the suspect is released if not 
brought to trial within 15 days. Those who are released pending trial 
may not leave a specific atoll. The law providing for the indefinite 
detention of individuals under investigation was revised substantially 
in 1998. Within 24 hours of an arrest, an individual must be told of 
the grounds for the arrest. An individual can then be held for 7 days. 
If no legal proceedings have been initiated within 7 days, the case is 
referred to an anonymous three-member civilian commission appointed by 
the President that can authorize an additional 15 days' detention. 
After that time, if legal proceedings still have not been initiated, a 
judge must sanction the continued detention on a monthly basis. There 
is no right to legal counsel during police interrogation. There is no 
provision for bail.
    The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and nonfamily 
visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported 
cases of incommunicado detention in recent years, the law does not 
provide safeguards against this abuse.
    There were no reports of the external exile of citizens, although 
24 foreigners suspected of proselytization were banished for life in 
1998 (see Section 2.c.). The Government sometimes banishes convicted 
criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities; a man 
who confessed to an extramarital affair in April 1998 was banished for 
1 year. AI reported that in 1999, 10 persons from Faafu Magoodhoo were 
banished, reportedly without trial, for trying to organize a 
demonstration against the local atoll chief.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution does not 
provide for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to 
executive influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court 
decisions, the President influences the judiciary through his power to 
appoint and dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are 
not subject to confirmation by the Majlis. The President nevertheless 
has removed only two judges since 1987. Both dismissals followed the 
recommendation of the Justice Ministry that found the judges' 
professional qualifications to be below standard. The President may 
also grant pardons and amnesties.
    In September 1997, the court system, under the Ministry of Justice, 
was reorganized and court administration has improved. There are three 
courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal cases; and one for 
family and juvenile issues. On the recommendation of the Ministry of 
Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for each court. There 
is also a High Court on Male, which is independent of the Justice 
Ministry and which handles a wide range of cases, including politically 
sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as court of appeals. Under a 
1995 presidential decree, High Court rulings can be reviewed by a five-
member advisory council appointed by the President. The President also 
has authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second 
hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male 
courts, there are 204 general courts on the islands.
    There are no jury trials. Most trials are public and are conducted 
by judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law. 
Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more 
complex legal questions are involved, the Justice Ministry will send 
more experienced judges to handle the case.
    The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right 
to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a'' (Islamic law). During 
a trial, the accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a 
lawyer. Courts do not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges 
question the concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a 
case.
    Civil law is subordinate to Shari'a, which is applied in situations 
not covered by civil law as well as in certain acts such as divorce and 
adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and criminal cases generally 
do not allow legal counsel in court because, according to a local 
interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and submissions should come 
directly from the parties involved. However, the High Court allows 
legal counsel in all cases, including those in which the right to 
counsel was denied in the lower court. Under the country's Islamic 
practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one 
man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance, and 
inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women are equal.
    There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The 1997 Constitution prohibits security officials 
from opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or 
monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by 
law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor 
telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal 
investigation.
    Although the 1997 Constitution provides residential premises and 
dwellings should be inviolable, there is no legal requirement for 
search or arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer 
of the police must approve the search of private residences.
    The Government is attempting to concentrate the population on the 
larger islands by providing government services and concentrating job 
creation efforts there. The smaller islands are to be provided with 
only ``basic services.'' However, no one is being coerced to move to 
the larger islands under this program.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits public 
statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or 
are libelous.
    The Penal Code prohibits inciting citizens against the Government. 
However, a 1990 amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized ``any true 
account of any act of commission or omission past or present by the 
Government in a lawfully registered newspaper or magazine, so as to 
reveal dissatisfaction or to effect its reform.''
    Regulations that make publishers responsible for the content of the 
material they published remain in effect but did not result in any 
legal actions during the year.
    Most major media outlets are owned either by the Government or its 
sympathizers. Nonetheless these sympathetic outlets do on occasion 
strongly criticize the Government.
    The Press Council is composed of lawyers, private and government 
media representatives, and other government officials. The Council 
reviews charges of journalist misconduct (advising the Ministry of 
Information, Arts, and Culture on measures to be taken against 
reporters, when appropriate) and promotes professional standards within 
the media (recommending reforms and making suggestions for 
improvement). Private journalists have said that they are satisfied 
with the Council's objectivity and performance. The Government agreed 
that private journalists, rather than the Government, should take 
responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of ethics. 
Individual newspapers and journals established their own ethical 
guidelines in many cases.
    There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic 
media, nor were there closures of any publications or reports of 
intimidation of journalists. Television news and public affairs 
programming routinely discussed topics of current concern and freely 
criticized government performance. Regular press conferences with 
government ministers instituted in 1995 continued. Journalists are more 
self-confident than in the past; self-censorship appears to have 
diminished, although it remains a problem. Since it is not clear when 
criticism violates the law prohibiting public statements that are 
contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or are libelous, 
journalists and publishers continue to watch what they say, 
particularly on political topics, to avoid entanglement with the 
Government.
    Pornography and material otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic 
values may be banned. In 1999 the Government banned the animated movie 
``The Prince of Egypt,'' on the grounds that it was offensive to Islam 
(see Section 2.c.).
    In 1997 the Government banned a book written by an elderly close 
relative of the President for its derogatory comments about a deceased 
previous president, after the relatives of the latter complained.
    Although 88 newspapers and periodicals are registered with the 
Government, only about 60 regularly publish. Aafathis, a morning daily, 
is often critical of government policy. Another daily, Miadhu, began 
publishing in 1996, and Haveeru is the evening daily. Both Miadhu's and 
Haveeru's publishers are progovernment.
    The Government owns and operates the only television and radio 
station. It does not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale 
of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts are aired 
on the Government television station.
    Cable News Network (CNN) is shown, uncensored, daily on local 
television. In 1996 a company began providing Internet service. The 
Government enacted no regulations governing Internet access but blocks 
distribution of pornographic material via the Internet.
    There are no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign 
publications except for those containing pornography or material 
otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of 
foreign publications were reported during the year.
    There are no reported restrictions on academic freedom. Some 
teachers reportedly are vocal in their criticism of the Government.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997 
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a 
manner that does not contravene the law;'' however, the Government 
imposes limits on this right in practice. The Home Ministry permits 
public political meetings during electoral campaigns but limits them to 
small gatherings on private premises.
    The Government registers clubs and other private associations if 
they do not contravene Islamic or civil law; however, the Government 
imposes some limits on freedom of association. While not forbidden by 
law, the President officially discourages political parties on the 
grounds that they are inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of 
society. However, many Majlis members were active and outspoken critics 
of the Government and have stimulated closer parliamentary examination 
of government policy.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted 
significantly. The 1997 Constitution designates Islam as the official 
state religion, and the Government interprets this provision to impose 
a requirement that citizens be Muslims. The practice of any religion 
other than Islam is prohibited by law. However, foreign residents are 
allowed to practice their religion if they do so privately. On July 4, 
the commemoration of the day the country embraced Islam, President 
Gayoom stated that no other religion should be allowed in the country, 
and the Home Affairs Ministry announced special programs to safeguard 
and strengthen religious unity. The President, the members of the 
People's Majlis, and cabinet members must be Muslims.
    There are no places of worship for adherents of other religions. 
The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious 
statues, but it generally permits the importation of individual 
religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also 
prohibits non-Muslim clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and 
conducting public worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another 
faith is a violation of Shari'a and may result in a loss of the 
convert's citizenship.
    Islamic instruction is a mandatory part of the school curriculum, 
and the Government funds the salaries of religious instructors. The 
Government has established a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to 
provide guidance on religious matters. The Government also has set 
standards for individuals who conduct Friday services at mosques to 
ensure adequate theological qualifications.
    In January 1999, the Government banned the animated movie ``The 
Prince of Egypt'' on the ground that ``its portrayal of the Prophet 
Moses was offensive to Islam, because all prophets and messengers of 
God are not to be animated or portrayed in any way'' (see Section 
2.a.). During June 1998, the authorities detained 24 foreigners 
(including children) for alleged Christian proselytization without 
explaining the charges against them and then expelled them from the 
country for life. Following the expulsion of the foreigners, police 
took two female citizens into custody for allegedly converting to 
Christianity. As many as a dozen other citizens were questioned. The 
women were detained from mid-June to late September 1998, during which 
time they received extensive counseling. No formal charges were ever 
brought against them, and they were released to their families. In 
April 1998, the Government asked the Seychelles Government to stop the 
radio broadcast of Christian programming in the local language, 
Dhivehi, to the country. However, the broadcasts continued throughout 
the year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and 
abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the 
Government discourages migration into the capital island of Male or its 
surrounding atoll. Foreign workers are often kept at their worksites. 
Their ability to travel freely is restricted, and they are not allowed 
to mingle with the local population on the islands. The Government has 
not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. 
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the 
year. There were no reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid 
claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, and 
the strong executive exerts significant influence over both the 
legislature and the judiciary. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Majlis 
chooses a single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male, 
from a list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be 
nominees for President are not permitted to campaign for the 
nomination. The nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot 
in a nationwide referendum. From a field of five candidates, President 
Gayoom was nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed for a fifth 5-year 
term in October 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation found the referendum to be free and fair.
    The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's 
50 members, 42 are elected--2 from each of the 20 inhabited atolls and 
2 from Male--and the President appoints 8 members. Individuals or 
groups are free to approach members of the Majlis with grievances or 
opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may introduce 
legislation. There are no political parties, which are officially 
discouraged.
    The Office of the President is the most powerful political 
institution. The 1997 Constitution gives Islamic law preeminence over 
civil law and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to 
propagate the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint 
one-sixth of the Majlis members, which is one-third of the total needed 
for nominating the President, provides the President with a power base 
and strong political leverage. The President currently also is 
commander in chief of the armed forces, the Minister of Defense and 
National Security, the Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the 
Governor of the Maldivian Monetary Authority.
    Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been 
constructive. The Government may introduce legislation but may not 
enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. However, the Majlis 
may enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the 
President fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is 
repassed with a two-thirds majority. In recent years, the Majlis has 
become increasingly independent, challenging government policies and 
rejecting government-proposed legislation.
    In 1993 the Majlis introduced a question period during which 
members may question government ministers about public policy. Debate 
on the floor has since become increasingly sharp and more open. 
Elections to the People's Majlis were held in November 1999. According 
to observers from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), the elections were generally free and fair. Several losing 
candidates entered court challenges, but the courts upheld the election 
results.
    Women are not eligible to become president but may hold other 
government posts. For reasons of tradition and culture, few women seek 
or are selected for public office, and women are underrepresented in 
government and politics. In order to increase participation by women in 
the political process, the Government continued a political awareness 
campaign in the atolls. In the November 1999 elections, six women ran 
for seats and two were elected. During the 1999 elections, observers 
from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral 
process. Following the elections, President Gayoom appointed an 
additional three women to the Majlis.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Although not prohibited, there are no active local human rights 
groups. The Government has been responsive to at least one foreign 
government's interest in examining human rights issues. The Government 
also facilitated visits of teams of SAARC election observers in 1994, 
1998, and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1997 Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law, 
but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination based on 
these factors. Women have traditionally been disadvantaged, 
particularly in terms of education and the application of Islamic law 
to matters such as divorce, inheritance, and testimony in legal 
proceedings.
    Women.--Women's rights advocates agree that wife beating and other 
forms of violence are not widespread. There are no firm data on the 
extent of violence against women because of the value attached to 
privacy in this conservative society. In 1997 the Government 
commissioned a study by a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) on 
domestic violence, but it was never completed. Police officials report 
that they receive few complaints of assaults against women. Rape and 
other violent crimes against women are extremely rare. None were 
reported or prosecuted during the year. Under Shari'a the penalty would 
be flogging, banishment, or imprisonment for up to 5 years.
    Women traditionally have played a subordinate role in society, 
although they now participate in public life in growing numbers and 
gradually are participating at higher levels. Women constitute 38 
percent of government employees, and about 10 percent of uniformed NSS 
personnel. Well-educated women maintain that cultural norms, not the 
law, inhibit women's education and career choices. In many instances, 
education for girls is curtailed after the seventh grade, largely 
because parents do not allow girls to leave their home island for an 
island having a secondary school. Nonetheless, women enjoy a higher 
literacy rate (98 percent) than men (96 percent). Due largely to 
orthodox Islamic training, there is a strong strain of conservative 
sentiment--especially among small businessmen and residents of the 
outer islands--that opposes an active role for women outside the home. 
However, the Government continued legal literacy programs to make women 
aware of their legal rights and workshops on gender and political 
awareness in the outer atolls. The Government also has built 10 of 15 
planned women's centers in the atolls, which are facilities where 
family health workers can provide medical services. The centers also 
provide libraries and space for meetings and other activities with a 
focus of the development of women.
    Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more 
easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Islamic 
law also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the 
share of female heirs. A woman's testimony is equal to only one-half of 
that of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance 
(see Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that 
of men in the same positions.
    In October the Cabinet replaced the National Women's Council with a 
Gender Equality Council to serve as an advisory body to the Government 
to help strengthen the role of women in society and to help ensure 
equal participation by women in the country's development. Also during 
the year, the Government, with the assistance of the European Union and 
the U.N. Population Fund, expanded a program of small loans to women 
for development projects to additional islands.
    Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory 
education, but it provides universal access to free primary education. 
The percentage of school-age children actually in school was as 
follows: (grades 1 to 5) 99.26 percent, (grades 6 to 7) 96.2 percent, 
and grades (8 to 10) 51.09 percent. Of the students enrolled, 49 
percent are female and 51 percent are male. The Government is committed 
to the protection of children's rights and welfare. The Government is 
working with UNICEF to implement the rights provided for in the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Government established a 
National Council for the Protection of the Rights of the Child in 1992. 
Government policy provides for equal access to educational and health 
programs for both male and female children. Laws protecting children's 
rights apply with equal force to children of either sex.
    Children's rights are incorporated into law, which specifically 
protects them from both physical and psychological abuse, including 
abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's 
Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes 
its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support 
for its efforts. The Ministry noted an increase in reports of child 
abuse during the first part of the year with 138 reports involving 317 
children, including 10 reports of sexual abuse. Penalties could be 
banishment or imprisonment for up to 3 years. It is not known if there 
were any prosecutions during the year. The Government is reviewing the 
law to see if improvements and additional protections are necessary. 
There is no reported societal pattern of abuse directed against 
children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically 
addresses the rights of the physically or mentally disabled. In 1999 
the Government initiated a survey and identified 30,000 persons in the 
country as disabled (primarily hearing and sight impaired). The 
Government has established programs and provided services for the 
disabled.
    Persons with disabilities usually are cared for by their families. 
When such care is unavailable, persons with disabilities are kept in 
the Institute for Needy People, which also assists elderly persons. The 
Government provides free medication for all mentally ill persons in the 
islands, and mobile teams regularly visit mentally ill patients. In 
1999 the Government enacted a new building code, which mandated that 
all new government buildings and jetties must be accessible to disabled 
persons. The CARE Society, an NGO that assists the disabled, with 
funding from UNICEF and the Australian Government, began programs to 
train disabled persons in life and work skills.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not 
expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them 
nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form 
unions or of strikes during the year. However, small groups of 
similarly employed workers with mutual interests have formed 
associations, which include employers as well as employees. These 
associations may address a variety of issues, including workers' 
rights.
    The work force consists of between 70,000 and 75,000 persons, 
including expatriate labor and seasonal and part-time workers. About 20 
percent of the workforce are employed in fishing. The approximately 
27,000 foreigners who work in the country makeup almost half of the 
workers in the formal sector; most are employed in tourist hotels, the 
retail and wholesale trade, factories, or on construction projects. The 
Government employs approximately 22,000 persons, both permanent and 
temporary. It estimates that the manufacturing sector employs about 15 
percent of the labor force and tourism another 10 percent.
    Although workers can affiliate with international labor 
federations, this generally has not been the case. However, it is 
believed some seamen have joined such federations.
    In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended Maldives' eligibility for 
tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights to Maldivian workers.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither 
prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain 
collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between 
employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar 
work in the public sector. There are no laws specifically prohibiting 
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members or 
organizers. The Government has exerted pressure in the past to 
discourage seamen from joining foreign seamen's unions as a means to 
secure higher wages. There have been no reported complaints alleging 
such discrimination or claiming government interference with workers' 
attempts to join unions in the past 5 years.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is not prohibited by law. However, there were no reports that it 
occurred. The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but more than 98 
percent of school-age children to grade 7 are enrolled in school. A 
1992 law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places of waged 
work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age, health, 
or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or adversely 
affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' An earlier law 
prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There 
are no reports of children being employed in the small industrial 
sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and 
commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers are not 
limited specifically by statute. The Government does not prohibit 
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices 
are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). A Unit for Children's Rights 
in the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible 
for monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations. It relies 
upon complaints filed with it rather than initiating its own 
inspections to ensure compliance. As a result, oversight is incomplete.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1994 the Government 
promulgated its first set of regulations for employer-employee 
relations. The regulations specify the terms that must be incorporated 
into employment contracts and address such issues as training, work 
hours, safety, remuneration, leave, fines, termination, etc. There is 
no national minimum wage for the private sector, although the 
Government has established wage floors for certain kinds of work. Given 
the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer competitive pay and 
conditions to attract skilled workers.
    There are no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the 
regulations require that a work contract specify the normal work and 
overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7-
hour day and a 5-day work-week have been established through 
administrative circulars from the President's office. Overtime pay in 
the public sector was instituted in 1990. Employees are authorized 20 
days of annual leave, 30 days of medical leave, maternity leave of 60 
days, and special annual leave of 10 days for extraordinary 
circumstances. There are no laws governing health and safety 
conditions. However, there are regulatory requirements that employers 
provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance of safety 
measures. It is unclear whether workers can remove themselves from 
unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of their jobs. The 
Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labour set up a Labour Dispute 
Settlement Unit in 1998 to resolve wage and labor disputes and to visit 
worksites and enforce labor regulations.
    In 1997 the Government for the first time worked closely with the 
International Labor Organization to address a number of labor issues. 
Although two draft labor laws were prepared in 1998: One to address 
issues such as the right of association, the right to organize, and 
acceptable work conditions related to health, environment, employer-
employee relations, leave, and termination, and the other to deal with 
social security, pensions, and provident funds, these laws have not 
been enabled.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address the problem of 
trafficking in persons; however, the Attorney General's Office believes 
that should a case arise it could be addressed under Shari'a. There 
were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or 
through the country.
                               __________

                                 NEPAL

    Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of 
government. In 1990 the King, formerly an absolute monarch, legalized 
political parties, after which an interim government promulgated a new 
Constitution. The King retains important residual powers, but has 
dissociated himself from direct day-to-day government activities. The 
democratically elected Parliament consists of the House of 
Representatives (lower house) and the National Council (upper house). 
In May 1999, the country's third national parliamentary elections were 
held, which international observers considered to be generally free and 
fair. In February 1996, the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front 
(``Maoists'') launched a ``People's War'' that has led to violence in 
more than 50 of the country's 75 districts. The insurrection has been 
waged through torture, killings, and bombings involving civilians and 
public officials. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, the courts generally are inefficient and 
susceptible to political pressure and corruption.
    The National Police Force maintains internal security and is 
subject to civilian control, but local officials have wide discretion 
in maintaining law and order. Police reaction to the ``People's War'' 
insurgency led to incidents of unwarranted force against prisoners and 
noncombatants. The army, which traditionally is loyal to the King, has 
sought to limit its domestic-security role in responding to the Maoist 
insurgency. The police committed numerous human rights abuses.
    The country is extremely poor, with an annual per capita gross 
domestic product of approximately $242. Over 80 percent of its 23 
million persons support themselves through subsistence agriculture. 
Principal crops include rice, wheat, maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism 
and the export of carpets and garments are the major sources of foreign 
exchange. Foreign aid accounts for more than half of the development 
budget. The economy is mixed, with approximately 50 public sector 
firms. Many former government firms have been privatized since 1992.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police at 
times used unwarranted lethal force and continue to abuse detainees, 
using torture as punishment or to extract confessions. The Government 
rarely investigates allegations of police brutality or punishes police 
officers who commit abuses. The disappearance of persons in custody is 
a problem. Prison conditions remain poor. The authorities use arbitrary 
arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial 
susceptibility to political pressure and corruption, and long delays 
before trial remain problems. The Government generally respects freedom 
of expression; however, at times it imposes some restrictions. The 
Government generally allows for freedom of assembly; some restrictions 
occur but are rare. The Government generally respects freedom of 
religion, although the Constitution imposes restrictions on 
proselytizing to spread religion. Women, the disabled, and lower castes 
suffer from widespread discrimination. Violence against women, 
trafficking in women and girls for prostitution, forced labor, and 
child labor also remain serious problems. There have been instances of 
forced child labor in the past, and there was one reported instance 
during the year.
    The Government established a national human rights commission in 
May. In July the Government outlawed the feudal ``Kamaiya'' system, 
releasing some 200,000 bonded laborers and family members from their 
debts to their landlords.
    During the year, the Maoists increased the scope of their campaign, 
frequently committing torture, killings, bombings, and other abuses.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--The police 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Most extrajudicial killings 
by police involved the Maoist insurgents, but police at times used 
unjustifiable lethal force in other situations as well.
    On October 27 in Dolakha district, police clashed with a group of 
24 Tibetans who had crossed into the country. After the Tibetans began 
throwing stones, police opened fire, killing one person and injuring 
five others. Police officers shot and killed six Nepalese citizens 
during countrywide civil unrest from December 26 to 31. Scores of 
police and hundreds of civilians were injured during the protests 
sparked by alleged anti-Nepali remarks from an Indian film star. On 
December 26 in Kathmandu, police who reportedly were protecting a 
crowded movie theater were surrounded by a group of persons who were 
throwing rocks and threatening to burn down the theater. After overhead 
shots failed to disperse the group, the police fired shots into the 
crowd, killing two persons. Another death occurred as police attempted 
to control rioters in Thamel, another area of Kathmandu. On December 27 
in Kathmandu, police gunfire against disruptive civilians killed two 
more persons including an uninvolved adolescent in a neighboring 
building. On December 31 in Rajbiraj, police shot and killed a 40-year-
old male while attempting to control a mob of persons. The Government 
announced that it would financially compensate the families of those 
killed and make arrangements for medical treatment for those injured in 
the December clashes. At year's end, a government commission was 
investigating the incidents.
    On June 18, Ravi Upreti died of injuries reportedly sustained from 
beatings while in police custody in Jhapa in the eastern part of the 
country. On July 26, Sudish Rimal died shortly after being taken into 
police custody in the Sarlahi district. Family members alleged that he 
was tortured but declined to allow an autopsy, making confirmation of 
these charges impossible.
    Both police and insurgents continued to be killed in the 
increasingly violent ``People's War.'' Launched in February 1996 by 
leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ``People's War'' 
is a self-declared Maoist insurgency. The Government continued to 
commit human rights abuses in its efforts to combat the insurgency. The 
police have killed nearly 1,000 Maoists since 1996. Some of the deaths 
are believed to have been extrajudicial killings. On January 14, police 
opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program'' at a school in Accham 
district, killing nine persons and wounding numerous others (see 
Section 1.c.). Police later admitted that seven of the persons killed 
were innocent bystanders. Police killed at least 18 Maoists during a 
``search operation'' in Rukum in February. An ensuing fire destroyed 
hundreds of homes in the area, though there are conflicting claims as 
to who started the blaze. On December 9, police fired on a meeting of 
the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association in Bharatpur, 
killing one woman and injuring nine others, according to local media 
reports. Police claim that they fired on the crowd only after persons 
threw stones at and charged the police. At year's end, the 20 to 30 
police officers charged with abuses against the public in connection 
with police sweeps in 1998 had not been brought to trial.
    The Maoists were responsible for numerous abuses, and clashes 
between Maoist rebels and police led to a number of deaths during the 
year. On January 3, Maoists killed nine police officers during a 3-hour 
gun battle in Jumla. Six police officers were killed and five others 
were injured seriously in a Maoist ambush in Jajarkot on January 22. On 
February 19, Maoists killed 15 police officers and injured 20 others in 
an attack on a police post in Rolpa. A constable died instantly on May 
25 when he stepped on a landmine planted by Maoists in Tanahu district. 
Three other police officers were wounded. A total of 25 persons were 
killed, including 12 police officers, in a June 8 Maoist attack on a 
police checkpoint in Jajarkot. On June 14, a group of more than 50 
rebels attacked the police post at Junbesi. Three police officers died 
in the ensuing 2hour firefight, after which the rebels bombed the post 
and seized weapons stored there. On July 15, a group of some 300 
Maoists ambushed a police post in Thokarpa, killing 4 police officers 
and injuring 9 others. On September 25, Maoist insurgents attacked the 
district police headquarters of Dolpa, killing at least 14 persons and 
wounding 40 others (see Section 1.c.). On November 30, Maoists attacked 
a police post in Kalikot district, killing 11 police officers. 
Reportedly, some of the police deaths were executions based on a list 
that the Maoists consulted at the time.
    Although their activities are focused on the police, the Maoists 
continued to kill, injure, and kidnap civilians as well. On February 
14, Maoists pulled two men out of a political procession in Rukum and 
beheaded them in front of hundreds of onlookers. It is believed that 
the victims were targeted because they were carrying Nepali Congress 
Party flags. A bomb planted by Maoists behind a police post in Dolpa 
killed an 11-year-old boy on February 15. Two other persons were 
injured in the blast. On February 24 in Sindhupalchowk, a group of 
rebels attacked a local official, tied him to a tree and hacked him to 
death with khukuri, large machete-like knives. On February 26, in 
Okhaldhunga in the eastern part of the country, a group of 
approximately 15 Maoists hacked to death another local official. On May 
3, Maoists kidnaped Chitra Bahadur Thapa, a rival political worker, 
from his home in Bhotechaur. He was found dead 7 days later. On the 
night of July 13, Maoists severed the hands and legs of a resident of 
Gulmi. He died immediately. According to local press reports, on 
November 5, Maoists killed a policeman and injured seven other persons 
in an attack on a police post at a village in Ramechap district.
    According to mid-November government figures, since 1996, the 
insurgency has resulted in the deaths of 1,483 persons, including 234 
police officers, 258 civilians, and 991 insurgents. These figures 
indicate that 98 police, 69 civilians, and 128 insurgents were killed 
through mid-November. The press has reported higher figures, and 
reports have claimed that more police than Maoists were killed during 
the year, pointing to a marked increase in the firepower and 
aggressiveness of the insurgency.
    b. Disappearance.--The disappearance of persons in police custody 
is a problem. According to the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), 
a local human rights organization, 10 persons disappeared from police 
custody during the first 9 months of the year; 218 persons have 
disappeared since 1996. Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a secondary school 
teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights organization, who 
disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu in September 1999, was 
released on July 6 without ever having been charged. There are reports 
that Shrestha was held incommunicado and tortured during his 
incarceration (see Sections 1.c. and 4). According to Amnesty 
International (AI), on September 6, police detained opposition 
politician Ishwari Dahal; at year's end, he remained missing.
    In December 1999, Suresh Ale Magar and Pawan Shrestha were released 
from jail in Kathmandu under a Supreme Court order, but immediately 
were re-arrested. At the time, police denied having them in custody, 
but Magar and Shrestha were released again in February (see Section 
2.a.). On November 3, authorities released Maoist leaders Dinesh Sharma 
and Diananath Gautam, whom police had held in custody for more than 11 
months. At a police-arranged press conference, Sharma initially said 
that he had been treated well; however, after his release he 
disappeared again. A statement later issued in his name alleges that 
police tortured him during his captivity.
    AI reported that on January 8, 1999, lawyer and human rights 
defender Rajendra Dhakal disappeared after his arrest in Jamdi in 
Tanahun district. He reportedly was arrested because of his alleged 
involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, along with two teachers 
arrested at the same time, was taken to the Bel Chantan police post. 
The teachers later were released. Dhakal remains missing, and police 
now deny ever having arrested him (see Section 1.e.). On January 21, 
1999, police arrested freelance journalist Milan Nepali. Nepali, who 
was associated with the left-leaning publication ``Janadesh'', later 
disappeared from police custody; as of year's end, Nepali's whereabouts 
were unknown (see Section 2.a.).
    According to AI, Maoists abducted as least 30 children in Jajarkot 
district in July and August.
    AI also expressed concern about other individuals currently held 
captive. According to AI, Dirgha Bahadur Dashoudi and Narayan Sharma, 
two teachers and members of the Tarun Dal from Dailekh district were 
abducted in early May, and the Chief Education Officer of Rolpa 
district, Rajendra Prasad Yadav was taken from a bus on which he was 
travelling on June 10. Yadav was released on September 16; the others 
remain missing.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law prohibit torture; 
however, the police at times use torture and beatings to punish 
suspects or to extract confessions. According to AI, torture methods 
include boxing of the ears, beating of the feet, and the rolling of 
weights over the thighs. AI noted that torture apparently was used to 
intimidate or punish detainees and to extract information and/or 
confessions, and that torture often occurred while detainees were held 
incommunicado and unable to contact family members, doctors, or lawyers 
(see Section 1.d.). The Government has failed to conduct thorough and 
independent investigations of reports of police brutality and has 
refused to take significant disciplinary action against officers 
involved. Police often are unwilling to investigate and to discipline 
fellow officers, and persons are afraid to bring cases against police 
for fear of reprisals. The Constitution and the Torture Compensation 
Act, which was passed by Parliament in 1996, provide for compensation 
for victims of torture. According to the Center for Victims of Torture 
(CVICT), 10 persons claimed compensation under the act during the year, 
all of the cases that were in the courts as of year's end. Another 20 
persons made claims during 1999. According to the CVICT, during the 
year one of the claims made in 1999 resulted in a payment of $70 (5,000 
rupees) to the claimant; none of the cases filed during the year were 
resolved by year's end. The Government has begun human rights education 
for the police force. According to an August 1999 government newspaper 
report, the Government suspended seven police personnel and appointed a 
high-level commission to probe the death of trucker Ale Tamang 
following alleged police torture while in police custody (see Section 
1.a.).
    Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, who disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu 
in September 1999, was released on July 6 without ever having been 
charged (see Sections 1.b. and 4). Shrestha reportedly was tortured 
early in his incarceration and allegedly was held in solitary 
confinement throughout most of his stay.
    On January 14, police opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program'' 
at a school in Accham district; according to INSEC, police killed nine 
persons and wounded seven others during the incident (see Section 
1.a.). In February police officers allegedly set fire to ``Maoist 
sympathizing'' villages in Rukum in retaliation for the killing of 14 
police officers in a single Maoist attack (see Section 1.a.).
    Human rights groups have reported instances of torture in areas 
affected by the ``People's War.'' Dozens of male detainees reported 
having torture inflicted on them by the police; women in these areas 
have reported instances of rape and sexual abuse by the police. AI, 
which visited the country in 1998, reported that it found evidence of 
``the systematic use of severe torture'' by the police, and raised 
concerns over the relative impunity of the police for such actions; 
however, in contrast to previous years, there only were two reports of 
torture during the year. AI did not find systematic use of severe 
torture when it visited the country during the year.
    On March 10, in Kathmandu, police charged a group of Tibetans with 
clubs and sticks, reportedly injuring several persons, including a 12-
year-old monk. The Tibetans were chanting antiChinese slogans after a 
ceremony to mark the anniversary of the 1959 antiChinese uprising in 
Tibet. In 1999 in Pokhara police used tear gas and batons to break up a 
similar demonstration (see Section 2.b.).
    Local and international human rights groups also have documented 
Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including 
the severing of limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted political 
leaders, local elites, and suspected informers. These targets included 
not only members of the majority Nepali Congress Party (NCP), but also 
members of the opposition Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist/
Leninist (CPN-UML). Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and 
bombed or set fire to government offices and homes of local political 
leaders. International nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also 
were attacked on several occasions, as were foreign companies. There 
also were cases of intimidation, torture, or other degrading treatment. 
On February 17, Maoists set fire to the home of Rukum resident Bal 
Bahadur K.C., a district executive member of the CPN-UML party. The 
house was destroyed completely. On April 23, Maoists assaulted two 
teachers of a primary school in Rukum, beating them and smearing black 
paint on their faces. On April 26, 12 Maoists set fire to the Surhket 
home of NCP regional chairman Yagya Bahadur B.C. On May 6, Maoists 
kidnaped school headmaster Dharma Chandra Sharma from his home in 
Jumla. Sharma was released 2 days later after his captors shaved his 
head and paraded him around his village with shoes tied around his 
neck. Maoists were responsible for at least 17 violent incidents 
involving bombings, arson, and looting, on August 23. On September 25, 
Maoist insurgents attacked the district police headquarters of Dolpa, 
in the town of Dunai, killing at least 14 persons and wounding 40 
others (see Section 1.a.). On October 23, approximately 30 members of 
the student wing of the Maoists attacked the Padma Kanya School's 
principle.
    Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is common in prisons, and 
authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. Women normally are 
incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions. The 
Government still has not implemented a provision in the 1992 Children's 
Act calling for the establishment of a juvenile home and juvenile 
court. Consequently children sometimes are incarcerated with 
adultseither with an incarcerated parent, or, as one local NGO reports, 
as criminal offenders. The Department of Prisons states that there are 
approximately 10 children in jail or custody for offenses that they 
have committed and approximately 100 noncriminal dependent children 
housed along with their parents (see Section 5). In April the 
Government established separate juvenile benches in district courts 
where youth are tried. As a result, trials of persons under the age of 
18 now occur in a separate room in the courthouse, though there are no 
separate juvenile courts as such. Likewise, there is no provision for 
separate juvenile detention facilities.
    The authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to 
hospitals than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of 
appropriate facilities, the authorities sometimes place the mentally 
ill in jails under inhumane conditions.
    The Government permits local human rights groups and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect 
within 24 hours of arrest, but the police at times violate this 
provision. Under the Public Offenses Act of 1970, the police must 
obtain warrants for an arrest unless a person is caught in the act of 
committing a crime. For many offenses, the case must be filed in court 
within 7 days of arrest. If the court upholds the detention, the law 
authorizes the police to hold the suspect for 25 days to complete their 
investigation, with a possible extension of 7 days. However, the police 
occasionally hold prisoners longer, though the Supreme Court has, in 
some cases, ordered the release of detainees held longer than 24 hours 
without a court appearance.
    Detainees do have the legal right to receive visits by family 
members, and they are permitted access to lawyers only after 
authorities file charges. In practice the police grant access to 
prisoners on a basis that varies from prison to prison. There is a 
system of bail, but bonds are too expensive for most citizens. 
According to the Department of Prisons, about half of the 6,000 persons 
imprisoned are awaiting trial. Due to court backlogs, a slow appeals 
process, and poor access to legal representation, pretrial detention 
often exceeds the period to which persons subsequently are sentenced 
after a trial and conviction.
    Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons 
who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquillity, amicable 
relations with other states, and relations between citizens of 
different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detains 
under the act are considered to be in preventive detention and can be 
held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. Human 
rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and 
detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities 
considered sympathetic to the Maoists (see Section 1.b.). Since the 
insurgents began their terrorist campaigns, police have arrested 5,866 
suspected Maoists. Of those persons arrested, 1,654 had been tried and 
4,182 had been released.
    The 1991 amendments to the Public Security Act allow the 
authorities to extend periods of detention after submitting written 
notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court 
of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6 
months of detention before authorities file official charges.
    Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary 
detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as 
disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Human rights 
monitors express concern that the act vests too much discretionary 
power in the Chief District Officer (CDO), the highest-ranking civil 
servant in each of the country's 75 districts. The act authorizes the 
CDO to order detentions, to issue search warrants, and to specify fines 
and other punishments for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few 
recent instances of the use of the Public Offenses Act have come to 
light, since it has become more common, particularly with the Maoists, 
to arrest persons under the Public Security Act. In January local 
authorities in Biratnagar arrested Laxmi Mudbari, the central member of 
the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary), 
under the act; Mudbari remained incarcerated at year's end. Human 
rights commission officials reported several other cases of arrests or 
detentions under the act, but were unable to provide details of the 
cases.
    Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion, 
on suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section 
2.a.).
    The police have arrested or illegally detained some suspected 
Maoist insurgents and held them incommunicado. There are no other 
political detainees.
    The Constitution prohibits exile; it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
independence; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to 
political pressure and bribery of judges and court staff is endemic. 
The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of 
legislation passed by Parliament. In the past it has ruled that 
provisions in the 1992 Labor Act and in the 1991 Nepal Citizenship Act 
are unconstitutional. In 1995 the Court also decided that the 
dissolution of the Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister 
was unconstitutional, and ordered the body restored.
    Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent, 
although sometimes they bend to political pressure as well. In Rolpa, 
one of the districts most affected by the ``People's War,'' human 
rights groups have accused the district courts of acting in complicity 
with CDO's in violating detainees' rights. These groups allege that 
arrest without a warrant, prolonged detention without trial, and police 
torture occurs in these areas.
    The judicial system consists of three levels: District courts, 
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body 
chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council also is responsible for the 
assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative 
matters. Judges decide cases; there is no jury system.
    Delays in the administration of justice are a severe problem. 
According to the latest statistics, approximately 150,000 cases are 
active throughout the country. The Supreme Court has a backlog of 
approximately 15,000 cases. At the Court's current rate, it never will 
clear this backlog.
    The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal 
protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection 
from retroactive application of the law, and for public trials, except 
in some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions, 
including acquittals, are subject to appeal. The Supreme Court is the 
court of last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King also can 
suspend, commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the 
Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners--if they have 
served 75 percent of their sentence and shown good behavior--on 
national holidays.
    Although prisoners have a constitutional right to legal 
representation and a court appointed lawyer, government lawyers or 
access to private attorneys is provided only on request. Consequently, 
those persons unaware of their rights may be deprived of legal 
representation.
    There have been reports of cases in previous years in which 
authorities allegedly penalized attorneys involved in the defense of 
human rights. In January 1999, lawyer and human rights defender 
Rajendra Dhakal was arrested reportedly because of his alleged 
involvement in Maoist violence. He has not been seen since (see Section 
1.b). Kathmandu newspapers reported that in July 1999, four lawyers 
pleading for a group of three detained journalists were ordered 
detained themselves by a district judge as they tried to express their 
views on the judicial order to detain the journalists. After other 
attorneys came to protest the arrests, the attorneys were released (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who 
are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. In 1992 the Supreme 
Court ruled that military courts could no longer try civilians for 
crimes involving the military services.
    The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the 
Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in 
closed sessions. No such trials have occurred during the past 5 years.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, Or 
Correspondence.--The Government generally respected the privacy of the 
home and family. Search warrants are required before searches and 
seizures may be carried out, except in cases involving suspected 
security and narcotics violations. As amended, the Police Act of 1955 
empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures in 
criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal activities. 
Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor cases must 
be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in felony cases.
    Government provisions permit discrimination in employment on the 
basis of political opinion; however, such discrimination is not known 
to occur.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that 
all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the 
Government may not censor any news item or other reading material; 
however, the Government imposes some restrictions on these rights. The 
Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the 
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious 
relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote 
sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent 
public behavior or morality.
    The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of 
publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The Act 
also includes penalties for violating these requirements. In addition 
the Act prohibits publication of material that, among other things, 
promotes disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that 
undermines security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the 
integrity or sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among 
persons of different castes and religions; or that adversely affects 
the good conduct or morality of the public. However, throughout August 
and September, the press and several private FM radio stations produced 
a number of stories calling for the prosecution of a nephew of the 
monarch who allegedly killed a popular local singer in a hit-and-run 
incident. This is the first time the local media has confronted a 
member of the royal family. The Press and Publications Act also 
provides a basis for banning foreign publications. However, foreign 
publications are widely available.
    There are hundreds of independent vernacular and Englishlanguage 
newspapers available, representing various political points of view. 
The Government owns ``Gorkhapatra,'' the second-largest circulating 
Nepali daily, and ``The Rising Nepal,'' the second-largest English 
daily. Editors and writers at the government newspapers practice self-
censorship and generally reflect government policy. Ruling political 
parties have influenced the editorial policy of the government 
newspapers to their advantage. However, despite the sensitivity of the 
Government to the ``People's War,'' the press has not faced overt 
pressure to report on it in a particular way. Views of human rights 
groups, the statements of the police, and the press releases of Maoist 
leaders all have been reported in the local press.
    Nevertheless, journalists and their advocates have suffered human 
rights abuses. Shambhu Prasad Patel, vice president of the Rautahat 
Branch of the Nepal Press Union (NPU), was shot and killed by two 
unidentified gunmen on January 23 at his residence; as of year's end, 
no one had been held accountable. On February 13, police arrested and 
briefly detained Dev Kumar Yadav, a Maoist-leaning newspaper reporter 
for Janadesh and council member of the Federation of Nepalese 
Journalists, Siraha (FNJS), and Nagendra Kumar Paswan, a reporter for 
Mahima and vice chairman of the FNJS. No charges were filed. The 1999 
case against Krishna Sen, the editor of Janadesh who was arrested in 
connection with the publication of an interview with a Maoist leader, 
continued during the year. On February 18, Sen was charged under the 
Illegal Weapons Act and subsequently was sent to Rajbiraj jail in 
Saptari. Also in February police released Suresh Ale Magar, another 
columnist with Janadesh who had been held without a detention order 
(see Section 1.b.). On March 12, Jagdish Bhattarai, editor of the local 
weekly Nava Chetana and correspondent for Kantipur Daily in Palpa, was 
sentenced to 7 days in jail and fined approximately $7.20 (500 rupees) 
for contempt of court. Bhattarai was accused of writing a 1998 
editorial that denounced corruption and threatened to publish names of 
corrupt government officials. On May 8, the publication Gorkhapatra 
suspended associate editor Ram Prasad Acharya for publishing a Maoist 
press release. Freelance journalist Milan Nepali remains missing (see 
Section 1.b). In contrast to prior years, there were no reported 
incidents of seizure of either publications or equipment.
    In February the censor board of the Ministry of Information and 
Communications banned public screening of the film ``Aago'' (Fire), 
claiming that the film undermined public safety. The film contained 
references to the Maoist insurgency. In July the board allowed the film 
to be shown after the references had been deleted.
    The Broadcast Act of 1993 allows private television and FM radio 
broadcasts, but implementation of the Act has been slow. The Government 
owns the only television station, and controls one radio station that 
broadcasts both AM and FM signals. Radio, primarily short and medium 
waves, reaches the greatest number of persons and has the largest 
influence. Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the 
country through a series of repeater stations. With privatization of a 
number of radio bands, there was a marked increase in the range of 
programming options available. However, only government-owned Radio 
Nepal may originate its own local news broadcasts, and all stations 
must rebroadcast its news programs. The Government does not restrict 
access to foreign radio broadcasts, private cable networks, or to the 
purchase of television satellite dishes. Indian and Pakistani broadcast 
television also is readily available in many parts of the country.
    Since 1996 two private cable television networks have been 
operating in the Kathmandu valley. They mainly provide entertainment 
programming, but commentary critical of government policies 
occasionally occurs during publicly broadcast discussion programs. 
Throughout the country, local entrepreneurs also are receiving 
international stations via satellite for viewing in local bars, and are 
reselling the signal to local residents. Television time on the 
government-owned television station also is leased to private 
producers.
    There are four private radio stations and three community-owned 
radio stations that have their own transmitters, an increase of two and 
one, respectively, over 1999. During the year, a private company 
acquired a license to establish a 1,000-watt FM transmitter in the 
eastern part of the country, which will cover much of the eastern 
region and portions of India. Five private radio stations so far have 
been licensed to operate outside of the capital city, although none 
have begun their broadcasts. Although nongovernment radio stations are 
precluded legally from broadcasting locally developed news, private 
stations select which newspaper stories to read, permitting editorial 
perspective. Private stations also must broadcast the Government 
station's news program but are permitted to rebroadcast news from 
abroad. Private radio stations, like print media, practice self-
censorship. In August 1999, one private radio station reported that a 
government official asked the station to stop a live call-in advice 
show dealing with the topics of HIV/AIDS and teenage problems. Other 
talk shows on sensitive topics continued without government comment.
    There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and 
privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, which 
successive governments so far have resisted, to open the airwaves and 
divest government-controlled printing operations. However, private FM 
radio and cable and satellite television have overtaken the 
Government's ability to regulate them.
    No government efforts to curtail academic freedom were reported 
during the year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, although it may be restricted by law 
on vague grounds such as undermining the sovereignty and integrity of 
the State or disturbing law and order. These restrictions rarely were 
used during the year. Large public demonstrations are common, and 
police intervention is rare except in cases where crowds become violent 
or violate the terms of their parade permit. On March 10, the Tibetan 
community in Kathmandu held its annual ceremony to commemorate the 
anniversary of the 1959 anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet. Following the 
conclusion of the official ceremony, a large group of young persons 
left the event location and went onto a public street chanting anti-
Chinese slogans. After attempting to restore order, police charged the 
crowd, reportedly injuring several persons in the process (see Section 
1.c.). In March 1999, police arrested 27 Tibetan demonstrators 
commemorating the same event in Pokhara; the police used tear gas and 
batons to break up the demonstration. All of the protesters were 
released soon after the incident.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and permits the practice of all religions; however, although 
the Government generally has not interfered with the practice of 
religions, conversion and proselytizing are prohibited and punishable 
with fines or imprisonment, and members of minority religions 
occasionally complain of police harassment. Some Christian groups are 
concerned that the ban on proselytizing limits the expression of non-
Hindu religious belief. The Constitution describes the country as a 
``Hindu Kingdom,'' although it does not establish Hinduism as the state 
religion.
    The large majority of citizens are Hindu. There are smaller numbers 
of Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian citizens, as well.
    April public observances of Easter in a Kathmandu park and a 
Passover Seder in a major hotel in Kathmandu were uneventful. However, 
in 1999, Christian groups in Kathmandu were prevented from observing 
Good Friday in a public park when they failed to obtain the proper 
permit; 3 members of a group of 400 persons reportedly were injured 
when police attempted to disperse the group's subsequent protest at a 
local government office. Easter services that year, which did have the 
proper permit, took place in a public park without incident.
    A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or 
imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country. 
Although arrests or detentions for proselytizing are rare, there have 
been few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection with 
conversion or proselytization during the last few years. However, the 
Government on occasion investigates reports of proselytizing. It 
investigated a 1997 accusation against the Adventist Development and 
Relief Agency (ADRA), and cleared ADRA in 1997. Nongovernmental groups 
or individuals are free to file charges of proselytizing against 
individuals or organizations. Such a case was filed with the Supreme 
Court against ADRA and the United Missions to Nepal, an umbrella 
Protestant group, on December 31, 1999. The case still was pending at 
year's end.
    For decades dozens of Christian missionary hospitals, welfare 
organizations, and schools have operated in the country. These 
organizations have not proselytized and have operated freely. 
Missionary schools are among the most respected institutions of 
secondary education in the country; most of the country's governing and 
business elite graduated from Jesuit high schools. Many foreign 
Christian organizations have direct ties to Nepali churches and sponsor 
Nepali priests for religious training abroad.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste, 
except for traditional religious practices at Hindu temples, where, for 
example, members of the lowest caste are not permitted.
    The Press and Publications Act prohibits the publication of 
materials that create animosity among persons of different castes or 
religions.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict 
travel abroad. However, for security reasons, the Government restricts 
travel by foreigners, including Tibetan residents in Nepal, to some 
areas near the Chinese border. The Government also has imposed 
restrictions on women's travel to the Gulf states to work as domestic 
servants, in response to cases of abuse of such women in the past. 
These restrictions do not apply to women who are traveling to the Gulf 
states for other reasons, nor do they apply for travel to other areas. 
Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory. The 
Government allows citizens abroad to return, and is not known to revoke 
citizenship for political reasons.
    The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does 
provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with other 
humanitarian organizations, in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet 
(China). The UNHCR has maintained an office in Kathmandu since 1989. 
Since 1959 the Government has accepted as residents approximately 
20,000 Tibetan refugees, many of whom still reside in the country. 
Since 1991 it also has provided asylum to some 97,000 Bhutanese 
refugees, the great majority of whom are living in UNHCR administered 
camps in the eastern part of the country.
    China and the Government of Nepal tightened control of movement 
across their border in 1986, but both sides have enforced these 
restrictions haphazardly. Police and customs officials occasionally 
harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from China. 
According to the UNHCR, police conduct in this regard has improved in 
the last 2 years, although border police sometimes extort money from 
Tibetans in exchange for passage. There were no reports of forced 
expulsion of Tibetan asylum seekers during the year.
    There are approximately 98,000 ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan 
in UNHCR-administered camps in the southeastern region of the country. 
An additional 15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either Nepal 
or India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's 
estimated pre-1991 population.
    The UNHCR monitors the condition of the Bhutanese refugees and 
provides for their basic needs. The Government accepts the refugee 
presence as temporary, on humanitarian grounds, but offers little more 
than a place to stay. The Government officially restricts refugee 
freedom of movement and work, but does not strictly enforce its 
policies. Visitors to the camps universally describe conditions as 
excellent. Violence sometimes has broken out between camp residents and 
the surrounding local population. The UNHCR and other donors and relief 
organizations have defused tensions through a refugee-affected areas 
assistance plan aimed at improving conditions in communities adjacent 
to the camps.
    In 1993 the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan formed a joint 
committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem. No 
significant breakthroughs were made for several years. However, during 
the tenth round of bilateral talks December 24-27, Nepal and Bhutan 
agreed to prepare for verification at the camps in January 2001. 
Earlier lack of progress in the talks had left refugees frustrated, and 
both government leaders and international organization officials were 
concerned that the frustration could lead to unrest. Refugees continued 
to hold ``peace marches'' to protest their plight.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully. 
Citizens, through their elected representatives, also have the right to 
amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles 
that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the 
multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
    Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of 
government. Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5 
years. Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its 
majority, loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. Under 
the Constitution all citizens aged 18 and over may vote.
    The House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation 
directly to the King by majority vote. The National Council, or upper 
house, may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house 
can overrule its objections. The upper house also may introduce 
legislation and send it to the lower house for consideration.
    The King exercises certain powers with the advice and consent of 
the Council of Ministers. These include exclusive authority to enact, 
amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to the throne. The King's 
income and property are tax-exempt and inviolable, and no question may 
be raised in any court about any act performed by the King. The 
Constitution also permits the King to exercise emergency powers in the 
event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic 
depression. In such an emergency, the King may suspend without judicial 
review many basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and 
assembly, freedom from censorship, and freedom from preventive 
detention. However, he may not suspend habeas corpus or the right to 
form associations. The King's declaration of a state of emergency must 
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the 
Parliament. If the lower house is not in session, the upper house 
exercises this power. A state of emergency may be maintained for up to 
3 months without legislative approval and for up to 6 months, renewable 
only once for an additional 6 months, if the legislature grants 
approval.
    The Constitution bars the registration and participation in 
elections of any political party that is based on ``religion, 
community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly 
and democratically. During the most recent national elections in May 
1999, there were sporadic incidents of violence that mainly occurred 
between supporters of rival political parties. Maoist efforts to 
disrupt the elections by intimidating voters and candidates had little 
effect. The elections generally were held throughout the country 
according to schedule. International observers considered the elections 
to be generally free and fair.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no 
specific laws that restrict women, indigenous peoples, or minorities 
from participating in the Government or in political parties. Tradition 
limits the roles of women and some castes in the political process. 
However, the Constitution requires that women constitute 5 percent of 
each party's candidates for the House of Representatives. A 1999 royal 
ordinance, which Parliament has ratified, also requires that 20 percent 
of all village and municipal level seats be reserved for female 
candidates. The 1999 elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in 
the number of women in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the 
60-seat upper house.
    No specific laws prevent minorities from voting or restrict them 
from participating in the Government and political parties on the same 
basis as other citizens. Hindus and members of certain castes 
traditionally have wielded more power than others, but members of other 
religious and social groups have in recent years gained increasing 
influence in government, including senior leadership positions. There 
are no special provisions to allocate a set number or percentage of 
political party positions or parliamentary seats for any minority 
group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are approximately 10 human rights NGO's. These include the 
Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), the Informal Sector 
Services Center (INSEC), the International Institute for Human Rights, 
Environment, and Development (INHURED), and the Forum for the 
Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR). The Nepal Law Society also 
monitors human rights abuses and a number of NGO's focus on specific 
areas such as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic 
minorities. Groups are free to publish reports on human rights abuses. 
The Government also has allowed groups to visit prisons and prisoners. 
The Government rarely arrests or detains persons reporting on human 
rights problems, but in June 1998, the police arrested Gopal Siwakoti 
Chintan, a human rights activist, for alleged collaboration with Maoist 
rebels. The police also confiscated audiotapes and videotapes of 
interviews with victims of human rights violations from Chintan's 
office. The police later released Chintan due to insufficient evidence 
that he had collaborated with the Maoists. There were reports that the 
Government and Maoists limited the activities of human rights 
activists.
    On July 6, police officers released Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a 
secondary school teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights 
organization; Shrestha never was charged (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    The insurgency has caused a number of NGO's in the midwestern 
districts to reduce their activities substantially. Agricultural 
development projects and community health offices have been frequent 
targets. Maoists also have targeted aircraft attempting to make 
humanitarian deliveries of foodstuffs to midwestern districts.
    In May the Government formed the Human Rights Commission (HRC), a 
government-appointed commission with a mandate to investigate human 
rights violations. Since then the commission has received nearly 400 
complaints of human rights violations. Although some cases involve 
disappearance of detainees, illegal detention, and arrest of acquitted 
persons, many other cases are relatively trivial. The HRC notes that 
none of its cases have moved forward. Many do not merit prosecution; 
for those that do, the HRC lacks the legal resources to pursue them in 
the courts.
    The Government does not refuse visas to international NGO human 
rights monitors, or otherwise restrict their access when they are in 
the country. However, some areas along the country's border with China 
are restricted. An organization monitoring Tibetan refugee flows has 
been denied access to these border areas.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifies that the State shall not discriminate 
against citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, or ideology. 
However, there still is a caste system. Discrimination against lower 
castes, women, and the disabled remains common, especially in rural 
areas.
    Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem, but it 
receives limited public attention. In a 1996 study, 50 percent of the 
respondents said that they know someone who was the victim of domestic 
violence. In another 1996 survey, respondents listed the perpetrators 
of violence in 77 percent of incidents as family members, and 58 
percent reported that it is a daily occurrence. There currently is no 
law against domestic violence.
    Rape and incest also are problems, particularly in rural areas. 
Laws against rape provide for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for the 
rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape of 
a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes imprisonment for 1 year 
or a fine for the rape of a prostitute. The law does not forbid spousal 
rape.
    The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai 
region. The killing of brides because of defaults on dowry payments is 
rare, but does occur. More common is the physical abuse of wives by the 
husband and the husband's family to obtain additional dowry or to force 
the woman to leave to enable the son to remarry.
    There is a general unwillingness among citizens, and particularly 
among government figures, to recognize violence against women as a 
problem. In a survey conducted by Saathi, a local NGO, 42 percent of 
the respondents said that in their experience medical practitioners 
were uncooperative or negligent in cases of violence against women and 
girls. This unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls 
as unacceptable in daily life is seen not just in the medical 
profession, but among the police and politicians as well.
    The police department has a ``women's cell'' in five cities, 
including Kathmandu. These cells include female officers who receive 
special training in handling victims of domestic violence. The police 
also have sent out directives instructing all officers to treat 
domestic violence as a criminal offense that should be prosecuted. 
However, according to a police official, this type of directive is 
difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory attitudes. 
Even though the police may make an arrest, further prosecution seldom 
is pursued by the victim or by the Government.
    At least six NGO's in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence 
against women and on women's issues in general. Saathi's assistance 
program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center. 
The shelter provides housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal 
advocacy for the victims of violence.
    Trafficking in women remains a serious social problem in several of 
the country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women still are 
forced to work against their will as prostitutes in other countries 
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including 
equal pay for equal work, the Government has not taken significant 
action to implement its provisions, even in many of its own industries. 
Women face systematic discrimination, particularly in rural areas, 
where religious and cultural tradition, lack of education, and 
ignorance of the law remain severe impediments to their exercise of 
basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold property in their own 
names.
    Women have benefited from some changes in marriage and inheritance 
laws. In 1994 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the 
Citizenship Law that discriminated against foreign spouses of Nepalese 
women. However, many other discriminatory laws still remain. According 
to legal experts, there are over 20 laws that discriminate against 
women. For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on 
narrower grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property 
rights also favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy, 
and the division of family property. In 1995 the Supreme Court also 
ordered the Council of Ministers to enact legislation within 1 year 
giving women property rights in regard to inheritance and land tenancy 
that were equal to those of men. Alhough legislation to comply with 
this order has been introduced, it remains stalled in Parliament.
    According to the 1991 census, the female literacy rate is 26 
percent, compared with 57 percent for men. Human rights groups report 
that girls attend secondary schools at a rate half that of boys. There 
are many NGO's focused on integrating women into society and the 
economy. These NGO's work in the areas of literacy, small business, 
skills transfer, and prevention of trafficking in women and girls. 
There also are a growing number of women's advocacy groups.
    Most political parties have women's groups. Members of Parliament 
have begun working for the passage of tougher laws for crimes of sexual 
assault, but have had little success so far.
    Children.--Education is not compulsory. Government policy is to 
provide free primary education for all children between the ages of 6 
and 12 years, but the quality of education is sorely inadequate, many 
families cannot afford school supplies and clothing, and schools do not 
exist in all areas. Schools charge fees for higher education. Roughly 
60 percent of the children who work also attend school. However, 
approximately 70 to 75 percent of boys who work go to school, compared 
to only 50 to 60 percent of the girls who work. Free health care is 
provided through government clinics, but they are poorly equipped and 
too few in number to meet the demand. Community-based health programs 
assist in the prevention of childhood diseases and provide primary 
health care services. Due to poor or nonexistent sanitation in rural 
areas, many children are at risk from severe and fatal illnesses.
    Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remain serious 
problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Societal attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be 
bartered off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact, 
consider marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that 
increases one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, child 
brides are common. According to UNICEF's Regional Office for South 
Asia, 40 percent of all marriages involve a girl under 14 years of age. 
The age difference in marriage often is cited as one cause of domestic 
violence.
    A local NGO reports that approximately 100 children considered 
delinquents or accused of public offenses are incarcerated with adults 
because the Government has not established juvenile homes. Some of 
these delinquent children allegedly are as young as 9 years old, even 
though, under the law, children under 18 cannot be charged with crimes; 
the Government reports that about 10 persons under the age of 18 are 
incarcerated for crimes they have committed. The UNHCR believes that 
police sometimes have falsified the ages of young detainees in order to 
avoid challenge on this point. However, according to the press, almost 
100 children are in jails as noncriminal dependents of incarcerated 
adults (see Section 1.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--The disabled face widespread 
discrimination. Families often are stigmatized by and ashamed of 
disabled family members, who may be hidden away or neglected. Economic 
integration is further hampered by the general view that the disabled 
are unproductive. The mentally retarded are associated with the 
mentally ill. Sometimes, mentally ill and retarded persons are placed 
in prisons due to the lack of facilities or support.
    The Government has long been involved in providing for the 
disabled, but the level of government assistance has not met the needs 
of the disabled. The 1982 Disabled Persons Protection and Welfare Act 
and additional 1994 rules mandate accessibility to buildings, to 
transportation, to employment, to education, and to other state 
services. However, despite government funding for special education 
programs, the Government does not implement or enforce laws regarding 
the disabled. A number of NGO's working with the disabled receive 
significant funding from the Government, but persons who are physically 
or mentally disabled rely almost exclusively on family members to 
assist them.
    Religious Minorities.--The adherents of the country's many 
religions generally coexist peacefully and respect all places of 
worship. Most Hindus respect the many Buddhist shrines located 
throughout the country; Buddhists accord Hindu shrines the same 
respect. Buddha's birthplace is an important pilgrimage site, and 
Buddha's birthday is a national holiday. The country's Muslim minority 
is not well integrated with the Hindu and Buddhist communities.
    Some Christian groups report that Hindu extremism has increased in 
recent years. In January 1999, the India-based Hindu political party 
Shiv Sena, locally known as Pashupati Sena, opened an office in 
Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates unsuccessfully ran for office in 
the 1999 general elections. Government policy does not support Hindu 
extremism, although some political figures have made public statements 
critical of Christian missionary activities. Some citizens are wary of 
proselytizing and conversion by Christians and, therefore, view the 
growth of Christianity with alarm.
    Those who choose to convert to other religions--in particular Hindu 
citizens who convert to Islam or Christianity--sometimes are ostracized 
socially. Some reportedly have been forced to leave their villages. 
While this prejudice is not systematic, it can be vehement and 
occasionally violent. Hindus who convert to another religion may face 
isolated incidents of hostility or discrimination from Hindu extremist 
groups. Nevertheless, converts generally do not fear to admit in public 
their new religious affiliations.
    The caste system strongly influences society, even though it is 
prohibited by the Constitution. However, the Government allows caste 
discrimination at Hindu temples where, for example, members of the 
lowest caste are not permitted to enter. Otherwise, the Government 
makes an effort to protect the rights of the disadvantaged castes. In 
1998 the Government formed the ``Committee for the Upliftment of 
Depressed Communities,'' which runs income generation, public 
education, and scholarship programs for the disadvantaged castes.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic 
groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides 
that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its 
language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies 
that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary 
level in its mother tongue.
    Discrimination against lower castes especially is common in the 
rural areas in the western part of the country. Although the Government 
has outlawed the public shunning of ``untouchables,'' an exception was 
retained for traditional practices at Hindu religious sites. Economic, 
social, and educational advancement tend to be a function of historical 
patterns, geographic location, and caste. Better education and higher 
levels of prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu valley, slowly are 
reducing caste distinctions and increasing opportunities for lower 
socioeconomic groups. Better educated urban-oriented castes (Brahmin, 
Chhetri, and certain elements of the Newar community traditionally 
dominant in the Kathmandu valley) continue to dominate politics and 
senior administrative and military positions, and to control a 
disproportionate share of natural resources in their territories.
    In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often 
are conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby 
municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university 
levels is conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which is 
constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. Human 
rights groups report that the languages of the small Kusunda, Dura, and 
Meche communities nearly are extinct.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permits 
restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar 
conditions. Despite the political transformation in 1990, trade unions 
still are developing their administrative structures to organize 
workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker education 
programs.
    Union participation in the formal sector accounts for approximately 
10 to 12 percent of the formal work force. In 1992 Parliament passed 
the Labor Act and the Trade Union Act, and formulated enabling 
regulations. However, the Government has not yet fully implemented the 
laws. The Trade Union Act defines procedures for establishing trade 
unions, associations, and federations. It also protects unions and 
officials from lawsuits arising from actions taken in the discharge of 
union duties, including collective bargaining, and prohibits employers 
from discriminating against trade union members or organizers. There 
have been few reports of discrimination against union members.
    The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services 
such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law 
empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's 
activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affects 
the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a 
union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot 
for the strike to be legal. Workers at a jute mill in Biratnagar struck 
from June 29 to July 4 to demand tenure, medical benefits, and annual 
leave. Workers returned to their jobs after management acceded to most 
of their demands. In August thousands of employees of various 
government-owned corporations went on strike to protest perceived 
inequities in their pay scales. The employees later returned to work 
voluntarily after the Government appointed a committee tasked with 
reaching an agreement on the issue. Several days later, the Government 
issued notices in local media stating that in the future, it would 
enforce the Essential Services Act of 1957 which prohibits strikes by 
employees of government-owned enterprises.
    The Government does not restrict unions from joining international 
labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations 
maintain a variety of international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act 
provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational 
structures to implement the Act's provisions have not been established. 
Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage 
earners in the organized sector. However, labor remains widely unable 
to use collective bargaining effectively due to inexperience and 
employer reluctance to bargain.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits slavery, serfdom, forced labor, or trafficking in human 
beings in any form; however, forced labor and trafficking in persons 
remain problems (see Section 6.f.). The Department of Labor enforces 
laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but remains 
unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
    Large numbers of women still are forced to work against their will 
as prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). Bonded labor, especially in 
agricultural work, was a perennial problem. Bonded laborers usually 
were members of lower castes. Bonded labor reportedly occurred among 
certain ethnic groups in the western Terai region. However, the 
Government in July outlawed bonded labor and released the ``Kamaiya'' 
bonded agricultural workers, from their debts. By year's end, the 
Government had not yet provided land to the Kamaiyas for resettlement 
nor had it begun programs to prepare the Kamaiyas for economic 
independence; however, it had announced plans to do so. The Government 
has set up temporary camps for the Kamaiyas and begun arrangements for 
distribution of food under a food-for-work program.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be 
employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work and limits 
children between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour work-week. 
The law also mandates acceptable working conditions for children. The 
law establishes a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in 
industry and 14 years in agriculture and mandates acceptable working 
conditions for children.
    On July 21, the country passed its first comprehensive child labor 
law. The law, drafted with the assistance of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), tightened earlier laws. It is the first national 
legislation to establish specific penalties for those who unlawfully 
employ children. It repeats the existing prohibition of the employment 
of children under the age of 14 years and renews the constitutional 
provision that children between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work, 
but no more than 6 hours a day and 6 days a week. The law prohibits 
child labor in tourism, cigarette or carpet factories, mines, or 
laboratories. Employers must maintain records of all 14- to 16-year-old 
laborers.
    These legal protections notwithstanding, resources devoted to their 
enforcement are limited, and children work in many sectors of the 
economy. According to a 1996 ILO study, up to 40 percent of all 
children work, mostly in agriculture. Others work in the carpet 
weaving, pottery, basket weaving, sewing, and ironsmithing industries. 
NGO's estimate that 2.6 million children are economically active, 1.7 
million of which work fulltime. According to a 1996 ILO study, most 
working children in the country are girls. Roughly 60 percent of the 
children who work also attend school. However, approximately 70 to 75 
percent of boys who work go to school, compared with 50 to 60 percent 
of girls who work. There also are reports that the Maoists use 
children, including girls, as soldiers, shields, runners, and 
messengers.
    The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record is improving. In 
February police rescued five children from a garment factory in 
Kathmandu. The children claimed that they were forced to work more than 
12 hours a day and that some were abused sexually. According to a 
February 1999 press report, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 years 
who were employed forcibly in a wool factory in Jorpati. The Government 
introduced a number of programs beginning in 1998 that are designed to 
reduce child labor. For example, the Ministry of Labor has set up three 
centers for children of carpet weavers, who might otherwise join their 
parents at the loom. The centers provide day care or education for the 
children, depending upon their ages. The Government also conducts 
public awareness programs to raise public sensitivity to the problem of 
child labor.
    The private sector has made its own efforts to eradicate child 
labor, especially in the carpet industry. Since 1996, the Rugmark 
Foundation has certified carpets made without child labor. Over half of 
all carpet factories now participate in this or a similar certification 
system. Partially as a result of this initiative, and of consumer 
pressure, children reportedly now constitute only 5 percent of the work 
force in the exportoriented carpet industry, and the carpet 
manufacturers association in August 1999 pledged publicly to end child 
labor in the industry by 2005. However, children's rights activists 
still say that, in the smaller factories, children remain a part of the 
work force. Rugmark, in its self-policing function, reports that it 
found 20 children working in carpet factories in Kathmandu in April and 
May.
    Trafficking in girls continues to be a serious problem (see Section 
6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In April the Government passed 
legislation that raised the minimum monthly wage for unskilled labor to 
$20 (1,450 rupees). The law also defined monthly minimum wages for 
semi-skilled labor at about $21 (1,500 rupees), skilled labor at $22 
(1,610 rupees), and highly skilled labor at $25 (1,800 rupees). The 
minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $16 (1,144 rupees). 
Wages in the unorganized service sector and in agriculture often are as 
much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act calls for a 48-hour work-week, 
with 1 day off per week, and limits overtime to 20 hours per week. 
Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident fund 
and maternity benefits also are established in the Act. Implementation 
of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government has not created 
the necessary regulatory or administrative structures to enforce its 
provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations. Although the law authorizes labor officers 
to order employers to rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety 
standards remains minimal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking and 
prescribes imprisonment of up to 20 years for infractions; however, 
trafficking in women and girls remains a serious social problem in 
several of the country's poorest areas. Young women are by far the most 
common targets; trafficking of men and boys is not known to occur. 
While the vast majority of trafficking is of women and girls for the 
commercial sex industry, women and girls sometimes are trafficked for 
domestic service, manual or semi-skilled labor, or other purposes. 
Nepal is a primary sending country for the South Asia region; most 
women and girls trafficked from the country go to India. Local NGO's 
working against trafficking estimate that 5,000 to 7,000 Nepali girls 
between the ages of 10 and 18 are lured or abducted annually into India 
and subsequently forced into prostitution. In some cases, parents or 
relatives sell women and young girls into sexual slavery. Hundreds of 
girls and women return to the country annually after having worked as 
prostitutes in India. Most are destitute and, according to some 
estimates, 65 percent are HIV-positive when they return. There is 
legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking, including a ban 
on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in Saudi Arabia 
and other countries in the Gulf (see Section 2.d.); women's rights 
groups have protested the ban as discriminatory.
    Prostitution also is a problem in the Kathmandu valley. A 
children's human rights group states that 20 percent of prostitutes in 
the country are younger than 16 years old.
    Since 1996 active special police units have dealt with crimes 
against women and children.
    Despite recent attempts to increase the imposition of penalties on 
traffickers, enforcement of antitrafficking statutes remains sporadic. 
The fear of the spread of AIDS by returning prostitutes has discouraged 
the Government from promoting efforts to rehabilitate prostitutes. 
Government efforts focus more on preventing prostitution and 
trafficking in women. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare sponsors 
job and skill training programs in several poor districts known for 
sending prostitutes to India. In May 1999, the Ministry of Women and 
Social Welfare opened the Women's Self-Reliance and Rehabilitation 
Center (WOREC), a rehabilitation and skills training center for women 
returned from being trafficked and for women and girls at risk of being 
trafficked. With the Government's endorsement, many NGO's have public 
information and outreach campaigns in rural areas. These groups 
commonly use leaflets, comic books, films, speaker programs, and skits 
to convey antitrafficking messages and education.
    There are over 15 NGO's working against trafficking, several of 
which have rehabilitation and skills training programs for trafficking 
victims. WOREC and other organizations involved in the rehabilitation 
of trafficking victims state that their members have been threatened 
and that their offices have been vandalized because of their 
activities. According to press reports, on August 18, 1999, five 
convicted traffickers who had been given 20-year sentences but were 
released within 3 years attacked a 17-year-old living at a WOREC 
facility. The director of another prominent anti-trafficking group 
reported in July that traffickers regularly make threats against her 
organization.
    In October NGO's, the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and 
the Home Ministry together hosted a regional workshop with senior 
police officers to enhance cross border antitrafficking collaboration. 
NGO's and law enforcement officials discussed ways of improving 
bilateral and regional cooperation on investigating and prosecuting 
traffickers and ensuring better protection of victims.
    In June 1999, the police hosted a workshop in Kathmandu to provide 
recommendations for new legislation regarding trafficking and the 
sexual exploitation of children. A followup workshop was held in July 
1999. To date no new legislation has been passed on the subject. There 
are many social and legal obstacles to successful prosecution, and 
convictions are rare.
                               __________

                                PAKISTAN

    On October 12, 1999, the elected civilian Government of former 
Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a bloodless coup led 
by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf. In consultation with 
senior military commanders, General Musharraf designated himself Chief 
Executive, and suspended the Constitution, the Parliament, and the 
provincial assemblies. The office of the President, which is mainly 
ceremonial, was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory 
National Security Council, which included both military and civilian 
advisers, and a civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy continued 
to function; however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government 
after the coup was ``monitored'' by military commanders. In May the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Musharraf Government was constitutional 
and imposed a 3-year deadline--starting from October 12, 1999--to 
complete a transition to democratic, civilian rule. On December 31, 
local elections were held in 18 districts on a non-party basis; however 
the Government has not set a timetable for national elections. 
Corruption and inefficiency remained acute in all branches of 
government. The suspended Constitution provided for an independent 
judiciary; however, the judiciary was subject to executive branch and 
other outside influences, and suffers from inadequate resources, 
inefficiency, and corruption. The Supreme Court demonstrated a limited 
degree of independence; however, the overall credibility of the 
judiciary remained low, and General Musharraf took steps to control the 
judiciary and to remove his regime from judicial oversight.
    The police have primary internal security responsibilities, 
although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and the Frontier 
Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are 
acute, like Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments 
control the police and the paramilitary forces when they are assisting 
in law and order operations. In August the Government announced a 
devolution plan that included some increase in local political control 
of the police; however, the Government had not implemented this plan by 
year's end. During some religious holidays, the regular army is 
deployed in sensitive areas to help maintain public order. After the 
coup, the army played a role in enforcing exit control restrictions at 
airports and border crossings, reportedly as part of the Musharraf 
regime's anticorruption accountability campaign. Members of the 
security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
    Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution 
of wealth. Education, especially for females is poor and only 33 
percent of the population are judged literate by a very low standard. 
Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are the 
principal exports. The economy includes both state-run and private 
industries and financial institutions. The suspended Constitution 
provided for the right of private businesses to operate freely in most 
sectors of the economy and there continued to be a strong private 
sector. The per capita annual income is $490 (PRs 29,400).
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and the Government 
committed numerous serious abuses; however, there were improvements in 
some areas, particularly with respect to freedom of the press. Citizens 
continued to be denied the right to choose or change their government 
peacefully. Police committed numerous extrajudicial killings; however, 
there were fewer such killings than in 1999. In Karachi there were 
fewer killings between rival political factions during the year; 
however, many of these killings reportedly were committed by or with 
the participation of the security forces. Police abused and raped 
citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were 
transferred or suspended for their actions, no officer has been 
convicted and very few have been arrested. In Karachi there were signs 
of progress in redressing police excesses; however, in general police 
continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison conditions 
remained extremely poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained 
citizens. The Government used arbitrary and sometimes incommunicado 
detention against leaders of the Sharif Government and their families; 
several major political leaders remained in jail or in self-imposed 
exile abroad at year's end. Case backlogs led to long delays in trials, 
and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is subject to 
executive and other outside influences, and corruption, inefficiency, 
and lack of resources remained problems. The Government took steps to 
control the judiciary and to remove itself from judicial oversight. On 
January 25, General Musharraf ordered all Supreme Court, Shariat court, 
and provincial High Court justices to swear to uphold the post-coup 
Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the 
Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior courts 
from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any person 
exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six Supreme 
Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine other provincial 
court justices resigned in protest. The Government's anticorruption 
campaign violated due process. In October 1998, the National Assembly 
(NA) voted for a 15th constitutional amendment, which would have 
required the Government to enforce Shari'a (Islamic law) throughout the 
country. However, General Musharraf abandoned his predecessor's attempt 
to enact the amendment. In April the Sindh Court found Nawaz Sharif 
guilty of treason and other charges; however, the court imposed a life 
sentence instead of the death penalty sought by the Musharraf 
Government. The court acquitted Sharif's six codefendants. In October 
the Sindh High Court upheld Nawaz Sharif's conviction. However, on 
December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to 
Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Government infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights. The press was able to publish relatively freely; 
however, several journalists practiced self-censorship, especially on 
sensitive issues related to the military. There was not a systematic 
harassment campaign against newspapers or commentators critical of the 
Government during the year; however, the broadcast media remain a 
closely controlled government monopoly. The Government restricted 
freedom of assembly. During the year, the Government sporadically 
permitted several large antigovernment demonstrations; however, it 
prevented other protests and arrested organizers, reportedly for 
security reasons. In March the Government instituted a country-wide ban 
on strikes, processions, and outdoor political demonstrations. The 
Government maintained some limits on freedom of association. The 
Government imposed some limits on freedom of religion, particularly for 
Ahmadis. The Government also imposed limits on freedom of movement. 
General Musharraf spoke out against some of the human rights abuses of 
the previous regime and held a conference on human rights in April; 
however, the Government made minimal progress toward achieving the 
goals set at the conference.
    Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse, 
rape, and other forms of degradation by spouses and members of society. 
The Government publicly criticized the practice of ``honor killings'' 
but failed to take corrective steps, and such killings continued 
throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against 
women, and traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a 
subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as 
child abuse, and prostitution, remained serious problems. Female 
children still lag far behind boys in education, health care, and other 
social indices. Governmental and societal discrimination against 
religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians remains a 
problem, and the Government failed to take effective measures to 
counter prevalent public prejudices against religious minorities. 
Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and 
civil disturbances. The Government and employers continued to restrict 
worker rights significantly. Debt slavery persists, and bonded labor by 
both adults and children remained a problem. The use of child labor 
remained widespread, although it generally is recognized as a serious 
problem, and industrial exporters have adopted a number of measures to 
eliminate child labor from specific sectors. Trafficking in women and 
children for the purpose of forced prostitution was a serious problem. 
Mob violence and terrorist attacks remained problems; however, the 
number of incidents declined slightly during the year.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed 
extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects, 
often in the form of deaths in police custody or of staged encounters 
in which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police 
officials generally insist that these deaths occur during attempts to 
escape or to resist arrest; family members and the press insist that 
many of these deaths are staged. Police personnel have been known to 
kill suspected criminals to prevent them from implicating police in 
crimes during court proceedings. After an attempt was made on then 
Prime Minister Sharif's life in January 1999, as many as 40 Sunni 
Muslims associated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the putative instigator, 
may have been killed in police encounters. The Human Rights Commission 
of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that there were fewer reports of 
extrajudicial killings during the year than there were in the previous 
year. In September a journalist reported that 19 persons died in police 
encounters or as victims of torture in the first 9 months of the year. 
Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 100 persons die from 
police torture each year (see Section 1.c.). The HRCP estimated that 23 
persons were killed in police custody or police encounters during the 
year. Police officials insist that these deaths occurred during 
attempts to escape or resist arrest. For example, in October police 
killed a suspect who reportedly attempted to resist arrest; there were 
no investigations of the incident during the year. In addition to 
killing suspects to prevent them from implicating the police in court, 
police reportedly killed suspected criminals to circumvent or overcome 
insufficient evidence, witness intimidation, judicial corruption, and 
sometimes political pressure. Police professionalism is low. The police 
view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of 
effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary on 
the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not 
stand up in court.
    According to a press report, Shaheen Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape 
victim charged with adultery was kept fettered in a hospital despite 
being diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended 
for involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, court-ordered 
inquiries into these killings have resulted in few trials and no 
convictions. In February two police inspectors who were charged with 
killing a member of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in custody were 
denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they had 
falsified precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime. 
Punjabi police killed Tahir Prince in February 1999; after his mother 
filed a writ, the Lahore High Court ordered a case registered against 
two police officers, one of whom was dismissed mid-year on charges of 
corruption. Tahir Prince's family then accepted financial compensation 
and dropped the case against the two officers. In general police 
continued to commit such killings with impunity.
    The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a 
number of individuals associated with political or terrorist groups. A 
committee of inquiry was established to look into the death of Pakistan 
Muslim League youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in the 
custody of the Peshawar police in July 1999. However, despite requests 
from human rights activists, the committee did not publish its 
findings, and the officer who allegedly was involved in the killing 
retained his position.
    The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an urban Sindh-based political 
party that in the past demonstrated a willingness to use violence to 
further its aims, claimed that the police specifically targeted its 
adherents for extrajudicial killings. Altaf Hussain established the MQM 
in 1984 to promote the rights of Mohajirs, the descendants of Urdu-
speaking Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan following 
partition in 1947. Elements of the group became involved in extortion 
and other forms of racketeering, and the party split into the
    MQM-Altaf--the original group headed by Altaf Hussain, a large 
breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and a few smaller factions. The MQM-
Altaf, in part because of its efficient organization and willingness to 
use violence, became the dominant political party in Karachi and 
Hyderabad, and sent several moderate and nonviolent leaders to the now 
suspended Parliament and the Sindh provincial assembly. Because of its 
past links, the MQM-Altaf has antagonized followers, suffered violent 
breakaways, and continually been at odds with successive governments. 
In a 1999 report, the MQM listed 10 persons, mostly MQM activists, that 
it alleged were killed extrajudicially by Karachi police between 
October 1998 and March 1999. Since the coup, reports of extrajudicial 
killings of MQM activists have dropped sharply. However, on September 
13, two MQM activists were killed, probably by government forces.
    Politically motivated and sectarian violence continued. After the 
coup, there was relative quiet until the traditionally tense Shi'a 
holiday of Muharram in April, when a number of violent incidents 
occurred between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups. One newspaper reported 
that an estimated 300 persons had died in sectarian attacks between 
late 1997 and 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Shi'a activists reported 
in April that approximately 40 Shi'as have been killed since the coup. 
According to government figures, 915 persons, 64 percent of them 
Shi'as, have died as a result of sectarian violence since 1994. On 
April 7, unknown gunmen in Karachi killed a Shi'a lawyer and the 
Secretary General of Tehrek-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP), his son, and his 
driver; the assailants may have been members of the extremist Sipah-e-
Sahaba Pakistan (SSP--see Section 5). On April 12, in the worst 
incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown assailants 
attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Rawalpindi with grenades and 
bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring 37 others. Police arrested 
several Sunni Muslims following the attack. In April an unknown gunman 
killed 15 Shi'a Muslims in the village of Mallow Wali. On May 11, 
unknown assailants killed a leader of the SSP, which marked the first 
killing of a known Sunni leader since 1998 (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
    Women were killed by family members in so-called ``honor 
killings.'' In March women's rights activists told a local newspaper 
that the frequency of honor killings is on the rise. For example, on 
June 1, a man from Yar Hussain in the northwest frontier province 
(NWFP) allegedly killed his 20-year-old daughter, Mumlikat Bibi, while 
she was sleeping. The father reportedly opposed his daughter's efforts 
to choose a spouse without parental consent (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
    There were at least two high profile killings during the year. In 
January unknown assailants killed the chief justice designate of the 
Baluchistan High Court; it is likely that Marri was killed as a result 
of a personal vendetta. On March 10, unknown assailants killed Iqbal 
Raad, one of the defense lawyers for former Prime Minister Sharif. 
However, many observers believe that Raad's involvement in the Sharif 
trial was not a factor in his death.
    There were numerous bomb attacks during the year. On January 17, a 
bomb in Karachi killed 12 persons and injured 22 persons. On January 
28, two separate explosions killed 6 persons and injured 40 persons. On 
February 5, a bomb exploded killing 7 persons and injuring 60 others. 
No one claimed responsibility for these attacks. In March during a high 
profile visit to the country by a foreign head of state, five 
explosions occurred in Hyderabad, Quetta, and Karachi; two persons were 
killed and four persons were injured in these explosions. On March 28, 
an explosion in Torkham along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border killed at 
least 7 persons and injured 27 others. In May a spate of bombings 
targeting Karachi police stations killed one person. On July 7, two 
explosions in the Punjab killed 3 persons and injured 11 others. On 
July 16, a bomb exploded on a train to Hyderabad, killing 10 persons 
and injuring 32 others. On September 3, a bomb exploded in Lahore's 
central bus station, killing 2 and injuring 12 others. On September 7, 
7 persons were killed and 35 injured in an explosion at the Dharampura 
Bazaar in Lahore. In late September, a large explosion at an Islamabad 
market killed at least 16 persons and injured 100 others. A local 
magazine reported that between January and October, there were more 
than 17 bomb explosions that killed dozens of persons in Quetta. No one 
claimed responsibility for these attacks (see Section 1.c.).
    Local newspapers reported that more than ten politically prominent 
Afghans were killed during the year (see Section 2.d.). For example, in 
April unknown assailants killed Arif Khan, the Taliban governor of 
Konduz province. Afghans attributed some of these killings to personal 
rather than political disputes. Police personnel did not arrest anyone 
in connection with these killings.
    There were reports that four prisoners died in a riot in a Peshawar 
jail in October; however, prison authorities denied these reports (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Tension along the line of control between Pakistan and Indian-held 
Kashmir was high during the year, and there was shelling in several 
sectors. A senior army official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir 
estimated that approximately 143 civilians were killed on the Pakistani 
side of the line of control.
    b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of politically 
motivated disappearances. For example, retired Major General Anwar Sher 
and an Afghan aide, Abdul Qaher Shariati, disappeared in July; they 
were active in organizing Afghans to pursue a peace process. There has 
been no police investigation into the disappearances. In the intra-
Mohajir violence in Karachi, victims sometimes first are held and 
tortured by opposing groups (or, as the MQM-Altaf alleges, by security 
forces). Bodies of these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped 
in the street soon after the victims are abducted; however, the 
incidence of such crimes decreased greatly during the year.
    In July a woman in Baluchistan was abducted by members of her tribe 
after a tribal jirga (council) forced the woman to annul her marriage 
(see Section 5).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The suspended Constitution and the Penal Code expressly 
forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; 
however, police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons. 
Police routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there were 
fewer such reports and greater police cooperation in investigating such 
reports during the year. Human rights observers suggest that, because 
of widespread torture by the police, suspects usually confess to crimes 
regardless of their actual culpability; the courts subsequently throw 
out many such confessions. AI estimates that at least 100 persons die 
from police torture each year (see Section 1.a.). According to a 1999 
Human Rights Watch report, children in detention also are subjected to 
torture and mistreatment (see Section 5).
    Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes; 
whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation; 
electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced 
spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation. Some 
magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports 
stating that the victims died of natural causes.
    Police personnel continued to torture persons in custody throughout 
the country. In June a local newspaper reported that prisoners waiting 
to appear in court routinely are held in fetters in police vans, even 
on extremely hot days. In 1999 70 prisoners awaiting or undergoing 
trial at Karachi prison, all MQM members, charged that they had been 
arrested illegally and tortured to induce confessions. According to MQM 
officials, police arrested over 700 MQM members during the past 2 years 
(see Section 1.d.); many of these persons reportedly were tortured in 
custody. In November 1999, Rana Sanaullah Khan, a PML member of the 
suspended Punjab provincial assembly, was arrested for criticizing the 
Musharraf Government; he reportedly was tortured in custody.
    In March a judge sentenced two prisoners convicted of murdering 
almost 100 children to be executed by having their bodies cut into 100 
and 98 pieces, respectively, and then having the pieces dissolved in 
acid. Legal experts criticized the judgment, and the case was under 
appeal at year's end.
    Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were 
investigated or charged in connection with abuse of detainees, the 
failure of successive governments to prosecute and to punish abusers 
effectively is the single greatest obstacle to ending or reducing the 
incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes 
transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom 
prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield 
their colleagues. However, in February Deputy Inspector General Fayyaz 
Ahmed Leghari stated that in 1999 Sindh police penalized 28,000 
officers for malfeasance, and discharged or compulsorily retired 1,100 
out of a total provincial force of 85,000. In February two police 
inspectors charged with killing an MQM activist in custody in 1998 were 
denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they falsified 
precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime (see Section 
1.a.).
    The 1997 Anti-terrorist Act allowed confessions obtained in police 
custody to be used in new ``special courts.'' Human rights 
organizations and the press criticized this provision of the law 
because police torture of suspects is common. Police generally did not 
attempt to use confessions to secure convictions under this law and the 
Government agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998 
invalidated this and other sections of the Anti-terrorist Act. Due to 
greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, including prison inspections 
in the Punjab and Sindh, the incidence of torture and abuse in prisons 
may be decreasing. In Karachi the Citizens Police Liaison Committee 
(CPLC) brought cases against police who make false arrests, practice 
torture, or take bribes. Cooperation between the CPLC and the police 
human rights complaint cell resulted in the dismissal of 216 policemen 
and the demotion or fines for 1,226 others between November 1998 and 
July 1999.
    Police corruption is widespread. Police and prison officials 
frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and 
their families. Police accept money for registering cases on false 
charges and may torture innocent citizens. Persons pay police to 
humiliate their opponents and to avenge their personal grievances. 
During the year, the Government took some steps to reduce police 
corruption and transferred several senior police officers to other 
provinces to circumvent their local ties. The Government also deployed 
army officers to police stations.
    In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in 
violation of considerations of merit and the department's regulations. 
In some instances, recruits had criminal records Police corruption is 
most serious at the level of the Station House Officer (SHO), the 
official who runs each precinct. In 1998 300 new SHO's recruited on 
merit began a long-delayed special training course; the new SHO's have 
been hired and observers believe that they might improve police 
performance greatly. Some SHO's widely are believed to operate arrest-
for-ransom operations, and establish unsanctioned police stations to 
collect illicit revenue. An August news report listed seven such 
stations in Karachi. SHO's are powerful; some are believed to have 
killed superior officers who tried to inhibit their corruption. Senior 
government officials have confirmed that police stations, and 
assignments therein, are sold to interested parties who then proceed to 
recoup their investment though illicit activities.
    Actions taken to redress police abuses often have mixed results. In 
urban Sindh, the CPLC committees helped to curb some excesses, but 
complaints of large-scale police abuse persist.
    Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in 
response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women, 
including rape. These stations are staffed by female personnel, but 
receive even fewer material and human resources than regular police 
stations. For example, at the beginning of the year, the Karachi 
women's police station was housed in an unsafe building that had no 
bathing facilities and only one toilet for staff and inmates to share. 
Alerted to these conditions, Sindh Inspector General of Police Aftab 
Nabi moved the station to improved quarters and began a fundraising 
drive for a permanent facility. According to the government's own 
Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not function 
independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders and 
regulations that only female officers may interrogate female suspects, 
women continued to be detained overnight at regular police stations and 
abused by male officers. Based on Lahore newspaper reports from January 
to May 1999, the HRCP found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of 
women in police custody. In 1998 ``Nasreen'' accused the SHO of 
Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she visited the 
station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of 
1998, the case was under internal investigation by Lahore police; 
however, during the year, ``Nasreen'' and her family withdrew the case 
without stating a reason. Instances of abuse of women in prisons are 
less frequent than in police stations. Sexual abuse of child detainees 
by police or guards reportedly also is a problem.
    The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law 
government in 1979, aimed to make the Penal Code more Islamic. These 
ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations of Shari'a 
(Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful sexual relations 
and amputation for other crimes (see Section 1.c.). These so-called 
Hadd punishments require a high standard of evidence. In effect, four 
adult Muslim men of good character must witness an act for a Hadd 
punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a single Hadd punishment has been 
carried out. However, on the basis of lesser evidence, ordinary 
punishments such as jail terms or fines are imposed. From 1979 to 1995, 
over 1 million Hudood cases were filed, and 300,000 were heard by the 
courts. More recent statistics are unavailable. The laws are applied to 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
    Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws for sexual 
misconduct, such as adultery. In 1998 about one-third of the women in 
jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan were awaiting trial for adultery; 
that percentage likely remains accurate. Most women tried under the 
ordinance are acquitted, but the stigma of an adultery charge alone is 
severe. A Hudood law meant to deter false accusations is enforced 
weakly, and one human rights monitor claimed that 80 percent of 
adultery-related Hudood cases are filed without supporting evidence. 
Men accused of rape sometimes are acquitted and released while their 
victims are held for adultery or fornication. The Commission of Inquiry 
for Women recommended that the Hudood laws be repealed as they are 
based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 5).
    The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), permits the punishment of relatives, 
friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to 
blockade villages or to detain tribal kinsmen to obtain the surrender 
of a fugitive (see Sections 1.e. and 1.f.).
    Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or 
strikers. On June 3, in Rawalpindi police that were armed with batons 
attacked 200 small business owners during a demonstration, injuring a 
number of persons. On June 9, police personnel used force to disperse a 
group of protesters, injuring 4 persons. Police accused the protesters 
of throwing stones and bricks at them, but some eyewitnesses alleged 
that the police fired without provocation. On June 29, police used 
batons and deployed tear gas during a rally of small and medium 
businessmen. In all three incidents, the protesters were challenging 
government plans to collect sales taxes (see Section 2.b.).
    Police at times also beat journalists (see Section 2.a.). For 
example, in August government agents allegedly beat journalist Mazhar 
Tufail.
    Police failed in some instances to protect members of religious 
minorities--particularly Ahmadis and Christians--from societal attacks 
(see Section 5).
    A number of bomb attacks killed and injured many persons during the 
year (see Section 1.a.). No one claimed responsibility for these 
attacks.
    Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is widespread. 
According to the HRCP, there are 80,000 prisoners in jails that were 
built to hold a maximum of 35,833 persons. In 1999 a journalist for the 
Nation newspaper visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi and reported that 
the prison holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for 2,000. According to 
a February press report, Sindh provincial officials claimed that the 16 
jails of Sindh province, with a total capacity of 7,759 prisoners, 
actually housed over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most 
overcrowded, with a population of 4,087 prisoners in a space designed 
for only 991; only 2 toilets are available per every 100 prisoners and 
the daily food budget in the lowest class of cells equals about $.020 
per prisoner. The HRCP claimed that the Lahore district jail, built to 
house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. In July 1999, the Punjab Home 
Department admitted before the Lahore High Court that over 50,000 
prisoners were held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. In the NWFP 21 
prisons with a total capacity of 7,397 prisoners house 10,194 persons, 
including 485 children. Some 80 percent of prisoners are awaiting 
trial, mostly for petty offenses.
    Prisoners routinely are shackled. The principal of the institute 
for jail staff training in Lahore stated in a July 1999 press interview 
that fettering is the most convenient way to administer an overcrowded 
jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of 1894 permits fettering for a 
variety of offenses, the punishment usually is given for administrative 
convenience, or to extract bribes from prisoners. The shackles used are 
tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have led to gangrene and 
amputation in several cases. According to a press report, Shaheen 
Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape victim charged with adultery under the 
Hudood Ordinances, was kept fettered in a hospital despite being 
diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see Section 
1.c.). Although the Sindh High Court ruled fettering illegal in 1993, 
the practice continues, and visitors to Sindhi jails regularly see 
fettered prisoners. On April 21, General Musharraf condemned fettering 
as a ``tool of indignity.'' Following a Lahore High Court ruling in 
June, prison wardens in Lahore were ordered to remove fetters; however 
police personnel and prison administrators have resisted (see Section 
4).
    There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class 
``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial 
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor 
food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, 
including beatings and forced kneeling for long periods of time. In 
1998 the Senate's Committee on Human Rights reported that at one 
facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined to a space 100 feet 
by 30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are common 
in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era prisons. 
Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, led to 
chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with 
help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem. 
Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not 
segregated from the general prison population (see Section 5). Foreign 
prisoners, mostly citizens of African countries with minimal diplomatic 
representation, often remain in prison long after their sentences are 
completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their 
home country. Conditions in ``A'' and ``B'' cells are markedly better; 
prisoners in these cells are permitted to have servants, special food, 
and televisions. Authorities reserve ``A'' cells for prominent persons, 
including political leaders. Especially prominent individuals--
including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest 
and permitted to receive visitors.
    In September prisoners in Hyderabad prison rioted to protest poor 
prison conditions. On September 25, police used force to quell a large 
prison riot; no casualty figures were reported. Prisoners also held 
riots over prison conditions in Peshawar in October and in Dera Islami 
Khan in December. There were reports that four prisoners died in the 
Peshawar jail riot; however, prison authorities denied the reports.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors (see 
Section 1.d.). Landlords in Sindh and political factions in Karachi 
operated private jails (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law regulates arrest 
and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply 
with the law and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The 
law permits the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order 
detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of 
threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-
day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report 
instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public 
Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For 
other criminal offenses, police may hold a suspect for 24 hours without 
charge. After the prisoner appears before a magistrate, the court can 
grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period of 14 
days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary for an 
investigation. The Musharraf regime created the National Accountability 
Bureau (NAB) and special accountability courts to try corruption cases; 
the National Accountability Ordinance allows those suspected of corrupt 
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge (see Section 1.e.).
    Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident 
Report (FIR) filed by a complainant, and have been known to file FIR's 
without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass or 
intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be based 
on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or persons 
unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the inactive 
file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a magistrate by 
the police; the police then name a suspect and ask that the suspect be 
remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After 14 days, the 
case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR is activated 
and brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling charges can be 
used to hold a suspect in custody continuously.
    If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical 
remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary 
for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14 
days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated 
assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully 
observe the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify 
anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge 
until a court challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals 
arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for 
their release. In Karachi small squads of police stopped taxis and 
delivery trucks for bribes. Human rights monitors report that a number 
of police stations have secret detention cells in which individuals are 
kept while police bargain for their release. There also are reports 
that the police move prisoners from one police station to another if 
they suspect a surprise visit by higher authorities. Some women 
continued to be detained arbitrarily and sexually abused (see Sections 
1.c. and 5). Police also detained relatives of wanted criminals in 
order to compel suspects to surrender (see Section 1.f.). Police 
personnel also have been known to detain persons as a result of 
personal vendettas. Following an August house robbery in a Christian 
neighborhood in Islamabad, police reportedly arrested residents of the 
neighborhood and extorted bribes from them in exchange for their 
release.
    The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 
30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start 
until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the HRCP estimated 
that there were almost as many individuals awaiting trial in jails as 
there were prisoners. According to the chief justice of the Lahore High 
Court, there were over 500,000 civil and criminal cases backlogged in 
the province's subordinate court system as of April 1999. In 1999 in 62 
Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners were awaiting trial in 6,000 cases; 
in 3,500 of these cases, the police have not even brought a 
``challan,'' or indictment, to the court. Sindh Government officials 
reported in February that 11,945 of the 14,219 prisoners in Sindh jails 
are awaiting trial. In 1997 the Government justified the creation of 
Anti-terrorist courts by citing the large number of murder and other 
cases that are clogging the regular court system (see Section 1.e.). 
The anti-terrorist courts reportedly sentenced 32 persons to death and 
15 persons to life imprisonment during the year. Double jeopardy 
applies to those convicted of possessing narcotics because of a 1990 
federal Shariat court ruling that customs and narcotics cases be 
initiated separately. A February ruling by the Lahore High Court 
forbidding a second trial was ignored by an April sessions court 
decision in Lahore, which sent the accused back to prison for the 
second time on the same narcotics conviction.
    Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has 
waited for over 3 years for the start of his trial on charges of 
killing his brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto. Charges were first filed 
against Zardari in 1997 and transferred successively to two courts, 
where several judges refused to preside. By year's end, only 2 of 223 
witnesses have been heard. In April 1999, Zardari was tried and 
convicted separately on corruption charges.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family 
members, and lawyers (see Section 1.c.). However, in some cases, 
authorities refuse family visits and, in some police stations, persons 
are expected to pay bribes to see a prisoner. The Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate legal system, the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the doctrine of collective 
responsibility. Authorities are empowered to detain fellow members of a 
fugitive's tribe, or to blockade the fugitive's village, pending his 
surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local 
tradition. The Government continued to exercise such authority during 
the year. In March two persons from Mullah Said village were arrested 
under the Frontier Crimes Regulation following a shooting incident in 
which some persons from this village fired on residents of the 
neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.f.).
    The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell protests or 
civil unrest. In 1999 police personnel arrested hundreds of persons, 
including two prominent members of the SSP, Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq 
and Maulana Mohammad Ahmad Ludhianvi, following a wave of sectarian 
violence in Punjab and Sindh. Tariq and Ludhianvi were released during 
the year; however, Ludhianvi was killed in May by unknown assailants 
and Azam Tariq has taken refuge in Afghanistan (see Sections 1.a. and 
5). Police arrested small businessmen during strikes in May and June; 
however, all of the demonstrators were released shortly after their 
arrests. On May 11, police arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and 
students in Lahore during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes 
to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). In September Lahore 
police arrested more than 500 activists of the Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) for shouting slogans against the Musharraf regime and the army. 
During the year, police arrested hundreds of opposition party members 
in order to prevent planned demonstrations from occurring (see Section 
2.b.).
    The Government detained several high-profile businessmen in 
connection with General Musharraf's anticorruption campaign. In March 
police detained a leading Afghan rug merchant; the merchant was 
released after 2 months. On May 8, armed gunmen seized Amin Lakhani, a 
leading Karachi businessman. Several days later, the NAB admitted that 
it authorized Lakhani's seizure. Lakhani was held without charge for 
several weeks and questioned about his financial affairs. His brother, 
Sultan Lakhani, also was seized on May 8 and remained in detention 
without charge at year's end.
    On a number of occasions, police arrested persons prior to 
demonstrations under the Criminal Procedures Code ban (see Section 
2.b.).
    Police personnel arrested about 150 journalists during a peaceful 
protest in April. In August police personnel arrested four journalists 
who reportedly criticized the police; the journalists were released 
after 4 days (see Section 2.a.).
    In past years, persons occasionally were detained arbitrarily 
because of disputes with powerful or well-connected persons; however, 
there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
    The Musharraf Government detained without warrants and without 
charges several dozen political figures, military officers, government 
administrators, and Sharif family members following the 1999 coup. 
Nawaz Sharif and members of his family, including Punjab chief minister 
Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors to the 
Prime Minister or to the Government; and a number of military and 
police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest immediately 
following the coup. On several occasions during the year, police 
officials prevented Nawaz Sharif's wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, from speaking 
at public meetings. Many of the officials who were arrested following 
the coup were held incommunicado. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado 
from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court more than 1 
month later. Most others were released within a few days. In December 
the Government released from detention former Minister of Information 
Mushahid Hussain who had been held under house arrest since the October 
coup. As of year's end, approximately 30 politicians and their 
relatives remained in custody.
    Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge, 
including Nawaz Sharif, were held in connection with the ``hijacking'' 
on October 12, 1999 of the civilian airliner carrying General Musharraf 
back from a conference in Sri Lanka; former Prime Minister Sharif 
reportedly denied permission for the plane to land in Karachi. Along 
with Sharif's summary replacement of General Musharraf with the 
Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, this 
event led to the 1999 coup. In the weeks following Sharif's arrest, he 
was detained without charge and denied access to counsel and family 
members (see Section 1.e.). A First Incident Report was filed on 
November 10, 1999, which charged Sharif with attempted murder, 
hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif advisor Ghous Ali 
Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines chairman Shahid Khaqan 
Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation Aminullah Chaudhary, and 
former Inspector General of Police Rana Maqbool were charged along with 
Sharif. The accused were to be tried before an Anti-terrorist court. On 
November 26, 1999, three other individuals--former Punjab chief 
minister Shahbaz Sharif, former senator Saifur Rehman, and former 
secretary to the Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named codefendants in 
the case. Following changes in the Anti-terrorist Act, the formal 
filing of charges against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8, 1999. 
Sharif was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in April. His 
six codefendants were acquitted; however, they were still in custody at 
year's end on a maintenance of public order charge'' (see Section 
1.e.).
    Private jails exist in tribal and feudal areas.
    Hundreds of MQM activists and legislators (including former Sindh 
Minister of Labor Shoaib Bokhari) were arrested in 1998 and remained in 
custody at year's end; some of these activists are being held without 
charge. According to MQM officials, police arrested over 700 MQM 
officials during the past 2 years (see Section 1.c.).
    Many persons apprehended by the National Accountability Bureau (see 
Section 1.e.) remained in detention past the ordinance's stipulated 90 
days detention without charge (see Section 1.d.). Siddiq ul-Farooq, a 
former press secretary to Nawaz Sharif, was arrested under the NAB in 
October 1999 and held without charge until May; at year's end, he was 
in detention pending commencement of the proceedings in his case. On 
April 4, Mian Manzoor Watoo, the former Punjab Chief Minister and head 
of his own PML faction, became the first senior politician to receive a 
jail term in a corruption case. In late 1999, MQM leader and former 
mayor of Karachi Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested by order of the NAB, 
removed from his domicile, and held in a cell without a bed, chair, or 
desk. On July 14, Sattar was convicted on a widely disputed corruption 
charge. In July Nawaz Sharif was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment 
and banned from holding political office for 21 years on the basis of a 
corruption conviction. Most observers reported that Sharif's trial was 
fair; however, they believe the Government's decision to pursue the 
corruption case was politically motivated.
    During the year, authorities released from prison thousands of 
persons convicted of petty crimes who were being held despite the fact 
that their prison terms had expired. For example, in January 
authorities released 12,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty 
crimes. In an October news report, a senior official in the Ministry of 
Interior stated that 47,000 persons who were jailed for minor offenses 
were released during the year. The Punjab Department of Jails 
reportedly released 15,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty crimes 
during the year.
    Human rights groups alleged that as many as 50 private jails, 
housing some 4,500 bonded laborers were being maintained by landlords 
in lower Sindh (see Section 6.c.). Some prisoners reportedly have been 
held for many years. In the five districts of upper Sindh, landlords 
have defied the courts and police by holding tribal jirgas, which 
settle feuds, award fines, and even sentence persons to the death 
penalty in defiance of provincial laws. In January a newspaper reported 
that 56 landless agricultural workers escaped from a private jail in 
Sanghar district, Sindh. The landlord reportedly had forced them to 
work without wages for several years. In February 42 bonded laborers 
escaped from a private jail in Umerkot district, Sindh. Under pressure 
from the landowner, seven of the laborers signed affidavits that they 
had not been confined against their will. On March 8, the Lahore High 
Court ordered the release of 24 brick kiln workers, including 10 women 
or children. According to press accounts, the laborers were kept in 
chains, not compensated for their work, and were beaten frequently.
    On December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to 
Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Sharif family was forced to surrender a 
number of assets to the Government and had to agree to withdraw from 
politics while in exile. Some observers stated that the Government 
exiled Sharif in order to remove him from politics and to reduce the 
power and influence of the opposition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The suspended Constitution 
provided for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the 
judiciary remains subject to executive branch influence, and despite 
the Musharraf regime's pledge to respect the independence of the 
judicial system, it took steps to control the judiciary and to remove 
the regime from judicial oversight. Provisional Constitution Order 
Number 1, issued on October 14, 1999, provided that all courts 
functioning at the time of the change in government would continue to 
operate, but that no court would have the power to issue orders against 
General Musharraf or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under 
his authority. The decree effectively removed the actions of the 
Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. General Musharraf further 
undermined the independence of the judiciary when he ordered that all 
Supreme Court, Shar'ia Court, and Provincial High Court justices take 
an oath to uphold the PCO that brought the military into power. Low 
salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption 
contributed to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
    On January 25, 4 days before the Supreme Court was due to begin 
hearings on the legitimacy of the coup, General Musharraf ordered all 
Supreme Court, Shariat court, and provincial High Court justices to 
take an oath committing themselves to uphold the PCO, which suspended 
the Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior 
courts from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any 
person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six 
Supreme Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine 
provincial High Court justices resigned in protest; however, 85 percent 
of the affected justices agreed to swear allegiance to the PCO. As a 
result of this decree, government directives and ordinances under the 
PCO are no longer subject to judicial review. Some government officials 
claimed that General Musharraf issued this decree due to concerns that 
judges were being bribed to rule against the Government in the court 
challenges to the military takeover. Many persons criticized this 
requirement, stating that it effectively ended the role of the 
judiciary as an independent body.
    The Supreme Court at times demonstrated a limited degree of 
independence. For example, on May 12, in a unanimous decision, the 
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the coup on the grounds of state 
necessity; however, the court ordered the current Government to hold 
national elections no later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The 
decision also affirmed the Supreme Court's continued right of judicial 
rule, ruled that it was legal for the Musharraf Government to amend the 
Constitution as long as the amendments do not change the basic 
character of the Constitution, and reserved the right to review the 
military's performance and the continued necessity of the Emergency 
Proclamation and the PCO. Many observers criticized the Supreme Court 
decision as vague and contradictory.
    The judicial system involves several court systems with overlapping 
and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and criminal 
systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics, and anti-
terrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat court for certain 
Hudood offenses. The appeals process in the civil system is: Civil 
court, district court, High Court, and the Supreme Court. In the 
criminal system, the progression is magistrate, sessions court, High 
Court, and the Supreme Court.
    The judiciary has argued that it has failed to try and convict 
terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor police casework, 
prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. In 
response to this problem, the Sharif Government passed the Anti-
terrorist Act in 1997; special anti-terrorist courts began operation in 
August 1997. The anti-terrorist courts, designed for the speedy 
punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures; 
however, due to the continued intimidation of witnesses, police, and 
judges, the courts produced only a handful of convictions in 1998. 
Under the act, terrorist killings are punishable by death and any act, 
including speech, intended to stir up religious hatred, is punishable 
by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are to be decided within 
7 working days, but judges are free to extend the period of time as 
required. Trials in absentia were permitted, but then subsequently 
prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an appellate tribunal also were 
required to take no more than 7 days, but appellate authority since has 
been restored to the High and Supreme Courts, under which these time 
limits do not apply. Under the Anti-terrorist Act, bail is not to be 
granted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused 
is guilty.
    Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press, 
and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations 
about the anti-terrorist courts, charging that they constitute a 
parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political 
repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent 
effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed to the 
reduction in sectarian violence after its passage. The anti-terrorist 
courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly 
``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several 
persons have been tried, convicted, and executed under these 
provisions. In 1997 cases filed under Section 295 (a) of the Penal Code 
(one of the so-called blasphemy laws--see Section 2.c.) were 
transferred to the anti-terrorist courts. Human rights advocates feared 
that if blasphemy cases were tried in the anti-terrorist courts, 
alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally were granted bail or 
released for lack of evidence were likely to be convicted, given the 
less stringent rules of evidence required under the Anti-terrorist Act.
    In November 1998, Nawaz Sharif announced the establishment of 
military courts in Karachi, which had been under Governor's Rule since 
October 1998. These courts were to try cases involving heinous acts and 
terrorism, which the Government stated were a serious challenge to 
public authority that the existing court system was inadequate to 
address. They were intended to bring swifter justice to the city, which 
had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a general breakdown in law 
and order. Military courts began operation in December 1998. In January 
1999, the Supreme Court ruled in an interim decision that military 
trial courts could not impose the death penalty. On February 17, 1999, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were unconstitutional 
and ordered the establishment of additional anti-terrorist courts; 
however, it allowed sentences already handed down by the military 
courts to stand. The anti-terrorist courts were to operate under the 
supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and courts of first instance 
and appellate courts were to render decisions within 7 days; in 
practice, this did not occur. Consequently in April 1999, the Sharif 
Government promulgated an ordinance transferring cases from military 
trial courts to anti-terrorist courts and expanded the jurisdiction to 
cover the same types of offenses as the military courts, including 
murder, gang rape, and child molestation. An April 1999 ordinance made 
strikes and go-slows illegal as ``civil commotion'' offenses; both are 
punishable by incarceration and fines (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). In 
December 1999, the Musharraf Government again modified the Anti-
terrorist Act by adding a number of additional offenses, including acts 
to outrage religious feelings; efforts to ``wage war against the 
state''; conspiracy; acts committed in abetting an offense; and 
kidnaping or abduction to confine a person. By ordinance the Musharraf 
regime created a special anti-terrorist court in Sindh presided over by 
a High Court justice rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the 
case. The amended provision permits the High Court justice to 
``transfer . . . any case pending before any other special court . . . 
and try the case'' in his court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained 
that these changes were designed to help the Musharraf regime prosecute 
Sharif.
    The trial of Nawaz Sharif and six codefendants on charges of 
hijacking was the most widely publicized case tried by an Anti-
terrorist court during the year. On April 6, Sharif was found guilty of 
hijacking and terrorism and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment 
(to be served consecutively), an unspecified fine, 5 years' rigorous 
imprisonment in lieu of non-payment of the fine, forfeiture of all 
property, and a fine to compensate the 198 passengers and crew of the 
flight. Judge Jaffrey ruled that there was insufficient evidence to 
arraign Sharif on four offenses related to ``waging war against the 
state'' and criminal conspiracy; the charges were dropped. The six 
codefendants were found not guilty; however, they were still in custody 
at year's end on a ``maintenance of public order charge.''
    Diplomatic observers who attended the Sharif trial concluded that 
the trial generally was fair, open, and transparent. The defendants 
were given free choice of and ready access to counsel. Diplomats and 
the media were granted free daily trial access and newspapers 
frequently reported on defense attorneys' criticism of General 
Musharraf and the army. In February the prosecution asked the judge to 
restrict media coverage of court statements by the accused. Judge 
Jaffrey rejected the prosecution's petition; however, the court 
reserved the right to prevent publication of sensitive national 
security data. Nawaz Sharif and his defense counsel expressed ``full 
confidence'' in the court. The prosecution appealed the codefendants' 
acquittals and Sharif's life sentences, arguing for the death penalty, 
and the defense appealed Sharif's conviction in the Sindh High Court in 
a trial that courtroom observers considered free and fair. On October 
30, the appeals court upheld Nawaz Sharif's convictions for hijacking 
and terrorism but combined them into one offense. The court also denied 
the prosecution appeal to upgrade Nawaz's sentence to the death 
penalty, reduced the amount of property forfeiture, and affirmed the 
antiterrorism court's acquittals of the six codefendants.
    By ordinance, the Musharraf regime created the National 
Accountability Bureau and special accountability courts to try 
corruption cases. The NAB was created in part to deal with as much as 
$4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that is estimated to be owed 
to the country's banks (all of which are state-owned) by debtors, 
mainly from among the wealthy elite. The Musharraf Government stated 
that it would not target genuine business failures or small defaulters 
and does not appear to have done so. The NAB was given broad powers to 
prosecute such cases, and the accountability courts were expected to 
try cases within 30 days. The ordinance prohibits courts from granting 
bail and gives the NAB chairman sole power to decide if and when to 
release detainees. The ordinance also allows those suspected by the 
State Bank of Pakistan of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt 
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being 
charged, does not allow access to counsel. During the year, many 
persons that were apprehended under the NAB ordinance remained in 
detention without charge for longer than 90 days (see Section 1.d.). In 
accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction 
under the ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment; fines; and 
confiscation of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from 
running for office or holding office for 21 years. On August 11, the 
Government announced that persons with a court conviction would be 
barred from holding party office.
    The Musharraf regime denied press reports that it had decided not 
to pursue accountability cases against active members of the military 
or the judiciary; however, no serving members of the military or the 
judiciary have been charged by the NAB. In June the Government 
announced that NAB had arrested 132 persons to date; 82 persons were in 
detention, 53 were held in judicial lockups, and 29 were in the 
bureau's custody. A published list of persons charged with corruption 
by the NAB included former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir 
Bhutto. On November 19, 1999, MQM leader and former mayor of Karachi 
Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested on a corruption charge by the NAB. He 
was held for more than three months in prison without access to counsel 
and was transferred from Karachi to Attock Fort, a high-security army 
facility in NWFP in February. Sattar was convicted on July 14 and 
sentenced to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, a $1 million (PRs 50 
million) fine, and 21 years of political disqualification. Sattar's 
lawyers complained about violations of due process and the remote venue 
of the trial.
    The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the 
presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal 
of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital 
cases. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges, 
the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases 
routinely take years, and defendants must make frequent court 
appearances. Cases start over when an attorney changes. Under both the 
Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and nonbailable 
offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused in 
bailable offenses must be granted bail, and those charged with 
nonbailable offenses should be granted bail if the alleged crime 
carries a sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially 
well-connected persons who are made aware of impending warrants against 
them, are able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and are thus spared arrest 
and incarceration.
    The federal Shariat court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme 
Court serve as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal 
court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat court also may 
overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of 
Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the 
Supreme Court. In two areas of the NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a 
law was instituted in 1999 by regulation and by ordinance, 
respectively. On September 20, 1999, the NWFP assembly passed a bill 
that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into law (see Section 2.c.). 
In May the governor of the NWFP reportedly affirmed to the media his 
plan to implement Shari'a law in Malakand division.
    The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic 
infighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the 
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the 
application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships 
and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized 
appointment process holds up the promotion of many lower court judges 
to the High Courts. Although the higher level judiciary is considered 
competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports of 
corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries.
    Persons in jail awaiting trial sometimes are held for periods 
longer than the sentence that they would receive if convicted. Court 
officials report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per 
day, but that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week. At the end of 
1997, 80,000 criminal cases were reportedly pending in Sindh, 67,800 of 
which were in Karachi. The Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the 
National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases 
pending with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court 
and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there were 
approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate 
the situation; the majority of cases in the High Courts consist of 
appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court, 
there are further opportunities for delay because decisions of 
individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or 
three judges. There continued to be charges that magistrates and 
police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade 
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the consequences. 
Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates in 
their decision-making, sometimes threatening to transfer magistrates to 
other assignments.
    In July 1999, press reports noted that hundreds of prisoners 
remained in the Karachi central prison after the completion of their 
sentences. The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of 
prisoners awaiting trial in Karachi central prison had no access to 
free legal aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters 
interviewing male prisoners in one block discovered that 16 percent of 
them were not represented by attorneys. As of March 1999, 6,000 cases 
awaited trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000 prisoners awaiting a 
court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have not yet submitted 
a ``challan,'' or indictment.
    The Penal Code incorporates the doctrines of Qisas (roughly, an eye 
for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not known to have been 
invoked; however, Diyat occasionally is applied, particularly in the 
NWFP, in place of judicial punishment of the wrongdoer. Only the family 
of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood, 
Qisas, and Diyat ordinances apply to ordinary criminal courts and 
Shariat courts. According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a 
non-Muslim, he can redress the crime by paying Diyat to the victim's 
family; however, a non-Muslim who kills a Muslim does not have the 
option of paying and must serve a jail sentence or face the death 
penalty for his crime. Failure to pay Diyat in non-capital cases can 
result in indefinitely extended incarceration, under Section 331 of the 
Diyat ordinance. In 1998 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted 
that there were 58 persons in prison after the completion of their jail 
terms because they could not pay the Diyat.
    Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess 
of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shariat courts 
and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using 
ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and 
must be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a 
Shariat court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a 
system of bail.
    The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex 
(including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol, 
and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to 
punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic, punishment 
(see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment. 
Although both types of cases are tried in ordinary criminal courts, 
special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd 
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them. 
Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for married 
Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to rape or 
there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to the act, the accused must 
be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim or married, if 
he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by four adult males (not all 
Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes with a whip, and 
such other punishment, including death, as the court may deem fit. The 
testimony of four female witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is 
insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. If the evidence falls short of 
Hadd criteria, then the accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of 
penalties (Tazir). Since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence 
to support the Hadd punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir 
level, under which sentences may be imposed up to 25 years in prison 
and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in the more 
than 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir 
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or 
future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male and two female 
witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of 
one man or one woman (see Section 5).
    Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the 
responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may 
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such 
proceedings, the accused have no right to legal representation, bail, 
or appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder. 
However, the Government's political agents, who are federal civil 
servants assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may 
impose prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the 
direction of the political agents frequently conduct punitive actions 
during enforcement operations. For example, in raids on criminal 
activities, the authorities have damaged surrounding homes as 
extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby 
criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
    In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political 
agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned 
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
    Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP, 
particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the 
Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under 
this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take 
revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--to redeem their honor. 
More often than not, these disputes arise over women and land, and 
frequently result in violence (see Section 5).
    There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Sections of the 
Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi faith; according to 
Ahmadi sources, approximately 200 Ahmadis have been incarcerated under 
these provisions since their inception. Several minority religious 
groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--particularly the 
related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory fashion by local 
officials or private individuals to punish religious minorities. While 
precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate that 80 of their 
coreligionists were charged in criminal cases ``on a religious basis'' 
in 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). On April 12, the Government 
announced its intention to require that deputy commissioners review all 
blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR; however, the Government 
reversed this decision on May 16 due to intense pressure from some 
Islamic groups (see Section 2.c.).
    Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest 
based on their political affiliation (see Section 1.d.). The Muttahida 
Quami Movement, in particular, has argued that the Government used 
Anti-terrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. 
The Anti-terrorist Act allowed police or military personnel acting as 
police to enter and to search homes and offices without search 
warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in an 
alleged terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision 
was never tested in the courts. While the Anti-terrorist Act was 
partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Anti-
terrorist Ordinances in October 1998 and in April 1999. Under these new 
ordinances, many blasphemy cases are now tried by anti-terrorist 
courts. By law the police need a warrant to search a house, but not to 
search a person. Despite this law, police have entered homes without a 
warrant and sometimes stole valuables during searches. In the absence 
of a warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal trespass. 
However, police seldom are punished for illegal entry.
    The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services 
that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, 
and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate 
that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercept and open 
mail. In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the Government to seek its 
permission before carrying out wiretapping or eavesdropping operations. 
The judiciary's directive has been widely ignored. A case in which it 
was alleged that 12 government agencies tapped and monitored citizens' 
telephone calls still was pending in the Supreme Court at year's end.
    Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted persons to 
compel them to surrender. In some cases, the authorities have detained 
entire families in order to force a relative who was the recipient of 
an arrest warrant to surrender (see Section 1.d.). While the Government 
generally does not interfere with the right to marry, the Government on 
occasion assists influential families to prevent marriages they oppose. 
For example, in July 1999, police in Mirpurkas District, Sindh raided 
the home of Javed Dal, who had eloped with his cousin, and arrested his 
family members as hostages. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his 
influence as a member of the Sindh National Front Executive Committee 
to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see 
Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute vigorously cases in 
which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking 
a divorce against the wishes of other family members. In June Mumlikat 
Bibi was killed in her parents' home in the village of Yar Hussain in 
the NWFP. Her father, who reportedly opposed Bibi's efforts to choose a 
spouse without parental consent, was accused of being the culprit (see 
Section 5).
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the 
FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities 
to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an 
entire village (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Government demolished 
the houses of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those 
who reportedly tolerated nearby criminal activity.
    On December 13, 1999, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-
Tulaba, an extremist group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged 
accomplices to a killing, and burned down their homes as punishment. On 
December 29, 1999, there were riots in Karachi in response to the 
demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the low-income 
Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an MQM-Altaf 
stronghold. Authorities claimed that the homes were built without 
permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals. In March 
police personnel arrested two persons from Mullah Said village 
following an incident in which several persons from the village shot at 
residents of the neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.d.).
    Provincial governments sometimes forcibly moved landless laborers 
from their temporary camps. For example, in October local government 
officials forcibly moved 900 persons who recently had been freed from 
bonded labor from their temporary camps in Sikandarabad in Kotri 
district (see Section 6.c.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The suspended Constitution 
provided for freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens generally 
are free to discuss public issues; however, some journalists practice a 
degree of self-censorship. In contrast to the Sharif Government, the 
Musharraf Government did not attempt to exercise direct control over 
views expressed in the print media. Newspaper editorials and 
commentators are increasingly critical of the Government; however, 
direct criticism of the military is rare. Investigative journalism is 
rare; instead the press acts freely to publish charges and 
countercharges by named and unnamed parties and individuals 
representing competing political and social interests. Both 
governmental and nongovernmental entities sometimes pay for favorable 
media coverage.
    Prior to the 1999 coup, any person deemed to have damaged the 
Constitution, including the publication of statements against the 
spirit of the Constitution, could be prosecuted for treason. However, 
prosecutions under this provision were rare. The suspended Constitution 
also prohibited the ridicule of Islam, the armed forces, or the 
judiciary.
    The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the 
name of the Prophet Mohammad, life imprisonment for desecrating the 
Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious 
beliefs with the intent to outrage religious feelings (see Section 
2.c.). The Anti-terrorist Act stipulates imprisonment with rigorous 
labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or insulting words, or 
possessing or distributing written or recorded material, with the 
intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is required to seize 
such material. While the Anti-terrorist Act was partially suspended in 
1998, the Sharif Government promulgated new Anti-terrorist Ordinances 
in October 1998 and in April 1999.
    In March police in Hyderabad registered criminal cases against 
Kulsoom Nawaz and 15 other PML leaders for making ``provocative'' 
speeches at a party convention held the previous day.
    The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom 
since the media often serve as a forum for political parties, 
commercial, religious, and various other interests to compete with and 
criticize each other publicly. Although the press does not criticize 
Islam as such, leaders of religious parties and movements are not 
exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. The press traditionally has 
avoided negative coverage of the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-
Services Public Relations (ISPR) has served to hold press coverage of 
military matters under close restraint. Officially the ISPR closely 
controls and coordinates the release of military news and access to 
military sources. After the 1999 coup, journalists reported no attempts 
by the ISPR agencies to influence editorial content.
    Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is 
hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone criticism, 
of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code 
of silence was undermined when a National Assembly committee discussed 
defense appropriations and corruption in defense contracts in open 
session, thereby making possible (and legal) newspaper coverage of the 
same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during the 
year, especially in the English-language press. Personnel changes among 
senior army officers in September were widely discussed in the press 
and newspapers published calls for extending the accountability process 
to include former military officers.
    Government leaks are not uncommon, but are managed carefully, and 
often are made to underpaid journalists who are on the unofficial 
payrolls of competing interests. Reports of intimidation, heavy-handed 
surveillance, and legal action to quiet the unduly curious or 
nondeferential reporter were common in the past; however, these reports 
have declined significantly since the coup. The Government has had 
considerable leverage over the press through its substantial budget for 
advertising and public interest campaigns and its control over the 
supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce regulations. Human 
rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures accused the 
Government of attempting to silence journalists and public figures; 
however, there were fewer such complaints during the year. On July 1, 
the Government ended its monopoly of newsprint supply and did not 
initiate new efforts to collect back taxes from selected newspapers. On 
August 28, the Government announced a draft ordinance for freedom of 
information, which would require every government office to designate a 
freedom of information officer who would be responsible for providing 
replies to written applications within 21 days. However, the act 
excludes all classified documents and does not define what constitutes 
classified information. By year's end, this ordinance has not been 
enacted. On December 30, the Government declassified the Hamoodur 
Rahman Commission Report, which criticizes the conduct of political and 
military leaders during the 1971 war with India.
    On April 29, a newspaper reported that police attacked and arrested 
150 journalists from Islamabad and Rawalpindi during a peaceful protest 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In May journalists in Abbotabad accused 
the local army monitoring cell of harassing Shuja Ahmad, president of a 
local organization of journalists. On August 22, several unknown 
assailants attacked Mazhar Tufail, a journalist from the Awam newspaper 
(see Section 1.c.). The journalist claimed that his assailants were 
government agents who wanted information on his activities. On August 
30, police in Dadu, Sindh arrested and charged with theft four 
journalists who reportedly criticized the police; authorities released 
the journalists after 4 days (see Section 1.d.). On July 10, police 
personnel entered the Lahore Press Club during a press conference and 
arrested the leader of the All Pakistan Traders Alliance, Umer Sailya. 
During the press conference, Sailya had criticized Musharraf and the 
military. In October a team of army monitors demanded immediate access 
to the premises of the Dawn newspaper and threatened to cut off power 
if refused; this occurred after the editors of Dawn received an 
unsigned letter threatening retaliatory action for recent articles 
criticizing the Government. However, many reputable journalists stated 
that this incident was an electrical inspection and not a violation of 
freedom of press. On October 3, police officials prohibited more than a 
dozen journalists from covering a speech that General Musharraf 
delivered to a group of businessmen. On December 10, army personnel 
detained for several hours a journalist and four photographers who 
attempted to photograph the departure of Nawaz Sharif following his 
exile. The officers confiscated the film and subsequently released the 
journalist and photographers.
    The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; however, the 
Ministry of Information controls and manages the country's primary wire 
service, the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP). The APP is both the 
Government's own news agency and the official carrier of international 
news to the local media. The few small privately owned wire services 
usually are circumspect in their coverage of sensitive domestic news 
and tend to follow a government line.
    The Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance requiring the 
registration of printing presses and newspapers was allowed to lapse in 
1997 after several years of waning application. In practice, 
registering a new publication is a simple administrative act, and is 
not subject to political or government scrutiny.
    Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted. 
Books and magazines may be imported freely, but are likewise subject to 
censorship for objectionable sexual or religious content. English 
language publications were not affected by the direct proscription of 
books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in Islamabad, 
who banned five Sindhi-language publications in 1997 for 
``objectionable material against Pakistan,'' i.e., expressions of 
Sindhi nationalism.
    Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and 
criticize the Government. They report remarks made by opposition 
politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The 
effort to ensure that newspapers carry their statements or press 
releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political 
parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups, militant student 
organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is 
a common feature of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its 
views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the 
intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the 
distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their agents, who 
have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in 
an atmosphere of impunity, retaliate against journalists who report on 
their crimes. Journalists working in remote areas can expect more 
difficulties from local authorities and influential individuals than 
their big city counterparts. However, violence against and intimidation 
of journalists is a nationwide problem.
    The broadcast media are mainly government monopolies directed by 
the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Pakistan Television (PTV). 
Domestic news coverage and public affairs programming on these media 
are controlled closely by the Government and traditionally reflect its 
views. One private radio station, one television broadcaster, and a 
semi-private cable television station are licensed under special 
contractual arrangements with the Government. The semi-private 
television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has 
been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to 
financial difficulties. None of these stations is permitted to produce 
news and public affairs programming; the private television station 
rebroadcasts or simulcasts the regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar 
Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current 
affairs programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors those 
segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if 
ever, are foreign news stories censored for content. In 1999 after STN 
aired news stories critical of the Sharif Government's handling of the 
Kargil crisis with India, PTV announced plans to turn the STN into an 
``all-news'' channel, scheduled to start in October 1999; as of year's 
end, these plans have not been implemented. The Ministry of Information 
monitors advertising on all broadcast media, editing, or removing 
advertisements deemed morally objectionable.
    In 1999 the Secretary for Information was quoted in the press as 
stating that additional, private television and radio channels would 
soon be licensed, echoing a pledge made by General Musharraf. However, 
by year's end, no such licenses were granted. Satellite dishes are 
readily available on the local market and are priced within reach of 
almost everyone with a television set--well into the lower-middle 
classes. South Asian satellite channels (usually India-based) have 
become important sources of news and popular entertainment.
    Literary and creative works remain generally free of censorship. 
Dance performances, even classical performances, are subject to protest 
by certain religious groups. Obscene literature, a category broadly 
defined by the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and 
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption, 
social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female 
inequality, are broadcast on television; however, some sensitive series 
have been canceled before broadcast.
    The Government and universities generally respect academic freedom. 
The atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student 
organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to 
threaten academic freedom, despite the fact that a 1992 Supreme Court 
ruling prohibits student political organizations on campuses. On some 
campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical 
religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students, 
instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus, 
examination policies, grades, doctrine, and dress. These groups 
facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff 
at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the 
funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the largest 
university in the province, Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student 
wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its 
self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The suspended 
Constitution provided for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without 
arms subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the 
interest of public order;'' however, while the Government until March 
generally permitted peaceful assembly, it later imposed significant 
restrictions on this right. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited 
from holding any conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.c.). 
Throughout the year, the Government occasionally interfered with large 
rallies, which were held by all political parties. On March 15, the 
Musharraf regime enacted an ordinance banning all public political 
gatherings, processions, and strikes. Government officials claimed that 
the ban was enacted as a safety measure for the visit of an official 
head of state; however, the ban remained in place at year's end, 
although it has been enforced unevenly. Some groups circumvented the 
ban by meeting in private homes while using loudspeakers to carry the 
proceedings to supporters outdoors. The Government approved some public 
political gatherings, including a meeting of the Grand Democratic 
Alliance in September where parties debated which steps to take to 
return the country to democracy.
    District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the 
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons 
where demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the 
year, police made preventive arrests of political party organizers 
prior to announced demonstrations. For example, in July police arrested 
a group of Sharif supporters on their way from Lahore to Peshawar for a 
demonstration. On August 11, police arrested 40 PML supporters ahead of 
a planned public meeting on the country's independence day. In 
September police in Lahore arrested more than 500 members of the PPP 
for shouting anti-Musharraf and anti-army slogans. In October police 
arrested approximately 300 opposition leaders prior to a planned 
demonstration commemorating the year anniversary of the coup.
    The MQM has been harassed in its regular political activities, 
especially by the Sindh police. On February 19, police arrested 35 MQM 
and Jiye Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM, a national Sindhi political party) 
members during a public protest against layoffs of Urdu and Sindhi 
speaking workers from Pakistan Steel (see Section 1.d.). On February 
19, police personnel arrested 40 members of JSQM who planned to 
participate in a strike (see Section 1.d.). Police frequently arrested 
PML leaders and supporters in order to prevent planned demonstrations 
during the year; the HRCP noted that all public PML demonstrations in 
Karachi were prevented, except for meetings at the party's headquarters 
(see Section 1.d.).
    In August 1999, the Sharif Government issued an ordinance related 
to the anti-terrorist courts (see Section 1.e.). One section of the 
ordinance made ``illegal strikes, go-slows, (or) lock outs'' punishable 
by up to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine. A wide spectrum of 
opposition groups opposed this measure, fearing that it would be used 
to silence legitimate dissent. The anti-terrorist courts did not invoke 
this ordinance during the year.
    Police also arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and students in 
Lahore in May and students in Lahore during protests against General 
Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 1.c. 
and 2.c.).
    Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. On 
April 29, a local newspaper reported that police attacked with batons 
and then arrested more than 150 journalists from Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi during a peaceful rally (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). On 
June 3, police attacked with batons a procession of 200 small business 
owners who were protesting a government campaign to collect sales 
taxes; police also arrested three demonstrators (see Section 1.c.). On 
June 9, police opened fire to disperse a protest in Peshawar; four 
persons were injured (see Section 1.c.). Police accused the protesters 
of throwing stones and bricks; however, eyewitnesses alleged that the 
police opened fire without provocation.
    The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious 
parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed their presence 
would increase sectarian tensions or cause public violence (see Section 
2.d.).
    The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of association 
subject to restriction by government ordinance and law; however, the 
Government maintained some limits on this right. While these ordinances 
and laws apparently have not been used since the martial law period, 
the Sharif Government revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in 
Punjab. After the coup, the government of Punjab lifted the ban on the 
registration of new NGO's, but the old NGO's remained without licenses 
at year's end. Overall, NGO's reported improved relations with the 
Government during the year (see Section 4). There are no banned groups 
or parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The suspended Constitution provided for 
freedom of religion, and stated that adequate provisions shall be made 
for minorities to profess and practice their religions freely; however, 
the Government imposes a range of limits on freedom of religion. 
Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which approximately 95 percent of 
the population is Muslim. The majority of the population is Sunni 
Muslim, but an estimated 15 percent of the population is Shi'a. The 
suspended Constitution required that laws be consistent with Islam and 
imposed some elements of Koranic law on both Muslims and religious 
minorities. In July General Musharraf amended the PCO in order to 
incorporate the Islamic provisions of the suspended Constitution, which 
include the definition of ``Muslim'' and ``non-Muslim'' and procedures 
regarding Shariat courts. While there is no law establishing the 
Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert from Islam), 
social pressure against apostasy is so powerful that most such 
conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals 
against suspected converts are common. Members of religious minorities 
are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times refuse to 
prevent such actions or charge persons who commit them.
    In the Malakand division and the Kohistan district of the NWFP, 
ordinances require that ``all cases, suits, inquiries, matters, and 
proceedings in the courts shall be decided in accordance with 
Shari'a.'' These ordinances define Shari'a as the injunctions found in 
both the Koran and the Sunna. Islamic law judges with the assistance of 
the Ulema (Islamic scholars), under the general supervision of the 
Peshawar High Court, try all court cases in the Malakand Division and 
the Kohistan District. Elsewhere in the country, partial provisions of 
Shari'a apply. For example, police are authorized to arrest or fine 
Muslims who eat or smoke in public places during Ramadan. In 1998 then-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, proposed an amendment to the Constitution 
(the 15th Amendment) that would have imposed Shari'a throughout the 
country; minority religious groups feared that the implementation of 
this amendment would have restricted further the freedom to practice 
religions other than Islam. However, the Musharraf Government did not 
enact the proposed 15th Amendment and reportedly has no plans to do so.
    Discriminatory religious legislation has added to an atmosphere of 
religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed 
against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus, 
and members of Muslim offshoot sects, such as Ahmadis and Zikris (see 
Section 5).
    The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A 1974 
constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority 
because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as 
the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as 
Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In 1984 the Government inserted 
Section 298(c) into the Penal Code, prohibiting Ahmadis from calling 
themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases, 
and greetings. The constitutionality of Section 298(c) was upheld in a 
split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. The punishment for violation 
of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine. The 
Government and anti-Ahmadi religious groups have used this provision 
extensively to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis suffer from various restrictions 
of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including 
violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in 
Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, speech, and assembly, 
and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi mosques remained 
closed. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited from holding 
conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.b.). Ahmadis are prohibited 
from taking part in the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca). 
Some popular newspapers publish anti-Ahmadi ``conspiracy'' stories, 
which contribute to anti-Ahmadi sentiments in society.
    Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code, 
originally stipulated a maximum 2-year sentence for insulting the 
religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to 10 
years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a 
sentence of life imprisonment for ``whoever willfully defiles, damages, 
or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.'' In 1986 another amendment, 
Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for 
directly or indirectly defiling ``the sacred name of the holy Prophet 
Mohammed.'' In 1991 a court struck down the option of life 
imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by 
rivals and local authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate 
Ahmadis, Christians, and even orthodox Muslims. No one has been 
executed by the State under any of these provisions, although religious 
extremists have killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996 
magistrates have been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy 
to see whether they are credible before filing formal charges. On April 
21, the Government announced its intention to require that deputy 
commissioners review all blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR 
(see Section 1.c.); however, General Musharraf later reversed this 
decision due to strong pressure from some Muslim groups. On May 11, 
police arrested approximately 300 Muslim clerics and students in Lahore 
during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy 
laws (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). According to Ahmadi sources, 
approximately 3 dozen Ahmadis have been charged under the blasphemy 
laws since the October 1999 coup. For example, in October police 
arrested Nasir Ahmad of Rajanpur district under Section 295(b) for 
allegedly defiling a copy of the Koran. Mushtaq Ahmad Saggon and Nasir 
Ahmad, were convicted in Muzaffargarh in July 1999 under Sections 
295(a) and 295(c) for preaching and distributing religious literature. 
Their case was transferred to an anti-terrorist court at Dera Ghazi 
Khan, and the Lahore High Court denied their request for bail.
    In May a lower court in Sialkot district, Punjab, sentenced two 
Christian brothers to 35 years' imprisonment each and fined them each 
$1,500 (PRs 75,000). The brothers were convicted of desecrating the 
Koran and blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed; both cases were registered 
by an ice cream vendor who allegedly fought with the brothers after he 
asked them to use their own dishes, stating that his were reserved for 
Muslim customers. Lawyers for the brothers filed an appeal in the 
Lahore High Court. On May 2, Augustine Ashiq Masih was charged with 
blaspheming the Prophet in Faisalabad. According to press reports, 
Masih converted to Islam, married a Muslim woman, and then converted 
back to Christianity, which angered local Muslims who brought the 
charges against him. Ayub Masih (detained since 1996) was convicted of 
blasphemy for making favorable comments about Salman Rushdie, the 
author of the controversial book, ``The Satanic Verses,'' and was 
sentenced to death in April 1998. Ayub's family and 13 other landless 
Christian families were forced from their village in 1996 following the 
charges, and he survived an attempt on his life in 1997, when he was 
shot at outside of the courtroom while in trial. The case was pending 
appeal before the Lahore High Court at year's end.
    Police also arrest Muslims under the blasphemy laws; government 
officials maintain that about two-thirds of the total blasphemy cases 
that have been brought to trial have affected Muslims. In February 
Muhammad Younis was sentenced to 13 months in jail in Multan for 
uttering derogatory remarks about the companions of the Prophet 
Mohammad. In March an anti-terrorist court in Sindh convicted Muslim 
author Gohar Shahi in absentia under the blasphemy laws. On August 5, 
Abdul Hasnain Muhammad Yusuf Aliwas was given a death sentence and 35 
years' imprisonment by a Lahore court after being convicted under 
Sections 295(a), 295(c), and 298 for defiling the name of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Some of Ali's supporters claim that he was being persecuted 
for his allegedly unorthodox Islamic beliefs. In August Abdul Hasnain 
Muhammad Yusuf Ali, a Sufi Muslim was convicted of blasphemy under 
Sections 295(a) and 295(c) for defiling the name of the Prophet 
Muhammad. A Lahore court sentenced Ali to death. On October 4, police 
arrested Yunis Shaikh on blasphemy charges after he allegedly made 
remarks offensive to Islam and to the Prophet Mohammad during a 
lecture. Police denied bail and he was awaiting trial at year's end. In 
1998 a Shi'a Muslim, Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy for 
allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995. 
He was sentenced to death, the first time a Muslim had been sentenced 
to death for a violation of the blasphemy law. The case remained under 
appeal at year's end.
    When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court, 
extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the 
consequences of an acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates often 
continue trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further 
legal costs and court appearances. Many judges also try to pass such 
cases to other jurists.
    The Government distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims with 
regard to political rights. In national and local elections, Muslims 
vote for Muslim candidates by geographic locality while non-Muslims 
must vote for at-large non-Muslim candidates. Legal provisions for 
minority reserved seats do not include the Senate and the Federal 
Cabinet.
    Furthermore according to the suspended Constitution, the President 
and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The Prime Minister, federal 
ministers, and ministers of state, as well as elected members of the 
Senate and National Assembly (including non-Muslims) must take an oath 
to ``strive to preserve the Islamic ideology, which is the basis for 
the creation of Pakistan'' (see Section 3).
    In June a prominent Christian-affiliated NGO that is active in 
defending those accused of violating the blasphemy laws received a 
series of death threats.
    ``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim 
students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not 
required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in 
their own religions. In practice many non-Muslim students are compelled 
by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat. An education policy announced 
by the Government in 1998 included provisions for increased mandatory 
Islamic instruction in public schools.
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
    The Government designates religion on passports, and to get a 
passport citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim. 
Muslims must also affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of 
the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
    In September 1999, the Sharif Government removed colonial-era 
entries for ``sect'' from government job application forms to prevent 
discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly 
Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. General 
Musharraf and members of his staff apparently consulted with religious 
minorities on some of his initial cabinet appointments.
    In December 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that interest is un-
Islamic and directed the Government to implement an interest-free 
system by June 2001.
    Following the coup, the Musharraf Government affirmed its 
commitment to protectthe rights of religious minorities. According to 
minority community members, the Government made efforts to seek 
minority input into decision-making and offered some religious 
minorities cabinet positions.
    The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Chenab Nagar 
(formerly known as Rabway) in Punjab often has been a site of violence 
against Ahmadis (see Section 5).
    In December 1999, several hundred persons looted and burned 
property in Haveli Lakha, Okara district, Punjab, which belonged to 
Mohammad Nawaz, a local Ahmadi leader accused of planning to build an 
Ahmadi house of worship (see Section 5). A neighbor reportedly incited 
the incident by accusing Nawaz of building the house of worship after 
the two were involved in a property dispute. Nawaz, a doctor, 
reportedly intended to build a free clinic next to his home. The mob 
destroyed the clinic and looted and burned Nawaz's home. According to 
Ahmadi sources, police personnel arrived at the scene, but did nothing 
to stop the crowd. At year's end, neither the neighbor nor anyone in 
the crowd had been arrested or questioned in connection with the 
incident, and police took no steps to find or return any of Nawaz's 
property. However, Nawaz and his two sons were arrested and charged 
with blasphemy. Several days later, they were released on bail; 
however, the blasphemy case against them was pending as of year's end. 
Three other Ahmadis in Haveli Lakha also were charged with blasphemy in 
connection with the incident, even though they were not in town at the 
time; however, the case against them was dismissed for lack of 
evidence.
    Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem 
throughout the country (see Section 5). More than 300 persons have died 
in incidents of sectarian violence in Punjab in the last 3 years, 
according to one credible newspaper report. Another newspaper reported 
that over 2,000 persons have died in sectarian violence since 1981 (see 
Section 1.a.). However, sectarian violence markedly decreased after the 
October 1999 coup.
    Anti-terrorist courts also handed down convictions against several 
individuals accused of sectarian violence. On April 22, an anti-
terrorist court in Rawalpindi sentenced 23 persons to life imprisonment 
for their role in leading a procession of persons that burned a Shi'a 
mosque in 1996. On July 3, an anti-terrorist court in Gujranwala 
convicted 2 men for reportedly killing a Shi'a senior police officer; 
however, the men later were released.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country and the freedom to travel abroad; however, the 
Government limits these rights. The authorities at times prevent 
political party leaders and religious leaders from traveling to certain 
parts of the country (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). Travel to Israel is 
prohibited by law. Government employees and students must obtain ``no 
objection'' certificates before travelling abroad, although this 
requirement is rarely enforced against students.
    Citizens regularly exercise the right to emigrate. However, an Exit 
Control List (ECL), which is made public but is constantly revised, is 
used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals and individuals under 
investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or other offenses. 
At the end of 1999, the HRCP estimated that there were more than 5,000 
entries on the ECL, including 400 PML leaders, all 45 MQM legislators 
and their family members, 20 journalists, and as many as 3,000 alleged 
bank defaulters. The Musharraf Government increased the use of the ECL 
reportedly to prevent those suspected of loan defaults or corruption 
from leaving the country. The focus apparently was on potential loan 
defaulters as part of the Musharraf Government's emphasis on 
accountability. According to a press report, the Musharraf Government 
added approximately 3,000 names to the ECL. No judicial action is 
required to add a name to the ECL; however, those named have the right 
to appeal to the Secretary of Interior and, if refused, to the Advocate 
General of the senior judiciary. In practice courts have directed the 
Government to lift restrictions on some politicians on the ECL. For 
example, Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister and leader of the PPP, 
was placed on the ECL and was prevented from leaving the country in 
December 1998. Bhutto was allowed to leave later that month following a 
court order to lift the travel restrictions against her.
    Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol and has not adopted domestic 
legislation concerning the treatment of refugees. In December 1999, the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a 
change from the practice of granting ``prima facie'' status to all 
Afghans in the country; under the new policy, all refugee 
determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis. However, means 
for screening Afghan refugees have not been established, and Pakistani 
law makes no provisions for asylum. The absence of legalized asylum, 
coupled with sharp economic competition, led to a more restrictive 
admissions policy and a deteriorating quality of life for some 
refugees.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum has been provided to 
refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, when several million Afghans 
fleeing Soviet occupation poured across the border. There remain an 
estimated 1.2 million Afghan refugees in the country who have been 
granted first asylum. There also are an estimated 2 to 3 million 
unregistered Afghans in urban areas throughout the country.
    The Government has not granted permanent legal resettlement to 
Afghan refugees but allows them to live and work in the country. Many 
are self-supporting and live outside refugee camps, which has resulted 
in some hostility among local communities whose residents resent the 
economic competition and believe that the refugees contribute to high 
crime rates. The Government occasionally harasses refugees and 
threatens them with deportation. For example, authorities in Quetta 
detained a number of newly arrived Afghans, mostly non-Pashtun 
minorities, with plans to deport them. In December 1999, the UNHCR 
proposed that the Government establish a formal joint screening 
mechanism to determine whether or not the intended deportees are 
refugees according to internationally accepted standards. No such 
formal mechanism was established during the year, and the Government 
deported some persons without notifying UNHCR officials. However, the 
Government sometimes allowed the UNHCR to attempt to find solutions 
other than deportation for refugees, such as arranging for resettlement 
in a third country.
    Most refugee camps are well established, and living conditions 
resemble those in neighboring villages, even though most direct 
assistance to the camps ended in the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals 
have gone to urban areas like Peshawar or Quetta, but some have settled 
in the new Akora Khattak camp (since 1996) and the Shamshatoo camp 
(since 1999). Conditions for newly arrived Afghans generally are worse 
than conditions in the well-established camps. For example, sanitation, 
health care, shelter, and fresh water are ongoing problems in the new 
camps. Some of the most recent arrivals still reside in makeshift 
tents. In 1999 874 Afghan refugees from Nasir Bagh camp were relocated 
to make room for construction of a new highway and housing development. 
Some were taken to Akora Khattak camp; however, many reportedly 
returned to Afghanistan or moved to other locations in Pakistan. 
Relocations declined in late 1999 and did not occur during the year.
    According to Amnesty International, there was one report of the 
forced return of a person to a country where he feared persecution 
during the year. Professor Mohammad Rahim Elhan, a prominent Afghan 
scholar who had accused the Government of interfering in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan, was deported against his will to Afghanistan on 
June 21. However, he was subsequently permitted to reenter Pakistan. 
The Government cooperated with the UNHCR to support voluntary 
repatriations to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. In 
1999 approximately 92,000 Afghans returned to their home country. 
Afghan refugees have limited access to legal protection and depend on 
the UNHCR and group leaders to resolve disputes among themselves and 
with Pakistanis. In the past, police sometimes attempted to prevent 
Afghan nationals from entering cities and there were reports that some 
have been forced back into refugee camps. During the year, there were 
reports that the Government closed some Afghan schools and cracked down 
on unlicensed medical practitioners that treat mostly Afghans.
    Most able-bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent 
employment; however, they are not covered by local labor laws. NGO's 
and private entities provided women and girls with better education and 
health care than is available in Afghanistan. However, Afghan women 
working for NGO's were targets for occasional harassment and violence 
by conservatives and Taliban sympathizers.
    Several prominent Afghans also reportedly have been the targets of 
harassment and violence from Taliban supporters and conservatives in 
the refugee community. According to newspaper reports, at least 10 
Afghans were killed during the year, reportedly for their political 
views (see Section 1.a.). On June 1, unknown gunmen injured Mohammad 
Enam Wak at his home in Peshawar (see Section 1.c.). Wak wrote a book 
calling for a federal system of government in Afghanistan. In July an 
Afghan leader, Haji Jan Mohammad, whose name reportedly appeared on a 
Taliban hit list, was killed by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.). 
Police investigations of these Afghan killings were perfunctory at 
best; there were no arrests or convictions in any case.
    The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue. 
The Biharis are Urdu speakers from the Indian state of Bihar who went 
to East Pakistan--now Bangladesh--at the time of partition in 1947. 
When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the Biharis sought 
resettlement in Pakistan. However, approximately 250,000 Biharis remain 
in refugee camps in Bangladesh. While the Mohajir community--
descendants of Muslims who immigrated to Pakistan from India after 
partition--supports their resettlement, the Sindhi community opposes 
it. In 1993 the Government flew 342 Biharis to the country and placed 
them in temporary housing in central Punjab. No further resettlement 
has occurred.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens continued to be denied their right to choose or change 
their government peacefully. After the imposition of a military 
government in October 1999, the Constitution and representative bodies, 
including the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial 
assemblies, were suspended indefinitely. General Musharraf appointed 
new members to the Cabinet, as well as new governors to all four 
provinces.
    The Musharraf Government pledged to return the country to a 
democracy; however, General Musharraf stressed his priority to build 
first a strong economic and political foundation to avert another bout 
of ``sham'' democracy. General Musharraf pledged to abide by a May 12 
Supreme Court ruling that mandates that national elections be held no 
later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The Government established 
the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to develop political reforms 
and a framework for elections. It is unclear whether or not the NRB has 
the institutional capacity to meet its mandate within the established 
deadline.
    Citizens' right to change their government also was restricted by 
the executive's strong influence on the judiciary. On January 25, 
General Musharraf ordered all of the justices in the country to swear 
to uphold his PCO (see Section 1.e.).
    The Musharraf regime did not ban political parties, and the parties 
active prior to the coup, including the Pakistan Muslim League (which 
was led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) continued their 
activities. However, the Government arrested hundreds of persons in 
opposition political parties during the year (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.). On March 15, General Musharraf issued an ordinance banning all 
political gatherings held outdoors (see Section 2.b.). The National 
Accountability Ordinance prohibits those convicted of corruption under 
the NAB from holding political office for 21 years (see Section 1.d.). 
On August 11, the Government amended the Political Parties Act to 
automatically disqualify anyone with a court conviction from holding 
party office. Legal observers expressed concern over the concentration 
of power in the NAB, the fact that NAB chairmen have all been members 
of the military, and the presumption of guilt in accountability cases.
    National elections for national and provincial assemblies last were 
held in February 1997. Election observers concluded that the elections 
generally were free and fair. Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League won 
a majority of seats and formed a government.
    Elections for local government bodies were held in Punjab in May 
1998. Elections were held in Baluchistan in March 1999 and a chairman 
was named in August. Elections have not been held in the two other 
provinces, NWFP and Sindh, since 1993, when these bodies were dissolved 
by a caretaker government because of corruption charges. Local 
government elections were postponed indefinitely in the NWFP and Sindh. 
Sindh was under Governor's rule from November 1998 until the October 
1999 coup. In October 1999, Musharraf suspended the local and 
provincial governments; the provinces are ruled by governors appointed 
by General Musharraf. During the year, Musharraf focused on the 
perceived need to devolve power to the local level in order to reduce 
the power of the central Government. In March General Musharraf 
presented his plan for devolution and political restructuring at the 
local level. According to this plan, non-party based local elections 
were scheduled to be held from December through August 2001. On 
December 31, there were elections in 18 districts of the country. 
According to local and international election observers, the elections 
generally were free and fair. Religious minorities boycotted the polls. 
Directly elected union councilors are to select a chief mayor and 
members of district council. Critics of the plan claim that it is 
merely an attempt to dissipate pressure for a return to democracy at 
the national level. On June 7, the Government announced a number of 
measures designed to make the electoral commission independent of 
government control, including granting the commission full financial 
autonomy.
    Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the 
political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 million inhabitants of the 
northern areas were not covered under the suspended Constitution and 
have had no representation in the federal legislature. An appointed 
civil servant administers these areas; an elected Northern Areas 
Council serves only in an advisory capacity and has no authority to 
change laws or to raise and spend revenue. In May 1999, the Supreme 
Court directed the Government to act within 6 months to give the 
northern areas an elected government with an independent judiciary. In 
November 1999, the Musharraf regime permitted previously scheduled 
elections to take place in the northern areas; independents and 
candidates from the PML, the PPP, and the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan won 
seats.
    The right of citizens to change their government also has been 
hampered at the provincial level by the Government's failure to release 
the 1998 census figures and by the likely underestimation of the 
population of Sindh. Held after a delay of 7 years, the national census 
was postponed repeatedly due to pressure from ethnic groups and 
provincial officials who feared diminished representation and access to 
federal funds. The 9.26 million census figure for Karachi, revised to 
9.8 million in a February report, is estimated to be 3 to 5 million 
short of the actual figure.
    Although women participate in Government, and former prime minister 
Benazir Bhutto is a prominent opposition figure, women are 
underrepresented in political life at all levels. Six women held seats 
in the 217-member National Assembly, up from 4 seats in the previous 
Parliament. Thirty-five women, more than ever before, campaigned for 
seats in the 1997 national elections. The Parliamentary Commission on 
the Status of Women in Pakistan recommended reserving one-third of 
seats in all elected bodies for women. The Musharraf Government 
announced in August that one-third of the seats in the upcoming local 
council elections would be reserved for female candidates; some 
political activists doubt that there would be enough female candidates 
in certain remote areas of the country to fulfill this requirement. 
Women participate in large numbers in elections, although some are 
dissuaded from voting by family, religious, and social customs. In 1997 
only 37 out of 6,600 female registered voters actually cast ballots in 
Jamrud in the Khyber Agency due to pronouncements that voting by women 
was un-Islamic. General Musharraf appointed a woman to his National 
Security Council and three women to his Cabinet. Provincial governors 
appointed by General Musharraf also have named women to serve in 
provincial cabinets.
    Minorities are underrepresented in Government and politics. Under 
the electoral system, minorities vote for reserved at-large seats, not 
for nonminority candidates who represent actual constituencies. The 
Musharraf regime abandoned a plan to abolish the separate electorate 
system due to pressure by some Muslim political groups. With separate 
electorates, representatives have little incentive to promote their 
minority constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that 
separate electorates are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of 
Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their 
followers not to register as ``non-Muslims,'' so most Ahmadis are 
completely unrepresented. In the National Assembly, Christians hold 
four reserved seats; Hindus and members of scheduled castes another 
four; Ahmadis one; and Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and other non-Muslims 
one (see Section 2.c.). Each of the four categories is maintained on a 
separate electorate roll, and minorities cannot cast votes for the 
Muslim constituency seats. Under Article 106 of the suspended 
Constitution, minorities also had reserved seats in the provincial 
assemblies. The 1997 general election report states that each Christian 
National Assembly member represents 327,606 persons; each Hindu and 
scheduled castes member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi, and other 
non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member 104,244. These 
figures significantly understate the population of most of the minority 
groups because they are based on 1981 census figures. By year's end, 
the 1998 census figures for religious minorities had not been 
published. According to a local magazine, there are approximately 3 
million Christians, 2.7 million Hindus, and several hundred thousand 
Ahmadis in the country.
    Tribal people are underrepresented in government and politics. The 
1997 elections for the eight National Assembly members from the FATA 
were, for the first time, conducted on the basis of universal adult 
franchise. Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions, tribal 
leaders, or maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the central 
Government's political agents in each agency, elected the FATA National 
Assembly members. In accordance with the Government's general ban on 
political party activities in the FATA, candidates were not allowed to 
register by political party and political party rallies were not 
allowed. However, several political parties did campaign covertly. 
Tribal people, including large numbers of women in some areas, 
registered to vote despite campaigns by some tribes against their 
participation. However, on election day, far fewer registered women 
than registered men actually voted.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new 
human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups 
generally are free to operate without government restriction; however, 
they are required to be licensed. Human rights groups report that they 
generally have good access to police stations and prisons. The 
Government has provided protection to human rights lawyers defending 
accused blasphemers following threats and attacks on the lawyers by 
religious extremists. These threats became more explicit and public in 
1998, with signed graffiti calling for the killing of well-known human 
rights activist Asma Jahangir.
    The Musharraf Government made some attempts to ease some of the 
previous government's restrictions on NGO's; the Sharif Government 
revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in 1999. General Musharraf 
appointed several persons with prominent NGO backgrounds to his Cabinet 
and many NGO workers reported a smoother working relationship with the 
Government during the period covered by this report. The new government 
in Punjab under General Musharraf lifted the previous ban on NGO 
registration (see Section 2.b.).
    International human rights observers are permitted to visit the 
country and travel freely. Several international organizations, many 
focused on refugee relief, maintain permanent offices in the country, 
although some report difficulty in securing visas for their foreign 
staff.
    The Ministry of Human Rights, established in 1995, is now a 
department within the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights, and 
Parliamentary Affairs. Some 125 employees staff the department, which 
is headquartered in Islamabad and has four regional offices. The 
department has set up a ``fund for women in distress and detention'' 
and a ``relief and revolving fund'' for victims of human rights 
violations. Because of its limited budget, the department operates 
primarily on a case-by-case basis but seeks help from donor agencies 
for projects to build institutional capacity and human rights 
awareness. The department finalized and began limited implementation of 
a reform program for jails. However, the department is not viewed as 
effective by human rights observers. The Government has failed to take 
follow-up action on the 1997 report of the Commission of Inquiry for 
Women.
    In April the Government organized a conference on human rights and 
pledged to take ``small but meaningful steps'' including: an 8-month 
public relations campaign on human rights themes; requiring deputy 
commissioners to move female burn victims to hospitals (see Section 5); 
banning the use of fetters in prisons and jails (see Section 1.c.); 
ordering deputy commissioners to review all blasphemy cases prior to 
the filing of a FIR (see Section 1.d.); creating a commission for 
police reforms; releasing 20,000 prisoners from jail; calling for a 
Commission on the Status of Women; and changing the law so that women 
married to foreign husbands can claim citizenship for their children. 
The Government subsequently took no apparent steps to organize the 
public relations campaign and backtracked on having deputy 
commissioners review blasphemy cases (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). The 
Government made limited progress in the following areas: the Lahore 
High Court ordered local jail authorities to remove all fetters (see 
Section 1.d.); the Government reportedly released 47,000 prisoners who 
were convicted of petty crimes and that already had served their prison 
terms; the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the Status 
of Women on September 1; and in late April President Tarar issued an 
amendment ordinance to the citizenship law to enable women married to 
foreigners to claim citizenship for their children (see Section 5).
    On July 23, several clergy in the NWFP shot at a female NGO 
worker's home and ransacked her NGO-sponsored medical camp.
Section 5. Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
    The suspended Constitution provided for equality before the law for 
all citizens and broadly prohibited discrimination based on race, 
religion, caste, residence, or place of birth; however, in practice 
there is significant discrimination based on these factors.
    Women.--Domestic violence is a widespread and serious problem. 
Human rights groups estimate that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of 
women are victims of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands, 
in-laws, or other relatives. The Progressive Women's Organization 
reported in 1999 that every one of two women is the victim of mental or 
physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women 
reported that violence against women ``has been described as the most 
pervasive violation of human rights'' in the country, and it called for 
legislation clearly stating that domestic violence against women is a 
criminal offense. Husbands are known to kill their wives even for 
trivial offenses. In 1999 the Pakistan Peace Coalition surveyed 1,000 
women in 10 communities in rural Punjab; 82 percent of the respondents 
reported that they feared violence from their husbands over trivial 
matters. While abusers may be charged with assault, cases rarely are 
filed. Police usually return battered women to their abusive family 
members. Women are reluctant to file charges because of societal mores 
that stigmatize divorce and make women economically and psychologically 
dependent on their relatives. Relatives also are reluctant to report 
abuse to protect the reputation of the family. There are no specific 
laws pertaining to domestic violence, except for the Qisas and Diyat 
ordinances, which are rarely invoked and may privatize the crime. 
However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be invoked where the victim is a direct 
lineal descendant of the perpetrator. Police and judges tend to see 
domestic violence as a family problem, and are reluctant to take action 
in such cases. Thus, it is difficult for women to obtain relief from 
the justice system in cases of domestic violence.
    The Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center in Karachi published a 
report in 1999 that summarized reports in the English language press 
about violence against women between 1993 and 1998. Even though it 
limited itself to reports of violence by close male relatives, Shirkat 
Gah documented 535 women who were killed or who committed suicide 
during the period; 95 of these women were killed or committed suicide 
after they expressed interest in marrying a man of their own choice.
    During the year, the press reported on hundreds of incidents of 
violence against women, and drew attention to the killings of married 
women by relatives over dowry or other family-related disputes. Most of 
the victims were burned to death, allegedly in kitchen stove accidents; 
some women reportedly were burned with acid. During the year, 593 burn 
cases were recorded in Lahore newspapers; cases were registered in 74 
percent but suspects were arrested in only 10 percent. Human rights 
monitors assert that many cases are not reported by hospitals and that, 
even when they are, the police are reluctant to investigate or file 
charges. Furthermore, human rights monitors agree that most ``stove 
deaths'' are in fact killings based upon a suspicion of illicit sexual 
relationship or upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of cases 
of wife burnings, spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has helped 
to raise awareness about violence against women. The Government has 
failed to take action in honor killing cases, particularly when 
influential families are involved. By year's end, there was no progress 
in the 1998 case of Shahnaz, who died after her husband poured gasoline 
on her and set her on fire. The police registered a case against her 
husband and three in-laws. The case remained pending.
    A crisis center for women in distress was opened in 1997 in 
Islamabad. The center, the first of its kind in the country, is an 
initiative of the Ministry of Women's Development with the assistance 
of local NGO's. The center offers legal and medical referrals from 
volunteer doctors and lawyers, counseling from trained psychologists, 
and a hotline for women in distress. During the year, the crisis center 
served 75 women. A second crisis center in Vehari, in southern Punjab, 
opened during the year.
    Rape is an extensive problem. The HRCP estimates that at least 
eight women, five of them minors, are raped every day, and more than 
two-thirds of those are gang-raped. In 1997 the National Assembly 
passed a law that provided for the death penalty for persons convicted 
of gang rape. No executions have been carried out under this law and 
conviction rates remain low because rape, and gang rape in particular, 
is commonly used by landlords and criminal bosses to humiliate and 
terrorize local residents. It is estimated that less than one-third of 
all rapes are reported to the police. Police rarely respond to and 
sometimes are implicated in these attacks (see Section 1.c.). According 
to a police official, in most rape cases the victims are pressured to 
drop charges because of the threat of Hudood adultery or fornication 
charges against them if they cannot prove the absence of consent. All 
consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of 
the Hudood Ordinances, and carry Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir (secular) 
punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman cannot prove 
the absence of consent, there is a risk that she may be charged with a 
violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or adultery. The 
Hadd--or maximum punishment for this offense--is public flogging or 
stoning; however, for Hadd punishments to apply, especially stringent 
rules of evidence are followed. Hadd punishments are mandatory if 
evidentiary requirements are met; for sexual offenses, four adult male 
Muslims must witness the act or the alleged perpetrator must confess. 
For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4 male witnesses are not 
Muslim, the punishment is less severe. The testimony of four female 
witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd 
punishments, therefore, even if a man rapes a woman in the presence of 
several women, he cannot be subjected to the Hadd punishment. If Hadd 
punishment requirements are not met, the accused may be sentenced to a 
lesser class of penalties (Tazir); in practice most rape cases are 
tried at this level. Under Tazir, a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25 
years in prison and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has been applied in 
the 20 years the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir 
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
offenders.
    According to an HRCP lawyer, the Musharraf Government has brought 
fewer charges against women under the Hudood Ordinance than in the 
past, and the courts have shown greater leniency toward women in their 
sentences and in the granting of bail. However, even in cases where a 
woman wishes to bring rape charges, she may have trouble bringing her 
attacker to justice. According to Amnesty International, men accused of 
rape sometimes are acquitted and released, while their victims are held 
on adultery charges.
    According to Human Rights Watch, women face difficulty at every 
level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases. Police are 
reluctant to take the complaint and sometimes are abusive toward the 
victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of proof as to what 
constitutes rape and to what corroboration is required; and judges, 
police, and prosecutors are biased against female rape victims, tending 
towards a presumption of female consent and the belief that women lie 
about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly are reluctant to 
convict; however, if there is some evidence, judges have been known to 
convict the accused of the lesser offense of adultery or fornication 
(consensual sex). Human Rights Watch also reported that women face 
problems in the collection of evidence; that the doctors tasked to 
examine rape victims often believe that the victims are lying; that 
they are trained insufficiently and have inadequate facilities for the 
collection of forensic evidence pertaining to rape; that they do not 
testify very effectively in court; and that they tend to focus on the 
virginity status of the victim, and, due either to an inadequate 
understanding of the need for prompt medical evaluations or to 
inadequate resources, often delay the medical examinations for many 
days or even weeks, making any evidence that they collect of dubious 
utility. Medical examiners and police personnel sometimes are 
physically or verbally abusive during these exams, especially in cases 
where a woman is charged with adultery or fornication (for which an 
exam may be requested) and does not wish to be examined (such women, 
despite the fact that by law they should not be examined without their 
consent, have been examined, and even have been beaten for their 
refusal to be examined). Police and doctors often do not know that a 
woman must consent to this type of exam before it can be performed, and 
judges may not inform women of their right to decline. If they report 
rape to the police, women's cases often are delayed or mishandled, and 
women frequently are harassed by police or the alleged perpetrators to 
drop the case. Police sometimes accept bribes to get the complainant to 
drop a case, and sometimes request bribes to carry it forward. Police 
tend to investigate the cases poorly, and may not inform women of the 
need for a medical exam or may stall or block women's attempts to 
obtain one. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women 
criticized Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and 
recommended that they be repealed asserting that they are based on an 
erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 1.c.). The Commission 
charged that the laws on adultery and rape have been subject to 
widespread misuse, with 95 percent of the women accused of adultery 
being found innocent either in the court of first instance or on 
appeal. However, the Commission pointed out that, by that time, the 
woman may have spent months in jail, suffered sexual abuse at the hands 
of the police, and seen her reputation destroyed. The Commission found 
that the main victims of the Hudood Ordinances are poor women who are 
unable to defend themselves against slanderous charges. These 
ordinances also have been used by husbands and other male family 
members to punish their wives and female relatives for reasons having 
nothing to do with sexual propriety, according to the Commission. At 
year's end, 511 women were awaiting trial for adultery under the Hudood 
Ordinance in Lahore; 400 in Peshawar; and 300 in Mardan (see Section 
1.e.).
    Marital rape is not a crime. The 1979 Hudood Ordinances abolished 
punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry 
for women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape. 
Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage 
is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is 
regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl 
cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if 
the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
    There are numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male 
relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated 
seriously and those who are arrested often are acquitted on the grounds 
that they were ``provoked,'' or for a lack of witnesses. While the 
tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual relations in so-
called ``honor killings'', in order to restore tribal or family honor, 
applies equally to offending men and women, women are far more likely 
to be killed than men. The Progressive Women's Organization, a human 
rights NGO, estimated that as many as 300 women are killed each year by 
their husbands or family, mostly as a result of ``honor killings,'' 
known as ``karo/kari'' in Sindh. The problem is believed to be even 
more extensive in rural Sindh. ``Karo/kari'' (or adulterer/adulteress) 
killings are common in rural Sindh and Baluchistan. The HRCP reported 
an average of 30 killings per month for the first half of the year. 
Tribal custom among the Baluch and the Pathans also sanctions such 
killings. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has rejected the concept 
of ``honor'' as a mitigating circumstance in a murder case and 
recommended that such killings be treated as simple murder. Women who 
are the victims of rape may become the victims of their families' 
vengeance against the victims' ``defilement.'' On June 1, Nazir Ahmad 
killed his wife, Yasmin, and a family friend, Nasir Farooq, on 
suspicion that the two were conducting an extramarital relationship. On 
December 12, Khalida was killed by her uncle and other relatives who 
accused her of having illicit relations with Momin Gorchani. Khalida's 
relatives also injured Momin's father and another one of his relatives. 
Police arrested one person in connection with the murder. AI also 
reported that if an accused adulteress is killed, and the adulterer 
manages to escape this fate, he may be required under the karo/kari 
tradition to compensate the family of the accused adulteress; 
sometimes, a woman from the adulterer's family is given compensation to 
repair the honor of the adulteress' family.
    Trafficking in women also is a significant problem (see Section 
6.f.).
    There are significant barriers to the advancement of women 
beginning at birth. In general female children are less valued and 
cared for than are male children. According to a UN study, girls 
receive less nourishment, health care, and education than do boys. In 
February Dr. Sher Shah Syed, of the Pakistan National Forum on Women's 
Health in Karachi, reported that the maternal mortality rate is 600 per 
100,000 pregnancies; this figure contradicts the Government's figure of 
300 per 100,000 pregnancies. At Karachi's civil hospital, the maternal 
mortality rate was 2,257 per 100,000 in 1999. According to a 1996 
report by the Islamabad-based human development center, only 16 women 
are economically active for every 100 men.
    Discrimination against women is particularly acute in rural areas. 
In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates are 
2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National Institute 
of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no financial 
benefit'' as the reason they kept their daughters from attending 
school, and sent their sons instead. Similarly a study by the NWFP 
directorate of primary education concluded that most girls in rural 
areas do not go to school because they have to look after the household 
while their mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 28 percent of 
girls completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science during the 
year would be able to find places in government-run colleges, as 
opposed to 83 percent of boys passing the same tests. In Baluchistan 
conditions are much worse, with only 2 percent of the province's women 
having received any formal education. Education activists have noted 
that many parents would like to educate their daughters; however, many 
parents reportedly choose not to send their daughters to school due to 
the poor quality of instruction and the lack of facilities.
    Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow 
interpretation of Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of 
women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and 
perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory 
treatment of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
    Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights 
in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of them, and often the 
laws are not observed. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for 
Women has recommended that marriage registration (nikahnama) be 
obligatory and that women, as well as men, have the right to initiate 
divorce proceedings. It also has called for the punishment of those who 
coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A husband legally is bound 
to maintain his wife until 3 months after the divorce. A father is 
bound to maintain his children until they reach the age of 14 for 
males, or the age of 16 for females. However, the legal system is so 
complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children to get 
maintenance.
    In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed 
to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due. In 
rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran'' still is 
widely accepted if the family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or 
wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married to the 
Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years of 
age, including her immediate family members. Press reports indicate 
that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in parts of 
the NWFP and the Punjab.
    A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in 
1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry 
without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father). 
However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry 
at the direction of family elders. When this custom is violated, 
especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result, 
and the authorities generally fail to prosecute such cases vigorously.
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in 
certain court cases (see Section 1.e.).
    In December speakers at a seminar stated that large numbers of 
working women face discrimination and sexual harassment. Women 
routinely are denied equal opportunities for promotion, pay, and 
benefits. Additionally women in some sectors are denied days off and 
overtime benefits.
    Although a small number of women study and teach in universities, 
postgraduate employment opportunities for women largely remain limited 
to teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless, an increasing 
number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
    Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many 
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other 
groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who 
may not be able to afford an attorney.
    The Government took several positive steps to improve the status of 
women during the year. For example, in April President Tarar issued an 
amendment ordinance to the citizenship law, which enables women who are 
married to foreign husbands to claim citizenship for their children. In 
September the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the 
Status of Women (see Section 4). The Commission was established in 
order to advise the Government on policies directly affecting women; 
however, the Commission lacks the authority to ensure that its 
recommendations are implemented.
    Children.--The Government, through its laws and programs, does not 
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's rights and welfare. There 
is no federal law on compulsory education, and neither the federal nor 
provincial governments provide sufficient resources to assure universal 
education. The education system is in disarray, with studies showing 
that only 65 to 70 percent of children under the age of 12 are enrolled 
in school, less than half of whom actually complete primary school. In 
Sindh province, the number of students enrolled in primary education 
rose from 2.1 million to 2.6 million between 1992 and 1998, an increase 
of approximately 6 percent. During this period, an average population 
growth rate of 3 percent would have added 20 percent to the number of 
primary school age children. Even in relatively prosperous Karachi, 
enrollment figures are low. M.I. Memon, the late head of the Board of 
Intermediate and Secondary Education in Karachi, estimated in 1998 that 
only 1.1 million of Karachi's school-age children actually were 
attending school: 500,000 in the public schools; 500,000 in private 
schools; and 100,000 in madrassahs (Islamic religious schools). Since 
the lowest estimate of school-age children in Karachi--the wealthiest 
and most developed city in the country--is 4 million, it would appear 
that no more than 27.5 percent of school age children are attending 
school. Even those children who go to school are not assured of being 
able to read and write. According to UNICEF figures, a nationwide 
sample of children in grade five revealed that only 33 percent could 
read with comprehension, while a mere 17 percent were able to write a 
simple letter. Development experts point to a number of factors for the 
poor state of public education, including the low percentage of gross 
national product devoted to education and inefficient and corrupt 
federal and provincial bureaucracies. Those fortunate enough to pursue 
higher education often face inordinate delays in receiving the results 
of final exams. On March 30, candidates for civil engineering degrees 
received results of the 1996 annual examinations. In 1999 one member of 
the Prime Minister's education task force estimated that up to 50 
percent of the education budget is ``pilfered.''
    Information about progress in educating girls is contradictory. A 
recent survey found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12 was 
65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but was 
considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official 
government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in 
public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4 
million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65 
and 75 percent are difficult to account for. In all of Sindh province, 
a 14 percent jump in the number of girls in Sindh's primary schools in 
the 1992-1998 period placed female enrollment in 1998 at only 35 
percent. Similarly the female literacy rate has doubled during the past 
two decades, although, at roughly 27 percent, it is just over half that 
of males. However, an Oxfam report released in March 1999 stated that 
the proportion of girls enrolled in school fell by 10 percent in the 
first half of the 1990's and one doctor claimed in a February press 
report that the average time girls spend in school nationwide is 0.7 
years.
    The Government announced a new education policy in March 1998, 
which dealt mostly with the construction of new schools but that also 
included provisions for increased Islamic instruction in public 
schools. Education is a provincial responsibility. In 1998 the 
government of Punjab, the country's most populous province, began an 
ambitious program to improve the quality of its educational system. A 
comprehensive survey was performed to identify school buildings that 
were being misused as well as the large numbers of teachers and 
administrators who were not performing their duties or even showing up 
for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost schools'' began, 
and the Government was better placed to ensure that its education 
budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked closely with 
both international and local NGO's to improve primary and secondary 
education. However, no legal action was taken against those found 
responsible for the misuse of government property.
    Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate 
for the nation's children. Children suffer a high rate of preventable 
childhood diseases. According to the National Institute of Child Health 
Care, over 70 percent of deaths between birth and the age of five are 
caused by easily preventable ailments such as diarrhea and 
malnutrition. Public health administration suffers from poor 
management, avoidance of responsibility, false data, and lack of 
cooperation among agencies. The problems associated with polio are 
illustrative. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1997 
91 percent of confirmed polio cases in the eastern Mediterranean region 
were in Pakistan (1,147). The WHO and the Center for Disease Control 
reported in 1999 that the full (three-dose) course of oral polio 
vaccine has been given to only 57 percent of children in Punjab, 50 
percent in the NWFP, 42 percent in Sindh, and 22 percent in 
Baluchistan. However, even the high number of reported polio cases may 
be too low, and the reported protection rate may be too high. Public 
health professors at a Karachi medical school report that vaccines 
frequently are degraded by poor storage, and that vaccination rates are 
inflated. In 1999 the English-language newspaper Dawn reported that 
doctors in Sindh had persuaded the Sindh health department to order a 
halt to the reporting of polio cases. Doctors are required by law to 
vaccinate all children under 5 years old within a 1.2 mile range (3 
miles in rural areas); however, they reportedly have taken steps to 
avoid the responsibility. Although the Government has undertaken six 
national immunization days since 1994, a Center for Disease Control 
official who observed a 1999 polio immunization campaign in Quetta, the 
capital of Baluchistan, reported that vaccination teams had no maps, 
census data, or plans. The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
reports that 8 percent of children suffer from iron deficiency and 30 
to 40 percent of children in the country suffer from stunted growth. 
According to a family-planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children are 
born iodine-deficient, resulting in high rates of mental retardation. 
During the year, the Government conducted a well-publicized campaign to 
encourage polio vaccinations; however, there were no statistics 
available on the number of children who were vaccinated.
    Many children begin working at a very early age (see Section 6.d.). 
At the age of 5 or 6, many female children assume responsibility for 
younger siblings.
    Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for 
ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.d.). On September 11, an anti-terrorist court in Karachi convicted 
five men for kidnaping the 15-year-old son of a businessman in January; 
three of the five defendants were sentenced to death. In rural areas, 
it is a traditional practice for poor parents to give children to rich 
landlords in exchange for money or land, according to human rights 
advocates. These children frequently are abused by these landlords and 
held as bonded laborers for life. Landlords also have been known to pay 
impoverished parents for the ``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the 
landlords then rape. Incidents of rape and the s are common. A 1996 
survey conducted in Punjab showed that 40 percent of reported rape 
victims were minors, with the youngest victim in the study only 8 years 
old. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found that 15 percent of girls 
reported having been abused sexually. Sexual abuse of boys is more 
common in segments of society where women and girls traditionally 
remain within the home. An HRCP study in the NWFP found 723 cases of 
sexual abuse of boys and 635 of girls during the first half of 1998. A 
newspaper reported that there were 1,025 incidents of sexual abuse of 
children between January and September; in the majority of cases, 
children were abused by acquaintances. There were credible reports of 
boys being sexually abused in a jail located in Punjab province during 
the year. At a May conference in Karachi on trafficking in women, 
speakers claimed that over 15,000 child sex workers were operating in 
Lahore and other cities. Child prostitution involving boys and girls is 
widely known to exist but rarely is discussed. All forms of 
prostitution are illegal and a person who abducts a child under the age 
of 10 and commits sexual assault may be sentenced to the death penalty. 
The Shabab-i-Milli, the youth wing of the Jamaat Islami party, launched 
a campaign in May to combat child prostitution by raising public 
awareness of the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has 
observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been virtually 
ignored,'' and called for a public education campaign on the subject, 
including introducing it into school curriculums and training nurses 
and doctors in how to handle such cases.
    In the aftermath of a September prison riot in Hyderabad (see 
Section 1.c.), military personnel discovered that adult prisoners 
abused sexually about 50 imprisoned minors. The Government did not take 
action against prison officials for permitting the abuse by year's end.
    Children's rights theoretically are protected by numerous laws that 
incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
However, the Government frequently fails to enforce these laws. There 
are two facilities--one in Karachi and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as 
reform schools for juvenile offenders. There is only one jail in each 
province for convicted prisoners under 21 years of age, and children 
frequently are incarcerated along with the general prison population, 
sharing prison conditions that are extremely poor (see Section 1.c.). 
Many children in prison were born to female inmates who were sexually 
abused by prison guards. Although Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws 
mandating special judicial procedures for child offenders, in practice, 
children and adults essentially are treated equally. According to a 
local NGO, an estimated 4,200 children were held in the nation's 
prisons at year's end, some as young as 8 years old, compared with 
4,000 in 1999. Imprisoned children often spend long periods of time in 
prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a magistrate, often in 
violation of the law. One child spent 3 years and 4 months awaiting 
trial. Children are subject to the same delays and inefficiencies in 
the justice system as adults are (see Section 1.e.). Peshawar's jail in 
1998 contained 183 children, 40 percent of whom were Afghan refugees. 
These prisoners were separated from the adult prisoners. According to 
some estimates, there are 900 children in Karachi's central jail, in a 
space meant to house 300; these children are 18 and under. Human Rights 
Watch reports that children frequently are beaten and even tortured 
while in detention; usually this is done to extract confessions, but it 
is done also to punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort 
payment from their families for their release (see Section 1.c.). 
Sexual abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a 
problem as well (see Section 1.c.).
    Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or 
various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide 
vocational or other training. Juvenile offenders and, in some cases, 
homeless and destitute children, may be sent to these residential 
facilities, for terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach 
majority. Conditions in these institutions reportedly are poor, similar 
to those found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such 
institutions is a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the 
inmates of the Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been 
tortured or otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these 
institutions often are inadequate; however, during the year, an NGO in 
Karachi started a school for the approximately 1 dozen children forced 
to live in a Karachi women's prison. Extortion on the part of the staff 
at such institutions is reportedly widespread; parents of inmates often 
are required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children 
or bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also is 
a problem; some children reportedly have developed drug habits while in 
these institutions, and are supplied by their guards.
    On July 1, the Government passed the Juvenile Justice System 
Ordinance. The ordinance abolished the death penalty for minors under 
18 years of age, guarantees that the Government will provide children 
with legal assistance, prohibits children from being tried for crimes 
with adults, and prohibits the proceedings of juvenile courts from 
being published.
    According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where 
children are confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and 
there were reports of the abuse of children studying at madrassahs 
during the year. Sexual abuse of boys is widely believed to occur at 
some madrassahs.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is practiced by the Bohra Muslims. There are an 
estimated 100,000 Bohra Muslims in the country; the Bohra observe a 
form of Shi'a Islam that was practiced in medieval Cairo. There were no 
available statistics on the extent to which the Bohra practice FGM; 
however, the practice of FGM in the Bohra community reportedly has 
declined in the last few years.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal 
accessibility to public buildings for disabled persons. The vast 
majority of physically and mentally disabled persons are cared for by 
their families. However, in some cases these individuals are forced 
into begging, while organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off much 
of the proceeds. Parents reportedly have given children as offering to 
Baba Shah Dola, a shrine in Punjab where the children reportedly 
intentionally are deformed by clamping a metal form on the head that 
induces microcephalitis. Some human rights organizations asked local 
authorities to investigate this practice; however, there have been no 
investigations. There is a legal provision requiring public and private 
organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their jobs for qualified 
disabled persons. Organizations that do not wish to hire disabled 
persons can instead give a certain amount of money to the government 
treasury, which goes into a fund for the disabled. This obligation 
rarely is enforced. The National Council for the Rehabilitation of the 
Disabled provides some job placement and loan facilities.
    Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not 
segregated from the general prison population (see Section 1.c.).
    Religious Minorities.--Government authorities afford religious 
minorities fewer protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim 
citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and 
harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to 
charge persons who commit them.
    Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims continued to be 
a serious problem throughout the country (see Section 2.c.). In Punjab 
in particular, a deadly pattern of Sunni-Shi'a violence in which 
extremists killed persons because of their membership in rival 
sectarian organizations, or simply for their religious identification, 
continued; however, there were fewer deaths during the year as compared 
to previous years. Anti-terrorist courts handed down convictions 
against several individuals accused of sectarian violence during the 
year; however, government authorities did not detain suspects in many 
other cases of sectarian violence. Several incidents of sectarian 
violence between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups occurred during Muharram 
in April, during which Shi'a Muslims mourn the deaths of the Prophet 
Mohammed's nephew Ali and his son Hussain. On April 7, a Shi'a lawyer 
and the secretary general of TJP, Syed Waqar Hussain, his son, and his 
driver were killed by unknown gunmen in Karachi; the assailants may 
have been members of the extremist SSP (see Section 1.a.). On April 12, 
in the worst incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown 
assailants attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Mullowali, 
Rawalpindi, with grenades and bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring 
37 others (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Police personnel arrested 
several Sunni Muslims following the attack. On April 19, unknown gunmen 
killed TJP activist, Iqubal Hussain in Multan. On April 26, unknown 
assailants killed TJP activist, Syed Farrukh Birjis Haider and his 
personal aide in Khanewal. On April 28, unknown gunmen killed local 
Shi'a leader Hakeem Syed Shahbaz Hussain Sherazi in Chishtian. On May 
2, unidentified assailants killed a Shi'a doctor, his pharmaceutical 
dispenser, and a patient in the doctor's Karachi office. The next day, 
unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer, Malik Ibrar Hussain in Toba Tek 
Singh, Punjab. On May 15, unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer Syed 
Sardar Hussain Jafri. Unknown assailants also killed Qudratullah 
Cheema, the chief of the Ahmadi community of Khanpur. On May 19, 
unknown assailants killed eminent Sunni cleric Maulana Yousuf Ludhianvi 
and Abdur Rehman, a teacher at the Sunni Banuri town religious school 
in Karachi; following these murders, hundreds of Sunni Muslims rioted 
in Karachi and torched a newspaper office, a movie theater, and a bank 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Ahmadis often are targets of religious intolerance, much of which 
is instigated by organized religious extremists. Ahmadi leaders charge 
that militant Sunni mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches 
through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and 
spiritual center in central Punjab. Backed by crowds of 100 to 200 
persons, the mullahs purportedly denounce Ahmadis and their founder, a 
situation that sometimes leads to violence. The Ahmadis claim that 
police generally are present during these marches but do not intervene 
to prevent trouble (see Section 2.c.).
    On October 30, 2 assailants opened fire on an Ahmadi mosque in 
Ghatialian in Sialkot district, killing 4 Ahmadis and 1 Sunni Muslim. 
Three suspects were arrested; however, no formal charges were filed by 
year's end. On November 10, a mob composed of the cleric's followers 
killed five Ahmadis in Takht Hazara, Sarghoda district following a 
scuffle between a group of Ahmadis and a Sunni Muslim cleric. Police 
detained 25 persons for questioning and imprisoned 13 others in 
connection with the killings; however, no charges were filed against 
any of the suspects by year's end (see Section 2.c.).
    On July 15, in response to pressure from some Muslim groups, the 
Government incorporated the Islamic provisions of the suspended 
Constitution into the Provisional Constitutional Order, including the 
clause declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Ahmadis suffer from 
harassment and discrimination and have limited chances for advancement 
into management levels in government service (see Section 2.c.). Even 
the rumor that someone may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can 
stifle opportunities for employment or promotion. Ahmadi students in 
public schools are subject to abuse by their non-Ahmadi classmates, and 
the quality of teachers assigned to predominantly Ahmadi schools by the 
Government generally is poor. However, most Ahmadis are home-schooled 
or go to private Ahmadi-run schools. Young Ahmadis complain of their 
difficulty in gaining admittance to good colleges and consequently 
having to go abroad for higher education. Certain sections of the Penal 
Code discriminate against Ahmadis (see Section 2.c.), particularly the 
provision that forbids Ahmadis from ``directly or indirectly'' posing 
as Muslims. Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges 
against Ahmadis for using standard Muslim salutations and for naming 
their children Mohammed.
    Other religious minority groups also experience considerable 
discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early 
years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military 
and civil service. Today many are unable to rise above mid-level ranks. 
Discrimination in employment reportedly is common. Christians in 
particular have difficulty finding jobs other than menial labor, 
although Christian activists say the employment situation has improved 
somewhat in the private sector. Christians are overrepresented in 
Pakistan's most oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Like 
Ahmadis many Christians complain about the difficulty that their 
children face in gaining admission to government schools and colleges, 
a problem they attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continue to 
express fear of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian 
women, although the practice is relatively rare. Reprisals against 
suspected converts to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of 
religious intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious 
minorities (see Section 2.c.). According to the HRCP, in January 
intruders broke into a church in Sialkot and desecrated religious 
literature. On March 12, men broke into the Lourdes Convent and 
attacked Sister Christine, a 78-year-old nun; she died in a nearby 
hospital a few days later. According to the Christian Liberation Front 
(CLF), an NGO, the perpetrators of the attack were Muslims who 
previously had accused Sister Christine of proselytizing. Police 
officials did not arrest anyone in connection with this attack. In May 
five masked men stopped a factory bus in Ferozwala on which female 
factory employees were traveling and raped six to eight Christian girls 
who were passengers; the assailants reportedly spared the two Muslim 
passengers on the bus. Initially police officials urged the girls to 
report that they were robbed, not raped; however, when the CLF 
complained to government officials, the officials immediately 
registered the cases as rape cases, arrested three suspects, and 
promised to investigate police behavior. The suspects were charged 
under the Hudood Ordinances and were scheduled to stand trial in 
September. One of the suspects was released for lack of evidence; 
however the other two cases had not been tried by year's end.
    There are restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims 
(see Section 1.e.).
    Although there are few Jewish citizens, anti-Semitic sentiments 
appear to be widespread, and anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist press 
articles are common.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 
1969 (IRO) permits industrial workers to form trade unions subject to 
major restrictions in some employment areas. The Essential Services 
Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESMA) covers the state administration, 
government services, and state enterprises like oil and gas production, 
electricity generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, and 
ports. Workers in these sectors are allowed to form unions. However, 
the ESMA sharply restricts normal union activities, usually 
prohibiting, for example, the right to strike in affected 
organizations. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed under the 
ESMA. For each industry subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a 
finding, renewable every six months, on the limits of union activity. 
There is no provision allowing agricultural workers or teachers to 
unionize as they are not defined as ``an industry.'' A presidential 
ordinance in 1998 banned all union activity in the water and power 
development authority (employing 130,000 workers) for 2 years. 
Following a 3-day conference on employment protection, human resource 
development, and industrial relations sponsored by the Musharraf 
Government and the ILO in May, the Government on July 17 passed an 
ordinance permitting water and power workers to engage in ``responsible 
trade unionism.''
    Other restrictions on union activities include the Anti-terrorist 
Ordinance of 1999 (ATO). The ATO codified the crime of a ``terrorist 
act,'' which includes ``an act of civil commotion.'' Such acts are 
punishable by imprisonment of 7 years to life, as well as fines. 
``Civil commotion'' includes illegal strikes, go-slows, and lockouts. 
Under the original ordinance, those distributing, publishing, or 
pasting a handbill or making graffiti or wall-chalking ``intended to 
create unrest'' were subject to arrest. According to the ILO, this 
ordinance prevented leafleting, posters, or even word-of-mouth notices 
of public meetings. In late 1999, the ATO was amended to eliminate 
references to handbills, graffiti, or the intent to create civil 
commotion (see Sections 1.e and 2.b.). According to government 
estimates, union members make up about 10 percent of the industrial 
labor force and 3 percent of the total estimated work force. Unions 
claim that the number of union members is underestimated. Contract 
labor continues to flourish, undercutting the power of the unions and 
exploiting workers who are willing to work on temporary contracts with 
fewer benefits and no job security.
    Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods 
constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to 
ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or 
prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike 
that has continued for 30 days. Strikes are rare. When they occur, they 
usually are illegal and short. The Government regards as illegal any 
strike conducted by workers who are not members of a legally registered 
union. Police do not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations. 
The law prohibits employers from seeking retribution against leaders of 
a legal strike and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The 
courts may imprison employers for violating this prohibition, but they 
are more likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of 
illegal strikes. In May and June, there were strikes by small and large 
businessmen throughout the country to protest the Government's efforts 
to collect taxes. In May there was a 3-day strike by religious leaders 
against General Musharraf's proposed modification of the blasphemy law 
(see Section 2.b.).
    Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major 
federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political 
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are 
associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition 
parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely.
    In 1997 the Cabinet passed an amendment to the IRO which states 
that: 1) only employees of the represented industry can hold office in 
a trade union; and 2) if trade unions form a federation, the federation 
cannot bargain with individual employers; each component union has to 
bargain for itself. The first provision disadvantages smaller unions, 
which may not have enough officers capable of bargaining. The second 
provision is an attempt to weaken the power of the federations. This 
amendment has been challenged by the trade unions and, as a result, has 
not yet come into force. Late in 1997, the Prime Minister announced the 
Government's new investment policy, under which, in order to improve 
working relations among employees and employers, trade union activity 
would be industry-based and not factory-based. The new policy also 
decrees that, in order to check the growth of trade unions, unions 
receiving less than 20 percent of the votes in a referendum are to be 
dissolved automatically and their registrations canceled. No action has 
been taken to implement these elements of the investment policy.
    The ILO has stated repeatedly that current law and practice violate 
the Government's commitments under ILO Convention 87. The ILO has urged 
the Government to lift prohibitions against union activity with respect 
to teachers, radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, banking, 
and other Government employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban 
on strikes. The ILO also expressed concern about the practice of 
artificial promotions that exclude workers from the purview of 
Convention 111. In response to a Government request, the ILO has 
provided technical assistance to help bring the country's labor laws 
into conformity with the ILO's conventions. However, no legislative 
remedies have been applied.
    In 1994 a government task force on labor recommended improvements 
on worker rights problems, which formed the basis for the development 
of a new government labor policy. The Government has not approved the 
new policy; however, it has implemented two components of the proposed 
policy: 1) improvements in the workers' welfare fund; and 2) increases 
in social security benefits for workers. Federations are free to 
affiliate with international federations and confederations. Pakistani 
trade unions belong to the ICFTU and to secretariats affiliated with 
the ICFTU.
    The United States revoked generalized system of preferences (GSP) 
trade benefits in 1996 for failure to make progress on worker rights 
issues.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of 
industrial workers to organize and freely elect representatives to act 
as collective bargaining agents is established in law. The IRO 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the law, private 
employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. 
However, in practice, such redress has not been available to workers, 
because workers usually do not pursue redress through the courts due to 
the fact that the legal system is normally slow, prohibitively 
expensive, and sometimes corrupt. In general, legal unions have the 
right to bargain collectively. However, the many restrictions on 
forming unions (see Section 6.a.) preclude collective bargaining by 
large sections of the labor force like agricultural workers who are not 
provided with the right to strike, bargain collectively, or make 
demands on employers. The National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union 
filed suit against the Government for implementing a banking companies 
ordinance that prohibited union activities in banks during working 
hours and allowed only current bank employees to serve as bank trade 
union officials. Labor unions report that workers are given artificial 
promotions (such as a new title with no salary increase) to make them 
ineligible for union membership. This practice is prevalent in the 
financial sector, particularly among foreign banks.
    The ESMA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry 
subject to the ESMA (see Section 6.a.), the Government must make a 
finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In 
cases in which the Government prohibits collective bargaining, special 
wage boards decide wage levels.
    The boards are established at the provincial level and are composed 
of representatives from industry, labor, and the provincial labor 
ministry, which provides the chairman. Despite the presence of labor 
representatives, unions generally are dissatisfied with the boards' 
findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National Industrial 
Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed 
under the ESMA. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the labor courts.
    The ESMA exempts export promotion zones (EPZ's) from the IRO's 
granting of workers the right to form trade unions. There is only one 
EPZ, in Karachi, with nearly 6,000 employees, according to government 
sources. In 1996 the Cabinet decided to withdraw these exemptions 
beginning in January 2000. However, the Government has stated that it 
will honor agreements with investors regarding the exemptions, making 
it unlikely that the EPZ's exemption will be lifted before 2001.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The suspended 
Constitution and the law prohibited forced labor, including forced 
labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce these 
prohibitions effectively. Critics argue that the ESMA's limitation on 
worker rights, especially the right to quit, constitutes a form of 
compulsory labor. The ILO has objected to this violation of Convention 
29. The Government has responded that the maintenance of essential 
services is required for the defense and security of the country, and 
that continued reviews have limited these services to a few core areas 
like electricity generation and distribution, and air and sea ports.
    There is a reasonable basis to believe that handmade bricks and 
hand-woven wool carpets are produced with forced or indentured child 
labor. Illegal bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick, 
glass, and fishing industries and is found among agricultural and 
construction workers in rural areas. A 1998 study by a trade federation 
reported that over 200,000 families work in debt slavery in the brick 
kiln industry and there are reports that this figure has grown with the 
arrival of Afghan refugees to the country. The Bonded Labor Liberation 
Front (BLLF) is an NGO that advocates for the rights of bonded laborers 
and provides a safe haven and educational and vocational training for 
those who have escaped their bondage. The BLLF states that it freed 820 
bonded brick kiln workers (including 351 children) in 1999. There is no 
evidence that bonded labor is used in the production of export items 
like sporting goods and surgical equipment. However, bonded labor 
reportedly is used in the production of carpets for export under the 
peshgi system, by which a worker is advanced money and raw materials 
for a carpet he promises to complete. Many workers do not realize the 
extent of their exploitation. The lack of education among bonded 
laborers deprives them of the ability to perform the necessary 
calculations to know when they have paid their debts to bondholders. 
Bonded laborers who escape often face retaliation from former 
employers. Although police do arrest violators of the law against 
bonded labor, many of these individuals bribe the police to release 
them. Conservative estimates put the number of bonded workers at 
several million. The Government disputes that peshgi workers are 
``bonded'' or ``forced'' laborers and argues that they are ``contract 
laborers'' who negotiate a salary advance in a free and open market.
    Human rights groups report that as many as 50 private jails housing 
some 4,500 bonded laborers were maintained by landlords in rural Sindh 
(see Section 1.d.).
    The suspended Constitution and the law prohibited slavery. However, 
in remote areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt 
slavery have a long history. Landlords have kept entire families in 
private prisons and sold families to other landlords.
    The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act of 1992 outlawed bonded 
labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits for the 
recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by children 
punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $900 (PRs 50,000) in 
fines. However, the provincial governments, which are responsible for 
enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement mechanisms. 
Furthermore the law is written in English and is frequently 
incomprehensible to persons it is intended to protect. Hence the law is 
ineffective. Lacking employment alternatives, many workers who have 
been freed end up returning to bonded labor. In April General Musharraf 
announced that approximately $1,700,000 (PRs 100,000,000) have been 
designated to fight bonded labor. However, these funds were not 
allocated by year's end.
    There are reports that children in juvenile detention facilities 
are required to work. Children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either 
are imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their 
parents, or were born in jail reportedly are involved in woodcrafts and 
television repairs (see Section 6.d.). Verifying these reports is 
difficult because of limited outside access to the jail.
    Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used for forced labor. 
According to 1996 ILO estimates, 3.3 million children between the ages 
of 5 and 14 years (about 8 percent of this population group) are 
``economically active.'' Of these, about two-thirds work in 
agriculture. Seventy percent of the working children have the status of 
``unpaid family helpers.'' Many observers believe that the ILO 
estimates understate the true dimensions of the problem. Observers also 
believe that the incidence of bonded labor among such children is 
significant, but there are no reliable figures available on this. Some 
boys, usually between the ages of 6 and 9, are taken to countries in 
the Persian Gulf to serve as camel jockeys (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is common and results from a combination of 
severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate enforcement of laws 
intended to control it. The suspended Constitution prohibited the 
employment of children aged 14 years and under in factories, mines, and 
other hazardous occupations. The Employment of Children Act of 1991, 
whose provisions were extended by the President in 1998 to the FATA, 
prohibits the employment of children under age 14 in certain 
occupations and regulates their conditions of work. Under this law, no 
child is allowed to work overtime or at night. Penalties for the 
violation of the act include fines of up to $335 (PRs 20,000) or 1 year 
in prison. The Government acknowledges that child labor is a problem. 
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, including forced labor 
performed by children; however, forced and bonded labor by children is 
common (see Section 6.c.).
    Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required 
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are 
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their 
parents, or were born in jail, reportedly are involved in woodcrafts 
and television repairs (see Section 6.c.).
    In 1996 the Government announced the results of its first 
comprehensive child labor survey conducted with the assistance of the 
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-
IPEC). According to the survey, 8.3 percent (or between 3.3 and 3.6 
million) of children between the ages of 5 and 14 worked. The child 
labor force was predominately male (73 percent) and rural (71 percent). 
About 60 percent of child labor in the country occurred in Punjab. Some 
45.8 percent of child laborers worked 35 hours or more per week and 
12.6 percent worked 56 hours or more. The majority (67 percent) of 
child laborers worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 
industries; 11 percent in the manufacturing sector, 9 percent in 
wholesale and retail, and 8 percent in social and personal services. In 
occupational terms, craft and related trade work accounted for about 19 
percent of child laborers, while 71 percent worked in unskilled jobs. 
Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO survey as an accurate 
measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many observers believe 
that it understates the problem, and give higher estimates of as many 
as 20 million child laborers. A 1997 survey by the Pakistan Institute 
of Labor Education and Research indicated that in one-fourth of 187 
Karachi households, the eldest child worker (below the age of 14) 
provided more than 40 percent of household income. A recent ILO survey 
indicated that agriculture is the largest child labor industry; 
followed by the informal sector, which includes domestic work, street 
vending, illegal work, and family businesses; hazardous work, such as 
the leather, surgical instruments, and brick kiln industries rank 
third. The report also noted that when programs are developed to 
eliminate child labor in one industry, parents often shift their 
children to work in other industries. A survey conducted by the Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan published in June 1999 noted that there 
are approximately 4,000 children working in auto workshops in the 
Mardan district of the NWFP. The report stated that most of the 
children were between the ages of 3 and 8. In a press conference in 
February, the president of the Punjab Laborers Front stated that 
100,000 children between the ages of 5 and 12 years were working in 
more than 4,500 brick kilns in Punjab. The ILO, the Ministry of Labor, 
and the Federal Bureau of Statistics was scheduled to conduct a new 
survey in 2001 in over 30,000 households; this survey will include the 
agricultural sector and rural areas where the worst forms of child 
labor often occur.
    Child labor, mostly female, is common in the carpet industry, much 
of which is family-run. Carpet manufacturers are working with ILO-IPEC 
to establish a program to eliminate child labor from the industry 
through monitoring and rehabilitation. Although surgical instrument 
manufacturers have acted to remove child laborers from their factories, 
child labor still occurs at rudimentary offsite filing and polishing 
centers run by subcontractors for low-end items. Almost all children 
working in the surgical instrument industry are male. According to the 
ILO and the Punjab Welfare Department, children constitute about 15 
percent of the work force in the surgical instrument industry in 
Sialkot; 7,500 of these children are estimated to be under age 14. 
According to a June 1999 report issued by Public Services 
International, the average age of children in the surgical instrument 
industry is 12. Children in the surgical instrument industry are prone 
to injuries from machinery and burns from hot metal, as well as 
respiratory illnesses from inhaling poisonous metal dust. The 
successful efforts to eliminate child labor in other industries have 
not been mirrored in the surgical instrument industry. Child labor is 
not regarded as a particular problem in the textile and apparel 
industries, but no specific studies of this sector have been performed. 
In October Fayyaz Ahmad, a child worker in a textile mill died as a 
result of injuries he sustained when his clothing became entangled in 
machinery.
    In 1997 soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and UNICEF 
implemented an 18-month action plan (the Atlanta Agreement) to 
eliminate child labor from the soccer ball industry. This project, 
based in Sialkot, monitored the production of soccer balls at newly 
established stitching centers, and set up as many as 185 rehabilitation 
centers to educate former child laborers and their younger siblings. At 
year's end, there were 153 rehabilitation centers; however, an 
additional 70 centers are projected for the next 2 years. The project 
also sought to identify unemployed adults, particularly women, from the 
families of former child stitchers to take up stitching work and 
replace lost income. Women initially were reluctant to move from their 
homes to stitching centers, so the project began to establish small, 
home-based stitching centers in individual villages; by year's end, 
there were 358 home-based centers and 146 larger centers for female 
stitchers. The ILO currently monitors over 1,200 stitching centers. 
Saga Sports, which also manufactures soccer balls, has built modern 
community-based facilities in 10 villages with a high percentage of 
family stitching operations. The facilities contain work space for 
stitchers as well as dining areas, child care centers, recreation 
areas, and medical clinics. Each facility also has its own water 
system, waste disposal system, generator for electricity, and 
transportation system. Meals, child care, medical services, and use of 
the facilities are provided gratis to workers and their families; use 
of non-production areas is allowed to all community members. These 
centers reportedly have created approximately 6,000 jobs, 400 to 500 of 
which are held by women. During the year, Saga Sports became the first 
industry in Sialkot to permit freedom of association. By year's end, 
over 6,000 children have been removed from employment in the soccer 
ball industry.
    Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the 
International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO/IPEC) 
program in Pakistan is involved with other child labor projects. 
Projects in Sialkot include one in the surgical instruments industry 
and one in the non-formal (non-exporting) sectors. The ILO works with 
the Government, employers, workers, and NGO's to pursue the 
Government's policy and plan of action for child labor. The Government 
established 30 rehabilitation centers (50 are planned) for former child 
laborers through the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, the Government's social 
welfare fund. Each center educates 120 children. The ILO created a 
similar program in conjunction with the European Union, specifically 
targeting child bonded laborers. In 1998 the ILO and the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation (SDC) launched a large project to 
combat child labor and child abuse in the NWFP. This program, which 
targets children in the automobile repair sector, aims to provide 
children with vocational training and informal education. In May the 
Government, in conjunction with the ILO, issued a national policy and 
action plan to combat child labor. Its three principal goals are: To 
immediately eradicate the worst forms of child labor, to progressively 
eliminate all remaining forms of child labor, and to ensure at least a 
primary education and vocational training for the targeted children. 
According to the plan, funding will be provided by the federal and 
provincial governments and ``international donors;'' however, no funds 
were allocated to implement this plan by year's end.
    In response to international criticism, the Government has begun to 
push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However, 
enforcement of these laws remains a problem. There are few child labor 
inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often have little 
training and insufficient resources. They reportedly also are subject 
to corruption. By law inspectors also may not inspect facilities that 
employ less than 10 persons; most child labor occurs in facilities 
smaller than this. Hundreds of convictions are obtained each year for 
violations of child labor laws, but low fines levied by the courts--
ranging from an average of $7 (PRs 364) in the NWFP to an average of 
$140 (PRs 7,280) in Baluchistan--are not a significant deterrent. The 
1991 Employment of Children Act allows for fines of up to $350 (PRs 
18,200). Penalties often are not imposed on those found to be violating 
child labor laws.
    The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was 
established in 1996 with support from the Ministry of Commerce. Other 
NGO's, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end child 
labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and international 
organizations, operates 33 education centers for children known 
collectively as the National Center for the Rehabilitation of Child 
Labor. Parents of working children are offered compensation of $6 per 
month (PRs 300), plus a small daily stipend of about $0.10 (PRs 5) in 
exchange for sending their children to school. Children in the centers 
receive free schooling, uniforms, books, and meals. However, many 
children apparently do not remain there for more than 1 year; the 
schools often are in areas far from their clients, and some children 
reportedly are sent to the schools in order to qualify for the stipend. 
The Bunyad Literacy Community Council also runs schools focusing on 
children who work in the soccer ball and carpet industries; its 
programs aim to transition children out of working and into mainstream 
schooling. Other local NGO's, such as the Society for the Protection of 
the Rights of the Child, are working to eliminate child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Federal statutes applicable 
throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for 
unskilled workers is $35 (Prs 1,976) per month, with only slightly 
higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial 
and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to 
agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The minimum wage 
usually is inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family, since families tend to be large, including members 
of the extended family.
    Federal law provides for a maximum work-week of 48 hours (54 hours 
for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid 
annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural 
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and 
contractors. Many workers are unaware of their rights because of their 
lack of education.
    Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include 
official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leave, 
health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, education 
for workers' children, social security, old age benefits, and a workers 
welfare fund. Employees earning more than $52 (PRs 3,120) per month are 
not considered workers for the purpose of these benefits.
    The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations 
because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory 
structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although 
organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done 
little and its efforts to enforce existing legal protection are weak. 
Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous working conditions 
without risking loss of employment. There is a serious lack of 
adherence to mine safety and health protocols. For example, mines often 
have only one opening for entry, egress, and ventilation.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of 
women under age 21 into the country for sexual purposes, as well as 
kidnaping and slavery; however, trafficking in persons, especially in 
women, is a significant problem. Trafficking in women is protected by 
powerful criminal interests and operates relatively openly. The 
Government has done little to stem the flow of women trafficked into 
the country or to help victims of trafficking. For example, despite the 
large numbers involved, only 88 cases have been registered in Sindh 
between 1990 and 1999. Of the 260 men and 110 women arrested, only 87 
were charged and only 7 were sentenced.
    Pakistan is a receiving country for thousands of trafficked women 
every year, mainly from Bangladesh. Smaller numbers of Burmese, Sri 
Lankan, Indian, and Afghan women also are trafficked into the country 
and some Pakistani women were trafficked overseas. The Commission of 
Inquiry for Women drew attention to the problem of ``enforced 
prostitution and trafficking in women,'' noting that women are the 
victims of exploitation by police and pimps, and should be treated with 
compassion. Trafficking in women has occurred for decades; there are 
likely several hundred thousand trafficked women in the country. A 
Karachi-based NGO estimates that 100 to 150 women who are trafficked 
into the country each day from Bangladesh are sold for domestic labor 
throughout the country and for forced prostitution in Karachi. Press 
reports indicate that the buying and selling of brides persists in 
parts of the NWFP and Punjab. Trafficking victims usually are deceived 
with false prospects of marriage or offers of legitimate jobs in 
Pakistan. They generally do not have legal residency, and, if arrested, 
end up in jail for violation of immigration laws or the Hudood 
ordinance. Without money to pay for bail, they often are bailed out by 
their pimps, who force them to return to prostitution. Small numbers of 
escaped victims of trafficking end up in shelters, but most do not 
because there are few such shelters available. Many women who are not 
bailed out are not repatriated; since they arrive without 
documentation, the Bangladesh High Commission will not take 
responsibility for them, and they remain confined to women's shelters. 
Some have been repatriated at the expense of individuals who discover 
them and pay for their return home.
    Prices for trafficked women start at approximately $550 (PRs 
30,000) but can go as high as approximately $5,000 (PRs 260,000). 
Physical beauty and educational level are major factors in determining 
prices. Some women sold in shops in Karachi reportedly are sent to 
Persian Gulf countries, where they are slaves; women sent to rural 
Pakistan reportedly are de facto slaves. Buyers in such shops 
reportedly purchase women for purposes of labor or sex; some are 
married to their buyers.
    There are reports that Afghan and Bangladeshi girls are trafficked 
into the country for sexual purposes.
    Young boys are trafficked from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf to work 
as camel jockeys; reports estimate that there are between several 
hundred and a few thousand boys between the ages of 4 and 10 working as 
camel jockeys, mostly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The majority 
of these boys are sent to the Gulf countries by their parents, landless 
agricultural workers who receive a monthly sum of money for their 
child's labor. Parents occasionally also accompany their children to 
the Persian Gulf. However, a significant minority of these children are 
abducted by traffickers in the country and sent abroad without the 
knowledge of their parents. The conditions such children live under 
often are poor, and many children reportedly are injured or maimed 
while racing camels. The children reportedly do not receive proper 
medical care or schooling, and when they become too old to race, they 
are sent back to the country and left to fend for themselves. In 
February the district administration in Multan approached the Pakistan 
Ambassador to the UAE for the return of two children reportedly sold to 
a UAE citizen for approximately $400 (PRs 20,000) each, and the federal 
investigation agency filed charges against four residents of Multan who 
were involved in the deal. To date, there has been no report on the 
return of the boys. Within the country, children sometimes are kidnaped 
to be used as forced labor, for ransom, or to seek revenge against an 
enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). In rural areas, it is a traditional 
practice for poor parents to give children to rich landlords in 
exchange for money or land, according to human rights advocates. These 
children frequently are abused by these landlords and held as bonded 
laborers for life.
                               __________

                               SRI LANKA

    Sri Lanka is a longstanding democratic republic with an active 
multiparty system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly 
elected President and the 225-member Parliament. Chandrika Kumaratunga, 
head of the governing People's Alliance (PA) coalition, won reelection 
in 1999 for a second 6-year presidential term in a process marked by 
voting irregularities and at least six election-related deaths. 
Violence and fraud marked the October parliamentary elections as well; 
at least seven persons were killed in campaign-related violence in the 
period prior to the October election, which resulted in a reduced 
majority for the PA for the next 6-year period. The Government respects 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary. Through its 
rulings, the judiciary continued to exhibit its independence and to 
uphold individual civil rights, although the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, in an attempt to reduce the court's workload, limited the 
fundamental rights cases that the court examined, preventing some 
torture victims from obtaining redress.
    For the past 17 years, the Government has fought the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent organization fighting for a 
separate ethnic Tamil state in the north and east of the country. The 
conflict has claimed over 62,000 lives. In 1999 government forces took 
LTTE-controlled areas north and west of Vavuniya, but counterattacks 
starting in November 1999 erased most government gains. In January the 
LTTE began a buildup on the Jaffna peninsula and in April captured the 
important Elephant Pass military base. The clashes left large numbers 
of civilians dead or wounded and displaced more than 150,000 persons. 
Although the military halted the LTTE advance toward Jaffna in June, 
continuing clashes between the security forces and the LTTE killed 
several hundred more persons on both sides.
    The Ministry of Defense controls all security forces (armed forces 
and police). The 60,000-member police force is responsible for internal 
security in most areas of the country, and it also has been used in 
military operations against the LTTE. The 120,000-member army (which 
includes the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member navy, and the 
18,500-member air force bear principal responsibility for conducting 
operations against the LTTE insurgents. The police paramilitary Special 
Task Force (STF) also battles the LTTE. The more than 15,000-member 
Home Guards, an armed force drawn from local communities and 
responsible to the police, provides security for Muslim and Sinhalese 
village communities in or near the war zone. The Government also arms 
and appears to direct various anti-LTTE Tamil militias, although at 
times these groups seemed to act independently of government authority. 
During the year, some members of the security forces committed serious 
human rights abuses.
    Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based on 
the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems. It also earns 
substantial foreign exchange from tourism and the repatriated earnings 
of citizens employed abroad. The gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita is approximately $850. Real GDP growth was 4.3 percent in 1999; 
because of increased exports and a surge in remittances from citizens 
abroad, growth by year's end reached 6.1 percent. In 1997 the 
Government intensified efforts to promote economic reform and 
liberalization, including privatizing public sector enterprises and 
promoting foreign investment and trade. These steps continued during 
the year, although privatization slowed due to the unsettled situation 
in the country.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in areas not affected by the insurgency, but there are serious problems 
in some areas, and the ongoing war with the LTTE continued to be 
accompanied by serious human rights abuses by both sides of the 
conflict. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. In 
the past, security forces almost certainly killed prisoners captured on 
the battlefield; however, there were no reports of this abuse during 
the year. The military and police reportedly tortured detainees, and 
one person died in police custody. In addition nine individuals 
reportedly disappeared from security force custody in Vavuniya and in 
the east. In the past, persons also have disappeared or have been 
killed after last being seen near the army's forward defense lines in 
the north, areas that civilians are ordered by the military to avoid. 
The circumstances of such disappearances and killings were unclear, and 
with the many military offensives and forward defense line changes 
throughout the years, the risk to civilians remained high. The military 
took some measures to limit civilian casualties during operations, 
although more than 100 civilians died, with hundreds more injured, as a 
result of military-LTTE clashes. Torture remained a serious problem, 
and prison conditions remained poor. Arbitrary arrests (including 
short-term mass arrests and detentions) continued, often accompanied by 
failure of the security forces to comply with legal protections. New 
Emergency Regulations (ER) published in May further eroded due process 
protections. Impunity for those responsible for human rights abuses 
also remained a serious problem. Little progress was made in resolving 
many cases of extrajudicial killing or disappearance. In most cases, 
there was no investigation or prosecution, giving the appearance of 
impunity for those responsible for human rights violations. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and restricted freedom 
of the press. The Government continued to engage in censorship of 
domestic newspaper reporting and some foreign television broadcasts on 
military and security operations during the year, implementing 
stringent censorship regulations and shutting down newspapers critical 
of the Government. On occasion in previous years, security forces 
harassed journalists; however, there were no reports of such harassment 
during the year. Serious restrictions remained on freedom of movement, 
especially from Vavuniya to Colombo and the southern part of the 
country generally. Violence and discrimination against women, child 
prostitution, child labor, and discrimination against the disabled 
continued to be problems. There is some discrimination and occasional 
violence against religious minorities, and there is institutionalized 
ethnic discrimination against Tamils. Trafficking in women and children 
for the purpose of forced labor occurs, and a significant number of 
male children are trafficked into prostitution for foreign pedophiles.
    In March the Government named five commissioners including a new 
chairman for the National Human Rights Commission (HRC), which has 11 
offices around the country; however, human rights observers believed 
the HRC was not pursuing its mandate aggressively due to poor 
leadership. Rights activists expressed some satisfaction with the new 
leadership. The Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest and Harassment 
(CIUAH) continued to assist those alleging abuse at the hands of the 
military and police. Human rights groups state that the committee is 
somewhat effective; however, critics believe that the committee's 
services have not been advertised widely, and they question its 
continued viability. In November the Government established an 
Interministerial Permanent Standing Committee and an Interministerial 
Working Group on Human Rights Issues, chaired by senior officials, to 
investigate human rights abuses referred by the Supreme Court, U.N. 
organs, or international human rights organizations. The Government in 
November also established the Prosecution of Torture Perpetrators Unit, 
under the direct supervision of the Attorney General, to prosecute 
torture cases. In March authorities arrested five suspects and issued 
an arrest warrant for another, in connection with the mass graves in 
Chemmani exhumed in 1999. Several of those arrested received bail. The 
case has not yet come to trial, and it was still pending at year's end.
    The Government did not attempt, as in the past, to use the ER to 
cover up security force misdeeds; however, the Government arrested one 
person under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to stifle 
competition with the state telecommunications monopoly. The Government 
captured or accepted the surrender of at least two LTTE cadres 
throughout the year (it is widely believed that many LTTE cadres 
committed suicide to avoid capture). The Government also continued to 
provide relief to those displaced by the conflict although many were 
still in areas under LTTE control such as the Vanni. However, 
government restrictions on medical supplies and a significant reduction 
in food rations contributed to poor health conditions for civilians in 
the Vanni. The Attorney General's office continued to indict security 
force personnel (including paramilitary organizations) and 
antigovernment elements, primarily the leftist Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), who were implicated in the 1997 reports of three 
regional commissions that documented the disappearance of more than 
16,000 persons from 1988 to 1994. These persons disappeared after being 
removed forcibly by security force personnel and others. The Attorney 
General referred 348 files for action by the courts, involving 583 
security force personnel and resulting in 4 convictions of 88 members 
of the police and military. A fourth commission, which was established 
in May 1998 to investigate the 10,000 cases of disappearance that the 
first 3 commissions could not investigate before their mandates 
expired, sent a report to the President on August 31 to assist in 
further investigations and possible indictments.
    There are several former Tamil insurgent organizations currently 
aligned with the Government. These progovernment Tamil militants, who 
are armed and at times appear to be directed by the security forces, 
sometimes committed extrajudicial killings and were responsible for 
disappearances, torture, detentions, extortion, and forced conscription 
in Vavuniya and the east. The military wing of the People's Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) committed many such abuses. Both 
PLOTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) supposedly 
were disarmed by the Government in Vavuniya after a May 1999 exchange 
of gunfire between the groups in Colombo.
    The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE continued to 
commit serious human rights abuses in the ongoing war with the 
Government. The LTTE regularly committed extrajudicial killings, 
including killing prisoners taken on the battlefield, and also was 
responsible for disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions, 
and extortion. At least 170 noncombatants were killed from January 
through September in LTTE suicide bombings and other attacks outside of 
the northern conflict zone. Through a campaign of killing and 
intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local 
government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair 
elections in January 1998. In addition the LTTE warned Tamil 
politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities 
during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such 
activity for some politicians.
    Although it released four prisoners in February and another in 
June, the LTTE refused to free remaining military personnel and 
civilians in its custody. The LTTE continued to control large sections 
of the north and east of the country through authoritarian military 
rule. It denied those under its authority the right to change their 
government, infringed on privacy rights, routinely violated civil 
liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted freedom of 
movement, used child soldiers, and severely discriminated against 
ethnic and religious minorities.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police, Home Guards, 
and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings, including the 
killing of civilians in connection with the conflict with the LTTE. One 
person died in police custody at Kantale after being arrested for 
suspected terrorist activity in June (see Section 1.c.). The STF shot 
and killed two young Tamil civilians in March. Seven persons died in 
elections-related violence on September 29. On July 13, army soldiers 
allegedly killed a Tamil student in Jaffna, which led to more than a 
week of protest and boycotts by students. The exact number of 
extrajudicial killings was impossible to ascertain due to frequent 
censorship of news relating to military or police operations and to 
lack of regular access to the north and east where the war between the 
Government and the LTTE insurgents is being waged.
    On April 30, gunmen in police uniforms killed the chief suspect in 
the 1993 killing of prominent politician Lalith Athulathmudali.
    On October 27, while police allegedly looked on, 27 Tamil males 
between 14 and 23 years of age were hacked to death by local villagers 
armed with machetes and clubs; 15 others were injured. Police allegedly 
took part in the killings and did nothing to prevent the villagers from 
entering the detention camp. The victims were former child soldiers 
being detained at a government-run ``rehabilitation'' camp at 
Bindunuwewa near Bandarawela. President Kumaratunga sent two police 
teams to investigate. The HRC said the police were guilty of ``grave 
dereliction of duty,'' and it did not believe that the mobs could have 
overpowered the police present. By year's end, police had arrested 3 
employees of a local teacher's technical training college and detained 
13 policemen in connection with the incident. Violence after the 
killings at Bindunuwewa continued for almost a week in the country's 
central hill area, and at least 14 people died during the week before 
police could restore order.
    On December 19, nine Tamil civilians were reported missing in 
Mirusuvil after being arrested by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA). One person 
escaped, and after checking himself into the local hospital for torture 
wounds, reported the incident to police and the local magistrate. The 
magistrate, accompanied by police, took the person to the site where he 
and the other eight had been arrested and tortured. The escapee 
identified two SLA soldiers as the perpetrators, and the soldiers 
admitted to torturing nine civilians and murdering eight. The soldiers 
identified the place of burial, and the bodies were exhumed. On 
December 25, an additional SLA commissioned officer and six additional 
SLA soldiers were arrested for the torture and murders. The army 
commander is monitoring the matter and has ordered a separate inquiry 
into the incident (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    In some cases, extrajudicial killings were reprisals against 
civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the security forces or 
civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the security forces 
claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but human rights 
monitors believe otherwise. In Thampalakamam, near Trincomalee, in 
February 1998, police and home guards allegedly massacred eight Tamil 
civilians, including three children, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE 
bombing of the Temple of the Tooth a week earlier. The Government 
arrested 31 police officers and 10 home guards, and charged 4 with 
murder and 17 with unlawful assembly. The other 20 were released after 
the Attorney General determined that there was insufficient evidence 
against them. The case remained active during the year.
    Impunity remains a serious problem. Since April 1995 at least 
several hundred persons have been killed extrajudicially by the 
security forces or have disappeared after being taken into security 
force custody; they are presumed dead. With the exception of the 6 
security force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi 
Kumaraswamy and the 4 convictions for abduction involving 88 security 
force personnel, no member of the security forces has been convicted 
for any of these crimes. In the vast majority of cases where military 
personnel may have committed human rights violations, the Government 
has not identified those responsible and brought them to justice. In 
August 1998, the Government reimposed a state of emergency nationwide. 
There was no evidence that the Government was using the ER, as in 
previous years, to conceal extrajudicial killings or disappearances. 
Nevertheless, crucial safeguards built into the ER and the legislation 
establishing the HRC often were ignored by the security forces--
especially those provisions requiring receipts to be issued for arrests 
and ordering the security forces to notify the HRC of any arrest within 
48 hours. Although security force personnel can be fined or jailed for 
failure to comply with the ER, none were known to have been punished 
for this during the year.
    In 1998 the court sentenced 6 persons to death and acquitted 2 
others in the case of 16 police and army personnel prosecuted for the 
rape and murder of Tamil schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, the murder 
of 2 members of her family, and the rape and murder of another 
individual. At his sentencing, 1 of the convicted, former Lance 
Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, claimed knowledge of mass graves at 
Chemmani in Jaffna containing the bodies of up to 400 persons killed by 
security forces in 1996. Five others convicted in the Kumaraswamy 
killings later also claimed knowledge of mass graves in the Chemmani 
area where they allegedly had buried between 120 and 140 bodies on the 
orders of their superiors. In 1998 the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated 
that the police Criminal Investigation Department had been directed to 
examine the allegation, and forensic experts and detectives were to 
visit the site. Exhumations in 1999 in the presence of international 
observers and forensic experts yielded 15 skeletons. Two of the victims 
provisionally were identified as young men who had disappeared in 1996. 
In December 1999, the Government submitted its forensic report to a 
magistrate in Jaffna; the report stated that 10 of the remains, 
including a skeleton that was bound and blindfolded, showed signs of 
physical assault which led to their deaths. The cause of death was not 
determined for the remaining bodies; however, the report stated that 
physical assault leading to death could not be ruled out. By year's 
end, 13 of the bodies had not been identified. Family members 
provisionally identified the bodies. Rajapakse and others named a total 
of 20 security personnel, including former policemen, as responsible 
for the killings. On March 14, authorities arrested five suspects and 
issued an arrest order for another who fled. In June one suspect not 
charged with murder was released on bail. The case was pending at 
year's end, but fighting near Jaffna displaced key witnesses and 
delayed proceedings.
    Although in June the courts ordered five soldiers arrested for the 
July 1999 gang rape and murder of Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl 
(two additional suspects were already in remand), the case remained 
pending at year's end. During the year, investigations conducted into 
the case found that the weapons used in the killing belonged to army 
personnel. Various witnesses testified at hearings held during the 
year. The case is to continue in 2001.
    The 1997 death of Reverend Arulpalan was not investigated during 
the year.
    In December 1997, three Tamil prisoners were hacked to death in 
prison by Sinhalese prisoners at Kalutara prison. Prison staff and army 
personnel at the prison allegedly failed to take measures to protect 
the detainees even as the attack occurred. At year's end, no charges 
had been filed in connection with the case. On January 6 and 7, 2 Tamil 
detainees in Kalutara prison died and more than 40 suffered injuries in 
clashes with other prisoners and prison guards. Authorities 
subsequently moved many detainees to another facility, but by year's 
end, they had taken no action against those responsible for the 
killings.
    The case against 8 soldiers and 1 reserve police constable arrested 
in February 1996 in the massacre of 24 Tamil villagers in Kumarapuram 
came to trial in September 1997. In November 1998, six of the soldiers 
were charged with murder, and the case was scheduled for trial during 
that year; however, the case had not gone to trial by year's end. The 
other two accused security force agents were released due to lack of 
evidence.
    The case of the 22 STF members arrested on suspicion of murdering 
23 Tamil youths at Bolgoda Lake in 1995 went to trial in June. Since 
key witnesses did not appear, the prosecution asked for the case to be 
rescheduled to October, when another hearing was held. The next hearing 
was scheduled for March 8, 2001.
    The PA Government came to power in 1994 and promised to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings from previous years. 
In 1994 it began prosecutions in several extrajudicial killings 
allegedly committed by members of the security forces. The trial of 21 
soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil civilians in 1992 in the 
village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district was transferred to the 
Colombo High Court in 1996. The court held hearings in June and 
October, but the case was postponed until January 2001. Many witnesses 
for the case live in refugee camps, and they cannot come to court to 
give evidence; observers believe that the case likely will be 
protracted.
    Former insurgent Tamil militant groups armed by and aligned with 
the Government committed extrajudicial killings in the eastern province 
and in the Vavuniya area in the north. The military wing of PLOTE and 
the Razeek group were responsible for killing a number of persons. The 
security forces arm and use these militias and a number of other Tamil 
militant organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE 
insurgents, and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against 
the insurgents. The exact size of these militias is impossible to 
ascertain, but they probably total fewer than 2,000 persons. Although 
the army in some instances took steps to convert Tamil militia groups 
into regular army units, military oversight of these groups remained 
inadequate, and complaints about them continued, especially in Vavuniya 
and Batticaloa. These groups frequently operated beyond government 
control. Complaints about their activities continued, especially in 
transit camps for internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Vavuniya. The 
militias gain access to these camps through a variety of means, 
including bribery and threats. It was impossible to determine the 
number of victims because of the secrecy with which these groups 
operated. Persons killed by these militants probably included both LTTE 
operatives and civilians who failed to comply with extortion demands. 
Unknown assailants killed Jaffna media correspondent Mayilvaganam 
Nimalarajan in the early morning of October 20. Nimalarajan's outspoken 
criticism of paramilitary groups in Jaffna led many to believe that one 
of these groups killed him. In February two members of the Razeek group 
were killed in separate incidents; in March a member of PLOTE was 
killed in Batticaloa; in April two TELO members were killed. These 
deaths likely resulted from rivalry among the groups. In May 1999, the 
Government forbade these groups from carrying arms and from stockpiling 
weapons, but these prohibitions have generally not been effective.
    Violence marred the period prior to parliamentary elections in 
October. By September 29, at least seven persons had died in election-
related violence, and local monitoring organizations reported over 500 
violent acts.
    On January 5, assailants shot and killed pro-LTTE Tamil politician 
Kumar Ponnambalam. Police detained four persons, two of whom alleged 
that a local businessman had hired them to commit the murder. The 
investigation continued at year's end.
    During the year, the Government ordered payment of compensation to 
victims of a 1999 air force bombing that killed 22 civilians at 
Puthukkudiyiruppu.
    The LTTE committed many extrajudicial killings, including many 
bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On January 23, the LTTE killed 
14 civilians in Kokkadicholai for alleged links to the security forces. 
On March 1, the LTTE killed a Jaffna municipal council member from the 
Eelam People's Democratic party (EPDP). On March 10, in an attack meant 
for government ministers scheduled to travel along a certain route near 
Parliament, the LTTE killed 30 civilians and injured 60 more with 
claymore mines, rocket propelled grenades, and automatic weapons during 
rush hour in a Colombo suburb. Other civilians died or suffered 
injuries in a fight between security forces and the LTTE that evening. 
On March 11, LTTE cadres who survived the first battle committed 
suicide or died at the hands of the security forces. In Batticola on 
November 7, two suspected gunmen killed newly-elected Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) Member of Parliament Nimalan Saundranayagam and 
wounded his security guard.
    On January 27, an LTTE bomb exploded at the post office in Vavuniya 
where military personnel were collecting paychecks, killing 11 persons 
and injuring more than 70 others, mainly civilians. Several bombings in 
commuter buses in January and February attributed to the LTTE killed 4 
persons and injured more than 100 others. On May 17, an LTTE bombing 
near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23 
persons, including children, and wounded dozens of others. Credible 
witnesses reported gunfire 10 minutes after the explosion; they 
described it as a retaliatory attack by police that allegedly killed 4 
persons (see Section 1.g.), but police and hospital records do not 
confirm this account. On May 30, an LTTE bomb in Nelunkulan near 
Vavuniya killed 2 persons and injured 40 others. On June 14, an LTTE 
bomb hit a bus transporting members of the air force, injuring more 
than a dozen soldiers and killing two civilians. On December 14, a bomb 
explosion linked to the LTTE killed two civilians and two police 
officers.
    On January 5, a suicide bomb blast in front of the Prime Minister's 
office killed 14 persons and injured dozens of others. On June 7, an 
LTTE suicide bomber killed 23 persons, including the Minister of 
Industrial Development C.V. Gooneratne and his wife, at a parade in a 
Colombo suburb. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs 
Uhana, a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to 
Jaffna. Five of the ship's crew remain missing, and they may have died 
in the attack or fallen prisoner to the LTTE. On September 15, an LTTE 
suicide bomber killed himself, 5 others, and wounded more than 20 
persons, in front of the National Eye Hospital in central Colombo. In a 
similar incident, on October 5, an LTTE suicide bomb killed 10 persons 
and injured 40 persons at a PA political rally at the north-central 
town of Medawachchiya.
    The LTTE also has targeted progovernment Tamil groups in the past.
    The LTTE also has committed a number of ``lamp post'' killings, 
although there were no reported lamp post killings during the year. At 
least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described 
courts were killed in 1999 by the LTTE in public executions; their 
bodies were tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display. 
The LTTE has attacked government installations, killing and wounding 
civilians, and the LTTE reportedly sometimes also kills its own injured 
troops to avoid their capture (see Section 1.g.).
    On October 2, at least 20 civilians were killed when a suicide 
bomber killed Mohammed Lathif Baithullah, a candidate for the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress, and his bodyguards, during campaigning for the October 
10 parliamentary elections. All of the civilians were reportedly 
members of the Muslim community.
    On October 19, a suicide bomb attack near the town hall in central 
Colombo left 3 dead and injured 24 others, including 3 foreigners.
    No further investigation has been made into the November 1999 
killing by unknown assailants of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of 
Parliament for the EPDP and editor of a weekly Tamil-language 
newspaper.
    During the year, no investigation or arrests were made in 
connection with a grenade explosion in November 1999 that killed a 
person and injured 35 others at a political rally held by UNP.
    In March 1999, municipal workers uncovered a pit near the Durraipa 
Stadium in Jaffna that contained the skeletal remains of several 
persons. Forensic evidence suggested that these remains were about 10 
years old. This discovery potentially implicated the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which occupied Jaffna at the time. Critics 
contrasted the prompt investigation of the Durraipa stadium graves with 
the slow investigation of the Chemmani mass graves.
    b. Disappearance.--Disappearances at the hands of the security 
forces continued in the north and east. During the year, there were no 
reports of disappearances in Colombo, or Jaffna. The army, navy, 
police, and paramilitary groups caused as many as 11 disappearances in 
Vavuniya and Trincomalee through September 29. In January, bodies of 
three Tamils allegedly taken by the Home Guards near Trincomalee were 
found; two of them had been decapitated. In December eight Tamil 
civilians were reported missing in Mirusuvil after being arrested and 
tortured by the SLA. Two SLA soldiers were identified as perpetrators 
and admitted to murdering seven of the civilians. The bodies were 
exhumed. One SLA commissioned officer and six additional SLA soldiers 
were arrested later. At year's end, the army commander had ordered an 
inquiry into the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including Amnesty International 
(AI), reported an increase in disappearances in Vavuniya during the 
second half of the year. As with extrajudicial killings, the exact 
number of disappearances was impossible to ascertain due to censorship 
of news about security force operations and infrequent access to the 
north and east. However, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances lists Sri Lanka as a country with an 
extremely large number of nonclarified disappearances. Those who 
disappeared during the year and in previous years are presumed dead. 
The commander of the army and the Inspector General of police both have 
criticized the disappearances and stated that the perpetrators would be 
called to account. Nonetheless there have been very few security force 
personnel prosecutions to date.
    Three regional commissions were set up in November 1994 to inquire 
into disappearances that occurred from 1988-94, most during the 1988-89 
period of the JVP uprising. The commissions found that 16,742 persons 
disappeared after having been removed involuntarily from their homes, 
in most cases by security forces. In other cases, antigovernment 
elements--in particular the leftist JVP--were determined to be 
responsible for the disappearances. After the reports were presented to 
the President in September 1997, the police created a Disappearances 
Investigations Unit (DIU) in November 1998 to examine 1,681 cases in 
which the commissions had evidence against specific individuals. In 
July 1999, the Attorney General created a Missing Persons Commissions 
Unit to consider institution of criminal proceedings based on results 
of DIU investigations. The Attorney General's office has opened over 
1,175 files and referred 262 indictments to the high courts and 86 
complaints to magistrates involving 583 members of the security forces 
on abduction and murder charges. Hearings and trials in at least 250 of 
these cases had begun by year's end. Of these the Attorney General's 
office successfully prosecuted 4 cases of abduction, involving 88 
security force personnel.
    In May 1998, a fourth commission was established to look into 
approximately 10,000 cases of disappearance that the initial 3 
commissions had been unable to investigate before their mandates 
expired. The commission is not to investigate cases of disappearance 
that occurred after 1994, but is to focus only on cases that were not 
completed by the first three commissions. Human rights observers have 
criticized the Government for not extending the mandate of this 
commission to include cases of disappearance that occurred since the 
Kumaratunga government took office in 1994. The commission is charged 
with facilitating payment of monetary compensation to the families of 
persons who disappeared, as well as forwarding cases to the Attorney 
General for possible prosecution. The commission submitted an interim 
report to President Kumaratunga in December 1999 and a final report on 
August 31 (which by year's end still had not been made public) to 
assist in further investigations and prosecutions.
    During the year, there were no developments in the Vantharamulle 
case, in which army troops allegedly abducted 158 Tamils from a refugee 
camp in the Batticaloa district in 1990. Observers maintain that there 
is credible evidence identifying the alleged perpetrators. Proceedings 
began in 1999 against an army major (who died before the court case 
began) and a former subinspector of police in the case of 31 youths who 
allegedly disappeared following their arrests in Divulapitiya in 1989. 
The case continued during the year.
    In October 1999, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances made its third visit to the country. Its report, 
released in December 1999, cited the PTA and ER as important factors 
contributing to disappearances and recommended the abolition or 
modification of these laws to bring them into conformity with 
internationally accepted human rights standards. The working group 
criticized the country's slow progress in resolving disappearances and 
noted the lack of implementation of its recommendations from visits in 
1991 and 1992, including the creation of a central register of 
detainees. The report encouraged the establishment of an independent 
body to investigate disappearances that occurred after the Kumaratunga 
Government took office in 1994.
    Progovernment Tamil militias also were responsible for 
disappearances. These militias detained persons at various locations 
that serve, in effect, as undeclared detention centers. Human rights 
observers believed that the PLOTE was a major offender in the case of 
disappearances. However, the HRC has no mandate or authority to enforce 
respect for human rights among these militia groups. When the HRC 
office director for Vavuniya complained about PLOTE activity, he 
received death threats. He eventually departed the country in 1999. It 
was impossible to determine the exact number of victims because of the 
secrecy with which these groups operated. The Government has taken no 
clear steps to stop these militants' actions, although tighter 
restrictions on these groups' right to bear arms were implemented 
following a May 1999 shootout between PLOTE and TELO supporters near a 
popular shopping center in downtown Colombo.
    The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian 
disappearances in the north and east during the year. Although the LTTE 
has denied taking any prisoners from its battles, at year's end it was 
known to be holding 11 civilian crew members of vessels that it has 
hijacked since 1995, along with 11 security force personnel. In 
February the LTTE released four security force members after a hunger 
strike; in April the LTTE released one civilian prisoner. The LTTE has 
not notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of any 
new security forces prisoners since 1994.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police 
continue to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and prisons, 
particularly Tamils suspected of supporting the LTTE. Suspected 
criminals also apparently were tortured. Several children reportedly 
have been tortured in detention during the last few years. The 1994 
Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a punishable 
offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific crime, the 
High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal conviction 
carries a 7-year minimum sentence. However, according to a 1999 AI 
report, the CATA does not implement several provisions of the U.N. 
Convention; this results in torture being prohibited under specific 
circumstances and allowed under others. Consequently torture continues 
with relative impunity. In addition, the PTA makes confessions obtained 
under any circumstance, including by torture, admissible in court. The 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other human 
rights organizations cited the PTA as a major factor contributing to 
torture of prisoners.
    The Government is developing regulations to prosecute and punish 
military and police personnel responsible for torture. The 
Interparliamentary Permanent Standing Committee and its 
Interministerial Working Group on Human Rights Issues have begun 
tracking criminal investigations of torture. By year's end, there were 
146 cases under investigation. In addition the Government also ceased 
paying fines incurred by security force personnel found guilty in 
proceedings of the offense. Security force personnel have been fined 
under civil statutes for engaging in torture. According to the Attorney 
General's office, by year's end, 8 members of the security forces and 
police had been prosecuted under criminal statutes, but none of the 
cases had come to conclusion. Members of the security forces continued 
to torture and mistreat detainees and other prisoners, particularly 
during interrogation.
    Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings (especially on 
the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted 
positions, burning, slamming testicles in desk drawers, and near 
drownings. In other cases, victims must remain in unnatural positions 
for extended periods, or they have bags laced with insecticide, chili 
powder, or gasoline placed over their heads. Detainees have reported 
broken bones and other serious injuries as a result of their 
mistreatment. There were no reports of rape in detention during the 
year.
    Medical examination determined that officers of the Counter-
Subversive Unit of the Vavuniya police beat and burned with cigarettes 
a Tamil man arrested in March. Police at Kantale, near Trincomalee, 
arrested and tortured five young Tamils in June; one died as a result 
(see Section 1.a.). In December the bodies of seven Tamils who had been 
tortured and killed by the army in Mirusuvil were exhumed after one 
person escaped and notified authorities. A commissioned officer and 
eight soldiers were arrested, and at year's end, an inquiry continued 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). Torture appeared more prevalent in rural 
areas than in Colombo.
    Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture 
victims may file civil suit for compensation in the High Courts or 
Supreme Court. Courts have granted awards ranging from approximately 
$175 (14,200 rupees) to $2,280 (182,500 rupees). In February the 
Colombo high court ordered compensation of $625 (50,000 rupees) to a 
young man beaten in police custody in Vavuniya and Colombo in 1999. In 
August the Supreme Court ordered $1,250 (100,000 rupees) in 
compensation for a Tamil man tortured in December 1999 at an army camp 
near Batticaloa. However, most cases take 2 years or more to move 
through the courts, and NGO's who represent torture victims complained 
that the new Supreme Court Chief Justice appointed in September 1999 
grants hearings in only the most egregious cases.
    At the invitation of the Government, the United Nations Committee 
on Torture sent a five-person mission to Colombo in late August to 
determine whether a systematic pattern of torture exists in the country 
and, if so, to make recommendations for eliminating the practice. By 
year's end, the mission had not submitted its confidential report to 
President Kumaratunga.
    Progovernment Tamil militants, directly responsible to the security 
forces, also engaged in torture. The PLOTE in Vavuniya has drawn the 
most criticism for routinely torturing its opponents, and during the 
year, its members reportedly burned with cigarettes those who refused 
to pay protection money. Security forces have done little to stop this 
practice.
    The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force 
prisoners released by the LTTE stated that they had been subjected to 
torture, including being hung upside down and beaten, having pins 
inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot rods.
    The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the 
year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians (see Sections 1.a. 
and 1.g.).
    Prison conditions generally are poor and do not meet minimum 
international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary 
facilities. An increase in detentions associated with the war with the 
LTTE caused a significant deterioration in already poor conditions in 
short-term detention centers and in undeclared detention centers run by 
progovernment Tamil groups (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government permitted representatives from the ICRC to visit 
approximately 160 places of detention. The HRC also visited over 2,000 
police stations and over 500 detention facilities by year's end (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Conditions also are poor in LTTE-run detention facilities. Some 
former prisoners reported being handcuffed and shackled during much of 
their captivity.
    The LTTE permits the ICRC to visit detainees in the Vanni regularly 
(see Section 1.d.). The ICRC provided medical attention and helped 
negotiate the release of four servicemen held in Mallavi following a 
hunger strike in February (see Section 1.b.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. Under the law, authorities must inform an 
arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a 
magistrate within 24 hours. In practice persons detained generally 
appear before a magistrate within a few days of arrest. The magistrate 
may authorize bail or order continued pretrial detention for up to 3 
months or longer. However, under the ER and the PTA, security forces 
may detain suspects for extended periods of time without court 
approval. The ER, in force periodically since 1979 and in force island-
wide since August 1998, allows pretrial detention for a maximum of four 
consecutive 3-month periods. The ER gives security forces broad powers 
for arrest and detention without charge or the right to judicial 
review. New ER provisions published in May lengthen to a year the 
period for which authorities may order individuals to remain at home or 
otherwise have their freedom of association and movement limited. The 
new ER provisions also permit police to hold individuals for up to 90 
days to investigate suspected offenses, although the police must 
present detainees to a court within 30 days to record the detention. 
The court can order a further 6 months detention. The ER states that 
detention orders ``shall not be called in question in any court on any 
ground whatsoever,'' which may contradict an individual's 
constitutional right to petition the Supreme Court to redress 
fundamental rights violations.
    As required under the ER, the army generally turned over those that 
it arrested to the police within 24 hours, although the police and the 
army did not always issue arrest receipts or notify the HRC within 48 
hours. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those arrested, and police 
generally respected this in areas outside of the conflict. Due to 
censorship and infrequent access, observers could not determine the 
state of affairs in the north and the east.
    Despite Government announcements that it would close all secret 
detention centers, there were continued credible reports that the 
military held persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps for 
interrogation before transferring them to declared places of detention. 
This procedure, which allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in 
Vavuniya, and in the east (see Section 1.c.), did not comply with 
requirements to notify the HRC of arrests and to issue arrest receipts. 
The military maintained the detainees were ``in transit,'' and claimed 
they did not violate the detainees' rights.
    Large-scale arrests of Tamils continued during the year; these 
arrests were particularly prevalent after LTTE bombings, when many 
young Tamils were detained or arrested on suspicion of being LTTE 
cadres or sympathizers. The Government detained more than 2,819 persons 
under the ER and PTA from January to August 31, a higher number than 
that for all of 1999. Many detentions occurred during operations 
against the LTTE. Most detentions lasted several days to several 
months. The number of prisoners held at any given moment under the ER 
and the PTA consistently remained close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils 
indicted under the PTA remained without bail awaiting trial, some for 
more than 2 years. The high courts held hearings on 1,000 cases under 
the PTA or ER during the year. Many such cases drag on for years. On 
January 7 and 15, security forces detained several thousand Tamils in 
Colombo and the surrounding suburbs in ``cordon and search'' operations 
meant to find LTTE cadres after suicide bomb attacks (see Section 
1.a.). Although authorities eventually arrested fewer than 100 persons, 
many of those rounded up for questioning spent hours in detention, 
often without access to sanitary facilities. On March 18, police at a 
Colombo checkpoint detained and publicly strip-searched one woman, who 
turned out to be Sinhalese, on suspicion of being an LTTE suicide 
bomber. On May 30, police detained hundreds of Tamils in downtown 
Colombo for almost 5 hours of questioning. Approximately 50 of the 
detainees were taken for photographing and further questioning. In 
addition those arrested, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing, 
sometimes were detained in prisons with convicted criminals. Many 
lesser incidents of this sort occurred during the year. Tamils 
complained that they were abused verbally and held for extended periods 
at the security checkpoints that have been set up throughout Colombo 
(see Section 1.d.). The Government justified the detentions and arrests 
on security grounds, but many Tamils claimed that the detentions and 
arrests were a form of harrassment. Tamils often suffered arbitrary 
searches in their homes.
    In February the Government ordered the arrest of an engineer 
employed by a local Internet provider under the provisions of the PTA 
as part of its attempt to stifle competition with the state-owned 
telecommunications monopoly. The Government alleged that the company 
involved in a fundraising scheme to benefit the LTTE. Under 
international pressure, the Government dropped the charges against the 
engineer and released him in August; however, investigations of the 
company continued at year's end.
    In July 1998, the President established the Committee to Inquire 
into Undue Arrest and Harassment (CIUAH). The committee, which includes 
senior opposition party and Tamil representatives, examines complaints 
of arrest and harassment by security forces and takes remedial action 
as needed. The committee received more than 200 complaints between 
January and August 31. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH are 
mixed. Some human rights observers believe that the work of the 
committee acted as a deterrent to random arrests and helped to 
alleviate some of the problems encountered by detainees and their 
families. However, some critics claim that, following initial 
publicity, the committee's services have not been advertised widely. 
For example, the fax number for the committee is not in the Colombo 
telephone directory. Those wishing to contact the CIUAH usually are 
referred through human rights lawyers or find it by word of mouth. Many 
Tamils believe that the CIUAH does little to deter police agents from 
stopping them more frequently at security force checkpoints in the 
capital.
    The HRC continued to investigate the legality of detention in cases 
referred to it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the 
HRC legally is mandated to exercise oversight over arrests and 
detentions by the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons, 
members of the security forces sometimes violated the regulations and 
failed to cooperate with the HRC.
    The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to 
approximately 160 detention centers, police stations, and army camps 
throughout the country that were recognized officially as places of 
detention. Such visits played an important role in enabling the ICRC to 
monitor the human rights practices of the security forces. The HRC, 
through its 11 offices, also visited places of detention; however, 
human rights observers believed that due to inadequate leadership and a 
failure of the HRC to give long term contracts to many of its workers, 
the organization was not pursuing its mandate (see Section 4).
    The PLOTE continued to run places of illegal detention in Vavuniya. 
The EPDP also detained members for short periods in Jaffna as 
punishment for breaking party discipline.
    The LTTE continued to detain civilians, often holding them for 
ransom. For example, in September 1999 the LTTE held three businessmen 
for a ransom of $550,000 (40 million rupees). The businessmen were 
freed after making partial payment and promising to pay the balance. 
Unconfirmed reports indicated the LTTE was holding in custody more than 
2,000 civilians in the northern part of the island. Those held included 
11 civilian crew members of 3 vessels hijacked by the LTTE since 1995. 
In February the LTTE released 4 of the 15 servicemen that it held. In 
June it also released 1 of its 12 declared civilians prisoners. The 
LTTE did not permit the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization to 
visit its detainees, aside from these crew members and security force 
personnel.
    The Government does not practice forced exile. There are no legal 
provisions allowing or prohibiting its use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects these provisions in 
practice.
    The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of 
appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of 
the Chief Justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers, 
and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until the mandatory 
retirement age of 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for other courts. 
Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or physical or mental 
incapacity, but only after a legal investigation and followed by joint 
action of the President and the Parliament.
    In criminal cases, defendants are tried in public by juries. They 
are informed of the charges and evidence against them, may be 
represented by the counsel of their choice, and have the right to 
appeal. The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on 
criminal charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal, but it 
does not provide counsel in other cases. Private legal aid 
organizations assist some defendants. In addition the Ministry of 
Justice operates 11 community legal aid centers to assist those who 
cannot afford representation and to serve as educational resources for 
local communities. There are no jury trials in cases brought under the 
PTA. Confessions, obtained by various means, including torture, are 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings, but are allowed in PTA cases; 
most convictions under the PTA rely heavily on them. Defendants bear 
the burden of proof to demonstrate that their confessions were obtained 
by coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the right to appeal. Subject 
to judicial review in certain cases, defendants can spend up to 18 
months being held in prison on adminstrative order waiting for their 
case to be heard. Once their case comes to trial, decisions are made 
relatively quickly. Courts held hearings on some 1,000 PTA and ER cases 
during the year.
    Most court proceedings in Colombo and the south are conducted in 
English or Sinhala, which, due to a shortage of court-appointed 
interpreters, has restricted the ability of Tamil-speaking defendants 
to get a fair hearing. Trials and hearings in the north and east are in 
Tamil and English, but many serious cases, including those having to do 
with terrorism, are tried in Colombo. While Tamil-speaking judges exist 
at the magistrate level, only four high court judges, an appeals court 
judge, and a Supreme Court justice speak fluent Tamil. Few legal 
textbooks and no law reports exist in Tamil, and the Government has 
complied only slowly with legislation requiring publishing all laws in 
English, Sinhala, and Tamil.
    In Jaffna LTTE threats against court officials disrupted normal 
court operations. Although magistrate and district level courts 
functioned during the year, the high court suspended activities due to 
security concerns.
    The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of 
judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without 
codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents 
of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts 
reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution.
    The Government claims that all persons held under the ER and the 
PTA are suspected members of the LTTE and, therefore, legitimate 
security threats. Insufficient information exists to verify this claim 
and to determine whether these detainees or members of the now legal 
JVP, detained in similar fashion in past years, are political 
prisoners. Between 200 and 300 of those previously detained--mostly JVP 
members--were convicted under criminal law; some remain incarcerated. 
In many cases, human rights monitors question the legitimacy of the 
criminal charges brought against these persons.
    The LTTE also holds a number of political prisoners. The number is 
impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of the 
organization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these 
prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy, 
and the Government generally respects these provisions in practice; 
however, it infringes on citizen's privacy rights in some areas. The 
police obtain proper warrants for arrests and searches conducted under 
ordinary law; however, the security forces are not required to obtain 
warrants for searches conducted under either the ER or the PTA. The 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for providing 
oversight for such searches. No judicial review or other means of 
redress exist for alleged illegal searches under the ER. Some Tamils 
complained that their homes were searched as a means of general 
harassment by the security forces (see Section 1.d.). The Government is 
believed to monitor telephone conversations and correspondence on a 
selective basis. The security forces routinely open mail destined for 
the LTTE-controlled areas and seize contraband. The Government censors 
news reports that cover military operations. Television stations 
practice self-censorship and some international news broadcasts which 
deal with the country specifically are blurred over. This censorship 
tightened after the publication of the new ER on May 3 (see Section 
2.a.), although some restrictions had eased by year's end. For example, 
although blocks marked ``censored'' were inserted over missing text in 
newspapers in past years, there was no occurrence of this action in the 
last 6 months of the year.
    Progovernment Tamil militant groups, nominally operating under 
government control, used forced conscription in the past, although it 
appears this practice abated after a 1999 order from the Government. In 
previous years, there have been credible reports that Tamil youth (in 
the east in particular) have been forced to join these groups under 
threats to themselves and their families; however, there were no 
reports that this practice occured during the year.
    The LTTE routinely invades the privacy of citizens, maintaining an 
effective network of informants. There are credible reports the LTTE 
has warned 66,000 displaced Muslims living in the Puttalam area not to 
return to their homes in Mannar and Jaffna until the conflict is over. 
The LTTE also recruits children (see Section 6.c.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE 
continued throughout the year. After establishing positions on the 
Jaffna peninsula in January, the LTTE in March began a sustained 
campaign to recapture Jaffna. On April 22, the LTTE captured a large 
base at Elephant Pass, and in the following weeks, forced the armed 
forces to retreat to Jaffna. By late May, the front lines had 
stabilized just east of Jaffna in the Chavacachcheri area. From June 
through August, there were minor skirmishes, with the armed forces 
carrying out counterattacks from September through year's end that 
resulted in high casualties on both sides. More than 2,000 combatants 
and more than 100 civilians died during the year in incidents related 
to the conflict.
    At year's end, approximately 490,000 persons were displaced by the 
conflict. Over 340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain 
displaced by the past several years of fighting; during the year the 
battles near Jaffna displaced an additional 150,000.
    The Government in the past often publicized aspects of its planned 
operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas to be 
affected. However, the armed forces were more secretive during the 
year, and it did not give public warnings before the commencement of 
its advances. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess 
targets before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE 
installations have killed civilians working at those installations or 
living nearby. More than 100 civilians were killed in the LTTE's 
advance on Jaffna in April and May, including 6 who died at Pallaikudu 
in May when the armed forces conducted an aerial bombing of an LTTE 
boat dock. More than a dozen persons were killed by the air force in 
bombings against Mullaitivu during the year. On April 19, artillery 
shells killed 15 and wounded 24 at a home for the elderly in Kaithady 
during a clash between the LTTE and the army. It was not clear which 
side was responsible. On November 23, 2 shells thought to be fired by 
the LTTE landed near a school in Muttur, near Trincomalee, killing 2 
students and wounding 10 more. During the year, dozens of civilians 
were wounded in contested areas of the north and east in clashes 
between the armed forces and the LTTE.
    On May 17, 23 people were killed and dozens were injured when a 
bomb exploded at a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa in the east, where 
people were gathered to celebrate the Buddhist festival of Vesak (see 
Section 1.a.). The bomb, concealed in a freezer box on a bicycle, 
exploded after the cyclist was stopped by two policemen and a soldier; 
the cyclist ran away. After the bomb exploded, security forces opened 
fire, killing four children and injuring eight more. Although the 
Government has blamed the LTTE publicly for this bombing, no one 
officially claimed responsibility, and at year's end, no investigation 
had been conducted. Furthermore the Government has not commented on the 
additional deaths and injuries caused by the security forces opening 
fire.
    The security forces use aerial observation for selecting targets 
for shelling and bombing. They also attempt to locate the source of 
incoming mortar fire before responding; however, inaccurate mortar and 
artillery fire killed civilians. In September 1999, the air force 
dropped 3 bombs on a village near Puthukudiyiruppu in the Vanni, 
killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights observers, 
including the ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were civilians. 
Government officials acknowledged that 22 men, women, and children were 
killed by the air force bomb; however, they alleged that the air force 
targeted an LTTE training camp, and at first they did not admit the 
possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Government later 
acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident. During the year, 
the Government held an investigation and authorized compensation for 
the victim's families, admitting that the site had been bombed ``in 
error.'' However, the Government did not admit formally to having 
killed civilians.
    The security forces continued to receive instruction in 
international humanitarian law as part of their training courses (see 
Section 4). According to the military, the army also established human 
rights cells in each division, and it established a human rights office 
in each brigade and battalion. The armed forces operate under written 
rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling, bombardment, 
or other use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas such as 
villages.
    The Government continued to provide food relief, through the 
Commissioner General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-
Purpose Cooperative Societies (MCPS), to displaced and other needy 
citizens, including those in areas controlled by the LTTE. Food rations 
were delivered by the Government to the Vanni area through a checkpoint 
that is controlled on one side by the security forces and on the other 
by the LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (an 
``uncleared area'' in Government parlance) was not closed during the 
year.
    The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ``war-related'' 
medical items, such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid 
supplies, bandages, and some drugs. NGO's and other groups that sought 
to take these items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed 
permission from local officials as well as from the Ministry of 
Defense. Delays were common and approval sometimes was denied, due to 
fear that supplies would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result, 
many medical items in the Vanni region were in short supply. This 
shortfall contributed to an already serious deterioration in the 
quality and quantity of medical care furnished to the civilian 
population. During the first half of the year, the Government proved 
particularly reluctant to allow medical supplies into LTTE-controlled 
areas. During this period, civilians injured in the conflict relied 
heavily on aid provided by international NGO's who faced severe 
restrictions on moving medical supplies into the area. Government 
restrictions on the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and 
currency into the LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impact on 
the relief work of NGO's in those areas.
    The Ministry of Defense reported capturing several LTTE insurgents 
on the battlefield during the year. It sent these, and other cadres who 
surrendered or whom security forces arrested to rehabilitation centers. 
The ICRC continued to visit approximately 100 former LTTE members now 
in government rehabilitation camps, although the October massacre of 
more than 20 such detainees at a government-run detention facility at 
Bindunuwewa, near Bandarawella, led observers to question the continued 
security of residents of these facilities (see Section 1.a.).
    In view of the scale of hostilities and the large number of LTTE 
casualties, some observers found the number of prisoners taken under 
battlefield conditions to be low and concluded that many LTTE fighters 
apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner. Some observers 
believed that, on the government side, an unwritten ``take-no-
prisoners'' policy generally remained in effect. The military denied 
this claim, stating that other factors limited the number of prisoners 
taken, such as the LTTE's efforts to remove wounded fighters from the 
battlefield, the proclivity of its fighters to choose suicide over 
capture, and the LTTE's occasional practice of killing its own badly 
wounded fighters (see Section 1.a.). There were no reported instances 
of security forces personnel executing LTTE cadres this year, and no 
army or other security forces personnel were prosecuted or disciplined 
for allegedly executing prisoners from previous years.
    The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide 
medical attention to wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to 
treat any LTTE wounded entrusted to government care. Credible reports 
told of wounded LTTE cadres surrendering to the Government and 
receiving appropriate medical care.
    The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than 
take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has 
executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. At the end of September, 
the LTTE admitted to holding only 11 security forces prisoners, all 
captured in 1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of 
the police officers and security force personnel that it has captured 
in recent years. However, the LTTE released two army deserters who 
surrendered to it in 1998, and in November 1999, it transferred over 11 
SLA members who were captured during the year to the ICRC. In February 
the LTTE released four servicemen, and in June it released one 
civilian.
    The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the 
year, the LTTE killed a government minister (see Section 1.a.) and more 
than 200 other noncombatants. The LTTE has engaged in hostage taking, 
hijackings, and bombing of civilian targets.
    In the past, the LTTE has used church and temple compounds, where 
civilians are instructed by the Government to congregate in the event 
of hostilities, as shields for the storage of munitions; however, there 
were no reports that this occurred during the year.
    The LTTE uses child soldiers. The armed forces captured a 14-year-
old female LTTE cadre in fighting in September, and during the year 
credible sources reported LTTE efforts to recruit children to replenish 
battlefield losses. According to some reports the LTTE shows war movies 
and gives political speeches to children in schools. In September 1998, 
25 young LTTE fighters surrendered as a group; at least one of those 
who surrendered was 13 years old. Most of the others were aged between 
15 and 17 years. In 1998 the LTTE promised the U.N. Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that it would not 
recruit children under 17 and would not use children under 18 in 
battle. It disregarded those promises.
    The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDP's, 
thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled and other parts of 
the Vanni region, with nutrition levels falling below the national 
average. Experts have reported an increase in anemia and a lower birth 
rate, both of which indicate lower levels of nutrition. There were 
confirmed cases of malnutrition, including hundreds of cases of 
malnourished children. Malnutrition resulted from several factors, 
including food shortages, poverty, and conflict-related dislocations. 
However, a survey completed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in 1999 found 
malnutrition levels in the war-affected areas at about the same level 
as in the war-free south of the country. Medical sources distinguish 
between ``undernourished'' children (of which there are many throughout 
the country) and ``malnourished'' children.
    Landmines were a problem in Jaffna and the Vanni and to some extent 
in the east. Landmines, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance pose a 
problem to resettlement of displaced persons and rebuilding. A U.N. 
landmine team tasked with locating and mapping LTTE and army mines in 
the Jaffna peninsula suspended its mission in April, stating that it 
was impossible to continue as long as hostilities continued. According 
to the Landmine Monitor Report for 2000, both the LTTE and the military 
abandoned promises given in 1999 not to place new mines in areas 
designated for civilian resettlement. Sources reported 16 civilians 
were killed or wounded from January to give end of August in incidents 
involving mines or unexploded ordnance. On November 28, a landmine 
blast attributed to the LTTE killed 7 persons and injured 24 passengers 
on a bus in Anuradhapura district. In contrast 20 such accidents 
occurred in 1999. Sources have confirmed that the SLA is making great 
efforts to clear all explosives from areas that it has recaptured.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and expression; however, the Government restricts 
these rights in practice, often using national security grounds 
permitted by law. During the year, the Government limited the access of 
domestic and foreign media to information and continued to censor news 
relating to the military and security situation. In June 1998, the 
Government imposed direct censorship on all domestic and foreign media 
reports relating to ongoing or possible future military and other 
security operations. The Government reissued its censorship order in 
November 1999 after the military suffered setbacks in the field. Even 
when no specific government censorship is exercised, private television 
stations impose their own, informal censorship on international 
television news rebroadcast in the country. In May the Government 
passed new ER to tighten censorship rules, to give the Government power 
to impound printing presses, and to close newspapers or broadcast 
stations it perceived as threats to national security. Subsequently a 
local NGO filed a fundamental rights case in the Supreme Court opposing 
censorship as a human rights violation. The court refused to consider 
the case. On November 1, International Press Institute (IPI) placed the 
country on its ``watch list'' of countries which ``appear to be moving 
towards suppressing or restricting press freedom.'' IPI cited the new 
Emergency Regulations as an impediment to free media expression.
    Despite earlier campaign promises to divest itself of its media 
holdings, the Government controls the country's largest newspaper 
chain, two major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting 
Corporation (SLBC, a radio station). There are a variety of 
independent, privately owned newspapers, journals and radio and 
television stations, most of which freely criticize the Government and 
its policies. However, some journalists practiced self-censorship due 
to fear of intimidation. There is also a privately owned newspaper 
published in Jaffna. The Government imposes no political restrictions 
on the establishment of new media enterprises.
    The Government has failed to reform the press law and privatize 
government-owned media as promised during the 1994 election campaign. 
In 1997 there was an attempt to pass a broadcast reform bill that was 
ultimately unsuccessful and further revisions subsequently proposed by 
a blue-ribbon panel have yet to be implemented.
    In a January speech, the President attacked the press and singled 
out individuals and media organizations for criticism by name. After 
passing the new ER in May, the Government created a special media 
information center to approve print and broadcast material produced in 
the country, including that of foreign journalists. Later that month, 
the SLBC defied an order by the censor and continued to broadcast the 
BBC's Sinhala-language news program. After a period of controversy, the 
Media Minister allowed the broadcasts to continue. The President 
officially eased censorship restrictions on foreign journalists in a 
circular published on June 5, although material for publication or 
broadcast within the country, regardless of author, remained subject to 
government approval. As a result of the Government's actions, 
journalists practiced self-censorship.
    In late May, the Government used its power under the new ER to 
close two publications in Colombo and the independent newspaper in 
Jaffna, citing security concerns. The Supreme Court in late June 
declared the censorship regulations to be invalid, and it ordered the 
Government to allow the newspapers to reopen. The Government complied 
with the ruling, but it reissued the regulations in a manner consistent 
with the Supreme Court ruling.
    On September 19, police arrested a young man for criticizing the 
President on a radio call-in show. Police traced the call to discover 
the caller's address. The young man's parents alleged that he had a 
mental illness and could not be held responsible for his comments. 
Regardless at year's end, the young man remained in prison pending a 
hearing of the case.
    On January 2, unknown attackers set fire to the home of an actress 
who supported the opposition party candidate during the 1999 
presidential election campaign. On January 26, presumed government 
supporters attacked a husband and wife singing duo, who also had 
supported the opposition presidential candidate. On April 6, the local 
BBC correspondent was assaulted while covering a rally that protested 
Norway's involvement in the country's peace process. Other journalists 
reported threats for expressing opinions critical of the Government. 
Several fled the country.
    During the year, police detained two persons for questioning in 
connection with the 1999 murder of Rohana Kumara, editor of a Sinhala-
language newspaper which had been critical of leading figures in the 
ruling coalition. By year's end, no one had been charged in connection 
with the case. Similarly authorities made no progress in the 1999 
murder of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of Parliament and the editor 
of a Tamil-language weekly.
    In March 1999, an army brigadier allegedly abducted and assaulted a 
journalist working for an independent Sinhala-language newspaper. 
Police arrested the brigadier, after which courts granted him bail. The 
case did not come to trial during the year.
    In February 1998, armed men attacked a journalist who regularly 
reported on defense matters, including corruption in military 
procurements. The Government criticized the attack; it subsequently 
arrested and indicted two air force personnel in the case, including 
the bodyguard of a former commander of the air force. A formal 
indictment was handed down in 1999. Courts postponed the hearings 
several times during the year; the case was scheduled to reconvene in 
February 2001.
    The editor of a leading national newspaper who was found guilty of 
defaming the President in 1997 appealed the verdict that year. On 
December 5, an appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling. The 
editor appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Another defamation 
case filed by the President in 1995 led to the September 5 conviction 
of an editor of another important English-language weekly. The editor 
received a 2-year jail sentence, later suspended; he appealed. Other 
defamation cases filed by the President against editors of major 
newspapers critical of the Government or supportive of the opposition 
remained pending. Journalists viewed these cases as frivolous and 
intended only to intimidate and harass the media.
    The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance was formed in 1999 to protect 
the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are subject to 
harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and Sri Lankan 
security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in the war zones 
have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention and difficulty in 
obtaining press accreditation. In August 1999, the Sri Lanka Tamil 
Media Alliance filed the first-ever fundamental rights case on behalf 
of an ethnic Tamil reporter on the staff of the government-owned and-
controlled Tamil language daily. Security forces arrested the reporter 
on August 21, 1999, on suspicion of affiliation with the LTTE and later 
released him. The court ruled that the security forces had acted within 
their rights in detaining the reporter and refused to award 
compensation.
    Travel by foreign and national journalists to the conflict areas 
was restricted, but in September the Government began approving some 
requests for journalists (both local and foreign) to travel north and 
they organized transport for selected journalists to visit Jaffna; 
however, the Government did not announce a formal policy change. Both 
local and foreign journalists still were required to obtain advance 
permission from the Ministry of Defense for travel to conflict areas. 
The Foreign Ministry also had to approve visits to conflict areas by 
foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in processing requests have 
been reduced, but they still prevail. The Government occasionally 
arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the vicinity of 
the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours. The Government 
remains the only source of most news about security and defense matters 
that can be disseminated to the public legally.
    The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly 
restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. The 
LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human rights.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom.
    The LTTE does not respect academic freedom, and it has repressed 
and killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate 
and widely-respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan 
Tiruchelvam, who was killed by a suicide bomber in July 1999. The LTTE 
severely repressed members of a human rights organization, the 
University Teachers for Human Rights, which formerly was based on the 
Jaffna peninsula; most former members of this group have been killed.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects this 
right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this freedom, the 
Government did not use the act for that purpose during the year. The 
right of assembly is also restricted under the emergency regulations, 
and the Government ordered the cancellation of two political rallies 
under the new emergency regulations in May. However, the Government 
generally granted permits for demonstrations, including those by 
opposition parties and minority groups. Nonetheless, both the main 
opposition UNP and the PA Government continued to accuse each other of 
political thuggery and hooliganism, complaining that supporters of the 
opposing party disrupted rallies and other political events.
    New ER enacted in May restricted the right to organize rallies, 
including political demonstrations and discouraged public celebrations. 
Under the new emergency regulations, police ordered the cancellation of 
a JVP protest organized for May 9 and cancelled the UNP's first pre-
election rally, scheduled for May 12. Nonetheless many political 
parties and factions continued to hold impromptu, short demonstrations 
without reprisals from the Government. A June presidential order lifted 
the restrictions on rallies.
    Violence at political rallies sometimes occurs. A JVP supporter 
died on September 27 from injuries sustained when the police broke up a 
JVP rally held in Matale on September 25, which the Government claimed 
was illegal because participants had not applied for permits or 
requested permission to use loudspeakers.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this 
right, the Government did not use the act for that purpose during the 
year.
    The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas that it 
controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in 
public places the names of Tamil civilians accused of associating with 
security forces and other Government entities. The LTTE has killed 
Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security forces in 
establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a political 
leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution gives Buddhism a foremost 
position, but it also provides for the right of members of other faiths 
to practice their religions freely, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Despite the special status afforded by the 
Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of all faiths are 
celebrated as public holidays.
    Foreign clergy may work in the country, but for the last 30 years, 
the Government has sought to limit the number of foreign religious 
workers given temporary work permits. Permission usually is restricted 
to denominations registered with the Government. The Government has 
prohibited the entry of new foreign clergy. It permitted those already 
in the country to remain; however, as foreign clergy have retired, Sri 
Lankans would replace them. For example, in 1962 the Government reached 
an agreement with the Catholic Church that new Jesuit clergy would not 
be permitted to enter the country on a permanent basis. However, the 
Jesuits want their clergy to be replaced by foreign members of their 
order as they retire. The local Catholic Church hierarchy does not 
support the Jesuits in the dispute, and it is not lobbying the 
Government to change the agreement. Most religious workers in the 
country, including most Christian clergy, are Sri Lankan in origin.
    Some evangelical Christians, who constitute less than 1 percent of 
the population, have expressed concern that their efforts at 
proselytizing often meet with hostility and harassment from the local 
Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work (see Section 5). They 
sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones such 
harassment; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In 
1997 the Assemblies of God Church filed a fundamental rights case with 
the Supreme Court after the local village council in Gampaha had tried 
to block the construction of a church on the grounds that it would 
interfere with Buddhism. The Supreme Court ruled that the construction 
of the church could proceed. However, in May 1999 two bombs exploded in 
the hall of the church; no one was injured, but the structure was 
damaged slightly. The denomination complained that it continues to face 
opposition at the local level in many places but stated that legal 
action or the threat of legal action generally has resulted in the 
Church being allowed to construct facilities for its congregations and 
conduct worship services.
    The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims. In 1990 it evicted some 
46,000 Muslims from areas under its control in the north. The LTTE also 
has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses, and threatened 
Muslims with death if they attempted to return to their homes before 
the conflict ends (see Section 5).
    The LTTE attacked Buddhist sites, most notably the historic Dalada 
Maligawa or ``Temple of the Tooth,'' the holiest Buddhist shrine in the 
country, in the town of Kandy in January 1998. In May an LTTE bombing 
near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23 
persons and wounded dozens of others (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen 
``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to 
return to Sri Lanka,'' and the Government generally respects the right 
to domestic and foreign travel; however, the war with the LTTE prompted 
the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the 
north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark. 
Tamils must obtain police passes in order to move freely in the north 
and east, and frequently they are harassed at checkpoints around the 
country (see Section 1.c.). These security measures have the effect of 
restricting the movement of Tamils.
    The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military 
checkpoints throughout the city. For Tamils travel from Jaffna to other 
parts of the country remained extremely difficult, due to security 
restrictions imposed by the security forces and the limited 
availability of transportation. The ICRC in September replaced its 
relief and supply ship with a new vessel capable of carrying up to 75 
persons. The ship evacuated civilians from Jaffna who needed medical 
treatment, but it also carried civilian passengers between Trincomalee 
and Jaffna on an as-needed basis. In addition the Government hired a 
passenger vessel with room for 400 persons that operated between 
Trincomalee and Jaffna and transported medical supplies; in July the 
ICRC began providing escort for the ship under the ICRC flag, at the 
request of the Government and with the agreement of the LTTE.
    The armed forces initially prevented more than 1,000 civilians from 
vacating conflict areas on the Jaffna peninsula during fighting in 
April and May and imposed a curfew, prompting accusations that the 
security forces were using the population as ``human shields.'' The 
military quickly decided to permit civilians to evacuate the area after 
intense pressure by human rights groups. During the April and May 
campaign, almost the entire population of the Thenmarachchi district, 
east of Jaffna, was trapped between the military and the LTTE. By early 
June, the situation had calmed sufficiently that many persons were able 
to leave. The LTTE and the military did not allow international NGO's 
to have access to the area until mid-June. Observers believe that many 
persons, including the elderly and invalids, may not have been able to 
leave the area during the heaviest fighting in May, and may have died 
as a result. The area still was contested at year's end. The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ICRC were unable to gain access 
to the region until fighting abated in June.
    In November 1999, most residents of Vavuniya fled when the LTTE 
threatened to shell the town as part of its counterattack. Security 
forces kept nearly 5,000 residents of nearby welfare centers or transit 
camps where they were. Human rights groups accused security forces of 
endangering the lives of camp residents. One week later the LTTE 
withdrew its threat, and most residents returned.
    Fighting between Government and LTTE has displaced hundreds of 
thousands of persons, with many displaced multiple times as front lines 
shift. Fighting in Jaffna from April to June this year displaced an 
estimated 150,000 more, most of whom sought shelter with friends or 
relatives. Another 340,000 displaced reportedly live in the Vanni. 
Since September 172,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) have been 
living in welfare centers ranging from camps, where conditions vary 
considerably, to settlements with government social services and food 
aid. By year's end, 500,000 displaced persons, including those in the 
Vanni, had registered for government food aid and were receiving 
medicine and other essential supplies from the Government.
    The Government has sought to resettle the displaced where possible 
and has arranged for a number of those from Jaffna to return to their 
homes. Some attempts at resettlement proved successful. Over the years, 
the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR, built permanent housing 
for 18,000 Muslims in the Puttalam area. However, many of the resettled 
were displaced again by further fighting, including those who in 1999 
returned to their homes north and east of Vavuniya, but they were 
forced to flee again when the LTTE retook the area starting in November 
1999.
    From October 1996 until the end of 1999, over 150,000 persons are 
estimated to have moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya 
and other transit points in government-controlled regions. Of these 
over 100,000 persons reached Jaffna and other Tamil-majority areas. 
Many had left the Vanni region with the intention of proceeding south; 
they opted for other destinations only after learning that they would 
have to remain in transit camps until security clearances for southward 
travel were obtained. Obtaining a clearance can take between 2 and 4 
months in some cases, and some human rights groups alleged that the 
procedures were arbitrary and unreasonably strict. Clearance procedures 
were applied to everyone, including the elderly and the very young. 
Those wishing to travel must be sponsored by a registered Vavuniya 
resident, and only one person may be sponsored at a time. This has 
created a lucrative black market in sponsorships. During the year, 
persons crossed illegally from LTTE-controlled to government-controlled 
areas. These individuals encountered strenuous security checks in 
Vavuniya that often took months, further contributing to crowding in 
the transit camps. While the Government had a legitimate interest in 
identifying LTTE infiltrators, it also appeared reluctant to allow 
displaced Tamils to travel to Colombo where they might contribute to 
unemployment and other social problems. At year's end, about 42,000 
displaced persons continued to live in substandard conditions with 
relatives or in camps in Vavuniya and Mannar. Some displaced persons 
wish to return to their homes.
    Prior to 1996, the LTTE severely restricted the movement of Tamils 
under its control, often levying a large ``exit tax'' on persons who 
sought to travel to areas under government control and requiring 
travelers to leave all their property in escrow. In addition it usually 
would allow only one family member to travel at a time. Following the 
Government's capture of Jaffna, the LTTE began to allow persons to move 
more freely into, government-controlled areas, although it still 
extracts a small fee for ``travel passes'' to leave the Vanni, and it 
rarely allows entire families to leave at once. The LTTE occasionally 
disrupts the flow of persons exiting the Vanni region through the one 
established and legal checkpoint. The LTTE also disrupted the movement 
of IDP's from Trincomalee to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking civilian 
shipping. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs Uhana, 
a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to Jaffna 
(see Section 1.a.). On November 2, the LTTE temporarily hijacked the 
Russian vessel M.V. Utyous after the Sri Lankan navy destroyed three 
LTTE craft in a sea battle. After successfully evading the navy and 
escaping to shore, the LTTE released the Russian ship and its crew. In 
addition the LTTE also disrupted civilian air traffic to Jaffna; in 
August 1998, it began warning civilians and humanitarian workers not to 
use civilian flights serving the peninsula.
    Humanitarian groups estimate that there are more than 200,000 IDP's 
in LTTE-controlled areas (see Section 1.g.).
    Several thousand Tamils fled LTTE-controlled areas to Tamil Nadu in 
southern India in 1998. An estimated 65,000 Tamil refugees lived in 
camps there, having left the country at various times throughout the 
period of the conflict. Indian authorities reported 1,400 new refugees 
from between January and August 31; about 100,000 refugees may have 
integrated into Tamil society in India over the years.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of 
first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government does not 
permit the entry of refugees into the country or grant first asylum, 
nor does it aid those who manage to enter to seek permanent residence 
elsewhere. Howver, the UNHCR granted refugee status to four persons 
during the year who asked for that status after arriving in the 
country. The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no instances 
of forcible repatriation of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government 
through periodic multiparty elections based on universal adult 
suffrage. The country is a longstanding democratic republic with an 
active multiparty system. Power is shared between the popularly elected 
President and the 225-member Parliament. The right to change the 
government was exercised in December 1999 when Chandrika Kumaratunga 
was elected to a second 6-year term as President and again during 
parliamentary elections in October. Both elections were marked by 
violence. As of September 29, the Center for Monitoring Election 
Violence (CMEV) recorded more than 500 acts of violence, including 7 
killings, in the period leading up to parliamentary elections. Another 
local monitoring organization counted 2,036 acts of violence during the 
campaign period from close of nominations in September to election day 
on October 10; it noted violence ranging from defacement of campaign 
posters to assault and 73 killings. Violence also plagued the 1999 
presidential elections; several persons died and many more were 
injured, including the President and the Justice Minister, in an LTTE 
suicide bomb attack.
    By year's end, local observers had not issued reports on the 
elections; however, they expressed concern about whether the vote was 
free and fair. A European Union monitoring mission, in its final 
report, expressed concern about violence and irregularities in the 
voting, but it concluded that the election ``did to a reasonable degree 
reflect the will of the electorate.''
    The incidence of electoral fraud has increased in recent elections. 
Elections Commission officers reported misuse of postal votes in the 
1999 Northwest (``Wayamba'') Province elections. In response to sharp 
criticism about the way that the vote was conducted, the President 
appointed a commission staffed by two retired judges to evaluate 
allegations of electoral fraud. Although they agreed that the poll was 
flawed, no new election was called. In February 1999, the President 
also created a bipartisan monitoring committee (which she chaired) to 
ensure that the remaining provincial council elections were ``free and 
fair.'' Two local election monitoring organizations found that the 1999 
presidential vote was flawed in more than 10 percent of polling 
stations. A group of 26 international observers invited by the 
Government to observe the elections stated that they saw no evidence of 
fraud in the 1999 presidential elections, but they admitted the 
possibility of irregularities and suggested ways for improving the 
voting system to prevent cheating. The EU sent a delegation of more 
than 70 monitors to observe the parliamentary elections in October. The 
Elections Commissioner granted the EU representatives access to polling 
and counting stations. Local monitoring groups also observed the polls.
    The Commissioner of Elections recognized 46 parties at the time of 
general elections in October; however, only 13 parties actually held 
seats in the 225-member Parliament elected during the year. The two 
most influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal 
component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally 
draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. Historically, 
these two parties have alternated in power.
    Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of 
women in politics or government, the social mores in some communities 
limit women's activities outside the home, and they are 
underrepresented in government and politics. Nonetheless, in August 
1994, voters elected a Parliament that chose a female Prime Minister 
for the third time in the country's history. In November 1994, a woman 
was elected President for the first time; she was reelected in December 
1999 for a second term. Eleven women held seats in the Parliament that 
completed its term in August. In addition to the Prime Minister, the 
Minister for Women's Affairs, and the Minister of Social Services, a 
number of women held posts as deputy ministers in the last parliament. 
Of the 5,000 candidates for the October parliamentary elections, 116 
were women and 7 of them won seats in the October elections. The 
President appointed three of these women, including the wife of the 
deceased leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, to ministerial 
posts.
    The Parliament elected in October has 23 Tamil and 22 Muslim 
members.
    The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control, 
although it did not oppose campaigning in the east during the October 
parliamentary elections. Through a campaign of killing and 
intimidation, it effectively undermined the functioning of local 
government bodies in Jaffna, whose members were elected in January 
1998. This campaign included the killing of 2 of Jaffna's mayors and 
death threats against members of the 17 local councils. Throughout the 
period of the conflict, the LTTE has killed popularly elected 
politicians, including those elected by Tamils in areas the LTTE claims 
as part of a Tamil homeland.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic NGO human rights groups, including the 
Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), the University 
Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement 
(CRM), and the Law and Society Trust (LST), that monitor civil and 
political liberties. There are no adverse regulations governing the 
activities of local and foreign NGO's, although in February 1999, the 
Government began requiring NGO's to include action plans and detailed 
descriptions of funding sources as part of its official registration 
process. Some NGO workers saw this as an attempt by the Government to 
exert greater control over the NGO sector after human rights groups 
criticized the Government's handling of the Wayamba elections in 
January 1999 (see Section 3). However, few NGO's complied with these 
new reporting requirements. The Government generally cooperated with 
NGO's, with members of Parliament, and with other officials frequently 
participating in seminars and other events concerning human rights and 
humanitarian affairs.
    The Government continued to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to 
detention facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In the past, the 
ICRC provided international humanitarian law training materials and 
training to the security forces on an ad hoc basis. The UNHCR, the 
ICRC, and a variety of international NGO's assisted in the delivery of 
medical and other essential supplies to the Vanni area, even with the 
many restrictions on such supplies (see Section 1.g).
    By year's end, the HRC conducted more than 2,000 visits to police 
stations and 500 visits to detention facilities. The HRC has over 4,000 
cases of alleged human rights abuse pending. The Commission's 
investigation into the allegations by former Lance Corporal Rajapakse 
about mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna resulted in exhumations in 1999 
that provided the basis for the ongoing case (see Section l.a.). 
Nonetheless, human rights observers believed that the work of the HRC 
was hampered severely by a lack of strong leadership within the 
organization. For example, after almost 4 years of operation, the HRC 
had failed to hire permanent staff. The organization also responded 
inadequately to requests from its field officers for protection when 
inquiries placed them in danger. The HRC also has been criticized for 
micromanaging the activities of the field offices, which are equipped 
poorly. The establishment of the CIUAH in 1998 strengthened claims of 
the HRC's ineffectiveness, since the responsibilities of the CIUAH 
clearly fell within the HRC's mandate (see Section l.d.). New 
commissioners were appointed in March after the tenure of the previous 
commissioners expired. Activists have expressed some satisfaction with 
the new leadership, especially for its prompt investigation into the 
Bindunuwewu massacre.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all 
citizens, and the Government generally respects these rights. The 
Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which 
individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil 
rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government 
has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in 
addition to access to the courts (see Section l.d.).
    Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated 
with alcohol abuse) continue to be serious and pervasive problems. 
Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995 specifically addressed 
sexual abuse and exploitation and modified rape laws to create a more 
equitable burden of proof and to make punishments more stringent. 
Marital rape is considered an offense in cases of spouses living under 
judicial separation, and laws govern sexual molestation and sexual 
harassment in the workplace. While the Penal Code may ease some of the 
problems faced by victims of sexual assault, many women's organizations 
believe that greater sensitization of police and judicial officials is 
required. The Government set up the Bureau for the Protection of 
Children and Women within the police in 1994 to respond to calls for 
greater awareness and attention. Police statistics indicated that there 
were 26,660 crimes against women during the period from January to July 
1999, compared with 26,565 crimes between January and June of 1998. 
Although laws against procuring and trafficking were strengthened in 
1995, facilitating the prosecution of brothel owners, trafficking in 
women for the purpose of forced labor occurs (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the 
public sector. However, women have no legal protection against 
discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes are paid 
less than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to 
supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute 
approximately one-half of the formal work force.
    Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law. 
However, issues related to family law, including divorce, child 
custody, and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each 
ethnic or religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women is 18 
years, except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their 
customary marriage practices. The application of different legal 
practices based on membership in a religious or ethnic group often 
results in discrimination against women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare 
and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The 
Government demonstrates a strong commitment to children's rights and 
welfare through its extensive systems of public education and medical 
care. The 1997 Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act, implemented in 
January 1998, requires children between the ages of 5 and 14 to attend 
school (see Section 6.d.). Approximately 85 percent of children under 
the age of 16 attend school. Education is free through the university 
level. Health care, including immunization, also is free.
    In the period January 1 to August 31, the police recorded 767 cases 
of crimes against children, compared with 1,491 in 1999. Many NGO's 
attribute the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of law 
enforcement rather than adequate legislation. Many law enforcement 
resources are diverted to the conflict with the LTTE, although the 
Bureau for the Protection of Children and Women of the police conducts 
investigations into crimes against these two groups.
    There is a serious problem of child prostitution in certain coastal 
resort areas. The Government estimates that there are more than 2,000 
active child prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim that 
the number is much higher (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). A 1998 U.N. 
International Labor Office study placed the total at 30,000, a number 
which has not been confirmed and has been criticized by activists in 
the field as highly speculative. The bulk of child sexual abuse in the 
form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some 
child prostitutes are boys who cater to foreign tourists. Some of these 
children are forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The 
Government has pushed for greater international cooperation to bring 
those guilty of pedophilia to justice. Several foreign pedophiles were 
brought before courts during the year. The penalty for conviction is 
usually a fine and deportation. Four cases of pedophilia were brought 
to court this year, one involving a foreigner.
    In 1995 the Ministry of Media, Tourism, and Aviation created a task 
force specifically to study the problem of sex tourism and related 
offenses. It was abolished at the end of 1997 and superseded by a 
presidential task force on child protection. Following the 
recommendation of the task force, the Government created the National 
Child Protection Authority (NCPA) in 1998. The law establishing the 
NCPA consolidated existing legislation and defined a child as anyone 
under age 18. Under the law, the definition of child abuse includes all 
acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and cruelty to 
children. The law also prohibits the use of children in exploitative 
labor or illegal activities or in any act contrary to compulsory 
education regulations. The legislation further widened the definition 
of child abuse to include the involvement of children in war. The NCPA 
is composed of senior law enforcement officers as well as 
representatives from the education, medical, and legal professions; it 
reports directly to the President. By year's end, the NCPA had 
recruited permanent staff and moved into an office space that it shares 
with the Bureau for the Protection of Women and Children of the police 
force.
    The LTTE uses child soldiers and recruits children for use in 
battlefield support functions and in combat. In September the military 
captured a 14-year-old girl who fought near Jaffna. Other LTTE 
recruits, some as young as 13, have surrendered to the military, and 
credible reports indicate the LTTE has stepped up recruiting efforts 
(see Section 1.g.). In May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the 
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Children in 
Armed Combat that it would not recruit children under the age of 17; 
however, the LTTE has not honored this pledge.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility 
to buildings or government services for the disabled. The World Health 
Organization estimates that 7 percent of the population is disabled. 
Most disabled persons who are unable to work are cared for by their 
families. The Department of Social Services operates eight vocational 
training schools for the physically and mentally disabled and sponsors 
a program of job training and placement for graduates. Some private 
companies, at the urging of the Government, have provided training and 
jobs to disabled veterans. The Government also provides some financial 
support to NGO's that assist the disabled, subsidizes prosthetic 
devices and other medical aids for the disabled, makes some purchases 
from disabled suppliers, and has registered 74 schools and training 
institutions for the disabled run by NGO's. The Social Services 
Ministry has selected job placement officers to help the estimated 
200,000 work-eligible disabled persons to find jobs. In spite of these 
efforts, the disabled still face difficulties because of negative 
attitudes and discrimination. In 1996 Parliament passed legislation 
forbidding discrimination against any person on the grounds of 
disability. No cases are known to have been filed under this law.
    Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, known as 
Veddas, number fewer than l,000. Some prefer to maintain their isolated 
traditional way of life, and they are protected by the Constitution. 
There are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political 
or economic life of the nation. In August 1998, the Government 
fulfilled a long-standing Vedda demand when the President issued an 
order granting Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific 
protected forest areas. The executive order granted the Veddas the 
freedom to protect their culture and to carry on their traditional way 
of life without hindrance. Under a pilot program, Veddas received 
special identity cards to enable their use of these forest areas. 
However, some Veddas still complain that they are being pushed off of 
their land. Although many Veddas continue to pursue a traditional way 
of life, visits by tourists have become an important source of income 
for the community.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religious 
differences seems much less common than discrimination based on ethnic 
group or caste. In general the members of the various faiths tend to be 
tolerant of each other's religious beliefs. However, on occasion 
evangelical Christians have been harassed by Buddhist monks for their 
attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity (see Section 2.c.). In 
1988 the leader of an Assemblies of God congregation in the southern 
town of Tissamaharama was killed by unknown assailants. In April 1999, 
two bombs exploded in the church hall of this congregation, now run by 
the pastor's widow. No one was injured; however, the building sustained 
some structural damage (see Section 2.c.).
    In the northern part of the island, LTTE insurgents expelled some 
46,000 Muslim inhabitants from their homes in 1990--virtually the 
entire Muslim population. Most of these persons remain displaced. In 
the past, the LTTE expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses and 
threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to return (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The LTTE also has attacked notable Buddhist sites. In May 23 
persons were killed and dozens wounded when an LTTE bomb exploded near 
a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 1 
million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called 
``hill'' Tamils or ``Indian'' Tamils, whose ancestors originally were 
brought to the country in the 19th century to work on plantations. 
Approximately 75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian 
or Sri Lankan citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the 
allocation of government funds for education. Without national identity 
cards, they also are vulnerable to arrest by the security forces. 
However, the Government has stated that none of these persons would be 
forced to depart the country. During 1999 the Government introduced a 
program to begin registering these individuals; 4,500 ``Indian'' Tamils 
received identity cards between January and September 22. Critics 
charged that the program did not progress fast enough.
    Both Sri Lankan and ``Indian'' Tamils maintain that they have long 
suffered systematic discrimination in university education, government 
employment and in other matters controlled by the Government. In 1996 
the Government established a parliamentary select committee to consider 
a package of constitutional reforms designed to devolve wide-ranging 
powers to local governments, thereby providing ethnic minorities 
greater autonomy in governing their local affairs. While the two main 
political groupings, the PA and UNP, reached consensus on many aspects 
of the devolution proposals, when the Government introduced the draft 
Constitution to Parliament in August in hopes of passing the measures, 
it had to suspend debate on the new Constitution due to political 
opposition. The LTTE rejected the devolution proposals.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the 
constitutional right of workers to establish unions. Any seven workers 
may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize their 
views. Over 70 percent of the plantation work force, which is 
overwhelmingly ``hill'' Tamil, is unionized. In total there are over 
800,000 union members, 650,000 of whom are women. Approximately 20 
percent of the nonagricultural work force in the private sector is 
unionized. Unions represent most workers in large private firms, but 
those in small scale agriculture and small businesses usually do not 
belong to unions. Public sector employees are unionized at very high 
rates.
    Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a 
prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the 
public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions 
have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of 
unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively 
large membership. In 1999, the most recent year for which data are 
available, the Department of Labor registered 69 new unions and 
canceled the registration of 71 others, bringing the total number of 
functioning unions to 1,676. The Department of Labor is authorized by 
law to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an 
annual report. This requirement is the only legal grounds for 
cancellation of registration.
    All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential'' 
services, have the right to strike. By law workers also may lodge 
complaints with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal or the 
Supreme Court to protect their rights. However, in May the Government 
issued new emergency regulations in response to military events in the 
north, which prohibited strikes as part of placing the country on a 
``war footing.'' Nonetheless, plantation workers and railway workers 
participated in strikes. The Government has periodically controlled 
strikes by declaring some industries essential under the ER. Despite 
this restriction, the Government in 1998 permitted a 5-week postal 
strike and a strike by plantation workers. The President retains the 
power to designate any industry as an essential service. The President 
attempted to break a doctors' strike in June 1999 by declaring their 
services essential. The doctors defied the order, and after a standoff 
which lasted a week, the Government agreed to consider their 
grievances. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has pointed out 
to the Government that essential services should be limited to services 
where an interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or 
health of the population.
    Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the 
Public Service Commission but have no legal grounds to strike. 
Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical, 
educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged 
brief strikes and other work actions in recent years. There were over 
100 public sector strikes during the year.
    The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential 
sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons, 
mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity are not grounds for 
dismissal. Dismissed employees have a right to appeal their termination 
before a labor tribunal.
    Unions may affiliate with international bodies, and some have done 
so. The Ceylon Workers Congress, composed exclusively of Tamil 
plantation workers, is the only trade union affiliated with the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), although a 
new trade union in the Biyagama export processing zone is affiliated 
with the Youth Forum of the ICFTU. No national trade union center 
exists to centralize or facilitate contact with international groups.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to collective bargaining, and it is practiced 
widely. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60 different 
unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the export 
processing zones (EPZ's), worker councils--composed of employees, 
employers and often a public sector representative--generally provide 
the forums for labor and management negotiation. The councils do not 
have the power to negotiate binding contracts, and they have been 
criticized as ineffective by labor advocates.
    In December 1999, Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial 
Disputes Act to require employers to recognize trade unions and the 
right to collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination. Employers found guilty of such discrimination must 
reinstate workers fired for union activities but may transfer them to 
different locations.
    There are approximately 110,000 workers employed in the export 
processing zones (EPZ's), a large percentage of them women. Under the 
law, workers in the EPZ's have the same rights to join unions as other 
workers. However, few unions have formed in the EPZ's, largely because 
of severe restrictions on access by union organizers to the zones. 
While the unionization rate in the rest of the country is approximately 
25 percent, the rate within the EPZ's is only 10 percent. Labor 
representatives allege that the Government's Board of Investment (BOI), 
which manages the EPZ's, including setting wages and working conditions 
in the EPZ's, has discouraged union activity. Work councils in the 
EPZ's are chaired by the BOI and only have the power to make 
recommendations. Labor representatives also allege that the Labor 
Commissioner, under BOI pressure, has failed to prosecute employers who 
refuse to recognize or enter into collective bargaining with trade 
unions. While employers in the EPZ's offer higher wages and better 
working conditions generally than employers elsewhere, workers face 
other concerns, such as security, expensive but low quality boarding 
houses, and sexual harassment. In most instances, wage boards establish 
minimum wages and conditions of employment, except in the EPZ's, where 
wages and work conditions are set by the BOI.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by provisions of the 1844 Abolition of Slavery Act; 
however, there were reports of its use. There are reports of women 
being trafficked to the country for the purpose of prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.). The act does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children specifically, but government officials interpret it as 
applying to persons of all ages. In the past there were credible 
reports that some rural children were employed in debt bondage as 
domestic servants in urban households; some of these children 
reportedly had been abused (see Section 5); however, no cases were 
reported during the year. Some children were trafficked and forced into 
prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    There are credible reports that some soldiers attached to an army 
camp north of Batticaloa forced local villagers to build a wall around 
the camp during the year, and they beat individuals who refused to 
comply. The military apparently transferred the officer responsible for 
the forced labor when notified of the abuse. Some members of the STF in 
the Batticaloa area forced villagers to work without compensation, 
clearing jungle areas and in other manual labor in and near STF camps 
during 1999; the villagers were threatened directly or indirectly with 
physical abuse if they did not perform the work.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In 1998 Parliament passed the National Child Protection 
Authority Act (NCPA) to combat the problem of child abuse, including 
unlawful child labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that 
clearly established what types of employment are restricted for 
children, which age groups are affected, and what the minimum age for 
child labor is for particular jobs. The minimum age for employment is 
14, although the law to permits the employment of younger children by 
their parents or guardians in limited agricultural work. In January 
Parliament repealed a regulation that permitted domestic employment for 
children as young as age 12. About 85 percent of children under the age 
of 16 attend school, and the law permits the employment of such persons 
for not more than 1 hour on any day before school. The 1997 Compulsory 
Attendance at Schools Act, which requires children between the ages of 
5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since January 1998, 
although it still is being implemented. The ultimate effect that this 
act may have on the child labor problem remains unclear.
    Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise 
in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children 
are employed in the EPZ's, the garment industry, or any other export 
industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest 
periods in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. A 
1995 labor survey of the plantations indicated that half of all 
children in plantations drop out of school after the fourth grade, 
leaving a large pool of children between the ages of 10 and 15 
available to pursue employment.
    Despite legislation child labor still exists. A child activity 
survey carried out in 1998-1999 by the Department of Census and 
Statistics found almost 11,000 children working full time and another 
15,000 engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. The survey 
found 450,000 children employed by their families in seasonal 
agricultural work.
    A recent study reported that child domestic servants are employed 
in 8.6 percent of homes in the Southern Province. The same study 
reported that child laborers in the domestic service sector often are 
deprived of an education. The law also permits employment in any school 
or institution for training purposes.
    Regular employment of children also occurs mainly in the informal 
sector and in family enterprises such as family farms, crafts, small 
trade establishments, eating houses, and repair shops. Children also 
are involved in the manufacture of coconut fiber products, bricks, 
fishing, wrapping tobacco, street trading, and farming. Government 
inspections have been unable to eliminate these forms of child labor 
(see Section 5), although an awareness campaign coupled with the 
establishment of hot lines for reporting child labor led to nearly 500 
complaints from January through August. According to the Ministry of 
Labor, there were 10 prosecutions for child labor (below the age of 14) 
during the year. Under legislation dating from 1956, the maximum 
penalty for employing minors is about $12 (1,000 rupees), with a 
maximum jail term of 6 months.
    Additional thousands of children are believed to be employed in 
domestic service, although this situation is not regulated or 
documented. Many child domestics are subjected to physical, sexual, and 
emotional abuse.
    Children work as prostitutes as well; internal trafficking in male 
children is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Estimates of the 
number of child prostitutes range from 2,000 to 30,000; however, there 
are no reliable statistics. Although forced or bonded labor by persons 
of any age is prohibited by law, some rural children reportedly have 
served in debt bondage, although there were no reports of this during 
the year (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    The LTTE continued to use high-school-age children for work as 
cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children reportedly 
help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as age 10 
were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special 
schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal 
education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 years of age in 
battle, and children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE 
(see Section 5). In May 1999, the LTTE began a program of compulsory 
physical training, including mock military drills, for most of the 
population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and 
the aged. According to LTTE spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the 
population fit; however, it is believed widely that the training was 
established in order to gain tighter control over the population and to 
provide a base for recruiting fighters.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Department of Labor 
effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large companies through 
routine inspections; however, staffing shortages prevent the department 
from effectively monitoring the informal sector. While there is no 
universal national minimum wage, approximately 40 wage boards set 
minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry. According 
to the statistics division of the Department of Labor, the Government 
in September mandated a $5 (400 rupees) increase in the minimum wage 
for private sector workers, and government workers received an increase 
equal to 10 percent of their salary, with a minimum raise of $12.50 
(1000 rupees) per month. Minimum wage rates average approximately 
$33.52 (2,682 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the service 
sector; and approximately $1.42 (114 rupees) per day in agriculture. 
The minimum wage in the garment industry is $39 (3,225 rupees) per 
month. These minimum wages are insufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and the standard family of five, but 
the vast majority of families have more than one breadwinner. Most 
permanent full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit them from 
working regularly more than 45 hours per week (a 5-1/2 day work-week). 
Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21 days of 
medical leave, and approximately 20 local holidays each year.
    Maternity leave is available for permanent and casual female 
workers. Employers must contribute 12 percent of a worker's wage to an 
employee's provident fund and 3 percent to an employee's trust fund. 
Employers who fail to comply may be fined, although the effectiveness 
of government enforcement of this provision is unknown.
    Several laws protect the safety and health of industrial workers. 
However, the Ministry of Labor's small staff of inspectors is 
inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Workers have the 
statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger 
their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent to, 
health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they removed 
themselves. Health and safety regulations do not meet international 
standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Penal Code amendments enacted in 1995 
made trafficking in persons illegal; however, there are credible 
reports that trafficking in women and children occurs. Penalties for 
trafficking in women include imprisonment for between 2 and 20 years, 
plus a fine. For trafficking in children, the law allows imprisonment 
of between 5 and 20 years, plus a fine. According to police reports, 
there is a floating pool of approximately 200 foreign female sex 
workers in the country who were trafficked from the former Soviet 
Union, Thailand, and China.
    Internal trafficking in male children also is a problem, especially 
from areas bordering the northern and eastern provinces. Protecting 
Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO, estimates 
that there are at least 5,000 male children between the ages of 8 and 
15 who are engaged as sex workers both at beach and mountain resorts. 
Some of these children are forced into prostitution by their parents or 
by organized crime (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). PEACE also reports an 
additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18 who are self-employed 
prostitutes. The country reportedly has a growing reputation as a 
destination for foreign pedophiles; however, officials believe that 
approximately 30 percent of the clients are tourists and 70 percent are 
locals. The Government occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles. As 
of September, a case against one foreign pedophile was pending in 
magistrate court. In 1999 a foreign pedophile was sentenced to 14 years 
in prison (the defendant has filed an appeal); another convicted 
pedophile was deported.
                           WESTERN HEMISPHERE

                              ----------                              


                          ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

    Antigua and Barbuda is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a 
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and 
a bicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A Governor 
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of 
state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Lester B. Bird's 
Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has controlled the Government and Parliament 
since 1976. In the March 1999 elections, the ALP retained power by 
winning 12 of 17 parliamentary seats, 2 more than it won in the 
previous elections in 1994. The Governor General appoints the 15 
senators in proportion to the parties' representation in Parliament and 
with the advice of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition. 
The judiciary is independent.
    Security forces consist of a police force and the small Antigua and 
Barbuda Defence Force. The police are organized, trained, and 
supervised according to British law enforcement practices. There were 
reports of occasional instances of excessive use of force by the police 
and prison guards.
    The country has a mixed economy with a strong private sector. 
Tourism is the most important source of foreign exchange earnings. The 
country is burdened by a large and growing external debt, which remains 
a serious economic problem. Per capita gross domestic product was about 
$7,500 in 1998.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. Prison 
conditions are poor, and there were allegations of abuse of prison 
inmates. Opposition parties complained that they received limited 
coverage or opportunity to express their views on the government-
controlled electronic media. Societal discrimination and violence 
against women also continued to be problems.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the 
authorities generally respected these prohibitions; however, there were 
allegations of abuse by prison guards.
    There have been occasional reports of police brutality and 
threatening behavior. In August the families of two young men arrested 
by the police charged that police beat the young men leaving them with 
bruises and cuts on their arms, cursed them, and waved guns at family 
members in a threatening manner. Police authorities acknowledged the 
arrest but denied the alleged behavior by the policemen named by the 
families.
    Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the lone, 18th-century 
prison considerably worsened when a fire destroyed most of the facility 
in January 1999. Prisoners allegedly started the fire to protest random 
searches by prison guards. Following earlier prison riots and serious 
security breaches in 1997, the Government had decided to privatize the 
prison and hired a foreign security company, which replaced all prison 
officials, with the exception of a small administrative staff and 
women's prison officials, with its own employees.
    Conditions at the prison have remained unsettled since the fire.
    All prisoners are back in the compound, but repairs and renovations 
were not yet completed at year's end. In August the private firm's 
contract ended and was not renewed. A local management team was hired, 
with an acting superintendent on temporary duty from a neighboring 
island, and was charged with restoring order in keeping with the June 
1999 recommendations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry that investigated 
charges of abuse and other problems. A resident superintendent was 
trained to take over from the acting official, and the new team 
continued to train new hires and returning guards who had been 
discharged when the private firm ran the facility. The Commission 
recommended hiring more guards and using a rehabilitative approach. A 
psychologist was hired to oversee a newly established Rehabilitation 
Center, while some 30 new guard officer positions were filled to bring 
the staff to 94, including 16 female officers.
    The prison remained overcrowded, with over 170 prisoners. In 
September inmates sent letters of complaint to the media, asking that 
the letters be forwarded to regional human rights organizations. They 
claimed that prisoners were chained naked to the floor in the maximum 
security section of the yet-to-be renovated prison. The authorities 
established a local review board to hear prisoner complaints and to 
monitor progress at the prison, but government officials and concerned 
private individuals agreed that problems are likely to continue until 
funds can be found to build a new prison outside the city precincts.
    The women's prison facility is separate and has not experienced the 
problems encountered in the men's prison. There is no separate facility 
for juveniles, who are housed with adult inmates.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects 
these provisions in practice. Criminal defendants have the right to a 
judicial determination of the legality of their detention. The police 
must bring detainees before a court within 48 hours of arrest or 
detention.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judicial system is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system 
and reflects historical ties to the United Kingdom. The Constitution 
designates the Privy Council in London as the final court of appeal, 
which always is employed in the case of death sentences. There are no 
military or political courts.
    The Constitution provides that criminal defendants should receive a 
fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases only, the Government 
provides legal assistance at public expense to persons without the 
means to retain a private attorney. Courts can reach verdicts quickly, 
with some cases coming to conclusion in a matter of days.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, of the press, and other forms of communication. 
Although the authorities generally respect these provisions in 
practice, the Government has restricted opposition parties' access to 
electronic media, effectively denying them equal coverage. The 
Government owns one of the two general interest radio stations and the 
single television station. A religious station broadcasts without 
impediment. One of the Prime Minister's brothers owns the second radio 
station, and another brother is the principal owner of the sole cable 
television company. The government-controlled media report regularly on 
the activities of the Government and the ruling party but limit their 
coverage of and access by opposition parties.
    These restrictions led opposition leader Baldwin Spencer to 
initiate a constitutional challenge in 1993. In 1997 the High Court 
determined that the Government had denied Spencer his constitutional 
right to freedom of expression and called on the Government to provide 
the opposition with greater media access in the future. However, this 
ruling has had limited impact in practice. The Government continues to 
restrict opposition access to the media, and there continue to be 
allegations of censorship as the result of subtle coercive pressure by 
influential persons. The March 1999 report of the Commonwealth observer 
group that monitored the general elections noted that the governing ALP 
party received the greatest share of political coverage by the 
government-controlled electronic media. The report also indicated that 
fair and equal access to publicly owned electronic media did not appear 
to be available to opposition party figures.
    However, print media, including daily and weekly newspapers, are 
active and offer a range of opinion, often publishing vigorous 
criticism of the Government. Nevertheless, efforts by print media to 
expand into electronic media have been restricted. In 1996 a daily 
newspaper attempted to start a radio station but has been unable to 
secure a license to operate. The authorities charged the owners with 
operating a radio station without a license. The case went to trial, 
and the judge found in favor of the Government, charging the newspaper 
owners with criminal conduct and finding them liable for damages. The 
owners sued the State in December 1996 for illegal search and seizure 
and claimed that their constitutional right to broadcast had been 
violated. In December 1997, the judge ruled that constitutional rights 
had not been violated, even though the owners could rightly claim 
significant delay; the judge found that the Government had not been 
inconsistent in this case, since it had not granted other licenses. In 
1998 the owners appealed the case to the Privy Council in London, 
pointing out that a progovernment station had been granted a license. 
On November 14, the Privy Council ruled in favor of the appellants, 
after finding that the Government had submitted fraudulent licenses and 
deceptive evidence to the court. (The Government had presented licenses 
supposedly issued to the Bird family for 25 years, but the signature on 
the licenses was that of an official who had retired prior to the date 
of issuance, and the law permitted licenses to have a validity of 1 
year only.) The Privy Council ordered the Government to assign the 
appellants a broadcast frequency within 14 days. On November 15, the 
Government said that it would take steps to introduce new regulations 
to govern broadcasting, and on November 27, the police returned the 
impounded radio station equipment to the owners, who planned to begin 
broadcasting as soon as possible.
    The police still have not issued an official report of their 
investigations in three possible arson attacks in November 1998. An 
arsonist destroyed an opposition newspaper; a fire of suspicious origin 
badly damaged the Ministry of Information; and the opposition United 
Progressive Party's outdoor convention site mysteriously was set on 
fire.
    In March 1999, a newspaper dismissed two journalists due to a 
controversy surrounding a news story critical of the Government. The 
foreign-born newspaper publisher dismissed the reporters for making 
public their opposition to the publisher's decision not to publish the 
article critical of the Government just prior to the general elections. 
The Caribbean Association of Media Workers criticized the dismissals as 
undermining the newspaper's editorial independence and as a threat to 
press freedoms.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The police normally issue 
the required permits for public meetings but sometimes deny them in 
order to avert violent confrontations. While the authorities placed 
some restrictions on demonstrations in the past, the opposition held 
numerous rallies and public meetings to promote its platform without 
any interference.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law 
enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear 
whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of the laws 
against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious 
practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government assesses all claims by refugees under the provisions 
of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. 
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for a multiparty political system 
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All citizens 18 
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. The 
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5 years; the 
last general elections were held in March 1999. The law obligates the 
Government to hold voter registration during a fixed period (of only 5 
days) each year, and parties conduct their own registration drives free 
of government interference.
    Except for a period in opposition from 1971 to 1976, the Antigua 
Labour Party has held power continuously since 1951. The opposition has 
charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and its 
influence over access to economic opportunities make it extremely 
difficult for opposition parties to attract membership and financial 
support. In 1992 public concern over corruption in government led to 
the merger of three opposition political parties into the United 
Progressive Party.
    The Commonwealth observer group that monitored the 1999 elections 
issued a report that noted irregularities in the electoral process and 
assessed the elections as free but not fair. The report indicated that 
the voters' register stood at 52,348 voters, of a total population of 
approximately 69,000 persons. Since 40 percent of the population were 
estimated to be below voting age, the voting rolls appeared to be 
inflated. According to the observer group, the voter registration 
period, which is limited to only a week every July, appeared too 
restrictive and potentially disfranchises citizens, such as persons who 
would reach the voting age of 18 after July but before the elections. 
The observer group recommended the establishment of an independent 
electoral commission to improve the voter registration process. By 
year's end, the Government had not acted on these recommendations.
    There are no impediments to participation by women in government 
and politics, but they are underrepresented. No women have been elected 
or currently serve in the House of Representatives. Two women are 
senators, which are appointed positions. Eight of the 14 permanent 
secretaries (the top civil servant position in ministries) are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights 
groups have been formed. There were no requests, other than the letters 
from prisoners (see Section 1.c.), for human rights investigations or 
inquiries from individuals or international human rights groups during 
the year. In 1995 the Government created the post of Ombudsman. In 1999 
the Ombudsman reviewed 220 cases, twice that of the previous year. The 
office of the Ombudsman generally is well regarded. The Ombudsman makes 
recommendations to the Government based on investigations into 
citizens' complaints; however, his recommendations often are not 
implemented to the satisfaction of alleged victims of government abuse 
and injustice.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed, 
language, or social status, and the Government generally observed its 
provisions.
    Women.--Violence against women is a recognized social problem. It 
is treated as a matter of public conscience, and there are 
nongovernmental social welfare groups focused on the problem. Women in 
many cases are reluctant to testify against their abusers. However, 
Parliament approved domestic violence legislation in January 1999, 
which supplements the 1995 Sexual Offenses Act. The latter provides 
penalties for rape and other sexual offenses. Organizations such as the 
Government's Directorate of Women's Affairs seek to increase women's 
awareness of their rights under the law. Police generally refrain from 
intervening in cases of domestic violence, and some women have charged 
credibly that the courts are lenient in such cases.
    While the role of women in society is not restricted legally, 
economic conditions tend to limit women to home and family, 
particularly in rural areas, although some women work as domestics, in 
agriculture, or in the large tourism sector. Although the Government 
pledged to provide better family planning services, educational 
opportunities, and job training, it has been slow to implement new 
programs. The Directorate of Women's Affairs exists to help women 
advance in government and the professions, but there has been little 
progress.
    Children.--The Government provides education for children through 
the age of 16; it is free, universal, and compulsory. Children have 
access to health care and other public services.
    Child abuse remains a problem. While the Government has repeatedly 
expressed its commitment to children's rights, it has done little to 
protect those rights in practice. The Government still plans to 
establish a committee on children's rights and indicated it intends to 
strengthen monitoring and implementation of the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. UNICEF helped support a study of the needs of 
children and families, and its recommendations are being used to 
develop a National Plan of Action on Child Survival, Development, and 
Protection.
    People with Disabilities.--No specific laws mandate accessibility 
for the disabled, but constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination 
against the physically disabled in employment and education. There is 
no evidence of widespread discrimination against physically disabled 
individuals, although the Government does not enforce the 
constitutional antidiscrimination provisions.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate 
freely and to form labor unions, and the authorities generally respect 
these rights in practice. Approximately 75 percent of workers belong to 
a union, and the hotel industry is heavily unionized. There are two 
major trade unions: The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the 
Antigua Workers' Union (AWU). The ATLU is associated with the ruling 
ALP, while the larger and more active AWU is allied rather loosely with 
the opposition.
    The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike, but the Industrial 
Relations Court may limit this right in a given dispute. Workers who 
provide essential services (including bus, telephone, port, and 
petroleum workers, in addition to health and safety workers) must give 
21 days' notice of intent to strike. Once either party to a dispute 
requests that the court mediate, there can be no strike. Because of the 
delays associated with this process, unions often resolve labor 
disputes before a strike is called.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international labor organizations 
and do so in practice.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor 
organizations are free to organize and bargain collectively. The law 
prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were no reports that it 
occurred. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are not 
required to rehire employees fired for union activities but must pay 
full severance pay and full wages lost by the employee from the time of 
firing until the determination of employer fault. There are no areas of 
the country where union organization or collective bargaining is 
discouraged or impeded.
    There are no export processing zones, but there are free trade 
zones which facilitate services such as international banking and 
gambling. The Labor Code applies fully to workers in these zones as 
elsewhere in the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids slavery and forced labor, including that by children, and they 
do not exist in practice.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law stipulates a minimum working age of 16 years, 
which corresponds with the provisions of the Education Act. The 
Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct periodic 
inspections of workplaces, effectively enforces this law. There have 
been no reports of minimum age employment violations. The law prohibits 
forced or bonded child labor, and it is enforced effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates, which were 
established by law for various work categories in 1981, have never been 
revised and generally are viewed as irrelevant to current economic 
conditions. The Ministry of Labor periodically surveys average wages 
paid in various sectors and issues these as guidelines to prevailing 
market wages. The guidelines are not compulsory. The Ministry provides 
them to reflect increasing wage expectations, and to offset not having 
yet updated the 1981 minimum wage rates. In 1999 the guidelines 
indicated that employers pay an average salary of $92.60 (EC$250) per 
week, although the range of actual salaries varies widely, depending on 
skill level and experience. The existing published minimum wages for a 
variety of jobs would not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family, and in practice the great majority of workers earn 
substantially more than the minimum wage.
    The law provides that workers are not required to work more than a 
48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in practice the standard workweek is 40 
hours in 5 days. The law stipulates that workers receive a minimum of 
12 days of annual leave. The law requires employers to provide 
maternity leave with 40 percent of wages for 6 weeks of leave, while 
social service programs provide the remaining 60 percent of wages. The 
employer's obligation ends after the first 6 weeks, but social services 
will continue to pay 60 percent of wages for an additional 7 weeks, 
covering a total of 13 weeks.
    The Government has not yet developed occupational health and safety 
laws or regulations, but a section of the Labor Code includes some 
provisions regarding occupational safety and health. Plans to 
incorporate comprehensive legislation on safety, health, and the 
welfare of workers into the existing Labor Code have not been 
implemented. Although not specifically provided for by law, workers may 
leave a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy to continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons. There were no recent reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                               ARGENTINA

    Argentina is a federal constitutional democracy with an executive 
branch headed by an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a 
separate judiciary. In October 1999, voters elected President Fernando 
de la Rua; in December 1999, he replaced Carlos Menem of the 
Justicialist Party. The elections were considered free and fair. The 
judiciary is generally independent but is inefficient and subject at 
times to political influence.
    The President is the constitutional commander-in-chief, and a 
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. Several agencies 
share responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Federal Police 
(PFA) report to the Interior Minister, as do the Border Police 
(``gendarmeria'') and Coast Guard. The PFA also has jurisdiction in the 
federal capital. Provincial police are subordinate to the respective 
governor. Members of the federal and provincial police forces and the 
federal prison guards continued to commit human rights abuses.
    Argentina has a mixed agricultural, industrial, and service 
economy. Following several years of economic growth during an economic 
reform and structural adjustment program, which included privatization 
and trade and financial sector liberalization, the economy slowed in 
1998 and in 1999 entered a recession. There was no real economic growth 
during the year. Unemployment rose to 13.8 percent in 1999 and in 
October it had reached 14.7 percent. Income disparities remain a 
serious problem; the wealthiest 10 percent of the population received 
36 percent of total personal income, while the poorest 10 percent 
received 1.5 percent of total personal income during the year.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Police officers 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Police torture and 
brutality are serious problems. In some cases the authorities 
investigated and sanctioned officers responsible for abuses. Prison 
conditions are poor. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens, 
and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The judicial system is 
inefficient and is subject at times to political influence and to 
inordinate delays in trials. There were many reports of harassment, 
threats, and criticisms of the press by public officials. Police used 
violence against demonstrators on a number of occasions during the 
year, with one person killed as a result. Violence and discrimination 
against women also are problems. Child abuse and child prostitution 
continued to be serious problems. AntiSemitism is a problem; however 
the Government took steps to combat it. Discrimination against 
indigenous people persist. Child labor is a problem. There were reports 
that women, and unconfirmed reports that children, were trafficked into 
the country.
    The legacy of the human rights abuses of the 1976-83 military 
regime continued to be a subject of intense national debate, 
particularly the arrest of former junta leaders on charges of taking or 
seizing babies born to dissidents in detention and giving them to 
supporters for adoption. Efforts by judges in Cordoba and Bahia Blanca 
to institute ``truth trials'' in an effort to force the military to 
provide information on the fate of those who disappeared during the 
military regime met with resistance on the part of those called to 
testify.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings; however, police officers 
were responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. The 
authorities investigated and in some cases detained, tried, and 
convicted the officers involved.
    According to reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), 
the police committed between 20 and 30 extrajudicial killings during 
the year. In July Amnesty International (AI) reported that 59 persons 
had died under suspicious circumstances in police stations throughout 
the country in the last 5 years. According to the report, of the 81 
police officers implicated in the deaths, 36 were sentenced, 43 have 
been indicted, and 2 were cleared of charges.
    On March 2, police in Buenos Aires killed two men who had taken 
hostages during an attempted robbery. After government negotiators 
failed to get the men to surrender, they entered a family home where 
they took three persons hostage and threatened to kill them. Government 
snipers then shot and killed both the hostage-takers.
    AI reported that on February 16, transvestite Vanesa Lorena 
Ledesma, also known as Miguel Angel Ledesma, died while in police 
custody; the body showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.c. and 5). 
However, later the court denied police involvement and claimed that the 
victim died of a drug overdose.
    On March 25, 28-year-old Jose Segundo Zambrano and 25-year-old 
Pablo Marcelo Rodriguez disappeared in Mendoza province. Their 
bloodstained car was found several days later, but their bodies were 
not discovered until July 3. The two men reportedly were police 
informants who had provided information about police officers who were 
involved in illegal activities. The victims' relatives and human rights 
organizations claimed that the killings were related to a police 
``mafia.'' By the end of July, the authorities had detained 21 
officers, 4 of whom faced trial at year's end. Three were active-duty 
police and one was a former police officer.
    In April police detained Juan Marcelo Carunchio, a 19-year-old man 
living in Cordoba province, on his way to a concert. A witness reported 
that she saw the police beat Carunchio and take him away. Following his 
detention, he was hospitalized in a coma and died a few days later. The 
authorities suspended five police officers suspected of involvement in 
the incident. On April 20, the authorities detained Francisco Eladio 
Bravo, head of the special forces unit, but further information was not 
available by year's end.
    On July 2, two armed police intercepted a truck in Jujuy province, 
forced Manuel Fernandez to get out, and shot him from behind in the 
head. They allegedly planted cocaine and a weapon on the man and 
claimed that an armed encounter had taken place. On July 4, a judge 
ordered 10 police detained on suspicion of involvement in this case. As 
of November, they were still being detained, but no one had yet been 
charged.
    In July in Corrientes province, police arrested 26-year-old Jorge 
Marcelo Gonzalez, whom they mistook for a car theft suspect and took 
him to police headquarters. They then tortured him and fatally shot him 
in the back of the neck. The police then attempted to convince the 
owner of the car to report it as stolen. On July 4, the authorities 
detained four police officers in connection with Marcelo's death. In 
July the authorities accused personnel of the Federal Penitentiary 
Service of ordering the murder of Gaston Maximiliano Noguera, an inmate 
at the Caseros prison. Noguera was one of a group of prisoners allowed 
to leave prison to commit crimes, apparently with the consent of the 
Federal Penitentiary Service officials in this prison. According to the 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, on the night of January 3, when 
he was supposed to have been in the Caseros prison, Noguera robbed a 
restaurant and killed a police officer. On January 4, he was found 
hanged in his cell. Carlos Sandez Tejada, a fellow inmate, claims to 
have killed Noguera as part of a deal made with prison officials. 
Noguera's prior cellmate, Miguel Angel Arribas, was going to provide 
testimony to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights about the system 
of release for robbery but penitentiary guards shot him in December 
1999 while transferring him to another prison. At year's end, the judge 
investigating the case was under 24-hour protection after having 
received threatening phone calls and a small wooden coffin sent to his 
home.
    On November 10, in Salta province, provincial police efforts to 
breakup roadblocks mounted by unemployed workers resulted in the death 
of one protester. Incited by the violence, demonstrators later burned 
several buildings and looted stores in the towns of General Mosconi and 
Tartagal. Ultimate responsibility for the protester's death is still 
unresolved, with both other picketers and the provincial police 
potentially suspected.
    The authorities have charged 10 persons, including 3 police 
officers, for the killing of 2 hostages trapped in a car during a bank 
robbery on September 17, 1999, in Villa Ramallo. One police officer, 
Aldo Cabral, provided the transmitter the robbers used during the bank 
robbery; the two others, Ramon Leiva and Oscar Parodi, reportedly were 
the officers who fired the shots that killed the hostages. Trial is 
scheduled for April 2001.
    An investigation continued in the December 1999 deaths of two 
persons several blocks from a protest in which police fired tear gas 
and rubber bullets into a crowd of persons protesting the Federal 
Government takeover of the provincial government in Corrientes 
province; at least 40 persons were injured.
    In April 1999, a court convicted a former chief of police of Rio 
Negro province and sentenced him to 26 months in prison for obstructing 
justice in the investigation of the November 1997 deaths of three young 
women in the town of Cipolletti. The authorities also charged two army 
officers, Claudio Kielmasz and Guillermo Gonzalez, with killing the 
women; their trial is scheduled for March 2001. The victims' families 
remain disappointed as they suspect that more than two persons were 
involved in the crime, and that details were covered up during the 
investigation.
    In February in Buenos Aires province, a court convicted eight 
defendants, including a former police officer, of killing news 
photographer Jose Luis Cabezas in 1997 (see Section 2.a.).
    In August in Mendoza the trial began of seven policemen and two 
civilians under indictment in the 1997 death of 18-year-old Sebastian 
Bordon. Several of these officers were among the 134 officials 
dismissed by Mendoza authorities on charges of misconduct in January 
1999. In December a court found the officers guilty; however, it set 
them free because they had already served sufficient time in prison to 
be released. The court awarded the Bordon family compensation of 
$70,000 (70,000 pesos); half to be paid by the provincial government 
and the other half by the four officers.
    Several army officers were among 11 suspects in the investigation 
of an alleged coverup of the March 1994 death of army recruit Omar 
Carrasco. In 1996 the Federal Court of Neuquen sentenced Ignacio 
Canevaro to 15 years in prison, and Cristian Suarez and Victor Salazar 
to 10 years each, for the killing. They appealed the verdicts, and in 
1996, the Supreme Court decided to uphold the lower court's decision. 
In April lawyers appealed the case again, this time claiming that there 
was substantial new evidence; however, in October, the Federal Court of 
Neuquen upheld its original sentence. On November 23, the authorities 
released both Suarez and Salazar based on a law that allows 1 year of 
good behavior in prison to count for 2 years of a sentence. They both 
served over 6 years of their 10-year sentence; Canevaro remained in 
prison at year's end.
    Investigations continued into the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires 
Jewish community center (AMIA), in which 86 persons were killed, and 
the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Fifteen former 
police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which 
furnished the van used in the AMIA bombing, and face various criminal 
charges (see Section 5). The defendants' trial is scheduled for April 
2001.
    No new information was available in the following cases from 
previous years: the investigation of police officers Nestor Trotta and 
Roberto Martini for the killing of a youth in 1999; the investigation 
into the death of Carlos Andres Sutara in 1998, in which 14 police 
officers were implicated; the investigation of a police officer in 
connection with the killing of Walter Repetto in 1998; and the 
investigation of four police officers in the death of Juan Carlos 
Cardozo in 1999.
    On February 9, 1998, the authorities detained five police officers 
from Rio Negro, including two chiefs of police, for the December 1989 
murders of Sergio Sorbellini and Raquel Laguna. A court reportedly 
indicted the officers later that year, but all five police were later 
released without charges. At year's end, the investigation was still 
pending.
    In October 1999, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon charged 186 persons 
with various crimes committed during the ``dirty war'' that the 1976-83 
military regime conducted against alleged extremists. In November 1999, 
Garzon indicted the leaders of the military junta, including former 
military leaders General Leopoldo Galtieri, General Jorge Videla, 
Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95 other officers, including 1 active 
federal judge, on charges of torture, terrorism, and genocide. The 
courts had sentenced Videla, Massera, and Galtieri to life in prison in 
1985, but former President Menem pardoned them in 1990. The 1986-87 
``full stop'' and ``due obedience'' laws put an end to further trials 
stemming from dirty war offenses. Judge Garzon continued efforts to 
extradite a number of Argentine citizens during the year, but the 
Government did not act on the requests on the basis that those charged 
already had been tried, convicted, and pardoned under Argentine law.
    Two retired military officers were arrested overseas on the basis 
of international arrest warrants for abuses allegedly committed during 
the military regime. On August 7, on the basis of a warrant issued by 
France, Italian authorities arrested retired Major Jorge Olivera in 
Rome, charged with participation in the kidnaping of a French citizen 
in San Juan province in 1976. Following an extradition request 
presented by France in early September, the Penal Court of Appeals of 
Italy released him on September 19 after ruling that under Italian law, 
the statute of limitations for the crimes of kidnaping and torture had 
lapsed. Olivera returned to Argentina, but later in the month, the 
authorities confirmed accusations made by human rights groups that the 
document that had allowed his release was a false death certificate. 
The Italian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the General 
Prosecutor started to investigate the proceedings of the case, and at 
the same time French judicial authorities requested that Olivera be 
arrested if he should try to leave the country.
    On August 24, on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Judge 
Garzon in 1998 related to charges of genocide, terrorism, and torture 
during the military regime, Mexican officials arrested retired 
Lieutenant Commander Miguel Angel Cavallo in Cancun. Cavallo had been 
working for several years as a businessman in Mexico. At year's end, 
Cavallo's extradition to Spain was pending in the Mexican Justice 
Ministry, a decision that must be finally approved by the Mexican 
Foreign Minister. Argentine judicial authorities rejected Cavallo's 
request for extradition to Argentina.
    These incidents demonstrated that while many of those accused of 
dirty war offenses are safe from prosecution in Argentina due to 
immunity laws, they run the risk of arrest if they travel abroad. In 
October Judge Juan Galeano filed a request with the Chilean Government 
for the arrest and extradition of General Pinochet for his involvement 
in the killing of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires in a 
car-bomb attack in 1974. The Prats killing has been under pretrial 
investigation for several years. At year's end, a Chilean response to 
the extradition request was pending and had been the subject of 
judicial proceedings in that country.
    In March a federal court gave former naval officer Alfredo Astiz a 
3-month suspended jail due to statements he made during a January 1998 
interview with a news magazine in which he claimed that he was a 
trained killer of political and media targets. The navy stripped Astiz 
of his rank and retirement pay following the interview. Astiz is 
subject to an Interpol arrest warrant for human rights violations 
committed during the 1976-83 dirty war period. This warrant is based on 
his 1990 sentence to life imprisonment in France (where he was tried in 
absentia) for his role in the disappearance of the French nuns Alice 
Domon and Leonie Duquet. He has also been linked to the disappearance 
of a Swedish teenager, Dagmar Hagelin.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The provincial police in Mendoza province compensated the families 
of Adolfo Garrido and Raul Bigorria, who disappeared in 1990 and are 
believed to have died in police custody, with a total of $220,000 
(220,000 pesos) as recommended in 1998 by the Inter-American Court for 
Human Rights.
    Most reliable estimates place the number of those who disappeared 
during the dirty war at between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. In 1984 the 
National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) issued a report 
listing 8,961 names of such persons, based on public testimony from 
friends, relatives, and witnesses. Since then the Ministry of Justice 
and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human Rights, which inherited 
the CONADEP files, has added over 700 new names, also based on 
voluntary reporting. At the same time, other names have been removed 
from the original list, either through confirmation of the death or 
survival of the person who disappeared, or through the identification 
of duplicate entries. The absence of documentary records of those who 
disappeared means that the Government must rely on public testimony, 
either voluntary or court-ordered. As CONADEP noted in its report, ``It 
has been possible to determine that an important quantity of 
documentation existed which has been destroyed or which is being 
concealed by those responsible for the repression.''
    The Under Secretariat for Human Rights accepted claims for 
financial compensation from families of persons who died or disappeared 
during the dictatorship under a law that permitted filing of 
applications until May. It had received nearly 9,000 claims by the 
deadline; at year's end the Senate had approved a bill extending the 
deadline for 3 more years. A law granting former prisoners of the 
military regime the right to apply for compensation from the Government 
expired in September 1998. The Under Secretariat, which administered 
the law, received over 12,000 applications, and by year's end had 
approved over 7,000 of them. While some human rights groups routinely 
claim that the number of disappeared was as many as 30,000, the fact 
that less than half that number of applications for compensation has 
been received suggests the lower figure of between 10,000 and 15,000 
may be more accurate.
    Despite military immunity laws and pardons, investigators continued 
efforts to hold members of the former military regime responsible for 
the kidnaping and illegal adoptions of children born to detained 
dissidents during the dirty war. At the urging of the human rights 
organization Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, judicial authorities 
continued to investigate such kidnaping and illegal adoption cases, 
thought to number approximately 250-300.
    In December 1999, the authorities arrested retired General 
Guillermo Saurez Mason in connection with a child kidnaping case. In 
March they put 73-year-old retired General Juan Bautista Sasiain under 
house arrest, charged with participating in the kidnaping and 
concealment of 11 children of women prisoners during the military 
regime. Retired General Santiago Omar Riveros was arrested in August, 
bringing to at least nine the number of former general officers 
arrested in connection with baby kidnaping cases. As in the case of 
most of the other retired general officers, Riveros was released to 
house arrest due to his age. Former Army General Jorge Rafael Videla, 
the de facto president from 1979 to 1981, remains under house arrest, 
following his initial arrest in June 1998. The kidnaping cases are 
being investigated by three federal judges, Judges Bagnasco, Servini de 
Cubria, and Marquevich. By year's end, Judge Bagnasco was concluding 
his investigations and was prepared to turn his investigator reports 
over to an oral court for trials. Investigations by the two other 
judges continued at year's end.
    In November Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo ordered the preventive 
arrest of former police agents Julio Simon, known as ``Julian, the 
Turkey'', and Juan Antonio del Cerro, known as ``Colors'', and charged 
them with kidnaping 8-month-old Claudia Poblete in 1978. Poblete was 
the daughter of Gertrudis Hlaczik and Jose Poblete, who were detained 
in 1978 and are among those persons who disappeared.
    In December 1999, Congress voted to block former General Antonio 
Bussi, who is charged with human rights abuses including torture and 
deprivation of liberty during the period of the dirty war, from taking 
his seat in the legislature. In May the lower house of Congress in an 
all-but-unanimous vote confirmed the earlier denial of Bussi's right to 
occupy a seat in that body.
    In August the Supreme Court ruled against the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces, which had attempted to assert jurisdiction over the 
baby theft case. The Supreme Court decided that the case should 
continue under the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.
    AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and 
her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats, 
apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in 
regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other 
human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.e.).
    In 1999 the Government created a reparation fund to be used by the 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in carrying out activities to find 
and return children stolen from their parents during the 1976-83 
military regime. The fund authorized $600,000 (600,000 pesos) over 2 
years, starting in January 1999, with the money coming directly from 
the national congressional budget. While full disbursement of this 
money has been delayed because of funding shortfalls, the fund has 
allowed the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo to carry out a nationwide 
advertising campaign that resulted in more than 70 individuals coming 
forward to ask the organization's assistance in confirming their true 
identities.
    In September a 23-year-old woman who had been ordered by a court to 
provide a blood sample for DNA analysis to determine whether she was 
one of the kidnaped babies was arrested and held overnight for refusing 
to comply. Her attorney succeeded in obtaining her release after citing 
her threat to commit suicide if the authorities proceeded with the 
forcible blood extraction.
    In the disappearance case involving survivors of the Tarnopolsky 
family, Admiral Massera, who was ordered by the Supreme Court in 
September 1999 to pay $120,000 (120,000 pesos) to a Tarnopolsky family 
member, refused to follow the court's directive. In November a lower 
court ordered Massera's ``forced bankruptcy'' in a further effort to 
oblige the former admiral to obey the earlier court order.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Criminal Code 
provides penalties for torture that are similar to those for homicide; 
however, police torture and brutality remain serious problems. Human 
rights organizations described widespread police brutality, the use of 
torture on suspects, and corruption within the police forces. In June 
1997, the U.N. Committee against Torture criticized the Government for 
tolerating continued brutality and the use of torture in police 
stations and prisons. In December 1998, the Government responded to the 
U.N. Committee's criticism but did not make its reply public.
    The body of a transvestite who died in police custody on February 
16 reportedly showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.a. and 5.).
    In March a group of police officers who were looking for the 
killers of a colleague in Carlos Paz (Cordoba province) fired between 
15 and 20 shots at a van and beat up the 2 men in the van, a dentist, 
Humberto Gorritti, and businessman Raul Calvo. The police admitted 
later that they had made a mistake. This case remains under 
investigation.
    In April relatives of 23-year-old Cristian Omar Lopez accused 
police officers of Diamante district (Entre Rios province) of beating 
him seriously after he and a group of friends were forced by the police 
for no apparent reason to leave a dancing place. At year's end, Judge 
Hugo Perotti was carrying out an investigation.
    In July in Corrientes province, police tortured a man before 
killing him (see Section 1.a.).
    In July Mason Aldo Bravo accused a group of officials from the 
Investigation Bureau of the Provincial Police of Santiago del Estero of 
kidnaping him for 3 days and torturing him. According to his report, 
the policemen broke into his house at night and attacked him. Judge 
Mario Castillo Sola was investigating the case.
    In September police arrested 25-year-old Ariel Simonini in Tres de 
Febrero (Buenos Aires province) and charged him with stealing a weapon. 
According to Simonini, no evidence was found but before releasing him, 
a policewoman allowed three former police officers and a former 
intelligence official, who themselves were under arrest, to torture 
Simonini. Simonini reported that they kicked and beat him in the 
stomach, head, legs and ribs. The authorities charged the policewoman 
as the instigator of the torture and the four men involved as 
participants.
    Police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters on 
numerous occasions, resulting in injuries (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). 
In one incident in Salta province, one protester was killed under 
circumstances that could have been the result of excessive use of force 
(see Section 1.a.).
    During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, 
federal police used force to suppress a group of protesters and injured 
over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing rubber bullets. One 
demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The 
Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force 
(see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
    Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons and jails are overcrowded, 
and some facilities are old and dilapidated. According to the Federal 
Penitentiary Service and by the different provincial jurisdictions, in 
1999 the prison system held 43,126 inmates in facilities designed to 
hold 23,523 persons, indicating a serious overcrowding problem.
    Reliable information on medical care and food available to 
prisoners is unavailable, but the general impression is that such 
services are minimal and of low quality. The Buenos Aires provincial 
government has considered various solutions, including renting 
temporary warehouse quarters, and was considering building 18 new 
prisons in various police districts, but had taken no action to do so 
by year's end.
    Pretrial prisoners cannot be held together with convicted 
prisoners, but reliable reports indicate that this form of prisoner 
separation often is not respected. Separate facilities for men and 
women and for adults and minors are provided for under the law and are 
available in practice. Facilities for women and for minors are not 
subject to the same serious overcrowding as prison facilities for men.
    Security is a problem at some prisons and detention facilities, at 
times resulting in jailbreaks. In 1999 there were 60 reported cases of 
prison riots in facilities around the country.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code limits 
the arrest and investigatory power of the police and the judiciary; 
however, provincial police sometimes ignored these restrictions and 
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Human rights groups find it 
difficult to document such incidents and state that victims are 
reluctant to file complaints because they fear police retaliation or do 
not believe that their complaints would result in any action.
    Police may detain suspects for up to 10 hours without an arrest 
warrant if the authorities have a well-founded belief that suspects 
have committed, or are about to commit, a crime, or if they are unable 
to determine the identity of a suspect. However, human rights groups 
argue that this provision of law is abused widely, that police often 
ignore the requirement that suspects must be unable to identify 
themselves, and often detain suspects who in fact do have 
identification.
    Police occasionally detain teenagers and young adults, sometimes 
overnight, sometimes for an entire weekend, without formal charges. 
They do not always provide such detainees with the opportunity to call 
their families or an attorney. These detainees are released only upon a 
complaint from relatives or legal counsel.
    In March 1999, the Federal Government promulgated Decree 150, which 
instructs police to prevent conduct that ``without constituting 
misdemeanors nor infractions in the code of misdemeanors, should be 
avoided.'' This decree is interpreted to allow the police to detain 
persons for carrying suspicious objects or potential weapons. Critics 
complained that the decree revived the old police edicts that had been 
in effect until the Buenos Aires City Council passed its Code of 
Misdemeanors in March 1998. Human rights groups long had argued that 
these edicts were used as an excuse for arbitrary detentions, 
particularly of young persons, immigrants, prostitutes, and 
transvestites.
    The law allows pretrial detention for up to 2 years, and the slow 
pace of the justice system often results in lengthy pretrial 
detentions. If convicted, a prisoner usually receives credit for time 
already served. Three-fourths of the inmates in the federal prisons of 
the greater Buenos Aires area were reportedly in pretrial detention. In 
the prison system of the province of Buenos Aires, this figure was 
reported to be as high as 90 percent. The law provides for the right to 
bail, and it is utilized in practice.
    The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is nominally 
independent and impartial, its processes are inefficient, and at times 
subject to political influence. The system is hampered by inordinate 
delays, procedural logjams, changes of judges, inadequate 
administrative support, and incompetence. Allegations of corruption are 
reported widely, especially in civil cases.
    The judicial system is divided into federal and provincial courts, 
each headed by a Supreme Court with chambers of appeal and section 
courts below it.
    The Council of Magistrates has responsibility for submitting to the 
President for his decision a slate of three qualified candidates for 
each federal judicial vacancy. The council is also responsible for 
conducting impeachment hearings on judges implicated in wrongdoings and 
for general administration of the federal court system. It began the 
process of selecting candidates for judicial vacancies in several parts 
of the country in September 1999. Nonetheless, it still does not 
function fully; the number of judicial vacancies has increased 
significantly, and a number of impeachment cases against judges remain 
to be resolved. The council made its first recommendations to the 
executive on the appointments of new judges in July. Of the candidate 
lists advanced to him by the Council of Magistrates, President de la 
Rua nominated two judges during the year. However, the Senate confirmed 
neither judge, as is required by law. At year's end, there were federal 
judicial vacancies for more than 113 positions nationwide. A number of 
prominent cases to discipline judges were initiated during the year, 
but were moving extremely slowly through the investigation process.
    Trials are public, and defendants have the right to legal counsel 
and to call defense witnesses. A panel of judges decides guilt or 
innocence. The law does not mandate a trial by jury. Federal and 
provincial courts continued the transition to oral trials in criminal 
cases, instead of the old system of written submissions. However, 
substantial elements of the old system remain. For example, before the 
oral part of a trial begins, judges receive written documentation 
regarding the case, which, according to prominent legal experts, can 
bias a judge before oral testimony is heard. Lengthy delays in trials 
are a problem.
    AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and 
her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats, 
apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in 
regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other 
human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.b.). 
AI called on the Government to protect the work of Judge Servini and 
Parodi.
    In June 1998, the Government allowed Father Juan Antonio Puigjane 
to leave prison and serve the remainder of his term under house arrest. 
Puigjane, a Capuchin monk, was a leader of the leftist ``All for the 
Fatherland'' movement, which in 1989 assaulted the La Tablada army 
barracks. Although he did not take part in the assault and denied any 
foreknowledge of it, the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. 
Members of the movement who were involved in the 1989 attack are 
recognized by some international human rights groups as having been 
jailed for political reasons, but the Government maintains that those 
involved were tried and convicted properly of involvement in a violent 
rebellion against a democratically elected government.
    The release of Puigjane followed the publication of a 1997 report 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on La Tablada, 
in which the IACHR absolved the Government of the use of excessive 
force in repelling the assault but concluded that the Government 
committed human rights violations after the attackers had surrendered. 
The IACHR also found that the Defense of Democracy Act, under which the 
La Tablada defendants were tried and convicted, effectively denied them 
the right of appeal.
    In September the La Tablada prisoners launched a hunger strike to 
bring further pressure on the Government to act on their demand for an 
appeal. Efforts since 1998 to pass legislation that would have allowed 
the defendants a chance to appeal their earlier convictions ended in 
December when the legislation failed to gain the necessary support in 
both chambers of Congress. Following that, the Supreme Court rejected 
by a vote of 5-4 a request by the defendants for an appeal. With the 
legislative and judicial routes thereby closed, on December 29, the 
President, still under strong international pressure from the IACHR and 
a wide range of human rights groups, signed a decree commuting the 
sentences of 11 of the 13 defendants. With these commutations, 9 of the 
13 defendants will be eligible for a parole hearing in 2002, one in 
2003, and one in 2005. The two leaders of the assault, Enrique 
Gorriaran and his wife, Ana Maria Sivori, were convicted for their 
roles at La Tablada only in 1997. Since they were not tried under the 
Defense of Democracy Act, they were allowed an appeal, which confirmed 
their earlier life sentences. For this reason, they were not included 
in the December 29 presidential decree. As a result of the presidential 
decree, the La Tablada defendants ended their hunger strike after 116 
days.
    There were no other reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the 
Government generally respects these prohibitions. Violations are 
subject to legal sanction. In practice, local police stop and search 
individuals without probable cause.
    Several highly publicized cases of unauthorized telephone wiretaps 
in recent years raised public concern, and the Government introduced a 
bill in Congress in 1998 to prevent such activities, including the 
unauthorized recording of telephone conversations, the unauthorized 
photographing or filming of private acts, and the dissemination of such 
unauthorized records. Various draft laws have been proposed on the 
control of wiretapping, but none became law during the year. The use of 
wiretaps approved by a federal judge continued to be governed by a 
decree issued by then-President Menem in the early 1990's.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, there were several reports 
that public officials harassed, threatened, and criticized the press.
    A number of independent newspapers and magazines publish freely, 
and all print media are owned privately. Privately owned radio and 
television stations broadcast freely. The Federal Government owns the 
Telam wire service, a television station, and a radio network. A few 
provincial governments also own broadcast media.
    During the year there were several reports of harassment and 
threats against journalists, and criticisms of the press by public 
officials. In its annual report released in September, the Argentine 
Association of Journalistic Entities (ADEPA), a media observer 
organization, reviewed several incidents and noted that they occurred 
principally in the provinces.
    In July ADEPA expressed its concern to the provincial government in 
Santiago del Estero with respect to an incident in which the telephones 
of El Liberal, a local daily newspaper, were wiretapped. The incident 
occurred after El Liberal published a story on an alleged intelligence 
gathering network sponsored by the provincial government. The Inter-
American Press Association (IAPA) criticized anonymous threats against 
three of El Liberal's journalists and the distribution of pamphlets 
with defamatory information about El Liberal. IAPA representatives met 
with Interior Minister Storani and expressed their concern over the 
situation in Santiago del Estero. In November the IAPA sent a 
delegation to Santiago del Estero to investigate the charges.
    In July the Cordoba daily newspaper La Voz del Interior reported 
the harassment of one of its distributors. An attacker ambushed and 
threatened the driver of a distribution van with a revolver. The IAPA 
reported that the attackers informed the driver that the governor was 
uncomfortable with the content of paper. This incident occurred after 
La Voz published a series of articles on the questionable practices of 
provincial government officials of Santiago del Estero, which included 
accusations of wiretapping and having blueprints of reporters' homes.
    In February an appeals court ordered television talk show host 
Bernardo Neustadt and Zidanelia Pacheco de Maroneses, whom Neustadt 
interviewed on his program New Times, to pay punitive damages to Judge 
Elisa Diaz de Vivar in the amount of $80,000 (80,000 pesos) for 
allegedly defamatory comments de Maroneses made in 1993 about the judge 
during the program. The IAPA stated that the award was a setback for 
the freedom of the press because it would force journalists to censor 
those they interview, and because it provides special privileges to 
public officials, who should be open to public scrutiny.
    In view of these incidents, many key media sources criticized the 
apparent lack of commitment on the part of some legislators to 
implement measures that would protect the role of the media as a 
``bridge'' between politics and civil society, and cited the failure of 
some public officials to recognize openly the role of an independent 
media in a democratic society. ADEPA stated that these incidents 
violated freedom of the press and have recurred in recent years in a 
systematic fashion.
    In February the District Court of Dolores (Buenos Aires province) 
sentenced to jail terms the eight persons charged with and found guilty 
of the highly publicized 1997 murder of photo-journalist Jose Luis 
Cabezas of the weekly magazine Noticias. The court sentenced some to 
life sentences without parole, and gave the others life sentences with 
parole. Although never confirmed, many believe Cabezas was murdered by 
operatives of the late businessman Alfredo Yabran for photos and 
stories that he produced regarding Yabran's alleged illicit activities. 
ADEPA expressed satisfaction with the sentencing of those charged with 
Cabezas' murder. The IAPA stated that the verdict was a step in the 
fight against impunity for those who violate freedom of the press. 
Cabezas' family, however, believes that the intellectual authors of 
Cabezas' murder remain free, and that the incarceration of the eight 
persons who were found guilty does not put an end to the case.
    No new information was available regarding the death of newspaper 
editor Ricardo Gangeme, who was killed in May 1999 in Chubut province.
    In November the Supreme Court upheld Eduardo Kimel's 1999 sentence 
to 1 year in prison (suspended) and a fine of $20,000 (20,000 pesos) 
for comments made in a book he wrote. In December the IACHR announced 
that the case will be investigated as a possible violation of the right 
to free speech.
    The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects 
this in practice.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
and the law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. However, provincial police clashed 
with public sector protesters on a number of occasions during the year, 
using rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protests that turned 
violent. In some incidents the police used deadly force against 
demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor 
groups led a march on the Congress. Clashes between protesters and the 
federal police resulted in injuries to over 30 demonstrators, including 
injuries from rubber bullets fired by police (see Sections 1.c. and 
6.a.). In May several protesters and police officers were injured after 
the authorities used rubber bullets and tear gas to break up the 
protest (see Section 6.a.).
    An investigation continued into the December 1999 deaths of 2 
persons near an area in which the police injured over 40 protesters who 
were demonstrating against the Federal Government's takeover of the 
provincial government of Corrientes (see Section 1.a.).
    The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of association, 
and the Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that the Federal 
Government ``sustains the apostolic Roman Catholic faith;'' however, 
other religious faiths are practiced freely. The Government provides 
the Catholic Church with a variety of subsidies totaling $8 million (8 
million pesos), administered through the Secretariat of Worship in the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship. The 
Secretariat was transferred from the office of the presidency following 
the inauguration of President Fernando de la Rua in December 1999. The 
Secretariat is responsible for conducting the Government's relations 
with the Catholic Church, non-Catholic Christian churches, and other 
religious organizations in the country. Religious organizations that 
wish to hold public worship services and to obtain tax exempt status 
must register with the Secretariat, and must report periodically to the 
Secretariat in order to maintain their status.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for 
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    A committee composed of representatives of the Ministries of 
Justice, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior determines grants of refugee 
status, using the criteria of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A representative of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees may participate in committee hearings, 
but may not vote. The Government has granted refugee status to numerous 
persons and accepted refugees for resettlement. The issue of the 
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
    In March 1999, the Government granted asylum to former Paraguayan 
General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, who fled that country after the 
assassination of Paraguayan Vice President Luis Maria Argana, in which 
Oviedo allegedly was implicated. Oviedo was granted asylum under the 
condition that he would not participate in political activities. In 
September 1999, the authorities determined that he had been politically 
active from his base in Buenos Aires and ordered him moved to Tierra 
del Fuego province in Patagonia. Oviedo remained there until he fled 
the country in December 1999; in June he was captured in Brazil.
    In September two Paraguayans, Luis Alberto Rojas and Fidencio Vega 
Barrios, wanted for extradition to Paraguay for their alleged 
involvement in the 1999 assassination of the Paraguayan Vice President, 
escaped from the National Police Headquarters in Buenos Aires where 
they were being held. The authorities had detained them since February; 
police collusion in the escapes was suspected. At year's end, the two 
men had not been found and were thought to have fled the country.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. In October 1999, voters elected Fernando de la Rua, leader of 
an alliance of opposition parties, as president; he succeeded President 
Carlos Saul Menem of the Justicialist party on December 10, 1999.
    In December 1999, President de la Rua requested and received 
congressional permission to suspend all three branches of the 
Corrientes provincial government and take direct federal control of the 
province. Public workers, including teachers, court workers, and public 
hospitals had been on strike or limiting services for much of the year, 
due to the provincial government's inability to pay salaries. The 
situation remained tense in the province during the year; in December, 
Congress passed legislation that extended the suspension of the 
Corrientes provisional government for 1 additional year.
    There are no legal impediments to participation by women and 
minorities in politics and government; however, they remain 
underrepresented. The Constitution stipulates that the internal 
regulations of political parties and party nominations for elections be 
subject to requirements to increase women's representation in elective 
offices. A 1991 law mandates the use of gender quotas by all political 
parties in national elections. A 1993 decree requires that a minimum of 
30 percent of all political party lists of candidates be female. As a 
result, the presence of women in Congress increased. About one-fourth 
of the 257 members of the lower house are women. Gender quotas have not 
applied in the Senate, where there are only 2 female members in the 72-
person body. However, a December presidential decree mandates that for 
future elections in the Senate (with the full chamber being competed in 
2001 in first-ever direct elections), at least one-third of all 
Senators elected must be women. There are two female cabinet-level 
officials, the Minister of Social Development and Environment and the 
Minister of Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Training. There are 
no women justices on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. The Government is generally 
cooperative, although not always responsive to their views.
    Some of the best-known human rights organizations include the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, the Center of Legal and Social Studies, the 
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, Service for Peace and Justice, and 
New Rights of Man. Within the federal government, the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights' Secretariat for Human Rights addresses human 
rights concerns at a domestic level. Human rights issues at the 
international level are handled by the Office of the Special 
Representative for International Human Rights of the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship.
    In July the new chief of the army appointed by President de la Rua 
proposed to establish a dialog among the Government, military, and 
human rights groups that would attempt to shed light on past abuses 
committed during the military regime. The proposal largely was rebuffed 
by human rights organizations, many of which oppose any contact with 
those officials whom they believe to be guilty of human rights abuses 
committed by the security forces during the dirty war period.
    In November Congress passed a law calling for the human rights 
commissions of both chambers to write an annual report on human rights 
in the country, commencing in 2001.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and law provide for equal treatment for all 
citizens, and the law provides for prison terms of up to 3 years for 
discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, ideology, 
political opinion, sex, economic position, social class, or physical 
characteristics.
    The National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and 
Racism (INADI), an agency of the Ministry of Interior, has as its 
mandate identifying and combating all forms of intolerance in the 
country. INADI investigates violations of the antidiscrimination law 
and carries out educational programs to promote social and cultural 
pluralism and combat discriminatory attitudes. However, early in the 
year, INADI began a process of reorganization and leadership change, 
during which its effectiveness was impaired seriously. With new 
leadership, the institute was active again by year's end.
    In April an AI report expressed concern over reports that police 
targeted, tortured, and harassed gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The 
report included information regarding the February death in police 
custody of a transvestite whose body showed signs of torture (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.c). AI noted that police bylaws and provincial 
codes of misdemeanors allow police to detain or sanction members of 
sexual minorities for actions that do not constitute a criminal 
offence. The Association Against Homosexual Discrimination filed a 
complaint to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Cordoba 
regarding such treatment.
    Women.--Domestic violence and sexual harassment against women are 
widely recognized as serious social problems. However, few official 
statistics on these crimes are available, so any accurate measure of 
the problems is difficult. The Government, through the National Council 
of Women, recently implemented a new database system, with the help of 
UNICEF, to standardize statistics on domestic violence, permit a more 
accurate evaluation of the scope of the problem, and promote better 
public policy. During the year, as part of a pilot project, two 
workshops provided training on the use of the software for this 
purpose.
    Any person suffering physical or psychological domestic violence by 
a family member can file a formal complaint before a judge, with the 
level of injury inflicted determining the punishment under the civil 
and criminal codes. In addition, the Law on Protection Against Family 
Violence gives a judge the right to prevent the perpetrator of a 
violent act from entering the home or place of work of the victim, and 
temporarily to decide issues of family support, child custody, and 
arrangements for communication with children.
    No statistics on domestic violence were available on a national 
level. However, as an indicator of the magnitude of the problem, in 
1999 the city of Buenos Aires received 25,630 telephone calls regarding 
family violence. Courts in the city of Buenos Aires received 1,289 
formal complaints through August, compared with 2,160 in all of 1999.
    Rape is a problem, but reliable statistics as to its extent were 
not available. The crime of rape falls under the Law of Crimes Against 
Sexual Integrity, the name of which was changed in 1999 from the former 
Law of Crimes Against Honesty. This name change, sought by various 
women's rights groups, recognized that the nature of the crime is not a 
violation of female purity and chastity, but of the personal integrity 
of the victim. Marital rape and acquaintance rape are recognized by 
law, if force is involved, but the need for proof, either in the form 
of clear physical injury or the testimony of a witness, often presents 
a problem. The 1999 law expanded the definition of punishable sexual 
violations beyond forcible intercourse and increased the severity of 
punishments; in addition, it is no longer possible for an accused 
rapist to be excused from prosecution by offering to marry the victim. 
The penalties for rape vary from 6 months to 20 years and depend on the 
nature of the relationship between the rapist and victim and the 
physical and mental harm inflicted.
    Public and private institutions offer prevention programs and 
provide support and treatment for women who have been abused, but 
transitory housing is almost nonexistent. The Buenos Aires municipal 
government operates a small shelter for battered women and a 24-hour 
hot line offering support and guidance to victims of violence, but few 
other shelters exist. NGO's working in the area of women's rights 
stress that women too often do not have a full understanding of their 
rights. Women lack information about what constitutes sexual 
harassment, what can be considered rape, or when physical and emotional 
abuse is considered a punishable crime.
    During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking 
ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise 
of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution 
(see Sections 6.c and 6.f.).
    Despite legal prohibitions, women encounter economic discrimination 
and occupy a disproportionate number of lower paying jobs. Often they 
are paid less than men for equivalent work, even though this is 
prohibited explicitly by law. Working women also are represented 
disproportionately in the informal sector, where effectively they are 
denied work-related economic and social benefits enjoyed by registered 
workers. According to government statistics, in 1999 the 
underemployment rate for women was twice as high as that of men, and 
women in general earned 30 percent less than men. The wage differences 
were more pronounced at higher levels of education; for example, women 
with a college degree earned 46 percent less than men.
    In 1992 the Government created the National Council of Women, an 
interagency organization under the authority of the President's Cabinet 
Chief, that carries out programs to promote opportunity for women in 
the social, political, and economic arenas. The new administration 
named Dr. Carmen Storani as the Council's President. The Council 
operates a web site that provides information on the organization and 
on issues relevant to the organization's goals.
    Children.--While the Government voices strong commitment to issues 
of children's rights and welfare, including education and health, 
increasingly tight federal and provincial budgets mean that programs 
relevant to these areas continue to receive insufficient funding. The 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human and 
Social Rights works with UNICEF and other international agencies to 
promote children's rights. Education is compulsory, free, and universal 
for children up to the age of 15; however, adequate schooling is 
unavailable in some rural areas. There are numerous health care 
programs for children, although not all children have access to them.
    NGO's and church sources indicate that child abuse and prostitution 
are increasing, although no statistics were available. The National 
Council for Minors and Family, a government organization reporting to 
the Ministry of Social Development and Environment, has developed an 
Action Plan, together with the Attorney General, the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights, the National Council of Women, and UNICEF, on 
the elimination of child prostitution. The most recent census (in 1991) 
noted that 4.5 million children under age 14 lived in impoverished 
conditions. There are street children in some large cities, although 
there are no reliable statistics on their numbers. There were 
unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children sometimes were sold to 
sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
    A May UNICEF report stated that sexual exploitation of children is 
widespread due to police inefficiency and lack of judicial 
intervention. The report indicated that the problem is substantial, but 
statistics on this crime were not available. The children involved 
usually work in the same institutions as adults. There were reports of 
children being trafficked from rural areas to urban areas of the 
country, and vice versa. Women and girls also are trafficked from other 
countries, although this reportedly involves very few underage girls 
(see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law intended to eliminate 
barriers for disabled persons mandates standards regarding access to 
public buildings, parks, plazas, stairs, and pedestrian areas. Street 
curbs, commuter train stations, and some buildings in Buenos Aires have 
been modified to accommodate wheelchairs, but many public buildings and 
lavatories are still inaccessible to the disabled. The Buenos Aires 
subway system installed a small number of elevators and escalators to 
facilitate use of the subway system by the disabled, and the subway 
administration pledged to increase the overall number of escalators in 
the system.
    The law prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in 
employment, education, and the provision of other state services, and 
mandates access to buildings for the disabled. There has been some 
progress in these areas. The National Advisory Commission on the 
Integration of People with Disabilities--a governmental office--and 
numerous nongovernmental groups actively defend the rights of the 
disabled and help them to find employment.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution recognizes the ethnic and 
cultural identities of indigenous people and states that Congress shall 
protect their right to bilingual education, recognize their communities 
and the communal ownership of their ancestral lands, and allow for 
their participation in the management of their natural resources. 
However, in practice, indigenous people do not participate in the 
management of their lands or natural resources. The National Institute 
of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) is the government agency responsible for 
implementing these provisions.
    The principal indigenous groups--the Kollas in Salta and Jujuy, the 
Mapuches in the Patagonian provinces, and the Wichis and Tobas in the 
northern provinces--represent less than 5 percent of the national 
population. The INAI estimates that there are approximately 700,000 
indigenous people, most of whom reside in rural areas. However, the 
nongovernmental Indigenous Association of the Argentine Republic 
estimates the indigenous population at 1.5 million persons. Other 
demographers in recent years have provided estimates of at most 450,000 
persons. To clarify the discrepancy, the national census scheduled to 
take place during the year was to have collected information about 
indigenous identity for the first time; however, at mid-year, funding 
shortfalls required the Federal Government to postpone the census until 
the year 2001.
    Existing census data show that poverty rates are higher than 
average in areas with large indigenous populations. Indigenous persons 
have higher rates of illiteracy, chronic disease, and unemployment. 
Government efforts to offer bilingual education opportunities to 
indigenous people continued to be hampered by a lack of trained 
teachers.
    Since 1994 the Government restored approximately 2.5 million acres 
of land to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, some communities were 
involved in land disputes with provincial governments and private 
companies.
    Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism is a problem; however the 
Government took significant steps to initiate a public dialog intended 
to highlight past discrimination, and to improve religious tolerance. 
Combating this and other forms of intolerance is a priority for the 
INADI. There were a number of reports of anti-Semitic acts, of anti-
Semitic violence, and of threats against Jewish organizations and 
individuals during the year. During the year, however, no one was 
convicted for any anti-Semitic acts.
    In February a Jewish country club in San Miguel received bomb 
threats. Following an evacuation of the building, it was established 
that the threats were spurious. Since it reopened in 1999, there have 
been several telephoned bomb threats made against the new AMIA Jewish 
community center building (which replaced the one destroyed by the 
bombing in 1994). No one has taken responsibility for the bomb threats, 
nothing was found in the building on these occasions, and no formal 
investigations were undertaken into the bomb threats.
    In April several adolescents allegedly vandalized several tombs in 
the Jewish cemetery at Posadas, in Misiones province. Local police 
subsequently arrested seven adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17 
in connection with the crime, but the police maintained that the acts 
of vandalism had no religious connotations.
    Most published reports of antireligious acts were anti-Semitic in 
nature. However, in June statues of Jesus Christ and Saint Augustine 
were vandalized at a Catholic Church in Buenos Aires. No arrests were 
reported at year's end.
    In January President de la Rua committed the Government to 
implementing a Holocaust Education Project to be carried out under the 
auspices of the International Holocaust Education Task Force. During 
the year, the Government appointed a special representative to the task 
force, began a number of projects including a Holocaust monument in 
Buenos Aires, and donated a building for a Museum of the Shoah. The 
Ministry of Education is working to include Holocaust education in 
primary and secondary schools, and the schools now commemorate a 
national day of tolerance on April 19. In June the Government renewed 
the charter of the National Commission for Clarification of Nazi 
Activities (CEANA), in order to enable CEANA to continue its 
investigations into past pro-Nazi actions on the part of Argentina. In 
June President de la Rua made a formal apology for Argentina's 
acceptance of Nazi war criminals as immigrants after World War II.
    The authorities continued to investigate the 1992 bombing of the 
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish 
community center, in which 86 persons died.
    In May 1999, the Supreme Court (which is responsible for leading 
the investigation into the embassy bombing) released a report that 
concluded that the embassy bombing was the result of a car bomb. The 
court also formally determined that Islamic Jihad was responsible for 
the bombing, based on claims made by the group following the attack and 
on similarities with other bombings claimed by the group. In September 
1999, the court issued an international arrest warrant for Islamic 
Jihad leader Imad Mughniyhah. In December 1999, the court released a 
more extensive finding on the bombing, which encompassed the May 
report.
    In late 1999, the Government sought the arrest and extradition of 
Mohammad Abbas Malik for questioning about the bombing. When he was 
arrested overseas on other charges, the authorities interviewed him in 
September, and he denied any connection with the Israeli Embassy 
bombing. Following the interview, the Government indicated that it had 
no further interest in Malik with in connection to the 1992 bombing.
    In the AMIA case, the investigating judge determined in February 
1999 that there was insufficient evidence to charge Iranian Nasrim 
Mokhtari, long suspected of complicity in the bombing. In July 1999, 
the Supreme Court ruled that she could leave the country. Wilson dos 
Santos, who reportedly had linked Mokhtari to the bombing, recanted his 
testimony in 1999 from earlier that year; the press reported in July 
1999 that he had offered to return and testify in exchange for money. 
An investigator interviewed him in Brazil in 1999, evaluated the 
proposed testimony, and rejected his offer. However, subsequently the 
authorities decided to issue charges against Wilson dos Santos, and he 
was arrested in Switzerland and extradited to Argentina in December. He 
was charged with having given false testimony in the AMIA case, and the 
authorities still hope that he will be able to shed light on the events 
leading up to the 1994 attack.
    In July 1999, the authorities brought formal charges against all 
the suspects being held in connection with the attack, including a 
number of former Buenos Aires provincial police officers. Fifteen 
former police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which 
furnished the van used in the bombing, and face various criminal 
charges (see Section 1.a.). The provincial police officers and others 
held in the AMIA case are suspected accessories to the crime and not 
those who are thought to have planned or executed the actual attack. In 
late February, the investigating judge formally presented for trial the 
report on his investigation regarding these suspected accessories. The 
defendants face charges of various acts of police corruption related to 
the vehicle used in the bombing. At year's end, Judge Galeano's 
investigation aimed at finding the actual perpetrators of the bombing 
continued.
    In April President de la Rua created a new task force of four 
independent prosecutors to investigate certain areas relating to the 
AMIA case. On the sixth anniversary of the AMIA bombing, President de 
la Rua and much of his Cabinet attended a solemn ceremony commemorating 
the victims at the now-rebuilt cultural center.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form ``free and democratic labor unions, recognized by simple 
inscription in a special register,'' and this right is observed in 
practice. With the exception of military personnel, all workers are 
free to form unions. An estimated 35 percent of the work force is 
organized. Trade unions are independent of the Government and political 
parties, although many union leaders traditionally have supported the 
Justicialist Party. Most unions are affiliated with the General 
Confederation of Labor (CGT). A smaller federation, the Argentine 
Workers' Central, also is recognized legally. In the early part of the 
year, the CGT split into two factions, an ``official'' faction and a 
``dissident'' faction, the latter of which conducted numerous marches 
and demonstrations--some of which became violent--in an effort to 
pressure the Government to take a more prolabor stance.
    The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts 
has criticized the law, which allows only one union per industrial 
sector to negotiate salary, collect dues, and call a strike. The law 
makes it virtually impossible for new unions to challenge existing 
unions, thus giving the established unions a monopoly on these 
fundamental powers of representation. On November 21, the Labor 
Minister formed a tripartite commission to analyze the ILO 
observations, including this issue.
    During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor 
groups led a march on the Congress that was suppressed by the federal 
police, who injured over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing 
rubber bullets. Ten police officers were injured in the altercation. 
One demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The 
Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and this right 
is observed in practice. Two national general strikes took place during 
the year. The first in June effectively shut down most public 
transportation, government offices, and schools throughout the country 
as millions of workers representing the three major labor federations 
protested the May reduction in government salaries, tax hikes, and 
other expenditure reductions as part of the Government's austerity 
plan. The second national general strike took place November 23-24, 
again with the support of all three major labor federations. This 
strike, in protest of labor reforms and further economic austerity 
measures, was more successful than the June strike in shutting down not 
only most public transportation, government offices and schools, but 
also many stores and businesses. While the November strike was 
generally peaceful, some prestrike acts of intimidation allegedly by 
union activists against bus and taxi companies left a number of busses 
and taxis damaged or burned in Buenos Aires and in other cities around 
the country. The police arrested no strikers or activists as a result 
of any of these incidents. In Cordoba, police made 10 arrests and there 
were at least 9 injuries in an effort to break up a demonstration by 
municipal workers. During the year, there also were scattered local 
work stoppage, and several unions, including transport workers, 
farmers, and teachers initiated numerous local and nationwide strikes 
to protest various issues including government labor policies, as well 
as nonpayment and late payment of wages by private companies.
    Groups of unemployed and underemployed workers around the country 
frequently used roadblocks as acts of protest. Hundreds of small 
incidents took place, with groups of activists blocking roads and 
highways. Some of these roadblocks were spontaneous actions by groups 
demanding continuation of federal and provincial unemployment payments 
and job subsidy programs that were expiring. Others were organized by 
radical labor and social groups such as the Classicist Combative 
Movement. While most roadblocks were resolved by negotiated 
settlements, usually including promises of extended unemployment 
programs, a number ended in confrontations between the police and 
strikers. In May the provincial and border police in Salta province 
used force to disperse truckers at roadblocks, who were protesting the 
withdrawal of government funds from a job subsidy program. Several 
protesters and police officers were injured after the authorities used 
rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the protesters. Protesters 
allegedly looted shops and set a townhall on fire. On November 10, 
again in Salta province, provincial police efforts to break up 
roadblocks resulted in the death of one protester (see Section 2.b.). 
Incited by the violence, demonstrators burned several buildings and 
looted stores in the cities of General Mosconi and Tartagal. The 
Federal Government criticized the provincial government's use of force 
but resisted calls for federal intervention.
    Unions are free to join international confederations without 
government restrictions; many unions also are active in international 
trade secretariats.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides unions with the right to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements and to have recourse to conciliation and 
arbitration, and these rights are observed in practice. The Ministry of 
Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Formation ratifies collective 
bargaining agreements, which cover roughly three-fourths of the work 
force. According to the ILO, the ratification process impedes free 
collective bargaining as the Ministry not only considers whether a 
collective labor agreement contains clauses violating public order 
standards, but also considers whether the agreement complies with 
productivity, investment, technology and vocational training criteria. 
In recent practice, however, the Government has not refused to approve 
any collective agreements under the above criteria.
    The Labor Reform Law, which went into effect in May, allows 
collective bargaining on a regional, provincial, or company basis 
depending on what the local union and company decide. Prior law only 
permitted negotiations by the heads of the national union on behalf of 
all the unions in the sector.
    The new law also established a mediation service, which was being 
organized at year's end. Foreign experts, as part of an Organization of 
America States project, conducted a 1-week training in mediation for 
labor professionals, particularly government officials.
    The new Labor Reform Law lengthened the probationary period for new 
workers from 30 days to between 90 and 120 days for large companies and 
to between 6 months and 1 year for small businesses. The new law also 
ended the practice known as ``ultra-activity,'' which allows existing 
labor contracts to be renewed if the parties cannot come to terms on a 
new agreement.
    Some labor unions strongly opposed the reform legislation. In 
August their opposition was strengthened when a bribery scandal emerged 
over alleged payments to key Senators to encourage votes in favor of 
the legislation. Most significantly, implementing regulations for the 
new labor reform law were still in the process of being developed at 
year's end, with no clear indication of when they would be approved. 
This fact, and an inconclusive closing in December of the judicial 
investigation into the alleged bribes, left the final impact of the new 
legislation unclear.
    The law prohibits antiunion practices, and the Government enforces 
this prohibition.
    There are three functioning export processing zones (EPZ's) with 
many others legally registered but not active. The primary commercial 
advantages of these zones are related to customs and duty exemptions. 
The same labor laws apply within these zones as in all other parts of 
the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports that it was used; 
however, there were reports that women were trafficked to the country 
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The law also prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children; however, there were unconfirmed reports that 
children were trafficked to the country to work in sweatshops (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits employment of children under 15 years of 
age, except in rare cases where the Ministry of Education may authorize 
a child to work as part of a family unit; however, child labor does 
occur in practice and may be increasing. Children between the ages of 
15 and 16 may work in a limited number of job categories, but not more 
than 6 hours a day or 35 hours a week. The penalty for employing 
underage workers ranges from $1,000 to $5,000 (1,000 to 5,000 pesos) 
for each child employed. On August 25, the President decreed the formal 
establishment of a National Commission for the Eradication of Child 
Labor, which is to work with the Government, organized labor, the 
business community, religious groups, UNICEF, and NGO's. Labor Minister 
Patricia Bullrich appointed Leandro Haleprin to head the commission.
    A 1993 law requires that all children receive a minimum of 9 years 
of schooling, beginning at age 6. Government census figures indicate 
that about 5 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 14 are 
employed, most with older family members. Local NGO's note that the 
figure is imprecise and could be as high as 10 percent. In 1999 in the 
greater Buenos Aires area, 12,500 children age 14 and below were in the 
work force. In a 1997 report, UNICEF stated that 252,000 children 
between the ages of 6 and 14 were employed--183,500 in urban areas and 
68,500 in the country--principally harvesting tea and tobacco. An 
August UNICEF report on adolescents found that, for children between 
ages 13 and 17, 3 percent were in school and also economically active; 
7 percent were not in school but were economically active; 84 percent 
were only in school; and 6 percent were neither in school nor working.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and there 
were no confirmed reports of its use; however, there were unconfirmed 
press reports that children were trafficked to the country to work in 
sweat shops (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum 
wage is $200 (200 pesos), which is not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. It is determined by a 
tripartite committee and has not been changed for at least 5 years.
    Federal labor law sets standards in the areas of health, safety, 
and hours. The maximum workday is 8 hours, and the maximum workweek is 
48 hours. Overtime payment is required for hours worked in excess of 
these limits. The law also sets minimums for periods of rest and paid 
vacation. However, enforcement of laws governing acceptable conditions 
of work is not carried out universally, particularly for workers in the 
informal sector who constitute about 40 percent of the work force.
    Employers are required by law to insure their employees against 
accidents at the workplace, and when traveling to and from work. In 
December a presidential decree increased the maximum cash payments and 
maximum total payments for workers' compensation in an effort to 
strengthen worker protections. Workers have the right to remove 
themselves from dangerous or unhealthful work situations, after having 
gone through a claim procedure, without jeopardy to continued 
employment. Nonetheless, workers who leave the workplace before it has 
been proven unsafe risk being fired; in such cases, the worker has the 
right to judicial appeal, but the process can be very lengthy.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws specifically 
addressing trafficking in persons, laws against child abuse provide 
penalties for trafficking children for purposes of prostitution, and 
other laws prohibit alien smuggling, indentured servitude, and similar 
abuses. During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking 
ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise 
of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into 
prostitution. In one prominent case, two girls escaped from an 
Argentine brothel in April and returned to their homes. The Paraguayan 
authorities charged a number of Paraguayans with involvement in the 
case; however, at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine 
television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes 
working in greater Buenos Aires and reported a number of undocumented 
Paraguayan women and girls working in slave-like conditions, offering 
their services as prostitutes in exchange for their clothing, room, and 
board.
    In 1999 police in Spain apprehended two Argentine citizens whom 
they charged with trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution.
    There were unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children 
sometimes were sold to sweatshops in Argentina.
                               __________

                                BAHAMAS

    The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary 
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth 
II, the nominal head of state, is represented by an appointed Governor 
General. Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham's Free National Movement 
(FNM) has controlled the Government and Parliament since August 1992. 
The judiciary is independent.
    The national police force maintains internal security, and the 
small Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) is responsible for external security 
and some minor domestic security functions such as guarding foreign 
embassies and ambassadors; both answer to civilian authority. There 
continue to be reports that the police occasionally committed human 
rights abuses.
    The economy depends primarily on tourism, which accounts for nearly 
two-thirds of the gross domestic product. Financial services, 
particularly offshore banking and trust management, are also major 
sources of revenue. While some citizens enjoy relatively high income 
levels, there is considerable underemployment and poverty. The 
unemployment rate remained at 7 percent during the year.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in several areas. There were reports that 
police occasionally beat and abused detainees, and prison conditions 
remain harsh. The police occasionally use arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Lengthy pretrial detention and delays in trials are 
problems. Violence and discrimination against women and violence 
against children also are problems. Discrimination against the disabled 
and persons of Haitian descent persists.

                       RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
					   
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings. Three prisoners 
died while in custody at the prison (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel and 
degrading treatment or punishment; however, the police occasionally 
beat and otherwise abused suspects. Many of the charges of abuse 
involved beatings to extract confessions. Human rights monitors and 
members of the public continued to express concern over such instances 
of police abuse against criminal suspects. Police officials continued 
to deny that there have been violations of defendants' rights. 
According to officials, these rights are protected by the trial judge, 
who determines the admissibility of the defendant's statement as 
evidence at trial.
    The Police Complaints and Discipline Unit, which reports directly 
to senior police officials, is responsible for investigating 
allegations of police brutality. This unit determines if enough 
evidence of abuse or misconduct exists in a particular case to warrant 
discipline within the police system or, in some instances, criminal 
prosecution by the Attorney General. Local human rights observers doubt 
the police force's ability to investigate itself impartially in cases 
of alleged abuse and misconduct and believe that many incidents of 
improper police behavior go unreported. Police officials insist that 
their investigations are fair and thorough. There were 197 complaints 
against the police during the year. In 14 cases, the complainant 
dropped the charges. A total of 26 complaints were dropped because the 
police were found to be not at fault. The authorities sent 31 cases to 
the Police Tribunal, and 126 cases were under investigation at year's 
end. Police officials believe that a continuing turnover in personnel 
is a contributing factor in disciplinary cases. There are approximately 
2,200 officers to police a total population (excluding tourists) of 
293,000.
    Corporal punishment is permitted by law with some restrictions. For 
example, caning is permitted at police stations but only if performed 
by a sergeant or higher ranking official. Cat-o-nine-tails are allowed 
at prisons but used rarely.
    Conditions at Fox Hill, the only prison, continued to improve but 
remain harsh and overcrowded. The men's maximum-security block, 
originally built in 1953 to house 400 to 600 inmates, holds nearly 800 
of the prison's total of over 1,400 inmates. The remaining prisoners 
are housed in medium- and minimum-security units which are currently 
at, or above, maximum capacity. The prison's female population is 
around 40 inmates, considerably less than the female unit's full 
capacity of 200. Male prisoners are crowded into poorly ventilated 
cells that generally lack regular running water. There are no separate 
facilities for inmates being held on ``remand'' (detention pending 
trial or further court action), although some eventually are segregated 
in a medium security wing after processing through maximum security. 
All inmates are screened for infectious diseases, and prison officials 
estimate that about 7 percent of the incoming prison population is 
infected with the HIV virus. Most prisoners lack beds. Many of them 
sleep on concrete floors and are locked in their cells 23 hours per 
day. Facilities for women are less severe and do have running water. 
Organizations providing aid, counseling services, and religious 
instruction have regular access to inmates. In August and September, 
three prisoners died while in custody at the prison. Prison officials 
were investigating the cases at year's end.
    The Government has provided funds for improvements in prison 
facilities and prisoner rehabilitation programs. Prison officials have 
instituted some technical and vocational programs, and correctional 
officers are undergoing instruction to become certified trainers. 
Modern training facilities are equipped with new computers, and the 
prison also offers some educational and literacy programs for 
prisoners. In December an 80-cell minimum security cellblock opened, 
and the prison is constructing a new 80-cell maximum-security building, 
scheduled to open in 2001. This building, which is to have larger cells 
and more extensive plumbing, should relieve some of the overcrowding in 
the existing block. Prison officials plan to renovate the current 
maximum-security unit once the new building is in service.
    Domestic and international human rights groups were able to visit 
the prison during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, police occasionally 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. In general the authorities 
conduct arrests openly and, when required, obtain judicially issued 
warrants. The Government respects the right to a judicial determination 
of the legality of arrests.
    Serious cases, including those of suspected narcotics or firearms 
offenses, do not require warrants where probable cause exists. Arrested 
persons appear before a magistrate within 48 hours (or by the next 
business day for cases arising on weekends and holidays) to hear the 
charges against them. They may hire an attorney of their choice, but 
the Government does not provide legal representation except to 
destitute suspects charged with capital crimes. Some local legal 
professionals and human rights observers believe that this lack of 
representation risks hasty convictions on the basis of unchallenged 
evidence, particularly in the case of poor or illiterate defendants. 
However, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that this is more 
than an occasional problem.
    The Bail Act prohibits bail for repeat offenders and those accused 
of certain violent crimes. Judges tend not to grant bail to foreign 
suspects, particularly on more serious offenses, since the authorities 
consider foreign offenders more likely to flee if released on bail. 
Judges sometimes authorize cash bail for foreigners arrested on minor 
charges, but in practice, foreign suspects generally prefer to plead 
guilty and pay a fine rather than pursue their right to defend 
themselves, given possible delays in court cases and harsh conditions 
in the prison. Attorneys and other prisoner advocates continue to 
complain of excessive pretrial detention.
    The authorities detain illegal immigrants, primarily Haitians and 
Cubans, at the detention center located off Carmichael Road until 
arrangements can be made for them to leave the country, or they obtain 
legal status. The detention center, which had been closed for repairs 
since suffering extensive damage from Hurricane Floyd in September 
1999, reopened in December. Detainees had been housed in the women's 
prison at Fox Hill where conditions are austere. Female and child 
detainees were housed together with the general population and were 
afforded little privacy. Incidents of antagonism between detainees and 
guards were frequent. Most of these incidents involved the Cuban 
detainees, a few of whom had been in custody for over a year. There 
were numerous escapes from Fox Hill prison, particularly by Cuban 
detainees. In the newly reopened detention center, which can hold up to 
600 detainees, women and men are housed separately. Haitians usually 
are repatriated within 2 weeks. Many detainees are provided with food 
and other items by relatives and friends on a regular basis, and those 
who can arrange and finance their repatriation generally are deported 
much more quickly. Illegal immigrants convicted of crimes other than 
immigration violations are held at Fox Hill prison where they may 
remain for weeks or months after serving their sentences, pending 
deportation.
    Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    Magistrate's courts are the lowest level courts and only handle 
crimes with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Trial by jury is available 
only in the Supreme Court, which is the trial court that handles most 
major cases. Its decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal; the 
Privy Council in London is the final court of appeal. The Governor 
General appoints judges on the advice, in most cases, of the 
independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
    The justice system derives from English common law. Trials are fair 
and public. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right 
to appeal. Defendants can confront and question witnesses against them 
and present evidence on their own behalf. However, the judicial system 
is plagued by a large backlog of cases, and delays reportedly can last 
as long as 2 years. To reduce the backlog, the Government continued the 
process of streamlining appeals, computerizing court records, and 
hiring new judges, magistrates, and court reporters. The Supreme Court 
established a task force to recommend further reforms in the court 
system and published a report in October 1999 proposing modifications 
in the system to facilitate case flow management including the 
disposition of cases within 16 months of initial filing.
    Despite these measures to improve efficiency, complaints persist of 
excessive pretrial detention, outdated record keeping, delayed justice 
for victims, and a failure to update new laws in the books. Some judges 
have been brought in from abroad; while familiar with English common 
law, they lack experience regarding Bahamian law and procedures. There 
were isolated complaints of deviations from normal, fair court 
proceedings--particularly in civil matters--but there were no 
indications that this was a widespread problem.
    The final appeals court recently ruled that death-row inmates 
appealing their sentences must be given the chance to be heard by 
bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or 
seizure, and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in 
practice. The law usually requires a court order for entry into or 
search of a private residence, but a police inspector or more senior 
police official may authorize a search without a court order where 
probable cause to suspect a weapons violation exists. Such an official 
also may authorize the search of a person (that extends to the vehicle 
in which the person is traveling) without a court order, should 
probable cause exist to suspect drug possession.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects the 
constitutional provision for the right of free expression, and the 
political opposition criticizes the Government freely and frequently.
    Three daily and several weekly newspapers, all privately owned, 
express a variety of views on issues of public interest, including 
varying degrees of criticism of the Government and its policies. 
Foreign newspapers and magazines are readily available.
    There is a government-run radio station and four privately owned 
radio broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-
owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas, presents a variety of 
views, although opposition politicians claim, with some justification, 
that their views do not receive as extensive coverage as those of the 
Government.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Groups must obtain permits to hold public 
demonstrations, and the authorities generally grant such permits.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The law permits private 
associations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees.
    There is no legislation governing the processing of asylum seekers, 
and applications for political asylum are supposed to be adjudicated on 
a case-by-case basis at the cabinet level. Trained immigration 
officials screen asylum applicants, and the UNHCR reviews the interview 
records and offers advice on certain cases. Local and international 
human rights observers have criticized the Government for failing to 
screen potential asylum applicants adequately. These organizations have 
claimed that some Cubans and Haitians with a legitimate fear of 
persecution were repatriated without first having the opportunity to 
make a claim for asylum. Although the repatriation agreement between 
the Bahamas and Haiti expired at the end of 1995, the Government 
continued to repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants based on the terms 
of that agreement. The Government signed a repatriation agreement with 
Cuba in 1998.
    At year's end, a total of 5,801 persons, including 4,897 Haitians, 
374 Jamaicans, and 284 Cubans had been repatriated. Two Nigerian 
nationals requested asylum during the year. The Government granted one 
request and denied the other. A total of 39 Cubans requested asylum. 
All were denied.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    The Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with two 
major political parties and general elections at least every 5 years. 
An elected Prime Minister and Parliament govern. The political process 
is open to all elements of society, and citizens 18 years of age and 
older are eligible to register and vote. Voting is by secret ballot. 
The two principal political parties are the ruling Free National 
Movement and the opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). The PLP 
led the country for 6 years of internal self-government from 1967 to 
1973 and held power from independence in 1973 until 1992. The FNM won 
general elections in 1992 and 1997. It holds 35 of 40 seats in the 
House of Assembly, and the PLP holds 4. The Coalition for Democratic 
Reform (a splinter party from the PLP) holds one seat. Both the ruling 
party and the opposition name members to the upper house, the Senate, 
in compliance with constitutional guidelines. Although it does pass 
legislation, the Senate is primarily a deliberative body that serves as 
a public forum to discuss national problems and policies.
    There are no legal impediments to participation by women in 
government and politics; however, women are underrepresented. The 40-
seat House of Assembly has 6 elected female members, including the 
Speaker of the House, and 6 appointed female Senators, including the 
government leader in the Senate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet 
Bostwick, also directs the Bahamian Bureau of Women's Affairs. Women 
also head the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce, 
Agriculture, and Industry. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a 
woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Individual human rights monitors and several local human rights 
groups, as well as representatives of international human rights 
organizations, operate freely, expressing their opinions and reporting 
their findings on alleged human rights violations without government 
restriction. The Government allows them broad access to institutions 
and individuals.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Government generally respects in practice the constitutional 
provisions for individual rights and freedoms regardless of race, place 
of origin, political opinion, creed, or sex. However, the Constitution 
and the law contain certain provisions that discriminate against women.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious, 
widespread problem. Government crime statistics do not separate 
domestic violence from other incidents of violence. The Government 
operates a nationwide toll-free hot line, with two trained volunteers 
on each of the inhabited islands who are on call to respond in the 
event of a crisis. Government and private women's organizations conduct 
public awareness campaigns highlighting the problems of abuse and 
domestic violence. On November 16, the Department of Social Services in 
partnership with a private company established, for the first time, two 
safe houses to assist battered women. The Domestic Court, which deals 
exclusively with family issues such as spousal abuse, maintenance 
payments, and legal separation, continued to receive a high volume of 
cases. The court can and does impose various legal constraints to 
protect women from abusive spouses or companions. However, advocates 
for women's rights see a need to improve the effectiveness of 
enforcement of the court's orders. They cite a general reluctance on 
the part of law enforcement authorities to intervene in domestic 
disputes and a lack of police training and sensitivity in dealing with 
domestic violence. While police training includes some presentations on 
domestic violence, law enforcement authorities admit that the problem 
has not been a top priority in training or resource allocation.
    The Constitution discriminates against women by not providing them 
with the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
born spouses. Additionally the law makes it easier for men with foreign 
spouses to confer citizenship on their children than for women with 
foreign spouses. Some inheritance laws also favor men over women. For 
example, when a person dies without a will, the estate passes to the 
oldest legitimate son, or in cases where there is no son, the closest 
legitimate male relative. Prominent women of all political persuasions 
continue to push for an amendment to the Constitution and related laws 
to redress this situation.
    Women participate fully in society and are well represented in the 
business and professional sectors.
    Children.--The Government places a priority on maintaining adequate 
expenditures for child welfare and education. Public education is 
compulsory for children through the age of 16.
    Awareness of parenting and responsibility for children has 
increased. However, child abuse and neglect remain serious problems. 
There were a total of 147 cases of child abuse during the year: 33 
cases of physical abuse, 94 cases of sexual abuse, 9 cases of neglect, 
4 cases of emotional abuse, and 7 cases of abandonment.
    The law requires that all persons who have contact with a child 
they believe to be abused sexually report their suspicions to the 
police. However, the same reporting requirement does not apply to cases 
of physical abuse, which health care professionals believe occurs quite 
frequently. The police refer reported cases of sexual and physical 
abuse to the Department of Social Services, which investigates them and 
can bring criminal charges against perpetrators. The Department may 
remove children from abusive situations if the court deems it 
necessary.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has constructed 
additional housing units in Nassau designed specifically for the 
disabled, but very few buildings and public facilities are accessible 
to the disabled. Although the 1973 National Building Code mandates 
certain accommodations for the physically disabled in new public 
buildings, the authorities rarely enforce this requirement. The code 
also fails to mandate accommodations in new private buildings, which 
often lack accessibility as well. Advocates for the disabled complain 
of widespread job discrimination and general apathy on the part of 
private employers and political leaders toward their need for training 
and equal opportunity. They note that there is no overarching 
legislation to implement and enforce equal opportunity policies in the 
workplace, educational institutions, or elsewhere.
    The Disability Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Social Development 
and National Insurance works with the Bahamas Council for Disability, 
an umbrella organization of nongovernmental organizations that offer 
services for the disabled, to provide a coordinated public and private 
sector approach to the needs of the disabled. A mix of government and 
private residential and nonresidential institutions provides a range of 
education, training, counseling, and job placement services for both 
physically and mentally disabled adults and children. There is still no 
disability act; a governmentsponsored task force drafted proposed 
legislation; however, it had not been introduced in Parliament at 
year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Unofficial estimates suggest 
that between 20 and 25 percent of the country's roughly 290,000 
inhabitants are Haitians or citizens of Haitian descent, making them 
the largest and most visible ethnic minority in the islands. While 
30,000 to 40,000 Haitian citizens reside in the Bahamas legally, some 
observers believe that similarly large numbers are in the country 
illegally.
    Although Haitians and Bahamians of Haitian descent generally are 
well integrated into society, interethnic tensions and inequities 
persist. Recent crime statistics show Haitians as targets for petty 
theft crimes. Some members of the Haitian community complain of 
discrimination in the job market, and resentment of continued Haitian 
immigration is widespread. However, reports of ethnic violence or 
blatant discrimination against legally resident Haitians are scarce. 
Leaders of the Haitian community approve of the Government's humane 
approach to the repatriation of illegal migrants and point to the high 
number of ethnic Haitians in the public service.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides labor 
unions with the right of free assembly and association. Private sector 
and most public sector workers may form or join unions without prior 
approval. Members of the police force, defense force, fire brigade, and 
prison guards may not organize or join unions. Workers exercise the 
right of association extensively, with almost one-quarter of the work 
force (and one-half of the workers in the important hotel industry) 
belonging to unions.
    Three major umbrella labor organizations--the National Workers 
Council of Trade Unions and Associations, the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC), and the National Congress of Trade Unions--along with individual 
labor unions, all function independently of government or political 
party control.
    The Industrial Relations Act requires that, before a strike begins, 
a simple majority of a union's membership must vote in favor of a 
motion to strike. The Department of Labor must supervise the vote. 
Unions threatened several work stoppages against both public and 
private employers during the year. In order to resolve trade disputes 
more quickly, in 1996 Parliament amended the Industrial Relations Act 
to establish an industrial tribunal. According to the act, labor 
disputes first are filed with the Ministry of Labor and then, if not 
resolved, are turned over to the tribunal. The tribunal follows normal 
court procedures for the admission of evidence, direct examination, and 
crossexamination. The tribunal's decision is final and can only be 
appealed in court on a strict question of law. Some employers complain 
that the industrial tribunal is biased unfairly in favor of employees. 
All labor unions have the right to maintain affiliations with 
international trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers freely 
exercise their right to organize and participate in collective 
bargaining, which the law protects. Unions and employers negotiate wage 
rates without government interference.
    The Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act prohibit anti-
union discrimination by employers. The act requires employers to 
recognize trade unions, and it requires the reinstatement of workers 
fired for union activities. Employers may dismiss workers in accordance 
with applicable contracts, which generally require some severance pay. 
The Government enforces labor laws and regulations uniformly throughout 
the country.
    Freeport is a specially designated free trade zone. Labor law and 
practice in this zone do not differ from those in the rest of the 
country. However, human rights advocates assert that the Port Authority 
has allowed the Hong Kong-based company Hutchinson-Whampoa, which now 
owns the harbor, airport, and many major hotels in Freeport, to 
discourage unions.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by all persons, including 
children, and such labor does not exist in practice.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 14 for industrial work or work during school hours. Children under 
the age of 16 may not work at night. There is no legal minimum age for 
employment in other sectors, and some children work part time in light 
industry and service jobs. The constitutional prohibition of forced and 
compulsory labor, including that by children, is respected in practice 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fair Labor Standards Act 
permits the creation of a Wages Council to recommend the setting of a 
minimum wage, but the Government never has established such a council 
or a general minimum wage. However, in July the Government established 
a specific minimum wage of $4.66 (B$4.66) per hour for all hourly and 
temporary workers throughout the public sector. In view of the high 
cost of living, this wage alone would not provide more than a 
subsistence living for a worker and family. The act limits the regular 
workweek to 48 hours, provides for one 24-hour rest period, and 
requires overtime payment (time and a half) for hours beyond the 
standard.
    The Ministry of Labor, responsible for enforcing labor laws, has a 
team of inspectors who conduct on-site visits to enforce occupational 
health and safety standards and investigate employee concerns and 
complaints, but inspections occur infrequently. The Ministry normally 
announces inspection visits in advance, and employers generally 
cooperate with inspectors to implement safety standards.
    The national insurance program compensates workers for work-related 
injuries. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to find 
suitable alternative employment for employees injured on the job but 
still able to work. The law does not provide a right for workers to 
absent themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons; however, the Penal code bans 
prostitution and prohibits the detention of persons against their will 
and for immoral purposes. There were no reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within or through the country.
                               __________

                                BARBADOS

    Barbados is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty, 
parliamentary form of government and is a member of the Commonwealth of 
Nations. The Queen is head of state and is represented by an appointed 
Governor General. Prime Minister Owen Arthur is the head of government 
and governs with an appointed cabinet. The judiciary is independent.
    The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining public 
order. The small volunteer Barbados Defence Force (BDF) is responsible 
for national security and can be employed to maintain public order in 
times of crisis, emergency, or other specific need. Police committed 
some human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on tourism, services, light manufacturing, and 
agriculture, which makes it vulnerable to external economic 
developments. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was about $9,323 
in 1999. The country has registered 7 successive years of sustained 
economic growth. For the first quarter of the year, GDP grew at 4.6 
percent.
    The Government generally respects constitutional provisions 
regarding human rights; however, there were problems in a few areas. 
There were three extrajudicial killings by police. Other principal 
human rights problems continued to be occasional instances of excessive 
use of force by police and societal violence against women and 
children. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings. However, police committed three 
extrajudicial killings. In all cases, the police conducted 
investigations that found no wrongdoing on the part of the police 
officers.
    On February 6, police shot and killed a suspect, Curtis Maynard, 
who they said was armed and attempted to flee. However, local residents 
mounted a demonstration and asserted that Maynard was never known to 
carry weapons and that, since he was surrounded by police, they should 
have captured him without gunfire.
    On February 21, police shot and killed Kerwin Wilkinson when they 
responded to a report of a domestic dispute. The police said he 
resisted and brandished a machete; his girlfriend claimed that he was 
not holding the machete when police shot him.
    On March 3, police shot and killed Tony Greenidge, an emotionally 
disturbed worker, who had slashed to death an elderly person. Greenidge 
then attacked a responding police officer, and another police officer 
shot and killed him.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, credible 
reports continued that law enforcement officials sometimes used force 
during detention to extract confessions from detainees.
    In February a defendant accused and later convicted of child 
molestation alleged that the police slapped him, choked him, and denied 
him access to legal representation, and that due to this treatment, he 
signed a written confession. Also in February, another defendant 
alleged that his statement made in a deposition had been altered after 
the fact by police.
    In September the Police Commissioner promised to investigate the 
alleged beating of a prisoner being held by police on a marijuana 
charge after his mother stated on a radio program that the police had 
mistreated her son brutally.
    In December 1998, the police took two foreign citizens into custody 
for questioning in connection with a bank burglary. According to 
eyewitnesses, both individuals were in good health when the police 
apprehended them. However, 2 days later, the police took both men to 
the local hospital following complaints of abdominal pain. One man had 
to undergo extensive emergency surgery for life-threatening internal 
bleeding; doctors treated the second man for injuries to the abdomen 
and groin. Both men asserted that they were restrained physically and 
beaten by five or six men while in police custody. The police force's 
Criminal Investigation Department conducted an investigation and 
presented a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions in February 
1999. The authorities filed charges against five police officers and 
started trial proceedings; however, at year's end, the case was 
unresolved and remained before the courts.
    The majority of complaints against the police fall into the 
categories of unprofessional conduct and beating or assault. While the 
police force has a complaints and discipline department headed by a 
superintendent to deal with matters of inappropriate police conduct, 
there is no independent body to review complaints against the police. 
However, in December 1998, the Attorney General instituted a working 
group to make recommendations regarding the establishment of an 
independent complaints authority. In February the group presented its 
report to the Cabinet, and its recommendations were expected to be 
submitted to Parliament for further consideration.
    Police procedures provide that the police may question suspects, 
and other persons they hold, only at a police station, except when 
expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must 
visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the 
detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must 
submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities 
must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations. 
The authorities generally adhere to these basic principles, although 
officials occasionally used excessive force.
    The authorities issued firearms to special foot patrols in 
highcrime areas in response to public concern over violent incidents 
that had led to recent public concern. Aside from this exception, the 
police force mainly still is unarmed, in keeping with its British 
traditions. In February the police established a special task force 
unit to address illegal weapons and crimes involving firearms. They 
also announced creation of a joint unit with the BDF to target high-
profile crimes.
    The only prison is antiquated and overcrowded, with over 625 
inmates in a structure built for 350 inmates. The Caribbean Human 
Rights Network has called for reform of the penal system and advocates 
the development of alternatives to imprisonment such as community 
service to alleviate the problem of severe overcrowding. During the 
year, government officials took steps to introduce alternative, 
noncustodial sentencing.
    The Government allows private groups to visit prisons to ascertain 
conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to 
be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the 
Government generally respects these provisions in practice. Criminal 
defendants have the right to counsel, and attorneys have ready access 
to their clients.
    The authorities do not use forced exile as a punishment or means of 
political control.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is free of intervention by other branches 
of government.
    The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the 
high court and court of appeal. The Governor General, on recommendation 
of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the leader of the 
opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges. Judges serve 
until the age of 65.
    The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal 
offenses be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial court, and the Government respects this right 
in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of due process 
at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until proven 
guilty.
    In February Parliament approved a package of new legislation 
intended to strengthen the powers of law enforcement officials. One of 
the new laws allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to appeal 
sentences in criminal cases that he considers too lenient.
    The Government provides free legal aid to the indigent with the 
exception of a limit of about $2,150 (1,300 pounds sterling) on 
expenses incurred for appeals by death row prisoners to the Privy 
Council in London. Two inmates have challenged this limit and are suing 
the Government on the grounds that it effectively deprives them of 
their right to due process.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or 
seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before privately 
owned property may be entered and searched.
    The Government does not interfere routinely in the private lives of 
its citizens; however, the police sometimes resorted to searches of 
homes without warrants. The Government does not censor mail. However, 
the Government restricts the receipt of foreign publications deemed to 
be pornographic. Other foreign publications of a nonprurient nature are 
allowed without restriction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these 
rights in practice. There are two independent daily newspapers, both of 
which present opposition political views. The Government regularly 
comes under criticism in the newspapers and on daily call-in radio 
programs. There are six radio stations, two of which are owned by the 
Government. The Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television 
service (the only television source, excluding direct satellite 
reception) is government owned. Although CBC is a state enterprise, it 
regularly reported views opposing government policies. Critics allege 
that the Government sometimes uses its influence to discourage media 
reporting on sensitive issues, but the press remained vigorously 
critical of the Government on a broad span of issues. The Government 
prohibits the production of pornographic materials.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Political parties, trade unions, and 
private organizations function and hold meetings and rallies generally 
without hindrance. The Public Order Act of 1970 requires police 
approval for public assemblies, and previously it had been enforced 
rarely. However, in February the authorities dispersed a protest march 
about the Maynard killing by police (see Section 1.c.) because no 
permit had been obtained. Permission later was granted for a 
demonstration held a few days afterwards.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and legal residents move freely 
within the country and leave and enter it without restriction.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum 
did not arise. There were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone 
having a valid claim to refugee status. However, government practice 
remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice. 
Political parties compete in free and fair elections by secret ballot 
at least every 5 years. In the 1999 elections, the Barbados Labour 
Party won a decisive victory, gaining a 26-to-2 majority over the 
Democratic Labour Party. There are no impediments to participation in 
the political process, and all citizens over age 18 may vote. The Prime 
Minister exercises executive power along with the Cabinet of Ministers 
that he appoints, balanced by the bicameral Parliament and the judicial 
system.
    Although underrepresented overall, women participate in all levels 
of government and politics. There are three female members of 
Parliament; the Deputy Prime Minister, who also serves concurrently as 
Foreign Minister, is a woman, as is the Minister of Education.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Local groups involved with human rights operate freely and without 
government hindrance. The Caribbean Human Rights Network, a Caribbean-
wide human rights organization which has its headquarters and a small 
staff in Barbados, investigates and reports on allegations of human 
rights violations throughout the region.
    The Ombudsman's office, established in 1987, hears complaints 
against government offices for alleged injuries or injustices resulting 
from administrative conduct. The office is prohibited from involvement 
in issues involving foreign affairs, immigration questions, and certain 
other matters. Because it focuses only on administrative conduct, it 
does not deal with complaints of police abuse; a separate department 
within the police force deals with matters of inappropriate police 
conduct.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law, 
regardless of race, religion, or sex. The Government respects these 
rights in practice.
    Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued to be 
significant social problems. Women's rights groups reported that 
victims of sexual assaults, domestic violence, incest, and rape are 
often reluctant to report such incidents. There are public and private 
counseling services for victims of domestic violence, rape, and child 
abuse. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.
    The 1992 Domestic Violence Law specifies the appropriate police 
response to domestic violence, which is intended to protect all members 
of the family, including men and children. It applies equally to 
marriages and to common law relationships. Criminal penalties for 
violent crimes are the same, regardless of the sex of the offender or 
the victim. The courts heard a number of cases of domestic violence 
against women involving assault or wounding. Victims may request 
restraining orders, which the courts often issue. The courts can 
sentence an offender to jail for breaching such an order. Human rights 
monitors criticized an inconsistency in sentencing for rape, incest, 
and statutory rape. They noted that the lack of sentencing guidelines 
resulted in longer sentences for persons convicted of petty theft than 
for incest; and lesser sentences for incest than for rape or sexual 
assault of nonfamily members.
    Women actively participate in all aspects of national life and are 
well-represented at all levels of both the public and private sectors. 
They form a large percentage of heads of household and are not 
discriminated against in public housing or other social welfare 
programs.
    The National Organization of Women (NOW) is an affiliate of a 
regional women's organization called the Caribbean Women's Association. 
The Business and Professional Women's club, an affiliate of the NOW, 
runs a crisis center staffed by 30 trained counselors and provides 
legal and medical referral services. The center also has a hot line for 
clients who wish to maintain their anonymity. The Government 
established a battered women's shelter, which opened in September 1999.
    In August Minister of Labor Greenidge told a labor meeting that he 
supported strong legislation aimed at preventing sexual harassment in 
the workplace.
    Children born overseas and out of wedlock to Barbadian men are 
considered citizens. However, Barbadian women married to nonBarbadian 
men were unable to confer citizenship on the child, until an act of 
Parliament took effect on August 16. Now a child born to a male or a 
female citizen has immediate citizenship.
    Children.--The Government provides for compulsory education to the 
age of 16. The national health insurance program provides children with 
free medical and dental services for most medical conditions. The 
Government is committed to children's human rights and welfare, 
although violence and abuse against children remain serious problems. 
The Child Care Board is responsible for monitoring and responding to 
the critical welfare needs, interests, and rights of children. 
Statistics from the Child Care Board show that approximately 1,000 
children suffered abuse in 1998-99.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not prohibit discrimination 
against the physically disabled in employment, education, or the 
provision of other state services. However, in 1997 the Ministry of 
Labor established the Disabilities Unit to address the concerns of the 
disabled, and in early 1998 it created an advisory committee on 
disabilities. The Labor Department, a unit within the Ministry that 
finds jobs for the disabled, long has advocated the introduction of 
legislation prohibiting discrimination. In May the Government, labor 
leaders, and the private sector jointly announced an agreement to 
promote a code of practice on the employment of persons with 
disabilities, as part of these groups' continuing social partnership. 
They also agreed to establish targets and time frames for the 
employment of disabled persons in the private and public sectors.
    While there is no legislation mandating provision of accessibility 
to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings, the Town and 
Country Planning Department sets provisions for all public buildings to 
include accessibility to persons with disabilities. As a result, the 
majority of new buildings have ramps, reserved parking, and special 
sanitary facilities for the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers freely exercise their right 
to form and belong to trade unions and to strike. Approximately 30 
percent of the labor force belongs to trade unions. Overall union 
membership appears to have declined slightly in recent years as some 
workers moved to better-paying positions in higher-technology sectors. 
There are two major unions and several smaller ones, representing 
various sectors. The public service union, the National Union of Public 
Workers, is independent of any political party or the Government. Some 
officers of the largest union, the Barbados Workers' Union, are 
associated personally with the Democratic Labour Party. Most unions 
belong to the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations, which 
was founded in 1995.
    The law accords full protection to trade unionists' personal and 
property rights. All private and public sector employees are permitted 
to strike, but essential workers may strike only under certain 
circumstances and after following prescribed procedures.
    In July the nonunion Barbados Police Association supported the 
police in a labor action over unfulfilled promises of increased wages 
and increased allowances. This action followed an October 1999 ``sick-
out'' over the same issues. The police took action because they did not 
receive promised wage increases and increased allowances. For several 
years, the Government has been reviewing wage and pay scales of all 
public service employees, including the police. Police said that they 
are entitled to special consideration since they are not allowed to be 
represented by a trade union because of their domestic security 
function. The police labor action took place in July during the height 
of the local Carnival period. As the action proceeded, members of the 
BDF were called in to supplement those police who reported for work. As 
of year's end, the issues had not been resolved and were still under 
consideration.
    Trade unions are free to form federations and are affiliated with a 
variety of regional and international labor organizations. The 
Caribbean Congress of Labor has its headquarters in Barbados.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the 
authorities respect it in practice. Normally, wages and working 
conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining process, 
but a 1993 tripartite prices and incomes policy accord established a 2-
year wage freeze. A revised (second) protocol contained provisions for 
negotiated increases in basic wages and increases based on 
productivity, which covered 1995-97. In May 1998, the tripartite 
partners signed a third protocol covering 1998-2000, broadened to 
address the needs of disabled workers and to express support for 
international efforts against child labor.
    Employers have no legal obligation to recognize unions under the 
Trade Union Act of 1964, but most do so when a significant percentage 
of their employees express a desire to be represented by a registered 
union. Several foreign-owned international data-processing companies 
challenged union claims in 1997-98 to represent their workforces, 
highlighting the country's need for legislation outlining the union 
recognition process. While there is no specific law that prohibits 
discrimination against union activity, the courts provide a method of 
redress for employees who allege wrongful dismissal. The courts 
commonly award monetary compensation but rarely order reemployment. New 
legislation that would address the union recognition process had been 
pending for about 2 years at year's end.
    There are no manufacturing or special areas where collective 
bargaining rights are legally or administratively impaired. There are 
no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including that by 
children, and there were no reports of its use.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum working age of 16 is observed broadly. 
Compulsory primary and secondary education policies, which require 
school attendance until age 16, reinforce minimum age requirements. The 
Labor Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot 
investigations of enterprises and check records to verify compliance 
with the law. These inspectors may take legal action against an 
employer who is found to have underage workers. The law prohibits 
forced or bonded labor by children, and the authorities effectively 
enforce it (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets and the authorities 
establish minimum wages for specified categories of workers. Only two 
categories of workers have a formally regulated minimum wage--household 
domestics and shop assistants (entry level commercial workers). 
Household domestics are entitled to a minimum wage of about $0.75 
(bds$1.50) per hour, although in actual labor market conditions, the 
prevailing wage is triple that amount. There are two agerelated minimum 
wage categories for shop assistants. The adult minimum wage for shop 
assistants was raised by 13 percent in June 1997, to $2.13 (bds$4.25) 
per hour; the juvenile minimum wage for shop assistants became $1.62 
(bds$3.25) per hour. The minimum wage for shop assistants is marginally 
sufficient to enable a worker and family to meet minimum living 
standards; most employees earn more.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law 
requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess. The Government 
accepts International Labor Organization conventions, standards, and 
other sectoral conventions regarding maximum hours of work. However, 
there is no general legislation that covers all occupations. Employers 
must provide workers a minimum of 3 weeks' annual leave. Unemployment 
benefits and national insurance (social security) cover all workers. A 
comprehensive, government-sponsored health program offers subsidized 
treatment and medication.
    The Factories Act of 1983 sets out the officially recognized 
occupational safety and health standards. The Labor Department enforces 
health and safety standards and follows up to ensure that problems 
cited are corrected by management. The Factories Act also requires that 
in certain sectors firms employing more than 50 workers create a safety 
committee. This committee can challenge the decisions of management 
concerning the occupational safety and health environment. Trade union 
monitors identify safety problems for government factory inspectors to 
ensure the enforcement of safety and health regulations and effective 
correction by management. Government-operated corporations in 
particular were accused of doing a ``poor job'' in health and safety. 
The Government has promised to undertake inspections of government-
operated corporations and manufacturing plants as a priority. Workers 
have a limited right to remove themselves from dangerous or hazardous 
job situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically 
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 BELIZE

    Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a constitution enacted in 
1981 upon independence from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, a 
cabinet of ministers, and a legislative assembly govern the country. 
The Governor General represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely 
ceremonial role of head of state. Prime Minister Said Musa's People's 
United Party (PUP) holds 26 of the 29 seats in the House of 
Representatives. The Government generally respects the constitutional 
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, at times the 
judiciary is subject to political influence.
    The Police Department has primary responsibility for law 
enforcement and maintenance of order. The Belize Defense Force (BDF) is 
responsible for external security but, when deemed appropriate by 
civilian authorities, may be tasked to assist the police department. 
Both the police and the BDF report to the Minister of National Security 
and are responsible to and controlled by civilian authorities. There 
were reports of abuse by the police.
    The economy is primarily agricultural, although tourism has become 
the principal source of foreign exchange earnings. The agricultural 
sector is heavily dependent upon preferential access to export markets 
for sugar and for bananas. The Government favors free enterprise and 
generally encourages investment, although domestic investors are given 
preferential treatment over foreign investors in a number of key 
economic sectors. Preliminary estimates of annual gross domestic 
product growth placed it at 6.2 percent in real terms. Annual per 
capita income was $2,771.
    The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human 
rights; however, there were problems in several areas. Principal human 
rights abuses include several extrajudicial killings, occasional 
brutality and use of excessive force by the police when making arrests, 
poor prison conditions, allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention, 
lengthy pretrial detention, political influence on the judiciary, and 
judicial limits on freedom of the press. Violence and discrimination 
against women, abuse of children, and employer mistreatment of 
undocumented foreign workers also were problems. There were instances 
of trafficking in persons.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
political killings by the security forces; however, there were three 
instances of extrajudicial killing.
    On January 24, six BDF soldiers shot and killed Samuel Ramirez, a 
Guatemalan farmer, near the border between the two countries. A public 
Commission of Inquiry ruled that Ramirez had attacked the soldiers and 
that the killing was justifiable.
    On February 24, an off-duty police officer with a machete chased 
Kelvin ``Brambles'' Barrow into the sea, where Barrow drowned. The 
Ombudsman presented a report to the National Assembly, and the case was 
before the Department of the Public Prosecutor (DPP) at year's end.
    On March 17, Hattieville prison inmates rioted. During the riot, a 
guard shot and killed one inmate. The Ombudsman's investigation 
revealed that the officer was delinquent, and the matter was before the 
DPP at year's end.
    In September 1999, 38-year-old Daniel Tillett died while in police 
custody, after being arrested for fighting in public. On February 14, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions issued instructions to the Police 
Commission to proceed to indictment of the officer-in-charge, Jesus 
Cantun. At year's end, he was in jail awaiting trial.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other inhuman 
punishment; however, the police occasionally used excessive force when 
making arrests. The Government's Ombudsman stated that the second and 
third most common complaints that his office receives involve police 
misconduct and brutality and misconduct on the part of Department of 
Corrections personnel. The Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his 
office would have approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
    The Police Department's internal affairs and discipline section, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ombudsman's office, and on 
occasion, special independent commissions appointed by the Prime 
Minister, investigate allegations of abuse by officials. When the 
Internal Affairs Division was established in 1995, it received 50 
complaints against police officers; in 1999, the number had increased 
to 299. The increase may reflect an increase in abuse by officials as 
well as an increase in the public's willingness to report such abuses.
    On February 14, a police officer shot and wounded a BDF soldier in 
Orange Walk Town. Witnesses claimed that the two men were involved in a 
verbal altercation. When the soldier pulled his machete, the police 
officer drew his firearm and shot the soldier in the abdomen. The 
exiting bullet struck an innocent bystander. Both victims recovered 
from their wounds. The officer was arrested and suspended from the 
force; at year's end, the Ombudsman was investigating the incident.
    On April 4, police shot escaped prisoner Darrel ``Bagga'' Jones. 
All investigations determined this to be a justified use of force.
    On May 20, while on duty at the national agriculture and trade 
show, a police officer shot and wounded a man. Immediately prior to the 
shooting, the sergeant in charge ordered the officer not to shoot. The 
victim had been brandishing a piece of cardboard that had a dead snake 
glued to it. The authorities suspended the officer from duty, and the 
Ombudsman was conducting an investigation at year's end.
    On August 27, two national team soccer players claimed that police 
beat them while they were handcuffed in Orange Walk Town. Police 
Commissioner Hughington Williams suspended the chief inspector for the 
district, James Magdaleno, and assistant inspector Eli Salazar, pending 
the outcome of the investigation. Williams also took disciplinary 
action against constables Roger Briceno, Mateo Carrillo, and A. Coc. 
The matter still was before the police internal affairs division at 
year's end.
    In April 1999, two Guatemalan men, Hector Balcarcel and Ricardo 
Guzman, were detained at the Guatemala-Belize border. They were taken 
into police custody, allegedly detained for 5 days, and Balcarcel 
allegedly was tortured. Balcarcel's report to the Human Rights 
Commission and the Guatemalan embassy claimed that he was stripped, 
handcuffed, burned with a lighter and habanero peppers on his genitals, 
beaten with a stick, and forced to drink his own urine. After an 
internal investigation, the police determined that these allegations 
were false. An internal review of this investigation still was underway 
at year's end.
    In June 1999, the authorities arrested a police constable and 
charged him with extortion and corruptly soliciting a reward. They 
relieved him of duty and put him on trial in the Supreme Court; the 
court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine.
    On March 16, two inmates at the Hattieville prison, Nehru Smith and 
Bert Elijios, were sentenced to receive corporal punishment in 
accordance with prison rules for assaulting and nearly killing another 
inmate. Smith and Elijios received 12 and 6 tamarind lashes 
respectively. The Minister of Prisons gave official support and 
approval for the floggings. On March 31, the newly reappointed prison 
governor stated that the floggings were necessary, but that while he 
was in charge, no other prisoners would be punished in that fashion.
    On March 17, between 300 and 400 prisoners at Hattieville reacted 
to the floggings by rioting. During the riot, one prisoner was killed, 
and three were hospitalized with gunshot wounds (see Section 1.a.). The 
matter still was before the DPP at year's end.
    On August 28, an inmate at the Hattieville correctional facility 
was given 12 lashes for stabbing a fellow inmate in the neck during an 
altercation over $2 (bz$4). A visiting judge sentenced the prisoner to 
the lashings following a hearing. The punishment was administered in 
accordance with prison rules, despite the new prison governor's earlier 
vow that floggings would not occur.
    Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the Hattieville 
Department of Corrections--the country's only prison--have deteriorated 
continually since it opened in 1993. Although designed to house 500 
inmates, it houses 745 male inmates and 20 female inmates, resulting in 
approximately 6 inmates in each 6-by-9 foot cell. The majority of 
prison accommodations do not have showers or toilets. Instead, inmates 
are provided with 5-gallon buckets. The prison psychiatrist provides 
mental health services for inmates. There is no separate facility for 
inmates with mental illnesses. First-time offenders are housed in the 
same building as those who commit capital crimes. Noncitizens 
constitute approximately 15 to 20 percent of the prison population. 
There are rare reports of human rights abuses in the form of physical 
brutality by prison wardens. Incidents of gang- and drug-related 
violence in the prison are on the rise. Frequent prison breaks, 
confiscation of weapons, and reports of beatings have occurred 
throughout the prison's history. Prison authorities estimated that they 
confiscated more than 1,500 deadly weapons by year's end. The 
authorities reported that there were 53 prison escapes during the year; 
all but 3 escapees were captured by year's end.
    The prison includes a separate facility for women.
    The Government took steps to curb recidivism and focus on 
rehabilitation. The Youth Enhancement Agency (YEA) houses over 60 
youths between the ages of 13 and 25, who participate in rehabilitation 
and job training programs. Prison authorities provided training for 
inmates in basic skilled trades such as carpentry. Increasingly, 
youthful offenders are transferred from the main prison to the YEA 
facilities. A job-training program at a citrus farm employs 44 inmates. 
There is a timeoff program for good behavior.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government observes 
these provisions to a degree; however, there were occasional 
accusations of arbitrary arrest and detention.
    The law requires the police to inform a detainee of the cause of 
detention within 48 hours of arrest and to bring the person before a 
court to be charged formally within 72 hours. In practice the 
authorities normally inform detainees immediately of the charges 
against them. Bail is granted in all but the most serious cases. In 
cases involving narcotics, the police cannot grant bail, but a 
magistrate's court may do so after a full hearing. There are persistent 
allegations that security forces hold detainees for 72 hours and 
release them, but upon release, arrest them again. In May the newly 
appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice published and promulgated ``The 
Judges' Rules,'' which outline a code of conduct to which police 
officers must adhere when dealing with arrested persons. Many detainees 
cannot afford bail, and backlogs in the docket often cause considerable 
delays and postponement of hearings, resulting in an overcrowded 
prison, and at times prolonged incarceration before trial.
    The Constitution forbids exile, and it does not occur in practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice; however, at times the judiciary is subject to 
political influence. The appearance of judicial independence from the 
executive branch is compromised because some foreign judges and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions must negotiate renewal of their 
contracts with the Government and thus may be vulnerable to political 
interference. In February the Government appointed a new Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, Abdullai Conteh, a jurist from Sierra Leone.
    The judiciary consists of the magistrate's courts, the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Appeals, and a family court that handles cases of 
child abuse, domestic violence, and child support. Those convicted by 
either a magistrate's court or the Supreme Court may appeal to the 
Court of Appeals. In exceptional cases, including those resulting in a 
capital sentence, the convicted party may make a final appeal to the 
Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
    Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses have constitutional 
rights to presumption of innocence, protection against self-
incrimination, defense by counsel, a public trial, and appeal. Legal 
counsel for indigent defendants is provided by the State only for 
capital crimes. In April 1999, the Government appointed an attorney to 
the Legal Aid Center to improve and strengthen legal aid services to 
the public. The judicial system is constrained by a severe lack of 
trained personnel, and police officers often act as prosecutors in the 
magistrate's courts.
    Trial by jury is mandatory in capital cases.
    A Political Reform Commission recommended that the family court be 
placed at the same level as the magistrate's courts, a recommendation 
that the Government adopted. However, trials in cases that come before 
the family court generally are private. The convicted party in family 
court may appeal to the Supreme Court. Defendants have the right to be 
present at their trial unless the opposing party fears for his or her 
safety. In such a case, the court grants interim provisions under which 
both parties are addressed individually during a 5day period.
    There are lengthy trial backlogs in the judicial system. One factor 
commonly cited is the low pay offered to judges, resulting in high 
turnover rates. In addition an inordinate number of significant 
narcotics-related cases are taking years to resolve. In these cases, 
defendants often are released on minimal bail payments. In April 1999, 
two retired judges were named to the Supreme Court in a temporary 
capacity to help reduce backlogs. At year's end, only three justices 
served on the Supreme Court, instead of the full complement of five.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violators are 
subject to legal action. However, there were several cases in which the 
previous government exercised its power under the right of eminent 
domain in an arbitrary manner. Such cases take years to resolve in the 
courts.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press but also permits the authorities to 
make ``reasonable provisions'' in the interests of defense, public 
safety, public order, public morality, or public health. These 
provisions include forbidding any citizen to question the validity of 
the financial disclosure statements submitted by public officials. 
Anyone who questions these statements orally or in writing outside a 
rigidly prescribed procedure is subject to a fine of up to $2,500 
(bz$5,000), or imprisonment of up to 3 years, or both.
    A wide range of viewpoints is presented publicly, usually without 
government interference, in seven privately owned weekly newspapers, 
three of which are affiliated directly with major political parties. 
There is no daily press. All newspapers are subject to the constraints 
of libel laws.
    There are a range of privately owned commercial radio stations. In 
addition to these local stations, there are two British military 
stations that broadcast news directly from London. Popular radio call-
in programs are lively and feature open criticism of and comments on 
government and political matters.
    There are eight privately owned television broadcasting stations, 
including several cable networks in Belize City and the major towns. 
The Government's Belize Information Service issues press releases and 
maintains an Internet web site. Two independent television stations 
produce local news and feature programs. The Belize Broadcasting 
Authority regulates broadcasting and asserts its right to preview 
certain broadcasts, such as those with political content, and to delete 
any defamatory or personally libelous material from political 
broadcasts.
    The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects 
it in practice.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects it in 
practice. Political parties and other groups with political objectives 
freely hold rallies and mass meetings. The organizers of public 
meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in advance of the meetings; such 
permits are not denied for political reasons and are granted routinely 
in practice.
    The Constitution permits citizens to form and join associations of 
their choosing, both political and nonpolitical, and the Government 
respects these provisions in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for granting of asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations. The Government's Refugee Department officially closed on 
December 31, 1999. Since then, the UNHCR has relied upon a local 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) to monitor the status of asylees and 
to represent its interests. There were 12 refugees receiving UNHCR 
assistance and awaiting the opportunity to apply for asylum in the 
country. Most are African, originating from Nigeria or Sierra Leone.
    The previous administration appointed members to an eligibility 
committee to review applications for asylum. The committee, which 
included a UNHCR representative, met on a weekly basis. In 1998 the 
Government turned down 30 requests for asylum. The Government has not 
established an eligibility committee since the change of administration 
in 1998. The Government has not accepted applications and no mechanism 
exists to adjudicate asylum requests. There is no legislation that 
formalizes the asylum process. The Government last honored the 
principle of first asylum in the case of four persons in 1995.
    In the wake of the civil conflicts in Central America in the 
1980's, over 40,000 predominantly Hispanic migrants came to Belize, 
many of them entering illegally and living without documentation. In 
May 1999, the Government instituted a 6-week amnesty initiative whereby 
undocumented migrants were eligible to obtain legal residency, 
provided: They had lived in Belize continuously for 4 years, married a 
Belizean citizen or had a stable common-law association, had Belizean 
children, or, if female, were at least 4 months pregnant. The amnesty 
is expected to benefit about 5,000 UNHCR-registered asylees, as well as 
13,000 others. Officials continued processing amnesty applications 
during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Belize is a democracy governed by a national assembly with 
executive direction from a cabinet of ministers headed by Prime 
Minister Said Musa. The law requires national elections every 5 years. 
The Government changed hands in August 1998 when the PUP won 26 of 29 
seats in the House of Representatives in free and fair elections.
    All elections are held by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal 
for citizens 18 years of age and older. National political parties 
include the People's United Party, the United Democratic Party (UDP), 
and the National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The country's 
ethnic diversity is reflected in each party's membership.
    No laws impede participation of women in politics; however, they 
are somewhat underrepresented in electoral politics due to both 
tradition and socioeconomic factors. Voters elected 2 women to the 29-
seat House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate, both appointed, are women. Women also hold a 
number of other appointive offices, including four of nine senate 
seats, one cabinet position, and three are permanent secretaries in 
ministries. The Chief Elections Officer is also a woman.
    There are no laws impeding participation by indigenous people or 
minority groups in politics. There are Mestizo, Creole, Maya, and 
Garifuna representatives in Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), an NGO affiliated 
with regional human rights organizations and partly funded by the 
UNHCR, operates without government restriction on a wide range of 
issues, including migrant and agricultural workers' rights and cases of 
alleged police abuse. The HRCB publishes human rights complaints and 
urges police and other governmental bodies to act upon them. The HRCB 
gained prominence through media reports about its workshops and 
seminars that educate citizens about human rights.
    International human rights groups operate freely as well. 
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
activities.
    The Government's Ombudsman, a position created in 1999, stated that 
his office receives an average of two to three complaints of human 
rights violations per week. The second and third most common complaints 
his office receives involve police misconduct and brutality and 
misconduct on the part of Department of Corrections' personnel. The 
Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his office would have 
approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
    In his first annual report, the Ombudsman highlighted three primary 
concerns: unprofessional police behavior; lack of response by public 
officials to the Ombudsman's formal inquiries; and public officials' 
lack of knowledge regarding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The report 
stated that the office had received 213 formal complaints (about all 
types of perceived abuse by government agencies) in its first 7 months 
of existence; of which the 3-person office had resolved 134 cases.
    On May 9, the Office of the Ombudsman and the HRCB signed a 
memorandum of understanding coordinating efforts to curb human rights 
abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The country is multiracial and multiethnic, and the Government 
actively promotes tolerance and cross-cultural understanding. 
Discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds is illegal and rare, 
although ethnic tension, particularly resentment of recently arrived 
Central American and Asian immigrants, continued to be a problem. The 
Government continues to reserve certain professions for citizens, 
granting permits and licenses to noncitizens only in specific cases. 
These occupations include fishing, souvenir manufacturing, sightseeing 
tours, accounting, insurance, real estate, and legal services.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Based on reported 
cases, the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society 
estimated that there were about 1,000 domestic violence cases during 
the year. A shelter for battered women offers short-term housing. The 
Belize Organization for Women and Development, an NGO, advises women on 
their rights and provides counseling. Laws prohibit rape and sexual 
harassment, but few offenders are charged and convicted. In October 
1999, an expanded criminal code outlawed marital rape. Shortly 
thereafter, the Police Department created a police family violence unit 
in order to combat spousal abuse.
    Despite constitutional provisions for equality, women face social 
and economic prejudice. Women find it more difficult than men to obtain 
business and agricultural financing and other resources. Most employed 
women are concentrated in female-dominated occupations with 
traditionally low status and wages. The Women's Bureau in the Ministry 
of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society is charged with 
developing programs to improve the status of women. That Ministry 
estimated that women would receive 35 percent of all small business 
loans during the year. A number of officially registered women's groups 
work closely with various government ministries in promoting social 
awareness programs. Women have access to education and are active in 
all spheres of national life, but relatively few hold top managerial 
positions. However, women head the Belize Business Bureau, Belize 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Belize Citrus Growers Association, 
several prominent environmental NGO's, and the Belize Rotary Club. The 
law mandates equal pay for equal work, but female workers often earn 
less than men in similar jobs. There are no legal impediments to women 
owning or managing land or other real property.
    There were reports that women have been trafficked for purposes of 
prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Children.--Education is compulsory for children between the ages of 
5 and 15. After children finish their primary education, they may enter 
a secondary school, the government-run apprenticeship program, or a 
vocational institution. However, these programs have room for only 
about one-half of the children finishing primary school; competition 
for spaces in secondary school is intense. Education is nominally free, 
but various school, book, and uniform fees place education out of reach 
for many poor children.
    The Family Services Division in the Ministry of Human Development, 
Women, and Civil Society is devoted primarily to children's issues. The 
division coordinates programs for children who are victims of domestic 
violence, advocates remedies in specific cases before the family court, 
conducts public education campaigns, investigates cases of trafficking 
in children (see Section 6.f.), and works with NGO's and UNICEF to 
promote children's welfare. The National Committee for Families and 
Children includes a representative from the Ministry of Human 
Development, Women, and Civil Society.
    Child abuse is not considered to be widespread or a societal 
problem. In 1998 Parliament passed the Families and Children Act, and 
in 1999 the National Organization for the Prevention of Child Abuse 
(NOPCA) published a handbook for the public that outlined in plain 
language provisions of the law. The law allows authorities to remove a 
child legally from an abusive home environment, removes the limit 
placed on child support that a parent must pay, and allows men to file 
for support, as well as women. It requires parents to maintain and 
support a child until he or she reaches the age of 18, compared with 
the previous law's mandate of support up to the age of 16. The law also 
accepts DNA testing as legal proof of paternity and maternity. It 
requires that all adoptions be reported to the Human Development 
Department of the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil 
Society, and that prospective parents be screened before they may adopt 
a child. The NOPCA instituted a nationwide telephone help line to 
encourage discourse and reduce abuse.
    There were some reports that children were trafficked for the 
purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically 
for accessibility for disabled persons or prohibit job discrimination 
against them. The Government's Disability Services Unit, as well as a 
number of NGO's, such as the Belize Association of and for Persons with 
Disabilities and the Belize Center for the Visually Impaired, provide 
assistance to physically disabled persons. Disabled children have 
access to government special education facilities, although the 
requirements to enter such programs are strict.
    Indigenous People.--Among the country's indigenous people, the 
Mopan and Ke'kchi are grouped under the general term Maya, although 
their leaders say that they should be identified as the Masenal, 
meaning ``common people.'' The Maya have sought official recognition of 
their communal claims to land, but the Government has been reluctant to 
single out one ethnic group for special consideration. The Government 
has designated 77,000 acres as 9 separate Mayan reserves; however, 
Mayan leaders claim that the Maya have an ancestral claim to a total of 
500,000 acres. The Maya have formed cultural councils and other groups 
to advance their interests, sometimes with the collaboration of NGO's 
concerned with environmental and indigenous issues. Several Mayan 
organizations have filed suit to force the Government to recognize the 
Maya's ancestral land rights and to prevent further granting of logging 
concessions on the disputed land.
    On October 12, the Government and the Mayan People of Southern 
Belize signed a collective agreement to address the grievances set 
forth in a petition by Mayan community leaders in the summer of 1998.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--By law and in practice, workers 
generally are free to establish and join trade unions. Eleven 
independent unions, whose members constitute approximately 11 percent 
of the labor force, represent a cross-section of white-collar, blue-
collar, and professional workers, including most civil service 
employees. However, several of these unions are inactive. The Ministry 
of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor recognizes unions 
after they file with the Registrar's Office. The law empowers members 
to draft the bylaws and the constitutions of their unions, and they are 
free to elect officers from among the membership at large. Unions that 
choose not to hold elections may act as representatives for their 
membership, but the national Trade Union Congress permits only unions 
that hold free and annual elections of officers to join its ranks. Both 
law and precedent effectively protect unions against dissolution or 
suspension by administrative authority.
    The law permits unions to strike and does not require them to give 
notice before going on strike.
    Although no unions are affiliated officially with political 
parties, several are sympathetic to one or the other of the two main 
parties (the PUP and the UDP).
    Unions freely exercise the right to form federations and 
confederations and affiliate with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining and unions practice it freely 
throughout the country. Employers and unions set wages in free 
negotiations, or, more commonly, employers simply establish them. The 
Labor Commissioner or his representative acts as a mediator in 
deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations between labor and 
management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides. Historically the 
Commissioner's guidance has been accepted voluntarily. However, should 
either union or management choose not to accept the Commissioner's 
decision, both are entitled to a legal hearing of the case, provided 
that it is linked to some provision of civil or criminal law.
    The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before and 
after a union is registered. Unions may organize freely, but the law 
does not require employers to recognize a union as a bargaining agent. 
For example, although the registered Banana Workers Union actively 
advocated worker rights, it was not recognized by the banana industry's 
growers association due to low membership. Some employers have been 
known to block union organization by terminating the employment of key 
union sympathizers, usually on grounds purportedly unrelated to union 
activities. Effective redress is extremely difficult to obtain in such 
situations. Technically, a worker can file a complaint with the Labor 
Department, but in practice it is virtually impossible to prove that a 
termination was due to union activity.
    The Labor Code applies in the country's export processing zones 
(EPZ's). There are no unions in the EPZ's, reflecting the general 
weakness of organized labor in the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
laws forbid forced, compulsory or bonded labor, including that 
performed by children, and generally it is not known to occur; however, 
there were reports that women were trafficked and infrequent reports 
that children also were trafficked for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Act prohibits all employment of children under 
age 12, and prohibits employment of children between the ages of 12 and 
14, before the end of school hours on official school days. The minimum 
age for employment is 17 years for work near hazardous machinery. 
Inspectors from the Departments of Labor and Education enforce this 
regulation. During the year, truancy officers, who historically have 
borne the brunt of the enforcement burden, were more active. The law 
requires children between the ages of 5 and 15 to attend school, but 
there are many truants and dropouts. According to the Central 
Statistics Office, in the 1990's, 46 percent of children did not 
complete primary school, and 10 percent of those children never 
enrolled in school at all. On March 21, the Government ratified 
International Labor Organization Convention No. 182 on the worst forms 
of child labor.
    Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and in general 
the Government effectively enforces this prohibition; however, there 
were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for purposes of 
prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $1.12 
(bz$2.25), except in export industries, where it is $1.00 (bz$2.00) per 
hour. For domestic workers in private households and shop assistants in 
stores where liquor is not consumed, the rate is $0.87 (bz$1.75) per 
hour. The minimum wage law does not cover workers paid on a piecework 
basis. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor 
is charged with enforcing the legal minimum wage, which generally is 
respected in practice. The minimum wage as sole source of income does 
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most 
salaried workers receive more than the minimum wage.
    The law sets the normal workweek at no more than 6 days or 45 
hours. It requires payment for overtime work, 13 public holidays, an 
annual vacation of 2 weeks, and sick leave for up to 16 days. An 
employee is eligible for severance pay provided that he was employed 
continuously for at least 5 years.
    The exploitation of undocumented Guatemalan, Honduran, and 
Salvadoran workers, particularly young service workers and possibly 
some agricultural workers, continued to be a problem. Banana farm 
owners slowly are moving the housing they provide for their workers 
away from the fields where poisonous pesticides are sprayed. Health 
clinics in the region report that the most frequently treated ailments 
are pesticide-related skin conditions. Company-provided housing often 
lacks electricity and water. The Government, the HRCB, and other 
concerned citizens all focus on this problem; however, since turnover 
rates of banana workers are so high, organizing this segment of the 
work force is difficult.
    A patchwork of health and safety regulations covers numerous 
industries, and the Labor Department in the Ministry of Industry, 
Commerce, Public Services, and Labor enforces these regulations to 
varying degrees. Enforcement is not universal, and the ministries 
commit their limited inspection and investigative resources principally 
to urban and more accessible rural areas where labor, health, and 
safety complaints have been registered. Workers have the legal right to 
remove themselves from a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy 
to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does proscribe procurement for the 
purpose of prostitution. Nonetheless, one dance hall owner reportedly 
recruited women from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to work as 
prostitutes by promising them jobs as dancers, waitresses, or 
domestics. Upon arrival, the employer allegedly takes their passports, 
forces them to engage in prostitution, and holds their wages. The 
police have investigated, but had not made any arrests by year's end, 
nor had the Government taken any other steps to address this practice.
    The Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society, the 
police department, and--in cases involving migrant children--the 
Ministry of National Security and Immigration investigate and attempt 
to remedy cases that involve trafficking in children (see Section 5). 
According to a spokesperson from the Human Development Department, 
there were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for the 
purpose of prostitution; most involved migrant children.
                               __________

                                BOLIVIA

    A constitutional, multiparty democracy with an elected president 
and bicameral legislature, Bolivia has separate executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of government, with an attorney general 
independent of all three. President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the 
Nationalist Democratic Action party took office in August 1997. The 
government coalition controls the Senate but only has a plurality of 57 
out of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the coalition 
holds the leadership positions in both chambers. The executive and 
legislative branches suffer from corruption and inefficiency to some 
extent. The judiciary, while independent, also is corrupt and 
inefficient.
    The National Police have primary responsibility for internal 
security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical 
situations, and this occurred during the year. The police provided 
security for coca eradication work crews in the Chapare region. A 
special counternarcotics force (FELCN), including the Mobile Rural 
Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to antinarcotics enforcement. 
Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over the 
security forces; however, some members of these forces committed human 
rights abuses.
    Bolivia has extensive poverty, and many citizens lack access to 
such basic services as potable water, sewage, electricity, and primary 
health care. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,087. 
According to the World Bank, between 1993 and 1999, approximately 67 
percent of the population lived below the national poverty line. The 
country is rich in minerals and hydrocarbons, and extensive investments 
in petroleum deposits in the eastern and southern parts of the country 
are expected to form a basis for strong GDP growth in the future. 
However, most workers engage in traditional agriculture, and many 
citizens remain barely linked to the cash economy.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remain in certain areas. Legal and 
institutional deficiencies prevented the full protection of citizens' 
rights. In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in 
Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project, and unrelated 
protests occurred across the country, leading to the deaths of 
protesters as well as members of the security forces; commerce was 
brought to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer declared a 
state of siege, which Congress approved on April 13. The stage of siege 
ended on April 20. Nongovernmental human rights organizations 
criticized the state of siege and the killings, injuries, and 
preventive detentions that took place during it. Violent demonstrations 
and other confrontations due to an unrelated list of grievances against 
the Government also took place in September and October, and resulted 
in the deaths of up to 10 civilians, 4 security officials, and the 
spouse of 1 of the security officials. There were a number of 
allegations of torture. There were credible reports of abuses by 
police, including use of excessive force, petty theft, extortion, and 
improper arrests. Investigations of alleged official abuses were slow. 
Prison conditions are harsh and at times police arbitrarily arrested 
and detained persons. The most pervasive human rights abuse continued 
to be prolonged incarceration of detainees due to antiquated procedures 
and inefficiency and corruption in the judicial system. Other problems 
include infringements on citizens' privacy rights, government attempts 
to intimidate some news media, violence and discrimination against 
women, abuse of children, discrimination against and abuse of 
indigenous people, discrimination against Afro-Bolivians, child labor, 
inhuman working conditions in the mining industry, and trafficking in 
women.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings. However, security forces 
killed some protesters during violent demonstrations in April and 
September.
    In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in 
Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project. These 
demonstrations, combined with unrelated protests across the country, 
brought commerce to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer 
declared a state of siege. Under a state of siege, the President has 
the authority to forbid demonstrations that threaten the public order 
and detain persons who are suspected of plotting against the public 
order (see Section 1.d.). In the days that followed, there were violent 
clashes between security forces and demonstrators. It appears likely 
that at least three out of the four civilians killed during the April 
demonstration were killed by security forces. In addition, 1 army 
officer was killed, and over 50 persons were injured. The state of 
siege ended on April 20.
    On October 10, the civilian justice system ordered 17 military 
officers and soldiers to testify or face arrest on charges in the death 
of a protester on April 8 in Cochabamba. The military officials did not 
testify and sought to have the case transferred to the military justice 
system at year's end. The Government agreed to pay all medical costs, 
as well as compensation up to $1,575 (10,000 bolivianos), to those 
injured in the violent disturbances in April, September, and October, 
depending on the severity of the injury. In addition, the Government 
awarded up to $2,362 (15,000 bolivianos) in compensation to the 
families of those killed in April and up to $3,937 (25,000 bolivianos) 
to the families of those killed in September. At year's end, the 
Government was paying the medical costs and had compensated the 
families of those persons killed in April but had not yet compensated 
those injured in April, September, and October, nor paid compensation 
to the families of those killed in September.
    The military justice case against alleged sharpshooter Captain 
Robinson Iriarte Lafuente, who was videotaped by television news 
organizations in civilian clothes kneeling alongside troops and firing 
a rifle during the disturbances in Cochabamba, was pending at year's 
end. On April 27, Captain Iriarte testified before the congressional 
Human Rights Committee that he fired shots in three different locations 
at walls and buildings to intimidate civilians who were rioting nearby. 
Iriarte claimed that each time he received permission from a superior 
officer at the scene. Armed Forces Commander Admiral Jorge Zabala 
earlier told the Congressional Human Rights Committee that, during the 
state of siege, soldiers only were authorized to fire live ammunition 
by order of their commander, and the 7th Division Commander, Brigadier 
General Jose Antonio Gil, testified that he gave no such order.
    The Constitution provides for declaration of a state of siege, 
which the Congress must approve, and many administrations have utilized 
it. In August the Constitutional Tribunal affirmed the 
constitutionality of the state of siege. However, human rights 
organizations criticized the state of siege and the resulting deaths, 
injuries, and detentions (see Section 1.d.).
    Violent demonstrations and other confrontations, due to an 
unrelated list of grievances against the Government, also took place in 
September and October. Protesting groups ranged from illegal coca 
growers in the Chapare, indigenous farmers in the highlands, to urban 
and rural teachers' unions, to groups protesting a controversial 
municipal water project in Cochabamba. These demonstrations resulted in 
the deaths of up to 10 civilians, and approximately 180 civilians were 
injured. At least three of these deaths were not plausibly attributable 
to the security forces. The Government enjoined the security forces to 
act with restraint and to avoid head-to-head conflict with 
demonstrators, and their performances generally were in keeping with 
these orders, despite violent provocations (see Section 2.b.). In 
addition, four security officials and the spouse of one of them 
disappeared in the Chapare during the disturbances and later were found 
tortured and murdered. Another security official was missing and 
presumed dead at year's end.
    The case of the November 1999 death of Miguel Angel continued to 
move slowly through the judicial system. Rivero Siles, a 17-year-old 
prisoner accused of murder, died due to severe burns suffered while he 
was held in a solitary confinement cell at San Sebastian prison in 
Cochabamba. Investigations into actions by police at the prison 
continued during the year. The authorities removed the prison governor, 
closed the solitary confinement cells, and replaced them with a regular 
jail cell that is used to punish prisoners for poor behavior by 
isolating them from the rest of the prison (see Section 1.c.).
    The case of 18-year-old Marcelo Botelho, who police arrested in 
October 1999 in Santa Cruz and who died the next day in a hospital, was 
closed. Although there were allegations that the police had beaten 
Botelho, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not 
pursue a case against the police.
    On May 20, 1999, police arrested Peruvian businessman Carlos Freddy 
Cano Lopez, after he refused to pay a disputed taxi fare. Cano suffered 
third degree burns over 50 percent of his body when his cell 
mysteriously caught fire. The authorities transferred Cano to a 
hospital in Lima, Peru, where he died in June 1999. The authorities 
suspended the policemen in question and their judicial case was pending 
at year's end.
    On January 13, the Government completed investigations and issued 
reports concerning the five unresolved cases of civilian deaths during 
the fatal confrontations between security forces and illegal coca 
growers in the Chapare in the spring of 1998. The reports were 
forwarded to the Cochabamba district attorney who recommended on 
February 1 that all five cases (plus two others) be closed. However, a 
judge in Villa Tunari decided to continue proceedings on three cases 
and following his decision allegedly received threats, which later 
apparently ceased. The three cases in question subsequently were 
transferred to a Superior Court in Cochabamba, which ruled that two of 
the cases should be closed and that one case, the death of Alberto Coca 
Cayo, should be sent back to the judge in Villa Tunari to continue 
proceedings. Military officers charged in the case petitioned for the 
case to be transferred to the military justice system. The case was 
transferred back to the superior court in Cochabamba, where the 
decision as to which jurisdiction would consider the case was pending 
at year's end.
    After 2-1years, the Government completed its investigations into 
the December 1996 events at Amayapampa and Capasirca that left nine 
civilians and one policeman dead in clashes between miners and security 
forces. The findings held five military officers responsible but 
absolved then-President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his ministers of 
any responsibility. The cases against the accused officers were pending 
in the military justice system at year's end; five officers were 
reassigned to nonoperational units pending the outcome of their legal 
cases. An attempt in Congress to censure Sanchez de Lozada and his 
ministers also was pending at year's end. The Government's delay in 
completing effective investigations and identifying and punishing those 
responsible for either civilian or security force deaths results in an 
atmosphere of impunity.
    There was violence during the year against government security 
forces and coca eradication crews. On January 20, an unknown assailant 
shot and killed Joint Eradication Task Force (JTF) conscript Raul 
Almendras; police later arrested a coca grower as a suspect in the 
murder. On May 14, a government helicopter flying in support of 
eradication efforts was fired upon; one JTF soldier was wounded. The 
JTF in the Chapare was fired upon on August 2, and the Ecological 
Police, who provide security for the JTF, returned fire and wounded one 
of the assailants, who subsequently was arrested along with a 
companion. On August 18, there were two serious explosive incidents 
that injured a policeman and another government employee. One suspect 
subsequently was arrested. In separate booby trap blasts on October 11, 
a coca eradication soldier and a civilian were injured. On October 21, 
as the JTF near Puerto Zudanez was returning to base camp, it was fired 
upon. Two members of the JTF were killed and four were wounded. On 
November 13, the JTF column was ambushed while proceeding to eradicate 
coca in the Ismael Montes sector. One policeman, Abad Espinoza, was 
killed.
    There were several reported cases of alleged criminals lynched or 
burned by civilians, sometimes resulting in death, for their alleged 
crimes.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The case of Jose Carlos Trujillo Oroza drew renewed attention as 
the most prominent of the cases of those who disappeared during the 
1971-78 de facto regime of President Hugo Banzer Suarez. Trujillo's 
mother presented the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in June 1999. The security forces had detained Trujillo, a 21-year-old 
university student, in December 1971, and he never was seen again after 
February 2, 1972. Trujillo's mother first presented his case to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in September 1992. In 1996 
President Sanchez de Lozada's Government accepted responsibility for 
Trujillo's arrest and disappearance and named those responsible, but 
did not hold them accountable. On January 25, the Banzer Government 
accepted responsibility for Trujillo's arrest and disappearance before 
the Court. The Government offered to begin negotiations with Trujillo's 
mother, who is seeking the return of her son's remains and punishment 
for those responsible, with the goal of an amicable settlement. These 
negotiations still were unsuccessful at year's end. The Government was 
pursuing cases against some persons accused of torture and deprivation 
of freedom, but not murder, in the Trujillo case. At year's end, the 
family was appealing the decision of the judicial system not to pursue 
murder charges.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government 
generally respects this provision; however, there were a number of 
significant allegations of torture, beatings, and abuse by members of 
the security forces. There were no independently confirmed reports of 
abuse or beatings by security forces of civilians during the year.
    During the April state of siege (see Section 1.a.), there were 
allegations that the military took residents of Achacachi into custody 
in the middle of the night and beat them in an attempt to learn the 
names of those responsible for the death of an army captain. The army 
captain was an officer in a unit thought by demonstrators to be 
responsible for the earlier death of a civilian in Achacachi. A mob 
beat the captain, and after he was taken to a hospital, dragged him 
from the hospital and beat him to death. There also were allegations 
that arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege were beaten by 
the military prior to being transferred to the custody of the PTJ.
    There were allegations that security officials beat protesters who 
they detained in the Chapare during the September-October disturbances, 
as well as allegations that they beat civilians to try to learn the 
location of missing security officials and the names of those 
responsible for their deaths.
    There also were credible allegations that military officers and 
sergeants beat and otherwise mistreated military conscripts. The 
military justice case against superiors accused of allegedly beating 
conscript Roger Candia Vallejos in September and November 1999 
continued at year's end.
    Several police officers were fired and charged for off-duty crimes, 
and a number were dismissed for corruption. However, in general the 
police were not disposed to investigate their own colleagues, and 
prosecutors were reluctant to prosecute security officials for alleged 
offenses committed while on duty.
    Neither the technical and judicial police nor prosecutors normally 
receive human rights training. Over 6,000 FELCN members, PTJ members, 
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges received training on bail provisions 
of the new Code of Criminal Procedures. In July foreign consultants 
conducted a 1-week human rights course for 33 FELCN investigators. The 
basic FELCN and UMOPAR training includes a human rights module.
    In September 1999, the military signed a cooperation agreement with 
the Ombudsman's office and, in November 1999, the military concluded an 
agreement for cooperation and coordination for human rights training 
with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, which took place during 
the year.
    Indigenous communities in areas with little or no central 
government presence impose punishment reliably reported to include the 
death penalty on members who violate traditional laws or rules, 
although the Constitution prohibits such punishment.
    Prison conditions are harsh. Prisons are overcrowded, and 
conditions can be life threatening for inmates without money. According 
to the Director General of the Penal System in the Ministry of 
Government, as of July there were approximately 8,500 prisoners in 
facilities designed to hold 4,400 prisoners. The majority of all 
prisoners were held for narcotics crimes. The Pardon and Extraordinary 
Freedom Jubilee 2000 Law, an amended version of which took effect on 
December 8, is expected to reduce this overcrowding. The law pardons 
prisoners under the age of 21 or over the age of 60; reduces felony 
sentences by onethird for all prisoners sentenced prior to August 30; 
and pardons prisoners who are parents of minor children and have 
completed at least 50 percent of their sentences. (Reductions in felony 
sentences are not extended to prisoners convicted of murder, parricide, 
or treason, nor to most prisoners convicted of terrorism, rape, or 
narcotics trafficking. In addition, prisoners who were convicted for 
murder, rape, kidnaping, terrorism, or narcotics crimes and sentenced 
to more than 10 years in jail are not eligible for the benefits given 
to prisoners under age 21 or over age 60, or to parents of minor 
children.) The one-third reduction in sentences is expected to be that 
many prisoners would then have served over 50 percent of their 
sentences and thus be eligible for parole much sooner than expected. 
The law is expected to lead to the release of between 1,500 and 2,000 
prisoners over the course of 2001.
    Ability to pay can determine a prisoner's cell size, visiting 
privileges, day-pass eligibility, and place or even length of 
confinement. Cell prices range from $20 to $5,000 (125 to 30,000 
bolivianos), paid to prior occupants or to prisoners who control cell 
blocks. For example, in the poorest parts of San Pedro prison in La 
Paz, inmates occupy tiny cells (3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation, 
lighting, or beds. Crowding in some ``low-rent'' sections obliges 
inmates to sleep sitting up. Although only children up to 6 years old 
are supposed to live with an incarcerated parent, children as old as 
age 12 live with their fathers in San Pedro prison. According to the 
Director General, as of July there were 900 children living with a 
parent in prison. If such children have nowhere else to go, the 
Government considers it more humane to support them in prison than to 
leave them homeless in the streets. The standard prison diet, according 
to a 1995 study, can cause anemia; the diet has not been improved since 
then. The Government budgets only $0.32 (2 bolivianos) per prisoner per 
day for food. Prisoners who can afford to use their own money to 
supplement the standard prison diet by buying food do so. There is no 
adequate health care within the prisons, and it is very difficult for 
prisoners to get permission for outside medical treatment. However, 
affluent prisoners can obtain transfers to preferred prisons or even to 
outside private institutional care for ``medical'' reasons. Drugs and 
alcohol are readily available for those inmates who can pay.
    There are separate prisons for women; conditions for female inmates 
are similar to those for men.
    Convicted juvenile prisoners are not segregated from adult 
prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other 
prisoners are scarce to nonexistent. The Government has acknowledged 
these problems but does not have sufficient resources to correct them 
quickly.
    On June 28, Brazilian prisoner Mustafa Samir was found hanged and 
on June 29, Peruvians Omar Casis and Renaldo Montesinos were shot and 
killed at the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison located 
near La Paz. Investigations into these deaths were pending at year's 
end. The prison houses the country's most violent prisoners and 
terrorists.
    Unlike 1999 there were no instances of prisoners dying from fires 
in their cells during the year. In November 1999, prisoner Miguel Angel 
Rivero Siles died as the result of a fire in his prison cell; in May 
1999 Carlos Freddy Cano Lopez was arrested and suffered severe burns 
after his cell mysteriously caught fire. He died in a hospital that 
June (see Section 1.a.). These were the second and third times since 
1998 that prisoners had been burned in their cells. In 1999 the 
authorities discharged the two policemen arrested for attempting to 
burn a drunken man in September 1998, but their judicial case still was 
pending at year's end. On November 29, 1999, the Ombudsman and the 
Ministry of Government signed an agreement that led to the closing of 
several prisons determined to have inhuman conditions, including the 
detention cell in La Paz where Cano Lopez was burned. The agreement 
also called for repair of other substandard prisons, including San 
Sebastian prison in Cochabamba where Rivero Siles was burned. The San 
Sebastian solitary confinement cells subsequently were removed and 
replaced by a regular jail cell (see Section 1.a.).
    In October 1999, Marcelo Botelho died in a Santa Cruz hospital and 
human rights organizations alleged that police had beaten the victim. 
However, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not 
pursue a case against the police (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and 
news media representatives.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were some 
instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out 
openly. The law requires a valid warrant, which a court must confirm 
within 48 hours. However, there were credible reports that these legal 
safeguards were violated in some cases.
    On April 8, President Banzer declared a state of siege (see Section 
1.a.), which under the Constitution provides for the detention of 
persons who are suspected of plotting against the public order. Those 
detained must be brought before a judge within 48 hours. The 
authorities detained 22 persons seen as instigators of the protests. 
Those detained included Felipe Quispe Huanca, executive secretary of 
the Sole Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(CSUTCB), and several other trade unionists, peasant leaders, and 
university students. Quispe, the leader of indigenous farmers who 
manned roadblocks outside La Paz, is a former terrorist in the Tupaj 
Katari Guerrilla Army who was imprisoned during 1992-97 and then 
granted conditional release. Another approximately 50 persons were 
arrested for violating the state of siege and later released. The 
Ombudsman and human rights organizations challenged the detentions as 
illegal, since the authorities detained the 22 persons on April 7, 
prior to the April 8 supreme decree that enacted the state of siege. 
All 22 detainees were released by April 14, and the state of siege 
ended on April 20. The La Paz superior court and the Constitutional 
Tribunal both ruled in favor of the habeas corpus petitions after the 
detainees already had been released. The Ombudsman's office noted that 
this state of siege was the first in which habeas corpus was used as a 
legal tactic to attempt to force the Government to release detainees. 
There were allegations that the military beat residents of Achacachi 
and arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege (see Section 
1.c.).
    Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains the most 
pervasive human rights problem. Judicial corruption, a shortage of 
public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex 
criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or 
even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial 
determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a 
judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months. 
Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford 
legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened (see Section 
1.e.).
    According to a 1998 study, approximately 60 percent of those jailed 
still were waiting for the processing of their cases to be finished, 
and of those, 30 percent already had served what would have been the 
maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.
    The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice 
by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the 
judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as 
they come to light. In May provisions of the new Code of Criminal 
Procedures replaced the release provisions of the Personal Recognizance 
Law, promulgated in 1996, which were never utilized effectively. Most 
prisoners still await either trial or sentencing, but under the new 
Code of Criminal Procedures the courts are beginning to provide release 
on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order 
preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight 
risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a 
judge still can order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.
    The expanding public defender program provides concise information 
about human rights to citizens and seeks to involve public defenders in 
arrest cases at the earliest possible juncture to ensure that human 
rights and due process are honored. A program of mobile public 
defenders who can reach the more remote parts of the country has proven 
effective.
    Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in 
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their 
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no 
judicial review.
    The 1997 abduction case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the 
Bolivian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), continued to move 
slowly through the judicial system. The authorities had yet to take any 
action regarding the four police officials accused of abducting 
Albarracin, although legal cases against two policemen were pending at 
year's end.
    The Government does not use forced exile as a punishment.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent; 
however, corruption and intimidation in the judicial system remain 
major problems. Poor pay and working conditions help make judges and 
prosecutors susceptible to bribes.
    The judicial system has four levels of trial: Investigative, trial, 
superior court, and Supreme Court or Constitutional Court appellate 
review. Since the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1998, 
the Supreme Court hears only appeals of substantive laws, not 
constitutional issues. The system is essentially a closed, written 
system. With rare exceptions, a judge does not interview witnesses, nor 
does an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses before the 
judge exist. The highly formal and corrupt judicial system makes it 
difficult for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to 
courts and legal redress.
    In cases not involving the narcotics law, a judge of instruction is 
in charge of the first stage. The judge instructs the police about what 
witness statements he wishes to take. A prosecutor, who is an overseer 
of correct procedure, may intervene, if the judge deems it necessary, 
to give an advisory opinion. Often this opinion is provided in advance 
and contains the statements of all witnesses interviewed by the police 
or the prosecutor. If the judge finds that the evidence is conclusive 
of guilt, the judge submits the case to a sentencing judge for review. 
This second stage of trial involves an analysis of this evidence by the 
trial judge, who allows the defense to present additional evidence. The 
trial judge is not required to seek additional evidence, although the 
judge may add additional witnesses to be interviewed if deemed 
necessary.
    In narcotics (Law 1008) cases, the FELCN handles the investigative 
stage, and there is no judicial review of cases to determine whether a 
case should move to the trial stage. This is expected to change when 
the new Code of Criminal Procedures takes full effect in 2001, and 
narcotics cases are expected to be handled the same as non-narcotics 
cases in the first two stages. The third stage of Superior Court review 
is essentially a review of all evidence, and the court may reopen the 
case for additional witnesses. The Supreme Court review, which is 
virtually automatic if sought in non-narcotics cases and is required in 
all narcotics cases, is a fourth iteration of that process. During the 
superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm, 
lower, raise, or annul sentences, or provide alternatives not 
contemplated in lower courts. The repetitive nature of this four-stage 
procedure requires a great deal of time before a final result is 
reached in an individual case.
    Defendants have constitutional rights to a presumption of 
innocence, to remain silent, to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to 
present evidence on their own behalf, to essential due process, and to 
appeal judicial decisions. However, in practice almost none of these 
rights systematically exist. The full implementation of the new Code of 
Criminal Procedures on May 31, 2001, is expected to alleviate some of 
these problems. The new code is expected to facilitate more efficient 
investigations, transparent oral trials, and credible verdicts. 
Although the law provides for a defense attorney at public expense if 
needed, one is not always promptly available. The Government has hired 
49 additional staff members to bolster rural public defense, achieving 
a total of 167 public defenders, legal assistants, and social workers.
    In October 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Judicial 
Council, established in 1998 to oversee the judicial process and to 
provide an impartial body to review the actions of judges, did not have 
the power to dismiss a Superior Court or higher level judge due to an 
administrative finding of malfeasance alone. The Court ruled that the 
removal of such a judge from office requires a final judgment and 
sentence of conviction in a criminal case tried before the Supreme 
Court. The Council retains its power to suspend without pay, for up to 
13 months, judges against whom a criminal charge has been filed or 
against whom a disciplinary process has been initiated.
    In early 1999, the Council had investigated numerous reports of 
judicial corruption, which led to the resignation or dismissal of more 
than 20 judges in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz. One of the 
dismissed judges, who allegedly accepted bribes from narcotics 
traffickers, protested his dismissal to the Constitutional Court, which 
ruled that only a court finding of malfeasance, rather than a finding 
by an administrative body such as the Council, was cause for dismissal. 
The Court's decision dealt a serious blow to the Judicial Council and 
weakened its role as a disciplinary body. At year's end, legislation 
was pending that would increase the Council's suspension powers to 3 
years or would reinstate the Council's power to dismiss judges found 
guilty of malfeasance by the Council.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of the home 
and the privacy of citizens; however, while the authorities generally 
respect these provisions, there were credible allegations of UMOPAR 
abuses involving thefts of property. Residents in the cocagrowing areas 
generally are reluctant to file and pursue formal complaints. On May 
17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region (see Section 
4).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
fundamental right to express ideas and opinions freely by any means of 
dissemination; however, there are some limitations on freedom of 
speech, and the Government attempted to intimidate some news media. The 
Penal Code provides that persons found guilty of insulting, defaming, 
or slandering public officials for carrying out their duties may be 
jailed from 1 month to 2 years. If the insults are directed against the 
President, Vice President, or a minister, the sentence may be increased 
by one-half.
    Press organizations alleged that the Government intentionally cut 
off electricity for 2 hours on April 8 in Cochabamba during the state 
of siege in order to silence radio and television stations (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). There has been no investigation of these 
allegations, by either press organizations or the Government.
    The 40-person La Paz Press Tribunal is authorized to evaluate 
journalists' practices that are alleged to violate either the 
Constitution or citizens' rights.
    Newspapers are privately owned, and most adopt antigovernment 
positions. State-owned and private radio and television stations 
operate freely. There were credible reports of government attempts to 
intimidate some news media to provide more favorable coverage.
    The Government prohibits the importation of pornographic books, 
magazines, and artwork.
    The Government respects academic freedom, and the law grants public 
universities autonomous status.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities generally 
respect this right in practice; however, under the state of siege the 
Government imposed some limits on this right. The Government routinely 
grants permits for marches and rallies. There were numerous 
demonstrations throughout the year; in some cases protesters blocked 
roads. The Governor of La Paz temporarily instituted a ban on public 
gatherings of more than three persons during the state of siege.
    As a rule, the authorities try to avoid confronting demonstrators. 
However, security forces clashed with union and other demonstrators on 
many occasions during the year, resulting in some deaths and hundreds 
of injuries (see Section 1.a.). The authorities intervened only when 
rallies became dangerously violent or interfered substantially with 
normal civic activity. The authorities regularly use tear gas and other 
forms of crowd control. In early February, violent protests over 
increases in municipal water prices left 130 persons injured (including 
30 police) and led to the arrest of 180 persons.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the authorities 
generally respect this right in practice. The Government requires 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to register with the appropriate 
departmental government. There were complaints in 1999 against the 
departmental government of La Paz for the revocation of civil 
registrations for three NGO's established by the Unification Church 
(see Section 2.c.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman 
Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution recognizes it as the 
official religion. Non-Catholic religious organizations, including 
missionary groups, must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Worship and receive authorization for legal religious 
representation. There were 268 registered religious groups, which were 
mostly Protestant; at year's end, approximately 130 applications were 
pending. The only minority religions in the country that have 
encountered problems are Hari Krishna and the Unification Church. Hari 
Krishna had registered as an educational organization instead of as a 
religious organization. The Government sought to expel Hari Krishna 
from the country in the mid-1980's; however, the attempt failed when 
the Supreme Court declared it illegal. According to the Government, in 
1999 it denied for lack of documentation a Hari Krishna application for 
registration as a religious organization. In August 1999, the 
Unification Church complained of ongoing harassment by the Government, 
specifically citing the August 1998 revocation by the La Paz 
departmental government of three civil registrations for church-
affiliated NGO's. However, the Unification Church still is registered 
legally with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship as a religious 
organization.
    On July 21, President Banzer signed a Supreme Decree governing the 
relationships between religious organizations and the Government. The 
decree updates a similar decree dating from 1985, which had been the 
subject of criticism by Catholic and non-Catholic religious groups. The 
new decree reflects input from religious groups and, according to the 
Government, is designed to increase transparency and dialog in church-
state relations.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on travel. 
However, on numerous occasions during the year protestors blocked roads 
and highways. The law permits emigration and provides for the right to 
return. The Government does not revoke citizenship for political 
reasons.
    The law provides for the grant of asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government has accepted persons for 
resettlement; it received 2 refugees during the year, over 40 refugees 
in 1999, and 5 refugees in 1998. The issue of the provision of first 
asylum did not arise. After the 1996 takeover of the Japanese 
Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru by Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement (MRTA) terrorists, the authorities found that some MRTA 
activists had used Bolivia as a safehaven and announced a more 
restrictive policy on accepting Peruvian political asylees. 
Nonetheless, members of the MRTA and other terrorists continued to use 
the country as a safehaven and a place to plan activities.
    There were no reports of persons forced to return to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Political parties ranging from far left to moderate 
right function openly. Implementing regulations for the 1994 
constitutional revisions provide for half of the congressional deputies 
to be elected individually and directly, rather than from party lists. 
The first national election under these regulations was held in June 
1997, with attendance by international observers. Only one instance of 
tampering with ballots was detected. Elections for national offices are 
held every 5 years; the next national election is scheduled for 2002. 
In August 1997, President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the Nationalist 
Democratic Action Party took office. His coalition controls the Senate 
but has a plurality of only 57 out of 130 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies. However, the government coalition holds leadership positions 
in both chambers.
    There are no legal impediments to women or indigenous people 
voting, holding political office, or rising to political leadership; 
however, women and indigenous people are underrepresented in government 
and politics. Political parties acceded to demands from women that they 
be allocated a fair share of the candidacies in the 1997 national 
elections, approving a law that every third candidate on party lists 
must be female. In addition every other candidate on municipal election 
ballots, beginning with the second candidate, must be a woman--a 
development that has significantly augmented female representation to 
approximately 30 percent of municipal council positions. However, there 
have been reports that in some municipalities party leaders have 
pressured councilwomen to resign in favor of their male substitute, and 
women in three separate municipalities have allegedly been threatened 
with death if they do not resign their positions. There are 20 women 
among the 157 deputies and senators; there are no female ministers in 
the Cabinet and only 4 women among the 45 vice ministers.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views. However, NGO's and the Ombudsman have 
complained that government security forces and government ministries 
have refused to cooperate when NGO's or the Ombudsman are conducting 
investigations. The Government criticizes human rights advocates for 
paying attention exclusively to the negative aspects of the 
Government's performance.
    APDH President Albarracin and his family have received anonymous 
threats in relation to the legal case against his alleged police 
abductors (see Section 1.d.). The APDH's branch office in Santa Cruz 
also received anonymous threats related to its investigations involving 
the security forces; in 1999 unknown parties broke into its office and 
destroyed its computer.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman conducted numerous investigations and in 
August presented a comprehensive report to Congress that was critical 
of the Government, and particularly cited the fact that the greatest 
number of alleged violations were attributed to the police. The Chamber 
of Deputies Human Rights Committee, led by an opposition party 
congressman, also presented its annual report in August, which 
criticized the Government.
    On May 17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region 
with assistance from an international donor. All of the human rights 
offices in the Chapare region had closed in June 1999. These offices 
accept and pursue complaints of human rights abuses committed by 
anyone, including police, narcotics traffickers, and illegal coca 
growers.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, origin, or economic or 
social condition; however, there was significant discrimination against 
women, indigenous people, and the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
    Women.--Violence against women is pervasive, but no system exists 
to register such incidents systematically. According to the National 
Police's Department of Statistics and Planning, in 1998 approximately 
57 percent of reported assaults were perpetrated against women. 
According to a 1997-98 study conducted by the Pan American Health 
Organization and the Ministry of Health among women in three 
municipalities representative of the country's three major cultural and 
geographic zones, 62 percent of women reported experiencing some kind 
of domestic violence or abuse at least once in their lifetime. 
Approximately 21 percent had suffered psychological abuse, 28 percent 
had suffered non-life-threatening physical violence, and 13 percent had 
suffered life-threatening violence. Rape is also a serious problem that 
is highly underreported. It is estimated that only one out of every 
five incidents of violence against women is reported.
    The 1995 Law on Domestic and Family Violence makes the rape of an 
adult victim a public crime; however, the victim must press charges. 
The law also broadens the definition of family member abuse. The 1999 
Law against Sexual Violation created the new crime of statutory rape of 
a person from 14 to 18 years of age and established new penalties of 10 
to 20 years' imprisonment for the rape of a child under the age of 14, 
2 to 6 years' imprisonment for statutory rape, and 5 to 20 year's 
imprisonment for the rape of an adult. The new Code of Criminal 
Procedures provides that crimes against adults included in previous 
laws on sex crimes can be made public crimes; however, the victim must 
press charges. Sexual crimes against minors automatically are 
considered public crimes. Public agencies state that reported incidents 
of abuse have increased markedly as a result of the recent laws, as 
citizens become more aware of the problem and of the availability of 
help. There was no further action on proposed legislation to provide 
benefits and protection for domestic workers, including specific 
protection from physical, psychological, and sexual aggression.
    In October 1999, President Banzer signed the Law to Protect Victims 
of Crimes Against Sexual Freedom, first proposed in 1997 as a draft law 
against sexual harassment. The new Code of Criminal Procedures (see 
Section 1.e.) for the first time considers sexual harassment a civil 
crime, also resulting in greater protection under the law. There are no 
statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment, but the problem 
generally is acknowledged to exist widely in the male-oriented society.
    Prostitution is legal for adults age 18 and older, and there were 
reports of trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights operate 
throughout the country. Family protection police units, staffed by 
specially trained officers, including women, also are active.
    The Maternal and Infant Health Insurance Program, which began in 
1996 and was expanded to the Basic Health Insurance Program in 1999, 
provides 75 types of health services, focused on maternal and infant 
health, to women of reproductive age and to children under the age of 
5.
    Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men. 
Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and 
social conditions remain obstacles to advancement. Women generally earn 
less than men for equal work; however, the minimum wage law treats men 
and women equally.
    Most women in urban areas work in the informal economy and the 
services and trade sectors, including domestic service and micro-
business, whereas in rural areas the vast majority of economically 
active women work in agriculture. Young girls often leave school early 
to work at home or in the economy. According to a 1997 study by the 
Ministry of Education, four out of five illiterate citizens are female. 
Girls have lower rates of school participation and higher dropout rates 
than boys. Although not effectively enforced, the national labor law 
limits women to a workday 1 hour shorter than that of men and prohibits 
them from working at night.
    Children.--The Government is aware of the precarious situation of 
children and the need to provide legal and institutional infrastructure 
for their protection. Seven Defender of Children and Adolescents 
offices were opened in 1997 in La Paz to help protect children's rights 
and interests. However, the Government has not given the poor situation 
of children sufficient political priority to ensure that it can be 
improved quickly and effectively. In December the Government's Inter-
Institutional Commission for the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor 
released a new national plan to address the problem of child labor, 
which includes programs to address financial, health, education, and 
other needs of children (see Section 6.d.).
    In October 1999, President Banzer signed into law a new Code for 
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents, which codifies many obligations the 
country assumed by ratifying the U.N. Convention on Rights of the 
Child. It also regulates adoptions and tightens protection against 
exploitative child labor and violence against children. However, 
resource constraints are expected to impede full implementation of this 
law.
    Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in 
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their own 
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker (see Section 1.d.). 
Corporal punishment and verbal abuse are common in school, and physical 
and psychological abuse in the home also are serious problems.
    Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years 
of primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in 
rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank calculated in 
1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Prolonged 
teachers' strikes often result in lengthy school closures, limiting 
children's access to education.
    The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that 
approximately 24 percent of children under 3 years old were chronically 
undernourished. A December 1999 UNICEF report on infant mortality 
indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children die before they reach 5 years 
of age.
    Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack the birth 
certificates and identity documents they need to secure social benefits 
and protection.
    Although laws provide safeguards against children working, they are 
not enforced effectively. According to a May 1999 study commissioned by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), approximately 369,385 
children between the ages of 7 and 14 work (23 percent of that age 
group), usually to help provide for family subsistence, in uncontrolled 
and sometimes unhealthy conditions (see Section 6.d.).
    Child prostitution is a problem, particularly in urban areas and in 
the Chapare region. At least two NGO's, Fundacion La Paz and Q'Haruru, 
have active programs to fight child prostitution. The Government's plan 
to combat child labor includes a campaign against child prostitution 
(see Section 6.d.).
    The old practice of ``criadito'' service still persists in some 
parts of the country. Criaditos are indigenous children of both sexes, 
usually 10 to 12 years old, whom their parents indenture to middle- and 
upper-class families to perform household work in exchange for 
education, clothing, room, and board. There are no controls over the 
benefits to, or treatment of, such children, who may become virtual 
slaves for the years of their indenture.
    There were unconfirmed reports that children sometimes were sold to 
work in sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--In 1997 the Government promulgated 
regulations to implement the 1995 Law on Disabilities. The regulations 
require wheelchair access to all public and private buildings; duty 
free import of orthopedic devices; a 50 percent reduction in public 
transportation fares; and expanded teaching of sign language and 
Braille. A National Committee for Incapacitated Persons was established 
to oversee the law's enforcement, conduct studies, and channel and 
supervise programs and donations for the disabled. The electoral law 
makes arrangements for blind voters. However, in general there are no 
special services or infrastructure to accommodate disabled persons. A 
lack of adequate resources impedes full implementation of the law. 
Social attitudes keep many disabled persons at home from an early age, 
limiting their integration into society.
    Indigenous People.--Discrimination against, and abuse of, 
indigenous people continued. The indigenous majority generally remains 
at the low end of the socioeconomic scale, facing severe disadvantages 
in health, life expectancy, education, income, literacy, and 
employment. More than one-half of all citizens speak indigenous 
dialects as their first language, and many speak no Spanish at all, 
which essentially excludes them from most of the formal economy. Lack 
of education, inefficient farming and mining methods, indigenous 
cultural practices, and societal biases keep the indigenous people 
poor. They continued to be exploited in the workplace. Some rural 
indigenous workers are kept in a state of virtual slavery by employers 
who charge them more for room and board than they earn. Although the 
1996 Agrarian Reform Law extended the protection of the national labor 
law to all paid agricultural workers, including indigenous workers, the 
problem persists due to lack of effective enforcement.
    The Agrarian Reform Law provides for indigenous communities to have 
legal title to their communal lands and for individual farmers to have 
title to the land they work. The Government and indigenous leaders 
jointly developed provisions of this law. However, the issue of land, 
specifically the Agrarian Reform Law, has been a constant source of 
complaints and protests by indigenous people.
    Indigenous people complain that their territories are not legally 
defined and protected, and that outsiders exploit their resources. 
Specific offenders allegedly are illegal coca growers and timber 
pirates. Indigenous groups have taken advantage of the Popular 
Participation Law to form municipalities that offer them greater 
opportunities for selfdetermination.
    Clashes between Laime and Qaqachaca indigenous groups in the border 
of the Oruro and Potosi departments left dozens dead and injured over 
the course of the year. These groups have a decades-long history of 
tension over disputed land.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is ongoing societal 
discrimination against the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers may form and join 
organizations of their choosing; however, labor leaders consistently 
state that a section of the 1985 Economic Liberalization Decree, which 
addresses the free contracting of labor, undermines any protections 
against dismissal without cause. Labor leaders allege that employers 
use or threaten to use this article to limit unionization. The Labor 
Code requires prior government authorization to establish a union, 
permits only one union per enterprise, and allows the Government to 
dissolve unions by administrative fiat; however, the Government has not 
enforced these provisions in recent years. The law requires the 
Government to confirm the legitimately elected officers of unions, a 
difficult role that it is not known to abuse. While the code denies 
civil servants the right to organize and bans strikes in public 
services, including banks and public markets, nearly all civilian 
government workers are unionized. Workers generally are not penalized 
for union activities; during the April state of siege some union 
leaders and activists were detained, not for union activities, but for 
their alleged roles in fomenting disturbances (see Section 1.d.). In 
theory the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) represents virtually the 
entire work force; however, only about one-half of workers in the 
formal economy actually belong to labor unions. Some members of the 
informal economy also participate in labor or trade organizations. The 
CSUTCB, led by Felipe Quispe, is not a trade union in the traditional 
sense, since there is no counterpart employer with which to bargain. 
The CSUTCB is designed to maximize the power of indigenous farmers with 
respect to the Government and traditional trade unions.
    On December 6, the Government announced that for the remainder of 
the President's term of office, it would not introduce legislation to 
modernize the antiquated Labor Code and patchwork of labor laws and to 
make them conform with ILO conventions that the country already has 
ratified.
    Workers in the public sector frequently exercise the right to 
strike. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the Government has neither 
prosecuted those responsible nor imposed penalties. Significant strikes 
centered around annual negotiations over salaries and benefits for 
public employees. However, their real targets were the Government's 
economic and social reform programs. During the April disturbances (see 
Section 1.a.), riot police struck for more pay. Most strikes were 
conducted and led by the self-described Trotskyite element of the Urban 
Teachers Union, which protested the Government's education reform plan, 
including reform of teacher training institutions, a merit-based salary 
system, and decentralization designed to give municipalities greater 
control over education. Teachers' strikes shut down public schools for 
several weeks in late September.
    Unions are not free from influence by political parties. The COB 
itself is a political organization directed by Marxist ideologues. Its 
stated aim is to end the Government's neoliberal economic program, and 
it gives little attention to serious collective bargaining. Most 
parties have labor committees that attempt to influence union activity 
and also have party activists inside the unions.
    The law allows unions to join international labor organizations. 
The COB became an affiliate of the Communist, formerly Sovietdominated, 
World Federation of Trade Unions in 1988.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers may 
organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining, or voluntary 
direct negotiations between employers and workers without the 
participation of the Government, is limited but growing. The Labor Code 
was written in a period in which the COB, which purports to represent 
all worker groups and interests, had quasi-governmental status and the 
exclusive authority to negotiate with state-owned enterprises. The 
practice was for the COB and the Government to negotiate a global 
agreement on salaries, minimum wages, and other work conditions each 
year. With the privatization of most of these enterprises, the COB's 
relevancy has diminished markedly, and the practice of direct employee-
management negotiations in individual enterprises is expanding.
    The law prohibits discrimination against union members and 
organizers. Complaints go to the National Labor Court, which can take a 
year or more to rule due to a massive backlog of cases. The court has 
ruled in favor of discharged workers in some cases and successfully 
required their reinstatement. However, union leaders say that problems 
are often moot by the time the court rules.
    Labor law and practice in the seven special duty-free zones are the 
same as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship and 
agricultural servitude by indigenous workers (see Section 5) constitute 
violations, as do some individual cases of household workers 
effectively held captive by their employers. In addition, women were 
trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits all work for payment by children under 
the age of 14; however, this prohibition generally is not enforced. 
Child labor is a serious and increasing problem. The Labor Code is 
ambiguous on conditions of employment for minors from 14 to 17 years of 
age and permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years old. The ILO 
has criticized this practice, which is sometimes tantamount to bondage 
(see Section 6.c). The law also prohibits the employment of persons 
under 18 years of age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work.
    Approximately one in every four children between the ages of 7 and 
14 is employed in some way. A May 1999 study by the ILO estimated that 
approximately 70,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14 were working 
in cities, and that approximately 300,000 children in the same age 
group were working in rural areas. The extreme poverty of many families 
dictates the involuntary employment of their children for motives of 
survival. After an ILO-sponsored conference in May 1999 on the 
country's child labor problems, an Inter-Institutional Commission for 
the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor was formed. The Government 
also signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO, pledging more 
attention to child labor, a 5-year plan to combat it, and adoption of 
policies against its most dangerous forms. In November President Banzer 
announced a plan to give small annual payments to families with 
children between the ages of 6 and 14 who were attending school. In 
December the Government's Inter-Institutional Commission released its 
new national plan to address the problem of child labor. The plan, 
which has not yet been funded, includes programs to give families 
alternatives to having children work, and to address financial, health, 
education, and other needs.
    The Labor Ministry is responsible for enforcing child labor 
provisions but generally does not enforce them throughout the country. 
Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years of 
primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in 
rural areas. Urban children sell goods, shine shoes, and assist 
transport operators. Rural children often work with parents from an 
early age, generally in subsistence agriculture. Children generally are 
not employed in factories or formal businesses but, when employed, 
often work the same hours as adults. Children also work in the mines 
and other dangerous occupations in the informal sector. Child 
prostitution is a growing problem, particularly among girls between the 
ages of 14 and 18. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship (criadito) and 
agricultural servitude by indigenous workers constitute violations, as 
do some individual cases of household workers effectively held captive 
by their employers (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In conformity with the law, the 
minimum wage is subject to annual renegotiation and was increased in 
January by 7 percent to approximately $56 (355 bolivianos) per month, 
plus bonuses and fringe benefits. The minimum wage does not provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family, and most workers 
earn more. Although the minimum wage falls below prevailing wages in 
most jobs, certain benefit calculations are pegged to it. The minimum 
wage does not cover members of the informal sector, who constitute the 
majority of the urban work force, nor does it cover farmers, who 
account for some 30 percent of the working population.
    Only one-half of the urban labor force enjoys an 8-hour workday and 
a workweek of 5 or 5-1/2 days, because the maximum workweek of 44 hours 
is not enforced. The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational Safety has 
responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety, but 
relevant standards are enforced poorly. Many workers have died due to 
unsafe conditions. However, the Government has requested technical 
assistance in the occupational safety area from an international donor. 
The Labor Ministry maintains a hot line for worker inquiries, 
complaints, and reports of unfair labor practices and unsafe working 
conditions.
    Working conditions in the mining sector are particularly bad. 
Although the State Mining Corporation has an office responsible for 
safety, many mines, often old and using antiquated equipment, are 
dangerous and unhealthy. In some mines operated as cooperatives, miners 
earn approximately $3 (20 bolivianos) per 12-hour day. They work 
without respirators in mines where toxic gases and cancer-causing dusts 
abound; they buy their own supplies, including dynamite, have no 
scheduled rest periods, and many work underground for up to 24 hours 
continuously. There are no special provisions in the law defining when 
workers may remove themselves from dangerous situations. Unless the 
work contract covers this area, any worker who refuses to work based on 
the individual's judgment of excessively dangerous conditions may face 
dismissal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons, although aspects of the problem are 
covered in other laws and in the Constitution. There were reports of 
domestic trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. A union 
leader asserted that employment agencies lure rural indigenous women to 
cities with promises of employment as domestic servants but then force 
them to work without salaries to repay transport and other fees and 
sometimes turn them over to houses of prostitution. There were also 
unconfirmed press reports that children sometimes were sold to 
sweatshops in Argentina.
                               __________

                                 BRAZIL

    Brazil is a constitutional federal republic composed of 26 states 
and the Federal District. The federal legislative branch exercises 
authority independent of the executive branch. In 1998 voters elected 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB), to a second 4-year term. The 1998 elections marked the 
third time since the end of military rule in 1985 that citizens freely 
chose their president and elected the legislative bodies in accordance 
with the 1988 Constitution. All parties are able to compete on the 
basis of fair and equal procedures. The judiciary generally is 
independent; however, it is inefficient and subject to political and 
economic influence.
    The military forces handled national defense and are subject to 
effective civilian control, both in law and in practice. Police forces 
fall primarily under the control of the states. State police are 
divided into two forces. The civil police have an investigative role, 
and the uniformed police, known officially as the ``military police,'' 
are responsible for maintaining public order. Although the individual 
state governments control the uniformed police, the Constitution 
provides that they can be called into active military service in the 
event of an emergency, and they maintain some military characteristics 
and privileges, including a separate judicial system. The federal 
police force is very small and primarily investigative. It plays little 
role in routine law enforcement. The state police forces committed 
numerous serious human rights abuses.
    Brazil has a market-based, diversified economy. The Government, 
which traditionally played a dominant role in shaping economic 
development, is encouraging greater private sector participation in the 
economy through privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and 
removal of some impediments to competition, trade, and investment. 
Industrial production, including mining operations and a large and 
diversified capital goods sector, accounts for approximately 35 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP); agriculture contributes about 8 
percent. Exports consist of both manufactured and primary goods. Among 
the principal exports are iron ore, coffee, airplanes, soybeans, and 
footwear. Per capita GDP was about $3,400, and the economy grew by 4 
percent. Income distribution remained highly skewed: the poorest half 
of the population received only 10 percent of national income while the 
richest tenth received 48 percent.
    The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there continued to be numerous serious abuses. State 
police forces (both civil and uniformed) committed many extrajudicial 
killings, tortured and beat suspects under interrogation, and 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Police also were implicated 
in criminal activity of all kinds, including killings for hire, death 
squad executions, and kidnapings for ransom. Prison officials often 
tortured and beat inmates. The state governments concerned did not 
punish most perpetrators of these abuses effectively. Police tribunals 
(special courts for the uniformed police) remained overloaded, rarely 
investigated cases thoroughly, and seldom convicted abusers. The 
separate system of uniformed police tribunals contributes to a climate 
of impunity for police officers involved in extrajudicial killings or 
abuse of prisoners. Prison conditions range from poor to extremely 
harsh. The judiciary has a large case backlog and often is unable to 
ensure the right to a fair and speedy trial. Justice is slow and often 
unreliable, especially in areas where powerful economic interests 
influence the local judiciary. Human rights monitors on occasion face 
threats and harassment. Violence and discrimination against women are 
problems. Child prostitution and abuse are problems. Despite 
constitutional provisions safeguarding the rights of indigenous people, 
government authorities often fail to protect them adequately from 
outsiders who encroach on their lands, and fail to provide them with 
adequate health care and other basic services in many areas. 
Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians is a problem. Violence against 
homosexuals is a problem. Forced labor continued to be a serious 
problem. Child labor is a serious problem. There continued to be 
occasional reports of forced child labor. The Government continued its 
interministerial campaign against child labor. Trafficking in women and 
children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious problem.
    The National Secretariat of Human Rights oversees the 
implementation of the Government's action plan to address human rights 
abuses. A new secretary was installed in May. In May U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited, and U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley visited in August and September. 
Robinson commented on the Government's recognition of its human rights 
problems and stated that President Cardoso was on the right track in 
trying to reduce and eliminate abuses. Rodley noted the poor conditions 
in prisons and said that in many cases law enforcement authorities who 
torture prisoners and suspects do so with impunity. The Government 
undertook several programs to promote the protection of human rights. 
In 1996 a nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a witness 
protection program; the Government adopted it in 1999 in an attempt to 
combat widespread impunity. The Government's inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Defense of the Human Being (CDDPH), chaired by the 
National Human Rights Secretary, continued to be an effective 
instrument to highlight human rights abuses and allocate federal 
resources to bolster the efforts of the states. However, because of 
jurisdictional and resource limitations, the efforts of the Federal 
Government had an uneven and limited impact in many of the states where 
human rights violations are most common.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed 
numerous extrajudicial killings, which continued to be a serious 
problem throughout the country. The uniformed police summarily executed 
suspected criminals rather than apprehend them, and then filed false 
reports that the suspects were resisting arrest. Preliminary estimates 
from the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo alone indicated that 
the police killed at least 1,000 persons during the year while 
operating in their ``official'' capacity. In addition many other 
killings occurred as the result of death squads and other criminal 
groups, many of which included police as members. The failure to 
investigate, prosecute, and punish police who commit such acts creates 
a climate of impunity that continues to encourage human rights abuses. 
Harsh conditions in prisons and rioting led to the death of inmates 
(see Section 1.c.).
    The lack of accountability and the inefficient criminal justice 
system allow impunity to continue. All crimes less serious than murder 
committed by uniformed police officers against civilians remain in the 
military justice system. In 1999 an investigation into Sao Paulo's 
special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing'' and 
``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes against 
civilians that include murder and torture. In 1999 a newspaper that had 
access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among 
them, some delayed for up to 12 years. Equally long delays allowed many 
cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of 
limitations. This probe was the closest scrutiny ever of the special 
police courts and resulted in the authorities bringing criminal charges 
against two court officials.
    Human rights activists believe that the 1996 ``Bicudo'' law, which 
gives civil courts jurisdiction over intentional homicide committed by 
uniformed police officers, has had limited success. In 1995--the last 
year before the implementation of the new law--police courts convicted 
23 percent (48 of 205) of officers tried for homicide. In 1998 civilian 
courts convicted 48 percent (31 of 64) of officers charged with 
homicide. The comparable rate for civilians tried for murder in Sao 
Paulo was 50 percent. The law allows for civil prosecutors to review 
the most egregious cases, while less prominent cases are reviewed by 
the police force itself. Almost without exception, the police 
investigators conclude that suspects were resisting arrest.
    Police often were members of vigilante groups and death squads 
responsible for killings. In addition uniformed and civil police 
involvement in criminal activity is widespread. Throughout the country, 
police were implicated in crimes ranging from killing for hire and 
kidnaping to drug trafficking and extortion.
    Reputable NGO's reported hundreds of extrajudicial killings and 
other abuses of force by police throughout the country during the year.
    A Sao Paulo press report indicated that on November 8, a local 
police officer was arrested near Boa Vista, Roraima, on the accusation 
that he had participated in the killing of seven adolescents whose 
noisy party had bothered him.
    Two Sao Paulo police officers were arrested on or about December 11 
and accused of having killed four persons in a bakery in Sao Bernardo 
do Campo 5 days earlier. Three other persons were injured in the 
attack.
    In May police shot and killed a member of the Landless Movement 
(MST) during a confrontation between protesters and uniformed police in 
the state of Parana (see Section 2.b.). The authorities did not charge 
or arrest any officer by year's end.
    The use of torture by police sometimes led to the death of the 
victims (see Section 1.c.). The authorities opened an investigation 
into the death of Nilson Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th 
district jail in Sao Paulo's Itaim Paulista neighborhood. At year's 
end, the investigation continued, but no one had been accused.
    Police killings of street children continued (see Section 5).
    Harsh or dangerous prison conditions, official negligence, poor 
sanitary conditions, abuse by guards, and a lack of medical care led to 
a number of deaths in prisons. Inmates in prisons and at juvenile 
detention facilities rioted repeatedly during the year (see Section 
1.c.). Many riots resulted in a number of deaths, but no estimates were 
available for the number of prisoners killed nationwide during prison 
riots.
    The office of the police ombudswoman in Rio de Janeiro state 
received 2,894 complaints from April 1999 through December 15, during 
its first 20 months of operation. Complaints against the uniformed 
police accounted for 60 percent of that total. There were 312 
officially reported police homicides in the first 9 months of the year, 
compared to 289 in all of 1999. These statistics seriously understate 
the number of killings by police, as they do not include the deaths of 
perpetrators allegedly caught in the act of committing a crime. 
Previous research by the Institute for Religious Studies (ISER) 
suggests that, to estimate the true number of police homicides, the 
official figures should be doubled. The ISER report also stated that 
Rio de Janeiro police killed half of their victims with 4 or more 
bullets and shot the majority of victims in either the shoulder or the 
head; 40 cases clearly demonstrated execution-style deaths, where 
police first immobilized the victims and then shot them at point-blank 
range. In 64 percent of the cases examined, the victims were shot in 
the back.
    According to the Sao Paulo state government, the uniformed and 
civil police killed 635 civilians in the first 9 months of the year, an 
increase of 30 percent over the same period in 1999. A Sao Paulo police 
ombudsman's report released in July showed that of the 664 persons 
killed by police officers in 1999, 31 percent were committing crimes at 
the time they were shot, 56 percent had no previous criminal record, 
and 51 percent of the victims were shot in the back. Many human rights 
observers believe that the report reflects excessive use of force by 
the Sao Paulo police.
    In a nationally televised bus hijacking in Rio de Janeiro in June, 
police wounded a hostage while attempting to shoot the hijacker. The 
hijacker then killed the hostage. The hijacker was apprehended unhurt, 
but arrived dead at the hospital after police riding in the ambulance 
allegedly strangled him. At year's end, one police officer had been 
acquitted and four awaited trial.
    Four uniformed police officers were sent to prison to await trial 
in a civil court for the highly publicized killing of three persons, 
including two juveniles (aged 14, 17, and 21) in Sao Paulo in February 
1999. The officers arrested the victims for fighting, beat them, then 
were seen leading them into a forested area near where the bodies were 
found 2 weeks later. Each victim was shot once in the head. The police 
officers initially denied having any contact with the victims. They 
later confessed to the killings after 19 witnesses came forward to 
testify against them and a DNA test identified blood inside the police 
car as that of one of the victims. The perpetrators were charged with 
aggravated triple homicide, abuse of power, and hiding bodies.
    The five uniformed police officers arrested in the March 1999 
shooting deaths of two persons, one of whom was mentally disabled, in 
Sao Paulo's Jardin Elba slum, were jailed in September, pending trial. 
The officers, who allegedly shot the two outside of their police car, 
dragged the bodies inside, and then simulated an exchange of gunfire, 
were charged with homicide. At year's end, no trial date had been set.
    Police sources reported that the investigation continues into the 
April 1999 death of 20-year-old Ricardo Galvao, who was shot, stabbed, 
and beaten. Galvao was last seen in a police vehicle after being caught 
trying to steal a car. On August 11, the police involved in the 
apprehension were expelled from the police force. The authorities 
charged two civilians with Galvao's death.
    Four uniformed policemen are still in custody awaiting trial in the 
August 1999 double homicide that took place in Sao Bernardo do Campo, 
Sao Paulo. The accused suspected the victims of stealing a police 
motorcycle, questioned them, and returned to the neighborhood the 
following day, when they allegedly killed the two youths by shooting 
them in the head and leaving another youth for dead. The third victim 
survived by feigning death and was placed in the witness protection 
program.
    In December 1999, police in the Federal District shot and killed 
one person and blinded another during a peaceful demonstration. The 
governor removed certain officials as a result. At year's end, the case 
against the police officers awaited trial.
    There was no information available about an investigation into the 
February 1999 killing of Antonio Lopes in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, 
or in the October 1999 killing of Robelio dos Santos, in Salvador, 
Bahia.
    Amnesty International reported that police death squads still were 
active in Mato Grosso do Sul. There was no information available about 
the status of the cases against various police officers accused of 
participating in death squads in the states of Alagoas and Mato Grosso 
do Sul in 1997 and 1998.
    In April a court retried and convicted former military policeman 
Otavio Lourenco Gambra, also known as ``Rambo,'' for the murder of 
Mario Jose Josino in a highly publicized March 1997 extortion and 
killing incident in Sao Paulo's Favela Naval neighborhood. Gambra's 
1998 conviction had been overturned due to lack of evidence. Eight 
other police officers were convicted of bodily harm and professional 
negligence. All were serving time in Sao Paulo prisons at year's end.
    In April the State Court of Para annulled an August 1999 trial in 
the city of Belem that acquitted 3 uniformed police officers in command 
of the unit responsible for the 1996 massacre of 19 landless workers at 
Eldorado de Carajas in the Amazonian state of Para. Human rights 
activists considered this decision a major blow against police 
impunity. A new trial was scheduled for March 2001.
    In September the State Court of Rondonia convicted 3 of 12 
uniformed policemen and 2 squatters of homicide in the August 1995 
killings of 11 squatters and 2 policemen in Corumbiara. The three 
officers received sentences of 16, 18, and 19 years. The two squatters 
who were tried were not convicted of murder but of inciting the 
killings and received 6 and 8 years respectively. Activists criticized 
the fact that the courts had acquitted 9 of the 12 police officers 
involved and that the court had not indicted the landowner who was 
involved directly in the conflict, despite the fact that there was a 
videotape of the landowner in which he told the police to attack the 
squatters, whom he called enemy guerrillas.
    Of 31 police officers charged with participation in the 1993 
massacre of 21 residents of the Vigario Geral neighborhood in Rio de 
Janeiro, the courts acquitted 19 and convicted 6 officers. At year's 
end, four officers awaited trial; two died before going to trial.
    The trial of retired police Colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes again was 
delayed. Guimaraes is accused of homicide in the deaths of 111 inmates 
during an October 1992 riot in Sao Paulo's Carandiru prison. The 
charges he faces carry a penalty of 1,350 years of imprisonment, 
although his jail term would be limited to 30 years by the 
Constitution. Guimaraes would be the first policeman of the rank of 
colonel to face a civilian jury under the Bicudo law. The other 85 
officers who are accused of involvement also await trial. The statute 
of limitations expired for the charges of torture and beatings, but the 
officers can be tried for murder. All of the officers, including 
Guimaraes, were released to await trial.
    Death squads in which the police are involved contribute 
significantly to the level of violence and lawlessness, according to 
public security officials. Human rights groups reported the existence 
of organized death squads linked to the police forces that target 
suspected criminals and persons considered ``undesirable'' (such as 
street children) in almost every state. A report on death squads issued 
by the committee for human rights of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in 
1999 highlighted death squad activity with police involvement in the 
states of Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, 
Amazonas, Para, Paraiba, Ceara, Espirito Santo, and Acre. The report 
stated that death squads ``arise because of the loss of credibility in 
the justice and public security institutions and the certainty of 
impunity as the result of the incapacity of the institutions that have 
jurisdiction in resolving the problem.'' The report indicated that 
death squad activity appeared to be declining except in Bahia.
    In August 1999, the Governor of Espirito Santo (the state with the 
highest rate of homicide), stated that death squad activity involving 
the police contributed significantly to the level of violence in the 
state. A state police investigation and a state parliamentary committee 
of inquiry reported that an informal organization, the ``Squad le 
Cocq'' involving police, judicial, and elected authorities including 
Jose Carlos Gratz, president of the state assembly, was responsible for 
the vast majority of organized crime in the state.
    An investigation instigated by the former president of the supreme 
court of Acre state and carried out under the auspices of the CDDPH 
amassed evidence that former Acre military police chief and former 
state and federal deputy Hildebrando Pascoal headed a crime ring and 
death squad in that Amazonian state linked to at least 30 murder and 
torture cases previously suspended by state authorities for lack of 
evidence. Charges against Pascoal include the kidnaping--with the 
collusion of military police officers from Piaui--and murder of the 
suspected killer of Pascoal's brother, and the kidnaping of the 
victim's wife and children in an attempt to locate the victim. A 
congressional committee of inquiry also established Pascoal's control 
of narcotics trafficking within the state. A witness who testified 
before that committee identified the site of a mass grave in Acre that 
federal authorities believe Pascoal's organization used to dispose of 
at least eight murder victims. Pascoal's election to the federal 
Chamber of Deputies in October 1998 conferred on him parliamentary 
immunity from all prosecution. However, in October 1999, the Chamber 
voted to remove Pascoal's immunity and the police subsequently arrested 
him. In June a federal judge ruled that Pascoal would face a jury trial 
on account of the capital offense, but no trial date was set. At year's 
end, he was in prison and awaited trial on charges of murder; 
additional charges of narcotics trafficking and electoral violations 
were pending.
    The authorities also failed to conclude the investigation of the 
May 1996 death squad killings in the Franco da Rocha neighborhood of 
Sao Paulo, and no charges have been filed in connection with the case. 
Witnesses identified five uniformed police officers as having arrested 
four men who were found dead a few hours later. Franco da Rocha is one 
of Sao Paulo state's poorest communities and the location of a 
clandestine dumping site for the victims of death squads. Since 1993 at 
least 212 bodies have been found there, including 50 victims shot in 
the head. Progress in the investigation has been hampered by difficulty 
in identifying bodies whose heads or hands were amputated.
    Several persons were killed in conflicts involving the settlement 
of disputes of land ownership and usage. The MST increased its campaign 
of legal occupation of lands identified as unproductive, and illegal 
occupation of land not yet so designated. In addition as a new policy, 
the MST began occupying public buildings in an effort to embarrass the 
Government and gain publicity for its cause. MST activists destroyed 
private property during some occupations. The Catholic Church's 
Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), the country's foremost entity 
monitoring human rights in rural areas, released in October its report 
covering rural violence in 1998. The report presents a mixed picture of 
the overall human rights climate relating to the country's land 
conflicts. Killings of landless activists increased to 47 in 1998, 
compared with 30 in 1997, while attempted murders rose from 37 to 46. 
Cases of torture rose from 5 to 35, but less serious indicators of 
aggression fell sharply. The report notes that increased actions by the 
Government to remove activists from illegal settlements resulted in 
increased confrontations and destruction of property and homes but also 
noted that the pace of agrarian reform outstripped new MST occupations, 
contributing to a less violent climate overall.
    In the investigation into the March 1999 killing of the brother of 
an MST leader in Parana, the police arrested a suspected gunman but 
later released him. There was no information available about the 
investigation into the April 1998 death of MST leader Sadi Padillo in 
Santa Catarina.
    The CPT's report concludes that the climate of impunity enjoyed by 
landed interests as a result of the ``fragile'' justice system and the 
collusion of local political interests continues to encourage serious 
human rights abuses of landless activists, including murder and 
torture. However, the report also notes that the tactics of the land 
reform movement have led to a self- perpetuating cycle in recent years, 
whereby increased confrontation and tension have led to increased 
government attention, encouraging in turn more land occupations. In 
1999 statistics showed a decrease in violence.
    Manuel Souza Neto, a leader of the MST, was killed in October and 
his body was found in his home. He had been shot, and reports indicate 
that his neck was slit. Members of the MST reported that landowners had 
sent death threats to the victim, and suspect one landlord in his 
death. However, others note that the victim also was active in politics 
and that his killer could have been motivated by political goals.
    On July 25, a wave of MST actions throughout the country left three 
dead. In Recife, a police officer shot and killed one protestor. The 
protester was part of a group of about 300 activists attempting to 
occupy a regional bank headquarters. Near Fortaleza ranchers killed 
another MST member during an occupation attempt. In Para state, an 
unknown gunman killed an MST activist; six other persons had died in 
land-related violence in that area since May.
    On November 21, MST leader Sebastiao da Maia, also known as 
Tiaozinho, was killed during the occupation of a ranch in Parana. The 
authorities claimed that Maia was killed in a shootout during the 
occupation, but the MST claimed that he died in an ambush by hired 
gunmen. The authorities did not charge anyone with murder in the case 
but arrested five security guards on firearms charges. According to the 
Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission, Maia's killing was the 
tenth killing of a rural activist during the year.
    Also on November 21, a gunman killed Jose Dutra da Costa, a rural 
activist in the state of Para. Police arrested the gunman the same day 
and suggested that Costa may have been killed on the orders of large 
landowners in the region. According to one source, for 2 years Costa 
had been on a death list of 18 activists.
    On December 19, federal police seized a large cache of arms at a 
ranch in Pontal do Paranapanema, east of Sao Paulo, in the home of a 
member of a landowner's group. In 1997 the ranch had been the scene of 
an armed conflict between the landowner and the MST, in which eight MST 
members were shot. The landowner was acquitted of charges of homicide 
in that case, but faced arms charges after the arms seizure.
    In June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was 
convicted of ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers' 
union, Expedito Ribiero de Souza. Human rights activists noted that 
this conviction is the first time that a landowner has been held liable 
for such a crime. The court sentenced Alves de Amorim to 19 years in a 
maximum security prison (see Section 6.a.).
    In an April retrial, a jury acquitted MST leader Jose Rainha for 
the 1989 killings of landowner Jose Machado Neto and police officer 
Sergio Narciso da Silva. In 1997 a jury in the small, rural town of 
Pedro Canario, Espirito Santo, sentenced Rainha to 26 years for the 
killing. The jury convicted Rainha even though the prosecution 
presented no material evidence and witnesses testified to Rainha's 
presence 1,500 miles away from the scene of the crime. Since Rainha's 
sentence exceeded 20 years, he automatically was entitled to a retrial. 
Police investigator Celso Jose da Cruz, who appealed his 1997 
conviction (and sentence of 516 years' imprisonment) for involvement in 
these killings, was convicted in a retrial. There was no information 
available regarding the trials of the 29 policemen charged as 
codefendants in the killings.
    According to human rights activists monitoring the case, 
proceedings remain stalled against the former mayor of Rio Maria, in 
the state of Para, who was charged with the 1985 murder of Joao Canuto, 
the first president of the rural workers' union in Rio Maria. Canuto's 
daughter, Luzia Canuto, received death threats as a result of the case. 
In 1998 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
criticized the Federal Government for failing to prosecute the crime.
    The four suspects charged with manslaughter in the burning death of 
Pataxo indigenous leader Galdino Jesus dos Santos in Brasilia still 
awaited trial at year's end. In 1998 an appellate court upheld a 1997 
court decision to prosecute for manslaughter rather than murder. In 
1999 a superior court ruled that a jury would try the defendants, and 
the defense appealed the decision. The appeal was denied in April, but 
a new appeal was filed, delaying the trial again. The accused remain in 
prison. Dos Santos died in April 1997 after the suspects set him on 
fire while he was asleep on a public bench.
    Vigilante groups and death squads, which often included police 
officials, also were responsible for killings.
    The National Secretariat for Human Rights sponsors training 
programs in human rights, carried out in cooperation with federal and 
state entities and national and international organizations, in most 
states. The Secretariat administers a human rights training program for 
policemen in cooperation with Amnesty International (AI) in 10 states. 
Human rights groups maintain that the effect of these programs has been 
limited, at best. However, human rights activists in many states 
reported willingness of police authorities to address their concerns 
and to deal with problems brought to their attention.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In 1995 Congress passed legislation that recognized and assigned 
government responsibility for the deaths of political activists who 
``disappeared'' during the military regime while in the custody of 
public officials, and obligated the Government to pay indemnities of 
between $100,000 and $150,000 (200,000 to 300,000 reais) to each of the 
families. In 1997 President Cardoso signed a decree awarding 
reparations to the families of 43 such persons. As of March 1999, 265 
persons had received indemnities out of 366 requests. A commission 
created by the law continued to evaluate requests for, and authorize 
payment of, indemnities.
    No further progress was made during the year in investigating the 
mass grave found in the Perus Cemetery in Sao Paulo on September 4, 
1990. Over the last 10 years, the authorities were able to identify the 
bodies of 6 persons from the 1,500 bones found. Human rights groups 
state that these persons were opponents of the military regime. 
However, attempts to identify additional bodies have stopped, and no 
efforts were made to find those responsible for the deaths.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and a 1997 law prohibit torture and 
provide severe legal penalties for its use; however, there are frequent 
credible reports that police torture and beat criminal suspects to 
extract information, confessions, or money. Victims generally are poor, 
uneducated about their rights, and afraid to come forward due to fear 
of reprisals. Prison officials often tortured and beat inmates.
    As in the cases of extrajudicial killings, the police benefit from 
a high level of impunity. A 1999 investigation by prosecutors into Sao 
Paulo's special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing'' 
and ``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes 
against civilians that include murder and torture. A newspaper that had 
access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among 
them, some dating back up to 12 years. Equally long delays have allowed 
many cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of 
limitations. Although some policemen are expected face criminal charges 
as a result of this investigation, human rights officials called the 
findings ``horrifying.''
    The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 481 complaints 
through the first 9 months of the year alleging torture, abuse, 
mistreatment, or neglect (negligence accounts for 132 of these 
complaints). This represented a slight increase from the same period in 
1999, when the ombudsman received 467 such complaints. The ombudsman's 
office believes that many cases are not reported.
    U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture Rodley visited the country for 
23 days in August and September. While his final report had not been 
issued before year's end, Rodley described conditions in some prisons 
as grotesque and stated that the Congress promotes impunity of police 
agents by failing to provide proper oversight and by giving them 
excessive powers. Rodley told the Federal Chamber of Deputies 
Commission on Human Rights that the authorities routinely subject 
suspects and prisoners to illegal detention, subhuman conditions and 
torture, and rarely are punished for the abuses. He described instances 
during his visit in which prisoners were beaten after talking with him, 
where torture implements were discovered in a prison, and where he had 
to take one prisoner to the hospital to recover from a beating. He also 
told the Commission that officials in one prison promised to discipline 
one corrections officer, but did not do so. He called the situation 
worse than he had imagined and presumed that his experience represented 
only a fraction of the problem.
    In 1999 the Globo newspaper in Rio de Janeiro published the results 
of an investigation into the allegations of torture by state police. 
The police opened a total of 53 investigations regarding complaints of 
torture against police authorities between 1997, when the torture law 
came into effect, and 1999. Only one of the inquiries, which had been 
suspended, officially had been concluded. The report identified several 
patterns, including the use of electric shock, beatings with iron bars, 
and sexual abuse including sodomy with foreign objects. The report 
noted that police classified such incidents as abuse of authority and 
physical assault, offenses that are far less serious than torture. As a 
result of the report, the state government ordered an independent 
review of the 53 cases, and the Federal Government established a task 
force to review Rio de Janeiro state police practices.
    In 1999 Sao Paulo officials investigated allegations that 
investigative police of the 26th state police district humiliated and 
beat prisoners after inmates secretly audiotaped 20 police officers 
beating them and threatening to kill them. The authorities responded by 
creating a special service to receive complaints of torture committed 
by investigative and uniformed police. Persons wishing to make a 
grievance about police activity or offer suggestions contacted the 
police ombudsman over 8,000 times during the first 9 months of the 
year.
    On October 18, Amnesty International released a special report on 
torture that included five cases in the country. One was that of 
``Jose'' (not his real name), a juvenile in the state of Para who was 
beaten so severely by police that he has needed psychiatric treatment 
ever since. Jose's mother complained about the beating to the local 
public prosecutor, who referred the case to the police chief at the 
same station where the beating occurred. Other cases were cited in 
Paraiba, Sao Paulo, and Pernambuco.
    On October 19, the authorities arrested two civil guards in Sao 
Paulo and accused them of the sexually assault of three teenage girls 
caught trespassing in a cemetery. Police authorities began an internal 
investigation into the matter.
    On October 24, Federal Highway Police arrested a Rio state 
policeman and accused him of having been a member of a gang that 
specialized in robbing trucks at gunpoint along the highways. Police 
were investigating the possible involvement of other officials in the 
activities of the gang.
    In late November, several former prisoners who had been held in an 
Air Force prison in Rio de Janeiro made public their allegations of 
having been tortured during their time in prison. The allegations 
included accusations of beatings and electric shocks. The Federal 
Police announced that it would begin an investigation into the reports. 
The allegations were also investigated in early December by the Human 
Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.
    On December 14, two policemen severely beat a shoe shiner, Rangel 
Bezerra de Lima, in Ceilandia, Federal District. The reason given by 
the police during the attack was that they had experienced a ``bad 
day.'' The case got the attention of the Human Rights Division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, which assisted Rangel in filing a 
complaint against the perpetrators, accusing the police of torture.
    The case of Otavio dos Santos Filho, who allegedly died as a result 
of torture at Sao Paulo's Depatri jail in 1999, was archived without 
any resolution. No explanation for closing the case was been made 
public by year's end.
    Police authorities took no action regarding 107 cases of torture 
and beating that took place in the Depatri jail in February 1998 and 
were confirmed by the Police Medical Institute. Prosecutors and human 
rights groups continued to push for a trial of the guards who are 
accused in the case.
    In 1997 civil policemen in Belem, Para state, under the command of 
Captain Clovis Martins de Miranda Filho, accosted Hildebrando Silva de 
Freitas, who apparently had failed to pay a bribe for a liquor license 
for his bar. At Captain de Miranda's direction, as many as 10 police 
officers severely beat and sexually abused de Freitas. In 1998 an 
internal police investigation concluded that de Freitas had suffered 
severe physical injury and did not contest the testimony of the 
witnesses who corroborated his account, but declared there was no 
connection between his injuries and the officers who had confronted 
him. At year's end, the case was under review by the Para state 
prosecutors' office. De Miranda has brought a defamation suit against 
the state ombudsman for public security in Para for statements that she 
allegedly made to the press regarding the case. The state has declined 
to bear the costs of the ombudsman's defense.
    Police violence against homosexuals continued (see Section 5).
    There continue to be numerous credible reports of state police 
officials' involvement in crime, including revenge killings and 
intimidation and killing of witnesses involved in testifying against 
police officials.
    The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 218 complaints in the 
first 9 months of the year alleging corruption, illicit enrichment, 
swindling, embezzlement, or participation in drug trafficking on the 
part of policemen.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued its 
human rights training courses for high-ranking state military police 
officers at the Federal Police Academy in Brasilia. A total of 860 
military police have been trained in basic techniques, including the 
apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects without recourse to 
excessive or unnecessary force. The program was funded through 
December, and the ICRC office expected authorization to proceed for 2 
to 3 more years. The Center for the Study of Violence at the University 
of Sao Paulo is expected to review the results. The military police in 
the states of Amapa, Paraiba, Rondonia, and Sao Paulo already have 
incorporated the ICRC program into their general police training 
program.
    Over one-fifth of Sao Paulo's uniformed police officers have 
received some kind of community police training under the state's 
community policing initiative. Begun in December 1997, the program is 
expected to take 10 years to implement fully. Under the program, high-
ranking police officials meet with citizens' consultative groups 
weekly. The uniformed police also instituted a policy of ``recycling'' 
policemen involved in shootings, removing them from patrols for 6 
months and offering them counseling.
    Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Severe 
overcrowding was prevalent, especially in larger cities. According to 
Ministry of Justice figures for 1998, about 85 percent of the prison 
population was kept in substandard conditions. The situation was most 
critical in the states with the largest prison populations, including 
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco. 
Most penal authorities in these states do not have the resources to 
separate minor offenders from adults and petty offenders from violent 
criminals. Prison riots were frequent occurrences. Discipline is 
difficult to maintain under such conditions, and prison officials often 
resort to inhuman treatment, including torture.
    AI stated that the prison system was ``in crisis'' in a 
comprehensive report on prisons released in June 1999. The report was 
based on 33 visits to prisons in 10 states. In December 1998, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) also issued a comprehensive report entitled ``Behind 
Bars in Brazil,'' based on an intensive review of prison conditions in 
eight states. Both reports meticulously detail inhuman conditions and 
systematic and wide ranging abuses of human rights throughout the 
prison system. Among the most serious charges are the commonplace 
undocumented and uninvestigated deaths of inmates at the hands of 
authorities or other prisoners, and the routine use of torture against 
inmates by both guards and police officers.
    Poor working conditions for prison guards aggravate substandard 
prison conditions and encourage corruption. The director of Sao Paulo's 
Carandiru prison (the largest in the country) told representatives from 
AI that many cases of torture and use of excessive force result in part 
from employees' working conditions. An investigation of the more than 
1,100 employees of Sao Paulo's prison at the end of 1998 showed that 
241 had criminal records themselves. The majority of the charges 
against them were for crimes committed while working at the prison and 
ranged from drug trafficking and threats to assisting in escapes. The 
state secretary of penitentiary administration was aware of the guards' 
criminal pasts and allowed them to continue working. At year's end, 
prison officials stated that investigations were continuing and that 
they had discharged some employees.
    In September the director of the maximum security prison Bangu 1 in 
Rio de Janeiro, who had attempted to clean up corruption and violence 
at the institution, was murdered--probably on orders from incarcerated 
drug traffickers, corrupt prison guards, or police officers, according 
to state security officials.
    Prisons do not provide adequate protection against violence 
inflicted by inmates on each other.
    On October 10, news media reported a riot in a Parana state prison 
in Piraquara, where prisoners armed with pistols and a grenade took 
seven guards hostage. According to news sources, this was the second 
riot there in 4 months. Another riot occurred on October 10 in 
Contagem, a district of Belo Horizonte, in which one policeman and one 
prisoner were injured. Press reports stated that it was the third riot 
there during the year, and that the cause was overcrowding.
    On October 22, prisoners took 66 persons hostage during a riot in 
Penitenciaria Nelson Hungria, near Belo Horizonte. The prisoners were 
armed with pistols and knives. The riot ended with a promise by the 
authorities to transfer some of the inmates to other facilities.
    On October 23, a riot broke out in Penitenciaria 2 de Itapetininga, 
in Sao Paulo State. At least 500 prisoners were involved; they took 14 
guards as hostages. The riot lasted only 9 hours, but three prisoners 
died from fires set during the incident. On October 24, a gang fight 
inside Carandiru Prison in Sao Paulo killed two prisoners and injured 
another five. According to the authorities, the gangs were fighting 
over control of the prison. Prison authorities responded by 
transferring prisoners identified as most dangerous gang members to 
other facilities.
    On or about November 5, a riot broke out in the Casa de Detencao 
Jose Mario Alves da Silva, in Porto Velho, Rondonia. Three prisoners 
were killed (apparently by other prisoners) and another 17 were 
injured. A guard also was injured. The revolt lasted 79 hours.
    Armed with knives, razor blades, and pistols, prisoners in Sao 
Paulo's high-security Taubate penitentiary rioted December 17 and 18, 
resulting in the deaths of nine inmates. The riot was sparked by 
prisoner demands for transfer to lower-security facilities and was 
followed by an unsuccessful escape attempt. After the riot was quelled, 
the authorities transferred 25 prisoners to other facilities.
    Prisoners also are subject to extremely poor health conditions. 
Scabies and tuberculosis, diseases not common in the general 
population, are widespread in Sao Paulo prisons. The Ministry of 
Justice estimates that 10 to 20 percent of the national prison 
population is HIV positive. Denial of first aid and other medical care 
sometimes is used as a form of punishment. According to the Sao Paulo 
state secretary of prison administration, 1,923 prisoners in Sao 
Paulo's prisons are infected with tuberculosis, 178 have leprosy, 122 
are infected with hepatitis, 457 are infected with HIV, and over 3,800 
suffer from full-blown AIDS. AI reports that, while underused, the Sao 
Paulo state hospital for prisoners with AIDS is cleaner and better 
organized than most prison hospitals.
    Overcrowding in Sao Paulo's prisons and police detention centers, 
which hold about 43 percent of the country's prison population, is a 
critical human rights problem. Although state prison capacity has risen 
by 50 percent with the opening of 21 new prisons since 1998, rising 
crime and inflexible sentencing has meant that facilities remain 
overcrowded. The prison population increased by 7,000 persons in the 
first 8 months of the year.
    The state of Sao Paulo has approximately 92,000 prisoners. Only 
about 59,000 these prisoners are in the state penitentiary system. Due 
to lack of space, more than 32,000 prisoners, most of whom already have 
been convicted and should be in state penitentiaries, remain in 
temporary holding facilities in police stations. The state penitentiary 
system has an over-capacity rate of about 18 percent.
    Sao Paulo prison authorities openly admit that overcrowding has led 
to abysmal conditions and violent riots in Sao Paulo prisons. There 
were 25 riots during the year in Sao Paulo prisons, which resulted in 
the deaths of 23 prisoners. A riot in Parana state on June 3-6 left one 
prisoner dead and three injured. Another riot occurred on July 12, 
although no one was hurt in that incident. Among the prisoners' 
complaints were overcrowding, the slow parole process, and lack of 
conjugal visits.
    Overcrowding and lack of adequate security also lead to a number of 
escapes and carefully planned jail and prison breaks. On September 19, 
in Sao Paulo state, armed men broke into 2 prisons and 1 jail and freed 
206 prisoners. At another break at Sumare prison, also in Sao Paulo 
state, 7 men stormed the complex and freed 92 of the 100 prisoners. 
Numerous breaks such as these occurred throughout the year, and very 
few prisoners were recaptured. In at least one case seven guards were 
held hostage during the escape.
    Torture and mistreatment of prisoners by prison officials is also a 
serious concern. Investigations began in the torture and beatings of 20 
prisoners in Sao Paulo's Sorocaba prison. The prisoners and their 
relatives charge that on July 28, the prisoners were forced to walk 
through two rows of police officers (armed with truncheons and sticks) 
who beat the prisoners as they walked. The prisoners were then divided 
into groups of five and each group locked into a solitary confinement 
cell designed to hold one person. In October a public prosecutor 
charged 20 policemen and 5 penitentiary guards with participating in 
the torture of inmates.
    The authorities opened an investigation in the death of Nilson 
Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th district jail in Sao Paulo's 
Itaim Paulista neighborhood. Human rights groups claim that he died as 
a result of torture after police beat him and other prisoners with bars 
and metal rods and applied electric shocks to them (see Section 1.a.).
    An investigation also has been opened into the allegation of a June 
3 torture incident involving over 100 prisoners in Sao Paulo state's 
prison facility in the city of Americana. According to Justica Global, 
a local human rights group, prisoners were forced to pass through a 
``corridor'' formed by military policemen from the Special Operations 
Unit while the policemen beat the prisoners with iron bars, truncheons, 
and whips. According to the organization, one prisoner's left arm was 
broken and another prisoner, Wilson Pereira da Silva, was beaten 
severely and then police threw a mixture of vinegar, water, and salt on 
his wounds. The director of the facility was fired shortly after the 
accusations surfaced.
    Sao Paulo prison officials have taken steps to improve the quality 
of the prison guard force. Since 1998 new hires are required to have a 
high school diploma and to take human rights courses. Sao Paulo prison 
authorities also are attempting to improve conditions by building more 
prisons (six small ones were built during the year), by improving 
training of prison personnel, and by creating committees of community 
leaders to monitor prison conditions. However, they emphasize that the 
most serious problem--overcrowding--can not be resolved in the short 
term as it is simply impossible to build as fast as the prison 
population is growing.
    The states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo provide separate prison 
facilities for women, but generally only in houses of detention or 
actual prisons, where female inmates are separated from men. However, 
in Rio de Janeiro state there are only two police districts in which 
women in lockup are held in exclusive short-term jail facilities. 
Women's facilities in Sao Paulo's penitentiary system are even more 
overcrowded than those for men. Facilities built to accommodate 600 
female inmates hold 1,055. The state's prison expansion program did not 
include provisions for additional space for women. There are no 
facilities that are exclusively female--including inmates, guards, and 
warden. With male officers in women's prisons, opportunities for abuse 
and extortion of sexual favors are abundant.
    Sao Paulo's juvenile detention centers (FEBEM) continue to be 
plagued by overcrowding, poor conditions, riots, and accusations of 
torture. The authorities completed an investigation into the 1999 riots 
at the FEBEM facility at Franco da Rocha and fired the director as a 
result. Human rights NGO's expressed regret that this was the only 
management-level employee discharged by year's end.
    Since the extremely violent Tatuape complex riot in October 1999, 
human rights groups estimate that FEBEM employees have tortured or 
beaten at least 700 FEBEM inmates. The two most common forms of torture 
cited by these groups are ``repique'' and ``recepcao.'' Repique is used 
after attempted escapes or rebellions, when the employees gather the 
inmates and beat them with iron bars and sticks. Recepcao occurs when 
adolescents are transferred to different facilities and are greeted by 
two rows of FEBEM guards who kick, beat, and scream at the prisoners as 
they pass between them to teach them the rules of discipline.
    The Public Ministry was investigating 87 cases of torture and 
mistreatment in FEBEM facilities. Officials were considering for 
investigation another 52 complaints of mistreatment. The majority of 
the investigations and complaints involve the Tatuape complex.
    Three cases of torture occurred in FEBEM facilities in June and 
July, involving the so-called ninjas, a group of FEBEM guards who roam 
FEBEM complexes at night, beating inmates at random. Actions by this 
group were registered at the Cadeiao de Pinheiros, Tatuape, and Franco 
da Rocha facilities.
    Human rights organizations also accuse the Sao Paulo state 
government of holding 900 of the 4000 FEBEM inmates in an ``irregular'' 
state (in violation of a federal statute) by putting them in adult 
prison facilities, in violation of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, to which the Government is a signatory. The 
transfer of youth to adult prison facilities began in August 1999 and 
intensified after the riots in November of that year. Injunctions that 
would force FEBEM officials to move the youth to juvenile facilities 
consistently have been reversed by the Sao Paulo supreme court, citing 
the fact that there is no other place to put the inmates.
    Government action has proved ineffective in improving the 
conditions in FEBEM. After the November 1999 riots, Sao Paulo Governor 
Mario Covas promised to build 20 new facilities and fire all FEBEM 
employees responsible for torture. To date 4 of the 20 facilities have 
been built, but they have failed to resolve overcrowding. Moreover, two 
of these new facilities were sites of later riots, leading employees to 
complain that the inmates had been transferred before the facilities 
were ready and able to provide basic care or recreational or 
educational activities. Some employees accused of mistreatment have 
been fired, but human rights groups claim that only a small portion of 
those responsible have been dismissed.
    There is no evidence that conditions have improved in the 14 months 
since riots began. A report put together by several human rights groups 
also notes that FEBEM officials demand 5 days' notice for visits by 
human rights groups, inhibiting the independent analysis of conditions 
within the FEBEM complexes.
    In August local human rights NGO's delivered a report to Nigel 
Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture about the situation in 
FEBEM. Rodley toured the facilities and reported finding instruments of 
torture.
    In November 1998, President Cardoso approved a law authorizing 
alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders aimed, in part, at 
easing prison overcrowding. In its 1999 prison report, AI noted that 
the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso do Sul have imposed 
noncustodial sentences effectively, but points out that in states such 
as Rio de Janeiro alternative sentencing has not been implemented 
effectively. There was minimal improvement during the year on the issue 
of alternative sentencing. In May the Government approved legislation 
that provided new funds for prisons and options for alternative 
sentencing. In September Justice Minister Jose Gregori inaugurated a 
National Center of Support and Accompaniment for Alternative Sentences 
to educate the judiciary to apply alternatives such as community 
service to convicts sentenced to less than 4 years' incarceration to 
reduce prison overcrowding.
    It is government policy to permit prison visits by independent 
human rights monitors, and state prison authorities generally observe 
this policy in practice. Federal officials in the Ministry of Justice 
responsible for penal matters offered full cooperation to AI, which 
reported no significant problems in gaining access to state-run prison 
facilities. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rodley was given full access during 
his 3-week fact-finding mission in August and September. By contrast, 
HRW noted in preparing its prison report in 1998 that gaining access to 
prisons was ``surprisingly difficult,'' and that barriers ranged from 
outright denial of access to the use of procedural delays. Only three 
states of the eight investigated--Amazonas, the Federal District, and 
Rio Grande do Norte--had made their prisons completely accessible to 
Human Rights Watch.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observes 
this prohibition; however, police continued at times to arrest and 
detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution limits arrests to those 
caught in the act of committing a crime or those arrested by order of a 
judicial authority. The authorities generally respect the 
constitutional provision for a judicial determination of the legality 
of detention, although many convicted inmates are detained beyond their 
sentences due to poor record keeping. The law permits provisional 
detention for up to 5 days under specified conditions during a police 
investigation, but a judge may extend this period. However, groups that 
work with street children claim that the police sometimes detain street 
youths illegally without a judicial order or hold them incommunicado.
    Human rights monitors allege that civil and uniformed police 
regularly detain persons illegally to extort money or other favors, 
citing the Favela Naval incident of 1997 as the most notorious example 
(see Section 1.a.).
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture made an inquiry into the 
death of Anderson Carlos Crispiniano, who alleged himself to be the 
victim of police torture in Rio de Janeiro. In June Crispiniano was 
asleep at his home when a group of armed men identifying themselves as 
policemen forced their way in and arrested him without a warrant. They 
removed Crispiniano from his home and later telephoned to say that he 
was being held hostage for ransom. He later was released, badly beaten 
and partly paralyzed, and died after 15 days in the hospital.
    HRW noted that police in the state of Parana arrested 173 persons, 
mostly without probable cause, during forced evictions carried out 
during the year.
    According to an AI press release, police detained 141 persons in an 
attempt to prevent protesters from disrupting the 500th anniversary 
celebration in Porto Seguro on April 22. Human rights activists 
protested the police action, calling the detentions unjustified and out 
of proportion to any perceived threat (see Sections 2.b. and 5). The 
authorities later released the temporarily detained demonstrators 
without filing charges.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is an independent 
branch of government; however, it is inefficient, subject to political 
and economic influence, and plagued by problems relating to lack of 
resources and training of officials. In many instances, lower-income, 
less educated citizens make limited use of the appeals process that 
otherwise might ensure the right to fair trial.
    The judicial system, with the Federal Supreme Court at its apex, 
includes courts of first instance and appeals courts. States organize 
their own judicial systems but must adhere to the basic principles in 
the Constitution. Specialized courts deal with police, labor, 
elections, juveniles, and family matters.
    Defendants in criminal cases arrested in the act of committing a 
crime must be charged within 30 days of their arrest, depending on the 
crime. Other defendants must be charged within 45 days, although this 
period can be extended. Defendants for all but the most serious crimes 
have the right to a bail hearing. Based on the police investigation 
leading to the formal charges, prosecutors prepare an indictment for 
the review of a judge, who determines if the indictment meets the legal 
requirements to bring the accused to trial. A judge and jury try 
persons accused of capital crimes, attempted homicide, or more serious 
charges. A judge tries lesser crimes. Defendants have the right to 
appeal all convictions to state superior courts. They further have the 
right to appeal state court decisions to both the Federal Supreme Court 
on constitutional grounds and to the Federal superior court to contest 
whether a decision was inconsistent with the decision of a court in 
another state or infringes on federal law. All defendants sentenced to 
20 years in prison or more have the automatic right to a retrial in the 
same court.
    Special police courts have jurisdiction over state uniformed police 
(except when charged with intentional homicide); the record of these 
courts shows that conviction is the exception rather than the rule. 
These courts (which are separate from the courts-martial of the armed 
forces, except for the final appeals court) are composed of four 
ranking state uniformed police officials and one civilian judge. With 
too few judges for the caseload, there are backlogs, and human rights 
groups note a lack of willingness by police to investigate fellow 
officers.
    A 1996 law gives ordinary courts jurisdiction over cases in which 
uniformed police officers are accused of intentional homicide against 
civilians. However, except for the most egregious cases, the internal 
police investigation determines if the homicide was intentional, and 
the police tribunal decides whether to forward a case to a civil court 
for trial. As a result, few cases are referred to the civil courts. It 
takes 8 years to reach a definitive decision in the average case. At 
the appellate court level, a large backlog of cases hinders the court's 
ability to ensure fair and expeditious trials.
    Defendants are entitled to counsel and must be made aware fully of 
the charges against them. According to the Ministry of Justice, 
approximately 85 percent of prisoners cannot afford an attorney. In 
such cases, the court must provide one at public expense; courts are 
supposed to appoint private attorneys to represent poor defendants when 
public defenders are unavailable, but often no effective defense is 
provided. Juries decide only cases of willful crimes against life, 
including crimes by police; judges try all others.
    The right to a fair public trial as provided by law generally is 
respected in practice, although in some areas, particularly rural 
areas, the judiciary generally is less capable and more subject to 
influence. Similarly local police often are less dutiful in 
investigating, prosecutors are reluctant to initiate proceedings, and 
judges find reasons to delay when cases involve gunmen contracted by 
landowners to eliminate squatters or rural union activists.
    Low pay, combined with exacting competitive examinations that in 
some years eliminate 90 percent of the applicants, make it difficult to 
fill vacancies on the bench. The system requires that a trial be held 
within a set period of time from the date of the crime. However, due to 
the backlog, old cases frequently are dismissed. According to a former 
judge, this practice encourages corrupt judges to delay certain cases 
purposely, so that they can be dismissed. Lawyers often drag out cases 
as long as possible in the hope that an appeals court might render a 
favorable opinion and because they are paid according to the amount of 
time that they spend on a case.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary 
intrusion into the home. Wiretaps authorized by judicial authority are 
permitted. The law regulating the conditions under which wiretaps may 
be used appears to strike a fair balance between giving the police an 
effective law enforcement tool and protecting the civil liberties of 
citizens. The inviolability of private correspondence is respected.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution prohibits all 
forms of censorship and provides for freedom of speech and a free 
press, and the authorities respect these rights in practice.
    Newspaper, magazines, and a growing number of on-line electronic 
publications, which are privately owned, vigorously report and comment 
on government performance. Both the print and broadcast media routinely 
discuss controversial social and political issues and engage in 
investigative reporting. Most radio and television stations are 
privately owned; however, the Government has licensing authority, and 
politicians frequently obtain licenses. Current or former congressional 
representatives, some of whom are or were members of the committee that 
oversees communications, own many television and radio stations, as 
well as local newspapers. It is difficult to determine how many media 
outlets are controlled indirectly by politicians, since concessions 
often are registered in the names of family members or friends linked 
to them. In addition the Government regularly approves transfers of 
concessions already granted to other individuals with little oversight.
    The penalty for libel under the 1967 Press Law is a prison term. It 
is considered extreme by judges and rarely is imposed. The National 
Newspaper Association (ANJ) continued to press for an updated press 
law, noting that the current law dates from time of the military 
regime. Newspaper owners throughout the country have complained about 
judges who have imposed huge fines and jail terms against newspapers 
for ``moral damage'' that appear aimed at crippling news organizations. 
According to the ANJ annual report issued in September, if the new law 
does not establish criteria for calculating maximum fines for libel, 
there is a risk of restrictions to freedom of the press.
    In December 1999, the Lower House of the Congress approved a press 
gag law (Lei Mordaca) that would penalize prosecutors, judges and 
government attorneys for revealing information about ongoing cases to 
the press. The ANJ, together with the Inter-American Press Association, 
mounted a public campaign against the law and Congress effectively 
stalled the legislation. The journalists argued that such a gag law 
would represent a prior restraint on freedom of speech, in violation of 
the Constitution.
    Complex electoral campaign laws regulate the broadcast media and 
prescribe complicated arrangements to apportion the free use of 
commercial radio and television broadcast time granted to political 
parties during an election campaign. The short periods for rulings and 
non-appeal provisions of the regulations are designed to enforce 
discipline and ensure that remedies are applied in a timely manner. 
Media and free speech advocates generally accept the manner in which 
the campaign laws are enforced.
    Foreign publications are distributed widely; prior review of films, 
plays, and radio and television programming is used only to determine a 
suitable viewing age.
    The National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) and the ANJ have 
documented a number of violent attacks, including killings and threats 
against journalists. The September ANJ report, which covered the period 
August 1999 through July, listed 8 cases of physical aggression against 
12 journalists, including a murder attempt upon a newspaper reporter in 
Bauru, Sao Paulo. It also described five death threats against 
journalists. Although no new murder cases were reported during the 
year, the ANJ report noted that seven journalists have been murdered 
since 1995 and none of the crimes have been solved. The police said 
that charges have been brought in four of the cases, and that they 
could not gather sufficient evidence in the other three. The ANJ 
further stated that impunity for crimes committed against journalists 
and inappropriate and inconsistent application of the Press Law are 
impediments to the functioning of the free press.
    The ANJ alleged that on February 17, two uniformed police officers 
attacked Juarez Rodrigues, from the newspaper Estado de Minas. The 
officers also confiscated Rodrigues' working equipment, his cellular 
phone, and demanded the roll of film in which Rodrigues had recorded a 
police action. Police Commander Augusto Severo later visited the 
newspaper's director to apologize for the actions against the reporter 
and to promise to pay for any material damage to the equipment. Severo 
also stated that a military inquiry had been initiated to punish the 
officers responsible.
    The ANJ also alleged that, on February 22, two journalists and a 
driver from the newspaper O Povo de Fortaleza were beaten and tortured 
on the orders of the mayor of a small town, Hidrolandia, in which they 
were investigating a story. Although criticized and forced to leave his 
political party, the mayor remained in office.
    According to the Inter-American Press Association (SIP), on March 
3, journalist Ricardo Noblat, managing editor of the newspaper Correio 
Braziliense of Bras!lia, alleged that two of his sons had been attacked 
and that he had been receiving anonymous telephone threats since 1998. 
He stated that these actions were political persecution because of his 
professional activity. On June 27, the CDDPH gave the Justice Minister 
a preliminary report about the attacks on Noblat's sons. Although it 
was only preliminary, the report by the Justice Ministry concluded that 
the attacks were political.
    Also according to the SIP, on March 8, a group of masked, armed men 
kidnaped journalist Klester Cavalcanti, correspondent of the magazine 
Veja in Belem, capital of Para state. The men pushed the journalist 
into a car, drove him to a forest with his head inside a black plastic 
bag, tied him to a tree in an isolated spot, pointed a revolver at him, 
and threatened him with death if he published a report on an illegal 
land sale.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Permits are not required for outdoor 
political or labor meetings, and such meetings occur frequently.
    Police used force to disperse demonstrators on several occasions 
during the year, resulting in serious injuries and at least one death 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In May MST protesters heading to Parana 
state's capital of Curitiba were stopped by police 20 kilometers 
outside the city. They said that they were planning to protest 
peacefully in front of government buildings. However, the same week, 
MST groups had invaded government buildings in several other capital 
cities. Parana state police say that they acted to prevent the same 
occurrence in their state. The confrontation between police and 
protesters which took place when the bus was stopped resulted in one 
death (see Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that police 
killed another demonstrator--Jose Marlucio da Silva--in Recife on July 
25 during a similar protest, but no further information was available 
about this case.
    Between May and October, MST protests increased, culminating in 
promises of about $2 billion (4 billion reais) in federal government 
money for agrarian reform. Protests in the capital, Brasilia, united 
large numbers of protesters. In August joint protests by the MST and 
Contag (Confederacao Nacional de Trabalhadores na Agricultura) drew 
over 12,000 participants. Demonstrations in Brasilia were usually 
concurrent with smaller, local protests and invasions, of anywhere 
between 200 and 5,000 landless activists. Many protests occurred 
without incident, with notable exceptions. The MST's new method of 
forcibly invading public buildings is an example of increasing 
aggressiveness on the part of the movement. The movement also invaded 
President Cardoso's family farm.
    However, the number of land invasions decreased sharply during the 
year. According to INCRA (the government agency charged with 
implementing land reform), there were only 226 invasions by landless 
militants through November, compared with 438 in 1999 and 427 in 1998, 
indicating that the large amount of land that has been distributed by 
the Federal Government may have had some effect in decreasing landless 
movement activity. The CPT noted that the number of conflicts between 
landless movement members, landowners, and police increased over the 
last 3 years, but that the number of resulting deaths declined from 47 
in 1998 to 24 in 1999. The total number of MST activists killed during 
the year was not yet available.
    In April a group of indigenous leaders organized a march in protest 
of the ceremonies to mark the 500-year anniversary of Portuguese 
arrival; however, police using riot gear prevented the protesters from 
entering the main square, and fired rubber bullets into the crowd. 
Human rights observers criticized the police for injuring over 30 
persons, arresting over 100 others, and limiting free assembly and 
lawful protests. The then-president of FUNAI, Carlos Frederico Mares, 
resigned in protest over this incident.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is 
no favored or state religion. All faiths are free to establish places 
of worship, train clergy, and proselytize, although the Government 
controls entry into indigenous lands.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on movement, 
except entry into protected indigenous areas, nor are there any 
restrictions on emigration or return. However, a parent is not allowed 
to leave the country with children under the age of 18 without the 
permission of the other parent, whether or not the marriage still is in 
effect.
    In 1997 the Government passed legislation with provisions for 
asylum and refugee status intended to conform to the principles of the 
1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the 
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. There were 2,632 refugees in the 
country, mostly from Angola and other African countries, but also 
including persons from Iran, Bosnia, and Kosovo. During the year, a 
total of 445 persons were granted refugee status, out of a total of 590 
requests.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate 
citizens aged 18 to 70, except for military conscripts who may not 
vote. It is voluntary for minors from 16 to 18 years of age, for the 
illiterate, and for those age 70 and over.
    Women have full political rights under the Constitution and are 
increasingly active in politics and government; however, they are 
underrepresented in both fields. Cultural, institutional, and financial 
barriers continue to limit women's participation in political life. The 
number of female candidates for office in the 1998 national elections 
roughly doubled, compared with the number in 1994, according to 
statistics released by the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). Women 
constituted approximately 12 percent of the total candidates. However, 
their representation in the national Congress decreased from 7.6 
percent to 6.1 percent after the 1998 elections; 29 women were elected 
to the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies, and 5 to the 81seat Senate. In 
August the TSE reported that for the first time, a majority of 
registered voters were female (50.45 percent). The TSE also reported 
that there were over 70,000 female candidates for the nationwide 
municipal elections. At 18.3 percent of the total number of candidates, 
this was a 40 percent increase from the last municipal elections in 
1996. There were no female members of Cabinet. In December the first 
woman assumed her seat on the country's highest court, the Supreme 
Federal Tribunal.
    Diverse ethnic and racial groups, including indigenous persons, 
while free to participate politically, are not represented in 
government and politics in proportion to their numbers in the general 
population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of local and national human rights groups operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Federal officials generally are cooperative and 
responsive to their views. Federal and state officials, due to 
insufficient resources, in many instances actively solicit the aid and 
cooperation of NGO's in addressing human rights problems. However, on 
occasion human rights monitors are threatened and harassed due to their 
efforts to identify and take action against human rights abusers, 
especially members of the state police forces (see Section 1.a.).
    AI reported in February that its office in Sao Paulo received a 
bomb threat from an extreme right group (see Section 5). The police 
investigated the threats and no bomb was found. AI noted that gay 
rights groups had received similar threats, that a member of their 
staff was attacked during the year, and that police had not acted to 
protect their staff or other human rights activists from violent 
attacks. The head of the AI office continued to receive threats by mail 
and phone. As a result, AI closed their Sao Paulo office and moved to 
Porto Alegre. At year's end, the Sao Paulo State Civil police still 
were investigating. The AI office in Porto Alegre also continued to 
receive threats, which the Rio Grande do Sul police were investigating.
    Henri des Roziers, a Dominican monk, attorney, and human rights 
activist in Xinguara, Para, received several death threats during the 
year for his assistance to victims of violence in the region and his 
direct involvement in criticizing cases of torture, police abuse, and 
forced labor. Des Roziers, along with the Ministry of Labor's Office to 
Combat Forced Labor, was instrumental in freeing 462 rural workers from 
forced labor in 1999. In May Pastoral Land Commission President Dom 
Tomas Balduino announced that des Roziers' name appeared on a ``hit 
list'' of 10 names of activists who were to be murdered, drawn up by 
large landowners. In July Des Roziers and the CPT criticized the use of 
torture in the Xinguara city police station. Para state civil police 
chief Joao Moraes responded with a personal attack on des Roziers and 
accused him of involvement in the murder of a landowner.
    Established in April 1997, the Justice Ministry's National 
Secretariat of Human Rights oversees implementation of a 1996 action 
plan to address human rights abuses. The Secretariat also administers 
or sponsors programs to reduce violence among the poor, to train police 
officials in human rights practices, and to combat discrimination 
against blacks, women, children, indigenous people, the elderly, and 
the disabled. In May the Government appointed Gilbert Saboia, former 
ambassador to Sweden, as the new Secretary for Human Rights.
    In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson 
visited the country and met with a full range of NGO's as well 
government officials. Robinson commended the Government for allowing 
her to investigate and for its recognition of its human rights problems 
and commitment to seek a solution. Robinson declared that impunity from 
prosecution is the greatest human rights problem, linking it to 
killings, torture, racial and sexual discrimination, and the 
exploitation of children. She also stated that the U.N. might open an 
investigation into the repression of indigenous rights during an April 
commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the European arrival to the 
country (see Sections 2.b and 5).
    In December the Government released the second National Report on 
Human Rights, independently prepared by the Center for the Study of 
Violence at the University of Sao Paulo. The National Secretariat for 
Human Rights, the University of Sao Paulo, and the U.N. Development 
Program co-sponsored the preparation of the report. A comprehensive 
account of the human rights situation in each state, it provides 
information on health, education, public security, and labor conditions 
and a list of human rights monitors and advocates in each state.
    In 1999 two attorneys working for a human rights group in 
Aracatuba, Sao Paulo state, received death threats after successfully 
prosecuting three police officers who were convicted of torture and 
homicide. The attorneys asked for police protection and refused to 
leave the city. Police investigations into the threats produced no 
results; the attorneys continued their work but without police 
protection.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion, or nationality; however, discrimination against women, 
blacks, and indigenous people continued to be a problem. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that important differences 
in wages affect women and blacks, particularly in rural areas. A 1997 
law provides prison penalties and fines for racist acts, including 
promulgation of pejorative terms for ethnic or racial groups, use of 
the swastika, or acts of discrimination based on sex, religion, age, or 
ethnic origin. Several persons have been charged with racism since the 
law's enactment, mostly for the use of racial slurs.
    There continued to be reports of violence against homosexuals, 
although it was not always clear that the victim's sexual orientation 
was the reason for the attack. The Gay Group of Bahia (GGB), the 
country's best known homosexual rights organization, and AI have in the 
past 7 years documented the existence of skinhead, neo-Nazi, and 
``machista'' gangs that attacked suspected homosexuals in cities 
including Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and 
Brasilia. In some cases, these gangs included police officers.
    In September Jose Eduardo do Bernardes da Silva, a member of AI, 
and Roberto de Jesus, president of the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Pride 
Association, both received bombs in the mail with swastikas and the 
word revenge printed on the package (see Section 4).
    Homosexual activist groups reported that 130 gay, lesbian, and 
transgender persons were murdered during the year, compared to 169 in 
1999 and 116 in 1998. However, data compiled by activist organizations 
and claims that violence against homosexuals is increasing cannot be 
confirmed, because the motives for the crimes are not always clear. 
Information from the GGB and other homosexual rights groups clearly 
indicates that transvestite prostitutes, the most visible homosexual 
group, are at a greater risk of violence than other homosexuals. Police 
routinely extort money from transvestites and often beat or kill those 
who fail to cooperate. Gay rights activists in the city of Recife 
compiled substantial evidence of extortion and the unlawful use of 
violence against transvestite prostitutes. In past years, flagrant 
abuses by the police in the states of Alagoas and Bahia have been 
reported.
    The Secretariat of State Security of Rio de Janeiro state, in 
partnership with NGO's, continued to operate a hot line to receive 
complaints of violence or other crimes against homosexuals. The 
Secretariat also continued to operate a hot line for complaints of 
prejudice, discrimination, or other crimes based on race, ethnicity, 
color, religion, or national origin. The offices in police headquarters 
where both hot lines are located also offered professional counseling 
to victims of such offenses. Respect for human rights and sensitivity 
to the problems of minorities and the poor are included in police 
training in Rio de Janeiro. In April a new Institute for Public 
Security was created to reform police organization, recruitment, and 
training; it also aims to improve police performance on human rights.
    Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved 
sexual and domestic violence, which are both widespread and vastly 
underreported. There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women. 
Most major cities and towns have established special police offices to 
deal with crimes of domestic or sexual violence against women; there 
are over 250 such offices. However, reporting crimes and receiving help 
continue to be a problem for women living in remote areas who must 
sometimes travel great distances to the nearest special precinct. For 
example, the large but sparsely populated states of Acre and Roraima 
each have only one such precinct. Though the numbers of reported cases 
of the most common crimes rose through much of the 1990's, they 
generally have leveled since 1998. For example, in the state of Sao 
Paulo, there were 1,731 reported cases of rape in the first 11 months 
of the year, compared with 1,833 for all of 1999. In the Federal 
District, the number of reported cases of rape declined slightly to 371 
during the year, compared with 416 cases in 1999. The annual number of 
cases of harmful physical assault against women reported to the police 
in the state of Rio de Janeiro nearly doubled from 1991 to 1999, to 
34,831, and the number of rapes reported increased from 952 to 1,455. 
Both state authorities and women's rights activists agree that a large 
number of rapes go unreported. According to a 1998 study of two middle-
class neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, only 10 percent of women who had 
suffered violent attacks reported them to the police. The Sao Paulo 
Center for Assistance to Female Victims of Sexual Violence reported 
that 400 women sought the center's intervention in rape cases after 
receiving no help from the police in 1998. In Bahia there were 7,751 
complaints about violence to women filed with the police Delegate for 
the Protection of Women during the first 7 months of the year, an 
increase of 40 percent over the same period in 1999.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is also 
a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Each state Secretariat for Public Security runs ``women's 
stations'' (delegacia da mulher). However, the quality and availability 
of services provided varies widely, especially in isolated areas. These 
offices are intended to provide the following services for victims of 
domestic violence: psychological counseling; a ``shelter home'' for 
victims of extremely serious abuses who have no place to go; hospital 
treatment for rape victims, including abortion (up to 12 weeks of 
pregnancy) and treatment for HIV and other sexually transmitted 
diseases; and initiation of criminal cases by investigating and 
forwarding evidence to the courts.
    The penalties for rape vary from 8 to 10 years in prison.
    A domestic violence offender in a case that does not involve a 
serious offense and carries penalties of less than 1 year's 
imprisonment may receive alternative sentencing with no jail term, 
according to the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense 
of Women's Rights.
    Men who commit crimes against women, including sexual assault and 
murder, are unlikely to be brought to trial and courts still are 
reluctant to prosecute and convict men who claim that they attacked 
their wives for infidelity. A 1999 study by an academic at the Catholic 
Pontifical University of Sao Paulo indicates that 70 percent of 
criminal complaints regarding domestic violence against women are 
suspended without a conclusion. Only 2 percent of criminal complaints 
of violence against women lead to convictions. In 1998 the National 
Movement for Human Rights reported that female murder victims were 30 
times more likely to be killed by current or former husbands or lovers 
than by others.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex in 
employment or pay and provides for 120 days of paid maternity leave. 
However, the provision against wage discrimination rarely is enforced. 
According to statistics released in 1998 by the International 
Confederation of Independent Unions, women are paid, on average, 44 
percent less than men. According to government statistics released in 
1998, women with a high-school education or less earn, on average, 63 
percent of the salaries earned by men with the same level of education. 
Black women earned on average 26 percent of a white male's salary. A 
1998 study by a sociologist showed that women who started working in 
positions in which they earned twice the minimum wage advanced in pay 
after 10 years to a wage of seven times the minimum wage. Men starting 
in the same positions earned 2.6 times the minimum wage and advanced to 
a wage of 10.9 times the minimum wage after 10 years. A Ministry of 
Labor survey reported that the average starting salary for high-school-
educated women in Sao Paulo was one-third less than the average 
starting salary for high school educated men. According to the Ministry 
of Labor and Employment (MLE), Centers for the Prevention of Workplace 
Discrimination have been established in 16 states. These centers, which 
are housed in regional bureaus of the Ministry, promote programs to end 
discrimination in the workplace and cultivate partnerships with other 
organizations that combat discrimination. The centers also serve as 
clearinghouses for allegations of discrimination.
    In response to the Maternity Leave Law, some employers seek 
sterilization certificates from female job applicants or try to avoid 
hiring women of childbearing age. A 1995 law prohibits employers from 
requiring applicants or employees to take pregnancy tests or present 
sterilization certificates. Employers who violate the law are subject 
to a jail term ranging from 1 to 2 years, while the company must pay a 
fine equal to 10 times the salary of its highest-paid employee.
    Children.--Millions of children continue to suffer from the poverty 
afflicting their families, must work to survive, and fail to get an 
education. Schooling is free and compulsory until the age of 14 and is 
available in all parts of the country. The education system does not 
exclude any groups; however, 1.1 million children between 7 and 14 
years of age did not attend school in 1999.
    In September UNICEF reported that nearly 100,000 children die each 
year before their first birthday, almost half during the peri-natal 
period. While the national infant mortality rate declined from 50.8 in 
1989 to 36.1 per 1,000 live births in 1998, in some states, such as 
Alagoas, it reached 72 per 1,000. Some municipalities have a rate of 
110 per 1,000.
    According to a UNICEF report, over 20 million children and 
adolescents, or almost 35 percent, live in poverty. About 2.9 million 
children under the age of 15, including over 375,000 between 5 and 9 
years old, continue to work (see Section 6.c.). Many work together with 
their parents, most often in agriculture. Many other children beg on 
city streets. According to the most recent government figures released 
in November 1999 and confirmed by UNICEF, the number of children 
working has decreased steadily since 1993, while the number of children 
attending school has increased. However, the overall level of child 
labor remained roughly the same between 1998 and 1999, because progress 
in reducing it was hampered by a rise in agricultural production that 
year. The Federal Government administers a total of 33 programs under 5 
separate ministries aimed at combating child labor. The Ministry of 
Social Security and Assistance's program for the eradication of child 
labor provided supplemental income or ``school scholarships'' to the 
families of 390,000 children in rural and urban areas who, in return, 
must attend school. The federal scholarship program is supplemented by 
a number of similar programs administered by municipalities and NGO's. 
Some of the largest such programs are in Campinas (Sao Paulo state), 
Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), and Olinda (Pernambuco).
    There are no reliable figures on the number of street children. 
Some are homeless, but the majority return home at night. Disparities 
in the numbers of children living on the street reported by children's 
rights activists indicate the difficulty of arriving at accurate 
estimates. The Center for the Defense of Children and Adolescents 
(CEDECA) in Belem, in the state of Para, reported that in 1998 a total 
of 2,328 youths under the age of 18, or 0.5 percent of the youth 
population, spent their days in the streets. CEDECA estimated that 97 
of those youths lived permanently in the streets.
    NGO's in Rio de Janeiro have made 28 shelters available for 
homeless children, but some children prefer the freedom and drugs that 
street life offers. Drug use, particularly glue sniffing and crack, is 
increasingly prevalent among street children. NGO's report that extreme 
poverty at home or sexual abuse by fathers and stepfathers are the 
principal reasons that many children choose to live in the streets. A 
national study of rape cases carried out by a group of Sao Paulo 
academics indicated that family members committed roughly 70 percent of 
rapes within their own homes. A study by the Brazilian Geography and 
Statistics Institute (IBGE) reported that 47 percent of Sao Paulo 
street children come from families that earn less than $200 (350 reais) 
per month. Nationwide, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates 
that some 30 million children live below the poverty line and 
increasingly come from households headed by women.
    In the October 1999 case of a child prostitution ring in Maranhao 
that involved police, judicial authorities, and elected officials, 
charges were brought against the owner of a bar, a local judge, a high-
ranking police official, and two attorneys. At year's end, trials had 
not yet taken place.
    Youth are both victims and perpetrators of violence. Of all deaths 
of 15- to 19-year-olds, 72 percent are due to causes such as homicide, 
suicide, and traffic accidents, which reduces by at least 3 years the 
average life expectancy of men. During the first half of the year, 50 
young people died as a result of manslaughter in the state of Sao Paulo 
alone. Approximately 85 percent were victims of commercial sexual 
exploitation and ranged from 12 to 17 years of age. Homicide is the 
leading cause of death for children aged 10 to 14, and only 1.9 percent 
of murderers are serving prison sentences.
    A 1999 study by the Information Network for Violence, Exploitation, 
and Sexual Abuse of Children and Adolescents (CECRIA), an entity within 
the National Human Rights Secretariat, states that government efforts 
to combat sexual exploitation of children need to be better tailored 
and coordinated. It cites 40 separate programs operated by national and 
international NGO's, some in partnership with Government entities, but 
notes that most of the programs face shortfalls in resources and 
personnel. In association with the Ministry of Justice, the NGO ABRAPIA 
has since 1997 operated a telephone hot line to register complaints of 
sexual abuse against children and adolescents. ABRAPIA also administers 
the ``SOS-child'' program in Rio de Janeiro state that registers 
complaints of domestic abuse against children and provides medical and 
social assistance.
    Sexual exploitation of children and child prostitution remained a 
significant problem throughout the country. The CECRIA report indicated 
that patterns of sexual exploitation of children correspond to the 
distinct economic and social profile of the country's region. In the 
northern Amazonian region, sexual exploitation of children centers 
around brothels that cater to mining settlements. In the large urban 
centers, children, principally girls, who leave home because of abuse 
or sexual exploitation often prostitute themselves on the streets in 
order to survive. In the cities along the northeast coast, sexual 
tourism exploiting children is prevalent, and involves networks of 
travel agents, hotel workers, taxi drivers, and others who actively 
recruit children and even traffic them outside the country. Child 
prostitution also is developed in the areas served by the country's 
navigable rivers, particularly in ports and at international borders. 
In port cities, crews from cargo vessels are a primary clientele. The 
report notes that although trafficking develops in part to meet the 
demands of foreigners, and that the local population sustains it.
    Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution contains several 
provisions for the disabled, stipulating a minimum wage, educational 
opportunities, and access to public buildings and public 
transportation. However, groups that work with the disabled report that 
state governments failed to meet the legally mandated targets for 
educational opportunities and work placement. A 1991 law stipulates 
that all businesses with over 200 employees must reserve 2 percent of 
their vacancies for the disabled. In 1999 labor officials in the 
Federal District launched an information campaign to encourage firms to 
comply with the law and warned that noncomplying firms could be fined.
    The National Human Rights Secretariat sponsored a ``City for 
Everyone'' program in cooperation with municipal governments and 
national and international NGO's that focused on providing better 
access for the disabled to public areas and public transport. However, 
little progress in the elimination of architectural barriers to the 
disabled has been made. In 1999 Rio de Janeiro state mandated that bus 
companies must make a specific number of buses on certain routes 
accessible to wheelchair users within 3 months. By September only 14 
public buses--of thousands in the city--had been adapted for wheelchair 
use. No intercity or interstate buses had been modified. The city of 
Niteroi put in service 10 vans specifically for the use of disabled 
persons, but the supply of this service lagged behind the rising 
demand.
    In June the Chamber of Deputies' Human Rights Commission released 
the report of its investigation into the conditions of mental hospitals 
and asylums. The report cited many examples of understaffed and poorly 
administered hospitals, substandard living conditions for many 
patients, and severely overcrowded and unclean facilities.
    According to the Federal Ministry of Education, in 1997 only 5 
percent of the estimated 6 million school-age children with 
disabilities had access to specialized instruction. Throughout the 
country, 43 percent of school districts offer special instruction for 
disabled children. In the nine states in the northeast part of the 
country, only 24 percent of school districts offer special instruction.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution grants the indigenous 
population of approximately 330,000 broad rights, including the 
protection of their cultural patrimony and the exclusive use of their 
traditional lands; however, the Government has fallen short of securing 
these rights for indigenous people in practice. The Government 
estimates that over half live in poverty in communities whose 
traditional ways of life are threatened on a variety of fronts. The 
number of indigenous citizens receiving food assistance in the southern 
states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul exceeded the total indigenous 
population at the time of the 1995 census in those states. The greatest 
number of beneficiaries reside in Mato Grosso do Sul state, where 
42,000 persons of a total indigenous population of 45,300 receive food 
assistance.
    Indigenous leaders and activists complain that indigenous people 
have only limited participation in decisions taken by the Government 
affecting their land, cultures, traditions, and allocation of national 
resources. They also criticized the Government for devoting 
insufficient resources to health care, other basic services, and 
protection of indigenous reserves from outsiders. Illegal mining, 
logging, and ranching are serious problems on indigenous land.
    The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is responsible for the 
coordination and implementation of indigenous policies. The President 
appoints the head of FUNAI; it is organized into 52 regions with 
directors appointed directly by the FUNAI president.
    The 1988 Constitution charged the Federal Government with 
demarcating indigenous areas within 5 years. By January the Government 
had completed demarcation of roughly 79 percent of the total area of 
identified indigenous territory. During the year, the Government 
demarcated 4 more areas totaling about 360 square miles. Of the 563 
identified indigenous areas, 313 have reached the final registration 
stage, and 250 remain to be demarcated legally. Identified indigenous 
territory comprises 11 percent of the national territory.
    In December 1998, the Federal Government issued a decree 
recognizing the original boundaries of the Raposa Serra do Sol 
indigenous area in the Amazonian state of Roraima, overturning a 
controversial decision made in 1996 by the Justice Minister to limit 
and alter the shape of the reserve. In 1999 a state court suspended the 
demarcation process after local landowners and economic interests filed 
a suit requesting that action. In 1999 Roraima Senator Mozarildo 
Cavalcanti presented a bill canceling the 1998 decree. In September the 
bill was given an unfavorable report in committee. Indigenous activists 
claim that the Government's failure to allocate resources and complete 
the demarcation was a political concession to local economic and 
political interests who then were able to influence the state court. 
The demarcation of Raposa Serra do Sol has been pending since 1992.
    The Constitution provides indigenous people with the exclusive use 
of the soil, waters, and minerals on indigenous lands, subject to 
congressional authorization. In granting such authorization, the 
Constitution stipulates that the views of the affected communities must 
be considered and that the communities also must ``participate'' in the 
benefits gained from such use. However, legislation regulating mining 
on indigenous lands has been pending before the Congress since 1995. 
The Catholic Church-affiliated Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) 
criticized the regulations within the legislation that would provide 
for indigenous groups' approval of mining concessions and their 
participation in the profits from mining, on the grounds that they do 
not address sufficiently the constitutional rights of indigenous 
people.
    In 1999 landowners brought a civil action to the Supreme Court 
against a lower court ruling in Bahia that restored demarcated land of 
the Caramuru-Catarina Paraguacu reserve to the Pataxo Ha-Ha-Hae tribe. 
At year's end, no trial date had been set. Other attempts were made to 
negotiate between the tribe and landowners.
    The Government estimates that 208 of the 563 identified indigenous 
lands are used illegally by nonindigenous persons for mining, logging, 
and agriculture. Nonindigenous invaders destroy the environment and 
wildlife, spread disease, and provoke violent confrontations. FUNAI 
admits that it does not have the necessary resources to protect 
indigenous lands from encroachment.
    Due partly to the Government's failure to provide adequate medical 
care as required by law, indigenous people have suffered epidemics of 
malaria, measles, and tuberculosis. According to the chief of FUNAI's 
medical department, 60 percent of the indigenous population suffer from 
a chronic disease such as tuberculosis, malaria, or hepatitis. In 
certain areas of the Amazon region, up to 80 percent of the population 
are affected. Illegal mining in the Amazon has led to the doubling of 
the incidence of malaria in the 1994-98 period. FUNAI estimates that 75 
percent of the affected population is indigenous. The infant mortality 
rate among the Yanomami in 1997 was 13 percent, while infant mortality 
among nonindigenous residents in the area was only 1.5 percent. 
According to health workers' unions, poor working conditions and lack 
of resources from the Government make it very difficult for health 
workers to travel into indigenous areas to provide sufficient medical 
care.
    FUNAI also has been unable to provide mandated health care and 
other basic services. Hoping to improve the level of health care 
provided to indigenous people, in 1999 the Government transferred that 
responsibility from FUNAI to the Ministry of Health.
    According to the Pro-Yanomami Committee, in 1999 FUNASA, the 
Government's health agency, issued a report showing that in 1998, 279 
indigenous persons died in Roraima, 180 of them Yanomami. Most of the 
deaths were caused by acute respiratory infection, malaria, and 
diarrhea. Almost half died without having received medical assistance.
    In September after Federal prosecutors complained about the 
slowness of the police investigation, the National Council for Human 
Rights formed a committee to oversee the investigation of the May 1998 
killing of Xucuru Chief Francisco ``Xicao'' de Assis Araujo. Araujo 
defended the land claims of his tribe, whose lands are being encroached 
upon by ranchers in his home state of Pernambuco.
    No progress was made in the case of mass sterilizations promoted 
among women of the Pataxo tribe of Bahia by Federal Deputy Dr. Roland 
Lavigne in exchange for votes during his 1994 electoral campaign. Women 
were reluctant to have children due to the general level of poverty in 
the community, and campaign workers allegedly convinced them that 
sterilization was the only effective form of birth control. Pataxo 
leaders claim that the sterilizations were a deliberate program of 
genocide intended to eliminate their tribe and free their land for 
farmers who illegally occupy the Pataxo reserve.
    In April during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the 
arrival of the Portuguese in Porto Seguro (Bahia), police used rubber 
bullets and tear gas, in violently blocking 2,000 indigenous marchers 
from entering the city. Indigenous leaders were seeking damages in 
civil court at year's end. In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Mary Robinson raised the police's actions with President 
Cardoso. The President denied any use of excessive force, and in July a 
Federal Police investigation reached the same conclusion. However, the 
Federal Public Prosecutor has challenged these findings. FUNAI 
president Mares resigned in protest over the treatment of indigenous 
people during the event.
    In May an Acre state judge sentenced former Acre governor Orleir 
Cameli, his family's firm, and his partner Abraao Candido da Silva, to 
pay about $5 million (10 million reais) to the Ashaninka-Kampa 
indigenous group for material and moral damage caused by the extraction 
of mahogany and cedar from 1981 to 1987. The firm extracted 2,478 cubic 
meters of wood from the area. Cameli announced he would appeal the 
decision.
    In September CIMI reported that FUNAI was going to press charges 
against Jordao, Acre city councilman Auton Farias, and two others for 
the murder of an indigenous person in Tarauaca, Acre.
    Religious Minorities.--Leaders in the Jewish community expressed 
concern over the continued appearance of anti-Semitic material on 
Internet websites compiled by neo-Nazi groups.
    Amnesty International reported that Eduardo Bernardes da Silva, a 
worker with the NGO's office in Sao Paulo, received a suspicious 
package at his home on September 5. He opened it partially and found a 
device covered in swastikas, thought to have been sent by a neo-Nazi 
group. Police confirmed that it was a bomb and destroyed it in a 
controlled explosion.
    The next day a similar bomb was sent to the offices of the 
Associacao da Parada GLBT, an association which organizes an annual Gay 
Pride March, reportedly by the same group.
    In September a neo-Nazi group sent letters to two prominent Sao 
Paulo human rights commission members, Renato Simoes and Italo Cardoso, 
threatening to ``exterminate'' gays, Jews, black people and nordestinos 
(people from the impoverished northeast of the country), as well as 
those seeking to protect their rights. The letter said that the group 
intended to target a number of human rights organizations on or around 
the country's September 7 Independence Day, including Tortura Nunca 
Mais (No More Torture), Action by Christians against Torture, AI, and 
gay and lesbian groups.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination 
has been illegal since 1951, darker-skinned citizens say that they 
frequently encounter discrimination. Legislation in force since 1989 
specifically prohibits, among other practices, denial of public or 
private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on race. A 
1997 amendment to this law added prohibitions against, and jail terms 
for, the incitement of racial discrimination or prejudice and the 
dissemination of racially offensive symbols and epithets. The media 
reported arrests of several persons charged with using racial slurs 
during the year. Several examples of such cases include that of a 
seamstress pressing charges against her employer, a stagehand bringing 
charges against a theatrical director, and a customer pressing charges 
against an employee of a video rental store. All instances involved use 
of racial slurs when insults were uttered; at year's end, none had 
completed the trial process.
    In Sao Paulo human rights activists continued to express concern 
because of discrimination against blacks and poor persons from the 
northeast by neo-Nazi groups in the south. Many of these groups 
maintain Web sites that espouse violence. The Sao Paulo State Assembly 
Human Rights Committee criticized several hate groups who maintain such 
Web sites and asked the Public Ministry for an investigation. One man, 
who maintained a Web site that called for the eviction from Sao Paulo 
of all emigrants from northeastern part of the country, was accused of 
crimes under the Racism Law. Instead of going to trial, he chose to 
accept guilt for the crime and did community service as punishment. At 
year's end, other similar cases still were being investigated.
    ISER research noted a disproportionately higher rate of police 
killings of Afro-Brazilians. Persons of color are five times more 
likely to be shot or killed in the course of a law enforcement action 
than are persons who are perceived to be white.
    In September two members of the Sao Paulo State Assembly's Human 
Rights Committee received threatening letters stating that the group 
which identifies itself as ``raca pura'' (pure race) is ``fighting for 
an end to homosexuals, blacks, and northeasterners.'' Sao Paulo's State 
Secretary of Security ordered an investigation into both incidents. The 
investigations were ongoing at year's end.
    In addition to these violent threats against minorities, research 
conducted this year at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
reconfirmed that Afro-Brazilians experience lower standards of living 
than whites. Cross-checking data from the IBGE, the national statistics 
office, and the U.N. Human Development Index showed that Afro-
Brazilians have lower salaries, life expectancies (62 years instead of 
69 years), and educational standards (79 percent literacy rates, 
compared with 92 percent) than whites. Afro-Brazilians and mulattos 
still are clearly disadvantaged economically and socially throughout 
the country. In Sao Paulo, for example, the rate of unemployment among 
blacks is 22.7 percent, while the rate among nonblacks is 16.1 percent. 
Nonblacks in Sao Paulo have an average monthly income of about $523 
(1,005 reais), while blacks average only $267 (512 reais) a month.
    According to research carried out by the Inter-Union Department of 
Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies in 1998, Afro-Brazilians had 
higher rates of unemployment, earned less, and enjoyed less job 
stability than white Brazilians in each of the five largest 
metropolitan regions where data were gathered. In and around Salvador, 
Bahia, which has the highest percentage of Afro-Brazilians of any 
metropolitan region, unemployment among Afro-Brazilians was 45 percent 
higher than among whites (the difference among heads of household was 
75 percent). In Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilian unemployment was 41 percent 
higher than among whites and 64 percent higher among heads of 
households. Afro-Brazilian men earned on average between 62 percent and 
70 percent of the average salary earned by white men in the five 
regions surveyed. Afro-Brazilian women earned on average between 33.5 
and 47 percent of the average salary of a white man. Illiteracy also is 
a problem: 32 percent of blacks are illiterate, compared with 14 
percent of whites. Blacks are less likely than whites to be enrolled in 
institutes of higher education.
    A much higher percentage of blacks are convicted by courts than 
whites, according to professor Sergio Adorno of the University of Sao 
Paulo's Nucleus for the Study of Violence. Adorno analyzed 500 criminal 
cases judged in Sao Paulo courts in 1990 and found that 60 percent of 
whites able to afford their own lawyers were acquitted, while only 27 
percent of blacks who hired lawyers were found not guilty. Ignacio 
Cano, a researcher at the Sociological Institute of Religious Studies 
in Rio de Janeiro, found strong evidence of racial bias by the police 
in the use of lethal force against residents of color in Rio de Janiero 
from 1993 to 1996 and in Sao Paulo from 1996 to 1999. According to 
Cano, Afro-Brazilians were three times as likely as whites to suffer 
death or injury from police gunfire.
    In 1997 the Federal Government's Interministerial Working Group for 
the Valorization of the Black Population issued 29 recommendations, 
including the creation of affirmative action programs for university 
admissions and government hiring. The group is charged with proposing 
public policies to increase the participation and access of Afro-
Brazilians in society. The National Secretariat for Human Rights 
adopted some of the group's recommendations in the national human 
rights program, which now contains, as a specific goal, the development 
of affirmative actions programs to increase access for Afro-Brazilians 
to professional schools and universities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provides for representation of all workers (except members of the 
military, the uniformed police, and firemen) but imposes a 
hierarchical, unitary system funded by a mandatory union tax on workers 
and employers. New unions must register with the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (MLE), which accepts the registration if no objections are 
filed. Registration can be contested with the MLE by other unions which 
represent workers in the same geographical area and professional 
category. In the case of such an objection, the MLE's Secretariat for 
Labor Relations has 15 days to consider the validity of the objection. 
If the objection is found to be valid, the MLE will not register the 
union and it remains for union organizers to challenge the decision in 
the labor courts.
    The 1988 Constitution freed workers to organize new unions out of 
old ones without prior authorization of the Government; however, it 
retained many other provisions of the old labor code. One such 
provision is a restriction known as ``unicidade'' (``one-per-city''), 
which limits freedom of association by prohibiting multiple, competing 
unions of the same professional category in a given geographical area. 
Most elements of the labor movement, as well as the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), criticize the retention of 
unicidade. The Cardoso administration submitted a constitutional 
amendment to Congress that would end unicidade, but at year's end, it 
still had not come to a vote due to disagreement over the proposal.
    In practice a number of competing unions have been allowed to exist 
among the thousands of local unions. However, these do not represent 
the norm, and the MLE and the courts actively enforce the principle of 
unicidade in decisions regarding the registration of new unions.
    Approximately 16 percent of the work force voluntarily pays union 
dues, but nearly twice that percentage is charged a mandatory union tax 
and also is represented in collective bargaining. The Ministry of Labor 
estimates that there are over 16,000 unions. Local unions are able to 
associate with state federations and national confederations in their 
professional category. Unions are obliged by law to represent all 
workers in a professional category and geographical area, regardless of 
membership status.
    Although the law makes no provision for central labor organizations 
that include multiple categories of workers, four major groups have 
emerged: the Workers' Unitary Central (CUT), the Forca Sindical (FS), 
the Workers' General Confederation (CGT), and the Social Democratic 
Union (SDS). Labor centrals are not provided for in the Labor Code, and 
centrals do not have legal standing to represent professional 
categories of workers in collective bargaining.
    Unions and their leadership are independent of the Government and 
of the political parties. The leadership of major unions is distinct 
and independent from that of the political parties. The major union 
centrals tend to share links to various left-of-center political 
parties. In some instances, unions and centrals form alliances with 
political parties and social movements to advocate or carry out protest 
acts regarding specific issues. One of the largest such acts in recent 
years was the ``March of 100,000,'' which brought 75,000 
representatives of the CUT, the National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers, the MST, and 30 other organizations to Brasilia in 1999 to 
protest government policies.
    The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike (except 
for the military, police, and firemen). Enabling legislation passed in 
1989 stipulates that essential services must remain in operation during 
a strike and that workers must notify employers at least 48 hours 
before beginning a walkout. Congress has yet to pass the complementary 
legislation establishing legal protection for strikes in the public 
sector; however, in practice the Government has not interfered with the 
right of public workers to strike. The Constitution prohibits 
government interference in labor unions, but provides that ``abuse'' of 
the right to strike (such as not maintaining essential services, or 
failure to end a strike after a labor court decision) is punishable by 
law. Employers are prohibited from firing workers or hiring substitute 
workers during a strike, with certain exceptions, provided that the 
strike is not ruled abusive. If a union follows the laws regarding 
strikes, which were eased in the 1988 Constitution, the labor courts 
generally do not rule that the strikes are abusive.
    The number of strikes has diminished in recent years. According to 
the Inter-union Department of Socioeconomic Studies and Statistics 
(DIEESE), there were approximately 550 strikes in 1999, compared with 
1,250 strikes recorded in 1996. In the city of Sao Paulo and the 
surrounding region, which covers the country's industrial center, data 
from the regional labor court showed that there were 84 strikes during 
the year, the lowest number in a decade. Public sector strikes received 
the most attention in the media during the year. Public sector unions 
that struck during the year include municipal transit workers, customs 
agents, public teachers, state university workers, and various 
categories of federal employees. In addition major strikes in the 
private sector included the metalworkers of Sao Paulo, bank workers, 
truck drivers, and longshoremen in the port of Santos.
    On May 18 in Sao Paulo, military police fired tear gas and rubber 
bullets into a crowd of striking workers from a coalition of 25 unions 
linked to the CUT. More than 20 strikers were injured. Strikers reacted 
by throwing rocks and cans at police, injuring five policemen (see 
Section 1.c.). The ICFTU reported that police fired on striking workers 
at a government-run company in Brasilia in December 1999, killing 
public sector worker Jose Ferreira da Silva and injuring 20 others. 
Although police said that they used only tear gas and rubber bullets, 
live ammunition was found in Ferreira's body.
    According to leaders of the National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers, an organized campaign exists in the state of Para to 
assassinate rural labor leaders. In November labor organizer Jose Dutra 
da Costa was shot and killed in Rondon do Para. Costa served as 
director for land reform policy of the local union, which was involved 
in taking over disputed land for the settlement of rural workers. In 
June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was convicted of 
ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers' union, 
Expedito Ribiero de Souza (see Section 1.a.).
    Unions and centrals freely affiliate with international trade union 
organizations; the CUT, FS, and CGT are affiliated with the ICFTU.
    The ICFTU reports that intimidation and killings of rural labor 
union organizers and their agents also continues to be a problem.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to organize. Businesses and unions 
are working to expand and improve mechanisms of collective bargaining. 
However, due to the highly detailed labor code, the scope of issues 
legally subject to collective bargaining is narrow. The labor court 
system exercises normative power with regard to the settlement of labor 
disputes, discouraging direct negotiation. The Cardoso administration 
made expansion of collective bargaining one of its major objectives in 
the labor sector. However, the Labor Ministry has yet to introduce 
legislation on the issue due to fierce resistance by labor unions, 
which view such government efforts as an attempt to make negotiable 
collective bargaining rights provided for by the Constitution.
    Collective bargaining is widespread in the formal sector. More than 
16,700 negotiated contracts were registered with the Labor Ministry in 
1999, a significant increase from the 10,000 contracts registered 2 
years earlier. To be binding, all collective bargaining agreements must 
be reported to the Labor Ministry within 8 days of their conclusion. In 
spite of the prevalence of collective bargaining, unicidade and the 
inability of new unions to compete with existing unions limit the 
effectiveness of negotiations and the bargaining power of unions. As a 
result, DIEESE reports that only half of the collective bargaining 
agreements it tracked in 1999 contained wage increases that kept pace 
with inflation.
    In 1995 the Cardoso administration promulgated a provisional 
measure that simultaneously ended inflation indexing of wages, allowed 
for mediation of wage settlements if the parties involved so desired, 
and provided greater latitude for collective bargaining. Previously the 
labor court and the Labor Ministry had responsibility for mediation in 
the preliminary stages of dispute settlement. Although labor court 
decisions still set wages in many disputes, parties now may choose 
mediation as an alternative. Free mediation services are provided by 
the Ministry of Labor and the Public Ministry of Labor, and unions and 
employers also may choose a private mediator from a registry kept by 
the Labor Ministry.
    The Constitution incorporates a provision from the old labor code 
that prohibits the dismissal of employees who are candidates for or 
holders of union leadership positions. Nonetheless, dismissals take 
place, with those dismissed required to resort to a usually lengthy 
court process for relief. In general the authorities do not effectively 
enforce laws protecting union members from discrimination. Labor courts 
charged with resolving these and other disputes involving unfair 
dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances 
are slow and cumbersome. At year's end, over 2.5 million complaints 
were languishing in the labor court system, where they may remain 
unresolved for 5 to 10 years. According to the Supreme Labor Court, 
over 2 million complaints have been registered in labor courts each 
year during the past 5 years.
    The Government is attempting to reduce this backlog and increase 
the efficiency of the courts. Legislation approved in January enables 
cases with relatively low monetary claims to be adjudicated in one 
meeting with a judge within 30 days of the filing. Another recent law 
promotes the formation of employee/employer conciliation commissions 
designed to resolve grievances before they reach the labor courts. In 
the past, according to union officials, as many as 95 percent of cases 
in courts took between 5 to 10 years to resolve.
    Labor law applies equally in the free trade zones. The unions in 
the Manaus free trade zone, like rural unions and many unions in 
smaller cities, are weaker vis-a-vis employers than unions in the major 
industrial centers.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, there continue to be credible reports 
of compulsory labor in many parts of the country. The 2000 ICFTU report 
states that forced laborers number in the hundreds of thousands, but 
there are no government sources to confirm such estimates. Forced labor 
is most common in agricultural activities in the rural north and 
center-west of the country, in logging, charcoal production, herding, 
and agriculture. The majority of cases occur when employers recruit 
laborers from population centers and transport them long distances to 
remote areas where escape is difficult. Laborers often are forced to 
work in inhuman conditions, many times under the watch of armed guards, 
to pay off debt that they incurred on the trip or at the worksite. In 
many cases, overseers or owners of farms withhold pay from migrant 
laborers and use force to retain and intimidate them.
    According to the Penal Code, violators of forced or compulsory 
labor laws may be sentenced up to 8 years in prison. Legislation passed 
in December 1988 better defined penalties for those who recruit workers 
under fraudulent claims, withhold documents or salaries, or force 
workers to labor against their will to repay debt.
    Government officials and labor activists say that widespread 
poverty, low levels of education, and lack of awareness of workers' 
rights greatly complicate efforts to combat forced labor. Enforcement 
also has been hampered by the remoteness of the areas in which forced 
labor is practiced and the difficulty of arriving in these areas 
without alerting those using illegal labor. Additionally, freed workers 
often are afraid to testify against those who recruited and supervised 
them and are unable to remain in the region in order to testify. Thus 
the authorities often have found it difficult to identify and prosecute 
the owners of farms or businesses that exploit forced labor. In its 
March report, the ILO Committee of Experts noted that when convictions 
do occur, usually only the third party recruiters are punished and the 
owners of the large estates who employ illegal labor are not 
sanctioned. Beginning in 1996, the Government may expropriate and use 
in land reform programs land on which slave labor is found. However, 
land owners must be compensated for these lands. In one case, the 
Government paid the owner of the Flor da Mata ranch in the Para state 
for lands expropriated for use in land reform in 1998. The Pastoral 
Land Commission objected to the amount paid to the ranch owner, stating 
that it was well above what the owner paid for the land, thereby 
contributing to a sense of impunity and rewarding those who allow their 
lands to be used for forced labor. There is proposed legislation in 
Congress that would allow land to be confiscated with no payment to 
land owners.
    Federal Government efforts to eliminate forced labor are 
coordinated by the Executive Group to Combat Forced Labor (GERTRAF), 
which was established in 1995. The Ministry of Labor coordinates 
GERTRAF, which includes representatives from seven different 
ministries. The enforcement arm of GERTRAF is the Special Group for 
Mobile Inspection (SETIF), which works in conjunction with Federal 
Police. During 1995-98, the teams carried out more than 500 raids. They 
reached over 140,000 persons working under varying conditions 
approximating forced labor. Over this period, SETIF freed nearly 800 
workers from slave-like conditions and helped in the prosecution and 
incarceration of 13 persons. SETIF conducted 123 raids and freed 639 
workers from forced labor in 1999--more than in any previous year. 
Through the first 6 months of the year, the group freed 418 workers 
from 45 ranches and levied over $200,000 (370,000 reais) in fines. 
Although 33 minors under 16 years of age were found working on ranches 
during raids by SETIF during the year, none of them were laboring in 
conditions of forced or compulsory labor.
    In its largest single operation to date, SETIF and the Federal 
Police freed 135 workers from slave-like conditions on a cotton ranch 
in the state of Mato Grosso in April. The team responded to a complaint 
made by 15 workers who had escaped from the ranch in February and 
reported working 7 days a week among rats and snakes, sleeping on the 
ground, and paying high prices for spoiled food. Workers had been 
recruited from cities in the region with promises of good housing, 
food, and salaries; instead, they were forced to work at gunpoint in 
inhuman conditions. The authorities are investigating at least eight 
other ranches in the region for suspected use of forced labor.
    GERTRAF receives allegations of forced labor from labor unions and 
other organizations. The CUT initiated a 24-hour hot line with a toll-
free number for reporting instances of forced labor in 1997. However, 
the most important supplier of information to GERTRAF is the Catholic 
Church's Pastoral Land Commission, which tracks instances of forced 
labor and carries out campaigns to educate workers about the risks of 
forced labor. The CPT reported 16 instances of forced labor involving 
1,099 workers in 10 states in 1999. Over one-half of these forced 
laborers were found in the state of Para. The 1999 figures represented 
a reversal of a 3-year trend of declining instances of forced labor. 
The CPT reported that, due to the hidden and complex nature of forced 
labor, these figures significantly understate the actual number of 
workers trapped in conditions of forced and compulsory labor in the 
country.
    The law also bars forced and bonded labor by children. Although the 
MLE found no children working as forced laborers during the year, in 
1999 the Pastoral Land Commission reported 25 children under the age of 
16 found working in conditions of forced labor. In March the ILO 
reported that observers have cited over 3,000 girls who were subject to 
debt servitude and forced into prostitution in the state of Rondonia.
    Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution also is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law restricts work that may be performed by children; 
however, child labor is a serious problem. The Government amended the 
Constitution in December 1998 to raise the minimum working age from 14 
to 16 years and the age at which apprenticeships may begin from 12 to 
14 years. The law bars all minors under age 18 from work that 
constitutes a physical strain or from employment in nocturnal, 
unhealthful, dangerous, or morally harmful conditions. However, the 
authorities rarely enforce additional legal restrictions intended to 
protect working minors under age 18, and the problem is widespread.
    The law requires permission of the parents for minors to work as 
apprentices, and working minors must attend school through the primary 
grades. Schooling is universal, free, and compulsory until the age of 
15.
    The rate of school enrollment of children aged 7 to 14 increased 
from 89.1 percent in 1994 to 95.5 percent in 1999. Rates of repetition 
have dropped from 30.2 percent in 1995 to 23.4 percent in 1997. Despite 
these promising numbers, repetition rates and the poor quality of 
public schools continued to be problems. Fully 40 percent of first-
graders repeat the year, and in a number of states first-graders are 
more likely to fail than to pass. Even with increased enrollment, there 
still were 1.1 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 who are 
not attending school.
    Although still a serious problem, the incidence of child labor has 
dropped significantly in recent years. According to government figures, 
the number of working children fell by nearly 24 percent between 1995 
and 1999. Over the same period, the rate of participation in the work 
force of children from the ages of 5 to 14 dropped from 11 to 9 
percent. Nevertheless, more than 2.9 million children under the age of 
15 continued to work in 1999. Frequent accidents, unhealthy working 
conditions, and squalor are common.
    A 1999 Labor Ministry report indicates that children work in about 
100 rural and urban activities. Common rural activities include 
fishing, mining, producing charcoal, and harvesting sugarcane, sisal, 
tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, and a variety of other crops. In urban 
areas, children are found in shoe shining, trash picking, street 
peddling, prostitution, and drug trafficking. According to the 
Government's Institute for Applied Economic Research, there are around 
400,000 children between the ages of 10 to 16 working as domestic 
servants.
    The Ministry of Labor and Employment is responsible for inspecting 
worksites to enforce child labor laws. These efforts are guided 
regionally by special Nuclei for the Eradication of Child Labor, which 
gather data and develop plans for child labor inspection. Nearly all 
inspections of children in the workplace are driven by allegations and 
tips from workers, teachers, unions, NGO's, and the media. 
Approximately 3,200 inspectors investigated 52,000 establishments in 
1999. Inspectors lack authority to investigate allegations of child 
labor in informal sector establishments, where most child labor is 
found. In all cases but the worst forms, inspectors attempt to reach an 
alternative solution before applying fines of around $225 (400 reais) 
per violation. Inspectors also may refer cases to prosecutors from the 
Public Ministry of Labor, who are able to levy fines upwards of $1,670 
(3,000 reais) and investigate cases in the informal sector.
    Fighting child labor is a priority of the Cardoso administration. 
The Ministry of Social Security and Assistance's Program for the 
Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) provides cash stipends to low-income 
families who keep their children in school and out of work activities. 
Because the public school day lasts only 4 hours, PETI also offers 
complementary cultural and instructional activities to children during 
nonschool hours to keep them from situations in which they could be put 
to work. PETI has grown from assisting about 3,700 children in 2 states 
in 1996 to over 390,000 in nearly all 26 states by the end of the year. 
The program started with children involved in hazardous activities in 
rural areas, such as charcoal production and sisal, sugar cane, and 
citrus harvesting. Other rural activities recently included in the 
program are work in cotton and tobacco fields, flour mills, salt mines, 
horticulture, weaving, fishing, wood mills, brick production, ceramics, 
and mining. The PETI program also is growing rapidly in urban 
activities such as trash picking, shoe shining, and street peddling.
    Social programs to end child labor have been matched by investments 
in programs to support greater access to education. The Ministry of 
Education's (MEC) Program for the Guarantee of a Minimum Income (PGRM) 
provides low-income families with modest monthly stipends--typically 
ranging from $6-8 (10-15 reais) per child--provided that all children 
aged 7-14 in the household are attending school. The poorest 20 percent 
of municipalities in each state are eligible to enroll in the program 
and receive funds from the Federal Government. MEC estimates that the 
PGRM has benefited 1 million children in more than 500,000 families. 
The Government supplements this program with a decentralized school 
lunch program that serves 37 million children across the country.
    In December 1999, the Government ratified ILO Convention 138 
dealing with the minimum age for work and Convention 182 on the 
eradication of the worst forms of child labor. At year's end, 
Convention 138 had not taken effect due to technical issues concerning 
the minimum working age that the Government submitted to the ILO. In 
March the Ministry of Labor established a tripartite commission to 
produce a list of worst forms of child labor to be eradicated in the 
country. At year's end, the commission produced a list of over 80 such 
activities, which includes 27 new activities that are to be banned for 
all workers under 18 years of age. These new activities include cutting 
sugar cane, applying pesticides, and driving tractors.
    Civil organizations have played a fundamental role in reducing the 
number of children working. One of the organizations coordinating the 
diverse efforts has been the National Forum for the Prevention and 
Eradication of Child Labor. The Forum was established in 1994 with 
funding from the ILO and UNICEF, and has chapters in every state and 
over 40 institutional members from government, unions, employers, and 
NGO's. The ILO's Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) 
sponsors programs in footwear, charcoal, citrus, sisal, and domestic 
service. IPEC programs have focused on capacity building, awareness 
raising, research promotion, and the incorporation of income generating 
schemes and monitoring systems into child labor prevention programs. 
UNICEF supports various NGO's, and began a campaign in to remove child 
laborers from working in trash dumps.
    The ABRINQ Foundation for Children's Rights has negotiated 
agreements and garnered commitments from producers in footwear, citrus, 
automobile production, charcoal, and other industries to investigate 
and eradicate instances of child labor. ABRINQ also awards mayors who 
invest in prochild policies with its Child-Friendly Mayor award. 
Through a labeling program and awareness-raising activities, the 
footwear industry's Pro-Child Institute has helped to reduce 
significantly instances of child labor in footwear production in the 
state of Sao Paulo. Other important NGO's include Projeto POMMAR, which 
works most closely with children at risk of becoming prostitutes in the 
Northeast, and Missao Crianca (Mission Child), a new NGO that seeks to 
disseminate its methodology for minimum income programs to end child 
labor. All major union centrals have made firm commitments to eradicate 
child labor by reporting violations and implementing programs to 
educate union members about the hazards of child labor. The News Agency 
for Children's Rights closely tracks stories in the media, publishes 
studies, and gives awards to media outlets that effectively cover 
children's rights.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is 
approximately $77 (151 reais) a month, which is not sufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for workers and their families. A 
1999 study by DIEESE concluded that the minimum wage was only about 
one-seventh of the salary necessary to support a family of four in the 
Sao Paulo metropolitan area. Many workers outside the regulated 
economy, particularly in the rural northeast, earn less than the 
minimum wage. At year's end, Congress was considering legislation that 
would increase the minimum wage.
    The Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and specifies a 
weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The 
Constitution provides for pay and fringe benefits and establishes 
protections for agricultural and domestic workers, although not all 
provisions are enforced. All workers in the formal sector receive 
overtime pay for work beyond 44 hours, and there are prohibitions 
against excessive use of overtime.
    Unsafe working conditions are prevalent throughout the country. 
Fundacentro, part of the Ministry of Labor, sets occupational, health, 
and safety standards, which are consistent with internationally 
recognized norms. However, the Ministry has insufficient resources for 
adequate inspection and enforcement of these standards. If a worker has 
a problem in the workplace and has trouble getting relief directly from 
an employer, the worker or union can file a claim with the regional 
labor court, although in practice this frequently is a cumbersome, 
protracted process.
    The law requires employers to establish internal committees for 
accident prevention in workplaces. It also protects employee members of 
these committees from being fired for their committee activities. 
However, such firings do occur, and legal recourse usually requires 
years for resolution. Individual workers do not have the legal right to 
remove themselves from the workplace when faced with hazardous working 
conditions; however, workers may express such concerns to the internal 
committee, which would conduct an immediate investigation.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the transport of 
persons for illicit reasons within and outside the country; however, 
trafficking in persons, including women and children, in, to, and from 
the country is a problem. Penalties for trafficking in persons include 
fines and prison sentences ranging from 1 to 12 years, depending on the 
severity of the abuse and whether violence, threats, or fraud were 
employed.
    Trafficking within the country often takes the form of rural 
workers being transported long distances to work on remote ranches in 
slave-like conditions (see Section 6.c.).
    Trafficking of women and children for purposes of prostitution, 
both within the country and to other countries is also a problem.
    Laws on trafficking are enforced by the Federal Police. Officials 
reported that it is very difficult to capture and incarcerate 
traffickers because they must be caught in the act of traveling with 
the victims. Further, most women who leave the country with traffickers 
do so willingly, and only upon arrival do they realize the severe 
conditions under which they are forced to work and live. Officials also 
report that fear of reprisals keeps a number of victims from seeking 
police intervention or from testifying against those who persecuted 
them.
    The U.N. reported that over 75,000 Brazilian women work as 
prostitutes in Europe. According to the report, most of the women come 
from the states of Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. During the 
year, the Federal Police arrested several suspects in the capital of 
Brasilia, Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Ceara involved in recruiting women 
to work as prostitutes abroad, mainly in Spain, but also in Portugal, 
Japan, and Israel. Police officials stated that in most cases women who 
are recruited by trafficking organizations understand that they are to 
work as prostitutes, but that they are lied to about working conditions 
and their prospective earnings. In other cases women were told that 
they would work as nannies or as household servants. Upon arrival 
victims of trafficking often have their passports confiscated and are 
forced to prostitute themselves and live in virtual confinement. As in 
other types of trafficking, perpetrators use debt and isolation to 
control the victims.
    In March the federal police arrested one person who was connected 
to a trafficking ring that brought women from the state of Goias to 
Spain. The person allegedly received $130 (234 reais) in return for 
each woman transported from the bus station to the airport. Four women 
were with the suspect at the time of arrest.
    In June the Federal Police uncovered a travel agency in Goias which 
had recruited and sent at least 20 women to work as prostitutes in 
Spain. At year's end, the two agency owners were in prison awaiting 
trial; the recruiters were still at large.
    The Government took a number of steps over the year to combat child 
prostitution. To call attention to the problem and foster initiatives 
to fight it, May 18 was declared the first National Day against the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents. Legislation enacted in 
June lengthened the maximum sentence to 10 years in prison for those 
who manage brothels that exploit child prostitutes. In July the 
Government announced the first national pilot program to combat child 
prostitution. The program has a budget of a $556,000 (1 million reais) 
but was geared to begin its outreach operations at the end of the year.
                               __________

                                 CANADA

    Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary 
form of government. Citizens periodically choose their representatives 
in free and fair multiparty elections. On November 27, voters elected a 
majority of 172 Liberal Party members to the 301-seat Parliament, and 
Jean Chretien began his third term as prime minister. The judiciary is 
independent.
    Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and 
municipal police forces. The armed forces have no role in domestic law 
enforcement except in national emergencies. Laws requiring the security 
forces to respect human rights are observed strictly, and the courts 
punish violators.
    Canada has a highly developed, market-based economy. Laws 
extensively protect the well-being of workers and provide for workers' 
freedom of association.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means for dealing 
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in 
some areas. Problems include discrimination against aboriginals, the 
disabled, and women. There was an increase in anti-Semitic harassment. 
The Government continued to take serious steps to address private acts 
of violence against women. Trafficking of persons into the country, 
including trafficking for purposes of prostitution is a growing 
problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    Four Toronto policemen were charged with manslaughter for the death 
of a suspect whom they beat while taking him into custody outside a 
convenience store in August. Accounts of the incident vary as to what 
actually transpired at the time.
    The Government made concerted efforts to resolve issues stemming 
from two controversial shooting deaths in previous years. In May an 
Alberta provincial court judge issued a fatality inquiry report on the 
causes of a 1998 incident in which a Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) officer shot a woman and her child on the Tsuu T'ina 
reservation. The report's 18 key recommendations focused on the needs 
of indigenous people and improvements in police and family services 
procedures, and other measures to prevent similar situations from 
occurring. A court upheld the 1999 conviction for criminal negligence 
of a police officer in the 1995 shooting death of an aboriginal 
activist at Ipperwash, Ontario.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions in practice; however, there were isolated 
incidents of police mistreating suspects. In February the RCMP began an 
inquiry into the deaths of four native men, two of whom were found 
frozen on the outskirts of Saskatoon and two of whom were found dead in 
or near their homes. Another native man filed charges against two 
Saskatoon police officers who allegedly picked him up in a police 
cruiser, drove him to the same spot outside the city where the two 
other men were found dead, and left him in sub-zero temperatures. At 
year's end, the two officers were awaiting trial in this case. In 
October Saskatchewan's Justice Minister ordered a public inquest into 
the events that led to the death of one of the men who had been found 
dead in his home, due to a drug overdose, shortly after being released 
from police custody. The provincial public prosecutions office already 
had decided that there was no basis for pressing criminal charges in 
relation to this case.
    The military continued to receive complaints from women serving in 
the armed forces who charge that they are subject to sexual abuse, 
harassment, and discrimination. A new armed forces grievance board that 
is independent of the military chain of command began operations in 
June. In addition, other mechanisms established by the Government to 
address such complaints, including the Advisory Board on Canadian 
Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity and an Ombudsman in the 
Department of National Defense, continue to operate. During the year, 
the Ombudsman received 14 discrimination complaints, 128 harassment 
complaints, and 2 sexual assault complaints.
    In 1999 Toronto police continued a review of procedures following 
public complaints about the use of strip searches and body cavity 
searches in several routine arrests. The review determined that there 
were isolated incidents of unnecessary searches. Toronto police 
authorities determined that the policy still was appropriate and during 
the year provided further guidance to officers about when such searches 
are appropriate.
    In June the RCMP Public Complaints Commission completed its 
hearings on the controversy surrounding the use of pepper spray to 
break up demonstrations at the November 1997 Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver (see Section 2.b.). The 
Commission had not issued a report by year's end.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However, the 
Ombudsman Ontario remains concerned about ``recurring evidence'' 
presented in three separate investigations concluded during the year 
that there is a ``systemic problem in the lack of consistent 
application of official policy and standing order across correctional 
facilities in the province's prison system.'' The Ombudsman 
investigated a variety of problems during the year, including 
segregation procedures, use of force, and lost property. The Ombudsman 
also made recommendations concerning standards of hygiene, health care, 
and fair and reasonable treatment to the Ministry of Correctional 
Services; the Ombudsman reports that the Ministry has begun to make 
improvements in these areas.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process and vigorously enforces the right to a fair trial.
    The court system is divided into federal and provincial courts, 
which handle both civil and criminal matters. The highest federal court 
is the Supreme Court, which exercises general appellate jurisdiction 
and advises on constitutional matters.
    The judicial system is based on English common law at the federal 
level as well as in most provinces; in the province of Quebec, it is 
derived from the Napoleonic Code. Throughout the country, judges are 
appointed. In criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of 
innocence and the right to a public trial, to counsel (which is free 
for indigents), and to appeal. The prosecution also can appeal in 
certain limited circumstances.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law generally prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice; however, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Government may 
limit free speech in the name of goals such as ending discrimination, 
ensuring social harmony, or promoting gender equality. The Court ruled 
that the benefits of limiting hate speech and promoting equality are 
sufficient to outweigh the freedom of speech clause in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.
    Journalists occasionally are banned from reporting some specific 
details of court cases until a trial is concluded, and these 
restrictions, adopted to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial, 
enjoy wide popular support. Some restrictions on the media are imposed 
by provincial-level film censorship, broadcasters' voluntary codes 
curbing graphic violence, and laws against hate literature and 
pornography. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for free 
speech and free press, but both the Criminal Code and human rights 
legislation have established limits. Inciting hatred (in certain cases) 
or genocide is a criminal offense. The Supreme Court has set a high 
threshold for such cases by specifying that these acts must be proven 
willful and public. The Broadcasting Act, which prohibits programming 
containing any abusive comment that would expose individuals or groups 
to hatred or contempt, has not yet been challenged in the courts.
    The Human Rights Act also prohibits repeated communications by 
telephone that expose a person or group to hatred or contempt. Human 
rights groups are exploring the possibility of extending this 
prohibition to the Internet, arguing that the Internet should be 
considered ``telephonic communications'' and therefore covered under 
the Human Rights Act. Between October and December, the Human Rights 
Tribunal heard two complaints that the Ernst Zundel web site, known for 
its Holocaust-denial material, incites hatred against Jews. The case 
was ongoing at year's end.
    On September 13, an unidentified gunman shot and wounded Michel 
Auger, the organized crime reporter for Le Journal de Montreal. The 
previous day, Auger had published an article regarding activities of 
motorcycle gangs. Police linked the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang to 
the shooting and their investigation continued at year's end. They 
arrested two men in connection with the attack, including one man for 
making and supplying the gun. The Auger shooting led to a debate 
between those who advocated additional powers for law enforcement to go 
after gangs (up to and including suspension of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms) and those who argued that preserving civil liberties 
outweighed the risk of isolated incidents of gang violence. The 
question divided the journalistic community, which relies heavily upon 
civil liberty provisions. After the Auger shooting, approximately 
20,000 persons (mostly journalists) demonstrated on the streets of 
Montreal, to urge police to do a better job in combating gang violence. 
Following Auger's recovery and return to work, the numbers of those 
calling for additional police powers dwindled.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government generally respects them 
in practice.
    In June the RCMP Complaints Commission completed hearings begun in 
1998 investigating the use of pepper spray by RCMP officers to break up 
small crowds of protesters at the APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in 
November 1997. The issues covered by the Commission included whether 
actions taken by police were justified by the security risk and whether 
political considerations such as direct influence from senior political 
leaders played a role in determining the level of RCMP response to 
protesters' actions. The Commission had not issued a report at year's 
end.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The province of Saskatchewan permits prayer and bible readings in 
school as provided for in the Saskatchewan Act, which forms part of the 
provincial constitution. However, in July 1999, a one-person Board of 
Inquiry ruled that it was discriminatory to require recitation of the 
Lord's Prayer in Saskatoon public schools. As a result of the ruling, 
the Lord's Prayer is not recited in Saskatoon public schools. At year's 
end, the Saskatoon School Board and complainants continued to search 
for a compromise.
    Public funding for Roman Catholic schools--or separate schoolsis 
constitutionally protected in the country's original four provinces, 
but the policy has been challenged in recent years. In 1999 the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee found that the province of Ontario had failed to 
provide equal and effective protection against discrimination.
    In March 1999, the government-mandated Proulx task force submitted 
a report on religion in schools to the Quebec National Assembly. Its 14 
recommendations included abolishing Catholic and Protestant status for 
public schools and creating secular public schools within which 
religion would be studied from a cultural perspective. Publicly funded 
support services would be provided for students of all faiths. School 
boards' responses are due to the Quebec government by July 1, 2001.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in 
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees and extends first asylum. Canada is 
a resettlement country, and the Government projected approving between 
36,600 and 40,800 claims for refugee status during the year.
    During the summer of 1999, 599 Chinese arrived illegally by boat 
off the coast of British Columbia and sought refugee status. Because 
the majority of the early refugee claimants who were released failed to 
appear for their hearings, a much larger percentage of refugee 
claimants from subsequent boats were remanded into custody pending 
their refugee hearings. A total of 586 persons made refugee claims. The 
Government has granted refugee status to 25 migrants and has denied 458 
claims. Of these, 330 have been returned to China. Other claims were 
abandoned or withdrawn. A total of 43 adults remained in custody at 
year's end. A total of 115 children were placed in the care of the 
Ministry of Children and Families.
    There was no information publicly available on the results of a 
formal inquiry into a Chinese refugee's claims that prison officers had 
beaten him in December 1999.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    On November 27, national parliamentary elections were held, in 
which the Liberal Party won a majority with 172 of 301 seats. The 
Canadian Alliance (conservative) won 66 seats, the Bloc Quebecois 
(separatist) won 38 seats, the New Democratic Party (liberal) won 13 
seats, and the Progressive Conservative Party (conservative) won 12 
seats. Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party entered his third term as 
Prime Minister.
    A significant body of opinion in the Province of Quebec 
(represented by the party that currently governs the province) 
continues to maintain that Quebec has the right to withdraw from the 
Confederation if that decision proves to be the democratically 
expressed will of the people of Quebec. However, in June the Federal 
Government enacted legislation to clarify its role in a possible 
secession attempt by a province. The new law is in response to a 1998 
Supreme Court reference (an answer to a question referred to the Court 
by the federal government), which stipulated that the Federal 
Government would be obliged to negotiate Quebec's separation in good 
faith if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to separate on the basis 
of a clearly phrased question. The new legislation stipulates that the 
House of Commons must determine whether any future secession referendum 
question proposed by a province is clear, and whether any subsequent 
majority vote is large enough to obligate the Government to negotiate 
secession. The legislation was controversial with Quebec's provincial 
government, which then drafted and, on May 30, passed Bill 99 to 
underline the right of the Quebecois to self-determination and to 
decide the political regime and legal status of Quebec.
    There are no laws limiting the participation of women in political 
life; however, they are underrepresented in government and politics. 
Following the November elections, in the Parliament, 62 of 301 members 
in the House of Commons are women, and 33 of 105 senators are women. 
Women hold 10 seats in the 36person Cabinet. In November 1999, a woman 
was appointed for the first time as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for equal benefits and 
protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, 
color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. These 
rights generally are respected in practice; however, there were some 
complaints of discrimination in this multicultural society.
    Women.--The law prohibits violence against women, including spousal 
abuse; however, it remained a problem. The number of sexual assault 
crimes have declined over the past 5 years; however, in 1999 a total of 
23,872 cases of sexual assault were reported. The courts consider such 
cases seriously and those convicted of sexual assault face up to 10 
years in prison. Cases involving weapons, threats, wounding, or 
endangerment of life carry longer sentences, up to life imprisonment.
    The Government's publication on family violence statistics 
indicates that an estimated 8 percent of women (and 7 percent of men) 
who were married or living in a common-law relationship during the 
previous 5-year period experienced some type of violence committed by 
their partner on at least one occasion. The economic costs of violence 
against women are estimated to be $2.7 billion (Can $4.2 billion). 
Services available to abused women have increased significantly over 
the past 2 decades. For example, the number of shelters for abused 
women across the country increased from 75 in 1979 to 470 in 1998.
    The Criminal Code prohibits criminal harassment (stalking) and 
makes it punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. The law 
prohibits sexual harassment, and the Government enforces this 
provision. Women continued to complain of harassment in the armed 
forces, and the Government has set up mechanisms to try to resolve 
complaints (see Section 1.c.).
    Women are well represented in the labor force, including business 
and the professions. Employment equity laws and regulations cover 
federal employees in all but the security and defense services. In 
October 1999, the Federal Government agreed to a settlement following 
an unsuccessful appeal of a 1998 Human Rights Tribunal ruling that the 
Government must pay back wages to workers in underpaid positions 
(predominantly female) under the concept of equal pay for work of equal 
value. Payment was made and finalized this year.
    Women have marriage and property rights equal to those of men. 
Women head over 85 percent of single-parent households.
    Prostitution is legal, but pimping and operating, being found in, 
or working in a brothel are not. Living (wholly or partially) on the 
earnings of prostitution is illegal. Communicating in public for the 
purpose of prostitution (solicitation) is also illegal, but is 
considered a lesser offense than the other offenses related to 
prostitution.
    Women were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual 
exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. Education is free through grade
    13 and is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16, depending on 
the province. Federal and provincial regulations protect children from 
abuse, overwork, and discrimination and penalize perpetrators of such 
offenses.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Changes to the 
law in 1997 strengthened tools to combat child prostitution and 
prohibited female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health.
    A group of 1,500 citizens, who as orphans were diagnosed falsely as 
retarded and psychotic, and illegally interned in mental institutions 
during the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, continued to seek compensation 
from the provincial and Federal governments. They charge that the 
Government is responsible for the abuse that they received in the 
Catholic Church-run institutions, including beatings, electric shock 
treatment, and sexual abuse. In 1999 they formed a committee to seek 
restitution for the abuse suffered. In May the Catholic Church 
announced that it would participate in a ``compassion fund,'' but would 
not issue a formal apology or admit fault in the cases. Quebec Premier 
Bouchard reiterated his government's compensation offer of 
approximately $650 (C$1,000) each to the victims, but the committee 
representing the orphans rejected the offer as insufficient.
    Children were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual 
exploitation (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. Nevertheless, the Government continued to receive 
numerous complaints regarding societal discrimination against disabled 
persons and has instituted programs to discourage such discrimination. 
Disabled persons are underrepresented in the work force; they make up 
2.7 percent of the federally regulated private sector work force, while 
those capable of working total 6.5 percent of the population. The law 
mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities, and for the 
most part the Government enforces these provisions.
    In 1999 the province of Alberta announced that it would compensate 
the nearly 500 surviving persons who were sterilized without their 
consent under a policy aimed at residents of mental institutions. More 
than 2,000 Albertans were sterilized between 1928 and 1972 under the 
Alberta Sterilization Act, which was repealed in June 1972. By the end 
of the year, the Alberta Government had settled all outstanding 
sterilization claims.
    The law provides a variety of protections and rights for the 
disabled and specifically prohibits discrimination against disabled 
persons in employment, education, or in the provision of public 
services. Sexual exploitation of persons with disabilities in 
situations of dependency is a criminal offense. The law requires 
employers and service providers to accommodate special needs of 
disabled persons, unless it constitutes an undue hardship, and mandates 
access to buildings for the disabled. The Government has instituted 
programs to help the disabled join the work force, but they continued 
to experience more difficulties in getting and retaining employment 
than those without disabilities.
    Indigenous People.--The treatment of aboriginal people continued to 
be one of the most important human rights problems facing the country. 
Disputes over land claims, self-government, treaty rights, taxation, 
duty-free imports, fishing and hunting rights, and alleged harassment 
by police continued to be sources of tension on reserves. Aboriginal 
people remain underrepresented in the work force, overrepresented on 
welfare rolls and in prison populations, and more susceptible to 
suicide and poverty than other population groups.
    The Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects aboriginal 
rights, including those established by historical land claims 
settlements; aboriginal rights also are recognized in the Constitution 
and by the courts. Historical treaties with native groups in eastern 
Canada form the basis for the Federal Government's policies there, but 
the antiquated language and uncertain intent have resulted in extensive 
legal challenges to the Government's interpretation of treaty rights. 
Native groups in the west that never signed historical treaties 
continue to claim land and resources, and many continue to seek legal 
resolution of outstanding issues. As a result, the evolution of the 
Federal Government's policy toward aboriginal rights, particularly land 
claims, has been linked closely to legal challenges, including 45 
Supreme Court decisions.
    In 1998 the Government established the Aboriginal Action Plan, a 
``long-term, broad-based'' policy approach to promote the quality of 
life of aboriginal people and promote self-sufficiency. According to 
the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, the Government spent 
$4.7 billion (Can $7 billion) on aboriginal programs during the year, 
which included the Aboriginal Action Plan and spending from 12 
different departments. Since 1999
    16 specific claims have been settled, and 70 comprehensive land 
claims have been negotiated across the country. After years of 
negotiations, the Federal and provincial governments concluded a modern 
day treaty with the Nisga'a people of British Columbia, who received 
claim to tribal lands, fishing and timber rights, limited self-
government, and other economic benefits. The Federal Government 
continued to be involved in self-government negotiations with over 350 
First Nations, and 6 agreements were in final or advanced stages of 
negotiations at year's end. Professional development and fiscal 
accountability projects further support aboriginal self-governance.
    In response to court decisions over the past few years, the 
Government continues to work at resolving a variety of issues, 
including fishing rights in Atlantic Canada. Disputes over native 
fishing rights in Atlantic Canada continued after a 1999 Supreme Court 
ruling on the Marshall case which interpreted centuries-old treaties to 
allow First Nations to earn a moderate livelihood from natural 
resources, in compliance with government regulations that promote 
conservation and protect others who depend on the same resource. The 
Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the 
34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First 
Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia 
have refused to sign the interim agreements and have been accused of 
contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season. 
Other test cases that involve aboriginals being tried on charges of 
illegally harvesting timber on Crown land continued in the court 
systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Court cases also continue in 
Quebec over timber resources.
    During the year, the Federal and British Columbia governments 
concluded a treaty with the Nisga'a people who live in northwestern 
British Columbia. The treaty gave the Nisga'a control over 765 square 
miles of tribal lands, a cash settlement, fishing and timber-cutting 
rights, and certain rights of self-government. The treaty ended a range 
of special tax breaks and other benefits available under previous 
arrangements. The treaty was ratified by the Nisga'a people in November 
1998 and by the provincial legislature in the spring of 1999. It was 
debated and passed by Parliament in December 1999. Although the British 
Columbia legislature ratified the treaty, two groups expressed their 
intention to challenge the treaty in court. These legal challenges 
include one from a political party that contends that the treaty should 
have been submitted to a referendum and one from the Gitanyow, an 
aboriginal band located near the Nisga'a, who contend that the treaty 
awarded more than 85 percent of their traditional tribal lands to the 
Nisga'a. At year's end, neither case had made legal progress.
    The Stoney reserve west of Calgary gave up control of its finances 
to federal Indian Affairs officials in 1997, following widespread 
allegations of political corruption, financial mismanagement, sexual 
assaults, and abuses connected with social service agencies. After a 2-
year probe, the RCMP concluded that no criminal charges would be made, 
and that instead, the problem with reserve finances was managerial in 
nature. Stoney Reserve corrected the situation and put its finances 
back in order. Of the 611 First Nations, 25 have their finances managed 
by a private accounting firm.
    Quebec's Indian people remain overwhelmingly opposed to separation 
from Canada and deeply distrust the separatist government of the 
province. Despite the Quebec Prime Minister's recent overtures to the 
leaders of the Cree and Inuit nations, surveys indicate that most of 
Quebec's 60,000 Indians would favor partition of the province in the 
event of Quebec's separation from Canada. Indian leaders maintain that 
a sovereign Quebec would treat Indians as another ethnic minority 
instead of as sovereign nations within the territory of the province. 
To address these sentiments and respond to a pending lawsuit, in 1998 
the Quebec government agreed with the Cree and Mohawk tribes to 
initiate negotiations regarding longstanding grievances over timber 
resources, public rights of way on tribal lands, and management of 
development in the James Bay region. In March 1999, Quebec gave the 
Mohawks increased fiscal rights and powers. In June 1999, the first 
summit in 11 years between Quebec's First Nations and the provincial 
government was held to establish a permanent policy forum to resolve 
ongoing issues. During 1999 the Government focused on negotiations over 
a commission to set up a political entity (Nunavik) for Quebec's Inuit. 
The commission, in accordance with an agreement signed in November 
1999, has Inuit, Quebec, and federal representatives. In September the 
James Bay Crees challenged the authority of the Nunavik Commission on 
the basis of overlapping land claims. In December the Commission 
postponed delivering its final report to the federal and provincial 
governments, stating that it needed more time and formally requested an 
extension of its mandate to the end of March 2001.
    In May 1999, representatives of the Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, the Federal Government, and the Labrador Inuit Association 
initialed a land claims agreement for the Inuit. The plan provides for 
land, water rights, self-government, and an economic development plan 
that includes sharing revenues from subsurface developments. The 
Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the 
34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First 
Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia 
have refused to sign. As a result, they have been accused of 
contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season.
    In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of 
Nova Scotia aboriginal Donald Marshall for catching and selling fish 
eels out of season and without a license. In doing so, the court ruled 
that the 18th century treaties between the aboriginals and the British 
Crown gave the First Nations rights not accommodated by modern fishery 
regulations. The Court ruled that the Federal Government must give 
treaty beneficiaries access to the fisheries sufficient to enable them 
to earn a moderate livelihood. The Court also found that this right is 
subject to regulation and subsequently reemphasized this point in a 
separate explanation of its decision. There was some violence against 
aboriginals by nonaboriginals, following aboriginal efforts to exercise 
their new rights by trapping lobsters in October prior to the normal 
season. The Supreme Court's decision to interpret the 18th century 
treaties liberally has encouraged aboriginals involved in a number of 
court cases seeking access to economic benefits from natural resources 
such as logging, mining, and energy.
    The Supreme Court's clarification of the Marshall case ruled out 
the possibility of aboriginals using the case to gain commercial rights 
in the forestry sector. However, test cases now are progressing through 
the court systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia that involve 
aboriginals being tried on charges of illegally harvesting timber on 
Crown land.
    Religious Minorities.--The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith 
in Canada reported that there were 267 incidents of anti-Semitism in 
1999--an 11 percent increase from 1998. An increase in acts of 
vandalism contributed to the rise in incidents, in contrast to a steady 
decrease in previous years. The League continues to express concern 
over the growth of anti-Semitic activity on the Internet. In October 
the Human Rights Tribunal examined the activities of one such web site 
(see Section 2.a.).
    In October and November, Jews were subjected to a wave of attacks 
that community leaders said was unprecedented. During a 6 week period 
beginning on October 1, about 45 anti-Jewish incidents--arson, 
assaults, verbal abuse and death threats--were recorded. Many Jewish 
leaders complained about what they described as a lukewarm response 
from government officials at all levels.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The narrow defeat of the 1995 
Quebec sovereignty referendum left unresolved the concerns of French-
speaking Quebeckers about their minority status in Canada, while 
sharpening the concerns of English-speaking Quebeckers about their 
minority status. The separatist Parti Quebecois provincial government 
of Quebec stated that it would hold another sovereignty referendum only 
under winning conditions. The Supreme Court ruled in August 1998 that a 
unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal, but that the 
Federal Government and other provinces would be obligated to negotiate 
Quebec's separation if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to change 
their relationship with Canada on the basis of a clearly phrased 
referendum question (see Section 3).
    Some English-speaking and native groups in Quebec assert the right 
to keep parts of Quebec in Canada in the event that Quebec declares 
independence. Despite personal meetings and other overtures by Quebec's 
Prime Minister to aboriginals and the English-speaking community, both 
groups remain distrustful of the separatist government of Quebec. Many 
members of these communities fear that their rights would be infringed 
by a sovereign Quebec.
    The Constitution protects the linguistic and cultural rights of 
minorities. Despite Canada's federal policy of bilingualism, English 
speakers in Quebec and French speakers in other parts of Canada 
generally must live and work in the language of the majority.
    In January the Supreme Court upheld an appeal by francophones who 
had been denied a French-language school in their community and forced 
to bus their children 57 minutes to another school. The Court ruled 
that the percentage of French language students in the community who 
potentially could attend a French language school (rather than the 
actual number of students who desired to attend one) met the 
requirements to establish such a school, and therefore the community 
was obligated constitutionally to provide one. In making its ruling, 
the Supreme Court stated that the Appeals Court erred (among other 
reasons) by not considering which services would best encourage the 
flourishing and preservation of the French language minority.
    Quebec's language law restricts access to publicly funded, English 
language schools through grade 11 to children whose parents were 
educated in English in Canada and to short-term residents. The Quebec 
courts heard two cases challenging this law. In June the Montreal 
Superior Court heard a suit brought against the Quebec government by 10 
francophone families for the right to send their children to anglophone 
schools. Another case was brought by a group whose native tongue is 
neither French nor English, who alleged that the law restricting 
English-language schools to children whose parents were educated in 
English in Canada is discriminatory. At year's end, both cases were 
pending.
    In October three coffeehouses with English names were firebombed, 
allegedly in an attempt to force them to change their names to French. 
A man associated with a group that aims to eliminate the use of English 
in Quebec was arrested for the bombings and was denied bail prior to 
his trial.
    The English-speaking minority of Quebec, representing 9 percent of 
the population of the province and 16 percent of the population of the 
city of Montreal, continues to protest restrictions placed on English-
language use. In 1997 the Quebec provincial government reestablished a 
French-language inspection office that had been abolished in 1993. 
Quebec's language law also stipulates that French is the working 
language of most businesses and must predominate in bilingual 
commercial signage. However, in October 1999, a Quebec court judge 
struck down a key section of the province's language law that requires 
French lettering to be twice as large as English lettering on 
commercial signs, stating that French is no longer in jeopardy in 
Quebec. In April the Quebec Superior Court overturned the lower court 
decision, ruling that the lower court erred by finding that the Quebec 
government had the burden of proving that French is still in jeopardy 
in Quebec. The Superior Court stated that the lower court should have 
found that the defendant had the burden of proving that French is no 
longer in jeopardy in Quebec. The defendant has appealed the Superior 
Court ruling. English speakers also expressed concern over the 
increasing scarceness of health services and public schooling in their 
language.
    Provinces other than Quebec often lack adequate French-language 
schooling and health services, which is of concern to local 
francophones, although French-language schools and French immersion 
programs are reported to be thriving in all three prairie provinces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Except for members of the armed 
forces, workers in both the public and private sectors have the right 
to associate freely. The Labor Code protects these rights for all 
employees under federal jurisdiction, while provincial legislation 
protects all other organized workers.
    Trade unions are independent of the Government. Of the civilian 
labor force, approximately 29.5 percent is unionized.
    All workers have the right to strike, except for those in the 
public sector who provide essential services. The law prohibits 
employer retribution against strikers and union leaders, and the 
Government enforces this provision.
    Labor action, including strikes, occurred throughout the country 
during the year. Notable strikes included: Inside Workers strike by 
clerical staff, social-work staff, tax collectors, health inspectors, 
and public nurses in the city of Toronto, nurse and federal prison 
guard strikes in Alberta, and forestry and hotel worker strikes in 
British Columbia.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers in both 
the public (except for some police) and the private sectors have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. While the law protects 
collective bargaining, there are limitations, which vary from province 
to province, for some public sector workers providing essential 
services.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires employers 
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. There are effective 
mechanisms for resolving complaints and obtaining redress.
    All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and 
the judicial system.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is illegal, and it generally does 
not occur; however, women and children were trafficked for the purposes 
of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections 5, 6.d, and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor legislation varies from province to province. 
The Federal Government does not employ youths under 17 years of age 
while school is in session. Most provinces prohibit children under age 
15 or 16 from working without parental consent, at night, or in any 
hazardous employment. These prohibitions are enforced effectively 
through inspections conducted by the federal and provincial labor 
ministries. Education is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16, 
depending upon the province.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and 
generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however, children were 
trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections 
5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Standard work hours vary from 
province to province, but in all provinces the limit is 40 or 48 a 
week, with at least 24 hours of rest.
    Minimum wage rates are set in each province and territory, and 
range from $3.65 to $4.77 (Can $5.50 to Can $7.20) per hour. Ontario 
and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their 
respective minimums for adult workers. The minimum wage does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. A family 
whose only employed member earns the minimum wage would be considered 
below the poverty line.
    Federal law provides safety and health standards for employees 
under federal jurisdiction, while provincial and territorial 
legislation provides for all other employees. Federal and provincial 
labor departments monitor and enforce these standards. Federal, 
provincial, and territorial laws protect the right of workers with 
``reasonable cause'' to refuse dangerous work and to remove themselves 
from hazardous work conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, the Government prosecutes such offenses as 
violations of immigration policies. The Government is conducting a 
legislative review of the Immigration Act and introduced legislation 
that specifically makes trafficking an offense punishable by fine or 
imprisonment, but the Senate had not passed it by year's end. The 
country is primarily a transit and destination point for trafficking in 
persons. There have been several widely reported cases of smuggling and 
trafficking, including hundreds of Chinese who arrived illegally by 
ship in British Columbia during the summer of 1999 (see Section 2.d.).
    Press reports indicate that over the past 10 years almost 15,000 
Chinese have entered Canada illegally. Many of these illegal immigrants 
have paid large sums to be smuggled to Canada and are indentured to 
their traffickers upon arrival. Almost all work at lower than minimum 
wage and use most of their salaries to pay down their debt at usurious 
interest rates. The traffickers (snakeheads) use violence to ensure 
that their clients pay and that they do not inform the police.
    Asian women and girls who are smuggled into Canada often are forced 
into the sex trade. Traffickers use intimidation and violence, as well 
as the illegal immigrants' inability to speak English, to keep these 
victims from running away or informing the police.
    Vancouver and Toronto serve as hubs for organized crime groups that 
deal in trafficking in persons, including trafficking for prostitution. 
East Asian crime groups have targeted Canada, and Vancouver in 
particular, because of lax immigration laws, benefits available to 
immigrants, and the proximity to the U.S. border.
    Canadian and Honduran officials are investigating the ongoing 
problem of Honduran youths being smuggled into Canada who are being 
used by Honduran drug traffickers to sell drugs. In January Canadian 
authorities arrested dozens of small-time Central American drug dealers 
including many Honduran minors. In February the press reported that 
Honduran authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
                               __________

                                 CHILE

    Chile is a multiparty democracy with a constitution that provides 
for a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a separate 
judiciary. Approved by referendum in 1980 and amended in 1989, the 
Constitution was written under the former military government and 
establishes institutional limits on popular rule. President Ricardo 
Lagos, of the Socialist Party, won a close runoff election on January 
16 against center-right candidate Joaquin Lavin of the Alliance for 
Chile coalition. Lagos took office on March 11, succeeding Christian 
Democrat Eduardo Frei. International and domestic observers found both 
the 1999 election and the subsequent runoff to be free and fair. Both 
the current and former presidents are members of the ``Concertacion'' 
coalition of political parties. The National Congress consists of 120 
deputies and 49 senators; this includes nine designated senators plus 
two former presidents who are senators-for-life. The government 
coalition of four major parties controls the lower house and, following 
the suspension of two conservative senators including former president 
Augusto Pinochet, counts a slim majority in the Senate. Continued 
turnover in the court system has reduced the number and influence of 
military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial 
branch to the point that there was very little influence in the 
administration of justice.
    The armed forces are constitutionally subordinate to the President 
through an appointed civilian Minister of Defense but enjoy a large 
degree of legal autonomy. Most notably, the President must have the 
concurrence of the National Security Council, which comprises military 
and civilian officials, to remove service chiefs. The Carabineros (the 
uniformed national police) have primary responsibility for public 
order, safety and border security. The civilian Investigations Police 
are responsible for criminal investigations and immigration control. 
Both organizations--although formally under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Defense, which prepares their budgets--are under 
operational control of the Ministry of Interior. Some members of the 
police committed human rights abuses.
    The export-led free-market economy experienced its first recession 
after 15 consecutive years of expansion in 1999, when the economy 
experienced a decline of 1.1 percent in real terms with inflation at 
2.3 percent. Economic growth for the year was 5.4 percent with 
inflation of 4.75 percent. Copper remained the most important export; 
salmon, forest products, fresh fruit, fishmeal, other minerals, and 
manufactured goods also were significant sources of foreign exchange. 
Unemployment stood at 8.3 percent at the end of the year. From 1987 to 
1998, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line 
decreased from 45 to 21.7 percent. Annual per capita gross domestic 
product was approximately $4,700.
    The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights; 
however, problems remained in some areas. The most serious involved a 
death in police custody, police mistreatment, use of excessive force, 
and physical abuse in jails and prisons. The due process rights of 
detainees were not always respected. Discrimination and violence 
against women and children continue to be problems. Indigenous people 
remain marginalized. Despite ongoing attempts to change the labor code, 
limitations on fundamental worker rights persisted. Child labor is a 
problem in the informal economy.
    During the year, the Government, primarily the judiciary, took 
significant steps to allow for the investigation of human rights abuses 
committed during the former military government, and to bring those 
accountable in certain cases to justice. The bulk of the human rights 
abuses under the military regime occurred between 1973 and 1978, 
although a number took place after this period. In its August 1999 
ruling to uphold the removal of former President Augusto Pinochet's 
congressional immunity, the Supreme Court ruled that Chile's Amnesty 
Law could only be applied after a crime had been investigated and 
prosecuted. At year's end, the Defense Ministry-sponsored Human Rights 
Roundtable Dialog, comprising members of the armed services, religious 
groups, human rights groups, and NGO's, was preparing to make public 
information on the fate of some of the persons who were killed or who 
disappeared while in official custody during the Pinochet regime; 
however, military authorities continued during the year to resist a 
full accounting of the fate of those who were killed and disappeared. 
Unlike in previous years, the judiciary appeared not to interfere in or 
stifle cases against alleged human rights abusers.
    In October 1998, the United Kingdom detained Pinochet pending 
resolution of a Spanish extradition request on charges of genocide and 
murder. On March 2, after considerable legal action and a series of 
court rulings, Home Secretary Jack Straw denied Spain's request on the 
basis of medical exams indicating that Pinochet was unfit mentally and 
physically to defend himself against the charges. On March 3, the 
British authorities freed Pinochet and he returned to Chile. He faces 
charges in over 200 cases, including charges of aggravated homicide, in 
Chilean courts. The investigation of the most prominent of these cases, 
known as the ``Caravan of Death'' case, led to the petition to remove 
Pinochet's immunity and the subsequent effort to indict him.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings or other extrajudicial killings during 
the year; however, one person died under yet to be explained 
circumstances while in police custody.
    On January 5, Carlos Antonio Millaman Munoz was detained on charges 
of aggravated robbery. According to the Corporation for the Promotion 
and Defense of Human Rights (CODEPU), on January 6, the authorities 
permitted family members and a friend a visit at the headquarters of 
the Investigative Police in the Santiago suburb of La Florida. Millaman 
was reportedly in bad physical condition and feared for his life. The 
same day he was transferred to the El Salvador hospital where he died 
later in the day. At the end of the year, the case was still being 
investigated.
    A number of cases from previous years in which the police were 
accused of extrajudicial killings due to excessive use of force or 
mistreatment of prisoners while in custody remained under investigation 
or pending resolution of appeals. These include the case of University 
of Tarapaca student Daniel Menco Prieto, who police shot and killed 
during a May 1999 student demonstration.
    No information was available regarding the case of Jonathan Moya 
Jara, whose partially clothed body was found with its head buried in 
the sand in August 1999. In September 1999 the authorities arrested two 
Carabineros who had allegedly detained the victim.
    No information was available in the case of Raul Palma Salgado, who 
died in police custody in 1998 after police allegedly tortured him. In 
1999 a court sentenced four police officers to 10 years in prison for 
his death, and their appeal was pending at the end of 1999.
    The case of Claudia Alejandra Lopez, who was shot under unclear 
circumstances during a 1998 demonstration in Santiago, also was 
inactive. No new information was available on the case of the September 
1989 murder of leftist leader Jecar Nehgme, which was reopened in 
November 1998 when new evidence was discovered.
    While former President Pinochet was in the United Kingdom, family 
members of victims filed numerous charges in Chile against him for 
deaths and disappearances during the period of military rule. Of these, 
one concerned the 1973 disappearance of 19 persons in a case known as 
the Caravan of Death. On August 8, the Supreme Court confirmed a Court 
of Appeals ruling lifting Pinochet's parliamentary immunity in this 
case. The Supreme Court's decision stated that ``the true purpose of an 
immunity proceeding is to decide whether there is probable cause 
against a congressman charged with a crime'' and, according to the Code 
of Criminal Procedure ``there is probable cause when evidence is 
discovered against a congressman that would warrant his arrest.'' 
Subsequently, the prosecuting judge ordered psychiatric exams as 
required by law for defendants over age 70. Pinochet's lawyers appealed 
the decision, arguing that general physical exams also should be 
required. At year's end, the prosecuting judge had ordered psychiatric 
and neurological exams and set a date to take Pinochet's deposition, 
both steps required by law, which would ultimately pave the way for an 
indictment and arrest order. At year's end, over 200 cases concerning 
human rights violations had been filed in the courts against Pinochet.
    The Supreme Court decision on Pinochet also contained guidelines 
calling for full investigation of cases of deaths and disappearances 
that are likely to fall under provisions of the Amnesty Law or that 
potentially are subject to the statute of limitations. The Court stated 
that amnesty is not applied to crimes in the abstract, but rather to 
individuals found guilty of a crime. Likewise, the statute of 
limitations should be applied only after the guilty party has been 
identified and the courts determine that no impeding factors, such as 
subsequent crimes by the accused are relevant. Previously, 
investigations into human rights abuses during the 1973-78 period had 
been impeded because the cases were thought to fall automatically under 
the Amnesty Law and the statute of limitations. By 1989 this 
interpretation already had begun to erode in the courts. The new 
guidelines make it possible to open investigations into all types of 
crimes committed during the 1973-78 period. Following these guidelines, 
the judge investigating the Caravan of Death case expanded the charges 
against Pinochet to include aggravated homicide.
    In January a military tribunal changed the charges in the case of 
Operation Albania--the June 1987 killings of 12 Manuel Rodriguez 
Patriotic Front (FPMR) members--against former National Intelligence 
Center (CNI) Director Hugo Salas Wenzel from being an author of the 
crime to concealing it. The military court dropped indictments against 
former CNI Sub-directors retired General Humberto Leiva Gutierrez and 
Brigadier Marcos Derpich Miranda, Air Force Captain Hernan Miguel 
Carmona, and Inspector Jose Morales Morales of the Investigations 
Police and changed the charges against the 15 other individuals accused 
in the case from kidnaping to illegal detention. The court ratified the 
thesis of the investigating judge that the crime under investigation is 
homicide, thereby affirming that there was never an armed confrontation 
as the CNI had alleged. At year's end, the investigation and legal 
proceedings continued.
    Acting on a petition by the Council for the Defense of the State 
(the official entity charged with the defense of the State's legal 
interests), the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court on June 1 
transferred the Operation Albania case from the military tribunal to 
the Court of Appeals. Investigating Judge Milton Juica, who had been 
handling the case under the military tribunal, was reappointed as 
investigating judge.
    No new information was available regarding the trial of eight CNI 
agents who authorities charged in November 1999 in the case of 
journalist Jose Carrasco, who died in 1986. Several of the officers 
charged in 1999 were also under investigation regarding Operation 
Albania.
    There was little progress in the investigation of Operation Condor, 
an undercover operation in which several military governments in Latin 
America cooperated to kill leftist opponents. In 1999 Spanish Judge 
Baltazar Garzon and a colleague collected evidence and took testimony 
regarding human rights violations in Chile and Argentina during the 
military dictatorships. The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches 
(FASIC) reported that on July 2, Argentine judge Maria Servini de 
Cubria (the same judge in charge of the Prats case) handed over 
``extrajudicially'' numerous antecedents regarding Operation Condor to 
Chilean Judge Juan Guzman in connection with the 126 (at that time) 
cases against Pinochet pending before Guzman's court.
    In 1999 an appeals court reopened the case of the 1982 killing of 
labor leader Tucapel Jimenez. In 1998 investigating judge Sergio 
Valenzuela Pinto had closed the case, ruling that there was 
insufficient evidence to bring anyone to trial. Acting on a petition by 
the Council for the Defense of the State, in April 1999 the Supreme 
Court replaced Valenzuela Pinto, who had been criticized for his 
handling of the case, with judge Sergio Munoz Gajardo.
    Judge Munoz led the Appeals Court to order the detention of 12 
persons for the crimes, including retired army general and former head 
of Army Intelligence (DINE) Ramses Arturo Alvarez Scoglia. Munoz 
subsequently charged several others, including retired army general and 
former DINE director Hernan Ramirez Rurange, who is accused of helping 
one of the suspects flee the country. He also indicted former Auditor 
General of the Army, retired General Genera Gernando Torres Silva. 
Another prominent official among the accused, former CNI director and 
retired general Humberto Gordon died of a heart attack in June. Munoz 
dropped charges against several other suspects. In November an 
investigative judge indicted active duty Brigadier General Hernan 
Ramirez Hald in the Tucapel Jimenez case; the indictment was the first 
ever of an active duty general. At year's end, of the 17 persons 
charged, the authorities had released 2 on bail, detained 14, and were 
still seeking 1 person.
    The family of Carmelo Soria, a Spanish citizen working for the 
United Nations killed in Santiago on July 14, 1976, continues to seek 
compensation from the Government in the amount of approximately $50 
million (2.7 billion pesos) and has asked the Audencia Nacional de 
Madrid to issue an arrest warrant for Pinochet, retired General Manuel 
Contreras, and others.
    In November an Argentine court found Chilean intelligence agent 
Enrique Arancibia Clavel guilty and sentenced him to life in prison for 
his role in the 1974 car bombing in Buenos Aires that killed former 
Chilean army chief Carlos Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert. Arancibia 
Clavel had filed an appeal, which was pending at year's end. The case 
had been reopened in 1992 as a result of a petition filed by the Prats 
family. An Argentine appeals court had ruled in October that the Prats 
killing was a ``crime against humanity'' and, as such, was not subject 
to the statute of limitations. The judge also requested the extradition 
of Pinochet and other former military officers and one civilian in 
connection with the Prats case. At year's end, the Chilean Supreme 
Court was considering the extradition request.
    On December 7, the family of Charles Horman, whom security forces 
killed in Santiago in 1973, filed a criminal complaint requesting that 
Judge Juan Guzman open a criminal investigation into his death. The 
family also filed a petition requesting that the Supreme Court appoint 
a special prosecutor to hear the case. At year's end, the Supreme Court 
had not ruled on the petition and the case remained before Judge 
Guzman.
    On July 20, the Seventh Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Santiago 
sentence two former CNI officials and a DINE official to life 
imprisonment in the related Juan Alegria Mundaca case. The Supreme 
Court upheld that decision on appeal.
    Families of persons who suffered, died, or disappeared while in 
government custody continue to file new claims for compensation. In 
June the Group of Former Political Prisoners of the Region of 
Valparaiso filed a claim with the regional appeals court seeking 
damages for illegal detention and deprivation of liberty. In April a 
Santiago court decreed that the Government should pay about $222,000 
(125 million pesos) to two children of Doctor Enrique Paris for damages 
resulting from the 1973 death and disappearance of their father. 
Another Santiago court ordered the Government to pay approximately 
$180,000 (100 million pesos) to the family of Arsenio Poupin Ossiel. A 
court also ordered a payment of approximately $430,000 (240 million 
pesos) to the family of Eduardo Paredes. All three disappeared after 
being taken into custody by the military following the September 11, 
1973, assault on the presidential palace. In August the courts awarded 
approximately $500,000 (300 million pesos) to the widow and three 
children of Luis Anibal Manriquez, detained and killed in November of 
1973. In October the courts awarded $400 million (225 million pesos) to 
Carmen Gloria Quintana, who received burns on her body after being 
detained by a military patrol in 1986. The Council for the Defense of 
the State was considering whether to appeal some of these awards at 
year's end.
    In October 1999, Italy requested the extradition of retired General 
Manuel Contreras and another DINA (the army intelligence branch during 
the military regime) official to serve prison sentences for their role 
in the attempted murder of Christian Democrat Party leader Bernardo 
Leighton, which occurred in Italy in 1975. Chile has no extradition 
treaty with Italy. In October Supreme Court President Hernan Alvarez 
rejected the recommendation of the investigating judge that the 
Government either extradite the two former officials or try them in 
country for the crime. At the end of the year, the Supreme Court denied 
the extradition request principally on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence and lack of due process because the two persons had been tried 
and convicted in Italy in absentia.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    On June 13, a ``Dialog Table'' of military officers and human 
rights attorneys signed an agreement that established a mechanism for 
gathering new information on persons who had disappeared during the 
military regime. Under a law approved in June, specific military 
officers and community leaders were designated to receive information 
on the whereabouts of those who ``disappeared'' during the military 
regime. Information was received in the strictest confidence during a 
6-month period. At year's end the armed forces and the Carabineros were 
preparing to turn over information on the fate of 200 persons executed 
during the Pinochet regime. The courts have taken steps to try to 
locate bodies identified by the Dialog Table process and are deciding 
what legal actions should be taken next. The FASIC, the CODEPU, and 
other human rights organizations have several denial-of-justice cases 
pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
regarding previously closed disappearance and execution cases (see 
Section 1.a.). Denial of justice cases based on application of the 
amnesty law also have been filed with the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR).
    Investigations of military-era detentions and disappearances of 
persons at Colonia Dignidad (now called ``Villa Bavaria''), a secretive 
German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago, intensified 
during the year. Paul Schaefer, who immigrated from Germany in 1961 
with 300 followers, founded the 34,000-acre enclave. In April 1999, 
investigating judge Juan Guzman issued a detention order against the 
79-year-old Schaefer for the kidnaping and disappearance in 1974 of 
Alvaro Vallejos in the vicinity of Colonia Dignidad. Schaefer, also 
wanted by the authorities on other charges, remained a fugitive at 
year's end. During the year the enclave was searched several times. In 
October the authorities confiscated files and arrested Schaefer's 
deputy Gerhard Muecke in connection with Vallejos' disappearance. The 
Government issued an order to expel Muecke and two other German 
citizens whose residency permits expired. Muecke would stand trial 
before being expelled.
    In January 1985, Boris Weisfeiler disappeared near the Colonia 
Dignidad under circumstances that have yet to be fully clarified. The 
case was reopened at the beginning of the year and is among those being 
investigated by Judge Guzman.
    On August 16, the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Fourth Criminal Court of Santiago had jurisdiction over the case of the 
disappearance of Jose Manual Ramirez Rosales, arrested by agents of the 
DINA in 1974. In May 1999, the authorities indicted former Army Sargent 
Major and DINA agent Basclay Humberto Zapata Reyes (``El Troglo'') in 
this case.
    Of the 1,156 persons who disappeared under the military regime, the 
remains of 985 have yet to be found. The government agency in charge of 
the compensation program for the families of those executed or 
disappeared under the military regime recognizes 3,197 victims of the 
Pinochet era. These include 2,095 victims in which circumstances of 
death have been established and 1,102 cases in which the persons 
disappeared. During the year, monthly pension benefits, distributed to 
an average 3,441 eligible survivors (spouse, mother or father, and 
children), were approximately $11.3 million (6.3 billion pesos). Since 
1992, the program has distributed well over $100 million (57.8 billion 
pesos). Survivors receive pensions, educational benefits and other 
assistance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of illegal pressure on 
detainees; however, the CODEPU has received reports of abuse and 
mistreatment by both the National Police and the Investigations Police. 
When requested by other human rights organizations or family members, 
CODEPU lawyers visit detainees during the interrogation (see Section 
1.d.) and represent some suspected terrorists in court. The CODEPU 
continues to investigate alleged use of excessive force against 
detainees. The Minister of Interior asks the courts to conduct 
independent investigations of credible complaints of police abuse, but 
such investigations often do not result in arrests, due in part to the 
reluctance of judges to pursue the issue vigorously.
    The Human Rights Office of the Metropolitan Legal Aid Office, an 
arm of the Justice Ministry, released a report in March 1999 noting it 
had assisted 815 persons in 1998, twice the number as in the previous 
year. The report further stated the Legal Aid Office presented 70 cases 
to civilian or military courts in 1998; 42 cases were filed in 1997. Of 
the more recent cases, 48 were lodged against national police officers, 
while 7 cases involved the Investigations Police and 6, military 
personnel; the remainder involved various civilian government 
authorities and private security guards.
    In 1998 a law entered into effect that clarified the illegality of 
any use of force against persons detained by the police. The law 
provides that if a member of the police force uses ``torture or 
unlawful coercion,'' either physical or mental, or orders them to be 
applied, or commits them against a person under arrest or detention, 
the officer would be sentenced to imprisonment. Officers who know about 
the abuse and have the ``necessary power and authority'' to prevent or 
stop it also would be considered accessories to the crime if they fail 
to do so. The CODEPU has found that this law had an important impact on 
the conduct of the Judicial Police, but little impact so far on 
Carabineros. Beginning in 2001, courses in human rights are expected to 
be part of the core curriculum in the Carabinero police academies for 
both rank and file as well as officers.
    Human rights groups continue to claim that military recruits 
sometimes are mistreated. The Commission on Juvenile Rights (CODEJU), a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), claimed in November 1999 that it 
had received 380 complaints of recruit mistreatment in the previous 5 
years. This statement followed claims of mistreatment by recruits, 
lawsuits, and an investigation by the army that affirmed recruits' 
claims of mistreatment. There were three suicides among recent recruits 
in 1999 and one in 1998.
    No new information is available regarding the case of 14 military 
conscripts who military officers reportedly beat during a military 
exercise in 1998. As of 1999, one corporal was awaiting trial in the 
case.
    At year's end, the court of appeals had not yet ruled on the August 
1997 filing by attorneys for Carmen Gloria Quintana that appealed 
efforts by the Government to set aside an award of approximately 
$600,000 in compensation that the IACHR had recommended for Quintana in 
1988. Army Captain Pedro Fernandez Dittus set fire to Quintana and her 
companion Rodrigo Rojas Denegri while they participated in a protest 
against the military regime in 1986. Rojas died 4 days later, while 
Quintana survived with severe and disfiguring injuries.
    During the year, there were instances of violent confrontations 
between radical Mapuche groups and local landowners and representatives 
of logging companies in the southern part of the country (see Section 
5). Most of the protests involved rockthrowing.
    A Marxist-Leninist group claimed responsibility for a bomb that 
exploded on November 26 in front of the Colombian embassy in Santiago. 
The bombing resulted in damage to property, but no injuries.
    Prisons are often overcrowded and antiquated. A fight among prison 
gangs that led to a fire and the death of seven prisoners caused a 
national debate on the overcrowding of prisons, which are unable to 
cope with a rapidly growing inmate population. At year's end, the 
number of prisoners averaged 163 percent of designed capacity. 
According to press reports, there were over 30,000 prisoners housed in 
104 locations. Food meets minimal nutritional needs, and prisoners may 
supplement the diet by buying food. Those with sufficient funds often 
can rent space in a better wing of the prison. Although most reports 
state that the guards generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat 
prisoners, prisoners have complained to CODEPU about beatings.
    Pretrial detainees are not generally held with convicted prisoners.
    In 1999 a Santiago appeals court ruled that prison guards had used 
excessive force when moving maximum security prisoners in February of 
that year. Prison authorities appealed the finding, and the courts 
absolved the guards, ruling that the force used was not excessive.
    Prison guards have been accused of using excessive force to stop 
attempted prison breaks. Although most reports state that the guards 
generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat prisoners, the CODEPU 
reported several instances of alleged mistreatment of prisoners and 
believes that many others go unreported. CODEPU is particularly 
concerned about the treatment of prisoners in maximum security prisons 
and prisoners with HIV/AIDS and mental deficiencies who often do not 
receive adequate medical attention. The Government announced plans to 
build 5 new prisons in 2001 capable of housing 8,000 prisoners.
    Women are generally housed in separate facilities, which tend to be 
less crowded and with somewhat better conditions than men's prisons.
    By law, juvenile offenders (those under the age of 18) are 
segregated from adult prisoners. According to the latest available 
figures, there were 6,630 minors in adult prisons in 1992 and 346 by 
the end of 1997 although this number increased to 422 by the end of 
1998. The Government announced plans to build three juvenile detention 
centers in 2001.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities 
generally respect constitutional provisions for arrest and detention; 
however, detainees are not always advised promptly of charges against 
them nor granted a timely hearing before a judge. The Constitution 
allows civilian and military courts to order detention for up to 5 days 
without arraignment and to extend the detention of alleged terrorists 
for up to 10 days. The law affords detainees 30 minutes of immediate 
and subsequent daily access to a lawyer (in the presence of a prison 
guard) and to a doctor to verify their physical condition. The law does 
not permit a judge to deny such access; police authorities generally 
observe these requirements.
    In practice, many detainees are not promptly advised of charges 
against them, and they are not granted a timely hearing before a judge. 
At the end of 1999, 8 percent of the general prison population of 
24,791 was under investigation but not charged with a crime; 45 percent 
were charged with an offense and were awaiting trial or had been 
convicted and were awaiting sentencing; and 48 percent were serving 
sentences.
    A 1998 law requires police to inform those detained of their 
rights, to expedite notification of the detention to family members, 
and eliminated the ability of police to demand identification from or 
stop persons bases solely on suspicion. The law also deals with 
physical abuse by police against detained persons.
    The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, but this 
is a reality only for those who can afford to pay. The Constitution 
allows judges to set bail.
    There were no cases of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a 
judicial system independent of the other branches of government; 
continued turnover in the court system has reduced the number of 
military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial 
branch to the point that there they had very little influence over the 
administration of justice.
    Cases decided in the lower courts can be referred to appeals courts 
and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Criminal court judges are 
appointed for life. In 1997 constitutional reforms set 75 as the age 
limit for Supreme Court justices, gave the Senate the right to approve 
or disapprove presidential nominations to the Court, and increased 
court membership from 17 to 21. Of the 21 justices on the Supreme 
Court, 3 were appointed under the military regime. The Supreme Court 
prepares lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and appeals courts, 
from which the President makes nominations. The Supreme Court continues 
to work with the other branches of government on broad judicial reform.
    If formal charges are filed in civilian courts against a member of 
the military, including the National Police, the military prosecutor 
asks for jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has sometimes granted, 
although less often than in previous years. This is of particular 
consequence in the human rights cases from the period covered by the 
1978 Amnesty Law. In addition, military courts have the authority to 
charge and try civilians for terrorist acts, defamation of military 
personnel, and sedition. Rulings by military tribunals can be appealed 
to the Supreme Court. Persons accused of terrorist acts and students 
arrested during demonstrations for damaging property or assaulting a 
police officer, are brought before military tribunals. On July 19 the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights received a submission on behalf of 
32 civilians convicted in military tribunals for violations of the Law 
on Terrorist Actions, Arms Control, and State Security. The plaintiffs 
argued that applying military criminal law to civilians violates the 
American Convention on Human Rights.
    A 1997 judicial reform law created the post of Attorney General, 
with a 10-year term, and a related office that is expected to be in 
full operation by 2002. Congress passed enabling legislation for the 
Ministry in September 1999. The judicial reform law, which applies to 
criminal cases, provides that national and regional prosecutors 
investigate crimes and formulate charges, leaving judges and 
magistrates the narrower function of judging the merits of evidence 
presented to them. Training and administrative setup began in 1999, and 
implementation began in December with oral trials in 2 of the 13 
political regions.
    Based on the Napoleonic Code, the criminal justice system does not 
provide for trial by jury, nor does it presume innocence until proven 
otherwise. However, recent changes to the trial system, including the 
gradual adoption of oral trials, have moved the system away from its 
Napoleonic roots. Criminal proceedings are inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial. The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, 
but indigent defendants do not always receive effective legal 
representation. Indigent defendants, who account for the majority of 
cases, may be represented by law students doing practical training, on 
occasion by a court-appointed lawyer, or by a lawyer from the 
Government's legal assistance corporation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners, although inmates in 
Santiago's maximum-security prison who have been convicted of terrorist 
acts routinely claim to be political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanctions. A 1995 privacy law bars obtaining 
information by undisclosed taping, telephone intercepts, and other 
surreptitious means, as well as the dissemination of such information, 
except by judicial order in narcotics-related cases.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respect these rights in practice. However, human rights groups have 
criticized the existence and application of laws that allow government 
officials to prosecute journalists who insult or criticize them.
    The press maintains its independence, criticizes the Government, 
and covers issues sensitive to the military, including human rights 
cases. Investigative journalism is infrequently practiced for both 
financial and political reasons, but recently on-line dailies are 
including such stories more frequently.
    Two major media groups control most of the print media, which are 
largely independent of the Government. The State is majority owner of 
La Nacion newspaper, but it is not under direct government control. 
Electronic newspapers are emerging with distribution over the Internet.
    The broadcast media also are largely independent of government 
control. The Television Nacional network is state-owned but not under 
direct government control. It receives no government subsidy and is 
self-financing through commercial advertising. It is editorially 
independent and is governed by a board of directors appointed by the 
President and approved by the Senate. Members reflect various political 
viewpoints, and the board encourages the expression of varied opinions 
over the network.
    Under the State Security Law of 1958, it is a criminal offense to 
besmirch the honor of state institutions and their members and symbols, 
such as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the military services, the 
flag, and the President. Military courts have the authority to charge 
and try civilians for defamation of military personnel and for 
sedition, but their rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and the Inter-American Press Association have 
criticized these restrictions on freedom of expression and information, 
as has the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression, who visited the country in June 1999 and called 
for changes in the law.
    Several cases have been brought against journalists under 
provisions of the State Security Law. In February the Supreme Court 
sentenced Jose Ale Aravena to a suspended prison sentence under the law 
for insulting former Chief Justice Servando Jordan in an article in La 
Tercera newspaper. HRW noted that the judge who issued the sentence 
also insulted and threatened Ale in public before releasing the 
verdict. In July President Lagos pardoned Ale.
    In April 1999, ``The Black Book of Chilean Justice'' by journalist 
Alejandra Matus, went on sale in Santiago. Former Supreme Court 
President Jordan, who was mentioned negatively in the book, immediately 
filed charges against Matus under the State Security Law, and an 
appeals court judge ordered all copies of the book seized from the 
publisher and book stores. The newspaper La Tercera and the Editorial 
Planeta publishing house subsequently placed the prohibited text on the 
Internet, using foreign servers, and the book was published in 
Argentina. It remains banned.
    After becoming aware of the Jordan lawsuit, Matus left the country 
and sought and obtained political asylum abroad. The charges against 
her and seizure of the book were widely repudiated, including by the 
President and members of Congress. The IACHR adopted a resolution in 
October declaring that, if the alleged facts of the case are certain, 
they would constitute a violation of the freedom of expression. 
Nevertheless, the State Security Law has yet to be modified and, 
without a conviction, the President is unable to grant Matus a pardon, 
as he did in the case involving the journalist Jose Ale.
    HRW reported that authorities charged journalist Paula Afani Saud 
with breaching the secrecy of a criminal investigation when she wrote 
articles in 1998 about an investigation by authorities into narcotics 
trafficking and money laundering. HRW noted that Afani refused to 
identify her sources for information contained in the articles and 
claimed that the subsequent charges brought against her violated the 
public's right of access to information and counteracted a Government 
initiative to protect the confidentiality of journalist's sources.
    A 1996 privacy law set penalties for those who infringe on the 
private and public life of individuals and their families. At the time 
of the law's passage, journalists argued vigorously that applying it to 
media reporting would have a chilling effect on freedom of the press. 
To date, this privacy law has not been applied to the media.
    The 1980 Constitution established a Film Classification Council 
(CCC) with the power of prior censorship. The Council has banned over 
50 films and approximately 700 videos, mostly for violence and 
pornography. Local and foreign film distributors regard the CCC's 
screening process as insufficiently transparent. The Constitution 
permits the State to censure films. The Lawyers Association for Public 
Liberties petitioned the IACHR to object to the Supreme Court's banning 
of the film ``The Last Temptation of Christ;'' the case was before the 
InterAmerican Court at year's end.
    The National Television Council (CNT), created by legislation in 
1989 and supported with government funding, is charged with assuring 
that television programming ``respects the moral and cultural values of 
the nation.'' The CNT's principal role is to regulate violence and 
sexual explicitness in both broadcast and cable television programming 
content. Films and other programs judged by the CNT to be excessively 
violent or to have obscene language or sexually explicit scenes can be 
shown only after 10 p.m. when ``family viewing hours'' end. In 
practice, the ever-increasing volume of programming makes the CNT's job 
all but impossible. The CNT issues occasional warnings to networks and 
cable providers and sometimes obliges them to postpone the showing of 
certain films until after 10 p.m. It also occasionally levies fines. 
Debate continues over the CNT's role.
    The courts can prohibit media coverage of legal cases in progress 
but do so rarely. The press has begun using foreign Internet web sites 
to publish articles when gag orders are issued.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. However, early in the year an 
international group of neo-Nazis were prohibited from holding a 
meeting. The Government enacted legislation to prevent the meeting from 
being held and specifically used immigration laws to prohibit foreign 
citizens from entering the country to attend the meeting.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Church 
and state are officially separate; however, the Roman Catholic Church 
continues to receive some preferential treatment. All denominations 
practice their faiths without restriction.
    A 1999 law on religion, designed to bring other religious entities 
closer to the legal status enjoyed by the Catholic Church, went into 
effect in March. The new law bestows the same legal status that the 
Catholic Church previously enjoyed upon all other faiths. However, 
their status still can be challenged in court. Reflecting its 
historical position, the legal status of the Catholic Church cannot be 
challenged at all. The new religion law removed the ability of the 
State to dissolve religious entities by decree. Instead, this only can 
occur after a judicial review begun by a complaint filed by the 
semiautonomous council for the Defense of the State.
    Many of the approximately two million Protestants, who represent 
about 12 percent of the population, assert the Government has 
discriminated against them. They cite the absence of Protestant armed 
forces chaplains, difficulties for pastors to visit military hospitals, 
and the predominantly Catholic religious education in public schools.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. For 
minor children to leave the country, either alone or with only one of 
their parents, they must have notarized permission from nonaccompanying 
parent(s).
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue 
of the provision of first asylum has not arisen.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government through periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for 
citizens 18 years of age and over. Free and fair presidential elections 
were held in December 1999, with a runoff in January. In the second 
round of elections, Ricardo Lagos narrowly defeated Joaquin Lavin with 
52 percent of the vote to Lavin's 48 percent. Lagos led the center-left 
Concertacion coalition that included his Socialist Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Radical Social 
Democrat Party. Lavin was supported by the center-right Alliance for 
Chile coalition consisting of the Independent Democratic Union and the 
National Renewal party. The legislative branch, with the exception of 
11 nonelected senators among its 49 members, is elected freely and is 
independent from the executive branch.
    The Government still operates under some political restraints that 
the military regime imposed. Under the 1980 Constitution, various 
national institutions--including the President, the Supreme Court, and 
the National Security Council (the latter acting on nominations by the 
armed forces)--appoint an additional nine Senators (beyond those 
elected) to 8-year terms. In addition, former presidents Pinochet and 
Frei exercised their option to become senators-for-life.
    The former military government wrote the 1980 Constitution, and 
amended it slightly in 1989 after losing a referendum on whether 
General Pinochet should stay in office as president. The Constitution 
provides for a strong presidency and a legislative branch with limited 
powers. It includes provisions designed to protect the interests of the 
military and the minority political opposition (currently the center-
right coalition). These provisions include limitations on the 
President's right to remove the commanders in chief of the three armed 
services and the national police; an electoral system that gives the 
second-place party (or coalition) in each district disproportionate 
representation in Congress; and the provision for non-elected senators. 
In January the IACHR issued a resolution criticizing the existence of 
designated senators and senators-for-life and urged the Government to 
end the practice. In October a Senate Commission (including two 
designated Senators) unanimously approved a proposal that would abolish 
these positions starting in 2006, but at year's end Congress had not 
passed legislation codifying this proposal.
    Women have the right to vote and are active in all levels of 
political life, including grassroots movements. Women are a majority of 
registered voters and of those who actually cast ballots; however, they 
are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 13 women 
among the 120 deputies, 2 women in the 49-seat Senate, and 5 women 
among the 16 cabinet ministers. No women currently serve as Supreme 
Court justices.
    The approximately 1.2 million indigenous people have the legal 
right to participate freely in the political process, although 
relatively few are active politically. One member of Congress is of 
indigenous descent.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several human rights NGO's are active. The Chilean Human Rights 
Commission, an NGO, is affiliated with the International League of 
Human Rights. The FASIC is active on the full range of human rights 
issues. The CODEPU provides legal counsel to those accused of 
politically related crimes and to victims of human rights abuses. The 
Government cooperates with domestic NGO's efforts to investigate 
current accusations of human rights violations. Many international 
NGO's also follow human rights issues closely.
    There were no confirmed reports of threats made against human 
rights activists during the year. An investigation into the burglary of 
the CODEPU offices in 1999 was inconclusive. No information was 
available regarding unconfirmed threats reportedly made against Rafael 
Castillo, who had been involved in investigations of human rights 
abuses associated with Operation Albania and other killings.
    In May 1998, then-President Frei advocated the creation of a 
``national defender of citizens,'' a state body that would receive 
complaints about abuse of authority by government officials and 
agencies. The Lagos administration forwarded legislation to Congress in 
October to create this entity, but Congress had not passed the 
legislation by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law and the 
Government generally respects these provisions. In 1999 Congress 
amended the Constitution to emphasize the principle of equality between 
men and women and now states that ``persons are born free and equal in 
their dignity and rights.'' There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or social status.
    Women.--The most serious violations of women's rights involved 
sexual and domestic violence. The public is becoming increasingly aware 
of the extent of physical abuse of women. The National Women's Service 
(SERNAM), created in 1991 to combat discrimination against women, 
conducted courses on the legal, medical, and psychological aspects of 
domestic violence for police officers and judicial and municipal 
authorities. In a 1996 study conducted by SERNAM, the most recent that 
it has conducted, results showed that of 12,000 reports of domestic 
violence since the Law of Intrafamily Violence went into effect, only 1 
in 5 accusations resulted in judicial action. The study also found that 
in nearly three-quarters of those cases, the accusation led to a 
positive change in the domestic situation regardless of the judicial 
outcome.
    The courts may order counseling for those involved in intrafamily 
violence. In 1997 there were approximately 61,000 reports of domestic 
violence. The Citizens' Peace Foundation indicated that there were 
1,052 cases of rape reported to the police in 1998, and 993 in 1997. 
Experts believe that a majority of rape cases go unreported. In July 
1999, a new law took effect increasing the penalties for sexual abuse. 
The legislation includes clauses to facilitate proof of the crime and 
to protect the privacy and safety of the person making the charge. The 
new law also overturned 100-year-old legislation that permitted a man 
charged with rape to be released if he asked the victim to marry him 
and she accepted.
    Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist. The law permits 
legal separation but not divorce, so those who wish to remarry must 
seek annulments. Since annulment implies that a marriage never existed 
under the law, former spouses are left with little recourse for 
financial support. A 1994 law created conjugal property as an option in 
a marriage, but some women saw this as a disadvantage, since the law on 
separate property (which still exists) gives women the right to one-
half their husbands' assets but gives husbands no rights to assets of 
the wife. In the face of heavy opposition from the Catholic Church, the 
Chamber of Deputies approved a divorce bill in September 1997; the bill 
faces Senate opposition but was still on the legislative agenda at 
year's end.
    A SERNAM study in 1997 found that the average earnings of female 
heads of household are 71 percent of those of male heads of household. 
Women with no schooling averaged a salary that was 87 percent of their 
male counterparts. The minimum wage for domestic helpers (who are 
thought to number 300,000 in what is probably the largest single 
category of working women) is only 75 percent of the standard minimum 
wage. Female heads of household with university training averaged 57 
percent as much as their male counterparts. The Labor Code provides 
specific benefits for pregnant workers and recent mothers. Employers do 
not have the right to ask women to take pregnancy tests prior to hiring 
them. Legislation extending these benefits to domestic employees took 
effect in November 1998.
    Children.--The Government provides free education through high 
school; education is compulsory from first through eighth grade.
    Violence against children is a problem, albeit a declining one. A 
survey of eighth grade students by UNICEF comparing the incidence of 
mistreatment in the years 1994 and 2000 showed that in 1994, 34 percent 
of children had been subject to some form of serious physical violence. 
That number had declined to 25 percent this year. During the same 
period, those having suffered some sort of serious physical violence 
from their parents had fallen from 21.3 percent to 11.9 percent. 
Violence by the mother (21.3 percent) was almost twice as frequent as 
violence by the father (11.9 percent), and violence in low-income 
households (31 percent) almost double that in high-income households 
(16.3 percent).
    A 1999 report by the National Minors Service (SENAME) noted that it 
had handled the cases of 5,453 maltreated children for the first 6 
months of that year; 583 of these cases were judged severe enough to be 
presented to legal authorities. The SENAME reported that cases of abuse 
brought to its attention totaled 9,723 in 1998 and 7,676 in 1997. From 
the middle of 1998 to December of 1999, the SENAME brought to the 
courts 713 cases for child abuse, 314 for rape, 292 for sexual abuse, 
79 for grave harm done to children, and 28 cases of homicide. Of the 
cases, 70 percent came to trial, of which 80 percent resulted in 
convictions. Beginning in 1997, the SENAME lawyers began receiving 
specialized training in child abuse cases, leading to a higher 
conviction rate of offenders according to the Director of the 
organization. A report from the La Morada Corporation for Women 
released in May 1999 estimated that there are 20,000 cases of sexual 
abuse of children every year.
    A 1996 UNICEF report stated that 34 percent of children under 12 
years of age experience serious physical violence, although only 3.2 
percent of the victims of intrafamily violence reported to the National 
Police family affairs unit were below the age of 18. A 1994 law on 
intrafamily violence was designed in part to deal with this problem. 
According to UNICEF, some form of corporal punishment is used by one or 
both parents in 62 percent of households. UNICEF estimated that 
approximately 107,000 children between the ages of 12 and 19 are in the 
work force. A study by the Catholic Church estimated that some 50,000 
children under age 15 are working (see Section 6.d.).
    UNICEF estimated in June 1999 that there were roughly 10,000 child 
prostitutes between the ages of 6 and 18, up from 4,200 in 1995.
    People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law promotes the integration of 
the disabled into society; the Government's National Fund for the 
Handicapped has a small budget to encourage such integration. The 1992 
census found that 288,000 citizens said that they had some form of 
disability. The disabled still suffer some forms of legal 
discrimination; for example, blind persons cannot become teachers or 
tutors. Although a 1994 law requires that new public buildings provide 
access for the disabled, the public transportation system does not make 
provision for wheelchair access, and subway lines in the Santiago 
metropolitan area provide facilitated access for the disabled only in 
some areas.
    Indigenous People.--Approximately 1.2 million persons identify 
themselves as indigenous. The Mapuches, from the south, constitute 
about two-thirds of the indigenous population, but there are small 
Aymara, Atacameno, Huilliche, Rapa Nui, and Kawaskhar populations in 
other parts of the country. A committee composed of representatives of 
indigenous groups participated in drafting the 1993 law that recognizes 
the ethnic diversity of the indigenous population and gives indigenous 
people a voice in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and 
traditions. It provides for eventual bilingual education in schools 
with indigenous populations, replacing a statute that emphasized 
assimilation of indigenous people. Of the population that identifies 
itself as indigenous, about one-half remain separated from the rest of 
society, largely because of historical, cultural, educational, and 
geographical factors. In practice, the ability of indigenous people to 
participate in governmental decisions affecting their lands, cultures, 
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is marginal. 
Indigenous people also experience some societal discrimination.
    The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI) was 
created in 1994, and indigenous people directly elected representatives 
to this body in 1995 and 1999. It advises and directs government 
programs that assist the economic development of indigenous people. In 
May a commission appointed by the Lagos administration proposed a 16-
point program aimed at addressing indigenous concerns. As part of the 
program, a permanent national commission was created to facilitate the 
participation of Mapuche and other indigenous populations in the 
formulation of national policies affecting them.
    In October the Chamber of Deputies allowed to lapse a proposed 
constitutional reform, pending since 1991, that would have recognized 
explicitly the existence of indigenous persons and the state's 
responsibility for encouraging development of indigenous culture. Also 
in October, a group of 200 Mapuches marched from Santiago to the 
National Congress in Valparaiso demanding land, more political rights, 
and ratification of International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
No. 169. That convention supports ``the aspirations of indigenous 
people to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life 
and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, 
languages and religions, with the framework of the States in which they 
live.'' The marchers declared themselves satisfied with the response 
they received from the legislators.
    In the first decision of its kind, a Temuco appeals court ruled in 
September 1999 that an indigenous employee fired from a municipal job 
had been discriminated against by her immediate superior. The court 
based its ruling on the Indigenous Law, which outlaws discrimination on 
the basis of ``origin and culture.''
    Several Mapuche families continued to object to exchanging 
traditional lands for other property as part of the Ralco hydroelectric 
project. The eight families involved continued to object to ENDESA's 
effort to have them resettled. Land occupations and other violence by 
isolated Mapuche Indian groups against private forestry companies 
occurred through much of the year (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government had not responded to suggestion from the U.N. 
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made in August 
1999. The Committee suggested that the Government apologize to and 
compensate indigenous people for their historical treatment, and 
explicitly outlaw racial and ethnic discrimination.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Country assimilated a major 
European migration in the 19th century and major Middle Eastern and 
Croatian migrations in the early part of the 20th century. Smaller 
racial and ethnic minority groups such as those of Asian descent and 
African-Chileans also can be found and experience some societal 
intolerance.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions 
without prior authorization and to join existing unions. The work force 
is estimated at 5.7 million persons, of whom 3.7 million are salaried. 
Union membership is approximately 655,000, or roughly 12 percent of the 
work force. Government-employee associations are provided with the same 
rights as trade unions; however, the law denies government employees 
the possibility of uniting with other workers or to benefit from joint 
actions, thus constituting an interference to their freedom of 
association. Police and military personnel and employees of state-owned 
companies attached to the Ministry of Defense may not organize 
collectively. Members of unions are free to withdraw from union 
membership.
    The 1992 Labor Code permits nationwide labor centrals, and the 
Unified Workers Central (CUT), the largest and most representative of 
these, legalized its status in April 1992. Labor unions are effectively 
independent of the Government, but union leaders usually are elected 
from lists based on party affiliation and sometimes receive direction 
from party headquarters. Political activities or affiliations of unions 
or union officials are not restricted. Registering a union is a simple 
process.
    Employees in the private sector have the right to strike; however, 
the Government regulates this right, and there are some restrictions on 
the right to strike. Public employees do not enjoy the right to strike, 
although government teachers, municipal, and health workers have struck 
in the past. The law proscribes employees of some 30 companies--largely 
providers of essential services (e.g., water and electricity)--from 
striking; it stipulates compulsory arbitration to resolve disputes in 
these companies. There is no provision for compulsory arbitration in 
the public sector. Striker replacements are permitted under certain 
circumstances.
    Employers must pay severance benefits to striking workers and must 
show cause to dismiss workers. Employees who believe they have been 
dismissed unfairly or dismissed because of their trade union activities 
file complaints with the Ministry of Labor. However, even if such a 
claim is found to have merit, the employee does not enjoy the right to 
reinstatement. In such cases the employer is only required to make 
additional compensatory payments. The burden of proof rests with the 
employer in cases in which employees allege illegal antiunion activity.
    In October protesting truck owners disrupted movement along parts 
of the highway system for over two days. The truckers asked for lower 
diesel fuel prices and a limit on the number of truckers allowed to 
work in the country. Labor unions did not support the truck owners.
    The CUT and many other labor confederations and federations 
maintain ties to international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Despite legal 
provisions for collective bargaining, the Labor Code includes 
provisions that make it difficult for trade unions to organize in many 
sectors. As a result, the majority of workers work under individual 
contracts. Employers say that this is due to the workers' preference, 
distrust of union leaders, and loyalty to companies. Union leaders 
counter that the Labor Code--which does not allow union shops--prevents 
successful organization in many sectors. Unions cite the widespread 
practices of subcontracting and temporary employment as a ways that 
employers resist unionization.
    The Ministry of Labor arbitrates about half of the complaints it 
receives. Workers may take cases to the courts if they have not been 
arbitrated. If complainants succeed in proving that they were fired 
unjustly, the employer must pay discharged employees twice their normal 
severance payment. There are no statistics available concerning the 
disposition of complaints of antiunion behavior. There were allegations 
that employers dismiss workers for union activity and attempt to avoid 
a complaint by immediately paying them some multiple of the normal 
severance pay.
    Temporary workers--defined in the Labor Code as those in 
agriculture and construction, as well as port workers and 
entertainers--may form unions, but their right to collective bargaining 
is limited, as it is dependent on employers agreeing to negotiate with 
unions of temporary workers. Likewise, intercompany unions are 
permitted to bargain collectively only if the employer agrees to 
negotiate with such a union. Labor Code sanctions against unfair 
bargaining practices protect workers from dismissal only during the 
bargaining process. Labor leaders complain that companies invoke the 
law's needs-of-the-company clause to fire workers after a union has 
signed a new contract, particularly when negotiations result in a 
prolonged strike.
    Labor laws apply in the duty free zones; there are no export 
processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known 
to occur. While the Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced 
and bonded labor by children, there were no reports of such practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law allows children between the ages of 16 and 18 to 
work with the express permission of their parents or guardians. The law 
allows 15-year-olds to work under certain conditions; their parents 
must consent they must have finished compulsory schooling, and they may 
only perform light work not requiring hard physical labor, or 
constituting a threat to health and childhood development. In July 
Congress passed a law that raised the minimum legal age for some types 
of work from 14 to 15 years of age. Additional provisions in the law 
protect workers under 18 years of age by restricting the types of work 
open to them (for example, they may not work in nightclubs), and by 
establishing special conditions of work (they may not work more than 8 
hours in 1 day). Labor inspectors enforce these regulations, and 
compliance is good in the formal economy; however, many children are 
employed in the informal economy. In August 1999, Congress passed a law 
that raised the minimum age to work in an underground mine from 18 to 
21 years; special regulations govern the ability of 18- to 21-year-olds 
to work at such sites.
    UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children between the 
ages of 12 and 19 work. A government study in 1996 estimated that 
15,000 children between the ages of 6 and 11 and 35,000 children 
between the ages of 12 and 14 are in the work force. A 1998 Catholic 
Church study estimated that 50,000 children under the age of 15 worked. 
The majority of these were males from single-parent households headed 
by women; among these were children who worked more than 40 hours per 
week and did not attend school. The Ministry of Labor convenes regular 
meetings of a tripartite group (business-labor-government) to monitor 
progress in eradicating child labor. The Labor Code does not 
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices were not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, and 
the minimum wage is adjusted annually. This wage is designed to serve 
as the starting wage for an unskilled single worker entering the labor 
force and does not provide a worker and family with a decent standard 
of living. Approximately 400,000 workers (about 11 percent of the work 
force) earn the minimum wage. According to the Government, of the 
workers who earn the minimum wage, approximately 43 percent are between 
the ages of 15 and 19. A tripartite committee comprising government, 
employer, and labor representatives normally suggests a minimum wage 
based on projected inflation and increases in productivity. In May 
1998, Congress approved the Government's proposal setting an escalating 
minimum monthly wage through the year 2000; the minimum wage as of 
December 31 was approximately $175 (100,000 pesos).
    The law sets hours of work and occupational safety and health 
standards. The legal workweek is 48 hours, which can be worked in 
either 5 or 6 days. The maximum workday length is 10 hours, but 
positions such as caretakers and domestic servants are exempted. All 
workers enjoy at least one 24-hour rest period during the workweek, 
except for workers at high altitudes who voluntarily exchange a work-
free day each week for several consecutive work-free days every 2 
weeks.
    Occupational health and safety are protected under the law and 
administered by both the Ministries of Health and of Labor. The 
Government has increased resources for inspections by over 60 percent 
since 1990 and targeted industries guilty of the worst abuses. As a 
result, enforcement is improving, and voluntary compliance is fairly 
good. A 1996 law increased the number of annual occupational health and 
safety inspections and provided that they be carried out by an expanded 
labor inspection service in the Ministry of Labor. Insurance mutual 
funds provide workers' compensation and occupational safety training 
for the private and public sectors. There was a 24-percent decline in 
reported occupational injuries in 1997, the last available figures, 
compared with the previous 5 years, although 11 percent of the work 
force still submitted claims. Workers who remove themselves from 
situations that endanger their health and safety have their employment 
protected if a real danger to their health or safety exists.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, although it may be prosecuted under 
other laws.
    There were occasional reports that persons were trafficked through 
the country.
    If cases of trafficking in persons were to arise, the police, 
Justice and Interior Ministries, SERNAM (if the cases involved women), 
or SENAME (if the cases involved children) would respond.
                               __________

                                COLOMBIA

    Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy in which the 
Liberal and Conservative parties have long dominated politics. Citizens 
elected President Andres Pastrana of the Conservative Party and a 
bicameral legislature controlled by the Liberal Party in generally 
free, fair, and transparent elections in 1998, despite attempts at 
intimidation and fraud by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and 
narcotics traffickers. Similar attempts at intimidation by illegal 
armed actors, including killings and kidnapings, threatened to impair 
local elections scheduled for October; however, the elections were 
generally peaceful. The civilian judiciary is largely independent of 
government influence; however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, 
witnesses, and prosecutors is common.
    The Government continued to face serious challenges to its control 
over the national territory, as longstanding and widespread internal 
armed conflict and rampant violence--both political and criminal--
persisted. The principal participants in the conflict were government 
security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics 
traffickers. The number of victims of paramilitary attacks during the 
year increased. In some areas government forces were engaged in combat 
with guerrillas or narcotics traffickers, while in others paramilitary 
groups fought guerrillas, and in still others guerrillas attacked 
demobilized members of rival guerrilla factions. The 2 major guerrilla 
groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), consist of an estimated 11,000 to 
17,000 full-time combatants organized into more than 100 semiautonomous 
groups. The FARC and the ELN, along with other smaller groups, 
exercised a significant degree of territorial influence and initiated 
armed action in nearly 1,000 of the country's 1,085 municipalities 
during the year, which was approximately the same level as in 1999. 
Their popular support nationwide remained low, according to polls and 
numerous other reports. The major guerrilla organizations received a 
significant part of their revenues (in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars) from fees levied on narcotics production and trafficking, as 
well as kidnaping and extortion. Guerrillas and paramilitary groups 
supplanted absent state institutions in many sparsely populated areas. 
Peace talks initiated in 1999 between the Government and the FARC 
continued in a demilitarized zone (``despeje'') consisting of 5 
southern municipalities, with a total population of approximately 
100,000 persons. In the absence of both a state presence and 
international verification, FARC human rights abuses inside the zone, 
as well as outside of it, continued. Peace talks were complicated by 
the September 8 hijacking of a commercial plane by a FARC guerrilla who 
obtained refuge in the demilitarized zone. On November 14, the FARC 
unilaterally suspended negotiations and demanded concrete government 
action against the paramilitary groups. On December 6, President 
Pastrana extended the term of the demilitarized zone until January 31, 
2001, as intense public debate continued over the value of the existing 
peace process. The killing of congressional peace commission chairman 
Diego Turbay Cote on December 29 cast further doubt on the future of 
peace negotiations, although government and FARC negotiators remained 
in contact.
    In April the Government and the ELN agreed in principle on 
verification within a proposed ``encounter zone'' in southern Bolivar 
and northeastern Antioquia departments, in which the ELN's national 
convention could take place. However, progress stalled when local 
residents of the proposed zone protested its creation. Two groups--
Asocipaz and the ``No to the Despeje'' Committee--demanded active 
consultation with the Government on the creation of an encounter zone 
and on occasion blocked access to the area. Paramilitary groups have 
attempted to influence these organizations. The Governments of Spain, 
France, Switzerland, Norway, and Cuba took a progressively more active 
role in the peace process during the year and committed to provide 
development assistance when the zone is implemented. However, the 
September 17 mass kidnaping of over 50 Cali residents by the ELN again 
slowed the peace process. After negotiation coupled with military 
pressure, the last of the hostages were released on November 3. ELN 
leaders participated in a mid-October conference in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, jointly sponsored by the Government and a group of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), to explore solutions to the 
conflict. (The FARC, although invited, did not participate in the 
conference.) On December 15, five hired killers wounded public 
employees' union president Wilson Borja, a key member of the civil 
society facilitating commission in the Government-ELN peace process. 
Carlos Castano, the head of the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia 
(AUC) paramilitary umbrella organization, admitted a role in the 
attack. The Christmas release of 42 police and military hostages by the 
ELN paved the way for continued negotiations on the encounter zone at 
year's end.
    In open opposition to the Government, in November the AUC 
paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of Congress and demanded that 
the Government grant the AUC a role in the peace negotiations with the 
FARC. Interior Minister Humberto de la Calle negotiated the hostages' 
release with Castano, an action that angered the FARC. The Government 
refused to accord illegal self-defense (paramilitary) groups any 
political status.
    The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is responsible for internal 
security and oversees both the armed forces (including the army, air 
force, navy, marines, and coast guard) and the National Police. In the 
past, civilian management of the armed forces has been limited; 
however, over the past few years, the professionalism of the armed 
forces has improved, and respect for civilian authority on the part of 
the military has increased. In addition to the armed forces and the 
National Police, the public security forces include armed state law 
enforcement and investigative authorities, including the Administrative 
Department of Security (DAS) and the Prosecutor General's Technical 
Corps of Investigators (CTI). The DAS, which has broad intelligence 
gathering, law enforcement, and investigative authority, reports 
directly to the President but is directed by a law enforcement 
professional. The police are charged formally with maintaining internal 
order and security, but in practice law enforcement responsibilities 
often were shared with the army in both rural and urban areas. Many 
observers maintain that government action to combat paramilitarism has 
been inadequate, and in the past security forces regularly failed to 
confront paramilitary groups; however, the security forces improved 
their efforts to confront and detain members of paramilitary groups 
during the year. Nevertheless, members of the security forces sometimes 
illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces. The armed forces and 
the police committed serious violations of human rights throughout the 
year.
    Despite years of drug- and politically related violence, the 
economy is diverse and relatively advanced. Crude oil, coal, coffee, 
and cut flowers are the principal legal exports. In 1999 the country 
suffered its first recession in over 60 years, with a decrease in gross 
domestic product (GDP) of 4.5 percent and record unemployment of over 
20 percent. Although the economy recovered with 3 percent growth during 
the year, the level of unemployment remained unchanged and was at 19.7 
percent by year's end. The inflation rate at year's end was 8.75 
percent. Since September 1999, the Government has adopted fiscally 
austere budgets and floated the peso. High levels of violence greatly 
inhibit business confidence. Narcotics traffickers continued to control 
large tracts of land and other assets and exerted influence throughout 
society, the economy, and political life. Income distribution is highly 
skewed; much of the population lives in poverty. Per capita GDP was 
approximately $2,100.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were some 
improvements in the legal framework and in institutional mechanisms, 
but implementation lagged, and serious problems remain in many areas. 
Government security forces continued to commit serious abuses, 
including extrajudicial killings. Despite some prosecutions and 
convictions, the authorities rarely brought higher-ranking officers of 
the security forces and the police charged with human rights offenses 
to justice, and impunity remains a problem. Members of the security 
forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in 
some instances allowing such groups to pass through roadblocks, sharing 
information, or providing them with supplies or ammunition. Despite 
increased government efforts to combat and capture members of 
paramilitary groups, often security forces failed to take action to 
prevent paramilitary attacks. Paramilitary forces find a ready support 
base within the military and police, as well as among local civilian 
elites in many areas.
    On August 12, the revised Military Penal Code went into effect, 
which provides for an independent military judicial corps and for legal 
protection for troops if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to 
commit human rights abuses; the code also precludes unit commanders 
from judging subordinates. A series of military reform decrees signed 
by the President on September 14 provided greater facility for the 
military to remove human rights abusers or paramilitary collaborators 
from its ranks and provided for the further professionalization of the 
public security forces. The military judiciary continued to demonstrate 
an increased willingness to turn cases involving security force 
officers accused of serious human rights violations over to the 
civilian judiciary, as required by a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling 
and the new Military Penal Code; in August a presidential directive 
reinforced these legal norms.
    Police, prison guards, and military forces tortured and mistreated 
detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons are 
harsh; however, some inmates use bribes or intimidation to obtain more 
favorable treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as 
prolonged pretrial detention, are fundamental problems. The civilian 
judiciary is inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case 
backlog, and undermined by intimidation and the prevailing climate of 
impunity. This situation remains at the core of the country's human 
rights problems. The Superior Judicial Council (CSJ) estimated, based 
on a 1997 survey, that 63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40 
percent of all reported crimes go unpunished. On April 6, the 
Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999 law that had created 
the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced the anonymous regional 
courts system on July 1, 1999).
    The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
Journalists typically work in an atmosphere of threats and 
intimidation, primarily from paramilitary groups and guerrillas, which 
appeared to worsen during the year; journalists practice selfcensorship 
to avoid reprisals. There were some restrictions on freedom of 
movement, generally because of security concerns. Violence and 
instability in rural areas displaced between 125,000 and 317,000 
civilians from their homes during the year. Almost one-fourth of these 
movements occurred in massive displacements. (Exact numbers of 
displaced persons are difficult to obtain because some persons were 
displaced more than once, and many displaced persons do not register 
with the Government or other entities.) The total number of internally 
displaced citizens during the last 5 years may exceed 1 million. There 
were reports that security force members harassed or threatened human 
rights groups. Violence and extensive societal discrimination against 
women, abuse of children, and child prostitution are serious problems. 
Extensive societal discrimination against the indigenous and minorities 
continued. Child labor is a widespread problem. Trafficking in women 
and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. ``Social 
cleansing'' killings of street children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and 
others deemed socially undesirable by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, 
and vigilante groups continued to be serious problems.
    Paramilitary groups and guerrillas were responsible for the vast 
majority of political and other killings during the year. Throughout 
the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened 
civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an orchestrated 
campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby depriving 
guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to 
challenge the FARC and the ELN for control of narcotics cultivations 
and strategically important territories. Paramilitary forces were 
responsible for an increasing number of massacres and other politically 
motivated killings. They also fought guerrillas for control of some 
lucrative coca-growing regions and engaged directly in narcotics 
production and trafficking. The AUC paramilitary umbrella organization, 
whose membership totaled approximately 8,150 armed combatants, 
exercised increasing influence during the year and fought to extend its 
presence through violence and intimidation into areas previously under 
guerrilla control while conducting selective killings of civilians it 
alleged collaborated with guerrillas. The AUC increasingly tried to 
depict itself as an autonomous organization with a political agenda, 
although in practice it remained a mercenary vigilante force, financed 
by criminal activities and sectors of society that are targeted by 
guerrillas. Although some paramilitary groups reflect rural residents' 
desire to organize solely for selfdefense, most are vigilante 
organizations, and still others are actually the paid private armies of 
narcotics traffickers or large landowners. Popular support for these 
organizations grew as guerrilla violence increased in the face of a 
slowly evolving peace process. The Government continued to insist that 
paramilitary groups, like guerrillas, were an illegal force and 
increased efforts to apprehend paramilitary members; however, the 
public security forces' record in dealing with paramilitary groups 
remained mixed. In some locations the public security forces 
increasingly attacked and captured members of such groups; in others 
elements of these entities tolerated or even collaborated with 
paramilitary groups.
    The FARC and the ELN regularly attacked civilian populations, 
committed massacres and summary executions, and killed medical and 
religious personnel. The FARC continued its practice of using gas 
canisters as mortars to destroy small towns, indiscriminately wounding 
government officials and civilians in the process. Guerrillas were 
responsible for the majority of cases of forcible recruitment of 
indigenous people and of hundreds of children; they also were 
responsible for the majority of kidnapings. Guerrillas held more than 
1,000 kidnaped civilians, with ransom payments serving as an important 
source of revenue. Other kidnap victims were killed. At year's end, the 
FARC and ELN reportedly held 527 soldiers and police. In many places, 
guerrillas collected ``war taxes,'' forced members of the citizenry 
into their ranks, forced small farmers to grow illicit crops, and 
regulated travel, commerce, and other activities. In March the FARC 
announced ``Law 002,'' which demanded that anyone with assets of $1 
million pay taxes to the FARC or risk kidnaping. The FARC routinely 
committed abuses against citizens who resided in the despeje zone. 
Numerous credible sources reported cases of murder, rape, extortion, 
kidnaping, robbery, threats, detention, and the forced recruitment of 
adults and children, as well as impediments to free speech and fair 
trial and interference with religious practices.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political and 
extrajudicial killings continued to be a serious problem. An estimated 
4,000 citizens died in such acts, committed principally by nonstate 
agents. Members of the security forces continued to commit 
extrajudicial killings.
    An analysis of data from the Center for Investigations and Popular 
Research (CINEP), published by the Colombian Commission of Jurists (an 
NGO), indicated that there were 20 reports of extrajudicial killings 
attributable to state forces in the period from October 1999 to March, 
including deaths that resulted from police abuse of authority. However, 
the military claimed that six of the deaths resulted from 
confrontations with guerrillas; four alleged deaths (of which only one 
was confirmed) resulted from a panic when the army tear-gassed an 
indigenous protest (see Sections 2.b. and 5); and five were attributed 
by other groups to paramilitary forces. CINEP calculated 37 similar 
cases in 1999, which also included deaths that resulted from police 
abuse of authority. Most of the incidents cited by the Commission were 
under investigation by military and civilian authorities at year's end. 
The number of cases of military personnel accused of human rights 
violations who were tried in civilian courts increased. There were some 
reports that police and former security force members committed social 
cleansing killings.
    According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, there were 235 
massacres (defined as the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous killing 
of 3 or more persons outside of combat at a single location or at 
several nearby locations) during the first 6 months of the year. An 
estimated 1,073 persons were killed in these massacres; the Ministry of 
Defense attributed none of these deaths during this period to public 
security forces. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police 
reported 1,286 persons killed in 216 massacres (defined as 4 or more 
persons killed in the same incident) during the year and attributed 
none of these massacres to security forces. The Ombudsman's office 
recorded 509 massacres in 1999, in which 2,262 persons were killed, and 
attributed 20 killings to public security forces.
    On August 15, an army unit mistakenly killed 6 children; the 
Prosecutor General's office determined that the act was unintentional 
harm caused in the course of duty and referred the case to the military 
justice system (see Section 1.g.).
    The human rights delegate of the Attorney General's office, which 
oversees the performance of all public sector employees, received 201 
complaints and cases during the first 6 months of the year and 
concluded 26 disciplinary investigations. Among the complaints were 20 
complaints of massacres. The Attorney General's office received 78 
complaints related to massacres and forced disappearances during the 
year. Approximately 75 percent of these complaints involved the army 
(particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia, and southern Bolivar 
departments); the other 25 percent implicated police or DAS officials. 
During the year, the Attorney General's office concluded 13 
investigations of massacres and forced disappearances attributed to 
state agents and sanctioned 50 members of the security forces 
(including 10 members of the National Police, 35 members of the army, 
and 5 members of the DAS). The office exonerated 20 accused persons. 
Contrary to previous years, the office referred all cases involving 
human rights violations to the Prosecutor General for criminal 
investigation. Five generals were under investigation by the Attorney 
General during the year for failure to prevent paramilitary massacres 
in 1998 and 1999.
    At year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's 
office reported that it had approximately 918 open investigations of 
human rights violations, in which 1,379 individuals are under 
investigation. This number includes 286 members of the military and 
police, 573 presumed members of paramilitary groups, 353 presumed 
guerrillas, and 187 other civilians. The unit arrested 302 persons 
during the first 6 months of the year, and other state entities 
arrested a further 70 persons against whom the unit had cases. As of 
November, another 676 arrest warrants for persons against whom the unit 
had cases remained outstanding, of which 37 are for military personnel, 
20 are for police, and 3 are for members of the DAS. The authorities 
detained 38 members of the army, 41 police, 5 members of the DAS, and 5 
members of the CTI during the year.
    The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police announced that 
25,660 murders occurred during the year, compared with 24,358 murders 
in 1999. The press reported that on average one person was killed every 
20 minutes. The police and the Prosecutor General's office have 
insufficient resources to investigate most killings adequately. The 
Superior Judicial Council estimated based on a 1997 survey that 63 
percent of crimes go unreported and that 40 percent of all reported 
crimes go unpunished.
    According to a March report by the Ministry of Defense, during the 
first half of the year, the military judiciary convicted and sentenced 
206 members of the National Police, army, and navy for serious offenses 
that the Ministry identified as violations of human rights: homicide, 
bodily injuries, rape, attempted murder, illegal detention, and abuse 
of authority. Of the total of 206 convictions, 66 were for homicide and 
113 were for bodily injuries. The average sentences issued in 1998 were 
58 months' imprisonment for homicide and 15 months' imprisonment for 
bodily injuries, although sentences ranged from 2 years to 64 years for 
homicide, and 2 months to 2 years for bodily injuries. The military 
judiciary convicted and sentenced 206 persons for serious crimes in 
1999. The civilian Criminal Procedure Code authorizes restriction to a 
military base as an acceptable substitute for imprisonment when 
military jails or prisons are unavailable.
    In August 1997, the Constitutional Court more narrowly defined the 
constitutional provision that crimes by state agents unrelated to 
``acts of service'' must be tried in civilian courts (see Section 
1.e.). Since then the military judiciary has turned 1,307 cases, of 
which an estimated 41 percent are for possible human rights violations, 
over to the civilian judiciary for investigation and possible 
prosecution, including cases involving high-ranking officers. During 
the year, the military judiciary turned 496 cases over to the civilian 
judiciary, compared with 79 cases in 1999 and 266 cases in 1998. The 
new Military Penal Code reiterates that the crimes of forced 
disappearance, torture, and genocide must be tried in civilian courts. 
President Pastrana reaffirmed these new legal norms in an August 
directive sent to the military high command and the commander of the 
National Police (see Section 1.e.).
    Prosecution continued in civilian courts against army Major David 
Hernandez, Captain Diego Fino Rodriguez, Sergeant Edgardo Varon, and 
Privates Carlos Escudero, Ferney Cardona, and Raul Gallego, members of 
the Fourth counter-guerrilla battalion (Fourth Brigade), for the March 
1999 murder of Antioquia peace commissioner (and former Vice Minister 
for Youth) Alex Lopera and two other persons. However, in March Captain 
Fino escaped military detention; four soldiers are under investigation 
for complicity in his escape. Major Hernandez had escaped in June 1999 
and was still at large at year's end. Following Fino's escape, the 
military announced that all military detainees would be transferred to 
the military stockade at Tolemaida to prevent further escapes; however, 
it was not clear that this was implemented in all cases.
    On April 1, the Attorney General's office publicly stated that it 
had found insufficient evidence to bring charges against retired army 
Colonel Jorge Plazas Acevedo, former chief of intelligence of the 
army's 13th Brigade, for the October 1998 kidnaping and later murder of 
Jewish business leader Benjamin Khoudari. The Attorney General's office 
announced that it was dropping its administrative investigation and 
publicly asked the Prosecutor General's office to drop its criminal 
investigation. However, the Prosecutor General's office continued its 
prosecution of Colonel Plazas and civilians Jhon Alexis Olarte Briceno 
and Guillermo Lozano Guerrero, who were on trial at year's end. The 
Prosecutor General's office has 11 other arrest warrants pending in the 
case; 1 lieutenant was ruled out as a suspect.
    During the year, the Attorney General sanctioned eight service 
members in connection with the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, of 
which three--army Captain Oswaldo Prada Escobar, Lieutenant Enrique 
Daza and Second Lieutenant Hector Guzman Santos--were discharged. A 
police lieutenant colonel, captain, and lieutenant, as well as two DAS 
agents were suspended. On July 12, Elizabeth Canas Cano, a key 
eyewitness to the massacre, was killed by two unidentified gunmen. In 
May the Prosecutor General's office ordered the preventive detention of 
four paramilitary suspects in the case; the investigation was still in 
progress at year's end. The Attorney General's office also was 
conducting an inquiry into the death of Canas.
    In December the Attorney General's office charged 17 police and 9 
army officials with collusion with paramilitary groups in approximately 
160 social cleansing murders by members of paramilitary groups in 
northeastern Antioquia (near the communities of La Ceja, Guarne, and El 
Penon) during 199598. The Attorney General also charged two municipal 
officials with omission. The Prosecutor General's office pressed 
criminal charges against 3 of the 26 officials charged by the Attorney 
General; police Captain Luis Alfredo Castillo Suarez Juan Carlos 
Valencia Arbalaez and Carlos Mario Tejada Gallego were on trial in 
Medellin at year's end. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Maria Clavijo 
Clavijo, Staff Sergeant Javier Gomez Herran, and soldier Carlos Mario 
Escudero are under investigation in the killings. Clavijo was arrested, 
suspended from duty, and placed in military detention on March 17. 
Although the army challenged jurisdiction, arguing Clavijo's actions 
were related to acts of service, the CSJ ruled that the case should be 
tried in civilian court.
    On March 3, the ongoing civilian prosecution of retired Colonel 
Bernardo Ruiz Silva, former commander of the army's now disbanded 20th 
Brigade (military intelligence), for allegedly organizing the November 
1995 Bogota killing of Conservative Party opposition leader Alvaro 
Gomez Hurtado suffered a major setback when key witness Luis Eduardo 
Rodriguez Cuadrado retracted his previous testimony before a Bogota 
judge. However, the testimony of another key witness helped the 
prosecution. The trial continued at year's end. Also on trial are army 
intelligence agents Henry Berrio Loaiza and Carlos Gaona Ovalle, 
retired army warrant officers Omar Berrio Loaiza and Franklin Gaona 
Ovalle, and civilian accused killers Hector Paul Florez Martinez, 
Manuel Mariano Montero Perez, Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo, and 
Hermes Ortiz Duran.
    In 1999 the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office 
formally indicted marine Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla, then-
commander of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion, as well as marine 
Corporals Javier Fernando Guerra, Eduardo Aristides Alvarez, and Jose 
Milton Caicedo for the 1995 social cleansing killings of alleged 
thieves Sifredy and Fredy Arboleda. On May 25, the Prosecutor General 
ordered the detention of marine Sergeant Francisco Duarte Zuniga, who 
was still at large at year's end. A disciplinary investigation by the 
Attorney General was still underway at year's end.
    In October 1998, the Attorney General's office severely reprimanded 
marine Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo Alfonso Quinones, along with 4 
others, for colluding with paramilitary groups in the murders of at 
least 50 persons in Barrancabermeja, Santander department, in 1992-94, 
although he was exonerated by a military tribunal in 1994. Quinones 
appealed the reprimand, but Attorney General Jaime Bernal recused 
himself from the case, and Congress never appointed anyone else to 
adjudicate the matter. The statute of limitations on the case expired 
during the year, leaving the reprimand standing. During the year, 
Quinones was promoted to brigadier general.
    In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office indicted paramilitary 
Nicolas Antonio Gomez Zapata for participation in the January 1994 ``La 
Chinita'' massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 35 persons. Among 
the 50 service members sanctioned by the Attorney General during the 
year were persons accused of involvement in this massacre. No progress 
has been reported in the Prosecutor General's case.
    At year's end, three army noncommissioned officers sought in 
connection with the April 1991 massacre of bus passengers at Los Uvos 
remained at large.
    In August a civilian court absolved retired army Colonel Hernando 
Navas of involvement in the November 1988 Nuevo Segovia massacre in 
which over 100 persons were killed or wounded. The authorities have 
charged 8 military officials, 1 police officer, and 10 civilians in the 
case. Among these, Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Londono Tamayo and 
Lieutenant Colonel Marco Baez Garzon continued to appeal civilian court 
convictions related to the massacre. Londono remained in detention, but 
was still on active duty, although he has been deprived of command 
responsibilities. Baez Garzon also was deprived of command 
responsibility and remained in military custody in Bogota.
    On June 29, the Constitutional Court instructed the CSJ to 
reconsider its 1996 decision referring the case of the 1987 forced 
disappearance, torture, and death of a member of the M-19 guerrilla 
group, Nydia Bautista, by accused retired General Alvaro Velandia 
Hurtado to military courts. Upon the stipulated review, the CSJ 
reversed itself and assigned jurisdiction to the civilian courts at the 
end of July, pointing out that the acts were not related directly to 
military service. The Prosecutor General's office continued its 
investigation.
    There was no information available regarding the pending trial of 
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Vincente Perez Berrocal for the 1987 killing of 
a Liberal mayor.
    No motives or suspects have been identified in the September 1998 
killing of Congressman Jorge Humberto Gonzalez. The investigation 
remained open at year's end.
    Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups, 
including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by 
members of the public security forces, in particular the army, 
continued. Evidence suggests that there were tacit arrangements between 
local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, and 
paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas that were under 
military control or despite a significant military presence. Individual 
members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of 
paramilitary groups--passing them through roadblocks, sharing 
intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even 
joining their ranks while off-duty.
    The military high command, under the leadership of Defense Minister 
Luis Fernando Ramirez and General Fernando Tapias, stated repeatedly 
that it would not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and 
paramilitary groups and that the army would combat paramilitary groups; 
however, security force actions in the field were not always consistent 
with the leadership's positions. Credible reports persisted of 
paramilitary installations and roadblocks near military bases; of 
contacts between paramilitary and military members; of paramilitary 
roadblocks unchallenged by military forces; and of military failure to 
respond to warnings of impending paramilitary massacres or selective 
killings. Military entities often cited lack of information or 
resources to explain this situation. Impunity for military personnel 
who collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
    In September the President signed military decrees that allowed for 
the dismissal of members of the public security forces who were 
complicit in paramilitary or other illegal activities; government 
agencies actively investigated allegations of collaboration or 
complicity with paramilitary groups by members of the security forces. 
A total of 388 members of the military were dismissed in October; 
however, it was not known how many of these were dismissed for 
collaborating with paramilitary groups in such abuses (see Section 
1.e.).
    Both the Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), 
the largest of the seven major paramilitary organizations of the AUC 
umbrella group, and the army's Fourth Brigade claimed responsibility, 
but in different circumstances, for the January 23 killings of two 
long-demobilized guerrillas. The ACCU claimed that it killed Uberney 
Giraldo and Jose Evelio Gallo, both leaders of the Socialist Renewal 
Current (CRS), and two others after abducting them from the village of 
San Antonio, Antioquia department. On January 24, the army's Fourth 
Brigade announced that it had killed two ``ELN guerrillas'' in combat, 
but civilian autopsies identified them as the two missing CRS leaders. 
On January 26, gunmen stole the bodies from the morgue but left the 
autopsy reports behind. At year's end, investigations by the Attorney 
General's office and the Prosecutor General's office were underway.
    On February 19-20, a large group of AUC paramilitary attackers 
killed an estimated 37 persons whom they suspected of being guerrillas 
or guerrilla sympathizers at El Salado, Bolivar department. The navy 
reportedly set up a roadblock shortly after the killings began, which 
prevented human rights and relief groups from entering; some groups 
accepted the navy's explanation that access was not possible due to 
fighting in the area. The Ministry of Defense denied charges that the 
navy blocked NGO's from entering or colluded with paramilitary forces, 
and an investigation by the Prosecutor General was underway at year's 
end. A military investigation did not find any substantiation for these 
charges.
    The paramilitary group reportedly had been in the town since 
February 16, and had a list of names of persons they suspected of being 
guerrilla supporters. The victims included a 6-year-old girl and an 
elderly woman, and some victims were tortured or raped. The attackers 
also burned several homes. On February 19, the paramilitary group flew 
in a helicopter to rescue an injured member. According to Human Rights 
Watch, 30 minutes after the paramilitary forces withdrew, government 
forces entered the town.
    On February 22, members of the 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion 
captured 11 members of the paramilitary group suspected of 
participating in the El Salado massacre, killed 2 of them, and downed a 
paramilitary helicopter. According to NGO's and press reports, the 
massacre at El Salado and a February 15-16 paramilitary massacre at 
nearby Las Ovejas, Sucre department, displaced approximately 3,000 
persons. By year's end, 16 paramilitary suspects were under arrest, and 
the Prosecutor General's investigation into the paramilitary group's 
responsibility for the massacre was concluded.
    Members of the San Jose de Apartado ``peace community'' in Uraba 
region, Antioquia department, as well as NGO's, accused the 17th 
Brigade of involvement in 2 paramilitary massacres in February and July 
in which 11 persons were killed. On February 19, unidentified 
perpetrators widely believed to be members of the ACCU paramilitary 
group attacked San Jose de Apartado. They selectively killed five 
persons, and wounded three others. There were reports that the men wore 
the insignia of the 17th Brigade on their uniforms and that army troops 
were seen on the outskirts of the city several hours before the 
massacre. On July 8, approximately 20 paramilitary assailants murdered 
6 peasants in La Union, part of San Jose de Apartado. The attackers 
reportedly gave the citizens 20 days to leave the town. NGO's alleged 
that the 17th Brigade was complicit in both attacks and that army 
members were near La Union prior to the July 8 attack. There were 
allegations that a military helicopter hovered over La Union during the 
massacre; however, these allegations were never confirmed. The military 
investigation rebutted the charges. The Prosecutor General was 
investigating both incidents at year's end. There were at least two 
visits during the year by joint commissions of inquiry including 
representatives from the Prosecutor General's office, the Human Rights 
Ombudsman's office, and international NGO's. Human rights NGO's and 
members of the peace community of San Jose de Apartado reported 11 
additional deaths in separate incidents during the year, half of which 
they attributed to paramilitary forces. They also reported frequent 
paramilitary roadblocks, intimidation, theft, and the restriction of 
incoming food supplies.
    In February Human Rights Watch issued a report that stated that the 
army maintains close operational ties to paramilitary groups. The 
report highlighted incidents of collaboration by officers of the army's 
Third, Fourth, and 13th Brigades. It stated that according to evidence 
from government investigators, the army's Third Brigade based in Cali 
provided weapons and intelligence to the paramilitary ``Calima Front.'' 
The report also detailed ties between the army's Fourth Brigade and 
paramilitary groups and ties between the 13th Brigade (intelligence) 
and paramilitary groups. The report also detailed threats received by 
various government agents while they investigated these ties.
    Vice President Gustavo Bell responded to the Human Rights Watch 
report and said that while the Government has never denied residual 
ties between individual members of the public security forces and 
paramilitary groups, it has moved to break those ties and punish those 
responsible. Bell said that the suggestion that there was a 
``deliberate, institutional will to help and support'' paramilitary 
groups was untrue. Bell noted that much of the information in the 
report came from the Prosecutor General's office, demonstrating that 
the Government was investigating military crimes.
    In March the Attorney General's office ordered that Vice First 
Sergeant Jose Maria Cifuentes Tovar, of the 45th Battalion, be removed 
from the army for having failed to obey orders to install a roadblock 
to prevent the escape of members of paramilitary groups from 
Barrancabermeja following a February 1999 massacre that left nine 
persons dead. On March 18, 1999, police arrested paramilitary leader 
Mario James Mejia (``el Panadero'') for killing a taxi driver; he then 
was charged in Bogota with leading the February 1999 Barrancabermeja 
massacre and was still under investigation at year's end. Pedro Mateo 
Hurtado Moreno and three other paramilitary suspects in the massacre 
remained at large at year's end. Politically motivated killings and 
related unrest continued in Barrancabermeja at a very high rate 
throughout the year.
    In March the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office 
ordered the detention of army Captain Luis Fernando Campusano Vasquez 
and sought the capture of 15 other civilians, including Carlos Castano, 
who remained at large. They are suspected of being affiliated with area 
units that collaborated with a 300person paramilitary group based at 
Vetas, Norte de Santander department, which committed 15 massacres in 
and around the towns of La Gabarra and Tibu between May 29 and 
September 1, 1999. More than 145 persons whom the attackers claimed 
were guerrillas or guerrilla supporters were killed. Nearby elements of 
the army's 46th counterguerrilla battalion (Tibu) and Fifth mechanized 
group (Cucuta), as well as police, did not intervene.
    In July the Attorney General announced an investigation into 
retired army Brigadier General Alberto Bravo Silva, Colonel Roque 
Sanchez, and three other army officers for failing to prevent a 
paramilitary massacre of 27 persons in August 1999 in La Gabarra. The 
investigation was still in progress at year's end. Bravo retired in 
August 1999 on the orders of President Pastrana. Two of the three army 
officers are still members of the public security forces. Colonel 
Sanchez, the regional police commander at the time of the killings, was 
on trial at year's end. In October the Attorney General's office also 
charged Colonel Sanchez. On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office 
formally charged AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano with 
masterminding the May 29 and August 21 La Gabarra massacres in 1999.
    In March the Prosecutor General issued formal indictments against 
eight security force members, including Tibu military base Commander 
Mauricio Llorente Chavez, for complicity in a paramilitary massacre 
that took place in Tibu in July 1999. Five members of the police were 
charged in May and subsequently were arrested. On June 20, the 
Prosecutor General's office arrested six members of the National 
Police--Arturo Velandia, Luis Toloza, Miguel Hernandez, Alfonso Ortiz, 
Gustavo Lobo, and Jose Ordonez.
    In April 1999, President Pastrana formally retired from service 
Brigadier Generals Fernando Millan Perez and Rito Alejo del Rio; both 
had links to paramilitary groups. The Government stated only that it 
``was no longer convenient'' for them to continue their military 
service. The military judiciary announced no new developments during 
the year in its ongoing investigation of General Millan regarding 
allegations that he armed and equipped a paramilitary group in Lebrija, 
Santander department, in 1997. The group was believed responsible for 
at least 11 killings. In October 1998, the Superior Judicial Council 
had determined that Millan's alleged actions constituted an act of 
service and turned the case over to the military judiciary for 
prosecution, effectively cutting off the prosecutor's investigation. 
Millan had denied the charges. In June 1999, the Attorney General's 
office opened a disciplinary investigation of Millan, which still was 
in progress at year's end.
    At year's end, General del Rio, former commander of the 13th 
Brigade, remained under preliminary investigation by the human rights 
unit of the Prosecutor General's office for allegedly establishing 
illegal paramilitary groups in Medellin in 1987, and in Uraba in 1996. 
General Del Rio is also under preliminary investigation by the Attorney 
General's office.
    On July 27, the Attorney General's office formally charged five 
army officers, including four generals, for failing to protect the 
residents of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, when paramilitary forces 
killed 19 persons in May 1998, despite repeated requests by the Human 
Rights Ombudsman. The five charged are former commanders of the army's 
Fourth Division, retired General Augustin Ardila Uribe and General 
Jaime Humberto Cortes Parada (the army's Inspector General); former 
commander of the 7th Brigade, retired Brigadier General Jaime Humberto 
Uscategui; commander of the 2nd Brigade, General Fredy Padilla de Leon 
(former head of the Seventh Brigade); and commander of the ``Joaquin 
Paris'' battalion, Colonel Gustavo Sanchez Gutierrez. Those involved 
denied the charges. The Attorney General's investigation was still in 
progress at year's end. In June a first instance military court 
recommended closing the investigation of the case; the Superior 
Military Tribunal was considering this recommendation at year's end. At 
year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office 
had detained three members of paramilitary groups and had outstanding 
arrest warrants for five more, including brothers Carlos and Fidel 
Castano.
    In August air force Commander Hector Fabio Velasco called for the 
renewed detention and a first instance hearing of Brigadier General 
Jaime Uscategui and Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Orozco in connection with 
the July 1997 AUC paramilitary massacre of dozens of persons at 
Mapiripan, Meta department. Army Commander General Jorge Mora had 
recused himself from Uscategui's case due to personal ties and was 
replaced by Velasco. A military tribunal was still considering the 
issue at year's end. In May 1999, Uscategui was arrested on civilian 
charges connected with the case, but in August 1999, the CSJ had ruled 
that the case should be tried in the military courts. Uscategui was 
released after 180 days when the military investigation produced no 
action, although the investigation continued. Early in 1999, Uscategui 
sought to retire from the military effective in January; however, his 
effort was thwarted by the Attorney General, who ordered Uscategui 
dismissed from the military in November 1999 for dereliction of duty in 
the October 1997 judicial convoy massacre in San Juan de Arama, Meta 
department. A military trial of Brigadier General Uscategui and 
Lieutenant Colonel Orozco still was in progress at year's end.
    In August 1999, the CSJ had sent the cases of all other defendants 
in the Mapiripan case to the civilian courts for action, including 
charges against Lieutenant Colonel Lino Hernando Sanchez Prada for 
facilitating the massacre, which was determined not to be an act of 
service. As of February 29, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit 
had completed its investigations of Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez and the 
five other defendants (two noncommissioned officers and three 
commercial pilots) in the civilian judiciary. In November the 
Prosecutor General indicted in a separate process Lieutenant Colonel 
Sanchez, two army sergeants, and eight members of paramilitary groups 
(including two civilian pilots). All the cases were on trial by year's 
end. In addition to Sanchez, and the five other defendants, two more 
presumed paramilitary group members (who also were still in detention) 
were indicted in December.
    In May the Attorney General's office, which in 1999 formally had 
accused five officers, three noncommissioned officers, and five 
civilian officials of possible complicity or participation in the July 
1997 Mapiripan massacre, dropped the charges against and closed the 
investigation of Lieutenant Colonel Lino Sanchez Prada. The other cases 
remained under investigation at mid-year.
    The case of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie Betancurt 
for collaboration in 1993-94 with a paramilitary group that killed 10 
persons remained pending before civilian courts at year's end.
    In July Ivan Cepeda, the son of murdered Senator Manuel Cepeda 
Vargas, was forced to flee the country due to death threats that he 
suspected were a reaction to his activism in pursuing justice for his 
father's 1994 death. In testimony before the Senate, the Attorney 
General had stated that the Senator had been killed as the result of a 
joint operation between some senior army officers and members of 
paramilitary groups. In 1999 the Attorney General's office severely 
reprimanded army First Sergeant Justo Gil Zuniga Labrador and Vice 
First Sergeant Hernando Medina Camacho, then members of the army's 20th 
Brigade, for the killing of Senator Cepeda, who was the leader of the 
Patriotic Union (UP) party. The army discharged both men from service, 
and in December 1999 they each were sentenced to 43 years' imprisonment 
for their roles in Cepeda's murder.
    Paramilitary groups committed numerous extrajudicial killings, 
primarily in areas where they competed with guerrilla forces for 
control, and often in the absence of a strong government security force 
presence. The frequency of paramilitary massacres continued to increase 
significantly. Several major paramilitary campaigns during the year 
involved a series of orchestrated massacres in Uraba, Norte de 
Santander, and Barrancabermeja. At mid-year the Human Rights Ombudsman 
attributed 93 massacres, which claimed 512 victims, to paramilitary 
groups. In 1999 the office received 1,467 complaints against members of 
paramilitary groups. The Ministry of Defense attributed 52 percent of 
the estimated 1,073 deaths that occurred in the 235 massacres reported 
by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office during the first 6 months of the 
year. In December the Ministry of Defense reported that paramilitary 
forces killed 983 civilians in massacres during the year. The Colombian 
Commission of Jurists attributed 657 killings and 118 social cleansing 
killings to paramilitary groups in the period from October 1999 through 
March. Paramilitary activities also included kidnaping, intimidation, 
and the forced displacement of persons not directly involved in 
hostilities (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Paramilitary groups targeted 
teachers (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see Section 4), 
labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists, national and 
local politicians (including President Pastrana), peasants, and other 
persons whom they accused of supporting or failing to confront 
guerrillas. Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups 
(see Section 5).
    AUC paramilitary groups were suspected of hundreds of selective 
killings throughout the country, especially in Choco, Santander, Valle 
del Cauca, and Antioquia departments. The FARC, the ELN, or both, had a 
strong presence in these areas as paramilitary forces vied with them 
for control of territory or resources, including coca cultivation. 
Paramilitary groups continued to kill political leaders and peace 
activists, including peace community leader Freddy Gallego, former 
Aguachica mayor and peace activist Luis Fernando Rincon, and former 
Cucuta mayor (and current mayoral candidate at the time of his death) 
Pauselino Camarga. Fourteen members of the CTI were killed during the 
year in various parts of the country. Both paramilitary forces and 
guerrillas were suspected of responsibility in these killings.
    Paramilitary massacres at Las Ovejas, Sucre department, and El 
Salado, Bolivar department, were part of an ongoing paramilitary effort 
to wrest control of the Montes de Maria region from guerrillas. On 
February 15-16, approximately 150 ACCU members staged attacks in 5 
neighborhoods of Las Ovejas. They killed at least 20 persons whom they 
suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers, burned dozens 
of homes, and displaced a large number of persons.
    On April 6, approximately 50 paramilitary attackers massacred 21 
men whom they suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla collaborators 
at Tibu, Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander department, in a 
continuation of a series of 15 massacres in the region in 1999.
    On May 11, a paramilitary group that identified itself as the 
``Calima Front'' claimed responsibility for the killings of 12 
civilians in the village of Sabaletas, just outside Buenaventura, Valle 
del Cauca department. The group also claimed to have killed 14 other 
persons it suspected of being guerrillas in the same area. According to 
Human Rights Watch, the army's Third Brigade created and supports the 
Calima Front, which Human Rights Watch believes is responsible for at 
least 200 killings between July 1999 and July 2000, as well as the 
displacement of over 10,000 persons.
    In August the AUC paramilitary movement claimed that it had killed 
the leader and six members of the ``la Terraza'' gang of hired killers 
based in Medellin. The AUC was known to have contracted the gang to 
conduct killings.
    In a series of attacks on the night of November 22, paramilitary 
forces killed 15 fishermen in Nueva Venecia, in the region of La 
Cienaga de Santa Marta, Magdalena department, and kidnaped another 22 
persons whose bodies later were discovered. Human Rights Ombudsman 
Eduardo Cifuentes issued a December 14 resolution that reported that 45 
persons were killed and that 25 had disappeared, criticized slow 
government action to assist those displaced as a result of the 
incident, and called for immediate investigation of reports of a 
paramilitary base in the area. The Prosecutor General's office was 
investigating the 37 confirmed deaths at year's end.
    Other examples of paramilitary massacres included the killing of 7 
persons in Estados Unidos in January, the November killings of 15 
persons in Granada in the western part of the country, and the killing 
in November of 7 persons in Barrancabermeja.
    Investigations of past killings and massacres proceeded slowly. In 
many cases there was no progress in ongoing investigations. Progress 
during the year included the issuance of warrants of arrest for five 
suspects involved in murder and extortion as members of the El Corral 
Convivir (self-defense group) in 1991 in Arauca department. Other 
members of paramilitary groups investigated and indicted included Luis 
Arnulfo Tuberquias, who was linked to kidnaping and theft on behalf of 
such groups; among those captured were Jose Luis Hernandez and Ruben 
Isaza, nephew and son respectively of paramilitary leader Ramon Isaza, 
and Dario Zapata Hernandez, allegedly the second in command of the AUC 
in the Puerto Boyaca area, Caldas department.
    On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office formally charged AUC 
paramilitary leader Carlos Castano with the August 1999 killing of 
renowned journalist, political comedian, and peace and human rights 
activist Jaime Garzon Forero in Bogota. On January 13, members of the 
CTI captured La Terraza gang member Juan Pablo Ortiz Agudelo in 
Medellin on suspicion of having been the gunman in the attack against 
Garzon. Ortiz remained in detention in Bogota at year's end. In 
December a group of men claiming to represent the ``La Terraza'' 
criminal organization said publicly that they were hired by Castano to 
kill Jaime Garzon and human rights activists Elsa Alvarado, Mario 
Calderon, Jesus Maria Valle, and Eduardo Umana Mendoza. They offered to 
turn themselves in and provide proof of Castano's involvement in return 
for security guarantees from the Government. There was no public 
response from the authorities by year's end.
    In December 1999, Spain complied with a government request and 
extradited paramilitary Lubin de Jesus Morales Orozco, who was arrested 
in Madrid in June 1999 on unrelated charges, for the April 1998 killing 
of Eduardo Umana Mendoza, perhaps the country's best-known and most 
controversial human rights lawyer. Five persons, including Morales, 
remained in detention and were on trial in a civilian court at year's 
end.
    On June 14, the trial of 10 persons suspected of the February 1998 
killing of human rights activist Jesus Maria Valle began in Medellin. 
Valle was the president of the Antioquia Permanent Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights. Charges were brought against suspected killers 
Jorge Eliecer Rodriguez Guzman, Alvaro Goez Meza, Gilma Patricia 
Gaviria Palacios, Elkin Dario Granada Lopez, Alexander Vallejo 
Echeverry, and Carlos Alberto Bedoya Marulanda for direct participation 
in the crime. In August 1999, the Prosecutor General's office issued 
arrest warrants for AUC paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and Juan 
Carlos Gonzalez Jaramillo for planning the crime. Castano was indicted 
in September 1998 for the killing. According to press reports, the 
first police agent on the case was killed soon afterward; the 
prosecutor fled the country; and another investigator was killed in 
September 1999.
    On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted paramilitary Juan Carlos 
Gonzalez Jaramillo (alias ``El Colorado'') and Walter Jose Alvarez 
Rivera in the May 1997 murders of two CINEP workers, Mario Calderon and 
Elsa Alvarado, as well as Alvarado's father, Carlos Alvarado. Jaramillo 
was sentenced to 60 years in prison, and Alvarez Rivera was sentenced 
to 45 years. The judge determined that soccer magnate Gustavo Adolfo 
Upegui Lopez was not implicated in the murders but ordered a review of 
evidence presented during the CINEP trial that connected Upegui with 
paramilitary groups. Upegui remained under arrest in Medellin on 
separate charges at year's end. The judge also convicted two other men 
connected to the case for the illegal use of telecommunications 
equipment and exonerated two other men accused of organizing the 
murders. An arrest warrant for paramilitary leader Carlos Castano in 
connection with this case remains outstanding.
    Accused paramilitary Ivan Urdinola Grajales remained detained in 
connection with the 1989-90 ``Trujillo I'' massacres in Valle 
department, and also is implicated in the 1994 ``Trujillo II'' 
massacre. Prosecutors also have an outstanding warrant for the 
detention of one other paramilitary member in the Trujillo I case. In 
May a court upheld charges against paramilitary Norberto Morales 
Ledesma for involvement in the Trujillo II massacre. Paramilitary 
member Reynel Gomez Correa, detained in 1999 in connection with 
Trujillo II, was murdered in prison in December, before he could be 
brought to trial. Two other members of paramilitary groups implicated 
in both Trujillo I and Trujillo II remain at large. One such person has 
been detained, and another is being sought in the Trujillo I massacre. 
One paramilitary member has been convicted and another detained for the 
1994 Trujillo II massacre. Investigations continue in both cases.
    In July the superior court of Cundinamarca department exonerated 
Jose Tellez and his wife Nancy Lozano, who were accused of 
participating in the 1989 killing of Liberal presidential candidate 
Luis Carlos Galan. Another suspect, Alberto Hubiz Hazbun, who was 
accused of planning the crime, was absolved in 1993. The only person to 
have been convicted of the crime is John Jairo Velazquez Vasquez, who 
was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 1997.
    No suspects have been identified in the September 1999 killing of 
academic and peace activist Jesus Bejarano.
    There was no information available on the investigation into the 
May 1998 killing of former Defense Minister General Fernando Landazabal 
Reyes.
    While an estimated 507 members of paramilitary groups were believed 
to be in jail at year's end, known paramilitary leaders largely 
remained beyond the reach of the law. Government figures indicated that 
from 1997 through October 2000, 934 members of paramilitary groups have 
been captured, and 150 members have been killed. The Ministry of 
Defense reported that during the year the security forces killed 89 
members of paramilitary groups and captured 315 members. In 1999 the 
army reported that it killed 26 members of paramilitary groups and 
captured 102 during that year.
    Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups (see 
Section 5) and members of trade unions (see Section 6.a.).
    The guerrillas of the FARC, the ELN, and the People's Liberation 
Army (EPL) continued to commit killings, often targeting noncombatants 
in a manner similar to that of paramilitary groups. The Colombian 
Commission of Jurists reported that guerrillas were responsible for 236 
political killings in the period of October 1999 through March. The 
Ministry of Defense attributed 880 civilian deaths in massacres to 
guerrillas during the year. The Human Rights Ombudsman attributed 22 
massacres to the FARC during the first 6 months of the year and 9 
massacres to the ELN. The Ombudsman also attributed 89 killings to the 
FARC and 31 killings to the ELN during the first 6 months of the year. 
Local elected officials and candidates for public office, teachers, 
civic leaders, business owners, and peasants opposed to their political 
or military activities were common targets. The Federation of Colombian 
Municipalities reported that 17 mayors were killed during the year; 
guerrillas were the principal suspects (see Section 3). For example, in 
November unknown gunmen killed Carlos Julio Rosas, mayor of Orito, 
Putumayo department. In addition, in the run-up to the October 
municipal elections, 19 mayoral candidates were killed. Police and 
military personnel were targeted for selective and combat killings (see 
Section 1.g.). Guerrilla groups also killed religious leaders (see 
Section 2.c.), members of indigenous groups (see Section 5), and labor 
leaders (see Section 6.a.). Some communities controlled by guerrillas 
also experienced social cleansing killings of criminal or other 
``undesirable'' elements. Guerrilla campaigns around the demilitarized 
area, in the Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and southern departments 
often involved significant civilian casualties and prompted significant 
displacements (see Section 1.g.).
    According to military statistics, FARC and ELN guerrillas killed as 
many as 200 children during the year (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
    The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported 
in November that it is conducting ongoing investigations into the 
detention, disappearance, and deaths of 92 off-duty army personnel. 
Police suspected 22nd FARC front commander ``Geovanni'' of ordering the 
February 27 killing of retired army General Crispiniano Quinones (a 
former commander of the 13th Brigade) by unidentified gunmen at La 
Vega, Cundinamarca department. According to the press, Geovanni and two 
other FARC members were killed shortly thereafter in a confrontation 
with police.
    On March 25 and 26, at least 21 police officers and 8 civilians 
(including the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte and 2 children) were killed 
when the FARC overran the twin towns of Vigia del Fuerte, Antioquia 
department, and Bellavista, Choco department. The FARC held captive at 
least seven more police officers. The FARC tortured many of the 
policemen before killing them outside of combat. In April the 
authorities issued an arrest warrant for FARC member Luis Fernando 
Zapata Hinestroza.
    In May six men who participated in roadblocks protesting a possible 
demilitarized zone for the ELN in southern Bolivar and Antioquia 
departments were killed in the Magdalena Medio region. The ELN was 
suspected of the killings.
    On May 7, FARC guerrillas attacked a public bus in Gigante, Huila 
department, with an explosive device; the driver lost control and hit a 
tree. FARC members shot at the occupants of the bus and burned the 
vehicle; four occupants were still inside when the bus was set on fire 
and are presumed dead.
    In June the FARC massacred at least 11 civilians at Nutibara, 
Antioquia department, and injured 15 other persons. The army's 14th 
Brigade responded to this and other FARC attacks, reportedly killing 14 
guerrillas.
    On July 10, in Huila department, two unidentified gunmen killed 
General Saulo Gil Ramirez, former Director of the National Police from 
1958-65. The press speculated that guerrillas were responsible for the 
killing.
    On July 1, 1 person was killed and approximately 40 were wounded 
when several explosive devices exploded at the El Valle police command 
in Cali. Authorities attributed the explosion to subversive groups. On 
the same day, ELN guerrillas attacked the police's Simon Bolivar 
Carabineer Academy in southwestern Cali.
    On July 14, the FARC entered the town of Roncesvalles in Tolima 
department and killed 13 policemen (see Section 1.g.).
    An August offensive by the FARC resulted in the deaths of more than 
20 civilians and military personnel.
    In August FARC guerrillas killed secretary general of Rio Blanco 
Milciades Luis Garabito after accusing him of paramilitary ties.
    According to press reports, also in August an ELN guerrilla squad 
tortured and killed eight residents of Sardinita, including one child 
and one teacher.
    In early October, the FARC attacked the remote village of Ortega 
and killed eight persons, including two women and two children. The 
guerrillas also burned 20 homes, a school, and a church.
    On October 18, guerrillas attacked Bagado and Dabeiba in the Choco 
department, killing 1 police officer; 17 were missing. Much of Bagado 
was destroyed.
    On November 23, suspected guerrillas killed 12 persons in Santander 
de Quilichao, Cauca department. At least some of the victims reportedly 
were linked to paramilitary groups. Two women were injured. Also on 
November 23, FARC guerrillas killed nine peasants suspected of 
collaborating with paramilitary groups in Antioquia department.
    Investigations into reported killings by FARC members within and on 
the periphery of the demilitarized zone continued. On December 29, 
congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay Cote, his mother 
councilwoman Ines Cote, and five other persons were killed in Caqueta 
department (near the FARC demilitarized zone). The killings placed the 
future of the peace process in doubt as the Prosecutor General, army, 
and police alleged that the FARC were responsible. There was no 
reported progress in the Prosecutor General's investigation into the 
May 1999 killings in Vereda Perlas Altas, Puerto Rico, Caqueta 
department. According to press reports, the FARC have executed 
approximately 20 residents in the despeje zone.
    Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs and artillery and continued 
their practice of using gas canisters to attack small towns, thereby 
killing civilians indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.).
    On May 1, FARC spokesman Raul Reyes said that a FARC 
``revolutionary tribunal'' exonerated FARC eastern bloc commander 
German Briceno Suarez (``Grannobles'') of involvement in the March 1999 
killings of kidnaped American citizen indigenous activists Terence 
Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok near Saravena, Arauca 
department. In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office ordered the 
arrest of Briceno; army efforts to apprehend him and other FARC members 
accused of the crime had not been successful at year's end. Reyes said 
that investigations of other FARC members suspected of the killings 
would continue. In September the Prosecutor General's office sought to 
question Nelson Vargas Ruedas, a FARC guerrilla imprisoned in Bogota, 
for information about the crime. U'wa tribe member Gustavo Bocota 
Aguablanca, who also was indicted for the crime in December 1999, was 
still at large at year's end. The investigation of the case continued 
at year's end.
    In December a Medellin court ruled that Wilson Eusebio Garcia 
Ramirez, commander of the ELN's ``Carlos Alirio Buitrago'' front, 
should be tried in absentia for the September 1998 killings of CTI 
members Edilbrando Roa Lopez and John Morales Patino at Mesopotamia, 
Antioquia. The two had been investigating a 1998 massacre of nine 
persons at the nearby town of Sonson.
    At year's end, the authorities had not yet captured two members of 
the FARC's 32nd Front, including Arley Leal and Milton de Jesus Tonal 
Redondo (``Joaquin Gomez'' or ``Usurriaga''), head of the FARC's 
southern bloc, in connection with the September 1998 murder of Father 
Alcides Jimenez in Putumayo.
    The Ministry of Defense reported that security forces killed 970 
guerrillas and captured 1,556 guerrillas during the year. The 
Prosecutor General's office reported that at year's end, it had open 
investigations of 353 guerrillas, had 53 guerrillas in custody, and had 
252 warrants for the arrest of guerrilla leaders.
    Approximately 80 cases regarding Colombia were before the 
InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at year's end. The 
great majority involved violations of the right to life. At year's end, 
the IACHR was expected to make a decision about whether to move a case 
involving paramilitary and military involvement in the 1996 killing of 
19 merchants to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
    The IACHR continued the process of trying to reach an amicable 
settlement of the Patriotic Union's 1996 complaint charging the 
Government with ``action or omission'' in what the UP termed 
``political genocide'' of the UP and the Communist Party. As part of 
the process, since June the Government has provided protection through 
the Interior Ministry to surviving UP and Communist Party members. 
Despite these efforts, at least two UP members reportedly were killed 
during the year.
    There continued to be incidents of social cleansing--including 
attacks and killings--directed against individuals deemed socially 
undesirable, such as drug addicts, prostitutes, transvestites, 
homosexuals, beggars, and street children. The Colombian Commission of 
Jurists did not attribute any social cleansing killings to security 
forces during the period from October 1999 through March; it attributed 
118 social cleansing killings to paramilitary groups and 2 such 
killings during this period to the guerrillas.
    b. Disappearance.--The 1991 Constitution and the law explicitly 
prohibit ``forced disappearance;'' however, it continued to be a 
problem. On May 30, Congress codified forced disappearance, genocide, 
torture, and forced displacement as crimes, permitting such cases to be 
tried in the civilian judiciary. On July 6, President Pastrana signed 
the law, and it entered into effect immediately. Human rights activists 
noted that the final law did not include a draft article stipulating 
that the four crimes, as serious human rights violations, must be tried 
in the civilian, rather than the military judiciary, when military 
defendants are involved, according to a 1997 Constitutional Court 
decision. However, advocates of the bill noted that the reformed 
Military Penal Code, which entered into effect August 12, did include 
such a stipulation. More than 3,000 cases of forced disappearance have 
been reported formally to the authorities since 1977; very few have 
ever been resolved. Many of the victims disappeared in the course of 
various confrontations between armed groups or with the State. The 
great majority of victims of forced disappearance were never seen or 
heard from again.
    The Attorney General's office, which oversees the performance of 
all public sector employees, received 78 complaints related to 
massacres and forced disappearances during the year; approximately 75 
percent of these complaints involved the army (particularly in 
Putumayo, Antioquia and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25 
percent implicated police or DAS officials. A report of three persons 
who allegedly disappeared due to actions by the army has not been 
confirmed.
    There were no reported results from the trial in a civilian court 
of police Major Manuel de Jesus Lozada Plazas, the former deputy 
commander of the Government's elite antikidnaping squads known as the 
GAULA, at year's end. The authorities had suspended him from duty and 
placed him on half-pay following his arrest in March 1997. There also 
have been no results reported in the investigation into cooperation 
between these squads and illegal paramilitary groups.
    In May the Prosecutor General indicted retired Colonel Gonzalo Gil 
Rojas, former commander of the 20th Brigade, for responsibility in the 
1989 kidnaping of Amparo Tordecillo Trujillo, a former EPL member; in 
December the charges were dismissed. The Prosecutor General also 
indicted in absentia former 20th Brigade members retired Captain Mario 
Raul Rodriguez Reynoso and three noncommissioned officers; they 
remained at large at year's end.
    The law prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely 
serious problem. Reforms to the Penal Code enacted in June increased 
the minimum sentence for simple kidnaping from 6 to 8 years; the 
maximum is 20 years. Police figures for the year, corroborated by Free 
Country Foundation (Fundacion Pais Libre), registered 3,706 kidnapings 
during the year, compared with 3,201 in 1999. Paramilitary groups 
kidnaped 280 persons, while criminals kidnaped 371 persons and another 
944 persons were kidnaped by unknown persons or groups. Guerrilla 
groups were responsible for 2,104 cases. An estimated 164 minors were 
in captivity at year's end. GAULA members and other units of the 
security forces freed 507 persons during the year (including at least 
48 children); 285 of the rescued victims were held by the ELN, 82 by 
the FARC, 44 by the EPL (Popular Liberation Army), and the remaining 96 
by either paramilitary groups or common criminals. The GAULA reported 
that 173 people died in captivity during the year, a 33 percent 
increase over 1999. Arrests or prosecutions in any kidnaping cases were 
rare.
    The Colombian Commission of Jurists attributed 145 forced 
disappearances to paramilitaries in the period from October 1999 
through March. In many instances persons kidnaped by paramilitary 
groups later were found dead.
    On March 9, a paramilitary group led by Jhon Jairo Esquivel 
Cuadrado kidnaped seven members of the CTI at Minguillo, Cesar 
department. Esquivel was captured in July and remained detained pending 
formal charges at year's end. There were no indications that the 
abducted investigators were still alive.
    In May paramilitary forces kidnaped and raped journalist Jineth 
Bedoya (see Section 2.a.).
    On June 19, Carlos Castano's AUC paramilitary group kidnaped 
Antioquia Deputy Guillermo Leon Valencia Cossio, brother of the 
Government's negotiator in the peace process with the FARC, Fabio 
Valencia Cossio, but released him on June 23.
    In October the AUC paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of 
Congress, including former Senate President Miguel Pineda and Zulema 
Jattin, a member of a congressional peace commission, and demanded that 
the AUC be consulted in the peace process. The Government refused to 
open discussions with the AUC, but Interior Minister Humberto de la 
Calle negotiated the hostages' release with Castano.
    Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing policy and major 
source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. In April the FARC 
announced ``Law 002,'' which required persons with more than $1 million 
in assets to volunteer payment to the FARC or risk detention. According 
to Pais Libre, politicians, cattlemen, children, and businessmen were 
guerrillas' preferred victims. The FARC often purchased victims 
kidnaped by common criminals; the FARC then negotiated ransom payments 
with the family.
    On March 22, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-old Clara Oliva Pantoja and 
did not release her until December 19. On April 7, the FARC kidnaped 3-
year-old Andres Felipe Navas; he had not been released by year's end. 
Both children reportedly were held in the FARC demilitarized zone. 
Several released kidnaped victims claim that the FARC is holding more 
than 200 persons in the despeje zone.
    In March the ELN kidnaped 25 electrical company workers at Guatape, 
Antioquia. The kidnapings were part of the ELN's campaign against the 
country's civilian electrical infrastructure.
    On September 17, the ELN kidnaped over 50 patrons of Cali 
restaurants. Roughly a dozen were released within a few days. After 
combined negotiation and military pressure, the remaining survivors 
were released by November, although three had died while in captivity 
due to illness after lengthy forced marches while the kidnapers 
attempted to evade the army. Over the objections of the army commander 
in charge of rescue, the Government allowed the captors to remain free 
in return for release of the remaining hostages. Brigadier General 
Jaime Canal Alban, commander of the 3rd Brigade, resigned to express 
his disagreement with the Government's decision.
    On November 28, unknown assailants kidnaped 18-year-old Juliana 
Villegas, daughter of the head of the National Association of 
Industrialists, a strong supporter of the peace process; guerrillas 
were suspected.
    Guerrillas continued to kidnap political leaders. For example, in 
October the FARC kidnaped a gubernatorial candidate in northern Choco 
department, Senator Juan Mesa, and Antioquia assemblyman Alvaro 
Velasquez. The Federation of Colombian Municipalities reported that at 
least 20 mayors were kidnaped during the year, nearly all by guerrilla 
groups. Many more unreported kidnapings of short duration may have been 
carried out. In response to this situation, some rural mayors fled to 
major cities, where they continued to conduct municipal business via 
telephone and facsimile. Guerrillas also kidnaped journalists (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The FARC, the ELN, and other guerrilla groups regularly kidnaped 
foreign citizens throughout the year; some were released after weeks or 
months of captivity. For example, in July a representative of Doctors 
without Borders was kidnaped by a fringe guerrilla group and had not 
been heard from at year's end. In August the ELN captured and held 26 
university professors and students, including several foreigners, for 
several days before releasing the group.
    On April 8, the DAS captured ELN leader Ovidio Antonio Parra 
Cortes, who had been sought for his role in directing the May 1999 
kidnaping of 174 persons from Cali's La Maria Catholic Church. The 
army's Third Brigade also arrested seven men believed to have helped 
carry out the La Maria hostage-taking.
    By year's end, all of the 41 occupants of an airplane hijacked by 
the ELN in April 1999 had been released; 1 died in captivity in 1999 
due to a lack of needed medications.
    Despite government search efforts and continued pressure by the 
Government on the FARC to account for three American missionaries 
kidnaped by FARC guerrillas in January 1993, their whereabouts and 
condition remained unknown.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit 
torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; however, police and military torture and mistreatment of 
detainees continued. On May 30, Congress codified torture as a crime 
(see Section 1.b.), and the reformed Military Penal Code directed that 
cases of torture involving military and police defendants be tried in 
the civilian, rather than the military, courts. The Attorney General's 
office, which only can sanction administratively or refer to the 
Prosecutor General's office those it finds guilty, did not sanction any 
security force members for torture during the year. Contrary to 
previous years, the Attorney General's office, which received 119 
complaints of torture in 1998, did not receive any complaints of 
torture by state agents during the year. The Colombian Commission of 
Jurists reported one case in the period from October 1999 to March. 
During the first 9 months of the year, CINEP reported that 79 persons 
were injured by state forces. During the year, the Military High Court 
convicted 52 service members for causing injuries.
    The Colombian Commission of Jurists reported that from October 1999 
through March, 136 corpses of persons presumed killed by paramilitary 
forces showed signs of torture; there were 14 similar cases attributed 
to guerrillas; one case attributed to an unidentified unarmed group; 
and none by the State. Of victims who survived torture, the Commission 
attributed one case to public security forces and four cases to 
paramilitary groups. In March the Ministry of Defense reported that the 
Superior Military Tribunal convicted 53 service members for inflicting 
bodily injuries.
    On March 10, a Bogota prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for four 
policemen for allegedly beating detainees Jorge Amilkar Murcia, Juan 
Antonio Rodriguez Ochoa, and a third unnamed victim, taking them to a 
bridge, and forcing them to jump. Rodriguez survived and reported the 
crime to the authorities; Murcia's body was never found.
    According to Human Rights Watch, on June 18, troops from the Rebeiz 
Pizarro Battalion fired upon a car carrying six adults and two 
children; all occupants were wounded.
    In December the Prosecutor General's human rights office indicted 
Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla (then-commander of the 2nd Marine 
infantry battalion), Captain Alvaro Hernando Moreno, Captain Rafael 
Garcia, Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four noncommissioned 
officers for torturing 12 marines with asphyxiation and electric shocks 
in December 1995. The victims were tortured to determine the 
whereabouts of two lost assault rifles. Colonel Molano and his accused 
subordinates remained in detention and are expected to be tried in a 
civilian court. In December the Attorney General's office concluded its 
investigation of the same incident and ordered a 3-month suspension 
from duty for Colonel Molano. It also suspended Captain Moreno, 
Lieutenant Jaramillo, seven noncommissioned officers, and one private.
    Four Venezuelans arrested in May 1999 in the course of a military 
antiguerrilla operation who subsequently claimed that the 3rd army 
Special Forces Battalion tortured and inflicted other cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading punishment against them were remanded to the custody of 
the Venezuelan Embassy and finally allowed to return to Venezuela. The 
Venezuelan Government also asked for an investigation in relation to 
five other persons who were with these four men at the time of their 
capture. The bodies of two of these five persons subsequently were 
found in a river; the other three allegedly disappeared following the 
operation.
    Paramilitary groups increasingly used threats both to intimidate 
opponents and to raise money. Letters demanding payment of a war tax 
and a threat to mark victims as a military target if they failed to pay 
were typical. In 1999 CINEP reported that nearly half of those 
threatened were public school teachers and that approximately half of 
all threat recipients were residents of Antioquia department.
    Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. The bodies of 
many persons detained and subsequently killed by guerrillas showed 
signs of torture and disfigurement. For example, one soldier captured 
by the FARC was subjected to several machete blows to the head until 
the entire left side of his head was destroyed. While he was still 
alive, his genitalia were cut off and acid was poured on his face. The 
military reported that another soldier and his brother were captured by 
the FARC while on a bus, subsequently were tortured and decapitated, 
and their heads were sent to their father inside a box. The Colombian 
Commission of Jurists reported 17 cases of torture by guerrillas during 
the period from October 1999 to March.
    Guerrillas also routinely used threats, both to intimidate 
opponents and to raise money, and--like the paramilitary groups--sent 
letters demanding payments of a war tax, along with threats to make 
persons military targets. Guerrillas also killed, kidnaped, and 
threatened mayoral candidates (see Section 3).
    According to press reports, in July explosive devices damaged three 
businesses in downtown Barrancabermeja, Santander department. The 
authorities stated that the ELN demanded that local businessmen attend 
a mandatory meeting and that the bombs were punishment against those 
who failed to attend. In April the FARC announced ``Law 002,'' which 
required persons with more than $1 million in assets to volunteer 
payment to the FARC or risk detention. In August the FARC bombed as 
many as 13 businesses in Medellin in retaliation for nonpayment of a 
FARC-imposed ``war tax.''
    Prison conditions are harsh, especially for those prisoners without 
significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary 
and health conditions remained serious problems. In December 1997, a 
visiting IACHR mission declared that the living conditions in Bogota's 
La Picota prison constituted ``cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
of the inmates,'' and these problems continue. Prison guards from the 
INPEC report to the Ministry of Justice. There are approximately 7,000 
prison guards. Guards and prison staff frequently are untrained or 
corrupt. In response to what was called a ``disciplinary emergency,'' 
INPEC's disciplinary office reported in September that it had removed 
159 prison guards and was investigating 651 INPEC officials for 
irregularities in performing their duties. Prisoners are suspected of 
killing or ordering the killing of 22 guards in 1999.
    According to the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners, 
a majority of prisoners' food was provided by outside, private sources. 
In 1999 INPEC reported that the daily food allowance for each prisoner 
was $1.44 (2,700 pesos). According to INPEC, the country's prisons and 
jails held approximately 50,702 inmates at year's end, significantly 
more than their capacity of 31,000 persons. The addition of a new 
prison in Valledupar, Cesar department, and the renovation of other 
facilities added 3,000 spaces over the past 3 years but was offset by 
an increase of approximately 10,000 prisoners over the same period. 
According to the Ministry of Defense, 20 percent of the country's 
inmates are in the 10 most crowded prisons, which have an average 
occupancy rate of 200 percent. In a number of the largest prisons, 
overcrowding was severe. Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's 
largest, was built to house 1,800 inmates; at year's end, it housed 
6,575 inmates. Bogota's La Modelo prison had a 169 percent occupancy 
rate, and the Palmira prison outside Cali held 192 percent above its 
planned capacity.
    In February the Justice Ministry announced a plan to renovate 
prisons and build 11 other new prisons over the next 3 years, expanding 
prison capacity by 18,000 persons. In July Congress approved the 
financing of the remaining announced facilities. Only 8,000 prisoner 
accommodations met international standards. A total of 17.8 percent of 
the country's prisons were between 40 and 80 years old, 3.5 percent 
were between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4 percent were more than 201 
years old.
    In November approximately 12,000 women and children, who were 
visitors to the prisons, protested prison conditions by spending 72 
hours inside 7 prisons, including Bogota's La Modelo. The Government 
negotiated with inmate representatives and human rights NGO's to ensure 
the peaceful exit of the protesters by agreeing to convoke the National 
Roundtable on Penitentiary Work, an intersectoral commission that 
includes inmate representatives, in December.
    An estimated 42 percent of all prison inmates are pretrial 
detainees. The remaining 58 percent are split roughly between those 
appealing their convictions and those who have exhausted their appeals 
and are serving out their terms. There are no separate facilities for 
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. According to the Ministry 
of Defense, 4,145 persons (8 percent of inmates) are in pretrial 
detention in police stations. Despite an August 1999 Constitutional 
Court ruling which obligated the transfer of detainees from overcrowded 
police station holding cells to prisons, Bogota's 21 police stations 
still hold 1,657 prisoners awaiting transfer to prisons.
    Local or regional military and jail commanders did not always 
prepare mandatory detention registers or follow notification 
procedures; as a result, precise accounting for every detainee was not 
always possible.
    There are separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts 
of the country, separate women's prisons exist. Conditions at women's 
prisons are similar to those at men's prisons but are far less violent. 
According to the Criminal Procedures Code, no one under the age of 18 
may be held in a prison. Juveniles are held in separate facilities 
operated by the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF).
    The reformed Penal Code requires sentences of 3 to 6 years for 
prison escapes. Escapes from prison continued to be a problem. There 
were six major riots in prisons. On February 3, six prisoners were 
killed and two were wounded during a confrontation between members of 
paramilitary groups and guerrillas at Bogota's La Picota Prison.
    In April members of paramilitary groups and guerrillas engaged in a 
12-hour battle inside Bogota's La Modelo prison, ending a 2-month 
truce, and employed a wide variety of firearms and other weapons. 
Thirty-two inmates were killed, and 35 were wounded. In response, 1,200 
members of the National Police entered La Modelo prison to retake 
control. Among prohibited items found were cellular telephones, 
handguns, shotguns, assault rifles, hand grenades, explosives, dogs 
trained to attack, illicit drugs, and alcohol. Police found a sauna and 
gym in a FARC commander's cell and also discovered a working brothel. 
Authorities brought a variety of charges, including homicide and rape, 
against 20 prisoners. In July Jorge Ospina Trujillo, reportedly a 
member of a paramilitary group, escaped from the Bellavista prison in 
Medellin, Antioquia department. According to the authorities, Ospina 
was one of the prisoners responsible for the April massacre in La 
Modelo prison in Bogota.
    Guerrillas launched several attacks against prisons holding 
guerrilla prisoners, facilitating numerous escapes. For example, during 
its April 2-3 offensive, the ELN attacked a prison at Cucuta, Norte de 
Santander department, initiating the attack with a car bomb. Some 75 
prisoners, including approximately 50 ELN and FARC guerrillas, escaped. 
Four prisoners were killed and four prisoners were wounded in the 
fighting.
    Key narcotics traffickers and some guerrilla leaders obtain cells 
with many comforts, some of which--such as access to twoway radios, 
cellular telephones, and computers--allowed them to continue their 
illegal activities from inside jail. In July the authorities dismantled 
a sophisticated telecommunications center in the district and Picalena 
prisons in Ibague, Tolima, department. Fortysix prisoners between the 2 
prisons used cellular telephones to extort money or negotiate ransom. 
To prevent this type of activity, on July 27, President Pastrana 
announced that he would issue a resolution making it mandatory for 
telephone companies to provide caller identification service to all 
customers.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to 
have routine access to most prisons and police and military detention 
centers.
    The ICRC continues to have ad hoc access to civilians held by 
paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. However, it has not been 
granted access to members of the police or military who are held by 
guerrilla groups.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention; 
however, there continued to be instances in which the authorities 
arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily.
    The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Anyone held in 
preventive detention must be brought before a prosecutor within 36 
hours to determine the legality of the detention. The prosecutor must 
then act upon that petition within 36 hours of its submission. Despite 
these legal protections, instances of arbitrary detention continued.
    Conditional pretrial release is available under certain 
circumstances, for example, in connection with minor offenses or after 
unduly lengthy amounts of time in preventive detention. It is not 
available in cases of serious crimes, such as homicide or terrorism.
    Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, pressed the Government and 
Congress to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law. Initiating regular 
prisoner exchanges remained a top guerrilla priority and featured 
prominently in the FARC's negotiating points at the peace talks. 
Neither the Congress nor the Government attempted to pass such 
legislation, and there was minimal popular support for it during much 
of the year. On September 27, the Attorney General proposed the 
implementation of an existing law that allows for the exchange of 
prisoners during armed conflict. In October the public debate on 
prisoner exchange revived when photographs emerged of 261 police and 
military hostages being held in outdoor fenced enclosures. The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) expressed deep concern for 
the well-being of the hostages and called on the FARC to permit ICRC 
access. At year's end, 527 soldiers and police are presumed held by the 
FARC and ELN, and the ICRC had not been permitted access to them.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and forced exile is not practiced 
by the State. However, there were repeated instances of individuals 
pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases 
included persons from all walks of life, including politicians, human 
rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and 
others. The threats came from various quarters: some individual members 
of the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups, 
narcotics traffickers, other criminal elements, or combinations of the 
above.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judicial system, 
reorganized under the 1991 Constitution, is independent of the 
executive and legislative branches both in theory and in practice; 
however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and 
prosecutors by those indicted or involved is common. The Human Rights 
Ombudsman's office reported receipt of 773 complaints of denial of the 
right to due legal process during 1999, the most recent year for which 
statistics were available. The office received 1,353 complaints in 
1998.
    The judiciary includes the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Justice, and the Council of State, the Superior Judicial Council, and 
lower courts. The Prosecutor General's office is an independent 
prosecutorial body that brings criminal cases before the courts. 
Article 234 of the new Military Penal Code states that the Supreme 
Court (not the Superior Military Tribunal) has first instance 
jurisdiction in cases involving criminal acts by generals, admirals, 
major generals, vice-admirals, brigadier generals, rear admirals, and 
magistrates and prosecutors of the Superior Military Tribunal. Cases 
that already were in their trial phase by August 12, 1999, must 
continue under the old military penal code; however, this article 
applies to all cases brought to trial after that date, regardless of 
when the crime was committed. Article 234 also states the Supreme Court 
is the court of second instance review of rulings by the Superior 
Military Tribunal, effectively asserting the authority of the Supreme 
Court--a body composed entirely of civilian magistratesover the 
military judiciary. The Council of State is the appellate court for 
civil cases. The Constitutional Court adjudicates cases of 
constitutionality, reviews all decisions regarding writs of protection 
of fundamental rights (``tutelas''), and reviews all decisions 
regarding motions for cessation of judicial proceedings. Jurisdictional 
clashes among the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Justice, the 
Council of State, and the Superior Judicial Council were common, due to 
the lack of a single supreme judicial authority capable of deciding 
issues of jurisdiction or constitutional interpretation.
    The CSJ, which oversees the administration of the judiciary, also 
has the responsibility of determining whether individual cases 
involving members of the security forces are to be tried in civilian or 
military courts. On August 17, President Pastrana issued a directive to 
the armed forces and the police that stated that the new Military Penal 
Code ``excludes from military criminal jurisdiction the crimes of 
genocide, torture, and forced disappearance'' and that ``acts against 
humanity do not fall under the jurisdiction of the military courts.'' 
The directive also ``raises to the category of law'' a 1997 
Constitutional Court decision that serious human rights violations and 
other crimes not directly related to acts of service must be tried by 
civilian courts.
    On April 6, the Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999 
law that had created the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced 
the anonymous (``faceless'') regional courts system on July 1, 1999). 
The Constitutional Court found that defendants have the right to know 
the identity of their accusers and that elements of the law that 
permitted some prosecutors and witnesses to remain anonymous under 
exceptionally dangerous circumstances were unconstitutional. The Court 
ruled that specialized jurisdiction judges and prosecutors no longer 
could transfer cases to other colleagues when they believed their own 
security to be at risk. The Court also ruled that persons detained for 
any of the crimes designated in the legislation may request to be 
confined in their homes and may request special permission to go to 
work, as is the case in the regular civilian judiciary. The Court 
permanently closed the appeals court for the specialized jurisdiction. 
The remaining first instance specialized jurisdiction courts continued 
to have responsibility for trying certain crimes, including crimes of 
kidnaping, hijacking, paramilitarism, narcotics trafficking, money 
laundering, and human rights abuses. Specialized jurisdiction 
prosecutors still are permitted 12 months to investigate and develop 
cases, rather than the 6 months afforded to regular civilian judiciary 
prosecutors.
    As part of the Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary falls 
under the executive branch, rather than under the judicial branch. The 
armed forces commander is also the president of the military judiciary. 
The workings of the military judiciary lack transparency and 
accountability, contributing to a generalized lack of confidence in the 
system's ability to bring human rights abusers to justice. On August 
12, a new Military Penal Code replaced the outdated one, which predated 
the 1991 Constitution and did not contemplate some contemporary crimes. 
(President Pastrana signed it into law in August 1999.) The 
Constitutional Court ruled that no implementing legislation was needed 
and instructed the Ministry of Defense to implement the new Military 
Penal Code. Provisions of the new code include the following: unit 
commanders no longer may judge their subordinates; an independent 
military judicial corps is to be created; and service members are to be 
protected legally if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to commit 
human rights abuses. The reformed code states that torture, genocide, 
and forced disappearance could never be related to ``acts of service,'' 
which is the constitutional standard for trying crimes in the military 
judiciary, and stipulates that these crimes therefore always must be 
tried in the civilian judiciary (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). The 
reformed Military Penal Code also gives representatives of the civilian 
judiciary the right to be present at military trials of military 
personnel.
    The new military justice system is composed of magistrates of the 
Military Court of Appeals, lower military court judges, investigating 
judges, prosecutors, and judge advocates (auditor de guerra) at the 
General Inspector, division, and brigade levels. Brigadier General 
Jairo Pineda was appointed to head the Executive Directorate of the 
military penal justice system and is to report directly to the Minister 
of Defense, a civilian. Military prosecutors report to Brigadier 
General Pineda, not to unit commanders as under the previous system.
    According to press reports, on August 16, the Military Penal 
Tribunal appointed its first three prosecutors as part of the new 
Military Penal Code. New prosecutors also were appointed for the 
military forces as a whole and one for each branch of the military and 
the police. On August 17, the prosecutors began to analyze and rule in 
military proceedings.
    A 1997 Constitutional Court decision directed the military judicial 
system to relinquish to the civilian judiciary the investigation and 
prosecution of serious human rights violations and other alleged crimes 
not directly related to acts of service-the 1991 constitutional 
standard for determining whether a case should be tried by the military 
or civilian judiciary. The CSJ assigned most cases involving high-level 
military personnel to the military courts, where convictions in human 
rights-related cases were the rare exception. According to the 1991 
Constitution, general-rank officers are to be tried by the Supreme 
Court; however, that provision was ignored in practice. No definitive 
court ruling has resolved various judicial interpretations of the 
provision; however, a majority of decisions appear to suggest that this 
provision applies only to full generals. The Court ruled that military 
justice was the exception to the general rule and that, in the case of 
doubt, jurisdiction should be assigned to the civilian system. In 
determining which alleged crimes were to be tried by military 
tribunals, the CSJ sometimes employed a broad definition of acts of 
service, thus ensuring that uniformed defendants of high rank, 
particularly the most senior, were tried in military tribunals. During 
the year, the CSJ assigned two key cases to civilian jurisdiction: the 
case against Major Clavijo and the Nydia Bautista case (see Section 
1.a.). In addition, CSJ figures quoted by the Ministry of Defense 
indicated that, where conflicts of jurisdiction arose, the total number 
of cases assigned to military courts dropped from 50 percent in 1992 to 
approximately 15 percent in 2000, while cases assigned to civilian 
jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 60 percent over the same 
period.
    According to figures released by the Ministry of Defense in 
December, since the 1997 Constitutional Court decision, the military 
judiciary has transferred 1,136 cases to the civilian judicial system; 
there was no information available as to how many of these cases dealt 
specifically with human rights abuses or violations of international 
humanitarian law, nor how many cases remained in the military judicial 
system. However, a March report by the Ministry of Defense reports that 
41 percent of the cases transferred involved serious crimes such as 
homicide, torture, illegal detentions, and infliction of bodily 
injuries; the rest were common crimes. Out of the total of 1,307 police 
and military cases transferred, 496 cases were transferred during the 
year, 79 in 1999, 266 in 1998, 295 in 1997, and 171 cases were 
transferred on an unknown date. According to year-end report of the 
Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary during the year found 122 
members guilty of violating ``human or fundamental rights.'' The 
average prison sentence was 58 months for homicide and 15 months for 
inflicting bodily injury.
    The military judiciary demonstrated an increased willingness during 
the year to turn cases of military officers who were accused of human 
rights violations or criminal activities over to the civilian 
judiciary; however, such officers generally were of lower rank. A July 
CSJ ruling suggested that it considered itself bound by the 
Constitutional Court's 1997 decision that certain human rights 
violations could not be considered acts of service and therefore must 
be tried in civilian courts. Between January and November, 80 cases 
were transferred.
    In October 1998, the CSJ had determined that Brigadier General 
Fernando Millan Perez's alleged organization of a paramilitary group 
constituted an act of service and therefore had turned General Millan's 
case over to the military judiciary for prosecution (see Section 1.a.). 
In reaching its decision, the CSJ had determined that it was not bound 
by the Constitutional Court's narrow 1997 interpretation of the 1991 
constitutional standard of relation to acts of service. The CSJ's 
decision effectively ended the Prosecutor General's investigation into 
whether General Millan had provided weapons and intelligence to 
paramilitary groups in Santander department.
    On September 14, President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to reform and 
strengthen the military. One decree provides for the separation from 
service of all uniformed members of the military regardless of their 
time in service, at the discretion of the top military commanders. 
Previously, the Minister of Defense could at his discretion separate 
from service only those who had served at least 15 years in the 
military. Other decrees establish three levels of misconduct and the 
crimes classified at each level. A total of 27 crimes are punishable 
with immediate dismissal; these include: Torture, forced disappearance, 
genocide, facilitating by any means the knowledge of protected 
information or access to classified documents without authorization, 
failure to enter into combat or to pursue the enemy having the capacity 
to do so, and retreating before the enemy or abandoning post without 
having used elements of defense that might be available. A higher-
ranking officer such as a unit commander is granted initial authority 
to issue disciplinary sanctions. Those under investigation may be 
suspended for up to 90 days with half pay; those suspended may perform 
administrative duties. The decrees also state that in the event that 
another authority should be informed of crimes, the military must 
inform that authority and provide all relevant information to it. 
Another decree states that, with limited exceptions, any officer 
sentenced to prison by the military or the civilian justice system is 
to be separated from service.
    On October 16, the military dismissed 388 members of the armed 
forces, including 89 officers. According to press reports, these 
included 2 lieutenant colonels and 15 majors. No information was 
available from the Ministry of Defense regarding the specific reasons 
for any of the dismissals, nor were their names announced; it was not 
known how many were dismissed due to allegations that they were 
responsible for human rights abuses or for collaborating with 
paramilitary groups in such abuses.
    In cases in which military officers were tried, convicted, and 
sentenced for human rights violations, they generally did not serve 
prison terms but were confined to their bases or military police 
detention centers, as permitted by law. Military prisoners remain on 
active duty (and reduced pay) while in detention but are relieved from 
command responsibilities. In other cases members of the military can be 
suspended pending investigation, as occurred in the August Pueblo Rico 
killings (see Section 1.g.). Some perform administrative functions 
while in detention. Armed Forces Commander General Tapias cited a lack 
of adequate military prison facilities as a primary cause for escapes 
from military detention areas. For example, on March 14, suspected 
Casanare department paramilitary leader Humberto Caicedo Grosso escaped 
from military confinement at the 14th Brigade's headquarters. The 
authorities detained five brigade members for failing to stop Caicedo's 
escape.
    The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil 
jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community 
laws (see Section 5).
    Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation, 
particularly when dealing with cases involving members of the public 
security forces or of paramilitary, narcotics, and guerrilla 
organizations. Violent attacks against prosecutors and judges 
continued, and prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys continued to 
be subjected to threats and acts of violence. On April 3, specialized 
jurisdiction prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo was killed in 
Medellin; AUC members were the prime suspects in her killing. 
Prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases often 
lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect their anonymity and 
were thus unwilling to testify, ruining chances for successful 
prosecutions. In June Congress approved Penal Code and Penal Procedural 
Code reforms that created a number of new crimes such as genocide (see 
Section 1.b.), but reduced the sentences for a number of serious 
crimes, including kidnaping and extortion, and the amount of time 
served necessary for parole. The new Penal Code and Procedural Code are 
scheduled to go into effect in 2001. It still was difficult for defense 
attorneys to impeach or cross-examine anonymous witnesses, and often 
the defense attorneys did not have unimpeded access to the State's 
evidence.
    The Attorney General's office investigates misconduct by public 
officials, including members of the military and police. The Attorney 
General's office can draw upon a nationwide network of hundreds of 
government human rights investigators covering the country's 1,085 
municipalities. The office received 78 complaints related to massacres 
and forced disappearances during the year. Approximately 75 percent of 
these complaints involved the army (particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia 
and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25 percent implicated 
police or DAS officials. Its constitutional mandate only provides for 
the imposition of administrative sanctions; it has no authority to 
bring criminal prosecutions or impose criminal sanctions but can refer 
all cases to the Prosecutor General's office for investigation. 
Contrary to previous years, the Attorney General's office referred all 
cases of human rights violations received during the year to the 
Prosecutor General for investigation. The Attorney General's office 
reported that the majority of these cases are investigated by the 
Prosecutor General's office.
    In August a judge convicted of ``corrupt practice'' for her 1999 
exoneration of billionaire emerald magnate Victor Carranza on charges 
of paramilitarism was released after serving less than half of her 46-
month term. Carranza remained in prison due to his prior convictions 
for homicide and kidnaping.
    The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor General for a 4-year term, 
which does not coincide with that of the president, from a list of 
three candidates chosen by the President. The Prosecutor General is 
tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting evidence 
against the accused before the various judges and tribunals. However, 
this office retains significant judicial functions and, like other 
elements of the civilian judiciary, it is struggling to make the 
transition from a Napoleonic legal system to a mixed one that 
incorporates an adversarial aspect.
    In an attempt to deal with impunity, the Prosecutor General in 1995 
created a special human rights unit as part of the regional courts 
system. The unit has achieved significant results; as of November, its 
group of 30 anonymous prosecutors had handled 918 cases involving 
massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, and terrorism during the 
year. These prosecutors have issued arrest warrants against members of 
the security forces and of paramilitary, guerrilla, and drug 
trafficking organizations. The unit arrested 192 suspects during the 
year.
    During the year, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's 
office investigated, indicted, or prosecuted 286 security force 
members, including at least 11 officers, on a variety of charges 
including homicide, torture, kidnaping, and sponsorship of paramilitary 
groups. The Attorney General's office and the security forces 
demonstrated a greater willingness to follow up with instructions that 
those ordered arrested be removed from their duties, denied the right 
to wear a uniform, or turned over to civilian judicial authorities. 
However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
    The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due 
process. Judges determine the outcome of all trials; there are no jury 
trials. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has 
the right to representation by counsel, although representation for the 
indigenous and the indigent historically has been inadequate. In mid-
1999, the CSJ's administrative chamber reported that the civilian 
judiciary suffered from a backlog of approximately 3,069,000 cases 
(including approximately 604,000 penal cases) and that there were 
approximately 338,000 outstanding arrest warrants. Approximately 
223,000 writs for protection of fundamental rights (``tutelas'') were 
before the Constitutional Court for its legally mandated review.
    Defendants in trials conducted by the regular courts have the right 
to be present and the right to timely consultation with an attorney. 
Regular court defendants and their attorneys have the right to 
question, contradict, and confront witnesses against them, to present 
witnesses on their own behalf, and to have access to government 
evidence relevant to the case. The country's judiciaries, including 
regular civilian, specialized jurisdiction, and military, continue to 
be overwhelmingly Napoleonic in character; everything is processed in 
writing. Public trials are still rare, and there are no juries; 
however, cross-examination of witnesses does occur. Defendants also 
have the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court.
    In addition to providing public defense attorneys in criminal 
cases, the Human Rights Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional 
offices throughout the country provide a legal channel for thousands of 
complaints and allegations of human rights violations. However, in 
practice, the Ombudsman's operations are underfunded and understaffed, 
slowing its development of a credible public defender system.
    Within the FARC-controlled despeje zone, local FARC leaders 
effectively supplanted judicial authorities and declared the 
establishment of an alternative, FARC-run ``justice system.'' Residents 
of the zone regularly were denied the right to a fair trial. In the 
face of FARC intimidation, all elements of the civilian judiciary fled 
the zone. In 1999 Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez publicly said 
that they would return only ``when accompanied by the security 
forces.'' In September the FARC gave haven to a FARC guerrilla who had 
hijacked an airplane and refused to release him to government 
authorities. Continuing concern about arbitrary FARC justice in the 
zone led the authorities to stress that governmental justice must be 
present.
    The Government states that it does not hold political prisoners. 
The ICRC reported that it monitored approximately 3,900 cases of 
imprisoned citizens accused of terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and 
abetting the insurgency, which are crimes punishable under law.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides for the protection of these rights; 
however, at times the authorities infringed upon them. The law 
generally requires a judicial order signed by a prosecutor for the 
authorities to enter a private home, except in cases of hot pursuit. 
The Ministry of Defense continued training public security forces in 
legal search procedures that comply with constitutional and human 
rights. Due to intimidation, corruption, or the absence of evidentiary 
proof collected directly by prosecutors, guerrilla suspects captured by 
the security forces in or out of combat and turned over to the judicial 
authorities routinely were set free.
    A judicial order or the approval of a prosecuting attorney is 
required to authorize the interception of mail or the monitoring of 
either landline or cellular telephones. This protection extends to 
prisoners held in jails. However, various state authorities sometimes 
monitored telephones without obtaining prior authorization. There were 
unconfirmed reports by some human rights groups that members of the 
security forces subjected them to surveillance, harassment, or threats.
    A preliminary investigation begun by the Prosecutor General's 
anticorruption unit in December 1999 determined that elements of the 
Administrative Department of Security had engaged in illegal 
wiretapping in Bogota over the course of several years. As of April, 
eight DAS officers were in custody, and another officer was sought. 
Having found sufficient evidence, on June 20, the Prosecutor General 
opened a formal investigation. This was the first instance in which the 
Prosecutor General pressed charges against a state entity for 
interference with privacy. The investigation continued at year's end.
    Guerrillas also used wiretaps and accessed bank accounts of 
citizens at roadblocks in order to select kidnap victims.
    There are some child soldiers among the paramilitary groups, who 
were recruited forcibly (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
    Guerrillas regularly forcibly recruited children and indigenous 
people to serve as soldiers (see Sections 1.g and 5).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The internal armed conflict and narcotics 
trafficking are the central causes of violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. Government security forces at times 
violated international humanitarian law and continued to commit serious 
human rights abuses, although the great majority of serious abuses were 
committed by paramilitary groups and guerrillas.
    In October the ICRC suspended evacuations of wounded combatants 
after the murder of a wounded guerrilla by paramilitary forces near 
Apartado, Uraba region, Antioquia department, and of a wounded member 
of a paramilitary group by guerrillas in Putumayo. In both cases the 
victims forcibly were taken from ICRC vehicles. The ICRC resumed 
medical evacuations of combatants in December.
    On February 24, the Government announced the creation of an 
interagency intelligence committee, chaired by the Minister of Defense 
and including members of the police, the Prosecutor General's office, 
the Attorney General's office, and the DAS, to improve the State's 
ability to track down and engage or capture members of paramilitary 
groups. However, at year's end there was little tangible evidence that 
the committee was functioning.
    The ICRC reported that the Government, including military 
authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC and readily 
incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian law in 
standard military training. However, impunity remains a problem. 
According to military sources, local commanders typically preferred to 
transfer or discharge soldiers accused of serious human rights 
violations, rather than initiate legal proceedings. On May 30, Congress 
passed legislation that codified forced displacement as a crime and 
provided for sentences of between 15 and 40 years' imprisonment; the 
legislation also codified genocide and forced disappearance as crimes 
(see Section 1.b). Departing from the historical, internationally 
accepted definition of genocide, and in response to the killings of 
thousands of members of the Patriotic Union leftist coalition (see 
Section 1.a.), the law codified ``political genocide'' as a crime. 
However, it stipulated that political genocide could be committed only 
against members of legally constituted (i.e., nonguerrilla) groups.
    On August 15, an army unit of 30 soldiers operating near Pueblo 
Rico, Antioquia, mistook a party of schoolchildren for a guerrilla unit 
and opened fire, killing 6 children between the ages of 6 and 10, and 
wounding 6 others. According to press interviews, the soldiers did not 
realize at the time that the persons that they were shooting were 
children. On September 28, a military justice panel provisionally 
disassociated 14 of the soldiers and allowed them to return to duty. 
The remaining 16 soldiers, including patrol commander Sergeant Jorge 
Enrique Mina Gonzalez, remained under investigation at year's end. On 
December 22, the Attorney General charged Sergeant Mina, and corporals 
Avilio Pena Tovar and Ancizar Lopez, stating that the three confused a 
15-year-old girl in the group with a guerrilla but that they willfully 
used indiscriminate force. The Attorney General's office exonerated the 
other 27 soldiers involved in the incident. The Prosecutor General's 
office determined that the act was unintentional harm caused in the 
course of duty and referred the case to the military justice system, 
where it remained at year's end.
    In May the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office 
recommended that the air force reopen its investigation into the 
December 1998 Santo Domingo, Arauca department, incident in which an 
air force helicopter was accused of bombing civilians in the course of 
combat with the FARC. A total of 19 civilians were killed, and 25 
others were wounded. The Prosecutor General's office based its 
recommendation on new evidence after the office subpoenaed three 
helicopter crew members and obtained an analysis of metal shards. An 
air force commander reportedly charged the FARC with planting shards at 
the scene. In December the air force revisited the zone prior to making 
a decision on whether to open formally an investigation. In November 
the Attorney General's office charged air force lieutenants Johan 
Jimenez Valencia and Cesar Romero Pradilla (the pilot and copilot of 
the helicopter) and flight technician Hector Mario Hernandez Acosta 
with indiscriminate use of force.
    According to the Independent Advisory Committee for Human Rights 
and Displacements (CODHES), 317,340 displacements of civilians from 
their homes occurred during the year; government sources estimate that 
125,000 persons were displaced. (Exact numbers of displaced persons are 
difficult to obtain because some persons were displaced more than once, 
and many displaced persons do not register with the Government or other 
entities.) According to CODHES, approximately 288,000 displacements 
occurred during 1999. As many as 1 million citizens may have been 
displaced since 1996. The ICRC provided emergency assistance to 135,000 
displaced persons during the year. An alliance of human rights, 
religious, and aid organizations stated that an estimated 2 million 
persons had been displaced by political violence since 1985. CODHES 
states that some persons have been displaced for as long as 10 years, 
but it is unable to identify a typical timeframe for displacement. Some 
persons return to their homes within days or weeks, others within 
months, and some never return. Some displaced persons move several 
times after fleeing their original home, making tracking difficult. The 
Government does not consider persons to be displaced after 2 years. 
CODHES estimated that perhaps 65 percent of displacements became 
permanent. In an attempt to determine the true scope of the problem, 
the Government, in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), developed a computerized system for collecting data 
on the displaced and estimating total numbers.
    The vast majority of displaced persons are peasants who have been 
displaced to cities, which have had difficulty integrating large 
numbers of persons into their infrastructure. According to CODHES, in 
1999 approximately 53 percent of displaced persons were women and 
girls, 32 percent of displaced households were headed by women, and 70 
percent of the displaced population were children. The Human Rights 
Ombudsman's office reported that only 15 percent of displaced children 
have access to schools. Many displaced persons settle on the outskirts 
of Bogota, Medellin, and Cartagena, where conditions are overcrowded 
and unsanitary, and smaller municipalities have been overwhelmed by the 
need for services. Malnutrition among displaced children is a problem. 
Many displaced persons lost access to health care, employment, and 
education (see Section 5). CODHES estimates that only 34 percent of 
displaced households have access to health services. According to the 
UNHCR, approximately one-third of displaced persons are indigenous 
people or blacks; these groups represent only 11 percent of the 
population. In 1999 the office of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
received reports of threats and attacks against displaced communities 
and their leaders; threats against individuals and groups working with 
the displaced increased in 1999, especially in the regions of Magdalena 
Medio and Uraba.
    Both paramilitary groups and guerrillas used forced displacements 
to gain control over disputed territories and to weaken their 
opponents' base of support. In some cases, entire towns were abandoned 
after paramilitary or guerrilla attacks. The authorities sometimes 
encouraged civilian populations to move back to their homes before 
security situations had normalized.
    The Government's response to the needs of the displaced population 
continued to be inadequate. The Government has no systematic program or 
budget to make adequate provisions for humanitarian assistance to the 
displaced, although it is required by law and court decisions to do so. 
Conditions at the Government's two camps for displaced persons in 
Uraba, at Pavarando and Turbo, were poor and unhygienic; health care 
remained poor, and there were few educational or employment 
opportunities. However, conditions at a temporary government shelter 
for displaced persons at the stadium at Cucuta, Norte de Santander 
department, were much better. The Government provides assistance 
through the Solidarity Network, the ICBF, the Health Ministry, and 
other state entities. The Solidarity Network was neither designed nor 
prepared for emergency humanitarian assistance work, and it usually 
provided such assistance only to refugees returning to the country. In 
March 1999, the Government estimated that the ICRC provided 70 percent 
of humanitarian assistance received by displaced persons. Private 
estimates were higher. Most displaced citizens receiving ICRC emergency 
humanitarian assistance received it for only 90 days. The Government 
also tries to limit assistance to 90 days; however, some displaced 
persons in the camps at Turbo and Pavarando, and in a stadium in 
Cucuta, received aid for a longer period. During the year, ICRC 
provided emergency assistance to 130,000 internally displaced persons.
    Hundreds of displaced persons also fled to Panama, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, where they often were denied refugee status, treated as 
illegal immigrants, and denied protection or assistance, and often were 
returned to Colombia. The UNHCR has an office in Bogota to address the 
problem and opened field offices in Barrancabermeja in 1999 and in San 
Jose de Apartado, Uraba and in Puerto Asis, Putumayo during the year.
    On January 4, a group of internally displaced persons violently 
took over the ICRC's Bogota offices; they injured 3 local ICRC 
employees and detained 37 ICRC workers for 13 hours, then allowed most 
staff to leave the building. On February 22, such a group again 
forcibly detained members of the ICRC staff, a representative from the 
Attorney General's office, and two journalists for 9 hours. Also on 
that day, members of the same group tried to occupy the Bogota 
headquarters of the Social Solidarity Network; the police arrested 
them. In April the ICRC abandoned offices in Bogota that had been 
occupied by approximately 60 internally displaced persons since 
December 1999. Despite a December Constitutional Court ruling that the 
Government should assist the group, at year's end, the group still 
occupied the old ICRC premises.
    According to the Vice President's office, there are more than 
70,000 antipersonnel landmines in the country, located throughout 135 
municipalities in 23 departments. Some 20,000 mines are maintained by 
the military to defend static positions. According to the International 
Campaign Against Mines, 63 persons were killed by mines in 1999. The 
Ministry of Defense reported that 10 military personnel were killed or 
wounded by antipersonnel mines during the first 7 months of the year. 
There is no generalized mine clearance program. However, in January the 
army deactivated 20 guerrilla landmines in southern Bolivar. Four 
civilians had been injured recently by landmines in the area. In August 
the military cleared two mine fields in Cundinamarca department. From 
1998 to mid-2000, the Ministry of Defense reported that the military 
had cleared 120 FARC minefields and 39 ELN minefields.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported continued violence 
against women, especially in war zones. It noted that most female 
victims in zones of conflict chose not to report the abuses they had 
suffered, in part due to a lack of confidence in the efficacy of 
governmental institutions to address their problems. The Ombudsman 
noted that female leaders of political and peasant organizations in the 
Uraba-Antioquia region were increasingly the targets of persecution, 
threats, torture, and executions. According to the Ombudsman's 1999-
2000 report, intrafamilial violence, sexual assault, and murder of 
women remained serious problems throughout the country (see Section 5). 
More than 30 percent of FARC members are female.
    Contrary to previous years, there were no reports during the year 
that the Government militarized public hospitals in conflict areas, 
which increased the risk that the hospitals would become targets of 
guerrilla attack. In March the Constitutional Court ruled that state 
security forces could not maintain installations (such as police 
stations) next to schools, so as to not endanger the lives of students 
in case of guerrilla attack. The Ministry of Defense later announced a 
proposal to relocate police stations outside of city centers; however, 
this had not been implemented by year's end. In contrast to the 
previous year, there were no reports that the State refused medical 
treatment to guerrillas.
    The many paramilitary groups are diverse in their motivations, 
structure, leadership, and ideology. The 1997 establishment of the 
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia as a national umbrella 
organization was designed both to provide a national structure and to 
develop a more coherent political culture for the country's local and 
regional paramilitary groups. The AUC paramilitary umbrella group 
comprises an estimated 8,000 combatants, who are members of 7 major 
organizations. The largest of these organizations is the ACCU, which is 
based in Cordoba department and the Uraba region of Antioquia 
department. The AUC also has as many as 4,000 of its own combatants. 
Carlos Castano heads both the AUC and the ACCU. Although illegal, some 
paramilitary groups reflected rural citizens' legitimate desire to 
defend themselves from the guerrilla threat. Other groups were actually 
the paid, private armies of drug traffickers or large landowners. Many 
members of paramilitary groups are former security force members or 
former guerrillas. Some local army and police commanders tacitly 
tolerated--and sometimes aided and abetted--the activities of 
paramilitary groups, despite the public pronouncements of the 
Government and the public security forces high command that they 
intended to combat paramilitary violence. Elements of political and 
economic elites in these areas also supported paramilitary groups. The 
President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and various NGO's 
noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups during the 
year. AUC leader Carlos Castano admitted publicly that his group 
receives funding from both legitimate businesses and from narcotics 
trafficking, and that the group is financed by ``dominant businesses'' 
in the regions in which it operates.
    Paramilitary groups used selective killings and systemic massacres 
to force displacements and punish civilians for perceived ties to the 
guerrillas (see Section 1.a.). Paramilitary groups also launched 
several offensive campaigns characterized by a series of massacres 
linked by time or location.
    The Fifth Brigade reported that in March troops of its 13th and 
56th Battalions captured 25 suspected AUC members at San Rafael de 
Lebrija, Santander department. During the operation, the troops 
captured a significant amount of war material. Also in March, elements 
of the army's 46th Battalion, based at Tibu, Norte de Santander 
department, captured another three suspected members of paramilitary 
groups and killed one. One soldier was killed in the action. In 
February the National Police and the DAS captured north coast 
paramilitary chief Adan Rojas Ospino in Barranquilla, Atlantico 
department. Rojas, a key aid to AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano, 
was sought in connection with a series of massacres dating back to the 
1980's, as well as to the 1994 killing of a congressman. On February 
24, the DAS also announced the capture of Arnoldo Segundo Meza de la 
Rosa, the alleged chief of intelligence and finance operations for the 
paramilitary fronts operating in Sucre and Bolivar departments. 
Additionally, the DAS announced the capture in Monteria, Cordoba 
department, of an ACCU paramilitary leader.
    Paramilitary groups on occasion used landmines and sometimes forced 
underage combatants into their ranks. Paramilitary forces failed to 
respect the injured and medical personnel. For example, in November 
members of a paramilitary group reportedly killed a patient on an 
ambulance driving from Tibu to Cucuta, Norte de Santander department, 
and declared the Tibu hospital a ``military objective,'' causing 
several support staff to flee. In late October, presumed members of a 
paramilitary group kidnaped the same hospital's director, who later was 
found dead. In late September, paramilitary forces in the Uraba region 
dragged a wounded FARC member from a Red Cross ambulance and shot and 
killed her. In early October, the FARC stopped a Red Cross ambulance 
carrying a wounded paramilitary member and killed him. In response, on 
October 4, the ICRC suspended all assistance to wounded combatants. The 
ICRC resumed evacuation of wounded combatants in late December.
    Guerrilla organizations continued to pursue strategies that 
routinely led them to commit abuses against citizens. Their tactics 
consistently included killings, kidnaping, torture, targeting of 
civilian populations and installations, including medical facilities, 
and the forced recruitment of children as young as 10 years old. In 
response to President Pastrana's August 1999 call to all armed groups 
to obey international humanitarian law (the rules of war), the FARC 
responded that it would not abide by, and was not bound by, 
international humanitarian law.
    Two main guerrilla armies, the FARC and the ELN, as well as the 
much smaller EPL and other groups, commanded an estimated total of 
between 11,000 and 17,000 full-time guerrillas operating in more than 
100 semiautonomous groups throughout the country. These groups 
undertook armed actions in nearly 1,000 of the 1,085 municipalities. 
Both the FARC and the ELN systematically attacked noncombatants and 
violated citizens' rights through the use of tactics such as killings, 
forced disappearances, the mutilation of bodies, attacks on churches, 
attacks on hospitals, attacks on ambulances, and executions of patients 
in hospitals. Guerrilla groups also were responsible for multiple 
abuses of religious and medical personnel with protected status and of 
the wounded. Indiscriminate attacks on police stations resulted in high 
numbers of civilian casualties. Guerrillas also killed religious 
leaders (see Section 2.c.) and indigenous people (see Section 5).
    Guerrillas used landmines both to defend static positions (such as 
base camps, cocaine laboratories, and sites at which kidnap victims 
were held) and as indiscriminate weapons of terror. According to the 
Vice President's office, the FARC and ELN have laid indiscriminately 
50,000 mines in rural areas. Landmines planted by guerrillas or 
disguised as everyday items such as soccer balls or paint cans often 
resulted in the killing or maiming of civilian noncombatants; thousands 
of displaced persons were unable to return to their homes due to the 
presence of antipersonnel mines. According to press reports, guerrilla 
bases in the despeje zone are surrounded by landmines. The FARC used 
sulfuric acid in the gas canisters that it employed as artillery, and 
continued its practice of using these canisters to attack small towns. 
Scores of soldiers, police, and civilians were burned indiscriminately 
as a result. For example, on August 19, two girls aged 13 and 14 years 
old, were killed when FARC guerrillas threw an explosive device into a 
hardware store in El Carmen de Bolivar, Bolivar department. In mid-
December, a 9-year-old girl died buried in rubble when a gas canister 
destroyed her home in San Alfonso, Huila department, during a FARC 
attack. A 15-year-old female guerrilla also was killed in combat during 
the same attack.
    Although the ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the 
terms of the June 1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, both it and 
the larger FARC regularly forced children into their ranks (see Section 
5). Once recruited, child guerrillas are virtual prisoners of their 
commanders and subject to various forms of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls 
is a particular problem, and former child guerrillas have testified to 
this in the press. According to one press report, the Roman Catholic 
Church documented one case of a 13-year-old girl who was recruited by 
the guerrillas and used for sex before a nun persuaded them to release 
her. Child soldiers, including girls, were seen in guerrilla ranks in 
the despeje, and reports from various sources indicate that the 
guerrillas recruited at least 120 minors in the despeje. In addition, 
many families reportedly left the despeje (or have been displaced from 
other regions) to escape forcible recruitment of their children. 
According to press reports, in April FARC military commander Jorge 
Briceno Suarez (``Mono Jojoy'') admitted that the FARC often had 
committed serious abuses against civilians and that the FARC made 
regular use of child combatants.
    Guerrilla-paramilitary violence left a string of civilian 
casualties in the wake of ongoing targeted or massive killings by both 
sides. For example, in Barrancabermeja paramilitary and guerrilla 
elements killed 160 persons during the first 6 months of the year, the 
highest total in 5 years for this area. On December 11, the army's 
Human Rights Office posted on placards in Bogota's central square the 
names of 3,289 civilians, of whom 11,596 persons were killed by 
paramilitary groups, and 693 persons by guerrillas. The names of more 
than 200 children were listed.
    The FARC staged many attacks against municipalities outside of the 
despeje, possibly in a de facto effort to expand the demilitarized 
zone. According to the Ministry of Defense, between January and 
October, 74 guerrilla attacks on towns left 3,515 civilians dead. On 
July 12, the FARC attacked four towns in Huila and Tolima departments, 
destroying police stations, churches, schools, businesses, and homes. 
Four FARC groups attacked Alpujarra in southern Tolima department, and 
Colombia, Timana, and Vegalarga in Huila department. The attacks left 4 
civilians dead and more than 15 persons wounded. The FARC attacked 
Vegalarga again 8 days later. As a result, more than 2,000 persons from 
Vegalarga, Colombia, Algeciras, and other towns fled to Neiva, capital 
of Huila department. On July 14, the FARC entered the town of 
Roncesvalles, Tolima department, and killed 13 policemen. According to 
press reports, the FARC attacked the mayor's office, various commercial 
buildings, a dozen homes, and the police station. After the police ran 
out of ammunition defending the station, they were killed upon 
surrendering.
    Ending its unilaterally declared Christmas truce, on January 12, 
the FARC attacked four towns in Narino department. The attackers 
destroyed police stations, town halls, and a water plant. The FARC 
killed three policemen and one civilian and kidnaped three other 
civilians. During the course of the attacks, FARC members also stole an 
ambulance and bombed the Trans-Andean oil pipeline near Ipiales, 
causing an oil spill. On January 15, approximately 500 guerrillas 
attacked four different points along the Bogota-Villavicencio highway. 
In confrontations among the army, the National Police, and the FARC, at 
least five civilians and five security force members were killed. The 
army reported that it killed 44 FARC combatants in action. Also on 
January 15, four National Police stations in southern Bogota were 
destroyed; one 11-year-old girl was killed by a grenade, and seven 
other civilians were reported wounded. The National Police suspected 
that the FARC was responsible for the attacks. According to press 
reports, in January the ELN kidnaped 15 persons southwest of Cartagena 
and then reportedly used 8 of its victims as human shields in 
confrontations with the police and the marines. One 19-year-old woman 
was killed in the crossfire.
    During a January attack on the town of El Castillo, Meta 
department, indiscriminate FARC use of homemade artillery resulted in 
the destruction of the town church, hospital, school, town hall, and at 
least 20 homes. Eight FARC guerrillas, all estimated to be between the 
ages of 13 and 15, were killed during the attack. Nine civilians were 
killed, and four civilians were wounded.
    On February 4, a car bomb in Puerto Asis, Putumayo department, 
killed 2 persons and wounded 10 other persons. On March 3, the FARC 
detonated a car bomb in the town square at Cachipay, Cundinamarca 
department; 3 civilians were killed and 19 were wounded. On March 30, 
the FARC detonated another bomb in front of the mayor's office in 
Cachipay, which killed 3 persons and wounded 20 others. On March 26, 
the FARC detonated another car bomb in the town square at Girardot, 
Cundinamarca department, killing 1 policeman and wounding 10 civilians. 
Many believed that the Girardot bombing was a FARC admonishment to 
local merchants who were late in making extortion payments. Other FARC 
car bombings in Cundinamarca department at Soacha (a southern 
neighborhood of Bogota) on February 24 and at Anapoima on January 16 
caused property damage but did not result in any deaths.
    During a March FARC artillery attack on the Medellin base of the 
army's Fourth Brigade, 2 civilians were killed and 18 injured when the 
FARC's gas cylinder-bombs exploded prematurely in a civilian 
neighborhood. A total of 45 homes and 2 civilian buildings were 
destroyed.
    On July 29, approximately 400 members of the FARC guerrilla group 
attacked the town of Arboleda, Caldas department, killing 12 policemen 
and 4 civilians. The attack lasted for 2 days. Guerrillas detonated 
explosives in front of town buildings, including the police station and 
a church. Most of the village was damaged or destroyed.
    On August 2, the FARC 14th front killed five hostages with shots to 
the head and left a sixth person for dead. The survivor, a farmer named 
Fernando Jimenez Hurtado, had been kidnaped in June in Caqueta 
department, south of the FARC demilitarized zone, and had been chained 
for 2 months to another hostage. He was forced to drag the victim's 
body almost 1 kilometer to the nearest police station. Jimenez Hurtado 
reported being held with 50 other kidnaped persons under poor 
conditions.
    Antioquia police reported that, on November 18, the FARC killed 6 
farmers who were former EPL guerrillas, burned 20 houses, and displaced 
30 persons in a rural area of Frontino, west of Medellin. Unconfirmed 
reports indicated that another five persons may have disappeared.
    From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road 
traffic in the southern department of Putumayo, following an offensive 
by paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormuga. The guerrillas' ban 
on road traffic, which was criticized by NGO's and local officials, led 
to severe shortages in food and medicine despite government efforts to 
fly in supplies and to secure key roads. The FARC also reportedly 
restricted the movement of ambulances.
    According to the Federation of Colombian Municipalities, 
paramilitary and guerrilla attacks damaged or destroyed the 
installations of 64 municipal governments during the year, and 
paramilitary groups and guerrillas kidnaped 20 mayors and 18 mayoral 
candidates (see Sections 1.b. and 3).
    The FARC committed numerous abuses against civilians in the despeje 
zone. The FARC was responsible for killings, alleged cases of forced 
disappearance, rape, arbitrary detention, infringement of the rights to 
free speech, freedom of religion (see Section 2.c.), and fair trial 
(see Section 1.e.), forced political indoctrination, and the forced 
recruitment of hundreds of children. According to press reports, the 
FARC has stated publicly that all persons between the ages of 13 and 60 
in the despeje zone are liable for military service with the 
guerrillas; families fleeing the zone reported that they were asked to 
surrender children to the FARC as of their 14th birthday.
    Guerrillas, usually the ELN, destroyed 434 electrical pylons in the 
period from January 1999 to September 2000, causing massive damage to 
the country's power industry and increases in electricity rates for 
consumers. Guerrilla attacks on oil pipelines caused considerable 
environmental damage.
    According to press reports in September, the ELN had held an 
internal trial of participants in the 1998 Machuca fireball incident in 
which over 80 persons were killed and 17 were injured as a result of an 
ELN pipeline bombing. According to the reports, the ELN claimed to have 
expelled guerrillas from its ranks for involvement in the crime.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press; and the Government generally respected this right 
in practice; however, journalists regularly practiced selfcensorship to 
avoid retaliation and harassment by various groups. The privately owned 
print media published a wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often 
voiced harsh antigovernment opinions without fear of reprisals. A ban 
on the publication of evidence pertaining to criminal investigations, 
based on the secrecy provisions of the Penal Code and an anticorruption 
statute, remained in effect. Journalists typically work in an 
atmosphere of threats and intimidation, primarily from paramilitary 
groups and guerrillas, which appeared to worsen during the year. 
Fearing for their safety, journalists often refrain from publishing or 
broadcasting stories counter to the interest of paramilitary groups, 
guerrillas, or narcotics traffickers.
    In October 1999, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression stated that the ``press freedom 
situation in Colombia is a serious source of concern'' and that, in 
addition to the killings of journalists, ``Colombian journalists endure 
constant threats and intimidation.''
    The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported 
in November that it had 32 open cases involving murders, kidnapings, 
and threats against journalists. Twelve journalists were killed during 
the year, although not all of the killings could be attributed directly 
to the journalists' work.
    On September 9, members of a paramilitary group murdered Carlos 
Jose Restrepo Rocha, the publisher of TanGente newspaper in Tolima, a 
municipal council candidate, and a former member of the now-inactive M-
19 terrorist group. Ten men who identified themselves as members of a 
paramilitary group seized Restrepo during a community meeting in San 
Luis de Ibague, Tolima department, and Restrepo was found dead hours 
later, with paramilitary pamphlets placed on his body.
    On November 15, unidentified assailants shot and killed local radio 
reporter Gustavo Rafael Ruiz Cantillo in the Pivijay municipality 
marketplace, Magdalena department. Many observers believe that he was 
killed by paramilitary forces, who reportedly have a strong presence in 
Pivijay; however, the FARC also are known to operate in the region. An 
investigation continued at year's end.
    On November 30, unidentified assailants killed reporter Guillermo 
Leon Agudelo in his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. On December 
13, two persons on a motorcycle shot and killed Alfredo Abad Lopez, 
director of the Voice of the Jungle radio station, a Caracol affiliate, 
as he left his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. The authorities 
formed a special investigative unit to establish whether the two 
murders are connected, and the Florencia mayor's office offered a 
$10,000 reward for information leading to arrests in these cases.
    In May 1999, the Prosecutor General's office created a new 
subdivision to handle investigations of crimes that targeted 
journalists. On May 3, investigations also produced arrest warrants 
against AUC leader Carlos Castano and three other persons who allegedly 
killed journalists Alberto Sanchez and Luis Alberto Rincon.
    In July the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit indicted Rodolfo 
Nelson Rosado Hernandez (alias ``El Pichi'') and Jorge Eliecer Espinal 
Velasquez (``El Parce'') in the September 1999 murder of newspaper 
editor Guzman Quintero Torres in Valledupar, Cesar department. The two 
have been in police custody since September 1999 and are thought to be 
members of a group of killers working for area paramilitary forces. 
Quintero's editorials had criticized state forces in the area, and he 
reportedly had been threatened before his death.
    There was also progress in the investigation of murdered journalist 
Jaime Garzon (see Section 1.a.).
    Guerrillas, primarily the ELN, were responsible for the kidnaping 
of 15 journalists during the year. Guerrillas abducted many of them to 
bear witness to crimes committed by paramilitary forces or to deliver 
messages to local authorities. Eleven journalists reported death 
threats during the year.
    In January the FARC kidnaped journalist Guillermo ``la Chiva'' 
Cortes; in August security forces rescued him, along with six other 
hostages.
    On May 25, Jineth Bedoya Lima, a reporter for the El Espectador 
newspaper, was kidnaped and raped over a period of 10 hours while on 
her way to interview a convicted paramilitary leader at the Modelo 
prison in Bogota. Two days prior to her kidnaping, El Espectador 
received threatening letters against her and other journalists. Carlos 
Castano, leader of the AUC paramilitary organization, denied that the 
AUC was involved in the kidnaping.
    On December 16, the ELN reportedly kidnaped Caracol television 
journalist Winston Viracacha in Tumaco, Narino department. Viracacha 
had traveled with his cameraman and an assistant to meet members of the 
ELN's ``Comuneros del Sur'' front, who retained Viracacha but released 
his companions.
    Thirteen journalists left the country during the year. In March 
Francisco ``Pancho'' Santos, editor of the family-run El Tiempo, the 
country's largest newspaper, and founder of the Pais Libre 
antikidnaping organization and the national ``No More'' antiviolence 
civic campaign, fled the country after announcing that he was the 
target of a FARC guerrilla group plot to kill him. Santos remained in 
exile at year's end. Also in March, television personality Fernando 
Gonzalez Pacheco fled the country after receiving threats from the 
FARC. In June Ignacio Gomez Gomez, a journalist for El Espectador, fled 
the country after receiving threats against his life.
    The InterAmerican Press Society opened a rapid action unit office 
in Bogota to help the Prosecutor General's office investigate crimes 
against journalists. On August 18, President Pastrana issued a decree 
establishing a program for the protection of journalists. In October 
the Minister of Interior announced the inauguration of the program, 
which is to provide armor for cars, escorts, and transportation. The 
Government consulted with journalism organizations to identify 
journalists at special risk but has not had the resources to provide 
protection. The Ministry of the Interior supported an alerts network 
organized for journalists by providing a small number of radios and an 
emergency telephone hot line.
    On December 20, a specialized court judge in Neiva, Huila 
department, absolved contractor Fernando Bermudez Ardila and two other 
defendants accused of the April 1998 murder of journalist Nelson 
Carvajal Carvajal; the judge cited weak evidence in the case. Bermudez 
had been accused of hiring the two other men to kill Carvajal, because 
Carvajal would not agree to stop negative reporting about a development 
project built by Bermudez's firm. Prosecutors appealed the decision, 
and the Supreme Court is expected to rule on the case.
    Media ownership remains highly concentrated. Wealthy families or 
groups associated with one of the two dominant political parties have 
consolidated their holdings of news media, and regional firms continued 
to purchase local news media outlets. As a result of the general 
economic downturn, large press conglomerates closed radio stations and 
newspaper offices in certain provinces and reduced staff. Although the 
press remained generally free, economic problems and the concentration 
of media ownership limited the media's resources, causing the media to 
rely heavily on a smaller pool of advertisers, including the 
Government, which the media often chose not to criticize.
    The National Television Commission continued to oversee television 
programming throughout the year.
    The FARC restricted the movement of journalists in the despeje 
through blockades and random identity checks and on at least three 
occasions stopped El Tiempo trucks and burned all of the newspapers 
that they carried.
    The Government generally respected academic freedom, and there was 
a wide spectrum of political activity throughout the country's 
universities. However, paramilitary groups and guerrillas maintain a 
presence on many university campuses, aimed at generating political 
support for their respective campaigns. They use both violent and 
nonviolent means towards political ends. Both paramilitary groups and 
guerrillas also regularly targeted public school teachers at the 
elementary and secondary levels for politically motivated killings.
    In August the National University was closed, and its premises were 
searched after a policeman was killed during a protest. Students held a 
referendum against violent groups operating on the university campus.
    In April schools in Chalan and Ovejas, in Sucre department, were 
suspended due to death threats against 50 teachers. More than 3,000 
students were affected. Threats also were made against teachers in 
Coloso, Morroa, Toluviejo, San Onofre, Los Palmitos, and San Antonio de 
Palmito in Sucre department. All of the major guerrilla organizations 
and the paramilitary groups maintain a presence in the region.
    On October 5, Universidad del Atlantico professors Luis Meza 
Almanza Alfredo Martin Castro Hayder were killed in Barranquilla on 
October 5 and August 26, respectively. Both were known for leftist 
views and had been under consideration for rector positions at the 
University. Castro was reportedly on a death threat list.
    Investigations continued into four 1999 attacks against prominent 
academics. Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a former government peace 
commissioner; Doctor Dario Betancur, head of the social sciences 
faculty of Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica; and Doctor Hernando Henao, 
an anthropologist who published on the subject of displaced persons, 
all were killed in 1999. In December 1999, Professor Eduardo Pizarro 
Leongomez, director of the political studies and international affairs 
institute at the National University, was shot twice by unknown 
attackers; he survived but fled the country. As a result of these 
incidents, academic leaders have chosen to assume a lower profile; many 
have taken up residence outside the country.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects 
this right in practice. The authorities normally do not interfere with 
public meetings and demonstrations and usually grant the required 
permission except when they determine that there is imminent danger to 
public order.
    There were large demonstrations on several occasions by citizens 
throughout the country; the authorities generally did not interfere.
    In February police sought to remove an U'wa road block by using 
tear gas to disperse the crowd; the U'wa claimed that four children 
were killed in the ensuing panic (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Press 
reports indicated that only one body was recovered. In April numerous 
indigenous groups blocked routes, freeways, and city streets throughout 
the country to demand respect for their life and territory and to 
support the Embera-Katio and U'wa tribes in their disputes against the 
Urra hydroelectric project and Occidental Petroleum respectively (see 
Section 5). On September 10, thousands of persons across the country, 
including business leaders, union activists, and ordinary citizens, 
marched in support of peace and respect for human rights.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Any legal organization is 
free to associate with international groups in its field. Membership in 
proscribed organizations, such as the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the 
AUC, is a crime.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
Roman Catholic religious instruction is no longer mandatory in public 
schools, and a 1994 Constitutional Court decision declared 
unconstitutional any official government reference to religious 
characterizations of the country. Although the Catholic Church was 
separated from the State by the 1991 Constitution, it retains a de 
facto privileged status. The law on the freedom of religion provides a 
mechanism for religions to obtain the status of recognized legal 
entities. Accession to the 1997 public law agreement between the State 
and non-Roman Catholic religious entities currently is required for any 
religion that wishes to minister to its adherents via any public 
institution. Local governments may exempt from taxes religiously 
affiliated organizations such as schools and libraries; however, in 
practice, local governments often exempt only organizations that are 
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The Government permits 
proselytizing among the indigenous population, provided that it is 
welcome and does not induce members of indigenous communities to adopt 
changes that endanger their survival on traditional lands.
    Paramilitary groups sometimes target representatives and members of 
the Roman Catholic Church and evangelical Christian churches, generally 
for political reasons.
    The FARC has placed religious restrictions on persons within the 
despeje zone. The FARC also levied ``war taxes'' on Roman Catholic and 
evangelical churches and schools in the despeje and elsewhere.
    The FARC and ELN guerrilla movements regularly target 
representatives and members of the Roman Catholic Church and 
evangelical Christian churches, generally for political reasons, and 
committed acts of murder, kidnaping, and extortion, as well as 
inhibited the right to free religious expression. For example, 
according to one evangelical movement, guerrillas regularly attacked 
rural evangelical Christians and their churches.
    According to the Christian Union Movement, the FARC murdered 46 of 
the movement's affiliated preachers between January 1999 and June 2000. 
As of June, the FARC had forced the closure of over 300 evangelical 
churches in Meta, Guajira, Tolima, Vaupes, Guainia, Guaviare, Vichada, 
Casanare, and Arauca departments. Additionally, the movement claimed 
that the FARC extorted and, in many cases, forced the closure of rural 
evangelical schools. Faced with threats by guerrillas or paramilitary 
forces, many evangelical preachers were forced to refrain from publicly 
addressing the country's internal conflict.
    Guerrillas were suspected of the April massacre of 2 evangelical 
preachers and 12 church members at Hato Nuevo, Carmen de Bolivar, 
Bolivar department.
    On March 27, unidentified perpetrators killed Roman Catholic priest 
Hugo Duque Hernandez at Supia, Caldas department.
    There were no new developments in the November 1999 killings of 
Roman Catholic priest Jorge Luis Maza and Spanish aid worker Inigu 
Egiluz in Choco department; security forces had arrested nine members 
of a paramilitary group in conjunction with the crime.
    The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's Office reported 
in November that it had 34 open cases of killings of members of 
evangelical groups.
    The Bishops' Conference of the Roman Catholic Church reported that 
paramilitary forces, the ELN, and the FARC sometimes threatened rural 
priests with death for speaking out against them. It also reported that 
Roman Catholic churches in Huila, Tolima, Cauca, and Antioquia 
departments were destroyed during guerrilla attacks on towns and police 
stations.
    On April 11, at least three Mormon temples in Cali were bombed. No 
one was injured in the attacks, which damaged buildings. No one claimed 
responsibility for the attacks.
    Jewish community leaders estimated that as many as 20 percent of 
the country's Jewish community had fled the country as of July 1999. 
Among the principal causes was a string of kidnapings, assaults, and 
murders affecting Jewish business leaders.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with 
the right to travel domestically and abroad, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice, with some exceptions. 
Outsiders who wish to enter Indian tribes' reserves must be invited. In 
areas where counterinsurgency operations were underway, police or 
military officials occasionally required civilians to obtain safe-
conduct passes; paramilitary forces and guerrillas often used similar 
means to restrict travel in areas under their control. At times the 
Government implemented curfews. Military counterinsurgency operations, 
forced conscription by paramilitary and guerrilla organizations, and 
guerrilla incursions often forced peasants to flee their homes and 
farms, and there was a very large population of internally displaced 
persons. According to CODHES, approximately 317,000 displacements of 
persons occurred during the year; the vast majority of displaced 
persons are peasants who have been displaced to cities (see Section 
1.g.).
    Throughout the year, frequent road blockades erected by 
paramilitary groups, the FARC, ELN, and peasant farmers inhibited 
transportation, communication, and commerce throughout the country. 
Social organizations also resorted to road blockages, some of them 
prolonged, to protest government actions or policies. Almost every 
major artery in the country was closed at some point during the year. 
From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road traffic 
in the southern state of Putumayo, following an offensive by 
paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormiga (see Section 1.g.).
    Press reports indicate that more than 300,000 citizens emigrated 
during the last 2 years, due principally to the deteriorating security 
situation and economic recession.
    The Constitution provides for the right to asylum, under terms 
established by law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has had a 
tradition of providing asylum since the 1920's. At year's end, 239 
refugees had legal asylum status, and 12 applications for asylum were 
pending.
    The Government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and internally 
displaced persons. The Government reserves the right to determine 
eligibility for asylum, based upon its own assessment of the nature of 
the applicant's suffering. The issue of the provision of first asylum 
did not arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government, and citizens exercise this right in regularly scheduled 
elections by secret ballot. In 1998 voters elected Conservative Party 
candidate Andres Pastrana President in elections that were free, fair, 
and transparent, despite some threats to the electoral process by 
paramilitary groups, narcotics traffickers, and guerrillas. The Liberal 
Party controls the legislature.
    Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with the incumbent 
barred for life from reelection. The Liberal and Conservative parties 
long have dominated the formal political process with one or the other 
winning the presidency. Public employees are not permitted to 
participate in partisan campaigns. Officially, all political parties 
operate freely without government interference. Those that fail to 
garner 50,000 votes in a general election lose the right to present 
candidates and may not receive funds from the Government. However, they 
may reincorporate at any time by presenting 50,000 signatures to the 
National Electoral Board. Voting is voluntary and universal for 
citizens age 18 and older, except for activeduty members of the police 
and armed forces, who may not vote.
    Prior to local elections in October, both paramilitary and 
guerrilla organizations sought to dissuade some potential candidates 
from running for office or restrict their ability to campaign. The 
Colombian Federation of Municipalities reported to the press that armed 
groups threatened candidates in more than half of the country's 1,085 
municipalities. By year's end, the Federation reported that 19 mayoral 
candidates were killed, 20 were kidnaped, 12 reported threats, and as 
many as 53 candidates for mayoral and municipal council posts withdrew 
their candidacies. For example, on September 23, guerrillas kidnaped 
the mayor of Samaniego, a Liberal Party candidate for that office, and 
six other mayoral candidates from this southern town in Narino. On 
September 9, members of a paramilitary group forced Carlos Restrepo, a 
leftist activist and publisher who was planning to run for a local 
office, from a community meeting; his body later was found outside San 
Luis. However, the October 29 elections were generally peaceful.
    In April the FARC announced the formation of a political party--the 
Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia--before a gathering of thousands 
of persons. FARC leader Manuel Marulanda announced that the party would 
operate secretly.
    There are no legal restrictions, and few practical ones, on the 
participation of women or minorities in the political process; however, 
both are underrepresented in official and party positions. In March a 
quota law to increase the number of women in high-level public 
positions went into effect. The quota law requires that a minimum goal 
of 30 percent of nominated positions, including seats on the high 
courts and ministerial positions, be allotted to women. The quota law 
does not apply to publicly elected positions, such as seats in 
Congress. Before the end of each year, the Government must report to 
Congress the percentage of women in high-level governmental positions. 
Voters elected 14 women to the 102-seat Senate and 19 women to the 
161seat House of Representatives in March 1998. At year's end, there 
were 4 women in the 16-member cabinet--they serve as the Ministers of 
Health, Culture, Communications, and Foreign Trade. There were no women 
among the 23 Supreme Court justices, 1 woman among 9 Constitutional 
Court magistrates, and 3 women out of 13 magistrates of the Superior 
Judicial Council.
    Indigenous people are underrepresented in government and politics. 
Two Senate seats are reserved for indigenous representatives. In 
October voters in Cauca elected Floro Tunubala, the country's first 
indigenous governor. Blacks also are underrepresented in government and 
politics. In 1996 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a 
1993 law that set aside two house seats for citizens of African 
heritage, although the ruling nonetheless allowed the incumbents to 
complete their terms in office. There is one black senator, but there 
are no black members of the Chamber of Representatives.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A large and varied nongovernmental human rights community is 
active, and provides a wide range of views. Among the many groups are: 
The Colombian Catholic Bishops Conference; the Colombian Commission of 
Jurists; the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace; the 
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights; the Center for 
Investigations and Popular Research; the Advisory Committee for Human 
Rights and Displacements; the Latin American Institute for Alternative 
Legal Services; the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners 
(dedicated to defending accused guerrillas); the Association of 
Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons; the Reinsertion 
Foundation (focused on demobilized guerrillas); the Pais Libre 
Foundation (focused on the rights of kidnap victims); and the Vida 
Foundation (focused on the rights of victims of guerrilla violence). 
Other international humanitarian and human rights organizations in the 
country that were active include the ICRC (with 16 offices across the 
country) and Peace Brigades International.
    Although the Government generally did not interfere directly with 
the work of human rights NGO's, many prominent human rights monitors 
worked under constant fear for their physical safety. There were 
unconfirmed reports that security forces harassed or threatened human 
rights groups. In August the Prosecutor General's office opened an 
investigation against retired Brigadier Generals Millan and Del Rio for 
bribing witnesses to testify falsely against a leading NGO organizer 
and a labor leader. Human rights groups were subjected to surveillance, 
harassing phone calls, graffiti campaigns, and threats by paramilitary, 
guerrilla, and other unidentified groups. At least four human rights 
activists had been killed as of October; there were three forced 
disappearances of human rights activists.
    In October Angel Quintero and Claudia Patricia Monsalve, members of 
ASFADDES (an association for relatives of the disappeared) were 
kidnaped in Medellin by persons claiming political motives. There has 
been no news of the victims since October, and no arrests have been 
made. The authorities continued their investigation at year's end.
    In August the Government launched an effort to improve its dialog 
with NGO's on human rights, the peace process, the Government's 
comprehensive strategy known as ``Plan Colombia,'' and other issues. In 
October the Government jointly hosted with an NGO umbrella group an 
international gathering on these issues which included the 
participation of the ELN.
    NGO's investigated and reported on human rights abuses committed by 
government forces, various paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas. 
Many NGO's expressed serious concern over the growing paramilitary and 
guerrilla violence and the Government's apparent inability to stop 
either group. In particular, a number of NGO's, as well as governmental 
human rights officials, were alarmed by the rapid growth of popular 
support for paramilitary groups, and their increasing political and 
military power.
    The human rights community remained under intense pressure during 
the year. Human rights monitors were subjected to a systematic campaign 
of intimidation, harassment, and violence. According to the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists, five human rights advocates were killed during 
the year; three human rights workers disappeared. A total of 49 human 
rights workers have been killed or have disappeared in the past 5 
years. On numerous occasions during the year, paramilitary groups in 
several municipalities circulated lists of the names of persons they 
considered ``military targets,'' which included the names of local 
human rights activists, labor organizers, and politicians.
    In addition, approximately 35 human rights workers left the 
country, either temporarily or permanently, for their own safety. For 
example, in July human rights activists Ivan Cepeda and his wife 
Claudia Giron left the country after receiving threats against their 
lives.
    The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and the DAS, 
allocated approximately $4.3 million (8 billion pesos) to its 2-year-
old program to protect human rights advocates and labor activists 
associated with 88 different human rights NGO's and unions. The funds 
were designated for security measures for individuals as well as for 
the headquarters of the NGO's, an emergency radio network, and funding 
for travel abroad for individuals who faced a particular threat; 
however, human rights groups stated that the protection programs are 
inadequate to address the crisis, and called for increased efforts to 
combat impunity.
    The new forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of 
60 years for cases involving human rights activists (see Section 1.b.).
    Armed groups targeted regional ombudsmen. Fourteen regional 
ombudsmen have been killed since 1998. In July Jose Manuel Bello, the 
municipal human rights ombudsman in Vigia del Fuerte, Atrato, Antioquia 
department, reportedly was kidnaped, killed, and dragged into the 
Atrato River by members of the FARC guerrilla group. In July 
unidentified, armed men killed Yemil Fernando Hurtado Castano, the 
human rights ombudsman in Narino municipality, southeastern Antioquia 
department. The regional ombudsman of Lourdes municipality, Norte de 
Santander department, was kidnaped and held for 3 days by paramilitary 
forces. Garcia and two other municipal human rights officials were 
forced to leave Norte de Santander department due to continued 
paramilitary threats.
    The criminal organization La Terraza publicly admitted to killing 
at least five human rights advocates and stated that the killings had 
been ordered by Carlos Castano (see Section 1.a.).
    There was no reported progress in the investigation of the 
September 1999 killing of the Human Rights Ombudsman's representative 
for San Juan Nepomuceno, Carlos Arturo Pareja, and his assistant.
    A preliminary investigation by the Prosecutor's national human 
rights unit indicated common criminals were responsible for the January 
1999 killings of Everardo de Jesus Puerta and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez, 
both members of the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners 
(CSPP). The case was referred to the Medellin prosecutor's office for 
further investigation.
    Prosecutors continued to investigate the November 1999 AUC killings 
of southern Bolivar department peasant leaders Edgar Quiroga and 
Gildardo Fuentes.
    On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted two members of a 
paramilitary group for the 1997 murders of two CINEP workers and one 
other person. Arrest warrants remained outstanding for Carlos Castano 
and four other members of paramilitary groups (see Section 1.a.).
    Suspected paramilitary leader Libardo Humberto Prada was linked by 
NGO's to the August 15 murder of peace activist and former mayor Luis 
Fernando Rincon Lopez in Aguachica, Cesar department. The case remained 
under investigation at year's end. In April 1999, the human rights unit 
of the Prosecutor General's office formally indicted Prada and 
paramilitary Cielo Lobo Ascano in the August 1998 killing in Valledupar 
of local Redepaz coordinator Amparo Leonor Jiminez.
    In February a lower civilian court convicted four Colombian human 
rights activists arrested by the army in 1997 for allegedly funneling 
international human rights assistance intended for displaced persons to 
the ELN guerrilla movement. The court sentenced them each to 5 years' 
imprisonment.
    The Ministry of Defense reported that in the past 5 years, 97,894 
security force members received human rights training during the year, 
including 1,994 human rights trainers. Such training is provided by the 
ICRC, the Colombian Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, elements of 
the Government and security forces, and foreign governments. Many 
observers credited these programs with having done much to foster a 
climate of increased respect for human rights and international 
humanitarian law within the military forces in recent years.
    The Government has an extensive human rights apparatus, which 
includes the office of the President's Adviser for Human Rights, headed 
by Vice President Gustavo Bell. Human rights expert Reinaldo Botero was 
named Director of the presidential program for human rights and 
international humanitarian law in September. The executive branch's 
efforts on human rights are supported by the Ministry of Interior, the 
human rights office of the Ministry of Defense, and dependent offices 
for each of the public security forces. The office of the national 
Human Rights Ombudsman, its regional representatives and corps of 
public defenders, the Attorney General's office and its delegate for 
human rights and regional representatives, and the Prosecutor General's 
office and its human rights unit are all independent institutions, not 
subject to executive branch direction.
    The House of Representatives elects the Public Ministry's National 
Ombudsman for Human Rights for a 4-year term, which does not coincide 
with that of the President. The office has the constitutional duty to 
ensure the promotion and exercise of human rights. The Ombudsman 
provides public defense attorneys and a channel for complaints of human 
rights violations (see Section 1.e.). However, the Ombudsman lacks 
sufficient funding and staff. In August the House of Representatives 
named former Constitutional Court Judge Eduardo Cifuentes Munoz as 
Human Rights Ombudsman.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman's office processed 13,951 complaints in 
1999 (the latest year for which figures were available); 8,562 cases 
(61 percent) were against government entities. Of the 7,272 cases 
concluded in 1999, the Ombudsman's office obtained favorable or 
partially favorable conclusions in 2,867, or forty percent. Another 
1,436 were referred to the competent authority. The office also 
provided 40,656 free legal consultations through its corps of more than 
1,000 public defenders, many of whom work only part-time.
    Early in the year, the Government established a high-level 
commission to coordinate policy on human rights and international 
humanitarian law, which is headed by Vice President Gustavo Bell.
    In August 1999, the Vice President enunciated the Government's 
human rights policy; however, some aspects of implementation have been 
slow to materialize. The Government's national human rights plan called 
for the respect, promotion, and assurance of human rights. It promised 
increased government attention to the consequences of human rights 
abuses and called on all armed factions to respect international 
humanitarian law. The plan asserted that security forces would combat 
both guerrilla and paramilitary forces. One of the plan's most 
important provisions permitted the armed forces commander to remove 
from service summarily any military member whose performance in 
combating paramilitary forces he deemed ``unsatisfactory or 
insufficient.'' In September President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to 
reform and strengthen the military; one decree provides for the 
separation from service of all uniformed members of the military 
regardless of their time in service, at the discretion of the top 
military commanders (see Section 1.e.).
    The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNHCR have 
offices in Bogota. In 1997 the UNHCHR opened a field office in Bogota 
to observe human rights practices and advise the Government; its 
mandate was extended through April 2002. The office is tasked with 
monitoring and analyzing the human rights situation throughout the 
country and with the provision of assistance to the Government, civil 
society, and NGO's in the field of human rights protection. It 
submitted reports to the Government and to the U.N. In March the UNHCR 
report, which covered 1999, noted that ``the continued existence of 
direct links between some members of the security forces and 
paramilitary groups, revealed by disciplinary and judicial 
investigations, is a cause of great concern.'' The report also noted 
that in 1999 ``in some regions of the country, these links were 
strengthened and the authorities responsible for penalizing them failed 
to take decisive action.'' In April UNHCHR Mary Robinson noted 
``reports indicating that members of the military forces participate 
directly in organizing new paramilitary groups and in disseminating 
threats. The President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and 
various NGO's noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups 
and a polarization of political opinion with concern.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on 
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status; however, 
in practice, many of these provisions are not enforced. The killing of 
homosexuals as part of the practice of social cleansing continued.
    Women.--Rape and other acts of violence against women are pervasive 
in society, and like other crimes, seldom are prosecuted successfully. 
According to the Ombudsman's 1999-2000 report, intrafamilial violence, 
sexual assault, and murder of women were increasing problems. The 
governmental Institute for Family Welfare and the Presidential 
Adviser's Office for Youth, Women, and Family Affairs continued to 
report high-levels of spouse and partner abuse throughout the country. 
In 1999 the Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 62,123 cases of 
domestic violence, of which 41,528 were conjugal violence, 9,896 were 
child abuse, and 10,699 were cases of abuse by other family members. 
The ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and counseling for 
victims of spousal abuse; however, the level and amount of these 
services were dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem. For example, 
ICBF's 530 family ombudsmen handle approximately 1,160 cases per year.
    The Institute estimated that 95 percent of all abuse cases are 
never reported to the authorities and reported 13,703 cases of probable 
rape during the year.
    The 1996 Law on Family Violence criminalizes violent acts committed 
within families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal 
recourse for victims of family violence, immediate protection from 
physical or psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the 
abuser from the household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to 
seek therapy or reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the 
law mandates sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or 
bail to offenders who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts. 
A 1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the Penal 
Code and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for crimes 
against sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex with a 
minor, sexual abuse, induction into prostitution, and child 
pornography. The law also repealed an old law that fully exonerated a 
rapist if he subsequently offered to marry the victim and she accepted. 
However, there was little evidence that this legislation was enforced 
systematically. The reforms to the Penal Code approved in June reduced 
the maximum sentence for violent sexual assault from 20 to 15 years; 
the minimum sentence is 8 years. The National Institute for Forensic 
Medicine reported 19,859 cases of spousal abuse during the first half 
of 1999. The overwhelming majority of victims were women. First Lady 
Nohra Pullana de Pastrana is on the board of directors of the ICBF and 
works with the ``Make Peace'' program, which provides support to women 
and children who were victims of domestic violence.
    Sexual harassment is a problem.
    Women also faced an increased threat of torture and sexual assault 
due to the internal conflict (see Section 1.g.).
    The forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of 60 
years for cases involving pregnant women (see Section 1.b.).
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution prohibits any form of discrimination against women 
and specifically requires the authorities to ensure ``adequate and 
effective participation by women at decisionmaking levels of public 
administration.'' Even prior to implementation of the 1991 
Constitution, the law had provided women with extensive civil rights. 
However, despite these constitutional provisions, discrimination 
against women persists. A study by the University of Rosario released 
during the year concluded that women faced hiring discrimination and 
that women's salaries were generally incompatible with their education 
and experience. The salary gap between men and women widened in the 
last decade, reaching a high point in 1999 as the country's economy 
declined. The study also noted that women were affected 
disproportionately by unemployment. Government unemployment statistics 
for the year indicated that the unemployment rate for men was 16.9 
percent, while the rate for women was 24.5 percent. According to the 
March report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, women earn 
28 percent less than men. The National Statistics Institute reported 
that a higher percentage of women were employed in minimum wage jobs. 
According to U.N. statistics, women's earnings for formal sector, 
nonagricultural work correspond to approximately 85 percent of men's 
earnings for comparable work, and women must demonstrate higher 
qualifications than men when applying for jobs. Moreover, women 
constitute a disproportionately high percentage of the subsistence 
labor work force, especially in rural areas. Female rural workers are 
affected most by wage discrimination and unemployment.
    Despite an explicit constitutional provision promising additional 
resources for single mothers and government efforts to provide them 
with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported that the 
social and economic problems of single mothers remained great. In 
September 1997, the Constitutional Court ruled that pregnant women and 
mothers of newborn children under 3 months of age could not be fired 
from their jobs without ``just cause.'' The court ruled that bearing 
children was not just cause.
    On October 25, the Constitutional Court struck down a law that had 
prohibited pregnant women who are divorced or separated from their 
partners from remarrying before giving birth. The law also had imposed 
a 270-day ``waiting period'' for women who wanted to remarry.
    Children.--The Constitution formally provides for free public 
education, which is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15. An 
estimated 25 percent of children in this age group do not attend 
school, due to lax enforcement of truancy laws, inadequate classroom 
space, and economic pressures to provide income for the family. The 
Government provides for the cost of primary education, but many 
families face additional expenses related to education, such as 
matriculation fees, books, school items and transportation costs (which 
are significant in rural areas where children may live far from 
school). These costs can be prohibitive, especially for the rural poor.
    Despite significant constitutional and legislative commitments for 
the protection of children's rights, these were implemented only to a 
minimal degree. The Constitution imposes the obligation on family, 
society, and the State to assist and protect children, to foster their 
development, and to assure the full exercise of these rights. The 
Children's Code sets forth many of these rights and establishes 
services and programs designed to enforce the protection of minors. 
Children's advocates reported the need to educate citizens with regard 
to the code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family violence, which 
had been drafted particularly to increase legal protection for women 
and children.
    Abuse of children is a problem. The National Institute for Forensic 
Medicine reported 9,896 cases of child abuse during the year; there 
were 9,713 reported cases in 1999. According to the March report of the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, sexual abuse is prevalent, 
particularly of children between the ages of 5 and 14 years of age. In 
70 to 80 percent of cases, children know their abusers.
    An estimated 25,000 boys and girls under age 18 work in the sex 
trade. In 1996 legislators passed a law prohibiting sex with minors or 
the employment of minors for prostitution, and they amended that law in 
1997 to provide that conviction for nonviolent sexual abuse of a child 
under age 14 carries a prison sentence of 4 to 10 years. Conviction for 
rape of anyone under the age of 12 carries a mandatory sentence of 20 
to 40 years in prison. Enforcement of such laws is lax. The ICBF 
oversees all government child protection and welfare programs and funds 
nongovernmental and church programs for children.
    Trafficking in girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Child labor is a significant problem (see Section 6.d.).
    In conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire 
between the public security forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrilla 
organizations. For example, on August 15, six children were killed and 
several others injured by members of the army's Fourth Brigade who 
mistook the children for a guerrilla unit (see Section 1.g.). Ministry 
of Defense figures indicated that approximately 200 children were 
killed due to the conflict during the year. At mid-year, UNICEF 
reported that 460 children had been killed over the past 4 years by 
various armed groups and that 789 had been kidnaped. Children suffered 
disproportionately from the internal conflict, often forfeiting 
opportunities to study as they were displaced by conflict and suffered 
psychological traumas. According to UNICEF, over 1 million children 
have been displaced from their homes over the past decade. The Human 
Rights Ombudsman's office estimated that only 15 percent of displaced 
children attend school. In July 1999, the Government announced that no 
one under the age of 18 could enter military service, even with the 
consent of a parent; previously, individuals over 16 years of age but 
below age 18 could volunteer to join the military with parental 
permission but were barred from serving in combat.
    Paramilitary groups sometimes impressed children into their ranks, 
and the use of child soldiers by guerrillas was common. According to 
press reports, in August members of the FARC killed a school rector in 
Meta department for criticizing the recruitment of his students. The 
Government estimates that approximately 6,000 children are engaged as 
combatants by both paramilitary groups and guerrillas. In May 1999, the 
FARC promised visiting Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary 
General on Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu that it would stop 
forcing children into its ranks; however, it continued the practice. 
The Roman Catholic Church reported that the FARC lured or forced 
hundreds of children from the despeje zone into its ranks. It engaged 
in similar practices in other areas under its control. For example, 
according to press reports, in June the FARC recruited at least 37 
youths, including minors, in the municipality of Puerto Rico in 
southern Meta department. According to one NGO, in Putumayo the FARC 
instigated compulsory service of males between the ages of 13 and 15 
and was recruiting in high schools. Once recruited, child guerrillas 
are virtual prisoners of their commanders and subject to various forms 
of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls is a particular problem. Although the 
ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the terms of the June 
1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, it also regularly impressed 
children into its ranks. Some 57 child guerrillas were captured or 
deserted during the year, and 27 children were killed during FARC-
military clashes.
    According to press reports, families from the demilitarized zone, 
as well as from Arauca, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia departments have 
fled their homes because guerrilla groups have tried to recruit their 
children forcibly. On May 4, a woman from Norte de Santander 
department, with the help of the Colombian military, delivered her 12-
year-old son to the ICBF to protect him from the FARC, which was trying 
to recruit him forcibly.
    Children were also among the preferred kidnaping targets of 
guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). Pais Libre reports that the number of 
children kidnaped annually has increased in recent years, from 131 in 
1998 to 206 in 1999, and as of November 12, 265 children had been 
kidnaped in 2000. According to one press report, more than 200 children 
were kidnaped during the year. For example, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-
old Clara Oliva Pantoja on March 22 and 3-year-old Andres Felipe Navas 
on April 7 and held both in the despeje zone. Clara Olivia Pantoja was 
released in December (see Section 1.b.). In April three armed men 
kidnaped 9-year-old Dagberto Ospina Ospina from his school bus in 
southern Cali. No group has been identified or claimed responsibility.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution enumerates the 
fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights of the physically 
disabled; however, serious practical impediments exist that prevent the 
full participation of disabled persons in society. There is no 
legislation that specifically mandates access for the disabled. 
According to the Constitutional Court, physically disabled individuals 
must have access to, or if they so request, receive assistance at, 
voting stations. The Court also has ruled that the social security fund 
for public employees cannot refuse to provide services for the disabled 
children of its members, regardless of the cost involved.
    Indigenous People.--There are approximately 80 distinct ethnic 
groups among the country's more than 800,000 indigenous inhabitants. 
These groups are concentrated in the Andes mountains, Pacific Coast 
lowlands, the Guajira peninsula, and Amazonas department. According to 
the National Organization of Colombia's Indigenous (ONIC), 93 percent 
of indigenous people live in rural areas; 25 percent are on 
reservations, and approximately 115,000 indigenous people are without 
land.
    The Constitution gives special recognition to the fundamental 
rights of indigenous people. The Ministry of Interior, through the 
office of indigenous affairs, is responsible for protecting the 
territorial, cultural, and self-determination rights of Indians. 
Ministry representatives are located in all regions of the country with 
indigenous populations and work with other governmental human rights 
organizations, as well as with NGO human rights groups and civil rights 
organizations, to promote Indian interests and investigate violations 
of indigenous rights. Nonetheless, members of indigenous groups suffer 
discrimination in the sense that they traditionally have been relegated 
to the margins of society. Few opportunities exist for those who might 
wish to participate more fully in modern life. The March report of the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of 
the indigenous population live in conditions of extreme poverty, that 
74 percent receive wages below the legal minimum, and that their 
municipalities have the highest rates of poverty. In addition, 
indigenous communities suffer disproportionately from the internal 
armed conflict (see Section 1.g.). Members of indigenous communities 
often flee together in mass displacements, relocating to another 
indigenous community.
    According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), 
68,245 indigenous families live on designated Indian reserves. 
Indigenous groups' rights to their ancestral lands are by law 
permanent. INCORA reports that approximately 80 percent of these lands 
have been demarcated. However, armed groups often violently contested 
indigenous land ownership. According to ONIC, roughly 95 percent of the 
country's resources are found on indigenous reservations and claimed 
territories. Traditional Indian authority boards operate some 519 
reserves; the boards handle national or local funds and are subject to 
fiscal oversight by the national Comptroller General. These boards 
administer their territories as municipal entities, with officials 
elected or otherwise chosen according to Indian tradition.
    Indigenous communities are free to educate their children in 
traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious 
customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
    INCORA estimated that some 200 indigenous communities had no legal 
title to land that they claimed as their own. INCORA reported that at 
mid-year some 488 requests by indigenous communities to establish new 
reserves remained outstanding. According to INCORA, more than 75 
million acres have been recognized legally as Indian lands. It is 
buying back much of this land, which has been settled by mestizo 
peasants, and returning it to indigenous groups.
    The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil 
jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community 
laws. However, some observers asserted that these special jurisdictions 
were subject to manipulation, and that punishments rendered by such 
community courts were often much more lenient than those imposed by 
regular civilian courts.
    Members of indigenous communities continued to be victims of all 
sides in the internal conflict, and a number of them were killed. The 
national Human Rights Ombudsman stated in its 1999-2000 annual report 
that among the indigenous communities most affected by extrajudicial 
killings, threats, and regional combat were the Corebaju in Caqueta, 
the Puinave in Guaviare, the Embera-Katio of Alto Sinu, the Embera-
dobida of Choco, the Paez in Cauca, the Emaer-katio in Antioquia, the 
Guayabero on the Guaviare-Meta border, the Tule in Choco, and the U'wa 
in Boyaca and Casanare. The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported 33 
killings in indigenous communities in 1999; 22 of these victims were 
community leaders.
    According to press reports, in June members of a paramilitary 
organization killed Joselito Bailarin, EmberaKatio governor of the 
community of Canaverales in Murri de Frontino in Antioquia department. 
On December 25, Embera leader Armando Achito reportedly was killed by 
paramilitary forces in Jurado municipality, Choco department.
    There were no new developments in the 1996 murder of Indians 
Dagoberto Santero Bacilio, Carlos Arturo Solano Bernal, and Sergio 
(Manue) in San Antonio de Palmito in Sucre department, allegedly by 
paramilitary groups.
    According to press reports, in early May, the FARC announced that 
it would execute seven Embera-Katio indigenous leaders in the town 
square at Frontino in Murri, Antioquia department, as retribution for 
the May 26 deaths of two indigenous brothers at the hands of 
paramilitary forces. The FARC believed that the indigenous leaders had 
laid a trap for the brothers by identifying them as guerrilla 
collaborators. The FARC stated that the indigenous leaders took too 
long (8 days) to report the crime. The Indigenous Organization of 
Antioquia (OIA) attributed the delay to difficulties in communicating 
from a rural zone to Medellin. The OIA called for a humanitarian 
commission to protect the leaders; however, on May 24, the FARC killed 
one of the leaders, a 30-year-old teacher named Hernando de Jesus 
Bailarin.
    Paramilitary and guerrilla groups have been known to force 
indigenous people, including children, into their ranks. Some guerrilla 
groups reportedly favored indigenous people as guides and 
communicators, due to their knowledge of the geography of their 
historical lands and knowledge of generally unfamiliar languages.
    On May 10, approximately 3,000 Kankuama tribe members from the 
Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta region in Magdalena department were 
pressured to leave their community by the AUC paramilitary 
organization. The AUC was fighting the FARC, ELN, and EPL guerrilla 
organizations in the region. On March 2, indigenous leader Jairo Bedoya 
Hoyos disappeared. The OIA held the AUC responsible. In an open letter, 
the AUC stated that it did not have Bedoya in its custody.
    U'wa protests against initial drilling by Occidental Petroleum in 
an area near but not on their reserve continued. The U'wa filed several 
court challenges to drilling, and succeeded in winning brief delays 
before appeal courts ruled in favor of the Government's arrangement 
with Occidental. U'wa repeatedly sought to block road access to the 
drilling site; in one instance in February, police sought to remove an 
U'wa road block by using tear gas to disperse the crowd; in an ensuing 
panic the U'wa claimed that four children were killed (see Sections 
1.a. and 2.b.). Press reports indicated that only one body was 
recovered. Indigenous Senator Jesus Pinacue announced a hunger strike 
to pressure Occidental Petroleum to leave U'wa land. Indigenous Senator 
Francisco Rojas Birri and Representatives Leonardo Caicedo and Jhonny 
Aparicio supported the hunger strike. A 1997 OAS joint study with a 
university recommended the immediate and unconditional suspension of 
oil exploration or exploitation activities; clarification of the status 
of U'wa territories and protected reserves; and the development of a 
formal process of consultation under the auspices of the Government. 
The U'wa also had threatened to commit collective suicide if their 
wishes were not respected. In August 1999, the Government increased the 
U'wa reserve, from 100,000 acres to 1.25 million acres. The area has 
estimated oil reserves of up to 1 billion barrels. In August a 
technical working group including the Ministries of Interior and 
Environment, as well as an advisor to the U'wa, reported that the 
Government and Occidental Petroleum are complying with all applicable 
regulations. The U'wa broke off talks in September, in response to a 
ruling by the Government's agrarian reform agency authorizing the state 
oil company to purchase lands to create a buffer zone around the 
drilling area. Talks remained suspended at the end of the year.
    Beginning in early January, 167 indigenous members of the 
EmberaKatio tribe occupied the grounds of the Ministry of the 
Environment in Bogota for 4 months to protest the flooding of their 
lands by the Urra hydroelectric project. In 1998 the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the human rights of the Embera had been violated by 
Urra because it had not consulted the Embera on the project.
    Religious Minorities.--There is little religious discrimination. 
The Roman Catholic Church and some evangelical churches reported that 
some indigenous leaders were intolerant of nontraditional forms of 
worship.
    Three Mormon temples were bombed in April, and members of the 
Jewish community were victims of abuse (see Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the Ministry of 
the Interior, citizens of African heritage live primarily in the 
Pacific departments of Choco (370,000), Valle del Cauca (1,720,257), 
Cauca (462,638), and Narino (261,180), as well as along the Caribbean 
coast. Although estimates vary widely, blacks represent approximately 
10 percent of the total population.
    Blacks are entitled to all constitutional rights and protections; 
however, they traditionally have suffered from discrimination. Blacks 
are underrepresented in the executive branch, judicial branch, and 
civil service positions, and in military hierarchies. Despite the 
passage of the African-Colombian law in 1993, little concrete progress 
was made in expanding public services and private investment in Choco 
department or other predominantly black regions. The same law also 
authorized black communities to receive collective titles to some 
Pacific coast lands. However, black leaders complained that the 
Government was slow to issue titles, and that their access to such 
lands often was inhibited by the presence of armed groups or 
individuals. Unemployment among African-Colombians ran as high as 76 
percent in some communities. The March report of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of African-Colombians 
live in conditions of extreme poverty, that 74 percent receive wages 
below the legal minimum, and that their municipalities have the highest 
rates of poverty. Choco remains the department with the lowest per 
capita level of social investment and is last in terms of education, 
health, and infrastructure. It also has been the scene of some of the 
country's most enduring political violence, as paramilitary forces and 
guerrillas struggled for control of the Uraba region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the 
rights of workers to organize unions and to strike, except for members 
of the armed forces, police, and those ``essential public services'' as 
defined by law. However, legislation that prohibits all public 
employees from striking is still in effect, although it often is 
overlooked. In practice violence towards trade unionists and antiunion 
discrimination are obstacles to joining and engaging in trade union 
activities. Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be 
targets of attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics 
traffickers, and their own union rivals. Union leaders contend that 
perpetrators of violence against workers, particularly members of 
paramilitary groups, operate with virtual impunity.
    The 1948 Labor Code (which has been amended repeatedly) provides 
for automatic recognition of unions that obtain at least 25 signatures 
from potential members and comply with a simple registration process at 
the Labor Ministry; however, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
has received reports that this process was slow and sometimes took 
years. The law penalizes interference with freedom of association. It 
allows unions to determine internal rules freely, elect officials and 
manage activities, and forbids the dissolution of trade unions by 
administrative fiat. In 1999 President Pastrana approved Law 584, which 
limits government interference in a union's right to free association. 
The law reflects recommendations made by the ILO Direct Contacts 
Mission and corresponds to international labor legislation. Previous 
requirements that were repealed under this law include the requirement 
that in order for a trade union to be registered, the labor inspector 
must certify that there is no other union. The law also amends the 
requirement that labor authorities must be present at general 
assemblies convened to vote on calling a strike (the trade unions now 
have the choice of having labor authorities present or not). However, 
the law added the requirement that when there is a request for 
information from an interested party, Ministry of Labor officials can 
require trade union leaders or members to provide relevant information 
on their work, including books, registers, plans, and other documents. 
The ILO Committee of Experts considers that this amendment is not in 
conformity with the freedom of association convention since control by 
an administrative authority should be used only for carrying out 
investigations when there are reasonable grounds that an offense has 
been committed.
    According to estimates by the Ministry of Labor and various unions, 
6 to 7 percent of the work force is organized. According to the 
Colombian Commission of Jurists, 89 percent of those organized are 
public sector workers. There are approximately 2,500 registered unions, 
87 to 95 percent of which are organized in one of three confederations: 
The center-left United Workers' Central, with which 45 to 50 percent of 
unions are affiliated; the Maoist/Social Christian Colombian Democratic 
Workers' Confederation, with which approximately 30 percent of unions 
are affiliated; and the Liberal Party-affiliated Confederation of 
Colombian Workers (CTC), with which 12 to 15 percent of unions are 
affiliated. Unions and Ministry of Labor officials report that union 
membership has declined in recent years.
    Before staging a legal strike, unions must negotiate directly with 
management and, if no agreement results, accept mediation. By law, 
public employees must accept binding arbitration if mediation fails; in 
practice, public service unions decide by membership vote whether or 
not to seek arbitration. In early August leaders of some unions called 
for a 24-hour strike by an estimated 700,000 state workers, including 
the Sindicated Union of Workers (USO) oil workers, the main public 
sector employees' union, telecommunications workers, teachers, and 
health workers, to protest government austerity workers and high 
unemployment.
    Unions, indigenous groups, debtors, students, and others continued 
to both protest and negotiate with the Government over the latter's 
inability to confront the country's economic downturn, soaring 
unemployment, and a Labor Code reform bill which may eliminate several 
popular worker benefits. On August 3, a general strike organized by 
various unions, including the United Workers' Central (CUT) and the 
General Confederation of Democratic Workers (CGTD), protested economic 
policies, privatizations, unemployment, new taxes, and social security 
reforms in Bogota and other cities throughout the country. Union 
strikers were joined by bank employees and state workers, such as 
teachers and health employees.
    Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be targets of 
attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and 
their own union rivals. Labor leaders and NGO's reported that 105 union 
members were killed during the year; U.N. officials reported 54 murders 
of labor leaders during the first 10 months of the year. According to 
the National Labor School (ENS), approximately 1,500 union members have 
been murdered since 1991, and unions face widespread societal hostility 
because they are seen by some observers as ``subversive.'' Trade union 
leaders allege that 90 percent of victims were killed by paramilitary 
groups. Other victims were targeted by the FARC for their membership 
in, or sympathy with, the National Syndicate of Agricultural Industry 
Workers (Sintrainagro), a union largely composed of demobilized EPL 
members. Many of the murdered Sintrainagro members had worked in the 
banana industry in the Uraba region. The ILO Direct Contact Mission 
preliminary report in March noted that ``cases where the instigators 
and perpetrators of the murders of trade union leaders are identified 
are practically nonexistent, as is the handing down of guilty 
verdicts.'' The ENS also reported that in the last 5 years, 47 
unionists have been the victims of forced disappearances, 60 unionists 
were kidnaped, and 1,573 unionists received death threats. The USO 
reported that at least 600 trade union leaders were displaced during 
the first 10 months of the year.
    In May 1998, the ILO expressed serious concern over allegations of 
murders, forced disappearances, death threats, and other acts of 
violence against trade union officials and members. The ILO documented 
more than 300 murders of trade union members during 1995-98. The ILO 
criticized the Government for failing, since November 1996, to provide 
it with information on a single case of detention, trial, and 
conviction of anyone responsible for the murder of union officials and 
members.
    In February an ILO Direct Contacts Mission, which had been approved 
by the ILO Governing Body and accepted by the Government in November 
1999, visited the country to examine alleged abuses of workers' rights 
to life, free association, and collective bargaining. In March the 
Direct Contacts Mission presented a preliminary report to the Governing 
Body's committee on freedom of association, which noted that the 
Government was ``making sincere efforts'' to address these problems. 
The report expressed concern over the number of killings, kidnapings, 
death threats, and other violent assaults on trade union leaders and 
unionized workers and stated that killings of trade union leaders and 
unionized workers were a ``regular'' occurrence.
    Government efforts to overcome impunity include the establishment 
of 25 special human rights investigative subunits, one of which is 
responsible for cases of human rights violations of trade unionists, 
and a 49 percent increase in the legal budget for judicial employees. 
To protect trade unionists from violence, in 1999 the Government 
developed the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and 
Trade Union Leaders. As of November, the program provided protection 
for 41 trade union premises and protection for 116 leaders and 
activists. These individuals are provided with bulletproof vests, 
bodyguards, and in some cases vehicles. Trade unionists complain that 
these measures are insufficient to protect adequately the large number 
of trade unionists who are threatened, and continue to press for more 
efforts to break the impunity with which most of these acts are 
committed.
    The ILO's recommendations included an urgent and global inquiry 
into the participation of public officials in the creation of self-
defense or paramilitary groups; an increase in government budgetary 
allocations to protect trade union officials; and an increase in 
efforts to combat impunity. After a contentious debate at the June 
International Labor Conference, the Government and worker delegations 
agreed to a compromise offered by the ILO Director General Juan 
Somovia: the establishment of an ILO office in Bogota to be headed by 
his personal representative. Rafael Alburquerque was appointed ILO 
Special Representative to Colombia and began work in October. In 
November Alburquerque reported to the ILO Governing Body that the 
situation continues to be grave; the Special Representative's next 
report is expected in March 2001.
    On May 4, Javier Suarez, the leader of a truck drivers' union, was 
shot and killed near his home in Buenaventura. Union leaders suspected 
that paramilitary groups were responsible.
    In early August, Carmen Emilio Sanchez Coronel, a trade unionist 
with the teacher's union in Norte de Santander department, was killed 
along with seven other trade unionists at a paramilitary roadblock. The 
CUT also blamed paramilitary forces for the August 2 death of Antioquia 
union worker Luis Rodrigo Restrepo. The CUT alleged that paramilitary 
groups were targeting its rank and file members as well as union 
leaders.
    On December 15, five men seriously wounded Wilson Borja, president 
of public employees' union FENALTRASE, when they fired on his car at a 
stoplight in an apparent attempt to kill him. The attackers killed a 
30-year-old female street vendor and wounded one of Borja's two 
bodyguards. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano publicly admitted 
ordering the attack and claimed that he meant to ``detain'' Borja. Most 
observers connected the attempt, which followed press reports of 
progress toward establishing an ELN ``encounter zone,'' with Borja's 
role in facilitating the ELN peace process. Police detained one 
suspected gunman and a possible paramilitary accomplice within days of 
the attack.
    Prosecutors have outstanding warrants for the arrest of 
paramilitary members Temilda Rosa Martinez and Eduardo Manrique Morales 
in the February 1999 killing of 72-year-old Julio Alfonso Poveda, a CUT 
founder.
    In December the Prosecutor General's office arraigned three hired 
killers alleged to have murdered CUT vice president Jorge Ortega in 
1998.
    There were no leads in the August 1999 bomb incidents at both the 
Sincelejo, Sucre department offices of the Association of Rural Land 
Users (which was destroyed by a bomb) and at the Medellin office of the 
USO, where a bomb was defused. According to the ENS, there have been 14 
bombing attempts against union offices in the last 3 years.
    The Government still has not addressed a number of ILO criticisms 
of the Labor Code. In 1993 the ILO had complained about the following 
provisions of the law: The requirement that government officials be 
present at assemblies convened to vote on a strike call; the legality 
of firing union organizers from jobs in their trades once 6 months have 
passed following a strike or dispute; the requirement that contenders 
for trade union office must belong to the occupation their union 
represents; the prohibition of strikes in a wide range of public 
services that are not necessarily essential; various restrictions on 
the right to strike; the power of the Minister of Labor and the 
President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration when 
a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union 
officers involved in an unlawful strike.
    The expired 1995 collective work convention between Ecopetrol and 
the USO was replaced by a new agreement in May 1999. USO leadership 
remained in open conflict with the Government on many issues. USO 
leaders reported that its members in the oilproducing Magdalena Medio 
region continued to receive death threats from presumed paramilitary 
groups, who have accused USO officials of working with the ELN 
guerrillas waging a sabotage campaign against the country's oil 
pipelines.
    Unions are free to join international confederations without 
government restrictions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution protects the right of workers to organize and engage in 
collective bargaining. Workers in larger firms and public services have 
been most successful in organizing, but these unionized workers 
represent only a small portion of the economically active population. 
High unemployment, traditional antiunion attitudes, a large informal 
economic sector, and weak union organization and leadership limit 
workers' bargaining power in all sectors. The requirement that trade 
unions must cover the majority of workers in each company as a 
condition for representing them in sectoral agreements further weakens 
workers' bargaining power.
    The law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of 
free association; however, according to union leaders, both 
discrimination and obstruction of free association occurred frequently. 
Government labor inspectors theoretically enforce these provisions, but 
because there are 271 labor inspectors to cover 1,085 municipalities 
and more than 300,000 companies, the inspection apparatus is weak. 
Furthermore, labor inspectors often lacked basic equipment, such as 
vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes deterred labor inspectors from 
performing their duties by declaring them military targets.
    The Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom 
of association and prohibits the use of strike breakers.
    Collective pacts--agreements between individual workers and their 
employers--are not subject to collective bargaining and typically are 
used by employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers 
must register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry 
does not exercise any oversight or control over them.
    The Labor Code also eliminates mandatory mediation in private 
labor-management disputes and extends the grace period before the 
Government can intervene in a conflict. Federations and confederations 
may assist affiliate unions in collective bargaining.
    Labor law applies to the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZ's), but 
its standards often were not enforced in the zones. Public employee 
unions have won collective bargaining agreements in the FTZ's of 
Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, and Santa Marta, but the garment 
manufacturing enterprises in Medellin and Risaralda, which have the 
largest number of employees, are not organized. Labor unions do not 
exist in any of the zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids slavery and any form of forced or compulsory labor, and this 
prohibition generally is respected in practice in the formal sector; 
however, women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.).
    Paramilitary forces and guerrilla groups forcibly conscripted 
indigenous people (see Section 5). There were some reports that the 
guerrillas used forced labor to build clandestine roads.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; however, the 
Government does not have the resources to enforce this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.d.). Although there were no known instances 
of forced child labor in the formal economy, several thousand children 
were forced to serve as paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see 
Section 1.g.), to work as prostitutes (see Section 5), or in some 
instances as coca pickers.
    Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 14 in most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the 
granting of work permits to youths under the age of 18; however, child 
labor is a significant problem, particularly in the informal sector. A 
1989 decree established the Minors' Code and prohibited the employment 
of children under age 12. It also stipulated exceptional conditions and 
the express authorization of Labor Ministry inspectors for the 
employment of children between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Children 
under age 14 are prohibited from working, with the exception that those 
between the ages of 12 and 14 may perform very light work with the 
permission of their parents and appropriate labor authorities. All 
child workers (anyone under the age of 18) must receive the national 
minimum wage for the hours they work. Children between the ages of 12 
and 14 can work a maximum of 4 hours a day; children between the ages 
of 14 and 16 can work a maximum of 6 hours a day; and children between 
the ages of 16 and 18 can work a maximum of 8 hours a day. All child 
workers are prohibited from working at night, or performing work in 
which there is a risk of bodily harm or exposure to excessive heat, 
cold, or noise. A number of specific occupations are prohibited for 
children as well, such as mining and construction. However, these 
requirements largely are ignored in practice, and only 5 percent of 
those children who work have filed for the required work permits. By 
allowing children between the ages of 12 and 13 to work, even under 
restricted conditions, the law contravenes international standards on 
child labor, which set the minimum legal age for employment in 
developing countries at 14 years.
    In the formal sector, child labor laws are enforced through 
periodic review by the Ministry of Labor and by the military, which 
ensures compliance with mandatory service requirements. However, in the 
informal labor sector and in rural areas, child labor continues to be a 
problem, particularly in agriculture and mining. Children as young as 
11 years of age work full-time in almost every aspect of the cut flower 
industry as a way to supplement family income. Even children enrolled 
in school or, in some cases, those too young for school, accompany 
their parents to work at flower plantations at night and on weekends. 
In the mining sector, coal mining presents the most difficult child 
labor problem. Many marginal, usually family-run, mining operations 
employ their young children as a way to boost production and income; it 
is estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 children are involved. The 
work is dangerous and the hours are long. Younger children carry water 
and package coal, while those age 14 and up engage in more physically 
demanding labor such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining 
operations are illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that, by the end 
of 1999 an interagency governmental committee had removed approximately 
80 percent of child laborers from the informal mines and returned them 
to school. The law prohibits the employment of minors for prostitution; 
however, child prostitution is a problem. In August the Prosecutor 
General's Specialized Sex Crimes and Human Dignity Unit reported that 
from August 1999 to August 2000 it opened 41 cases in which a child 
under age 14 was induced or lured into prostitution.
    A Catholic Church study conducted in May 1999 reported that 
approximately 2.7 million children work, including approximately 
700,000 who worked as coca pickers. This represented a sharp increase 
from 1992, when according to a 1997 study by Los Andes University, 
approximately 1.6 million children (between the ages of 12 and 17) 
worked. One observer noted that the recent economic downturn might 
increase the number of children working, especially in rural areas. 
Child participation in agricultural work soared at harvest times. 
According to the Ministry of Labor, working children between the ages 
of 7 and 15 earned on average between 13 and 47 percent of the minimum 
wage. An estimated 26 percent of working children had regular access to 
health care; approximately 25 percent were employed in potentially 
dangerous activities. The ICBF estimated that paramilitary and 
guerrilla groups employed 6,000 children as combatants (see Section 5). 
School attendance by working children was significantly lower than for 
nonworking children, especially in rural areas. The health services of 
the social security system cover only 10 percent of child laborers. A 
1996 study by the national Human Rights Ombudsman of child labor in 
Putumayo department found that 22 percent of the children between the 
ages of 5 and 18 were full-time coca pickers. In the municipality of 
Orito, the figure reached 70 percent.
    The Labor Ministry has an inspector in each of the 33 departments 
responsible for certifying and conducting repeat inspections of 
workplaces that employ children; however, this system has few resources 
and covered only the 20 percent of the child work force employed in the 
formal sector of the economy. In 1995 the Government established a 
National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, made up of 
representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, and 
Communications, as well as officials from various other government 
offices, unions, employer associations, and NGO's. Under the Action 
Plan, the Government distributed funds during the year to member 
organizations of the committee for child labor eradication projects. 
The Government also obtained commitments from the country's leading 
trade associations and unions to implement child labor eradication 
programs with the jointly ILO's IPEC program, these programs were in 
the preparatory stages at year's end. During the year, the Government 
formulated a 2000-02 Action Plan which gives priority to direct 
intervention on behalf of domestic child workers, child miners, 
sexually exploited children, children in trade activities and children 
in the agricultural sector. It has also designed a project, for which 
it is seeking funding, to collect more reliable national data on child 
labor.
    The Government is taking steps to incorporate into national law, 
ILO Convention 182 concerning the prohibition of and immediate action 
for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, it is unable to enforce this prohibition effectively, and 
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution and the 
forced recruitment of child soldiers are problems (see Sections 1.f., 
1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a uniform 
minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage 
bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by tripartite negotiations 
among representatives of business, organized labor, and the Government 
was about $150 (322,500 pesos) throughout the year. The minimum wage 
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. 
Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's target inflation 
rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real inflation in recent 
years. A total of 70 percent of all workers earn wages that are 
insufficient to cover the costs of the Government's estimated low-
income family shopping basket. However, 77 percent of all workers earn 
no more than, and often much less than, twice the minimum wage.
    The law provides for a standard workday of 8 hours and a 48-hour 
workweek, but it does not require specifically a weekly rest period of 
at least 24 hours, a failing criticized by the ILO.
    Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers' 
occupational safety and health; however, these standards are difficult 
to enforce, in part due to the small number of Labor Ministry 
inspectors. In general, a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate 
attention by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry result 
in a high-level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working 
conditions. Over 80 percent of industrial companies lack safety plans. 
The Social Security Institute reported 53,408 work-related accidents 
during the year, which resulted in 417 deaths. There were 243 cases of 
work-related illness. The industries most prone to worker accidents 
were mining, construction, and transportation.
    According to the Labor Code, workers have the right to withdraw 
from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued 
employment. However, unorganized workers in the informal sector fear 
the loss of their jobs if they exercise their right to criticize 
abuses, particularly in the agricultural sector.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons, and the country is a source for 
trafficking in women and girls to Europe, the United States, and Asia. 
In June Congress approved a new Criminal Code, which provides for a 
prison term of 6 to 8 years and a fine up to the equivalent of 100 
times the minimum legal monthly salary for any person who ``promotes, 
induces, compels, facilitates, collaborates, or in any other way 
participates in the entry or exit of people into or from the country 
without complying with all legal requisites.'' While intended to combat 
alien smuggling in general, the law could be used to prosecute 
traffickers as well. The law is scheduled to enter into effect in 
January 2001.
    A government committee composed of representatives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, the DAS, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Attorney General's office, the Prosecutor General's office, and the 
presidency meets once every 2 months to discuss trafficking in persons. 
In November the Ministry of Justice, the Organization for International 
Migration, and NGO Hope Foundation held the first national conference 
on trafficking in persons.
    The DAS reported at that conference that Colombia is the third most 
common country of origin of trafficking victims, and that the majority 
of Colombian women trafficked for prostitution go to the Netherlands, 
Spain, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe issued a report on trafficking in persons in 
September 1999, which stated that women and girls from Colombia also 
are trafficked to North America. According to press reports, more than 
50 percent of women from Colombia who enter Japan are trafficking 
victims forced to work as prostitutes. According to the DAS, 126 
Colombian trafficking victims have been rescued abroad by Interpol 
during 1998-2000, and 115 victims were rescued by the National Police 
during 19992000. According to police, the majority of international 
trafficking operations are managed by Colombians and have ties to 
narcotics trafficking.
    First Lady Nohra Pastrana, in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and Interpol, participated in a public relations campaign to 
alert citizens, in particular women, to the risks of immigrating 
illegally to other countries.
    On June 23, a Colombian woman trafficked to Denmark was granted 
asylum in Denmark after testifying against Colombian and Danish 
traffickers. In August police in Andalucia, Spain, detained 51 persons 
and broke up a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and 
Ecuador for purposes of prostitution.
                               __________

                               COSTA RICA

    Costa Rica is a longstanding, stable, constitutional democracy with 
a unicameral Legislative Assembly directly elected in free multiparty 
elections every 4 years. Miguel Angel Rodriguez of the Social Christian 
Unity Party (PUSC) won the presidency in the February 1998 elections, 
in which approximately 70 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. The 
judiciary is independent.
    The 1949 Constitution abolished the military forces. The Ministry 
of Public Security--which includes specialized units such as the 
antidrug police--and the Ministry of the Presidency share 
responsibility for law enforcement and national security. In 1996 the 
Government combined several police units within the Ministry of Public 
Security, including the Border Guard, the Rural Guard, and the Civil 
Guard, into a single ``public force.'' Public security forces generally 
observe procedural safeguards established by law and the Constitution; 
however, members of these forces occasionally committed human rights 
abuses.
    The market economy is based primarily on light industry, tourism, 
and agriculture. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was estimated 
at 1.4 percent, compared with 8 percent in 1999. The government deficit 
is estimated to have narrowed to 2.1 percent of GDP, compared with 2.3 
percent in 1999; however, the public sector deficit remained at 3.3 
percent of GDP, the same as in 1999. The Constitution protects the 
right to private property; however, domestic and foreign property 
owners encounter considerable difficulty gaining adequate, timely 
compensation for lands expropriated for national parks and other 
purposes. The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade 
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in a 
few areas. There were some instances of physical abuse by police and 
prison guards, and reports of police abuse of authority or misconduct 
increased during the year. The judicial system processes criminal cases 
very slowly, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention for some persons 
charged with crimes. Domestic violence is a serious problem, and abuse 
of children also remains a problem. Traditional patterns of unequal 
opportunity for women remain, in spite of continuing government and 
media efforts to advocate change. Child labor persists, and child 
prostitution is a growing problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    The third judicial police officer accused of the 1994 murder of 
farmer Ciro Monge did not appear for his trial in April, and his 
whereabouts were unknown at year's end. The two officers convicted in 
1997 appealed the rulings and lost; one fled the country in 1998 but 
was captured and returned to serve his sentence in February.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment 
and holds invalid any statement obtained through violence, and the 
authorities generally abide by these prohibitions; however, members of 
the public forces were responsible for some physical abuse, and reports 
of police abuse of authority or misconduct increased during the year. 
An effective mechanism for lodging and recording complaints of police 
misconduct exists. The Ombudsman's office serves as a recourse to 
citizens that have complaints about violations of their civil and human 
rights and about deficiencies in public and private infrastructure. It 
investigates complaints and, where appropriate, initiates suits against 
officials.
    The Ombudsman's office received 52 reports of police abuse of 
authority or misconduct during the year, compared with 14 in 1999 and 4 
in 1998. The majority of the reports involved complaints about 
negligence or corruption, but part of the large increase was due to 
complaints of alleged police brutality during the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute strike (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). Police 
intervention during strike-related protests in downtown San Jose 
included the use of tear gas and riot gear.
    A large percentage of police personnel owe their appointments to 
political patronage. The Rodriguez administration continued 
implementation of the 1994 Police Code designed to depoliticize and 
professionalize the police force. The Government's longterm plan is to 
establish permanent, professional cadres, eventually resulting in a 
nonpolitically appointed career force. The basic course for new police 
recruits includes training using a human rights manual developed by the 
Ministry of Public Security.
    Prisoners generally receive humane treatment. Prisoners are 
separated by sex and by level of security (minimum, medium, and 
maximum). There are separate juvenile detention centers. Illegal 
narcotics are readily available in the prisons, and drug use is common. 
As of August, the Ombudsman's office had received two complaints of 
physical abuse of prisoners by guards, and four complaints of 
psychological abuse; compared with six complaints of physical abuse and 
six complaints of psychological abuse in all of 1999. The Ombudsman's 
office investigates complaints and refers serious cases of abuse to the 
public prosecutor.
    Penitentiary overcrowding remains a problem, with the prison 
population estimated at 67 percent above planned capacity in 1999. A 
study by a U.N. agency found that the prison population grew by 155 
percent from 1992-99. The Government is expanding six prisons to 
address this problem. In March 1996, the Supreme Court's Constitutional 
Chamber issued an order to the San Sebastian prison in San Jose, giving 
the institution 1 year to achieve minimally acceptable conditions for 
the prisoners. As of September, occupancy in that prison was 139 
percent above intended capacity, an increase from 108 percent in 1999. 
In August the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber declared that no 
additional prisoners would be admitted to the San Sebastian prison 
until it met the U.N. minimum standards for the treatment of the 
imprisoned. The Ministry of Justice responded by calling on the 
Rodriguez administration to allocate more funds for prison enhancement. 
Five additional facilities have been opened and three have been 
undergoing renovation since 1999 as part of this plan. The Government 
also approved the budget for a series of detention facilities in 
outlying provinces, which are expected both to reduce overcrowding and 
to locate prisoners closer to their families.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and law 
prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally 
respects these prohibitions.
    The law requires issuance of judicial warrants before making 
arrests. The Constitution entitles a detainee to a judicial 
determination of the legality of the detention during arraignment 
before a court officer within 24 hours of arrest. The authorities 
generally respect these rights.
    The law provides for the right to bail, and the authorities observe 
it in practice. Generally, the authorities do not hold detainees 
incommunicado. With judicial authorization, the authorities may hold 
suspects for 48 hours after arrest or, under special circumstances, for 
up to 10 days.
    The Constitution bars exile as punishment, and it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide 
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this 
provision in practice. The Constitution provides for the right to a 
fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this 
right.
    The Supreme Court supervises the work of the lower courts, known as 
tribunals. The Legislative Assembly elects the 22 Supreme Court 
magistrates to 8-year terms, subject to automatic renewal unless the 
Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority. Accused persons 
may select attorneys to represent them, and the law provides for access 
to counsel at state expense for the indigent.
    Persons accused of serious offenses and held without bail sometimes 
remain in pretrial custody for long periods. Lengthy legal procedures, 
numerous appeals, and large numbers of detainees cause delays and case 
backlogs. As of February, there were 1,967 accused persons jailed while 
awaiting trial, representing 21 percent of the prison population.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. However, one 
individual was jailed for committing crimes against the State 
(politically motivated acts of violence) in the 1980's. The human 
rights group Families for the Defense of Political Prisoners and Human 
Rights considers this person to be a political prisoner.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions; and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction. The law requires judicial warrants 
to search private homes. Judges may approve the use of wiretaps in 
limited circumstances, primarily to combat narcotics trafficking.
    The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade 
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property. 
Landowners throughout the country have suffered frequent squatter 
invasions for years. President Rodriguez said he would give priority to 
reducing these conflicts, increasing public security, and regularizing 
land tenure. The Legislative Assembly is reexamining laws that allow 
occupants of land to gain title through adverse possession. The 
incidence of squatter invasions had increased in 1999 in anticipation 
of the land tenure regularization. However, during the year there was 
only one instance when squatter families were removed. In that case, 
the Government removed 230 families without reports of protests or 
violence.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, a generally effective 
judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system together 
ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
    There are 6 major privately owned newspapers, several periodicals, 
20 privately owned television stations, and over 80 privately owned 
radio stations, all of which pursue independent editorial policies. 
While the media generally criticized the Government freely, there were 
unconfirmed allegations that the Government withheld advertising from 
some publications in order to influence or limit reporting.
    A 1996 ``right of response'' law provides persons criticized in the 
media with an opportunity to reply with equal attention and at equal 
length. Print and electronic media continued to criticize public 
figures; however, media managers have found it difficult to comply with 
provisions of this law.
    The Penal Code outlines a series of ``insult laws'' that establish 
criminal penalties of up to 3 years in prison for those convicted of 
``insulting the honor or decorum of a public official.'' The law also 
identifies defamation, libel, slander, and calumny as offenses against 
a person's honor that can carry criminal penalties. The Inter-American 
Press Association and the World Press Freedom Committee assert that 
such laws have the effect of restricting reporting by the media, and 
that they wrongly provide public officials with a shield from public 
scrutiny by citizens and the press.
    The Office of Control of Public Spectacles rates films and has the 
authority to restrict or prohibit their showing; it has similar powers 
over television programs and stage plays. Nonetheless, a wide range of 
foreign films are available to the public. A tribunal reviews appeals 
of the office's actions.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    In March police intervention to disband strike-related protests in 
San Jose resulted in complaints to the Ombudsman's office that such 
actions were abusive and constituted evidence of police brutality (see 
Sections 1.c. and 6.a.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. While the 
Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion, 
members of all denominations freely practice their religion without 
government interference. Religious education teachers, including those 
in public schools, must be certified by the Roman Catholic Episcopal 
Conference. Foreign missionaries and clergy of all denominations work 
and proselytize freely.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no 
restrictions on travel within the country, on emigration, or on the 
right of return.
    There is a long tradition of providing refuge to persons from other 
Latin American countries.
    The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has 
admitted approximately 5,000 persons as refugees under terms of the 
convention. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government makes a distinction between 
political asylum and refugee status. The issue of the provision of 
first asylum did not arise. The Constitution specifically prohibits 
repatriation of anyone subject to potential persecution, and there were 
no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
    The authorities regularly repatriated undocumented Nicaraguans, 
most of whom entered the country primarily for economic reasons. 
However, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the Government announced a 
program of general amnesty for all Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and 
Salvadorans in the country prior to November 9, 1998. By June 156,000 
Central Americans, 95 percent of whom are Nicaraguans, qualified for 
and received legal resident status under this government amnesty 
program.
    Immigration officials reported that 4,000 Colombians were expected 
to emigrate to Costa Rica during the year; 2,831 emigrated in 1999. The 
majority immigrate legally. However, others seek temporary refugee 
status, and under the law, are expected to return to their country of 
origin once the period of conflict ends in their country.
    The Government has been reluctant in many cases to state publicly 
under what status it would grant legal residence. However, according to 
press reports, the authorities granted 16 Cuban athletes asylum in the 
period between January 1999 and June, under the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    Allegations of abuse by the Border Guard periodically arise. 
Although instances of physical abuse appear to have declined, there 
were credible reports of extortion of migrants by border officials.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage 
and by secret ballot every 4 years. The independent Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal ensures the integrity of elections, and the authorities and 
citizens respect election results. The Constitution bars the President 
from seeking reelection, and Assembly members may seek reelection only 
after at least one term out of office. In September the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this 
provision in response to a petition filed by private citizens. The case 
is expected to be appealed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
for a determination of whether the ban on presidential reelection 
constitutes an infringement of citizens' rights to vote and run for 
office.
    In the 1998 elections, President Rodriguez's Social Christian Unity 
Party won a plurality in the Legislative Assembly, winning 27 of 57 
seats. The National Liberation Party (PLN) won 23 seats, the Democratic 
Force won 3 seats, and 4 minor parties--the Labor Action, National 
Integration, Costa Rican Renovation, and Libertarian Movement parties--
each won 1 seat.
    Women encounter no legal impediments to their participation in 
politics; however, while they are underrepresented overall, women are 
represented increasingly in leadership positions in the Government and 
political parties. Both vice presidents (who are also cabinet members), 
the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Women's Affairs, and 11 
legislative assembly deputies are women. Sonia Picado, leader of the 
PLN, the principal opposition party, is also a woman. Former Assembly 
Deputy Sandra Piszk continues as Ombudsman, a key autonomous post 
created in 1993 to protect the rights and interests of citizens in 
their dealings with the Government, and Linette Saborio remained the 
Director General of the judicial investigative organization. The PUSC 
mandated that a minimum of 40 percent of posts in party councils be 
occupied by women and created the Ministry of Women's Affairs, headed 
by Dr. Gloria Valerin. In 1998 female legislators formed the Foundation 
of Women Parliamentarians of Costa Rica to commemorate the 45th 
anniversary of the first female members of the Assembly. The group's 
principal focus is to promote women's involvement in politics through 
informational meetings and public awareness campaigns, but it also 
works for a number of social objectives, including the decentralization 
of government.
    Indigenous people may participate freely in politics and 
government; however, in practice, they have not played significant 
roles in these areas, except on issues directly affecting their 
welfare, largely because of their relatively small numbers and physical 
isolation. They account for about 1 percent of the population, and 
their approximately 20,000 votes constitute an important swing vote in 
national elections. None of the 57 members of the National Assembly 
identifies himself as indigenous. There are two black members in the 
Assembly. The country's 100,000 blacks, who mostly reside on the 
Caribbean coast, enjoy full rights of citizenship, including the 
protection of laws against racial discrimination.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Various human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views. The 
Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the Defense 
of Human Rights in Central America, and the Family and Friends of 
Political Prisoners of Costa Rica monitor and report on human rights, 
as does the Ombudsman's office.
    The Legislative Assembly elects the Ombudsman for a 4-year, 
renewable term. The Ombudsman's office is part of the legislative 
branch, ensuring a high degree of independence from the executive 
branch. The law provides for the functional, administrative, and 
judgmental independence of the Ombudsman's office.
    Several international organizations concerned with human rights, 
including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, are located in San Jose.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the 
law, and the Government generally respects these provisions.
    Women.--The Government has identified domestic violence against 
women and children as a serious societal problem. The Costa Rican 
Women's Defense Office handled 5,188 cases of domestic violence in 
1999. The Law Against Domestic Violence classifies certain acts of 
domestic violence as crimes and mandates their prosecution. An old law 
permitted a judge to pardon a man accused of statutory rape if the 
perpetrator intends to marry the victim, she and her family acquiesce, 
and the National Institute for Children does not object; however, an 
August 1999 reform to the Penal Code rendered this article void. The 
authorities have incorporated training on handling domestic violence 
cases into the basic training course for new police personnel. The 
domestic violence law requires public hospitals to report cases of 
female victims of domestic violence. It also denies the perpetrator 
possession of the family home in favor of the victim. Television 
coverage of this issue has increased in news reporting, public service 
announcements, and feature programs. Reports of violence against women 
have increased, possibly reflecting a greater willingness of victims to 
report abuses rather than an actual increase in instances of violence 
against women. The public prosecutor, police, and the Ombudsman all 
have offices dedicated to this problem. The law against sexual 
harassment in the work place and educational institutions seeks to 
prevent and punish sexual harassment in those environments.
    Prostitution and sex tourism are both legal for persons over the 
age of 18. The prohibition against trafficking in women for the purpose 
of prostitution was strengthened by a statute that went into effect in 
August 1999, although there have been only infrequent and isolated 
cases reported in the past (see Section 6.f.).
    Women constitute 50.1 percent of the population. In 1998 President 
Rodriguez created the Ministry of Women's Affairs. The 1990 Law for the 
Promotion of the Social Equality of Women prohibits discrimination 
against women and obligates the Government to promote political, 
economic, social, and cultural equality. In March 1996, the 
Government's National Center for the Development of Women and the 
Family presented its 3-year National Plan for Equality of Opportunity 
between Women and Men. The plan is based on the Platform for Action 
adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. As 
part of the plan, the Government established an office for gender 
issues in the Ministry of Labor; similar offices are planned in two 
other ministries.
    According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1999 
Human Development Report, women represent 31 percent of the labor 
force. Most women work in the services sector, with others working in 
industry and agriculture. While laws require that women and men receive 
equal pay for equal work, average salaries for women remain somewhat 
below those of their male counterparts. According to 1997 UNDP data, 
women occupy 45 percent of executive, management, and technical 
positions.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare through well-funded systems of public education and medical 
care. The Government spends over 5 percent of GDP on medical care. In 
June 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional amendment 
increasing spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP. 
The country has a high rate of literacy (95 percent) and a low rate of 
infant mortality (14 persons per 1,000). The law requires 6 years of 
primary and 3 years of secondary education for all children. There is 
no difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or in 
health care services. The autonomous National Institute for Children 
(PANI) oversees implementation of the Government's programs for 
children. In December 1996, the Assembly passed a law strengthening the 
PANI's role in protecting and promoting the rights of children, in 
accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.
    In recent years, the PANI has increased public awareness of abuse 
of children, which remains a problem. From January to June, the 
Institute intervened in 3,704 cases of abandonment, 1,013 cases of 
physical abuse, 536 cases of sexual abuse, and 885 cases of 
psychological abuse of children. The PANI attributed the increase in 
cases reported to better reporting capabilities and an increase in 
patterns of child abuse. There was also a continued increase in 
reported psychological abuse cases because the 1997 Code of Childhood 
and Adolescence redefined such abuse and increased awareness of it. 
Abuses appear to be more prevalent among poor, less-educated families. 
Traditional attitudes and the inclination to treat such crimes as 
misdemeanors sometimes hamper legal proceedings against those who 
commit crimes against children.
    In February 1996, the PANI announced a comprehensive plan to 
improve the conditions of the poorest children. According to Institute 
estimates, 19 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 are 
employed in domestic tasks, while 15 percent work outside the home. The 
Government, police sources, and UNICEF representatives acknowledge that 
child prostitution is a growing problem. Although no official 
statistics exist, the PANI has identified street children in the urban 
areas of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas as being at the greatest risk. 
Estimates of the number of children involved in prostitution vary 
widely. An International Labor Organization (ILO) study of four San 
Jose neighborhoods in 1998-99 identified at least 212 minor girls 
working as prostitutes, but other countrywide estimates are higher. A 
PANI study estimated that some 40 families in August supported 
themselves by ``renting'' their children to sex tourists. In July 1999, 
the Legislative Assembly passed the Law Against the Sexual Exploitation 
of Minors, which specifically penalizes persons who use children and 
adolescents for erotic purposes and made it a crime to engage in 
prostitution with minors. An adult who pays for sex with a minor can be 
sentenced to 2 to 10 years in prison. The Government took steps to 
enforce this law and has raided brothels and arrested clients. The law 
provides for prison sentences from 4 to 10 years for those managing or 
promoting child prostitution. The authorities brought charges against 
30 persons for violating the law and had convicted 4 persons by year's 
end.
    Casa Alianza operates a 24-hour telephone help line that received 
240 accusations of exploitation of minors. In March the organization 
made a presentation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) about what it termed the growing commercial sexual exploitation 
of children in the country. Casa Alianza criticized the Government for 
not providing the PANI with 7 percent of national tax revenue, as 
stipulated by the law creating the Institute, and also criticized the 
Government for the relatively low number of persons actually charged, 
found guilty, and sentenced for child exploitation.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1996 Equal Opportunity for Persons 
with Disabilities Law prohibits discrimination, provides for health 
care services, and mandates provision of access to buildings for 
persons with disabilities. This law is not enforced widely, and many 
buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities. In July a 
government study concluded that only 35 percent of the law's stated 
goals had been implemented. Nonetheless, a number of public and private 
institutions have made individual efforts to improve access. In 1999 
the PANI and the Ministry of Education published specific classroom 
guidelines for assisting children with hearing loss, motor 
difficulties, attention deficit disorder, and mental retardation. In 
October the Ministry reported that since 1998 there had been a 20 
percent increase in special education services offered throughout the 
country, and that 116 special education centers had been created.
    Indigenous People.--The population of about 3.5 million includes 
nearly 40,000 indigenous people among 8 ethnic groups. Most live in 
traditional communities on 22 reserves which, because of their remote 
location, often lack access to schools, health care, electricity, and 
potable water. The Government, through the National Indigenous 
Commission, completed distribution of identification cards to 
facilitate access to public medical facilities in 1999. The Government 
also built a medical clinic and several community health centers in 
indigenous areas. The Ombudsman has established an office to 
investigate violations of the rights of indigenous people. In January 
1999, a group of indigenous people from Puntarenas challenged the 
constitutionality of the 1978 Indigenous Law because of their inability 
to possess private property on the reservation. The Supreme Court's 
Constitutional Chamber rejected this challenge in January.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law specifies the right of 
workers to join unions of their choosing without prior authorization, 
although barriers exist in practice. About 15 percent of the work force 
is unionized, almost entirely in the public sector. Unions operate 
independently of government control.
    Some trade union leaders contend that ``solidarity'' associations,
    in which employers provide access to credit unions and savings 
plans in return for agreement to avoid strikes and other types of 
confrontation, infringe upon the right of association. After the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) ruled that solidarity 
associations and their involvement in trade union activities violated 
freedom of association, the Government amended the Labor Code in 1993. 
The following year, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) ruled that these 
and other planned changes fostered greater freedom of association. In 
1995 the COE encouraged the Government to approve legislation to allow 
unions to administer compensation funds for dismissed workers and to 
repeal labor code provisions restricting the right to strike in certain 
nonessential public, agricultural, and forestry sectors. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported that 
the Labor Ministry provided information about newly formed unions to 
employers who then encouraged formation of solidarity associations and 
blacklisted union members. The Labor Ministry denied the reports but 
acknowledged that solidarity association culture is deeply embedded. 
During 1999 and 2000, the Labor Ministry received 13 complaints 
(representing 7 incidents) charging explicit antiunion discrimination.
    In June 1998, the Rerum Novarum Workers Confederation complained 
about government noncompliance with commitments to protect worker 
rights but withdrew the complaint after the Rodriguez administration 
asked for a reasonable period to demonstrate its commitment to worker 
rights. Some labor unions did not support the complaint because they 
believed that it interfered with the administration's national 
reconciliation process. In August the Rerum Novarum confederation 
resubmitted the complaint against the Government; they had not received 
a response at year's end.
    The Constitution and Labor Code restrict the right of public sector 
workers to strike. However, in February 1998, the Supreme Court 
formally ruled that public sector workers, except those in essential 
positions, have the right to strike. Even before this ruling, the 
Government had removed penalties for union leaders participating in 
such strikes.
    In March the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber clarified the 
law forbidding public sector strikes. It ruled that public sector 
strikes may be allowed only if a judges approves them beforehand and 
finds that ``services necessary to the well-being of the public'' are 
not jeopardized. Public sector workers who decide to strike can no 
longer be penalized by a prison sentence but can face charges of breach 
of contract.
    In March Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) workers, employees 
from public hospitals, teachers, students, taxi drivers, and public 
transportation workers called a general strike that lasted several days 
to protest the passage of legislation which would partially open the 
ICE to private participation (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    There are no legal restrictions on the right of private sector 
workers to strike, but very few workers in this sector belong to 
unions. Private sector strikes rarely occur; however, their frequency 
increased during the year.
    Unions may form federations and confederations and affiliate 
internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution protects the right to organize. Specific provisions of the 
1993 Labor Code reforms provide protection from dismissal for union 
organizers and members during union formation. The revised provisions 
require employers who are found guilty of discrimination to reinstate 
workers fired for union activities. However, the ILO's CFA reported 
that harassment is still used to force workers to leave unions, and 
that other violations of labor legislation continue to occur. In one 
incident, a company in the banana industry refused to negotiate with a 
legitimate union for 3 years. The company eventually fired the union 
leader and established a solidarity association.
    Trade unions claim that the 1993 reforms have not led to 
significant improvements because the Government has not enforced the 
law effectively. However, the Labor Ministry hired an additional 10 
labor inspectors who are able to expedite such cases. The 
Constitutional Chamber ruled that the labor inspectorate must comply 
with the 2-month time limit for investigations. Most cases take up to 2 
months to resolve, but some may take longer if the judge decides that 
an unusual situation merits further investigation and requires 
witnesses. Delays in processing court rulings are common throughout the 
judicial branch.
    Public sector workers cannot engage in collective bargaining 
because the Public Administration Act of 1978 makes labor law 
inapplicable in relations between the Government and its employees. 
However, the Supreme Court has affirmed their right to strike (see 
Section 6.a.). In August 1999, the Government negotiated a wage 
increase following a 7-day strike by public sector workers. Private 
sector unions have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining.
    All labor regulations apply fully to the country's nine export 
processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Ministry oversees labor regulations 
within the EPZ's. It reported that after an effort to hire additional 
inspectors, it now has 1 inspector for every 9,000 workers, compared 
with 1 for every 30,000 in 1999.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no known instances 
of such practices. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, 
and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code provide special 
employment protection for women and children and establish a minimum 
working age of 15 years. The Legislative Assembly adopted the Code on 
Childhood and Adolescence in December 1997, which includes provisions 
designed to implement the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 can work for a maximum of 6 
hours daily and 36 hours weekly, while children under age 15 cannot 
work legally. The PANI, in cooperation with the Labor Ministry, 
generally enforces these regulations in the formal sector. Due to 
limited government resources for enforcement, some children work on the 
fringes of the formal economy in violation of these limits. Youths 
under the age of 18 may not work in the banana industry. A 1999 study 
by the Census Bureau and Ministry of Labor estimated that 8.9 percent 
of the population between the ages of 5 and 14 are involved in the 
country's formal and informal workforce, and found that 70 percent of 
these children are boys. However, the study also indicated that the 
number of minor children in the workforce has dropped steadily over the 
past 10 years.
    With help from the ILO, the Labor Ministry is working to phase out 
child labor and has asked employers of children to notify the Ministry 
of such employment. The Government formed the National Directive 
Committee for the Progressive Eradication of Child Labor and Protection 
of Adolescent Laborers in 1990. Representatives from the PANI, the 
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Ombudsman's Office, UNICEF, the ILO, and area 
universities are part of the committee. In April 1999, the Committee 
conducted an aggressive public awareness campaign as part of its 
national plan. The campaign addressed child labor and explained 
existing legislation to audiences of different age groups. The Ministry 
of Labor maintains an Office for the Eradication of Child Labor, which 
cooperates with projects sponsored by the ILO, U.N. Development 
Program, and other entities. Nonetheless, child labor remains an 
integral part of the informal economy, particularly in small-scale 
agriculture and family-run microenterprises selling various items, 
which employ a significant proportion of the labor force. Child 
prostitution is a growing problem (see Section 5). The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    In October the International Relations Commission of the 
Legislative Assembly approved ILO Convention 182 on the eradication of 
the worst forms of child labor for debate on the Assembly floor, which 
was scheduled for the session beginning in December.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for a 
minimum wage. A National Wage Council, composed of three members each 
from government, business, and labor, sets minimum wage and salary 
levels for all sectors. Monthly minimum wages, last adjusted in July 
for the private sector, range from $137 (42,373 colones) for domestic 
employees to $662 (205,365 colones) for some professionals. Public 
sector negotiations, based on private sector minimum wages, normally 
follow the settlement of private sector negotiations. The Ministry of 
Labor effectively enforces minimum wages in the San Jose area, but does 
so less effectively in rural areas. Especially at the lower end of the 
wage scale, the minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and 
family with a decent standard of living.
    The Constitution sets workday hours, overtime remuneration, days of 
rest, and annual vacation rights. Although often circumvented in 
practice, it also requires compensation for discharge without due 
cause. Generally, workers may work a maximum of 8 hours during the day 
and 6 at night, up to weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively. 
Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime premium of 50 percent of 
regular wages for work in excess of the daily work shift. However, 
agricultural workers do not receive overtime pay if they voluntarily 
work beyond their normal hours. Little evidence exists that employers 
coerce employees to perform such overtime.
    A 1967 law on health and safety in the workplace requires 
industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms with 10 or more workers 
to establish a joint management-labor committee on workplace conditions 
and allows the Government to inspect workplaces and to fine employers 
for violations. Most firms subject to the law establish such committees 
but either do not use the committees or do not turn them into effective 
instruments for improving workplace conditions. Due partly to budgetary 
constraints, the Ministry has not fielded enough labor inspectors to 
ensure consistent maintenance of minimum conditions of safety and 
sanitation, especially outside San Jose. However, ministry programs to 
hire additional inspections and enhance inspector training programs 
have resulted in some progress. While workers have the right to leave 
work if conditions become dangerous, workers who do so may jeopardize 
their jobs unless they file written complaints with the Labor Ministry.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women 
for the purpose of prostitution, and in August 1999, a statute went 
into effect that strengthens this prohibition. There have been only 
infrequent and isolated cases of trafficking in women in the past (see 
Section 5). However, in its March submission to the IACHR, Casa Alianza 
asserted that there was trafficking in women from Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, and the Philippines to the country. Local 
authorities lack the resources necessary to address this problem; there 
is little in the way of government protection, aid, or educational 
campaigns for persons who have been trafficked to or from the country. 
The Ministry of Women's Issues began an awareness campaign in 1999 to 
educate women about the dangers of trafficking.
                               __________

                                  CUBA

    Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by President Fidel Castro, 
who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the 
Communist Party, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. President 
Castro exercises control over all aspects of life through the Communist 
Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government 
bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Communist Party is 
the only legal political entity, and President Castro personally 
chooses the membership of the Politburo, the select group that heads 
the party. There are no contested elections for the 601-member National 
Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which meets twice a year for a few 
days to rubber stamp decisions and policies already decided by the 
Government. The Party controls all government positions, including 
judicial offices. The judiciary is completely subordinate to the 
Government and to the Communist Party.
    The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security 
and totalitarian control. Officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FAR), which are led by President Castro's brother, Raul, have been 
assigned to the majority of key positions in the Ministry of Interior 
in recent years. In addition to the routine law enforcement functions 
of regulating migration and controlling the Border Guard and the 
regular police forces, the Interior Ministry's Department of State 
Security investigates and actively suppresses opposition and dissent. 
It maintains a pervasive system of vigilance through undercover agents, 
informers, the rapid response brigades, and the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). The Government traditionally uses 
the CDR's to mobilize citizens against dissenters, impose ideological 
conformity, and root out ``counterrevolutionary'' behavior. During the 
early 1990's, economic problems reduced the Government's ability to 
reward participation in the CDR's and hence the willingness of citizens 
to participate in them, thereby lessening the CDR's effectiveness. 
Other mass organizations also inject government and Communist Party 
control into citizens' daily activities at home, work, and school. 
Members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    The Government continued to control all significant means of 
production and remained the predominant employer, despite permitting 
some carefully controlled foreign investment in joint ventures with it. 
Foreign companies are required to contract workers only through Cuban 
state agencies, which receive hard currency payments for the workers' 
labor but in turn pay the workers a fraction of this (usually 5 
percent) in local currency. In 1998 the Government retracted some of 
the changes that had led to the rise of legal nongovernmental business 
activity when it further tightened restrictions on the self-employed 
sector by reducing the number of categories allowed and by imposing 
relatively high taxes on self-employed persons. In September the 
Minister of Labor and Social Security publicly stated that more 
stringent laws should be promulgated to govern self-employment. He 
suggested that the Ministry of Interior, the National Tax Office, and 
the Ministry of Finance act in a coordinated fashion in order to reduce 
``the illegal activities'' of the many self-employed. According to 
government officials, the number of self-employed persons as of 
September was 156,000, a decrease from the 166,000 reported in 1999.
    According to official figures, the economy grew 5.6 percent during 
the year. Despite this, overall economic output remains below the 
levels prior to the drop of at least 35 percent in gross domestic 
product that occurred in the early 1990's due to the inefficiencies of 
the centrally controlled economic system; the loss of billions of 
dollars of annual Soviet bloc trade and Soviet subsidies; the ongoing 
deterioration of plants, equipment, and the transportation system; and 
the continued poor performance of the important sugar sector. The 1999-
2000 sugar harvest (just over 4 million tons) was marginally better 
than the 1998-99 harvest. The 1997-98 harvest was considered the worst 
in more than 50 years. For the tenth straight year, the Government 
continued its austerity measures known as the ``special period in 
peacetime.'' Agricultural markets, legalized in 1994, provide consumers 
wider access to meat and produce, although at prices beyond the reach 
of most citizens living on peso-only incomes or pensions. Given these 
conditions, the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances 
from the exile community significantly helps those who receive dollars 
to survive. Tourism remained a key source of revenue for the 
Government. The system of so-called tourist apartheid continued, with 
foreign visitors who pay in hard currency receiving preference over 
citizens for food, consumer products, and medical services. Most 
citizens remain barred from tourist hotels, beaches, and resorts.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor. It continued to 
violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of 
its citizens. Citizens do not have the right to change their government 
peacefully. There were unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings by 
the police, and reports that prisoners died in jail due to lack of 
medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials 
continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. The 
Government failed to prosecute or sanction adequately members of the 
security forces and prison guards who committed abuses. Prison 
conditions remained harsh. The authorities continued routinely to 
harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame 
human rights advocates and members of independent professional 
associations, including journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers, 
often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country. The 
Government used internal and external exile against such persons, and 
it offered political prisoners the choice of exile or continued 
imprisonment. The Government denied political dissidents and human 
rights advocates due process and subjected them to unfair trials. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government denied 
citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It 
limited the distribution of foreign publications and news, reserving 
them for selected party faithful, and maintained strict censorship of 
news and information to the public. The Government restricts some 
religious activities but permits others. Before and after the January 
1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, the Government permitted some public 
processions on feast days, and reinstated Christmas as an official 
holiday; however, it has not responded to the papal appeal that the 
Church be allowed to play a greater role in society. During the year, 
the Government allowed two new priests to enter the country (as 
professors in a seminary) and another two to replace two priests whose 
visas were not renewed. However, the applications of many priests and 
religious workers remained pending, and some visas were issued for 
periods of only 3 to 6 months. The Government kept tight restrictions 
on freedom of movement, including foreign travel. The Government was 
sharply and publicly antagonistic to all criticism of its human rights 
practices and discouraged foreign contacts with human rights activists. 
Violence against women, especially domestic violence, and child 
prostitution are problems. Racial discrimination occurs. The Government 
severely restricted worker rights, including the right to form 
independent unions. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, it requires children to do farm work without 
compensation during their summer vacation.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings. There were unconfirmed 
reports of deaths due to the excessive use of force by the national 
police.
    On October 6, according to a report by the Agencia de Prensa Libre 
Oriental (APLO--an independent news agency), a policeman shot 41-year-
old Leovigildo Oliva, from El Poblado, Dos Caminos de San Luis, 
Santiago province, as he was returning home in the early morning on 
horseback carrying a bag of animal feed. Oliva was taken to the 
hospital and died a few hours later. No explanation was given for the 
shooting.
    On December 28, 27-year-old Leonardo Horta Camacho was shot and 
killed. According to some reports, Horta apparently was shot while 
trying to steal a pig; a policeman reportedly told Horta's girlfriend 
that he was accidentally shot while struggling with a policeman. 
Another version was that police thought Horta was one of two escaped 
prisoners that they were searching for.
    Government sanctions against perpetrators were light or nonexistent 
in the cases of deaths due to excessive use of force that occurred in 
1998. There was no information available about the results of any 
investigations into the 1998 deaths of Wilfredo Martinez Perez, Yuset 
Ochoterena, and Reinery Marrera Toldedo.
    During the year, there were reports that prisoners died in jail due 
to lack of medical care (see Section 1.c.).
    In 1996 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
issued its final report on the Government's July 1994 sinking of the 
13th of March tugboat, which killed 41 persons. The IACHR ordered the 
Government to indemnify the survivors and the relatives of the victims 
for the damages caused. At year's end, the Government still had not 
done so. The Government detained a number of human rights activists to 
prevent them from participating in a Mass in memory of the victims on 
the anniversary of the deaths (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees 
and prisoners; however, there were instances in which members of the 
security forces beat and otherwise abused human rights advocates, 
detainees, and prisoners. There were numerous reports of 
disproportionate police harassment of black youths (see Section 5).
    On January 22, Communist Party members attacked members of the 
Sigler Amaya family in their home in Pedro Betancourt, in the province 
of Matanzas, in the presence of police officers. The family was 
concluding a fast for the release of two of their family members, Guido 
Sigler Amaya and Ariel Sigler Amaya, who were detained on December 15, 
1999. After destroying a number of placards, the 10 party members 
attacked several persons in the family with sticks. Juan Francisco 
Sigler Amaya was knocked unconscious; Miguel Sigler Amaya suffered a 
broken rib; Gulliver and Ulises Sigler Gonzalez, the sons of Juan 
Francisco, received lesser injuries. Party members also beat Gloria 
Amaya Gonzalez, the grandmother. After the attack, police officers 
entered the house and arrested all the men in the house. The police did 
not arrest the attackers. On January 23, the authorities released Juan 
Rogelio ``Yeyo'' Gonzalez, Juan Francisco Martinez, and Miguel Sigler 
Amaya but fined them for disturbing the peace and causing public 
disorder. At year's end, the Government had not sanctioned any of the 
Communist Party members for this attack. Police released Guido Sigler 
Amaya on July 9, and Airel Sigler Amaya on August 5.
    On July 13, Ernesto La O Ramos of the ``Maximo Gomez National Civic 
Movement,'' reportedly planned to place flowers in a nearby river in 
commemoration of the death of 41 persons, who died in the sinking of 
the 13th of March tugboat in 1994. A policeman warned La O Ramos not to 
go to the river. When he refused, the policeman brought him to the 
police station. On the way to the police station, La O Ramos greeted a 
friend, and the policeman reportedly interpreted this as an indication 
that La O Ramos intended to run away. The officer hit La O Ramos in the 
face, fracturing his nose and breaking his eye glasses. La O Ramos was 
cited for disrespect and his trial on August 3 was postponed until 
further notice. However, on September 29, the judge dismissed the 
charges against La O Ramos.
    The Government continued to subject persons who disagree with it to 
acts of repudiation. At government instigation, members of state-
controlled mass organizations, fellow workers, or neighbors of intended 
victims are obliged to stage public protests against those who dissent 
with the Government's policies, shouting obscenities and often causing 
damage to the homes and property of those targeted; physical attacks on 
the victims sometimes occur. Police and state security agents are often 
present but take no action to prevent or end the attacks. Those who 
refuse to participate in these actions face disciplinary action, 
including loss of employment.
    During the year, there were no massive acts of repudiation directed 
against the homes of individual human rights activists; however, there 
were smaller-scale acts of repudiation, known as ``reuniones 
relampagos,'' or rapid repudiations. These acts are conducted by a 
small number of persons, usually not from the person's neighborhood, 
and can last up to 30 minutes. These individuals shout epithets and 
throw stones or other objects at the target's house. For example, in 
the early morning on June 21, a small group of persons threw stones, 
tomatoes, and eggs for about 10 minutes at the home of Yvette Rodriguez 
Manzanares in Santiago de Cuba. Rodriguez is a member of Followers of 
Chibas Movement (MSC).
    On the night of August 12, unknown persons threw stones at the 
house of Nelson Parra Polanco, a member of the Democratic Solidarity 
Party in Manzanillo in the province of Granma. On September 27, just 
before midnight, an unknown number of persons entered the yard of the 
house of Isabel del Pino, president of the Association of Humanitarian 
Followers of Christ the King, and knocked loudly on her door. The crowd 
also shouted abusive language, such as ``Down with the Worm'' (``Abajo 
la gusanera''), ``Let the worms leave'' (``Que se vayan los gusanos''), 
etc.
    Prison conditions continued to be harsh and life threatening, and 
conditions in detention facilities also are harsh. The Government 
claims that prisoners have rights, such as family visitation, adequate 
nutrition, pay for work, the right to request parole, and the right to 
petition the prison director. However, police and prison officials 
often denied these rights in practice, and beat, neglected, isolated, 
and denied medical treatment to detainees and prisoners, including 
those convicted of political crimes or those who persisted in 
expressing their views. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in 
February 1999, the Government revised the Penal Code to provide that 
prisoners cannot be subjected to corporal punishment, nor is it 
permitted to employ any means against them to humiliate them or to 
lessen their dignity. However, the revised code failed to establish 
penalties for committing such acts.
    The Government regularly violated prisoners' rights by failing to 
provide adequate nutrition and medical attention. On June 1, APLO 
reported that Marcelo Diosdado Amelo Rodriguez, imprisoned in Boniato, 
was not receiving medicine for hypertension and circulatory problems. 
In June the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) called on the 
Government to provide medical treatment to two journalists serving 
prison sentences. The two journalists suffered from hepatitis and 
serious influenza, and the IAPA feared that one might contract 
tuberculosis. On July 27, an independent press agency reported the 
death of common prisoner Lucia Castelua Padron because prison 
authorities did not transfer her to a hospital to receive treatment for 
hepatitis. In 1997 the IACHR described the nutritional and hygienic 
situation in the prisons, together with the deficiencies in medical 
care, as ``alarming.'' Both the IACHR and the former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Cuba, as well as other human rights monitoring 
organizations, reported the widespread incidence in prisons of 
tuberculosis, scabies, hepatitis, parasitic infections, and 
malnutrition.
    On April 10, over 100 prisoners in Prison 1580, located in the 
Havana City municipality of San Miguel del Padron, protested the lack 
of medical attention and requested better prison conditions. On May 3, 
a number of prisoners reportedly rioted in Kilo 7, a prison in 
Camaguey, and requested better medical treatment, better food, and 
personal respect. Special police forces apparently attacked the 
prisoners and terminated the strike, an action that resulted in 20 
prisoners being hospitalized.
    Prison guards and state security officials also subjected human 
rights and prodemocracy activists to threats of physical violence; to 
systematic psychological intimidation; and to detention or imprisonment 
in cells with common and violent criminals, sexually aggressive 
inmates, or state security agents posing as prisoners.
    There are separate prison facilities for women and for minors.
    Prison officials regularly denied prisoners other rights, such as 
the right to correspondence, and continued to confiscate medications 
and food brought by family members for political prisoners. Prison 
authorities also routinely denied religious workers access to detainees 
and prisoners.
    Political prisoners are required to comply with the rules for 
common criminals and often are punished severely if they refuse. They 
often are placed in punishment cells and held in isolation. Detainees 
and prisoners often are subjected to repeated vigorous interrogations 
designed to coerce them into signing incriminating statements, to force 
collaboration with authorities, or to intimidate victims.
    Vladimiro Roca Antunez, a member of the Internal Dissidents Working 
Group, remains in prison, and was moved from solitary confinement in 
early July to a section of the prison for common prisoners. Prison 
officials denied Roca prison furloughs over weekends, which were 
granted to the three other members of the group before their release in 
May (see Section 1.e.).
    The authorities took Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet to a prison in Holguin, 
located about 450 miles from Havana where his family lives, immediately 
following his 1-day trial in February. On June 7, Biscet was placed in 
a ``punishment cell'' and could not receive visitors nor receive food, 
clothes, or publications. He was not allowed to take any reading 
materials to the punishment cell, not even the Bible. The authorities 
allegedly placed Biscet in a punishment cell because he started a 6-
hour fast to commemorate the 40 days of fasting that he started on June 
7, 1999, in an apartment on Tamarindo 34 in the 10th of October 
municipality in Havana. On July 1, Biscet left the punishment cell; 
however, authorities sent him back to the punishment cell again when he 
announced his intention to fast on July 13 in honor of the Cubans who 
died when the 13th of March tugboat sank in 1994. Prison authorities 
reportedly told Biscet that such actions were disruptive of prison life 
and could lead to violence. Biscet served 42 days in solitary 
confinement. In November prison authorities punished Biscet again, this 
time for protesting inadequate medical attention for 10 common 
prisoners suffering from diarrhea. Guards allegedly denied him food 
that his family brought and refused to allow a scheduled family visit. 
Biscet still was imprisoned at year's end.
    From May 24 to June 1, political prisoners Jorge Garcia Perez 
(Antunez) conducted a hunger strike to protest the lack of medical 
attention, the arbitrary removal of books and literature, including the 
Bible, and suspension of family visits. He reportedly received improved 
treatment from prison officials following the hunger strike.
    On August 22, the parents of Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez reported 
that he was placed in a punishment cell in the provincial prison of 
Canaleta in Ciego de Avila. Prison officials did not allow him to have 
any literature, including the Bible.
    Although no longer in solitary confinement in a punishment cell, 
Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, who was president of the National Council 
for Civil Rights in Cuba and who has been imprisoned since 1994 on 
charges of espionage and disrespect, refuses to see family members 
until prison officials guarantee that he can receive visits from his 
family members once a month, in accordance with prison regulations. 
Presently Chaviano and his wife exchange letters.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions by international or national human rights monitoring groups. 
The Government has refused to allow prison visits by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1989 and continues to refuse 
requests to renew such visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention continued to be problems, and they remained the Government's 
most effective weapons for harassing opponents. The Law of Penal 
Procedures requires police to file formal charges and either release a 
detainee or bring the case before a prosecutor within 96 hours of 
arrest. It also requires the authorities to provide suspects with 
access to a lawyer within 7 days of arrest. However, the Constitution 
states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to 
anyone who actively opposes the decision of the Cuban people to build 
socialism. The authorities routinely invoke this sweeping authority to 
deny due process to those detained on purported state security grounds.
    The authorities routinely engage in arbitrary arrest and detention 
of human rights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats, 
and degrading treatment and unsanitary conditions for hours or days at 
a time. A survey by the illegal nongovernmental organization (NGO) the 
Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported 
that the Government sanctioned or processed 368 persons for political 
motives in 1999. Amnesty International (AI) further recognized the 
increase of arrests and harassment of dissidents at year's end, 
particularly around the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, when the authorities arrested approximately 200 persons 
to prevent them from participating in a celebration of that 
anniversary. Human rights activists characterized this escalation as 
the worst in a decade. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the 
Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation, said that 
he especially was disturbed about the new and unlawful methods that the 
security forces used to harass dissidents, including the use of force 
when arresting activists.
    For example, the police arrested Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona, an 
independent journalist, and Pedro Pablo Hernandez Mijares during a 
birthday party celebration for Noel Ascanio Montero in Guines. The 
police beat Rolando Arroyo, confiscated his cassette recorder (he is an 
independent journalist) and $15. Police subsequently left the two men 
on the side of a road, far from Guines. The men returned to Guines and 
went to the local police station to lodge a formal complaint against 
the police, but instead were again driven away and left on the road 
more than 20 miles away. On returning to Guines in the early morning, 
Rolando Arroyo again went to the police station, but police intercepted 
him and took him to the next municipality of Guanajay.
    In December 1999, police detained Jose Aguilar Hernandez and Carlos 
Oquendo Rodriguez of the July 13 Movement, Diosdado Gonzalez Marrero of 
the Peace, Love, and Liberty Party, and Marcel Valenzuela Salt of the 
Brotherly Civic Organization when they attempted to demonstrate during 
the religious festivities in honor of St. Lazarus, near the small town 
of El Rincon, near Havana. On June 13, the authorities released the 
four men.
    In December 1999, the authorities arrested Maritza Lugo Fernandez, 
the vice president of the Democratic November 30 Party and released her 
only on June 2. Maritza Lugo had been released from jail in August 
1999, then was detained various times before her subsequent arrest in 
December 1999. When Maritza Lugo was released, state security officials 
told her to prepare the papers for the departure of her family, 
including her husband, Rafael Ibarra Roque, who still was in jail. 
However, in December the authorities again arrested Maritza Lugo and 
detained her until year's end without filing charges against her.
    The authorities continued to detain human rights activists and 
independent journalists for short periods, often to prevent them from 
attending or participating in events related to human rights issues. 
The authorities also placed such activists under house arrest for short 
periods for similar reasons.
    On January 13, security personnel impeded a number of human rights 
activists and independent journalists from attending the trial of 
independent journalist Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona. Victor Rolando 
received a 6-month jail sentence for allegedly hoarding toys. He bought 
toys to distribute to poor children on January 6. The Government 
confined Juan Carlos Perez Arencibia, Feliciano Alvarez, and Cecilio 
Gonzalez to their homes so that they could not attend Arroyo's trial in 
Pinar del Rio. In 1996 Arroyo Carmona served a 1-year and 9 months' 
prison term for showing disrespect to authorities.
    On January 25, police detained Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, president of 
the Christian Liberation Movement and Hector Palacios Ruiz, director of 
the Center for Social Studies. According to Elizardo Sanchez Santa 
Cruz, the two were detained to prevent a meeting from taking place at 
Palacios' house regarding ``All United,'' a document that was issued 
just before the Ninth Ibero-American Summit in November 1999 in Havana. 
The police also detained a number of other dissidents, including Jose 
Orlando Gonzalez Bridon, Secretary General of the Confederation of the 
Democratic Workers Union of Cuba, and an independent journalist; all 
were released the same afternoon. Police had detained Bridon on January 
20 and questioned him about his journalistic activities.
    State Security officers detained human rights activists and 
independent journalists, including Alejandro Chang of the Movement of 
Fraternal Brothers for Dignity; Nelson Aquiar Ramirez of the Orthodox 
Party, Maria A. Garcia Delgado of the Movement of 24 February, Carlos 
Alberto Dominguez of the November 30 Democratic Party, Carlos Rios of 
Change 2000, Clara Morales Martinez of the July 13 Movement, Angel 
Polanco, Rafael Peraza, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, and Jose 
Antonio Fornaris Ramos to make sure they did not attend the 1-day 
public trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Eduardo Diaz Fleitas, and 
Fermin Scull Zulueta, which took place on February 25 in Havana. In 
addition, the authorities told many dissidents and independent 
journalists not to attend. The authorities ordered prominent dissident 
Jesus Yanez Pelletier not to leave his house, and placed guards outside 
to ensure compliance. Others who were ordered to stay in their homes 
were Maria Esther Suarez Valdes of the Confederation of Democratic 
Workers Union of Cuba; Ileana Gonzalez of the Democratic Party November 
30; Ruben Camalleri of the Movement of February 24; Carlos Raul Jimenez 
Carrero of Nationalist Agenda; and Odilia Collazo Valdes of the Pro-
Human Rights Party of Cuba. The authorities placed independent 
journalists Omar Rodriguez Saludes and Jorge Olivera Castillo under 1-
day house arrest.
    On May 24, security police detained four human rights activists who 
were on their way to deliver a letter requesting better prison 
conditions for political prisoners to prison authorities in Vedado, 
Havana. The letter also protested Dr. Biscet's incarceration 450 miles 
away from his family. Police detained Armando Dominguez and Iosvani 
Aquilar Camejo of the Movement of Fraternal Brothers for Dignity, and 
Alejandro Chang Cantillo and Marlon Cabrera of the Brotherly Civic 
Movement. On October 23, the police released Marlon Cabrera Rivero and 
Alejandro Chang Cantillo; they released Armando Dominguez Gonzalez on 
October 20 and Iosvani Aquilar Camejo on October 30. The authorities 
also fined Aguilar Camejo about $30 (600 pesos) for disturbing the 
peace in the prison.
    On June 29, the police arrested Rafael Iturralde Bello, president 
of the Libertad independent agricultural cooperative in Santiago de 
Cuba, outside a bus station in Pinar del Rio. They arrested Iturralde 
before he could meet with other members of the National Association of 
Independent Farmers of Cuba in Pinar del Rio. They released Iturralde 
24 hours later and placed him on a bus to Santiago de Cuba.
    As in previous years, on July 13, police prevented activists from 
commemorating in any way the 1994 incident in which 41 persons drowned 
when the Border Guard sank the 13th of March tugboat (see Section 
1.a.). Beginning on July 12, police detained activists in a number of 
provinces, and ordered others to remain in their homes on July 13. The 
authorities told dissidents that if they did not obey they would be 
prosecuted for illegal assembly and distribution of enemy propaganda, 
or for incitement to rebellion. In Santiago de Cuba, more than 80 state 
security agents reportedly attacked about 30 dissidents who had thrown 
bouquets of flowers into the ocean in honor of those who died in 1994. 
State Security agents allegedly also beat women in the group. Security 
agents accused the dissidents of being thieves and delinquents (see 
Section 2.b.).
    On July 21, the authorities also prevented activists in Santiago de 
Cuba, including independent journalist Luis Alberto Rivera and Fidel 
Soria Torres and Ivette Rodriguez Manzanares of the MSC, from attending 
the trial of Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of 
the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy. The two men were charged 
with disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder. On 
August 15, the court gave Rodriguez a 6-year prison sentence and 
sentenced Mena to 5 years in prison (see Section 1.e.).
    On September 8, security police ordered a number of human rights 
activists not to attend the annual procession in honor of the Virgin of 
Charity (see Section 2.c.).
    The Penal Code includes the concept of ``dangerousness,'' defined 
as the ``special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated 
by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.'' If the 
police decide that a person exhibits signs of dangerousness, they may 
bring the offender before a court or subject him to therapy or 
political reeducation. Government authorities regularly threaten 
prosecution under this article. Both the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) and the IACHR have criticized this concept for its 
subjectivity, the summary nature of the judicial proceedings employed, 
the lack of legal safeguards, and the political considerations behind 
its application. According to the IACHR, the so-called special 
inclination to commit crimes referred to in the Criminal Code amounts 
to a subjective criterion used by the Government to justify violations 
of the rights to individual freedom and due process of persons whose 
sole crime has been an inclination to hold a view different from the 
official view.
    On August 8, police summoned Manuel Lantigua Dominguez, a member of 
the dissident Council of Cuban Workers (CUTC) in the province of 
Guantanamo, to the local police office. After taking his photograph and 
fingerprints, the police told Lantigua that a case on charges of 
dangerousness would be opened against him.
    The Government also used exile as a tool for controlling and 
eliminating the internal opposition. AI has noted that the Government 
detains human rights activists repeatedly for short periods and 
threatens them with imprisonment unless they gave up their activities 
or left the country. The Government used these incremental aggressive 
tactics to compel Ruben Ruiz Armenteros, vice president of the Human 
Rights Party of Cuba, to leave the country on September 28. On October 
26, Orestes Rodriguez Horruitiner, president of the MSC, also left the 
country. Rodriguez had been imprisoned from July 1997 to April 7.
    The Government also has pressured imprisoned human rights activists 
and political prisoners to apply for emigration and regularly 
conditioned their release on acceptance of exile. HRW observed that the 
Government routinely invokes forced exile as a condition for prisoner 
releases and also pressures activists to leave the country to escape 
future prosecution.
    AI has expressed particular concern about the Government's practice 
of threatening to charge, try, and imprison human rights advocates and 
independent journalists prior to arrest or sentencing if they did not 
leave the country. According to AI, this practice ``effectively 
prevents those concerned from being able to act in public life in their 
own country.''
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
independent courts; however, it explicitly subordinates the courts to 
the ANPP and the Council of State, which is headed by Fidel Castro. The 
ANPP and its lower level counterparts choose all judges. The 
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party, which the 
Constitution designates as the superior directive force of the society 
and the State further compromises the judiciary's independence. The 
courts undermine the right to a fair trial by restricting the right to 
a defense and often failed to observe the few due process rights 
available to defendants.
    Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and supreme court 
levels. Panels composed of a mix of professionally certified and lay 
judges preside over them. Military tribunals assume jurisdiction for 
certain counterrevolutionary cases.
    The law and trial practices do not meet international standards for 
fair public trials. Almost all cases are tried in less than a day; 
there are no jury trials. While most trials are public, trials are 
closed when there are alleged violations of state security. Prosecutors 
may introduce testimony from a CDR member about the revolutionary 
background of a defendant, which may contribute to either a longer or 
shorter sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal 
courts but limits it in provincial courts to cases such as those 
involving maximum prison terms or the death penalty. Appeals in death 
penalty cases are automatic. The death penalty ultimately must be 
affirmed by the Council of State.
    Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases of human 
rights advocates, are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the sole 
evidence provided, particularly in political cases, is the defendant's 
confession, usually obtained under duress and without the legal advice 
or knowledge of a defense lawyer. The authorities regularly deny 
defendants access to their lawyers until the day of the trial. Several 
dissidents who have served prison terms reported that they were tried 
and sentenced without counsel and were not allowed to speak on their 
own behalf. AI concluded in 1996 that ``trials in all cases fall far 
short of international standards for a fair trial.''
    The law provides the accused with the right to an attorney, but the 
control that the Government exerts over the livelihood of members of 
the state-controlled lawyers' collectives--especially when they defend 
persons accused of state security crimes--compromises their ability to 
represent clients. Attorneys have reported reluctance to defend those 
charged in political cases due to fear of jeopardizing their own 
careers.
    In January a Havana court reaffirmed the 4-year prison term for 
dangerousness imposed in 1998 on Lazaro Constantin Duran, leader of the 
Friends Club of an independent teachers' organization. On January 18, a 
court sentenced independent journalist Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez to 4 
years imprisonment for dangerousness (see Section 2.a.).
    On February 25, diplomats and members of the international press 
attended the 1-day trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, president of the 
Lawton Foundation for Human Rights. Biscet was convicted of disrespect, 
creating a public disturbance by hanging a Cuban flag upside down 
during a press conference in his home, and encouraging others to 
violate the law. In his opening statement, Biscet denied all charges 
against him, and insisted that he was a nonviolent activist for human 
rights. The three judge panel heard six witnesses and listened to the 
opening and closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense 
attorney. The court sentenced Biscet to 3 years in prison (less than 
the 7 years the prosecution sought). The same court sentenced Fermin 
Scull Zulueta to 1 year in prison, and released Eduardo Diaz Fleitas. 
The latter two men were charged with insulting national symbols, 
creating a public disturbance, and instigating a crime. The authorities 
transferred Biscet to the Cuba Si prison in Holguin (see Section 1.c.). 
The authorities detained and prevented human rights activists and 
independent journalists from attending the trial (see Section 1.d.).
    On July 13, prison authorities accused Egberto Angel Escobedo 
Morales, serving a 24-year sentence for the crimes of espionage, 
propagating enemy propaganda, and theft of the additional crimes of 
disrespect and causing disturbances in a penitentiary. The prosecution 
requested an additional 20-year sentence.
    On July 21, in Santiago de Cuba, Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy 
Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy went 
on trial for disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder. 
On August 15, Rodriguez received a 6-year prison sentence, while Mena 
was sentenced to 5 years in prison.
    During the year, three of the four members of the Internal 
Dissident Working Group received conditional release from prison--Felix 
Antonio Bonne Carcasses, on May 12; Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, on 
May 15; and Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, on May 23. Police arrested the 
four persons in July 1997 for expressing peacefully their disagreement 
with the Government. In September 1998, they were charged with acts 
against the security of the state in relation to the crime of sedition. 
Despite the prosecution's demand for sentences from 5 to 6 years, Felix 
Bonne and Rene Gomez received a 4-year jail sentence while Martha 
received a 3-1/2 year sentence. The fourth member of the group, 
Vladimiro Roca Antunez, received a 5-year sentence. In early July, Roca 
was moved from solitary confinement to a section of the prison for 
common prisoners; he remained in prison at year's end.
    Human rights monitoring groups inside the country estimate the 
number of political prisoners at between 300 and 400 persons. On July 
16, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation 
reported that 314 persons were in prison for political reasons. The 
authorities have imprisoned persons on charges such as disseminating 
enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the authorities 
(usually for criticizing Fidel Castro), clandestine printing, or the 
broad charge of rebellion, which is often brought against advocates of 
peaceful democratic change.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Although the Constitution provides for the 
inviolability of a citizen's home and correspondence, official 
surveillance of private and family affairs by government-controlled 
mass organizations, such as the CDR's, remains one of the most 
pervasive and repressive features of daily life. The State has assumed 
the right to interfere in the lives of citizens, even those who do not 
actively oppose the Government and its practices. The mass 
organizations' ostensible purpose is to improve the citizenry, but in 
fact their goal is to discover and discourage nonconformity. Citizen 
participation in these mass organizations has declined; the economic 
crisis both has reduced the Government's ability to provide material 
incentives for their participation and has forced many persons to 
engage in black market activities, which the mass organizations are 
supposed to report to the authorities.
    The authorities utilize a wide range of social controls.
    The Interior Ministry employs an intricate system of informants and 
block committees (the CDR's) to monitor and control public opinion. 
While less capable than in the past, CDR's continue to report on 
suspicious activity, including conspicuous consumption; unauthorized 
meetings, including those with foreigners; and defiant attitudes toward 
the Government and the revolution.
    The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all 
electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. The Department of 
State Security often reads international correspondence and monitors 
overseas telephone calls and conversations with foreigners. The 
Government also monitors domestic phone calls and correspondence.
    In January the authorities dismissed Teidy Betancourt Gonzalez from 
her job as an assistant teacher in a kindergarten because her husband, 
Ruben Perez Pons, a member of the Democratic Action group in Sancti 
Spiritus, is a dissident. On April 29, the authorities expelled from 
his workplace Jose Carlos Malina Gonzalez, conditionally released from 
jail, because he refused to participate in a government-sponsored 
public event for the return of Elian Gonzalez Brotons. The 
administrator of Molina's workplace threatened to inform the police so 
that he could be returned to prison.
    In August Romilio de Jesus Garcia Mauri, member of the Club of 
Prisoners and Former Political Prisoners, was convoked three times to 
appear at the local police station in Santiago de Cuba for possible 
drug trafficking. Every time Mauri arrived at the police station, he 
was asked to submit a writing test for examination. On August 10, 
police detained Yuri Tier Pineiro on the La Victoria beach in the 
province of Sancti Spiritus and interrogated him for 3 days about the 
political activities of his father, Marcelo Tier Perez, and his older 
brother Marcelo Tier Pineiro, members of the Democratic Solidarity 
Party. He himself is not a political activist.
    There were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of 
squatters and residents who lacked official permission to reside in 
Havana (see Section 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government does not allow 
criticism of the revolution or its leaders. Laws against antigovernment 
propaganda, graffiti, and disrespect of officials carry penalties of 
between 3 months and 1 year in prison. If President Castro or members 
of the National Assembly or Council of State are the objects of 
criticism, the sentence can be extended to 3 years. Charges of 
disseminating enemy propaganda (which includes merely expressing 
opinions at odds with those of the Government) can bring sentences of 
up to 14 years. In the Government's view, such materials as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international reports of human 
rights violations, and mainstream foreign newspapers and magazines 
constitute enemy propaganda. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of speech by 
monitoring and reporting dissent or criticism. Police and state 
security officials regularly harassed, threatened, and otherwise abused 
human rights advocates in public and private as a means of intimidation 
and control.
    The Constitution states that print and electronic media are state 
property and cannot become in any case private property. The Communist 
Party controls all media--except a few small church-run publications. 
Even the church-run publications, denied access to mass printing 
equipment, are subject to governmental pressure. In particular, the 
Government publicly criticized the publisher of the magazine Vitral, a 
publication of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, twice during the year; 
President Castro had criticized publicly an article that the magazine 
printed in 1999. The Government reported extensively on Vitral articles 
and on the publisher's activities and contacts, which it labeled as 
counterrevolutionary. As of October, Vitral had not been shut down, but 
as of year's end, the Church was still being subjected to considerable 
pressure to avoid political topics.
    The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all 
electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. Citizens do not 
have the right to receive publications from abroad, although newsstands 
in hotels for foreigners and certain hard currency stores sell foreign 
newspapers and magazines. The Government continued to jam the 
transmission of Radio Marti and Television Marti. Radio Marti 
broadcasts generally overcame the jamming attempts on short-wave bands, 
but its medium-wave transmissions are blocked completely in Havana. 
Security agents subjected dissidents, foreign diplomats, and 
journalists to harassment and surveillance, including electronic 
surveillance.
    All media must operate under party guidelines and reflect 
government views. The Government attempts to shape media coverage to 
such a degree that it not only continued to exert pressure on domestic 
journalists but also kept up a steady barrage of pressure on groups 
normally outside the official realm of control, such as visiting 
international correspondents. Fidel Castro continued to criticize 
publicly the international press, often by name.
    Resident foreign correspondents reported that the very high-level 
of government pressure experienced in 1999, including official and 
informal complaints about articles, threatening phone calls, and lack 
of access to officials, continued throughout the year. The Government 
strengthened its ability to control the foreign press by ceasing to 
issue multiple entry visas to journalists from foreign press 
organizations who reside in Havana. Such journalists are now required 
to apply for a new visa each time they leave the country.
    In August Radio Moron, a small government-run radio station in the 
central part of the country, dismissed the host of one of its programs 
after he read on the air a poem by Raul Rivero (founder and director of 
the Cuba Press news agency).
    The 1999 Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy 
outlaws a broad range of activities as undermining state security, and 
toughens penalties for criminal activity. Under the law, anyone caught 
possessing or disseminating literature deemed subversive, or supplying 
information that could be used by U.S. authorities in the application 
of U.S. legislation, is subject to fines and to prison terms of 7 to 20 
years. While many activities between Cuban nationals and foreigners 
possibly could fall within the purview of this new law, it appears to 
be aimed primarily at independent journalists.
    This law increased the penalties and broadened the definitions of 
activities covered by the 1996 Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty Act, which 
already proscribed citizens from providing information to any 
representatives of the U.S. Government, or seeking any information from 
them, that might be used directly or indirectly in the application of 
U.S. legislation against the Government. This includes accepting or 
distributing Publications, documents or other material from any origin, 
which the authorities might interpret as facilitating implementation of 
such legislation.
    The Government continued to threaten independent journalists, 
either anonymously or openly, with arrest and conviction based on the 
new law. Some journalists have been threatened repeatedly since the law 
took effect. Independent journalists noted that the law's very 
existence had some effect on their activities and increased self 
censorship, and some noted that it is the Government's most effective 
tool to harass members of the independent press.
    In February 1999, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon told 
foreign correspondents that under the new law, even reporters working 
for accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years in 
prison if the information they publish is deemed to serve U.S. 
interests.
    The Government continues to subject independent journalists to 
internal travel bans, arbitrary and periodic detentions (overnight or 
longer), harassment of family and friends, seizures of computers, 
office and photographic equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged 
imprisonment (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Independent 
journalists in Havana reported that threatening phone calls and 
harassment of family members continued during the year. More than 20 
independent journalists experienced varying degrees of harassment, and 
certain individuals appear to have been singled out. Since January 
dozens of reporters were repeatedly detained, some for several days. 
Authorities also placed journalists under house arrest to prevent them 
from reporting on conferences sponsored by human rights activists, 
human rights events, and court cases against activists.
    Family members have lost their jobs because they refuse to condemn 
or inform on these so-called counterrevolutionaries (see Section 1.f.). 
Acts of intimidation have been reported less frequently since 1999. 
However, police have tried more often to prevent independent 
journalists from covering so-called sensitive events.
    In January an unidentified assailant attacked Mary Miranda, of Cuba 
Press, and beat her unconscious.
    In February police briefly detained Edel Garcia, Director of the 
Centro Norte del Pais agency, as he left church after attending a 
memorial Mass for the Brothers to the Rescue pilots who were aboard 
planes that the air force shot down in 1996. Police frequently stop 
Garcia on fabricated traffic violations. Garcia's wife receives weekly 
death threats and his teenage daughters are harassed with increasing 
frequency. Garcia has a criminal trial pending, but the date and the 
charges are as yet not known. Charges that have been mentioned include: 
insulting the President, illicit association, collaboration with the 
enemy, spreading false news, and espionage.
    In February security officials ordered several journalists to 
remain home and not to attend the trial of a member of the opposition. 
Jose Antonio Fornaris, of Agencia Cuba Verdad, refused to stay home; 
the police detained him at the local jail for the entire day.
    In March the University of Havana expelled the daughter of Maria de 
los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, Director of the Union de Periodistas y 
Escritores Cubanos Independientes, after a university dean warned her 
not to follow in her mother's footsteps. In September on two occasions, 
security officials intimidated Mrs. Gonzalez in her home.
    In April the Government's Juventud Rebelde newspaper accused Raul 
Rivero, Tania Quintero, Manuel David Orrio, Lucas Garve, and Vicente 
Escobal of being counterrevolutionary leaders.
    In May the authorities went to the home of Manuel Vasquez Portal, 
Director of Agencia Decoro, who was scheduled to speak that day on 
``Globalization and Culture'' at the Centro de Estudios Sociales. Two 
officials from State Security threatened Vazquez with detention if he 
give his speech. State Security officials also visited 17 other persons 
and told them not to attend the speech.
    In July the authorities confiscated equipment (video cameras, 
camera, and cassette recorders) and all office supplies from the 
Agencia Yara in Bayamo.
    In August police detained Ricardo Arabi Jimenez, director of 
Agencia Yara, for attending a meeting about organizing the first 
congress of independent trade unions by the CUTC, scheduled to be held 
in October (see Section 6.a.).
    In September Dorca Cespedes, Havana Press reporter, was told by the 
director of her daughter's day care center, that the toddler could no 
longer attend. The authorities had instructed the director not to care 
for the child due to the mother's counterrevolutionary activities.
    In September the security police took octogenarian Nestor Baguer, 
independent journalist and founder of the original Independent Press 
Agency of Cuba, to a private home in Havana where he was questioned 
about his activities. The authorities also made calls to contacts of 
Baguer to invite them to a meeting at his home. The authorities then 
went to Baguer's home to inform him that they knew about the alleged 
meeting.
    In September individuals posing as vandals, but thought to be 
security officials, threw rocks at the home of Juan Tellez, Agencia 
Libertad.
    In September the authorities jailed Joaquin Cabeza de Leon in 
Camaguey because he helped to organize a literary award ceremony.
    In September police arrested brothers Jesus and Jadir Hernandez 
Hernandez, of Havana-Press, in Guines, and charged them with illegal 
trafficking in persons and collaboration with a foreign diplomatic 
mission. For several weeks, both men had been disseminating information 
about the unification of several dissident groups in Havana Province. 
In October authorities again threatened the brothers and their family 
members.
    In October a security official showed a photograph to Dr. Jose Luis 
Garcia, Agencia Libertad, in which Garcia was conversing with a man 
that he had just casually met. Garcia was told that the man was a 
member of state security and that the photograph would be shown to 
other members of the opposition to make it look like Garcia was 
actually collaborating with state security.
    In October the police detained Jesus Alvarez Castillo and Pedro 
Duque, Cuba Press correspondents from Ciego de Avila, in front of the 
office of Cuba Press and accused them of involvement in a murder. The 
authorities later dismissed the accusation as a case of mistaken 
identity.
    The authorities often confiscate equipment when arresting 
journalists, especially photographic and recording equipment. It is now 
possible to buy a fax machine or computer, payable in dollars; if a 
receipt can be produced, this equipment is usually not confiscated. 
Photocopiers and printers are impossible to find on the local market, 
which makes them a particularly valuable commodity for journalists. A 
fax machine that a friend brought from overseas for journalist Reinaldo 
Cosano Alen, arrived damaged and was not usable after 10 days in 
Customs. Equipment lost due to burglary also has been reported. In 
January unidentified persons entered the home of journalist Juan 
Gonzalez Febles and stole his tape recorder, recorded tapes, and 
several articles. In August a couple posing as employees of Cuba Press 
stole all the documents, books, and office materials collected by the 
agency after the owner of the premises had asked the agency to move due 
to pressure from the police.
    Outside the capital of Havana, independent journalists reported 
that detentions, threats, and harassment are more severe than in the 
capital.
    AI, HRW, the IAPA, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), and the 
Committee to Protect Journalists repeatedly called international 
attention to the Government's continued practice of detaining 
independent journalists and others simply for exercising their right to 
free speech (see Section 1.d.).
    In June the IAPA called on the Government to provide medical 
treatment to two independent journalists serving prison sentences. Joel 
de Jesus Diaz, in prison in Ciego de Avila, was suffering from 
hepatitis and Manuel Antonio Gonzalez Castellanos in Holguin was 
suffering from severe influenza and possibly tuberculosis. The IAPA 
also called for the release of independent journalists Victor Rolando 
Arroyo and Bernardo Arevalo Pardon, both of whom are serving prison 
sentences (see Section 1.c.).
    In July police detained Ricardo Gonzalez, RSF correspondent, for 6 
hours as they tried to coerce him to collaborate with them. In August 
French journalist Martine Jacot, sent by RSF to the country, was in 
contact with a dozen independent journalists in Havana and Ciego de 
Avila. She also met with the families of two of the three journalists 
currently in prison. On August 17, just before she was to leave the 
country, security police arrested her, questioned her at the Havana 
airport, and seized a video camera, two videotapes, and documents. The 
police never returned this equipment to RSF.
    In August the authorities detained three Swedish journalists and 
later expelled them from the country. The journalists had met with 
independent journalists and had organized a seminar for two groups of 
independent journalists. The authorities said that the journalists, 
including Martine Jacot, violated immigration laws by traveling on 
tourist visas, instead of traveling on visas issued to journalists.
    Distribution of information continues to be controlled tightly. 
Importation of foreign literature is controlled, and the public has no 
access to foreign magazines or newspapers. Leading members of the 
Government have indicated that citizens do not read foreign newspapers 
and magazines to obtain news because they do not speak English and they 
have access to the daily televised round tables on issues with which 
they need to concern themselves. Access to computers is limited. E-mail 
use is growing slowly as the Government incrementally allows access to 
more users; however, the Government generally controls its use, and 
only very few persons or groups have access. The Government opened a 
national gateway to some journalists, artists, and municipal-level 
youth community centers, but the authorities still restrict the types 
and numbers of international sites that can be accessed.
    Independent journalist Reinaldo Cosano Alen received a letter from 
Customs informing him that two magazines were confiscated for being 
counterrevolutionary. Customs also confiscated several editions of the 
Cartas de Cuba magazine that were addressed to independent journalist 
Tania Quintero Antunez.
    The Government officially prohibits all diplomatic missions in 
Havana from printing or distributing publications, particularly 
newspapers and newspaper clippings, unless these publications deal 
exclusively with conditions in a mission's home country and prior 
Government approval is received. Many missions do not accept this 
requirement and send materials out liberally; however, the Government's 
threats to expel embassy officers who provide published materials had a 
chilling effect on some missions.
    The Government restricts literary and academic freedoms and 
continued to emphasize the importance of reinforcing revolutionary 
ideology and discipline over any freedom of expression. The educational 
system teaches that the State's interests have precedence over all 
other commitments. Academics and other government officials are 
prohibited from meeting with some diplomats without prior approval from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Education requires 
teachers to evaluate students' and their parents' ideological 
character, and note such evaluations in school record that students 
carry throughout their schooling. These reports directly affect the 
students' educational and career prospects. As a matter of policy, the 
Government demands that teaching materials for courses such as 
mathematics or literature have an ideological content. Government 
efforts to undermine dissidents include denying them advanced education 
and professional opportunities. Fidel Castro has stated publicly that 
the universities are available only to those who share his 
revolutionary beliefs.
    Artistic expression is less restricted. The Government encourages 
the cultural community to attain the highest international standards in 
order to sell its work overseas for hard currency. However, the 
Government began implementing a program in the fall called ``Broadening 
of Culture'' that ties art, socialism, and modern ``revolutionary'' 
ideology and legends into its own vision of culture. The Government 
uses the government media and the schools to impose this vision on the 
public, particularly the youth.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the 
Constitution grants limited rights of assembly and association, these 
rights are subject to the requirement that they may not be ``exercised 
against the existence and objectives of the Socialist State.'' The law 
punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons, 
including those for private religious services in a private home, by up 
to 3 months in prison and a fine. The authorities selectively enforce 
this prohibition and often use it as a legal pretext to harass and 
imprison human rights advocates.
    The Government's policy of selectively authorizing the Catholic 
Church to hold outdoor processions at specific locations on important 
feast days continued during the year. For the third consecutive year, 
it permitted a procession in connection with Masses in celebration of 
the feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana on September 8. The 
Government also authorized other denominations to hold a few public 
events in late November. However, the Government continued routinely 
and arbitrarily to deny requests for other processions and events. Just 
before Holy Week, the Government informed Catholic Church officials 
that no processions would be allowed. When the Church made this 
information public, state officials changed their position and decided 
that churches that had requested permission for a procession could 
proceed.
    The authorities have never approved a public meeting by a human 
rights group. On February 22, state security officers detained 
prodemocracy activists in different parts of the country to prevent 
them from staging activities commemorating the February 24, 1996, 
shootdown of two civilian aircraft over international airspace by the 
air force. Security agents also warned many more activists against 
staging any public demonstrations on February 24, and warned 
independent journalists not to cover such incidents.
    In early August, security agents detained in Havana leaders of the 
Council of Cuban Workers from various provinces to ensure that members 
could not hold a preparatory meeting for the CUTC's first congress. 
Although scheduled to take place in October, it never was held. On 
October 13, state security arrested Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, the 
Secretary General of the CUTC, as he was about to conduct a press 
conference. At year's end, he remained in jail without being charged.
    On August 15, state security informed a number of activists not to 
gather in the cemetery in Havana in honor of Eduardo Chibas, a well-
known politician of the 1940's and early 1950's.
    A march from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church 
of La Merced and which was organized by dissidents for the release of 
political prisoners on September 17 did not take place because of 
police intimidation and detentions.
    On September 25, police again prevented a number of activists from 
marching from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church of 
Mercedes. Police took the activists to a police station to review their 
identification documents.
    On November 2, the Day of the Dead, state security personnel 
prevented activists from entering the chapel in Havana's Colon Cemetery 
where a number of human rights activists are buried.
    On November 10, police in Santiago de Cuba prevented activists from 
marching from the Plaza de Marte in honor of the first anniversary of 
the attempt to demonstrate in Dolores Park in Havana.
    During the year the Government organized a number of marches and 
rallies in front of diplomatic missions. The Government mobilizes 
thousand of persons in these marches, including school children and 
workers. Anyone who does not attend the event can be easily identified 
since persons congregate at certain points from factories or schools. 
Sometimes small identification papers are given to participants; they 
must present these papers to their immediate supervisor or school 
officials the next day to demonstrate that they attended the rally.
    The Government generally denies citizens freedom of association. 
The Penal Code specifically outlaws illegal or unrecognized groups. The 
Minister of Justice, in consultation with the Interior Ministry, 
decides whether to give organizations legal recognition. The 
authorities have never approved the existence of a human rights group. 
However, there are a number of professional associations that operate 
as NGO's but without legal recognition. For example, some scientists 
formed the Zoological Society, and some teachers established an 
Association of Independent Teachers.
    Along with recognized churches, the Roman Catholic humanitarian 
organization Caritas, the Masonic Lodge, small human rights groups, and 
a number of nascent fraternal or professional organizations are the 
only associations outside the control or influence of the State, the 
Communist Party, and their mass organizations. With the exception of 
the Masons, who have been established in the country for more than a 
century, the authorities continue to ignore those groups' applications 
for legal recognition, thereby subjecting members to potential charges 
of illegal association. All other legally recognized nongovernmental 
groups are at least nominally affiliated with, or controlled by the 
Government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution recognizes the right of 
citizens to profess and practice any religious belief, within the 
framework of respect for the law; however, in law and in practice, the 
Government continues to restrict freedom of religion.
    In 1991 the Government allowed religious adherents to join the 
Communist Party. In 1992 it amended the Constitution to prohibit 
religious discrimination and removed references to ``scientific 
materialism,'' i.e., atheism, as the basis for the State. Members of 
the armed forces do not attend religious services in their uniform, 
probably to avoid possible reprimand by superiors.
    The Government requires churches and other religious groups to 
register with the provincial registry of associations within the 
Ministry of the Interior to obtain official recognition. In practice, 
the Government refuses to recognize new denominations. The Government 
prohibits, with occasional exceptions, the construction of new 
churches, forcing many growing congregations to violate the law and 
meet in private homes. Government harassment of private houses of 
worship continued, with evangelical denominations reporting evictions 
from houses used for these purposes. According to the Cuban Council of 
Churches (CCC) officials, most of the private houses of worship that 
the Government closed were unregistered, making them technically 
illegal. In addition CCC Pentecostal members have complained about the 
preaching activities of foreign missionaries that led some of their 
members to establish new denominations without obtaining the required 
permits. Because of these complaints by the Pentecostals, the CCC has 
formally requested overseas member church organizations to assist them 
in dissuading foreign missionaries from establishing Pentecostal 
churches.
    The Government's main interaction with religious denominations is 
through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Communist Party. The 
Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor 
the country's religious institutions, including surveillance, 
infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and laypersons.
    In 1998 following Pope John Paul II's January visit, the country's 
Roman Catholic bishops called on the Government to recognize the 
Church's role in civil society and the family, as well as in the 
temporal areas of work, the economy, the arts, and the scientific and 
technical worlds. The Government continued to limit the Church's access 
to the media and refused to allow the Church to have a legal 
independent printing capability. It maintained a prohibition against 
the establishment of religious-affiliated schools. Nonetheless, in 
September local government authorities, for the third time since 1961, 
allowed the Catholic Church to hold an outdoor procession to mark the 
feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana. Although visibly present, 
state security personnel did not harass any participants or observers, 
as they did in 1998. However, prior to the event, security police 
ordered a number of human rights activists not to attend the 
procession. On December 25, 1999, the Government permitted the Catholic 
Church to hold a Christmas procession in Havana. Catholic Church 
authorities received permission to conduct the closing ceremonies for 
the jubilee year celebration and the Cuba Eucharistic Congress (the 
last one took place in 1959) on December 9 and 10. On December 9, 1,500 
children from all over the country received their first communion in 
the square outside the San Carlos Seminary. On December 10 Cardinal 
Jaime Lucas Ortega Alamino, carrying the eucharist, led a procession of 
bishops, priests, and believers from the Church of Christ (Iglesia del 
Cristo del Buen Viaje) to the San Carlos Seminary. Unlike 1999, there 
was no broadcast of the Pope's annual Christmas Day message from the 
Vatican, but it was mentioned in the evening television news.
    In 1998 the Government announced in a Politburo declaration that 
henceforth citizens would be allowed to celebrate Christmas as an 
official holiday. (The holiday had been cancelled, ostensibly to spur 
the sugar harvest, in 1969, and restored in 1997 as part of the 
preparations for the Pope's 1998 visit.) However, despite the 
Government's decision to allow citizens to celebrate Christmas as a 
national holiday, it also maintained a December 1995 decree prohibiting 
nativity scenes in public buildings.
    The Government allowed two new foreign priests to enter the country 
during the year and two to replace two priests whose visas were not 
renewed during the year. Some visas were issued only for periods from 3 
to 6 months, and the applications of many other priests and religious 
workers remain pending.
    The Government continued to enforce a resolution that prevented any 
national or joint enterprise (except those with specific authorization) 
from selling computers, fax machines, photocopiers, or other equipment 
to any church at other than official--and exorbitant--retail prices.
    On July 9, dissidents attended the Jubilee Mass for prisoners 
celebrated by Cardinal Jaime Ortega Alamino at the Church of Our Lady 
of Charity. The Church distributed leaflets that invited worshippers to 
attend the Mass and to pray for prisoners and requested former 
prisoners and prisoners on conditional release to attend. Recently 
released members of the Internal Dissident Working Group, Martha 
Beatriz Roque Cabello, Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, and Felix Antonio 
Bonne Carcasses also attended. During the ceremony a white dove was 
released from its cage, and the congregation spontaneously started to 
clap and some persons shouted ``liberty, liberty.'' State security 
officials outside the church did not intervene. The Church normally 
uses lay members to provide security at events like these. Apart from 
ensuring that people remain in their places or in the procession line 
during the service, these church guards also prevent any activities 
from taking place that could lead to a response from state security 
officials such as occurred at the July 9 Mass.
    On August 30, the independent press agency Grupo Decoro reported 
that evangelical pastor Pablo Rodriguez Oropeza and his wife Enma 
Cabrera Cabrera were evicted from the house where they had lived for 6 
years. The press agency did not report the reason for the eviction. 
Santos Osmany Dominguez Borjas, a bishop of the United Pentecostal 
Church of Cuba (Apostolic), returned to Havana after he was expelled to 
Holguin on October 8, 1999. In recent years, the Government has relaxed 
restrictions on some religious denominations, including Seventh-Day 
Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses. The CCC continues to broadcast a 
monthly 15-minute program on a national classical music radio station, 
under the condition that the program not include material of a 
political character.
    State security officials visited some priests and pastors, prior to 
significant religious events, ostensibly to warn them about dissidents; 
however, some critics claim that these visits are done in an effort to 
foster mistrust between the churches and human rights or prodemocracy 
activists. State security officers also regularly harassed, including 
inside churches and during religious ceremonies, human rights advocates 
who sought to attend religious services commemorating special feast 
days or before significant national days.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government tightly restricted 
freedom of movement. The Government generally has not imposed legal 
restrictions on domestic travel, except for persons found to be HIV-
positive, whom it initially restricts to sanatoriums for treatment and 
therapy before conditionally releasing them into the community. 
However, in recent years state security officials have forbidden human 
rights advocates and independent journalists from traveling outside 
their home provinces, and the Government also has sentenced others to 
internal exile. On December 12, a court sentenced Angel Moya Acosta to 
1 year in prison and banned him from traveling to Havana from his home 
province of Matanzas for 10 years after serving his prison term.
    In 1997 the Council of Ministers approved Decree 217, aimed at 
stemming the flow of migration from the provinces to the capital. 
Persons from other provinces may travel and visit Havana; however, they 
cannot move into the city, on the grounds that if internal migration is 
left unchecked, the city's problems regarding housing, public 
transport, water and electrical supplies will become worse. The 
Government recently noted that since the decree went into effect, 
17,000 fewer people have migrated to Havana. Police frequently check 
the identification of persons on the streets, and if someone is found 
from another province living in Havana illegally, they are fined $15 
(300 pesos) and sent back home. Fines are higher$50 (1,000 pesos) for 
those who are residing illegally in the neighborhoods of Old Havana and 
Cerro. Human rights observers noted that while the decree affected 
migration countrywide, it was targeted at individuals and families, who 
are predominantly of African descent, from the more impoverished 
eastern provinces.
    The Government imposed some restrictions on both emigration and 
temporary foreign travel. In June the Government denied an exit permit 
to Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, secretary-general of the CUTC to attend a 
labor conference in the United States organized by the AFL-CIO. No 
explanation was given. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the 
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation also was 
not allowed to leave the country. Mexico's Partido Accion Nacional 
(PAN) had invited Sanchez to witness the Mexican presidential election 
on July 2. The PAN also invited members of the Moderate Reflection 
Group, but Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Democratic Liberal 
Party and a member of the Moderate Reflection Group, said that the 
group decided not to apply for an exit permit because of lack of funds 
to pay for the application fees for exit permits. PAN also issued an 
invitation to Elizardo Sanchez to attend the inauguration of the new 
President on December 1. According to Sanchez, even though PAN 
officials requested an exit visa for him directly from the Government, 
he never received it. Similarly, the authorities denied an exit visa to 
Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Liberal Party, who was invited 
to attend the International Liberal Party's convention that took place 
in Canada in October.
    The Government did issue an exit permit to Manuel Costa Morua of 
the Socialist Movement to travel to Europe in April; Costa Morua also 
is a member of the Moderate Reflection Group.
    The Government allows the majority of persons who qualify for 
immigrant or refugee status in other countries to depart; however, in 
certain cases the authorities delay or deny exit permits, usually 
without explanation. Some denials involve professionals who have tried 
to emigrate and whom the Government subsequently banned from working in 
their occupational field. The Government refused permission to others 
because it considers their cases sensitive for political or state 
security reasons. In July 1999, the Ministry of Health issued an 
internal regulation, known as Resolution 54, that provides for the 
denial of exit permits to medical professionals, until they have 
performed 3 to 5 years of service in their profession after requesting 
permission to travel abroad. This regulation normally applied to recent 
graduates. This regulation was not published as part of the legal 
provisions, and may apply to other professionals as well.
    The Government also routinely denies exit permits to young men 
approaching the age of military service, and until they reach the age 
of 27, even when it has authorized the rest of the family to leave. 
However, in most of those cases approved for migration to the United 
States under the September 1, 1994, U.S.-Cuban migration agreement, the 
applicants eventually receive exemption from obligatory service and are 
granted exit permits.
    In September two independent journalists, Jesus Labrador, Cuba 
Press reporter, and Gustavo Cardero, (NotiCuba reporter) planned to 
leave the country as refugees until the authorities confiscated their 
exit permit.
    The Government has a policy of denying exit permission for several 
years to relatives of individuals who successfully migrated illegally 
(e.g., merchant seamen who have defected while overseas, and sports 
figures who have defected while on tour abroad).
    Migrants who travel to the United States must pay the Government a 
total of about $500 per adult and $400 per child, plus airfare. These 
government fees for medical exam, passport, and exit visa--which must 
be paid in dollars--are equivalent to about 5 years of a professional 
person's accumulated peso salary and represent a significant hardship, 
particularly for political refugees who usually are marginalized and 
have no income. In 1996 the Government agreed to allow 1,000 needy 
refugees to leave each year with reduced exit fees. However, after the 
first group of 1,000 in 1996, no further refugees have been accorded 
reduced fees. At year's end, 85 approved refugees remained in the 
country because they were unable to pay government exit fees for 
themselves and their families.
    The Penal Code provides for imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or a 
fine of $15 to $50 dollars (300 to 1,000 pesos) for unauthorized 
departures by boat or raft. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that it regards any sentence of over 1 
year for simple illegal exit as harsh and excessive. Under the terms of 
the May 2, 1995, U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, the Government agreed not 
to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international 
or U.S. waters, or from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, after 
attempting to emigrate illegally.
    In 1994 the Government eased restrictions on visits by, and 
repatriation of, Cuban emigrants. Citizens who establish residency 
abroad and who are in possession of government-issued permits to reside 
abroad may travel to the country without visas. The Government reduced 
the age of persons eligible to travel abroad from 20 to 18 years and 
extended the period for a temporary stay abroad from 6 to 11 months. In 
1995 the Government announced that emigrants who are considered not to 
have engaged in so-called hostile actions against the Government and 
who are not subject to criminal proceedings in their country of 
residence may apply at Cuban consulates for renewable, 2-year multiple-
entry travel authorizations. However, in 1999 the Government announced 
that it would deny entry permits for emigrants who had left the country 
illegally after September 1994. It remains unclear whether the 
Government actually was implementing such a policy.
    The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to individuals 
persecuted ``for their ideals or struggles for democratic rights 
against imperialism, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; against 
discrimination and racism; for national liberation; for the rights of 
workers, peasants, and students; for their progressive political, 
scientific, artistic, and literary activities; and for socialism and 
peace.'' However, the Government has no formal mechanism to process 
asylum for foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the Government honors the 
principle of first asylum and has provided it to a small number of 
persons. There was no information available on its use during the year. 
According to the UNHCR, since January the authorities received 75 
applications for refugee status within the country. Of the 75 
applicants, 24 persons were recognized as refugees. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens do not have the legal right to change their Government or 
to advocate change, and the Government retaliates systematically 
against those who seek peaceful political change. The Constitution 
proscribes any political organization other than the Communist Party. 
While the Constitution provides for direct election of provincial, 
municipal, and National Assembly members, the candidates must be 
approved in advance by mass organizations controlled by the Government. 
In practice, a small group of leaders, under the direction of President 
Castro, selects the members of the highest policy-making bodies of the 
Communist Party--the Politburo and the Central Committee.
    The authorities tightly control the selection of candidates and all 
elections for government and party positions. The candidacy committees 
are composed of members of government-controlled mass organizations 
such as the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and the CDR's and are 
responsible for selecting candidates, whose names are then sent to 
municipal assemblies that select a single candidate for each regional 
seat in the ANPP. An opposition or independent candidate has never been 
allowed to run for national office.
    In January 1998, the Government held national elections in which 
601 candidates were approved to compete for the 601 seats in the 
National Assembly. According to the official state media, the 
candidates were voted in by over 93 percent of the electorate. No 
candidates with views independent from or in opposition to the 
Government were allowed to run, and no views contrary to the Government 
or the Communist Party were expressed in the government-controlled 
national media. The Government saturated the media and used government 
ministries, Communist Party organs, and mass organizations to urge 
voters to cast a ``unified vote'' where marking one box automatically 
selected all candidates on the ballot form. In practice, the Communist 
Party approved candidates for all offices. A small minority of 
candidates did not belong formally to the Communist Party. The 
Communist Party was the only political party allowed to participate in 
the elections.
    On April 23, elections for local representatives to the municipal 
assembly were held. Government newspapers reported that 98 percent of 
voters participated in the election. Slightly more than 50 percent of 
those elected were the incumbents, 20 percent were women, and about 9 
percent of all candidates were between the ages of 16 and 30. The 
reports also claim that nationwide the number of blank ballots 
decreased from 3.2 percent to 2.8 percent, while the number of annulled 
votes also decreased to 3 percent from nearly 4 percent, compared with 
the last election. Municipal elections are held every 2-1/2 years to 
elect 14,686 local representatives to the municipal assemblies. 
Deputies to the National Assembly, delegates to the provincial 
assemblies, and members of the council of state are elected during 
general elections held every 5 years. The municipal assemblies 
constitute the lowest level of the Government's structure.
    Although not a formal requirement, Communist Party membership is in 
fact a prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional 
advancement.
    The Government rejects any change to the political system judged 
incompatible with the revolution and ignored and actively suppressed 
calls for democratic reform. Although President Castro signed the 
Declaration of Vina del Mar at the Sixth Ibero-American Summit in 1996, 
in which government leaders reaffirmed their commitment to democracy 
and political pluralism, the Government continued to oppose independent 
political activity on the ground that the national system provides a 
``perfected'' form of democracy and that pluralism exists within the 
one-party structure.
    Government leadership positions continue to be dominated by men, 
and women remain underrepresented. There are very few women or 
minorities in policymaking positions in the Government or the Party. 
There are 2 women in the 24-member Politburo, 18 in the 150-member 
Central Committee, and 166 in the 601-seat ANPP. Although blacks and 
persons of African descent make up over half the population, they hold 
only six seats in the Politburo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not recognize any domestic human rights groups, 
or permit them to function legally. The Government subjects domestic 
human rights advocates to intense intimidation, harassment, and 
repression. In violation of its own statutes, the Government refuses to 
consider applications for legal recognition submitted by human rights 
monitoring groups (see Section 2.b.).
    Dissidents generally believe that most human rights organizations 
have been infiltrated and are subjected to constant surveillance. 
Activists believe that some, perhaps many, of the dissidents are either 
state security or are persons attempting to qualify for refugee status 
to leave the country.
    In its 1997 report, the IACHR examined measures taken by the 
Government and found that they did not ``comprise the bedrock of a 
substantive reform in the present political system that would permit 
the ideological and partisan pluralism implicit in the wellspring from 
which a democratic system of government develops.'' The IACHR 
recommended that the Government provide reasonable safeguards to 
prevent violations of human rights, unconditionally release political 
prisoners and those jailed for trying to leave the country, abolish the 
concept of dangerousness in the Penal Code, eliminate other legal 
restriction on basic freedoms, cease harassing human rights groups, and 
establish a separation of powers so that the judiciary would no longer 
be subordinate to political power.
    The Government steadfastly has rejected international human rights 
monitoring. In 1992 the country's U.N. representative stated that Cuba 
would not recognize the mandate of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) on Cuba and would not cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on 
Cuba, despite being a UNCHR member. This policy remained unchanged and 
the Government refused even to acknowledge requests by the Special 
Rapporteur to visit the country. In April 1998, the UNCHR did not renew 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, following as yet unfulfilled 
assertions by the Government that it would improve human rights 
practices if it was not under formal sanction from the UNCHR. As in 
1999, the UNCHR again passed a resolution on April 18, introduced by 
the Czech Republic and Poland, which expressed concern about the human 
rights situation in the country. The Government responded by organizing 
a march of an estimated 200,000 persons past the Czech Embassy in 
Havana. On April 19, national television featured a round-table 
discussion on the UNCHR vote in which the Foreign Minister strongly 
criticized the UNCHR resolution and accused it of discriminating 
against third world countries.
    During this same UNCHR session, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women released her report, which was critical of the 
Government on issues of women's rights and on other human rights 
problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Cuba is a multiracial society with a black and mixed-race majority. 
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, or national 
origin, although evidence suggests that racial discrimination occurs 
frequently.
    Women.--Violent crime rarely is reported in the press, and there 
are no publicly available data regarding the incidence of domestic 
violence and rape; however, human rights advocates report that violence 
against women is a problem. The law establishes strict penalties for 
rape, and the Government appears to enforce the rape law; however, 
according to human rights advocates, the police do not act on cases of 
domestic violence.
    Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, visited the country in 1999 and issued a report on her 
findings in February. The report states that she was surprised to find 
that most government officials did not see violence against women as a 
prevalent problem. However, she noted that activists at the grassroots 
level are very attuned to problems of violence affecting women. 
Coomaraswamy urged the Government to take comprehensive steps to 
enhance the legal protection against violence against women and 
specifically urged the adoption of legislation to address domestic 
violence and sexual harassment.
    Prostitution is legal (except for prostitution by children under 17 
years of age); however, pandering or otherwise benefiting from 
prostitution is a felony. Prostitution has increased greatly in the 
last few years; press reports indicate that tourists from various 
countries visit specifically to patronize inexpensive prostitutes. A 
government crackdown on prostitution that began in late 1998 initially 
had some effect, but prostitutes (known as ``jineteras'') were still 
visible in Havana and other major cities during the year. The early 
success was obtained by stationing police on nearly every major street 
corner where tourists are present. Some street police officers are 
suspected of providing protection to the jineteras. Most observers 
believe that the Government clamped down on prostitution to combat the 
perception that the Government promotes sex tourism. The Government set 
up centers to take prostitutes off the streets and reeducate them; the 
newest center reportedly opened in September in Valle Grande near 
Havana. In her February report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy 
recommended that the Government dismantle the centers and find ``other 
mechanisms that do not violate the rights of the prostitutes.''
    The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and 
responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children, 
maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. Women are subject to the 
same restrictions on property ownership as men. The maternity law 
provides 18 weeks of maternity leave and grants working mothers 
preferential access to goods and services. About 40 percent of all 
women work, and they are well represented in many professions. 
According to the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), women hold 33 percent 
of managerial positions. The FMC also asserted that 11,200 women have 
received land parcels to cultivate; that more than 561,000 women have 
begun working as agricultural workers, and that women devote 34 hours a 
week to domestic work, about the same number of hours they spend 
working outside the home.
    Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government protect 
family, maternity, and matrimony. It also states that children, 
legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law and notes the 
duties of parents to protect them. Education is free and compulsory to 
the ninth grade, but it is grounded in Marxist ideology. State 
organizations and schools are charged with the integral formation of 
children and youth. The national health care system covers all 
citizens. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However, 
child prostitution is a problem, with young girls engaging in 
prostitution to help support themselves and their families. It is 
illegal for a child under 17 years of age to engage in prostitution. 
The police began to enforce this law more actively in late 1998 and 
continued to do so during the year, as part of their crackdown on 
prostitution in general. However, the phenomenon continues as more 
cabarets and discos open for the growing tourist industry which make it 
easier for tourists to come into contact with child prostitutes.
    Police officers who find children loitering in the streets or 
begging from tourists frequently will intervene and try to find the 
parents. If the child is found bothering tourists a second time, police 
frequently fine the child's parents.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based 
on disability, and there have been few complaints of such 
discrimination. However, a young married blind couple, members of the 
Fraternity of Independent Blind People of Cuba were told to leave a 
cafe in Moron where they sang for tips. There are no laws that mandate 
accessibility to buildings for the disabled. In practice buildings and 
transportation are rarely accessible to disabled people.
    On November 8, a special police operation dislodged a number of 
persons with disabilities from selling their products in Central 
Havana. Police arrested two persons; a court sentenced one of them to 1 
year in jail for selling stolen goods.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Many persons of African descent 
have benefited from access to basic education and medical care since 
the 1959 revolution, and much of the police force and army enlisted 
personnel is black. Nevertheless, racial discrimination often occurs, 
and is acknowledged publicly by high governmental officials, including 
Castro. There have been numerous reports of disproportionate police 
harassment of black youths. In 1997 there were numerous credible 
reports of forced evictions of squatters and residents lacking official 
permission to reside in Havana. The evictions, exacerbated by Decree 
217 (see Section 2.d.), primarily targeted individuals and families 
from the eastern provinces, which are traditionally areas of black or 
mixed-race populations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives priority to 
state or collective needs over individual choices regarding free 
association or provision of employment. The demands of the economy and 
society take precedence over individual workers' preferences. The law 
prohibits strikes; none are known to have occurred. Established 
official labor organizations have a mobilization function and do not 
act as trade unions, promote worker rights, or protect the right to 
strike. Such organizations are under the control of the State and the 
Communist Party, which also manage the enterprises for which the 
laborers work.
    The Communist Party selects the leaders of the sole legal labor 
confederation, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, whose principal 
responsibility is to ensure that government production goals are met. 
Despite disclaimers in international forums, the Government explicitly 
prohibits independent unions and none are recognized. There has been no 
change in conditions since the 1992 International Labor Organization 
(ILO) finding that the Government violated ILO norms on freedom of 
association and the right to organize. Those who attempt to engage in 
unofficial union activities face government persecution.
    Workers can and have lost their jobs for their political beliefs, 
including their refusal to join the official union. Several small 
independent labor organizations have been created, but function without 
legal recognition and are unable to represent workers effectively or 
work on their behalf. The Government actively harasses these 
organizations. Police detained independent labor activist Jose Orlando 
Gonzalez Bridon of the CUTC for brief periods in January. Most 
political dissidents lose their jobs and remain unemployed; the only 
work they are offered is cleaning streets.
    The CTC is a member of the Communist, formerly Soviet-dominated 
World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for Work and Social 
Security (CETSS) sets wages and salaries for the state sector, which is 
almost the only employer in the country. Since all legal unions are 
government entities, antiunion discrimination by definition does not 
exist.
    The 1995 Foreign Investment Law (Law 77) continued to deny workers 
the right to contract directly with foreign companies investing in the 
country without special government permission. Although a few firms 
have managed to negotiate exceptions, the Government requires foreign 
investors to contract workers through state employment agencies, which 
are paid in foreign currency and, in turn, pay workers very low wages 
in pesos. Workers subcontracted by state employment agencies must meet 
certain political qualifications. According to Minister of Basic 
Industry Marcos Portal, the state employment agencies consult with the 
Party, the CTC, and the Union of Communist Youth to ensure that the 
workers chosen deserve to work in a joint enterprise.
    There are no functioning export processing zones, although the law 
authorizes the establishment of free trade zones and industrial parks.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Neither the 
Constitution nor the Labor Code prohibits forced labor. The Government 
maintains correctional centers where it sends persons for crimes such 
as dangerousness. Prisoners held there are forced to work on farms or 
building sites. The authorities often imprison internees who do not 
cooperate.
    The Government employs special groups of workers, known as 
microbrigades, that are temporarily reassigned from their usual jobs, 
to work on special building projects. These microbrigades become 
increasingly important in the Government's efforts to complete tourist 
and other priority projects. Workers who refuse to volunteer for these 
jobs often risk discrimination or job loss. Microbrigade workers 
reportedly receive priority consideration for housing assignments. The 
military assigns some conscripts to the Youth Labor Army, where they 
serve their 2-year military service requirement working on farms that 
supply both the armed forces and the civilian population.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; 
however, the Government requires children to work without compensation. 
All students over age 11 are expected to devote 30 to 45 days of their 
summer vacation to farm work, laboring up to 8 hours per day. The 
Ministry of Agriculture uses ``voluntary labor'' by student work 
brigades extensively in the farming sector.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum working age is 17 years. However, the 
Labor Code permits the employment of 15- and 16-year-old children to 
obtain training or fill labor shortages. The law requires school 
attendance until the ninth grade, and this law generally is respected. 
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, it 
strongly encourages children to work without compensation (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage varies by 
occupation and is set by the CETSS. For example, the minimum monthly 
wage for a maid is $8.25 (165 pesos); for a bilingual office clerk, 
$9.50 (190 pesos); and for a gardener $10.75 (216 pesos). The 
Government supplements the minimum wage with free education and 
subsidized medical care (but reduces daily pay by 40 percent after the 
third day of being admitted to a hospital), housing, and some food 
(this subsidized food is enough for about 1 week per month). However, 
even with these subsidies, the minimum wage does not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Corruption and black market 
activities are pervasive. The Government rations most basic necessities 
such as food, medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, which are in very 
short supply.
    The Government requires foreign companies in joint ventures with 
state entities to hire and pay workers through the State. HRW noted 
that the required reliance on state-controlled employment agencies 
effectively leaves workers without any capacity directly to negotiate 
wages, benefits, the basis of promotions, and the length of the 
workers' trial period at the job with the employer. Reportedly these 
exploitative labor practices force foreign companies to pay the 
Government as much as $500 to $600 per month for workers, while the 
workers in turn receive only a small peso wage from the Government.
    The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays in 
hazardous occupations, such as mining. The Government reduced the 
workday in some government offices and state enterprises to save 
energy.
    Workplace environmental and safety controls are usually inadequate, 
and the Government lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. Industrial 
accidents apparently are frequent, but the Government suppresses such 
reports. The Labor Code establishes that a worker who considers his 
life in danger because of hazardous conditions has the right not to 
work in his position or not to engage in specific activities until such 
risks are eliminated. According to the Labor Code, the worker remains 
obligated to work temporarily in whatever other position may be 
assigned him at a salary provided for under the law.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In February 1999, the National Assembly 
revised the Penal Code to prohibit trafficking in persons through or 
from the country and provided the following penalties for violations: a 
term of 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for organizing or cooperating in 
alien smuggling through the country; 10 to 20 years' imprisonment for 
entering the country to smuggle persons out of the country; and 20 
years to life in prison for using violence, causing harm or death, or 
putting lives in danger, in engaging in such smuggling. These 
provisions are directed primarily at persons engaging in organized 
smuggling of would-be emigrants. In addition, the revised code made it 
illegal to promote or organize the entrance of persons into or the exit 
of persons from the country for the purpose of prostitution; violators 
are subject to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment.
    There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, 
within, or through the country for the purpose of providing forced 
labor or services.
                               __________

                                DOMINICA

    Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member of 
the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and a 
unicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A president, 
nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the 
opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, is 
head of state. The Dominica Labour Party (DLP) prevailed in free and 
fair elections held on January 31, and Roosevelt P. Douglas became 
Prime Minister. Douglas died in office on October 1, and former 
Minister of Communication and Works Pierre Charles replaced him. The 
judiciary is independent.
    The Dominica Police is the only security force. It is controlled by 
and responsive to the democratically elected Government. There were 
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
    The country's primarily agrarian economy depends on earnings from 
banana exports, which declined some 20 percent during the year. The 
Government's efforts to develop the tourist industry had mixed results, 
with a decline in tourist arrivals but an increase in cruise ship 
visitors during the year. The Government also is diversifying 
agricultural production and promoting the export of fresh fruits, 
vegetables, and coconut products, both within and outside the region. 
Per capita gross domestic product was about $3,426 in 1999.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. The principal 
human rights problems are occasional instances of use of excessive 
force by police, poor prison conditions, societal violence against 
women and children, instances of discrimination against indigenous 
Carib Indians, and societal discrimination against female Caribs in 
mixed marriages.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there 
were some allegations of occasional use of excessive force by the 
police. During the first half of the year, the authorities reportedly 
received 13 complaints regarding excessive use of force by the police.
    In November 1997, the authorities forced the Commissioner and 
Deputy Commissioner of police to retire as a result of recommendations 
by a Commission of Inquiry that investigated allegations of 
mismanagement, corruption, and police brutality. Under new leadership, 
the police created an Internal Affairs Department in December 1997 to 
investigate public complaints against the police and to provide 
counseling to police. In July 1998, a consultant from the United 
Kingdom conducted a 3-month study to update antiquated police 
regulations and to establish new operational guidelines for the police. 
This report was submitted to the Government in 1998, but the 
recommendations have not yet been implemented.
    Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions 
continue to be problems in the sole prison facility. There are over 200 
prisoners. The prison provides work therapy, sports programs, 
educational opportunities, and counseling for inmates. There continued 
to be complaints by prisoners about the poor quality of prison food. 
Female prisoners are segregated from male prisoners; however, juveniles 
are housed with adult inmates.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
requires that the authorities charge persons with a crime within 24 
hours after arrest. If charges are brought, the police must bring the 
detainee to court within 72 hours. This requirement generally is 
honored in practice, although those arrested on Fridays often must 
remain in jail over the weekend and are not charged until the following 
Monday.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    The judicial system is composed of a high court judge, 5 
magistrates, and 10 magistrate courts located in police stations around 
the country. Appeals can be made to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
and to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
    The law provides for public trial before an independent, impartial 
court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, 
are allowed legal counsel, and have the right to appeal. Courts provide 
free legal counsel to the indigent only in capital cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of free expression, and the Government respects this in practice. 
The political opposition openly criticizes the Government.
    The print media consist of two private newspapers and political 
party journals; all publish without censorship or government 
interference. The principal radio station is state-owned and has a 
government-appointed board. There is also an independent radio station 
owned by the Catholic Church. Citizens also have access to independent 
news sources through cable television and radio reception from 
neighboring islands.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law 
enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear 
whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of laws 
against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious 
practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice. The Government may revoke 
passports if subversion is suspected but has not done so in recent 
times.
    The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, 
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum 
did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to 
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The Constitution calls for elections at least every 
5 years.
    On January 31, the Dominica Labour Party won 10 seats in free and 
fair elections, defeating the United Workers' Party (UWP) which had 
held power since 1995. DLP leader Roosevelt P. ``Rosie'' Douglas forged 
a majority coalition of 13 seats in the 21-member Parliament, with the 
Dominican Freedom Party, holder of 2 seats, and 1 former UWP 
parliamentarian who changed party affiliation to join the DLP 
Government. Douglas died in office on October 1, and the former 
Minister of Communication and Works, Pierre Charles, became the Prime 
Minister. Ian Douglas, nephew of Rosie Douglas and representing the 
DLP, won the December 11 by-election for the deceased Prime Minister's 
seat.
    There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation 
of women in leadership roles in government or political parties; 
however, they are underrepresented in practice. Voters elected two 
women to Parliament in the January elections.
    Carib Indians participate in national political life.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no government restrictions on the formation of local 
human rights organizations, although no such groups exist. Several 
advocacy groups, such as the Association of Disabled People and a 
women's and children's self-help organization, operate freely and 
without government interference. There were no requests for 
investigations of human rights abuses from international or regional 
human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution includes provisions against racial, sexual, and 
religious discrimination, which the authorities respect in practice.
    Women.--Sexual harassment and domestic violence cases are common, 
and there is no family court to deal specifically with domestic 
violence issues. Women can bring charges against husbands for battery, 
and both the police and the courts prosecute cases of rape and sexual 
assault, but there are no specific spousal abuse laws. However, in 
April 1998, a new Sexual Offences Act went into effect to replace the 
previous act, which required medical evidence or witness corroboration 
for indictment. As a matter of policy, all rape cases are handled 
solely by female police officers. The Department of Labor recruited a 
permanent counselor and established a crisis response mechanism to 
assist women who are victims of domestic violence. The Welfare 
Department assists victims of abuse by finding temporary shelter, 
providing counseling to both parties, or recommending police action. 
The Welfare Department reports all cases of abuse to the police. The 
courts may issue protective orders, but the police do not enforce them 
consistently.
    Beyond the general protection of the Constitution, women do not 
benefit from any specific civil rights legislation. While there is 
little open discrimination against women, property ownership continues 
to be deeded to ``heads of households,'' who are usually males. When 
the male head of household dies without a will, the wife cannot inherit 
the property or sell it, although she can live in it and pass it to her 
children. In the civil service, the law establishes fixed pay rates for 
specific jobs, whatever the gender of the incumbent.
    The Dominica National Council of Women, a nongovernmental 
organization, has developed local adult education and small business 
training programs for women. According to the Labor Department, many 
women in rural areas find it difficult to meet basic needs, at least in 
part owing to the decline in the banana export industry.
    Children.--The law stipulates that the Government should protect 
the rights of children to education and health care. Education is 
compulsory through the age of 16, and primary health care is available 
throughout the island.
    Various laws enumerate children's rights, but their enforcement is 
hampered by lack of staffing in government agencies. According to the 
Welfare Department, reported cases of child abuse, including sexual 
abuse, have increased in the past few years. In 1999 there were 303 
reported cases of child abuse, which affected 71 boys and 232 girls. Of 
these cases, 124 involved sexual abuse. At year's end, there were nine 
staff members in the social welfare office that handles all welfare 
problems, including complaints of child abuse.
    Although the maximum sentence for sexual molestation (rape, incest) 
is life imprisonment, the normal sentence given is 15 years except in 
the case of murder. The age of consent for sexual relations is 16 
years.
    People with Disabilities.--Beyond the general protection of the 
Constitution, there is no specific legislation dealing with the 
disabled. However, the labor laws permit authorization of employment of 
a disabled person for less than the minimum wage, in order to increase 
opportunities for employment of the disabled (see Section 6.e.). There 
is no requirement mandating access for those with disabilities.
    Indigenous People.--There is a significant Carib Indian population, 
estimated at 3,400 persons, of a total population of 76,000. Most live 
on a 3,783-acre reservation created in 1903 and expanded in 1997. 
School, water, and health facilities available on the Carib reservation 
are rudimentary but similar to those available to other rural 
Dominicans. Most Carib Indians engage in farming, fishing, and 
handicraft. Unemployment is believed to be higher than in rest of the 
country, while the average income is below the national average. About 
65 percent of the Carib population is between the ages of 18 and 35.
    The reservation is governed by the 1978 Carib Constitution. Carib 
Indians over the age of 18 who reside there are eligible to vote for 
the Chief and eight members of the Council of Advisors. Elections are 
held every 5 years, and the latest election was held in July 1999. 
According to the Carib Constitution, the Council must meet once a 
month, determine the chief's itinerary, and publish council meeting 
agendas in the government Gazette.
    There are credible reports of discrimination against Carib women 
who are married to, or who live with, non-Carib men, making it 
difficult for such couples to obtain permits to build homes within the 
reservation. Building permits are obtained from the Carib Council. 
Until 1979 the Carib Constitution allowed Carib men married to non-
Carib women to continue living on the Carib reserve but dictated that 
Carib women married to non-Carib men had to move off the reservation. 
Although the law has changed, practice is not yet in keeping with the 
law. In one case, a Carib woman in a common-law relationship with a 
non-Carib man who tried to build a house on land reserved for her 
family received threats that her house would be burned down. An 
estimated 25 percent of the Carib Indian population is believed to be 
in mixed marriages or relationships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the legal right to 
organize, to choose their representatives, and to strike, but unions 
represent less than 10 percent of the work force. All unions are 
independent of the Government. While there are no direct ties, members 
of certain political parties dominate some unions. There is no 
restriction on forming labor federations, but there is no Trades Union 
Congress. Unions may affiliate with various international labor bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have 
legally defined rights to organize workers and to bargain with 
employers. Collective bargaining is widespread in the nonagricultural 
sectors of the economy, including in government service, and there is 
also recourse to mediation and arbitration by the Government. The law 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and judicial 
authorities enforce union rights. In addition, employers must reinstate 
workers fired for union activities. The law requires that employers 
recognize unions as bargaining agents once both parties have followed 
appropriate procedures. Department of Labor inspectors under the 
supervision of the Labor Commissioner enforce labor legislation, but 
the small Labor Inspection Office lacks sufficient personnel to carry 
out its duties.
    Labor regulations and practices governing the country's industrial 
areas and export firms do not differ from those prevailing in the rest 
of the economy. There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that by children, and such labor 
is not known to exist.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum legal age for employment is 15 years. 
Employers generally observe this law without government enforcement. 
The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages for 
various categories of workers, but these were last revised in 1989. The 
minimum wage rate for some categories of workers (e.g., household 
employees) is as low as $0.37 (EC$1.00) per hour if meals are included. 
However, minimum wages for most workers fall in a range between $0.74 
(EC$2.00) per hour for tourist industry workers to $1.11 (EC$3.00) per 
hour for occupations such as shopclerks. Minimum wages are not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. However, most workers (including domestic employees) earn more 
than the legislated minimum wage for their category. The Minimum Wage 
Advisory Board met in 1998 and recommended increases in these wage 
levels, but the Government had not yet acted upon these recommendations 
at year's end.
    The labor standards laws state that no employer shall establish or 
maintain differences in wages between men and women performing the same 
or similar work with parallel responsibilities under similar 
conditions. The law further states that no employer may reduce the 
wages of an employee to comply with equal wage standards. The labor 
laws also provide that the Labor Commissioner may authorize the 
employment of a disabled person at a wage lower than the minimum rate 
in order to enable that person to be employed gainfully.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law provides 
for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation per year. The Employment Safety 
Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are 
consistent with international standards. The Advisory Committee on 
Safety and Health is an established body but has never met. The rarely 
used enforcement mechanism consists of inspections by the Department of 
Labor, which can and does prescribe specific compliance measures, 
impose fines, and prosecute offenders. Workers have the right to remove 
themselves from unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons.
    The country has an economic citizenship program that allows foreign 
investors to purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures 
requiring cash inflows ranging from $15,000 (EC$40,000) to $50,000 
(EC$135,000). This process reportedly has facilitated the illegal 
immigration of persons from China and other countries to North America 
where, in some instances, they may be forced by the criminal 
organizations that provided the funds to work under conditions similar 
to bonded labor to repay their debt.
                               __________

                           DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

    The Constitution provides for a popularly elected president and a 
bicameral Congress. President Hipolito Mejia of the Dominican Reform 
Party (PRD) took office on August 16 after a free and fair election, 
replacing President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Liberation Party 
(PLD). The PRD also has control of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. 
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, 
interference from outside forces remains a problem. The Government took 
some steps to improve the ability of the judiciary to resist such 
outside interference.
    The National Police (PN), the National Department of Investigations 
(DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), and the military 
(army, air force, and navy) form the security forces. The PN is under 
the Secretary of the Interior and Police; the military is under the 
Secretary of the Armed Forces; and the DNI and the DNCD, which have 
personnel from both the police and the military, report directly to the 
President. Although the security forces generally are responsive to 
civilian authority, there were instances in which members of the 
security forces, principally the National Police, acted independently 
of government authority or control. Members of the National Police, and 
to a more limited extent the military, continued to commit serious 
human rights abuses.
    The economy, once heavily dependent on sugar and other agricultural 
exports, continues to diversify; tourism, telecommunications, and free 
trade zones (FTZ's) are major sources of income and employment. 
Remittances from abroad, estimated to exceed $1.5 billion, are 
equivalent to approximately 9 percent of the $2,100 per capita gross 
domestic product. The country's agricultural and tourism sectors and 
electrical power network largely have recovered from the effects of 
Hurricane Georges, which hit the island in 1998, while housing 
reconstruction and transportation infrastructure lag behind. The 1999 
transfer of sugar mills to private control contributed to increasing 
poverty and joblessness in the bateyes (sugar cane shantytowns). Income 
distribution in the country is highly skewed, and according to the U.N. 
Development Program, the richest 10 percent of the population receives 
over 37 percent of the income, over 18 times that received by the most 
impoverished 10 percent of the population.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems 
remain. Police committed extrajudicial killings. The police, and to a 
lesser degree the military, tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
detainees and prisoners. Police on several occasions used force to 
disperse demonstrators. There was a significant increase in allegations 
of physical abuse and torture of minors in police and military 
detention. Prison conditions ranged from poor to extremely harsh. 
Police arbitrarily arrested and detained suspects and suspects' 
relatives. The ability of prosecutors to limit police detentions and 
practices has eroded, as compared with 1999. While there have been some 
improvements in the efficiency of the judiciary, lengthy pretrial 
detention and long delays in trials remained problems. Police committed 
break-ins of private homes without judicial orders. The authorities 
rarely prosecute abusers, and at times members of the security forces 
commit abuses with the tacit acquiescence of the civil authorities, 
leading to a climate of impunity. Numerous allegations of corruption by 
government officials were raised following the change of 
administration. The authorities infringe on citizens' privacy rights. 
Members of the police harassed journalists. The Government at times 
pressured editors not to publish unfavorable items, and journalists 
practice self-censorship. The Government at times restricted freedom of 
assembly. The Government restricts the movement of and forcibly expels 
Haitian and Dominican-Haitian migrants. Violence and discrimination 
against women; prostitution, including child prostitution; abuse of 
children; discrimination against the disabled, discrimination against 
and abuse of Haitian migrants and their descendants, and child labor 
are serious problems. There continued to be reports of forced labor. 
Workers on the sugar plantations and mills continued to work in unsafe 
conditions. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials; however, police 
committed at least 250 extrajudicial killings. It is difficult for any 
outside observer to quantify the exact number of victims of 
extrajudicial killings each year; included in this number are civilians 
who were killed in alleged ``exchanges of gunfire'' with police. The 
police fail to cooperate with civilian authorities in many ways, which 
made quantifying the problem very difficult. For example, the police do 
not provide Public Ministry officials with reports on investigations of 
citizens killed in confrontations with police; police rarely documented 
citizen killings in accordance with minimum investigations or crime 
scene standards; police denied civilian authorities, including 
prosecutors requesting information, transcripts of police tribunal 
hearings that process these cases in secret; and the police have been 
known to publicly fire officials involved in these incidents, only to 
reinstate them quietly later.
    The Dominican Human Rights Committee and other observers state that 
the police may employ unwarranted deadly force against criminal 
suspects in a kind of uniformed vigilantism. In addition, some victims 
are involved in private disputes with police agents, while other 
victims later were found to be honest citizens erroneously caught up in 
the wave of antigang violence carried out by the police. The 
circumstances of the vast majority of these killings are questionable, 
but witnesses other than the police usually are lacking.
    Extrajudicial killings stem from the lack of basic education, poor 
training, and weak discipline of the members of the police force. These 
problems are aggravated by low pay and the fact that the Government's 
budgetary allocation for the police is too low to support the higher 
recruiting standards needed and to provide adequate training for 
police. For example, new recruits fire only one round of ammunition 
during training, and there is no coherent policy on the use of deadly 
force or rules of engagement by the police. Additionally, the lack of 
professional, transparent, and credible investigation of the 
circumstances in which police kill citizens in ``exchanges of gunfire'' 
lead to the perception of impunity in these killings. Finally, there is 
a lack of specific training in human rights as applied to police work.
    In the majority of the 250 deaths at the hands of police, the 
police characterized the victims as delinquents. The rest were wives, 
girlfriends, or associates of the officers, other civilians, or fellow 
officers. In most cases, the police claimed that the deaths resulted 
from the exchange of gunfire in the course of an arrest. Amnesty 
International's August report noted the large number of deaths at the 
hands of police and the lack of transparency in the investigative 
process. In October 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) issued a report that criticized the police for committing 
extrajudicial killings and neglecting to investigate and punish 
officers responsible for such abuses. Police assert that the deaths of 
so-called delinquents resulted from shoot-outs requiring the police to 
act in self-defense. However, a number of cases demonstrate that this 
often is not the case.
    For example, on April 18, police shot and killed Antonio Lora 
Fernandez allegedly during questioning at the Isabela police substation 
of Puerto Plata.
    In July in Manoguayabo, a suburb of Santo Domingo, police shot and 
killed Juan Expedito Garcia, a 49-year-old businessman who was 
traveling with his daughter-in-law, Katy Jimenez de Garcia. Garcia and 
Jimenez were victims of an attempted carjacking by a group of 
delinquents. The delinquents ultimately kidnaped the two and sped away, 
followed closely by the police. After being stopped by police, Garcia 
and Jimenez threw themselves to the ground, raised their hands, and 
told the police not to shoot because they themselves were victims. 
Jimenez, the only surviving witness, reported that the police shot 
Garcia four times in the head and three times in the body before 
shooting and killing one of the kidnapers. She overheard one officer 
giving the order to kill her as well, but was spared when she was able 
to explain the circumstances of their kidnaping. The police commission 
investigating the incident recommended that those responsible be tried 
in a military tribunal. At year's end, there was no public information 
about the investigation into this case.
    In July witnesses, including the victim's sister, reported that 
police shot and killed 20-year-old Juan Jose Urena in Santo Domingo. 
The police said that Urena was wanted by the Secret Service and the 
Department of Homicide and Crimes against Property. They reported that 
when they tried to detain Urena, he threatened them with a machete, and 
they were forced to shoot him. The victim's sister, who saw the 
incident, said that he did not resist arrest, but that he already was 
wounded and handcuffed when the agents fired the shots that killed him. 
Urena's death at the hands of police led to public protests, tire 
burnings, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails. Police responded with 
tear gas and guns. The police shot a bystander in the leg as they tried 
to calm the protests (see Section 2.b.). The police officers who 
participated in the shooting of Urena were arrested pending a police 
investigation.
    On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti, 
military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and 
wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck 
(see Section 2.d.).
    On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after soldiers took him 
into custody in La Canada, near Hondo Valle (see Section 2.d.).
    On September 25, police killed two persons in separate incidents, 
20-year-old Emilio Jose Matias Moronta and 23-year-old Lauri Mendez 
Sena, in Santo Domingo neighborhoods Villa Maria and Los Alcarrizos, 
respectively. The local press reported that the police said that 
Moronta resisted arrest and threatened officers with a gun; however, an 
unidentified businessman claimed the police version was false and that 
the victim did not carry a firearm and was first wounded by the police 
in the leg. In the same press report, the police claimed Sena resisted 
arrest with a machete. At year's end, there was no public information 
about an investigation.
    On November 15, police shot and killed Johnny Perdomo Santo, in the 
Santo Domingo neighborhood of Ozama. Police reported to the press that 
they followed Santo in a car, whose plates linked it to a history of 
crimes, and that Santo attempted to shoot at them. Santo reportedly 
died on the way to the hospital. Witnesses told the press there were a 
total of three victims, including a woman. They said two corpses were 
taken away in the police vehicle, and a third one was taken away in the 
victims' car. At year's end, there was no public information about an 
investigation into the facts of the case.
    Military personnel killed a number of Haitian migrants who were 
attempting to enter the country (see Section 2.d.).
    The administration of President Hipolito Mejia acknowledged the 
problems with the police apparatus and early in his administration 
agreed to the creation of a Police Reform Commission to be made up of 
the Chief of Police, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Armed 
Forces, the Legal Advisor to the President, representatives of human 
rights organizations, and legislators. However, President Mejia 
retained the services of Chief of Police Pedro de Jesus Candelier, 
under whose tenure the number of deaths at the hands of the police rose 
significantly over previous years. At year's end, the Commission had 
not made public any recommendations, but the Secretary of Interior and 
Police indicated in early December that he would make public and open 
to public debate any contemplated reforms. In October the Attorney 
General publicly agreed to more aggressive independent investigation of 
extrajudicial killings. On December 7, the Supreme Court president 
urged judges to apply the full weight of the law in cases of violations 
of human rights.
    Police courts may try police officers or may remand them to 
civilian court jurisdiction. Military courts try military personnel 
charged with extrajudicial killings or other crimes. Police Chief 
Candelier announced that every time an officer is involved in a 
questionable incident, the case goes to a commission of superior 
officers for investigation. He said that if it is determined that the 
police officer exceeded his authority, the case is sent to the police 
courts or to the civilian courts, depending on the severity of the 
offense. However, the police send very few--if any--cases to civilian 
courts, despite requests from the former Attorney General, District 
Attorney, and Justice Reform Commissioner. On September 4, six civil 
society groups submitted an ``Act of Unconstitutionality'' to the 
Supreme Court on the issue of the legality of Law 285, which 
encompasses the Code of Police Justice. Civil society groups argue that 
police courts violate the Constitution, and that they weaken the 
separation and independence of governmental functions, as well as the 
exclusivity of the judicial function in the administration of justice. 
The lawsuit asks the Court to rule on the constitutionality of these 
police tribunals; a decision was still pending at year's end.
    State agents in prisons also committed extrajudicial killings. In 
the Najayo Prison in San Cristobal, police custodians shot and killed 
inmates Francisco Alberto Jaquez Brito, Manuel Sanchez Fermin, and 
Rafael Taversal Alberto in August during an escape attempt. A 
commission that included the Attorney General, the Chief of Police, and 
the Director of Prisons concluded that police agents acted negligently 
and in excess of their duties, and that the escapees could have been 
subdued by other means. The prisoners had not yet breached the exterior 
gates of the prison campus when they were shot and killed. The 
commission recommended that the three police cadets be tried in a 
police tribunal, and that three police supervisors be sanctioned with 
days in prison and ``arrest without salary'' for failing to control 
their subordinates and for failing to take an adequate count of 
prisoners. Human rights groups called for civilian trials for those 
responsible for the deaths of the prisoners.
    There also were a number of deaths in prisons due to harsh 
conditions and official negligence (see Section 1.c.).
    In July 1999, the authorities arrested a general, a colonel, a 
legal consultant, and various police officers in connection with the 
deaths of three alleged delinquents in Moca. In a civilian video, the 
police were shown handcuffing the three young men and placing them, 
alive, in the back of a police pickup truck. When the truck arrived at 
police headquarters, the three men were dead. A lower police tribunal 
reportedly tried, convicted, and sentenced officers Cesar Ovando 
Michell and Virgilio Severo Rodriguez to 2 years in prison, but a 
Police Appeals Tribunal later absolved the officers. The first-instance 
police tribunal discharged three other officers. In early November, the 
Attorney General asked Police Chief Candelier for a detailed report on 
the tribunal's proceedings, and said that he would investigate the 
possibility of reopening the case on a procedural appeal to the Supreme 
Court. Candelier said that he would not prevent such action; however, 
as of year's end, the case had not yet been presented to the Supreme 
Court.
    In August a court sentenced Rafael Paredes de la Cruz, a former 
cadet in the National Police to 15 years in prison for the 1998 killing 
of Father Jose Antonio Tineo Nunez. The court found the other 
defendant, Juan Bautista Caminero Mendoza, not guilty.
    There was no progress reported in trials of police officers 
detained for killing law student Franklin Bortolo Fabian Mejia in July 
1998; for killing a suspected robber of a Santiago pharmacy, also in 
July 1998; or for the triple homicide in November 1998 of three young 
male victims who might have been killed because of their refusal to 
share the proceeds of a recent robbery with the police.
    In August a court in Santo Domingo released the verdict in the case 
of the 1975 murder of journalist Orlando Martinez Howley, a critic of 
the Balaguer administration. Retired General Joaquin Pou Castro, former 
air force officer Mariano Cabrera Duran, and Luis Emilio de la Rosa 
Beras admitted to the killing and a court sentenced each of them to the 
maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. The court also awarded an 
indemnity of $314,000 (5 million pesos) to Martinez's surviving 
brothers. Lawyers for the sentenced defendants say that they plan to 
appeal. Although several witnesses testified to the knowledge and 
complicity of former President Balaguer in the murder, he was not 
called to testify for health reasons.
    In April violence at political rallies during the election campaign 
resulted in two deaths and several injuries when PRD bodyguards fired 
into the crowd at a political rally in Moca (see Section 3.)
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    There was little progress in the investigation into the case of 
Narciso Gonzalez, a university professor and critic of the Balaguer 
government who disappeared in May 1994. According to the former 
District Attorney, there is not enough evidence to go to trial, and 
existing evidence is contradictory. There was no action during the year 
on the family's complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and other 
forms of physical abuse; however, security force personnel continue to 
torture, beat, and otherwise physically abuse detainees and prisoners. 
Lack of supervision, training, and accountability throughout the law 
enforcement and corrections systems exacerbate the problem of physical 
abuse. Human rights groups, the local press, and the President's 
Commission to Support the Reform and Modernization of Justice (Justice 
Reform Commission) reported regular and repeated occurrences of 
physical abuse of detainees while in custody. There was a significant 
increase in allegations of physical abuse and torture of minors in 
police and military detention.
    In June the Justice Reform Commission reported cases of torture and 
abuse of at least nine minors in the police stations in Villas 
Agricolas, Los Farallones, Villa Francisca, and Plan Piloto in the 
national district. It cited numerous instances of beatings, sexual 
abuse, asphyxiation with plastic bags to elicit confessions, and a 
torture method called ``roasting the chicken'' in which the victim is 
placed over hot coals and turned until confessing. After completing an 
internal investigation, the National Police claimed that there were no 
instances of torture or abuse, and that if force was used, it was 
necessary to obtain the ``obedience'' of the minor. The Justice Reform 
Commission criticized the police for failing to conduct an objective 
investigation and for covering up serious abuses. As of September, the 
district attorney for Santo Domingo had made two requests to the Chief 
of Police that three officers be turned over for interrogation. Both of 
these requests were denied. An investigative judge was appointed to the 
cases, which were still pending in the Eighth Penal Court in Santo 
Domingo at year's end.
    In August judges of the Appeals Court for Children and Adolescents 
in San Pedro de Macoris made public a set of allegations of similar 
abuses committed against 19 minors in police stations in Juan Dolio and 
Boca Chica, as well as in the General Pedro Santana public jail, which 
is controlled by the army. One of the adolescent victims reported that 
the police beat him to force him to say ``yes'' to their questions; in 
the interrogation sessions, they hit him with the butts of their guns; 
they made him kneel and two officers at once hit him in the ears and 
kicked him; they hit him with a baton, and put him in a dark room where 
they applied an electric current to his body. The child reported that 
due to the marks these incidents left on his body, the police held him 
for 8 days before transferring him to the judge. The law requires that 
minor detainees be transferred to a judge within 24 hours. There is no 
information available regarding any investigation into these alleged 
abuses by the police or the military.
    Homosexual and transvestite detainees report to gay rights 
advocates that during detention the police have held them in a darkened 
room and have given them the alternative of performing fellatio on 
guards or being placed in a locked cell with the most dangerous 
prisoners, where the detainees presumed that they would be raped, 
beaten, or both. Other informants confirmed that the police use the 
prospect of being locked in with the most dangerous prisoners as a 
threat.
    The National Coordinator for Human Rights cited the Department of 
Homicide and Robbery Investigations and the DNCD for the persistent use 
of torture to extract confessions from detainees. According to human 
rights organizations, the method most often used is beating. After 
several former detainees went to the press in 1999 with credible 
reports that police interrogators had beaten them repeatedly, the Chief 
of Police and Attorney General designated a commission to investigate. 
The beatings allegedly took place during periods of detention of up to 
15 days without arraignment before a judge (the Constitution permits 
only 48 hours). The informants reported that the police repeatedly 
awoke them during the night for questioning. Human rights advocates 
have described another form of abuse that guards reportedly use against 
prisoners in the Mexico section of San Pedro de Macoris Prison. Prison 
officials use a punishment called ``the toaster'', where prisoners are 
laid, shackled hand and foot, on a bed of hot asphalt for the entire 
day and are beaten with a club if they scream. The army administers San 
Pedro de Macoris prison.
    The National District Prosecutor's office continued to place 
lawyers in high-volume police stations and in several DNCD offices to 
monitor the investigative process and to assure that detainees' rights 
are respected (see Section 1.d.). Most of the affected PN and DNCD 
investigators responded positively to this oversight, although some 
DNCD personnel reportedly complained that their hands were being tied. 
This initiative remains largely limited to the Santo Domingo 
metropolitan area, with a lesser presence in Santiago. There is some 
evidence that these assistant prosecutors at times acquiesce in 
traditional police practices, rather than attempt to raise these 
practices to constitutional standards. Less qualified prosecutors 
assigned to the rest of the country have not assumed strong roles in 
managing criminal investigations and ensuring the rights of suspects. 
Human rights courses are offered in the training curriculums for 
military and DNCD enlisted personnel and officers; however, the courses 
are optional. In October the Armed Forces Secretary inaugurated the 
Military Institute of Human Rights, located in Santiago.
    Civilian prosecutors sometimes file charges against police and 
military officials alleging torture, physical abuse, and related 
crimes. A 1997 law provides penalties for torture and physical abuse, 
including sentences of from 10 to 15 years in prison. However, until 
recently these provisions were not known fully or applied by 
prosecutors and judges. There have been repeated calls by human rights 
groups as well as by the Justice Reform Commission for civilian trials 
of officials charged with abuse and torture; however, most cases, if 
tried at all, are sent to military or police tribunals.
    Out of a police force of about 23,000 members, Police Chief 
Candelier fired 84, disarmed 200, and sent 100 officers for retraining 
during the first 6 months of the year as part of an effort to increase 
respect for human rights and discipline within the police force. He 
reported that many of the 84 were fired for drug use, including cocaine 
and marijuana. However, some discharged officers later were rehired. 
Significant problems also remain because serious efforts have not been 
made to vet police recruits. Many persons with prior criminal records 
reportedly have been incorporated into police ranks, either using false 
names or identification or with recommendations from other state 
institutions, such as the army.
    The police at times forcibly dispersed demonstrators, using tear 
gas and weapons (see Sections 2.b. and 6.b.).
    Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Reports of 
torture and mistreatment in prisons are common. The prisons are 
seriously overcrowded, health and sanitary conditions are poor, and 
some prisons are out of the control of the authorities. The General 
Directorate of Prisons falls under the authority of the Public Ministry 
and is seriously underfunded. Budget allocations for necessities such 
as food, medicines, and transportation were lacking. Medical care in 
all prisons suffers from a lack of supplies and available physicians. 
Prisoners immobilized by and dying of AIDS are not transferred to a 
hospital, but some terminal-stage inmates were released early to spend 
their last days at home.
    In 32 prisons around the country with a total capacity of 9,000 
persons, the police and the military hold more than 15,000 prisoners 
and detainees. The military controls 22 prisons with a total of 6,000 
prisoners, and the National Police controls 10 prisons, with a total of 
9,000 inmates. A warden is responsible for running each prison and 
reports to the Attorney General through the Directorate of Prisons. A 
police or military colonel (or lieutenant colonel), who is appointed 
for 3 to 6 months only, reports to the warden and is responsible for 
providing security. However, in practice the colonel is in charge of 
the prison, and neither the Directorate of Prisons nor the individual 
wardens have much power. According to credible reports, some prisons 
are totally out of the control of the authorities. They are, in effect, 
operated by armed inmates, who decide whether an individual gets food, 
space to sleep, or medical care. Individual inmates only can secure a 
tolerable level of existence by paying for it. Only those with 
considerable personal or family resources can do so.
    Conditions at La Victoria prison, which is run by the National 
Police, pose a serious threat to life and health. In June this prison 
held over 3,500 prisoners in a facility built for 1,000. In March there 
was a serious fire at La Victoria in which 13 persons died, 44 suffered 
burns, and 20 others were injured. Inmates alleged that guards refused 
to open cell doors so that they could escape. At year's end, the 
Director of Prisons reported that an investigation had been conducted, 
and that those responsible were arrested and sent before a police 
tribunal. However, there was no public information on the trial's 
outcome.
    The Barahona Commission for the Defense of Human Rights has 
criticized the conditions in the Barahona prison, which has 22 beds, 
but currently holds 586 inmates. In one cellblock, which has space for 
32 persons, there are 145 inmates. The commission issued a report at 
mid-year, in which it described 52 Haitians imprisoned there as 
``practically kidnaped,'' and said that they have not been taken to 
their hearings. The Commission reported that the bathroom facilities 
amount to cesspools and that the authorities are indifferent to the 
lack of hygiene; prisoners do not receive medicine or medical 
attention, and many have tuberculosis and other diseases. They 
allegedly receive only one meal on Saturdays and no meals on Sundays.
    A government food program for the general public is used to provide 
lunches at some prisons. The former Director of Prisons reported that 
his office had the budget to spend $0.50 (8 pesos) per inmate to 
provide three meals per day. Inmates surveyed said that the food 
provided was unacceptable, and most chose to eat whatever they could 
beg for or purchase from persons in the vicinity of the prison or from 
family members. Due to inefficiency and corruption within the prison 
system, visitors often have to bribe prison guards in order to visit 
prisoners.
    Female prisoners are separated from male inmates. In general, 
conditions in the female prison wings are superior to those found in 
male prison wings. There have been some reports of guards physically 
and sexually abusing female inmates. Female inmates, unlike their male 
counterparts, are prohibited from receiving conjugal visits. Those who 
deliver while incarcerated are permitted to keep their babies with them 
in prison until they reach 1 year of age.
    In May in Rafey Prison in Santiago, guards beat six inmates with 
aluminum and wooden bats as they bathed in the rain in a courtyard of 
the prison. Two officials allegedly responsible for the beatings were 
said to have been tried in a police tribunal; however, there was no 
public information available about any investigation or trial.
    The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults. 
However, recent press reports found a high incidence of juveniles who 
were detained with adult prisoners being forced into sexual servitude 
in return for protection at prisons around the country. Najayo prison 
has a new wing for juvenile offenders that holds 250 persons. Inmates 
are not separated by crime within the prison population; however, they 
may be put into solitary confinement for disturbances while 
incarcerated.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors and by the press.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution provides for the security of 
the individual against imprisonment without legal process, bars 
detention beyond 48 hours without the detainee being presented before 
judicial authorities, and prohibits custodial authorities from not 
presenting detainees when requested. It also provides for recourse to 
habeas corpus proceedings to request the release of those unlawfully 
held. However, the security forces continued to violate constitutional 
provisions by detaining suspects for investigation or interrogation 
beyond the prescribed 48-hour limit. The police traditionally detain 
all suspects and witnesses in a crime and use the investigative process 
to determine who are innocent and merit release, and who they should 
continue to hold. After the prosecutor's office placed its lawyers in 
several police stations in 1997, the police began to curtail the 
practice of arbitrary detention in those precincts. However, progress 
has been slow (see Section 1.c.), and this program has been limited for 
the most part to the Santo Domingo metropolitan area. During the year, 
no new prosecutors were placed in police stations, and the 
effectiveness against human rights abuses of those working in police 
stations cannot be discerned accurately.
    The prosecutor for the Court of Appeals in Santiago reported that 
the Department of Investigation of Homicide and Robbery of the National 
Police, Northern Command, routinely detained persons beyond the 48-hour 
limit. Detainees at police headquarters in Santo Domingo, known as 
``the palace,'' reported that they were held for 15 to 21 days. 
Juveniles held at the Department for Minors at the Villa Juana Police 
Station commonly are held for 8 to 14 days, well beyond the 24-hour 
limit for minors. The official in charge of the Department for Minors 
attributes this to lack of swift action by the Juvenile Defender, the 
Public Ministry official in charge of interrogating minors and sending 
them before a Juvenile Court judge. By law juveniles may not be 
interrogated by the police or in the presence of police.
    The police continued the practice of making frequent sweeps or 
roundups in low-income, high-crime communities in which they arrest and 
detain individuals arbitrarily. The alleged objective of the roundups 
is to fight delinquency. Following the indiscriminate arrests, the 
police regularly detain individuals for up to 20 days or more, while 
they look for a reason to charge them with a crime. For example, on 
September 23-24, police arrested 900 persons around the country in 1 
weekend with the objective of ``preventing the commission of crimes'' 
and ``maintaining order and peace.'' They also took possession of 
property including motorcycles, other vehicles, and weapons. Human 
rights organizations report that individuals detained in these roundups 
frequently are beaten. The police say that they rely upon unlawful 
detention without presentation to a court because some cases involve 
more complicated investigations. However, there is a clear pattern of 
the police arresting individuals before investigating a crime 
thoroughly, and relying on confessions to make their case. Without the 
education, training, or equipment to conduct modern forensic 
investigations, police rely instead on holding suspects incommunicado 
(see Section 1.e.), repeatedly questioning them, and sometimes beating 
them, until they confess. Prosecutors who are assigned to monitor the 
criminal investigation phase at police stations appear to be unable to 
control the practice (see Section 1.c.).
    A related problem is the police practice of arresting and detaining 
individuals solely because of their familial or marital relationship to 
a suspect. A suspect's parents, siblings, or spouse are all vulnerable 
to this practice, the goal of which is to compel an at-large suspect to 
give himself up or to coerce a confession from one already arrested. In 
1999 the PN chief had ordered that this practice be ended immediately; 
however, it continued. According to the Dominican Human Rights 
Committee, there were several reports of detentions of suspects' 
relatives during the year.
    Local human rights organizations have reported on and criticized 
police roundups of Haitian and Dominican-Haitian construction workers. 
Officials allegedly take groups of dark-skinned or ``Haitian-looking'' 
individuals to empty buildings soon after they are paid, in order to 
extort money from them. One worker reported that he was beaten 
frequently, and that many of his paychecks were taken during these 
roundups. He said that the license plates are removed from the official 
police vehicles so that the perpetrators cannot be identified easily.
    Many suspects suffer long pretrial detention. In November over 83 
percent of the national prison population was awaiting trial, 11 
percent higher than in 1999; of these, about three-quarters were 
``prisoners without sentences,'' and the remainder had convictions 
under appeal. However, while suspects nationwide still suffer long 
pretrial detention, judicial statistics show reduced delays for the 
last 3 years in the Santo Domingo National District (an area that 
accounts for approximately 45 percent of all criminal cases in the 
country). The average pretrial detention throughout the country is more 
than 6 months.
    Due to the historical inefficiency of the courts (see Section 
1.e.), the granting of bail serves as the de facto criminal justice 
system. As a rule, defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial. 
(Time already served counts toward a sentence.) This situation improved 
somewhat as a result of the steps taken by the former Santo Domingo 
District Attorney and the judiciary, in cooperation with the Director 
of Prisons, to introduce a prisoner registry system that focuses on 
providing timely trials for prisoners. The failure of prison 
authorities to produce the accused caused a significant percentage of 
trial postponements. Authorities held some prisoners even though there 
were no formal charges against them, and kept some prisoners jailed 
even after a court ordered their release. One prisoner held in Najayo 
Prison was charged with swindling over 4 years ago. The maximum penalty 
for this crime is 3 years; however, the prisoner was never tried or 
convicted. His case finally was dismissed in August. In October the 
Attorney General proposed a program to reduce prison crowding by 
releasing inmates who only were held pending payment of a fine. Large 
numbers of prisoners are generally pardoned at the end of the year. In 
early December, prison authorities paroled 80 elderly (75 years or 
older) persons, 90 terminally ill prisoners, and 150 inmates who have 
finished sentences, but cannot pay their fines.
    Notable advances also were made by the new Mejia administration to 
increase the availability of free legal services to the poor. Most 
detainees and prisoners cannot afford adequate defense services. There 
were 12 new public defenders added, bringing the total to 31 throughout 
the country. A bill to create a national public defender program was 
pending in Congress at year's end.
    Hoguisten Canji, a 33-year-old Haitian, spent 9 years in prison 
without an official charge and without ever being presented to a 
judicial officer. His case finally came to the attention of the Public 
Defender Program, which ultimately obtained his release on January 14 
on a writ of habeas corpus. His attorney noted that there was no 
official file on the case, no name of the person that he allegedly 
murdered in 1991, and no order for preventive detention. A Public 
Defender Program attorney also defended Hector Manuel Reyes, who spent 
17 years behind bars for a murder for which he had never been 
convicted. The authorities had lost his case file. Reyes was released 
on March 20. Officials acknowledge that there may be hundreds of such 
cases in the prison system.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its 
use. However, persons who credibly asserted that they were citizens 
sometimes were expelled to Haiti (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, attempts by public and private 
entities, including the executive branch, to undermine judicial 
independence still remain. The judiciary appears better equipped to 
resist such outside interference, due in part to training funded by 
foreign technical assistance. Court officials also began to implement 
new selection criteria for judges. The National Judiciary Council 
chooses members of the Supreme Court, with the goal of ensuring 
independence from the executive and legislative branches, and some 
progess has been made.
    The judiciary, based primarily on the Napoleonic Code, includes a 
16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts, courts of first instance, and 
justices of the peace. There are also specialized courts that handle 
administrative, labor, land, and juvenile matters.
    Military or police courts have jurisdiction over members of the 
security forces. However, civil society groups challenged this system 
in a Supreme Court case filed in August (see Section 1.a.). Public 
pressure exists for military or police boards to remand cases involving 
serious crimes to civilian courts for review; however, there is no 
information that any such cases were remanded during the year. In other 
cases, civil authorities have requested that the PN turn over their 
files so that cases of suspected extrajudicial killings might be 
evaluated independently for possible prosecution. There was little 
cooperation from the National Police or military in requested 
investigations during the year (see Section 1.c.).
    Judges, rather than juries, render all verdicts. Under the 1994 
constitutional amendments, which entered into force in August 1998, the 
Supreme Court is responsible for naming all lower-court judges in 
accordance with a judicial career law. The National Judiciary Council 
selects new justices of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the 
President, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies, two at-large members designated by them (one Senator and one 
Deputy, from parties different than those of the presidents of the 
Senate and Chamber), the President of the Supreme Court, and one other 
justice designated by the Supreme Court.
    Following the commission of a crime, the criminal process begins 
with the arrest of possible suspects. During the investigative phase, 
suspects are questioned repeatedly and urged to confess. The 
Constitution provides for the right not to be arrested without judicial 
warrant except in cases where the suspect is caught in the act; the 
right not to be deprived of liberty without trial or legal formalities, 
or for reasons other than those provided by law; the right to be 
presented to a competent judicial authority within 48 hours of one's 
detention; the right not to be a witness against oneself; and the right 
to a defense in an impartial and public trial. These rights commonly 
are disregarded.
    The most serious and common violation of these rights occurs when 
police detain suspects, sometimes for many days, without giving them 
access to a telephone call to family while subjecting them to frequent 
questioning. Although accused persons are entitled to have an attorney 
present, they often are not permitted to call one or, if one arrives, 
the attorney is not permitted to be present during the questioning. 
(The police complain that the presence of attorneys interferes with 
their investigations.) Torture frequently is used as a method to 
extract a confession during questioning (see Section 1.c.). Under these 
circumstances, suspects may confess to acts that they did not commit 
merely to get relief from the intense questioning and the detention. 
The results of these interrogations frequently form the only evidence 
presented at the trial.
    The law provides for the remedy of ``Amparo,'' an action any 
citizen may bring for violation of a constitutional right, in 
accordance with the terms of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights. This action includes violations by judicial officials. The 
process of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, and 
arbitration, continues to be used as an alternative to trial and 
incarceration.
    There remains a large backlog of criminal cases in the National 
District and throughout the country. The Supreme Court's plan to unclog 
the court dockets has been frustrated by the Government's failure to 
allocate sufficient funds. Dockets are crowded with traffic infractions 
that should be heard in the traffic courts provided for by statute; due 
to a lack of funds, the traffic courts have not been set up. Other 
complications in clearing the backlog arise from the exhaustion of 
funds for transporting prisoners to court; many cases must be sent back 
when the accused does not appear. The Government has not yet 
established 25 additional courts provided for by law.
    Throughout the year, there were improvements in the administration 
of justice that resulted from cooperation between the judiciary and the 
Santo Domingo district attorney's office. New cases unnecessarily 
congesting the criminal system were reduced by more than 50 percent 
through use of community conciliation centers, and investigative judge 
rulings increased by 65 percent in the last 2 years. The courts' 
efforts to improve productivity of judges was notable: the number of 
definitive (final) sentences quadrupled over the past 3 years and time 
to trial was reduced from an average of 11.8 to 6.5 months. It is not 
yet clear how the change of 90 percent of Public Ministry officials in 
August will affect the changes introduced by the previous 
administration.
    The judicial training school trained 530 judges (out of a total of 
585) on drafting and structuring sentences in its first cycle. The 
school prepared a computer seminar on fundamental constitutional 
protections with four modules for judges on human rights. In October it 
held a seminar on domestic violence and a seminar on judicial ethics 
for 200 judges. A dialog among 500 judicial and civil society 
representatives created a judicial code of ethics.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions against arbitrary 
entrance of one's home; however, police sometimes break into private 
quarters without cause to search for suspects, and the authorities 
infringe on citizens' privacy rights in other ways as well. Although 
the Government denies arbitrary use of wiretapping or other 
surreptitious methods to interfere with the private lives of persons or 
families, it has not taken necessary steps to dismantle an active 
private wiretapping industry.
    The law permits the arrest of a suspect caught in the act of 
committing a crime, and police may enter a residence or business in 
pursuit of such suspects. Otherwise judges must authorize arrests and 
issue search warrants. However, the PN and occasionally the DNCD 
continued to violate these requirements. Some prosecutors confessed 
that out of ``tactical necessity to combat criminality'' and ``with 
great reluctance,'' they tolerated the illegal search practices. They 
justified their actions by arguing that the Government has not provided 
sufficient resources or attention to criminal investigation and that, 
given the cumbersome and antiquated criminal procedures, adhering to 
the letter of the law would make law enforcement nearly impossible.
    The Dominican Human Rights Committee reported that police carried 
out raids on private homes in the Santo Domingo neighborhoods of 
Caputillo, Villa Agricola, Los Alcarrizos, and Guachupita; police 
allegedly went into homes without search warrants to look for 
delinquents.
    The police continued to detain relatives and friends of suspects to 
try to compel suspects to surrender or to confess (see Section 1.d.).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these 
freedoms, and the Government generally respected them in practice; 
however, there were some isolated exceptions. For example, there were 
isolated instances of government pressure on editors not to publish 
certain unfavorable items, such as negative poll results.
    Citizens of all political persuasions exercise freedom of speech. 
Newspapers and magazines freely present a diversity of opinion and 
criticism; there are eight daily and seven weekly newspapers, and three 
weekly magazines. However, journalists and editors practice self-
censorship, particularly when coverage could adversely affect the 
economic or political interests of media owners.
    The National Press Union criticized police treatment of journalist 
and union secretary Paul Meguis Jose in April. Jose was following a 
story in Batey Central in Barahona when a police officer shoved him, 
threw his camera on the ground, and then confiscated it. A police 
tribunal found the official guilty of an infraction, and ordered that 
he serve 10 days in prison. In San Francisco de Macoris, police smashed 
the camera of La Nacion newspaper reporter Julio Benzant. DNI agents 
arrested and mistreated Jose Rivas, a reporter for the daily newspaper 
Hoy, during his coverage of the return of Mario Duran Cabrera, one of 
the defendants in the Orlando Martinez case (see Section 1.a.). The 
Dominican Human Rights Committee criticized the detention of journalist 
Robert Vargas, of the Spanish news agency (EFE), and the unlawful 
search of his residence carried out by police as an attempt to 
intimidate him for his reporting on human rights issues.
    Numerous privately owned radio and television stations broadcast 
all political points of view. The Government controls one television 
station.
    In September the National Press Union criticized the violation of 
freedom of expression by the director of the government-owned Dominican 
Radio and Television for canceling an FM radio program. The director of 
the station arrived with a group of military officers to interrupt the 
broadcast and said that the program served as a forum to criticize the 
Government of President Mejia. The union complained that this 
cancellation occurred only days after installation of the new 
Government and asserted that the station director should have discussed 
the program with its producers if he disagreed with its content.
    In November the National Press Union reported that PRD leaders, 
including one from the Secretariat of Youth and another from the 
National Lottery, beat a journalist in Hato Mayo, who broadcast a radio 
program critical of the PRD. In the same month, in Moca, a provincial 
official of the Secretariat of Education punched a correspondent of the 
daily newspaper El Nacional when he asked the official about problems 
with the national school lunch program. Also in November, a 
correspondent from the El Siglo newspaper was sued for slander and 
detained for 2 days after he denounced the cutting of trees ordered by 
the vice mayor of Constanza. The charges later were dropped.
    Public and private universities enjoy broad academic freedom. The 
main public university, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, 
with approximately 100,000 mostly part-time students, has few 
restrictions on enrollment and maintains a policy of nonintervention 
(other than on curriculum development) in classroom affairs. The 
Government exerts no control over private universities, except for the 
preservation of standards, and teachers are free to espouse their own 
theories without government oversight.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions, and the 
Government at times restricted this right. Outdoor public marches and 
meetings require permits, which the Government usually grants; however, 
the police used force to break up demonstrations on several occasions 
throughout the year. The Government responded with force to disperse 
demonstrators calling for completion of public works projects, opposing 
evictions, or supporting a strike. During transportation strikes in the 
first 4 months of the year, police used force to disperse union 
members; others were arrested and detained without charges for several 
days.
    The police used force to disperse demonstrators. News reports and 
human rights organizations criticized the manner in which police used 
force to disperse demonstrators in Batey 5 in Barahona in mid-year. 
Protesters gathered to call for compliance with a promise to finish 
installation of electricity made 4 years ago by the governor of the 
province. There were reports that police indiscriminately launched tear 
gas into homes; several children had to be taken to hospitals due to 
the effects of the gas. According to the Dominican Human Rights 
Committee, the police on several other occasions used force to remove 
squatters from Punta Villa Mella, Valiente, La Toronja, and Vallo 
Lindo, state-owned lands near the national district (Santo Domingo and 
environs).
    In a December interview with the newspaper Hoy, the Secretary of 
Interior and Police admitted that the police committed abuses when 
responding to several public marches and demonstrations in late 
November. These protests were largely in response to the Government's 
package of economic proposals. On November 16, a police lieutenant and 
four others were wounded by bullets and rocks in the confrontation 
between high school students and police in the town of Licey. National 
news media reported that the police repelled the students with tear 
gas. Student leaders told reporters that the police came into the 
school and arrested and beat several students. The police have promised 
an investigation into the protests.
    On November 24, former President Leonel Fernandez and numerous 
other PLD leaders were involved in confrontations with the police when 
the PLD officials marched to the offices of the Public Ministry to 
protest the arrest of four high-level PLD members on corruption 
charges. The police used tear gas against the marchers and prevented 
Fernandez from entering the building. He and several others were 
overcome by the gas and taken to nearby hospitals.
    On November 29, the ``black helmet'' unit of the police interrupted 
a march to the National Palace by groups of student, chauffeur, and 
social organizations who were also protesting the economic reform 
package. Police repelled demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets 
and detained more than 170 demonstrators. Organizers of the 
demonstration, including Human Rights Committee president Virgilio 
Almanzar, claimed that the police denied their right to freedom of 
assembly.
    There were no reports of the use of the criminal charge 
``association with criminal elements'' to stifle political dissent this 
year. Under former President Balaguer, the authorities traditionally 
used this charge against dissidents and those involved in street 
demonstrations against the Government.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties 
frequently affiliate with their foreign counterpart organizations. 
Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others 
function freely and can maintain relationships with counterpart 
organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination 
on religious grounds, and many religions and denominations are active. 
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice.
    The Catholic Church, which signed a concordat with the Government 
in 1954, enjoys special privileges not extended to other religions. 
These include the use of public funds to underwrite some church 
expenses, such as rehabilitation of church facilities, and a complete 
waiver of customs duties when importing goods into the country. The 
attendance at Catholic Mass for members of the National Police is 
compulsory.
    In July then-President Fernandez signed a law making Bible reading 
in public schools obligatory. This new law added Bible reading to the 
weekly flag raising and singing of the national anthem in public 
schools. Private schools are not obliged to include Bible reading as 
part of their weekly activities.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
travel, except for limitations imposed under judicial sentence, or 
police regulations for immigration and health reasons, and the 
Government generally respects these provisions in practice; however, 
there were some exceptions. Citizens face no unusual legal restrictions 
on travel within or outside the country. Local and international human 
rights groups cited discrimination against Haitian migrants, whom they 
said were subject to arbitrary and unilateral action by the 
authorities.
    Haitians continue to migrate in great numbers to the Dominican 
Republic, some legally but most without legal documents, in search of 
economic opportunity. Some illegal migration is assisted or sanctioned 
indirectly by the authorities, especially by police and military in the 
border areas, who profit from the illegal traffic. Throughout the year, 
the security forces, particularly the army, repatriated undocumented 
Haitian nationals believed to be in the country illegally. In December 
the Directorate of Migration reported that 12,500 Haitians were 
repatriated during the year; however, a later report issued by the 
armed forces stated that they had deported 36,362 Haitians between 
August 16 and the end of the year.
    In many cases, the Government denied those deported the opportunity 
to demonstrate that they were legal residents in the country or to make 
arrangements for their families or property. Haitian Government 
officials complained that Haitians often were detained with little or 
no food and then deported without timely notice to the Haitian 
authorities. Human rights organizations and the media continued to 
report many instances of violent treatment of Haitian migrants by the 
authorities.
    On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti, 
military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and 
wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck. 
The truck had sped through several military checkpoints, and members of 
the military pursued it until it crashed. Controversy exists as to 
whether the military personnel knew that the truck was filled with 
immigrants when they fired at it. A Commission with members from Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic was established to investigate the incident. 
The officers reportedly were tried in a military court, given letters 
of reprimand, and returned to military service.
    On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after he was taken into 
custody by soldiers in La Canada, near Hondo Valle, a border town. 
According to newspaper reports, he entered the country illegally and 
was detained along with two other illegal migrants; soldiers allegedly 
beat him to death. The Commander of the Third Brigade of the army 
arrested the soldiers involved in the homicide and promised a quick 
investigation.
    On November 7, soldiers in the Department of Border Investigation 
Operations shot and killed a Haitian under questionable circumstances 
at the Elias Pina border crossing point. Investigations of killings of 
civilians at the hands of military, similar to killings at the hands of 
police, lack transparency. At year's end, there was no information 
about an investigation into this case.
    On March 6, the IACHR held a hearing in two 1997 cases of two 
Dominican-born children who have been denied birth registrations. The 
mothers of both children are Dominican citizens of Haitian descent. The 
law in question is Law 6-59 on Civil Records, and the legal issue in 
the case is the denial of the right to register a late declaration of 
birth. The cases were still pending at year's end.
    On August 8, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights heard a case 
presented by the Dominican Center for Justice and International Law 
(CEJIL), Dominicans 2000, Human Rights Watch, the International Human 
Rights Law Clinic, and other international human rights organizations, 
alleging that massive expulsions, repatriations, and deportations of 
Haitians and Dominican-Haitians by the Government violated 
international human rights law. The Inter-American Court considered 
general concerns about ``mass expulsions'' and ``forced repatriations'' 
carried out by the Ministry of Interior and Police, as well as nine 
individual cases of persons who allegedly were expelled forcibly 
without opportunity for due process. The Court did not address the case 
of the six Haitians killed in Guayabin.
    On August 18, the Court rendered its decision, laying out 
``provisional measures'' for the future treatment of Haitians, and 
specific relief and protection of the nine individuals. It did not 
require immediate broad-based accountability of the migration 
authorities for enforcement of border agreements reached with Haiti in 
December 1999. These agreements set out a systematized deportation 
procedure in which Haitian authorities would be advised of potential 
deportations, deportees would be given opportunities for legal hearings 
(to present proof of legal status in the country), as well as 
opportunities to advise family members and collect belongings. Rather, 
the Court requested that the Government provide more detailed 
information about the condition of individuals in the border 
``bateyes'' (shantytowns) who potentially are subject to forced 
expulsions. It also asked for a government report every 2 months on 
provisional measures that are expected be adopted to comply with the 
Court's decision.
    The ongoing process of repatriating Haitian citizens did not 
diminish after the Court's decision in August. NGO representatives 
working in rural areas reported that decisions to deport often were 
made by lower ranking members of the security forces, sometimes based 
upon the racial characteristics of the deportees. The Director of 
Migration stated that the process of rounding up illegal Haitians is 
performed by the rank and file of the armed forces and migration 
officers. They approach persons who look like Haitians, including 
persons who have very dark complexions and fairly poor clothing. They 
engage them in conversation about their work and residence, mainly to 
check their use of Spanish and any accent they may have. If such 
persons speak Spanish poorly or with a noticeable accent, they 
generally are detained and deported.
    The Haitian Government protested the failure to give detainees an 
opportunity for a hearing on their claim of citizenship or right to 
residence, although it acknowledges the Government's right to deport 
those individuals who are illegal aliens. NGO's and Catholic priests 
familiar with the process also have protested that children born of one 
or two Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic, heretofore denied 
registration as Dominican citizens, frequently are among those deported 
as illegal Haitians.
    While the Government has a policy of strictly enforcing documentary 
requirements and repatriation for those found lacking, it appears to 
have an unofficial policy that is more tolerant, which is fueled by the 
reality of dependence on Haitian labor for certain agricultural and 
construction work. Thus, after being stopped as a suspected illegal 
Haitian migrant, an individual may be allowed to remain in the country 
despite his lack of documents if his story about work satisfies the 
official who stopped him. NGO's have reported corruption among the 
military and migration border officials, and noted that these officials 
sometimes cooperate with the transit of Haitian workers into the 
country. However, in December the Director of Migration reported that 
the need for Haitian labor is generally filled by Haitian migrants 
already in the country.
    According to a 1984 presidential decree, an applicant for refugee 
status must be referred to the Technical Subcommittee of the National 
Commission for Refugees by the National Office of Refugee Affairs. The 
Subcommittee, which makes a recommendation to the Commission, is made 
up of members from the Foreign Ministry, the DNI, and the Immigration 
Directorate. The Commission, which makes a final decision on the 
application, consists of the three members of the Subcommittee; the 
legal advisor to the President; and members of the PN, the Ministry of 
Labor, and the Attorney General's office. There is no functioning 
National Office of Refugee Affairs, and the National Commission for 
Refugees, an office of the Foreign Ministry, has not met since 1993. 
However, the Subcommittee makes recommendations, and the Immigration 
Directorate issues documentation to refugees certified as such by the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While these documents are 
accepted routinely by the police and immigration officials, the process 
by which they are issued does not comply with the decree. During the 
year, 43 refugee applications (30 of which were from Haitians) were 
submitted. Of those, the UNHCR recognized 14 and refused 5; 17 were 
pending and 5 were abandoned. There were no reports of repatriation or 
refoulement of persons claiming refugee status.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first 
asylum and resettlement. There were several cases in which the 
Government offered political asylum to refugees and their families 
fleeing war-torn countries.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully through periodic elections. Citizens exercised 
this right in free and fair presidential elections in May. Voters gave 
the PRD 49.87 percent of the vote, while the DLP received 24.94 
percent, and the Social Christian Reform Party (PRSC) received 24.6 
percent of the vote. The Constitution requires 50 percent plus one vote 
for a candidate to be elected to the presidency; however, if the 
second-place candidate concedes, as happened in May, the Central 
Electoral Board (JCE) may declare the first-place candidate the winner 
without a second round of elections.
    The President and all 179 members of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies are elected freely every 4 years by secret ballot. There is 
universal adult suffrage; however, active duty police and military 
personnel may not vote. In practice, voting is limited to those persons 
who can show a national identity document, which requires that their 
births were registered properly by their parents.
    There was a significant controversy about the ability of the JCE to 
issue new national identity cards to the voting population prior to the 
May elections, and there were serious allegations by the PRD that the 
PLD intentionally was sabotaging its supporters' ability to vote. 
Ultimately, the Board was able to issue cards to most voters who 
applied for them. However, there were numerous reports, including 
allegations by supporters of the PRD, that identity cards were being 
taken or ``bought'' from dark-skinned individuals so that they would 
not exercise their right to vote.
    Election campaigning was relatively peaceful, although there were 
isolated instances of violence. On April 29, two PLD activists were 
killed in Moca during a PRD campaign rally. PLD members claimed that 
PRD supporters shot into a group of PLD flag wavers. In contrast, PRD 
supporters argued that PLD opposition members were trying to ``ambush'' 
their presidential candidate's motorcade. There was also political 
violence in San Pedro de Macoris at the end of April in which a vice 
mayor and secretary general of the PRD were wounded by gunfire when 
their party was carrying out a medical mission in one of the 
neighborhoods. During the August 16 election, an argument between 
political rivals reportedly led to the fatal shooting of an 
unidentified man in San Juan de la Maguana.
    The nation has a functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups 
of the left, right, and center operate openly. The President often 
dominates public policy formulation and implementation. He can exercise 
his authority through the use of the veto, discretion to act by decree, 
and influence as the leader of his party. Traditionally, the President 
has predominant power in the Government, effectively making many 
important decisions by decree. Former President Fernandez reduced the 
reliance on rule by decree during his administration. The President 
appoints the governors of the 29 provinces.
    Congress provides an open forum for the free exchange of views and 
debate. The main opposition party is the PLD, which holds 4 of 30 seats 
in the upper house and 49 of 149 seats in the lower house. A third 
major party, the PRSC of former President Balaguer, contests all 
elections; various smaller parties are certified to contest provincial 
and national elections.
    The JCE conducts all elections. In April 1999, the leading 
political parties agreed that the Congress should approve legislation 
expanding the JCE from five to seven members until after the May 
presidential elections. The PLD and the PRSC each nominated one new 
member to join the board.
    There were no reports of disturbances surrounding the Dominican 
Municipal League (LMD). It functioned normally, albeit with diminished 
legitimacy, due to the exclusion of PRD candidates from the 1999 
election for LMD president.
    Women and minorities confront no serious legal impediments to 
political participation; however, they are underrepresented in 
government and politics. By law parties must reserve 33 percent of 
positions on voting lists for women; a proportion that is to increase 
to 40 percent in 2002. However, the parties often place women so low on 
the lists as to make their election difficult or impossible. With the 
election of former Senator Milagros Ortiz-Bosch to the vice-presidency, 
there is only 1 woman in the 30-member Senate; women hold 24 seats in 
the 149-member Chamber of Deputies. Women continue to be represented in 
appointed positions, albeit to a limited degree. The President of the 
Chamber of Deputies is a woman, as are two cabinet secretaries. Women 
fill 5 of the 15 seats on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Nongovernmental human rights organizations generally operate freely 
without government interference. In addition to the Dominican Human 
Rights Committee, the National Human Rights Commission, and the 
nongovernmental Truth Commission (dealing with the Narciso Gonzalez 
case), several Haitian, church, women's, and labor groups exist.
    The Government established the Reform Commissions for the police 
and armed forces in the latter part of the year, and allowed limited 
civil society or NGO representation. The most credible human rights and 
civil society organizations are not represented. At year's end, there 
was no public information available nor discussion in civil society 
about the objectives of the two reform commissions.
    There is no ombudsman's office. However, at year's end, legislation 
was pending in Congress to create a human rights ombudsman's office as 
well as a special prosecutor for human rights abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on race and sex; however, 
such discrimination exists, the Government seldom acknowledges its 
existence or makes efforts to combat it.
    Women.--Domestic violence is widespread. Under the 1997 Law Against 
Domestic Violence, the State can prosecute for rape, incest, sexual 
aggression, and other forms of domestic violence. Penalties for these 
crimes range from one year to 30 years in prison, and have fines 
ranging from $30 to $6,000 (500 to 100,000 pesos). The State can 
prosecute a suspect for rape even if the victim does not file charges. 
This law also allows a rape victim to press charges against her husband 
without having her marriage annulled. The Secretariat of Women, as well 
as various NGO's, have outreach programs on domestic violence and legal 
rights. In 1998 the Government opened a center in Villa Juana (National 
District) for the legal support and forensic examination of abused 
women, which handled 35 to 50 cases per day in its first year. Since 
its opening, it has handled over 7,000 cases and now averages 60 to 90 
cases per day. Due to the success of this first center, the Government 
opened two additional centers during the year in San Francisco de 
Macoris and Santiago. The Ministry of Women has begun a project, in 
coordination with a local NGO, to open a fourth Services Center for 
Victims of Domestic Violence in San Cristobal. At year's end, there 
were still no shelters for battered women.
    Rape is a serious problem and is believed to be widely 
underreported. From January through October, the Santo Domingo district 
attorney's office received only 203 reports of rape in the National 
District. The penalties for committing rape are 10 to 15 years in 
prison and a fine of $6,097 to $12,195 (100,000 to 200,000 pesos). 
Victims often do not report cases of rape because of fear of social 
stigma, as well as the perception that the police and the judiciary 
would fail to provide redress. The police are reluctant to handle rape 
cases and often encourage victims to seek assistance from NGO's.
    Sexual harassment is widespread.
    Prostitution is illegal; however, the Government does not enforce 
vigorously prostitution laws, except in cases involving child 
prostitution and international trafficking in women and girls, which is 
a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Sex tourism is a 
growing industry throughout the country as the number of international 
visitors increases. NGO's have ongoing HIV/AIDS and sexually 
transmitted disease prevention programs for male and female 
prostitutes, as well as for hotel and industrial zone workers. The 1997 
Domestic Violence Law prohibits acting as an intermediary in a 
transaction of prostitution, and the Government has used the law to 
prosecute third parties that derive profit from prostitution.
    Divorce is easily obtainable by either spouse, and women can hold 
property in their own names apart from their husbands. Traditionally, 
women have not shared equal social and economic status or opportunity 
with men, and men hold the majority of leadership positions in all 
sectors. In many instances women are paid less than men in jobs of 
equal content and equal skill level. Some employers reportedly give 
pregnancy tests to women before hiring them, as part of a required 
medical examination. Union leaders and human rights advocates report 
that pregnant women often are not hired.
    Children.--Despite the existence of government institutions 
dedicated to child welfare, private social and religious organizations 
carry the principal burden. The Oversight Organization for the 
Protection of Children, created by the executive branch, is the primary 
government institution covering issues of child welfare. Private 
institutions receive 35 to 40 percent of the budget of the Oversight 
Organization. The Mejia administration created a new Ministry of Youth 
soon after the election.
    The 1994 Minor's Code requires 8 years of formal education. The 
Oversight Organization works with NGO's, law enforcement personnel, and 
the general public to publicize children's rights. In the National 
District, the Department of Family and Children, in the Office of the 
Prosecutor, administers the Minor's Code and arranges conciliation of 
family conflicts to execute court decisions with respect to child 
protection, and to interview children whose rights have been violated.
    Abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological, is the most 
serious human rights violation affecting children. The Department of 
Family and Children estimates that 50 percent of the children in the 
country are victims of some sort of abuse. No statistics were available 
from the National Police's Department of Sexual Abuse regarding rapes 
of children between 4 and 11 years of age, and few such cases reached 
the courts. In 50 percent of the cases, the accused is a person close 
to the child: a father, grandfather, uncle, brother, cousin, or close 
family friend. The criminal law provision on sexual abuse and 
intrafamily violence provides for a penalty of 10 to 20 years 
incarceration and a fine of $6,600 to $13,200 (108,000 to 216,000 
pesos) for persons found guilty of sexual abuse of a minor, and up to 
30 years if the victim is a family member of the abuser.
    Typical cases of child abuse include that of a 4-month-old child 
whose arm and rib were broken by his parents. The child was separated 
from his parents and sent to a shelter until the parents completed 
required counseling and psychological treatment. An 8-year-old child's 
father burned his child's hand after the child was caught stealing. 
There also have been reports of children being left tied up and without 
food in their homes while their parents go to work. The law prohibits 
the press from reporting on all cases of child abuse, which results in 
a diminished public perception of it.
    The Minor's Code contains provisions against child abuse, including 
physical and emotional mistreatment, sexual exploitation, and child 
labor. It also provides for removal of a mistreated child to a 
protective environment. According to local monitors, instances of child 
abuse were underreported because of traditional beliefs that family 
problems should be dealt with inside the family. However, child abuse 
is receiving increasing public attention.
    The Ministry of Health gave conservative estimates that, from 
January through October, there were 887 deliveries by female 
adolescents under age 15, and 15,491 deliveries by adolescents between 
the ages of 15 and 19. This information is preliminary and conservative 
in light of 1999 statistics, which estimated deliveries by adolescents 
below age 15 at 1,529, and by adolescents from 15 to 19 at 33,332 for 
that full year. Many of these pregnancies were reported to be the 
result of rape or incest and often are accompanied by sexually 
transmitted diseases.
    Some in the tourist industry have facilitated the sexual 
exploitation of children; particular areas of concern are Boca Chica 
and Puerto Plata. Tours are marketed by foreigners overseas with the 
understanding that boys and girls can be found as sex partners. 
According to an official in the District Attorney's Office, the 
Association of Hotels has asked to participate in government 
initiatives to combat the exploitation of children in the tourist 
industry. Journalists reported that the majority of prostitutes in 
brothels visited around the National District appeared to be between 16 
and 18 years of age. There are several church-run shelters that provide 
refuge to children who break free from the prostitution trade. 
Prostitution is the principal area of exploitation of underage girls in 
the informal economy. The Oversight Organization carried out community 
information campaigns on children's rights, including the prevention of 
child abuse, child labor, and family violence. It also provided 
training to persons and groups providing social services to children, 
judicial officials, and other children's advocates.
    Poor adolescent girls and boys sometimes are enticed into 
performing sexual acts by the promise of food or clothing; sometimes 
they are forced into unsafe relationships with strangers by the need 
for money. Once involved, they may be held against their will by 
individuals who sell their sexual favors to others. Some of these 
minors are lured from their parental homes; others are already on the 
street.
    Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (see Section 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    The judicial system sometimes fails to protect the status of minors 
in criminal cases. The authorities sometimes treated minors as adults--
most often when physical forensic examinations indicated that the 
person claiming to be minors were probably adults--and incarcerated 
them in prison rather than juvenile detention centers. In 1997 the 
Government began implementing the 1994 Minor's Code, laying the 
groundwork for a juvenile court system. The Supreme Court inaugurated 
the first of 11 juvenile courts in August 1999 and chose judges for the 
other 10 courts, some of which were functioning by year's end. Although 
these juvenile courts are organized with a focus on rehabilitating 
offenders, very few social services are available for minors. In 
practice, juveniles are detained in excess of the time permitted by 
law, and then are sent to jail rather than referred for rehabilitative 
services. There are legal advocates especially for juveniles in Santo 
Domingo and La Vega to provide them with representation in delinquency 
cases.
    Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.). It is not uncommon for 
minors to be put on the street to fend for themselves as younger 
siblings claim the parent's meager resources. Homeless children called 
``palomas'' (doves) are frequently at the mercy of adults who collect 
them and put them to work begging and selling fruit, flowers, and other 
goods on the street. In return for their work they are given basic 
housing. The ages at which these children work, the hours they put in, 
and their failure to comply with compulsory school attendance all 
violate the law, but the Government has not been able to combat this 
practice.
    People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons encounter 
discrimination in employment and in the provision of other services. 
Although the law provides for physical access for the disabled to all 
new public and private buildings, the authorities have not enforced 
this law uniformly. There is a Subsecretariat for Rehabilitation under 
the Ministry of Public Health, a recreation center for the disabled in 
Las Caobas, and a department in the Sports Ministry to facilitate 
athletic competition for the disabled. However, there is little 
consciousness of the need to make the daily lives of the disabled safer 
and more convenient. For example, new street construction makes few 
provisions for the disabled to cross the streets safely.
    The Dominican Rehabilitation Association (ADR) has grown from a 1-
room operation to a large complex with 17 affiliates throughout the 
country. It provides services for 2,500 persons daily. The Government 
provides about 30 percent of the ADR's budget. The Government also 
distributed 25,000 wheelchairs donated by a foreign athletic team.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A strong prejudice against 
Haitians runs through society and disadvantages many Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian ancestry, as well as other foreigners of African 
descent. The Government has not acknowledged the existence of this 
discrimination nor made any efforts to combat it. Darker-skinned 
Dominicans also face informal barriers to social and economic 
advancement.
    Efforts to stem the influx of Haitian immigrants have made it more 
difficult for those Haitians already in the country to live peacefully. 
Police regulations threaten those offering transportation to illegal 
immigrants with confiscation of their vehicles, and have discouraged 
taxi and bus drivers from picking up dark-skinned persons. In roundups 
of illegal immigrants, authorities pick up and expel darker Dominicans 
as well as legal Haitian residents.
    Perhaps 500,000 Haitian immigrants--or 7 percent of the country's 
population--live in shantytowns or sugar cane work camps, in harsh 
conditions with limited or no electricity, running water, or schooling. 
There are estimates that as many as 1 million Haitians live in the 
country. Human rights groups regularly charge the Government with 
unlawful deportations of, and police brutality toward, these legal and 
illegal immigrants (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
    Credible sources also charge that the Government refuses to 
recognize and document as Dominican citizens many individuals of 
Haitian ancestry born in the country. Since many Haitian parents have 
never possessed documentation for their own birth, they are unable to 
demonstrate their own citizenship. As a result, they cannot declare 
their children's births at the civil registry and thereby establish 
Dominican citizenship for their offspring. Some civil registry offices 
do not accept late declarations of birth for children of Haitian 
immigrants, although they routinely accept late declarations for 
children of Dominican parents.
    Haitian parents encounter difficulties registering their children 
for school. Lack of documentation usually deprives children of Haitian 
descent of the opportunity to attend school where there is one 
available. Some parents fail to seek documentation due to fear of being 
deported. It falls to the discretion of public school principals 
whether children may attend, when immigrant parents have no identity 
cards or birth certificates to register children formally. Even when 
permitted to attend primary school, it is rare that the children of 
Haitian parents progress beyond sixth grade.
    Sometimes poor Haitian families arrange for Dominican families to 
``adopt'' and employ their children. The adopting parents can simply 
register a child of any age as their own. In exchange, the parents 
receive monetary payment or a supply of clothes and food. They believe 
that this ensures their children a more promising future. In many 
cases, adoptive parents do not treat the adoptees as full family 
members and expect them to work in the households or family businesses 
rather than attend school. The effect is a kind of indentured 
servitude, at least until the young person reaches majority (see 
Section 6.c.). There were reports that Haitian girls between the ages 
of 10 and 14 were the most sought after, especially in border areas.
    The Government is doing little to improve the conditions of Haitian 
immigrants. Most social services in shantytowns are provided by NGO's 
and other relief organizations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
freedom to organize labor unions and for the right of workers to strike 
(and for private sector employers to lock out workers), and workers in 
all sectors exercise this right. All workers, except the military and 
the police, are free to organize. Organized labor represents an 
estimated 10 percent of the work force and is divided among four major 
confederations and a number of independent unions. There are 
approximately 190 registered unions in the country. The 1992 Labor Code 
provides extensive protection for worker rights and specifies the steps 
legally required to establish a union, federation, or confederation. 
The Code calls for automatic recognition of a union if the Government 
has not acted on its application within 30 days. In practice, the 
Government readily facilitates recognition of labor organizations.
    Unions are independent of the Government and generally independent 
of political parties. The law against companies who fire union 
organizers or members is enforced selectively, and penalties are 
insufficient to deter employers from violating worker's rights. There 
were reports of widespread discreet intimidation by employers in an 
effort to prevent union activity. This is apparent particularly in the 
FTZ's where foreign companies have located in search of low labor costs 
and little interference in their operations. For example, unions in the 
FTZ's in San Pedro de Macoris report that their members hesitate to 
discuss union activity at work, even during break time, due to fear of 
losing their jobs.
    Requirements for calling a strike include the support of an 
absolute majority of all company workers whether unionized or not, a 
prior attempt to resolve the conflict through mediation, written 
notification to the Ministry of Labor, and a 10-day waiting period 
following notification before proceeding with the strike. The 
Government generally respects association rights and places no 
obstacles to union registration, affiliation, or the ability to engage 
in legal strikes. However, enforcement of labor laws is sometimes 
unreliable, inhibiting employees from freely exercising their rights.
    In May nurses belonging to the National Union of Nursing Services 
and the National Union of Dominican Nursing Services unions went on 
strike to protest noncompliance with terms that the Ministry of Health 
agreed to in 1997. Issues of contention included a pay raise and a 
demand for hospital equipment. Sugar workers struck in La Romana in 
August to protest the company's failure to make bonus payments. 
Transportation workers struck in the Puerto Plata in September to 
protest rising fuel costs.
    G & K Services, a company in San Isidro, fired 20 union members in 
April. No judicial action was taken because the company paid severance 
pay to the workers. A court judgment in April ordered Dennis Fashions, 
Inc., which had been closed since 1998, to provide severance pay to its 
352 unionized employees. The company failed to comply with the 
judgment. A total of 350 unionized workers of Euromodas in Cristo Rey 
filed a lawsuit to collect severance pay after the company closed in 
1998. In January the court ruled that Euromodas had to pay the workers; 
however, the company no longer exists. The owners of Euromodas opened a 
new company during the year, and in June former employees protested 
outside the new factory. Protesters were dispersed by the police, who 
arrested 35 of them and held them for 2 days without charges before 
releasing them.
    In November 1999, employees of the FTZ company D & P Handbag in 
Santiago formed a union and filed the register of union members with 
the Director of Labor. This register was rejected because the Director 
General of Labor claimed that it did not contain the requisite number 
of members. In January the Ministry of Labor reversed this decision; 
however, the company did not permit formation of a union. At year's 
end, the case was still pending before a labor court in Santiago.
    On December 29, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a judgment against 
Han Chang company. It upheld the decision of the lower court that the 
work contracts of five union leaders fired in 1995 were valid. The 
Court ordered that the workers be reinstated and paid back wages. The 
Bani company has failed to comply with the decision and the National 
Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (FENATRAZONA) has asked for the 
cancellation of the company's export license. Legal authority to cancel 
export licenses lies with the National Council of Free Zones and is 
dependent on a request from the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of 
Labor reported that this case was being mediated.
    Labor unions can and do affiliate freely regionally and 
internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is legal and may take place in firms in which a union has 
gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a 
minority of companies have collective bargaining pacts, and the 
International Labor Organization considers the requirements for 
collective bargaining rights to be excessive and finds that in many 
cases they could impede collective bargaining. The Labor Code 
stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade 
union membership or activities; however, in practice, workers sometimes 
are fired because of their union activities.
    The Labor Code establishes a system of labor courts for dealing 
with disputes. While cases do make their way through the labor courts, 
enforcement of judgments is sometimes unreliable.
    The Labor Code applies in the 40 established FTZ's, which employ 
approximately 200,000 workers, mostly women. Workplace regulations and 
their enforcement in the FTZ's do not differ from those in the country 
at large, although working conditions are sometimes better and the pay 
is higher. Some FTZ companies have been accused of discharging workers 
who attempt to organize unions, but there also have been reports of 
union organizers extorting money from business owners. In the FTZ's, 
while there may be as many as 10 collective bargaining agreements on 
paper, only 3 actually are functioning. The majority of the unions in 
the FTZ's are affiliated with the National Federation of Free Trade 
Zone Workers or the United Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers.
    Many of the major manufacturers in the FTZ's have voluntary ``codes 
of conduct,'' that provide for protection against forced labor, freedom 
of association, freedom from discrimination, and prohibit the use of 
child labor. They also call for a workplace that is safe and healthy. 
However, workers rarely have heard of such codes, or the principles 
they set out.
    Tortoni Manufacturing closed its doors in April after unionized 
employees told management they wanted a collective bargaining 
agreement. New investors reportedly took control of the company, 
renamed it Gramerci Dominicana (a subsidiary of Andover) in July, and 
committed to pay the employees their severance pay. As of December 8, 
through mediation by the Secretariat of Labor, the employees were 
reinstated and had received the first of two installments of severance 
pay.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, such practices still exist to a limited extent in 
the adult worker population and, to a limited extent, among children in 
the informal sector. Young children ``adopted'' by families work under 
a kind of indentured servitude and homeless children are made to beg by 
adults (see Section 5). Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of 
prostitution is also a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The 
FENATRAZONA noted that there were over 40 reports of coerced overtime 
in factories. Workers gave examples of their employers locking factory 
doors with chains so they could not leave, and taking incentive pay 
away from or firing those who refused to work overtime. Union officials 
state that newly hired workers are not informed that overtime is 
optional. The Association for the Development of Women and the 
Environment reported several instances of forced adult labor in the 
sugar industry in the shantytowns of La Jagua, Sabana Grande de Boya, 
and Los Jovillos. Field guards reportedly kept workers' clothes and 
documents to prevent them from leaving. In January a field guard in Los 
Jovillos broke a worker's arm when he tried to leave.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of children under 14 
years of age and places restrictions on the employment of children 
under the age of 16. These restrictions include limiting the daily 
number of working hours to 6, prohibiting employment in dangerous 
occupations or in establishments serving alcohol, and limiting 
nighttime work. A company could face legal sanctions and fines if 
caught employing underage children. Children between the ages of 14 and 
16 may work in apprenticeship and artistic programs. The law requires 6 
years of formal education. Children who do not continue in school often 
seek illegal employment before reaching the minimum working age (see 
Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    In August FENATRAZONA criticized the Overseas Manufacturing 
Corporation, in the FTZ in San Pedro de Macoris, for employing underage 
workers in the production of computer components. The Ministry of Labor 
carried out two investigations and found no workers under age 16. 
(FENATRAZONA asserted that the inspectors were denied entry on their 
first visit and that when they returned, the children had been removed. 
The Secretariat of Labor denied this version and said that the 
inspectors were never denied entry.) At the end of August the company 
was operating with only 20 workers, rather than the normal force of 60 
to 80. According to the owner, the company was undergoing a work ``slow 
down'' due to lack of primary materials. At year's end, the company 
reportedly had closed.
    The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net 
create pressures on families to allow or encourage children to earn 
supplemental income. Tens of thousands of children begin working before 
the age of 14. Child labor takes place primarily in the informal 
economy, small businesses, clandestine factories, and prostitution. 
Conditions in clandestine factories are generally poor, unsanitary, and 
often dangerous. The Government largely has eliminated the use of 
children for cutting sugar cane; however, there are still reports that 
poor Haitian and Dominican children accompany their parents to work in 
the cane fields, with the tacit acceptance of sugar companies.
    Sexual exploitation of children is a problem (see Section 5).
    The Ministry of Labor, in collaboration with the International 
Labor Organization's Program on the Eradication of Child Labor, and 
other international labor rights organizations, has implemented 
programs to combat child labor. These include a national child labor 
survey; a program to remove children from dangerous agricultural work 
in San Jose de Ocoa, Constanza, and Azua; and an upcoming program in 
the area of child prostitution in Boca Chica and Puerto Plata. By 
November the Constanza program removed 500 children, twice as many as 
the targeted number, from work in hazardous agriculture, and placed 
them in schools.
    The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however, 
such practices persist in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.). There 
were no reports of forced child labor in the formal sector.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution empowers the 
executive branch to set minimum wage levels, and the Labor Code assigns 
this task to a national salary committee. Congress also may enact 
minimum wage legislation. The minimum monthly salary is $135 (2,222 
pesos) in the FTZ's and ranges from $107 (1,757 pesos) to $176 (2,895 
pesos) outside the FTZ's depending upon the size of the company and the 
nature of the business. The minimum wage does not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. It only provides 
approximately one-third of the income necessary to sustain an average 
family. The national poverty level, which is based on a basket of goods 
and services consumed by a typical family, is $402 (6,607 pesos) per 
month for a family of five.
    The Labor Code establishes a standard work period of 8 hours per 
day and 44 hours per week. The code also stipulates that all workers 
are entitled to 36 hours of uninterrupted rest each week. In practice, 
a typical workweek is Monday through Friday plus a half day on 
Saturday, but longer hours are common. The code grants workers a 35 
percent differential for work totaling between 44 hours to 68 hours per 
week and double time for any hours above 68 hours per week.
    Conditions for agricultural workers are poor, especially in the 
sugar industry. Most sugar cane worker villages have high rates of 
disease and lack schools, medical facilities, running water, and sewage 
systems. On sugar plantations, cane cutters usually are paid by the 
weight of cane cut rather than the hours worked. Employers often do not 
provide trucks to transport the newly cut cane at the conclusion of the 
workday, causing workers to receive lower compensation because the cane 
dries and weighs less.
    When the cane is weighed, workers are given tickets indicating the 
weight of cane cut (often rounded in favor of the employer) and the 
amount of money due. These tickets, issued to a specific person but 
payable to the bearer, may be turned in to the employer and redeemed 
for cash every 2 weeks. Many cane cutters earn less than $4.00 (60 
pesos) per day. Because workers earn so little and sometimes cannot 
wait until payday to redeem their tickets, an informal barter system 
has evolved in which the tickets also are used to purchase items at 
private stores located on the plantations. These private stores make 
change by giving back a combination of tickets and cash. However, it is 
not unusual for these stores to retain 10 percent of the cash due a 
customer.
    The Dominican Human Rights Committee and batey residents report 
that conditions of work for cane workers have deteriorated since the 
industry was privatized in 1999. Workers reportedly are paid less, work 
longer hours, and have fewer benefits, according to the Committee. The 
Dominican Association of Sugar Technicians reported that before the 
October 1999 privatization of the industry, there were approximately 
32,000 sugar industry workers, compared to approximately 3,200 at 
year's end. While child labor in the sugar industry has decreased 
significantly, it still exists according to human rights advocates and 
labor federations (see Section 5).
    The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace 
safety and health conditions. The existing social security system is 
seriously underfunded and applies to only about 9 percent of the 
population. Approximately 13,000 employees work in the IDSS bureaucracy 
to support fewer than 20,000 retirees.
    Both the IDSS and the Ministry of Labor have small corps of 
inspectors charged with enforcing standards. The Secretariat of Labor 
has 250 inspectors who seek to improve sanitation, health care, and 
safety for workers. Included in this number is a smaller, specialized 
corps (eight in the National District) of inspectors for the FTZ's. 
Inspector positions customarily are filled through political patronage, 
and bribes from businesses are common. In practice, workers cannot 
remove themselves from hazardous working situations without 
jeopardizing employment (see Section 6.b.).
    For example, an FTZ in Bonao, Bi Bong Apparel, fired several 
workers who, displeased with the safety of work conditions, cut wires 
to stadium lighting under which they were forced to work. In March the 
Labor Court held that the company should not have fired the workers and 
ordered an inspection. The Department of Hygiene and Safety carried out 
an inspection of the lighting, drinking water, bathrooms, and 
ventilation. According to the Ministry of Labor, inspectors found 
irregularities and made a series of recommendations. In November the 
workers returned to their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and a 1998 alien smuggling law increased the penalties for 
those found guilty of various phases of this crime; however, 
trafficking in women and children from, to and within the country 
remains a serious problem. The penalties for trafficking are 3 to 10 
years in prison, or, if there is a death, 10 to 20 years in prison, 
plus punitive damages.
    Laws dealing with domestic violence, as well as the Minor's Code, 
create protection under both civil and criminal law against particular 
situations that may be conducive to, or acts that may be a part of, the 
traffic in persons, whether female or male, minors or adults. The law 
also prohibits acting as an intermediary in a transaction of 
prostitution, and the Government has used this law to prosecute third 
parties that derive profit from prostitution.
    The Directorate of Migration estimates that there are approximately 
400 rings of alien-smugglers, traffickers, and purveyors of false 
documents operating within the country. These individuals profit by 
facilitating the trafficking of women to Europe and the Eastern 
Caribbean under false pretenses and for purposes of prostitution.
    In 1996 the Government created the Interinstitutional Committee for 
the Protection of Migrant Women (CIPROM); however, this organization 
ceased functioning due to lack of funding. One NGO, the Center for 
Integral Orientation and Investigation (COIN), counsels women planning 
to accept job offers in Europe and the eastern Caribbean about 
immigration, health, and other issues including the dangers of 
trafficking, forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. The program 
also provides services to returning women. COIN administers the Center 
for Health and Migration Information for Migrant Women that carries out 
community education campaigns in high risk areas on various issues, 
including citizenship, legal work requirements, dangers of trafficking, 
forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. It also provides a 
information hotline and offers psychological, legal, and health 
counseling to returning women.
    In January two journalists from the Spanish newspaper, El Mundo, 
made public a documentary that exposed a ring of traffickers of women 
to Europe. The ring included foreigners as well as local officials. The 
authorities arrested one military officer and deported one Dutch 
citizen. In July the Public Ministry dismantled a house of prostitution 
in which the majority of the prostitutes were from Europe and Russia. 
The leader of the operation, as well as the women themselves, fled the 
country before they could be prosecuted.
    From January through August, the authorities dismissed 42 
immigration employees for links with groups trafficking in persons. In 
addition authorities have charged at least 45 persons for allegedly 
organizing illegal trips under the 1998 antismuggling law. Of these, 30 
persons were tried and 15 were convicted. Their sentences range from 3 
to 5 years in prison. At year's end, 15 cases were pending.
    The Oversight Organization for the Protection of Children 
coordinates the approaches of various agencies involved in combating 
trafficking in children, whether for adoption, sexual exploitation, or 
other purposes. This organization works with the Attorney General's 
office, the Public Health Ministry, Migration, and other agencies. In 
the National District, the Department of Family and Children in the 
Office of Public Prosecutor focuses on identifying children who are 
victims of abuse and prosecutes offenders under heightened penalties 
contained in the domestic violence law.
    A primary concern of the Oversight Organization is preventing abuse 
of the child adoption process by those intending to sell or exploit 
children through prostitution or child pornography. The Department of 
Family and Children is very concerned about kidnapings, especially of 
infants, for sale to foreigners who deliberately have sidestepped legal 
formalities--including those of their own country. The Government seeks 
to protect children from victimization under the rubric of adoption. 
Many children leave the country as adoptees, but government officials 
have made such adoptions much more difficult and, they hope, have 
prevented would-be traffickers from abusing the system.
    Poor Haitian and Dominican parents sometimes arrange for more 
prosperous Dominican families to ``adopt'' their children, in exchange 
for money or goods. Such children often are not treated as full family 
members and are expected to work long hours in domestic service, 
agriculture, or industry under threat of corporal punishment and 
without compensation. Especially in the case of girls, these children 
often are abused sexually.
                               __________

                                ECUADOR

    Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a 123-member unicameral 
legislature that was chosen in free elections in May 1998. On January 
21, members of the military joined protesters, including indigenous 
dissidents, to force President Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief 
period of confusion and the proclamation of a ``People's Parliament'' 
by the coup leaders, on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa 
assumed the presidency and restored order. At the end of May the 
Government extended a full amnesty to all those who participated in the 
overthrow of Mahuad. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but 
in practice is inefficient and susceptible to outside pressure.
    The military enjoys substantial autonomy, reinforced by assured 
revenues from the country's oil exports, as well as from civil 
aviation, shipping, and other commercial sectors. The National Police 
are responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of 
internal order and fall under the civilian Ministry of Government and 
Police. In early January, then-President Mahuad declared a state of 
emergency, which gave him the power to use troops to monitor and react 
to public protests. The state of emergency lasted 1 month in most of 
the country, and until March in Guayas province. Throughout the year, 
the military continued to supplement the police on an ad hoc basis. 
Some military officers were forced to resign for their role during the 
events of January 21, despite the blanket amnesty. The police and, in 
some isolated cases, members of the military, continued to commit 
abuses.
    The economy is in a severe economic recession, although it began to 
improve slightly during the year. The economy is based on private 
enterprise, although there continued to be heavy government involvement 
in key sectors such as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. The 
principal exports are oil, bananas, shrimp, and cut flowers, which are 
the country's leading sources of foreign exchange. Most citizens are 
employed in the urban informal sector or as rural agricultural workers; 
rural poverty is extensive, and underemployment is high. According to a 
1999 study, approximately 62 percent of citizens live in poverty and 15 
percent are indigent, with an almost total lack of resources. By the 
end of 1999, the incomes of approximately 56 percent of households were 
below the poverty line. The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of 
$1,053 provided most of the population with a low standard of living 
during the year. Per capita GDP was $1,101 in 1999. In response to the 
recession, the Government announced in January that the country would 
adopt the U.S. dollar as its national currency and completed that 
process in September. Inflation for the year was 91 percent.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor in a number 
of areas, and serious problems remain. There were credible reports that 
police committed extrajudicial killings. Police tortured and otherwise 
mistreated prisoners and detainees, usually with impunity. Prison 
conditions remained poor. In August a law went into effect that is 
expected to either free or reduce the sentences of approximately 2,900 
prison inmates for humanitarian reasons. Persons often are subject to 
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention is a problem. Once 
incarcerated, persons may wait years before being convicted or 
acquitted. More than one-half of the prisoners in jail have not been 
sentenced formally. The Government failed to prosecute and punish human 
rights abusers. The most fundamental human rights abuses stem from 
shortcomings in the politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt 
legal and judicial system. The Government infringed somewhat on press 
freedom and some self-censorship continues. The Government declared 
states of emergency during the year that limited freedom of assembly 
and movement. Violence and pervasive discrimination against women, 
indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians also remain problems. The 
Government continued to order participants in nationwide strikes back 
to work, and arrested striking members of the National Teachers' Union. 
Child labor is a problem. Mob violence and killings persist.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings; however, there 
continued to be credible reports that police committed extrajudicial 
killings. Through December the Ecumenical Committee for Human Rights 
(CEDHU) reported a total of 15 extrajudicial killings by the police, 
security forces, or semiofficial entities such as neighborhood 
brigades. However, during the same period, the Permanent Committee for 
Human Rights (CDH) reported 20 cases of extrajudicial killings by the 
same groups in Guayas province alone. (Neighborhood brigades are civic 
defense groups organized by the National Police to provide an anticrime 
presence in neighborhoods. They are not authorized to carry firearms, 
but often do.) In many of these instances, there was insufficient 
evidence to reach a conclusion as to what occurred; however, the 
killings sometimes exhibited a suspicious pattern.
    On January 6, a crowd of residents from the evacuated town of Banos 
forced their way past a military roadblock in order to reoccupy their 
homes. (Banos had been evacuated due to the threat from a nearby active 
volcano.) A stray bullet fired by security forces struck and killed 
Edison Guato, and dozens of persons were injured during the melee (see 
Section 2.b.).
    On May 13, in a remote northeast section of the Amazon near the 
Peruvian border, government security forces clashed with a previously 
unknown armed group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Ecuador--Defenders of the People (FARE-DP). Two of its members were 
killed and five others were wounded and/or captured, including their 
purported leader, ``Alex.'' The authorities later maintained that the 
FARE-DP was criminal in nature and linked the group to a series of 
kidnaping and murder cases.
    In Guayaquil on May 31, Guayas Transit Commission police reportedly 
shot 24-year-old civil engineer Cesar Matute nine times and killed him. 
Matute apparently failed to stop his truck at a police roadblock, 
thinking it was set up by robbers. The authorities suspended officers 
Alfonso Peasantes and William Jimenez. After an investigation by the 
fourth district police court, the two officers were exonerated and 
reinstated.
    On June 5, in Guayaquil Special Operations Group police confronted 
a group of criminals that they were pursuing and killed seven persons; 
eight others reportedly escaped. Police stated that the robbers were 
armed heavily and strongly resisted arrest.
    On August 28, in Portoviejo, police surprised 19 armed robbers 
attempting to hold up a local bank. Eleven of the gunmen were killed 
during the shootout and 8 escaped. Three policemen also were wounded. 
Police stated that all of the suspects refused to surrender. There was 
no investigation of the incident.
    Also on August 28, in Guasmos Sur, members of an army patrol shot 
and killed Sergeant Carlos Lemos as he allegedly fled from them. 
Officials reported that Lemos had escaped 12 days earlier from a jail 
at the 5th Army Engineers headquarters where he was being held pending 
an investigation into the theft of rifles from an armory in Esmeraldas. 
Lemos's lawyer and his family dispute the official version of events 
and claim that he was tortured and murdered. No official inquiry had 
been made by year's end.
    On December 4, 60-year-old Josefina Rios Murillos died after 
apparently being thrown from a police vehicle in Guayaquil. Her family 
said that the city's recent ``greater security campaign'' had increased 
police brutality, and it has charged that Rios was struck on the head 
before being thrown out of the patrol car. At year's end, the case was 
under investigation.
    On February 9, the bodies of two men were found in different parts 
of Guayaquil. One was identified as a security guard mysteriously 
killed at a business from which nothing was stolen; the other was an 
unidentified individual whose corpse was dumped along the highway that 
circles the city. There have been other unsolved murders along this 
highway; for example, in May the bodies of John Merchan and Jacobo 
Moreira were found there--both had long criminal histories. Other 
bodies found on the highway include: On June 21, Adolfo Perez; on June 
23, Francisco Pazmino; and on July 27, Angel Pacucar. Seven other 
bodies of suspected criminals also were found on the highway over a 4-
day period in September. Some human rights groups suspect police 
involvement in these killings, but no investigation had been undertaken 
by year's end.
    In January a police court inquiry into the March 1999 killing of 
14-year-old Mickey Mendoza concluded; the court charged policeman 
Carlos Alberto Iturralde Salazar with unintentional homicide. The court 
ruled that he had failed to maintain proper control of the weapon, 
which apparently went off when Mendoza tried to grab the gun. Iturralde 
was confined to police barracks pending trial. On January 13, the 
Mendoza family filed a dissent with the court asking that the second 
policeman on the scene also be tried, and that five policemen whom they 
believe conspired to cover up the incident be charged as accomplices. 
The charges were increased and, on July 17, Iturralde was found guilty 
of simple homicide; however, he was transferred to Cuenca and returned 
to full duty status pending the court's issuance of a final decision. 
Late in the year, the authorities arrested Iturralde and jailed him 
pending the outcome of a sentencing hearing. Iturralde faces a sentence 
of up to 8 years' imprisonment; however, the Mendoza family believes 
that the killing was premeditated and is seeking additional charges 
that would carry a longer sentence.
    A court dismissed the case against Carlos Alulema, a policeman who 
shot and killed a cigarette vendor in July 1999 in Guayaquil, on the 
grounds that the policeman was drunk and not responsible when he 
committed the crime. No information was available about the 
investigation into the killing by two police officers of Richard 
Morales Cabrera in November 1999 in Guayaquil, a shooting that also 
wounded several other persons.
    The investigation continued into the February 1999 killing of Jaime 
Hurtado Gonzalez, an Afro-Ecuadorian member of Congress from the far-
left Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) party; Pedro Tapia (Hurtado's 
alternate in the Congress); and Wellington Borja near the Supreme Court 
in Quito. The killings bore the hallmarks of a professional ``hit,'' 
and the authorities have brought charges against several suspects, 
including police officers and a former police informant, in the 
killings. Several suspects were jailed and convicted, and their appeals 
were denied; at year's end, the investigation was still active.
    There has been no disposition of the November 1998 kidnaping and 
killing in Quito of Saul Filormo Canar Pauta, a leader of the 
Ecuadorian Confederation of United Working Class Organizations. In 
December 1998, a municipal worker found Canar's body in a trash dump. 
His hands and feet were tied and his body showed signs of torture. The 
authorities suspect that he may have been killed by private landowners 
in retaliation for his activities organizing land invasions by 
squatters.
    There also were instances in which citizens took the law into their 
own hands, inciting mob violence that resulted in lynchings and 
burnings of suspected criminals (see Section l.e.). Mobs killed at 
least 14 crime suspects in the first 11 months of the year; individual 
lynchings continued to occur in all parts of the country, especially in 
indigenous communities in remote areas of the highlands. For example, 
on August 13, in the indigenous community of Quilla Silla in Azuay 
province, local residents beat three men whom they accused of cattle 
rustling. As a result, 22-year-old Jorge Guanuci died, and two of his 
companions were injured seriously before firemen from a nearby town 
intervened.
    Government officials reported the killings of 20 persons in the 
town of Lago Agrio during November and December. Most were killed 
execution-style as the result of conflicts between rival Colombian 
groups who had entered the country. In addition, in December another 
five persons were killed while travelling on a public bus outside of 
Lago Agrio when unidentified criminals blew up a section of the oil 
pipeline.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    Criminal kidnaping for profit continued to be a problem. By mid-
year the police antikidnaping unit reported 8 kidnaping cases and 
another 56 possible cases. On October 12, an unidentified armed group 
kidnaped a group of 10 oil workers near Pompeya, in Orellana province. 
The Government launched a major operation to find the victims and to 
investigate the perpetrators of this act. At year's end, eight oil 
workers still were being held.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and similar forms of 
intimidation and punishment; however, the police continued to torture 
and abuse suspects and prisoners, usually with impunity. Reports of 
abuse increased.
    The CEDHU published detailed reports on suspects who reported being 
tortured by specific policemen. By December the authorities had 
registered 33 complaints of some form of torture by security forces. In 
most cases, the police appeared to have abused such persons during 
investigations of ordinary street crime. The victims reported that the 
police beat them, burned them with cigarettes, applied electric shocks, 
or threatened them psychologically. By year's end, human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) had received at least 135 reports 
of incidents involving physical mistreatment.
    For example, on January 29, near Milagros, an 18-year-old woman 
accepted a ride and a drink from policeman Freddy Veloz. She later 
awoke from a state of unconsciousness in a remote area after having 
been raped. The woman lodged a formal complaint in court, but there was 
no disposition in the case by year's end.
    On March 2, in Guayaquil, off-duty CTG Corporal Miguel Noriega, in 
an inebriated state, shot and wounded Anabel Villegas in the hand and 
leg. Noriega subsequently was arrested, and the case was pending at 
year's end.
    On August 24, in Guayaquil, police shot and wounded off-duty 
fireman Xavier Barriero, in a case of mistaken identity. Once police 
discovered their mistake, they then left the scene without providing 
any assistance to Barriero. Eventually, the police admitted their error 
and paid his medical bills.
    Police corruption is a problem throughout the country. During the 
year, the police in Guayaquil dismissed 20 police officers for various 
reasons that included corruption.
    Conditions in prisons and detention centers generally continued to 
be poor. Prisons in the tropical coastal areas tend to be worse than in 
the temperate highlands. For example, the Tomas Larrea prison in 
Portoviejo was built in 1930 to hold 150 inmates, but its current 
population exceeds 300. It has never been repaired or expanded and has 
many tunnels, which have contributed to some of the 30 successful 
escapes since 1970. Overcrowding also is a chronic problem elsewhere. 
There are no separate facilities for hard core or dangerous criminals, 
nor are there effective rehabilitation programs. New prisons have not 
been constructed due to lack of financial resources.
    The Constitution requires that prisoners charged with lesser 
offenses (those carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years or less) and who 
have been detained for more than 1 year without a sentence obtain their 
freedom immediately. In January the National Directorate for Social 
Rehabilitation (DNRS) reported that 553 inmates had been released since 
the provision entered into force. On August 18, a law went into effect 
that is expected eventually to free or reduce the sentences of 2,947 
prison inmates for humanitarian reasons.
    In September 1999, the DNRS published a report that indicated that 
there were a total of 8,520 inmates incarcerated in facilities 
originally designed to hold a population of 5,964 prisoners. In 1998 a 
total of 26 inmates died in prison. The report stated that traumatic 
injuries, reportedly inflicted by fellow inmates, caused 65 percent of 
those deaths. It attributed the others to illness and drug use. The 
prison authorities routinely investigate deaths in custody. During the 
year, a number of prisons experienced serious outbreaks of disease, 
including meningitis.
    In September 1999, women represented 9.5 percent of the total 
prison population. Women are held separately from men, and conditions 
are notably better in the women's prison in Quito than in other 
facilities. There also are separate facilities for juveniles.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
Penal Code provide that no one may be deprived of liberty without a 
written order from a governmental authority; however, the authorities 
often violate these legal protections in practice, and arbitrary arrest 
and detention remain problems. For example, on January 28, in Azuay, 
the authorities arrested Maria Guatama, her daughter, and 
granddaughter; they spent a night in jail without any formal charges. 
The incident was traced to a disgruntled neighbor who apparently had 
friends on the police force. The family's release most likely was due 
to the fact that they could afford a lawyer.
    The law requires the authorities to issue specific written arrest 
orders within 24 hours of detention--even in cases in which a suspect 
is caught committing a crime--and the authorities must charge the 
suspect with a specific criminal offense within 48 hours of arrest. All 
detained persons may challenge the legality of their detention by 
petition within 48 hours of their arrest, but in practice few such 
petitions are brought forward. The senior elected official (usually the 
mayor) of the locality in which the suspect is held reviews any such 
petitions. Regardless of the legality of a detention, a prisoner may be 
released only by court order. In some cases, detainees who are unaware 
of this, or who do not have the funds to hire a lawyer, may remain in 
prison for an extended period of time before being released. Bail 
generally is not available, and the law prohibits it in narcotics and 
major offense cases. Families of detainees sometimes attempt to secure 
the prisoners' freedom through illegal means.
    Human rights organizations continued to report occasional cases of 
incommunicado detention, although the law prohibits this practice. Even 
when the police obtain a written arrest order, those charged with 
determining the validity of detention often allowed frivolous charges 
to be brought, either because they were overworked or because the 
accuser bribed them. The system frequently was used as a means of 
harassment in civil cases in which one party sought to have the other 
arrested on criminal charges. Preventive detention up to and including 
trial is legal if a judge determines that it is necessary and if 
evidence that a crime has been committed is presented.
    As in the previous year, the authorities in Guayas Province 
arrested scores of persons under a state of emergency that was imposed 
from January until May. The measure was imposed to stem a soaring crime 
rate (584 persons died in violent crimes in the city of Guayaquil in 
1999, and 104 kidnaping cases were registered.) The police often 
arrested persons on mere suspicion or for lack of proper 
identification; they released most of them a few days later.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does 
not use it as a method of political control.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is 
susceptible to outside pressure and corruption. Despite efforts begun 
in 1992 to depoliticize and modernize the court system, the judiciary 
continues to operate slowly and inconsistently. Judges reportedly 
rendered decisions more quickly or more slowly depending on political 
pressure, or in some instances, the payment of bribes. There are 
lengthy delays before most cases come to the courts.
    The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit 
courts, other courts and tribunals that hear cases in accordance with 
the Constitution and other laws, and the Judicial Council. There also 
are military and police tribunals that have the same status as circuit 
courts, while criminal, provincial, and cantonal courts serve as courts 
of first-instance.
    The regular court system tries most nonmilitary defendants, 
although some indigenous groups try members independently for 
violations of tribal rules. The law permits police or military courts 
to try police officers and military defendants in closed sessions, in 
accordance with the respective military and police court martial 
manuals. Only the Supreme Court may try cases involving flag-rank 
officers. The police court does not announce verdicts or punishments, 
reinforcing the strong impression that the police are immune from 
prosecution. The 1998 Constitution placed both police and military 
justice under the control of the Supreme Court. However, the three 
systems have not yet been integrated.
    The Supreme Court that took office in 1997 publicly recognized the 
shortcomings of the judicial system and pledged to improve the quality 
and training of judges. In May 1998, the Supreme Court supervised the 
selection by open competition of all appellate judges. A Judicial 
Council, charged with administering the court system and disciplining 
judges, took office in the fall of 1998. In November 1999, the 
Council's disciplinary committee fired two judges and two court 
employees for their role in the release of suspected drug traffickers. 
All four faced criminal charges. During the year, the Judicial Council 
removed at least two judges and a number of minor officials from their 
jobs.
    The failures of the justice system contributed to a growing number 
of cases in which communities took the law into their own hands. There 
continued to be reports of lynchings and burnings of suspected 
criminals by outraged citizens (see Section 1.a.). These occurred 
particularly in indigenous communities and poor neighborhoods of major 
cities where there is little police presence.
    The law provides for internationally accepted due process rights 
for criminal defendants, but the authorities, including the Chief 
Prosecutor's office, often did not observe these rights in practice. By 
law, the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and 
defendants have the right to a public trial, defense attorneys, and 
appeal. They may present evidence, refuse to testify against 
themselves, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Although a public 
defender system exists, in practice there are almost no attorneys 
available to defend the large number of indigent suspects.
    Trial is supposed to begin within 15 to 60 days of the initial 
arrest; however, in practice initiation of the trial phase can take 
years. Less than 40 percent of all those incarcerated have been 
convicted and sentenced. Accused narcotics traffickers and suspects in 
major crimes cannot obtain bail or be released on their own 
recognizance.
    In November 1999, Congress passed a new Criminal Procedures Code. 
Then-President Mahuad proposed changes in December 1999, which Congress 
accepted in January. The code is scheduled to take effect in July 2001, 
and is intended to change the criminal justice system from an 
inquisitorial to an accusatorial-style system. The Chief Prosecutor's 
office is to investigate and prosecute crimes, while the role of judges 
is to change to that of neutral arbiters presiding over oral trials. 
The new code is a step toward implementation of provisions in the 1998 
Constitution intended to strengthen the justice system by improving due 
process and enhancing the rights of the accused, through measures such 
as habeas corpus and limits on preventive detention.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanctions.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, and the authorities generally respected this 
provision in practice; however, there were some notable exceptions. 
There are frequent charges of slander and libel brought by and against 
public figures, but few result in final decisions or judicial relief. 
On April 19, the President of Congress announced that press coverage of 
congressional proceedings would be restricted to an audio broadcast; 
following vigorous protest by the press, which formerly had enjoyed 
wide access to Congress, he announced that separate areas would be set 
aside for live coverage of sessions. Some self-censorship continues.
    There is a free and vigorous press. Ownership of the media is 
broadly based, and editorials represent a wide range of political views 
and often criticize the Government. However, some degree of self-
censorship in the print media occurs, particularly with respect to 
politically sensitive issues or stories about the military and its 
related industries. In addition, most elements of the media were 
influenced by economic considerations and tend to reflect the narrow, 
regional interests of their owners.
    All of the major media organs--newspapers, radio, and television--
are locally and privately owned, except for one governmentowned 
national radio station. The law limits foreign investment in broadcast 
media. Using a law promulgated by the last military regime that 
requires the media to give the Government free space or broadcast time, 
the Government can and does require television and radio to broadcast 
governmentproduced programs featuring the President and other top 
administration officials.
    On February 16, in Guayaquil, Rafael Cuesta, the news director of 
the Tele Centro television station was injured severely by a bomb 
contained inside a videocassette. Congresswoman Cinthya Viteri and 
indigenous leader Marco Murillo also received videocassette bombs in 
the mail; however, because of the Cuesta incident they were suspicious 
and alerted the police, who defused the devices. Police were unable to 
discover who sent the bombs.
    Near the end of the year, the mayor of Guayaquil banned a guidebook 
that contained negative comments about the city.
    The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government 
does not interfere in issues involving academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of free assembly for peaceful purposes, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice; however, there 
were some limits. In February President Noboa decreed a nationwide 
state of emergency that lasted until March and limited freedom of 
assembly. Public rallies require prior government permits, which 
generally are granted, although exceptions occur. In January protesters 
took over the congressional building and, joined by military leaders, 
forced the resignation of President Mahuad (see Section 3). Numerous 
other labor and student demonstrations took place without major 
incident in the capital and the outlying regions during the year. 
Protesters often blocked roads. On January 6, police in Quito and 
Guayaquil arrested 46 protesters, and in Quito 1 student was shot and 
injured; some protesters were armed, and the police denied 
responsibility. In general the security forces intervened in 
demonstrations only when there was violence against bystanders or 
destruction of property. Police in Quito used tear gas in January, 
March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought access to the 
city center (see Section 6.a.). Police also used tear gas against 
protesting members of the National Teachers' Union. On April 17, 
members of the Evangelical Indigenous Movement (FEINE) and the 
Federation of Indians, Campesinos, and Blacks (FENOCIN) occupied the 
Government's Indigenous Affairs Office.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Government does not require religious groups to be licensed or 
registered unless they form NGO's that engage in commercial activity. 
Approximately 90 percent of the population consider themselves to be 
Roman Catholic, although most citizens do not regularly practice the 
religion or follow a syncretistic version that combines indigenous 
beliefs with orthodox Catholic doctrine. The Government allows 
missionary activity and religious demonstrations by all religions. The 
Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools; 
private schools are permitted to teach religion, as are parents in the 
home. There are no restrictions on publishing religious materials in 
any language. In early 1998, police in Pinchincha suspended the 
meetings of a group known as ``Gnostico Cristiano Universal,'' 
following the suicide of 29 members of the ``Heaven's Gate'' cult in 
California, while they investigated possible links between the two 
groups. The Government's investigation was inconclusive, and the groups 
have resumed their activities.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice; 
however, frequent military and police roadblocks often present problems 
for travelers using public transportation, especially at night. The 
Government requires all citizens to obtain exit visas when travelling 
abroad, which are granted routinely. Military and minor applicants must 
comply with special requirements.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of provision of first 
asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    According to the UNHCR, since September approximately 1,600 
Colombian refugees arrived in the country, most of whom fled due to 
fighting between guerrillas and paramilitary forces in the Colombian 
department of Putumayo. The Government and the UNHCR have developed a 
three-point contingency plan to cope with the refugee influx into 
Sucumbios province. In November nine persons occupied offices of a 
Catholic Church in Quito that worked with the UNHCR to screen and 
register refugees. The occupation ended peacefully after 48 hours.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage; however, on January 21, members of the military 
joined protesters, including indigenous dissidents, to force President 
Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief period of confusion during 
which the leaders of the coup announced the dissolution of the three 
branches of government and the formation of a ``People's Parliament,'' 
on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa assumed the presidency and 
restored order.
    On January 19, approximately 6,000 persons including members of the 
Confederation of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities (CONAIE), students, and 
leftwing political protesters marched in Quito. On January 21, 
thousands of protesters, including members of CONAIE, students, 
teachers, and union members, occupied and took control of the 
congressional building in Quito. The police and military guarding the 
building did not oppose the occupation with force, and over 100 
soldiers joined the protesters. CONAIE leader Antonio Vargas announced 
on television from the floor of Congress that he would head the 
People's Parliament. He also said that retired army Colonel Lucio 
Gutierrez would join him in a new ``ruling junta'' as the executive, 
and that former Supreme Court President Carlos Solorzano would take 
over the role of Supreme Court President. The protesters called for 
President Mahuad to resign. (There also were protests in Guayaquil, 
where a group of students, unionists, and neighborhood associations 
seized the provincial government building.)
    President of Congress Juan Jose Pons described the small military 
group that joined the protests as ``seditious'' and called for support 
for the democratically elected Government. Mahuad then spoke on 
television and refused to resign. On the afternoon of January 21, the 
armed forces service chiefs and joint staff chief General Carlos 
Mendoza called for the President to resign. Mahuad resisted the call to 
resign but later fled the palace. The junta (also called the 
``triumvirate'') originally was composed of Vargas, Solorzano, and 
Colonel Gutierrez. Later during the night of January 21, at the palace, 
General Mendoza briefly joined the junta, replacing Colonel Gutierrez. 
On January 22, President Mahuad appeared again on television and 
accepted Vice President Gustavo Noboa as president; on the same day, 
Congress ruled that Mahuad had deserted his post. With Noboa's 
assumption of office, order was restored.
    On January 22, Congress sanctioned two of its membersDemocratic 
Left representatives (and former army generals) Paco Moncayo and Rene 
Yandunfor their role in the coup and removed them from their seats in 
the Congress.
    On February 4, General Norton Narvaez, the head of the armed 
forces, announced that a military court had found 113 soldiers, 17 of 
whom were in jail, guilty of breach of discipline and breaking their 
oath for taking part in the coup. They were put on administrative leave 
and confined to barracks. General Mendoza resigned.
    On May 31, Congress approved an amnesty for army officers involved 
in the coup, and those held in prison were released. On June 5, the 17 
most senior imprisoned officials were placed on 48-hour administrative 
leave. Colonel Gutierrez served 4 days in jail for a ``breach of 
discipline,'' i.e., for his interviews with the press. On June 12, the 
military forced Colonel Gutierrez and 11 other officers to resign 
despite the blanket amnesty.
    On July 13, Supreme Court President Galo Pico issued arrest 
warrants for former President Mahuad and his former finance minister 
for crimes in connection with the freezing of bank assets in March 
1999.
    Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over 18 years of age and 
voluntary for illiterate citizens. The law does not permit active duty 
members of the military to vote. The Constitution bars members of the 
clergy and active duty military personnel from election to Congress, 
the presidency, or vice presidency. The Constitution provides that if a 
political party fails to garner a minimum of 5 percent of the votes in 
two open elections, the party must be eliminated from the electoral 
registry.
    In August a dispute arose over who had the right to be elected 
president of Congress. After a Constitutional Court ruling forced 
Susana Gonzalez from office following a challenge, Hugo Quevedo was 
elected. He later defeated a challenge to his own election and remained 
in office at year's end.
    No specific laws prevent women or minorities from attaining 
leadership positions; however, few women, indigenous people, or Afro-
Ecuadorians occupy senior positions in government. Women are 
underrepresented in politics and government, although they have made 
gains in recent years. Women hold 17 of 123 seats in Congress, the 
largest proportion of seats held by women in the country's history. 
There is one female cabinet minister.
    The indigenous movement, which previously shunned traditional 
politics, formed an electoral movement called Pachakutik (which means 
``cataclysmic change'' in Quichua) and ran candidates for national, 
provincial, and local office in the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections. A 
Pachakutik Congresswoman, Nina Pacari, formerly the Second Vice 
President of Congress, is part of an eight-member congressional bloc 
whose cooperation with the majority in Congress on some issues has 
ensured it significant influence. The politically active Confederation 
of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities, headed by Antonio Vargas, was at the 
forefront of protests that overthrew then-President Mahuad. Indigenous 
members of the National Constituent Assembly and their supporters won 
important constitutional protections for indigenous rights in the 1998 
Constitution. There are 3 indigenous deputies serving in the 123-member 
Congress.
    One Afro-Ecuadorian serves as a member of Congress, but none are 
found in senior-level government jobs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Domestic human rights groups, such as the CEDHU and 
the regional Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), were 
outspoken in their criticism of the Government's record on specific 
cases. Nevertheless, the Government contracted with the ALDHU to 
provide human rights training to the military and the police.
    The office of the Ombudsman was created in 1998 to ensure ongoing 
attention to human rights problems; however, some observers have 
criticized its independence in practice. In May Congress removed the 
Ombudsman from office on charges of fraud for acts that he committed 
while he was acting Attorney General. As of year's end, Congress had 
not named a replacement, and Claudio Mueckay was acting Ombudsman at 
year's end.
    In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights 
Plan with the goal of preventing, penalizing, and eradicating human 
rights violations in the country. The three branches of government, as 
well as the independent Ombudsmen's office and a number of NGO's, 
contributed to development of this plan. At the end of 1999, the U.N. 
had contributed $1.2 million to support the plan. The plan includes 
education for the Congress on human rights matters. The Government 
began to implement various aspects of its plan, including seminars, 
publishing documents, and a contingency plan for refugees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, 
sex, or social status. In addition, the constitutional reforms 
explicitly increased the rights of women, children, and minorities, and 
required Congress to pass legislation implementing these rights 
promptly. However, women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians 
continue to face significant discrimination.
    Women.--Although the law prohibits violence against women, 
including within marriage, it is a widespread practice. The 1995 Law 
Against Violence Affecting Women and Children criminalized spousal 
abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; created 
family courts; and reformed the Penal Code to give courts the power to 
separate an abusive spouse from the home. Although nationwide 
statistics were not available, according to an NGO in Guayaquil, that 
city registered more than 32,000 official complaints of domestic 
violence between May 1998 and May 1999, almost double the previous 
period's figure. The NGO's report also said that one out of three women 
suffered from some form of domestic violence. Women may file complaints 
against a rapist or an abusive spouse or companion only if they produce 
a witness. Many rapes also are not reported due to the victims' 
reluctance to confront the perpetrators. The penalty for rape is a jail 
sentence of up to 16 years. In cases of statutory rape involving 
``amorous'' sex with a minor, if the rapist marries the victim the 
charges against him, or anyone else who took part in the rape, cannot 
be pursued unless the marriage subsequently is annulled. While some 
communities have established their own centers for counseling and legal 
support of abused women, the Government only began to address this 
problem seriously with the 1994 formation of the Women's Bureau. 
Although this office can accept complaints about abuse of women, it has 
no authority to act on the complaints. However, the Women's Bureau has 
doubled the number of its outreach offices and actively referred abuse 
cases to prosecutors.
    Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
    Adult prostitution is legal.
    Discrimination against women is pervasive in society, particularly 
with respect to educational and economic opportunities for those in the 
lower economic strata. The increasingly active women's movement alleges 
that culture and tradition inhibit achievement of full equality for 
women. There are fewer women than men in the professions and skilled 
trades, and pay discrimination against women is common.
    The Ecuadorian Women's Permanent National Forum, founded in 1994, 
includes more than 320 women's organizations and promotes social, 
economic, and cultural change through various methods, including 
increasing political participation by women. In addition the National 
Women's Council provides support for approximately 500 women's 
organizations, many of which promote social consciousness and greater 
participation by women in the political process. The Women's Political 
Coordinator, an NGO that operates in 17 provinces, promotes similar 
themes relating to women's rights, with an emphasis on political 
participation and human rights. It also focuses on young women and 
Afro-Ecuadorian women.
    Children.--According to the National Statistics Institute, in 1999 
approximately 47 percent of the population was under the age of 18. The 
Government has not taken effective steps to promote the welfare of 
children. The Constitution requires that children achieve ``a basic 
level of education,'' estimated at 9 years of school; however, the 
Government rarely enforces this requirement in practice (see Section 
6.d.). Education is free.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. Government 
resources to assist children traditionally have been limited, although 
the Government operates a program to care for the children of the 
working poor called ``Operation Child Rescue.'' The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has concluded that this program reached only 
a small percentage of those affected. Approximately 45 percent of 
children under the age of 5 are malnourished. Government spending on 
education continued to decline, both in real terms and as a proportion 
of GDP. There are more than 20 NGO's that promote child welfare.
    Several private organizations are very active in programs to assist 
street children, and UNICEF also runs a program in conjunction with the 
Central Bank. The children of the poor often experience severe 
hardships, especially in urban areas. Children as young as 5 or 6 years 
of age often sell newspapers or candy on the street to support 
themselves or to augment family income. Also, there are reports of 
prostitution by girls and boys under 18 years of age in urban areas, 
and there have been reports of cases in which children were forced into 
prostitution. In rural areas, young children often must leave school at 
an early age to help out on the family's plot of land.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of 
other state services. However, there are no laws to ensure disabled 
persons access to public buildings or services, nor are they provided 
any other special government assistance. In June the city of Guayaquil 
began a modest program to give the disabled better access to public 
buildings.
    Indigenous People.--While at least 85 percent of all citizens claim 
some indigenous heritage, culturally indigenous people make up about 15 
to 20 percent of the total population. The vast majority live in rural 
areas, including the highlands and the Amazonian provinces, and most 
live in varying degrees of poverty. Land is scarce in the more heavily 
populated highland areas where high infant mortality, malnutrition, and 
epidemic disease are common. Electricity and potable water often are 
unavailable. Although the rural education system is seriously 
deficient, many indigenous groups participated actively with the 
Ministry of Education in the development of the bilingual education 
program used in rural public schools.
    The Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous communities to 
hold property communally, to administer traditional community justice 
in certain cases, and to be consulted before natural resources are 
exploited in community territories. Indigenous people also have the 
same civil and political rights as other citizens. In the Amazon area, 
indigenous groups have lobbied the Government, enlisted the help of 
foreign and domestic NGO's, and mounted protests (including kidnaping 
oil workers and tourists), in their attempts to win a share of oil 
revenues and a voice in exploitation and development decisions. The 
Constitution expressly recognizes the indigenous communities' rights to 
be consulted on, but not to approve, oil exploration and development. 
Oil companies have increased their efforts to minimize the 
environmental and social impact of their oil projects in the Amazon but 
continue to face criticism from indigenous groups that environmental 
damage still is occurring.
    Despite their growing political influence and the efforts of 
grassroots community groups, which were increasingly successful in 
pressuring the central Government to assist them, Indians continue to 
suffer discrimination at many levels of society. With few exceptions, 
indigenous people are at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale. For 
example, by one UNICEF estimate in 1999, 83 percent of indigenous 
children worked at some kind of job (see Section 6.d.).
    CONAIE was at the forefront of protests that toppled President 
Mahuad (see Section 3). It also has arranged a popular referendum and 
public demonstrations to protest government economic austerity measures 
and to urge the repeal of economic modernization laws involving 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.
    Religious Minorities.--Although relations between religious 
communities generally have been amicable, in past years there have been 
a few incidents of interreligious or intrareligious tension or 
violence.
    A Baptist clinic in the town of Chachas is operating normally, 
following opposition to its establishment from local residents in April 
1999.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of the rural, 
northern coastal area includes large numbers of Afro-Ecuadorian 
citizens. They suffer widespread poverty and pervasive discrimination, 
particularly with regard to educational and economic opportunity. There 
are no special government efforts to address these problems.
    There are five major Afro-Ecuadorian organizations active in the 
country; the largest is the Confederacion Nacional Afroecuatoriana, 
with headquarters in Quito. It estimates that Afro-Ecuadorians account 
for more than 1 million persons, or about 10 percent of the total 
population. While the presence of Afro-Ecuadorians has grown in the 
fields of sports and culture, their educational opportunities continue 
to be limited.
    The press has focused on lingering racism among all strata of 
society. Afro-Ecuadorian organizations note that despite the absence of 
official discrimination, societal discrimination continues to affect 
them. For example, they assert that the police stop Afro-Ecuadorians 
for document checks with greater frequency than other citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Code 
provide most workers with the right to form trade unions. Members of 
the police, the military, and public sector employees in nonrevenue 
producing entities are not free to form trade unions. The 1991 Labor 
Code reforms sets the number of workers required for an establishment 
to be unionized at 30, which the International Labor Organization's 
Committee on Freedom of Association considers too stringent a 
limitation at the plant workers' council level. Although the Congress 
debated additional labor reforms, labor law was in flux at year's end 
because the Constitutional Court ruled that some recent labor 
legislation was unconstitutional. The court's ruling nullified several 
articles that the Government stated provided flexibility to employers, 
but that some observers claimed undercut constitutional protections of 
worker rights.
    While employees of state-owned organizations enjoy rights similar 
to those in the private sector, the law technically prevents the 
majority of public sector employees from joining unions or exercising 
collective bargaining rights. However, most public employees maintain 
membership in some labor organization, and there are frequent 
``illegal'' strikes. Despite official threats, the Government rarely 
takes action against striking public workers. However, in May the 
Government ordered striking teachers back to work and arrested and 
temporarily jailed National Teachers' Union (UNE) leaders. A November 
1997 law prohibits public sector strikes if they paralyze key services, 
including schools.
    Although the labor confederations are politically independent, the 
two largest single labor unions, the UNE and the Union of Social 
Security Workers, are allied with the Democratic Political Movement, a 
communist party. Approximately 12 percent of the work force is 
organized. There are four large labor centrals or confederations. None 
of the main labor centrals is connected firmly to any one political 
party, and there are no ties between the Government and any labor 
union.
    There are few restrictions on the right of workers to strike, 
although a 10-day cooling-off period is required before a strike can be 
declared. The Labor Code revisions limit solidarity strikes or boycotts 
to 3 days, provided that the Labor Ministry approves them. In a legal 
strike, workers may take possession of the factory or workplace, thus 
ending production at the site, and receive police protection during the 
takeover. The employer must pay all salaries and benefits during a 
legal strike; the Labor Code protects strikers and their leaders from 
retaliation.
    There were several significant strikes during the year, mainly in 
response to government austerity measures. They involved public sector 
employees such as teachers and social security and medical workers, as 
well as petroleum, electricity, and transportation workers; indigenous 
groups also protested during the strikes. Police in Quito used tear gas 
in January, March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought 
access to the city center (see Section 2.b.). In April public sector 
bureaucrats went on strike to demand higher wages. In May the Public 
Teachers Union (UNE) began a countrywide strike for higher wages, and a 
judge issued an arrest warrant for Arcelly Moreno, the president of the 
UNE. The strike lasted more than 2 months; some striking teachers were 
detained for as long as 10 days. In December health workers held a 
strike for 2 weeks.
    Unions may freely form and join federations or confederations, and 
three of the large labor centrals maintain international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor 
market is highly segmented, with a minority of workers in skilled, 
usually unionized, positions in state-run enterprises or in medium to 
large industries. Most of the economically active population is 
employed in the agricultural sector or the urban informal sector; the 
vast majority of these workers are not organized. The Labor Code 
requires that all private employers with 30 or more workers belonging 
to a union must negotiate collectively when the union so requests. 
Collective bargaining agreements cover only onequarter of the 
approximately 12 percent of the work force that is organized. In March 
a new labor law allowed businesses to hire workers on ``individual 
contracts,'' but the practice did not become prevalent because Congress 
was reconsidering the law at year's end.
    The Labor Code streamlined the bargaining process in state 
enterprises by requiring workers to be represented by only one labor 
union. It prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that 
employers provide space for union activities upon the union's request. 
The law does not permit employers to dismiss a worker without the 
express permission of the Ministry of Labor, whose rulings are not 
subject to judicial review. If the Ministry of Labor rules that a 
dismissal is unjustified, it can require the employer to pay large 
indemnities or separation payments to the worker, although the reforms 
set a cap on such payments. A fired worker is eligible for 
reinstatement and in general would not be blacklisted at other 
companies. Workers generally are protected against antiunion 
discrimination only by pressure from the union. The Labor Code provides 
for resolution of labor conflicts through an arbitration and 
conciliation board which consists of one representative of the Ministry 
of Labor, two from the union, and two from management.
    The 1990 Maquila Law permits the hiring of temporary workers for 
the maquila (in-bond processing for export) industries only. While 
there is no express prohibition on association rights in the Maquila 
Law, in practice it is difficult to organize temporary employees on 
short-term contracts. Since temporary workers are not recognized by the 
Labor Code, they do not enjoy the same level of protection offered to 
other workers. The maquila system allows a company and its property to 
become an export-processing zone wherever it is located. Many such 
``zones'' have been established; most are relatively small and are 
dedicated to textiles and fish processing.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit compulsory labor, and there were no reports of 
it in general. There have been reports of children forced into 
prostitution (see Section 5), but there were no other reports of forced 
or bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits boys younger than 12 years old and girls 
younger than age 14 from working, except in special circumstances such 
as apprenticeships. It requires children between the ages of 12 or 14 
and 18 years to have the permission of their parent or guardian to 
work. The law also prohibits children between the ages of 14 and 18 
years from working more than 7 hours per day or 35 hours per week, and 
it restricts children below the age of 14 years to a maximum of 6 hours 
per day and 30 hours per week. In practice the Ministry of Labor fails 
to enforce child labor laws, and child labor is prevalent. The problem 
has increased in recent years due to the prolonged economic crisis, and 
urban child labor has increased with the migration of the rural poor to 
the cities. A UNICEF report estimated that in 1997, 37 percent of the 
2.1 million children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked; in 1999 
almost 1 out of 2 children in this age bracket worked. A 1999 report 
based on a joint national and World Bank study found that 45 percent of 
children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked at least parttime. Among 
children aged 10 to 11, who cannot work legally, 28 percent worked at 
least part-time nationwide. More than 60 percent of all children live 
in rural areas and do unpaid agricultural work for their families.
    The Constitution provides that children must attend school until 
they attain a ``basic level of education'' estimated at 9 school years. 
However, due to the lack of schools in many rural communities, the 
Government's failure to provide adequate resources, and the need for 
children to work, this provision rarely is enforced. UNICEF reported in 
1999 that one out of three children did not remain in school long 
enough to complete the 6th grade. The Constitution provides that 30 
percent of the public budget must be devoted to education; however, in 
practice only half of that amount is spent. The Government has programs 
in 18 urban areas that provide families with educational subsidies as 
an incentive to keep children in school. In rural areas, many children 
attend school only sporadically after about 10 years of age in order to 
contribute to household income as farm laborers.
    In the city, many children under 12 years of age work in 
familyowned ``businesses'' in the informal sector, shining shoes, 
collecting and recycling garbage, or as street peddlers. Others are 
employed in commerce, messenger services, domestic service, and 
begging. Child prostitution is a problem, and there have been cases 
reported of children being forced into prostitution (see Section 5). 
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no 
other reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor 
periodically sets the minimum wage in consultation with the Commission 
on Salaries, but Congress also may adjust it. As of August, the minimum 
wage plus mandated bonuses provided a gross monthly compensation of 
approximately $110, or 50 cents per hour in the case of contract 
workers. The statutory minimum wage is not adequate to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Most organized workers in 
state industries and formal sector private enterprises earned 
substantially more than the minimum wage and also received other 
significant benefits through collective bargaining agreements. However, 
the majority of workers work in the large informal and rural sector 
without recourse to the minimum wage or to legally mandated benefits.
    The Ministry of Labor has the principal role in enforcing labor 
laws and carries this out through a corps of labor inspectors who are 
active in all 22 provinces. The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour 
workweek, a 15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and other employer-
provided benefits, such as uniforms and training opportunities. In 
March reforms to the labor law nominally gave greater flexibility to 
employers by hiring parttime workers, such as accountants, for only a 
few hours per week. However, this legislation was affected by a 
Constitutional Court decision (see Section 6.a.).
    The Labor Code also provides general protection for workers' health 
and safety on the job. However, a worker may not leave the workplace of 
his own volition, even if there is a hazardous situation. The worker is 
allowed to request that an inspector from the Ministry of Labor come to 
the workplace and confirm the hazard; that inspector then may close 
down the workplace. Response time for inspectors ranges from a few days 
in major cities to much longer in the countryside.
    The Government enforces health and safety standards and regulations 
through the Social Security Institute. In the formal sector, 
occupational health and safety is not a major problem. However, there 
are no specific regulations governing health and safety standards in 
the agricultural sector and in practice there is no enforcement of 
safety rules in the small mines that make up the vast majority of the 
mining sector. During the year, at least two fatalities were reported 
due to accidents in the mines.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is a misdemeanor law that 
addresses trafficking in persons; it provides for penalties from 6 
months to 3 years in prison, as well as fines. The Migration Law and 
the Penal Code provide for the imposition of sanctions on suppliers of 
false documents for purposes of travel or work. Other laws dealing with 
kidnaping, labor, occupational safety, and slavery apply to and provide 
sanctions for trafficking in persons. In June Congress amended the 
Criminal Code to strengthen sentences for furnishing or utilizing false 
documents and for alien smuggling. Alien smugglers or traffickers can 
receive sentences from 3 to 6 years' imprisonment; the penalties range 
from 6 to 9 years' if victims are injured, and a penalty of up to 12 
years may be imposed if a death occurs. The law specifically exempts 
victims from prosecution. There were no confirmed reports of persons 
being trafficked to, from, within, or through the country against their 
will; however, there were many reports of persons being smuggled 
illegally from the country to the United States through Central America 
in which trafficking sometimes was suspected. In 1999 police in Spain 
reported that they had arrested 50 Ecuadorian women working as 
prostitutes who were likely victims of trafficking.
                               __________

                              EL SALVADOR

    El Salvador is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with an 
executive branch headed by a president and a unicameral legislature. 
President Francisco Flores of the Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) was elected in 1999 to a 5-year term. In free and fair 
elections in March, the former guerrilla organization Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) won a plurality of the seats in the 
Legislative Assembly. ARENA maintains a working majority in coalition 
with the conservative National Conciliation Party. Three other parties 
hold seats in the Assembly. The judiciary is constitutionally 
independent but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
    The National Civilian Police (PNC) maintains internal security. The 
military is responsible for external security. The military provides 
support for some PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 by 
presidential executive order in an effort to contain violence by well-
armed, organized criminal bands. In March at the President's direction, 
the air force, navy, and selected army units formed Joint Task Groups 
with the police as part of an interagency antinarcotics program. 
Civilian authorities maintain effective control of the military and 
security forces. Some members of the police committed human rights 
abuses.
    The country has a free-market, mixed economy largely based on 
services, agriculture, and manufacturing. Although agriculture accounts 
for only 12 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), it is the 
largest source of employment, engaging 35 percent of the work force, 
estimated at 2.3 million persons. Coffee and sugar are the principal 
export crops and important sources of foreign exchange. The 
manufacturing sector, which contributes 21 percent of GDP, employs 9 
percent of the work force. The textile sector, especially the maquila 
(in-bond assembly or processing) plants in free trade zones, represents 
about 50 percent of manufacturing sector employment and is the main 
source of new jobs. The economy is open, and private property is 
respected. The rate of real economic growth was estimated to reach 2.5 
percent during the year. Inflation was 3.6 percent. Per capita GDP 
reached $2,080. The official unemployment rate averaged 7.7 percent 
during the year, 6.5 percent urban and 11 percent rural; however, the 
rate of underemployment (less than full-time work or total income below 
the minimum wage) was estimated at about 30 percent. Approximately 44 
percent of the population lives below the poverty level.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Police 
officers committed extrajudicial killings. The Supreme Court found the 
1993 Amnesty Law constitutional but noted that certain categories of 
crimes were not covered. Police kidnaped persons for profit. The police 
used excessive force and mistreated detainees; there were also 
allegations that police abused street children. Prison conditions 
remained poor. High crime rates, together with police officer 
involvement in prominent kidnapings, led to the creation of a 
presidential commission to discipline and dismiss corrupt and criminal 
police. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The judiciary 
remained inefficient and is hampered by widespread corruption. Impunity 
for the rich and powerful remained a problem. The authorities used 
force to disperse one demonstration; one person was injured. In 
February Human Rights Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned over 
misconduct charges; the Legislative Assembly had not named a successor 
at year's end. Violence and discrimination against women continued, and 
discrimination against disabled persons also remained a problem. Abuse 
of children, child labor, and forced child prostitution were also 
problems. The Government did not adequately protect workers' rights to 
organize and bargain collectively. Trafficking in women and children is 
a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by agents of the Government; however, the 
police committed some extrajudicial killings.
    During the year, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office received for 
investigation 87 cases alleging killings by the PNC during the year and 
in prior years. As of November, the presidential commission 
investigating police misconduct identified at least 72 officers 
suspected of extrajudicial killings during the year and in prior years.
    On February 10, police shot at the tires and windshield of a 
vehicle that failed to obey their signal to stop on a major 
thoroughfare in San Salvador. When the vehicle halted, passenger 
Salvador Hernandez fled, and a police officer shot and killed him. The 
prosecutor charged Mario Orlando Franco Duran with aggravated homicide. 
He also charged Franco and three other officers with the attempted 
murder of Edwin Quintanilla Flores and Ricardo Trejo Stanley, the 
vehicle's driver and another passenger. On December 11, a judge 
determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the homicide 
charge for the trial of Franco to proceed to the next phase; however, 
the judge dismissed the attempted homicide charges against the 
defendants on grounds that it was impossible to determine which 
officers intended to shoot at the vehicle's windshield. The prosecutor 
appealed the latter verdict, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
    On April 7, police driver Mauricio Enrique Martinez shot and killed 
Luis Edgardo Garcia Vasquez after he failed to stop when signaled by 
police on the highway between Santa Ana and Ahuachapan. Two police 
officers and two police drivers pursued him and shot out his tires. 
When the vehicle stopped, Martinez opened the door and shot Garcia in 
the head. In December a court convicted Martinez of aggravated murder 
and sentenced him to 28 years in prison. The two officers were 
acquitted, and charges were dropped against the other driver, who 
became a witness in the case.
    In June PNC officer Luis Alonso Navarrete was on duty with a Joint 
Task Group (composed of soldiers and police) when he allegedly shot and 
killed six persons and wounded four others with an M-16. Five of the 
victims were soldiers who formed part of his Joint Task Group. Police 
arrested Navarrete the same day; he reportedly suffered from mental 
illness. The PNC disciplinary committee dismissed Navarrete from the 
police in September. He remained in custody awaiting trial on charges 
of aggravated homicide and attempted aggravated homicide at year's end.
    A total of 13 inmates died in prison due to violence and illness 
(see Section 1.c.).
    There was mixed progress in resolving cases of extrajudicial 
killings from previous years.
    In October a court sentenced police officer Jose Miguel Soriano 
Melgar to 12 years in prison for the November 1999 shooting of Carlos 
Lopez Regalo. The court acquitted police captain Erick Fuentes of the 
charge of aggravated homicide. That verdict was appealed in November; 
the appeal was pending at year's end.
    In July a police disciplinary tribunal removed from the force five 
officers charged with the November 1999 beating death of Manuel de 
Jesus Parada. In October a jury acquitted four of them of the crime; it 
issued no verdict for the fifth officer, who had fled prosecution and 
did not appear for the trial.
    In October a court found three PNC officers guilty of attempted 
homicide for torturing Juan Carlos Miranda before stabbing him and 
stealing his vehicle (see Section 1.c.).
    In November a court convicted police officer Jorge Alberto Canas 
Sanchez of aggravated homicide and sentenced him to 30 years in prison 
for the August 1999 murders of Fernando Hernandez and Manuel Aguilar. 
Two other officers charged with the crime remained fugitives at year's 
end. A judge provisionally acquitted another individual who had been 
charged with complicity. The prosecutor's appeal was pending at year's 
end.
    In February a court dismissed charges against a police officer in 
the August 1999 shooting of a protester near Sonsonate during a 
confrontation between police and several hundred members of the 
Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Producers. The prosecutor 
appealed, but the appeals court upheld the verdict.
    In October the trial of Jose Ernesto Cordova, charged with the July 
1999 murder of William Ernesto Rosales Bonilla, an employee of the 
newspaper El Diario de Hoy, began. The trial had not concluded at 
year's end. Prosecutors assert that there were other participants in 
the crime, including police officers. However, no evidence of police 
participation had been found by year's end.
    A public prosecutor charged police captain Mariano Rodriguez Zepeda 
with aggravated homicide for the 1998 shooting of Jose Antonio 
Villalta. The next phase of the trial was scheduled for January 2001.
    There were no further developments in the 1998 death of Carlos 
Ernesto Lovo who died of drowning after fleeing police custody.
    In February four members of the National Action Party (PAN) were 
killed in two separate incidents. Masked gunmen shot and killed 
Gilberto Cano Gonzalez near PAN headquarters in Metapan while he was 
distributing campaign materials to a party sympathizer, Samuel Martinez 
Flores. Martinez was killed by his own gun, which he dropped in his 
attempt to flee after the first shots were fired. In October a court 
found ARENA activist Jose David Murcia and Gilberto Torres not guilty 
of aggravated homicide. The prosecutor appealed, alleging procedural 
errors in the trial. The appeal was pending at year's end. In San 
Antonio de Monte a local resident (reportedly mentally disturbed) 
stoned two PAN members to death. The police detained the perpetrator, 
and there was no indication of any political connection.
    On March 26, Jose Maria Tojeira, rector of the Jose Simeon Canas 
Central American University, formally asked the Attorney General to 
reopen the case of the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests, their 
housekeeper, and her daughter and prosecute the crime's alleged 
instigators. He based his request in part on the December 1999 report 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) which found 
the State responsible for violating the right to life of the eight 
murdered persons and for failing to conduct an effective investigation. 
The report also criticized the 1993 General Amnesty Law, which led to 
the release from custody of two military officers found guilty of the 
murders in 1992, and called on the Government to reopen the case. In 
reply to the IACHR report, the President reviewed the steps taken by 
the justice system to investigate and punish the crime; however, he 
recommended against reopening the case because that would undermine the 
integrity of the post civil war amnesty, which he regarded as essential 
to the continuing process of national reconciliation. The Attorney 
General deferred action on Tojeira's petition until the Supreme Court 
(CSJ) issued its decision on the constitutionality of the 1993 General 
Amnesty Law. On September 26, the CSJ upheld the constitutionality of 
the 1993 General Amnesty Law. However, the Court also indicated that 
certain special cases were not eligible for amnesty and gave lower 
courts discretion to adjudicate these matters on a case-by-case basis. 
In December the Attorney General brought the matter before a lower 
court judge and recommended that the case be closed. The judge ruled 
that the accused were not covered under the amnesty law because they 
were public officials at the time of the killings. However, she closed 
the case because the 10-year statute of limitations had expired. 
Tojeira appealed the decision, as did the defense, who wanted the court 
to find the accused not guilty based on the facts rather than the 
statute of limitations. Both appeals were pending at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed politically motivated 
disappearances.
    As of mid-November, the presidential commission investigating 
police misconduct identified at least 12 officers suspected of 
involvement in kidnapings in during the year and in prior years. Most 
disappearances were the result of kidnaping for profit, a common 
occurrence affecting all levels of society throughout the country.
    In May an organized crime group that included police officers 
kidnaped businessman Rodrigo Zablah in San Salvador and held him for 
more than 2 weeks. Three police officers allegedly stopped his vehicle 
and told him to accompany them to the police station because of a 
traffic accident that had occurred a day earlier. Once he was in the 
police car, they took him to another location. The Attorney General's 
office identified 18 persons involved in the crime, including at least 
3 police officers. A hearing was scheduled for June 2001. Eight of the 
accused remained at large at year's end.
    In June another organized crime group that included police officers 
kidnaped a couple in Sonsonate and demanded ransom. The PNC's 
antikidnaping unit rescued the victims the next day and captured five 
persons. The Attorney General's office charged eight persons with the 
crime, including PNC sergeant Tomasa Reyes Alvarado and former PNC 
sergeant Jose Azcunaga Segura. The latter had been charged with 
kidnaping in the past and had been removed from the police force. A 
hearing was scheduled for May 2001. Two of the accused remained at 
large at year's end.
    There were no new developments in the 1999 kidnapings of Margarita 
Posada, the director of a domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO), 
and Miguel Montenegro, president of the Human Rights Commission of El 
Salvador. Both victims were released within a day. The police did not 
find the perpetrators.
    The Association for the Search for Children who Disappeared as a 
Result of the Armed Conflict, a local NGO, advocated the creation of a 
national commission to clarify what happened to 383 children who 
disappeared during the war, and whose whereabouts remain unknown. The 
Legislative Assembly had taken no action on their request at the end of 
the year.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, some 
members of the PNC continued to use excessive force or otherwise 
mistreated detainees.
    In February four PNC officers allegedly tortured Juan Carlos 
Miranda before stabbing him and stealing his vehicle. The officers had 
stopped him as he was driving a minibus. After putting him in the back 
of the bus, they kicked, beat, and threatened him for 2 hours. Finally, 
they stabbed him and left him for dead. In October a court found three 
officers guilty of attempted homicide and sentenced them to 16 years in 
prison. The court absolved a fourth officer of all charges.
    During the year, the office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of 
Human Rights (PDDH) received 724 complaints of violation of the right 
of personal integrity by government authorities, a decrease from a 
total of 929 complaints in 1999. This category covers torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, 
and improper treatment of detainees. The majority of these complaints 
involved the PNC and alleged minor to serious violations of arrest 
procedures. The PDDH received a total of 1,198 complaints against the 
PNC for all categories of human rights violations during the year. The 
number of complaints against the PNC and the cases of violations of 
personal integrity by all authorities have declined for the past 
several years.
    At year's end, 128 police officers were in prison on criminal 
charges or serving prison sentences for crimes that included murder, 
rape, extortion, and kidnaping.
    In June President Flores named a commission to investigate alleged 
police misconduct. The commission proposed reforms to PNC regulations 
to expedite discipline and dismissals, including the establishment of 
special courts to review cases of alleged misconduct. In June the 
Legislative Assembly passed authorizing legislation to implement the 
measures recommended by the commission. This legislation strengthened 
the role of the PNC Inspector General's office, making it a quasi-
independent body within the PNC, charged with investigating allegations 
of police misconduct and reporting directly to the chief. In August the 
Assembly approved a temporary measure that allowed the chief of police 
for 120 days to remove officers charged with crimes or inadequate 
performance following an internal PNC investigation by the office of 
the Inspector General. In December the Assembly extended the measure 
for an additional 45 days. By year's end, the police force had 
dismissed more than 1,500 persons under the special decree and 
preexisting disciplinary procedures, and the special police courts had 
acquitted more than 200 persons. Some assembly deputies and the press 
questioned the transparency of the process and the fairness of its 
application and charged that high ranking officers remained immune from 
scrutiny. The commission identified 14 persons suspected of having 
committed torture.
    Labor organizations and the Human Rights Ombudsman alleged that in 
March the Government used unwarranted force to disperse a demonstration 
by striking social security workers. The police used water cannons on 
demonstrators who had blocked a busy street for several hours and 
refused to move when urged to do so by police and other authorities, 
including the Human Rights Ombudsman. The police shot rubber bullets in 
the air, injuring one journalist. When the case was brought to court in 
March, the judge determined that the use of force by police was 
appropriate for the circumstances. The Government did not employ force 
during other demonstrations during the year.
    In the past there have been allegations from children's rights 
groups that street children suffer from police brutality; the PNC 
always have denied these charges (see Section 5).
    There were no further developments in the 1998 shooting of FMLN 
communications adviser Leonardo Mena Marroquin.
    Human rights awareness was a standard component of the police 
officers' basic training program.
    Prison conditions remained poor. From December 1997 to December 
1999, the prison population fell about 23 percent as a result of the 
implementation of new sentencing and penal codes, which limit 
preventive detention to serious crimes. However, it increased again 
during the year. The prison system has the capacity to hold 5,794 
prisoners in 18 penal facilities. There was still some overcrowding in 
individual facilities. At year's end, 7,383 men were held in 17 prison 
facilities with a combined capacity of 5,674; there are 371 women in 
the single women's prison, which has a capacity of 120; and there are 
61 men in 3 secure hospital wards with a combined capacity of 75 
persons. Because of a lack of holding cells, pretrial detainees often 
are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with 
violent criminals.
    Gang violence, especially in the country's three largest and oldest 
penitentiaries and its juvenile holding facilities, continued to plague 
the prison system, despite government efforts to separate different 
gangs. In January the media reported incidents of prisoners torturing 
other prisoners in La Esperanza in San Salvador in 1999 and earlier. 
Prison authorities reported that, during the year, there were 13 deaths 
in the prison system, 4 of which were from multiple wounds caused by 
violence between prisoners. The remaining deaths resulted from illness.
    There are separate facilities for female detainees and prisoners.
    The law requires that all juveniles be housed separately from 
adults both prior to trial and while serving a prison sentence, and the 
Government observes this requirement in practice. Most criminal cases 
involving juveniles are brought to trial or conciliation proceedings 
within 3 months.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors, NGO's, and the media.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest; however, at times the PNC arbitrarily 
arrested and detained persons. During the year, the PDDH received 181 
complaints for violations of personal liberty, a decrease from 225 
complaints in 1999. The number of complaints in this category has 
declined steadily since 1996. The courts generally enforced a ruling 
that interrogation without the presence of counsel is coerced and that 
any evidence obtained in such a manner is inadmissible. As a result, 
police authorities generally delayed questioning until a public 
defender arrived.
    The law permits the police to hold a person for 72 hours before 
delivering the suspect to court, after which the judge may order 
detention for an additional 72 hours to determine if an investigation 
is warranted. Because of a lack of holding cells, such detainees often 
are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with 
violent criminals. The law allows 120 days to investigate serious 
crimes and 45 days for lesser offenses before a judge is required to 
bring the accused to trial or dismiss the case. However, many cases 
were not completed within the legally prescribed time frame. During the 
year, more than 2,000 inmates were in pretrial detention. From January 
through May, the justice of the peace courts, where most court cases 
originate, accepted a daily average of 166 cases. Of these, a daily 
average of nine cases were resolved through conciliation proceedings.
    The Penitentiary Code permits release on bail for detainees who are 
unlikely to flee or whose release would not impede the investigation of 
the case. Because it may take several years for a case to come to 
trial, some prisoners have been incarcerated longer than the maximum 
legal sentence for their crimes. In such circumstances, a detainee may 
request a review by the Supreme Court of his or her continued 
detention.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. However, the judiciary suffers from inefficiency and 
corruption.
    The court structure has four levels: justices of the peace, trial 
courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and appellate judges from 
a list of nominees proposed by the National Judicial Council. The 
Council is an independent body provided for in the Constitution to 
nominate, train, and evaluate judges. All lower court judges serve 
until they voluntarily resign or are dismissed for cause. The 
Legislative Assembly elects, by a two-thirds majority, Supreme Court 
justices from a list provided by the National Judicial Council and the 
National Association of Lawyers. A justice serves for 9 years and may 
be reelected. There are separate court systems for family matters and 
juvenile offenders; they stress conciliation as an alternative to 
adjudication. The Criminal Sentencing Court has responsibility for 
executing and monitoring the sentences imposed by the trial courts. 
Through its Department of Judicial Investigation, the Supreme Court 
regularly receives and investigates public complaints about judicial 
performance. This department also reviews the findings and 
recommendations of the National Judicial Council, which evaluates 
justices on an ongoing basis. The Supreme Court imposes penalties when 
warranted.
    Judges, not juries, decide most cases. A jury verdict cannot be 
appealed. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the Supreme 
Court for reduction. A jury verdict may be overturned by a mistrial 
determination that there were serious problems with jury panel 
selection or errors in the trial procedure. A judge's verdict may be 
appealed.
    The Juvenile Legal Code requires that minors under the age of 18 be 
tried only in juvenile courts, limits sentences for minors to a maximum 
of 7 years, and includes alternatives to incarceration for minors.
    In 1999 the Legislative Assembly approved a number of additional 
changes to the Criminal Procedures and Penal and Penitentiary 
(Sentencing) Codes. These changes included the establishment of more 
severe penalties for some crimes (including increasing the maximum 
possible prison sentence from 30 to 35 years), the elimination of 
parole for some crimes, and the addition of new crimes to the code. One 
of these reforms strengthened the legal protection afforded to children 
and the disabled by prescribing 6-to-8-year prison sentences for 
persons convicted of sexual aggression against adults incapacitated by 
mental or physical conditions or against minors.
    The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence, 
protection from self-incrimination, legal counsel, freedom from 
coercion, and compensation for damages due to judicial error. 
Defendants also have the right to be present in court. These rights 
were not always respected fully in practice. The Constitution and law 
require the Government to provide legal counsel for the indigent; 
however, this requirement was not always implemented in practice.
    Impunity before the country's civil and criminal laws continued, 
especially for persons who were politically, economically, or 
institutionally well-connected. In August National Conciliation Party 
leader and Legislative Assembly Deputy Francisco Merino shot at police 
officers, injuring one officer. (Merino is also a former Vice 
President.) Merino settled out of court with the police department and 
the injured officer. The Assembly decided not to lift Merino's 
parliamentary immunity to allow criminal prosecution.
    In October a judge exonerated the individuals accused of the April 
1999 rape and murder of 9-year-old Katya Miranda. Investigators 
allegedly failed to collect important evidence at the crime scene, and 
the judge refused to interview several witnesses identified by 
prosecutors. In November a judge ruled that the ex-president and 
directors of the Salvadoran Soccer Federation could not be prosecuted 
for misuse of funds, document fraud, and other charges because the 
organization was not public. More than $4 million (36 million colones) 
was missing from the Federation. The Attorney General's office appealed 
the judge's decision, and a hearing was scheduled for January 2001.
    Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources and lack of 
sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and witnesses 
(especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest, and 
prosecute criminals, resulting in diminished public confidence in the 
justice system.
    Corruption in the judicial system and the Attorney General's office 
contributed to impunity. In November the Attorney General announced 
that he was investigating information that almost 450 prosecutors and 
judges might have falsified their credentials or obtained them 
illegitimately, and another 83 persons might have been involved in 
nepotism. He also was investigating suspicions that prominent defense 
attorneys had sources inside the prosecutors' office who provided leaks 
that impeded investigations and prevented successful prosecutions.
    The Government and the Legislature took steps to address these 
problems. At the Attorney General's urging, the Legislative Assembly 
passed a law on November 23 that created an expedited process for 
dismissing employees of the Attorney General's office. The measure, 
authorized for 120 days, was modeled after a law passed in August that 
permitted the expedited removal of undesirable persons from the police 
force.
    Some public officials called for the Supreme Court to begin a 
similar initiative to remove corrupt judges. The Court maintained that 
its Department of Judicial Investigation and the National Judicial 
Council already scrutinized judicial performance on an ongoing basis. 
In practice, the Court imposed few sanctions upon judges. During the 
year the Court received the Council's evaluations of the performance of 
322 justices of the peace, 46 trial court judges, 63 sentencing court 
judges, and 28 appeals court magistrates. The evaluations reviewed each 
judge's performance over several months in 1998 or 1999. The Council 
recommended the dismissal of 3 justices of the peace and 1 trial court 
judge, and suspensions ranging from 3 to 60 days for 156 justices of 
the peace, 23 trial court judges, 18 sentencing court judges, and 13 
appeals court magistrates. The Court exonerated two of the four 
officials recommended for dismissal; a third resigned, and the fourth 
case remained under review at the end of the year. By the end of the 
year, the Court had begun to review 11 cases of judges recommended for 
dismissal. It had taken no action in the remaining cases.
    The implementation of judicial reforms continued to create 
confusion and uncertainty among police, prosecutors, public defenders, 
and the courts. Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources 
and lack of sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and 
witnesses (especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest, 
and prosecute criminals, thus diminishing public confidence in the 
justice system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for a right to privacy, and 
government authorities generally respected these rights in practice. 
The law requires the police to have a resident's consent, a warrant, or 
a reasonable belief that a crime is under way or is about to be 
committed, before entering a private dwelling.
    In June the Attorney General's office initiated investigations of 
reported illegal wiretapping activities conducted by the 
telecommunications company, TELECOM. The Legislative Assembly formed a 
special commission to conduct parallel investigations. The 
Superintendent of Telecommunications and Electricity produced a list of 
telephone numbers believed to have been tapped, including those of the 
offices of the Attorney General, politicians, journalists, and NGO's. 
Neither the commission nor the Attorney General had completed their 
investigations, and the purpose of the wiretapping had not been 
determined at year's end.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Print and broadcast journalists from all major media outlets 
regularly and freely criticize the Government and report opposition 
views. Opposition figures are interviewed routinely on television and 
radio, and in the press. According to major media associations, the 
Government did not use direct or indirect means to control the media. 
However, some television stations complained that advertising agencies 
responsible for placement of government-funded public service 
announcements were biased in favor of media companies that generally 
supported government policy.
    The Inter-American Press Association identified problems in several 
areas, including the absence of a law providing for journalists' right 
to maintain the confidentiality of sources. In September some news 
organizations criticized the Government for attempting to require all 
television and radio stations to broadcast the President's speech and 
related events celebrating Independence Day. Several organizations 
refused to broadcast events other than the President's speech; however, 
the Government took no action against them.
    There are 5 daily newspapers, with a combined circulation of more 
than 250,000 copies per day, and 12 television stations. Four 
independent VHF television stations reach most areas of the country, 
while the government-owned and operated VHF station has poor signal 
quality even in San Salvador. Seven independent UHF stations serve San 
Salvador, and several can be received as far as 30 miles from the 
capital. Two cable television systems cover much of the capital, and 
other cable companies operate in the major cities of San Miguel, Santa 
Ana, and Sonsonate. All carry major local stations and a wide range of 
international programming. There are approximately 20 small cable 
television companies across the country, serving limited local areas. 
While most of them appear to be authorized broadcasters, several are 
believed to be pirating signals. Approximately 150 licensed radio 
stations broadcast on the FM and AM bands.
    A provision in the 1999 Criminal Code allows judges to close court 
proceedings if public exposure could prejudice the case. The media and 
the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) have asserted that the 
provision abridges press freedom. In the past, legislative deputies 
have argued that misuse of the provision could lead to impunity and 
corruption by limiting the ``watchdog'' role of the press.
    There were no instances of censorship of books, other publications, 
films, or plays.
    The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government 
respects this right in practice.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for peaceful assembly for any lawful purpose, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. There is no requirement for 
permits to hold public meetings, and public demonstrations are common 
and generally peaceful. A court determined that the Government's use of 
force to disperse a demonstration by striking social security workers 
in March was appropriate (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    The Supreme Court still had not decided a constitutional challenge 
to a 1996 law charging the Ministry of Interior with registering, 
regulating, and overseeing the finances of NGO's and non-Catholic 
religious groups, which a group of affected organizations filed in 
1998.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Constitution specifically recognizes the Roman Catholic Church and 
grants it legal status. In addition, the Constitution provides that 
other churches may register for such status in accordance with the law.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The law does not include specific provisions for granting refugee 
or asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; 
however, the Government has procedures for handling such requests in 
accordance with these principles.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum has not 
arisen in recent years. There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The President and Vice President are elected every 
5 years. The Constitution bars the President from election to 
consecutive terms. Voting is by secret ballot.
    Ten political parties, representing the full political spectrum, 
fielded 7 candidates in the March 1999 presidential elections. The 
Government did not restrict opposition participation, and there were no 
violent incidents during the campaign. Observers found that the vote 
was without major flaws and proceeded peacefully with fair access to 
the polls for all. Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ARENA party, 
won a clear majority in the first round of voting.
    In March the country held legislative elections that observers 
generally reported to be free and fair. The FMLN won a plurality of 
legislative seats.
    Four PAN members were killed in two separate incidents in February 
prior to the March elections (see Section 1.a.).
    There are no laws or overt practices that prevent women from voting 
or participating in the political and governmental systems; however, 
women are not accorded equal respect or stature in these areas and are 
under-represented in government and politics. Women head three 
ministries (Foreign Affairs, Education, and Environment) and the Social 
Security Institute, and hold a substantial number of vice- and sub-
ministerial jobs. Women represented 49 percent of the registered voters 
in the March election. In March voters elected 8 women to the 84-seat 
legislature, a decrease from the previous Assembly's 14 women. One 
woman sits on the Assembly's 11-member governing board; there were 2 
women on the board in the previous legislature.
    Minorities, including indigenous people, are not barred from voting 
or participating in government and politics; however, they are 
underrepresented.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally demonstrated a willingness to discuss 
human rights issues and problems with international and domestic NGO's. 
However, it was sometimes reluctant to discuss worker rights issues 
with NGO's. Numerous domestic and various international NGO's operated 
freely. Domestic and international NGO's are required to register with 
the Government under the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law, and 
some reported difficulties.
    The principal human rights investigative and monitoring body is the 
Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), elected by the 
Assembly for a 3-year term. The Peace Accords specifically created the 
PDDH, which was established formally by an amendment to the 
constitution that defined its role.
    Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned in February. The Attorney 
General had charged him with diverting funds from international donors 
while he worked in a previous job, and the Legislative Assembly was 
preparing to remove him from office for negligence. Following his 
resignation, the office continued its work under an acting Ombudsman 
while the Legislative Assembly considered other candidates. The 
office's investigative capacity remained limited due to resource 
constraints. The institution remained handicapped because the interim 
official lacked confirmation by the Assembly and therefore did not have 
the same authority as a permanent ombudsman.
    During the year, the PDDH accepted 2,572 complaints of human rights 
violations. The rights most frequently alleged to have been violated 
included personal integrity and due process of law; 566 complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law 
and prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, sex, or 
religion. In practice, discrimination against women, the disabled, and 
indigenous people occurs in salaries and hiring. There were some 
instances of violence against homosexuals.
    There were no new developments in the 1999 shooting of a man 
leaving the office of the domestic homosexual rights organization Entre 
Amigos, or in the telephonic death threats against the director of that 
organization. There were no new developments in the 1999 murders of 
transvestite prostitutes ``Doris'' and Nestor Adonai Marenco (known as 
``Gloria'') nor in the murders of transvestite prostitutes in 1998.
    There was no new information in the 1999 case of PNC agents in 
Chalatenango department charged with hitting, insulting, and 
threatening six homosexuals.
    Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is a 
widespread and serious problem. The law prohibits domestic violence and 
provides for sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year in prison upon 
conviction. Convicted offenders are prohibited from using alcohol or 
drugs and from carrying guns. The law also allows the imposition of 
restraining orders against offenders. Once a taboo social subject, 
domestic violence increasingly is being recognized publicly and has 
become a topic for national debate. Government institutions, such as 
the PDDH, the Attorney General's office, the Supreme Court, and the 
PNC, coordinated efforts with NGO's and other organizations to combat 
violence against women through education, government efforts to 
increase enforcement of the law, and NGO support programs for victims. 
The National Secretariat for the Family maintains a hot line for 
victims to report domestic abuse. The Salvadoran Institute for the 
Development of Women (ISDEMU) received 4,017 cases of domestic violence 
through August, a number slightly down from the same period in 1999. 
Incidents of domestic violence and rape continued to be underreported 
for several reasons: societal and cultural pressures against the 
victim; a fear of reprisal; poor response to victims by the 
authorities; fear of publicity; and the belief that cases are unlikely 
to be resolved. The penalties for sexually aggressive rape are 6 to 10 
years in prison. The law does not specifically address spousal rape; 
however, it could be considered a crime if the actions meet the 
Criminal Code's definition of rape. The ISDEMU received 277 cases of 
sexual aggression through August, a slight increase above the same 
period in 1999.
    Prostitution is common. There were credible reports that some women 
and girls were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
    Women are trafficked to Mexico to work as prostitutes (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    The law prohibits sexual harassment. In May the authorities 
dismissed a deputy police commissioner for having sexually harassed a 
female subordinate.
    The Constitution grants women and men the same legal rights; 
however, women suffer discrimination.
    Women suffer from cultural and societal discrimination and have 
significantly reduced economic opportunities. Priority generally is 
given to male children for schooling, to men for available jobs and 
promotions, and to sons for inheritances. Women are not accorded equal 
respect or stature in traditional male-dominated areas such as 
agriculture and business. On June 15, the Legislature ratified 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention Number 100, on equal 
remuneration. However, while there is no definitive evidence available, 
it is widely believed that women often are paid less than men for equal 
work. The one sector in which there is an exception to this practice is 
in the export processing zones and in-bond assembly plants, the largest 
source of new jobs, where women made up 85 to 90 percent of the work 
force (see Section 6.b.). However, even in this sector, men hold the 
majority of management positions. Training for women generally was 
confined to low-wage occupational areas where women already hold most 
positions, such as teaching, nursing, home industries, and small 
businesses. The law prohibits pregnant women from working in strenuous 
occupations after the fourth month of pregnancy (see Section 6.e.).
    Several NGO's are engaged in promoting women's rights and have 
conducted several rights awareness campaigns.
    Children.--The Government concentrated more on reducing poverty and 
promoting family stability through economic growth than in direct 
expenditure on children's programs. The National Secretariat of the 
Family solicited public input on a new national policy of comprehensive 
attention for children and adolescents.
    Education is compulsory through the 9th grade (up to age 14). 
Public education is free through high school, and only a nominal fee is 
charged to attend the national public university. Rural areas fell 
short of providing a ninth grade education to all potential students, 
in part because of a lack of resources and in part because many rural 
parents withdraw their children from school by the sixth grade to work. 
UNICEF data from 1998 show that 14 percent of urban children (ages 7-
17) and 29 percent of rural children were not attending classes.
    The Government worked through state institutions and with UNICEF to 
promote protection and general awareness of children's rights. However, 
children continued to be victimized by physical and sexual abuse, 
abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The Salvadoran Institute for 
the Protection of Children (ISPM), an autonomous entity, has 
responsibility for protecting and promoting children's rights. The ISPM 
estimated that an average of 2,600 children, some abandoned and others 
victims of mistreatment, stayed in its shelters. For the year, it 
reported 1,126 cases of physical mistreatment, 267 cases of negligence, 
and 374 cases of abandonment. All of these statistics were below those 
for the same period in 1999 when the ISPM reported approximately 1,500 
cases of mistreatment, 650 cases of negligence, and 700 cases of 
abandonment. Using different criteria, the ISDEMU recorded 3,071 cases 
of abuse during the year, significantly below the 1999 level of 10,070 
cases. The difference reflects a change in reporting criteria.
    Substance abuse (glue and paint sniffing) was a problem among urban 
street children. FUNDASALVA, an NGO, provides drug counseling and 
treatment to minors. In the past, there have been allegations from 
children's rights advocates that street children suffer from police 
brutality. The PNC denied these charges and incorporated PDDH human 
rights training into programs for police units that deal with 
juveniles.
    The ISPM reported 87 cases of sexual abuse, a slight increase from 
the 1999 figure of 72. A majority of the victims were female. According 
to the PDDH, over 85 percent of all abuse occurs in schools and at 
home, and only a small percentage of these cases were reported to the 
authorities.
    The PDDH estimated that 270,000 minors work, most as street vendors 
(see Section 6.d.). In addition to lost educational opportunities, some 
of these children fell victim to sexual abuse and were exploited and 
forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Between 10 and 
25 percent of ``visible'' prostitutes are minors, and an estimated 40 
percent of the ``hidden'' prostitutes who cater to upper-class clients 
are believed to be minors, according to a UNICEF study released during 
the year.
    Children, especially those living on the streets, are trafficked to 
other countries and then forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
    Children from Honduras have been used as beggars to support 
traffickers in San Salvador (see Section 6.f.).
    Infant malnutrition continued to be a problem. A National Family 
Health Poll, conducted in 1998 and released in December 1999, found 
that 1.1 percent of children under 5 years of age suffered from grave 
malnutrition, with an additional 21 percent experiencing less severe 
malnutrition. The Ministry of Health listed malnutrition as one of the 
10 principal causes of infant mortality in the country. The Government 
has a national plan for infants designed to increase access to potable 
water, iodized salt, and micronutrients, and to encourage breast 
feeding, but all of these remain problem areas, especially among the 
rural poor.
    People with Disabilities.--Government efforts to combat 
discrimination and increase opportunities for the disabled are growing 
but inadequate, with the exception of the war wounded, who have secured 
both government and international funding for rehabilitation and 
retraining programs. In May the Legislative Assembly passed a law 
mandating that new or renovated public buildings be accessible to the 
disabled. The law also required businesses to employ 1 person with a 
disability for every 25 employees, an increase from the preexisting 
requirement of 1 to 50. Although the Government had not enforced the 
previous law's employment quota, it brought together dozens of 
government agencies and nongovernmental organizations to discuss ways 
to implement the new law effectively. However, the Ministry of Labor 
has only two persons to handle all issues related to the disabled, and 
its records are kept on paper files in its regional branches. 
Therefore, there are no reliable data on the number of disabled 
persons, nor on how many are employed.
    Access by the disabled to basic education was limited due to lack 
of facilities and appropriate transportation. There was no provision of 
state services for the physically disabled. Only a few of the 
Government's community-based health promoters have been trained to 
treat the disabled, and they rarely provided such service. The Ministry 
of Health estimated that 10 percent of the population is afflicted by 
some form of disability. Many disabilities are directly attributable to 
the civil war. Other contributing factors included lack of prenatal 
care, misuse of pesticides in food production, malnutrition, auto 
accidents, and criminal violence.
    There were several organizations dedicated to protecting and 
promoting the rights of the disabled, but funding was insufficient. 
Foreign funds for badly needed rehabilitation services channeled 
through the Telethon Foundation ProRehabilitation, a local private 
voluntary organization, helped address numerous rehabilitation issues 
and provided alternatives for the education and rehabilitation of the 
disabled population. A semiautonomous institute, the Salvadoran 
Rehabilitation Institute for the Disabled, has 10 centers throughout 
the country and offers medical treatment, counseling, special education 
programs, and professional training courses to the disabled. The 
Government and national and international private and nongovernmental 
organizations provide its funding.
    Indigenous People.--The country is ethnically homogeneous, although 
a very small segment of the population still claims indigenous status.
    The Constitution states that native languages are part of the 
national heritage and should be preserved and respected. In reality, 
very few persons speak the indigenous language of Nahuatl. There are no 
national laws regarding indigenous rights.
    Early in the century, facing active repression, most indigenous 
people adopted local customs and successfully assimilated into the 
general population, from which they are generally indistinguishable. 
There are a few very small communities whose members still wear 
traditional dress and maintain traditional customs to a recognizable 
degree without repression or interference. There are no special rights 
for indigenous people; however, they are allowed to make decisions 
regarding their communal lands just as any other landowners under 
Article 105 of the Constitution. These small indigenous groups exist in 
the poorest parts of the rural countryside where employment 
opportunities are few and domestic violence is a problem.
    Indigenous people reportedly earned less than other agricultural 
laborers. Indigenous women in particular had little access to 
educational and work opportunities due to cultural practices, lack of 
resources, and rural underdevelopment. As with the poor rural sector in 
general, access to land was a growing problem confronting indigenous 
people. Few possessed titles to land, and bank loans and other forms of 
credit were extremely limited.
    There are some small, active indigenous associations. The largest 
and best known is the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans.
    Religious Minorities.--There were no new developments in the 
investigation of the 1999 burglaries at offices of the Lutheran Church.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
rights of workers and employers to form unions or associations, and the 
Government generally respected these rights; however, there were some 
problems. There were repeated complaints by workers, in some cases 
supported by the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on 
Freedom of Association (CFA), that the Government impeded workers from 
exercising their right of association.
    Union leaders asserted that the Government and judges continued to 
use excessive formalities to deny applications for legal standing to 
unions and federations. Among the requirements to obtain legal 
standing, unions must have a minimum of 35 members in the workplace, 
hold a convention, and elect officers. In March the Government denied 
an application from five food industry unions to form a federation, 
because they allegedly had made procedural errors in their application. 
In a complaint submitted to the ILO, the unions asserted that the 
Government had not given them an opportunity, as required by law, to 
correct the errors in their application. The CFA, in its November 
report, supported the workers' view, observing that it ``deeply 
regretted'' that the Government had not worked to overcome procedural 
problems that ``could easily have been rectified.'' It criticized the 
Government, observing that ``formalities should not be of such a nature 
as to impair the free establishment of organizations.'' In September 
the unions submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court that remained 
pending at year's end.
    In 1999 the CFA similarly cited the Government for its failure to 
provide protection or remedy for a number of labor leaders fired in 
1998 during the process of privatizing the state-owned telephone 
company. The finding concluded that the Labor Code imposed excessive 
formalities for the recognition of a trade union, and found that the 
application of the law repeatedly was used to refuse legal status to a 
trade union in the telephone company. The Committee called on the 
Government to complete the process for recognition of the 
telecommunications union, amend the Labor Code to remove the excessive 
formalities that the Committee concluded infringe on the right to form 
a union, seek to have the two union leaders who had not yet accepted 
severance pay reinstated, and ensure that future changes of company 
ownership did not threaten labor leaders or labor organizations.
    The Government asserted that the telephone company complied with 
the labor code by offering a severance payment to the fired workers.
    In September the Supreme Court determined that the Government had 
erred in denying legal standing to the telecommunications union and 
ordered the Government to grant it legal status. On October 23, the 
Government complied with the order and granted legal status to the 
union. However, TELECOM, the privatized successor to the state-owned 
telecommunications company, dismissed three union leaders in the next 5 
weeks. As part of a company restructuring process, it also asked dozens 
of employees, many of whom were union members, to submit resignations. 
Thirteen employees refused, and the company prohibited their entry to 
the workplace. Telecom petitioned the Ministry of Labor to decertify 
the union, asserting that the union had failed to follow correct 
procedures for obtaining legal recognition. In December the Ministry of 
Labor sought to mediate a mutually agreeable settlement between the 
parties, but was unsuccessful. The union filed a lawsuit against the 
company for violating the rights of the union members. At year's end, 
the suit had not gone to trial, and the Ministry of Labor had not ruled 
on the company's petition.
    There is a small organized labor sector with approximately 150 
active unions, public employee associations, and peasant organizations, 
representing over 300,000 citizens, approximately 20 percent of the 
total work force. Unions generally are independent of the Government, 
political parties, and other political forces. The Labor Code prohibits 
foreigners from holding leadership positions in unions.
    By law only private sector workers have the right to form unions 
and strike; some employees of autonomous public agencies may form 
unions if they do not provide essential services. Military personnel, 
police, and government workers may not form unions but are allowed to 
form professional and employee organizations. Some of the most powerful 
labor groups are public employee associations. They have the same 
responsibilities as unions, including calling technically illegal 
strikes and collective bargaining. The Government negotiated with 
public employee associations and generally treated their strikes as 
legitimate, although the Labor Code provides for mandatory arbitration 
of public sector disputes. The November CFA stated that ``denial of the 
right of association of public service employees to establish unions is 
an extremely serious violation.'' The Committee formally recommended 
that the Government amend national legislation to recognize the right 
of association of workers employed in the service of the State, with 
the possible exception of the armed forces and the police. There was 
one public sector strike during the year (see Section 1.c.).
    The law prohibits antiunion actions before a union is registered 
legally and prohibits the dismissal of workers whose names appear on a 
union application. The Constitution provides that union officials may 
not be fired, suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted 
except for legal cause from the time of their election until one year 
after the completion of their term of office. However, the Labor Code 
does not require the employers to reinstate them, but requires the 
employers to provide a severance payment. In practice, some employers 
dismissed workers who sought to form unions. The Government generally 
ensured that employers paid severance to these workers. However, the 
Government did not prevent their dismissal or require their 
reinstatement.
    The Committee on Freedom of Association cited one case in which a 
private firm blocked the formation of a union by coercing the union 
founders to resign 1 hour before the union was to be recognized 
officially (see Section 6.b.).
    Unions can only strike after the expiration of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Unions must first seek to resolve differences 
through direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration before striking. 
To be considered legal, the strike must aim to obtain or modify a 
collective bargaining agreement and to defend the professional 
interests of workers. Union members must approve a decision to strike 
through secret ballot. The union must name a strike committee to serve 
as a negotiator and send the list of names to the Ministry of Labor, 
who notifies the employer. The union must wait 4 days from the time the 
Ministry notifies the employer before beginning the strike.
    In June the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Government's 
dismissal of striking Social Security Institute workers in 1999 was 
illegal. In accordance with that ruling, in August the Social Security 
Institute reinstated 187 of the 219 workers. The remaining workers 
requested a severance payment in lieu of reinstatement.
    The Labor Code prohibits partisan political activity by unions. The 
unions routinely ignored this prohibition, but the Government took no 
punitive action against them.
    Unions and other labor organizations freely affiliated with 
international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining 
rights for employees in the private sector and for certain categories 
of workers in autonomous government agencies, such as utilities and the 
port authority. However, both private sector unions (by law) and public 
sector employee associations (in practice) used collective bargaining.
    The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of collective 
bargaining agreements and acts as a conciliator in labor disputes in 
the private sector and in autonomous government institutions. In 
practice, ministers and the heads of autonomous government institutions 
often negotiate with labor organizations directly, relying on the 
Ministry of Labor only for such functions as officially certifying 
unions. The Ministry often seeks to conciliate labor disputes through 
informal channels rather than attempt to enforce regulations strictly, 
which has led to charges that the Ministry is biased against labor. 
Labor leaders assert that the Government had an unfair advantage in 
arbitration of public sector labor disputes, because the Government 
holds two of three seats on arbitration panels. (The employer, the 
workers, and the Labor Ministry each name one representative to a 
panel.) The arbitration panel for the Social Security labor dispute in 
March included a representative of the Labor Ministry, although the 
Labor Minister sits on the governing council of the Social Security 
Institute. Corruption continued to affect labor inspectors and courts.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions. It 
provides that union officials at the time of their election, throughout 
their term, and for 1 year following their term may not be fired, 
suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted except for 
legal cause. Workers and the ILO reported instances of employers using 
illegal pressure to discourage organizing, including the dismissal of 
labor activists and the maintenance of lists of workers who would not 
be hired because they had belonged to unions.
    In reviewing the February firing of 44 union members by the La 
Salud Dairy, the Ministry of Labor found that the cooperative had the 
legal right to dismiss the workers. It cited a provision of the Labor 
Code that allows enterprises to suspend labor contracts when economic 
conditions require them to reduce their activities; however, the 
dismissals occurred 1 day before a deadline for completing the 
renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, and in letters to 
the fired workers, the company cited the union's negotiating position 
as the reason for the dismissals. Labor representatives stated that, 
after dismissing the first set of workers, management successfully 
pressured the 43 remaining members to resign from the union.
    There are approximately 220 maquila (in-bond assembly or 
processing) plants, the majority of which are located in the country's 
8 export processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Code applies in the EPZ's; 
there are no special EPZ labor regulations.
    Most EPZ companies and a large portion of the maquila plants had 
voluntary codes of conduct promoted by their parent corporations or 
foreign purchasers. In addition, two EPZ's have their own codes of 
conducts for all tenants. These codes include worker rights protection 
clauses. Some companies in the EPZ's provided salaries and on-site 
benefits (e.g. clinics, cafeterias) competitive with the best private 
sector enterprises (see Section 6.e.). However, there were credible 
reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and there are 
no collective bargaining agreements with the 19 unions that exist in 
the maquila sector. The International Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) contended in its annual report that some EPZ workers also 
suffered low pay, health and safety risks, 12- to 14-hour workdays, and 
minimal toilet breaks.
    In January the clothing assembly factory DOALL reemployed workers 
that unions alleged it had dismissed illegally when they tried to form 
a union in 1999. The reinstatements followed pressure from DOALL's 
major foreign customer and involvement by the Ministry of Labor. In 
September the Ministry of Labor approved an application for legal 
standing for a union formed by the rehired workers. The Ministry had 
denied the union's original application in 1999 based on documentation 
provided by DOALL showing that the workers had resigned 1 hour before 
they held the union's constituent assembly. Union officials asserted 
that company management had falsified the letters of resignation. The 
Committee on Freedom of Association noted that the Government had not 
responded to the Committee's queries on this incident which it said 
included ``antiunion acts of discrimination and interference on the 
part of the company.''
    In October the Ministry of Labor opened branch offices in EPZ's to 
make its services more accessible to its users. The Ministry provided 
the staff, and the EPZ's covered other costs.
    In the past, there have been credible accusations that some 
factories abused their workers, and that some women were not hired 
because they were pregnant. Workers have reported mistreatment, 
threats, abuse, and sexual harassment. Although the Ministry of Labor 
has improved its efforts to increase inspection and follow up on such 
complaints, it still has insufficient resources to cover all the EPZ's, 
much less the much larger national private sector.
    Although a 1996 law gives the Ministry of Economy the power to 
withdraw free zone privileges from companies that violate labor 
regulations, there have been no instances in which this has been used 
or even threatened publicly. The ICFTU has reported persistent problems 
facing female employees in EPZ's, including mandatory pregnancy tests 
and firing of workers who are pregnant (see Section 5).
    On October 23, the Government complied with a Supreme Court order 
to provide legal standing to the telecommunications union (see Section 
6.a.).
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of calamity 
and other instances specified by law, and the Government generally 
enforces this provision; however, there were reports that women were 
forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
    Although not specifically prohibited by law, forced and bonded 
labor by children are covered by the general prohibition. There were no 
reports of their use in the formal sector; however, there was strong 
evidence that minors have been forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 
and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 14; however, child labor is a problem. Minors, age 14 
or older, may receive special Labor Ministry permission to work, but 
only where such employment is indispensable to the sustenance of the 
minor and his or her family. This is most often the case with children 
of peasant families who traditionally work during planting and 
harvesting seasons. The law prohibits those under the age of 18 from 
working in occupations considered hazardous. The law limits the workday 
to 6 hours for youths between 14 and 18 years of age and sets a maximum 
normal workweek for youths at 36 hours. The PDDH estimated that 270,000 
minors work, most as street vendors.
    Orphans and children from poor families frequently work for their 
own or family survival as street vendors and general laborers in small 
businesses, mostly in the informal sector (see Section 5.). Children in 
these circumstances often do not complete schooling through the 9th 
grade, as the law requires. There were no reports of child labor in the 
industrial sector. It does not exist in the EPZ's.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor laws 
and made an effort to do so; however, scarce resources and the 
difficulty of monitoring the large informal sector limited its 
effectiveness outside the urban formal sector. On June 15, the 
Legislative Assembly ratified ILO Convention 182 on the elimination of 
the worst forms of child labor. In September the ILO's International 
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) opened an office to 
help develop and support this effort. The Government continued to 
collaborate with IPEC on projects initiated in 1999. In March IPEC 
began a project with local NGO's, police, municipal officials, and 
fireworks producers to take 1,000 children out of the fireworks 
industry and prevent another 1,000 children from entering. The project 
includes community awareness programs, increased educational and health 
care opportunities for children, creation of alternative economic 
opportunities for families, and increased labor enforcement capacities. 
Similar programs target children in the coffee and shellfish extraction 
industries.
    The Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, but they are covered by its general prohibition; 
however, there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution 
(see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set by 
executive decree based on recommendations from a tripartite 
(government, labor, and business) committee. The minimum daily wage is 
$4.80 (42.00 colones) for commercial, industrial, and service 
employees; $3.57 (31.20 colones) plus food allowance for coffee 
plantation workers; $2.61 (22.80 colones) plus food allowance for sugar 
and cotton plantation workers; and $2.47 (21.60 colones) plus food 
allowance for all other agroindustrial workers. The minimum wage with 
benefits does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing minimum wage 
laws and generally does so effectively in the formal sector. However, 
some maquila plants underpaid workers and failed to compensate them in 
accordance with the law for mandatory overtime.
    The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours. It limits the 
workweek to no more than 6 days for all workers. It requires bonus pay 
for overtime. By law a full-time minimum wage employee is paid for an 
8-hour day of rest in addition to the 44-hour normal workweek and 
receives an average of 1 month's wage a year in required bonuses plus 2 
weeks of paid vacation. Many workers worked more hours than the legal 
maximum.
    The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including 
the Government, to take steps to ensure that employees are not placed 
at risk in their workplaces. These laws prohibit the employment of 
persons under 18 years of age in occupations considered hazardous or 
morally dangerous, such as bars and billiard halls; the prohibition 
also applied to hazardous occupations such as agricultural work with 
poisonous chemicals or factory work with dangerous equipment. The Labor 
Code prohibits pregnant women from engaging in strenuous physical 
exertion at the workplace after the fourth month of pregnancy. Health 
and safety regulations are outdated, and enforcement is inadequate. The 
Ministry of Labor attempts to enforce the applicable regulations but 
has restricted powers and limited resources to enforce compliance. 
Workers in some maquilas expressed concerns about unhealthy drinking 
water, unsanitary bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate 
ventilation (problems with dust and heat). Some of the largest plants 
have dust control, air conditioning, on-site medical facilities, and 
enforced safety regimes.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons; however, it stipulates that any crime involving 
``commerce in women or children'' automatically carries a 30 percent 
increase in the prison sentence or fine that otherwise would be imposed 
for that crime. The Government enforces this provision.
    The country is a source of women and children for trafficking in 
prostitution to Mexico and other countries. There are credible reports 
that women and children are lured to Mexico by procurers only to be 
sold to owners of establishments there who then force the trafficked 
persons to work off the debt as sex workers. According to Guatemalan 
authorities, street children from El Salvador are lured to border areas 
with Guatemala where they are then forced into prostitution by 
organized rings.
    According to press reports, Honduran children were brought to San 
Salvador to beg for their sponsors. The Government investigated and 
took a number of children into custody. When their parents could not be 
found, they were turned over to the ISPM.
                               __________

                                GRENADA

    Grenada is a parliamentary democracy, with a Governor General as 
titular Head of State. In the January 1999 parliamentary elections, 
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell's New National Party (NNP) won all 15 
seats and formed a new government. Subsequently, one Member of 
Parliament left the NNP and became the sole opposition member. The 
elections were conducted openly and fairly and were free of violence. 
The judiciary is independent.
    The 755-member Royal Grenada Police Force is responsible for 
maintaining law and order. It is controlled by and responsive to 
civilian authorities. There were occasional allegations of abuse by the 
police.
    Grenada has a free market economy based on agriculture and tourism. 
The projected annual real economic growth rate was 5.3 percent, 
compared with about 8 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic 
product was approximately $3,205.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Violence against 
women is common. Child abuse is a problem.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reported incidents of torture. Flogging, a legal form of punishment, 
is rare but has been used as punishment for sex crimes and theft cases.
    There were no media reports of police brutality during the year. 
Allegations of police brutality are investigated internally by the 
police. The Police Commissioner can discipline officers in valid cases 
of brutality with penalties that may include dismissal from the force. 
The Police Commissioner has spoken out strongly against police use of 
unlawful force.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides the 
police with the right to detain persons on suspicion without a warrant, 
but they must bring formal charges within 48 hours. The police adhere 
to this time limit in practice. If the police do not charge a detainee 
within 48 hours, they must release the person.
    The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of 
detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge. The police 
must formally arraign or release a detained person within 60 days, and 
the authorities generally followed these procedures. There is a 
functioning system of bail, although persons charged with capital 
offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with treason may be accorded 
bail only upon the recommendation of the Governor General.
    In January the Government announced establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission with a broad mandate to examine events in the 
country from 1976 through 1991. The Commission's terms of reference 
specify the objective of recommending ``general amnesty to certain 
persons who in the opinion of the Commission have given truthful 
information during the hearing of evidence.'' The Commission is 
expected to review the convictions of former Deputy Prime Minister 
Bernard Coard and other leaders of the former People's Revolutionary 
Government for their roles in the 1983 assassination of former Prime 
Minister Maurice Bishop and his cabinet colleagues. In 1986 a court 
convicted Coard and 18 other revolutionary leaders of murder and 
sentenced them to death; subsequently, 2 were pardoned, and the 
sentences of the remaining 17 commuted to life in prison. Of these, one 
person was granted parole to undergo medical treatment overseas. At 
year's end, the Commission was preparing to begin its work.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, a part of the 
Eastern Caribbean legal system, is independent. Final appeal may be 
made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. Those arrested on 
criminal charges are brought before a judge to determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges; if there is, the 
judge remands the defendant for trial.
    The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the 
authorities observe it in practice. There is a presumption of 
innocence, and the law protects persons against self-incrimination and 
requires the police to explain a person's rights upon arrest. The 
accused has the right to remain silent and to seek the advice of legal 
counsel. A defense lawyer has the right to be present during 
interrogation and may advise the accused how to respond or not to 
respond to questions. The accused has the right to confront his 
accuser.
    The court appoints attorneys for indigents only in cases of murder 
or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reach the 
appellate stage, the court appoints a lawyer to represent the accused 
if the defendant was not previously represented or reappoint earlier 
counsel if the appellant no longer can afford that lawyer's services. 
Due to the backlog of cases caused by a shortage of judges and 
facilities, up to 6 months can pass before those charged with serious 
offenses face trial in the High Court. With the exception of persons 
charged with murder and foreign-born drug suspects, the courts grant 
most defendants bail while awaiting trial.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law generally 
requires judicially issued warrants for searching homes, except in 
cases of hot pursuit. The Firearms Act of 1968 and the Drug Abuse 
Prevention Act Number 7 of 1992 contain other exceptions that give the 
police and security units legal authority to search persons and 
property without warrants in certain circumstances. In practice police 
obtain warrants in the majority of cases before conducting any search.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. There are three weekly newspapers, and several 
other newspapers publish irregularly. One of the weeklies is affiliated 
with an opposition political party, but the three most widely 
circulated newspapers are independent and often critical of the 
Government. The newspapers routinely carry press releases by the 
opposition parties, including regular weekly columns expressing the 
opposition parties' views.
    There are six radio stations. The main station is part of the 
Grenadian Broadcasting Network (GBN), a privately owned organization in 
which the Government holds a minority share. The principal television 
station is also part of the GBN. A privately owned television station 
began broadcasting in 1992. A cable television company operates in most 
areas of the country. All newspapers, radio, and television stations 
enjoy independence from the State and regularly report opposition 
views. The television news often carried reports on opposition 
activities, including coverage of political rallies held by various 
political parties and candidates, public forums featuring political 
leaders of each of the major parties, and other public service 
broadcasts.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to assemble for any peaceful purpose, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Supporters of political 
parties meet frequently and hold public rallies; the authorities 
require permits for the use of a public address system but not for 
public meetings themselves.
    The Constitution provides for the right to association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country, and all citizens have the right to enter 
and leave the country, except in special circumstances as outlined in 
and limited by the 1986 Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of 
Certain Persons. This law allows the Minister for National Security to 
restrict travel out of the country by any person whose aims, 
tendencies, or objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and 
parliamentary system of government; it has not been invoked in the past 
few years. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an 
independent and impartial tribunal. The Chief Justice appoints an 
accredited lawyer to preside over such a tribunal.
    No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests 
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There 
were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. General elections must be held every 5 years; in 
January 1999, Prime Minister Keith C. Mitchell's NNP was returned to 
office, securing all 15 seats in Parliament. Since then one Member of 
Parliament changed party affiliation to become the single elected 
opposition member, leaving the NNP with a majority of 14 seats.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by 
women in government and politics. Four of the 15 elected Members of 
Parliament are women; there are no women among the 13 appointed 
Senators. Women account for 7 of the 13 permanent secretaries, the 
highest civil service position in each ministry; in addition, a woman 
is the Cabinet Secretary, the highest civil service position in the 
Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Local human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
and the Government cooperates with visits from international human 
rights organizations. In September Amnesty International established 
its regional office for the Eastern Caribbean in Grenada.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of 
origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex, and the Government 
generally adheres to these provisions.
    Women.--Women's rights monitors believe that violence against women 
remains a serious problem; however, they reported a decrease in such 
incidents during 1998, and more recent figures were not available. The 
police state that most cases of abuse are not reported, and others are 
settled out of court. The law stipulates a sentence of 15 years' 
imprisonment for a conviction of any nonconsensual form of sex. 
Sentences for assault against a spouse vary according to the severity 
of the incident. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was preparing a public 
relations campaign to increase awareness of the problem of domestic 
violence. In September 1999, a shelter for battered and abused women 
and their children opened in the northern part of the island, with 
medical and psychological counseling personnel on its staff. The home 
accommodates 20 persons.
    Sexual harassment in the workplace is a problem.
    There is no evidence of official discrimination in health care, 
employment, or education. Women frequently earn less than men 
performing the same work; such wage differences are less marked for the 
more highly paid jobs.
    Prostitution is illegal.
    Children.--The Social Welfare Division within the Ministry of Labor 
provides probationary and rehabilitative services to youths, day care 
services and social work programs to families, assistance to families 
wishing to adopt or foster children, and financial assistance to the 
six children's homes run by private organizations.
    Education is compulsory until the age of 16.
    Government social service agencies reported a further increase in 
the number of child abuse cases, including sexual abuse. Abused 
children are placed either in a government-run home or in private 
foster homes. The law provides for harsh penalties against those 
convicted of child abuse and disallows the victim's alleged ``consent'' 
as a defense in cases of incest. Women's organizations and other 
nongovernmental organizations increased their public awareness efforts 
to recognize and combat sexual abuse of women and children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law does not protect job seekers 
with disabilities from discrimination in employment, nor does it 
mandate provision of accessibility for public buildings or services. 
The National Council for the Disabled and the National Children's Home 
assist the Government in placing disabled students into community 
schools. The Council also seeks assistance from architects and builders 
in the construction of ramps at hotels and public buildings, and ramps 
have been installed at some hotels and government buildings.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers are free to organize 
independent labor unions. Labor Ministry officials estimate that 35 
percent of the work force is unionized. Union leaders play a 
significant role in the political process, and one labor leader serves 
in the Senate on behalf of the Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC).
    Workers in the private and public sectors are free to strike, once 
legal and procedural requirements are met. There were several incidents 
of industrial action, including brief strikes by teachers, port 
authority workers, and private sector workers. Workers at the water 
company and the telephone company briefly employed ``work-to-rule'' 
tactics. However, all such actions were short-lived and settled with 
the intervention of the Labor Commission, the Minister of Labor, or the 
Industrial Court. All unions are technically free of government 
control, and none receive government financial support. However, all of 
the major unions belong to one umbrella labor federation, the GTUC, 
which is subsidized by the Government. The GTUC holds annual 
conventions and determines some policies for member unions.
    The GTUC and its unions freely affiliate with regional and 
international trade union groups.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are 
free to organize and to participate in collective bargaining. 
Legislation requires employers to recognize a union that represents the 
majority of workers in a particular business. The law prohibits 
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. If a 
complaint of discrimination arises, mechanisms exist to resolve it. 
After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been exhausted between 
union representatives and employers, both sides may agree to ask for 
the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor Commissioner is 
unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the Minister of Labor 
intervenes and, if unable to reach an agreement, may appoint an 
arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its ruling. The 
law requires employers who are found guilty of antiunion discrimination 
to rehire dismissed employees, but in most cases the employee accepts 
the option of compensation. There were no cases of antiunion 
discrimination reported to the Ministry during the year.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that of 
children, and it is not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is illegal; however, children sometimes work 
in the agricultural sector. The statutory minimum age for employment of 
children is 16 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor enforce 
this provision in the formal sector by periodic checks. Enforcement 
efforts in the informal sector are lax. The Constitution prohibits 
forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it 
occurred (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no minimum wage laws 
in force. Most workers, including nonunionized workers, receive 
packages of benefits from employers set by collective bargaining 
agreements between employers and labor unions. In many cases, overall 
wages and benefits are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Many agricultural workers earn only 
about $5.37 to $5.55 (EC$14.50 to EC$15.00) per day.
    The Constitution stipulates that the maximum number of hours per 
week workers may work is 40. The law does not prescribe a standard 
workweek, except for the public sector, which is expected to work a 40-
hour week Monday through Friday. The normal workweek in the commercial 
sector includes Saturday morning work but does not exceed 40 hours.
    The Government sets health and safety standards, but the 
authorities enforce them unevenly. Workers can remove themselves from 
dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                               GUATEMALA

    Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a 
centralized national administration. The 1985 Constitution provides for 
election by universal suffrage of a one-term president and a unicameral 
congress. On January 14, Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) candidate 
Alfonso Portillo replaced President Alvaro Arzu of the National 
Advancement Party (PAN), following a free and fair December 1999 runoff 
election. The FRG also holds a majority (63 seats) in the 113-member 
Congress. Despite significant pledges, the Portillo administration took 
only limited steps to implement the Peace Accords that the Government 
concluded with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
guerrillas in 1996. The judiciary is independent; however, it suffers 
from inefficiency, intimidation, and corruption.
    The Minister of Interior oversees the National Civilian Police 
(PNC), created in January 1997 under the terms of the Peace Accords. 
The PNC has sole responsibility for internal security; however, during 
the year some members of the predecessor National Police (PN) remained 
on duty, and awaited mandated training to become PNC officers. There 
are no active members of the military in the police command structure, 
but for the past 3 years, the Government has ordered the army to 
support the police temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide 
wave of violent crime. On March 21, Congress enacted a law that enabled 
the Government to continue this practice. Under the new law, military 
personnel were not subordinated clearly to police control during joint 
patrols or operations; however, in practice army units generally were 
subordinated to police control in situations such as PNC road 
checkpoints, security deployments around prisons, and deployments in 
response to reported lynchings. The Constitution requires the Minister 
of Defense to be either a colonel or a general in the military. On 
January 14, a bill was submitted that would enable the President to 
appoint a civilian as Minister of Defense; in June Congress asked the 
Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of the bill. On 
October 3, the Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for the 
President, as Commander in Chief, to name a civilian as the Minister of 
Defense, with the rank of assimilated general. The President has been 
slow to carry out his commitment to dissolve the Presidential Military 
Staff (EMP) and to have its functions taken over by a civilian agency. 
On October 13, Interior Minister Byron Barrientos announced the 
creation of a citizen security brigade in Santiago Sacatepequez as a 
pilot project that may be extended to other parts of the country. Some 
members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The mostly agricultural-based, private sector-dominated economy 
grew by approximately 3 percent during the year. Coffee, sugar, and 
bananas are the leading exports, but tourism, textiles, and apparel 
assembly are key nontraditional export industries. According to a study 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, 4 percent of producers control 80 
percent of the land. About 40 percent of the work force are engaged in 
some form of agriculture, and subsistence agriculture is common in 
rural areas. According to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), between 
50 and 60 percent of the population depends on subsistence farming. 
Officially, inflation was about 5.5 percent during the year, although 
most observers acknowledge that the official price index does not 
measure accurately actual price movements. There is a marked disparity 
in income distribution, and poverty is pervasive, particularly in the 
large indigenous community. Approximately 83 percent of citizens live 
in poverty; this figure rises to 90 percent among the indigenous 
population. According to the UNDP, 59 percent of the population live in 
extreme poverty. Combined unemployment and underemployment was 
estimated at 46 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was 
approximately $1,600 during the year. Remittances from citizens living 
abroad continue to grow as a major source of foreign currency.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens 
in many areas; despite improvements in some areas, serious problems 
remain in others. Some police officers committed extrajudicial 
killings. The investigation of the 1998 murder of Catholic bishop and 
human rights activist Juan Gerardi Conedera neared conclusion, and five 
defendants, including an army captain, a retired army colonel, and a 
former EMP specialist, were scheduled to stand trial. In May a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) acting as legal representative for 
10 communities whose inhabitants were massacred by government forces in 
the early 1980's filed a criminal suit against the high command of the 
regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, alleging 
genocide and other crimes. There was one credible report of forced 
disappearance attributed to the police. There were credible reports 
that some police tortured, abused, and mistreated suspects and 
detainees. Despite greater numbers of police officers on duty 
throughout the country, and less public apprehension about filing 
complaints against the police, the total number of such complaints 
remained roughly the same as the previous year. Arrests and 
administrative sanctions against police officers remained high. In May 
the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis (SAE), the President's Peace-
Accords-mandated civilian think tank, announced that it had discovered 
a database containing the names and other personal information of over 
650,000 persons given to the SAE by Military Intelligence; the database 
appeared to have been compiled several years earlier. In June an NGO 
released a two-volume publication about the army and its conduct, 
personnel, and organization during the internal conflict. Prison 
conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy 
pretrial detention continued to be problems. Judges and other law 
enforcement officials are subject to intimidation and corruption, and 
the inefficient judicial system frequently is unable to ensure fair 
trials and due process. Efforts to reform the judiciary continued; 
however, the climate of impunity is a serious problem. The Government 
achieved convictions in a few important cases involving past human 
rights violations; however, more often cases remained pending for 
lengthy periods in the courts as defense attorneys took advantage of 
the inefficient judicial system and filed numerous, baseless motions 
and appeals to delay trial. Threats to and intimidation of witnesses, 
victims, prosecutors, and judges continued to be a serious problem. 
Although the Government increased the security it provided for judicial 
personnel and witnesses in key cases, many observers believe that the 
level of protection still is insufficient. From April to June, the 
number of threats against judicial personnel, journalists, and human 
rights workers increased significantly, further contributing to the 
public's already heightened sense of insecurity. Allegations persisted 
that the EMP infringed on citizens' privacy rights by monitoring 
private communications.
    The U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to 
monitor peace implementation and human rights issues. On March 3 and 
August 9, the Government signed a series of agreements in which it 
accepted responsibility for a number of human rights cases pending 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). By 
December 5, the Government was negotiation with the IACHR on 79 of 140 
pending cases. The Government began to pay reparations in a number of 
key cases. Violence and discrimination against women persisted, as did 
societal abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled and 
the indigenous population. Workers' efforts to form unions and 
participate in union activities are hindered by an ineffective legal 
system. Child labor and trafficking in women and children also are 
problems. Lynchings and mob violence continued, but at a significantly 
reduced rate, due in part to increased action by the PNC to combat 
lynchings. The Government conducted anti-lynching campaigns, achieved a 
very few convictions in past lynching cases, and made numerous arrests; 
however, fewer than a third of the hundreds of past lynching cases have 
gone to trial, and at year's end only one person was serving a prison 
sentence for taking part in a lynching. There was limited progress in 
the criminal case against a group of armed civilians who held the 
leaders of the principal banana workers' union at gunpoint in October 
1999 and forced them to resign from both their jobs and union 
positions.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
allegations of politically motivated killings by government agents; 
however, members of the police committed some extrajudicial killings. 
The Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest and 
prosecute those responsible and achieved some convictions in high-
profile cases; however, in many cases, the scarcity of law enforcement 
resources and a weak prosecutorial and judicial system prevented the 
Government from adequately investigating killings and other crimes or 
arresting and successfully prosecuting perpetrators.
    The number of reported extrajudicial killings continued to decline. 
The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH), which generally 
compiles data based on personal interviews with victims and their 
families, reported 13 complaints of extrajudicial killings during the 
year, compared with 16 complaints in 1999 and 32 complaints in 1998. 
Based on 20 complaints alleging 21 extrajudicial killings in the 9-
month period between October 1, 1999, and June 30, MINUGUA investigated 
15 cases and confirmed 13. It reported 27 such complaints in the first 
9 months of the year.
    MINUGUA's 11th Human Rights Report, released on August 31, noted a 
number of extrajudicial killings by members of the PNC. Many of these 
cases involved accidental discharges of weapons, drunken misbehavior by 
on- or off-duty officers, questionable crowd control techniques, or 
poor judgment by officers who lost control of unstable situations 
involving angry crowds or persons resisting arrest. Other cases 
presented signs of premeditation and malicious intent. In many of these 
cases, there was effective investigation by both the PNC's Office of 
Professional Responsibility (ORP) and the prosecutors of the Public 
Ministry; however, in some cases, there was credible evidence of a 
coverup by PNC officers, the ORP, or both.
    On February 5, PNC officers without a warrant conducted a sting 
operation against street vendors of pirated music recordings in an 
outdoor market in Guatemala City. When a confrontation ensued with 
angry vendors, a combined patrol of additional police and army units 
was called to provide backup. As the situation deteriorated, police 
forces fired their weapons into the air to regain control of the crowd 
that had gathered. During the confusion, street vendor Francisco Ixcoy 
Osorio was shot and killed; other persons present were injured. The 
authorities investigated the killing and arrested several suspects. On 
June 5, the Public Ministry accused six PNC officers and three army 
soldiers of homicide. The PNC officers claimed that colleague Alfredo 
Saso Perez killed Osorio and that two of their superiors--Commissar 
Virgilio Ramos and Chief of Operations Diones Arriaza Solis--used death 
threats and false testimony to organize a coverup to impede the Public 
Ministry's investigation. In June the judge released the accused on 
bail and provisionally closed the case due to lack of evidence. The 
Public Ministry appealed this decision, arguing that a case should be 
pursued against Ramos and Arriaza, and that Saso Perez should be 
arrested. The Fourth Appellate Court rejected the appeal; however, the 
Public Ministry continued its investigation, and hoped to reopen the 
case if new evidence is found.
    On March 6, in San Jose Acatempa, Jutiapa, Byron Florian Yanez and 
Jose Mendez Interiano, two police officers in a PNC patrol car, shot 
off-duty PNC officer Sergio Barahona Arana from behind and killed him. 
MINUGUA found that the local PNC falsified its report of the incident, 
in which it claimed that Barahona had a gun in his hand when he died 
and that there had been a shootout with the other police officers. 
There was credible evidence that police later conducted searches and 
fired weapons into the front of a school building to simulate a gun 
battle as part of their coverup. MINUGUA also cited evidence that the 
ORP participated in the coverup by altering its investigative report. 
Florian Yanez was a fugitive until he was found dead of a gunshot wound 
on May 31 in Jutiapa. On April 5, the authorities arrested Mendez 
Interiano; he was in jail awaiting trial at year's end, accused of 
participating in the coverup. In addition, the Police Commissioner of 
Jutiapa has not collaborated with the Public Ministry prosecutor in the 
case; he refused to turn over photographs of the crime scene and the 
weapons used in the crime.
    On April 19, in Coban, Alta Verapaz, Denis Fredy Cucul Tun argued 
with PNC officers about the fact that his car was parked in a street 
that was to be cleared for a religious procession. Officer Rolando 
Salvador Rubio Choc took Cucul to the opposite side of the street, held 
him against a wall at arm's length, and shot him in the chest at 
pointblank range, killing him. Hearing the shot, a crowd quickly 
gathered and sought to lynch Rubio, who fled to the nearby police 
station. An ORP investigation quickly established Rubio's 
responsibility for the killing, despite his argument that his weapon 
accidentally discharged, and he was jailed while the Public Ministry 
conducted its investigation and prepared to go to trial. MINUGUA 
confirmed in its 11th report that PNC officers had tried to cover up 
the facts of the case and impede the Public Ministry's investigation. 
MINUGUA also noted that Rubio had violated PNC protocols by carrying a 
weapon that was loaded and contained unauthorized expanding cartridges.
    In some cases, detainees or prisoners died while in the custody of 
PNC officers or Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) detectives, 
apparently due to torture or abuse (see Section 1.c.).
    On March 11, detainee Luis Armando Colindres was found dead in his 
cell at a PNC substation in Zone 12 of the capital, apparently the 
victim of strangulation. The PNC claimed that Colindres hanged himself, 
but the forensic report found injuries consistent with a struggle to 
resist being strangled. A judge ordered the detention of PNC officers 
Santos Medardo Recinos Moran, Elman Avigail Garcia Pineda, and Jeremias 
Santiago Godoy Ramos on charges of homicide. On June 7, the judge 
granted a defense motion to modify the charges to material document 
fraud (because PNC reports were altered) and abandonment of duty and 
released the defendants on bail. A Public Ministry appeal of these 
decisions was pending at year's end.
    Although most cases from past years remained unresolved, there were 
some convictions during the year for past extrajudicial killings by 
members of the security forces. In contrast to 1999, there were fewer 
judicial setbacks in human rights cases. At year's end, trials 
continued in several high profile cases. In many other cases of past 
extrajudicial killings, there was little or no progress, often due to 
the tactics of defense attorneys who frequently abused the legal system 
by filing dilatory motions to derail impending trials against their 
military clients.
    The investigation entered its final stages and pretrial 
preparations began against five defendants in the April 1998 murder of 
Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera, the Coordinator of the Archbishop's 
Office on Human Rights (ODHAG). President Portillo promised in his 
inaugural address that all state institutions would cooperate fully in 
the investigation. Bishop Gerardi was killed just 2 days after his 
public delivery of the final report of the ``Recovery of Historical 
Memory'' project, which held the military and its paramilitary allies 
responsible for more than 90 percent of the human rights violations 
committed during the 36-year-long internal conflict. After 2 years 
under Public Ministry witness protection, on January 17, former 
indigent Ruben Chanax Sontay gave additional testimony before Judge 
Flor de Maria Garcia Villatoro in which he implicated several 
individuals in Gerardi's murder. Based largely on Chanax's new 
testimony, on January 21, Judge Garcia issued arrest warrants for five 
suspects: Retired army Colonel Byron Disrael Lima Estrada; his son, 
army Captain Byron Miguel Lima Oliva; former EMP Specialist Jose 
Obdulio Villanueva Arevalo; Father Mario Leonel Orantes Najera; and 
former parish house cook Margarita Lopez. (Lopez, who was charged with 
being an accessory after the fact, had been detained briefly in 1998 
and then released.) Lima Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Margarita Lopez were 
arrested on January 21, followed by Villanueva on January 22. On 
February 9, Father Orantes, who had been arrested and charged with the 
murder in October 1998, then released in February 1999, secretly 
returned to the country and immediately checked into a hospital, 
claiming that his health was too poor to be sent to jail. On February 
15, Judge Garcia granted Orantes permission to remain in the hospital, 
based on a court-ordered medical examination that confirmed his health 
problems.
    Shortly after Villanueva's arrest, his defense attorney presented 
evidence indicating that he was actually in prison in Antigua on the 
night of Gerardi's murder, completing the final days of his prison 
sentence for the 1996 killing of Pedro Sas Rompich. On February 25, 
Judge Garcia released Villanueva, based on this new information and a 
lack of Public Ministry evidence to the contrary. On March 15, lead 
prosecutor Leopoldo Zeissig released the results of a handwriting 
analysis that demonstrated that Villanueva had not signed personally 
for his EMP paychecks in prison for several months, including at the 
time of the Gerardi murder. (Villanueva had remained on the EMP payroll 
while serving his prison sentence.) In early April, Zeissig also 
produced a former cellmate of Villanueva's, Gilberto Gomez Limon, who 
testified that Villanueva frequently was allowed to leave prison, 
including on the night of the Gerardi murder. This new evidence 
convinced Judge Garcia to order Villanueva's rearrest, which occurred 
on April 7.
    On March 16, Judge Garcia ruled that prosecutors had presented 
sufficient evidence against Margarita Lopez to send her case to trial 
on charges of participating in a criminal coverup. Also on March 16, 
Zeissig filed charges against navy Captain Carlos Rene Alvarado 
Fernandez for falsifying Villanueva's signatures on his paycheck 
receipts and lying to conceal the fraud. On March 21, another court-
ordered medical exam confirmed that Father Orantes should continue to 
spend his pretrial detention in the hospital. In April Judge Garcia 
ruled that Father Orantes must face trial on charges of murder, based 
largely on Chanax's testimony and contradictions in Orantes' own 
statements. On April 24, Chanax left the country under Public Ministry 
witness protection due to concerns for his safety.
    On April 26, the Catholic Church was granted status as a private 
plaintiff in the case. ODHAG, as the Church's legal representative, 
gained the right under the law to present witnesses and other evidence 
at trial and to prosecute the accused alongside the Public Ministry 
prosecutors. On May 9, the Fourth Court of Appeals agreed with defense 
attorneys representing Father Orantes and Margarita Lopez that ODHAG 
did not have sufficient ``juridical standing'' to act as private 
plaintiff in the case against them. However, the ruling did not apply 
to ODHAG's participation in the case against the three military 
suspects.
    On May 18, Judge Garcia charged the three military suspects, Lima 
Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Villanueva, with the extrajudicial execution 
of Bishop Gerardi. The charge of ``extrajudicial execution,'' unlike 
the charge of murder, generally is reserved for members of security 
forces on active duty, although Lima Estrada was not on active duty in 
1998. The judge's decision was based largely on the testimony of 
witness Ruben Chanax Sontay, which placed all three military defendants 
at or near the crime scene on the night of the murder. In late July, 
witness Juana del Carmen Sanabria, the former administrator of Bishop 
Gerardi's parish house, left the country due to death threats. A total 
of seven judges, prosecutors, and witnesses have left the country due 
to threats and intimidation in the case. On August 1, Lima Oliva was 
involved in a disturbance in prison and was injured slightly. He 
claimed that other inmates were trying to kill him, but the other 
inmates claimed that he started the fight and was trying to take 
control of the cellblock. During the scuffle, several items, including 
a planner/organizer, disappeared from Lima Oliva's cell and later were 
found in the possession of Public Ministry prosecutors, whom Lima Oliva 
accused of masterminding the disturbance for the purpose of 
``stealing'' the documents. On August 7, Judge Garcia granted 
conditional freedom to Margarita Lopez, allowing her to await trial 
under house arrest rather than in prison. Another courtordered medical 
exam in August confirmed that Father Orantes' poor health required that 
he remain hospitalized.
    After one judge recused herself for a supposed friendship with Lima 
Estrada and another resigned after being challenged for bias by ODHAG, 
in July a three-judge panel to hear the case at trial was constituted, 
with Judge Eduardo Cojulun presiding, joined by Judges Jazmin Barrios 
and Carlos Chin. A number of appeals and motions filed by the defense 
attorneys in July and August delayed the trial against all five 
defendants from October until early 2001. Prosecutors acknowledged 
publicly that they are pursuing a political motive theory for the 
upcoming trial, arguing that Gerardi was killed by current or former 
members of the military with the assistance of Father Orantes and 
Margarita Lopez. MINUGUA confirmed multiple complaints by Judge Garcia 
and other judicial colleagues, prosecutors, witnesses, and ODHAG staff 
of numerous threats and acts of intimidation, including telephone 
threats, electronic surveillance, and observation by unknown 
individuals following them on foot or in vehicles (see Sections 1.e. 
and 4).
    Negotiations continued regarding indemnification for the family of 
Pedro Sas Rompich, who was killed in 1996 by Jose Obdulio Villanueva 
Arevalo, while Villanueva was acting as a bodyguard for then-President 
Arzu. Villanueva has since served a commuted prison sentence for the 
killing and spent most of the year in jail as one of five suspects in 
the murder of Bishop Gerardi. A court-ordered damages award to be paid 
by Villanueva to the victim's survivors remained pending.
    On April 28, the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) annulled an 
appellate court's December 1999 verdict in the Xaman massacre case, in 
which an army patrol entered a refugee-returnee community at Xaman, 
Alta Verapaz, in October 1995, killing 11 persons and injuring 30 
others. The Appellate Court had found 15 members of the patrol innocent 
and resentenced the remaining 10 members to 12-year prison sentences. 
The prosecutor had appealed the Appellate Court's decision, feeling 
that the sentences were too lenient. The CSJ decision remanded the case 
back to the trial court for a retrial. At year's end, the case 
continued to be delayed by appeals that must be resolved before the 
retrial can begin. The original trial was the longest in the country's 
history and was marked by numerous death threats and acts of 
intimidation against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and family members 
of the victims.
    Two former police officers sentenced to death in 1996 in the so-
called Patrol No. 603 case remained on death row pending the outcome of 
several appeals by their defense attorney. The case stems from a 1995 
murder and attempted murder in what appeared to be a ``social 
cleansing'' operation, in which persons deemed socially undesirable 
(e.g., gang members, local delinquents, or convicts released from 
prison) are found murdered in circumstances suggesting that the killing 
was planned and carried out by an organized group. Similarly, there was 
no progress in the related case before the IACHR.
    The August 1994 killing by police of four workers at La Exacta farm 
remained under investigation, and the criminal case remained suspended. 
The parties continued to seek a resolution through the IACHR's amicable 
settlement procedures. Negotiations continued regarding a settlement of 
the pending labor court charges, with intervention from the Labor 
Ministry and the Presidential Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH) to 
install a Conciliation Court to resolve the dispute. The Center for 
Legal Assistance in Human Rights (CALDH) continued to represent the 
families of the deceased, the injured, and those who lost their jobs 
and homes during the illegal eviction. On August 9, President Portillo 
signed an agreement with the IACHR in which the Government acknowledged 
its responsibility for failure to provide justice in the case and 
promised both to pay reparations and pursue renewed criminal 
investigations against those responsible for the violence.
    An appellate court ruling remained pending in the case of the 1994 
murder of Constitutional Court president Epaminondas Gonzalez Dubon. 
Both the prosecution and defense appealed aspects of the May 1998 
murder conviction of Marlon Salazar and Roberto Antonio Trabanino, who 
were serving 27-year prison sentences for the crime at year's end. A 
third suspect, Mario Rene Salazar, remained at large. On August 8, 
another suspect implicated in the Gonzalez Dubon murder, Elser Omar 
Aguilar, was found dead in the trunk of a car in Guatemala City. His 
body showed signs of torture. In February an appellate court reaffirmed 
the 14-year jail sentence for narcotics trafficking imposed in July 
1999 on former Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rene Ochoa Ruiz, widely 
suspected of being the intellectual author of the Gonzalez Dubon 
murder.
    Defense attorneys in the case of the murder of anthropologist Myrna 
Mack Chang continued to file appeals in order to delay the proceedings, 
and the courts continued to fail to resolve those appeals in a timely 
manner. In January 1999, Judge Henry Monroy ordered a trial of the 
three high-ranking military officers accused of ordering the 1990 
murder: Retired General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitan, Colonel Juan 
Valencia Osorio, and Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera. A trial 
originally scheduled for early in the year was delayed by appeals filed 
by defense attorneys. On March 27, Myrna Mack's sister, Helen Mack 
Chang, met with CSJ representatives to learn why there had been no 
decision regarding a defense appeal filed on November 4, 1999, nearly 5 
months earlier (the law sets a 30-day time limit for resolving such 
appeals). CSJ representatives had no answer at that March 27 meeting, 
but on March 29, they announced that they actually had issued a 
decision in the appeal on March 23. That decision denied the appeal and 
fined the defense attorney approximately $130 (1,000 quetzals) for 
filing a frivolous appeal. On March 31, the defense attorney filed 
another appeal, this time of the CSJ's March 23 decision. On May 8, 
that appeal was recognized by the Constitutional Court, which set a May 
11 date for a hearing on the merits. However, the Court still had not 
resolved the appeal at year's end. EMP member Noel de Jesus Beteta, who 
confessed to the killing, continued to serve a 30-year sentence. On 
March 3, the Government signed an agreement with the IACHR in which it 
accepted responsibility for Myrna Mack's murder as well as the denial 
of justice and proposed an amicable settlement, which was refused by 
Helen Mack. A commission composed of a Guatemalan jurist and an 
international expert was established under IACHR auspices to monitor 
due process in the case.
    In November the Government reached a settlement with the 
InterAmerican Court of Human Rights to pay reparations to the survivors 
of the 1990 killing of three street children--Julio Roberto Caal 
Sandoval, Jovito Josue Juarez Cifuentes, and Anstraun Villagran--and 
two indigent adults, Federico Clemente Figueroa Tunchez and Henry 
Giovanni Contreras, by police officers (see Sections 4 and 5). In 
December 1999, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence that 
police officers Samuel Rocael Valdes and Nestor Fonseca were 
responsible for the deaths. The Court also ruled that the Government 
failed to protect the rights of the victims and provide them with 
justice.
    On August 9, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in 
which it accepted responsibility for its failure to provide justice in 
the unresolved disappearances in 1989 of 10 university students, 5 of 
whom were later found dead, and pledged to negotiate an amicable 
settlement with the victims' survivors, including reparations and 
criminal prosecution of those responsible.
    On August 11 and 12, the Inter-American Court held hearings to set 
the amount of compensation owed to the families of the victims in the 
``white van'' case; the Court's decision remained pending at year's 
end. Separately, the Government also offered to enter into settlement 
negotiations with the victims' survivors. In March 1998, the Court had 
found the Government liable in the case, in which members of the now-
disbanded Treasury Police kidnaped and then either released or killed 
11 persons in 198788.
    In the case of the 1982 military massacre at Dos Erres, Peten, 
prosecutors secured relocation abroad for two key witnesses and their 
families in exchange for their testimony against their former army 
comrades. On March 17, former army Sergeants Favio Pinzon Jerez and 
Cesar Franco Ibanez testified before a judge about the massacre of more 
than 200 unarmed civilians on December 6-8, 1982, in the village of Dos 
Erres. In their testimony, they implicated several former comrades and 
gave detailed accounts of the massacre, before departing the country 
under witness protection from the Public Ministry. Based on their 
testimony, prosecutors obtained arrest warrants against 16 former 
members of the implicated army patrol. Defense attorneys eventually 
contested 10 of those arrest warrants, arguing that their clients 
should be protected from prosecution by the National Reconciliation 
Law, which grants limited amnesty for certain acts committed during the 
internal conflict. The Constitutional Court granted temporary 
injunctions against the arrest warrants so that the petitions could be 
decided on their merits. On July 7, an appellate court found the 
petitions to be without merit and denied them. The defense appealed 
that ruling to the Constitutional Court, where a decision remained 
pending at year's end. The PNC did not execute six of the arrest 
warrants, nor did they present the warrants to the military, even 
though many of the suspects still were on active duty at the time. On 
December 4, the prosecutor publicly urged the PNC to act on the 
warrants of four military suspects, including Vicente Alfonso Bulux, 
Santos Lopez Alonzo, and Fredy Antonio Samayoa Tobar.
    Army Sergeant Major Manuel Pop Sun, who was arrested in April and 
later released under a temporary injunction, remained the only 
individual to have been arrested in the Dos Erres case by year's end. 
On June 14, Pop Sun appeared at the MINUGUA offices claiming that the 
army had imprisoned him in a military hospital, kept him drugged with 
antipsychotic medications, and was trying to kill him because of his 
knowledge of the Dos Erres massacre. Pop Sun offered his testimony to 
prosecutors in exchange for witness protection, but later jumped from a 
secondstory window and fled from Public Ministry protection. 
Prosecutors stressed that Pop Sun was free to depart at any time, as 
his participation in the witness protection program was voluntary. His 
odd behavior raised speculation about the true intent of his offer to 
testify, and he remained a suspect in the case at year's end. In its 
11th Human Rights Report issued in August, MINUGUA noted the presence 
of Military Intelligence observers when it tried to interview Pop Sun 
at the Military Medical Center. MINUGUA also found that Pop Sun had 
been overmedicated while in the military hospital and concluded that 
his treatment there amounted to torture and abuse.
    On March 3, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in 
which it recognized its institutional responsibility for the Dos Erres 
massacre. Represented by COPREDEH, the Government pursued settlement 
negotiations with the victims' survivors, who were represented by two 
NGO's--Families of the Disappeared in Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) and the 
Center for Justice and International Law. In those negotiations, the 
Government agreed in principle to prosecute aggressively the material 
and intellectual authors of the massacre, pay for reparations and other 
community assistance for the survivors, create a historical document 
that recounts what happened at Dos Erres, and erect a memorial in honor 
of the victims. Those negotiations continued at year's end, with 
reparations as the central focus. On December 1, in accordance with 
recommendations of both the IACHR and the Inter-American Court, the 
Government created a Special Commission to Locate and Identify Families 
and Victims of the massacre at Dos Erres. On December 7, a monument to 
the victims of the Dos Erres massacre was erected at the cemetery of 
the Aldea Las Cruces.
    On February 1, an appeals court in Coban substituted 50-year prison 
sentences for the death penalties handed down by a trial court in 
October 1999 against three former Civilian Defense Patrol (PAC) members 
in the March 1982 massacres at Rio Negro and Agua Fria, two villages in 
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. The Appeals Court gave the three defendants, 
Carlos Chen, Francisco Gonzalez Gomez, and Fermin Lajuj, 30 years in 
prison for each of the two murders proven at trial, for a total of 60 
years' imprisonment; however, the law sets the maximum prison sentence 
at 50 years. In June a survivor of the Rio Negro massacre, who was 
adopted and raised by a foreign family, returned for the first time. 
She was reunited with surviving members of her family and called on the 
Government to provide reparations for the impoverished survivors of the 
conflict-era massacres.
    On May 2, CALDH filed a lawsuit on behalf of 10 communities in 
Quiche and Chimaltenango whose citizens were massacred by government 
security forces between October 1981 and March 1982, resulting in over 
850 deaths. The suit alleges crimes, including genocide, committed by 
high command of the regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas 
Garcia. In addition to Fernando Lucas Garcia, the suit also names his 
brother (and former army Chief of Staff) Benedicto Lucas Garcia and 
former Defense Minister Luis Rene Mendoza as defendants. By the end of 
the year, prosecutors had made significant progress in their 
investigation. The suit is the first genocide case to be brought in a 
Guatemalan court and is a precursor to a similar suit that CALDH plans 
to file against the regime of former de facto President and current 
President of Congress Efrain Rios Montt.
    There was no apparent progress in recapturing 12 former PAC members 
convicted in 1999 for the 1993 killing of Juan Chanay Pablo in 
Colotenango, Huehuetenango, and then freed in April 1999 from a police 
station by a crowd armed with sticks, machetes, homemade explosives, 
and smoke bombs. Although arrest warrants were issued to recapture the 
escapees, they remained at large despite credible reports that they had 
returned to their home region of Colotenango and were being protected 
by former PAC comrades. There also was no progress in the investigation 
of Brigadier General Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo, the alleged 
intellectual author of the crime, who was elected to Congress in the 
November elections and therefore enjoys legislative immunity from 
prosecution. According to the Government, amicable settlement 
negotiations between the Government and the victim's survivors, 
mandated by the IACHR, neared completion by year's end. The Government 
continued to provide security for several human rights activists in 
Colotenango in accordance with a resolution of the Inter-American 
Court.
    The Supreme Court ordered the Public Ministry to conduct a new 
investigation into the 1993 murder of newspaper publisher and former 
presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle and three associates. 
Suspect Francisco Ixcoy Lopez, former PAC member, remained at large, 
despite the fact that the Carpio family had located him at one time and 
informed the authorities of his whereabouts. The criminal case remained 
open, but the Public Ministry made no efforts to advance the case and 
the victim's family withdrew the charges. The case before the IACHR for 
the Government's failure to provide justice remained pending at year's 
end, as did a motion to send the case forward to the Inter-American 
Court. The family of Jorge Carpio requested that the IACHR authorize 
that the case be taken up by the Court, since they believed that 
justice was not being served in the Guatemalan courts. The Commission's 
decision was pending at year's end.
    On January 31, a court convicted former PAC member Vicente 
Cifuentes Lopez of homicide in the 1985 murder of American journalist 
Nicholas Blake and sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment. In May 
police and prosecutors located three other suspects in the case in the 
remote Cuchumatanes Mountains; however, the Government made no effort 
to recapture the suspects and they remained at large at year's end. On 
March 30, the Government paid restitution of $161,000 (1 million 
quetzals) to Blake's survivors as mandated by the Inter-American Court.
    On February 15, an appeals court upheld the November 1999 trial 
verdict in which former military commissioner Candido Noriega was found 
guilty of six murders and two cases of manslaughter and sentenced to 
220 years in prison. On August 24, the CSJ rejected a similar appeal 
and upheld both the guilty verdict and the 220-year sentence. (In 1996 
the Penal Code was modified to extend the maximum sentence for murder 
from 30 to 50 years' imprisonment. Because the case began prior to this 
change, the commuted death sentence for the two murder convictions is 
for 30 years.) There was no progress in the court-ordered investigation 
of Noriega's alleged accomplice, Juan Alesio Samayoa, or in the 
investigation of military officers who served at the so-called Base 20 
in Quiche in 1982, the suspected intellectual authors of some or all of 
Noriega's actions.
    On August 28, a court acquitted Lazaro Obispo Solorzano Lopez and 
Henry Orlando Hernandez Montepeque of the May 1999 kidnaping and murder 
of oil refinery businessman Edgar Ordonez Porta. Neither prosecutors 
nor the private plaintiff, the victim's brother Hugo Ordonez Porta, 
pursued a serious case against the accused during the trial; instead, 
Hugo Ordonez presented witnesses and evidence that asserted that 
members of Military Intelligence may have committed the murder. Ordonez 
also claimed that Military Intelligence conducted a parallel 
investigation that significantly interfered with the official 
investigation and may have led the Public Ministry and the PNC into 
conspiring in a coverup. Also on August 28, the trial court 
acknowledged the parallel investigation and interference, ordered a new 
investigation, and left the case open with respect to additional 
suspects, including several high-ranking military and police officials, 
as well as the former prosecutor in the case. The motive for the 
killing remained unclear. During the year, the Attorney General named 
Leopoldo Zeissig as prosecutor; he was reviewing testimony at year's 
end.
    There was no progress in the 1997 killing of congressional Deputy 
Joel Salomon Mendoza Pineda and his nephew. The court case against two 
former congressional deputies was dismissed, and there was no case 
pending against the former mayor of Escuintla, a suspected intellectual 
author. In August 1998, the court of appeals upheld the 50-year prison 
sentence for the four persons convicted of the murder. In October 1999, 
the CSJ upheld the immunity of Alfred Reyes and Gueillermo Deominguez 
and determined that the evidence against the legislators was 
insufficient to oblige them to go to trial.
    On June 1, the National Security Archive, an NGO, publicly released 
its two-volume publication entitled ``The Guatemalan Military: What the 
United States Files Reveal.'' Volume One is a database of Guatemalan 
military officers and the positions they held during the internal 
conflict. Volume Two is a compilation of over 50 key declassified 
documents said to be representative of the thousands of documents 
collected during the group's ``Guatemala Documentation Project,'' which 
was begun in 1994 to support the Historical Clarification Commission's 
efforts to catalog the devastation of the 36-year internal conflict. 
Human rights activists viewed the report largely as a tool to determine 
the responsibility of individual military officers for specific human 
rights abuses during the internal conflict.
    There was little progress in the investigations into the ``military 
diary,'' an apparently genuine military intelligence dossier that 
documented the abduction, torture, or killing of 183 persons by 
security forces during the 1983-85 period. The National Security 
Archive had released that document publicly in May 1999. The Government 
responded by appointing 35 prosecutors to handle the cases and a 
supervising prosecutor designated with overall coordination. Public 
Ministry investigators made slow progress during the year and learned 
that some of the victims named in the document still were alive and 
living either in the country or abroad. The unit that compiled the 
document has not yet been identified.
    Exhumations of clandestine cemeteries continued throughout the 
year. Most of the bodies recovered have been those of victims of 
military or paramilitary killings in the 1980's. Forensics groups use 
the information obtained from the exhumations to verify eyewitness 
reports of massacres, of which 669 were recorded by the Historical 
Clarification Commission, and to determine, at least in general, who 
might have been responsible. Forensic research and DNA testing have 
identified some of the remains. The forensic evidence has been used in 
some criminal cases. During the year, ODHAG's Forensic Anthropology 
Unit exhumed bodies from eight sites in Alta Verapaz, Quiche, Santa 
Rosa, Huehuetenango, and San Marcos. As of September, workers at these 
sites had found 419 skeletons and identified 28. By the end of August, 
the forensic team of the Office of Peace and Reconciliation of the 
Quiche Diocese conducted excavations of 44 sites in Quiche, where they 
exhumed a total of 95 human remains, of which 19 were infants and none 
were identified. Twelve of these sites (containing 28 remains) were 
found within the grounds of the Joyabaj Parochial Convent, which served 
as a military detachment headquarters during the 1980's. Threats and 
intimidation against persons working on exhumations continued, but at 
lower levels than in previous years. ODHAG reported attempts by 
landowners to prevent exhumations on their property and, in some cases, 
suspected clandestine cemetery sites had been disturbed just prior to 
their investigation. At the end of the year, ODHAG's forensic 
anthropology unit had ceased work while waiting for a change in 
funding. Through August the Forensic Team of the Office of Peace and 
Reconciliation of the Quiche Diocese conducted exhumations at 44 
different clandestine cemeteries throughout Quiche department.
    In October the prosecutor requested that the judge close the case 
of the clandestine cemetery alleged in 1999 to be on the grounds of a 
former Mobile Military Police (PMA) facility. An October 1999 
excavation failed to produce any human remains. There was little 
progress in the investigation into metal fragments found at the site 
that prosecutors believe were once license plates used during 
clandestine operations. The delays were due in part to the January 
resignation of prosecutor Fernando Mendizabal, who feared reprisals 
from the new FRG-led Government for his role in the investigation into 
the nationwide smuggling ring led by Alfredo Moreno.
    In December press reports suggested that the Guatemalan Forensic 
Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) recently unearthed the remains of 20 
persons in a clandestine cemetery located near San Martin Jilotepeque, 
Chimaltenango, in what was used as a military post from 1982 to 1986. 
FAFG staff reportedly believe that the cemetery is one of at least 
seven in the area.
    The criminal case filed in Spain in December 1999 by indigenous 
leader and 1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu Tum against 
eight former military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses 
committed during the 36-year internal conflict was not heard by the 
court. The suit alleged that the defendants, including former de facto 
President and current president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, former 
President and retired General Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto 
President Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, and five other defendants were 
responsible for ``crimes against humanity,'' including genocide, 
torture, and terrorism. The suit cited 3 cases--the 1980 assault on the 
Spanish Embassy in which more than 30 persons died, the killing of 
Menchu's mother and 2 siblings, and the killing of 4 Spanish priests 
over the course of the conflict.
    On April 29, Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco denied the third 
motion in 4 months by Prosecutor Pedro Rubira to dismiss the Menchu 
suit. This motion was based on the argument that the cases presented by 
Menchu effectively were adjudicated by the signing of the Peace Accords 
in 1996, which ended the internal conflict. (The earlier motions had 
contested Spanish jurisdiction in the case.) During the year, Judge 
Ruiz Polanco called several witnesses to testify in Spain, including 
Congresswoman Nineth Montenegro, former Spanish Ambassador to Guatemala 
Maximo Cajal, former Historical Clarification Commission member Alfredo 
Balsells Tojo, and Jesuit author Ricardo Falla.
    Early in the year, several organizations and individuals attempted 
to join the Menchu suit, sometimes trying to add numerous additional 
crimes and defendants. For example, in April Human Rights Ombudsman 
Julio Arango attempted to join the suit with additional complaints 
against Lucas Garcia and Mejia Victores. Similarly, in April the human 
rights NGO the Mutual Support Group (GAM) added 8 additional defendants 
from the Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo regime to the Menchu suit, accusing 
former civilian and military leaders of the extrajudicial killings of 
53 university student leaders between 1984 and 1990. In May the family 
of one of the four Spanish priests whose murder constitutes part of the 
Menchu complaint joined the suit. On December 13, the Spanish court 
decided not to hear the case. The decision was based in part on the 
fact that it was not clear that justice in the case could not be 
achieved in Guatemala, since a genocide case had yet to be tried by the 
Guatemalan court system.
    Attorneys for Mejia Victores made little progress in their counter-
charges against Menchu in Guatemalan criminal court, in which they 
accused her of treason, violating the Constitution, and failing to 
report a crime by filing charges in a Spanish court rather than a 
Guatemalan court. In early August, the Spanish court denied a request 
by prosecutor Candido Bremer for a copy of Menchu's complaint, which 
Bremer intended to use in his investigation of Mejia Victores' 
accusations against Menchu. In response, Menchu filed a brief with the 
Guatemalan court in which she defended her right to file the Spanish 
lawsuit, based on Guatemala's international treaty obligations that 
provide for the extraterritorial prosecution of crimes against humanity 
and genocide. The press reported in November that the counter-suit 
brought against Menchu in Guatemala by attorneys for Mejia Victores had 
been closed.
    Menchu and various staff members of her human rights NGO, the 
Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation, have been targeted with numerous death 
threats and other acts of intimidation since the lawsuit was filed in 
Spain. The number of death threats against Menchu increased sharply in 
April and May, as it did generally among the human rights community and 
journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 4.).
    Intimidation of witnesses continued to be a problem, although at 
less than 1999 levels; there were no reports of the killing of 
witnesses. For example, two witnesses in the Bishop Gerardi murder 
case, Ruben Chanax Sontay and Juana del Carmen Sanabria, left the 
country due to threats and intimidation. Several potential witnesses 
were intimidated in the case of murdered Zacapa Municipal Workers Union 
leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda. Several witnesses in 
the Ordonez Porta case also were threatened.
    There were some allegations of politically motivated killings by 
nonstate actors during the year, and the authorities demonstrated a 
willingness to investigate these murders. In some of these cases, there 
was insufficient evidence to conclude whether or not the killing was 
politically motivated.
    On June 22, Oswaldo Monzon Lima, Secretary General of the 90member 
Union of Gasoline Transport Drivers in Escuintla, was killed. His body, 
shot once in the back, was found on June 23 in a thicket across the 
highway from his abandoned tanker truck. Since 1998 Monzon Lima had 
been involved in an ongoing dispute with his employer at the time, 
president of the Association of Fuel Transporters Mario Ortiz Barranco. 
In 1998 Monzon Lima had filed a complaint with the police that Ortiz 
had threatened to have him killed, based on a suit in the labor courts 
alleging that Ortiz had fired illegally three union leaders within 
weeks of the union's formation. In addition, Monzon had presented the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines with a file that outlined irregularities 
in Ortiz's conduct of his gasoline transportation business, including 
his use of forged permits and licenses. On June 19, Monzon refused to 
accept a settlement offer from Ortiz in the suit over the illegal 
firings. He was murdered 3 days later. By September the Public 
Ministry's investigation was proceeding normally with Ortiz as the 
primary suspect.
    On February 29, Erwin Haroldo Ochoa Lopez and Julio Armando 
Vasquez, two environmentalists working for the National Council for 
Protected Areas (CONAP), a governmental environmental protection 
agency, were killed outside a restaurant in Puerto Barrios, Izabal. 
MINUGUA noted serious mishandling of the crime scene, including the 
fact that police would not allow firemen to administer first aid to the 
victims, who still were alive when firemen first arrived on the scene, 
but who died shortly thereafter. The Public Ministry's investigation 
eventually focused on retired army Colonel Sergio Otoniel Ponciano, who 
owned a private security firm and a ranch in a protected area. In 
August the authorities arrested Ponciano and charged him with murder. 
Separate investigations by SIC detectives and Public Ministry 
prosecutors underscored the lack of coordination between these two 
organizations on both the local and national levels.
    In October Maura Ofelia Paniagua Corzantes, civil law coordinator 
for the law clinic at San Carlos, was murdered. She was in charge of 
receiving criminal complaints, particularly complaints of violence 
against women, on behalf of the University, which is recognized under 
domestic violence law. The day before Paniagua was killed, someone came 
to the door to see her; her maid told the person that she was not 
available and the person went away. The following day the same person 
returned and shot her repeatedly. At year's end, the Public Ministry 
was investigating the case to determine a motive and suspect for the 
killing.
    On March 2, on a road near Coban, Alta Verapaz, four armed men 
attacked a group of attorneys, judicial personnel, representatives of 
the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, and farmers, leaving three persons 
dead and three wounded. The group was travelling to a meeting where it 
planned to mediate a dispute between ranchers and small farmers over 
the use of a new road. PNC officers later arrested rancher Hermelindo 
Caal Rossi and an unidentified minor for the killings. The case was 
under investigation by the Public Ministry at year's end.
    On May 4, Jose Anancio Mendoza Garcia was found dead in a well in 
Camotan, Chiquimula. His body showed signs of multiple injuries that 
indicated that he was murdered. Mendoza Garcia was a former New Nation 
Alliance (ANN) candidate for mayor in Camotan, as well as a local 
leader of the Council of Ethnic Communities Runujel Junam (CERJ), a 
prominent indigenous human rights organization. There was no clear 
motive for his killing, but Mendoza's CERJ and ANN colleagues concluded 
that his murder was politically motivated. There was little progress in 
identifying a motive or a suspect by year's end.
    There were some trials resulting in convictions for past cases of 
politically motivated killings, but many cases remained unresolved, 
including the 1999 murders of Zacapa Municipal Workers Union leaders 
Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda.
    On July 27, a court convicted former Santa Cruz mayor Silverio 
Perez de Leon and former city council member Justo Lopez and sentenced 
them each to 50 years' imprisonment for their roles as intellectual 
authors of the May 1998 murder of acting mayor Luis Yat Zapeta. Former 
treasurer Cayetano Alvarez Velasquez was found innocent. Prosecutors 
convinced the court that the crime was committed in revenge for Yat's 
successful effort to remove Perez de Leon from office on charges of 
corruption. An appeal of the trial court's verdict was pending at 
year's end. Bernardino Zapeta Vicenta, Tomas Zapeta Ixcoy, and Manuel 
Pacajoj Mejia, the suspected material authors of the killing, were in 
jail for an unrelated robbery.
    In the case of murdered Retalhuleu Prosecutor Shilvia Jerez Romero 
de Herrera, on August 7, the 7th court of appeals upheld the death 
sentence handed down by a trial court in October 1999 against Agosto 
Negro gang member Tirso Roman Valenzuela Avila. In that decision, the 
appeals court modified the trial court's verdict with respect to Jorge 
Ever Lopez Monroy, to whom it also gave the death penalty, and Waldemar 
Hidalgo Marroquin and Jaime Raul Quezada Corzo, each of whom received 
50-year prison sentences for the May 1998 murder. They previously had 
been set free by the trial court. The CSJ upheld the death sentence for 
Valenzuela Avila and upheld the 50-year sentences for the other three 
defendants.
    Prosecutors determined that the January 1999 killing of alleged 
gang member Olman Alexis Viera Rodriguez, and the May 1999 murder of 
New Guatemalan Democratic Front (FDNG) leader Roberto Gonzalez Arias 
were not politically motivated.
    Prosecutors continued to investigate the 1999 murders of Zacapa 
Municipal Workers Union leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel 
Pineda, both of whom had protested labor rights violations and 
corruption in the Zacapa mayor's office. Prosecutors made no apparent 
effort to continue to investigate former Zacapa Mayor Carlos Vargas y 
Vargas, his driver, or his bodyguard, who were believed widely to be 
the intellectual and material authors of the murders. On February 3, 
police arrested Carlos Anibal Paz Gordon, a former employee of a 
company owned by persons close to Mayor Vargas, as the suspected 
material author of the crime. Paz Gordon's alleged accomplice, Carlos 
Ramiro Mende Aldana, remained at large at year's end. Paz Gordon's 
trial originally was scheduled to begin on February 15, but was delayed 
by a change in the prosecutor and a series of pretrial evidentiary 
motions and hearings. On October 5, the court convicted Paz Gordon and 
sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment. Several other Zacapa Municipal 
Workers Union members claimed to have received death threats, as did 
several key potential witnesses. MINUGUA reported in 1999 that the 
prosecutors in Zacapa seriously mishandled several aspects of the 
investigation against the material authors.
    Six months after the May 1999 abduction and killing of Tomas Tol 
Salvador, an FDNG leader in Quiche and human rights activist for the 
CERJ and for the Council of Ethnic Communities, an indigenous 
organization, the courts finally ordered the January 18 exhumation of 
an unidentified body. The body was confirmed to belong to Tol Salvador. 
No suspects were identified and no clear motive had been established by 
year's end; the case remained under investigation.
    In the May 1999 killing of former Judge Herberto Zapata Gudiel, 
prosecutors requested provisional closure of the case while they gather 
additional evidence against primary suspect Elmer Ezequiel Hernandez 
Salazar. In addition prosecutors ruled out the possibility that Zapata 
might have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The case still was 
pending at year's end. Two presumed suspects were identified, but the 
judge provisionally closed the case against them pending the discovery 
of further evidence.
    The investigation into the July 1999 murder of Mayan priest Raul 
Coc Choc remained provisionally closed for lack of evidence, although 
prosecutors continued their investigation. Coc Choc was a leader of the 
National Association of Mayan Priests; members of the board reported 
that he had received numerous death threats over the telephone prior to 
his murder. The Public Ministry has accused Julian Chonay Buc and 
Josefina Cristal Costop of the crime, but the judge provisionally 
closed the case for lack of evidence. The Public Ministry has requested 
a reconstruction of the crime scene in order to reopen the trial.
    There were no further developments in the investigation into the 
August 1999 murder of sociologist Maria Ramirez Sanchez. Because 
Ramirez was an employee for the same organization as anthropologist 
Myrna Mack when the latter was killed for political reasons in 1990, 
media and human rights groups speculated that Ramirez's murder also was 
politically motivated. However, by the end of the year, prosecutors 
still had not established a motive or identified the possible killers; 
the investigation continued.
    A heightened sense of public insecurity fueled by a deteriorating 
violent crime situation and a rash of threats against journalists, 
human rights workers, and judicial personnel, contributed to some 
allegations of social cleansing operations. During the first half of 
the year, a number of corpses were found in and around Guatemala City 
with signs of torture and violent death, including decapitation. Nearly 
all of the corpses were young males, many with gang-style tattoos, 
causing some human rights observers to suspect that the Government was 
conducting a social cleansing operation against gang members or other 
criminals. Others argued that the deaths were the product of an inter-
gang turf war, possibly related to narcotics trafficking. In its 11th 
Human Rights Report, MINUGUA noted apparent social cleansing operations 
in Siquinala, Escuintla, in which armed groups kidnaped, tortured, or 
killed several individuals.
    Prison authorities reported that on May 8, convicts Gumercindo 
Lopez Salazar and Elvin Arnulfo Sosa Flores escaped from prison and 
killed a guard in the process. The next day, Lopez's dead body was 
found in a river with signs of torture and mutilation. A preliminary 
autopsy by a forensic doctor from the judiciary concluded that the 
victim had been murdered--a conclusion that was discarded by the Public 
Ministry in a follow-up autopsy by its own doctor. In addition it was 
unclear whether Lopez's death might have preceded the time at which he 
was alleged to have escaped from prison, thereby raising doubts as to 
whether the escape might have been faked to camouflage an extrajudicial 
killing. In its 11th Human Rights Report, MINUGUA concluded that the 
Public Ministry did not thoroughly pursue the investigation in its 
initial stages.
    In 1999 ODHAG and CALDH brought criminal charges against former 
leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) for the alleged 
killings of five former EGP guerrillas. The charges were initiated 
after relatives of EGP members who had disappeared in the early 1980's 
broke off negotiations with former EGP leaders aimed at determining the 
whereabouts of the remains. CALDH later halted the legal process after 
negotiations resumed. In August ODHAG reported that the case remained 
in the investigation phase, with an exhumation planned in Nicaragua to 
search for the bodies of the EGP members, based on information received 
from potential witnesses. According to ODHAG and CALDH, at year's end 
the case was suspended at the request of the victims' families.
    The number of attempted lynchings and resultant deaths decreased 
significantly during the year, and the PNC deterred a number of 
lynchings. However, popular frustration with the inability of the 
Government to control crime and of the courts to assure speedy justice, 
as well as a tradition of extrajudicial repression of crime during 
years of military rule, led to continued lynchings and mob violence. 
Since MINUGUA began tracking lynchings in 1996, it has recorded a total 
of 337 cases. Of these, 75 cases have gone to trial, and 17 sentences 
have been handed down. Of these sentences, 7 were acquittals and 10 
were guilty verdicts. By year's end, only one individual had actually 
begun to serve a prison sentence. MINUGUA reported 52 lynchings during 
the year (including 24 lynchings and 28 attempted lynchings), which 
resulted in 32 deaths and 83 persons injured. These figures are 
significantly lower than in 1999, when there were 105 lynchings (71 
lynchings and 34 attempts), resulting in 48 deaths and 188 persons 
injured. There were fewer lynchings during the first half of the year; 
this was attributed by many observers primarily to the elections and 
the new Administration's early period in office, and in part to 
increased PNC deployment in rural areas and greater intervention by the 
PNC and other authorities. While the police were successful in rescuing 
some victims of mob attacks, many observers agree that their efforts to 
deter or prevent lynchings would benefit greatly were the organization 
to establish more effective ties with indigenous communities (see 
Section 5). MINUGUA has noted that lynchings increasingly are planned 
and premeditated events. There continued to be some cases in which 
municipal officials or other local leaders were involved in lynching 
attempts. As in past years, mobs generally killed the victims for 
either property-related crimes or suspected membership in criminal 
gangs. The large majority of the attacks took place in rural areas in 
the mostly Mayan communities of the western and central highlands. 
Generally these were communities where, during the internal conflict, 
PAC's were accustomed to conducting populist summary hearings in the 
town square and then publicly executing alleged criminals or 
guerrillas.
    On April 29, approximately 500 residents of Todos Santos 
Cuchumatan, Huehuetenango, stoned to death a Japanese tourist and 
burned to death his Guatemalan tour-bus driver. The incident apparently 
resulted from local fears based on rumors that a satanic group intended 
to hold a conclave in the area at that time. Authorities reacted 
quickly, eventually arresting a total of 13 suspects. On August 13, 
three of the suspects were accused formally of murder and assault; the 
investigation continued at year's end, with no date set for the trial.
    On July 8, a crowd trapped eight men at a roadblock near 
Xalbaquiej, Chichicastenango, Quiche. The victims were pulled from 
their vehicles, doused with gasoline, and burned to death because they 
were suspected of running guns and drugs. Authorities quickly 
identified and issued arrest warrants for 12 suspected ringleaders of 
the mob. Representatives of 30 surrounding communities threatened 
unspecified retaliation against the Government should any arrests be 
made in the case; at year's end, the PNC had not executed the warrants.
    While the justice system has been slow to convict and imprison 
perpetrators of lynchings, the Government has demonstrated an increased 
willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute lynching 
offenders. There were numerous arrests and several convictions against 
lynch mob leaders during the year. On May 25, a court sentenced four 
men to 41 years and 8 months in prison each for a 1999 lynching of two 
victims in Chisec, Alta Verapaz. On May 10, three individuals received 
30-year prison sentences and on June 2, one vigilante was sentenced to 
50 years in prison and two others were given 33-year sentences for an 
October 1997 lynching in Comitancillo, San Marcos. On December 19, the 
Sentencing Tribunal of Solola condemned Diego Tzaj Cuc to 50 years in 
prison on two 25-year counts of murder for the January 1997 lynching in 
Nahuala of Cristobal Tambriz Ixtama and Diego Crisostomo Coti Gomez. 
The conviction came after the Solola district prosecutor appealed a 
June 14 decision which found Tzaj Cuc not guilty. The Ninth Appelate 
Court agreed with the prosecution and ordered a retrial at which Tzaj 
Cuc was convicted. Three other suspects in the case were awaiting trial 
at year's end: Francisco Boluz Lopez, Cruz Sojom Coti, Alonzo Tulul 
Guarchai and Francisco Traj Tay. At year's end, 10 men and 1 woman were 
scheduled to stand trial for the June 1997 lynching of 9 persons in 
Barreneche, Solola.
    With the assistance of MINUGUA, the Government inaugurated a new 
anti-lynching campaign targeting those specific areas where lynchings 
have occurred. During the year, about 50 workshops had been held in 
rural towns, and these towns had not seen a recurrence of lynchings at 
year's end. In conjunction with the program's inauguration, CSJ 
President Jose Quesada Fernandez strongly denounced lynchings in a 
public statement and pledged support and protection for judicial 
personnel who are threatened by the local populace when lynching 
perpetrators are brought before the courts. In addition the National 
Tourism Institute (INGUAT) promotes a campaign that includes 
educational workshops to prevent lynchings. The PNC developed an 
antilynching operational plan that outlines procedures for officers to 
follow when confronted with lynchings. There were some criticisms that 
the PNC has yet to meaningfully deploy its operational plan or take 
advantage of officers who speak indigenous languages to build 
relationships with the communities that they police. Some observers 
also have criticized national antilynching campaigns as lacking 
sufficient focus or coordination with rural communities.
    Despite improvements in the Government's response to deter 
lynchings and punish those responsible, growing public feelings of 
insecurity in the face of an ongoing wave of violent crime led many 
communities to form Local Security Councils--as provided for in the Law 
on the National Civilian Police--to protect themselves from criminal 
activity. These organizations were created primarily in Quiche 
department, with others believed to exist in Baja Verapaz, Solola, 
Huehuetenango, and San Marcos departments. At a November press 
conference, PNC director Rubio Lecsan Merida announced that the 
Councils would be implemented in 31 municipalities as a measure to 
extend the effectiveness of the police. In addition there were 
unconfirmed reports that armed groups not covered by the Council 
statute have organized in numerous other communities. There also were 
unconfirmed reports that these unregulated, uncontrolled groups were 
responsible for killings, torture, and social cleansing operations. 
There continued to be concerns that former PAC members sometimes are 
involved in lynchings.
    b. Disappearance.--There was one credible report of forced 
disappearance attributed to police forces.
    On May 7, plainclothes PNC and SIC agents detained Adelso Carrillo 
Leiva, Rigoberto Pineda Agustin, and Mynor Pineda Agustin in San 
Benito, Peten. During interrogation for suspected participation in a 
kidnaping, the suspects were blindfolded and driven to a remote 
location, then threatened, beaten, and tortured. They returned to San 
Benito without Mynor Pineda, and his whereabouts were unknown as of 
June 30, suggesting a forced disappearance. A MINUGUA investigation 
indicated that PNC and SIC members tried to frame the three suspects 
for the kidnaping by falsifying evidence and documents. In addition the 
police apparently drove the suspects to the scene of the crime in order 
to claim that they caught the suspects in the act. The Public Ministry 
made no serious attempt to investigate or solve the crime. A writ of 
habeas corpus submitted on May 10 was answered by the judge in the San 
Benito Criminal Court, but did not produce Mynor Pineda or any 
information regarding his whereabouts.
    There was no progress in the February 1998 disappearance of 
Francisco Gonzalez Vasquez, which was attributed to two Zacapa police 
officers. Despite an August 1998 arrest warrant for the arrest of 
Inspector Marvin Rolando Gomez Noguera on charges of ``abuse of 
authority and threats,'' he never has been arrested. The PNC 
transferred him to a position in Tecun Uman, San Marcos (on the other 
side of the country).
    The PDH's office reported 10 complaints of forced disappearance 
during the year, compared with 12 in 1999, and 18 in 1998. MINUGUA 
reported two complaints of forced disappearance during the year, 
compared with one in 1999 and one in 1998.
    There was one credible report of a politically motivated 
disappearance. On April 7, University of San Carlos (USAC) Professor 
Mayra Gutierrez Hernandez disappeared. The human rights community and 
Gutierrez's family and friends concluded that her disappearance was 
politically motivated, due to her social activism and political 
activities, which included social research into international 
adoptions, women's rights, and a range of human rights causes. They 
also accused prosecutors of sabotaging the investigation by pursuing 
inaccurate theories that Gutierrez was an active member of a guerrilla 
organization and either left voluntarily or was kidnaped by her 
guerrilla comrades. These theories were repeated publicly by high-level 
Government officials, including then-Interior Minister Guillermo Ruiz 
Wong, thereby adding fuel to suspicions of a rightwing conspiracy. 
During its own investigation, MINUGUA found evidence that persons 
associated with military intelligence were spreading rumors and other 
misinformation to divert the official investigation, while persons 
close to Gutierrez inexplicably altered or removed valuable evidence 
and gave false information to Public Ministry prosecutors. 
Nevertheless, there were strong indications that the Public Ministry's 
investigation was neither thorough nor objective. On November 28, the 
NGO Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo requested a special mandate from the CSJ to 
conduct an investigation into the case due to the lack of information 
that has been made available to date by the authorities. On December 7, 
the Supreme Court granted the PDH the status of special investigator in 
the case until February 2001.
    Disappearances in high-profile cases from recent years remained 
unresolved at year's end. For example, there was no progress in the 
investigation into the April 1999 disappearance of prominent indigenous 
leader and FDNG party member Carlos Coc Rax. Nor was there progress in 
the disappearance cases of Arnoldo Xi, an indigenous- and peasant-
rights activist who reportedly was shot and abducted in March 1995; 
Lorenzo Quiej Pu, a human rights activist who disappeared in January 
1994; and Juan Jose Cabrera (``Mincho''), the guerrilla commander 
reportedly captured by the EMP in 1996 while taking part in a 
kidnaping.
    On August 10, ODHAG released its report on children missing since 
the armed conflict. The report stated that of the documented cases, 86 
percent were of ``forced disappearances'' and the remaining 14 percent 
were attributable to diverse causes associated with the conflict, such 
as communities fleeing attack. Of the documented cases of forced 
disappearances, the military was responsible for 92 percent of the 
cases; PAC's were responsible for 3 percent; guerrilla forces were 
responsible for 2 percent; and the remaining 3 percent could not be 
attributed to anyone. In 68 percent of the forced disappearances, boys 
and girls were taken directly to a military post of one kind or 
another. Approximately 93 percent of the victims were Mayan children, 
the majority of whom were between 1 and 4 years old.
    The fate of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who 
disappeared following a March 1992 clash between army and URNG forces, 
remains unknown. On December 5, the Inter-American Court ruled that the 
Government was guilty of violating Bamaca's personal liberty and 
integrity, and his rights to life, to juridical personality, and to 
legal protection. It further found that in the case, the Government 
violated international human rights conventions, specifically the 
Convention against Torture. The Court ordered the Government to 
investigate, publicly identify and try those responsible, and award 
damages for its violations.
    There was no apparent progress in the 1998 criminal case filed by 
Adriana Portillo Bartow for the 1981 abduction and disappearance of her 
two children and four other members of her family. The lawsuit named 
former Interior Minister Donald Alvarez Ruiz, former National Police 
Director German Chupina Barahona, and Pedro Garcia Arredondo, the 
former chief of Commando Seis (a plainclothes police urban 
counterinsurgency force) as defendants. Garcia Arredondo was reelected 
as mayor of Nueva Santa Rosa in the November 1999 elections and 
therefore has immunity from prosecution.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the integrity and security 
of the person and prohibits physical or psychological torture of 
prisoners; however, there were credible reports of torture, abuse, and 
other mistreatment by members of the PNC, although at decreased levels 
from the previous year. These complaints typically involved the use of 
excessive force during arrests, interrogations, or other police 
operations. SIC detectives continued to torture and beat detainees 
during interrogation to obtain forced confessions. The Government and 
the PNC showed increased willingness and ability to investigate, 
prosecute, or otherwise punish officers who committed abuses. The PNC 
transferred cases of alleged torture to the Public Ministry. There was 
a significant increase in the number of murder victims that 
demonstrated signs of torture or cruel treatment, in such diverse 
locations as the Peten, the border with Honduras, Escuintla, and 
Guatemala City, which led some observers to suspect social cleansing 
operations (see Section 1.a.).
    The PDH's office reported no complaints of torture during the year, 
compared with four in 1999 and two in 1998. In its 11th Report on Human 
Rights, MINUGUA investigated 13 complaints of torture, of which 12 were 
confirmed. The majority of these cases involved abuse or mistreatment 
of suspects and detainees by PNC officers or SIC detectives. The PNC 
sometimes punished the use of excessive or illegal force by officers, 
but more often offenders merely were transferred to a different 
location. In several cases, there was credible evidence that PNC 
officers and their superiors altered documentation, falsified evidence, 
bribed and intimidated victims and witnesses, or otherwise obstructed 
the investigation and prosecution of police misconduct. Some PNC 
officers accused of crimes evaded punishment by fleeing justice. On 
November 25, the PNC director said that the organization has ``zero 
tolerance for illegal acts or for human rights abuses on the part of 
police officers.'' Through the end of October, 215 PNC officers had 
been dismissed from duty, while another 537 officers were under 
investigation in the courts.
    On February 3, PNC officers in Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa, 
arrested Juan Carlos Zepeda Herrera for public drunkenness. Several 
neighbors witnessed the arrest, but when Zepeda's father went to the 
police station to inquire about his son, a senior officer denied 
knowledge of the arrest. The next day, Zepeda was found in the bottom 
of a 15-meter deep ravine with several broken bones and other serious 
injuries. The ORP and Public Ministry concluded that the arresting 
officers were responsible, but little progress had been made on the 
case against them by the end of the year.
    On February 9, Augusto Marroquin Carreto was taken from his cell in 
the Quetzaltenango detention center by SIC detectives and interrogated 
about his alleged involvement in the death of another prisoner. The 
detectives beat and tortured him until he confessed. Several high 
ranking PNC and SIC officers attended the interrogation. On February 5, 
SIC officers from Quetzaltenango tortured Pablo Albani Edelman 
Bethancourt and Alex Guillermo Reyes Monterroso into confessing their 
membership in a gang of car thieves by asphyxiating them with rubber 
hoods and beating them.
    On February 13, in Jocotenango, Sacatepequez, Carlos Samayoa Olayo 
was arrested inside his home and beaten severely by PNC officers who 
did not have an arrest warrant. He was taken to jail despite signs that 
his health was deteriorating quickly. Eventually, he was taken to a 
hospital, where part of his intestine was removed surgically due to 
injuries he sustained from blows to the stomach. PNC officers falsified 
his arrest documentation to justify their use of force and hide the 
fact that they had arrested him illegally. A judge freed Samayoa and 
the PNC initiated disciplinary proceedings against the responsible 
officers, but the Public Ministry's investigation failed to produce 
criminal charges by year's end.
    Casa Alianza reported that although the number of incidents of 
abuse of street children roughly was equal to 1999 levels, relatively 
few incidents were committed by members of the security forces. Most 
acts of violence against street children were committed by individuals, 
by private security guards, or in gang- and drug-related violence among 
street children. Casa Alianza reported only one case of abuse of street 
children by PNC officers, in which several officers were alleged to 
have threatened and intimidated five street children. Prosecutions and 
convictions for crimes against street children continued to be very 
rare.
    There were no reports that police used excessive force in evictions 
of landless peasants occupying farms in attempts to gain land during 
the year. Because of violent confrontations in the past, the Government 
continued its policy of securing an eviction order from a court, 
informing the occupiers of the coming eviction, and sending in a 
lightly armed police contingent to end the occupation by using dialog 
and verbal persuasion. The Ministry of Government carried out numerous 
evictions without incident during the year using this policy. Despite 
these improved tactics, on March 7, police and squatters clashed during 
an eviction near Villa Nueva, when police used tear gas to subdue rock-
throwing squatters. In a similar operation, police also clashed with 
squatters in the Peten on December 11. Some 21 persons were injured as 
violence broke out during the eviction of about 300 squatter families. 
Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The public continued to 
experience difficulty in demonstrating or securing legal title to land, 
and some progress was made toward genuine land reform. On April 27, the 
parastatal Fontierras signed a $31 million loan agreement with the 
World Bank to provide property titles to landowners in the Peten 
department. Cooperation between the parastatals Fontierras and 
Contierra brought together the related functions of land purchases with 
that of resolving land conflicts, which are at the root of a great deal 
of rural violence and lynchings (see Section 1.a.). The alliance 
resolved 89 such conflicts during the year. The issuing of land titles 
by Fontierras has affected approximately 5,400 families; the estimated 
demand for these services is estimated at 55,000 families.
    Corruption continued to be a problem, and there were credible 
allegations of involvement by individual police officers in criminal 
activity; contrary to the previous year, there were no credible 
allegations of police involvement in kidnapings. The authorities 
arrested some police officers and continued to take action against 
officers found to have engaged in illegal activities, referring some 
violations to the criminal justice system rather than simply imposing 
administrative punishments. However, some observers claimed that rather 
than discipline its officers the PNC often just transferred them to a 
different part of the country. Transfers are a common practice and are 
used to avoid personal problems, corruption, and questions of 
mistreatment of detainees. Impunity for police who commit abuses 
remained a serious problem.
    All PNC members were required to meet minimum education 
requirements and pass an entrance examination. Former PN staff who 
wished to integrate into the PNC must complete successfully a 3-month 
retraining course. According to MINUGUA, there are 1,200 former PN 
employees who have yet to receive training. There also were screening 
procedures to detect suspected human rights violators and officers 
involved in criminal activities. New recruits had to complete a 6month 
training course before entering on duty. The training course, developed 
with the assistance of MINUGUA, foreign countries, and international 
organizations, includes extensive human rights components. However, 
some observers claimed that the retraining course was not sufficiently 
rigorous and that relatively few members of the PN were screened out 
during retraining, allowing the incorporation of some poorly qualified 
PN members into the ranks of the new PNC.
    Pursuant to the Peace Accords, former members of the military were 
eligible to apply for positions in the PNC but were required to apply 
like other civilians and complete the 6-month training course required 
of all civilian applicants. However, the Government incorporated some 
former members of the military and the former PMA into the ranks of the 
PNC upon the completion of only the shorter course intended for current 
members of the PN. A total number of 10,144 officers from prior 
security forces have taken the retraining course since its inception. 
The former PMA members were not subjected to a competitive selection 
process but were screened carefully before they were allowed to enter 
the program. Although government plans called for 20,000 PNC members to 
be on duty around the country by the end of 1999, resource constraints 
limited that number to about 16,700 by year's end. According to a June 
MINUGUA report, PNC officers covered 307 of 331 municipalities. 
Approximately 39 percent were new recruits, and 61 percent were 
inducted from existing organizations. Approximately 10 percent of the 
force is female. In August a class of 999 new recruits graduated from 
the Police Academy.
    The PNC's Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) handles 
internal investigations of misconduct by police officers. Despite 
greater numbers of police officers on duty throughout the country, and 
less public apprehension about filing complaints against the police, 
the total number of such complaints remained roughly the same as the 
previous year. There were signs that the ORP increased its 
independence, professionalism, and effectiveness, despite limited 
experience and resources. However, there were isolated cases in which 
ORP investigators appeared to participate in coverups of police 
misconduct. The ORP received a total of 1,581 complaints during the 
year, compared to 1,517 complaints for 1999. There were 222 complaints 
of abuse of authority, 104 of robbery, 43 of homicide, 141 of 
corruption, 108 of improper conduct, 107 of threats, and 72 of illegal 
detention. In cases where sufficient evidence suggested that criminal 
acts were committed, ORP investigators forwarded them to the Public 
Ministry for further investigation and prosecution. Between January and 
the end of October, the PNC fired 215 officers. By year's end, charges 
were brought against a total of 594 officers. At the end of the year, 
the ORP had closed 870 cases, compared to 153 cases in 1999. The 
investigations found 345 officers culpable and exonerated 525 officers. 
Most observers still considered the PNC to be a significant improvement 
over the PN.
    In 1998 the PNC accepted some 60 police candidates from indigenous 
communities in the Ixil region--approximately 30 of whom graduated on 
their first attempt--to ensure that PNC personnel in those communities 
would be proficient in the local language and able to operate 
effectively in those communities. According to MINUGUA, approximately 7 
percent of PNC officers speak an indigenous language. However, it 
appears that a very high percentage of officers that do speak 
indigenous languages work outside of the geographic area of their 
particular linguistic competency.
    No active members of the military serve in the police command 
structure, but on March 21, Congress enacted a law enabling the 
Government to employ the army to continue to support the police 
temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide wave of violent crime. 
In 1998 and 1999, President Arzu had ordered the army to support the 
police temporarily. While these measures were popular politically, 
given the public's preoccupation with crime and security, they left 
open the possibility of renewed military involvement in internal 
security functions, a role prohibited by the Peace Accords. Under the 
new law, military personnel are not subordinated clearly to police 
control during joint patrols or operations.
    There has been only modest progress in the case of Sister Dianna 
Ortiz, who was kidnaped, tortured, and sexually abused by a group of 
armed men in November 1989. The prosecutor on the case, Braulio Guzman, 
renewed his efforts to finalize the investigative phase of the trial 
despite logistical constraints. The court is empowered to close the 
case for lack of evidence should nothing further be submitted.
    Prison conditions remained harsh but generally not life 
threatening. There was at least one death in the prison system that 
caused observers to suspect social cleansing by government agents (see 
Section 1.a.). The prison system continued to suffer from a serious 
lack of resources, particularly in the areas of prison security and 
medical facilities. In November the Government reported that prison 
capacity nationwide was 6,170 persons and that there were approximately 
6,700 inmates. The majority of the prisoners are not serving prison 
terms but are being held in pretrial detention. Pretrial detainees 
often are separated from convicted criminals. Many are released either 
on good behavior or because they never are sentenced. Some institutions 
were overcrowded; for example, in August the Preventive Detention 
Center for Men in Guatemala City was approximately 75 percent over its 
designed capacity. In February a project to improve prison 
infrastructure began, involving improvements to fences and walls to 
prevent further escapes and installation of better water, electricity, 
sanitation, and emergency systems. In the spring, a new maximum 
security facility opened. Prisoners continued to complain of inadequate 
food. Corruption-especially drug-related--was widespread. Prison 
officials reported frequent escape attempts and other manifestations of 
prisoner unrest. According to press reports, in December approximately 
1,100 prisoners temporarily took control of the interior of the main 
detention facility in Guatemala City, calling for better living 
conditions and access to visitors. The frequency of jailbreaks 
continued to be a matter of serious public concern, although the number 
of successful escapes appears to have declined. Several escaped 
convicts eventually were recaptured. The military continued to provide 
perimeter security for various prisons, as it has done since 1998.
    The 433 female prisoners in the penal system generally are held in 
facilities separate from men. Immigration detention facilities do not 
always keep female detainees separate from the male population. In 
August one woman claimed that she had been raped while in detention; 
however, she declined to cooperate with authorities willing to 
investigate. The Government permitted access to prisons by family 
members.
    Minor children are held in separate detention facilities. According 
to a December MINUGUA report, there are only five juvenile delinquent 
facilities in the country; approximately 39 percent of the children 
housed in these facilities have sought protection and have committed no 
offense.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were frequent credible 
reports of arrests without judicial warrants, illegal detentions, and 
failure to adhere to prescribed time limits in legal proceedings. In 
practice, arresting officers frequently fail to satisfy legal 
requisites. The Constitution requires that a court-issued arrest 
warrant be presented to a suspect prior to arrest unless he is caught 
in the act of committing a crime. Police may not detain a suspect for 
over 6 hours without bringing the case before a judge. Once a suspect 
has been arraigned, the prosecutor generally has 3 months to complete 
his investigation and file the case in court. The law also provides for 
access to lawyers and bail.
    There are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of 
arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that the security 
forces routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal 
detention. The PDH reported 46 complaints of illegal detention during 
the year, compared with 20 in 1999 and 18 in 1998. From October 1999 
through June, MINUGUA investigated some 31 cases of illegal or 
arbitrary detention, and confirmed 23. According to a December MINUGUA 
report, approximately 95 percent of arrested children were arrested by 
authorities without a warrant.
    Government figures indicated that approximately 61 percent of those 
incarcerated are awaiting trial. The law sets a limit of 3 months for 
pretrial detention; however, longer detentions still occurred 
routinely. Prisoners often were detained past their legal trial or 
release dates. Prisoners sometimes were not released in a timely 
fashion after completing their sentences due to the failure of judges 
to issue the necessary court order or other bureaucratic problems.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judicial system often fails to 
provide fair trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient 
personnel and funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and 
witnesses. The courts' response to human rights violations, as well as 
to general criminal activity, has been inadequate, although during the 
year the Government achieved convictions in a few important human 
rights cases from previous years. However, many high-profile human 
rights cases remained pending in the courts for long periods as defense 
attorneys abused the system by employing numerous dilatory appeals and 
motions, for which they rarely were sanctioned. Courts sometimes took 
months to resolve even patently frivolous appeals. There were numerous 
credible allegations of corruption, manipulation, and intimidation in 
the judiciary. There also were credible allegations of parallel 
investigations by military intelligence-in the Bishop Gerardi and 
Ordonez Porta murder cases--that interfered with the justice system's 
efforts to investigate or prosecute those responsible (see Section 
1.a.).
    Judges and prosecutors continued to receive threats aimed at 
influencing current decisions or as reprisals for past decisions. Death 
threats and intimidation of the judiciary were extremely common in most 
cases involving human rights violations, particularly where the 
defendants were current or former members of the military, military 
commissioners, or PAC's; witnesses often are too intimidated to 
testify. For example, the lead prosecutor and his staff in the Bishop 
Gerardi murder investigation continued to report wiretapping, 
surveillance, and frequent death threats. In addition at least two 
judges and a judicial staff member in the Gerardi case reported threats 
and intimidation, including surveillance (see Section 1.a.). With 
relatively few exceptions, plaintiffs, witnesses, prosecutors, and 
jurists involved in high-profile cases against members of the military 
reported threats, intimidation, and surveillance. A March report at the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission noted that many judges and prosecutors are 
denied health insurance because the threats and intimidation that they 
receive makes their jobs too dangerous. The Government allocated more 
resources to the judiciary's physical security, including providing 
protective details for the judge and at least some members of the 
prosecution team in the Gerardi case and witnesses in the SITRABI and 
Dos Erres cases (see Sections 1.a. and 6.a.). The Government also 
devoted more resources to providing for witness protection abroad for 
key witnesses in the Gerardi and Dos Erres cases (see Section 1.a.). 
According to a November press article, the Public Ministry spent 
approximately $800,000 (6 million quetzals) on its witness protection 
program, and was reviewing the criteria according to which witnesses 
are admitted into the program.
    The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), 
appellate courts, trial courts, and courts of first instance (which 
function like grand juries). There also are courts of special 
jurisdiction such as labor courts and family courts; these also are 
under the jurisdiction of the CSJ. The Constitutional Court is 
independent of the rest of the judiciary. The Constitution requires 
that Congress elect all CSJ and appellate court magistrates every 5 
years from lists prepared by panels composed of active magistrates, 
representatives of the bar association, law school deans, and 
university rectors. In October 1999, new CSJ and appellate magistrates 
were chosen in a selection process that was more participatory and 
transparent than ever before, despite some accusations that political 
parties were attempting to fill the courts with their sympathizers 
prior to the November 1999 general elections. There are several 
community courts in indigenous rural areas (see Section 5). During the 
year, 18 judges whose 5-year contracts were not renewed collectively 
filed a petition before the Constitutional Court, which still was 
pending at year's end.
    The 1994 Criminal Procedures Code provides for the presumption of 
innocence, the right to be present at trial, the right to counsel, plea 
bargaining, and the possibility of release on bail. Trials are public, 
allowing victims, family members, and human rights groups to observe 
the process. Verdicts are rendered by three-judge panels. The Criminal 
Procedures Code introduced oral trials; however, only those attorneys 
who have graduated since that time have had real training in oral 
trials. The code also provides for language interpretation for those 
who require it; however, in practice this provision rarely is honored 
due to budgetary and other constraints (see Section 5). During the 
year, some new interpreters were hired, and the Public Defender's 
Office began hiring attorneys who speak indigenous languages and 
assigning them to areas where they can use their language skills to 
defend non-Spanish-speaking defendants. The Public Ministry, which is 
independent of the executive branch, may initiate criminal proceedings 
on its own or in response to a complaint. Private parties may 
participate in the prosecution of criminal cases as coplaintiffs. 
Lengthy investigations and frequent procedural motions by both defense 
and prosecution often lead to excessively long pretrial detention (see 
Section 1.d.). Courts showed little willingness to exercise discretion 
in dismissing frivolous or patently invalid motions. As a consequence, 
parties continued to use such motions as delaying tactics, frequently 
holding up trials for several months or even years.
    Inefficiency and corruption in the courts, Public Ministry, and 
police continued to impede the proper functioning of the judicial 
system and undermine the right to due process. The Supreme Court 
continued to seek the suspension of judges and to conduct criminal 
investigations for improprieties or irregularities in cases under its 
jurisdiction. According to government statistics, through August 1999 
(the last period for which figures were available), the Supreme Court 
imposed 1,215 sanctions against members of the judiciary for offenses 
ranging from simple impropriety to illegal conduct. Of those sanctions 
against judges, 1,159 were findings of impropriety, 66 were warnings, 9 
judges were fired, and 1 was suspended. Magistrates received 13 
findings of impropriety. The Public Ministry has been hampered in its 
efforts to investigate crimes and prosecute offenders by inadequate 
training and equipment, excessive caseloads, and insufficient numbers 
of investigators. Prosecutors remained susceptible to intimidation and 
corruption. In addition the Government's failure to clearly delineate 
responsibility for investigating crimes to either the PNC or the Public 
Ministry led to continued infighting and competition between these 
organizations, as well as the duplication of investigative resources. 
It was difficult to attract qualified personnel to the courts because 
of the low salaries offered, but a raise in the salaries of judges 
attracted greater numbers of higher caliber candidates.
    On December 2, 1999, the new law on legal careers took effect, 
fulfilling a major objective of the Peace Accords. That law establishes 
a system to regulate the income, terms of office, promotion, training, 
disciplinary measures, and other activities of judges and magistrates, 
as well as support their professionalism and independence. The new law 
was designed to speed up trials and reduce corruption by recognizing 
and protecting competent judges while creating mechanisms to remove 
incompetent or corrupt ones. A Judicial Career Advisory Committee and a 
Disciplinary Committee were established, as called for by the new law, 
and a permanent training staff was hired for what is now called the 
Institutional Training Unit of the Judicial Career Council. It provides 
a mandatory 6-month training course for all newly appointed judges. The 
Council is responsible for selecting judges as well as disciplining 
them in accordance with the law's criteria for sanctions. The 1999 law 
also provided for a Peer Review Council, which has been in operation 
since mid-year. The panel reviews accusations brought by the public, 
litigants, or other sources, investigates the complaints, and takes 
administrative action where appropriate. The panel had reviewed dozens 
of cases by year's end, resulting in sanctions ranging from letters of 
reprimand to firing.
    In cooperation with foreign donors, the Government continued its 
efforts to reform the judicial system, and there were some significant 
improvements throughout the year. For example, on July 18, a new Public 
Ministry Case Intake Unit was inaugurated in Guatemala City, which 
reduced the average waiting time for filing a complaint from several 
hours to approximately 10 minutes. A new Public Ministry Victim's Unit 
was inaugurated with doctors and nurses on call 24 hours a day to 
assist rape and other crime victims and to gather evidence for their 
cases.
    One of the most successful reform efforts has been the creation of 
``justice centers,'' which bring together judges, public defenders, 
prosecutors, private law practitioners, police, municipal 
representatives, military officers, and civil society in a team 
approach to dispute resolution and problem solving. The centers have 
installed modernized docket and case filing systems in the courts, 
thereby increasing efficiency and public service while significantly 
decreasing corruption in the disappearance of case files. Centers are 
located in Zacapa, Quetzaltenango, Escuintla, Nebaj (Quiche), the 
Peten, Santa Eulalia (Huehuetenango), and Santa Cruz del Quiche (which 
opened in April). Additional centers in Huehuetenango, Coban, 
Chiquimula, Puerto Barrios, San Marcos, and Solola are scheduled to 
open by mid-2001. The Supreme Court extended the administrative model 
of the justice centers to include the criminal courts in the capital by 
creating a new Clerk of Court office, which has streamlined the 
processing of cases, increased transparency, and improved customer 
service. Under the old system, courthouses resembled marketplaces in 
which individuals could bribe a court official to ``lose'' their case 
file--a system that resulted in near-complete impunity for those with 
sufficient money. Individuals also could bribe the court to lose the 
file of a person in pretrial detention, thus assuring that that person 
would remain in jail indefinitely. With the implementation of the 
centralized, computerized case tracking system, the number of missing 
cases has dropped from approximately 1,000 per year to 3 cases since 
the new system was introduced. In all three of the misplaced cases, the 
individuals named in the complaints have been identified and are under 
investigation. Prospective judges and assistant judges attended special 
courses at the School of Judicial Studies, from which applicants were 
selected to fill vacancies in the judiciary. Since 1994 the Government 
has expanded the judiciary's presence throughout the country; at year's 
end, there were judges in more than 300 of the 331 municipalities 
around the country.
    Despite some progress, much remains to be done to reform the 
judiciary and establish effective rule of law, as mandated by the Peace 
Accords. Many of the structural and procedural weaknesses of the 
judiciary would have been addressed by the proposed constitutional 
reforms that were defeated in a national referendum in May 1999. The 
National Commission for the Strengthening of Justice, which was created 
following the Peace Accords, increasingly is active; in July it 
announced its strategic plan, and subsequently created a number of 
subcommittees to work on implementation. The Commission met weekly 
during the year to consider reforms to the penal code in order to 
assist justices of the peace in resolving local disputes.
    Beginning in August, residents of small towns in Quiche began 
holding customary law trials, allegedly based on Mayan indigenous law, 
in which community leaders meted out corporal punishment rather than 
lynch suspected wrongdoers (see Section 1.a.). For example, on August 
17, leaders of several small communities near Zacualpa, Quiche, rounded 
up a crowd of 350 residents and summoned representatives from the PNC, 
Public Ministry, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's office to serve as 
witnesses. They then held a customary law trial and sentenced 2 
brothers suspected of thievery to 25 lashes with a whip, shaved their 
heads, and made them promise never again to do anything to harm the 
community. The two men reportedly accepted responsibility for their 
crimes and their father was designated to administer the whippings. 
(One of the worst mass lynchings in 1999, in which five suspected gang 
members were killed by a mob that also took several PNC officers 
captive to prevent them from interfering in the lynching, also occurred 
in Zacualpa.) Government and law enforcement officials quickly 
criticized the common law trials as illegal and emphasized the need for 
all suspected criminals to be processed through the judicial system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of 
home, correspondence, and private documents; however, allegations 
persist that the authorities sometimes disregard these provisions. 
Elements of the security forces, specifically the EMP, reportedly 
continued to monitor private communications. The prosecutor and his 
staff in the Bishop Gerardi murder investigation continued to report 
wiretapping and surveillance, and other human rights organizations 
reported telephone anomalies that suggested wiretapping (see Section 
1.a.).
    On May 7, Edgar Gutierrez, head of the President's Secretariat for 
Strategic Analysis, announced the existence of a computer database 
containing names, personal information, and cryptic codes about more 
than 650,000 persons. The database appeared to have been compiled by 
military intelligence several years earlier and a copy remained on the 
SAE computer system. The SAE provided a copy to the Human Rights 
Ombudsman, who offered access to the database as a public service for 
those who wished to learn if their names appeared on the list.
    The military continued to honor the 1994 presidential order to 
suspend all conscription, including forced recruitment, as the armed 
forces found it relatively easy to recruit young male volunteers from 
impoverished areas using pay and education incentives.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression, and the Government generally respected this 
right in practice. There were numerous credible reports that members of 
the press were targets of anonymous threats and intimidation; and there 
were two credible allegations of government-connected censorship. There 
were no reports of self-censorship.
    In addition to regular and open criticism of government policies, 
the print media publicized communiques from human rights organizations, 
unions, and groups opposed to the Government or its policies. The press 
criticized the military and other powerful sectors. The press also 
regularly published stories on reputed drug traffickers, official 
corruption, and clandestine intelligence networks.
    The Government prepared public information programs, which the 
radio and television stations were required to broadcast. The 
Government owns the rights to seven national television channels but 
used none of them for broadcasts.
    All four of the country's national television stations are owned by 
a Mexican citizen, Angel Gonzalez, who plays a significant role in 
politics and provides free broadcast time to Guatemalan Republican 
Front politicians whom he supports. These channels are criticized 
strongly as being monopolistic, progovernment, and interested in 
broadcasting only uncontroversial news. In exchange for giving 
extensive free time to the Guatemalan Republican Front and denying 
access to then-ruling National Advancement Party, Gonzalez reportedly 
insisted that his brother-in-law, Luis Rabbe, be the FRG's candidate 
for mayor of Guatemala City. Despite the FRG's electoral sweep of most 
major offices, Rabbe was defeated. Portillo then named Rabbe as his 
Minister of Communications. By year's end, both Rabbe and the 
Communications Ministry were the subject of numerous corruption 
charges.
    In February journalist Jose Eduardo Zarco, host of the popular 
television political news show ``Evening Issues,'' claimed that his 
show had been forced off the air due to political pressure from the 
newly inaugurated Portillo Government. Specifically Zarco alleged that 
Communications Minister Rabbe pressured Angel Gonzalez to close the 
show because it was too critical of the Government. Gonzalez owns the 
television station that broadcast Zarco's show as well as several other 
stations, despite a law forbidding non-Guatemalans to own radio or 
television stations and laws to prevent monopoly control. Human Rights 
Ombudsman Julio Arango investigated and concluded that the Government 
wrongfully had forced the show off the air. Arango called for 
legislation to eliminate the media monopoly held by Gonzalez. The 
Government denied responsibility for the show's closure and invited 
Organization for American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on the 
Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton to conduct an investigation into 
the incident.
    On April 12, Canton arrived for a 3-day visit, after which he 
recommended a ``serious investigation of the possible existence of a 
real monopoly on television stations open to public access,'' in 
reference to the control by a single individual of all of the private 
stations in the country. He also recommended that the Government 
implement clear regulations to prevent conflicts of interest between 
government officials and the media; suspend the auctions on radio 
frequencies until the Peace Accord regarding the rights of indigenous 
people is implemented; change the regulations governing television and 
radio advertising to ensure equal access; include the recommendations 
of civil society in legislation on information access that President 
Portillo promised to propose; and launch a campaign to promote and 
provide training in freedom of expression, including the passage of a 
law to protect the freedom of information. Based in part on Canton's 
recommendations, as well as a similar recommendation from the 
Historical Clarification Commission, on August 16, the Government 
introduced legislation in Congress to create a Freedom of Information 
Law. The bill would establish an ombudsman's office to defend the right 
to freedom of information, including the ability to petition the 
Government for personal records and other information. The bill 
languished in the FRG-dominated Congress at year's end.
    In September popular radio talk show host Marielos Monzon was fired 
from Radio Sonora, allegedly for returning 3 days late from a trip. 
Monzon credibly alleged that she was fired because she earlier had 
rejected a demand from station management not to interview certain 
``leftwing'' members of the Portillo Administration, nor opposition 
politicians.
    Despite its Peace Accords pledge to enact reforms to the Radio 
Communications Law to make radio frequencies available for indigenous 
communities, the Government instead passed a law that created a public 
auction system for radio frequencies. In August when eight local radio 
operators were unable to purchase the frequencies that they already 
were using due to the extremely high cost, the Superintendent of 
Telecommunications fined them $10,000 (about 78,000 quetzals) for 
broadcasting without a license. MINUGUA concluded that the high cost of 
the public auction system was an effective barrier to rural indigenous 
access to radio frequencies.
    On April 27, photojournalist Roberto Martinez of the newspaper 
Prensa Libre was killed while covering street demonstrations provoked 
by bus fare increases. Martinez allegedly was shot by private security 
guards, who opened fire on a group of demonstrators who were 
accompanied by a number of professional journalists carrying their 
photographic equipment. Two guards were remanded for trial, and 
remained in police custody at year's end (see Section 2.b.).
    In May and thereafter, there were significant increases in the 
number of threats and other acts of intimidation directed against 
journalists, which coincided with an increase in threats against 
judicial personnel and human rights workers. Various reporters, 
columnists, and editors from several daily newspapers complained of 
telephone threats and other acts of intimidation. Personnel from one 
newspaper, El Periodico, began receiving numerous threats the day 
before publishing a series of articles on an alleged clandestine 
intelligence network within the military. Some reporters claimed that 
they were followed by vehicles with tinted windows and no license 
plates. Others alleged that they were the victims of telephone 
surveillance. The sudden and significant increase in the number of 
threats in April and May led many observers to believe that there was 
an organized campaign to intimidate the press by conservative elements 
affiliated with the military.
    On September 30, 1999, the Chiquimula sentencing court found Jose 
Gabriel Lopez Leon and Neftaly Lopez Leon guilty of the 1997 murder of 
journalist Jorge Luis Marroquin Martinez; the court sentenced each of 
them to 30 years in prison. The same court found that the prosecutors 
in the case had presented inadmissible evidence against the suspected 
intellectual author of the crime, former Jocoton Mayor Manuel Ohajaca. 
The Public Ministry did not bring any new evidence against Ohajaca.
    The Constitution provides for academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Peaceful demonstrations were common. 
The police acted with restraint, and the authorities sometimes 
negotiated the peaceful departure of the demonstrators. On April 24, a 
demonstration against an increase in public transportation rates turned 
violent, as rioters looted, burned buses, and destroyed property in 
downtown Guatemala City. On April 25, the police responded with tear 
gas and riot control measures, and arrested over 50 alleged 
participants. However, the violence continued on April 27. Many 
citizens criticized the police for not responding earlier and with more 
force to stop the violence. During the riot, private security guards 
killed three persons, including a journalist, and wounded several 
others (see Section 2.a.). On October 10, mass protests over land 
reform occurred, generally without incident. However, 1 demonstrator 
was killed by an unidentified assailant, and 10 protesters were injured 
in a clash with police in downtown Guatemala City.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The Government did not 
interfere with political associations. However, organizations must 
obtain legal status, a formerly cumbersome and expensive procedure that 
was streamlined considerably in 1998. The URNG and several NGO's had 
alleged that this law particularly disadvantaged organizations 
representing marginalized social sectors, including indigenous groups.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
There is no state religion; however, the Constitution recognizes 
explicitly the separate legal personality of the Catholic Church. 
Members of a religion need not register simply in order to worship 
together. However, the Government requires religious congregations 
(other than the Catholic Church), as well as other nonreligious 
associations and NGO's, to register as legal entities in order to be 
able to transact business.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Director General of Immigration acknowledged publicly that 
extortion and mistreatment of persons attempting to cross illegally 
into the country are subject to extortion and mistreatment by 
government officials. Many observers believe that this mistreatment is 
underreported because illegal immigrants almost never have the capacity 
to lodge formal complaints, either with the authorities or against 
them; and there is little legal assistance available to such 
immigrants.
    The Government grants refugee status and asylum in accordance with 
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees from other countries. 
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared 
persecution.
    Voluntary repatriation of Guatemalan refugees who had migrated to 
Mexico during the internal conflict concluded in 1999, bringing the 
total to over 40,000 since 1993. Guatemalans who still remain in Mexico 
do so by choice. Forty former refugee families returned voluntarily to 
Mexico in August, claiming that the Government was not providing for 
their fundamental needs. The Government of Mexico reportedly accepted 
their return. Over 1,500 other individuals indicated their intention to 
return to Mexico if the Government would not resolve their land issues 
and improve living conditions.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government by peaceful and 
democratic means, through secret ballot and universal suffrage for 
those 18 years of age and older. Members of the armed forces and police 
may not vote. Since the return to democracy and civilian rule in 1985, 
there have been nine free elections. International observers concluded 
that both the November 1999 general elections and the December 1999 
runoff presidential election were free and fair. During and after the 
November round of elections, political parties lodged numerous 
complaints of fraud and misconduct against each other, the vast 
majority of which were unaccompanied by evidence and appeared to be 
partisan attempts to disqualify opponents or annul election results. 
Due largely to unexpectedly high voter turnout, the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal (TSE) was slow to report the November vote count. Public 
uncertainty over the delayed count contributed to violence and 
disturbances in a number of municipalities with highly contested local 
races. Lack of transportation, onerous voter registration requirements, 
and elections scheduled during the harvest season prevent many poor, 
indigenous, and rural persons from voting.
    Voters elect the 113-member, unicameral Congress every 4 years 
using a system of proportional representation based on population, with 
deputies elected both from districts and from a nationwide list. The 
Congress had 91 deputies from districts and 22 from the national list. 
The 1999 elections involved 13 political parties, including two 2-party 
coalitions. Four parties and both coalitions won seats in the 
legislature, led by the FRG with a 63-seat majority, followed by the 
PAN with 21 seats, the Bancada Unionista with 16 seats, and the New 
Nation Alliance coalition, which includes the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) party, with 9 seats. Other small parties 
hold a total of 4 seats. Voter participation in the 1999 elections was 
at a 13-year high. Congress can and does act independently of the 
executive, but fragmentation along party lines and a weak support and 
staff structure result in a legislature that is relatively ineffective. 
Nevertheless, Congress increased its relative power and independence 
under the leadership of president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, a 
former de facto President and current leader of the ruling party, the 
FRG.
    The former Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrillas met 
all legal requirements for qualification as a political party and 
competed in the 1999 general elections, winning nine seats in Congress 
as part of a coalition with a much smaller party.
    On December 26, 1999, voters elected FRG presidential candidate 
Alfonso Portillo in a runoff election that international observers 
characterized as free and fair. He took office on January 14.
    The new Government's efforts to implement the Peace Accords were 
limited as it struggled to organize itself and set policy priorities 
throughout the year. By year's end, the Portillo Administration 
established a new timetable for the implementation of the many elements 
of the Accords which had yet to be accomplished.
    In May 1999, in a national referendum, voters rejected the entire 
package of 50 constitutional reforms approved by Congress in 1998, 
dealing a significant blow to the peace process. Only 20 percent of the 
electorate voted. The defeated amendments included provisions to 
recognize, respect, and protect indigenous languages and traditional 
customs, professionalize the judicial service, give civilian courts 
jurisdiction over military personnel, and define the army as an 
apolitical organization. While ordinary laws could be enacted to 
accomplish many of the reforms, the constitutional reforms nonetheless 
held great symbolic value for the peace process.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics 
and government, but women are underrepresented in politics. The major 
parties nominated and elected fewer female candidates for Congress in 
the 1999 elections; however, women's participation as voters was the 
highest ever, despite social traditions that inhibit voting by women. 
Nevertheless, women held some prominent political positions. Voters 
elected 8 women to Congress in November, and that number was increased 
to 13 as substitutes took the seats of members of Congress recruited to 
serve in the Executive Branch. One woman, Zury Rios de Lopez, is the 
Second Vice President of Congress. Women hold two seats on the Supreme 
Court and one on the Constitutional Court. There was one female 
minister in the Portillo Cabinet--the Minister for Culture and Sports.
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for indigenous people. 
Some attained high positions as judges and government officials, 
including 14 members of the new Congress (15 were elected, but Aura 
Marina Otzoy Colaj, an indigenous woman, later was appointed Ambassador 
to Norway). There were 6 indigenous members in the 80-member Congress 
before the 1999 elections. Indigenous people still are underrepresented 
significantly in politics due to limited educational opportunity and 
pervasive discrimination (see Section 5). There are two indigenous 
members in the Cabinet of the Portillo Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government permits local human rights groups to operate without 
restriction. Numerous domestic and international groups investigate and 
report freely on human rights issues. Senior government officials also 
met with numerous foreign government officials and international human 
rights monitors. While many international human rights organizations 
and their workers do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to 
operate openly.
    During the year, most NGO's credibly reported receiving threats or 
being intimidated by unidentified persons. From April to June there was 
a very significant increase in the number of threats against human 
rights workers, as well as journalists and judicial personnel, in 
comparison to 1999 levels (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Most of these 
acts of intimidation involved anonymous telephonic threats, 
surveillance, and unknown individuals and cars following human rights 
workers or watching their workplaces or residences. In addition at 
least two murders and one disappearance allegedly were committed for 
political reasons, possibly related to the victims' human rights work. 
These cases included the killing of two government environmental 
workers in Izabal (see Section 1.a.), and the disappearance of 
Professor Mayra Gutierrez (see Section 1.b.). ODHAG personnel reported 
frequent and persistent death threats, surveillance, and other acts of 
intimidation, as did the prosecutors, two judges, and other judicial 
personnel working on the Bishop Gerardi murder case (see Section 1.a.). 
1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu and her staff reported 
numerous threats in connection with the genocide lawsuit that they 
filed in 1999 in a Spanish court against former de facto President 
Efrain Rios Montt and seven other former military or government 
officials. There were other incidents during the year of possible 
political intimidation of human rights workers; however, the reports 
could not be verified.
    In addition to the increased number of threats, there was a series 
of breakins or robberies in human rights NGO offices that some 
observers believed was part of an overall campaign to intimidate civil 
society. In March unknown persons broke into the offices of former 
presidential candidate and leftist leader Alvaro Colom, took files and 
computer information, and wrecked the office. They also defecated and 
urinated on tables and in hallways and scribbled political graffiti and 
insults on chalkboards. In May the National Coordinator of Widows of 
Guatemala, an NGO, reported what appeared to be an ordinary robbery of 
its daycare center in Santa Cruz del Quiche, which was followed a month 
later by a break-in at its Guatemala City office. On June 14, robbers 
stole three computers from a branch office of CALDH after drugging the 
night watchman. On September 4, four armed men entered the offices of 
FAMDEGUA around noon and demanded keys to vehicles and money. They 
stole a FAMDEGUA vehicle, four computers, two laptops, a television, 
and other electronic equipment. The computers contained sensitive 
information about human rights complaints, statistics, and information 
regarding specific human rights cases, such as the Dos Erres massacre 
(see Section 1.a.). On October 26, an armed group assaulted the 
employees and robbed the offices of a group called Women Let's Advance. 
The assailants raped one employee, and stole several computers and 
other office equipment as well as the money and jewelry of the 
employees. On December 22, 2 days after the press reported that ODHAG 
would be bringing a genocide suit against former de facto president and 
current president of Congress, Efrain Rios Montt, ODHAG's legal 
coordinator Mynor Melgar and his family were threatened, tied up, and 
robbed at gunpoint in their home. While the event contained elements of 
common crime, Melgar was threatened, and the perpetrators' actions 
showed premeditation in directing their actions to him specifically. 
While each of these incidents, if taken separately, could be explained 
as a common crime, the frequency of such incidents was a cause for 
significant concern.
    Every 5 years, Congress elects the Human Rights Ombudsman from 
three candidates chosen by the Congressional Committee on Human Rights; 
the next election is scheduled to occur in August 2002. The Ombudsman 
reports to Congress and monitors the rights provided for by the 
Constitution. The PDH's rulings do not have the force of law. The 
Ombudsman, Julio Arango Escobar, operates with a large degree of 
independence from other branches of the Government, often passing 
judgment on controversial issues not normally considered human rights 
topics, such as bus fares and electricity rates. During the year, 
Arango continued to complain that the Congress neither funded his 
office adequately nor implemented his recommendations on human rights. 
The PDH's lack of funding limited the possibility of developing 
adequate investigative capabilities. Relations between the Ombudsman's 
office and MINUGUA were strained and distant. Upon the expiration of 
MINUGUA's mandate at the end of the year, the PDH was to take over 
MINUGUA's human rights verification function, but there was no visible 
preparation for the transfer of that responsibility by either party. 
MINUGUA said that its attempts to engage the PDH in meaningful 
preparations were rejected. On November 22, the Secretary General 
recommended to the General Assembly that the MINUGUA mission be 
extended for another year; it is expected to continue working on a 
reduced staff and budget through 2003 in accordance with the 
rescheduled Peace Accord implementation timeline.
    COPREDEH continued to forge responsive and cooperative 
relationships with both domestic and international human rights 
monitors, often acting as a liaison between such groups and other 
government offices. Unlike in the previous year, COPREDEH took a more 
active approach in attempting to resolve cases before the IACHR. Due 
largely to the leadership of new COPREDEH president Victor Hugo Godoy, 
on March 3, the Government signed a series of precedent-setting 
agreements before the IACHR in which it accepted responsibility for 
several key human rights cases, including the Dos Erres massacre (see 
Section 1.a.); the murder of Myrna Mack Chang (see Section 1.a.); and 
the killing of street child Marcos Fidel Quisquinay by a live grenade 
placed in a bag of food. COPREDEH sought to negotiate amicable 
settlements with the victims or their survivors in these 3 cases and 
over 40 others pending before organs of the Inter-American human rights 
system. On March 29, the Government, represented COPREDEH, designated 
46 cases that had been submitted to the IACHR as priority cases for 
seeking settlements with victims or their survivors. Similarly, on 
August 9, President Portillo signed an agreement with the IACHR in 
which he acknowledged the Government's general responsibility to pay 
reparations to victims or their survivors of human rights abuses 
committed during the internal conflict in 10 cases. On November 30, the 
Government, in compliance with a decision by the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights, agreed to compensate the families of the murdered 
street children (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Also on November 11, 
President Portillo accepted the Government's responsibility in several 
other human rights cases, including the La Exacta Farm case (see 
Section 1.a.). During the year, the Government signed agreements 
covering 52 cases before the IACHR, out of a total of approximately 
130, in which it pledged to indemnify victims or their survivors and 
investigate and prosecute those responsible. By December 5, the 
Government had entered into negotiations on a total of 79 cases before 
the IACHR. Human rights observers described this as a sign of a 
fundamental shift in Government policy regarding human rights.
    MINUGUA maintained a human rights verification staff of 
approximately 70 persons, with 13 regional or subregional offices to 
monitor implementation of the human rights provisions of the Peace 
Accords and strengthen democratic institutions. MINUGUA stated that the 
Government generally cooperated with its investigations but cited 
occasional isolated incidents in which government officials or 
institutions had obstructed its efforts.
    In April the Government hosted a visit by OAS Special Rapporteur on 
the Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton, whose visit focused on 
allegations of government censorship of a television news show and an 
alleged media monopoly by a Mexican businessman (see Section 2.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all persons are free and equal in 
dignity and rights, and that the State must protect the life, liberty, 
justice, security, peace, and development of all citizens. However, in 
practice the Government frequently is unable to enforce these 
provisions, due to inadequate resources, corruption, and a 
dysfunctional judicial system.
    Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, 
remained common among all social classes. The 1996 Law on Domestic 
Violence provides that the Public Ministry, the national police, family 
courts, legal clinics, and the PDH can receive complaints of domestic 
violence. Domestic violence is defined as ``whatever action or omission 
by direct or indirect manner causes damage, or physical, sexual, 
psychological, or patrimonial suffering'' to a person within the family 
group. The law provides for the issuance of restraining orders against 
alleged aggressors and obligates the PNC to intervene in situations of 
domestic violence. Statistics vary significantly. The Procuracy General 
of the Nation registered 1,664 complaints in the first 10 months of the 
year, compared with 1,548 complaints in all of 1999. During the first 
half of the year, the PDH received 1,535 cases of abuse against women. 
In 1998 the PDH reported approximately 2,600 complaints of domestic 
violence nationwide. Of the total number of cases of domestic violence 
of all types (including child abuse), only 33 have gone to trial, 
resulting in 28 convictions. On July 28, an appeals court upheld a 2-
year prison sentence for spousal abuse against Amado Morales. The 
decision is only the second such conviction in the country's history--
the first reportedly took place 8 years ago.
    Complaints of spousal abuse continued to rise due, at least in 
part, to increased nationwide educational programs, which have 
encouraged women to seek assistance. Judges may issue an injunction 
against an abusive spouse or companion, and the police are charged with 
enforcing such injunctions. The Women's Rights Department of the PDH 
and various NGO's provided medical and legal assistance and information 
on family planning. The office of the Ombudsman for Indigenous Women, 
led by Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy, was established in 1999 and began to 
provide social services for victims of domestic or social violence, as 
well as mediation, conflict resolution, and legal services for 
indigenous women. It formed a coordinating committee and other advisory 
boards and representative assemblies from each of 24 linguistic groups. 
It opened its first branch offices and spent much of its first year 
resolving personnel, equipment, and organizational issues. On November 
28, the Government announced the formation of the National Coordinator 
for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women 
(CONAPREVI), which is to be chaired by the Secretary for Women's 
Affairs, and include public sector representatives from the Public 
Ministry, the judiciary, the National Statistics Institute, and three 
representatives from the private sector Network Against Violence 
Against Women.
    Victims rarely reported criminal sexual violence, although the 
number of complaints of such offenses continues to increase 
significantly. PNC statistics showed 323 rapes in 1999, (the latest 
year for which statistics were available), compared to 220 rapes in 
1998. Many observers believed that this increase did not reflect an 
increase in the number of rapes committed, but rather an increased 
willingness on the part of victims to come forward, greater public 
confidence in the PNC, and improved record keeping of crime statistics. 
Despite these advances, relatively few rape cases went to court, in 
large part because police have little training or investigative 
capacity for such crimes and because many rape victims were reluctant 
to report and prosecute such crimes. Unofficial statistics suggested 
that there were 80 convictions during the year for rape or related 
crimes in 1999, compared with 67 convictions in 1998. In July the 
Public Ministry created a Special Victim's unit, staffed 24 hours a day 
with doctors and nurses with rape test kits to assist rape victims in 
gathering evidence to use against their attackers. The law allows a 
rapist to be exonerated when the victim is at least 12 years old and 
agrees to marry him, but the Public Ministry must approve the marriage 
when the victim is below the age of 18.
    Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
    On May 23, the Portillo Administration announced the creation of a 
Secretariat for Women's Affairs. The Secretariat operates under the 
direction of the President, advising him on the coordination of policy 
affecting women and their development.
    The Constitution asserts the principle of equality between the 
sexes. Nonetheless, in practice women face job discrimination, are less 
likely to win management positions, and on average receive 
significantly lower pay than men. Some women were subjected to 
preemployment pregnancy tests. Women are employed primarily in low-wage 
jobs in the textile industry, agriculture, retail businesses, and the 
public sector. More working women than men are employed in the informal 
sector of the economy, where pay and benefits generally are lower. 
Women may own, manage, and inherit property on an equal basis with men. 
In 1999 the Congress repealed a rarely enforced Civil Code article that 
enabled a husband to deny his wife the right to work outside the home 
and an article that placed the husband in charge of administering the 
family's property.
    The National Women's Forum, inaugurated in November 1997, continued 
to promote women's issues by participating in local and regional forums 
organized by political parties during the general election campaign. In 
May the Forum presented its 2-year plan for development and women's 
issues to the Government. The plan sets specific targets for 
development, including literacy, expanded primary school coverage, 
scholarship programs, and integrated women's health. In each of the 24 
linguistic communities, women's groups are responsible for implementing 
and monitoring the Forum's policies and programs.
    Children.--The Constitution charges the Government with protecting 
the physical and mental health, as well as the moral well-being, of 
minors. However, despite these provisions, the Government in the past 
has not devoted sufficient resources to ensure adequate educational and 
health services for children. Approximately 80 percent of children 
under the age of 18 live in poverty. The Government budgeted 
approximately $345 million (2.69 billion quetzals) for education and 
$178 million (1.39 billion quetzals) for health care; however, the 
percent of the country's GDP that was spent on education decreased from 
2.46 percent of GDP in 1999 to 2.3 percent during the year.
    A MINUGUA report, issued on December 11, found that 51 percent of 
the population is under 18 years old; of this group, 83 percent live in 
poverty; 46 percent of children under the age of 5 suffer chronic 
malnutrition and another 24 percent suffering periodic malnutrition. 
There are approximately 200,000 orphans throughout the country, 
approximately 10,000 children in gangs, and 6,000 children living on 
the streets. A total of 444 children have disappeared since 1996.
    The Constitution provides for compulsory education for all children 
up to the 6th grade. However, less than half the population actually 
receives a primary education, and only 3 of 10 students who begin 
primary school complete it. One-fourth of all children do not attend 
school. These are concentrated in rural areas, and a disproportionate 
number are indigenous. Only one of eight girls who begin school 
graduates from the 6th grade. According to a December MINUGUA report, 
the average Guatemalan child receives 2.3 years of education; however, 
when only indigenous children are considered, the average drops to 1.3 
years of education. Children in rural and indigenous areas are less 
likely to complete primary school.
    Approximately 2.1 million children between the ages of 5 and 12 
were enrolled in schools in 1999, according to the Ministry of 
Education. The Ministry also reported that 3,461 communities had access 
to educational services for the first time. The PDH reported in 1999 
that 38 percent of elementary school-age children and 79 percent of 
secondary school-age children do not attend school. There were special 
initiatives to promote the education of girls, and about 49,000 girls 
received incentive scholarships from PRONADE, a privately run program 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, during the year, in 
addition to approximately 12,000 scholarships from other government 
institutions and international organizations.
    Most estimates indicated that reports of child abuse continue to 
increase, although there are few statistics available to measure the 
problem. The Procuracy General reported 1,126 cases of child abuse as 
of December 5, compared to 1,478 cases in 1999 and 1,172 cases in 1998. 
A total of 70 cases reported during the year concerned physical abuse; 
the remainder involved sexual or psychological abuse. Out of a total of 
4,250 cases of domestic violence, the PDH investigated 126 complaints 
of child abuse during the year. The largest percentage of these 
complaints were for physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, as well as 
neglect. A Permanent Commission for Children and Youth investigates 
cases of mistreatment of children. The Social Secretariat for the 
Welfare of Children has oversight for the children's welfare program, 
treatment and training for children, and special education assistance 
for children. The Secretariat provides shelter and assistance to 
children who are victims of abuse; however, due to lack of resources, 
these children sometimes are placed with other youths who have 
committed crimes.
    Abuse of street children remained a serious problem in major cities 
(see Section 1.c.). Most credible estimates put the number of street 
children at approximately 6,000 nationwide, with about 3,500 of these 
youths concentrated in Guatemala City. The NGO Casa Alianza increased 
its estimates of the number of homeless persons to 25,000, of whom 
8,000 are children. Approximately 1 in every 1,000 children lives on 
the street. The majority of street children ran away from home after 
they were abused. Criminals--reported to include private security 
guards and corrupt police or military personnel--often recruited these 
children into thievery or prostitution rings. According to Casa 
Alianza, drugs, prostitution, and gangs posed the greatest danger to 
this vulnerable group during the year. Most violence against street 
children was committed by individuals, private security guards, and 
other street children, not by police or other government forces. There 
was only one report of abuse of street children by PNC officers, in 
which several officers allegedly threatened five street children. The 
Government and a number of NGO's operate youth centers, but the funds 
devoted to them are not sufficient to alleviate the problem. The 
Government maintains one shelter for girls and one shelter for boys in 
Guatemala City; these shelters provide housing for the homeless and 
incarceration for juvenile offenders. A new phenomenon developed as 
street children began giving birth to a second generation of street 
children, dubbed ``street babies.'' Casa Alianza reported three cases 
of kidnaping or forced disappearance of street babies by unknown 
individuals.
    On November 30, the Government, in compliance with a decision by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, agreed to compensate the 
families of the street children who were killed between 1990 and 1995 
(see Section 1.a.). In addition to the modest $11,500 per victim 
compensation, the Government also promised to develop programs to 
prevent the abandonment of and violence against street children.
    In August ODHAG issued its report on children missing in the armed 
conflict (see Section 1.b.). A report by ODHAG issued in September 
found that children accounted for 20 percent of the victims of 
arbitrary extrajudicial executions during the armed conflict, and that 
27 percent of the victims of sexual abuse committed during the armed 
conflict were children.
    On February 29, Congress indefinitely suspended a proposed new 
Minors' Code due to strong political opposition from certain powerful 
sectors, reportedly led by the adoption attorneys who receive large 
financial gains from nonjudicial adoptions that would have been 
eliminated under the new code. Other opponents, including religious 
leaders, argued that the code derogated parental rights and threatened 
the integrity of the family. The bill was to have become law on March 
3. Debate on changes to the code continued during the year.
    COPREDEH continued weekly meetings of the Permanent Commission for 
Children, composed of representatives from Casa Alianza and from the 
judicial and executive branches, with the aim of addressing the 
problems of street children. The Government continued its program to 
train instructors to educate civil society groups and the public about 
children's rights.
    Sexual exploitation of children is a growing problem, including 
child prostitution and the trafficking of children for purposes of 
prostitution. The Ministry of Labor noted an increase in child 
prostitution in the towns along the borders with Mexico and El 
Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child prostitutes 
were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras 
by organized rings, who force the children into prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.). The proposed Minor's Code would have mandated stricter 
punishments for parents who force their children into prostitution, and 
for adults who solicit child prostitutes.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that the State 
should protect disabled persons. Nonetheless, physically disabled 
persons are discriminated against in education and employment 
practices, and few resources are devoted to combat this problem or to 
assist the disabled. The PDH continued to draft proposed regulations to 
implement the provisions of the 1996 Law on Protection of the Elderly 
and the Law on Attention to Disabled Persons, which mandates equal 
access to public facilities, prohibits discrimination based on 
disability, and provides other legal protections. The law defines a 
disabled person as one whose physical, mental, or emotional 
deficiencies limit performance of normal activities. It stipulates 
equal opportunity for disabled persons in health, education, work, 
recreation, sports, and cultural activities. It also provides that all 
disabled persons receive the benefits of labor laws and social security 
and have the right to work. In addition the law establishes equal 
education opportunities, the requirement that buildings meet access 
codes, and the right to equal pay. While implementation of the new law 
has been slow, a National Council for the Disabled, composed of 
representatives of concerned government ministries and agencies, met 
regularly to formulate regulations needed to implement the legislation.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution states that the country is 
composed of diverse ethnic groups and obliges the Government to 
recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions, 
forms of social organization, and manner of dress of indigenous people. 
In 1999 the Arzu Government created the office of Ombudsman for 
Indigenous Women and appointed Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy as its first 
Director.
    Indigenous people constitute over one-half the population but 
remain largely outside of the country's political, economic, social, 
and cultural mainstream. An October U.N. report stated that 73 percent 
of indigenous persons, and 72 percent of those living in rural areas, 
face an institutional lack of economic possibilities and limited access 
to basic services. The 1994 census, the most recent, stated that 42.8 
percent of the population is indigenous; however, most observers 
believe that this figure is low and that indigenous people constitute a 
majority of the population. There is no single indicator of indigenous 
status, and there are at least 22 separate Mayan ethnic groups, each 
with its own language. In addition to the indigenous Mayan groups, 
there is an indigenous Xinca community of some 6,000 persons. The 
Garifuna, descendents of Africans brought to the Caribbean region as 
laborers and who later migrated to South and Central America, are a 
separate minority group.
    Indigenous people were the most common victims of extrajudicial 
killings and other serious human rights abuses during the internal 
conflict. The commissions established to discuss the implementation of 
constitutional provisions relating to indigenous rights met during the 
year to formulate recommendations to the Government regarding 
protection of indigenous culture, languages, traditions, lands, and 
sacred sites. Indigenous people continued to organize themselves into 
interest groups to promote bilingual education, women's rights, and 
community development. Politically, the indigenous groups remained 
fragmented, and there was little agreement among the Mayan groups on 
common goals or strategies to increase their political representation 
and power. The Government devoted marginally increased resources to 
bilingual education. Contrary to previous years, there were no reports 
of schools denying children the right to wear traditional indigenous 
dress, a common complaint under the previous administration.
    Rural indigenous people have limited educational opportunities and 
thus have fewer employment opportunities. Many indigenous people are 
illiterate or do not speak Spanish. Linguistic barriers hinder 
interaction with the Government and limit access to public services, 
including the judiciary, since few officials speak any of the 24 
indigenous languages. In 1998 the Indigenous Languages Officialization 
Commission issued a report, in which it recommended that a variety of 
public services be provided in the four most widely spoken indigenous 
languages (K'iche', Q'eqchi', Mam, and Kaqchikel), with a lesser degree 
of services provided in less widely spoken indigenous languages.
    Indigenous people arrested for crimes often are at a disadvantage 
due to their limited comprehension of Spanish. The Criminal Procedures 
Code states that the courts must provide interpretation for anyone 
requiring such services during criminal proceedings. In 1999 there were 
67 interpreters at all levels of the legal system, from the police to 
the formal courts, to assure non-Spanish speakers the means to bring 
complaints, resolve conflicts, and provide testimony. Interpreters were 
concentrated in former conflict areas of the country; more interpreters 
were in training. The Public Defender's Office began hiring attorneys 
fluent in indigenous languages and assigning them to areas where they 
could serve as translators in addition to defending their clients. The 
Government also made efforts to recruit justices of the peace who are 
bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language. In January 1998, 
several community courts were created in primarily indigenous, rural 
areas to decentralize justice and incorporate customary Mayan law for 
minor offenses. In August there were several incidents in which 
indigenous common law courts were convened to hand down sentences, 
including whippings and other forms of corporal punishment, against 
suspected criminals and other delinquents (see Section 1.e.). The 
University of San Carlos offers a postgraduate degree in indigenous 
customary law. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders, judicial 
translators, and others already have received the degree, which 
emphasizes criminal law and human rights.
    Contrary to the previous year, no indigenous leaders disappeared 
during the year. There was one credible report of an indigenous leader 
killed for political reasons, Jose Mendoza Garcia (see Section 1.a.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and 
join trade unions. The Government does not control unions. Although 
internal intelligence services allegedly monitor the activities of 
politically active union leaders, there is no direct state interference 
in union activities. In June the Labor Ministry proposed a package of 
major reforms intended to strengthen the Labor Code's protection of 
worker rights. In December the Labor Ministry proposed a revised Code 
of Labor Procedure aimed at streamlining labor dispute litigation. The 
proposed Labor Code reforms would increase the fines for firing workers 
who organize unions and define the mission of the Labor Ministry as 
that of ``carrying out a national policy of defense and development'' 
of worker rights. The reforms were pending at year's end. The most 
recent reforms to the Labor Code in 1992 mandated steps to improve 
worker rights by facilitating freedom of association, strengthening the 
rights of working women, increasing penalties for violations of labor 
laws, and enhancing the role of the Labor Ministry and labor courts in 
enforcing labor law. However, enforcement of the law is weak. Despite 
continuing credible efforts to enlarge it, the labor inspection system 
remains ineffective, inadequate, and corrupt. All workers have the 
right to form or join unions, including public sector employees, with 
the exception of members of the security forces. However, retaliation 
by employers--including firing, intimidation, and sometimes violence--
against workers who try to exercise internationally recognized labor 
rights is common and usually goes unsanctioned. In its November report 
to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Body, the ILO's 
Committee on Freedom of Association detailed five cases of dismissal of 
workers for unionizing activity in which courts ordered the workers 
reinstated but the employers never complied. In some of these cases, 
appeals and reappeals by employers of court decisions against them have 
continued the proceedings for years, revealing the inability of the 
courts to dismiss frivolous appeals and have their decisions enforced.
    The law provides for a system of labor and social welfare courts to 
rule on violations of the Labor Code. Employers often failed to comply 
with the decisions of the Labor Courts and suffered no effective 
sanctions for having done so. Throughout the economy, employees were 
reluctant to exercise their right of association for fear of reprisal 
by employers. Workers had little confidence that the responsible 
executive and judicial institutions would defend effectively their 
rights as employees when employers violated those rights. In addition 
the weakness of labor inspectors, the failures of the judicial system, 
poverty and lack of education, the legacy of violent repression of 
labor activists during the internal conflict, and the deepseated 
hostility of the business establishment towards independent and self-
governing labor associations constrained the exercise of worker rights. 
In its 4th Report on the Peace Process, MINUGUA noted that ``genuine 
trade union freedom does not exist'' due to antiunion violence.
    According to the Labor Ministry, less than 2 percent of the work 
force (about 60,000 persons) belong to labor organizations. The 
approximately 1,300 registered unions and 400 company-sponsored 
``solidarity organizations'' were independent of government and 
political party domination. However, the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in a September 1999 report described the 
solidarity organizations as ``set up by employers to undermine trade 
unions.'' The administrative process for unions to obtain legal status 
has been simplified progressively over the past decade. In 1996 the 
Ministry of Labor reduced the number of steps within the Ministry for 
consideration of union applications and established strict timetables 
for approval or denial; the time for the procedure was reduced to 20 
days from 60. During the year, the Labor Ministry expanded its program 
to assist unions with their applications. During the year, the Ministry 
also simplified the process for forming federations and confederations. 
The Labor Ministry granted legal status to 42 unions during the year. 
In 1999 there were 1,389 registered unions, including 401 unions in the 
public sector and 988 unions in the private sector.
    On October 13, 1999, a group of men, many of them armed, took 
control of the union hall of the SITRABI banana workers union in the 
town of Morales, Izabal. There were credible reports that leaders of 
the vigilante group repeatedly threatened to kill some of the union 
leaders. During the incident, which lasted over 8 hours into the 
morning of October 14, about 20 rank-and-file union members reportedly 
were held captive for much of that time on the bus in which they had 
come to the union hall. There were several credible reports that armed 
men forcibly entered the home of one of the union leaders and made him 
go with them to the union hall. Various union leaders and rankand-file 
members were shoved and struck. Union leaders were forced to sign 
letters of resignation from their positions in the union and from their 
jobs. The Ministry of Labor immediately declared the coerced 
resignations to be invalid. MINUGUA's report on the incident called it 
``one of the most serious violations of human rights since the signing 
of the Peace Accords.''
    Despite the availability of dozens of potential witnesses, and 
therefore little doubt as to the essential facts, the investigation and 
indictment process that followed was lengthy and slow to progress. 
According to MINUGUA, law enforcement failures attendant to this 
incident included police inaction as the incident took place, lapses in 
applying the Code of Criminal Procedures during the indictment phase, 
and a weakening of the charges finally placed against the accused. In 
June the first instance court rejected charges of abduction, 
intimidation, aggravated trespass, and aggravated illegal detention, 
which were sought by the prosecution. The first instance court 
arraignged 24 defendants on charges of trespass, illegal detention, and 
coercion. The trial date is scheduled for spring 2001.
    The ILO's Governing Body, sitting as the Committee on Freedom of 
Association, published a detailed account of these events in its report 
released in November. The report noted that ``the BANDEGUA enterprise 
denies any links with the acts of violence while the trade union 
accuses it of being responsible for them.'' (SITRABI is the union of 
BANDEGUA employees; BANDEGUA is the Guatemalan subsidiary of Del Monte 
Fresh Produce). In the background to this violence against these union 
leaders was the firing of 897 workers by BANDEGUA in September 1999, in 
violation of the contractual agreement ``in force between the 
enterprise and the trade union.'' In October the Ministry of Labor 
facilitated the completion of a collective bargaining agreement between 
the SITRABI union and the lease holding contractors of BANDEGUA who had 
taken up operating the plantations on which the 918 workers had worked 
as directhire BANDEGUA employees.
    Workers have the right to strike, but labor code procedures for 
having a strike recognized as legal are cumbersome. Labor organizers 
have criticized the law, which requires that twothirds of the work 
force must approve a vote to strike, prohibits strikes by agricultural 
workers at harvest time, and allows the Government to prohibit strikes 
that it considers seriously harmful to the national economy. Employers 
may suspend workers or fire them for absence without leave if the 
authorities have not recognized their strike as legal. The strike 
regulation law calls for binding arbitration if an impasse has been 
reached after 30 days of negotiation.
    In 1996 Congress approved a law that further restricted the right 
to strike for workers employed in a range of essential public services, 
including urban and interurban transport, mail, and telegraph. Unions 
had opposed the law strongly, and some members of Congress called the 
measure unconstitutional and contrary to obligations under ILO 
conventions. However, the Constitutional Court declared it 
constitutional in 1997. This essential services strike legislation 
gives the President the authority to intervene forcefully should 
strikes threaten the orderly functioning of society. The Labor Code 
reforms proposed in June would undo the provisions of this law that the 
ILO regards as incompatible with ILO standards with respect to the 
right to strike. The proposed reforms would reduce the number of 
workers required to call a legal strike to a simple majority. The 
proposed reforms would limit essential services to health, 
communications (including air traffic control), and public transport, 
and provide for legal strikes in those sectors so long as minimum 
services are maintained.
    There were no significant strikes during the year.
    The law protects workers from retribution for forming unions and 
for participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these 
provisions is inconsistent. Many employers routinely seek to circumvent 
labor code provisions in order to resist unions, which they view as 
disruptive and as a challenge to their full control of the workplace. 
An ineffective legal system and inadequate penalties for violations 
have hindered enforcement of the right to form unions and participate 
in trade union activities. Although the Labor Code provides that 
workers illegally fired for union activity should be reinstated within 
24 hours, in practice employers often filed a series of appeals or 
simply defied judicial orders for reinstatement. Penalties for defying 
such orders were increased somewhat in the 1992 Labor Code reform and 
further in a decree that went into effect in June 1998. The Labor 
Ministry has worked to ``promote the restructuring of labor relations 
in enterprises by encouraging labor-management cooperation'' and bring 
about a ``culture of negotiation'' as called for by the Peace Accord on 
Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. However, 
productive, good-faith negotiations between employer and worker 
representatives have been the exception rather than the rule. The 
majority of unions that engaged in collective bargaining during the 
year reported that employers increasingly rejected the underlying 
premise of collective bargaining--that power in the workplace can be 
shared equitably according to a contract between the employees and 
company management.
    Impunity for acts of intimidation and violence against trade union 
members remains a problem. In its Fourth Report on the Peace Process, 
MINUGUA noted that ``genuine trade union freedom does not exist'' due 
to antiunion violence. In its November report, the ILO noted that 12 
murders, some of which date back to 1995, of union leaders and union 
members, have not yet been investigated credibly nor effectively 
prosecuted. In June Mixco city councilman Francisco Rodas left the 
country, alleging persistent, credible death threats following his 
campaign to have 400 fired municipal workers reinstated by Labor Court 
rulings. Mixco Mayor Elmer Morales fired the workers in the months 
after he assumed office in February and was the suspected source of the 
threats.
    An active ``solidarity'' movement claims to have approximately 
170,000 members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in 
workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the 
right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government 
views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere 
with the functioning of trade unions. The Labor Code stipulates very 
clearly that trade unions have an exclusive right to bargain 
collectively on work conditions on behalf of workers. However, unions 
charge that management promotes solidarity associations to avoid the 
formation of trade unions or to compete with existing labor unions. 
There were credible reports that some of these associations did not 
always adhere to democratic principles in their formation and 
management and that workers were unable to participate fully and freely 
in decision-making. Similar credible charges were made against some 
trade unions.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman's office for economic and social issues 
receives complaints related to violations of internationally recognized 
worker rights. Union leaders and workers filed over 100 complaints with 
the PDH in 1999, and the Ombudsman has made public statements about 
labor conditions in various sectors of the economy. The PDH can 
investigate union complaints and issue a statement, but the office has 
no enforcement powers beyond attempting to resolve the situation 
through publicity and moral persuasion.
    Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate 
with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, the practice 
of collective bargaining is constrained by legal restrictions, 
according to a report by the ILO Committee of Experts (COE). The COE 
called on the Government to remove the legal requirement that a 
collective bargaining agreement be submitted to the Government and that 
it have two-thirds support of union members. The COE report also lists 
seven other reforms necessary to provide for full exercise of the right 
to organize and bargain collectively. The practice of collective 
bargaining also is limited by the weakness of the labor movement; the 
requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory or business 
must be union members in order for collective bargaining to take place; 
the lack of experience with collective bargaining; and management's 
aversion to sharing power with worker associations. Both management and 
labor honored wellwritten collective contracts at some firms; however, 
in others management, and sometimes labor, chose to ignore the 
contractually binding collective bargaining agreements. Between 1995 
and 1999, 153 collective bargaining agreements were concluded between 
employers and employees and registered with the Labor Ministry. Nearly 
all of these agreements remained in force at the end of the year; 
although some had expired and were under renegotiation. Most workers, 
even those organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts 
to cover their wages and working conditions nor do they have individual 
contracts as required by law. According to a study released in November 
by the Association for Research and Social Studies, only 10 percent of 
workers have a contract duly registered with the Labor Ministry as 
required by law.
    Employers legally cannot dismiss workers for helping to form a 
trade union; workers file complaints in this regard with the labor 
inspectors for resolution; however, the Government does not enforce 
this law effectively. The Labor Code provides for the right of 
employers to fire union workers for cause, permits workers to appeal 
their dismissal to the labor courts, and requires the reinstatement 
within 24 hours of any union worker fired without cause. The Labor Code 
prohibits employers from firing workers for union organizing and 
protects them for 60 days following the official publication of 
approval of the union. The Labor Code also prohibits employers from 
firing any member of the executive committee of a union and also 
protects them for 12 months after they are no longer on the executive 
committee. An employer may fire a member of the union's executive 
committee for cause only after a trial and issuance of a court 
resolution. However, the Government does not enforce these laws in 
practice.
    Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to 
restructure and modernize the labor court system, the system remained 
ineffective. There are 20 labor courts, including 7 in the capital and 
13 elsewhere around the country. An additional nine courts deal with 
labor issues as part of their jurisdiction. The weakness of the 
judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of competent judges and 
staff, and a heavy backlog of undecided cases all contribute to the 
labor courts' lack of credibility and effectiveness. The small number 
of competent and motivated labor inspectors, and the lack of training 
and resources devoted to detecting and investigating Labor Code 
violations, compound the weakness of the labor courts. However, 
government efforts to improve the labor inspection system continued. At 
year's end, there were 80 full time, professional labor inspectors on 
the rolls of the Ministry of Labor. In September the Ministry hired 
another 70 inspectors under temporary contracts. The Ministry of Labor 
continued to increase its rate of inspections and fired some 
incompetent or corrupt inspectors. Ministry figures show that over 
2,000 investigations or inspections were conducted between January and 
August 1999. A portion of these inspections was a successful campaign 
to improve compliance with labor standards in the inbond processing for 
export or ``maquila'' sector. In addition some represented an effort to 
ensure compliance with minimum wage provisions. As a result of this 
revitalized labor inspection effort, the Labor Ministry filed 1,136 
complaints for uncorrected labor law violations during the year, which 
was a record number.
    The Ministry of Labor has reorganized its labor inspection system 
to permit some complaints to be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather 
than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry 
instituted a set of complaint assistance, small claims mediation, and 
informational initiatives designed to provide better services to 
workers. The Ministry continued its educational campaign on worker 
rights (especially the rights of minors and women), which included a 
campaign of radio announcements and the provision of some documents in 
indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement of the Labor 
Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued to 
decentralize its operations. Seven of the Ministry's offices outside 
the capital have been accorded regional authority. These regional 
offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include specialists in 
women and workplace issues, managementworker relations/conflict 
resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor Ministry 
plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority over branch 
offices in the departmental capitals of each region.
    Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including 
in the few export processing zones (EPZ's); however, they are enforced 
weakly. (Maquilas that make garments for export operate under an EPZ-
like regime, although they are not located in distinctly set-apart 
areas.) The laws governing the EPZ's are not discriminatory on the 
subject of organizing trade unions or collective bargaining. Union 
leaders often blamed their inability to organize workers in these zones 
on employer pressures and unofficial restrictions on their access to 
the EPZ's. While labor standards in the EPZ's were no different from 
those found outside the zones, actual working conditions were often 
better.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
bars forced or compulsory labor, and the practice generally does not 
exist. The ILO COE urged the Government to ensure the rapidity of 
judicial processes and inquiries concerning compulsory labor and to 
ensure the imposition of penalties and the strict enforcement of laws. 
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by 
children, but they are covered by the general constitutional provision. 
Forced or bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however, 
children were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections 
5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age forEmployment.--
The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14 without 
written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However, children below 
this age regularly are employed in the informal and agricultural 
sectors, usually in small family enterprises. A MINUGUA report, issued 
on December 11, found that 34 percent of children between the ages of 7 
and 14 work. The law prohibits minors from night work and extra hours 
(the legal workday for minors under the age of 14 is 6 hours; for 
minors 14 to 17 years of age, it is 7 hours), from working in 
establishments where alcoholic beverages are served, and from working 
in unhealthy or dangerous conditions. However, between 3,000 and 5,000 
children were employed in the illegal cottagebased fireworks industry. 
The Labor Ministry estimated that approximately 10 percent of the 
children in this industry work illegally in factories, while younger 
children, under the age of 14, typically work at home on piecework 
taken in by their families. On July 12, an explosion in a family-run 
home fireworks workshop killed three siblings, including a 13-year-old; 
all three were working in their father's illegal fireworks factory in 
San Raymundo Sacatepequez. The accident was due to carelessness and 
inexperience handling explosives; and was typical of accidents that 
occur regularly in the informal cottage fireworks industry.
    Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced 
effectively, due to the shortage of qualified labor inspectors and the 
weakness of the labor court system. The Association for Girls and Boys 
in Central America estimates that approximately 2 million children 
work. The majority of child laborers work in agriculture (family farms, 
coffee, and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in domestic 
service, construction, various family businesses, stone quarrying, 
rock-breaking, fireworks manufacturing, shining shoes, begging, 
performing in the streets, or other jobs. According to Labor Ministry 
statistics, between 1995 and 1999, 507 permits were issued authorizing 
the employment of minors. The Ministry of Labor's efforts to reduce the 
number of these permits issued had the unintended effect of increasing 
the number of minors applying for work with falsified age documents. 
Many children under the age of 14 work without legal permission and are 
open to exploitation. They generally receive no social benefits, social 
insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and earn below-minimum 
salaries.
    The Labor Ministry has a program to educate minors, their parents, 
and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 1992 the 
Government formed the Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry 
of Labor. Late in the year, the Ministry of Labor, with the support of 
a group of NGO's, finalized a National Plan for the Prevention and 
Eradication of Child Labor and Protection of Adolescent Workers. 
Implementation of the 1997 Children's and Minor's Code has been 
suspended indefinitely because of political controversy over its 
provisions (see Section 5). Economic necessity forces most families to 
have their children seek some type of employment to supplement family 
income, especially in rural and indigenous communities. Children who 
work generally do so in family enterprises. Education is compulsory for 
all children up to the 6th grade. The law does not prohibit 
specifically bonded labor by children, but they are covered by a 
constitutional prohibition on forced or compulsory labor. Bonded labor 
by children generally did not occur; however, children were trafficked 
into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages; 
however, noncompliance with minimum wage provision in the rural and 
informal sectors is widespread. The Ministry of Labor oversees a 
tripartite committee, which includes formal sector representatives of 
labor and management, and makes recommendations for increases in the 
minimum wage. In the event that agreement is not possible, the 
Government may decree such increases. The Executive Branch promulgated 
the most recent minimum wage increase by decree, after the tripartite 
commission was unable to reach a consensus, and it took effect on 
December 16. This decree raised the minimum daily wage for agricultural 
work by $0.45 (3.46 quetzals) to $3.24 (25.08 quetzals). It raised the 
minimum daily wage for service, industrial, and government sector work 
by $0.49 (quetzals 3.82) to $3.57 (27.67 quetzals). In March the 
National Legislature mandated by decree an incentive bonus that 
augments the minimum wage. This decree increased the minimum wage by 
ordering that an incentive bonus be paid for each hour worked--$0.09 
(0.6725 quetzals) per hour for agricultural workers and $0.08 (0.64375 
quetzals) per hour for industrial and other workers. This raises the 
legal minimum wage for a regular 8hour day to $3.93 (30.46 quetzals) 
for agricultural work and $4.32 (32.82 quetzals) for service, 
industrial, and government sector work. The minimum wage was not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. According to the UNDP, at least 80 percent of the population 
live below the poverty line, including approximately 60 percent of 
those employed. In November MINUGUA reported that a minimum wage 
adequate for feeding a family of six would have to be nearly 80 percent 
higher than the current minimum wage. MINUGUA also reported that a 
minimum wage also adequate for clothing, sheltering, and educating a 
family of six would have to be nearly 225 percent higher than the 
current minimum wage.
    The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours, but a 
tradition of longer hours remains in place due to economic conditions. 
The Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours. 
Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that workers 
sometimes were forced to work overtime, often without premium pay, in 
order to meet work requirements. Labor inspectors report uncovering 
numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff fines or 
strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the labor 
court system, inhibit adequate enforcement of the law.
    Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. Many of 
the provisions of the applicable law--which dates back to 1957--are 
archaic, making enforcement problematic. During the year, as part of 
its effort to address this situation, the Ministry of Labor 
participated in a number of international initiatives intended to 
sensitize employers and workers to health and safety risks in the 
workplace. Enforcement of occupational health and safety standards that 
do exist and could be applied reasonably is weak. When serious or fatal 
industrial accidents occur, the authorities often fail to investigate 
fully and to assign responsibility for negligence, if any. Employers 
rarely are sanctioned for having failed to provide a safe workplace, 
although the authorities did suspend one maquila operation for safety 
shortcomings, and threatened about a dozen others, in some cases 
repeatedly, with a suspension of operations if they failed to improve 
safety conditions. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for 
labor inspectors in health and safety standards, and has given such 
training a higher priority despite scarce resources. Legislation 
requiring companies with more than 50 employees to provide on-site 
medical facilities for their workers has not been well enforced; 
however, most large employers provided such facilities for their 
employees. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from 
dangerous workplace situations, and the law provides them with 
protection for their continued employment. However, few workers are 
willing to jeopardize their jobs by complaining about unsafe working 
conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons unless that trafficking involves entry into or 
departure from the country for the purpose of prostitution. In addition 
an immigration law that came into effect in January 1999 made alien 
smuggling a crime punishable by imprisonment. The law mandates 
sentences of 5 to 8 years in prison for those found guilty of 
``promoting or facilitating the illegal entry of persons.'' 
Prostitution is not illegal; there are certain health code requirements 
for persons engaging in prostitution. Pimping and inducing a person 
into prostitution are crimes that can result in either fines or 
imprisonment, with heavier penalties if minors are involved. 
Trafficking in women and children, primarily for the purpose of 
prostitution, is a growing problem.
    The country is a significant transit country for alien smuggling, 
both from neighboring Latin American countries and from China, Taiwan, 
and south Asia; aliens often are smuggled to the United States. 
Traffickers use force, coercion, fraud, and deception. In one instance, 
Chinese male victims apparently agreed to debt bondage to pay off their 
transportation costs, while female victims, some of whom were under the 
age of 18, apparently were being taken to the United States to work as 
prostitutes. The victims were told that their families in China would 
suffer if they broke the debt bondage agreement.
    The Defense of Children's Rights unit in the PDH and the Minors' 
Section of the Public Ministry regularly investigate cases of 
trafficking. Officials in the Labor Ministry also raise the issue with 
the police and social welfare agencies as part of their efforts to 
combat child labor and child exploitation. There are no programs 
specifically designed to provide shelter or rehabilitation to victims 
of trafficking. NGO's that focus on women and children's rights often 
help victims of trafficking and work to educate the population about 
the dangers of trafficking; however, there are no NGO's that focus 
solely on trafficking.
    The Ministry of Labor, UNICEF, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, who 
visited the country in July 1999, have noted a marked increase in child 
prostitution over the past 2 years in the towns along the borders with 
Mexico and El Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child 
prostitutes were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
and Honduras by organized rings, who force the children into 
prostitution. In its annual report for 1999 on the state of children, 
ODHAG clearly identified the growing problem of child prostitution as 
linked inextricably to that of trafficking in persons. The report notes 
that no child prostitute ``got there alone'' without inducement and 
exploitation by adults.
                               __________

                                 GUYANA

    The Co-operative Republic of Guyana is a small nation struggling 
with the problems of consolidating its democratic institutions. It has 
a multiparty political system based on proportional representation. 
Citizens elect an executive president and a 65-member unicameral 
parliament. The President appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. In 
December 1997, citizens voted in a free and fair national election to 
return the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its Civic (C) partner 
to office. Social unrest and occasional violence marred the post-
election period, with the main opposition party alleging that the 
election was fraudulent; charges that international observers 
considered unfounded. Nonetheless, as part of a Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) brokered compromise between the two parties, the PPP/C 
alliance agreed to shorten its constitutionally mandated 5-year term to 
3 years, and a new election is scheduled for 2001. The judiciary, 
although constitutionally independent, is inefficient and often appears 
subject to government influence.
    The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF) 
are under civilian control. The GPF has the authority to make arrests 
and maintains law and order throughout the country. The GDF is a 
professional military responsible for national defense, internal 
security, and emergency response. Some members of the police force 
committed human rights abuses.
    Guyana is a very poor country. The economy, which for years was 
centrally planned and controlled, is based on a mix of private and 
state enterprises. Rice, sugar, bauxite, and gold are the major 
exports. There are severe shortages of skilled labor and the economy is 
constrained by an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure for 
transportation, power distribution, flood control, and communications. 
Real economic growth unofficially was estimated at 0.5 percent, 
compared with 3 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic product is 
estimated at $824, and over half the population lives in poverty.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas. The police 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, and police abuse of 
suspects continued to be a problem. The authorities took some steps to 
investigate abuses, but in general, the police continued to commit 
abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remain poor, and lengthy 
pretrial detention remains a problem. The inefficient judicial system 
results in long delays in trials. Police infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. Violence against women and children, societal discrimination 
against women and indigenous Amerindians, and incidents of 
discrimination stemming from the racial tensions between Indo-Guyanese 
and Afro-Guyanese are problems, as is child labor in the informal 
sector.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police continued 
to commit extrajudicial killings. The Guyana Human Rights Association 
(GHRA) reported that the police killed 13 civilians during the year, 
compared with 9 in 1999, 11 in 1998, and 27 in 1997. In most cases, the 
police shot the victims while attempting to arrest them or while a 
crime was being committed.
    The GHRA also expressed concern about the death in custody of Shawn 
``Big Bird'' Nedd, who reportedly was shot and killed on February 7 by 
police after being arrested, while being held in a vehicle of the 
``Quick Reaction Squad.'' Eusi Kwayana of the Working People's Alliance 
political party filed a private criminal charge against a police 
constable for Nedd's death. In July the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) dismissed the case.
    On February 9, police shot and killed criminal fugitive Linden 
``Blackie'' London, a former army officer wanted for 4 murders and 14 
robberies. Television cameras recorded a police officer shooting London 
as he appeared to surrender to the GDF. The manner of London's death 
led to speculation that he was executed to prevent him from revealing 
details of criminal connections within the Government or the security 
services. Several thousand persons attended London's funeral on 
February 16, including former President Desmond Hoyte, who publicly 
condemned extrajudicial killings by police. Rhonda Forde, a female 
companion of London's, died when she was shot during the exchange of 
gunfire. On February 18, a government official announced that an 
independent board would not be established to investigate police 
actions during the standoff, but that police and defense forces would 
conduct a joint services investigation. However, no results of any 
investigation of London's killing have been made public.
    On March 18, a police squad shot and killed Hilton Rodrigues, 
wanted for murder and robbery; a police constable also was killed in 
the shootout. On June 23, a police officer shot and killed 26-year-old 
Ramdeo Rampersaud while attempting to arrest him on rape charges.
    On August 18, a policeman shot and killed 14-year-old Trevor 
Crossman in Ituni, along the Demarara River. The policeman mistook him 
for his older brother, with whom the policeman had argued. In order to 
express public sympathy for the family, the Police Commissioner 
attended Crossman's funeral. The authorities charged the policeman with 
manslaughter; on September 8, he was released on bail pending trial.
    On September 3, Mohammed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police 
lockup. An autopsy revealed that Shafeek was beaten all over his body; 
his skull and neck were fractured. The Home Affairs Minister initially 
announced that police reports indicated that Shafeek might have been 
beaten by other prisoners. However, the Police Commissioner 
subsequently announced on September 28 that an investigation revealed 
that Shafeek was beaten by the Venezuelan crew of a ship that had since 
left the country, and that the police had arrested him for disorderly 
conduct. The commissioner added that Shafeek should have been 
hospitalized instead of being placed in a prison cell, and that 
procedures would be instituted in the future to ensure that injured 
prisoners were hospitalized. On October 4, the police submitted a 20-
page report to the DPP. The report noted that disciplinary action would 
be taken against police officers involved. At year's end, an inquest 
was scheduled for January 2001.
    On November 21, a presidential guard allegedly shot and killed 
fruit vendor Oscar Daniels in Georgetown. The guard reportedly was 
aiming at Daniels' cousin, with whom he had argued, and the guard took 
Daniels to a hospital, but he died on the way. Shortly thereafter, the 
guard returned to duty until media reports led to his removal. At 
year's end, an inquest was pending.
    Throughout the year, the Rise Organize and Rebuild (ROAR) political 
party complained about threats and harassment from the ruling PPP. ROAR 
portrayed the murder on November 12 of a man named Mohan, the father of 
ROAR's organizer in the Essequibo region, by a PPP supporter as a 
result of the PPP's campaign against it. However, the ROAR presented no 
evidence that connected the killing to the PPP.
    There were no new developments in most of the extrajudicial 
killings by police in previous years, including the police shootings of 
Fazal Narine and Colin McGregor in 1999. In April a jury found that no 
one could be held criminally responsible for the death of Victor 
``Junior'' Bourne in 1998. Two police superintendants were charged with 
killing Bourne but defended themselves by asserting that they acted in 
self-defense. Human rights monitors questioned the jury's verdict by 
noting that the police version of the shooting was contradicted by 
eyewitness testimony, which stated that Bourne was in bed asleep when 
police shot him. Amnesty International issued a statement criticizing 
the verdict and expressing concern over the climate of police impunity 
in the country.
    On March 30, the U.N. Human Rights Committee made 22 
recommendations to the Government, including a call for prompt 
investigation by an impartial body of extrajudicial killings and 
excessive use of force. It also called for measures to be taken to 
ensure the prosecution of offenders and to provide effective remedies 
to victims. The Committee recommended that all law enforcement 
officials receive thorough training in international human rights 
standards.
    Many justice authorities and human rights activists say that 
because of rising crime and pressure from urban businesses, which are 
often the targets of criminals, the Government has taken a lax attitude 
toward investigation of alleged police abuses. In general police abuses 
are committed with impunity.
    The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), established in 1989, is 
composed of five members who investigate complaints against police 
officers. The statute provided for the independence of the PCA; 
however, most members are themselves members of the criminal justice 
system, and the PCA is not truly independent. The PCA received 69 
complaints during the year (compared with 45 in 1999), completed 
investigation of 27 of them, and sent them to the Police Commissioner 
for action. However, there is no information publicly available on the 
status of these investigations. The PCA has not submitted an annual 
report since 1995. Even when police officers do face charges, most of 
the cases are heard by lower magistrate courts, where other specially 
trained police officers serve as the prosecutors. As a result, human 
rights activists question officers' commitment to prosecuting their own 
colleagues.
    In response to the growing number of complaints against the police, 
the police established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
in 1997. During the year, the OPR received 150 cases; it completed 
action on 97 of them and was awaiting instructions from the DPP on 27 
cases. Since its inception, the OPR has carried out investigations of 
complaints against police, and at least 99 cases have resulted in some 
type of disciplinary action being taken against police officers.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police 
continued to abuse suspects, although to a lesser degree than in the 
previous year. From 1995 to 1997, the GHRA received an average of 20 
complaints per year from victims who had been beaten by police while in 
custody. The GHRA still considers police mistreatment of prisoners a 
problem. Moreover, inmates, attorneys, and judicial authorities 
provided credible evidence that police and correctional officers 
frequently ignored the actions of other inmates who beat, robbed, or 
otherwise mistreated ``problematic'' prisoners.
    On September 3, Mohamed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police lockup, 
after being arrested the previous day (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison and jail conditions were poor, especially in police holding 
cells. Georgetown's Camp Street Prison, the country's largest, is 
extremely overcrowded. For most of the year, Camp Street held between 
900 and 1,100 prisoners in space initially designed to hold 350. 
Conditions in the country's four smaller prisons generally are 
adequate. In 1997 when the Director of Prisons reported that a prisoner 
had died in part due to overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison, the 
Government responded by assigning more full-time nurse practitioners 
and pharmacists to the prison system and by requiring that doctors 
visit prisons more regularly. Prison directors and inmates reported 
that, over the course of the year, medical coverage improved. The GHRA 
continues to advocate improved health care in the prison system. In 
addition to overcrowding and a lack of medical personnel, poor staff 
morale is a serious problem within the prison system. Prison staffers 
are poorly paid, and their salaries and benefits are insufficient to 
compensate for the on-the-job risks; however, they try to assist 
prisoners as much as possible. Prison officials lobbied the Government 
for increased funding to improve prison conditions; they also 
encouraged efforts by local and international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) to improve physical and sanitary conditions.
    Although sanitary and medical conditions in police station 
temporary holding facilities vary, in almost all cases these conditions 
are worse than those in the prisons. Some such jails are bare, 
overcrowded, and damp. Few have beds, washbasins, furniture, or 
utensils. Meals are normally unavailable; friends and relatives must 
bring detainees food and water. Cells rarely have sanitary facilities, 
and inmates sometimes are escorted by staff members outside the cells 
to use holes in the floor for toilets. Inmates generally sleep on a 
thin pallet on the concrete floor. The Brickdam lockup in Georgetown 
has poor sanitation and dangerous conditions. One cell without plumbing 
or other facilities typically holds up to 30 detainees and is often the 
site of violence between inmates. Although precinct jails are intended 
to serve only as pretrial holding areas, some suspects have been 
detained there as long as 4 years, waiting for the overburdened 
judicial system to take action on their cases.
    In October the GHRA criticized prison authorities for the death of 
Michael Ramcharran at the hands of another inmate, which the GHRA said 
was the direct result of overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison. To 
reduce overcrowding, the GHRA called on the judiciary to consider 
alternate sentencing for minor offenses, rejuvenation of the Parole 
Board, and the release of ill prisoners who have completed almost all 
of their sentences. However, the Government did not adopt any of these 
recommendations. Since then, the Parole Board has become more active, 
but still is reluctant to release prisoners due to insufficient post-
release resources, including a lack of probationary staff.
    The GHRA noted that protest actions on the roof of the central 
prison increased significantly during the year; at one point in October 
six inmates were on the roof to protest lengthy delays in trials (see 
Sections 1.d and 1.e.).
    Conditions were generally adequate in the only women's prison, 
which is at New Amsterdam, in a facility that holds men and women in 
separate dormitory-type buildings. There are a number of vocational and 
educational courses, and regular visits by a psychiatrist who provides 
counseling were started for female inmates. The GHRA has urged that 
female inmates' responsibility for children should be recognized in 
terms of length of sentence and facilities for family contact. The East 
La Penitence police jail, where female prisoners are held until 
sentencing, was upgraded during the year; sanitation improved, and 
there is piped water for the inmates. Construction has not begun yet on 
the new women's detention center at East La Penitence.
    Following widespread criticism caused by the detention in 1999 of 
two boys (ages 8 and 11) with adult prisoners who mistreated them, 
police have been careful to place juvenile offenders in a separate 
facility, in which conditions are adequate. In December 1999, police 
moved imprisoned juveniles from Brickdam to the Kitty police lockup, 
but conditions were so poor there that they were moved to the Ruimveldt 
police station. This station became the only facility holding 
juveniles, whose ages range between 14 and 17 years.
    Prison officials were receptive to local and international NGO 
requests to enter and inspect prison facilities. The GHRA participates 
as a member of the prisons' visiting committee, which investigates 
prisoner complaints, inspects diets, reviews primary medical care 
services, and provides recommendations to prison authorities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that no person may be deprived of personal liberty except as 
authorized by law and requires judicial determination of the legality 
of detention, a mandate that the authorities generally respected in 
practice.
    Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official. 
Police may arrest without a warrant when an officer witnesses a crime 
or at the officer's discretion in instances where there is good cause 
to suspect that a crime or a breach of the peace has been or will be 
committed. The law requires that a person arrested and held for more 
than 24 hours be brought before a court to be charged. Bail is 
generally available, except in capital offense cases. In narcotics 
cases, magistrates have limited discretion in granting bail before 
trial and must remand persons convicted of such crimes into custody, 
even if an appeal is pending.
    Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem. The GHRA has asserted 
that prisoners often are detained for 3 or 4 years while awaiting 
trial; however, the authorities denied that delays were this long. 
During the year, prisoners protested lengthy trial delays (see Section 
1.c.)
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, law enforcement officials and prominent 
lawyers questioned the independence of the judiciary and accused the 
Government of intervening in certain criminal and civil cases. There 
are no institutional checks on the President or the ruling party when 
they seek to influence judges. However, the Government generally 
respects the independence of the judiciary in human rights cases.
    The court system is composed of a high court (the Supreme Court of 
Judicature), an appeals court, and a system of magistrate courts. 
Magistrates are members of the civil service and are trained lawyers. 
The magistrate courts deal with both criminal and civil matters. The 
Ministry of Legal Affairs, headed by the Attorney General, is the 
principal legal advisor to the State. The Director of Public 
Prosecution is statutorily independent and can file legal charges 
against offenders. The Constitution provides that anyone charged with a 
criminal offense has the right to a hearing by a court of law. This 
right is respected in practice.
    Delays in judicial proceedings are caused by shortages of trained 
court personnel and magistrates, inadequate resources, postponements at 
the request of the defense or prosecution, occasional alleged acts of 
bribery, poor tracking of cases, and the slowness of police in 
preparing cases for trial. The inefficiency of the judicial system 
undermines due process. Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem 
(see Section 1.d.). In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee called on 
the Government to recruit competent part-time and temporary judges in 
order to deal with the backlog of cases. In September four additional 
judges were sworn in.
    Defendants are granted public trials, and appeals may be made to 
higher courts. Appeals of some murder cases may go on for several 
years. Trial postponements are granted routinely to both the defense 
and the prosecution. Programs designed to improve legal structures, 
reform judicial procedures, upgrade technical capabilities, and improve 
efficiency of the courts have had only a limited effect, and judicial 
staff still need further training in all areas. Although the law 
recognizes the right to legal counsel, in practice, with the exception 
of capital crimes, it has been limited to those who can afford to pay. 
There is no public defender system.
    The Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic, with public and private support, 
provides advice to persons who cannot afford a lawyer, with a special 
interest in cases of violence against women and criminal cases related 
to civil cases in such matters (for example, assault as part of a 
divorce case). Defendants in murder cases who need a lawyer are 
assigned an attorney by the court. The Guyana Association of Women 
Lawyers provides free legal services for civil cases only.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights; however, 
the authorities often infringed on citizens' privacy. Law enforcement 
officials must obtain warrants before searching private homes or 
properties. Although the authorities generally respected these 
requirements, there were numerous reports of police officers searching 
homes without warrants, particularly in neighborhoods where narcotics 
trafficking is a problem.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. Citizens openly criticize the 
Government and its policies.
    The independent Stabroek News publishes daily, and a wide range of 
religious groups, political parties, and journalists publish a variety 
of privately owned weekly newspapers. The Government's daily newspaper, 
the Guyana Chronicle, covers a broad spectrum of political and 
nongovernmental groups. However, throughout the year the Chronicle 
typically displayed a clear antiopposition bias.
    While printed media flourished, a growing number of journalists 
charged the Government with failure to respect freedom of the 
electronic media. The Government owns and operates the country's sole 
radio station, which broadcasts on three frequencies. There are no 
private radio stations, and private interests continued to allege that 
the Government either denied or failed to respond to more than 20 
requests for radio frequency authorizations. The Government maintained 
that it was unable to grant frequencies to private stations because 
there was no legislation governing their allocation. However, despite a 
similar lack of legislation to govern television frequencies, there 
were 12 independent television stations in addition to the government 
station.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right. The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass 
political meetings. The Police Commissioner has the authority to refuse 
permission for a public meeting if he believes that it may provoke a 
breach of the peace. In cases of refusal, applicants can appeal to the 
Minister of Home Affairs, whose decision on the matter is final. After 
obtaining authorization, which generally is granted, political parties 
and other groups held public meetings and rallies throughout the 
country without hindrance.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country, and the Government generally respects this 
right in practice. Travel to Amerindian areas requires government 
permission, the result of a law dating from colonial times designed to 
protect indigenous people from exploitation. However, in practice most 
persons travel throughout these areas without regard to the formality 
of a permit. Citizens are free to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to 
return.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. The Government does not have a formal policy on 
refugees or asylum and has not enacted model legislation prepared by 
the UNHCR. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens enjoy this right and exercised it in free and fair 
elections held in December 1997. There is a multiparty political system 
based on proportional representation. Voters indirectly elect the 
President to a 5-year term of office. Any citizen 18 years or older can 
register to vote.
    The party that wins the most votes for parliament wins the 
presidency. A party's presidential candidate must be announced in 
advance of the election. The President appoints a cabinet and a prime 
minister who, with the President, exercise executive power. Citizens 
are free to join or support political parties of their choice. Since 
Parliament always is controlled by the party in power, the legislature 
typically provides only a limited check on the executive's power.
    In December 1997, citizens voted to return the PPP and its Civic 
partner to office and elected Janet Jagan, widow of former president 
Cheddi Jagan, as President, defeating the People's National Congress 
(PNC), which is the main opposition party. As a result of opposition 
charges of election fraud that international observers considered 
unfounded, the ruling party entered into an agreement brokered by 
officials from other CARICOM nations to hold new elections after 3 
years instead of 5 years as required by the Constitution. In October 
1998, a court began hearing testimony in a civil suit filed by the PNC 
in support of its allegation that the 1997 election was rigged; 
however, by year's end, no verdict was reached.
    In 1999 Finance Minister Bharrat Jagdeo succeeded to the presidency 
following the resignation of Janet Jagan due to health reasons. The 
CARICOM-brokered agreement also called for constitutional reform of the 
electoral process, and Parliament began to debate changes to the 1980 
Constitution, but reaching agreement on proposed revisions is a lengthy 
process. In December Parliament passed a Constitutional Amendment Act 
that imposes a 7-year residence requirement on candidates for the 
presidency and sets a limit of two terms. In addition the act removed a 
clause that made the President immune from prosecution, and it limits 
the number of nonelected ministers to four. Additional constitutional 
amendments are expected following the next general elections, which are 
scheduled to be held in March 2001.
    Guyana is a racially divided society in which the political party 
structure polarizes the main ethnic groups. Winner-take-all elections 
exacerbate these tensions. The two major parties (the PPP and the PNC) 
are formed largely by Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, respectively.
    There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or 
minorities in the political process, but women and minorities are 
underrepresented in decisionmaking, government, and politics. The 20-
person Cabinet includes 2 women, and the country's second-highest judge 
is a woman. The 65-member Parliament includes 12 women and 10 
Amerindians, representing both major parties.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Guyana Human Rights Association, the most active local human 
rights group, functioned without government interference. The GHRA is 
an NGO formed in 1979 with the participation of trade unions, 
professional organizations, various ethnic groups, and churches. It 
issues periodic press releases and normally publishes an annual report 
on human rights. Members of the Government openly discussed human 
rights issues and made public statements in response to foreign and 
local human rights reports. The authorities did not interfere with the 
activities of human rights groups. The new draft constitution provides 
for the creation of a human rights commission to investigate abuses and 
to promote respect for human rights. An Amnesty International 
delegation visited in February and met with senior government 
officials.
    In 1999 the Government presented its first report since 1981 on the 
country's human rights situation to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, as 
required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), of which it is a signatory. However, the Government's report, 
which was due in 1987, only covered the human rights situation between 
1982 and 1987. In March the Government participated in 2 sessions with 
the committee, which then made 22 recommendations on a wide range of 
human rights issues (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). In 1999 the 
Government withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which had 
permitted death row prisoners to appeal their cases to the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee. The withdrawal was in response to the Committee's 
1996 ruling in favor of two convicted murderers who were to be hanged 
in 1997.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons 
regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin. However, the 
Government does not always enforce these provisions effectively.
    Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is 
widespread. Rape, particularly of girls and young women, is a serious 
problem but infrequently reported or prosecuted. Health professionals 
and NGO's reported a high incidence of incest. Lawyers say that while 
more victims are reporting these crimes to the authorities, there is 
still a social stigma applied to the victim for doing so. Despite 
efforts by NGO's and the Department of Public Prosecutions to sensitize 
police officers to domestic violence, the police are often hesitant to 
interfere in cases of domestic disputes. According to press reports, 
there were 17 deaths as a result of domestic violence between January 
and October 16; the actual number was likely to be higher.
    In 1996 Parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act. In addition to 
defining domestic violence and establishing it as a crime, the law 
gives women the right to seek prompt protection. Magistrates can issue 
interim protection orders when a victim of abuse, a police officer, or 
a social worker fills out an application for protection. A magistrate 
then evaluates the case and decides whether to replace interim orders 
with permanent orders. The Domestic Violence Act allows victims to seek 
protection, occupation, or tenancy orders. Protection orders prohibit 
abusers from being anywhere that the applicant lives, works, visits, or 
attends school. If protective orders are violated, the abuser can be 
fined up to $54 (G$10,000) and imprisoned for up to 12 months. However, 
this legislation frequently has not been enforced. Occupation orders 
allow the victim and any children to remain at a home previously shared 
with an abuser, while the abuser must leave. Similarly, tenancy orders 
require an abuser to leave a rented dwelling and continue to pay some 
or all of the rent. Although local NGO's that address the issue of 
domestic violence are relatively new, they work effectively together 
under tight budget constraints. While NGO's consider the Domestic 
Violence Act as a positive step, they claim that it has had little 
effect on the overall situation of domestic violence in society. NGO's 
report that domestic violence crosses racial and socioeconomic lines.
    In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee criticized the lack of 
information about the effect of the Domestic Violence Act in reducing 
the level of violence against women. The Committee called for training 
of police and other law enforcement personnel in the importance of 
ensuring that women who are victims of violence are accorded equal 
protection and that preventive and punitive measures are enforced. By 
year's end, the Government had not taken any action in response to the 
U.N. recommendations.
    Help and Shelter (H&S), the first local NGO dedicated to fighting 
domestic violence, focuses on societal reeducation in order to 
sensitize the public to domestic violence. By mid-1999, H&S had 
counseled 1,768 persons since it began offering counseling services in 
November 1995. H&S reported that 68 percent of its cases involved 
spousal abuse and 7 percent involved child abuse. Another 10 percent of 
cases reported to H&S were rape cases; the vast majority of these--78 
percent--were reported by victims age 16 and under.
    The 1997 Antidiscrimination Act builds upon the provisions of the 
1990 Equal Rights Act. The two laws provide a strengthened framework 
under which women and minorities may seek redress for discriminatory 
acts or practices. However, no case has ever been tried under the Equal 
Rights Act, and critics of the Antidiscrimination Act claim that it is 
unlikely to be effective since the act places enforcement 
responsibilities on the overburdened Chief Labor Officer.
    There is no legal protection against sexual harassment in the 
workplace. The law prohibits dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy, and 
dismissal on such grounds does not occur in practice. The Women's 
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Labor monitors the legal rights of 
women. The Women's Leadership Institute was established by law in 
December 1997 and opened in February 1999. The center seeks, through 
education and training, to facilitate greater women's participation in 
government and the private sector. The center plans to train an average 
of 350 women annually on issues such as women's rights, status of 
women, violence against women, and leadership development.
    A 1990 law protects women's property rights in common-law marriages 
and entitles a woman who separates or divorces to onehalf the couple's 
property if she had been working and onethird of the property if she 
had been a housewife. Divorce by consent remains illegal. The courts 
may overturn a husband's will in the event that it does not provide for 
his wife, as long as she was dependent on him for financial support.
    The new draft constitution provides for a minimum number of women 
to be on party slates for parliamentary seats and creates a women and 
gender equality commission to promote the enhancement of the status of 
women, girls, and gender issues.
    Children.--At least half of the population lives in poverty, and 
children are affected more severely than any other group. One-third of 
the population is under 18 years of age and, although the Government 
provides free education through secondary school, the severe 
deterioration of the public education and health care systems has 
limited children's future prospects. The public health system is 
inadequate, and private health care is unaffordable for many children. 
Children often do not attend school because their families need them to 
contribute to the household by working or providing child care for 
siblings or younger relatives.
    Concern continues to rise over the effects of domestic violence on 
children. It is unclear how many deaths from child abuse take place, 
since law enforcement officials believe that the vast majority of 
criminal child abuse cases went unreported. The GHRA is concerned that 
there are no law enforcement investigative procedures in place to 
determine if abuse or parental incapacity were the true causes of death 
in some cases of the 400 children under the age of 5 who die each year, 
deaths that usually are ascribed to malnutrition or disease. Media 
reports of rape and incest further indicated that violence against 
children is a significant problem. According to UNICEF, a disturbing 
aspect is the concept of the ``girl child,'' in which teenage girls 
trade sexual favors for money, a practice condoned by their parents yet 
obscured by cultural norms. In a related practice, parents demand 
monetary compensation following the rape of a teenage daughter.
    The Domestic Violence Act allows police officers or social workers 
to file an application on behalf of an abused child. However, there is 
a lack of social services or trained experts to deal with children 
fleeing sexual, physical, or emotional abuse. Many children suffer from 
neglect or abandonment, particularly when 3 percent of the adult 
population emigrates each year, often leaving children behind.
    The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a 
commission on the rights of the child to promote the well-being of 
children. This commission would monitor compliance and make 
recommendations for compliance with the U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and other international instruments acceded to by the 
Government. It also would review legislation affecting children and 
investigate complaints relating to children's rights.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no law mandating provision of 
access for disabled persons, and the lack of appropriate infrastructure 
to provide access to both public and private facilities makes it very 
difficult to employ the disabled outside their homes. In 1997 
Parliament passed a law establishing a council for persons with 
disabilities; however, the council has yet to begin its activities. 
There are several special schools and training centers for the 
disabled, but they lack trained staff and are in disrepair.
    Indigenous People.--The Amerindian population, which consists of 
nine tribal groups, constitutes an estimated 8 percent of the 
population. Most live in reservations and villages in remote parts of 
the interior. Their standard of living is much lower than that of most 
citizens and their ability to participate in decisions affecting their 
lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is 
limited.
    Amerindian life is regulated by the Amerindian Act, legislation 
dating from colonial times designed to protect indigenous people from 
exploitation. Under the act, the Government may determine who is an 
Amerindian and what is an Amerindian community, appoint Amerindian 
leaders, and annul decisions made by Amerindian councils. It also 
prohibits the sale of alcohol to Amerindians and requires government 
permission before any Amerindian can accept formal employment; however, 
these provisions are not enforced. Both Amerindian individuals and 
groups remain free to criticize the Government. In 1998 the Ministry of 
Amerindian Affairs admitted that the Amerindian Act was antiquated and 
expressed a commitment to update it, although it has taken no action to 
do so.
    The Government has long maintained that it is committed to 
demarcating lands that traditionally have been the home of Amerindians. 
However, the Government holds title to almost all the country's land 
and is free to act as it wishes without consultation. The Government 
identified a total of 75 villages, and reported that it successfully 
demarcated the lands of 11 Amerindian communities in 1998. The Ministry 
of Amerindian Affairs claimed that, in close consultation with 
Amerindian leaders, it would demarcate a total of 40 additional 
villages by the end of 1999; however, while a handful of village 
leaders have accepted these new titles, most leaders rejected the 
demarcations. Local Amerindian NGO's regarded government consultations 
as mere public relations exercises and demarcation as a means of 
confining Amerindian communities so that the rest of what Amerindians 
considered to be their land could be offered as concessions to miners 
and loggers. (Most of the titles to demarcated land were granted 
decades ago under the Amerindian Act and did not allow for the growth 
of Amerindian communities.) The Amerindian NGO's claimed that 
Amerindian leaders were not consulted properly and were pressured into 
uninformed decisions. The Government maintained that it would consider 
granting additional land rights to those communities that agreed to 
have their lands demarcated in 1999, but it has not yet taken action to 
do so.
    In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed regret that the 
Government had not yet amended the Amerindian Act and expressed concern 
that Amerindians did not enjoy fully the right to equality before the 
law. The Committee was especially concerned that the right of 
Amerindians to enjoy their own culture was threatened by logging, 
mining, and delays in the demarcation of their traditional lands, and 
that in some cases insufficient land is demarcated to enable them to 
pursue their traditional economic activities.
    The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a 
commission on indigenous people to promote and protect the rights of 
the Amerindian community. Among the duties of the commission is to make 
recommendations for the protection, preservation and promulgation of 
the cultural heritage and language of indigenous people. In addition 
the commission is to promote the empowerment of indigenous people 
through local government institutions including village councils and 
the Council of Toushaos (community elders).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Longstanding ethnic tensions, 
primarily between citizens of African descent and those of South Asian 
origin, continued to influence society and political life. Racial and 
ethnic grouping of social and political organizations has polarized 
society along ethnic lines, and discrimination and exclusion continue 
to occur. Members of both the largely Indo-Guyanese PPP and the largely 
Afro-Guyanese PNC engaged in rhetorical and propaganda attacks that 
fueled racial tensions. In August Parliament passed legislation 
creating an ethnic relations commission in an effort to reduce 
tensions, and in December it approved implementing legislation for the 
commission.
    The civil service and defense and police forces are overwhelmingly 
staffed by Afro-Guyanese. Recruitment efforts targeted at Indo-Guyanese 
candidates for the uniformed services generally have met with an 
unenthusiastic response, with most qualified Indo-Guyanese candidates 
opting for a business or professional career over military, police, or 
public service. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 election, the 
Government increased its efforts to recruit Indo-Guyanese for the 
security forces. The Government sponsored various forums for discussion 
of racial problems and to promote inclusion. It supported the work of 
NGO's that deal with these concerns.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of association and specifically enumerates workers' rights to 
form or belong to trade unions. The Trade Unions Recognition Law, which 
requires employers to recognize the union chosen by a majority of the 
workers, was passed in late 1997 and came into effect in 1999, but was 
not effective in practice. The Trade Unions Recognition Board did not 
grant recognition to any new unions; it issued recommendations to 
recertify existing unions that previously had represented workers, but 
the process was not completed by year's end.
    Approximately 34 percent of the work force is unionized. Most union 
members work in the public sector and in state-owned enterprises. 
Organized labor freely associates in one major national federation, the 
Guyana Trades Union Congress (TUC), which is composed of 22 unions. 
There is a tradition of close ties between the trade union movement and 
political parties. Historically, the two major political parties have 
wielded significant influence over the leadership of several unions, 
and trade union officials often served in dual roles as party 
officials. This arrangement occasionally led to overt politicization of 
labor issues. For example, the Public Service Union organized a strike 
of customs employees in November 1998, with explicit political support 
from the opposition PNC. In 1999 all opposition parliamentary parties 
supported the public service workers' strike.
    Workers have a generally recognized right to strike. Strikes can be 
declared illegal if the union leadership did not approve them, or they 
did not meet the requirements specified in collective bargaining 
agreements. Public employees providing essential services may strike if 
they provide the proper notice to the Ministry of Labor and leave a 
skeleton staff in place.
    In May workers at the Forestry Commission went on strike. They were 
attempting to obtain recognition of their union, but 10 union branch 
chiefs were dismissed and had not been paid the severance package due 
to them.
    In 1999 following a civil service strike, an arbitration panel 
awarded government workers an across-the-board 31 percent pay increase 
for 1999, an additional 26 percent increase in 2000, and step 
increases. While the Government has paid the annual increases, it has 
not yet agreed to implement step increases. There is no law prohibiting 
retaliation against strikers or antiunion discrimination by employers. 
However, this principle always is included in the terms of resumption 
after a strike. The Trade Unions Recognition Law defines and places 
limits on the retaliatory actions employers may take against strikers. 
Arbitration rulings, when agreed to by the contending parties, are 
enforceable legally.
    Unions and their federations freely maintain relations with 
recognized international trade union and professional groups. All three 
of the major international trade union federations have affiliates in 
the country.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Public and 
private sector employees possess and utilize the right to organize and 
to bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor certifies all collective 
bargaining agreements and has never refused to do so. However, until 
enactment of the 1997 recognition law, this right was not codified, and 
employers legally were not required to recognize unions or to bargain 
with them. Individual unions directly negotiate collective bargaining 
status, pursuant to the 1993 repeal of a regulation that required that 
all collective bargaining be negotiated through the GTUC. Unions are 
dissatisfied with a provision granting the Ministry of Finance veto 
power over wage contracts negotiated by other ministries. The Chief 
Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor provide 
consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there is no indication that 
it occurs. The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children 
and enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Factories Act and the Employment of Young Persons and 
Children Act set out minimum age requirements for employment of 
children. Legally, no person under age 14 may be employed in any 
industrial undertaking and no person under age 16 may be employed at 
night, except under regulated circumstances. The law permits children 
under age 14 to be employed only in enterprises in which members of the 
same family are employed. However, it is common to see very young 
children engaged in street trading in the capital. While cognizant of 
the situation, the Ministry of Labor does not employ sufficient 
inspectors to enforce existing laws effectively. According to UNICEF, 
child labor in the informal sector is a problem, as is the practice of 
teenage girls trading sexual favors for money (see Section 5). The 
Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children and enforces 
this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Act and the Wages 
Councils Act allow the Labor Minister to set minimum wages for various 
categories of private employers. However, there is no legislated 
private sector minimum wage. As a result of the civil service 
arbitration ruling in 1999 (see Section 6.a.), the minimum public 
sector wage increased to $104 (G$19,000) per month. Although 
enforcement mechanisms exist, it is difficult to put them into 
practice, and unorganized workers, particularly women and children in 
the informal private sector, often are paid less than what is required 
legally. The legal minimum wage for the public sector is insufficient 
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    The Shops Act and the Factories Act set hours of employment, which 
vary by industry and sector. In general work in excess of an 8-hour day 
or a 44-hour week requires payment of an overtime rate. However, if the 
initial contract stipulates a 48-hour workweek, then the overtime rate 
applies only for hours worked in excess of 48 hours. The law does not 
require at least a 24-hour rest period each week.
    The Factories Act also establishes workplace safety and health 
standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry 
of Labor is charged with conducting factory inspections and 
investigating complaints of substandard workplace conditions. As with 
its other responsibilities, inadequate resources prevented the Ministry 
from effectively carrying out this function. Workers cannot remove 
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, and there were occasional reports of 
trafficking in persons of Chinese and South Asian origin, who would 
immigrate illegally to the United States under conditions amounting to 
debt bondage. Persons providing fraudulent documents for the purpose of 
facilitating illegal immigration can be charged with obtaining money 
under false pretenses, which carries a small fine and a 6-month prison 
sentence. Some fraud cases were prosecuted during the year.
                               __________

                                 HAITI

    Haiti is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral 
legislature; although the 1987 Constitution remained in force, the 
failure to hold legislative elections left the country without a 
functioning legislature for over 3 years. The terms of office of the 
House of Deputies and most of the Senate expired on January 11, 1999; 
however, elections were not held until May 21, 2000. Parliament was not 
in session during that period. President Rene Preval, Prime Minister 
Jacques Edouard Alexis, and a cabinet governed during the year. The 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), formed in March 1999, delayed the 
local and parliamentary elections five times. After first-round 
elections were held in May, the CEP adopted a methodology that gave 
outright victory to candidates from the ruling Fanmi Lavalas (FL) 
party. Opposition parties and the international community objected to 
the CEP's method for tabulating votes and refused to recognize the new 
Parliament, which was sworn in on August 28. After CEP president Leon 
Manus refused to certify the results, he received death threats and 
subsequently fled the country. Two other CEP members also resigned in 
protest over the tabulation method. In a highly controversial move, 
President Preval replaced the three CEP members with FL loyalists on 
July 2. This now controversial CEP, whose mandate was expanded in 
August to include presidential elections, held presidential elections 
on November 26. Opposition parties refused to participate and the 
international community refused to support or certify the presidential 
elections because the controversy over the May 21 elections was not 
resolved. The opposition demanded the formation of a new CEP, 
resolution of the May 21 elections disputes, and security guarantees 
for future elections. On November 30, the CEP announced that Jean-
Bertrand Aristide had won 91.5 percent of the vote in the November 26 
presidential elections and proclaimed him the winner. However, 
controversy continued over voter turnout claims. The CEP announced a 
nationwide voter turnout rate of 60.5 percent. Other observers, 
including the opposition and local and international media, estimated 
voter turnout between 5 percent and 20 percent. The judiciary is 
theoretically independent; however, it is not independent in practice 
and remained largely weak and corrupt, and there were allegations that 
the executive branch interfered in politically sensitive cases.
    In September 1994, a U.N.-sanctioned multinational force restored 
the country's democratically elected president. The Armed Forces of 
Haiti (FAd'H) subsequently were disbanded. At that time, the Government 
established the Haitian National Police (HNP). Despite substantive 
international assistance and some notable progress, the HNP remains a 
fledgling institution with inadequate resources. It still grapples with 
corruption; the presence of human rights abusers within its ranks and 
attrition are serious problems. Allegations of corruption, 
incompetence, and narcotics trafficking are leveled against members at 
all levels of the force, which now numbers between 3,000 and 3,500 
officers for a population well in excess of 8 million. The HNP has a 
variety of specialized units, including a crisis response unit (SWAT), 
a crowd control unit (CIMO) serving Port-au-Prince and the Western 
department, crowd control units (UDMO's) serving each of the remaining 
eight departments, a presidential and security unit, a small Coast 
Guard unit, and a Special Investigative Unit (SIU), formed to 
investigate high-profile political killings. The SIU is no longer ill-
equipped and inexperienced; however, it lacks a mandate from the 
country's political leaders. It is making progress on some cases. Some 
members of local government councils (CASEC's) exercise arrest 
authority without legal sanction. Members of the HNP and other security 
forces continued to commit serious human rights abuses, although less 
so than in 1999.
    Both the mandates of the U.N. Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and 
of the U.N./Organization of American States (OAS) International 
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) have expired. The International 
Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH) began operations in March 
with a limited mandate, largely dedicated to technical training. Its 
mandate is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. The departure of 
MICIVIH removed an objective monitor of the HNP, thereby making the 
compilation of human rights abuse statistics very difficult.
    Haiti is an extremely poor country, with a per capita income of 
around $400. This figure probably does not fully include significant 
remittances from the over 1 million Haitians living abroad, as well as 
income from informal sector activities that constitute an estimated 70 
percent of actual economic activity. The country has a market-based 
economy with state enterprises controlling utilities. Aside from the 
sale of two previously closed enterprises, the privatization of state-
owned enterprises has come to a halt. A small elite controls much of 
the country's wealth. Accurate employment statistics are unavailable. 
About two-thirds of the population work in subsistence agriculture, 
earn less than the average income, and live in extreme poverty. A small 
part of the urban labor force (approximately 20,000 persons) works in 
the industrial and assembly sectors, with an equal number in government 
or service sector employment. Assembled goods, textiles, leather goods, 
handicrafts, and electronics are sources of limited export revenue and 
employment. Other important exports are mangoes and coffee. The country 
is heavily dependent on international assistance, especially 
remittances from expatriates. It imports basic foodstuffs, including 
rice and sugar. The economic situation worsened perceptibly during the 
year. Political instability, deficit financing, depreciation of the 
gourde, and the world fuel price increase contributed to the country's 
severe economic problems. Episodes of sharp gourde depreciation in 
September-October, combined with a fuel price increase, resulted in 
high costs for import-dependent business enterprises, prices for food 
and consumer goods remained high at year's end. The International 
Monetary Fund estimated the increase in inflation from 1999 in October 
at 18 percent.
    The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and its 
overall effort to respect the human rights of its citizens was marred 
by serious abuses and shortcomings in oversight. Contrary to the 
previous year, there were no credible allegations of extrajudicial 
killing or disappearance. There were several politically motivated 
killings during the year. The HNP continued to beat, torture, and 
otherwise mistreat detainees. Methodical investigations by the HNP are 
rare, and impunity remains a problem. Very poor prison conditions, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged pretrial detention 
continue to be problems. Many criminal deportees who already served 
full sentences overseas are put back in jail for indefinite periods of 
time. The judiciary remained understaffed and underfunded; judges are 
corrupt and untrained. Judicial dockets are clogged, and fair and 
expeditious trials are the exception rather than the rule. The 
judiciary is not independent in practice; however, the completion of 
the Carrefour-Feuilles and Raboteau trials were signs of improvement. 
Security forces carried out illegal warrantless searches. Popular 
organization militants and members of the HNP increased their 
harassment of political parties, especially the opposition, during and 
after the May legislative elections. Opposition candidates were 
arrested, beaten, shot, and sometimes killed. Some opposition party 
offices were burned or otherwise destroyed. Most media practice some 
form of self-censorship, although they are frequently critical of the 
Government. Violence and societal discrimination against women, and 
government neglect and abuse of children remain problems. Some 
government leaders directed their rhetoric against the mulatto segment 
of society. The practice of rural families sending young children to 
the larger cities to work as unpaid domestics (restaveks) is still a 
problem. Child labor persists. Vigilante activity, including killings, 
remained a common alternative to formal judicial processes.
    The Government made some progress in fighting police impunity and 
in addressing the legacy of human rights abuse from the 1991-94 period. 
On September 29, the trial of former soldiers involved in the 1994 
Raboteau massacre began. On November 10, the court found 16 of the 22 
defendants guilty and acquitted 6. The judge sentenced 12 to life 
imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years' 
imprisonment. On September 11, a jury found 4 police officers, 
including former police chief Jean Coles Rameau, guilty for their role 
in the murder of 11 civilians in the Carrefour-Feuilles section of 
Port-au-Prince on May 28, 1999. The judge sentenced the defendants to 3 
years' imprisonment each.

                        RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
						
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
credible reports of extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP; 
however, it is very difficult to obtain reliable statistics in this 
regard because the mandate of MICIVIH has expired. Its successor, the 
International Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH), has a much 
more limited mission that does not include compiling statistics on 
human rights abuses. However, there were political killings during the 
year.
    On January 11, a crowd chased HNP and U.N. CIVPOL officers into the 
Fort Liberte Commissariat after police rescued one of two thieves 
caught by the local populace seeking to lynch them. The second thief 
was beheaded. One 14-year-old was shot and subsequently died. The 
source of the bullet is unknown.
    There were politically motivated killings during the year. On March 
27, unknown persons killed Popular Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi 
in the La Saline area of Port-au-Prince. Following discovery of his 
body, the crowd lynched one individual suspected of involvement in the 
killing; five others were wounded in the confrontation. Samedi's murder 
led to further street violence later in the week, during which two 
persons were killed and at least three others, including a police 
officer, were wounded. On March 28, Legitime Annis, a local opposition 
party coordinator, and his wife were murdered at their home in Petit-
Goave. On March 29, Ferdinand Dorvil, campaign manager for an 
opposition Senate candidate from Grand Riviere du Nord, was dragged 
from his home, shot, and killed. On April 10, Merilus Deus, opposition 
candidate in Savanette, was murdered, and his daughter was injured. The 
HNP investigated these murders as politically motivated incidents.
    On April 3, unknown gunmen shot popular radio host and director 
general of Radio Inter Jean Leopold Dominique, known for his criticism 
of the Government and of former coup leaders (see Section 2.a.). For 
weeks before the attack, Radio Inter employees had received threatening 
phone calls. On April 8, following Dominique's funeral, a gang of 
approximately 25 persons burned the office of the KID party to the 
ground while police watched. The HNP is treating the case as a 
politically motivated killing. The investigation was still open at 
year's end. Two arrests were made in this case; one man was released 
while the other, a former policeman, was still in custody at year's 
end. In September Jean-Senat Fleury, a respected judge known for his 
impartiality, was removed by the Minister of Justice from investigating 
the case. The grounds for his removal were unclear. In November the 
Minister named a new prosecutor, Claduy Gassant, who began calling 
witnesses, including high ranking HNP officials and FL politicians.
    On May 12, Branor Simon, the campaign coordinator for a local 
opposition candidate in Grand'Anse department, was shot and killed. His 
murder credibly is believed to be politically motivated. On May 21, two 
election-related deaths were reported in Croix de Bouquets, a suburb of 
Port-au-Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an 
altercation away from a polling booth. Police were cooperating with the 
investigation at year's end.
    On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured and 
killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of a local nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) called Fonkoze (see Section 4).
    Two prominent killings in 1999 remain unresolved. No arrests have 
been made in the October 1999 killing of Jean Lamy, an unofficial 
advisor to the HNP and longtime political ally of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide or in the March 1999 killing of opposition Senator 
Yvon Toussaint.
    On September 11, a court found 4 of 6 police officers guilty for 
their role in the summary execution of 11 civilians in the Port-au-
Prince suburb of Carrefour-Feuilles on May 28, 1999. The judge 
sentenced each to 3 years' imprisonment.
    On September 29, 22 former members of the military went on trial 
for taking part in the 1994 Raboteau massacre. On November 11, the jury 
found 16 of the defendants guilty. The judge sentenced 12 defendants to 
life imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years 
imprisonment.
    In 1995 Claudette Gourdet Saint Albin was convicted in absentia of 
the September 1993 murder of Antoine Izmery. When in April the SIU 
attempted to arrest her, the judicial police presented a 1998 document 
acquitting her. There has been no further movement on the Gourdet/
Izmery case.
    The Government has focused its efforts on investigations into 
political killings that happened before the 1994 return of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, e.g. Raboteau, Cite Soleil. Little progress has been 
made in the investigations of political killings after 1994, with the 
exception of the Carrefour-Feuilles trial. Judges assigned to 
politically sensitive cases complained about interference by the 
executive branch of the Government.
    There was little movement on the investigation into the 1993 
massacre of residents of Cite Soleil, a Port-au-Prince slum, by members 
of the FAd'H and its allied paramilitary group, Revolutionary Front for 
the Advancement and Progress of Haiti. In November 1999, 23 arrest 
warrants were issued; however, soon afterwards, Minister of Justice 
LeBlanc terminated the employment of the judge on grounds of 
corruption, leaving the 4-year-old case without a judge with 
institutional knowledge of the case. By year's end, no arrests had been 
made; however, a new judge was appointed in the late summer.
    Extrajudicial killings often take the form of vigilante actions. In 
general, such incidents occurred without official complicity, 
especially in rural areas where there is little or no police presence, 
the populace routinely resorts to vigilante actions in the absence of 
reliable means of legal redress. In November the Prime Minister called 
for the reappearance of vigilante brigades, and several began to 
operate. Angry mobs often kill suspected thieves, bandits, murderers, 
rapists, and sorcerers, usually by assault with machetes, stoning, 
beating, or burning. The HNP tried to prevent instances of vigilante 
justice in at least two cases in Port-au-Prince.
    On March 30, a mob attacked and severely injured a murder suspect 
in Port-au-Prince who had just been arrested by the HNP. The suspect 
was in police custody when he was attacked. The HNP did not provide 
adequate security but instead drove the suspect through downtown Port-
au-Prince in the back of a pick-up truck, despite a large crowd which 
had formed.
    In March Amnesty International (AI) released a public statement 
expressing concern about reports of politically motivated violent 
street demonstrations by individuals said to be calling for, among 
other demands, the resignation of the Provisional Electoral Council. On 
March 27 and 28, demonstrators, some of whom claimed ties to the Fanmi 
Lavalas party, set fire to tires at barricades around Port-au-Prince. 
The central market was burned. A police officer in civilian clothes was 
shot twice at close range. Local television broadcast a report that a 
9-year-old child had been shot and killed in the protests. Local police 
response was sporadic and limited; at least six persons were killed and 
many wounded. On March 29, Constitution Day, the violence continued in 
and around Port-au-Prince. FL supporters threatened Espace de 
Concertation party marchers. An opposition party organizer Legitime 
Adis and his wife were shot in their Petit Goave home.
    Prison administrators and international human rights observers 
report a high number of deaths in prison (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports of politically 
motivated disappearances.
    On April 27, Claudy Myrthil, the Espace de Concertation candidate 
for the post of Delegue de Ville in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of 
Martissant was abducted from his home by unknown persons and held 
captive for 10 days. It is not clear whether his abduction was 
politically motivated.
    In June 1999, recent skeletal human remains were found at Titanyen 
(near Croix des Missions), an area that often had served as a dumping 
ground for bodies of victims of political killings during the Duvalier 
and military eras. The HNP's forensic unit removed the remains with the 
assistance of foreign experts. Preliminary findings link some of the 
remains with an April 1999 incident in which HNP officers allegedly 
arrested eight teenage associates of the gang leader, Hypolite Elysee, 
whom HNP agents killed in April. Despite the efforts of their families 
to find them at police stations, prisons, and the morgue the youths 
were not located. The HNP opened an investigation into the case in 
June; at year's end the investigation remained open.
    c. Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1987 Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary 
force or restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the 
security forces; however, members of the security forces continue to 
violate these provisions. Police officers used excessive--and sometimes 
deadly--force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and 
rarely were punished for such acts. Police frequently beat suspects. 
Torture and other forms of abuse are pervasive.
    On July 6, members of the HNP questioned, beat, and tortured a 
journalist and businesswoman at her home for 2 hours (see Section 
2.a.).
    According to an opposition political party leader, on July 12, a 
police commando unit led by Mayor-elect Willo Joseph and local HNP 
Commissioner M. Jose rounded up and beat seven Espace leaders in 
Maissade. They were taken to neighboring Hinche where police 
authorities imprisoned them. The authorities stated that they were 
arrested for ``setting houses on fire.'' One of the detained persons 
was dragged through the streets of Maissade by a rope attached to his 
neck.
    According to Marc-Antoine Destin, president of the Confederation of 
Haitian Workers (CTH), on February 22, HNP officers led by Joanna 
Lunday, a local judge, kicked and beat a group of about 20 CTH 
officials at their headquarters in Petionville. Four CTH officials were 
arrested (see Section 6.a.). They were not charged with any crime, and 
were later released. The officers and judge have not been disciplined.
    Police mistreatment of suspects at both the time of arrest and 
during detention remains pervasive in all parts of the country. Beating 
with fists, sticks, and belts is by far the most common form of abuse. 
However, international organizations documented other forms of 
mistreatment, such as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, and 
kalot marassa (severe boxing of the ears, which can result in eardrum 
damage). Those who reported such abuse often had visible injuries 
consistent with the alleged maltreatment. There were also isolated 
allegations of torture by electric shock. Mistreatment also takes the 
form of withholding medical treatment from injured jail inmates. Police 
almost never are prosecuted for the abuse of detainees.
    There were isolated credible allegations of excessive force on the 
part of the CIMO and UDMO crowd control forces.
    The Government's record of disciplining police officers implicated 
in these offenses is mixed. More often the HNP simply fires officers 
caught in flagrant abuses. The Government prosecuted six HNP officers 
during the year, and four received a sentence of 3 years in the 
Carrefour-Feuilles trial (see Section 1.a.). There are some HNP 
officers in prison for other offenses, although no exact figures were 
available at year's end. More than 800 officers have been removed since 
1996. The lack of an Inspector General's office within the HNP 
significantly contributes to a problem with discipline.
    There were sporadic instances of brutality on the part of local 
officials exercising unauthorized law enforcement functions. Especially 
in rural areas, brutality is perpetrated by members and agents of 
CASEC's (administrative councils of communal sections), who tend to 
assume illegally a law enforcement role in the absence of a regular 
police presence.
    A Committee to Judge Jean Claude Duvalier lobbied the French 
Government for his return to the country. Early in the year, they filed 
a complaint in a French court asking for his return, but the court 
dismissed their motion. The group was in the process of appealing this 
decision at year's end.
    Prison conditions remained very poor. The Penitentiary 
Administration Management (DAP), with the support of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), struggled to improve conditions in 
the country's prisons. Prisoners and detainees, held in overcrowded and 
inadequate facilities, continued to suffer from a lack of basic 
hygiene, poor quality health care, and 24-hour confinement to cells in 
some facilities. Several prisons experienced water shortages. As of 
August, the country's 19 prisons held 4,219 prisoners, an increase of 
about 350 persons compared with 1999.
    The prison system continued to experience food shortages. Prison 
administrators and international human rights observers report a high 
number of deaths in prison. No official statistics are available; 
however, prison administrators report that in the month of November 
alone, at least 10 deaths were reported--5 attributable to 
malnutrition, 2 or 3 to AIDS, and the remainder to other causes. 
International human rights observers report that the number of deaths 
attributable to malnutrition rose significantly at year's end. Many 
prisons were only able to supply one (as opposed to the required two) 
meals a day to inmates. Most severely affected were inmates whose diet 
was not supplemented by food brought by family members. Even in those 
prisons where two meals were supplied, the food routinely lacked the 
minimum nutrients established by international standards; many 
prisoners were malnourished.
    The ICRC manages a number of humanitarian programs to improve 
living conditions within the prison system. It pays for prescriptions 
not available in the prison pharmacies. On a quarterly basis, the ICRC 
distributes basic hygiene supplies to the prisons, including soap, 
bleach, brooms, mops, paper towels, and disinfectants. The ICRC also 
provides funding on an as needed basis to clear the prison septic tanks 
and renovate prison bathrooms, showers, and water pumps. The ICRC also 
donates reading material, sewing machines, wood and other items to help 
prisoners pass the time.
    The DAP is plagued by budgetary and management problems. The prison 
system still operates on the same budget as in 1995. Even when the 
administration manages to purchase enough food for all the prisoners, 
they experience difficulties in delivering the food to the 19 prisons. 
The prison administration does not have a delivery system, so it is up 
to the individual prison inspectors to go to the main warehouse and 
carry out as much food as they can fit in a taxi or local bus. The 
central warehouse also lacks a control mechanism to ensure that each 
prison is getting its fair share.
    In the past, when the authorities received Haitian citizens 
deported from other countries for having committed crimes, they were 
processed in 1 week and then released. However, since March 24, 
criminal deportees who already have served sentences outside the 
country are kept in jail, with no timetable for their eventual release. 
Prosecutor August Brutus said that ``preventive measures'' are being 
taken to prevent the ``bandits'' from increasing the level of 
insecurity and crime in the country.
    Health care services offered to inmates is improving slowly. 
However, most of the nurses do not receive adequate training. All 
receive a minimal 3-month training course before beginning work; 
however, of the system's 60 nurses, at most 5 have completed the 3-year 
course of instruction necessary to obtain full certification as 
registered nurses. In October 1999, a new Chief Physician was 
appointed. He instituted monthly meetings of all the prison healthcare 
professionals. Every prison has a dispensary, none have hospitals. Only 
the National Penitentiary has a nurse on duty 24 hours a day. The 
common sicknesses after malnutrition are skin problems, tuberculosis, 
and AIDS. In the capital, doctors are available; however this is not 
always the case in the provinces. The nurses do not conduct daily 
checkups on the physical condition of the prisoners; the prisoners must 
first ask and then receive permission to visit the nurse. The 
dispensaries have a limited supply of medication. If the needed 
medication is not available through the dispensary, family members must 
provide it, or in cases when there are no relatives, the ICRC provides 
funding for the medication on a routine basis in the capital and on a 
quarterly basis in the provinces.
    Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince is the only prison facility 
expressly for women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women 
are housed in cells separate from the men. However, overcrowding often 
prevents strict separation of juveniles from adults, convicts from 
those in pretrial detention, or violent from nonviolent prisoners. Many 
prisoners were held in police holding cells, particularly in the 
provinces. The National Penitentiary is the only prison originally 
constructed for use as a prison; all other prisons are former police 
holding cells.
    International human rights observers and prison officials admit 
that there are instances of abuse by prison personnel against 
prisoners; however, no statistics were available at year's end. Prison 
officials report that prisoners did not file any official complaints 
against prison personnel during the year. However, they also admitted 
that they are aware that abuse occurs because they have heard oral 
reports from prisoners. However, the prisoners are afraid to file an 
official complaint because they fear that the abuse may worsen as a 
result.
    The authorities freely permitted the ICRC, the Haitian Red Cross, 
MICAH, and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police 
stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with medical care, 
food, and legal aid. The Director General of the HNP cooperated with 
MICAH and the ICRC.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution 
stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during the 
commission of a crime, or if a written order by a legally competent 
official such as a justice of the peace or magistrate has been issued. 
These orders cannot be executed between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and 
the authorities must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours 
of arrest. In practice, the authorities frequently ignored these 
provisions. There were instances of arrests by security forces and 
local authorities lacking the authority to do so. In particular, 
arrests by mayors and members of local CASEC's occurred in underpoliced 
rural areas. Occasionally parents ask a judge to imprison a delinquent 
child.
    On July 12, police beat and arrested seven leaders of the Espace de 
Concertation party (see Section 1.c.).
    The requirement that a detainee be brought before a judge within 48 
hours of his arrest was disregarded routinely in certain police 
jurisdictions, according to NGO's. Although the 48-hour rule is 
violated in all parts of the country, it is most often and flagrantly 
ignored in Jeremie, Cap Haitien, Petionville, and the Delmas 
commissariat of Port-au-Prince. Moreover, arrests sometimes are made on 
charges (for example, sorcery or debt) that have no basis in law. The 
authorities also detained some persons on unspecified charges or 
``pending investigation.''
    In 1999 the international community was increasingly troubled by 
the authorities' tendency to detain persons in defiance of valid orders 
for their release issued by judges. MICIVIH expressed ``extreme 
concern'' at these cases, and described the authorities' actions as 
``completely arbitrary and illegal.'' Prisoners with histories of 
opposition to the Government or affiliation with the Duvalier or de 
facto regimes were affected disproportionately by this practice. By 
August about half of those prisoners identified in 1999 had been 
released. By October prisoners still held despite valid release orders 
included Leoncefils Ceance, Esteve Conserve, Calero Vivas Fabien, Jean-
Robert Lherisson, Rilande Louis, Leonard Lucas, Georges Metayer, 
Alexandre Paul, Jean-Michel Richardson, and Jean Enel Samedi.
    As in previous years, the dysfunctional judicial system resulted in 
pervasive prolonged pretrial detentions, with an estimated 80 percent 
of the country's prisoners awaiting trial and a third of them for more 
than one year (see Section 1.e.). The problem is most extreme in Port-
au-Prince. A February 1999 compilation of statistics on these cases by 
MICIVIH showed that of 3,090 prisoners awaiting trial, 1,172 have been 
held for more than 1 year. Of these, 775 had been held between 1 and 2 
years, 287 had been held between 2 and 3 years, and 110 had been held 
for more than 3 years. Sometimes the charges in these lengthy 
detentions are minor. Approximately 98 percent of the female and minors 
in prison are awaiting trial, indicating that the judicial system moves 
even more slowly for women and children (see Section 5).
    In late 1999, Minister of Justice Leblanc announced that resolving 
the problem of prolonged pretrial detention was a high priority; he 
reorganized the Port-au-Prince prosecutor's office and attempted to 
implement a more rigorous schedule for hearings for correctional and 
criminal affairs. The Government had made little progress at year's 
end, as resolution of the problem required thorough judicial reform at 
all levels of the penal process: police, justices of the peace, 
prosecutors, investigating magistrates, trial judges, and prisons (see 
Section 1.e.).
    In Cap-Haitien, the second largest city and largest city in the 
North, the judicial system has improved somewhat, although serious 
human rights violations occur on a routine basis. The Constitution 
prohibits police detention in excess of 48 hours; however, lengthy 
delays are routine. In some cases, detainees in police holding cells 
have been held for more than a month. Those accused of crimes and 
awaiting trial face lengthy delays in reaching trial. In many cases, 
pretrial detainees spend years awaiting trial. Human rights 
organizations note that the average wait before trial has increased 
from 3 to 4 years. Nevertheless, they report that beatings of prisoners 
have decreased in Cap-Haitien and active efforts are being made to 
decrease the lengths of pretrial confinement.
    Police in some instances attacked journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution prohibits the involuntary exile of citizens, and 
there were no reports of its use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice. 
Years of rampant corruption and governmental neglect have left the 
judicial system poorly organized and nearly moribund. The Constitution 
sets varying periods of tenure for judges above the level of justice of 
the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of Justice exercises 
appointment and administrative oversight of the judiciary, prosecutors, 
and court staff. The Ministry of Justice can remove justices of the 
peace and occasionally dismisses judges above this level as well.
    At the lowest level of the justice system, the justices of the 
peace issue warrants, adjudicate minor infractions, mediate cases, take 
depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial 
officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate 
in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges 
of the first instance courts. Appeals court judges hear cases referred 
from the first instance courts, and the Supreme Court deals with 
questions of procedure and constitutionality.
    The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the 
Napoleonic Code; the Criminal Code dates from 1832, although it has 
been amended in some instances. The Constitution provides for the right 
to a fair public trial; however, this right was abridged widely in 
practice. The Constitution also expressly denies police and judicial 
authorities the right to interrogate persons charged with a crime 
unless the suspect has legal counsel or a representative of his of her 
choice present or waives this right; however, this right was abridged 
in practice. While trials are public, most accused persons cannot 
afford legal counsel for interrogation or trial, and the law does not 
require that the Government provide legal representation. Despite the 
efforts of local human rights groups and the international community to 
provide legal aid, many interrogations without counsel occur. During 
actual trials, however, some defendants had access to counsel. 
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to be present 
at trial, to confront witnesses against them, and to present witnesses 
and evidence in their own behalf, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice.
    A shortage of adequately trained and qualified justices of the 
peace, judges and prosecutors, as well as underfunding, among other 
systemic problems, created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with many 
detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a 
court date. Bail is available; however, it is entirely at the 
discretion of the investigative judge (juge d'instruction). Bail 
hearings are not automatic. The attorney for the defendant can make an 
application based upon a specific need, and the judge then decides if a 
conditional release is warranted. This usually is done only in minor 
cases when there is an overwhelming humanitarian reason, such as a need 
for medical attention. In some regions, there are not enough judges to 
hear cases, and judges lack basic resources (such as office space, 
legal reference texts, and supplies) to perform their duties. 
Professional competence is sometimes lacking as well; some judges are 
illiterate. If an accused person ultimately is tried and found 
innocent, there is no redress against the Government for excessive time 
served in detention.
    The Code of Criminal Procedure does not assign clear responsibility 
to investigate crimes and divides the authority for cases among police, 
justices of the peace, prosecutors, and investigative magistrates. 
Examining magistrates often receive files that are empty or are missing 
police reports. Autopsies are conducted only rarely, and autopsy 
reports are even more rare. The code provides for 2 criminal court 
sessions (assizes) per year in each of the 15 first-instance 
jurisdictions, each session generally lasting 2 weeks, to try all major 
crimes requiring a jury trial. During the year, the Port-au-Prince 
jurisdiction--by far the largest in terms of caseload--failed to adhere 
to this stipulation due to difficulties in assembling juries. The first 
criminal assizes since July 1998 occurred in Port-au-Prince in December 
1999. The second was held almost 1 year later in September.
    At least 3 classes of approximately 80 students have graduated from 
the Magistrates School. The school conducted seminars on human rights 
and judicial reform during the year.
    There were no official reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits interference with privacy, 
family, home, or correspondence; however, police and other security 
force elements conducted illegal warrantless searches. In the past 
there were reports that the police arrested family members of wanted 
persons when the suspects themselves could not be found.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government has in the past 
generally respected these rights; however, the Government's respect for 
the press deteriorated during the year. Print and electronic media from 
opposite ends of the political spectrum often criticize the Government. 
However, most media practice self-censorship, wary of offending 
sponsors or the politically influential. After the November 26 
presidential elections, death threats proliferated against media 
figures who questioned the electoral process or outcomes. Although the 
threats were anonymous, the Government did nothing to counter them. 
Three radio station were forced to stop temporarily news programming 
for brief periods in late November and December as a direct result of 
threats against the stations for their coverage of the elections.
    There are two French-language newspapers in the country, Le 
Nouvelliste and Le Matin, with a combined circulation of less than 
20,000 readers. Print media in Creole is limited due to regional 
variations and the lack of a consistent orthography; however, many 
newspapers include a page of news in Creole. Both daily newspapers are 
frequently critical of government policies.
    The written press is beyond the reach of many citizens, due to 
language differences, illiteracy, and cost. The literacy rate is only 
about 20 percent, and broadcast media, especially Creole-language 
radio, have a preeminent importance. Although most radio stations and 
other forms of telecommunications are nominally independent, they are 
subject to a 1997 law that names the State as the sole owner and 
proprietor of all telecommunications media. Members of the press 
believe that the Government refuses to sign the Chapultepec Convention 
(on freedom of expression) because the Convention prohibits government 
monopolies of the media, which would be in direct violation of the 1977 
law. The State leases the right to broadcast to private enterprises but 
maintains the right to repossess the airwaves as it sees fit.
    Over 200 private radio stations exist, including about 40 in the 
capital alone. Most stations carry a mix of music, news, and talk show 
programs, which many citizens regard as their only opportunity to speak 
out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues. Uncensored 
foreign satellite television is available; however, its impact is 
limited, as most persons cannot afford access to television. Broadcast 
media freely express a wide range of political viewpoints.
    Credible reports indicate that the Government's inability or 
unwillingness to provide adequate security to media outlets and 
prominent members of the press has contributed to an increased 
sentiment of vulnerability among those members of the press who 
criticize the Government or Fanmi Lavalas.
    According to employees of Radio Metropole, on February 11, Prime 
Minister Alexis publicly criticized the station for its coverage of 
rightwing leader Claude Raymond's death while in prison; however, none 
of the reported items were inaccurate.
    On April 3, unknown persons killed radio commentator Jean Leopold 
Dominique and a security guard (see Section 1.a.).
    On December 15 two youths killed sports broadcaster Geral Denoze; 
the motive remained unknown at year's end.
    Numerous anonymous death threats have been directed at journalists 
by name, including the entire news staff of Radio Vision 2000, which is 
known for its opposition to the Government. On April 5, Radio Vision 
2000 journalists sent a signed letter to Justice Minister Camille 
Leblanc, in which they described ``daily threats against their lives.'' 
They asked the Minister to ensure security for the radio staff and 
building. Following Jean Leopold Dominique's funeral on April 8, a 
group of at least 100 persons massed outside the station, threatening 
to attack it. The CIMO dispersed the crowd. A few days after 
Dominique's murder, Daly Valet, a Radio Vision 2000 journalist, went 
into hiding after receiving frequent and credible death threats. He 
fled the country. In June heavily armed, hooded men painted slogans on 
the wall of the station and threatened newsroom employees. In face of 
threats, Radio Galaxie suspended its news service the day after the 
November 26 elections. That same day Radio Vision 2000 joined Radio 
Galaxie in suspending its service following the receipt of threats. 
Radio Caraibes shut down its news service on December 23, after 
receiving threats to the station and personnel.
    On April 4, hooded, armed men attacked the Radio Unite station in 
Artibonite province. They stole transmitters and destroyed much of the 
recording studios and electrical installations.
    According to employees of Radio Echo 2000 in Petit Goave, on April 
5, a group of armed men entered the station and threatened to burn the 
station down and kill the employees if they did not cease broadcasting. 
The police did not respond. In March a group of bandits beat one of the 
journalists, Elyse Sincere.
    On April 17, presidential staff employee and information officer 
Guy Delva organized a march ``to protest attacks against freedom of the 
press,'' coercing independent media to take part or else be stigmatized 
as antigovernment agitators. He also pressured news directors by 
telephone to cease broadcasting on April 17, lest they be branded as 
opponents of the event. Radio news sections sent representatives to the 
march in small numbers to avoid open defiance, but all refused to shut 
down their programming on April 17.
    In May unknown persons destroyed radio and television stations in 
Petit-Goave.
    In June a private radio station, Horizon PM, issued an open 
nationwide alert, noting that its editor and several of its employees 
had received anonymous verbal threats.
    In August unknown persons hurled a fragmentation grenade at the 
National Television Building in Port-au-Prince. No one was injured.
    On August 22, agents from TeleTimoun, the television station wholly 
owned by the FL, entered and offered the news staff quadrupled 
salaries, connected cell phones, and freedom from fear of future 
harassment to those Telemax employees who accepted the offer. All but 
one person accepted. The Telemax news service, previously the country's 
most objective and technically advanced, subsequently was staffed with 
Lavalas supporters and objective reporting ceased.
    Foreign journalists generally circulated without hindrance from the 
authorities; however, in July police questioned, beat, and tortured a 
dual national journalist in her home (see Section 1.c.). The journalist 
identified the officers from a police line-up. The police commissioner 
who orchestrated the event was fired on other charges not related to 
this incident. At year's end, the Government had not apprehended, 
charged, or disciplined the officers, even though the victim had 
identified them.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities generally respect 
this right in practice. In general, a variety of organizations were 
able to exercise this right without hindrance throughout the year. For 
example, on September 18, about 6,000 members of the Papaye Peasants' 
Movement marched from the central plateau town of Papaye to Hinche in 
an anti-Lavalas demonstration. According to observers, the police 
played a passive role, except at one point intervening to separate the 
demonstrators from pro-Lavalas supporters, and there was no 
confrontation.
    However, in several instances police inaction allowed organized 
political militants to violate the right of freedom of assembly in 
practice, and there were numerous violent political demonstrations (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Olivier Nadal, former president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, 
reported to the press that he and his family had received death 
threats, and that they had fled the country. He also had been 
threatened with arrest. Nadal was the organizer of a May 1999 rally of 
entrepreneurs, which was broken up by a band of unknown persons while 
the police stood by and did not intervene.
    A peaceful, well-publicized demonstration scheduled for August 29 
in Cap Haitien by the opposition Convergence Group never took place. 
According to local press reports, the Convergence Group decided to 
avoid confrontation with members of the pro-Lavalas OP, who moved into 
the area of the Cap Haitien Cathedral chanting antiopposition slogans.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to 
practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not 
disturb law and order, and the Government respects this right is 
practice.
    In many respects, Roman Catholicism retains its traditional primacy 
among the country's religions although Protestant denominations 
(primarily Methodist and Baptist) have overtaken the Catholic Church in 
numbers of members. Voodoo, a traditional religion derived in part from 
West African beliefs, is practiced alongside Christianity by a large 
segment of the population. While there are associations of voodoo 
practitioners and priests, there is no organized hierarchy or 
established voodoo church. Accusations of sorcery, particularly in 
rural areas, have been known to lead to mob violence resulting in 
deaths. Given the prevalence of voodoo in these areas, it appears 
likely that voodoo practitioners are targeted in some cases.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government respects the right of 
freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation.
    An unknown number of undocumented migrants put to sea during the 
year seeking better economic opportunities in other countries. The 
Government operated, with international support, the National Migration 
Office (ONM) to assist citizens involuntarily repatriated from other 
countries, including the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. That 
office stopped providing humanitarian services to involuntarily 
repatriated migrants in June, and in August it stopped meeting and 
processing the migrants. Although the ONM office still exists, it no 
longer provides any services to repatriated migrants but conducts 
training courses. According to the International Organization for 
Migration, the Dominican Republic deports approximately 500 Haitians 
each month across the Border. At the end of August, a mass repatriation 
of approximately 3,000 Haitian nationals took place. There were 
reliable reports of separation of families and maltreatment of Haitians 
by Dominican soldiers during this period, as had been the case in 1999.
    The Government has no policy regarding foreign nationals seeking 
refuge or asylum from third countries. The question of provision of 
first asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return 
of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for regular elections for local and 
parliamentary offices and for the presidency. Rene Preval, who was 
elected in 1995 in an election regarded by the international community 
as free and fair, continued in office during the year. On May 21, a 
first round of long overdue senatorial, legislative, and municipal 
elections to fill vacant posts took place after repeated postponements. 
The CEP manipulated the results by its choice of a methodology for 
calculating the percentages in determining senate seats, by the faulty 
transmission of results, and by the arbitrary treatment of challenges 
which had an impact on the results of several races. A continuing 
standoff through the rest of the year between the Government and 
opposition parties led to an opposition boycott of a second round of 
legislative elections in July and of the November 26 elections for 
president and remaining Senate seats. Elections to replace President 
Preval took place as scheduled on November 26.
    The country's constitutional crisis continued through the first 
half of the year. The crisis began with the flawed local and 
parliamentary elections of April 1997 and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth's 
subsequent resignation. A stalemate between the President and 
Parliament continued through January 11, 1999, when the terms of office 
of the entire 85-seat House of Deputies and of all but 9 of the 27 
members of Senate expired. In March 1999, President Preval negotiated 
an agreement with a coalition of five small opposition parties to form 
a Provisional Electoral Council to organize the overdue local and 
parliamentary elections. After many delays, these were fixed for May 
21, with a second round on July 9.
    There were scattered acts of violence in the months leading up to 
the election, as well as several politically motivated killings during 
the year (see Section 1.a.). On March 11, supporters of the ruling 
Fanmi Lavalas' candidate for deputy in the Delmas region physically 
attacked Serge Auguste, an opposition candidate. On March 17, Marie 
Laurence Jocelyn Lassegue, an opposition candidate running for Senate, 
was shot and injured while campaigning. On March 20, two men shot and 
injured Marcel Fils, an opposition party coordinator, in downtown Port-
au-Prince. On March 27, unknown persons killed progovernment Popular 
Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi in the La Saline area of Port-au-
Prince. Samedi's murder led to further street violence later in the 
week, during which two persons were killed and at least three others, 
including a police officer, were wounded (see Section 1.a.). The HNP 
investigated their murders as politically motivated incidents.
    Opposition leaders reported that while they participated in a 
proconstitution march on March 29, seven hostile FL supporters attacked 
them, shouting ``Aristide or death,'' and other threats. The attackers 
brandished pistols and threw stones and one Molotov cocktail.
    AI reported that a group of armed men attacked members of an 
opposition party as they handed out pamphlets in Port-au-Prince on 
March 29. On April 3, noted journalist Jean Leopold Dominique and one 
of his guards were shot and killed (see Section 1.a.). On April 4, 
Merilus Deus, an opposition senatorial candidate in Savanette was 
murdered (see Section 1.a.); the deputy candidate went into hiding. On 
April 6, the Grand'Anse BED legal adviser reported that several 
individuals forced their way into his house, dragged out his personal 
property and burned it. There was no sign of the HNP during this 
incident. On April 8, a group of pro-FL militants attacked and burned 
the headquarters of an opposition party. The FL denied involvement 
despite several credible reports that its supporters were responsible 
for the attack. On April 9, two regional opposition offices in Achaie 
and Aquin were burned and destroyed. On April 19, an opposition 
candidate for local office in suburban Port-au-Prince allegedly was 
kidnaped, but reappeared unharmed on May 3.
    On May 21, about 60 percent of the country's 4 million registered 
voters went to the polls to select from some 29,000 candidates for 
11,000 local and national posts. International and domestic observers 
agreed that despite some scattered irregularities (polling booth 
intimidation, ballot stuffing, and publication of voting results before 
polling booths were closed), the elections were generally free and 
fair. Two election-related deaths were reported in a suburb of Port-au-
Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an 
altercation away from a polling booth. On May 22, the HNP arrested and 
charged Paul Denis, an opposition party leader and former senator, for 
possession of illegal weapons. He later was released amidst allegations 
the arrest was motivated politically.
    While the initial voting was generally free and fair, serious 
irregularities in the counting of votes and the computation of winners 
in certain senate races compromised the election. A December report by 
the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded that the voting 
process began to deteriorate after the closing of the polls. For 
example, armed groups stole and burned ballot boxes in the departments 
of the Center, North, and Artibonite. The delivery of voting materials 
(ballots, ballot boxes, pens, ink, and voter registration lists) in 
Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien was chaotic and a substantial number of 
these materials may have been lost. The election controversy became 
serious with the publication of the results of the Senate races. Under 
the Constitution and electoral law, a candidate must receive an 
absolute majority of votes cast in order to be elected in the first 
round of voting. If no candidate receives a majority, a second-round 
runoff is required. The Senate results published by the CEP announced 
that the ruling Fanmi Lavalas party won 16 of the 17 Senate seats in 
the first round. These results were based on what opposition parties 
and independent observers termed a flawed interpretation of both the 
Constitution and the electoral law. Officials only counted votes cast 
for the top four contenders in each Senate race, yielding what both 
international and local observers said were false FL victories. 
Percentages of votes were calculated imprecisely, by using the total of 
votes received by the top four contenders rather than the total of 
votes for all candidates. There were 20 to 30 candidates for Senate in 
each department. CEP President Leon Manus and two other members (all 
representing opposition parties) refused to certify the irregular 
results and resigned their posts. A preliminary evaluation conducted by 
the OAS found that only 9 Senate seats should have been decided in the 
first round, while 10 should have gone to a second round. President 
Preval responded to the three CEP resignations by appointing 
replacement council members loyal to FL, who immediately certified the 
Senate results without addressing the controversial counting method.
    The international community, local civic groups, and opposition 
parties called on the Government to address the controversy. The CEP 
ignored these protests and on July 9, held second-round races for 
deputies. There were no senatorial second-round contests. With an 
almost unanimous boycott by opposition parties and candidates, voter 
turnout for this round was significantly lower than in May, at 
reportedly only 5 percent. All international and most domestic 
observers refused to participate in monitoring the second round.
    Domestic human rights and opposition parties continued to protest 
the election results. Following his resignation, CEP president Leon 
Manus fled the country after being threatened repeatedly. He then 
issued a statement that acknowledged that the methodology used in 
counting votes for the Senate was flawed. On June 15 and 16, bands of 
pro-FL militants shut down metropolitan Port-au-Prince with barricades 
and tire burnings to protest international refusal to certify the 
results. International missions led by the OAS unsuccessfully attempted 
to encourage resolution of the May 21 elections dispute.
    Despite local and international calls not to seat the Parliament 
before resolution of the election controversy, on August 28, Parliament 
was sworn in formally.
    Violence escalated, particularly in Port-au-Prince, during the days 
before the November 26 elections for President and for replacements for 
the remaining nine Senators whose terms would expire in January 2001. 
While some of the violence was attributable to the political situation, 
for which the FL accused the opposition of responsibility and vice-
versa, common crime was undoubtedly the source of many episodes; 
however, the violence contributed to an overall climate of 
intimidation.
    On the evening of November 2, in Hinche heavily armed members of FL 
attacked a meeting being held by opposition political party leader 
Chavannes Jean Baptiste and injured seven persons. A few days later, 
the mayor of Port St. Louis fired shots into a seminar being conducted 
by a respected opposition politician.
    Shootings and robberies became an almost daily occurrence in Port-
au-Prince. On November 3, unidentified persons opened fire on an 
evening rush hour crowd, killed at least five, and wounded several 
others. That same day three bodies were found in another location. On 
November 4 and 5, three more bodies were found in yet another site. 
Also on November 4, at least one person was killed and another gravely 
wounded during a confrontation between rival gangs at another street 
intersection. Ongoing confrontation between rival gangs in the Port-au-
Prince slum of Cite Soleil during the month of November resulted in 
numerous injuries and property damage. In general, the HNP did not 
respond to the confrontations.
    On November 14, a group of approximately 500 pro-FL demonstrators 
rallied peacefully in front of a foreign Embassy to protest 
international pressure on former-President Aristide to bring about a 
negotiated solution to the political stalemate that had developed over 
the May 21 elections. The same day, a drive-by shooting killed one 
person in front of the Le Nouvelliste newspaper offices in downtown 
Port-au-Prince. That evening, residents panicked as unidentified 
persons in a pick up truck drove through several neighborhoods shooting 
at persons (injuring a number of them) and ordering persons off the 
streets.
    On November 15, a clearly marked U.N. vehicle was hit in a drive-by 
shooting in Gonaives. No one was injured.
    On November 22, nine separate explosions occurred in crowded areas 
of Port-au-Prince; the explosions killed two children and left many 
other persons injured. On November 25, marching FL members in Petit 
Goave staged citizen's arrests of several opposition members and 
detained several others. Also on November 25, an attempt was made 
during the evening to burn the communal electoral office (BEC) in 
Ganthiere. Police intervened and were able to save the electoral 
materials, although the building was partially destroyed.
    The international community and most opposition parties refused to 
help or take part in the November 26 presidential elections because of 
the unresolved controversy surrounding the May elections. Due to the 
lack of international observers, the local press monitored the election 
process. Several radio stations were forced to close their news 
operations because of threats (see Section 2.a.).
    The November 26 elections took place amidst heavy police security 
and were characterized by low turnout--accounts vary from the 5 percent 
to 20 percent. Aside from a pipe bomb that exploded in the Port-au-
Prince suburb of Carrefour and the burning of ballots during the 
morning in the city of Anse d'Hainault, the elections generally passed 
without disturbance. With the opposition boycott, former President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide faced only token opposition and was elected to a 
5-year term with a reported 91.5 percent of the votes cast.
    In the days following the November elections, pro and anti 
government violence occurred again in the department of Grand-Anse. In 
the cities of Anse d'Hainault, Cotetaux, and Petite Riviere de Nippes, 
protest and violence led to the deploying of HNP units from Port-au-
Prince, and in the case of Nippes, the Coast Guard, to restore order. 
Throughout the rest of the country, calm generally prevailed.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics 
or government; however, they are underrepresented, and the low status 
of women limits their participation. The Election Law provides that the 
monetary deposit required of female candidates for political office is 
one-half that required of male candidates, if a recognized party 
sponsors them. Three of the 82 deputies are women, and there are 6 
women among the 27 senators.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups generally operate 
without government restrictions; however, threats and intimidation from 
unknown sources continued to increase during the year. Justice Minister 
Leblanc continued to seek dialog with some groups and solicited their 
recommendations on human rights issues such as police impunity and 
prosecution of police and former military suspected of committing human 
rights abuses. The number of groups that monitor human rights has 
grown, as has the scope of those groups; however, most monitoring 
groups are hampered by a lack of resources. Human rights organizations 
increasingly turn to issues that they have not addressed before, 
including prison conditions, the widespread lack of health facilities, 
and impunity for criminals.
    Following the April 3 killing of Jean Leopold Dominique, members of 
the local human rights community, including the National Coalition for 
Haitian Rights (NCHR) and the Platform of Haitian Human Rights 
Organizations rallied in front of the Haiti Inter radio station. Self-
described members of Fanmi Lavalas beat and shot at several 
participants. Riot police were on hand but did not protect the rally 
participants (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured, and 
killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of Fonkoze, a local NGO (see Section 
1.a.). AI and local human rights organizations appealed to the HNP for 
a swift and thorough investigation. The investigation continued, but no 
arrests had been made by year's end.
    There were no arrests or progress made in the investigation of the 
1999 attempted murder of Pierre Esperance, NCHR country director. The 
HNP's investigation remains open but apparently inactive.
    The difficult security climate remained unchanged. Organizations 
such as the NCHR, the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations, 
the Human Rights Fund, and the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights 
reported receiving repeated threats, most of them anonymous.
    The Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC), an autonomous, 
ombudsman-like office provided for by the 1987 Constitution, was 
hampered by a cut in funds due to the Government's budget crisis. The 
OPC is one of the Government's four independent, autonomous 
institutions. Despite budgetary problems, the OPC conducted a number of 
seminars throughout the year, including over 20 seminars in schools, 
some in the Magistrates School, and others at the local and county 
levels of government. In February Dr. Louis Roy, the Director of the 
OPC, appointed Florence Elie to a 4-year term as Deputy Director. Dr. 
Roy was chosen as the Director by a commission of parliamentarians in 
conjunction with the President in 1995. However, his seven-year 
appointment only was ratified by Parliament in 1997.
    The recently seated Parliament created a Justice and Human Rights 
Committee. The chairman of the committee said that his primary goal 
would be the improvement and reform of the judicial system. It is not 
clear whether the committee would also conduct human rights monitoring.
    The mandate of MICIVIH expired on March 15. MICIVIH played a vital 
and successful role in monitoring the human rights situation and in 
promoting adherence to human rights norms by the authorities. The U. N. 
created a new entity, the International Civilian Mission for Support in 
Haiti (MICAH), after MICIVIH's mandate expired. MICAH's mandate began 
in March and is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. This new 
entity is much smaller in size and scope than MICIVIH. MICAH's mandate 
is limited to training in human rights and to conducting civic 
education courses. It does not conduct human rights monitoring.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1987 Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination 
on the grounds of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social 
status. It does provide for equal working conditions regardless of sex, 
beliefs, or marital status. However, there is no effective governmental 
mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions.
    Women.--The law provides penalties for rape and domestic violence; 
however, the authorities do not enforce these provisions adequately. 
According to women's rights groups, rape and other abuse of women is 
common, both within and outside marriage. A 1998 study by the Haitian 
Center for Research and Action for the Promotion of Women documented 
widespread rape and violence against women. The report also found that 
many women do not report these forms of abuse out of fear, shame, or 
lack of confidence in judicial remedies. A 1999 survey by UNICEF of 
violence against women found that 37 percent of women reported being 
victims of sexual violence or reported knowing a woman who had been; 
another 33 percent reported being victims of other types of physical 
abuse. The law excuses a husband if he murders his wife or her lover 
upon catching them in the act of adultery in his home. A wife who kills 
her husband upon discovering him in the act of adultery is not excused. 
The National Commission of Truth and Justice, formed after the 1991-
1994 period of military rule, recommended several improvements to 
existing laws concerning rape and abuse of women, but Parliament 
enacted none of the proposed changes. In January U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy released a 
report based on her June 1999 visit to the country. She noted, among 
other problems, that most women prisoners share living quarters with 
male prisoners, exposing them to violence and sexual abuse (see Section 
1.c.). In 1998 a national coalition of women's organizations met with 
the Ministries of Health, Population, Social Affairs and Women's 
Issues. Three proposed changes to the law were submitted to Parliament; 
by year's end, Parliament had not voted on the proposals. There are no 
government-sponsored programs for victims of violence.
    Sexual harassment of female workers is a problem, especially in the 
assembly sector (see Section 6.b.).
    The Ministry of Women's Affairs is charged with promoting and 
defending the rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal 
status in society, but it has few resources at its disposal and was 
able to accomplish little in this regard.
    The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law; 
however, women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men. 
In some social strata, tradition limits women's roles. Peasant women, 
often the breadwinners for their families, remain largely in the 
traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic labor. Very 
poor urban women, who head their families and serve as their economic 
support, also often find their employment opportunities limited to 
traditional roles in domestic labor and marketing. Laws governing child 
support recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families 
but are rarely enforced. Female employees in private industry or 
service jobs, including government jobs, are seldom promoted to 
supervisory positions. However, welleducated women have occupied 
prominent positions in both the private and public sector in recent 
years. Women's rights groups are small, localized, and receive little 
publicity.
    Children.--The Government's programs do not promote or defend 
children's rights. Government health care and education programs for 
children are inadequate. Malnutrition is a problem. The Government has 
a school nutrition program administered through the Office of National 
Development, with food provided by foreign donors. The Constitution and 
the law provide that primary education be free and compulsory; however, 
in practice access to public schools is the primary obstacle to most 
rural families. Even in public schools there are nominal mandatory fees 
associated with sending a child to school (uniform, books, etc.), and 
these costs are beyond the means of many rural families. One study 
reported that schools are dilapidated and understaffed. An estimated 90 
percent of schools are private, and the costs of school fees, books, 
materials, and uniforms are prohibitive for most families. According to 
the Government, 40 percent of children never attend school, and less 
than 15 percent of those who do graduate from secondary school. Poorer 
families sometimes ration education money to pay school fees for male 
children only. Several international and local NGOs work on children's 
issues.
    Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent 
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called 
``restavek'' (which means ``lives with'' in Creole); families of these 
children frequently received financial compensation (see Sections 6.a., 
6.d., and 6.f.). Most local human rights groups do not report on the 
plight of restavek children as an abuse nor seek to improve their 
situation. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes that it can do 
little to stop this practice, regarding it as economically motivated; 
the Ministry assigned five monitors to oversee the welfare of restavek 
children. Society holds such children in little regard, and the poor 
state of the economy worsened their situation.
    Port-au-Prince's large population of street children includes many 
restaveks who have been sent out of employers' homes or who are 
runaways. There is some anecdotal information indicating that children 
are involved in prostitution or being trafficked.
    The Ministry of Social Affairs is aware of the problem, provides 
some assistance to street children. In 1998-1999 (last available data), 
they assisted 887 children. The Haitian Coalition for the Defense of 
the Rights of the Child (COHADDE) promotes children's rights by 
conducting awareness raising activities. According to COHADDE, children 
work primarily in domesticity (restavek), but some are found working on 
the street, and some are involved in prostitution.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that disabled 
persons shall have the means to ensure their autonomy, education, and 
independence. However, there is no legislation to implement these 
constitutional provisions or to mandate provision of access to 
buildings for the disabled. Although they do not face overt 
mistreatment, given the severe poverty in which most citizens live, 
those with disabilities face a particularly harsh existence. Disabled 
beggars are a familiar sight on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other 
towns.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some 99 percent of Haitians are 
descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who won their war 
of independence from France in 1804. The remaining population is of 
European, Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American origin. The 
law makes no distinction based on race. Longstanding social and 
political animosities often are tied to cultural identification, skin 
color, and overlapping issues of class in this starkly inegalitarian 
society. Some of these animosities date back to before the country's 
revolutionary period.
    Racial distinctions tend to parallel social and economic strata. 
Mulattos, generally belong to the wealthiest classes of society. During 
the year, various political figures, including the President, used 
rhetoric indirectly targeting the mulatto segment of society. Mulattos 
historically have been targets of sporadic attack in many cases because 
they are perceived to be wealthy.
    The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, which is 
spoken by virtually all Haitians; and French, which is spoken by about 
20 percent of the population, including the economic elite. The 
inability to communicate in French long has limited the political and 
economic opportunities available to the majority of the population. The 
Government prepares most documents only in French, and judges conduct 
most legal proceedings exclusively in French. However, Creole is used 
in parliamentary debate in the Lower House of Parliament.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provide for the right of association. An article of the 1987 
Constitution, which supersedes the labor code, gives legal recognition 
to public sector employees. The law protects union activities and 
prohibits a closed shop. The law also requires a union, which must have 
a minimum of 10 members, to register with the Social Affairs Ministry 
within 60 days of its formation in order to obtain legal recognition. 
The labor code does not require prior approval before any association 
is established. The Labor Code stipulates that ``no labor union can be 
formed with less than 10 individuals.'' Article 232 gives unions 60 
days after formation to register with the Office of Personnel 
Management of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
    Unions are independent of the Government and political parties. 
Nine principal labor federations represent about 5 percent of the total 
labor force of approximately 2,800,000 persons, including about 2 to 3 
percent of labor in the industrial sector.
    Teachers went on strike for several months in 1999 because they had 
been promised a 32 percent pay increase, later renounced by the 
Government. The Government denied that public school employees had a 
right to strike, suspended some teachers, and garnished the salaries of 
public school employees who participated in the strike. At year's end, 
19 teachers remained suspended. In October seven teachers, members of 
the CNEH, were reinstated. A total of 77 teachers were given financial 
penalties that amounted to the number of days they were on strike 
multiplied by 1/30 of their gross pay.
    The labor code forbids strikes by public utility service workers. 
Article 209 of the Labor Code defines public utility service employees 
as essential workers who ``cannot suspend their activities without 
causing serious harm to public health and security.'' Managers, 
administrators, and other heads of establishments are not allowed to 
join labor unions and strike.
    In August the Government issued rules governing the public school 
calendar for the 2000-01 academic year. The Ministry of National 
Education moved the opening date back about 3 weeks and reduced the 
number of holidays by 1 day, which added 1 month to the school year; 
teachers unions were not notified prior to the change nor given 
adequate opportunity to bargain prior to implementation. The unions 
criticized this unilateral change as an unfair labor practice and a 
violation of the contract they signed on June 28, 1999. In the wake of 
these confrontations, communication between the unions and the 
Government has been limited. Some unions hope to resurrect negotiations 
through mediators, while others expanded their lawsuit filed in 1999. 
While the school year started on schedule, less than 10 percent of 
students attended classes during the week of September 4. Approximately 
15 percent of students did not return at all.
    On May 15, about 300 technicians of the Government-owned telephone 
company (TELECO) went on a 1-day work stoppage to protest management's 
slow response in addressing employees' concerns regarding reductions of 
employee health insurance and pension benefits. TELECO management paid 
its arrears to the insurance fund, and promised to resume its 
contributions to the pension fund. However, it later dismissed four 
technicians in apparent retaliation.
    On August 7, armed temporary employees walked into the TELECO 
headquarters and demanded the so-called 14th month salary, which is a 
bonus normally paid to full-time employees to pay for school fees. 
Temporary employees are normally not eligible. TELECO's offices in the 
greater Port-au-Prince area remained closed for 2 days, and telephone 
service was reduced. The police took control of the TELECO building and 
its environs to restore order. The bonus was not paid. The protestors 
resumed normal activity after some were fired, and others threatened. 
Using this incident as a pretext, management suspended payment of the 
traditional 1-month bonus to full-time employees paid 1 month before 
the school opening date.
    In August workers at several factories in the Shodecosa Industrial 
Zone protested the minimum wage that they received. More than 40 
workers were fired, and the protest gradually ended.
    On September 11, public transport unions went on strike to protest 
the Government's decision to raise fuel prices. They ended their strike 
the following day. On October 3, public transport unions called for a 
general strike to protest the Government's failure to open a dialog on 
new fuel prices. The strike was not successful; drivers and owners of 
public transportation vehicles did not participate.
    On October 2, the union of the electric company workers conducted a 
one-day sit-in inside the Ministry of justice compound. The Ministry 
promised workers police protection from angry residents while they are 
on the job. The workers were satisfied and returned to work.
    Each of the principal labor federations maintained some fraternal 
relations with various international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for 
those who interfere with this right. No fines were issued during the 
year. Unions generally were free to pursue their goals, although the 
Government made little effort to enforce the law. Union leaders assert 
that some employers in the private industrial sector dismiss 
individuals who participate in union organizing activities. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions brought a complaint to 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) in September 1999, alleging 
that a utility company (Electricite d'Haiti) violated freedom of 
association in 1996 when it dismissed 30 leaders and more than 400 
members of the Federation of Electricity Workers of Haiti, closed trade 
union offices by armed persons, and banned any meetings by trade union 
members in the company. Additional allegations in this case include the 
attempted murder of two trade union officials, and the arrests and 
assaults of other trade union leaders. The ILO had not received a 
response from the Government on these allegations by year's end, and 
the case remained unresolved. According to the current union 
(FESTRED'H) leaders, the 1996 union leaders and workers were dismissed 
permanently. The Government orchestrated a reorganization of the union 
and allowed it to function under new leadership. The workers are not 
fighting actively for reinstatement. Some retired, some left the 
country, and the rest attempted to find employment in other sectors.
    Labor unions reported at least one killing, and several arrests 
during the year. On September 4, Elison Merzilus, a member of the 
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), was taken from his home 
by a group of 10 armed men. He lived in the 7th Section of the Gros-
Morne Commune, in the Artibonite Department. His body was found 2 weeks 
later, in a ravine located in the 8th Section of the Gros-Morne 
Commune. Merzilus was instrumental in forming a women's organization 
affiliated with CATH several days before his disappearance. Around the 
same time, 10 other union members were informed that their names were 
blacklisted and spent several months in hiding.
    On December 19, the authorities arrested Wilson Duverson and Rigaud 
St.-Juste in the commune of Anse-a-Foleur, Northwest Department. They 
were subjected to severe beatings and other harsh treatment. The 
authorities released Duverson on January 8 and released St. Juste on 
January 18. Both are members of the Anse-a-Foleur Workers Organization 
for Recovery (OTRA).
    Several leaders of major Labor Confederation leaders were subjected 
to persistent telephone threats and were given ultimatums to rally 
behind the FL.
    Organized labor activity was concentrated in the Port-au-Prince 
area, in state enterprises, the civil service, and the assembly sector. 
The high unemployment rate and antiunion sentiment among some factory 
workers and most employers limited the success of union organizing 
efforts. The ILO has criticized the law for its failure to include a 
specific provision envisaging protection against antiunion 
discrimination at the time of hiring.
    Collective bargaining continued to be nonexistent, and employers 
set wages unilaterally. The Labor Code does not distinguish between 
industries producing for the local market and those producing for 
export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector enjoyed 
better-than-average wages and benefits. However, frequent verbal abuse 
and intimidation of workers and organizers is a problem in the assembly 
(maquiladora) sector. Female workers in the assembly sector report that 
some employers sexually harass female workers with impunity. Women also 
report that while the vast majority of assembly sector workers are 
female, virtually all the supervisors are men.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor for adults and minors; however, 
while such labor is not known to occur among adults, the Government 
failed to enforce this law for children, who continued to be subjected 
to forced domestic labor as restaveks in urban households under 
conditions that amount to slavery (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum employment age in all sectors is 15 years, 
with the exception of domestic service, where the minimum age is 12 
years of age. The Labor Code prohibits minors from working under 
dangerous conditions, and it prohibits minors under the age of 18 from 
working at night in industrial enterprises. There is also a legal 
provision for employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16 as 
``apprentices.'' Fierce adult competition for jobs ensures that child 
labor is not a factor in the industrial sector; however, children under 
the age of 15 commonly worked at informal sector jobs to supplement 
family income. Children also commonly worked on small family farms 
alongside their parents, even though the high unemployment rate among 
adults keeps children from being employed on commercial farms in 
significant numbers. In these as in many other areas, government 
agencies lack the resources to enforce the relevant laws and 
regulations effectively. The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory 
labor, which applies equally to minors; however, some children are 
forced to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent 
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called 
restavek; families of these children frequently received financial 
compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). A 1991 U.N. study cited this 
practice as an example of slavery in the 20th century. UNICEF estimated 
that 250,000 to 300,000 children, 85 percent of them girls, may be 
victims of this practice. According to a 1998 UNICEF study, the average 
restavek is between 11 and 14 years of age; however, more than 20 
percent are between the ages 4 and 10, and more than 75 percent are 
girls. About 23 percent of these girls are raped by a host family 
member, and 15 percent of them become pregnant. About 77 percent of 
restaveks have never been to school. Among those who have, only 2 
percent reach secondary school. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes 
that many employers compel the children to work long hours, provide 
them with little nourishment, and frequently beat and abuse them. The 
law requires that restaveks 15 years of age and older be paid ``not 
less than one half the amount payable to hired servant'' to perform 
similar work, in addition to room and board. To avoid this obligation, 
employers send many if not most restaveks away from the home before the 
children reach the age of 15.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum daily wage, 
established in June 1995 by the Tripartite Commission of Salaried 
Workers, whose six members are appointed by the President of the 
Republic, (two representatives each of labor, employers, and 
Government), is about $1.52 (36 gourdes). Annually, a minimum wage 
worker would earn about $473, an income above the national average but 
not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. Some workers are paid on a piece-rate basis, and may earn more 
than the minimum wage. The majority of citizens work in subsistence 
agriculture, a sector where minimum wage legislation does not apply. 
Many women work as domestic employees, where minimum wage legislation 
also does not apply.
    The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the 
standard workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24 hours 
of rest on Sunday. However, the officers of the HNP work 12-hour shifts 
6 days per week, in apparent violation of the Labor Code. The code also 
establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The industrial and 
assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. The assembly sector 
published a voluntary code of conduct in April 1999, committing 
signatories to a number of measures designed to raise industry 
standards, including payment of the minimum wage and the prohibition of 
child labor. Employers in the assembly sector generally pay the minimum 
wage or higher amount. However, the real value of the gourde has 
diminished, and workers are no longer satisfied with the minimum wage. 
Working conditions are also generally better in this sector. There are 
no reports of child labor in this sector. However, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs does not enforce work hours or health and safety 
regulations. There is no formal data, but unions allege that job-
related injuries are prevalent in the construction industry and public 
works sectors. With more than 50 percent of the population unemployed, 
workers were not able to exercise the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and internal trafficking of children is a problem. Rural 
families send young children to affluent city dwellers to serve as 
unpaid domestic labor; the families of such restaveks frequently 
receive monetary compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). An estimated 
300,000 children, 75 percent of them girls, may be victims of this 
practice.
    There were no other reports of trafficking to, from, within, or 
through the country. However, there are anecdotal reports on the 
practice of families taking restaveks to Europe and the United States 
to continue using them as domestic servants.
                               __________

                                HONDURAS

    Honduras is a constitutional democracy, with a president and a 
unicameral congress elected for 4-year terms. President Carlos Roberto 
Flores Facusse of the Liberal party took office in January 1998. Since 
the country's return to democracy in 1982, the two major political 
parties, the Liberals and the Nationalists, both have held power after 
free elections. The judiciary is generally independent, but often 
ineffective and subject to outside influence.
    The Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) include the army, the air force, 
and the navy. The national Preventive Police (formerly a paramilitary 
force known as the FUSEP) were placed under civilian control in 1997. 
The police handle public security, counternarcotics, and border patrol 
duties. The Government created a Ministry of Security in 1998 to 
oversee police operations and counter a national crime wave. In 
November the Government authorized the use of joint armed forces and 
police patrols throughout the country to combat rising levels of crime. 
The Government has used the military to patrol the streets seven times 
in the last 6 years. In January 1999, the National Congress ratified a 
constitutional amendment that established direct civilian control over 
the armed forces--through a civilian Minister of Defense--for the first 
time since 1957. The amendment also replaced the position of the armed 
forces commander in chief with that of Chief of the Joint Staff. In 
July 1999, the President replaced the Chief of the Joint Staff, the 
Vice Chief of Staff, and other senior HOAF officers after they sought, 
without prior authorization from the civilian leadership at the Defense 
Ministry, to have the Congress amend a draft organic law to govern the 
HOAF; that action further cemented civilian control of the military. A 
number of versions of the draft law regulating responsibilities between 
the Defense Ministry and the HOAF were debated during the year; at 
year's end, Congress had not passed legislation. Members of the police 
continued to commit human rights abuses.
    The market-based economy is based primarily on agriculture and, 
increasingly, on the important maquiladora (in-bond processing for 
export) industry, which accounts for approximately 130,000 jobs, most 
of which are filled by young women. The HOAF play an indirect, 
diminishing role in the national economy through their pension fund, 
which controls some enterprises usually associated with the private 
sector, including a bank and several insurance companies. About 39 
percent of workers labor in agriculture, with most of the rest in 
industry and manufacturing, commerce, and services. The principal 
export crops are coffee and bananas; these, along with ``value added'' 
income from the maquiladora industry, are the leading sources of 
foreign exchange. Nontraditional products, such as melons, pineapples, 
and shrimp, play a growing role in the economy. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch 
caused widespread flooding and landslides and over $3 billion in 
damage, and led to an economic recession during 1999. Most affected 
export sectors have recovered, and the economy experienced positive 
growth during the year. The Central Bank estimated growth for the year 
at between 5.3 and 5.5 percent. Annual per capita income is 
approximately $800; about two-thirds of the country's households live 
in poverty.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems remained. Members of the security 
forces committed some extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups 
accused the security forces and the business community of colluding to 
organize ``death squads'' to commit extrajudicial killings. Security 
force personnel committed acts of torture, and beat and otherwise 
abused detainees and other persons, including street children. Prison 
conditions remain harsh, lengthy pretrial detention is common, and 
detainees do not always receive due process. Considerable impunity for 
members of the economic and official elite, exacerbated by a weak, 
underfunded, and often corrupt judicial system, contributed to human 
rights problems. Although the civilian courts increasingly considered 
allegations of human rights violations or common crimes against armed 
forces personnel, and some cases went to trial, there were relatively 
few convictions. While no senior Government official, politician, or 
bureaucrat, or member of the business elite, was convicted of crimes, 
the Government removed more than 100 military officials, police 
officers, police agents and investigators, and judges from office on 
corruption and other charges. The judicial system continued to deny 
swift and impartial justice to prisoners awaiting trial. On occasion 
the authorities conducted illegal searches. Individual members of the 
news media suffered various forms of harassment, including attempted 
murder and physical assaults. Other human rights problems included 
violence and societal discrimination against women, child prostitution, 
abuse of street children, and discrimination against indigenous people. 
The Government does not enforce effectively all labor laws. Some 
workers are forced to work overtime. Child labor is a problem, 
particularly in rural areas and in the informal economy, but not in the 
exportprocessing sector.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government agents; however, the 
security forces were suspected of an estimated 200 extrajudicial 
killings, many involving persons under 18 years of age, during the 
year. Human rights groups alleged that individual members of the 
security forces worked with civilian (including vigilante) groups and 
used unwarranted lethal force against supposed habitual criminals or 
suspected gang members. Several groups pushed for investigations into 
specific incidents, while others claimed to have provided public 
prosecutors with evidence of collusion between police elements and 
business leaders with regard to these murders. The Government publicly 
denied accusations relating to the security forces as institutions but 
investigated allegations against members of neighborhood vigilante 
groups. During the year, the authorities sought or detained 11 police 
officials for their involvement in the killings of various individuals.
    In the spring, a suspected gang member who was arrested by police 
died while in the hospital, after the police reportedly ``worked with 
him'' at the crime scene to identify suspects who had fled. Another 
suspect was executed after the police left him alone in the back of a 
pickup truck while they chased his companions.
    Prison guards shot and killed one escaping prisoner (see Section 
1.c.).
    In July the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Covenant House 
reported that 302 homeless children and street youths were killed in 
``social cleansing'' killings between January 1998 and May. The 
majority of the killings occurred in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. 
Covenant House attributed 36 percent of the killings to the police and 
members of the military; and private security officers committed other 
killings. In August the Public Ministry and the General Directorate of 
Criminal Investigation (DGIC) named a joint special commission to 
investigate the extrajudicial killing of minors. In October the DGIC 
reported that 312 minors were victims of extrajudicial killings between 
1998 and 2000. In October Covenant House filed a complaint with the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) stating that 360 
street children were killed from 1998 through October 2000. In 1997 
Covenant House brought charges before the Public Ministry against 
unnamed members of the armed forces and the police for the alleged 
torture of 63 juveniles or minors, 35 of whom reportedly were murdered, 
since 1990. The Government took no action in this instance.
    The case of a prison guard who shot and killed a minor who refused 
to surrender after escaping from the central penitentiary in 
Tegucigalpa in May 1999 went to trial during the year; however, no 
further information was available.
    Human rights organizations continued to allege that individual 
members and former members of the security forces, acting in collusion 
with business leaders, committed extrajudicial killings of street 
criminals. They also charged neighborhood watch (``vigilante'') groups 
with the responsibility for many extrajudicial executions. On various 
occasions during the year, the Public (Justice) Ministry and the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an autonomous government 
entity, publicly admitted that individual government employees might be 
taking part in such executions; however, the Government asserted that 
the individuals were acting without official authorization.
    There was no progress in the investigation of the March 1999 murder 
of Juan Ramon Alvarado, the late mayor of Cabanas in Copan department. 
Two suspects previously detained were released in 1999 due to lack of 
evidence.
    In September the Third Court of Appeals issued an arrest warrant 
for Jaime Raudales, a former member of the now-disbanded Army 
Intelligence Battalion 3-16, for the 1988 murders of social activists 
Miguel Angel Pavon and Moises Landaverde.
    Also in September, a government team exhumed the remains of four 
persons from a cemetery in Olancho department; these were the first 
official exhumations by the Government (see Section 1.b.).
    There were several developments in the investigation of the 1982 
murder of Nelson MacKay Echevarria. During the year, a court charged 
Colonel Wilfredo Leva Cabrera with the killing. Leva Cabrera, who is in 
prison on a drug trafficking conviction, requested protection under the 
Amnesty Law; however, during the year the Supreme Court overruled a 
lower court decision and rescinded amnesty protection for Leva Cabrera 
in this case. At year's end, the murder charge was being initiated in a 
criminal court. At year's end, former military official Alexander 
Hernandez Santos was being tried for the murder of MacKay, as well as 
other crimes related to human rights abuses.
    In March Major Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, who for 5 years had been 
a fugitive from justice, surrendered voluntarily to the authorities, 
who remanded Trejo Rosa to a prison hospital. In May the court indicted 
him for the murder of MacKay; he also was indicted for the kidnaping 
and torture of Miguel Francisco Carias, as well as the 1982 kidnaping 
and torture of six university students (see Section 1.c.). In June the 
court released Trejo Rosa from the prison hospital but ordered him 
placed under house arrest due to his age and infirmity.
    In February the First Court of Appeals acquitted Captain Billy Joya 
Amendola of the 1982 murder of university student Hans Madisson. The 
Public Ministry appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in March. 
In October a court issued an arrest warrant for Joya Amendola in 
connection with the 1982 kidnaping and torture of six university 
students (see Section 1.c.).
    There was no information available regarding the Public Ministry's 
appeal of an October 1999 ruling by a lower court that found former 
army chief of staff Oscar Hernandez Chavez not guilty of the 1982 
murder of university student Hans Madisson.
    In July the Third Court of Appeals acquitted retired General Daniel 
Bali Castillo, retired Colonel Manuel Enrique Suarez Benavides, and 
retired police Major Marco Antonio Matute Lagos of the 1982 deaths of 
Adan Avilez Funez and Nicaraguan citizen Amado Espinoza Paz. The Public 
Ministry filed appeals of these decisions with the Supreme Court, which 
had yet to rule on the appeals at year's end. The Supreme Court is 
required to confirm the ruling of the Third Court of Appeals for a full 
acquittal; it had not done so by year's end. Other former military 
officials, including Alexander Hernandez Santos (who was in prison and 
being questioned about this incident at year's end), still face charges 
in this case.
    In September a court sentenced police officer Jose Raul Bonilla 
Velasquez to 15 years' imprisonment for the murder of Jose Alejandro 
Molina. The court acquitted police officer Jose Alfredo Leiva in the 
same case.
    In November a court sentenced Oscar Esmelin Rivera to 20 years in 
prison for the October 1998 killing of Pedro Garcia Villanueva, the 
director of Public Ministry attorneys in Santa Barbara department. 
Garcia had been investigating alleged human rights violations and other 
criminal activities in the region at the time of his death.
    In February the Public Ministry named a special prosecutor to 
continue its investigation of the 1998 murder of Carlos Antonio Luna 
Lopez, a town councilman in Catacamas, Olancho department. A suspect in 
the murder of Luna Lopez, Oscar Aurelio ``Machetillo'' Rodriguez 
Molina, subsequently was brought before a court, which in March 
conducted a ``reenactment'' of Luna Lopez's murder. Several other 
suspects remained at large at year's end.
    Homicides, armed robberies, and other violent assaults remained 
commonplace. Violent crime continued to fuel the growth of private--
often unlicensed--guard services, and of volunteer groups that 
patrolled their neighborhoods or municipalities to deter crime. In 
February the Security Ministry authorized the creation of approximately 
500 neighborhood watch groups, known as Citizen Security Councils 
(CSC's), around the country to assist the police in combating rising 
crime. Human rights groups during the year criticized the CSC's, which 
they viewed as active participants in the increasing number of 
extrajudicial killings. However, in June National Human Rights 
Commissioner Leo Valladares stated publicly his belief that the CSC's 
were not acting as vigilantes or ``death squads.'' The continued 
proliferation of private security forces and CSC's nonetheless made it 
more difficult to differentiate among homicides that may have been 
perpetrated by government security personnel, private vigilantes, or 
common criminals. In October the Government ordered all private 
security firms to turn in assault rifles, even if acquired legally, in 
an effort to decrease the availability of weapons to criminals.
    Vigilante justice allegedly led to the killing of known and 
suspected criminals, as well as of street children (see Section 5). The 
Preventive Police claimed to have investigated 382 of 410 known 
killings since 1997, concluding that all police personnel accused of 
involvement in such incidents had been placed at the disposition of the 
courts, except for 1 fugitive.
    Several ``murders for hire'' occurred during the year, usually 
related to land disputes or criminal activities. In February the police 
arrested Johnny Orlando Funez Funez and Jose Antonio Galdamez for the 
murder of social activist Jairo Amilcar Ayala Nunez in Lanza, Colon 
department over a land expropriation case. Also in February, four 
unidentified gunmen killed community leader Ruben Elvir in El Camalote, 
Santa Barbara department. Also in February, unknown assailants killed 
Marciano Martinez Ramirez and Victor Manuel Almendares, the president 
and the treasurer, respectively, of a forestry cooperative in 
Lepaterique.
    In March four members of the Chorti indigenous group, Vicente 
Arias, Enecon Arias, Antonio Garcia, and Balbino Hernandez died during 
a gun battle in Copan. Ines Mejia and Wilfredo Bueso were arrested for 
the murders; a third assailant died during the gun battle. Indigenous 
activists claimed that the group was killed in a dispute over tribal 
lands; however, the police asserted that the killers and their victims 
were members of rival criminal gangs involved in the contraband trade 
(see Section 5).
    In April two gunmen killed Concepcion ``Chonillo'' Alvarez and 
three members of his family in Choluteca over a local land dispute; no 
one has been arrested in this case. Also in April, the authorities 
arrested Julio Cesar Espinoza Mejia for the murder of Copan mayor Hugo 
Alvarado over another land dispute.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    Various witnesses, survivors, and former HOAF personnel have 
charged that members of the now-disbanded army Intelligence Battalion 
3-16 kidnaped, tortured, and killed many of the 184 persons who 
disappeared during the 1980's. The Public Ministry and the National 
Human Rights Commission kept open their investigations of those 
disappearances.
    In February the Public Ministry filed an appeal of a December 1999 
decision by a lower court that freed former police intelligence 
director Carlos Roberto Velasquez Ilovares in the 1988 disappearance of 
leftist activist Roger Samuel Gonzalez Zelaya. The appeals court had 
not ruled on this petition at year's end.
    On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and 
execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987 
Amnesty law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal 
prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and 
torture of six leftist university students (see Section 1.c.).
    In September a government team of forensic experts from the Public 
Ministry and local officials exhumed the remains of four persons from a 
cemetery at Dulce Nombre de Culmi in Olancho department. The four 
persons were believed to have been guerrillas who died during a 
firefight with HOAF personnel in 1983. Government forensic experts 
planned to conduct DNA testing on the remains of the four persons in an 
effort to verify their suspected identities; those efforts continued at 
year's end. Human rights activists noted that these were the first 
official exhumations by the Government.
    Following charges brought by human rights groups to the IACHR 
beginning in 1986, in November the Government made compensatory 
payments totaling approximately $1,580,000 (23,800,000 lempiras) to the 
families of 17 persons who disappeared between 1981 and 1989. The human 
rights groups then dropped their charges before the IACHR. The 
suspected perpetrators of those disappearances remain subject to 
criminal prosecution in the future, but these payments freed the 
Government of further civil liability in these 17 specific cases. Some 
human rights activists publicly criticized as inappropriate the 
presence among the group of 17 families receiving payments of the NGO 
Committee of Families of the Detained-Disappeared of Honduras (COFADEH) 
general coordinator Bertha Oliva de Nativi, and of Andres Pavon, 
president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras 
(CODEH), since the relatives of the other 167 persons who disappeared 
during this time period have not received justice nor any financial 
recompense.
    The courts adjudicated several pending cases involving 
disappearances (see Section 1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were 
isolated instances in which officials employed such practices. In 
addition, police beatings and other alleged abuses of detainees 
remained a problem. The police also engaged in violence, which included 
beatings, against street children (see Section 5). During the year, a 
court in San Pedro Sula ordered the imprisonment of four police 
officers accused of wounding a woman in a vehicle that they allegedly 
attempted to stop in late December 1999. On March 30, the authorities 
detained the officers.
    In February Special Prosecutor for Human Rights Wilfredo Flores 
charged publicly that police officers routinely protected torturers and 
other human rights abusers in their ranks. In March DGIC Director 
Wilfredo Alvarado denied that DGIC agents tortured or abused prisoners. 
In May Preventive Police Director Alvaro Flores Ponce made a similar 
declaration regarding the Preventive Police. In October the Preventive 
Police were singled out in Amnesty International's annual report for 
their use of ``torture and excessive force.''
    During the year, the Ministry of Security revised the procedures 
for internal review of police abuse and misconduct, partly as a result 
of public pressure from human rights groups and the Public Ministry, 
which in the past had reported that the Preventive Police's reviewing 
office was unresponsive to their requests for impartial investigations 
of police officers accused of abuse. The police force, which includes 
the Preventive Police and the DGIC, is subject to investigation by the 
Internal Affairs office regarding public complaints of police behavior; 
the Internal Affairs office reports to the Minister of Security. The 
Preventive Police and the DGIC each have an Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR), which conduct internal reviews of police 
misconduct such as offduty criminal conduct and ethics violations. An 
OPR ruling is reported to the Minister of Security, who can take 
disciplinary action or direct a supervisor to decide upon disciplinary 
action for minor infractions. Some human rights groups indicate that 
the new system has increased impartial judgments of police behavior.
    Both the DGIC and the Preventive Police suspended or dismissed 
numerous agents and officers for corruption and abuse of authority 
during the year. The Public Ministry reported that it received 697 
complaints of police abuse through August, compared with 421 complaints 
during 1999. The authorities dismissed more than 100 police officers 
and DGIC agents during the year, compared with nearly 400 officer and 
agents in 1999. The authorities accused 16 police and DGIC agents of 
torture and other abuses, and charged 4 persons with corruption and 
abuse of authority during the year. For example, in October the DGIC 
fired chief administrative officer Armando Espinal for alleged 
corruption, and a lower court issued an arrest warrant for former FUSEP 
Director Julio Cesar Chavez Aguilar for profiting from noncompetitive 
FUSEP purchases during his tenure as director.
    In February the HOAF announced that three army officers would be 
tried in courts-martial for having beaten and threatened eight recruits 
in January in an effort to recover a missing weapon. The Defense 
Minister, the HOAF chief of the joint staff, and other senior officers 
met with the president of CODEH, the country's leading human rights 
NGO, to review this incident, which also led the HOAF to create a 
Directorate of Humanitarian Law to investigate future human rights 
abuses within the HOAF. Also in February, the Defense Ministry 
appointed a civilian as its chief financial officer in an effort to 
counter a history of corruption among former HOAF paymasters and 
announced that it would cooperate with investigations by private human 
rights groups of alleged abuses of authority by HOAF personnel. In 
March the HOAF inaugurated mandatory human rights training for its 
majors and captains. In September the Defense Ministry signed an 
agreement with the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights to provide 
human rights training for the HOAF.
    In May Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa was indicted in the 1982 
kidnaping and torture of six leftist university students, as well as 
for the kidnaping of Miguel Francisco Carias and the murder of Nelson 
MacKay Echevarria (see Section 1.a.). Trejo Rosa surrendered to the 
authorities in March; he remained under house arrest at year's end.
    On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and 
execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987 
Amnesty Law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal 
prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and 
torture of the university students. Seventeen current and former 
military and police officials continued to face simultaneous criminal 
and civil charges in various courts. As a result of the Supreme Court's 
decision, amnesty laws are no longer applicable for: Alexander 
Hernandez, Juan Blas Salazar Meza, Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, Juan 
Evangelista Lopez Grijalba, Captain Billy Hernando Joya Amendola, 
retired General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, Juan Ramon Pena Paz, Roberto 
Arnaldo Erazo Paz, Jorge Antonio Padilla Torres, and Julio Cesar Funez 
Alvarez (the current deputy director of the Preventive Police).
    In September the First Court of Appeals once again issued arrest 
warrants for Raymundo Alexander Hernandez Santos and for Julio Cesar 
Funez Alvarez. In September the Supreme Court ruled against a petition 
by the Public Ministry for the preventive detention of Joya Amendola 
for the 1982 kidnaping and attempted murder of the six university 
students. In October the First Court of Appeals issued additional 
arrest warrants in this case for Billy Joya Amendola, Amilcar Zelaya 
Rodriguez, and Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa. At year's end, Hernandez 
Santos, who turned himself in voluntarily, was detained for questioning 
regarding his involvement in the case.
    In 1998 the Supreme Court had ruled that the country's amnesty laws 
protected Juan Blas Salazar Meza from prosecution for the 1982 
kidnapings. The June Supreme Court decision overturned that decision. 
Salazar Meza is serving a 5-year prison sentence for narcotics 
trafficking. In September the First Court of Appeals reinstated an 
arrest warrant for Salazar Meza, sought by the Public Ministry in 
connection with the 1982 cases as a first step to bringing him to 
trial.
    In September a judge issued a warrant for the arrest of retired 
General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, the owner of the property in the 
Amarateca Valley of Francisco Morazan department where the 1982 
incidents occurred. An appellate court upheld the arrest warrant for 
Zelaya in October.
    In August a separate court ruling absolved Captain Billy Joya 
Amendola of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca 
and his wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 2.a.).
    The police forces are underfunded and understaffed, and corruption 
is a problem. Widespread frustration at the inability of the security 
forces to prevent and control crime, and the well-founded perception 
that corrupt security personnel were complicit in the high crime rate, 
led to continued support among a segment of the general public for 
vigilante justice (see Section 1.a.).
    In August Security Minister Gautama Fonseca dismissed Preventive 
Police Deputy Director Wilfredo Urtecho Jeamborde and DGIC Deputy 
Director Saul Bueso Mazariegos from their posts. Human rights and civic 
groups noted the dismissals, since both Urtecho Jeamborde and Bueso 
Mazariegos have been suspected in the past of profiting from a variety 
of illegal enterprises. The Public Ministry reportedly was 
investigating both individuals at year's end for possible prosecution.
    Prison conditions remained harsh. Prisoners suffered from severe 
overcrowding, malnutrition, and a lack of adequate sanitation, and 
allegedly were subjected to various other abuses, including rape. The 
27 penal centers held over 11,500 prisoners, more than twice their 
maximum capacity; more than 90 percent of all prisoners were awaiting 
trial for an average of 22 months, with some waiting over 5 years (see 
Section 1.d.). Prison facilities are overcrowded, and pretrial 
detainees generally are not separated from convicted prisoners. Prison 
security was poor. Contrary to the previous year, the Government did 
not send the army in to any prisons to maintain order during the year. 
Retired military officers do work as guards in some areas, and some 
Preventive Police are used as guards. Prison disturbances, caused 
primarily by harsh conditions, occurred throughout the year, although 
at a lesser rate than in 1999, due to increased manpower and training 
of prison personnel. On March 27, a fight at the San Pedro Sula prison 
left one prisoner dead and five prisoners and guards wounded. Following 
the fight, the authorities transferred 181 prisoners to HOAF 
facilities. Prison escapes, through bribery or otherwise, remained a 
frequent occurrence. Prison guards shot and killed one escaping 
prisoner during the year; there were no other serious injuries to 
escaping prisoners.
    More often than not, for lack of alternative facilities, wardens 
housed the mentally ill and those with tuberculosis and other 
infectious diseases among the general prison population. Prisoners with 
money routinely bought private cells, decent food, and permission for 
conjugal visits, while prisoners without money often lacked basic 
necessities, as well as legal assistance. The prison system budgets 
about $0.40 (6 lempiras) per day for food and medicine for each 
prisoner. Prisoners were allowed visits and in many cases relied on 
outside help to survive, as the prison system could not provide 
adequate or sufficient food.
    In June 1999, the Public Ministry signed an agreement with the 
Center for the Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Torture and their Relatives to establish programs to protect the human 
rights of prisoners; to train police and prison personnel to avoid 
committing acts of torture; and to arrange for periodic inspections of 
prisons. These programs continued during the year. In February a 
Tegucigalpa court ordered the central prison in the capital to suspend 
disciplining prisoners because of widespread reports of abuse, and 
instructed prison authorities to develop a plan to stop the alleged 
abuses. In September the Security Ministry and CODEH agreed to 
collaborate on a national plan to provide human rights training to 
prison guards and to rehabilitate the prison population through formal 
education and vocational training.
    In July the Government announced that it would build a model prison 
farm in the Sula Valley at a cost of $15 million (225 million 
lempiras). The 1,500-bed penitentiary, scheduled to open in 2002, would 
be one of several to be built to relieve overcrowding and promote 
rehabilitation within the country's antiquated penal system.
    Women generally were incarcerated in separate facilities under 
conditions similar to those of male prisoners; however, female 
prisoners do not have conjugal visit privileges.
    The Government operates juvenile detention centers in Tamara, El 
Carmen, and El Hatillo; all are located in or near Tegucigalpa or San 
Pedro Sula. This lack of juvenile detention facilities contributed to 
the detention of minors in adult prisons and to vigilante violence 
against, and police abuse of, street children (see Sections 1.a. and 
5). In February Covenant House alleged that 800 juvenile criminals have 
been housed in adult prisons since 1995. Street children in detention 
sometimes were housed in adult prisons, where they were abused 
routinely. However, in May Covenant House made public its judgment that 
the Government no longer routinely houses juvenile offenders in adult 
prisons. In October the IACHR ordered the Government to make 
compensatory payments to 300 juvenile offenders who served time in 
adult prisons from 1995 to 1999. In April the Government announced 
plans to permit juvenile criminals to pursue an education while in 
prison.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for 
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the 
authorities occasionally fail to observe these legal requirements. The 
law states that the police may arrest a person only with a court order, 
unless the arrest is made during the commission of a crime, and that 
they must clearly inform the person of the grounds for the arrest. By 
law the Preventive Police cannot investigate crimes; that force only 
detains suspects. The police must bring a detainee before a judge 
within 24 hours; the judge then must issue an initial, temporary 
holding order within 24 hours, make an initial decision within 6 days, 
and conduct a preliminary investigation to decide whether there is 
sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation.
    While bail is legally available, it is granted primarily for 
ostensibly medical reasons; however, procedures in such cases are 
confused and unclear. Poor defendants, even when represented by a 
public defender, seldom are able to take advantage of bail (see Section 
1.e.). Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem; in March an 
independent study estimated that 92 percent of prisoners were awaiting 
trial, some for over 5 years. The average length of detention was 
approximately 22 months, and over 90 percent of all prisoners had been 
neither tried nor sentenced (see Section 1.c.).
    The 1996 Unsentenced Prisoner Law mandates the release from prison 
of any detainee whose case has not come to trial and whose time under 
detention exceeds the maximum prison sentence for the crime of which he 
is accused. This law also authorizes the parole until trial of persons 
over the age of 60 accused of nonfelony crimes, women who are pregnant 
or lactating, and the mortally ill. In April the Government estimated 
that as many as 3,017 prisoners qualified for release under the 
Unsentenced Prisoner Law, that 3 officers were required to monitor each 
person, and that the annual cost of enforcing this law was 
approximately $6.7 million (100 million lempiras).
    However, despite this law, many prisoners remain in jail after 
being acquitted or completing their sentences, due to the failure of 
responsible officials to process their releases. A significant number 
of defendants served the maximum possible sentence for the crime of 
which they were accused before their trials were concluded, or even 
begun. For example, a man arrested in August 1997 was released without 
a trial in October 1999, while his two alleged accomplices, who also 
were arrested in August 1997, were released without trials in October 
2000. In September the authorities released a man who had been 
exonerated of all charges 6 days after his arrest in July 1998. Also in 
September, the authorities released another man who had been detained 
without a trial since April 1996. In October the authorities released 
one prisoner who was arrested in June 1991, and then ordered freed in 
March 1995.
    Neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code explicitly prohibits 
exile, but it is not used as a means of political control.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is poorly staffed and 
equipped, often ineffective, and subject to outside influence. While 
the Government respects constitutional provisions in principle, 
implementation has been weak and uneven in practice. A number of 
factors limit the effectiveness of the system. Both the judiciary and 
the Public Ministry suffer from inadequate funding; low wages and lack 
of internal controls make law enforcement officials susceptible to 
bribery; the civil law inquisitorial system is both inefficient and 
opaque; and powerful special interests still exercise influence and 
often prevail in the courts. Approximately 35 percent of the complaints 
received by the National Human Rights Commission concern the judicial 
system. Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity.
    The court system is composed of a 9-member Supreme Court, 10 
appeals courts, 67 courts of first instance with general jurisdiction, 
and 325 justice of the peace courts with limited jurisdiction. Congress 
elects the nine Supreme Court justices and names the president of the 
court; the Supreme Court, in turn, names all lower court judges. The 4-
year term for justices of the Supreme Court coincides with those of the 
Congress and the President.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial; however, 
the written, inquisitorial trial system is labor-intensive, slow, 
opaque, and does not protect the rights of defendants adequately. In 
December 1999, the Congress passed a law to modernize the Criminal 
Procedures Code; this new law, which is scheduled to take full effect 
in February 2002, substitutes an adversarial system for the 
inquisitorial system and mandates a speedier disposition of cases. The 
new law is designed to change the code into one based upon the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and respect for 
the dignity and liberty of the accused. It also expressly prohibits 
incarceration without first receiving a clear sentence from a judge or 
tribunal.
    Judges legally are in charge of investigations, as well as of 
trials and sentencing. Under the 1984 Code of Criminal Procedures, 
judges, the police, public officials, and individual citizens can 
initiate criminal proceedings. As many as 80 percent of the cases 
reported to the police are never referred to the criminal justice 
system, but instead are settled administratively by the police or by 
municipal courts. A judge may jail an accused person for 6 days before 
a determination is made of probable cause to accept charges. If a judge 
sustains the criminal accusation, the accused remains in jail, or may 
be released on bail while awaiting trial (see Section 1.d.).
    An accused person has the right to an initial hearing by a judge, 
to bail, to an attorney provided by the State, if necessary, and to 
appeal. Although the Constitution recognizes the presumption of 
innocence, the criminal code in practice often is administered by 
poorly trained judges operating on a presumption that the accused is 
guilty; consequently, the rights of defendants often are not observed. 
All stages of the trial process are conducted in writing and, at the 
judge's discretion, may be declared secret and, thus, even less 
``public'' than normal.
    Defendants and their attorneys are not always genuine participants 
in the process, despite rights accorded under law. Defendants may 
confront witnesses against them and present evidence on their own 
behalf, but only through the judge. By law defendants and their 
attorneys are entitled to review governmentheld evidence relevant to 
their cases, but this right is not always respected in practice.
    A public defender program provides assistance to those unable to 
afford an adequate defense. There are 137 public defenders providing 
free legal services nationally to 37 percent of the prison population; 
however, public defenders are hard pressed to meet the heavy demands of 
an unautomated, inadequately funded, and labor-intensive criminal 
justice system. The Supreme Court issued an instruction in 1998 that 
holds judges personally accountable for reducing the number of 
backlogged cases, and separates judges into pretrial investigative 
judges and trial and sentencing judges. The Court also created a 
program to monitor and enforce compliance with these measures. The 
Court's instruction was intended to ensure more effective protection 
for the rights of the accused to a timely and effective defense, but it 
has had little effect.
    Modest progress was made in previous years towards implementing a 
judicial career system to enhance the qualifications of sitting judges; 
depoliticize the appointment process; and break the subcultures of 
corruption, clientism, patronage, and influencepeddling within the 
judiciary. Nonetheless, many courts remain staffed by politically 
selected judges and by unqualified clerks who are inefficient and 
subject to influence from special interests. The reforms have not been 
implemented fully.
    On April 7, the National Human Rights Commissioner released a 
report that alleged political interference and corruption within the 
judiciary. The Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against Valladares, and 
charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion, and blackmail;'' 
however, the Supreme Court later dropped its charges (see Section 4).
    On May 2, President Flores issued a decree that created a special 
commission to draft recommendations for improving the judicial system. 
On September 19, the commission presented recommendations to the 
President. The Government incorporated many of these recommendations 
into a constitutional amendment that was presented to Congress on 
October 3. Congress passed the amendment on December 20; it must 
approve it a second time in the 2001 session.
    On November 7, the Supreme Court announced that it is investigating 
500 civil, criminal, administrative, and labor judges in an 
anticorruption effort. According to press reports, at least 100 judges 
have been charged with corruption or fired for judicial indiscretions 
in the past 3 years.
    Elements of the armed forces withheld their cooperation from 
official efforts to track down military officers wanted in connection 
with alleged human rights abuses dating back to the 1980's. The Supreme 
Court considered throughout the past decade whether legal amnesties 
adopted in 1987, 1990, and 1991 for crimes committed during the 1980's 
covered the military, as political deliberations in the Congress had 
suggested. In 1998 the Court determined that while the amnesty laws 
were constitutional, amnesty appeals would have to be decided on their 
individual merits. On June 26, the Court ruled that laws providing 
amnesty protection to present and former military officials were 
inapplicable to common crimes, such as illegal detention and homicide, 
which some officials were alleged to have committed. At the request of 
the Public Ministry, on August 1, the Court clarified that its June 
ruling applied only to the specific case (the 1982 kidnaping and 
torture of six university students) under consideration (see Section 
1.c.), and that the amnesty laws would continue to apply to all 
military defendants until the prosecutor in a specific case established 
the grounds for the exclusion of amnesty for the accused in that case. 
Thus, military officials still may benefit from the amnesty laws, but 
the Public Ministry now has the right to challenge the applicability of 
those laws to specific investigations of past human rights abuses.
    Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity from 
prosecution because of their membership in either the National Congress 
or the Central American Parliament. That immunity extends to acts 
committed before taking office. Only the National Congress can deprive 
a protected person of his immunity: such a person lacks the legal 
capacity voluntarily to surrender his immunity. In April the Congress 
passed a General Law of Immunities that reduced the number of 
government positions with immunity from an estimated 1,250 to less than 
200 positions. The new law continues to require a vote of Congress to 
deprive an individual protected under the law of his immunity, but it 
permits certain civil suits to be brought against such an individual 
without regard to his position in the Government. In March Attorney 
General Roy Medina declared that military amnesties and the political 
immunity of political leaders combined to make impossible the 
prosecution of such individuals for alleged past and present crimes.
    Over the past 6 years, the Public Ministry has taken steps to 
investigate and charge not only military officers for human rights 
violations, but also ranking officials of the two previous governments, 
for abuses of power, fraud, and diversion of public funds and 
resources. However, at year's end, very few of those accused had been 
tried or convicted.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution specifies that a person's home is 
inviolable, that persons in the employ of the State may enter only with 
the owner's consent or with the prior authorization of a competent 
legal authority, and that entry may take place only between 6 a.m. and 
6 p.m., or at any time in the event of an emergency or to prevent the 
commission of a crime. However, as in previous years, there were 
credible charges that police personnel failed at times to obtain the 
needed authorization before entering a private home. Coordination among 
the police, the courts, and the Public Ministry remained weak. The 
Government respects the privacy of correspondence.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities largely 
respected these rights in practice. However, journalists admitted to 
self-censorship when their reporting threatened the political or 
economic interests of media owners. A small number of powerful business 
magnates whose business interests, political loyalties, and family ties 
often intersect own many news media. Systemic national problems, such 
as corruption and conflicts of interest, also have limited the 
development of the news media. For example, three of the four national 
newspapers are run by presidential candidates or their close family 
members. Reporting of events, particularly those related to elections, 
is subject to editorializing.
    The Government has various means to influence news reporting of its 
activities, such as the granting or denial of access to government 
officials, which is crucial for news reporters, editors, and media 
owners alike. Other methods are more subtle, such as the coveted right 
to accompany the President on his official travels. Journalists who 
accompany the President on such occasions do so at the expense of the 
Government, which grants or withholds invitations for such travel at 
will.
    The comparatively little investigative journalism that took place 
focused on uncontroversial issues, such as illegal immigration. When 
the news media attempted to report in depth on national politicians or 
official corruption, they continued to run into obstacles, such as 
external pressures to desist from their investigations, artificially 
tight reporting deadlines, and a lack of access to Government 
information and independent sources.
    The news media also continued to suffer from internal corruption, 
politicization, and outside influences. Payments to journalists to 
investigate or suppress certain stories continued, although no 
individual journalist was accused publicly of engaging in the practice. 
News directors and editors acknowledged their inability to halt the 
practice, given their own workloads and the difficulty of discovering 
why a given reporter opted to emphasize one aspect of a story over 
another, or why a particular name was omitted from a list of suspects 
to be made public.
    The executive branch continued to make frequent use of the ``Cadena 
Nacional,'' a complete preemption of all television and radio 
broadcasting, including international channels seen only on cable 
television. Originally designed to transmit critical information during 
an emergency or crisis, such as Hurricane Mitch, the Cadena Nacional is 
used primarily to promote the supposed accomplishments of the 
Government, from the inauguration of infrastructure projects to the 
transmission of President Flores's audience with the Pope. The 
Government also has considerable influence on the print media through 
its ability to grant or withhold official advertisements funded with 
public monies.
    The leading newspaper in the capital of Tegucigalpa, La Tribuna, 
was founded by the late father of President Flores. La Tribuna is still 
run by his family, and it competes directly with rival publications for 
scarce revenues from advertising, much of which comes from the 
Government itself.
    In March El Nuevo Dia, the smallest of the five daily newspapers, 
ceased publication due to rising production costs and a protracted 
labor dispute with its production staff.
    One potentially abusive practice continued to be the granting of 
awards to individual reporters on ``Journalists' Day.'' In May all 
three branches of the Government and several private organizations, 
including chambers of commerce, bestowed numerous awards, some 
accompanied by substantial sums of cash, on the ``best'' journalists. 
Rather than being tied to a specific accomplishment--a particular 
article or series, or even a lifetime's body of work--most awards were 
granted without any published criteria to beat reporters assigned to 
the granting institution. Some of these awards appeared to be deserved; 
however, many observers viewed the awards as little more than 
acknowledgments by the granting institutions of perceived services 
rendered. One newspaper editor who regularly rotates news assignments 
precisely to avoid any conflict of interest acknowledged that employees 
objected to the rotations because the practice effectively eliminated 
them from award consideration each year.
    Individual members of the news media suffered various forms of 
harassment. In February Vica television reporter Allan Montenegro lost 
an eye during an altercation with police following an automobile 
accident. Montenegro, who is suing the Security Ministry over the 
incident, said that a police officer struck him in the face with the 
butt of a rifle after Montenegro identified himself as a reporter. In 
May Canal El Progreso television reporter Hernan Cubas Padilla filed a 
complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that 
Deputy Johny Handal had threatened at various times to close Canal El 
Progreso and kill Cubas Padilla due to his reporting of alleged corrupt 
activities in Yoro department by Handal, deputies Jamil Hawit and Rene 
Ramon Robleda, and El Progreso town councilwoman Nelly Soliman. Also in 
May, deputy and former president of Congress Rodolfo Irias Navas struck 
La Prensa newspaper reporter Ramon Alberto Tejedo while Tejedo 
conducted a press interview with a third party.
    In April Radio Progreso news director Julio Cesar Pineda Alvarado 
survived a drive-by shooting but was injured when a bullet struck his 
head; Pineda Alvarado subsequently reported having received death 
threats and being followed prior to the attack.
    In April El Heraldo newspaper reporter Leonarda Andino filed a 
complaint with the National Human Rights Commission because she 
received a summons for publishing excerpts from a report on the 
judiciary by the National Human Rights Commissioner (see Section 1.e.). 
In July a court in San Pedro Sula ordered El Heraldo reporter Sogelia 
Alvarado to testify in a defamation suit filed by Supreme Court 
President Oscar Armando Avila Banegas against mayoral candidate Oscar 
Kilgore. In September a court acquitted La Prensa reporter Arnulfo 
Aguilar of credit card fraud, abetting the escape of a prisoner, and 
contempt of court; Aguilar had maintained during his trial that unnamed 
persons whom he was investigating for alleged corruption had generated 
false charges against him. In October Deputy Francisco Herrera 
Dominelli filed a lawsuit on behalf of his wife against La Prensa 
reporter Serapio Umanzor Diaz, whom Herrera Dominelli accused of 
defaming his wife in the course of reporting on her business 
activities; Umanzor Diaz avoided a prison sentence by paying a fine of 
$192 (2,880 lempiras).
    According to the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), during 
the year television journalist Rosanna Guevara lost her position as a 
manager in Vica Television's news department, allegedly because she 
criticized President Flores. In March she reported receiving death 
threats over her station's political coverage.
    Such attempts by government officials and unidentified assailants 
to intimidate journalists increasingly led both local and foreign 
observers to call into question the ability of the news media to report 
freely on sensitive topics. In May the annual report of the IAPA noted 
that 13 reporters had been subjected to various forms of harassment 
during the past decade. In October the NGO Freedom House expressed 
concern regarding local treatment of the news media. At its annual 
conference in October, the IAPA adopted a resolution that called 
attention to several of the harassment cases and called upon the 
Government to respect the freedom of the press.
    In August a court absolved former army captain Billy Joya Amendola 
of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca and his 
wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government respects academic freedom, and has not attempted to 
curtail political expression on university campuses.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respects it in practice.
    In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic 
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias (see Sections 4 and 5). Dozens 
of persons conducted a hunger strike in support of Sanchez for 9 days 
during August and September, and some 1,200 protesters seized the Mayan 
ruins at Copan, the country's leading tourist attraction, in September. 
On September 7, the police forcibly restored order to the site after 3 
days of protests, causing 15 injuries (including 5 police) in the 
process.
    Also in September, some 300 indigenous persons sought to march from 
Copan to Tegucigalpa in support of Sanchez; however, the Security 
Ministry arrested all of the marchers in order to prevent them from 
entering Tegucigalpa. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a writ of 
habeas corpus to compel the Security Ministry to release the marchers. 
The protests and the hunger strike ended in mid-September when the 
Public Ministry agreed to reinstate Sanchez on the condition that he 
immediately would resign his post, receiving the various severance 
payments provided for by the Labor Code. In November lawyers for the 
demonstrators filed a lawsuit against Security Minister Gautama 
Fonseca, which accused him of abusing his authority and violating their 
civil rights when he ordered their detention in September. If the 
courts accept the protesters' lawsuit, the Minister in theory could 
face criminal charges as well; the courts had not made a decision at 
year's end.
    On December 5-6, protesters clashed with police during a 
demonstration in support of opposition presidential candidate Ricardo 
Maduro (see Section 3). Protesters attacked police with sticks and 
rocks; at least 12 persons were injured, including 3 journalists. 
Police used tear gas to break up the demonstration and arrested 20 
persons.
    In March the Public Ministry announced that it had declined to 
prosecute several dozen alleged instigators of a riot in front of the 
presidential offices in October 1999. The Ministry also announced that 
it was considering pressing charges against senior police officials who 
directed the police response against the alleged rioters, 44 of whom 
sustained a variety of injuries at the time. In October the Government 
made compensatory payments averaging $1,500 (22,500 lempiras) each to 
the 44 persons injured during the 1999 protest, including a payment to 
the family of 1 individual who died of natural causes in May, and to 
the indigenous organization that organized the 1999 demonstration (see 
Section 5). The total amount of payment each victim received depended 
upon the type of injury suffered.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects it in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for all forms of 
religious expression, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice.
    In September the Congress adopted a controversial measure requiring 
that, beginning in 2001, all school classes begin with 10 minutes of 
readings from the Bible. Parents who do not want their children to 
listen to the readings may notify school authorities in writing. The 
Education Ministry, in consultation with Christian churches, is to 
establish procedures to select readings, plan their implementation, and 
promote their distribution. However, the law does not stipulate which 
segments of the Bible would be used. After the vote, many legislators 
also questioned whether the wording of the legislation in fact made 
such readings mandatory. Evangelical Christians supported the law; 
however, lay constitutional scholars, the Roman Catholic Church, and 
other religious leaders opposed the measure as a violation of the 
constitutional separation of church and state. A legal challenge to the 
constitutionality of this law appeared likely at year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enter and exit the country 
without arbitrary impediment, and the Government does not restrict 
travel within the country's borders.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the International Office of Migrations (IOM), and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum and grants asylum or refugee status in accordance 
with the terms of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution. On several occasions during the year, 
small boats piloted by persons fleeing Cuba were discovered in Honduran 
waters or washed ashore. In each instance, the Government provided 
temporary refuge to those Cubans and collaborated with the IOM and 
local human rights groups to interview each person to determine whether 
the individual had a well-founded fear of persecution. In every 
instance, the Government assisted those persons who expressed a desire 
to return to Cuba to do so, facilitated voluntary transit by others to 
third countries, or granted temporary residence and work permits to 
those who wished to remain in the country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens last exercised the right to change their government 
through democratic and peaceful elections in November 1997. 
International observers found the elections to be free and fair.
    Citizens choose a president, three vice presidents, and members of 
the National Congress by free, secret, direct, and obligatory balloting 
every 4 years. In 1997 voters for the first time were able to cast 
separate ballots for the president, deputies in the National Congress, 
and municipal leaders, making individual elected officials more 
representative and accountable. Voting was made easier for citizens by 
a change that allowed them to vote closer to their homes.
    Suffrage is universal; however, neither the clergy nor members of 
the military or civilian security forces are permitted to vote. Any 
citizen born in Honduras or abroad of Honduran parentage may hold 
office, except for members of the clergy, the armed forces, and the 
police. A new political party may gain legal status by obtaining 20,000 
signatures and establishing party organizations in at least half of the 
country's 18 departments.
    In June the Congress amended the Law on Elections and on Political 
Organizations to permit citizens residing abroad to vote in future 
presidential elections. The opposition National Party charged that the 
ruling Liberal Party had brought the bill to a vote without prior 
notice and when few Nationalists were present, and asserted that the 
amendment was illegal because it failed to include Congressional 
elections or to provide a role in overseas elections for the National 
Electoral Tribunal (TNE), as required by the existing law. When the 
Nationalists threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the 
amendment, the Liberals agreed to negotiate with the Nationalists over 
how overseas voting would be conducted; the status of this legislation 
and its implementation continued to be debated at year's end.
    The next national elections are scheduled for November 2001; 
presidential primaries for the Liberal and National parties took place 
in December. President of Congress Rafael Pineda Ponce won the Liberal 
primary; Luis Cosenza, a stand-in for the original candidate Ricardo 
Maduro, won the National Party's primary. A major political conflict 
began in October after the ruling Liberals petitioned the National 
Electoral Tribunal (TNE) not to allow National Party presidential 
contender Maduro to compete in his party's primary because the Liberals 
questioned whether he was ``Honduran by birth,'' a legal requirement 
for assuming the presidency. (Maduro was born in Panama of a Panamanian 
father and a Guatemalan mother, but Maduro and his mother both received 
official documentation of Honduran citizenship in the 1980's, through 
Maduro's Honduran maternal grandmother. Since that time, Maduro has 
served in several government positions that required ``Honduran by 
birth'' nationality.) Despite numerous accusations, an arbitration of 
international jurists, and presidential intervention, the TNE refused 
to register Maduro for the primary. At year's end, the National Party 
continued to express interest in reinstating Maduro as the presidential 
candidate, even though the question of Maduro's citizenship was not 
resolved.
    There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or 
minorities in government and politics; however, they are 
underrepresented. One of the country's three vice presidents is a 
woman, as are four cabinet ministers; approximately a dozen women also 
serve as vice ministers or head various government agencies. Women hold 
12 of 128 seats in the National Congress, and 2 of 20 Honduran seats in 
the Central American Parliament. The Government's Office of Women's 
Affairs has cabinet-level status, although the executive president of 
that office is not a member of the cabinet. There is one female justice 
on the Supreme Court.
    In April the Congress enacted a Law of Gender Equality that 
mandates that 30 percent of all candidates nominated for public office 
by recognized political parties be women. Female legislators and 
women's groups criticized this law for not requiring full gender parity 
in political party slates. They also complained that, in practice, 
electoral slates for general elections would not meet the 30 percent 
threshold established by the law because the country's few female 
politicians might be defeated during the internal nominating processes 
of the political parties. The law is expected to apply to the 2001 
elections.
    There are few indigenous people in leadership positions in 
government or politics. There are no members of Congress who state that 
they are indigenous, but there is one indigenous alternate deputy.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operates without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with these 
groups and are responsive to their views.
    Anonymous telephone callers continued to threaten human rights 
workers. The National Human Rights Commissioner and the leaders of the 
CODEH and of the COFADEH all reported receiving numerous death threats 
by telephone.
    In 1996 the Congress ratified a presidential decree expanding the 
functions of the NHRC and unanimously reelected Leo Valladares to a 6-
year term that is scheduled to expire on March 5, 2002. Under this 
decree, and in fulfillment of his expanded functions, the NHRC has free 
access to all civilian and military institutions and detention centers, 
and is supposed to perform his functions with complete immunity and 
autonomy. However, in April the Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against 
Valladares, and charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion, 
and blackmail'' over a report issued by the NHRC in April that exposed 
corruption within the judicial branch (see Section 1.e.). However, the 
Supreme Court later dropped its charges.
    In June the NHRC announced that the Commission would close 7 of its 
12 regional offices for budgetary reasons. Human rights activists 
charged that the Government deliberately underfinanced the NHRC to 
hinder its operations. Valladares observed publicly that, while the 
NHRC required an annual budget of $1.8 million (27 million lempiras) to 
operate on a national scale, the actual NHRC budget for the year 2000 
was only $1,067,000 (16 million lempiras). Various aid grants from 
foreign governments to the NHRC expired earlier in the year. In 
December the Congress passed a budget that provides the NHRC with a 
budget of $1.6 million (24 million lempiras).
    In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic 
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a 
reorganization of the Ministry. However, indigenous groups claimed that 
Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of 
indigenous rights too diligently (see Section 5).
    In March the CODEH publicly accused the INTERPOL unit in Honduras 
of conducting research into the CODEH's foreign information and funding 
networks, but did not make public any evidence to support those 
accusations. In July the CODEH announced that it would close four of 
its regional offices due to a shortfall in funding.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution bans discrimination based on race or sex. The 
Constitution also bans discrimination on the basis of class; however, 
in practice, the political, military, and social elites generally 
enjoyed impunity before the legal system. Members of these groups 
rarely were arrested or jailed; the President, cabinet ministers, and 
legislators all enjoy legal immunity (see Section 1.e.).
    Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. The Penal Code 
was amended in 1997 to classify domestic violence and sexual harassment 
as crimes, with penalties of 2 to 4 years' and 1 to 3 years' 
imprisonment, respectively. In February the Pan-American Health 
Organization reported that 60 percent of women have been victims of 
domestic violence. Most such violence took place within the family. The 
penalties for rape are relatively light, ranging from 3 to 9 years' 
imprisonment. All rapes are considered public crimes, so a rapist can 
be prosecuted even if he marries his victim.
    Under pressure from women's advocacy and reform groups, the 
Congress in 1997 enacted the Law Against Domestic Violence to 
strengthen the rights of women and increase the penalties for crimes of 
domestic violence. This law allows the Government to protect battered 
women through emergency measures, such as detaining an aggressor or 
separating him temporarily from the victim's home. It also imposes such 
penalties as a fine of $333 (5,000 lempiras) and 4 years' imprisonment 
per incident.
    In March the Public Ministry reported that it receives an average 
of 200 allegations of domestic violence each month, but that many cases 
remain pending because the Government has not yet created the special 
courts authorized by the Law Against Domestic Violence. In August the 
Public Ministry reported investigating 10,535 cases of spousal abuse 
during 1999; male spouses filed 1,267 of those cases. In September the 
U.N. Population Fund estimated that 8 of every 10 women suffer from 
domestic violence. In October the Public Ministry reported that it had 
received 3,000 complaints of domestic violence, averaging 35 per day, 
during the year.
    The Government attempted to remedy this situation by working with 
women's groups to provide specialized training to police officials on 
enforcing the Law Against Domestic Violence. There are few shelters 
specifically maintained for battered women. The Government operates 1 
shelter that can accommodate 10 women and their families. Six private 
centers for battered women offer legal, medical, and psychological 
assistance, but not physical shelter.
    Sexual harassment in the workplace also continued to be a problem.
    Women, who make up 51 percent of the work force, were represented 
in at least small numbers in most professions, but cultural attitudes 
limited their career opportunities. In theory, women have equal access 
to educational opportunities; however, family pressures often impede 
the ambitions of women intent on obtaining a higher education. The law 
requires employers to pay women equal wages for equivalent work, but 
employers often classify women's jobs as less demanding than those of 
men to justify paying them lower salaries. In July the Government 
created the Inter-Institutional Technical Committee on Gender to 
coordinate government assistance programs for women.
    Some organizations have begun to offer assistance to women, 
principally targeting those who live in rural areas and in marginal 
neighborhoods of cities. For example, the Honduran Federation of 
Women's Associations provided home construction and improvement loans, 
offered free legal assistance, and lobbied the Government on women's 
causes. The Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights 
continued to operate a program to make women aware of their legal 
rights. Programs that provide small loans to microentrepreneurs target 
female clients.
    Women have advanced significantly in some professions during the 
past several years. The HOAF and national police academies have 
accepted female recruits since 1998, and the first class of women to 
receive aeronautical training at the air force academy graduated in 
1999. In 1998 Reyna Dinora Aceituno was elected Secretary General of 
the Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH), the country's second 
largest labor confederation. In May the capital city of Tegucigalpa 
hired its first female firefighter. In June and July, the Episcopal 
Church ordained its first three female religious ministers.
    In October tens of thousands of women commemorated World Food Day 
by conducting demonstrations against poverty and violence in the 
country's major cities. Also in October, the Government announced a new 
program to provide ``agricultural equality'' for women through such 
measures as recognizing female land ownership separately from male 
spouses or family members, increasing the number of government land 
titles granted to women, and facilitating access to financial 
assistance for female agricultural workers.
    Children.--Although the Government allocated 32 percent of its 
budget for the year to public education and health care, this was 
insufficient to address the needs of the country's youth. The 
Government provides free, universal, and compulsory education through 
the age of 10; however, the Government estimated that as many as 
175,000 children each year fail to receive schooling of any kind, 
either due to insufficient financial resources, or because parents rely 
on their children to assist in supporting the family by working. Girls 
attend primary school in the same proportion as boys. In October the 
Government announced its intention to increase its national school 
capacity by 5,000 children during 2001.
    Media reports indicated that up to 40 percent of children under the 
age of 5 years suffer from chronic malnutrition. The Government 
estimated that 7,000 children (40 of every 1,000) under the age of 5 
die each year because of inadequate health care; to combat these 
deaths, in March the Health Ministry announced a 2-year program to 
reduce infant mortality by 25 percent.
    The Government was unable to prevent the abuse of street children 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.) or child laborers (see Section 6.d.). 
During the year, the Government and children's rights organizations 
raised their estimates of the number of street children to 10,000, only 
half of whom have shelter on any given day. The number of street 
children has increased substantially since 1998, due to Hurricane 
Mitch. Many street children have been molested sexually, and about 40 
percent regularly engaged in prostitution.
    Approximately 30 percent of the street children in Tegucigalpa and 
San Pedro Sula, the two largest population centers, were reported to be 
HIV-positive. Over 75 percent of street children found their way to the 
streets because of severe family problems; 30 percent simply were 
abandoned. Abuse of street children is a serious problem. Both the 
police and members of the general population engaged in violence 
against street children (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In September 
police arrested the adult son of the Human Rights Commissioner for 
burning a child's eyelid with a cigarette. He was charged with a minor 
infraction. The Human Rights Commissioner publicly separated himself 
from his son's actions and emphasized that his son should be subject to 
appropriate legal action.
    In May the Public Ministry reported receiving an average of 20 
complaints of child abuse every week; in May UNICEF estimated that 17 
percent of children have suffered some form of child abuse. In March 
the Tegucigalpa city administration opened 12 temporary shelters for 
children, with a total capacity of 240 children. In November the 
Government announced that it plans to open a 24-hour Street Child 
Attention Center in Tegucigalpa, which had not opened at year's end. 
The Center, working with the municipal authorities and with children's 
rights organizations, would initiate contact on the streets with 
abandoned children, meet their basic needs, then offer counseling and 
formal or vocational training to help reincorporate them into society.
    Human rights groups implicated out-of-uniform security force 
personnel, vigilantes, and business leaders in many juvenile deaths 
(see Section 1.a.). In February Covenant House alleged that 21 children 
were killed and 879 children suffered various forms of mistreatment 
from 1994 to 1999.
    The 1996 Code of Childhood and Adolescence covers the rights, 
liberties, and protection of children, including in the area of child 
labor (see Section 6.d.). It established prison sentences of up to 3 
years for persons convicted of child abuse.
    In September the Government sponsored its eighth annual Children's 
Congress in Tegucigalpa, at which children from across the country 
discussed issues of national interest. For the first time, several 
departmental capitals hosted similar meetings of local children 
simultaneously.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no formal barriers to 
participation by an estimated 300,000 disabled adults in employment, 
education, or health care; however, there is no specific statutory or 
constitutional protection for them. There is no legislation that 
requires access by disabled persons to government buildings or 
commercial establishments. In April the Government reactivated the 
National Council for the Treatment of the Disabled Minor to coordinate 
assistance to an estimated 800,000 disabled youths and appropriated 
about $1.3 million (20 million lempiras) to fund its activities.
    Indigenous People.--Some 450,000 persons, constituting 11 percent 
of the general population, are members of various indigenous groups. 
These small communities of indigenous people have little or no ability 
to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, 
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. Indigenous land 
rights are communal. While the law permits persons to claim individual 
freeholding titles, this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Tribal 
lands often are defined poorly in documents dating back to the mid-19th 
century and, in most cases, lack any legal title based on modern 
cadastral measurements. The Government makes all decisions regarding 
exploitation of timber resources on indigenous lands, often over 
strenuous tribal objections.
    The lack of clear title by indigenous groups to public lands that 
they occupy often leads to conflicts between such groups and various 
government entities. However, such disputes are equally common between 
the Government and nonindigenous groups, and the Government is working 
with various indigenous groups on management plans for public and 
tribal lands that they occupy. In the absence of clear land titles and 
unequal access to legal recourse, indigenous groups also are vulnerable 
to frequent usurpation of their property rights by nonindigenous 
farmers and cattle ranchers. Expanded coverage of the national 
cadastral registry, property titling, and government land registries is 
reducing this vulnerability.
    The courts commonly deny legal recourse to indigenous groups and 
often show bias in favor of nonindigenous parties of means and 
influence. Failure to obtain legal redress frequently causes indigenous 
groups to attempt to regain land through invasions of private property, 
which usually provokes the authorities into retaliating forcefully. The 
Government generally is responsive to indigenous land claims; however, 
numerous cases remained unresolved because of conflicting claims by 
influential nonindigenous groups.
    In 1997 after a month of nationwide protests by indigenous 
organizations that included a hunger strike, the Government signed a 
22-point agreement with representatives of various groups that made 
available 9 initial land grants of about 22,000 acres each to different 
tribes, granted some contested land titles outright to indigenous 
petitioners, and set aside about $13,000 (200,000 lempiras) in 
government funds for indigenous housing. The Congress also created a 
commission to study indigenous land claims, which often conflict with 
the claims of small farmers, but the commission was largely inactive. 
Since 1997 the Government has distributed tens of thousands of legal 
titles encompassing hundreds of thousands of acres of land to 
indigenous persons. In September the Congress appropriated about $1.7 
million (25 million lempiras) to purchase land for distribution to the 
indigenous Chorti community, plus an additional $1,267,000 (19 million 
lempiras) in October for its general land redistribution programs. 
Indigenous groups nonetheless charged that the Government had failed to 
fulfill its commitments under the 1997 agreement.
    Members of the Black Carib and Garifuna indigenous groups, backed 
by international supporters, objected strenuously to a proposed 
constitutional amendment that would permit foreigners to own and 
develop land for tourism within 25 miles of the country's coasts and 
land frontiers. The amendment was approved on its first reading in 1998 
but failed to obtain a constitutionally required second approval in 
1999, following an indigenous demonstration in October 1999, that led 
to a violent clash near the presidential offices (see Section 2.b.). 
The amendment appears unlikely to be considered again in the near 
future.
    In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic 
Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a 
reorganization of the Ministry; however, indigenous groups claimed that 
Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of 
indigenous rights too diligently (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
    Indigenous groups petitioned actively during the year for the 
Government to carry out more effective investigations into dozens of 
murders of indigenous leaders that date back to the 1970's, including 
the deaths in March of four Chorti men in Copan (see Section 1.a.).
    In August various indigenous groups convened a First Conference of 
National Solidarity in Tegucigalpa in preparation for the World 
Conference Against Racism, to be held in South Africa under U.N. 
auspices in 2001.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the legal right to form 
and join labor unions; unions are independent of the Government and of 
political parties. Most peasant organizations are affiliated directly 
with the labor movement. Unions frequently hold public demonstrations 
against government policies and make extensive use of the news media to 
advance their views. However, only about 14 percent of the work force 
is unionized, and the economic and political influence of organized 
labor has diminished in recent years.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that various 
provisions in the law restrict freedom of association, including the 
prohibition of more than one trade union in a single enterprise, the 
requirement of more than 30 workers to constitute a trade union, and 
the requirement that trade union organizations must include more than 
90 percent Honduran membership.
    The labor movement is composed of three national labor 
organizations: the General Council of Workers (CGT), the Confederation 
of Honduran Workers (CTH), and the Unitary Confederation of Honduran 
Workers (CUTH).
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, along with a 
wide range of other basic labor rights, which the authorities respect 
in practice. However, the civil service code denies the right to strike 
to all government workers, other than employees of state-owned 
enterprises. The ILO has reported that federations and confederations 
are prohibited from calling strikes and that a two-thirds majority of 
the votes of the total membership of the trade union organization is 
required to call a strike; the ILO asserts that these requirements 
restrict freedom of association. Public sector health care employees 
conducted illegal work stoppages during the year.
    A number of private firms have instituted ``solidarity'' 
associations, essentially aimed at providing credit and other services 
to workers and managers who are members of the associations. 
Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these 
associations, asserting that they do not permit strikes, have 
inadequate grievance procedures, and neutralize genuine, representative 
trade unions.
    In May dissident members of some 40 labor, peasant, and social 
organizations formed a Popular Bloc (``Bloque Popular'') whose 
immediate goals were to pressure the Government to implement social 
reforms and cease its efforts to privatize inefficient state-owned 
enterprises. During the second half of the year, the Bloc conducted a 
series of nationwide, 1-day work and traffic stoppages that brought the 
Government, the private sector, and organized labor to the bargaining 
table to negotiate a national wage increase outside the formal 
framework of the annual minimum wage talks, which normally are held 
each December (see Section 6.e.).
    The three national labor confederations maintain close ties with 
various international trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
protects the rights to organize and to bargain collectively; collective 
bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in which workers are 
organized. The Labor Code prohibits retribution by employers for trade 
union activity; however, it is a common occurrence. Some employers have 
threatened to close down unionized companies and have harassed workers 
seeking to unionize, in some cases dismissing them outright. The labor 
courts routinely consider hundreds of appeals from workers seeking 
reinstatement and back wages from companies that fired them for 
engaging in union organizing activities. However, once a union is 
recognized, employers actually dismiss relatively few workers for union 
activity. Nonetheless, such cases serve to discourage workers elsewhere 
from attempting to organize.
    Workers in both unionized and nonunionized companies are protected 
by the Labor Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the 
Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor took action in several cases, 
pressuring employers to observe the code. Labor or civil courts can 
require employers to rehire employees fired for union activity, but 
such rulings are uncommon. Agreements between management and unions 
generally contain a clause prohibiting retaliation against any worker 
who participates in a strike or other union activity.
    The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting; however, there 
was credible evidence that informal blacklisting occurred in the 
privately owned industrial parks, known as maquiladoras. When a union 
is formed, its organizers must submit a list of initial members to the 
Ministry of Labor as part of the process of obtaining official 
recognition. However, before official recognition is granted, the 
Ministry of Labor must inform the company of the impending union 
organization. The Ministry of Labor has not always been able to provide 
effective protection to labor organizers. There were credible reports, 
particularly in the export processing zone (EPZ) sector, that some 
inspectors had sold the names of employees involved in forming a union 
to companies that then dismissed union organizers before the Ministry 
of Labor could recognize the unions.
    The same labor regulations apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of 
private industry. Unions are active in the Government-owned Puerto 
Cortes free trade zone (7 of 11 maquiladoras there are unionized), but 
factory owners have resisted efforts to organize the privately owned 
industrial parks. The Honduran Association of Maquiladores (AHM) 
routinely sponsors seminars and other meetings between its members and 
major labor groups in order to reduce potential tensions within the 
industry. At year's end, 54 of the country's 434 maquiladoras were 
unionized, and 26 of those plants operated under collective bargaining 
agreements.
    In 1997 the AHM adopted a voluntary code of conduct governing 
salaries and working conditions in the industry and recognizing 
workers' right to organize. Although local unions were not consulted 
during the drafting process and have no formal role in its 
implementation, this code nonetheless represented a public commitment 
by apparel manufacturers to abide by local laws and regulations 
governing their industries. It provided a starting point for a dialog 
among the AHM, organized labor, and the Government, which formed a 
Tripartite Commission that meets on a monthly basis to discuss and 
facilitate solutions for labor problems. The AHM often serves as an 
informal arbiter of labor disputes between its member companies and 
their workforces. The attitude of the Government towards organized 
labor in the EPZ's is the same as in other industries.
    In a number of maquiladora plants, workers have shown little 
enthusiasm for unionizing, since they consider their treatment, salary, 
and working conditions to be as good as, or better than, those in 
unionized plants. In the absence of unions and collective bargaining, 
several EPZ plants have instituted solidarity associations that, to 
some extent, function as ``company unions'' for the purposes of setting 
wages and negotiating working conditions. Other EPZ plants use the 
minimum wage to set starting salaries, and adjust wage scales by 
negotiating with common groups of plant workers and other employees, 
based on seniority, skills, categories of work, and other criteria. In 
November Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), a private 
sector initiative to improve working conditions in maquiladoras around 
the world, granted its first overseas certifications of compliance with 
WRAP principles to two local companies, Cross Creek de Honduras and 
Kellwood de Honduras.
    Labor leaders accuse the Government of allowing private companies 
to act contrary to the Labor Code and expect the problem to continue 
until the Ministry of Labor is reorganized to make it more efficient. 
They criticize the Ministry of Labor for not enforcing the Labor Code, 
for taking too long to make decisions, and for being timid and 
indifferent to workers' needs. Industry leaders, in turn, contend that 
the obsolete and cumbersome Labor Code discourages foreign investment 
and requires significant amendment. The Ministry of Labor has sought to 
address these deficiencies by requesting increased funding from the 
Flores administration, by dismissing or transferring Ministry of Labor 
employees whose performance was unsatisfactory, by opening more 
regional offices to facilitate worker access to Ministry of Labor 
services, and by conducting a painstaking, ongoing review of the Labor 
Code within the Tripartite Commission.
    A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ministry of 
Labor and the Office of the United States Trade Representative calling 
for greater enforcement of the Labor Code has resulted in some 
progress. However, labor unions charge that the Ministry of Labor has 
not made sufficient progress towards enforcing the Code, especially in 
training its labor inspectors and in conducting inspections of the 
maquiladora industry. The Government has acknowledged that it does not 
yet adhere completely to international labor standards. In 1997 the 
country, in conjunction with other Central American nations, agreed to 
fund a regional program to modernize the inspection and labor 
management functions of all regional labor ministries. In August and 
September, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to abide by the 
terms of the 1995 MOU and to take additional steps to strengthen 
enforcement of the Labor Code.
    Kimi de Honduras, a South Korean-owned maquiladora with a history 
of labor troubles, closed its doors in May and laid off over 600 
employees, most of whom were women. Former Kimi employees complained 
that severance payments made by the company did not meet requirements 
stipulated by the Labor Code, but a Ministry of Labor examination of 
the company's calculations found Kimi's severance payments to its 
former workforce in order.
    In July 1999, workers at Yoo Yang, another South Korean-owned 
maquiladora, sought to establish a union for all maquiladora workers. 
Both the Yoo Yang employees and the Ministry of Labor missed various 
deadlines stipulated in the Labor Code for the processing of the 
workers' petition, which the Ministry of Labor invalidated in April 
because the Labor Code precludes the creation of industrial unions once 
individual companies in a given industry become unionized. In July Yoo 
Yang employees submitted a new petition for recognition as a company 
union to the Ministry of Labor, which declined to rule definitively on 
the petition because of alleged irregularities contained in the 
workers' application for juridical recognition; in the process, the 
Ministry of Labor again missed several processing deadlines for labor 
petitions established by the Labor Code. The irregularities were 
addressed, and in December the Ministry of Labor granted union status 
to Yoo Yang employees.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and this applies equally 
to children; however, there were credible allegations of compulsory 
overtime at EPZ plants, particularly for women, who make up an 
estimated 80 percent of the work force in the maquiladora sector. The 
legal prohibitions apply equally to children, and there were no 
official reports of such practices in the area of child labor (see 
Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the 
employment of minors under the age of 16, except that a child who is 15 
years of age is permitted to work with parental and Ministry of Labor 
permission. The Children's Code prohibits a child of 14 years of age or 
younger from working, even with parental permission, and establishes 
prison sentences of 3 to 5 years for individuals who allow children to 
work illegally. An employer who legally hires a 15-year-old must 
certify that the child has finished, or is finishing, his compulsory 
schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants a limited number of work 
permits to 15-year-old children each year.
    The Ministry of Labor cannot enforce effectively child labor laws 
outside the maquiladora sector, and violations of the Labor Code occur 
frequently in rural areas and in small companies. According to the 
Ministry of Labor, human rights groups, and children's rights 
organizations, an estimated 350,000 children work illegally. 
Significant child labor problems exist in family farming, agricultural 
export (including the melon and coffee industries), and small scale 
services and commerce. Many children also work in the construction 
industry, on small family farms, as street vendors, or in small 
workshops to supplement the family income. Boys between the ages of 13 
and 18 work in the lobster and shrimp industries, where they provide 
support to divers from boats while they learn the trade. Hurricane 
Mitch exacerbated existing child labor problems in every sector of the 
economy.
    The employment of children under the legal working age in the 
maquiladora sector may occur, but not on a large scale. (Younger 
children sometimes obtain legitimate work permits by fraud or purchase 
forged permits.) The maquiladoras in recent years have raised their 
minimum employment age, and some hire only at age 18 or above, reducing 
the number of legal job opportunities available to persons under 18 
years of age.
    In September 1998, the Government created the National Commission 
for the Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor, which 
includes government ministries, official family welfare agencies, and 
local NGO's. In August the National Commission sponsored a public 
seminar on child labor in the country to assist the Commission in 
developing a national plan to combat this problem.
    Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited, including that performed 
by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Mitch in December 1998, labor leaders agreed to forgo the customary 
January increase in the minimum wage in return for a pledge by business 
leaders to control price increases for basic goods and services. In 
June 1999, the Roman Catholic Church arbitrated a 25 percent increase 
in the minimum wage that the Government implemented in July 1999; an 
additional 8 percent increase took effect in January. The minimum wage 
in effect prior to July 1999 served as the basis for both increases. 
Daily pay rates vary by geographic zone and the sector of the economy 
affected; urban workers earn slightly more than workers in the 
countryside. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the nonexport 
agricultural sector, where it ranges from $2.33 to $2.96 (35.00 to 
44.50 lempiras) per day, depending on whether the employer has more 
than 15 employees. The highest minimum wage is $3.89 (58.30 lempiras) 
per day in the export sector. All workers are entitled to an additional 
month's salary in June and December of each year. The Constitution and 
the Labor Code stipulate that all labor must be paid fairly; however, 
the Ministry of Labor lacks the personnel and other resources for 
effective enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living (above the poverty line) for a worker and 
family.
    Under the threat of a nationwide work stoppage by the country's 
three labor confederations (see Section 6.a.), in October the private 
sector agreed to a monthly wage increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) for 
workers earning up to $116.60 (1,749 lempiras) per month. A monthly 
increase of $10 (150 lempiras) would be retroactive to October 1, and 
an additional monthly increase of $13.33 (200 lempiras) is scheduled to 
take effect on February 1, 2001. This agreement excluded workers in the 
nonexport agricultural sector, who instead would receive a monthly wage 
increase of $10 (150 lempiras) as of February 1, 2001.
    Under this agreement, workers earning between $140 (2,100 lempiras) 
and $400 (6,000 lempiras) per month would receive an additional wage 
increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) as of April 1, 2001. This wage 
increase excluded: Workers receiving a salary increase equivalent to, 
or greater than, $23.33 (350 lempiras) through either an individual 
contract or a collective bargaining agreement taking effect 3 months 
prior to April 1, 2001; those paid by piecework or based on 
productivity; microenterprises, agricultural firms, or ranches 
employing 15 or fewer workers; and workers in medicine or petroleum 
product sales whose utility margins are regulated by the Government.
    This agreement also incorporated various social commitments by the 
Government, including the establishment of an Economic and Social 
Council within which the Government, the private sector, and labor and 
social groups would debate wages and other labor issues, as well as 
national social policy. The Congress enacted legislation implementing 
this agreement in December, which obviated any need to hold the formal 
talks on increasing the minimum wage that had been planned for 
December. The CTH, which initially opposed the terms of this agreement, 
conducted a protest strike during the first week of October that only 
resulted in some success along the country's North Coast.
    The law prescribes a maximum 8-hour workday and a 44-hour workweek. 
There is a requirement of at least one 24-hour rest period every 8 
days. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after 
1 year, and of 20 workdays after 4 years. However, employers frequently 
ignored these regulations due to the high level of unemployment and 
underemployment and the lack of effective enforcement by the Ministry 
of Labor. Foreign workers enjoy equal protection under the law, 
although the process for a foreigner to obtain a work permit from the 
Ministry of Labor is cumbersome.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national health 
and safety laws, but does not do so consistently or effectively. There 
are 19 labor inspectors throughout the country. The informal sector is 
regulated and monitored poorly. For example, divers for shrimp and 
lobster work in hazardous conditions; the lack of medical facilities in 
the Mosquito Coast region adds to the problem. Worker safety standards 
are also difficult to enforce in the construction industry. Some 
complaints alleged that foreign factory managers failed to comply with 
the occupational health and safety aspects of Labor Code regulations in 
factories located in the EPZ's and in private industrial parks. There 
is no provision allowing a worker to leave a dangerous work situation 
without jeopardy to continued employment.
    In March workers at Chung Sing Textiles, a Taiwanese-owned 
maquiladora, alleged publicly that the company maintained a clandestine 
``punishment cell'' for employees who violated factory regulations. 
Separate investigations by the Ministry of Labor and the AHM of those 
charges failed to develop any evidence of the existence of a punishment 
cell at Chung Sing. In July a seamstress at Sunny Industries, a Korean-
owned maquiladora, lost the effective use of her left hand when it 
accidentally became entangled in a machine. In a lawsuit filed against 
Sunny Industries in August, the seamstress alleged that company 
management for several hours refused to free her hand from the machine 
for fear of damaging the equipment, then delayed referring her to a 
public hospital for medical treatment for 8 days because it did not 
wish to pay her medical expenses.
    In August the Government announced its participation in a regional 
program to improve occupational safety and health conditions throughout 
Central America. This program aims to strengthen regional labor codes 
and the enforcement capabilities of the Central American labor 
ministries in these fields.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Legal Code includes provisions that 
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, it is a problem. The 
Government and Justice Ministry, through its General Directorate for 
Population and Migration, is responsible for enforcing the country's 
immigration laws. However, weak police and court systems hinder law 
enforcement efforts.
    Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of aliens smuggled 
to the United States involving the use of force or sequestration 
(holding persons incommunicado against their will). The most common 
practice involves the sequestration of persons until a smuggling fee is 
paid. If the fee is not paid, the smugglers normally seek retribution 
by turning such persons in for deportation proceedings. Many times, 
fees are paid by relatives who fear that smugglers may employ violence 
against the smuggled persons. The most common practice involving debt 
bondage is the smuggling of indentured persons, through the country 
from China or South America, whose smuggling fee is paid by an employer 
in the United States in return for free or lowpaid labor. There were 
two such cases, involving a total of seven persons.
    In January Covenant House of Honduras asserted that some 250 
Honduran children in Canada had been coerced into prostitution or the 
transportation of illicit narcotics. An investigation of those charges 
was ongoing at year's end. In January Canadian authorities arrested 
dozens of small-time Central American drugdealers including many 
Honduran minors. In February the press reported that Honduran 
authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
    In February a judge in San Pedro Sula, Alexa Cubero, was arrested 
for allegedly kidnaping six minors with intent to sell them to persons 
unknown; this case had not come to trial at year's end. In July the 
Government announced that it was working with the Government of Mexico 
to repatriate over 200 Honduran minors working as prostitutes in 
southern Mexico. In September a local children's rights group charged 
that 498 children had been reported missing since 1986, including 22 
children during the year. The group asserted that local kidnapers 
receive an average of $133 (2,000 lempiras) per child, each of whom 
subsequently is sold abroad for $10,000 to $15,000.
    The Government does not provide economic aid to victims or 
potential victims of such crimes. However, in March the Government 
inaugurated two centers in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula to assist 
citizens deported from other countries to relocate in Honduras. With 
the assistance of several international organizations, the Government 
hoped to be able to reinsert up to 4,000 persons into society each 
year.
                               __________

                                JAMAICA

    Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a member of 
the Commonwealth of Nations. Two political parties have alternated in 
power since the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1944; 
a third major party was established in late 1995. Prime Minister P.J. 
Patterson's People's National Party (PNP) won 50 of the 60 seats in 
Parliament in national elections in December 1997 that were 
significantly less violent than previous general election campaigns. 
Intimidation of voters and party agents and restrictions on the free 
movement of voters was reported. The judiciary is independent but lacks 
adequate resources.
    The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has primary responsibility for 
internal security, assisted by the Island Special Constabulary Force. 
The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF--army, air wing, and coast guard) is 
charged with national defense, marine narcotics interdiction, and 
supporting the JCF. The JDF has no mandate to maintain law and order 
and no powers of arrest. The Ministry of National Security and Justice 
oversees the JCF and the JDF. Civilian authorities generally maintain 
effective control of the security forces; however, some members of the 
security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on primary products (bauxite and alumina, 
sugar, bananas), services (tourism, finance), and light manufacturing 
(garment assembly). The Government promoted private investment to 
stimulate economic growth and modernization, pursuing in the process a 
sometimes painful program of structural adjustment. The trade-dependent 
economy contracted (by 0.5 percent) for the fourth consecutive year in 
1999. In 1999 annual per capita income was $2,531, but there is a large 
gap between the wealthy and the impoverished.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members 
of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings and beatings 
and carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions.
    Although the Government moved to punish many of those police 
involved, continued impunity for police who commit abuses remains a 
problem. Police investigations often were hampered by lack of 
witnesses, and bottlenecks in the judicial systems cause long delays in 
resolution of criminal cases. Prison and jail conditions remained poor; 
overcrowding, brutality against detainees, and poor sanitary conditions 
were problems. The judicial system was overburdened, and lengthy delays 
in trials were common. There were allegations that citizens' privacy 
rights were infringed upon. Violence and economic discrimination 
against women remained problems. There were cases of societal 
discrimination against disabled persons and members of the Rastafarian 
religion. Violence against suspected homosexuals occurred. Child labor 
is a problem. Mob violence against those suspected of breaking the law 
remains a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings during the year.
    However, there were two killings involving politically connected 
victims that produced allegations of possible political motivation. On 
December 6, unknown assailants shot and killed an organizer for Sharon 
Hay-Webster, a PNP Member of Parliament, in front of Hay-Webster's 
constituency office in South Clarendon, after a party event. On 
December 12, a PNP area leader was found strangled in St. Andrew 
parish. One Member of Parliament said that the victim had been 
threatened and that he was ``sure she had been eliminated for political 
reasons,'' but another Member of Parliament contended that constituents 
had killed her in a dispute over jobs in a public works project. 
Although the last two national elections were relatively calm, there is 
a history of political violence and killings in the period leading up 
to elections (see Section 3).
    The police frequently employed lethal force in apprehending 
criminal suspects. During the year, there were 140 deaths, including 
those of 11 police officers, during police encounters with criminals. 
While allegations of ``police murder'' were frequent, the validity of 
many of the allegations was suspect. The country faces a crime 
situation with a homicide rate exceeding 30 per 100,000 persons. Well-
armed gangs trafficking in narcotics and guns control many inner-city 
communities. The gangs are often better equipped than the police force 
and have conducted coordinated ambushes of joint security patrols. 
There have been targeted assaults against police officers and their 
families.
    In February police killed a 20-year-old man in Farm district, 
Clarendon parish. The police claimed that they encountered a group of 
men, were fired upon, and returned fire. At that point, the man was 
hit. However, residents said that the police came upon the group, began 
firing indiscriminately and hit the victim. The incident led to 2 days 
of violent protests in May Pen, Clarendon's capital, which subsided 
when the area's parliamentarian visited and appealed for calm. In May 
the police concluded their investigation and forwarded it to the Public 
Prosecutor's office for action. In September the authorities brought 
murder charges against a policewoman involved in the incident; at 
year's end she awaited trial.
    On April 25, television stations broadcast news footage taken by an 
independent cable operator that showed a group of armed police officers 
surrounding a house in pursuit of an alleged gang leader, who was shot 
and killed by a police superintendent a few moments later. The 
videotape did not show the shooting; however, the footage of a woman 
crying for help and a violent scuffle in a doorway stirred much 
controversy and led to a confrontation on April 27 between heavily 
armed gunmen and the police in a volatile area of Kingston. Two 
policemen were killed and several injured in a prolonged gun battle; 
one gunman was also killed. In a press conference immediately after the 
outbreak of violence, security force leaders criticized Jamaicans for 
Justice, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocating human rights, 
for politically motivated involvement in the controversy (see Section 
4). During the press conference, the Police Commissioner also 
criticized a journalist for questioning possible political motivation 
behind the violent events (see Section 2.a.).
    The JCF has undertaken an initiative of ``community policing'' in 
certain areas to address the problem of longstanding antipathy between 
the security forces and many poor inner-city neighborhoods. For 
example, designated policemen walk beats and interact with members of 
the community on a daily basis. The JCF conducted both administrative 
and criminal investigations into all incidents involving fatal 
shootings by the police. In July the Government established a special 
police body, the Bureau of Special Investigations, specifically to 
address police shootings. This group supplements the JCF Office of 
Professional Responsibility, which investigates police corruption and 
other misconduct, and the civilian Public Complaints Authority that 
oversees investigations of the other two bodies and can initiate its 
own investigations. In April a prominent human rights activist assumed 
the newly created position of human rights advisor to the Minister of 
National Security and Justice. She has been engaged in educating JCF 
trainees as well as junior officers to respect citizens' rights. The 
JCF policy statement on the use of force incorporates U.N.-approved 
language on basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials.
    Following a police investigation, in September 1999 the Public 
Prosecutor's office charged a police sergeant with murder for the April 
1999 killing of an off-duty JDF soldier during island-wide protests. A 
preliminary hearing found that there was sufficient evidence to proceed 
to trial; at year's end, the case was still before the courts.
    The authorities also brought murder charges against a police 
officer for the death of a taxi driver killed when police fired on a 
taxi carrying passengers in Kitson town in June 1999. The case was 
still in preliminary hearings at year's end.
    On August 21, 1999, nine soldiers and four policemen severely beat 
Michael Gayle, described as a paranoid schizophrenic, after he tried to 
pass through a roadblock near his home after curfew. Gayle died as the 
result of a ruptured abdomen; at the coroner's inquest, the jury 
returned a majority verdict that all police and military personnel on 
duty at the roadblock at that time should be charged with manslaughter. 
However, in March the Director of Public Prosecutions ruled that there 
was not sufficient evidence to bring charges against specific 
individuals for Gayle's death. The police opened a new investigation of 
this incident, completed it in April, and resubmitted the results to 
the Public Prosecutor's office. The police investigation did not 
uncover any new information and recommended that the case be closed.
    Vigilantism, involving spontaneous mob executions in response to 
crime, continued to be a problem. There were 8 known vigilante killings 
during the year, compared with 9 in 1999 and 16 in 1998. Official 
investigations into such killings generally do not uncover information, 
since the persons and the community involved usually band together to 
intimidate potential witnesses.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other abuse of prisoners and 
detainees; however, reports of physical abuse of prisoners by guards 
continued, despite efforts by the Government to remove abusive guards 
and improve procedures.
    In June police fired on a minibus carrying 16 passengers when the 
driver failed to stop at a roadblock. The police reported that they had 
received reports of gunmen on the bus. After the bus sped away, the 
police pursued and fired on it. One passenger took off his white shirt 
and waved it out a window, shouting that passengers were on the bus, 
but had to duck back inside when the police continued shooting. Six 
persons were injured, including two students. Two policemen involved in 
the incident were removed from front-line duty and more training was 
mandated for police in the proper use of firearms. The police concluded 
an investigation into the incident and sent it to the Public 
Prosecutor's office for action.
    In December 1998, the court of appeal announced that flogging could 
not be imposed as a punishment because the legislative authority for it 
had expired. This sentence was used rarely; prior to 1994, no sentence 
of flogging had been imposed for 25 years.
    There were reports that police sexually harassed women (see Section 
5).
    A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in July 1999 detailed 
frequent and credible allegations of police abuse, specifically in 
lockups, including severe beatings, mock executions, and rape. The 
conditions in these lockups are harsh, with severe overcrowding, 
intermittent meals, and poor lighting, ventilation, and sanitation. HRW 
noted that the Government must undertake a systematic effort to curb 
police abuse effectively and bring sanctions against officers who 
commit abuses. The police have acknowledged the problem and have stated 
they are trying to address it by establishing a police code of conduct 
and by increasing human rights training. The police must call a legal 
aid attorney when they detain a person.
    Prison conditions remained poor; overcrowding, inadequate diet, 
poor sanitary conditions, and insufficient medical care are typical. 
During the year, the Government secured the services of a dentist for 
the prisons. The Government also outplaced food services for the 
prisons.
    In May a riot at the St. Catherine's district prison led to reports 
of beatings by guards and JDF soldiers of 300 inmates. The JDF soldiers 
had been in charge of prison security at St. Catherine's following a 
work stoppage by guards in January (see Section 6.a.). Guards and 
soldiers fired into cells, but caused no injuries. Prisoners alleged 
that they were upset with being given spoiled food, and that the guards 
and soldiers retaliated against them when they refused to eat it. 
Prison officials contended that the disturbance developed during a 
search of cells for weapons and contraband (including cellular 
telephones brought in with the acquiescence of certain guards). There 
were also reports that the prisoners were staging a riot in conjunction 
with another prison, coordinated by telephone, in order to facilitate a 
jailbreak. Many prisoners had to wait days for medical attention 
following these events.
    In June the Government convened a one-person Commission of Inquiry 
into the incident; the JDF initiated its own internal inquiry. A prison 
doctor testified that he saw 15 guards and soldiers repeatedly club and 
kick a handcuffed inmate, and that only his presence prevented the 
inmate from being killed. The doctor has since been reassigned. A 
sentry from a private security company also testified to witnessing 
beatings. There were also reports that inmates took a JDF soldier 
hostage, and the soldiers acted to recover him. In July the 
Commissioner concluded his work but had not reported his findings by 
year's end. The authorities did not bring criminal charges against any 
of the guards or soldiers.
    A separate prison for women--the Ft. Augusta Women's Prison--is 
housed in a 19th century fort. Poor sanitary conditions are the norm, 
although far less so than in the men's prisons because there is less 
overcrowding. Ft. Augusta is also safer and does not have the violence 
found in the men's prisons.
    The Constitution prohibits the incarceration of children in adult 
prisons; however, in practice some juveniles are held with adults. The 
July 1999 HRW report criticized the conditions in which juveniles are 
held. HRW noted that the Government responded quickly to remove some 
children from lockups. The report detailed many cases in which 
juveniles were detained improperly, not given access to legal 
representation, and held in adult lockups where they were victimized by 
adult prisoners.
    In July the court of appeals ruled that it was unconstitutional for 
juveniles to be held ``at the Governor General's pleasure.'' This 
referred to a section of the 1951 Juveniles Act that provides that 
persons under the age of 18 who commit a capital crime must have their 
death sentence commuted; however, they could be held for an 
indeterminate time at the Governor General's discretion and were 
subject to incarceration in an adult prison.
    In general the Government allowed private groups, voluntary 
organizations, international human rights organizations, and the media 
to visit prisons and monitor prison conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Jamaica Constabulary 
Force Act permits the arrest of persons ``reasonably suspected'' of 
having committed a crime, and the police continued to arrest and detain 
citizens arbitrarily. In 1997 the Jamaican Bar Association (JBA) 
protested that the police unlawfully were detaining and fingerprinting 
groups of citizens in poor, inner-city areas. At the time, the Police 
Commissioner disavowed the practice and ordered it discontinued; 
however, both the JBA and the Independent Jamaica Council for Human 
Rights state that the practice continues. In July 1999, police rounded 
up 52 men from the Grant's Pen area of Kingston after civil unrest 
erupted there. The men reportedly were fingerprinted, photographed, and 
then released without being charged. A class action civil suit was 
brought and was pending at year's end.
    In March a three-person Commission of Inquiry was convened to 
investigate the detention and forced transport in July 1999 of at least 
25 persons (many of whom were reportedly mentally ill), who were living 
on the streets in a Montego Bay business district. In October 1999, the 
authorities had charged three persons (including a police inspector and 
two public sector employees) with false imprisonment and assault, but 
later dropped the charges against the police inspector when he turned 
State's witness in the inquiry. In September the commission presented 
its recommendations, among them that the victims be granted $500 
(J$20,000) per month for life. The Government indicated that it 
intended to set up a trust for that purpose but had not yet done so by 
year's end. The police inspector said that he was under orders from his 
superiors, a claim the commission rejected as perjured. Although it was 
believed widely that the police were involved and acted at the behest 
of Montego Bay merchants and with the acquiescence of the local 
government, the commission exonerated the Montego Bay mayor and parish 
council. The commission named the police inspector and civil service 
truck driver as key conspirators and criticized the local head of 
public works for instituting a coverup. The two public sector employees 
were awaiting trial at year's end.
    The law requires police to present a detainee in court within 48 
hours of arrest, but the authorities continued to detain suspects, 
especially those from poor neighborhoods, without bringing them before 
a judge within the prescribed period. The Government attributed this 
circumstance to an overburdened court system that cannot accommodate 
large numbers of such presentations in a timely manner. Magistrates 
inquire at least once a week into the welfare of each person listed by 
the JCF as detained. There is a functioning bail system.
    Foreign prisoners must pay for their own deportation when they have 
completed their sentences. If they cannot afford to pay, they are 
jailed until relatives or consulates can arrange for transportation. In 
effect this constitutes an additional prison term for indigent 
foreigners.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and no instances of exile 
occurred.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, which exists in practice. However, the judicial 
system is overburdened and operates with inadequate resources.
    Three courts handle criminal matters at the trial level. Resident 
magistrates try lesser offenses (misdemeanors). A Supreme Court judge 
tries felonies, except for felonies involving firearms, which are tried 
before a judge of the Gun Court. Defendants have the right to appeal a 
conviction in any of the three trial courts to the Court of Appeal, 
which is the highest court. This appeal process results in frequent 
delays. The Constitution allows the Court of Appeal and the Parliament 
to refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 
United Kingdom as a final court of appeal.
    The lack of sufficient staff and resources hinders due process. 
Trials in many cases are delayed for years, and other cases are 
dismissed because files cannot be located. The Government initiated a 
night court in 1995, which has had some success in reducing the backlog 
of cases. Donations of computers are also expected to assist the courts 
in this regard.
    The defendant's right to counsel is well established. In February 
the Government increased salaries for attorneys appointed by the State, 
and in April it created the position of Public Defender, to bring cases 
for individuals who have had their constitutional rights violated. The 
defender's office would contract private attorneys to represent 
clients. However, as of year's end, no cases had been brought as the 
defender's office was still securing funds.
    In May legal aid was expanded to include prisoners charged with any 
offenses, except those covered by certain provisions of the Money 
Laundering Act or possession or trafficking of narcotics under the 
Dangerous Drugs Act. Although the authorities assert that those who 
commit such offenses can afford counsel, the Jamaican Bar Association 
has criticized this as presuming guilt.
    During the Commission of Inquiry into the beatings of prisoners at 
St. Catherine's district prison in June (see Section 1.c.), the judge 
ruled that a human rights group could not take notes during the 
proceedings. A Supreme Court judge later overturned this ruling.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the 
State into the private life of an individual; however, there were 
allegations of unauthorized wiretapping by the police. The revised 
Jamaica Constabulary Force Act gives security personnel broad powers of 
search and seizure similar to those granted by the former Suppression 
of Crimes Act. The act allows search of a person on board or 
disembarking a ship or boat without a warrant if a police officer has 
good reason to be suspicious. In practice the police conducted searches 
without warrants.
    In October the media reported allegations that the police 
wiretapped the telephones of the Prime Minister, two Cabinet members, 
and other senior officials. Only the Prime Minister has the authority 
to order wiretaps, and on October 24, the Prime Minister stated that 
his last authorization for wiretapping had been in April, for 14 lines 
associated with 12 different individuals suspected of trafficking in 
firearms and narcotics. The head of the Special Intelligence Unit, 
which the press alleged had carried out the wiretaps, denied that his 
unit placed wiretaps on any telephones. At year's end, it was still 
unclear whether any wiretaps had been put in place. In December the 
Government introduced a draft Interception of Communications Act, which 
would place authorization for wiretapping in the hands of the 
judiciary.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice.
    The four largest newspapers, all privately owned, regularly report 
on human rights abuses, particularly those involving the JCF. Foreign 
publications are available widely. The Government privatized the 
Jamaica Broadcasting Company in 1997, and the television station and 
two radio stations it operated became privately owned. The Government's 
broadcasting commission has the right to regulate programming during 
emergencies. Foreign television transmissions are unregulated and 
available through satellite antennas.
    In an April 27 press conference, the Police Commissioner criticized 
a journalist who raised a question about political motivation behind a 
violent confrontation that occurred the previous day (see Section 
1.a.). On the following day, the same journalist was confronted by a 
police officer who pointed his gun inside the journalist's vehicle and 
asked him what he was doing.
    Near year's end, Parliament approved the Corruption Prevention Act, 
which the Government had reintroduced without clauses that journalists 
had charged would restrict their ability to report about corruption. 
The original draft had provided that journalists could be fined up to 
$25,000 (J$1 million) and receive 10 years' imprisonment for publishing 
information about an ongoing corruption investigation. The new act does 
not restrict the media from publication.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice.
    There were numerous community protests against police actions 
during the year, such as the 2 days of protests in May Pen over a 
killing by police (see Section 1.a.). A local human rights group 
organized various rallies, including reenactments of the August 1999 
beating of a man by security forces (see Section 1.a.) and the July 
1999 abduction of homeless persons (see Section 1.c.). Security 
personnel generally acted with restraint during public demonstrations.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law 
enforcement officials unfairly target them. It is alleged that the 
police force Rastafarian detainees to cut their hair and 
surreptitiously give them food that they are forbidden to eat. 
Rastafarians have no right to prison visits by Rastafarian clergy.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government provides asylum or refugee status in accordance with 
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum; it approved 
one application during the year. The Government established a committee 
and formal procedures to review claims to refugee status. This 
committee has denied all claims to refugee status by Cubans and 
Haitians who have arrived in the country since 1994.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in periodic 
elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. All citizens age 18 
and over have the right to vote by secret ballot. However, voters 
living in ``garrison communities'', in inner-city areas dominated by 
one of the two major political parties, face substantial influence and 
pressure from politically connected gangs and young men hired by 
political parties, which impede the free exercise of their right to 
vote.
    During the 1997 general election campaign, both international and 
local observer groups concluded that, although the process was 
significantly less violent than recent election campaigns, problems 
persisted in the garrison communities. These problems included 
intimidation of party agents and voters of nondominant parties and 
restrictions on the movement of voters and election workers. Some areas 
are so dominated by one party that the polls simply closed early and 
vote counts were taken that resulted in 100 percent (or nearly 100 
percent) of the votes being awarded to the dominant party. These 
problems persisted in the December 1997 election, despite the best 
efforts of the security forces, which were credited with controlling 
violence, such as the beating of voters, and reducing election 
malpractice, such as the theft of ballot boxes from polling places.
    There were two killings of politically connected persons late in 
the year that produced allegations of possible political motivation 
(see Section 1.a.), as well as other acts of alleged intimidation.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Women hold about 13 percent of all political offices and 30 
percent of the senior civil service positions. Two of the 16 cabinet 
members are women, as is the PNP General Secretary.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. The Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights is the 
country's only formal organization concerned with all aspects of human 
rights. Jamaicans for Justice is a human rights group created in August 
1999 in response to concerns about police impunity; the NGO focuses on 
the issues of extrajudicial killing and excessive use of force by the 
police. Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive 
to the views of human rights organizations.
    However, in an April press conference, senior police officials 
criticized Jamaicans for Justice on the occasion of an outbreak of 
severe violence (see Section 1.a.). The organization also reported that 
it received threatening telephone calls at its office following the 
killing of two policemen that month. The group noted that the police 
were cooperative in tracing and stopping threatening calls. In a 
newspaper article, the Minister of National Security and a member of 
the clergy questioned the sincerity of those defending human rights, 
claiming that they cared little for police officers killed in the line 
of duty. The Police Federation labeled the human rights NGO 
``suspicious,'' and stated that it would monitor the group's actions 
closely. Jamaicans for Justice reported that undercover police 
regularly attend their meetings.
    In August Amnesty International (AI) issued a statement to the 
Government expressing concern for a human rights attorney's safety. The 
attorney figured prominently in the inquiry into the abduction of 
homeless persons from Montego Bay (see Section 1.d.) and represented 
prisoners at the inquiry into beatings at St. Catherine's district 
prison (see Section 1.c.). AI contended that the attorney fled the 
country fearing for her life and that she reported death threats, 
surveillance, and illegal wiretapping from agents of prison 
authorities. The Police Commissioner stated that the attorney had not 
notified police of any such threats. The attorney also is wanted by 
police in connection with charges of fraud brought by a former client.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place 
of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex. The Government 
largely enforces these prohibitions in practice, except for widespread 
discrimination on the basis of political opinion in the distribution of 
scarce governmental benefits, including employment, especially in the 
garrison communities (see Section 3). Individuals have committed acts 
of violence against suspected homosexuals; in April a mob cornered a 
25-year-old man in a Kingston church and killed him because they 
suspected that he was a homosexual.
    Women.--Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against 
women, including spousal abuse. Violence against women is widespread, 
but many women are reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive behavior, 
leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent. Reported 
incidents of rape and incest have been on the rise, with a 10 percent 
increase in rapes during the year. The JCF rape investigative and 
juvenile unit, which is headed by a female deputy superintendent, 
handles sex crimes.
    The Domestic Violence Act of 1995 provides remedies for domestic 
violence, including restraining orders and other noncustodial 
sentencing. Breaching a restraining order is punishable by a fine of up 
to $250 (J$10,000) and/or 6 months' imprisonment.
    There have been some reports of sexual harassment of women by the 
police.
    The Constitution and the 1975 Employment Act accord women full 
legal equality; however, in practice women suffer from sexual 
harassment and economic discrimination in the workplace. The Bureau of 
Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Labor oversees programs to ensure 
the legal rights of women. These programs have had limited effect but 
have raised the awareness of problems affecting women. In 1996 the 
Government established a steering committee, charged with creating a 
Commission on Gender and Social Equity. The committee forwarded its 
recommendations to Parliament in 1997, which accepted them; Parliament 
continued to discuss methods of implementation at year's end.
    A number of active women's rights groups exist. They are concerned 
with a wide range of issues, including violence against women, 
political representation, employment, and the image of women presented 
in the media. Their effectiveness is mixed, but the groups were 
successful in advocating enactment of the 1995 Domestic Violence Act.
    Children.--The Government is committed to improving children's 
welfare. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture is responsible 
for implementation of the Government's programs for children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However, a 
number of reported cases of sexual abuse and incest may point to a 
growing trend. There were reports of child prostitution in some resort 
areas. Inducing prostitution on one's premises of a girl under 12 is a 
felony punishable by life imprisonment; of a girl between the ages of 
12 and 16 is a misdemeanor punishable by 5 years in prison. The 
encouraging of prostitution of a girl under age 16 by a legal guardian 
is a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment; procuring a girl 
under age 18 is also a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment. 
Child pornography is not prohibited by statute, but it is a common law 
offense that can be prosecuted as a form of indecency.
    The Juvenile Act of 1951 deals with several areas related to the 
protection of children, including the prevention of cruelty, a 
prohibition on causing or allowing juvenile begging, the power to bring 
juveniles in need of care or protection before a juvenile court, the 
treatment of juvenile offenders, the regulation and supervision of 
children's homes, and restrictions on employment of juveniles. However, 
resource constraints have resulted in juveniles ``in need of care or 
protection'' being incarcerated in police lockups with adults (see 
Section l.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--No laws mandate accessibility for the 
disabled, and disabled citizens have encountered discrimination in 
employment and denial of access to schools. Several government agencies 
and NGO's provide services and employment to various groups of disabled 
citizens. In 1998 the Prime Minister appointed the first blind member 
of the Senate, an action that despite expectations has not brought 
tangible benefits to disabled persons, although it helped to increase 
public awareness related to these issues. In July 1999, an incident in 
which police rounded up a number of persons (many of whom reportedly 
were mentally ill) triggered a national debate over police action (see 
Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to 
form or join a trade union, and unions function freely and 
independently of the Government. The Labor Relations and Industrial 
Disputes Act (LRIDA) defines worker rights. There is a spectrum of 
national unions, some of which are affiliated with political parties. 
Approximately 15 percent of the work force is unionized.
    The LRIDA neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to strike, but 
strikes do occur. Striking workers can interrupt work without criminal 
liability but cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. Other than in 
the case of prison guards, there is no evidence of any workers losing 
their job over a strike action. Workers in 10 broad categories of 
``essential services'' are prohibited from striking, a provision the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) repeatedly condemned as overly 
inclusive.
    Beginning December 29, 1999, prison guards conducted an islandwide 
sick-out to protest the proposed reappointment of the Commissioner of 
Corrections. When 800 guards failed to comply with an order to return 
to work, the authorities put them on forced leave at one-fourth pay 
beginning in January. In March the Government brought disciplinary 
charges against the guards and declared the work stoppage illegal. In 
May court hearings began to examine the charges against the guards on a 
case-by-case basis; they still were under way at year's end.
    On March 30, members of the Junior Doctor Association (JDA) staged 
an industrial action in which they curtailed their hours in retaliation 
for nonsettlement of salary negotiations. The Government declared the 
action illegal and the Supreme Court ordered the doctors back to work. 
They did not comply but subsequently ended their protest on April 4. 
The Government brought charges against the doctors who then apologized 
for their actions. In April the court sentenced the JDA's executive 
members to 200 hours of community service. The JDA appealed the ruling; 
in June a higher court overturned the ruling on the grounds that the 
JDA is not a legal organization and could not be taken to court. In 
July in response to the ruling, the Government declared that it would 
no longer conduct negotiations with ``nonlegal entities.'' Unions that 
represent teachers and government workers feared that this could 
include them, since they are not officially registered with the 
Government as trade unions. In protest the three largest registered 
trade unions boycotted an unrelated meeting with employers and the 
Government in August. However, there have been no consequences for the 
unregistered unions following the Government's announcement, reflecting 
the fact that various other laws and regulations provide for their 
right to bargain.
    Unions maintain a wide variety of regional and international 
affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There were no 
reports of government interference with union organizing efforts during 
the year. Judicial and police authorities effectively enforce the LRIDA 
and other labor regulations. All parties are committed firmly to 
collective bargaining in contract negotiations, even in some nonunion 
settings. An independent Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) hears cases 
where management and labor fail to reach agreement. Any cases not 
resolved by the IDT pass to the civil courts. The IDT generally handles 
35 to 40 cases each year. Most are decided within 90 days, but some 
take longer to resolve due to the complexity of the dispute or delays 
requested by the parties. The LRIDA prohibits antiunion discrimination, 
and employees may not be fired solely for union membership. The 
authorities enforced this law effectively.
    Collective bargaining is denied in a bargaining unit if no single 
union represents at least 40 percent of the workers in the unit in 
question or when the union seeking recognition for collective 
bargaining purposes does not obtain 50 percent of the votes of the 
total number of workers (whether or not they are affiliated to the 
union). The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) considers that where there 
is no collective agreement and where a trade union does not obtain 50 
percent of the votes of the total number of workers, that union should 
be able to negotiate at least on behalf of its own members. The COE 
requested the Government to take necessary measures to amend this 
legislation.
    Domestic labor laws apply equally to the ``free zones'' (export 
processing zones). However, there are no unionized companies in any of 
the 3 zones, which employ 7,703 workers. Organizers attribute this 
circumstance to resistance by foreign owners in the zones to organizing 
efforts, but attempts to organize plants within the zones continue. 
Company-controlled ``workers' councils'' handle grievance resolution at 
most free zone companies, but they do not negotiate wages and 
conditions with management. Management determines wages and benefits 
within the free zones; these are generally as good as or better than 
those in similar industries outside the zones. The Ministry of Labor is 
required to perform comprehensive factory inspections in the free zones 
once each year, and in practice it performs them at 6- to 9-month 
intervals. There were no reports of substandard or unsafe conditions in 
the free zone factories.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
does not specifically address the matter of forced or compulsory labor 
for either adults or children, but there were no reports that this 
practice exists.
    The ILO COE noted that the Jamaica Shipping Act of 1998 did not 
remove the provision that disciplinary offences of seafarers such as 
desertion and absence without leave are punishable by imprisonment 
(involving an obligation to work). The ILO points out that this is 
incompatible with ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor 
and requested that the Government amend the legislation. However, 
amendments to the law that were enacted in November did not address 
this criticism.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of 
12 shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that such 
employment may be only in domestic, agricultural, or horticultural 
work. However, enforcement is uneven. Children under the age of 12 are 
seen peddling goods and services on city streets. There are also 
reports that underage children are employed illegally in fishing 
communities and in prostitution. The Educational Act stipulates that 
all children between 6 and 11 years of age must attend elementary 
school. However, due to economic circumstances, thousands of children 
are kept home to help with housework and avoid school fees. A 1994 
UNICEF report stated that 4.6 percent of children below the age of 16 
worked to help support their households. In December 1999, the Minister 
of Labor, Welfare, and Sport gave a speech in which she stated that 
23,000 children were engaged in child labor. The Government and UNICEF 
cooperated on a strategy designed to eliminate child labor, to increase 
school awareness through poverty alleviation, and on a public awareness 
campaign intended to combat public complacency. However, these efforts 
are hampered by economic conditions, lack of resources, and incomplete 
information on the full extent of the problem.
    In September the Government signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the ILO in preparation to ratify ILO Convention 182 on the 
prohibition and elimination of the ``worst forms'' of child labor. The 
memorandum provides funding and technical assistance to assess the 
country's child labor situation. While the Constitution does not 
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children, such practices were not 
known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, raised from 
$20 (J$800) to $30 (J$1,200) per week in August 1999, is considered 
widely to be inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Most workers are paid more than the legal minimum, 
except in the tourism industry. Work over 40 hours per week or 8 hours 
per day must be compensated at overtime rates, a provision that is 
observed widely.
    The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division sets and enforces 
industrial health and safety standards, which are considered adequate. 
Public service staff reductions in the Ministries of Labor, Finance, 
National Security, and the Public Service have contributed to the 
difficulties in enforcing workplace regulations.
    The law provides workers with the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued 
employment if they are trade union members or covered by the Factories 
Act. The law does not specifically protect other categories of workers 
in those circumstances. Industrial accident rates, particularly in the 
bauxite and alumina industry, remained low.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, there are laws against assault and 
fraud, and other laws establish various immigration and customs 
regulations. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, 
from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                 MEXICO

    Mexico is a federal republic composed of 31 states and a federal 
district, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. On 
July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox Quesada of the opposition Alliance 
for Change Coalition president in elections that domestic and 
international observers judged to be generally free and fair, and which 
ended the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year hold on the 
presidency. Observers described the election as a historic turning 
point of the most profound significance and made recommendations for 
further electoral reform. Fox began his 6-year term on December 1, 
replacing Ernesto Zedillo. Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated 
violence continued to occur in the southern states of Chiapas, 
Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The peace process in Chiapas between the 
Government and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) remained 
stalled throughout most of the year; however, some progress was made in 
December after President Fox ordered the dismantling of military 
checkpoints, submitted to Congress a bill to implement the peace 
accords, and closed two contentious military posts in Chiapas. In 
addition, during December the state government released 16 EZLN 
prisoners and the EZLN, through its spokesman, set 3 conditions for the 
resumption of dialog. The judiciary is generally independent; however, 
it occasionally has been influenced by the executive branch. In 
addition, judicial effectiveness is hampered by inefficiency, a high 
caseload, and limited resources at almost all levels.
    The police forces, which include federal and state judicial police, 
the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), municipal police, and the various 
police auxiliary forces, have primary responsibility for internal 
security. However, the military plays a large role in some law 
enforcement functions, primarily counternarcotics, and also exercises 
internal security responsibilities. Elected civilian officials control 
the police and the military; however, corruption is widespread within 
police ranks and also is a problem for the military. The military 
maintains a strong presence in the state of Chiapas and a lesser, but 
still significant, deployment in Guerrero. Military personnel and 
police officers continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
    The Government continued to deregulate and open the market-based, 
mixed economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 was $484 
billion and the inflation rate was 12.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999 
was about $4,974. The economy still is recovering from the 1994 
economic crisis, and real wages are less than before the crisis. 
Leading exports include petroleum, automobiles, and manufactured and 
assembled products, including electronics and consumer goods. One-
fourth of the population resides in rural areas where subsistence 
agriculture is common. Income distribution remained skewed; the top 30 
percent of the population received about 67 percent of total income, 
while the bottom 30 percent earned less than 7.4 percent.
    The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas and in some 
states where a poor climate of respect for human rights presents 
special concern. Federal and state law enforcement officials were 
accused of committing political and extrajudicial killings. There 
continued to be credible reports of disappearances. The police 
regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this 
evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence 
confessions extracted under torture. The military also has been accused 
of using torture. Widespread police corruption and alleged police 
involvement in narcotics-related crime continued. Prison conditions are 
poor. The police continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. 
Lengthy pretrial detention, lack of due process, and judicial 
inefficiency and corruption persisted. Threats and attacks on 
journalists--some reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
hindered press freedom, and there were reports of some self-censorship. 
Drug-related killings and violence, particularly in the northern 
states, continued. Violence and discrimination against women, 
indigenous people, religious minorities, and homosexuals persisted. 
Child prostitution and abuse continued. There were credible reports of 
limits on freedom of association and worker rights. Extensive child 
labor in agriculture and the informal economy and trafficking in 
persons are problems. There were increased reports of vigilante 
killings.
    The Government's efforts to improve the human rights situation 
continued to meet with limited success. Although the Government has 
sanctioned some public officials, police officers, and members of the 
military, widespread impunity continues to be a serious problem among 
the security forces. The Zedillo Government continued to support the 
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), and in April 1999, Congress 
amended the Constitution to grant it greater autonomy from the 
executive branch. However, the CNDH primarily investigates complaints 
against federal authorities and has no enforcement powers.
    Armed civilian groups operating in the state of Chiapas committed 
human rights abuses. There continued to be a high incidence of 
narcotics-related violence, particularly in the northern states, and 
human rights abuses, allegedly with the assistance of members of the 
security forces. Guerrilla attacks against government property and 
personnel continued, but at a lesser rate and intensity relative to 
previous years.
    On December 2, the day after his inauguration, President Fox and 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson signed an 
agreement on technical assistance in human rights matters. Commissioner 
Robinson also announced the establishment of a human rights U.N. 
liaison office to work with human rights organizations to help 
implement the technical assistance program. Robinson stated that the 
accord was especially significant because the President himself had 
signed it on his second day in office in the state of Oaxaca, where 
there are notable human rights problems.
    Shortly before assuming office, President Fox announced the 
appointment of Mariclaire Acosta, former president of the Mexican 
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, to the new 
position of Special Ambassador for Human Rights. Her mission is to 
ensure that the Government complies with its human rights commitments, 
and that it distributes its human rights resources effectively.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Federal and state 
law enforcement officials were accused of committing political and 
extrajudicial killings. In past years, the military also was accused of 
such killings; however, there were no reports implicating the military 
during the year.
    There were some apparently politically motivated killings by 
security force officials. On June 15, Artemio Arturo Perez, a 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) supporter arrested for causing a 
public disturbance during a PRI political rally in Mixistlan de La 
Reforma, Oaxaca, died in his jail cell. Perez and his family claimed 
that PRI party members forced persons to attend the rally, and that 
Perez was arrested for voicing his disapproval. The prison authorities 
declared suicide to be the official cause of death, but Perez's family 
and various human rights organizations claim that he died as a result 
of torture (see Section 1.c.). On June 21, two family members began a 
hunger strike to demand action against prison employees Alfredo Reyes, 
Wilfrido Hernandez Solano, and Luis Faustino Gonzalez for abuse of 
authority, illegal detention, and torture. The case is under 
investigation by the Oaxaca state attorney general's office and the 
state's Human Rights Commission.
    In March the president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission cited 
several cases of possible police involvement in the deaths of prisoners 
(see Section 1.c.).
    The Durango state Human Rights Commission is investigating the 
presumed suicide of Jose Manuel Urbina, who was found drowned in a 
state security facility in June. National Action Party (PAN) deputy 
Victor Hugo Castaneda Soto questioned the manner in which Urbina was 
arrested and noted that his body was found in a crouched position, a 
difficult position to maintain by someone attempting to drown himself.
    On July 19, five men with known drug connections were found hanged 
near El Quelite, Sinaloa. On July 16, according to witnesses, armed men 
in Federal Judicial Police uniforms kidnaped the five--Fausto Andres 
Arellano Vidales, Anacleto Valle Garcia, Gaston Horacio Lopez 
Amarillas, Guillermo Gurrola Gutierrez, and Carlos Lopez Torres--from a 
store in Mazatlan, Sinaloa. State authorities were investigating the 
case, including a drug trafficking connection, at year's end.
    There were numerous reports of executions carried out by rival drug 
gangs, whose members have included both active and former federal, 
state, and municipal security personnel. Throughout the country, but 
particularly in the northern border states, violence related to 
narcotics trafficking continued. For example, 27 murders with presumed 
or proven drug connections occurred in the Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua 
area from January 1 to August 31. The modus operandi of the killings 
has shifted from the kidnapings and disappearances of the mid-1990's to 
armed attacks in public areas throughout the city, in which intended 
targets and innocent bystanders are victims. The police and military 
were accused of committing serious human rights violations as they 
carried out the Government's efforts to combat drug cartels.
    Although narcotics-trafficking organizations committed many 
killings, human rights groups allege that security forces are 
responsible for some killings generally attributed to narcotics 
traffickers or other criminals, including some of those whose bodies 
were discovered in Chihuahua in December 1999 (see Section 1.b.). The 
Association of Families of Disappeared Persons has alleged that the 
security forces were behind many of the disappearances and has argued 
that the cases were not investigated properly for that reason.
    In October 1999, a group of men armed with assault weapons attacked 
Acapulco City councilor-elect Marco Antonio Lopez Garcia and his family 
while they were en route to a PRD election victory celebration. The 
councilor's son was killed, and the councilor seriously wounded. State 
authorities charged a PRD activist with the crime and alleged that he 
was affiliated with the Popular Revolutionary Insurgency Army (ERPI). 
The suspect later repudiated a confession that he alleged was coerced 
by torture and was released in November 1999. PRD officials rejected 
the results of the state investigation as false and called for federal 
intervention. Human rights observers charged that state and federal 
authorities used the investigation into electoral violence to repress 
opposition parties and peasant organizations by linking the political 
opposition to insurgent groups. The case is unresolved and still open.
    There were no new developments during the year in the Federal 
Attorney General's office's (PGR) investigation into the March 1999 
killing in Guerrero of Aurelio Penaloza Garcia, a former state attorney 
general and advisor to the PRD's unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate, 
by men dressed in Federal Judicial Police uniforms and armed with 
automatic weapons. In April 1999, the authorities had charged 
Bernardino Alvear Villa and Juan Valdovinos Rodriguez in connection 
with this murder. They have been arrested and were in jail awaiting 
trial at year's end. An arrest warrant has been issued for Eulogis 
Palacios.
    On April 29, the Morelos state supreme court upheld the state 
congress's decision to bar former governor Jorge Carillo Olea from 
holding state office for the next 12 years because of his 
administration's connection to a kidnaping ring in the state. In March 
1999, a court convicted the former Morelos state attorney general, 
Carlos Peredo Merlo, of allowing the cover-up of the kidnaping, 
torture, and murder of Jorge Nava Aviles in 1998. He eventually 
received a sentence of less than 2 years. The court also convicted 
Cuernavaca's former deputy prosecutor and the former director of the 
state judicial police on related charges in the same case and sentenced 
each of them to 3 years and 3 months. The remaining persons accused in 
this case still are awaiting trial.
    There were no new developments regarding the October 1999 death of 
Cosem Demian Sanchez Sastre, a member of the Zapatista National 
Liberation Front (FZLN), the political branch of the EZLN, who was 
found dead in his cell in a Tijuana detention facility. There also were 
no new developments regarding either the August 1999 case of the arrest 
of Tamaulipas PGR officials charged with the murder of fellow PGR 
official Jaime Rajid Gutierrez Arreola or the May 1999 killing of 1 
immigrant when federal fiscal police opened fire on a van containing 23 
persons.
    There were no new developments in the June 1999 case of Mauricio 
Martinez Hernandez, a municipal worker killed by a police officer in 
Naucalpan, in the state of Mexico. There were no new developments in 
the May 1999 attack on indigenous rights leader Herberto Pazos Ortiz.
    There were no new developments in the case of Gerardo Villarreal 
Rodriguez, who died in Nuevo Leon in 1998, after being tortured by four 
state police officers; or in the investigation of the 1998 killing of 
an alleged migrant smuggler, in which seven members of the Grupo Beta 
police unit were detained.
    On May 18, a Chiapas state court convicted the thendirector of the 
auxiliary police, former General Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz, and his two 
chief lieutenants, Roberto Garcia Rivas and Roberto Martin Mendez, of 
``homicide by omission'' and sentenced them to 8 years in jail in 
connection with the 1997 Acteal massacre. The men were close enough to 
hear the shootings, but took no action and reported that all was quiet 
in their area when questioned by state officials. Of the 102 persons 
detained, 58 now have been convicted and sentenced, although 24 have 
had their sentences suspended. There are outstanding warrants for 27 
others.
    On May 10, 14 former police officers involved in the 1997 killing 
of 6 youths during a police operation in the Mexico City neighborhood 
of Buenos Aires were convicted in connection with 3 of those killings. 
The court sentenced 11 officers to the maximum penalty of 50 years in 
jail and 2 others to 18-1/2 years. However, in September a judge denied 
an arrest warrant for Moctezuma Ilhuicamina Zaepeda Rodriguez and Jose 
Lamberto Ponce Lara, the two former leaders of the police groups 
implicated in the murders. The same judge also either acquitted or 
denied arrest warrants for 15 other police officers in September. 
Investigations were still underway into the killings of the remaining 
three youths.
    The courts have arrested 44 public officials in connection with the 
1995 Aguas Blancas massacre of 17 indigenous farmers. Of the 44, 13 
former police officers have been convicted and sentenced to 18 years in 
prison, 9 other former government officials have been convicted and 
sentenced, and 3 of the accused are fugitives. Fifteen former police 
officers have been absolved and freed on appeal, as have 7 other former 
officials. Despite recommendations by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR), the U.N. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, 
and the Supreme Court, then-Governor Ruben Figueroa Alcocer has not 
been investigated or prosecuted for his alleged involvement in the 
massacre. The Guerrero state government has indemnified the debts of 
the victims' families, and both the federal and state governments 
consider the case resolved.
    On June 12, seven Chiapas state policemen were killed and one other 
policeman and a civilian were wounded in an ambush in Las Limas 
village, El Bosque municipality, Chiapas. On July 26, the Federal 
Attorney General's office announced the arrests of PRI supporter 
Alberto Patishtan Gomez and EZLN supporter Salvador Lopez Gonzalez in 
connection with the ambush on charges of murder, robbery, and 
possession of illegal weapons. The Federal Attorney General's office 
charged that Patishtan and Lopez were part of an armed 10-person group 
that carried out the attack. However, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas 
Human Rights Center maintains Lopez's innocence, claiming there is 
insufficient proof against him.
    On July 30, Juan Lopez and Gabriel Luis Hernandez Gomez were 
arrested in connection with the June 1999 murder of Jose Hidalgo Perez, 
a member of a politically active family in San Cristobal de Las Casas, 
Chiapas. They are awaiting trial.
    There were no new developments in the January 1999 killing of 
villagers in Tzacabel, Chiapas.
    On February 27, the authorities arrested two suspects for the 
January 1999 murder of Jorge Aguirre Meza, cofounder of the Sinaloa 
Human Rights Defense Commission and a mayoral candidate in the 
municipality of Navolato. The suspects, who reportedly have ties to 
narcotrafficking, are currently in jail and on trial in Culiacan, the 
state capital. Arrest warrants for two other suspects were also issued; 
however, these suspects are in a Mexicali jail on unrelated crimes.
    The number of reports of vigilante killings and violence increased 
during the year, as compared to 1999. For example, on July 30, 
approximately 2,000 residents of the community Nueva Palestina, 
Chiapas, put an indigenous man on trial for a robbery and murder and 
killed him. The state attorney general's office dispatched a team to 
investigate and to help resolve tensions in the community.
    b. Disappearance.--There continued to be credible reports of 
disappearances. The CNDH is working to establish a nationwide database 
to assist in the identification of unknown remains, some of which may 
be those of persons who disappeared. According to press reports, the 
CNDH during the year received 37 cases of presumed disappearances; 19 
of those reported missing later were found alive and well. In December 
1999, nine bodies were recovered from graves outside Ciudad Juarez, 
Chihuahua. Six of the nine bodies were identified positively and the 
remains released to their families in May. Three of the bodies were 
identified as persons not previously listed among the 224 persons 
reported missing in the state since 1994. All of the victims are 
believed to have had ties to drug trafficking in some way. Federal 
authorities confiscated the ranch where the bodies were found but the 
courts subsequently ordered it returned to its owner in July. The 
Chihuahua-based Committee for the Defense of Human Rights alleges that 
military and police forces are responsible for some of the 
disappearances. The Association of Families of the Disappeared Persons 
also has alleged that the security forces were behind many of the 
disappearances and has argued that the cases were not investigated 
properly for that reason.
    According to the national public security system, there were 607 
kidnapings in 1999, 734 in 1998, and 1,047 in 1997. However, kidnaping 
is an underreported crime. In Michoacan police have broken 89 kidnaping 
rings since 1996, resulting in 500 arrests, including 49 during the 
year. On August 18, Mexico City's Legislative Assembly passed a law to 
impose mandatory minimum sentences of 15 to 20 years for Mexico City 
public servants convicted of kidnaping. Although 6 kidnapings were 
reported in Chihuahua State from January to August, all have been 
resolved and 11 suspects were arrested and remain in custody. None of 
the suspects detained are public officials.
    According to the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Center for Human Rights 
(PRODH), on March 13, gunmen allegedly under the order of local bosses 
in Ajuchitlan del Progreso, Guerrero, kidnaped Maximino Marcial Jaimes. 
He has not been seen since. Marcial was a member of an environmentalist 
organization. According to PRODH, the press had reported that Marcial 
was in Almoloya prison, but the prison officially denied his presence 
there. His whereabouts were unknown at year's end.
    According to the January 1999 Human Rights Watch report, many 
disappearance cases were in fact cases of prolonged detention by 
security forces. The report detailed incidents that occurred in 
previous years, and numerous human rights groups credibly asserted that 
disappearances continued to occur.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, it continues 
to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as evidence 
confessions obtained in the absence of the accused person's defense 
attorney, and the law excludes coerced confessions, including those 
extracted under torture. However, the police regularly obtain 
information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts, 
and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted 
under torture. The military has also been accused of using torture. 
According to Amnesty International (AI), many victims do not report, or 
do not follow through on complaints against the police due to fear of 
reprisals, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators. To combat 
torture, the Congress passed laws to prevent and sanction torture in 
1991 (amended in 1994), adopted the Law of the Defense Office of Mexico 
City in 1998 and the Federal Public Defense Law in 1998.
    In her 1999 annual address, the then-president of the CNDH 
acknowledged that torture continued to be a serious human rights 
problem. She cited the PGR and the Defense Secretariat as the main 
organizations associated with the use of torture. In a report published 
in July 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that 
laws aimed to prevent torture were inadequate because of the absence of 
an independent body to investigate allegations of mistreatment. There 
are persistent reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) of the 
widespread use of torture by the police and the security forces. In a 
June 22 report, AI Mexico claimed to have received numerous complaints 
that indicate that torture is a habitual practice in many areas of the 
country especially to extract confessions and information in place of 
police investigations. In October the same organization reported that 
the legal system permits torture, that torture is practiced in the 
country, and that urgent action is needed to eliminate it. AI called 
for legislative and administrative reforms to enforce the laws against 
torture and eliminate the judicial prerogative that permits the 
introduction of confessions extracted under torture. Nigel Rodley, the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported in January 1998 that 
torture continued to occur despite the fact that the country had in 
place an array of legal safeguards. In March Guadalupe Morfin Otero, 
president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission (CEDHJ), attacked the 
state attorney general's office for continuing the use of torture when 
interrogating prisoners. She cited several cases of possible police 
involvement in the death of prisoners (see Section 1.a.).
    The authorities punish few officials for torture, which continues 
to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in 
many criminal convictions. Poorly trained and inadequately equipped to 
investigate crimes, police officers often attempt to solve crimes by 
rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them 
by force.
    In August the police in Nueva Italia, Michoacan, arrested Ivan 
Ramirez and Israel Moline and allegedly tortured them into confessing 
to the murder of their friend. One of the youths charged that he 
confessed only after at least six state police officers had beaten him, 
semi-asphyxiated him using plastic bags, and damaged his testicles. The 
youths told the judge that they had been tortured; however, he admitted 
their confessions as evidence anyway and consigned them to jail. When 
the friend returned from an unannounced trip 3 months later, the youths 
were released. The Michoacan State Human Rights Commission charged 
state legal authorities with fabricating evidence in the case.
    On August 4, CNDH report 8/2000 charged that the military falsified 
evidence against two environmental activists, Rodolfo Montiel Flores 
and Teodoro Cabrera Garcia, tortured them, violated their rights to due 
process, and harassed residents in their home village, Pizotla, 
Guerrero. The military did not respond publicly to the CNDH report. 
Montiel and Cabrera had been arrested in May 1999 on charges of illegal 
drug cultivation and illegal possession of arms, and their colleague 
Salome Sanchez Ortiz was killed by the military. Montiel and Cabrera 
stated that military personnel tortured them to extract their 
confessions. The Government stated that on three separate occasions, 
Montiel and Cabrera confessed to illegal activities, and that tests had 
indicated that both men had fired a gun. However, the defense team 
stated that on each of those occasions Montiel and Cabrera were 
intimidated by the presence of military personnel. Initial medical 
examinations performed in 1999 by government and CNDH doctors did not 
find evidence of torture, but a medical examination by independent 
doctors on July 29 did find physical evidence consistent with torture. 
The CNDH recommended that the army conduct numerous internal 
investigations of its handling of the arrests and detentions. On August 
28, a judge sentenced Cabrera to 10 years' imprisonment for illegal 
possession of arms reserved for the exclusive use of the military. 
Montiel was sentenced to 6 years and 8 months on the same charge, as 
well as for possession of arms without a license, and illegal drug 
cultivation. Defense lawyers cited many irregularities in the judicial 
process and are appealing the verdict. On October 19, the press 
reported that the PGR requested that the sentences of Montiel and 
Cabrera be increased to the maximum of 20 years; however, on October 
27, the appeals judge upheld their original sentences.
    On April 1, the former president of the Guerrero state PRD, David 
Molina Francisco, alleged that he was freed after being held hostage 
for 40 hours by military personnel. Molina claims that he was tortured 
physically and psychologically, including being beaten and subjected to 
electric shocks, and interrogated on activities of insurgent groups. 
The PRD lodged a formal complaint with the Guerrero state human rights 
commission.
    On August 1, the Mexico City human rights commission recommended 
that the city's attorney general's office investigate the torture of 
Jose Luis Mendez Briano and Fernando Martinez Beltran, who were 
arrested by city police on June 24 while making their getaway from a 
robbery. One of the men was transferred to the hospital for treatment 
of various injuries.
    On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police discovered 
four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car. The police 
allegedly beat them, stripped them of their clothing, and kept them in 
a cell for several hours, before finally letting them go. The federal 
prosecutor's office in Ecatepec opened an inquiry into the alleged 
violations; the inquiry continued at year's end.
    State human rights commissions also received reports of torture 
allegedly committed by police. The CEDHJ charged in September 1999, 
that the Jalisco state attorney general, Felix Ledesma Martinez, and 
the mayor of Guadalajara, Francisco Ramirez Acuna, had impeded an 
investigation into an alleged case of torture to protect high-ranking 
members of the Guadalajara municipal police force. On January 13, 
Jalisco state police arrested former armored car guard Jesus Galvan 
Ortiz in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Galvan claimed that police took him to a 
house, tortured him, and demanded that he confess to robbing an armored 
car. Police released him several hours later and never charged him. The 
house where Galvan allegedly was taken and tortured was later found to 
belong to the wife of attorney general Ledesma. On February 8, Ledesma 
admitted to owning the property but denied any knowledge of the alleged 
torture. Nonetheless, on February 14, citing personal reasons, he 
resigned from office. The Jalisco CEDH was investigating Galvan's 
allegations at year's end.
    In September 1999, the president of the Mexico City Human Rights 
Commission (CDHDF), Luis de la Barreda, announced that during the 
CDHDF's 6 years of existence, the Mexico City attorney general's office 
(PDJDF) was the subject of the majority of its recommendations 
regarding torture. The commission made 14 recommendations involving 18 
alleged perpetrators; 7 against the PDJDF, 6 against the Director 
General of Prisons, 3 against the Secretary of Public Security, and 2 
against the Director General of Public Health. In its report, the CDHDF 
noted that it had investigated 44 security personnel for the use of 
torture. It had 17 of these cases still under investigation, dismissed 
5, and had found 22 public officials culpable. However, the authorities 
did not arrest 11 of those found culpable.
    During the year, the Zacatecas state Human Rights Commission issued 
several recommendations for punitive action against the state police 
for their habitual use of torture. On August 8, the Zacatecas state 
legislature requested that Governor Ricardo Monreal Avila order the 
state attorney general to designate a special prosecutor to investigate 
the local police for the alleged torture of four persons accused of 
stealing farm equipment in 1999. On September 20, state prosecutors 
issued arrest warrants for two state policemen on charges of torture, 
illegal arrest, and abuse of authority. The prosecutors also announced 
that they were investigating five other members of the state police, 
including the state police chief, for their presumed involvement in 
torture. However, despite the public urging of Governor Ricardo 
Monreal, neither arrest order had been executed by year's end.
    Members of the security forces were charged with committing rape. 
For example, on June 10, municipal police in Matias Romero, Oaxaca, 
arrested Rolando Jesus Vazquez Vargas, a sergeant in the 6th artillery 
regiment, for the rape and beating of Maria de Carmen Dominguez. Two 
other men are being sought in connection with the same assault. On July 
18, Chihuahua state judicial police arrested three soldiers, Ruben 
Villanueva Sanchez, Eleazar Jimenez Flores, and Rosendo Juarez Zenil, 
for raping and beating a tourist. A 1998 report by the IACHR described 
a definite pattern of rape and sexual assault against women committed 
by such officials. The Commission stated that some women had been 
assaulted sexually by law enforcement officials, particularly those in 
detention, or had been assaulted by others with the officials' consent.
    Official corruption and complicity in crime continues to be a 
source of human rights violations. For example, on May 25 and 26, the 
authorities arrested two Mexico City judicial police agents, Ahui Omar 
Castro Hernandez and Gerardo Bustamante Dominguez, and Rene Rodriguez 
Monroy, a former employee of the city's public security secretariat, on 
extortion charges. They allegedly demanded $16,000 (150,000 pesos) from 
narcotics trafficker Jose Rigoberto Caballero, in exchange for his 
freedom from city custody. Many citizens distrust the justice system, 
including law enforcement officials, and are reluctant to register 
official complaints.
    On July 23, workers at a hospital construction site in Ciudad 
Juarez rioted in protest over mistreatment by police and poor working 
conditions (see Section 6.e.). According to the workers, one of the 
underlying causes of the incident was persistent petty extortion by the 
police.
    On August 8, Juan Ramos Lopez, judicial director of the city's 
Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), lodged a complaint against the 
PGJDF with the Mexico City human rights commission. Ramos alleged that 
the PGJDF had been persecuting him since November 1999 when the SSP 
approached the PGJDF for information on the diversion of funds in the 
city's auxiliary police force. A PGJDF investigation into the diversion 
of funds continues, and 26 auxiliary police commanders have been 
suspended from duty for their involvement in the scandal.
    Police abuse and inefficiency hamper investigations. For example, 
in April a court overturned on appeal the 30-year sentence of Abdel 
Latif Sharif, convicted in connection with the string of murders of 
over 200 women since 1993 in Ciudad Juarez, based on lack of 
consistency in the autopsy reports. Sharif remains in custody and is to 
receive a new trial. Since his arrest, eight more young women have been 
kidnaped, raped, strangled, and their bodies dumped in the same areas 
of the desert where previous victims were found. Four bus drivers are 
still in detention for allegedly committing the murders while Sharif 
was incarcerated. The bus drivers claim that they were tortured into 
confessing, and their case remained under investigation at year's end 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Several human rights organizations and the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, who visited the country in 
1999, believe that the Government has made only limited progress in 
solving these murders because most of the victims were poor, young 
women, few of whom had anyone to press the authorities for intensive 
investigation. However, police incompetence, prosecutorial ineptitude, 
and lack of investigative resources also hampered the investigation.
    To enhance the investigation into the murders in Ciudad Juarez, the 
Chihuahua attorney general's office appointed a special prosecutor for 
crimes against women in 1998. The special prosecutor's office has 65 
cases in process, related to 67 of the victims; the remains of 23 of 
the victims required extensive scientific examination to identify them. 
In August the court system in Ciudad Juarez had a total of 145 cases in 
process against 103 persons for murdering women, including for motives 
of domestic violence, crimes of passion, drug connections, and revenge.
    Some law enforcement personnel have been known to have drug 
trafficking connections. For example, in November 1999, 4 former 
Tamaulipas state police officers were among a group of 10 men, 
including narcotics trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Quillen, who confronted 2 
international law enforcement officers with automatic rifles on a busy 
street in Matamoros, Tamaulipas. Carlos-Guillen and his associates went 
into hiding and are being sought by the authorities.
    On June 21, the PGR arrested Jose Ricardo Rodriguez Torres, Ruben 
Cortes Flores, Miguel Angel Crespo Zoloeta, and Carlos Pineda Bernal, 
four Tijuana-based agents of the PGR's counternarcotics agency. They 
were charged with drug trafficking.
    On August 8, the newspaper La Jornada reported that the internal 
affairs department of the PGR sanctioned 3,060 public servants between 
December 1996 and March 2000 for involvement in illegal activities, 
especially drug trafficking.
    Narcotics-trafficking organizations also included corrupt public 
officials. The former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva 
Madrid, is suspected of having aided narcoticstrafficking 
organizations. He fled shortly before his term of office expired in 
1999 and still was being sought by federal authorities at year's end. 
Villanueva Madrid claims that he is innocent and the victim of a 
political frame-up.
    Government officials have conceded the country's serious human 
rights shortcomings. UNHCHR Robinson, who visited the country in 
November 1999, said that President Zedillo's admission that serious 
human rights violations occur in Mexico was a positive sign. In an 
effort to fight corruption and provide better public security, the 
Government created the PFP in 1999. The 12,000-person force includes 
approximately 5,000 transferred military personnel and another 6,000 
from the former federal highway police. The inclusion of military 
personnel, who take a leave of absence from the armed forces while 
serving in the PFP, led to criticism from some human rights NGO's.
    Police extorted money from street children, at times abused 
homosexuals (see Section 5), and violated the rights of illegal 
immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
    Francisco Hernan Cortes, one of the presumed attackers in the May 
1999 attempt on the life of PRD Senator Hector Sanchez Lopez and two 
companions, remains in jail awaiting trial in Oaxaca.
    Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons are staffed by 
undertrained and corrupt guards, and some lack adequate facilities. 
Prisoners complain that they must purchase food, medicine, and other 
necessities from guards or bribe guards to allow the goods to be 
brought in from outside. The penal system comprises 444 facilities: 5 
federal penitentiaries, 8 federal district prisons, 329 state prisons, 
and 102 municipal and regional jails. Prison overcrowding continued to 
be a common problem, despite an early release program endorsed by the 
CNDH, legal reforms that reduced the number of crimes that carry 
mandatory prison sentences, and the construction of new prisons. 
Antonio Sanchez Galindo, technical director of the Council for Minors 
of the Secretariat of Government, estimated that the prison population 
is 50 percent over capacity. The prisons with the largest 
overpopulation are: Reclusorio Norte in Mexico City-Capacity 4,506, 
actual population 7,419; Reclusorio Oriente in Mexico City-Capacity 
4,295, actual population 7,441; Reclusorio Sur in Mexico City-Capacity 
2,914, actual population 4,485; La Mesa in Tijuana-Capacity 1,716, 
actual population 5,982; Ciudad Juarez-Capacity 1,310, actual 
population 2,740. In Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the state prison 
increased its capacity by 400 beds to 1,240, but the facility still has 
2,720 inmates. The authorities in Chihuahua State have approved the 
construction of a second penitentiary in Ciudad Juarez to ease 
overcrowding and begun construction on a new juvenile detention 
facility, which is scheduled to be completed in 2001.
    In 1998 Federal District prison director Carlos Tornero Diaz 
admitted that guards supply 40 percent of the illegal drugs smuggled 
into the prisons, and that inmates lacked sufficient drinking water. 
While the authorities investigate some prison officials for abusing 
prisoners, they more commonly dismiss those who commit abuses or charge 
them with only minor offenses. Drug and alcohol abuse is a problem in 
prisons. A Baja California State official estimated that 80 percent of 
the state's prison population are addicted to drugs. Conflicts between 
rival prison groups involved in drug trafficking continue to occur. On 
September 5, Federal Judicial police stormed the Torreon prison to end 
what they claimed were 20 years of self-government by the prisoners. In 
the process, the police seized munitions, drugs including cocaine and 
marijuana, and alcohol. In May doctors at a prison in Nuevo Laredo 
resigned, citing unhealthy conditions such as inadequate food and water 
as the reason for their resignations. They stated that conditions such 
as mange, AIDS, and tuberculosis are known to the authorities, who fail 
to take any action to treat and segregate sick inmates.
    The Oaxaca Human Rights Networks reported that Eugenio Almaraz 
Garcia, a Zapotec man, died on February 29 from presumed neglect by the 
director of the Pochutla, Oaxaca prison. According to his family and 
the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights, Almaraz died of 
septic shock, multiple organ failure, and tuberculosis after being 
denied medical attention 6 days before his death. The Oaxaca state 
Human Rights Commission is investigating the case.
    In many prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison 
officials. Influence peddling, drug, and arms trafficking, coercion, 
violence, sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of 
control used by prisoners against their fellow inmates. Corruption and 
poor conditions led to riots and escapes. On September 30, about 60 
detainees at the Juarez Juvenile Detention Center were involved in a 
clash with authorities. The troubles began when repeat offenders being 
held in isolation allegedly exposed themselves to guards and refused to 
return to their cells. Ten ringleaders then incited others to join in 
the disturbance. Rioters broke lights and tore down power cables before 
being subdued by police reinforcements using tear gas.
    On May 17, the PFP intervened in the Penitentiary Number 1 in Nuevo 
Laredo, Tamaulipas to regain control of the prison, which had been 
exercised by a narcotics-trafficker prisoner, Guillermo Martines.
    On September 5, close to 1,000 PFP personnel intervened in the 
state penitentiary in Torreon, Coahuila, to break the control 
established by prisoner Martin Gallardo.
    In August the CNDH issued a recommendation to the governor of 
Tabasco and requested an immediate investigation into the 
administrators of the state penitentiary. Prison riots at the state 
penitentiary on October 22 and November 3, 1999, left 11 prisoners 
dead. The CNDH report criticized Tabasco prison administrators for 
their negligence in not caring for the prisoners during severe flooding 
and for failing to maintain order, impartiality, and the physical 
integrity of prisoners.
    Women are held separately from men and juveniles are held 
separately from adults.
    Although the Constitution calls for separation of convicted 
criminals from detainees held in custody, in practice these 
requirements were violated routinely as a result of overcrowding.
    There is no specific law or regulation to allow human rights 
organizations or other NGO's to visit prisons; however, in practice 
such visits are permitted in certain situations, especially by the 
CNDH. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
is able to visit prisoners in Chiapas due to a July 1998 agreement with 
the Government. For permission to visit prisoners in Oaxaca and 
Guerrero, the ICRC must apply to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued 
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Arbitrary arrest and 
detention were among the most common human rights abuses. Legally, a 
prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours before he must 
present the accused to a judge, except when the accused is caught in 
the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. In 1999 Human Rights 
Watch reported that a great number of disappearances eventually are 
found to be cases of arbitrary detention (see Section 1.b.).
    Reports of arbitrary detention occur with greatest frequency in 
Tabasco, Guerrero, Chiapas, the Federal District, and Oaxaca. States' 
attorney general personnel, state police, and the army are the most 
frequent abusers of detention laws.
    The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an 
accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime 
carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime 
carries a longer sentence. These periods can be extended if the parties 
agree. In practice, judicial and police authorities frequently ignored 
these time limits. Criminal defendants often were held with convicted 
prisoners. Furthermore, many detainees reported that judicial officials 
often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges. Those able 
to pay were released from custody. Corruption is rampant throughout the 
system. For example, in May two judicial police agents along with a 
former city government employee were arrested on extortion charges (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally 
mandated periods. In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661 files of indigenous 
persons who were detained and recommended the immediate release of 
1,727 persons. Of those states with the largest numbers of indigenous 
prisoners, the CNDH reviewed 2,222 cases in Oaxaca, and recommended 407 
releases, of which 296 had been accomplished by the end of 1998; 1,219 
cases in Veracruz, with 331 recommendations for release and 245 
releases; and 639 cases in Puebla, with 157 releases recommended, and 
61 releases. In November 1999 the CNDH signed an accord with 
Secretariat of Government, the PGR, the Federal Institute of the Public 
Defense office, and the National Indigenous Institute (INI), to develop 
a program for the anticipated liberty of indigenous prisoners in 
federal prisons. Since that time, the CNDH has developed a database of 
2,314 registered cases, and 381 persons were released during the year.
    Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the recommendation by 
the INI that they drop charges against first-time offenders accused of 
drug cultivation, as drug traffickers often forced indigenous 
defendants, who were not made aware of the legal significance of their 
actions, to grow the crops. The INI also supports programs to provide 
translators for indigenous defendants and to assist them in obtaining 
bail bonds.
    Some human rights groups have claimed that activists arrested in 
connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political 
detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes 
those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes, 
such as homicide and damage to property.
    The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally 
independent; however, on occasion it has been influenced by the 
executive branch, particularly at the state level. Corruption, 
inefficiency, and disregard of the law are major problems. Corruption 
and impunity are serious problems and tend to benefit the wealthy and 
powerful. Lack of training also is a problem. Judicial reforms have 
begun to address some of these problems, but full resolution of these 
problems awaits more extensive and systemic judicial reform. In 
February and March 1999, the Congress and the states passed 
constitutional reforms designed to streamline the administration of 
justice and repeal archaic laws. Human rights groups criticized these 
reforms, claiming that they effectively allow prosecutors to disregard 
defendants' allegations of violation of due process during criminal 
proceedings. On August 11, the International Jurists Commission 
reported that judicial authority has been diminished severely by the 
procedural immunity enjoyed by officials of the State, particularly the 
military.
    The federal court system consists of a Supreme Court, 91 circuit 
courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.
    Efforts to implement the 1995 judicial reforms continued. During 
the year, the Federal Judicial Council strengthened administrative 
control over the judiciary, investigated cases of corruption, and 
removed some corrupt judges. In addition, in September the Institute 
for Professional Formation of the Mexico City Attorney General's office 
initiated new workshops and courses directed at officials who deal with 
prosecutions, including the prosecutor's office, official secretaries, 
judicial police, and police group leaders. The course material 
encompassed case management, scientific investigation techniques, legal 
framework, and evidence collection. However, in a report released in 
December, Human Rights Watch asserted that deficiencies in the 
administration of justice were still a major concern, and repeated its 
1999 statement that judicial reforms have done little to improve the 
problems that plague the justice system. The December report stated 
that prosecutors not only ignored abuses by police but also fabricated 
evidence. Judicial oversight was seriously inadequate as the courts 
accepted evidence obtained through human rights violations, and judges 
cited legal precedents that weakened human rights protections.
    Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series 
of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary 
evidence or testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents 
(that are not authenticated) into the case file. A judge in chambers 
reviews the case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The 
record of the proceeding is not available to the general public; only 
the parties have access to the official file, although by special 
motion the victim may have access to it.
    The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend 
the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the 
Government respects these rights in practice. In general, court 
hearings are open to the public and it is common to find not only the 
accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in the 
courtroom.
    While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages 
of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often do not 
assure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the 
public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although 
improvements in salaries and benefits have ameliorated this situation. 
Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of 
defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to 
represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to 
certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually 
attend the full proceedings. Prosecutor salaries and benefits vary by 
region and agency. Federal prosecutors are usually better paid than 
state ones.
    In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak 
Spanish, the situation is often worse. The law calls for translation 
services to be available at all stages of the criminal process; 
however, the courts do not routinely furnish translators for indigenous 
defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings, and thus defendants 
may be unaware of the status of their cases. Provision of translators 
to non-Spanish speaking defendants, including indigenous ones, is 
provided for but poorly implemented, resulting in prisoners being 
convicted without fully understanding the documents they have been 
required to sign. The CNDH, through the Fourth Inspector General's 
office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous defendants. The 
INI also has judicial assistance programs for indigenous defendants and 
provides counsel on their behalf. The INI also distributes legal, 
educational, and informational material in indigenous languages.
    A particularly egregious abuse of due process is the prosecution's 
ability to use evidence gathered by means of torture. While torture 
itself is a criminal act, judges routinely allow statements coerced 
during torture to be used as evidence against the accused (see Section 
1.c.). For example, in August a court convicted two environmental 
activists in Guerrero although they allege that they had been tortured 
into signing confessions (see Section 1.c.).
    The law does not require civil trial of soldiers involved in civil 
crimes, and the military continues to handle such cases. The 
Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses 
involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a 
member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil 
authorities, the military has the right to request transfer immediately 
of the case to military jurisdiction. Although the military retains 
jurisdiction over its personnel, it has begun cooperating with the PGR 
on investigations of counternarcotics cases involving soldiers and 
sailors. For example, in late August, Generals Quiroz and Acosta were 
arrested by military police on charges of narcotics trafficking and 
assisting the Ciudad Juarez-based Amado Carrillo drug cartel. General 
Acosta also was accused of complicity in the disappearance and torture 
of several persons in Guerrero during the 1960's and 1970's.
    In 1999 the Military Judicial Police had arrested five members of a 
military dissident group, the Patriotic Command for Raising People's 
Awareness (CPCP), a group composed of military personnel protesting 
what they had called an unjust military justice system. The authorities 
charged the five CPCP members with the crime of sedition and later 
arrested the leader of the group, Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez. According 
to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), on April 17, the CNDH concluded that 
allegations that the military had tortured or violated the human rights 
of Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez and the other incarcerated members of the 
CPCP were unfounded. At year's end, the authorities held Bacilio Gomez 
in jail but had not yet brought him to trial. In December, the 12th 
circuit court in Mazatlan, Sinaloa, granted injunctions that in essence 
dismissed the charges of insubordination, sedition, and conspiracy 
against Juan Francisco Bernal Vasquez, Gerardo Torres Benitez, and 
Ignacio Manzano Benitez. Although they still face charges of violating 
``common military duties,'' they are eligible for release on bail. The 
appeal filed by Hildegardo Bacilio, leader of the December 1998 
protest, is still under consideration.
    At times lawyers in human rights cases faced harassment. For 
example, on January 27, two men physically harassed Juan de Dios 
Hernandez Monge and issued threats against Pilar Noriega Garcia. Both 
are attorneys for students at the Autonomous National University in 
Mexico City (UNAM) detained by the authorities. On March 29, unknown 
persons broke into the home of Leonel Guadalupe Rivero Rodriguez, 
another attorney for UNAM students. No valuables were taken but his 
computer files having to do with the UNAM cases were searched (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The only political prisoner is General Jose Francisco Gallardo who 
maintains that he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment for speaking 
his mind on the advisability of having a military ombudsman (see 
Section 4). During the year, he received visits from Amnesty 
International.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of 
privacy, family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search 
warrants; however, in the past there have been credible reports that 
unlawful searches without warrants were common.
    The law allows for electronic surveillance with a judicial order. 
The law prohibits electronic surveillance for electoral, civil, 
commercial, labor, or administrative purposes.
    On September 20, the Mexico City daily newspaper El Universal 
reported that President-elect Fox, his transition team, and the 
National Executive Committee of Fox's party, PAN, were victims of 
eavesdropping on their telephone conversations. To substantiate its 
charge, the newspaper printed the transcript of a phone conversation 
between Fox and his spokesperson. Fox later verified the authenticity 
of the transcript. The persons or person responsible for the taping are 
unknown, but the press speculated that it only could have been the 
Government's civilian intelligence organization, the Center for 
Investigation and National Security (CISEN). However, no evidence was 
provided to support that charge, and CISEN denied responsibility. In 
December President Fox formed a committee, led by Secretary of 
Government Santiago Creel, Secretary of Public Security Alejandro Gertz 
Manero, Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, and security 
advisor Aguilar Zinser, to revise the practices and role of CISEN. The 
President gave the committee 100 days to evaluate CISEN and propose a 
plan for its reorganization and the enhancement of its transparency.
    On July 19, Jose Murat Casab, governor of Oaxaca, announced that a 
routine check of his office had turned up three listening devices. 
Murat blamed three officials of the Federal Secretariat of Government--
Francisco Eduardo de la Vega y Avila, Jose Trinidad Rodriguez 
Ballesteros, and Olaf Ivan Corro Labrafor this act. The three officials 
then lodged a federal complaint against Murat for character defamation. 
Zacatecas governor Ricardo Monreal Avila instructed state attorney 
general Gonzalez Navarro to open an investigation into alleged 
electronic monitoring of state government officials by federal security 
agents. In addition, state police chief Miguel Angel Hernandez advised 
state representatives that they all were being monitored 
electronically, although the factual basis for this advice was unclear.
    On November 29, the PGR announced that it would not initiate legal 
action against Jorge Salomon Azar, former governor of Campeche, nor 
Antonio Gonzalez Kuir, current governor of Campeche, for their presumed 
involvement in the 1998 wiretapping of Layda Sansores, a former member 
of Congress. They later were released. However, on December 18, 
Sansores petitioned a court to order the PGR to reactivate the 
investigation against both men and to investigate Valente Quintana, 
coordinator of the state security and police system; Antonio Ayala; 
Dante Omana; and Manual Alfaro Isaac, former coordinator of advisors 
for then-Governor Salomon Azar.
    The Constitution states that all persons have the right to make 
free, responsible, and informed decisions on the number of children 
they choose to have. The 1984 General Health Law provides for criminal 
action against those who pressure a woman to undergo sterilization 
procedures or perform such procedures without a woman's consent. There 
were no reports of forced sterilization during the year. In 1995 the 
CNDH found that the largest number of complaints against health care 
institutions involved negligence or abuse during childbirth by medical 
personnel and charges of coerced sterilization. It said that the number 
of such complaints had grown, in large part due to women's increased 
awareness of their rights.
    Independent agencies believed that forced sterilization procedures 
exceeded by several times the number of known cases, but the overall 
scope of the problem was difficult to quantify. Women may not realize 
that procedures have been performed until after the fact, and many 
victims are reluctant to file complaints, although there are mechanisms 
for filing formal complaints with the National Medical Arbitration 
Commission and with the national and state human rights commissions. 
However, the CNDH office in Chiapas reported that in some indigenous 
communities women choose sterilization, but then due to fear of 
reprisal from their husbands report that it was forced upon them or 
that they simply did not understand the nature of the procedure. In 
1999 there were reports of possible violations of informed consent 
standards with contraceptive drug use in the state of Guerrero; 
however, these charges were not substantiated.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--There were numerous allegations of the use of 
excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law. 
Incidents of conflict in Chiapas between the security forces and EZLN 
sympathizers and in Guerrero between the army, the Popular 
Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the Revolutionary Army of the People's 
Insurgency (ERPI) led to many of these accusations. However, the 
confused circumstances of these clashes made those allegations 
difficult to substantiate. UNHCHR Robinson suggested in November 1999 
that the Government consider creating a military human rights ombudsman 
to combat impunity in the armed forces. In an interview with the 
newspaper La Jornada published on July 27, CNDH president Jose Luis 
Soberanes responded that his agency was capable of dealing with 
complaints of violations by the military, and he also called for a 
restructuring of the military. The Secretariat of National Defense 
(SEDENA) has offices in Chiapas and Guerrero, to deal with citizen 
complaints of human rights violations. SEDENA, in coordination with the 
CNDH and state human rights commissions, provides its officers with 
human rights training; however, enlisted troops do not always receive 
instruction on human rights (see Section 4).
    During much of the year, the Government maintained around 20,000 
troops in selected areas of Chiapas to contain the EZLN-backed uprising 
that began in 1994, and about half that number in Guerrero to handle 2 
much smaller rebel groups there. The EPR and the EPRI maintain a 
presence in Guerrero; however, they were less active compared with the 
previous year.
    On December 1, his first day in office, President Fox ordered the 
dismantling of 53 military checkpoints in Chiapas and military camps in 
the conflict zone. In less than 10 days, the army withdrew from two 
contentious military positions. In addition, the Government lifted 
restrictions on previously expelled foreigners and eased visa 
requirements for members of human rights organizations. In a December 2 
press conference in La Realidad, Chiapas, the EZLN's Subcommander 
Marcos stated that President Fox's initial steps were encouraging and 
praised his choice of Luis H. Alvarez as his Chiapas Peace Coordinator. 
The rebel leader also laid down five conditions for a return to 
dialogue with the government: passage of the Congressional Chiapas 
Peace and Reconciliation Commission (COCOPA) bill, liberation of all 
EZLN prisoners, withdrawal of the army from EZLN territory and 
repositioning of the army to pre-1994 positions, closure of seven 
specific military posts in Chiapas, and no substitution of state police 
for army troops in the newly demilitarized areas. On December 5, Fox 
sent to Congress the COCOPA bill to implement the 1996 San Andres 
Accords between the EZLN and the Government. Governor Pablo Salazar 
Mendiguchia took office on December 8, and declared that he plans to 
review the cases of all state prisoners charged with links to the EZLN. 
On December 30, he had 16 Zapatista prisoners released from state 
custody with a promise that more would follow.
    At year's end, an amnesty by the Oaxaca state government led to the 
release of 32 persons accused of ties to the guerrillas from state 
detention. Of the 55 persons still in custody, 27 are subject to 
additional federal charges; and 20 were charged before 1996, the 
commencement date stipulated in the amnesty law.
    NGO's and others have alleged that in the process of dealing with 
rebels in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, the Government used excessive 
force. For example, on May 25, state police forces and the army entered 
San Isidro Miramar in San Agustin Loxicha, Oaxaca, to detain alleged 
EPR members. Community residents claimed police and military officers 
harassed, threatened, and beat them during the arrest of Octaviano 
Hernandez Pacheco and Andres Enrique Hernandez. Since 1996 more than 70 
residents of Loxicha have been arrested for alleged involvement with 
the EPR. As of July, 24 of these were still in prison. In July AI 
claimed that the prisoners had been subjected to torture and death 
threats and criticized the absence of due process in the handling of 
the cases. The NGO the Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture 
has criticized the use of torture against residents of Loxicha since 
1996. However, on December 2, President Fox announced his support for 
an amnesty for the EPR, the demilitarization of the Los Loxichas area 
of Oaxaca State, and a review of the arrests of alleged EPR members. On 
December 8, the Oaxaca State legislature passed an amnesty law for 
local indigenous persons (Loxichas) accused of having links to the EPR. 
As of December 16, eight persons had been released from detention as a 
result of the amnesty; 79 Loxichas were still in custody. Of these, 
another six persons were acquitted of homicide charges but not released 
because of other charges pending against them. Although 27 of these 
remaining prisoners are subject to federal charges, the Oaxaca State 
government has already petitioned the federal government for an amnesty 
on their behalf. Ultimately, up to 50 more prisoners could be released 
and 200 other persons still at liberty could have their arrest warrants 
cancelled, according to press reports.
    In December 1998, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas center and the 
PGR published conflicting reports on the Acteal massacre. The Fray 
Bartolome report blamed the Government for sponsoring armed civilian 
groups in Chiapas and for failing to protect the victims. The NGO 
accused the Government of waging ``lowintensity warfare'' in Chiapas 
and stated that the Government was responsible for the massacre. The 
PGR attributed the massacre to a history of local confrontation, the 
presence of the EZLN, an absence of the rule of law, and the neglect of 
local enforcement officials. In May a court convicted former General 
Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz and his two chief lieutenants of ``homicide 
by omission'' and sentenced each to 8 years in prison (see Section 
1.a.). On October 15, the CNDH issued a report on the June 1998 battle 
in El Charco, Guerrero between the military and alleged elements of the 
ERPI that resulted in the killing of 12 persons. The Commission found 
that the army had violated the human rights of the inhabitants and that 
various articles of the Constitution, the Federal Criminal Procedure 
Code, and the Code of Military Justice had been violated. The CNDH 
recommended that the SEDENA investigate the actions of the military 
participants in the El Charco events, that the Judge Advocate's office 
investigate the official in the military prosecutor's office who first 
received evidence in the case, that the Judge Advocate's office 
determine if charges should be brought against military personnel, that 
SEDENA advise all military personnel regarding their role and 
responsibilities in upholding human rights and due process, and that 
Sedena issue general instructions limiting the role of military 
prosecutors in criminal investigations. SEDENA acknowledged receipt of 
the report, accepted its recommendations, and pledged to study how to 
implement them. At year's end, there was no information released 
regarding the results of any military investigations.
    The military continues to deny any responsibility for abuses 
committed during the early stages of the Chiapas rebellion in 1994. The 
military authorities who have jurisdiction failed to punish any 
military personnel or government officials for committing abuses, 
although the CNDH issued an interim report in May 1994 finding that 
there was reason to believe that the military had injured or killed 
civilians in aerial attacks and that there were summary executions, 
illegal detentions, and instances of torture.
    There were credible reports of violent incidents and murders 
committed by armed civilian groups and local political factions in 
Chiapas. The National Democratic Federation alleges that the group 
``Peace and Justice'', which it described as a paramilitary group, was 
responsible for the murders of 53 Zapatista sympathizers since 1995. 
Another group that allegedly has committed human rights abuses in 
Chiapas is the Revolutionary Indigenous Movement against the 
Zapatistas. From January 1998 through August 1999, the army confiscated 
431 weapons from civilians in the Chiapas zone of conflict. The Chiapas 
state attorney general's office claimed to have disbanded 39 gangs and 
confiscated 132 firearms within the same time period. On August 3, 
between 30 and 300 members of the Peace and Justice armed civilian 
group fired their weapons in the air, set off fragmentation grenades, 
and burned at least 6 houses to evict 90 EZLN sympathizers from 
Paraiso, Yajalon Municipality, Chiapas. The eviction reportedly was the 
result of a 1997 land dispute. The 15 displaced families remain in the 
nearby village of Hidalgo Joshil, and 40 military personnel patrol the 
area to maintain peace.
    Armed civilian groups, controlled or sponsored by local political 
bosses loosely affiliated with the PRI, were alleged to have committed 
many human rights violations in Chiapas, including the 1997 Acteal 
massacre. NGO's such as the PRODH, The Fray Bartolome de las Casas 
Human Rights Center in Chiapas, and the Mexican Commission for the 
Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) have identified at least 
15 such groups; they identified 9 such groups in 1999. Some NGO's and 
press accounts contended that these groups were not only the private 
armies of local bosses, but also army surrogates armed by the military 
and used to attack the EZLN. The Government denied these allegations 
and likewise rejected the existence of paramilitary groups. On April 
18, the Federal Attorney General's office opened a new special unit to 
investigate possible armed civilian groups in Chiapas. On October 27, 
the unit arrested 11 alleged members of Peace and Justice on charges of 
illegal weapons possession, organized crime, and terrorism. Among those 
arrested were three alleged leaders of the group: Samuel Sanchez, a 
former PRI state legislator; Marcos Albino Torres Lopez, a former army 
corporal; and Mario Cruz Perez, who reportedly was the link between the 
political and military wings of Peace and Justice.
    On May 7, four masked men killed three indigenous persons and 
wounded one more during their return home by truck to Tzanembolom, 
Chenalho Municipality, Chiapas. The survivor was a reported EZLN 
sympathizer, while the dead were all members of the same progovernment 
family. It is unknown whether the attack was politically motivated, the 
result of a family feud, or a random criminal act. The CNDH opened two 
investigations that were still in progress at year's end. To maintain 
public order, the Chiapas state government adopted preventive measures, 
including police patrols and 24-hour police presence to protect local 
residents.
    In June the municipal authorities of Chenalho, Chiapas, promised to 
facilitate the return to the area of almost 3,000 displaced members of 
``the Bees,'' a pacifist organization that sympathizes with some of the 
goals of the EZLN. The Bees had been displaced from Chenalho since 
1997.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice. The mass media are not subject to 
formal censorship by the Government; however, there were reports of 
some self-censorship. In addition, threats and attacks on 
journalistssome reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
hindered press freedom. Nonetheless, the freedom and independence of 
the media continued to expand. Many observers believe that drug 
trafficking organizations or corrupt security personnel in their pay 
carried out most of the attacks on the media.
    The traditional cozy relationship between the Government and the 
media that tilted coverage and editorial opinion in the Government's 
favor has diminished but not disappeared entirely. The Government no 
longer controls the import of newsprint but does retain control over 
broadcast licensing, which critics claim led some broadcast media to 
practice self-censorship. Accordingly old habits of accommodation 
lingered, and the editorial line of some key news organizations 
maintained a bias in favor of the Government. The persistence of 
official influence--and its greatest concentration--was most apparent 
in television. Instead of paying a 12.5 percent tax on advertising 
revenues, television broadcasters provided free broadcast time to the 
Government, which gave it convenient access to this powerful medium. 
Official advertising in the media continues, but disguising it as news 
coverage is more common at the state than at the national level. Cash 
and noncash payments to journalists persisted but were not as common as 
they once were; legislation to end this practice was enacted in 1998.
    The many attacks on journalists constituted the most serious 
problem for press freedom. The Committee for the Protection of 
Journalists and Media Communications reported that in 1999 there was a 
decline in the number of acts of intimidation, including physical 
attacks, threats, and detentions, against journalists; from 202 in 1998 
to 135 in 1999. A report issued by 4 NGO's in 1999 recorded 240 attacks 
of various types against journalists during 1998, compared with 187 
during 1997. These numbers include all aggressive acts against the 
media as reported in the media. According to the report, government 
institutions (including federal, state, or local police) or officials 
were responsible for 41 percent of the incidents. The Manuel Buendia 
Foundation, one of the NGO's, concluded that the vast majority of acts 
were intended to intimidate. During the first 7 months of 1999, the 
CNDH program on aggression against journalists investigated 22 
complaints of attacks on journalists; most were for assault or 
intimidation. One, from July in the state of Morelos, was for murder. 
The CNDH began an investigation of that case.
    There were no new developments in the 1999 harassment cases of 
Sergio Haro Cordero or Jesus Barraza Zavala. There was no information 
available about the Mexico City attorney general's office's (PGJDF) 
investigation of the February 1998 killing of Luis Mario Garcia 
Rodriguez, a reporter for the Mexico City daily newspaper La Tarde.
    On August 14, the CNDH recommended that the CISEN investigate and 
sanction agent Abraham Ponce Calvo for violating the privacy rights of 
Miguel Badillo Cruz, a columnist for the newspaper El Universal, and 
his wife. Badillo complained that on June 13 and 14, Ponce tracked his 
wife's movements from his car. Ponce denied the allegations, stating 
that from June 12 to 15 he was in a different location investigating 
organized crime.
    According to PRODH and the newspaper La Jornada, on May 14, members 
of the military harassed journalists at the Las Limas checkpoint in the 
state of Chiapas. The journalists were prevented from taking 
photographs and were filmed by the soldiers.
    On June 15, men dressed in police uniforms kidnaped Freddy 
Secundino Sanchez, a writer from the magazine Epoca, outside his home 
in Mexico City. The men drove him around in a taxi while they beat and 
threatened him at gunpoint before releasing him. On June 7, he received 
a death threat via telephone. On June 20, Secundino submitted a 
complaint to the Mexico City Human Rights Commission. The Commission in 
turn asked the Mexico City Attorney General's office to ensure that no 
agent under its command threatened or harmed Secundino, and that it 
provide Secundino and his family with protection and investigate 
Secundino's complaint. As a result, the Mexico City Attorney General's 
office assigned agents to protect Secundino and his family. The case 
was under investigation.
    On June 22, unknown men opened fire on Lily Tellez, a highprofile 
news anchor and reporter for the national network TV Azteca, while she 
was driving in Mexico City. Tellez was uninjured, but her chauffeur and 
two bodyguards were wounded. The motive for the attack is unknown, but 
speculation has focused on Tellez's investigative reporting on 
narcotics and the Francisco Stanley murder case. Francisco ``Paco'' 
Stanley was a television talk show host who was murdered while exiting 
a Mexico City restaurant. In its 2001 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
reported that in February that the Human Rights Commission of Mexico 
City alleged that the principal suspect had been framed by prosecutors.
    On April 28, the body of Jose Ramirez Puente, the host of a popular 
radio news program in Ciudad Juarez, was found in his car. He was 
stabbed to death. State judicial police claimed that they found 17.6 
pounds of marijuana in his car hours after the discovery of the body, 
although local media organizations disputed any connection to drug 
trafficking. Ramirez covered state and local politics and the police 
beat; it was not clear whether the killing was related to his work.
    On April 9, the body of Pablo Pineda, a reporter and photographer 
with the newspaper La Opinion in Matamoros was discovered in the United 
States. According to news reports, he had been shot in the back of the 
head. In December 1999, Pineda survived an attempt on his life near his 
home.
    In May Meliton Garcia, a reporter with the Monterrey-based 
newspaper El Norte was charged with fraudulently obtaining a voter's 
registration card. The charges against Garcia stem from a two-part 
series in which he reported on his efforts to obtain voting 
registration documents using a false birth certificate. In the article, 
he described how unofficial document expediters who congregate outside 
government offices sell false birth certificates.
    In September the former police commissioner in Ciudad Juarez filed 
a criminal defamation suit against Jesus Antonio Pinedo Cornejo and 
Luis Villagram, editor and reporter for the weekly Seminario. An 
article dated February 28 and entitled ``History of Police Officer and 
Drug Traffickers' linked the police commissioner with the drug trade. 
On October 2, the commissioner announced that he would drop the suit.
    Television news independence has been enhanced by greater political 
pluralism, generational change in media leadership, and growing 
competition for advertisers and viewers, which continued to separate 
government and media interests. Moreover, as much of the national media 
has developed higher journalistic standards and independence in recent 
years, government influence has declined. The media showed a high 
degree of editorial independence, particularly in the capital and other 
major urban centers. Direct criticism of the Government, especially in 
radio and the print media, was common.
    During the course of the year, prior to the July presidential 
elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the newspaper 
Reforma monitored media access for each of the candidates, especially 
broadcast media. The resulting published analysis demonstrated that the 
leading candidates enjoyed equal access to the media. National 
electronic media covered the candidates far more equitably than in past 
elections; however, there continued to be large discrepancies in 
coverage in local and state level electronic media. The overall effect 
was to give the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida more positive 
coverage. After the July 2 election, both the national and local media 
provided more balanced coverage overall.
    In the middle of the campaign, the Government attempted to change 
the procedures for the distribution of government publicity placed in 
the media, placing control of all government advertising in the hands 
of the Secretariat of Government, which would then funnel the 
advertising through the government-owned Notimex news service. Media 
outlets protested, voicing concern that spending decisions would be 
based on political considerations. The Government retracted its plan 
and reverted to the system in which each government entity was 
responsible for its own paid advertising.
    The Constitution recognizes academic freedom in higher education, 
and the Government respected this provision in practice.
    In April 1999, a student strike at the UNAM to protest a proposed 
tuition increase shut down the university. The strike began when the 
authorities announced an increase in tuition but quickly evolved from a 
protest by some students into a more generalized attack on the national 
political system. The university administration made the tuition hike 
voluntary but did not meet other striking students' demands. The 
students at time used violence and intimidation to keep the university 
closed, and attempts to negotiate an end to the campus occupation 
failed. On February 6, several thousand PFP, accompanied by CNDH 
monitors, stormed the main campus, breached barricades, and detained 
about 600 strikers. Strikers did not resist the police operation, and 
the CNDH reported no human rights violations. Most of those detained 
were released within 24 hours, and only 251 were actually arrested and 
charged with rioting, terrorism, and dispossession. On February 14, 
classes resumed; however, on March 6, classes were disrupted once again 
when strikers reoccupied the university administration building and 
demanded the release from prison of fellow strikers. On April 14, at 
the request of UNAM rector Juan Ramon De la Fuente, 3,000 PFP personnel 
armed with batons and riot shields positioned themselves in and around 
the UNAM campus to forestall a strikers' reoccupation of the 
university. The PFP later withdrew from the campus. On June 7, the PGR 
released on bail the last six jailed strike leaders.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. The only requirement for holding demonstrations is 
that groups that wish to meet in public areas must inform local police 
authorities in advance. Organized, peaceful demonstrations occur 
frequently throughout the country.
    The police showed restraint and avoided confrontation with UNAM 
student strikers, who conducted periodic marches through the streets of 
Mexico City (see Section 2.a.).
    According to the NGO General Office of Citizenship Participation 
and Social Conduct, in the first half of the year, on the national 
level there were 83 marches with 291,560 participants and 58 blockages 
with 54,552 participants. In Mexico City there were 43 marches with 
13,255 participants and 60 blockages with 10,990 participants.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties, 
opposition, and independent associations functioned freely without 
government interference or restriction. The Federal Electoral Code 
recognizes national political parties as well as political 
associations. Political associations can participate in elections 
through an agreement with a political party but are not allowed to use 
their names or symbols during the election campaigns. Political parties 
do not have legal status until they receive their official designation 
from the IFE. The IFE currently recognizes 8 political parties and 31 
political groups. Three parties lost their registration as a result of 
the July election because they obtained less than 2 percent of the 
vote.
    Citizens are free to associate and may form private or charitable 
associations. However, in 1998 the Mexico City legislature passed a law 
that gave the city government more influence over private charities. 
According to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), there are as many as 7,500 
NGO's active in the country, which are an important and vocal part of 
civil society.
    The Government was accused of harassing NGO's, especially in the 
state of Chiapas (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, there are some restrictions. In November 1998, the Government 
and representatives of many religious denominations signed a religious 
code of conduct that reaffirms freedom of religion. The law bars the 
clergy from holding public office, advocating partisan political views, 
supporting political candidates, or opposing the laws or institutions 
of the State.
    Religious groups cannot operate legally without registering as 
religious associations with the Under Secretariat of Religious Affairs 
of the Federal Secretariat of Government. Although the Government does 
reject a few applications, usually due to incomplete documentation, the 
registration process is routine.
    The authorities in the past have used immigration law to restrict 
the activities of religious workers, particularly in the state of 
Chiapas. To visit the country for religious purposes, foreign religious 
workers must secure government permission. The Government limits the 
number of visas each religious group is allowed. Some religious groups 
claim that it is government policy to keep foreign religious 
practitioners out of Chiapas and Oaxaca, thus making it more difficult 
for religious workers going to those states to obtain visas. The 
Government maintains that it does not deny visas based on religion, and 
does not expel religious workers based on their religious activities. 
The Government argues that foreign religious workers have been expelled 
for inappropriate political behavior. There also have been incidents of 
violence between religious groups in Chiapas (see Section 5).
    The Government lifted almost all restrictions on religious groups 
in 1992. The Catholic Church and other religions maintain their own 
schools; however, the Catholic Church complains of government 
restrictions on the running of those schools and the raising and 
spending of school funds. Although religious associations cannot own or 
administer broadcast radio or television stations, the Catholic Church 
owns and operates a national cable television channel. Government 
permission is required to transmit religious programming on broadcast 
radio or television, and permission is granted routinely.
    Relations were difficult between the Catholic Diocese of San 
Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, and the Government during the tenure 
of Bishop Samuel Ruiz, which ended in April. The situation in Chiapas 
is a result of a complex mix of economic, ethnic, political, and 
religious tensions. The San Cristobal Diocese has complained that its 
foreign clergy are unable to get their visa status extended or 
rectified (many enter on tourist visas).
    The non-Catholic Christian population continued to grow in 
Campeche, Chiapas, Yucatan, and along the northern border. There is a 
long history of religious intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain 
indigenous communities whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/
Mayan) religious practices and view other religious practices as a 
threat to indigenous culture (see Section 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of free movement, and the Government does not restrict the movement of 
its citizens into, out of, or within the country, except in Chiapas 
where the Government attempts to keep persons away from EZLN areas.
    The army and federal immigration authorities maintain strict 
checkpoints in parts of Chiapas. The focus of the checkpoints is the 
verification of tourist activities by persons with tourist visas. They 
also serve to stem illegal immigration. Church and human rights 
activists claim that the Government is fostering an antiforeigner 
climate. In addition, church groups complain about legal requirements 
that foreign religious workers must secure government permission to 
visit the country for religious purposes, and that the Government 
limits the number of visas granted to each religious group.
    Corrupt police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants. 
Illegal immigrants rarely file charges in cases of crimes committed 
against them, because the authorities generally deport immediately such 
persons who come to their attention; any pending case brought by an 
illegal immigrant is subject to dismissal because the person is no 
longer present. In May the CNDH criticized the mistreatment of Central 
American migrants by the authorities and society. Studies conducted by 
the College of Mexico indicate that human rights violations against 
Central American migrants were increasing. On May 2, the newspaper La 
Jornada reported that approximately 2,899 complaints of human rights 
violations had been filed by Central American migrants in 1999.
    There were incidents in which illegal immigrants either were 
harassed or injured. On April 11, members of the state auxiliary police 
and federal judicial police arrested seven indigenous residents of 
Oaxaca State in a bus terminal, mistaking them for illegal Guatemalan 
migrants. After being interrogated by federal and state authorities, 
they were released. On April 13, the CNDH opened an inquiry into the 
victims' claim of cultural discrimination.
    On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police allegedly 
beat four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car (see Section 
1.c.).
    There was no new information available about the alleged beating in 
March 1999 of four intending immigrants near Mexicali, Baja California, 
by federal fiscal police.
    There were also credible reports that police, immigration, and 
customs officials were involved in the trafficking of illegal migrants 
(see Section 6.f.).
    The law provides for the protection of foreigners who might face 
political persecution if they were to return to their countries of 
origin. The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government accepts 
the principle of first asylum and reviews each claim on a case-by-case 
basis with the assistance of the office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, UNHCR Sadako Ogata visited the 
country and signed agreements with the Government to strengthen 
protection for refugees.
    On October 3, immigration authorities arrested Pedro Anibal Riera 
Escalante, a Cuban national and deported him to Cuba the following day. 
The Foreign Relations Secretariat subsequently noted that Riera, a 
former Cuban consul general in Mexico City, had applied for asylum on 
September 8. There were no other reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully through periodic elections. As a result of 
electoral reforms approved and implemented in recent years, the 
political process and especially the electoral process have become more 
transparent. While elections are open and generally fair, some abuses 
continue to occur. Prior to the July 2 presidential election, the PRI 
had dominated politics, controlled the Federal Government, and won 
every presidential election since its founding in 1929. However, on 
July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action 
Party and presidential candidate of the Alliance for Change Coalition, 
president, with 43.3 percent of the vote. Observers, both international 
and domestic, judged the elections, which ended the PRI's 71-year hold 
on the presidency, to be generally free and fair. The observers 
described the election as a historic turning point of the most profound 
significance and made recommendations for further electoral reform.
    The legislature amended the Constitution to allow the eligible 9 
million citizens resident overseas to vote in national elections; 
however, the Senate failed to act on the necessary implementing 
legislation that would have made voting possible in the 2000 election, 
due to differences over the costs and requirements for voting.
    Presidents are elected every 6 years and cannot be reelected. 
President Ernesto Zedillo supported legislation making the IFE an 
independent agency and declined to handpick his party's candidate for 
the presidential election. Instead, the PRI held a multicandidate 
primary in 1999 and chose Francisco Labastida as its presidential 
candidate.
    The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), operating with full 
autonomy, arranged the July 2 federal elections, which international 
observers judged to be generally free and fair. They described the 
elections and the resultant overturning of 71 years of dominance by the 
PRI as a historic turning point of the most profound significance and 
made recommendations for further electoral reform. The IFE had 
implemented the extensive 1996 constitutional and legislative reforms 
to help prevent electoral fraud and to create more uniform conditions 
for political party participation by regulating campaign finance, 
advertising, and other areas. It standardized the voter registration 
list and recruited and trained thousands of civil society volunteers to 
serve as independent electoral workers at the voting booths. The IFE 
also has provided support to state electoral institutes in running 
state and local elections and was instrumental in overhauling electoral 
district boundaries to reflect demographic shifts.
    After the July election, in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI held 
211 seats; the PAN 207; the PRD 50; the Green Ecologist Party (PVEM) 
17; the Labor Party (PT) 7; Democracy Convergence (CD) 3; the 
Nationalist Society Party (PSN) 3; and the Social Alliance Party (PAS) 
2. The PRI holds 59 seats in the Senate; the PAN 45; the PRD 17; the PT 
1; the PVEM 1; and the CD 1. Legislators can and do change their party 
affiliation frequently.
    On the state level, the PRI governs 19 states, the PAN 8, the PRD 
1, PRD-PT coalitions 3, and PAN-PRD-led coalitions 2. On the municipal 
level, opposition strength is well established. The PRD governs the 
Federal District, and the PAN governs 13 of the 20 largest metropolitan 
areas.
    On August 20, Chiapas voters elected the opposition Alliance for 
Chiapas candidate Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia to serve as governor, in a 
decisive victory over the PRI's Sami David David. As during the federal 
elections, the army was confined to its barracks, and the police 
presence was restrained. Although there were reports of minor, isolated 
irregularities, voting generally went smoothly. In his victory speech, 
Salazar supported the demilitarization of Chiapas and the introduction 
in Congress of the COCOPA legislation based on the 1996 San Andres 
accords between the EZLN and the federal Government.
    On August 25, post-election violence in Chimalhuacan, Mexico state, 
between local PRI factions left at least 10 persons dead and many more 
injured. State police later arrested 62 persons, including the supposed 
ringleader, Guadalupe Buendia Torres.
    Despite the IFE's efforts, there were still controversies at the 
state level over elections. On December 29, in Tabasco, the ultimate 
court of appeal on election matters (TEPJF) annulled the results of the 
state's disputed October 15 gubernatorial election and directed the 
Tabasco state legislature to name an interim governor and prepare for a 
new election. In its decision, the TEPJF cited inequitable local media 
coverage, diversion of funds for the election for the PRI candidate, 
and the blocking or miscounting of opposition votes. The TEPJF was 
created in 1987 and had never before invalidated an election.
    Yucatan state opposition parties accused PRI Governor Victor 
Cervera Pacheco and the PRI-dominated state legislature of stacking the 
State Electoral Council to favor the PRI's candidates in the 2001 
elections. On December 29, the TEPJF rejected the Council nominated by 
the state legislature and named a new Council. PRI state legislators 
questioned the legitimacy of this TEPJF-appointed Council and vowed to 
fight the ``imposition'' in the courts.
    Although there are no legal impediments to their full 
participation, women are underrepresented in government and politics. 
Women hold approximately 16 percent of the seats in the Congress. No 
women serve as governors or justices on the Supreme Court. A woman, 
Rosario Robles, served as head of government of the Federal District 
from September 1999 to December. Under President Zedillo, 2 Cabinet 
Secretaries out of 20 were women. President Fox appointed 9 women to 
his 51-member Cabinet. A total of 9 of the 15 members of Mexico City 
Mayor Manual Lopez Obrador's cabinet are women, and 13 of the city's 23 
key city officials are women.
    The Electoral Code provides that no more than 70 percent of 
candidates can be of the same gender. All political parties are 
attempting to increase the number of women who run for elected office 
through formal and informal means. They have utilized quotas requiring 
that a certain percentage of candidates on a party list be female. 
However, in practice women more often are put forward as substitute 
candidates who have little chance of serving unless the titular 
candidate leaves office. The PRD leadership is 22 percent female, 24 
percent of its representatives and 13 percent of its senators are 
female, and it has a female party president. The PAN has utilized more 
informal methods to increase female registration. Nonetheless, 23 
percent of its leadership is female, and 11 percent of its senators and 
representatives are female. PRI party rules mandate that a certain 
number of its candidates be women. Twelve percent of the party 
leadership, including its president, is female. Fifteen percent of both 
its representatives and senators are female.
    Constitutional changes in 1996 expanded the rights of indigenous 
people to elect representatives to local office according to ``usages 
and customs,'' rather than standard electoral law. Only the states of 
Oaxaca and Quintana Roo have enacted the implementing legislation. 
These traditional customs vary from village to village. In some 
villages, women do not have the right to vote or to hold office. In 
others, they can vote but not hold office. Women were excluded 
systematically from the political process by ``usages and customs'' in 
Oaxaca state and expected to face the same phenomenon in the state of 
Quintana Roo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without 
government restriction, investigating allegations of human rights 
abuses and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government 
officials generally have become more cooperative and responsive to NGO 
views; however, the Government used vigorous enforcement of its 
constitutional prohibition on foreigners engaging in political 
activities to hinder the work of foreign human rights monitors, and it 
restricted the activities of many human rights observers and religious 
workers in the state of Chiapas.
    After the December 1997 Acteal massacre, foreign concern over 
Chiapas increased significantly, and many foreigners and members of 
human rights groups traveled to that area, often on tourist visas, to 
learn firsthand about conditions there, to observe the human rights 
situation, and donate supplies. However, when individual foreign 
activists in Chiapas acted in ways that the Government considered 
political and inconsistent with tourist status, the Government issued 
them a letter of departure that required them to leave the country upon 
expiration of their visas.
    On July 4, Deputy Secretary of Government Jose Angel Pescador Osuna 
annulled the 2-year expulsion of Tom Hansen, director of Mexico 
Solidarity Network, and agreed to reconsider the expulsions of 400 
other human rights activists, priests, and foreign development 
volunteers. On June 30, Hansen was granted a 15-day election observer 
visa.
    In 1998 the National Migration Institute (INM) began to require 
persons who wished to enter the country to monitor the human rights 
situation to go through a new application process, which required, 
among other things, that they apply 30 days in advance. The INM also 
placed a 10-day limit on visits, set a limit of 10 visitors per NGO, 
and required that visitors submit a detailed itinerary and agenda. 
Domestic and foreign NGO's objected to these new visa requirements, and 
asserted that they actually restrict human rights monitoring and give 
the Government the right to decide which human rights organizations are 
legitimate. While government officials promised that the process would 
improve access for human rights observers, the effect has been the 
opposite. Immigration officials have used this visa requirement in the 
past to remove from the country religious workers whom they judge to be 
engaging in human rights activities. They also used this procedure to 
restrict the activities of human rights monitors. Human rights 
observers reported that the process is difficult, complex, rarely 
results in visa issuance, and interferes significantly with their 
ability to monitor human rights violations. As of September 15, 155 
applications for human rights observer visas were made and 74 visas 
were issued. Of the 100 applications made in 1999, 95 were issued.
    NGO's reported that human rights workers in several states received 
death threats while working on cases that implicated government 
officials. On June 13, Arturo Solis, president of the Center of Border 
Studies and the Promotion of Human Rights, publicly accused federal 
immigration agents in Tamaulipas of involvement in illegal immigrant 
trafficking. He has since received numerous death threats. The case is 
under investigation by the Secretariat of Government, the National 
Human Rights Commission, the Tamaulipas State Human Rights commission, 
and a congressional commission.
    On August 3, in Oaxaca, Oaxaca, the home of Angelica Ayala Ortiz, 
vice president of the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights 
(LIMEDDH), was robbed. Missing were Ayala's computer, recording 
equipment, and the new television and videocassette recorder that 
replaced similar ones stolen from her home last year. Asserting that 
the robbery was an act of intimidation, Ayala, who works on indigenous 
rights issues, lodged a complaint with the state attorney general's 
office, which is investigating. On February 15, an arrest warrant was 
issued for Jesus Reynaldo Hernandez Bautista, a bank security guard, 
for the July 1999 robbery of the LIMEDDH office in Oaxaca. There had 
been no apparent progress in the investigation into the August 3 
robbery of Ayala's home by year's end.
    In August elements of the army allegedly began to harass Hilda 
Navarrete Gorjan, director of the human rights NGO the Voice of Those 
Without a Voice in Coyuca de Benitez, Guerrero. On August 18, military 
personnel were parked in vehicles outside Navarrete's office with 
weapons pointed in the direction of her building. On August 23, unknown 
persons broke into the office and stole computer and video equipment; 
however, there was no evidence to suggest that the military was 
responsible for the break in.
    There were no new developments in the investigation into the 1999 
threats, harassment, and attacks against the PRODH and human rights 
lawyer Digna Ochoa. The investigation was still open at year's end. 
Mexico City judicial police provide protection for Ochoa while she is 
within the city limits. On May 10, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights stated that the Government was providing the protection for 
Ochoa ordered by the court, and that it had received no information 
about new threats or evidence of violence against PRODH. However, Ochoa 
did receive telephone death threats in June.
    The PRODH has criticized the Government's actions to provide safety 
to human rights workers as inadequate. The PRODH advocates the adoption 
of measures to promote awareness of the importance of human rights work 
and to investigate cases of threats, intimidation, and attacks against 
human rights workers.
    The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), established by the 
Government in 1990, has improved its credibility steadily. The Senate, 
instead of the President, now appoints the commission's president, 
although some NGO's feared that this would make the CNDH more 
susceptible to political pressure. In November 1999, the Senate named 
legal scholar Jose Luis Soberanes to a 5-year term as CNDH president, 
replacing the sitting president prior to the expiration of her term. 
Although most NGO's have a favorable opinion of the CNDH, many are 
critical of its method of presenting information, especially the 
reporting of compliance with recommendations. NGO's also have 
criticized the CNDH's reliance on former government security or 
judicial personnel as investigators of human rights abuse allegations.
    General Jose Francisco Gallardo Rodriguez, who was arrested in 1993 
on a range of charges, including embezzlement and dishonoring the 
military, was moved in 1999 from a military to a civilian jail. 
Gallardo maintained that military authorities were persecuting him 
because he wrote an academic dissertation calling for the establishment 
of a human rights ombudsman's office in the military. Since 1996 the 
IACHR and AI had called for his release. On August 4, Gallardo's lawyer 
lodged a complaint with the Federal Attorney General's office to demand 
action against the military tribunal for negligence of administration 
of justice because it allegedly had issued its resolution against 
Gallardo 63 days after the legal time limit.
    In 1999 U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions Asma Jahangir visited the country at the 
Government's invitation. Her report stated that the ineffectiveness of 
the justice system had led to violations of human rights. In addition, 
civilian courts' lack of jurisdiction over members of the armed forces 
for violations of human rights committed against civilians erodes the 
independence of the courts. The IFE implemented Jahangir's suggestion 
to invite international observers for the presidential elections and 
accredited 860 persons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that men and women are equal before the 
law, and that education should avoid ``privileges of race, religion, 
groups, sexes, or individual;'' however, these provisions are not 
enforced effectively, although the Government continues to make 
progress in efforts to do so.
    Amnesty International has reported that homosexual men and women 
are likely to be victims of abuse and violence. In its 1999 annual 
report, the Citizen's Commission Against Homophobic Crimes reported 
that on average three murders are committed because of sexual 
orientation per month, and that there have been 190 such killings in 
the last 5 years, mostly in Mexico City, Mexico State, and Veracruz. 
The consensus among gay rights groups is that the police fail to 
investigate these crimes seriously.
    Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve 
domestic and sexual violence, which is both widespread and vastly 
underreported. A 1997 law on intrafamily violence criminalized 
intrafamily violence, established protective measures for victims, and 
provided public education on the domestic violence problem. The law 
provides for fines equal to 30 to 180 days worth of pay and the 
detention of violators for up to 36 hours. The law also expanded the 
definition of rape to include spousal rape, involving married or 
common-law couples. According to a 1999 survey by the National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Computation, some form of 
domestic abuse occurs in one of every three homes. The victim seeks 
help in only one of every six homes suffering from domestic abuse. More 
than 65 percent of all women suffer some form of abuse, verbal or 
otherwise, but only 30 percent lodge formal complaints, according to 
the Mexican Association Against Violence Toward Women. In 86 percent of 
abuse cases, it is the father or husband who commits the abuse. The 
Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence reports that it receives 
between 50 to 60 complaints nationwide every day. Women are reluctant 
to report abuse or file charges, and the police are reluctant to 
intervene in what society considers a private matter. Many police also 
are inexperienced in these areas and unfamiliar with appropriate 
investigative technologies, although some have received training on 
these issues.
    According to the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion 
of Human Rights (CMDPDH), over 1 million women each year seek emergency 
medical treatment for injuries sustained due to domestic violence, 
which is the fourth highest cause of death for women. Groups such as 
the NGO Center for Research and Care of Women, are attempting to 
counter the widespread view of domestic violence as private, normal 
behavior and to deter future violence. On June 1, Mexico City Mayor 
Rosario Robles publicized a handbook written by a coalition of feminist 
NGO's to reduce domestic violence and to help victims of gender 
discrimination.
    Under certain circumstances limited to the statutory rape of a 
minor between the ages of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code allows a judge 
to dismiss charges if the persons involved voluntarily marry. In 
practice this provision is invoked rarely.
    In the case of the approximately 200 women raped, murdered, and 
mutilated in the Ciudad Juarez area since 1993 (see Section 1.b.), the 
CNDH determined in 1998 that the Chihuahua state attorney general's 
office's inadequate response had violated the human rights of the 
victims and their families. The CNDH therefore recommended that the 
state attorney general and the mayor of Ciudad Juarez be investigated 
for negligence. In the same year, the authorities appointed a special 
prosecutor and hired foreign experts in serial killings to advise 
investigators. The murders and rapes continued during the year.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution occurs 
(see Section 6.f.).
    The Federal Criminal Code includes penalties for sexual harassment, 
but victims must press charges. Many female victims were reluctant to 
come forward, and cases were difficult to prove. Sexual harassment in 
the workplace is widespread.
    The CNDH's First Inspector General's office is devoted entirely to 
protecting the rights of women.
    Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes, 
neither the authorities nor society in general respect this in 
practice. The legal treatment of women's rights is uneven. Women have 
the right to own property in their own names and to file for separation 
and divorce. However, in some states a woman may not bring suit to 
establish paternity and thereby obtain child support, unless the child 
was a product of rape or cohabitation, the child resides with the 
father, or there is written proof of paternity.
    The Constitution and labor laws provide that women shall have the 
same rights and obligations as men, and that ``equal pay shall be given 
for equal work performed in equal jobs, hours of work, and conditions 
of efficiency.'' However, women in the work force generally are paid 
less than their male counterparts and are concentrated in lower-paying 
occupations. According to a 1998 academic study, even though girls and 
boys attend school at similar rates, a woman on average needs to have 4 
more years of education to earn the same salary as a man in a 
comparable position.
    Labor law includes extensive maternity protection, including 6 
weeks' leave before and after childbirth and time off for breast 
feeding in adequate and hygienic surroundings provided by the employer. 
Employers are required to provide a pregnant woman with her full pay, 
are prohibited from dismissing her, and must remove her from heavy or 
dangerous work or exposure to toxic substances. To avoid these 
expensive requirements, some employers, including some in the maquila 
industry, reportedly deliberately violate these provisions by requiring 
pregnancy tests in preemployment physicals, by regular examinations and 
inquiries into women's reproductive status (including additional 
pregnancy tests), by exposing pregnant women to difficult or hazardous 
conditions to make them quit, or by dismissing them. In its 2000 and 
2001 annual reports, Human Rights Watch indicated that the Government 
not only was aware of such practices and failed to prevent them or to 
punish the perpetrators, but also made public excuses for companies 
that violated the law. The U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO), 
under terms of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), the labor side agreements to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, accepted a challenge to these practices in the maquila 
industry and in January 1998 recommended ministerial consultations. As 
a result, the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of Labor participated in a 
conference in Merida, Yucatan, in March 1999, on gender discrimination 
in employment. In addition, the U.S., and Mexican NAO's organized 
cross-border outreach sessions in August 1999 on the rights of women in 
the workplace in McAllen, Texas and Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The conference 
and the outreach sessions concluded that discrimination exists, that it 
is not sanctioned by law, and that the authorities have taken steps to 
inform female workers of their right to file complaints about such 
practices, by distributing brochures and opening government offices 
that work together with NGO's to publicize the problem and available 
remedies.
    To protect the labor rights of women, the Secretariat of Labor made 
9,593 safety and hygiene inspections in private factories and public 
institutions through August and estimated that it would complete 13,790 
by the end of the year. The Secretariat made 23,138 inspections in 
1996. However, while the Government increased the number of federal 
inspectors in 1997 and concluded agreements with more states to expand 
and better coordinate labor inspections, the number of maquila plants 
(approximately 3,500 operating) far exceeds what the less than 700 
(approximately 350 state and 341 federal) inspectors can monitor.
    In 1995 the CNDH found that the largest number of complaints 
against health care institutions involved negligence or abuse during 
childbirth by medical personnel and charges of forced sterilization 
(see Section 1.f.).
    The National Women's Program (PRONAM) monitored the situation of 
women, made recommendations to the Government regarding women's issues, 
and worked with government agencies, international organizations, and 
NGO's to support women's causes. PRONAM and the National Statistics 
Institute compiled gender-specific statistics to ascertain more 
accurately the status of women. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO), the Secretariats of Labor and Foreign Relations, and PRONAM also 
promoted the status of women in the workplace. In addition, PRONAM and 
UNICEF initiated in 1999 an ongoing advertising campaign attacking 
social stereotypes and discrimination against women.
    Children.--Children under the age of 15 make up 35 percent of the 
population, and the median age of the population is 21. The Government 
maintains several programs to promote child welfare that support 
maternal and infant health, provide stipends for educating poor 
children, subsidize food, and provide social workers; however, problems 
in children's health and education remain. The CNDH receives numerous 
complaints about the services provided by the Secretary of Health, the 
Secretary of Education (SEP), and the Institute of Social Security. 
Nine years of education are compulsory, and the legal minimum age for 
employment is 14; however, according to SEP and the Sierra Neighborhood 
Foundation, only 31 percent of youths between 15 and 20 years of age 
attend school.
    The problem of child labor is particularly pronounced among migrant 
farming families (see Section 6.d.). The Government has attempted to 
make schooling easier for the children of such families by making their 
educational credentials portable. The National Public Health 
Institute's 2000 National Nutrition Survey reported that 3 million 
children under the age of 5 suffer some form of malnutrition. UNICEF 
also reported that approximately 5 million children, 2 million of which 
are under 12 years of age, are working. In 1998 the director of the 
National Education Council reported that 1.7 million school-age 
children were not in school because their poverty obligates them to 
work. About 900,000 children work in agriculture, particularly in the 
northern states. UNICEF and the National Institute for Integral 
Development of the Family, in a 1999 study of working children in the 
100 largest cities, estimated that 150,000 children work in those 
cities. (NGO's maintain that the total is higher.) According to a 1999 
national nutrition survey, 30 percent of children under 5 years of age, 
or about 3 million, suffer anemia, while another 2 million children are 
chronically malnourished.
    On January 4, the Congress passed a constitutional amendment to 
protect the rights of children and teenagers and ensure respect for 
their dignity. The new law also increased penalties for the sexual 
abuse or exploitation of children. Child prostitution and pornography 
are felonies under the law. On May 31, the Congress passed the 
Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents Law. The law 
provides for the right to life, non-discrimination, healthy living 
conditions, protection against threats to liberty and physical abuse, a 
healthy family life, health services, equal treatment for the disabled, 
education, pursuit of happiness, and freedom of thought and expression. 
Penalties under the law include fines of 500 to 1,000 times Mexico 
City's minimum wage and possible administrative jail time.
    The CNDH attempted to protect children by educating them on their 
rights and reviewing legislation to ensure compliance with relevant 
international conventions. On August 30, the Public Education 
Secretariat (SEP) announced the publication of four new books geared to 
teach children about discrimination, violence in the home, and 
toleration of differing beliefs.
    The Mexican Association of Childhood and Youth reported that there 
is a large population, estimated at 42,000, of vulnerable street 
children in Mexico City. Street children often become involved with 
alcohol, drugs, prostitution, petty thievery, and increasingly, violent 
crimes. Corrupt police officials sometimes exploit these children by 
pressuring them to commit petty crimes and extorting money from them.
    A 1998 report by the NGO Center for Research and Advanced Study in 
Social Anthropology counted 5,000 minors, 90 percent of them female, 
working as prostitutes or subjects of pornography. In April the Mexico 
City attorney general's office and the Mexico City Human Rights 
Commission reported that nearly 12,000 children in Mexico City are 
victims of sexual commercialism, including prostitution. The National 
System for the Integral Development of the Family (DIF) receives an 
average of about 35,000 complaints per year of physical and mental 
abuse against children, the majority in Mexico City, Mexico State, and 
Nuevo Leon.
    Trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.). On November 22, the Federal Attorney 
General's office established the Special Prosecutor's Office for 
Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children.
    The Government and various NGO's have programs directed at children 
that address human rights issues. Generally, the purpose of these 
programs is not only to protect the rights of children but also to 
instill a generational respect for human rights through educational 
programs. An example of this educational approach is the Tree House (La 
Casa del Arbol), an interactive learning project sponsored by the human 
rights commission of Mexico City.
    People with Disabilities.--Estimates of the number of disabled 
persons range from 2 to 10 million. In Mexico City alone, 124 NGO's 
dealt with issues affecting the physically disabled.
    Twenty-seven of the 31 states have laws protecting the disabled. 
Local law requires access for the disabled to public facilities in 
Mexico City, but not elsewhere in the country. However, in practice 
most public buildings and facilities in Mexico City do not comply with 
the law. The Federal District also mandated access for physically 
disabled children to all public and private schools. The Mexico City 
secretary of education, health, and social development has maintained 
that 78 percent of these children received some schooling. On August 2, 
the President's Office announced that 90,000 disabled children were 
integrated into a regular education system under the Zedillo 
Administration.
    In December President Fox established the Citizen's Commission 
Against Discrimination to be headed by former Social Democracy 
presidential candidate Rincon Gallardo. The Commission's objectives 
include ensuring equal opportunities and access for the disabled and 
codifying these rights in a legal framework.
    Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI), an NGO, discovered 
mistreatment and violations of the rights of the mentally disabled 
persons in government mental health facilities. Abuses uncovered from 
1996-99 included inhuman and degrading treatment, misuse of physical 
restraints, and criminal neglect that in some cases led to deaths of 
patients. The MDRI further alleged that because the process through 
which persons are admitted legally to state institutions is conducted 
without oversight by a judicial or independent body, which can lead to 
a total loss of independent decision making or consent to treatment by 
patients. As a result of its 1999 report and an expose in the January 
30 issue of the newsmagazine Proceso, in February the Secretariat of 
Health made over $800,000 (8 million pesos) available to improve 
conditions in Mexico City's institutions and to provide over $5,000 
(50,000 pesos) for each of the 400 persons living in these institutions 
to participate in community-based workshops. The Secretariat of Health 
also made $1.7 million (17 million pesos) available to improve the 
Ocaranza, Hildalgo institution as a pilot project.
    Indigenous People.--The indigenous population, long subject to 
discrimination, repression, and marginalization, is estimated at 29 
million persons of Indian descent, of whom 11 million live in Indian 
communities and 5 million are native speakers of Indian dialects. An 
estimated 9 million indigenous persons live in extreme poverty. 
According to the National Indigenous Plural Assembly for Autonomy 
(ANIPA), there are 56 distinct indigenous groups, each with its own 
unique culture and language. Indigenous people are located principally 
in the central and southern regions and represent a majority in the 
states of Oaxaca (53 percent) and Yucatan (52 percent). However, these 
groups have remained largely outside the political and economic 
mainstream, as a result of longstanding patterns of economic and social 
development. In many cases their ability to participate in decisions 
affecting their lands, cultural traditions, and allocation of natural 
resources is negligible.
    The 1994 Chiapas uprising focused unprecedented attention on the 
demands of that state's indigenous population for increased economic 
and social rights. Among its basic demands, the EZLN called on the 
Government to enact measures to protect indigenous cultures, provide 
more opportunity for employment, and invest in schools, clinics, and 
infrastructure projects. In the 1996 San Andres accords, the Government 
agreed with the EZLN on the need to expand indigenous rights. However, 
Congress has not yet approved these accords, and the conflict remains 
unresolved. The Government maintains a heavy military presence in parts 
of Chiapas, a presence that NGO's have called threatening and 
intimidating to the indigenous population (see Section 1.g.).
    In its report ``The War in Chiapas'', issued in April the Fray 
Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) reported that the 
military was the principal aggressor in its 1999 cases. The CDHFBC also 
concluded that the presence of the military put at risk the human 
rights of life, physical integrity, liberty, and security of the local 
inhabitants. In addition other groups expressed concern during the year 
over growing instability and tension within the Indian communities 
provoked by the presence of military, police, and paramilitary troops.
    In April an ICRC representative stated that thousands of Indians 
who fled their homes in Chiapas were suffering from food shortages and 
malnutrition. At year's end, the ICRC was feeding over 9,000 persons at 
year's end on a continual basis. There still were cases of 
malnutrition, and the ICRC addressed those cases with 100 percent 
complete food supplements.
    At year's end, the federal and state government strove to create a 
positive atmosphere for negotiation in Chiapas through troop 
withdrawals and the release of Zapatista prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
    The Government, through the National Indigenous Institute, the 
CNDH, and various NGO's, operates programs to educate indigenous groups 
about their political and human rights. The Government generally 
professes respect for their desire to retain elements of their 
traditional culture. The CNDH's office of the Fourth Inspector General 
reviews and investigates violations of indigenous rights. More than 130 
NGO's are dedicated to the promotion and protection of indigenous 
rights.
    Indigenous people do not live on autonomous reservations, although 
some indigenous communities exercise considerable local control over 
economic, political, and social issues. In the state of Oaxaca, for 
example, 70 percent of the 570 municipalities are governed according to 
the indigenous regime of usages and customs, which may not follow 
democratic norms such as the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and 
political affiliation (see Section 3). These communities apply 
traditional practices to resolve disputes, including allegations of 
crimes, and to elect local officials. In 1998 Quintana Roo's state 
Legislature passed a similar usages and customs law. While the laws 
allow communities in these states to elect officials according to their 
traditions, these usages and customs tend to exclude women from the 
political process (see Section 3).
    The law provides some protection for indigenous people, and the 
Government provides support for indigenous communities through social 
and economic assistance programs, legal provisions, and social welfare 
programs. However, these were not sufficient to meet the needs of all 
indigenous people. Although the national population growth rate has 
slowed to less than 2 percent annually, the birth rate among 
marginalized indigenous groups such as those in Chiapas is around 5 
percent. The General Education Act provides that teaching shall be 
promoted in the national language (i.e. Spanish) without prejudice to 
the protection and promotion of indigenous languages. However, many 
indigenous persons speak only their native languages. As a result, 1999 
ANIPA statistics suggest that indigenous people suffer from a high rate 
of illiteracy and a low rate of school attendance. Non-Spanish speakers 
frequently are taken advantage of in commercial transactions involving 
bilingual middlemen and have difficulty finding employment in Spanish-
speaking areas.
    Religious Minorities.--There is a long history of religious 
intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain indigenous communities 
whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/Mayan) religious 
practices and view other religious practices as a threat to indigenous 
culture. In parts of Chiapas, local bosses of indigenous communities 
sometimes regard evangelical groups and Catholic lay catechists as 
unwelcome outside influences and potential economic and political 
threats. As a result, these bosses sometimes acquiesced in, or actually 
ordered, the harassment or expulsion of individuals belonging 
primarily, but not exclusively, to Protestant evangelical groups. In 
many cases, these expulsions involved the burning of homes and crops, 
beatings, and, occasionally, killings. These problems more frequently 
arise in ``autonomous indigenous areas'' under the influence of the 
EZLN, according to evangelical leaders. The abuse related to these and 
other incidents, apparently did not occur solely and exclusively on the 
basis of religion. While religious differences were often a prominent 
feature of such incidents, ethnic differences, land disputes, and 
struggles over local political and economic power were very often the 
basic cause of the problems.
    There were reports of conflict between Catholic/Mayan syncretists 
and Protestant Evangelicals in Chiapas. For example, on March 5, 
Catholic/Mayan syncretists evicted at least 70 evangelical families 
from Plan de Ayala, Chiapas. Later that month, 250 state police 
escorted the Evangelicals back to Plan de Ayala, where they remained 
for 2 weeks. However, in early April the Catholic/Mayan syncretists 
again evicted 20 of the evangelical families from that community. On 
April 16, the Catholic/Mayan syncretists drove out the 70 police 
officers stationed there to keep the peace and set up roadblocks around 
the town. The following day the expelled Evangelicals attempted to 
return to the community, but were prevented from doing so by the 
roadblock. Expelled evangelical families reported that the Catholic/
Mayan syncretists demanded that they sign a statement renouncing their 
faith as a prerequisite for their return to the community. Attempting 
to mediate, Governor Roberto Albores offered social programs to the 
Catholic/Mayan syncretists if they allowed the Evangelicals access to 
the town. The Catholics accepted the offer, but denied blocking access 
to community members, claiming that they only wanted to ``prevent 
strangers from infiltrating the community and causing problems.'' They 
removed the roadblock, but tensions remain.
    Tension between Catholic/Mayan syncretists and evangelical groups 
continues to be a problem in the municipality of San Juan Chamula. The 
Evangelical Commission for the Defense of Human Rights claims that 
municipal authorities have expelled 30,000 persons in the last 30 
years. The children of Evangelicals have been denied access to the 
local public schools in six communities since 1994.
    Adventists in Oaxaca report that families who were members of their 
denomination were expelled from the community of Santo Tomas Kirri. In 
Santo Domingo, Mexico state, Adventists reported that they were forced 
temporarily to close their church. In Chiapas the Adventists viewed the 
local government as reluctant to intervene in towns governed by 
traditional ``practices and customs.''
    On May 17, the body of an alleged witch doctor was found in 
Comitan, Chiapas. The motive for his death is suspected to be the 
victim's practice of witchcraft, which is common in rural areas of 
southern Mexico; no suspects were arrested or charged.
    Progovernment supporters had in the past accused the Catholic 
Church in the San Cristobal diocese in Chiapas of supporting the EZLN.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Federal 
Labor Law (LFT) provide workers with the right to form and join trade 
unions of their choice. About 25 percent of the total work force is 
unionized, mostly in the formal sector, where about one-half the labor 
force is employed.
    No prior approval is needed to form unions, but they must register 
with the Federal Labor Secretariat (STPS) or state labor boards (JLCA) 
in order to function legally. Registration requirements are not 
onerous. However, the STPS or the JLCA occasionally have withheld or 
delayed registration of unions hostile to government policies, 
influential employers, or established unions. The STPS and the JLCA 
also have registered unions that turned out to be run by extortionists 
or labor racketeers falsely claiming to represent workers. To remedy 
this, STPS officials required evidence that unions were genuine and 
representative before registering them. Genuine unions are those that 
can demonstrate that they actually have members and represent the 
workers at the workplace. Some labor organizations have complained that 
they have found it difficult to obtain registration, especially from 
some local conciliation and arbitration boards.
    Human Rights Watch criticized the Government's system of labor 
tribunals in a December 1999 report that claimed that the right to 
freedom of association often was violated even when courts ruled in 
favor of organizing workers. The report states that in the case of the 
Democratic Union of Workers of the Ministry of the Environment, Natural 
Resources, and Fishing the courts allowed workers to organize formally, 
but Government officials continued to interfere in such a way that the 
union could not function effectively.
    Like the Federal Labor Board (JFCA), the JLCA are tripartite. 
Although trade union presence on the boards is usually a positive 
feature, it sometimes led to unfair partiality in representation 
disputes. For example, the board member from an established union may 
work to dissuade a JLCA from recognizing a rival organization. Trade 
union registration was the subject of follow-up activities pursuant to 
a 1995 agreement reached in ministerial consultations under the NAALC.
    Unions form federations and confederations freely without 
government approval. Most unions belong to such bodies. They also must 
register to have legal status. The largest trade union central is the 
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), traditionally a part of the 
labor sector of the PRI, but affiliation is by individual unions.
    The Federal Employee Union Federation (FSTSE), the Revolutionary 
Worker and Peasant Confederation, and most of the separate national 
unions, smaller confederations, and federations in the Labor Congress 
(CT) also are allied with the PRI. However, several unions do not ally 
themselves with the PRI, including the large teachers' union, which 
severed its PRI ties a decade ago, and freed its minority factions to 
cooperate openly with other parties, particularly the PRD. Rivalries 
within and between PRI-allied centrals are strong. There also are a few 
small labor federations and independent unions outside the CT not 
allied with the PRI. One is the small, left-of-center Authentic Labor 
Front (FAT). Most FAT members sympathize with the PRD, but the FAT is 
independent and not formally tied to the PRD. In November 1997, 160 
labor organizations representing workers in the private and public 
sectors, led by the telephone workers and social security workers 
unions, formed the National Union of Workers (UNT)--a labor central in 
competition with the officially recognized CT. In April 1999, the 
Mexican Electricians Union (SME) announced that it would withdraw from 
the CT over its failure to give full support to the SME's opposition to 
the Government's plan to privatize partially the electric power sector. 
The SME had not withdrawn officially from the CT at year's end; 
however, it currently maintains no contact with the CT.
    PRI-affiliated union officers traditionally helped select, ran as, 
and campaigned for, PRI candidates in federal and state elections and 
supported PRI government policies at crucial moments. This gave unions 
considerable influence on government policies but limited their freedom 
of action to defend member interests in other ways, particularly when 
this might harm the government or the PRI. The CT, especially the CTM, 
was well represented in the PRI senatorial and congressional 
delegations, although its numbers diminished significantly after the 
1997 and the July elections.
    The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has found that certain 
restrictions in federal employee labor law, adopted at FSTSE request, 
violate ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. These restrictions 
allow only one union per jurisdiction, forbid union members from 
quitting the union, and prohibit reelection of union officials. In 1998 
the COE and the ILO Committee on Application of Standards reiterated 
their criticism and asked the Government to amend the law. The 
Government had not amended the law by year's end; however, a May 1999 
Federal Supreme Court decision now permits the formation and 
recognition of more than one union per federal entity. A 1996 Supreme 
Court decision invalidated similar restrictions in the laws of two 
states, but the decision applied only in the specific instances 
challenged. In May 1999, the Supreme Court extended this interpretation 
to unions in federal government entities.
    The Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to strike. The 
law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by brief 
government mediation. If federal or state authorities rule a strike 
``nonexistent'' or ``illicit,'' employees must remain at work, return 
to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If they rule a strike 
legal, the company or unit must shut down completely, management 
officials may not enter the premises until the strike is over, and the 
company may not hire replacements for striking workers. Provisions for 
maintaining essential services are not onerous. The law also makes 
filing a strike notice an effective, commonly used threat that protects 
a failing company's assets from creditors and courts until an agreement 
is reached on severance pay. Although few strikes actually occur, 
informal stoppages are fairly common, but uncounted in statistics, and 
seldom last long enough to be recognized or ruled out of order. The law 
permits public sector strikes, but formal public sector strikes are 
rare. Informal ones are more frequent.
    During the year, the JFCA reported that 8,282 strike notices were 
filed and 26 legal strikes occurred in federal jurisdiction. Federal 
labor authorities did not stretch legal requirements to rule strikes 
nonexistent or illicit, nor did they use delays to prevent damaging 
strikes and force settlements. However, in 1998 strikers at the Han 
Young maquiladora plant in Tijuana filed an ``amparo'' (a type of 
injunction) action in a Federal District court challenging the ruling 
of the JLCA in Tijuana that declared the strike begun on May 22 of that 
year to be illegal. On May 3, 1999, the court recognized the striking 
union's right to the collective bargaining contract and declared the 
1998 strike to have been legal. Acting quickly on that decision, the 
union put strike flags at the plant, but the JLCA declared the new 
strike illegal because the board had not yet been informed officially 
of the court's ruling nor given time to act on that ruling. Efforts to 
resolve the conflict through the courts continued throughout the year. 
The union's leader and lawyer were the subjects of arrest warrants for 
allegedly detaining the plant manager against his will; however, these 
individuals had not been taken into custody at year's end.
    The dissident leaders of the teachers' union who were charged with 
forcing entry into the Senate and holding several senators hostage in 
1998 were released within 3 months from pretrial detention when charges 
were reduced substantially. There is no record that they were ever 
tried on the reduced charges.
    During the first major strike in 10 years that occurred at a Ciudad 
Juarez plant in July, some protesting workers reported that they were 
harassed by police and representatives of the union holding the 
contract at the plant. Earlier in the summer, the leader of a group of 
workers challenging the existing union at a plant in Tamaulipas 
asserted that he had been kidnaped and held for more than 24 hours by 
representatives of that union. However, state labor authorities 
eventually recognized the new union, which allowed it to negotiate with 
plant management.
    The Constitution and the LFT protect labor organizations from 
government interference in their internal affairs, including strike 
decisions. However, this also can protect undemocratic or corrupt union 
leaders. The law permits closed shop and exclusion clauses, allowing 
union leaders to vet and veto new hires and to force dismissal of 
anyone the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective 
bargaining agreements.
    Employer organizations slowed efforts to push for labor law reform 
early in 1999 and entered into ongoing discussions with the Government 
and labor unions about reforming the LFT's rules of procedure. 
Government, employers, and unions had negotiated reforms through 
tripartite national agreements and collective bargaining at the 
enterprise level. Reforms were effected also through cooperation in 
programs to increase, and compensate for, productivity. Government, 
national labor unions, and employer organizations met periodically 
throughout the year to discuss ways and means of cooperation to boost 
productivity, wages, and competitiveness. The need to reform the LFT 
was an issue in the presidential campaign and in the fall session of 
Congress.
    Unions are free to affiliate with, and increasingly are interested 
in actively participating in, trade union internationals. Reflecting 
that change in attitude and relationship, the International Federation 
of Metalworkers Unions opened an office in Mexico, and U.S., Canadian, 
and Mexican autoworker union representatives held meetings in the 
country during the year.
    A complaint alleging a refusal on the part of the Government to 
register the Academic Workers Union of the National College of 
Technical Occupational Education (SINTACONALEP) as a union is pending 
before the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). 
SINTACONALEP's employer, the National College of Technical Occupational 
Education (CONALEP), requires its teaching staff to sign documents 
denying the existence of an employment relationship thereby feigning a 
type of relationship that is covered under the civil code and not the 
LFT even though the form, terms, and conditions all correspond to an 
employment relationship. Hence according to STPS, SINTACONALEP members 
do not meet the definition of workers under the LFT to be registered as 
a union. In 1999 the CFA issued an interim report requesting that the 
Government provide a copy of the applicable law that denies trade union 
status to SINTACONALEP and that the Government investigate the 
allegations of interference and antiunion discrimination on the part of 
CONALEP. The ILO had not received a response from the Government by 
year's end.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a union strike notice, 
compels an employer either to recognize a union and negotiate with it 
or to ask the federal or state labor board to hold a union recognition 
election. LFT prounion provisions led some employers to seek out or 
create independent ``white'' or company unions as an alternative to 
mainstream national or local unions. Representation elections are 
traditionally open, not secret. Traditionally, management and union 
officials are present with the presiding labor board official when 
workers openly declare their votes, one by one. Such open recounts are 
prevailing practice but are not required by law or regulation. Secret 
ballots are held when all parties agree.
    Wage restraints no longer exist, except for those caused by 
recession or an employer's difficult situation. Wages in most union 
contracts appeared to keep pace with or ahead of inflation, but most 
workers had not yet regained buying power lost over the past decade.
    The country's record in internal union democracy and transparency 
was mixed. Some unions were democratic, but corruption and strong-arm 
tactics were common in others.
    A disputed 1997 election for the right to the collective bargaining 
contract for workers at a Korean-owned maquiladora in Tijuana, Baja 
California continued to provoke controversy. Although the parties 
reached a settlement in January 1998, allegations that plant management 
violated health and safety regulations were considered in a public 
hearing by the U.S. NAO that year. The dispute over union 
representation at the plant continued, and in May the U.S. and Mexican 
Secretaries of Labor signed an agreement on steps to resolve this 
dispute; pursuant to that agreement the Mexican Labor Secretariat held 
a public NAFTA conference in Tijuana in June to address the issues 
raised in the complaint.
    In another case involving freedom of association linked to the 
right to organize unions, in December 1997, 9 unions and 24 human 
rights NGO's jointly filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging that 
a CTM-affiliated union used strong-arm tactics to intimidate workers so 
that they would not vote in favor of a rival union to represent workers 
at a plant in Mexico state. This submission also alleged violations of 
health and safety regulations. The Canadian NAO also received a 
submission on this case in the spring of 1998. The U.S. NAO issued a 
report in July 1998 that recommended ministerial consultations. At 
year's end, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian labor authorities continued to 
discuss the issues raised in both submissions. The May agreement 
between the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries and adhered to by the 
Canadian Labor Minister provided that the Mexican Labor Secretariat 
hold a public NAFTA conference in Mexico City in late fall to address 
the issues raised in the complaints. However, the conference had not 
taken place by year's end.
    In November 1999, the U.S. Association of Flight Attendants filed a 
submission with the U.S. NAO alleging violations of worker rights to 
freedom of association and to bargain collectively; protection of the 
right to organize; minimum employment standards; and prevention of 
occupational injuries and illnesses at Executive Air Transport, Inc. 
(TAESA). The complaint focused on the voting process employed when the 
Mexican flight attendants union sought the right to represent flight 
attendants employed by TAESA. The U.S. NAO held a public hearing in 
Washington in March and issued a report in July recommending 
ministerial consultations.
    The public sector is almost totally organized. Industrial areas are 
heavily organized. Even states with little industry have transport and 
public employee unions, and rural peasant organizations are 
omnipresent. The law protects workers from antiunion discrimination, 
but enforcement is uneven in the few states with low unionization.
    Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector vary by 
area and sophistication of the manufacturing process. Wages have been 
lower and job creation has been greater in this sector than in more 
traditional manufacturing. Wages in the maquiladora sector are still 
lower than in the traditional manufacturing sector, although they are 
approaching manufacturing sector level. Some observers allege poor 
working conditions, inadequate wages, and employer and government 
efforts to discourage unionization in this sector. There is no evidence 
that the Federal Government opposes unionization of the plants (the 
maquiladora sector tends to be under state jurisdiction), but some 
state and local governments in the west are said to help employers 
discourage unions, especially independent ones, through the use of 
protection contracts. Protection contracts, to which the workforce is 
not privy, are used in the maquila sector and elsewhere to discourage 
the development of authentic unions. These contracts are collective 
bargaining agreements negotiated and signed by management and a 
representative of a so-called labor organization, sometimes even prior 
to the hiring of a single worker.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, there were some cases of trafficking in persons for 
purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.). 
There also were cases of abuses of refugees and illegal immigrants in 
Chiapas (see section 2.d.). There were no reports of forced child 
labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits children under 12 years of age 
from working. The law sets the minimum legal work age at 14 years. 
Those between the ages of 14 and 15 may work only limited hours, with 
no night or hazardous work, which generally makes hiring them 
uneconomical. Enforcement was reasonably good at large and medium-sized 
companies, especially in export industries and those under federal 
jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate at many small companies and in 
agriculture and construction. It was nearly absent in the informal 
sector, despite continued government efforts.
    In 1996 the ILO reported that 18 percent of children 12 to 14 years 
of age work, often for parents or relatives. Most child labor is in the 
informal sector (including myriad underage street vendors), family-
owned workshops, or in agriculture and rural areas. Mexico City's 
central market employs approximately 11,000 minors between the ages of 
7 and 18, who work as cartpushers, kitchen help, and vendors. The 
children do not receive a fixed wage, and most work long shifts, 
starting in the early morning hours. The CTM agricultural union's 
success years earlier in obtaining free transport for migrant seasonal 
workers from southern states to fields in the north inadvertently led 
to a significant increase in child labor. The union and employers were 
unable to convince indigenous farm workers to leave their families at 
home, and many have settled near work sites in the north. The union has 
had some limited success in negotiating with employers to finance 
education in Spanish and indigenous languages near work sites and in 
obtaining social security child care centers, but it has had difficulty 
in persuading member families not to bring their children into the 
fields. Many urban child workers are migrants from rural areas, are 
illiterate, and have parents who are unemployed.
    The Federal Government increased the number of obligatory school 
years from 6 to 9 in 1992 and made parents legally liable for their 
children's attendance, as part of a reform to upgrade labor force 
skills and long-term efforts to continue increasing educational 
opportunities for and participation by youth. Scholarships offered to 
families of the abject poor under the Government's ``Progresa'' 
antipoverty program kept an additional 100,000 children in school in 
1999. According to ``Progresa,'' that number increased by 18 percent 
during the year.
    In March the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst 
forms of child labor. The government of the Federal District 
implemented a law adopted in July 1999 that increased limitations on 
working hours and conditions for children employed as supermarket 
baggers and automotive attendants.
    The law bans child labor, including forced or bonded labor, and 
there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution and the LFT 
provide for a daily minimum wage. The tripartite National Minimum Wage 
Commission (government, labor, and employers) usually sets minimum wage 
rates each December, effective January 1, but any of the three parties 
can ask that the Commission reconvene during the year to consider a 
changed situation. In December 1999, the wage commission adopted a 10 
percent increase effective January 1, based in part on the Government's 
projection of a 10 percent annual inflation rate for. For the first 
time, all labor representatives on the Commission abstained from the 
vote in protest, and also for the first time, the Government stood firm 
on its original offer. During the course of the year, wage and benefit 
adjustments to collective bargaining contracts averaged about 13 to 15 
percent, which was several points above the final inflation rate of 8.9 
percent for the year.
    In Acapulco, Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, southeast 
Veracruz State's refining and petrochemical zone, and most border 
areas, the minimum daily wage was set at $3.99 (37.90 pesos). However, 
employers actually paid $4.55 because of a supplemental 14 percent 
subsidy. These income supplements to the minimum wage, agreed to in 
annual tripartite pacts, are for all incomes less than four times the 
minimum wage, decreasing as wages and benefits rise. In Guadalajara, 
Monterrey, and other advanced industrialized areas, the minimum daily 
wage (before the subsidy) was $3.70 (35.10 pesos). In other areas, it 
was $3.44 (32.70 pesos). There are higher minimums for some 
occupations, such as building trades.
    The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Few workers (about 16 percent) earn only the minimum 
wage. Industrial workers average three to four times the minimum wage, 
earning more at larger, more advanced, and prosperous enterprises.
    The law and contract arrangements provide workers with extensive 
additional benefits. Legally required benefits include free social 
security medical treatment and pensions, individual worker housing and 
retirement accounts, substantial Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and 
profit sharing. Employer costs for these benefits add from about 27 
percent of payroll at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at major 
firms with good union contracts. In addition, employers frequently 
subsidize the cost of meals, transportation, and day care for children, 
and pay bonuses for punctuality and productivity.
    The LFT sets six 8-hour days as the legal workweek, but with pay 
for 56 hours. For most industrial workers, especially under union 
contract, the true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 7 
full 8-hour days. This is one reason why unions vigorously defend the 
legal ban on hourly wages. Workers asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime 
per day or required to work overtime on 3 consecutive days must be paid 
triple the normal wage.
    There are 11 special labor arbitration and conciliation boards (in 
Queretaro, Pachuca, Ciudad del Carmen, Zacatecas, Orizaba, Ciudad 
Juarez, Cancun, Colima, La Paz, Reynosa, and Tijuana) and 4 more state 
offices of the STPS to make it more convenient for workers to file 
complaints and bring other actions before the labor court system. In 
addition, the Labor Secretary has transferred more personnel to the 
JFCA to reduce backlogs. He also has highlighted as special issues 
child labor, women in the workplace, and the physically disabled by 
assigning responsibility for them directly to one of the under 
secretaries. In February 1999, the Labor Secretariat established a 
separate office for equality and gender issues.
    The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and 
health regulations, issued jointly by the STPS and the Social Security 
Institute (IMSS), and to pay contributions that vary according to their 
workplace safety and health experience ratings. LFT-mandated joint 
management and labor committees set standards and are responsible for 
workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These committees meet at 
least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of their 
minutes with federal labor inspectors. Federal and state authorities 
exchange information.
    STPS and IMSS officials continued to report that compliance is 
reasonably good at most large companies. However, because smaller firms 
are far more numerous and so much more difficult to monitor, these 
officials were unable to draw any general conclusions about their 
compliance. Federal inspectors are stretched too thin for effective 
enforcement if companies do not comply voluntarily and fulfill their 
legal obligation to train workers in occupational health and safety 
matters. There are special problems in construction, where unskilled, 
untrained, poorly educated, transient labor is common, especially at 
many small sites and companies. Many unions, particularly in 
construction, are not organized effectively to provide training, to 
encourage members to work safely and healthily, to participate in the 
joint committees, or to insist on their rights.
    In July a large group of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican labor 
organizations and NGO's filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging 
the failure of Mexican labor authorities to comply with health and 
safety regulations resulting in occupational injuries to a number of 
workers at maquiladora plants belonging to a U.S. company in the border 
state of Tamaulipas. The U.S. NAO accepted the submission in September 
for formal review and conducted a public hearing in San Antonio, Texas, 
on December 12.
    On July 23, about 150 workers at a construction site for a hospital 
in Ciudad Juarez rioted over mistreatment by police and poor working 
conditions. The workers complained of low pay and extremely poor living 
conditions at the barracks where they were housed.
    Many agricultural workers are internal migrants, who often travel 
with their families, including young children. They often are paid by 
volume of the work they produce, rather than by the day. Working 
conditions vary by area of the country and from one locality to 
another. Allegations have been made that workers, including young 
children accompanying them, have been exposed to pesticides and other 
chemicals.
    Individual employees or unions also may complain directly to 
inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their 
employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the federal labor 
board at no cost to themselves.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that 
prohibit the trafficking of persons; however, immigration laws, the 
federal organized crime law, and federal and state penal codes contain 
laws that are used to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants, 
women, and children, and trafficking is a serious problem. The country 
is a transit country for the trafficking of persons, especially from 
China, to the United States and Canada. There also are isolated cases 
of trafficking Mexican nationals for the purpose of forced prostitution 
or sexual services, domestic servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop 
labor, or other debt bondage. The Government has strengthened 
significantly its cooperation with China, the United States, and other 
countries. There were credible reports that police, immigration, and 
customs officials were involved in the trafficking of such persons (see 
Section 2.d.).
    On July 31, the Honduran Government stated that it was working to 
repatriate from Mexico approximately 400 Honduran girls, between the 
ages of 10 and 16 years, who after having tried to enter the United 
States illegally were forced into prostitution in Mexico.
    A study that was jointly funded by UNICEF and DIF and released in 
June studied the commercial sexual exploitation of children in six 
cities. Its author estimated that the number of children involved in 
the sex trade countrywide at 16,000. Most are Mexicans, although there 
are significant numbers from Central America--principally Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador. The Central American children enter the 
country through Chiapas. In many cases they are brought there by 
procurers who promise them employment in legitimate occupations. They 
are thereafter sold to the owners of bars and other establishments and 
then forced into prostitution to ``pay off their debts.'' This debt 
peonage often never ends because the children accrue more debt for 
their meals and housing. Oftentimes, the owners will sell or trade the 
children among themselves. Other children are transported to Mexico 
City for training. They are then sent to centers of tourism. Some 
children are trafficked to the United States and Canada. The study 
concludes that the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a 
phenomenon that is present today throughout the whole country.
                               __________

                               NICARAGUA

    Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, with a directly elected 
president, vice president, and unicameral legislature. President 
Arnoldo Aleman was elected in a free and fair election in 1996, 
defeating his closest competitor, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Supreme Electoral Council is an 
independent fourth branch of government. A series of political accords 
between the governing Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), though highly 
controversial, ceded the FSLN more power in several governmental 
institutions in exchange for the avoidance of the use of violent 
protests to achieve political ends. FSLN leaders largely refrained from 
using or threatening the use of violence. The Constitution provides for 
an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is at times 
susceptible to political and financial influence.
    The President is the supreme chief of the national defense and 
security forces. President Aleman established the first-ever civilian 
Defense Ministry upon his inauguration. The Ministry of Government 
oversees the National Police, which is charged formally with internal 
security. However, the police share this responsibility with the army 
in rural areas. The National Police recently diminished the role of 
voluntary police, private citizens contracted by the National Police to 
help fill staffing gaps, in law enforcement. The civilian authorities 
generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Some 
members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
    Nicaragua is an extremely poor country, with an estimated per 
capita gross domestic product of less than $480. The economy is 
predominantly agricultural; coffee, seafood exports, sugar, beef, and 
some light manufacturing are the key sectors. The economy grew at 7 
percent in real terms in 1999, but the rate declined in 2000. Real GDP 
growth rate for 2000 is estimated at 5 percent. The estimated annual 
rate of inflation was 8 percent, marking the second consecutive year of 
single digit price increases. While the Government estimated that 
unemployment is less than 11 percent, some nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) calculated the rate of unemployment and 
underemployment as high as 40 to 50 percent. Private foreign investment 
continued to increase during the year; however, economic growth is 
hindered by unresolved property disputes and unclear land titles 
stemming from massive confiscations by the Sandinista government in the 
1980's. The country continued to have a precarious balance of payments 
position and remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance and 
remittances from citizens living abroad.
    The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human 
rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Members of 
the security forces committed six reported extrajudicial killings. 
Police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There were 
allegations of torture by the authorities. Prison and police holding 
cell conditions remain harsh, although they improved somewhat. Security 
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens at an increased rate. 
The Government effectively punished some of those who committed abuses; 
however, a degree of impunity persisted. Lengthy pretrial detention and 
long delays in trials remain problems; however, the judiciary has made 
efforts to reduce the large case backlog. The judiciary also is subject 
at times to political influence and corruption. The Supreme Court 
continued its structural reform program for the judicial system. A new 
Judicial Organic Law, intended to address many of these problems, came 
into effect in January 1999; however, the weakness of the judiciary 
continued to hamper prosecution of human rights abusers in some cases. 
The Human Rights Ombudsman made several publicized recommendations 
during the year that openly challenged the policies of the Aleman 
Administration. These led to little concrete action. Violence against 
women, including domestic abuse and rape, remained a problem. 
Discrimination against women is an ingrained problem. Violence against 
children is a problem and child prostitution continues. Discrimination 
against indigenous people is a problem. Child labor also remained a 
problem. There were reports of trafficking for forced labor and 
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution.
    The civil war formally concluded in June 1990 with the 
demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN, or ``Contras''). 
However, the rule of law and basic infrastructure do not extend to all 
rural areas. Despite the Government's disarmament campaigns, many 
citizens, especially in rural areas, are heavily armed. Marauding 
criminal gangs, some of which claimed political agendas, continued to 
be a problem in the mountainous regions of the north, as well as on the 
Atlantic Coast.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials; however, the 
police registered six reports of extrajudicial killings by police.
    The Inspector General's office (IG) of the National Police reported 
6 instances in which a member of the police killed an alleged criminal 
and 35 instances in which police seriously wounded criminal suspects 
while attempting to arrest them. The IG automatically remands to the 
court system for review cases in which police use deadly force; 
however, the cases often take considerable time to process. The police 
do not make a final decision on cases sent to the courts until the 
courts respond with a verdict. While the police await the decisions 
from the courts, the IG's office normally applies a mild punishment, 
such as suspension or confinement to precinct. Of the 48 cases the IG 
remanded to the courts during the year, there were no reports of case 
adjudication.
    On August 19, in Managua, police officers Juan Ramon Velasquez and 
Leonel Antonio Velasquez shot and killed 20-year-old Javier de Jesus 
Solorzano Hernandez. Solorzano and his friend Marlon Antonio Obando 
Madrigal were leaving a neighborhood block party when two unknown 
thieves reportedly attempted to rob them. When Solorzano and Obando 
refused to give up their money, the four youths entered into a fight. 
The thieves had beaten Solorzano to the ground when the Velasquez 
brothers, who were patrolling the neighborhood, arrived on the scene. 
The thieves reportedly escaped just before the police arrived, at which 
time one of the two policemen approached Solorzano, believing that 
Solorzano and Obando were gang members. The officer hit Solorzano with 
his police baton until he fell down again. Obando then claimed that one 
of the two officers, at close range, fired two bullets into Solorzano's 
chest. Juan Ramon Velasquez claimed that when they arrived on the scene 
Solorzano was brandishing a gun. The police reported that they shot 
Solorzano in an act of self-defense. It remained unclear if Solorzano 
indeed was brandishing a revolver, and the preliminary autopsy report 
raised questions about the veracity of Velasquez's story. Juan Ramon 
Velasquez was suspended from his position and was awaiting trial at 
year's end.
    In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama 
political party led to one reported death and several injuries (See 
Section 5).
    The police authorities treated another death involving police 
officers as a justified homicide in self-defense. On April 6, 
roadblocks on major transit arteries in the Southern Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAS) by former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance 
resulted in clashes with police and the death of one of the protesters. 
The roadblocks were organized allegedly in response to the Government's 
failure to follow through on accords to settle longstanding claims for 
land titles and other benefits. According to a police report, the 
police were in the process of negotiating an end to the roadblock when 
five of the protesters attacked a policeman, Rafael Urbina Ortega. One 
of the assailants, Mauricio Mendoza, took the policeman's rifle and 
started shooting indiscriminately, injuring one policeman and four 
protesters. Mendoza, whom the police claim was inebriated, then was 
shot fatally by police. The local court in Rama, RAAS had yet to decide 
on the culpability of the police in the killing at year's end.
    National Police reports indicate that the four policemen involved 
in the January 1999 killings of Hilario Briones Arostegui and Santos 
Arostegui Torres were never investigated.
    There were no further developments in the May 1999 case of Pedro 
Gonzalez Talavera who was shot and killed by policemen in Villa 
Sandino, Chontales. At year's end, the case was still pending in the 
Appellate Court of Juigalpa.
    There were no further developments in the 1997 Wamblan case in 
which 16-year-old Irma Lopez was killed, after allegedly being raped, 
by an army patrol.
    There were no further developments in the 1997 La Patriota case, in 
which the army allegedly killed five members of a criminal band as they 
slept.
    In 1997 the Government negotiated the disbandment and disarmament 
of over 1,200 members, a majority of them former contras, of the 
``Northern Front 3-80'' and promised them food, clothing, seeds, and 
small plots of land. It also disarmed 423 members of the proSandinista 
``Andres Castro United Front'' (FUAC). Despite these successful 
disarmaments, armed bands, including former members of the 3-80 front 
and FUAC, engaged in murder, kidnapping for ransom, and armed robbery 
in the north and north-central regions. FUAC members have alleged that 
they were acting in opposition to the Aleman administration, and FSLN 
leaders have made positive reference to the FUAC activities in public 
statements. However, law enforcement groups, human rights 
organizations, and political analysts described the political 
motivations as tenuous and stated that most of these actions were 
purely criminal in nature. The violent criminal activities of the FUAC-
related gangs received so much public attention that in June the army 
launched an intensive military operation to eliminate the gangs in the 
region (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law makes the use of torture a punishable crime; 
however, police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There 
were numerous credible reports that police beat or physically 
mistreated detainees, often to obtain confessions. During the year, the 
Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) received 70 complaints 
of torture or degrading treatment by the authorities. However, 
according to government figures, the Ombudsman's Office for the Defense 
of Human Rights (PPDDH) submitted the majority of human rights cases to 
the police authorities; 39 of the 40 cases received by the police 
investigative bodies resulted from PPDDH inquiries. Police Inspector 
General Eva Sacasa proved willing to prosecute abusers. During the 
year, her office recorded 177 complaints of physical abuse by police, 
including those submitted by the ANPDH and others, and found 50 to have 
merit. The Inspector General sanctioned 131 officers in these cases.
    Between January and November, 27 police officers were discharged 
dishonorably.
    The National Police recently diminished the role of voluntary 
police in law enforcement. Volunteer police are private citizens who 
are contracted by the National Police on a volunteer basis to help fill 
staffing gaps in several precincts. The National Police provide them 
with a uniform, and in some cases, with a gun, at the discretion of the 
police chief. Voluntary police do not receive a salary from the 
statealthough they may be ``subcontracted'' to provide security to 
businesses and farms--nor do they receive any professional training. 
Given the sustained criticism of voluntary police for their involvement 
in human rights violations, on August 8, Chief of Police Franco 
Montealegre approved a new police statute terminating the employment of 
all voluntary police in Managua. Government authorities report that 
there still are 3,303 voluntary police located throughout the country.
    While the Inspector General's office investigated allegations of 
abuse and sanctioned the offenders in many cases, a degree of impunity 
persisted. Inadequate budget support for the National Police also 
hampered efforts to improve police performance and resulted in a 
continuing shortage of officers. However, the police were provided with 
extensive training during the year, much of it through international 
assistance programs.
    The Office of Civil Inspection for Professional Responsibility is 
responsible for monitoring allegations of illegal detention and police 
abuse and forwarding complaints received to the police Inspector 
General for follow-up action. A small budget and a small staff limited 
its effectiveness. Police Inspector General Sacasa received a total of 
863 complaints of human rights violations by police officers during the 
year, including complaints forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection 
for Professional Responsibility, and found 177 of these cases to have 
merit. She sanctioned a total of 288 officers for violations of human 
rights. Of those sanctioned, 69 officers were discharged dishonorably, 
and 48 were remanded to the courts; the rest received lesser 
punishments, including demotion, suspension, and loss of pay.
    On February 16, voluntary policeman Julio Cesar Montenegro Pacheco 
accompanied by Lt. Roger Perez entered the house of Jose Francisco 
Fernandez in Managua, allegedly without authorization, after hearing 
what sounded like a gunshot. When the police began to beat Fernandez, 
he ran out of the house and tried to climb over a fence. Montenegro 
then used Perez's gun to shoot Fernandez twice in the legs. Montenegro 
later defended his actions, claiming that he only fired in Fernandez's 
general direction without intending to hit him when Fernandez tried to 
throw a machete at the police to impede their pursuit. However, the 
inquiries and site investigation of the Nicaraguan Center for Human 
Rights (CENIDH) concluded that Montenegro used unnecessary force and 
faulted Perez for allowing the voluntary policeman to use his gun. The 
National Police subsequently dismissed Montenegro and subjected Perez 
to disciplinary action.
    On March 2, several members of the National Police stopped Rene de 
Jesus Membreno Calero, a Nicaraguan citizen who was traveling from 
Costa Rica to his mother's house in the department of Boaco. Captain 
Juan Manuel Chavez and other members of the patrol force, for unknown 
reasons, severely beat Mr. Membreno, causing rib fractures and other 
lesions. After making an investigation, the National Police concluded 
that the officers were innocent of all charges and closed the case.
    On March 10, several police officers from San Rafael del Norte 
entered the home of Rafael Ubeda Castro to arrest Roger Antonio and 
Carmen Rafael Ubeda Castro without showing any type of arrest warrant. 
Roger Ubeda reported to ANPDH that when the police officers Mario 
Castillo and Mario Rojas took him and his brother Carmen outside the 
home of their father, the police officers began to beat them with a 
wooden stick and the handles of their pistols. The police officers took 
the victims to the police headquarters in Jinotega to interrogate them 
about possible involvement in armed gangs. Roger and Carmen remained in 
a holding cell for 3 days, at which time the police released them for 
lack of evidence and the receipt of good conduct reports by private 
citizens who knew the individuals (see Section 1.d.).
    On March 11, police allegedly apprehended, handcuffed, and brutally 
beat Jesus Ramon Olivas Espinoza as he left a bar in Wiwili. The ANPDH 
reported that police officers Antonio Armador Ciclon, Teodoro Vanegas, 
and several others punched and kicked Olivas several times. The police 
officers reportedly carried Olivas to a freight container and continued 
physically abusing him in the presence of six other detainees also held 
in the container. Olivas claimed that for 3 days the Wiwili police 
transferred him and the six other detainees to the holding cells at 
night while during the day they were moved to the container. The 
container attracted so much heat from the sun that the detainees were 
reportedly close to dying from asphyxiation. The police apprehended 
Olivas because he was suspected of destroying the propaganda of 
political parties. On March 14, the local judge dismissed the case 
against Olivas for insufficient evidence. Olivas filed a complaint of 
mistreatment with police captain Alberto Garcia Pineda, but an 
investigation remained pending at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    On June 13, CENIDH reported that army soldiers Ricardo Lopez 
Navarrete and Jose Danilo Hernandez sexually abused Yadira Mendez 
Chavarria and robbed Ismael Reyes in the city of Rosita, Northern 
Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAN). The soldiers were part of a military 
operation, carried out in June, to combat the illicit and violent 
activities of gangs in the region. The local judge in Rosita ruled in 
favor of the soldiers, but the Military Appeals Court found the 
soldiers guilty and sentenced them to 4 years in prison.
    On August 6, police officer Allan Gonzalez and a police cadet 
repeatedly kicked a minor in Managua when the youth would not abandon 
the sidewalk in front of a private store. Spectators took photographs 
of the abuse, and all the major newspapers and human rights 
organizations criticized the event. Police Chief Franco Montealegre 
dismissed the officer and the cadet from the police department.
    On August 23, four soldiers in civilian clothing, including Eleazar 
Miguel Romero, robbed a bus full of civilians in Palacaguina, Madriz, 
and then fired their guns at the passengers. After hijacking the bus, 
they fired their rifles in the air and began to rob the passengers, 
including in one instance shooting one, Jose Santos Cordoba Garcia, in 
both his legs. Once they stole everything, they stepped off the bus and 
allegedly began to shoot indiscriminately into the side of the bus, 
injuring a total of nine persons. Erling Suyapa Figueroa, a 15-year-old 
girl, was wounded in her left hand. The only identified assailant, 
Eleazar Miguel Romero, said that the soldiers committed the crime to 
augment their small salaries. While the military investigation remains 
pending, as of September, the case already was presented before the 
local judge in the region. In December the court found three of the 
four soldiers guilty, sentenced them to 16 years in prison, and 
acquitted the other soldier.
    On August 26, Miguel Angel Toruno Orozco accused police officer 
Lizandro Exiles Moncada of shooting him in the chin at close range on 
May 22. Toruno claimed that while he and a friend named Francisco Reyes 
were walking home from a restaurant in the northern city of Esteli, 
Moncada, who was drunk and in civilian clothing, jumped out of a truck 
and pointed a pistol at him. Moncada threatened to kill Toruno and 
then, at close range, shot Toruno in the chin and left him lying in the 
street. While confined to a hospital bed for 2 months in critical 
condition, Toruno contacted local human rights organizations and the 
police to investigate the case. The local police allegedly closed the 
investigation claiming that Toruno was shot by friend, Francisco Reyes. 
However, Toruno flatly denied the police claim because he recognized 
Moncada before the incident, and Reyes does not know how to drive. The 
police in Esteli advised Toruno to take his case to the Office of 
Internal Affairs at the National Police headquarters. The office of 
internal affairs sent the case to a local magistrate. The police 
forensics team concluded that the bullet used to wound the victim did 
not come from the gun of the police officer. Based on that evidence, 
the local judge acquitted police officer Lizandro Exiles Moncada of all 
charges.
    On April 11, three antiriot police were shot and wounded seriously 
when police attempted to disperse a group of 500 to 600 former members 
of the Resistance. The former Resistance members had established a 
roadblock at Boaco, in central Nicaragua. One member of the police, 
Ernesto Moises Lopez, lost his right eye, while another was shot in the 
stomach and a third in the back. The CENIDH reported that Jose Jesus 
Jiron, of the former Resistance, was killed in the incident. An 
individual riding on a bus also was shot in the leg. Police arrested 12 
to 15 former Resistance members. The protesters allegedly were armed 
with grenades and shotguns at the time of the incident. The police sent 
three of the protesters to a local court in Boaco and released the 
others for lack of evidence.
    Prison conditions remained harsh, but improved somewhat. The 
Supreme Court (CSJ), the National Police, the Attorney General, the 
Department of Prisons, and several human rights organizations worked 
together during the year to significantly reduce the number of 
prisoners who spent 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial 
(see Section 1.d.). The initiative helped to alleviate overcrowded 
prisons. As of September, only one of the eight correctional facilities 
maintained prison populations significantly higher than the standards 
established by U. N. conventions on the treatment of prisoners; the 
Granada penitentiary exceeded the U.N. standards by 146 prisoners. 
According to government statistics, the prisons had a total inmate 
population of 4,903 in September, compared with 5,298 in September 
1999.
    However, the prison system remains underfunded and medical 
attention ranges from inadequate to nonexistent. For example, for all 8 
penitentiaries and 4,903 prisoners, prison authorities only maintained 
a staff of 22 specialists, which include doctors, psychologists, 
teachers, and social workers. Prison authorities also reported that 31 
percent of prisoners remained without beds, forcing prisoners to sleep 
on concrete beds or floors. The percentage of prisoners without beds or 
bed mattresses would likely be higher without the periodic inflow of 
privately donated mattresses.
    On June 6, then-Minister of Government Rene Herrera appointed 
Rosario Gaitan to replace Carlos Quintana as Director of Prisons. 
Gaitan previously served as Deputy to Quintana, has maintained a career 
in the penal system since 1980, and has earned both the respect of the 
prison personnel and the prisoners.
    Prison officials calculated that the daily expenditure per prisoner 
for food was about $0.50 (6 cordobas) and reported that the annual 
budget for food remained constant. There was some improvement in prison 
food, but malnutrition remained a problem in local jails and police 
holding cells. Many prisoners also received additional food from 
visiting family and friends. Medical care available to prisoners fell 
far short of basic needs. Some prisons and many police holding cells 
were dark, poorly ventilated, and unhygienic. At the Bluefields jail, 
there were only 2 showers and 4 toilets for more than 102 prisoners.
    Only Managua has a separate prison for women; outside the Managua 
area, women were housed in separate wings in prison facilities and were 
guarded by female custodians. As of September, females made up 2.6 
percent of the prison population. The Public Defender's office assigned 
two full-time employees to work with the women's prison system to help 
ensure its proper functioning in such areas as timely release of 
inmates granted parole.
    As of September, 3 percent of the prison population were between 
the ages of 15 and 18, compared with 4 percent in 1999 and 8.5 percent 
in 1998. All youths were housed in separate prison wings from adults. 
During the year the Department of Prisons completed the process of 
establishing separate facilities for juveniles or converting part of 
their existing prison space into a separate youth wing for all prisons.
    Conditions in jails and holding cells remained harsh. Police 
station holding cells were severely overcrowded. Suspects often were 
left in these cells during their trials, since budgetary shortfalls 
often restricted the use of fuel for frequent transfers to distant 
courtrooms. At the Corn Island jail, six cells each holding six 
detainees frequently were filled to capacity. The authorities 
occasionally released detainees when they no longer could feed them. 
Several churches and national and international NGO's donate 
foodstuffs, beds, and medicine to the prison system to help alleviate 
shortfalls. The ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons in an effort 
to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely fashion when their 
sentence had been served or they were granted parole (see Section 
1.e.). Prison guards received human rights training from NGO's and the 
Catholic Church and generally treated prisoners well, although there 
were some reports of abuses.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention by the police remains a problem. The Police Functions Law 
requires police to obtain a warrant prior to detaining a suspect and to 
notify family members within 24 hours of the detainee's whereabouts. 
Compliance with this law increased significantly in 1999, largely 
because of pressure applied by the police internal affairs office and 
support for compliance from Chief of Police Franco Montealegre. 
Detainees do not have the right to an attorney until they have been 
charged formally with a crime. Local human rights groups are critical 
of the law for providing inadequate judicial oversight of police 
arrests.
    The 1995 constitutional reforms reduced from 72 to 48 hours the 
time police may hold a suspect legally before they must bring the 
person before a judge to decide if charges should be brought. The judge 
must then either order the accused released or transferred to prison. 
Although cumbersome, this law was observed more closely than in past 
years, and few prisoners were held illegally beyond the 48-hour 
deadline (see Section 1.c.).
    An interinstitutional effort comprised of the Supreme Court (CSJ), 
the National Police, the Department of the Penitentiary System, and 
several human rights organizations significantly reduced the number of 
prisoners with 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial. 
Specifically, on February 4, the Penal Bench of the Supreme Court 
passed an order to all local magistrates to give priority to those 
cases involving pretrial prisoners with 6 months or more of 
incarceration. According to government statistics, only 4 percent of 
the 4,958 prisoners have been in jail for 6 months or longer without a 
trial; in 1999, 8 percent of the prison population experienced an 
unusually long delay before their court hearing (see Section 1.c.).
    During the year, ANPDH received 155 complaints of illegal arrest 
and arbitrary detention. Of those cases sent to the police IG's office 
by ANPDH and other human rights organizations, 28 complaints were found 
to merit investigation. Of these, 2 were determined to be without merit 
and 26 remained under investigation at year's end. As in past years, 
incidents of arbitrary detention were most common in Managua and in the 
rural northern and north-central regions, where much of the civil war 
was fought.
    Exile is not practiced. There were no reports of political violence 
against any citizens returning from civil war era self-imposed exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible at times 
to corruption and political influence. The judiciary is hampered by 
arcane legal codes, prosecutors who play a passive role, an 
underfunded, and understaffed defender's office, judges and lawyers who 
often lack sufficient training or education, and corruption. In the 
past, many judges were not lawyers. Judges' political sympathies or 
acceptance of bribes reportedly often influenced judicial actions and 
findings.
    The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The 
16-member Supreme Court is the system's highest court, and in addition 
to administering the judicial system, also is responsible for 
nominating all appellate and lower court judges. The Court is divided 
into specialized chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional, 
and civil matters. Under the Law of the Child and Family, which took 
effect in 1998, the Attorney General's office rather than the police 
investigates crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 1994 
Military Code requires the civilian court system to try members of the 
military charged with common crimes.
    A 5-year administration of justice reform program, begun in 1997, 
continued during the year. A Judicial Organic Law, passed by the 
National Assembly in 1997 to overhaul the archaic structure of the 
court system, finally was signed by President Aleman in 1998 and took 
effect in January 1999. The law contains a provision establishing 
minimum professional standards for judicial appointees. The Supreme 
Court commission supervising the revision of the country's outdated 
criminal codes and procedures continued its work, in coordination with 
the National Assembly's Judicial Commission. Reform of these codes is 
intended to reduce judicial delays and resulting excessive pretrial 
detention. By year's end, the Assembly had begun the process to approve 
a new draft Criminal Code. However, the Assembly still must approve 
each chapter of the draft Criminal Code before it can go into effect. 
At year's end, a special subcommission of the National Assembly 
Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court finalized a new draft 
Criminal Procedures Code. In 1999 the National Assembly approved a 
reform of the Public Ministry's office that streamlined the judicial 
process by separating the defense and the prosecution functions. 
President Aleman vetoed it in May but later rescinded his veto.
    In July the Government opened new property tribunals to handle 
cases concerning seized properties (see Section 1.f.). This ends the 
nearly 3-year freeze in property-related lawsuits that started when the 
processing of such cases in district courts was suspended in December 
1997.
    Although the civil and criminal courts made significant progress in 
expediting the judicial process for those in prison without a prior 
court hearing, human rights and lawyers' groups in general continued to 
complain about the delay of justice, sometimes for years, caused by 
judicial inaction.
    Judges appeared susceptible to corruption and political influence. 
The shelving of politically charged cases or ruling in favor of the 
politically connected party remained the most common manifestations of 
judicial corruption. For example, on May 26, Alejandro Carrion 
McDonough, the brother of Army Commander General Javier Carrion 
McDonough, allegedly killed Pablo salon Leal Aguirre, a rural farmer, 
in Masaya when Leal allegedly refused to provide access to the water 
pipeline leading to Carrion's farm. The family of Leal took the case to 
the police and judicial authorities, but in spite of an arrest warrant, 
the police never apprehended Alejandro Carrion. Several weeks after the 
incident, including an announcement by Leal's family that the Carrion 
family attempted to bribe them in exchange for dropping the charges, 
alternate judge Walter Solis in the Criminal Court of Managua dismissed 
the charges. Largely due to public pressure, the Supreme Court forced 
alternate judge Solis, previously suspected of official misuse of 
authority, to retire from the bench. The Leal family appealed the 
decision of Solis, but at year's end, the Court of Appeals acquitted 
Alejandro Carrion. The case then went to the Supreme Court where it was 
pending at year's end.
    In an ongoing campaign to reduce incompetence and corruption in the 
judiciary, the Supreme Court removed an additional 10 judges during the 
first half of 1999, bringing the total removed since the campaign began 
in 1997 to 104--more than one-third of the 300 judges in the system. 
The Judicial Inspector's office received 238 official complaints 
against lawyers, judges, and judicial functionaries in the first half 
of 1999.
    In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and 
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Judicial 
Organic Law provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's 
office to represent indigent defendants. The office in Managua 
maintained a staff of 13 appointed public defenders throughout the 
year; however, more are needed. The Court has requested funding for 26 
additional public defenders to be located outside of Managua. Elsewhere 
in the country where public defenders have not been available, the 
system in effect before the passage of the new law continued in use. 
Under that system, the presiding judge appoints attorneys from a 
standard list to represent indigent defendants, but, because they are 
not paid by the State, many attorneys have paid a fine of about $8.30 
(100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients.
    According to the ANPDH, despite difficulties in implementing fully 
the provisions of the new law, the number of indigent defendants who 
went to trial without an attorney to represent them decreased 
significantly. However, high-ranking officials in the Public Defender's 
office complained that they continued to encounter blatant judicial 
corruption and the willingness of several judges to sentence defendants 
without a public defender present.
    Under the Napoleonic legal system, a trial does not consist of a 
public hearing. Rather, there is a desk review by a magistrate of the 
file of the accused. An initial hearing usually is held within the 
constitutionally mandated 10 days. Although very simple cases or those 
with high profile or outside interest may be resolved quickly, many 
languish for months. Due to a lack of administrative coordination 
between judges and the penal system, many prisoners have remained in 
prison after their scheduled release date. The Supreme Court tried to 
alleviate the problem by issuing instructions to prison authorities to 
release prisoners immediately upon the return of an innocent verdict. 
In addition, the ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons during the 
year in an effort to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely 
manner after serving their sentence or being granted parole.
    Despite improvements to the criminal law system, the country still 
lacks an effective civil law system. As a result, cases more properly 
handled in a civil proceeding often are transmuted into criminal 
proceedings. One party then effectively is blackmailed, being jailed 
due to action by the party wielding greater influence with the judge. 
In addition, this heavy civil-based criminal caseload claims attention 
from an overburdened public prosecutor's office and diverts resources 
that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal matters.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against these 
abuses, and the Government generally respected these provisions in 
practice. The Constitution stipulates that all persons have the right 
to privacy of their family and to the inviolability of their home, 
correspondence, and communications; requires warrants for searches of 
private homes; and excludes from legal proceedings illegally seized 
letters, documents, and private papers.
    In November 1997, the National Assembly passed a law intended to 
resolve longstanding property disputes that stemmed from massive 
confiscations by the Sandinista government in the 1980's. The 
legislation provided for the establishment of new property tribunals 
with procedures that include mediation, binding arbitration, and 
expedited trials. After numerous delays, the new property tribunals 
finally started accepting cases for filing in July. The tribunals' 
administrative offices are fully staffed and operational. Any lawyer 
interested in serving as a judge may submit his or her resume. The 
Supreme Court then selects judges by lottery, after which the names of 
the designated judges are published in newspapers for public comment. 
The Supreme Court can eliminate from consideration those judges about 
whom they received complaints. The judges for Managua and Leon already 
have been selected, and the process is continuing for tribunals in 
other regions. As of December, the tribunals reported that almost 100 
cases have been filed. A total of 35 cases were settled through 
mediated settlement agreements. The unsuccessfully mediated cases 
passed on to arbitration or expedited trials. By year's end, the 
tribunals had not yet issued a final determination in any case, and it 
was too early to judge their fairness and efficiency.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. However, several constitutional provisions 
potentially qualify freedom of the press. The 1987 Constitution 
stipulates that citizens have the right to accurate information, 
thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to publish 
information that the Government deems inaccurate could be abridged. 
Although the right to information cannot be subject to censorship, 
there is retroactive liability established by law, defined as a social 
responsibility, implying the potential for sanctions against 
irresponsibility by the press. Although the legislature did not modify 
these provisions in the 1995 constitutional reforms, the Government has 
not invoked these provisions to suppress the media.
    The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported that during 
1999, members of the pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union and 
leaders and members of the Nicaraguan Journalists' Association 
attempted to revive legislation to establish a professional 
journalists' guild. Although in 1996 the National Assembly passed a 
bill that would have established such a guild, the bill never was 
signed into law. The journalistic community was divided sharply over 
whether such a law would improve the quality of journalism or merely 
restrict freedom of speech and of the press. The IAPA expressed concern 
about any attempts to revive this proposal and also about the possible 
effect on press freedom of a provision in the new draft criminal code 
approved by the Judicial Commission of the National Assembly (see 
Section 1.e.) that would increase the possible penalties for libel and 
slander.
    The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic 
circles freely and openly discussed diverse viewpoints in public 
discourse without government interference. In April a popular daily 
newspaper revealed a corruption scandal that received significant 
attention from the Government and the public. Over a period of several 
weeks the newspaper provided substantial evidence that the Director of 
Internal Revenues Collection (DGI) Byron Jerez misused his position and 
authority. The journal's coverage of the scandal forced the Government 
to investigate the scandal and take action; in June Byron Jerez was 
forced to resign from his office.
    The IAPA continued to report that the Government directed a 
disproportionate amount of total government advertising in the print 
media to publications favorable to the Government and denied to a 
newspaper critical of the government certain tax benefits provided to 
other media businesses.
    Media representatives also charge the Aleman Government with using 
other means to retaliate against critics. La Prensa, the newspaper most 
active in unearthing government corruption, has been in a tax dispute 
with the DGI that the paper claims is based purely on politics. Channel 
8 is involved in a dispute over the nonpayment of social security fees 
for its employees, a dispute that the owner of Channel 8 also 
attributes to political machinations on the part of the administration 
for his vocal criticism of the President. The administration also 
proposed a bill that would set minimum wage levels for print, radio, 
and television journalists. The media claimed that the President had an 
ulterior motive in proposing the bill that would set unrealistically 
high minimum salaries and force media outlets to either close or 
drastically reduce their operations. In February the National 
Assembly's Commission on Education, Media, Culture, and Sports rejected 
the proposal.
    The news medium with the largest national audience is radio, but 
polls show that television is the primary source of news in the cities. 
There are 117 chartered radio stations in the country; listeners 
receive a wide variety of political viewpoints, especially on the 67 
stations based in Managua. There are seven Managua-based television 
stations, six of which carry news programming, often with noticeable 
partisan political content. In addition, there are 60 cable television 
franchises that offer services in most large and medium-sized cities.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
recognizes the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission, and 
the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, the 
Constitution also recognizes the right to public assembly, 
demonstration, and mobilization ``in conformity with the law,'' and the 
law requires demonstrators to obtain permission for a rally or march by 
registering its planned size and location with the police. The 
authorities routinely granted such permission, but many groups chose 
not to register because, they claimed, the process was too cumbersome. 
Throughout the year, several groups threatened to cause civil unrest as 
a result of the newly instituted constitutional and electoral reforms. 
In August coffee growers held small demonstrations to protest 
government policies and a lack of government support.
    In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama 
political party led to the reported death of one demonstrator and 
injuries to several others (see Section 5).
    The Constitution provides for the right to organize or affiliate 
with political parties, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Opposition and independent associations functioned freely 
without government interference or restriction. Private associations do 
not have legal status to conduct private fund raising or receive public 
financial support until they receive this authorization from the 
National Assembly, which it routinely confers.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to travel and reside anywhere in the country and to enter and exit the 
country freely, and the Government respects these rights in practice. 
In December 1998, the Government abolished a requirement that citizens 
and residents obtain an exit visa to leave the country. The right of 
citizens to return to the country is not established in the 
Constitution, but in practice the Government has not restricted 
anyone's return.
    In May the Government nullified the citizenship application of 
former Minister of Defense Jose Antonio Alvarado. This action was 
portrayed widely in the media as a response by President Aleman to 
Alvarado's aspirations to the presidency in 2001. Alvarado, a 
Nicaraguan by birth, relocated abroad during the civil war in the 
1980's and acquired foreign citizenship. Alvarado claimed that he 
returned to Nicaragua in 1990, and reacquired his Nicaraguan 
citizenship. Minister of Government Rene Herrera nullified Alvarado's 
application for ``repatriation'' based on allegations of fraud and 
other irregularities in the application. This administrative action 
effectively removed Alvarado's opportunity to qualify for the 2001 
national elections. A new constitutional reform stipulates that elected 
positions can be occupied only by Nicaraguans who have maintained their 
citizenship for the 4 years immediately prior to the date of the 
general elections. In August an appeals court ruled in favor of 
Alvarado, thus suspending Herrera's administrative action. The Supreme 
Court ultimately is to decide the case.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for asylum, and refugees 
cannot be expelled to the country that persecuted them. The issue of 
the provision of first asylum did not arise.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercised their right peacefully to change their 
government in free and fair national elections in 1996 held under the 
auspices of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), an independent branch 
of government. Over 90 percent of eligible voters registered, and 76 
percent of eligible voters voted in 1996. Over 3,000 national and 
international observers declared the elections free and fair, despite 
some logistical and organizational problems.
    The 1995 reforms to the 1987 Constitution established a more equal 
distribution of power and authority among the four coequal branches of 
government. The President heads the executive branch and a cabinet 
appointed by the President, who is both head of state and head of 
government, as well as supreme chief of the defense and security 
forces. The Vice President has no constitutionally mandated duties or 
powers. Both the President and Vice President are elected to 5-year 
terms by direct popular vote, with the possibility of a runoff election 
between the top two candidates if one does not obtain at least 35 
percent of the vote on the first ballot. The Constitution does not 
permit the President to hold consecutive terms in office.
    A single-chamber National Assembly exercises legislative power. In 
October 1996, voters chose 93 members, including 20 deputies from 
nationwide lists, 70 from lists presented in each of the 15 departments 
and the 2 autonomous regions, and 3 defeated presidential candidates 
who obtained a minimum percentage of the national vote. Members elected 
concurrently with the President and Vice President in 1996 are to serve 
5-year terms. The ruling PLC holds the highest number of deputy seats 
with 36; the FSLN has 35; a dissident liberal caucus has 8; the 
Conservatives have 5; and a conglomeration of minor parties make up the 
remaining 9 seats.
    On January 20, the National Assembly approved a package of proposed 
constitutional amendments supported by the leadership of both the 
governing PLC and the opposition FSLN. Key elements of the legislation 
included a change in the requirements that a presidential candidate 
must meet to avoid a second-round runoff election; expansion of the 
Supreme Court from 12 to 16 judges; expansion of the CSE from 5 to 7 
magistrates; an automatic assembly seat for the outgoing President and 
Vice President; a requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the 
Assembly, rather than the previous qualified majority vote, to remove 
presidential immunity from prosecution; and the replacement of a single 
Controller General with the current 5-person collegial body charged 
with investigating allegations of wrongdoing or financial malfeasance 
by Government officials. The legislation provided for election of the 
President and the Vice President in the first round of voting if one 
political party wins at least 40 percent of the vote, or if one party 
wins at least 35 percent of the vote and the party in second place is 
more than 5 percentage points behind the front-runner. In addition, a 
party will lose its legal status if it obtains less than 4 percent of 
the vote in a general election. The latter provision is expected 
greatly to reduce the number of parties eligible to field candidates in 
general elections; over 20 parties ran candidates in the 1996 
elections.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice against women, 
indigenous groups, or other minorities voting or participating in 
politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Women served as President and Vice President until January 
1997, and a woman served as president of the CSE until January. 
Additionally, 2 of 16 Supreme Court justices are women; women hold 
ministerial, vice ministerial, and other senior positions in 
government; and voters elected 10 women to the National Assembly in 
October 1996. Two members of the National Assembly claim indigenous 
heritage.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    With some exceptions, human rights groups operated without 
government interference. Major organizations included the Permanent 
Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), the (ANPDH), and the Nicaraguan 
Center for Human Rights (CENIDH). The ANPDH, the CENIDH, the CPDH, and 
the Catholic Relief Services continued to conduct human rights 
workshops at the police training academy, at various police 
headquarters, and with army units throughout the country. Some military 
officers received internationally sponsored human rights training.
    On March 29, Amnesty International (AI) reported that the 
Government accused Vilma Nunez de Excorcia, President of CENIDH, of 
obstructing police. On June 2, AI reported that she had received 
telephonic threats to her life. Nunez alleges that the death threats 
are because she spoke out against Government complicity in alleged 
army-ordered assassinations of FUAC leaders. When she asked the police 
to investigate, they concluded that her charges were unfounded and 
closed the case.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (PPDDH), the only autonomous 
government-financed human rights office, continued to focus on filling 
staffing gaps and organizing its scope and activities. In 1995 the 
National Assembly passed a law creating a Human Rights Ombudsman's 
office, with the Ombudsman to be elected by the Assembly. In June, 
after a delay of nearly 5 years, the National Assembly elected Benjamin 
Perez, formerly the head of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission, as 
the country's first Ombudsman and Julian Corrales as Deputy Ombudsman. 
Perez relied on the participation of most local human rights 
organizations to select the Special Ombudsmen for Children's Issues and 
for Women Issues, Carlos Emilio Lopez and Patricia Obregon, 
respectively. In December he selected the Special Ombudsman for 
Indigenous Affairs, Rev. Norman Bent. The PPDDH also began to 
investigate actively human rights violations during the year. Perez 
began demonstrating the effective independence of his office from the 
Aleman Administration when he publicly criticized the Government for 
violating the constitutional rights of former Defense Minister Jose 
Antonio Alvarado by nullifying his repatriation application (see 
Section 2.d.). However, he has been reluctant to exercise the full 
powers of his office.
    In July 1997, the Organization of American States' (OAS) Technical 
Cooperation Mission (TCM), opened at the request of the Government and 
continues to operate. The TCM is a small successor organization to the 
OAS International Support and Verification Commission. The TCM focuses 
on the 13 municipalities that were affected most adversely by the 
decade-long civil war, where the TCM works on conflict resolution, 
reconciliation, improving local government, and extending legal 
infrastructure. The TCM and Catholic Relief Services help maintain more 
than 200 peace commissions in the northern and central parts of the 
country, intended to give inhabitants of the area a means of dispute 
resolution, a means of monitoring human rights abuses, and a vehicle 
for expressing their concerns to government authorities. Many of the 
commissions operate in areas that are without any governmental 
presence, and serve as surrogates for absent police and courts. The 
Government granted legal standing to additional such grassroots 
organizations during the year. Some peace commission members initially 
reported that soldiers, rural police, and local residents sometimes 
misunderstood their efforts at advocacy on behalf of jailed criminals, 
interpreting them as challenges to law enforcement officials' 
authority. However, during the year, the commissions continued to 
report increased support from all elements of the societies they serve, 
including law enforcement.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of birth, 
nationality, political belief, race, gender, language, religion, 
opinion, national origin, economic condition, or social condition; 
however, in practice the Government made little or no effort to combat 
discrimination. Few, if any, discrimination suits or formal complaints 
were filed with government officials.
    Women.--The most prevalent violations of women's rights involved 
domestic and sexual violence, which were widespread and underreported. 
The National Police reported that of 20,905 reports filed by women 
between January and August, more than 11,086 concerned physical or 
sexual abuse.
    The Criminal Code provides punishment for sexual abuse, and 
stipulates that any person convicted of physically abusing or raping 
another person will face from 9 months to 4 years in prison. The 
National Police, as well as local human rights groups, have confirmed 
that while police sometimes intervene to prevent domestic violence, 
they rarely prosecute perpetrators because victims often refuse to 
press charges. Those cases that actually reached the courts usually 
resulted in a not guilty verdict due to judicial inexperience with, and 
lack of legal training related to, proper judicial handling of such 
violence.
    The 1996 Law against Aggression against Women reformed the Criminal 
Code to make domestic violence a crime and to provide up to 6 years' 
imprisonment for those found guilty of such violence. The law also 
provided for the issuance of restraining orders in cases in which women 
fear for their safety.
    According to statistics from the National Police, the police 
received 1,181 rape complaints during the year. In 1999 there were 
1,367 reported instances of rape. Many women are reluctant to report 
abuse or file charges due to social stigmas attached to victims of 
rape.
    The police manage 18 women's commissariats in 14 cities. Each 
commissariat is located adjacent to a police station and is staffed by 
six police officers, two social workers, one psychologist, and one 
lawyer. However, due to a lack of funding, the staff size is often 
limited to a far smaller number. The commissariats provide both social 
and legal help to women and mediate spousal conflicts.
    In October 1999, with the help of the CENIDH, Zoilamerica Narvaez 
filed a complaint with the IACHR against her stepfather, FSLN leader, 
National Assembly Deputy, and former President Daniel Ortega. Narvaez 
asserted that Ortega sexually molested and harassed her from the time 
she was 11 years old until she filed charges against him in 1997. The 
case publicized the problems of incest, rape, and women's rights and 
also highlighted the issue of immunity from prosecution for 
parliamentary deputies. In 1998, Narvaez championed an effort to 
persuade the National Assembly to withdraw Ortega's immunity so that 
she could bring a lawsuit against him; however, the Assembly did not 
take up the issue of Ortega's immunity by year's end. In November 1999, 
the IACHR officially opened a case in response to Narvaez's complaint 
and advised the Government that it would be required to respond to the 
charges. On September 27, the Government responded that the claims made 
by Narvaez were unfounded and merited no further investigation. The 
Government argued that the State did not violate her constitutional 
rights because the legislative and judicial branches gave her case due 
consideration. The IACHR has not responded to the Government.
    Prostitution is common, and there were credible reports that some 
women were trafficked and forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. 
and 6.f.). In Managua most prostitutes work on the streets, 
clandestinely in nightclubs and bars, or offer sexual services in 
massage parlors. In towns along the Pan American Highway, women and 
girls sell sexual services to truck drivers and other travelers, often 
foreigners driving north from Costa Rica. In port cities such as 
Corinto, the primary clientele are sailors. Corinto is unusual in that 
prostitutes receive medical examinations, and a card certifying their 
health if they are free of disease. In addition, prostitutes in Corinto 
reportedly often work together to maintain a rudimentary price-setting 
structure that enabled them to earn much more than they would in other 
areas. However, in most areas, prostitutes do not have access to 
medical screening or treatment.
    Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes, 
reports of discrimination against women are persistent and credible. 
According to a poll released on April 16, women comprise about 61 
percent of the public labor force, a number much larger than that in 
the private sector. It also showed that even with comparable 
educational backgrounds, salaries for male and female workers differ 
significantly, with men making sometimes twice as much as women in the 
same positions. Even with similar qualifications, men advance more 
quickly than women do. Women constitute the majority of workers in the 
traditionally low-paid education and health service sectors. According 
to a 1998 report, women have equal or somewhat better access to 
education than men, especially in urban areas.
    There are many NGO and government programs that target 
discrimination against women, mostly by analyzing the current status of 
women in the workplace. The Program for Reform and Modernization of the 
Public Sector, directed by the Vice President, collects statistics on 
salary differences and hiring techniques in the public sector, thereby 
publicizing the issue of discrimination. However, it is unclear what 
measures have been taken to actually counteract such discrimination in 
practice.
    Children.--The Government expresses its commitment to children's 
human rights and welfare publicly, but does not commit adequate funding 
levels for children's programs or primary education. A constitutional 
provision known as the ``6 Percent Rule'' automatically allots 6 
percent of the annual budget to a higher education consortium, often at 
the expense of funding for primary and secondary education programs. 
Children 18 years of age and younger made up approximately 53 percent 
of the population. A 1995 study showed that as many as 40 percent of 
all children are not registered officially. Education is compulsory 
through the sixth grade, but this provision is not enforced. The study 
also indicated that 45 percent of children do not attend school. 
Primary school enrollment rates for boys and girls are estimated at 73 
and 75 percent, respectively; secondary school enrollment rates are 39 
and 47 percent.
    Children increasingly were involved in crime both as victims and as 
perpetrators. From 1993 to 1997, offenders under the age of 17 
increased from approximately 1.5 percent to approximately 15 percent. 
From January to August, 29 minors died as a result of violent crime. 
During the same period, victims of rape included 222 children under the 
age of 13, and 351 between the ages of 13 and l7. Children, especially 
boys in street gangs, contributed to an ongoing rise in the crime rate, 
which resulted in a police crackdown on youth gangs in August that 
involved over 500 juvenile arrests. During the year, there were about 
3,500 reported cases of child abandonment and abuse, 1,506 cases of 
children who were hospitalized for severe burns, and 105 children who 
disappeared. It is estimated that about 63 percent of sexual abuse 
victims are under the age of 18, and that 36 percent are younger than 
13. Over 676,000 children are at-risk and exposed daily to violence, 
abuse, exploitation, and neglect. According to UNICEF, this number is 
expected to increase because the population of children under 5 years, 
living on the streets, is increasing.
    As a result of the Child and Family Law, which took effect in late 
1998, juvenile prisoners could no longer be held in adult facilities, 
or for more than 24 hours without being charged. However, 
implementation of the new law proved problematic. In August 1999, 17-
year-old Modesto Perez ambushed and killed his former employer, 
National Assembly deputy Jose Cuadra, after Cuadra fired Perez. Public 
outrage at the inability of the system to punish Perez effectively was 
directed primarily at the new law, in particular the provision that 
minors charged with crimes be prosecuted in new juvenile courts, where 
the possible penalties for serious crimes are less than those imposed 
on adults. In addition, the juvenile courts were operational only in 
Managua and Ciudad Dario; consequently, minors charged with crimes 
elsewhere in the country often avoided prosecution entirely. The 
National Assembly, the Catholic Church, and other organizations spoke 
out in favor of reforming the law to allow the prosecution of minors 
who commit serious crimes as adults. In September a jury found Perez 
guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
    Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
    The First Lady has established several commissions on children's 
issues. Mrs. Aleman headed the National Council for the Protection of 
Children and the National Council for the Eradication of Child Labor.
    According to local media and the Ministry of the Family, the 
incidence of child prostitution increased, especially in Managua, and 
near border cities and ports. According to press reports, UNICEF noted 
significant growth in prostitution among children between the ages of 
12 and 16 in towns where taxi drivers were said to serve as middlemen. 
OAS personnel in the country also noted growth in prostitution among 
girls as young as 10 years of age; in rural areas, their clients are 
often truck drivers and other travelers, including foreigners, who 
patronize prostitutes in towns along the Pan American Highway. From 
December 1998 to May 1999, the Ministry of the Family sponsored an 
investigation into child prostitution in five municipalities. Of the 
more than 300 children surveyed, 82 percent reported that they had 
started engaging in prostitution within the past year. Many of those 
surveyed said that they engaged in prostitution to buy basic 
necessities such as food and clothing, or to support a drug habit. A 
1999 survey by the NGO Casa Alianza reported that of 520 children, 504 
admitted to consuming drugs, usually glue. There have been cases of 
adults who exchange sexual favors with street children in return for 
glue. There were cases of trafficking in children for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). In 1999 a National Forum 
against the Sexual and Commercial Exploitation of Children and 
Adolescents was created to fight for children's rights and bring this 
issue to the public attention; however, it failed to take any actions 
during the year.
    People with Disabilities.--In 1998 the Ministry of Health created a 
National Council for Rehabilitation to address the needs of the 600,000 
citizens with some type of disability, only 3 percent of whom receive 
medical treatment. Through its clinics and hospitals, the Government 
provides care to war veterans and other disabled persons, but the 
quality of care is generally poor. However, with assistance from 
international NGO's, foreign governments, and the public health care 
system, the Government has procured thousands of prostheses and other 
medical equipment for veterans and former resistance members.
    Despite some efforts, the Government's past role in helping the 
disabled is minimal and often has been criticized. It has not 
legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility to buildings for the 
disabled. In the spring, the Ministry of the Family announced that it 
would cut a considerable amount of financial support for the Blue Bird 
Protection Association that shelters about 100 disabled persons, aged 
from 10 months to 40 years old, who are considered unable to care for 
themselves. Although the Ministry agreed to cover a significant percent 
of the Association's budget, its failure to do so forced the 
Association's employees to go without pay, and a significant decrease 
in medicinal, clothing, and food supplies. Many organizations centered 
on helping the disabled called for the Government to focus more 
attention on the needs and interests of the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Indigenous people constitute about 5 percent of 
the country's population and live primarily in the Northern Autonomous 
Atlantic Region (RAAN) and Southern Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAS). 
The RAAN and the RAAS, which were created in 1987 out of the former 
department of Zelaya and which border the Caribbean Sea, constitute 47 
percent of the national territory. Based on 1998 information from the 
Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and 
other sources, the four major identifiable tribes are the Miskito (with 
approximately 100,000 members), the Sumo (10,000), the Garifuna 
(3,000), and the Rama (1,000).
    In an effort to encourage indigenous participation in Atlantic 
coast regional elections held in 1998, the CSE distributed electoral 
and civic education materials in four languages, including Miskito and 
Sumo. The indigenous people of the RAAN, primarily the Miskito and the 
Sumo, have a political organization known as Yatama, which has 
representation in regional and municipal councils. There is also an 
armed faction of the same name; the extent to which the two groups are 
linked is not clear. Like many armed groups operating since the end of 
the civil war, the Yatama groups mix banditry with a genuine desire to 
force the Government to devote more resources to their under-developed 
region. However, two factors differentiate the armed groups in the RAAN 
from those that have operated elsewhere in the country. First, most 
participants in these groups are Amerindians who long have seen 
themselves as having a separate culture. Second, drug trafficking and 
drug money on the Atlantic coast have become far more pervasive than 
elsewhere in the country. The total strength of Yatama armed groups was 
estimated at 210 men.
    In September 1999, President Aleman signed a disarmament agreement 
with representatives of the Yatama armed groups. In return, the 
Government made a number of promises to the Miskitos including land to 
fighters who turned in their arms, support for housing for Yatama-
affiliated families, agricultural credits, protection of traditional 
Amerindian fishing rights, and resolution of long-standing disputes 
about the boundaries of communal Miskito land. However, these 
provisions had not been implemented at year's end which has caused 
recent threats of remobilization by the Yatama groups.
    The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) ruled in August that the Yatama 
political party did not meet the qualifications to participate in the 
November 5 municipal elections. The party attempted to enter into a 
political alliance with two other Atlantic-coast parties, but the CSE 
determined that the alliance failed to meet the electoral eligibility 
requirements for the municipal elections, thus eliminating Yatama's 
participation in the November elections. Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera 
led protests against the party's exclusion in Puerto Cabezas and other 
areas of the RAAN. In subsequent clashes between October 26-29 between 
police and Rivera's followers, several followers were injured and 
scores were arrested. One person was killed; however, it was unclear 
whether his death resulted from the disturbance. There were high levels 
of abstention on election day mainly due to dissatisfaction with the 
CSE ruling. Consequently, the PLC and the FSLN won all the contested 
offices in the RAAN. Since the electoral body ruled late in the year on 
the eligibility of the alliance, it granted Yatama automatic 
qualification for the 2001 national elections.
    The 1987 Autonomy Law requires the Government to consult indigenous 
people regarding the exploitation of their areas' resources. Indigenous 
people claim that the central Government often made decisions without 
adequate community consultation. As in previous years, some indigenous 
groups complained that central government authorities excluded the 
indigenous people of the Atlantic coast from meaningful participation 
in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the 
allocation of natural resources. Government health care exists in the 
Atlantic towns of Puerto Cabezas, Siuna, and Bluefields, but a majority 
of indigenous people in rural areas have no access to modern health 
care. Critics of government policy cited extremely high unemployment 
rates, but calculation of reliable employment statistics was 
complicated because most of the working indigenous population on the 
Atlantic coast is engaged in subsistence fishing, farming, and mining.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens are of mixed 
background, and ethnicity is not a barrier to political or economic 
success. However, various indigenous groups from both the RAAN and the 
RAAS sometimes linked the Government's failure to expend resources in 
support of the Atlantic coast population to the existence of ethnic, 
racial, and religious (principally members of the Moravian church) 
minorities that predominate in that region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions, and this right was 
reaffirmed in the new Labor Code that entered into effect in 1996 and 
replaced the antiquated 1944 code. All public and private sector 
workers, except those in the military and the police, may form and join 
unions of their own choosing, and they exercise this right extensively. 
The Labor Code permits the existence of more than one union, 
representing the same group of workers, at any place of employment. To 
become a union, a group of at least 20 persons must petition the 
Ministry of Labor for legal status and the right to engage in 
collective bargaining. The new code legally recognizes cooperatives, 
into which many transportation and agricultural workers are organized. 
Less than half of the formal sector work force, including agricultural 
workers, is unionized, according to labor leaders. Union membership 
continued to fall during the year. The unions are independent of the 
Government, although many are affiliated with political parties.
    The Constitution recognizes the right to strike. The Labor Code 
requires a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise to call a 
strike. The Labor Code requires that before a union may strike, it must 
first receive approval from the Labor Ministry. To obtain approval, the 
union must go through a process that requires good faith negotiation 
with management.
    The Labor Code prohibits retribution against strikers and union 
leaders for legal strikes. However, this protection may be withdrawn in 
the case of an illegal strike. In 1999 the national construction 
workers' union was about to begin a legal strike after having spent 2 
years following all the necessary measures. The Ministry of Labor would 
have declared the strike legal, but the strike was avoided when the 
construction branch of the Private Enterprise Council finally agreed to 
negotiate with the union. Legal strikes are rare, and there was only 
one during the year. The Labor Ministry asserts that it would take 
approximately 6 months for a union to go through the entire process to 
be permitted to have a legal strike. Observers contend that the process 
is inappropriately lengthy and so complex that there has been only one 
legal strike since the 1996 Labor Code came into effect.
    The Labor Code provides protected status to union leaders, 
requiring that companies receive permission from the Ministry of Labor 
after having shown just cause to fire union executive board members. 
Such protection is limited to nine individuals per union. However, the 
Labor Code allows businesses to fire any employee, including union 
organizers, provided the business pays the employee double the normal 
severance pay. This practice is used sometimes by business leaders to 
stymie unionization attempts.
    Unions freely form or join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right to bargain collectively, and this 
right was reaffirmed in the 1996 Labor Code. The Government generally 
sought to foster resolution of pressing labor conflicts (usually in the 
public sector) through informal negotiations rather than through formal 
administrative or judicial processes. According to the reformed Code, 
companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate with the 
employees' union if the employees have thus organized themselves. 
However, the possible existence of more than one union at any place of 
employment means that several unions, each with different demands, can 
coexist at any one enterprise. Similarly, management may sign 
collective bargaining agreements with each union.
    There are 29 enterprises operating in the government-run free trade 
zones (FTZ), employing approximately 24,000 workers. In addition, there 
are 4 authorized private FTZ's; the 9 enterprises in these zones employ 
some 2,000 workers.
    Approximately half the workers in the government-run FTZ are 
represented by a union organization; however, only about 10 percent of 
them are actual union members. While some of these unions have real 
collective bargaining power, others are primarily symbolic.
    There have been several allegations of violations of the right to 
organize, primarily at the Las Mercedes FTZ, the largest in Managua, 
with 15 enterprises and approximately 19,000 workers. The Ministry of 
Labor has investigated these allegations and has concluded that 
employers have acted within the law. Notwithstanding the legality of 
employer actions, the result has been to weaken significantly an 
important union in the FTZ, the Sandinista Workers Central (CST). The 
CST has declared several strikes without first exhausting the very 
lengthy and complex administrative process of getting the required 
majority of the workers. Consequently, the Ministry of Labor 
consistently has ruled the strikes illegal. Employers then fire the 
striking workers based on the Ministry's ruling.
    In essence, employers have taken advantage of the extensive 
administrative requirements required to declare a strike legal and the 
CST's failure to follow the prescribed rules.
    In April Chentex, a Taiwanese-owned textile factory, tried and 
failed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with an 
independent union, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN), and the CST. 
Negotiations broke down because the CST demanded an increase in the 
factory minimum salary from $62-115 (800 to 1,500 cordobas) per month. 
Although management considered this an inordinate increase, 1,500 
cordobas falls below the Government's estimate of 1,600 cordobas per 
month for a basic basket of goods. After 50 CST workers participated in 
a work stoppage, management requested and received permission to fire 
11 of the 13 CST board members based on participation in an illegal 
strike. All dismissed members filed an appeal before the labor court, 
which subsequently found that the workers had been fired properly. The 
CST appealed that finding to an appellate court, which had not issued a 
decision by year's end. In addition, scores of workers were fired while 
many others resigned to show their support for the fired board members.
    Meanwhile the CST organized a series of work stoppages leading to 
the occupation of the factory on May 2. Chentex then filed criminal 
charges against the 9 board members for damaging property, kidnapping 
management personnel, and injuring security persons during the 
takeover. Chentex also later filed a petition to have the CST's legal 
status dropped because after the firings and resignations, they failed 
to meet the legal minimum of members. There are ongoing negotiations 
between the union and Chentex to resolve these issues; however, these 
negotiations were stalled at year's end.
    On January 6, Mil Colores, a textile factory, asked the Ministry of 
Labor for permission to fire 50 workers as a money-saving measure, 
included were 26 of the 34 workers who petitioned, on January 11, to 
recertify the CST union. Another union--the Mil Colores Workers Union 
(MCWU)--had been certified earlier in the month. The Ministry denied 
the CST's request because it claimed that CST failed to meet the 20-
member minimum requirement for certification. The CST alleged collusion 
between the Ministry and the company, specifically that the Mil Colores 
request to the fire workers was backdated to precede the attempt to 
form a union. On January 27, during a CST-organized protest protesters 
broke through the factory doors, leading to the hospitalization of over 
30 persons and the arrest of another 5. Shortly thereafter the company 
filed criminal charges against 68 workers for involvement in the 
incident. The president of Mil Colores subsequently dropped all charges 
and came to an agreement with the CST to rehire dismissed workers on a 
case by case basis.
    In October 1999, JEM III, an American-owned company, laid off over 
100 workers, reportedly because of the seasonal nature of their 
product--flannel shirts. The company began negotiations with the CST 
over these and future layoffs. In December 1999, after failure to reach 
an agreement, the CST workers went on strike. The company immediately 
petitioned the Ministry of Labor to declare the strike illegal, which 
would allow the company eventually to fire the strikers. However, the 
Ministry declared the strike legal, and the workers went back to work 
after obtaining minimum concessions. The JEM III strike is the only 
strike at the FTZ ever to be found legal by the Ministry of Labor. 
However, in January, another 70 workers were fired, including most CST 
board members. Because of various internal problems, the CST did not 
grieve the firings and the Ministry had no further involvement. 
However, the net effect was that the CST disappeared from JEMIII.
    In response to longstanding complaints by union representatives 
that the Ministry of Labor did a poor job of enforcing the Labor Code 
in the FTZ's, in 1997 the Ministry opened an office in the Managua FTZ 
to ensure that the code was being enforced. FTZ officials claim that, 
due to memories of the corrupt and ineffective unions of the 1980's, 
many workers in the FTZ enterprises simply have no interest in 
unionizing. They also claim that wages and working conditions in FTZ 
enterprises are better than the national average. For example, some FTZ 
enterprises assert that they pay wages that average over $192 (2,400 
cordobas) per month, three times the minimum wage.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor but does not specifically address 
forced or bonded labor by children, and such practices occur. The 
Ministry of Labor continues to report that some children were forced to 
beg by their parents, and that some were rented by their parents to 
organizers of child beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). There have 
been reports this year of trafficking in persons for forced labor or of 
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.).
    In July the Labor Ministry investigated charges of forced labor at 
a textile factory located outside the FTZ, but which operates under the 
same rules and enjoys the same tax incentives as FTZ companies. The 
inspector verified that some 34 workers had begun work at 7:00 a.m. the 
previous day and were still working at 10:00 a.m. the next day when the 
inspector arrived--a total of 27 hours. The company produced signed 
documents from the workers stating that they had agreed voluntarily to 
work extra hours. Privately, the workers stated that they had signed 
the document for fear that they would be fired if they refused. 
Moreover, they understood that they would work only 2 extra hours. 
Although there is no evidence that the company made any threats, the 
fact that all 34 workers who were requested to work overtime agreed to 
do so indicates that the workers believed they would be fired if they 
refused. The workers were only provided a piece of bread and a bottle 
of soda during the night that they spent at the factory. The human 
resources manager who allowed the inspector into the factory 
subsequently was fired. The Ministry of Labor issued the company a 
warning and threatened heavy fines and possible closure if the problem 
reoccured.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution provides for the protection of children's 
rights and prohibits child labor that can affect normal childhood 
development or interfere with the obligatory school year. The country 
has comprehensive labor legislation to protect children up to age 18. 
The Constitution also provides protection from any type of economic or 
social exploitation. The 1996 Labor Code raised the age at which 
children may begin working with parental permission from 12 to 14 
years. Parental permission to work also is required for 15- and 16-
year-olds. The law limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and 
prohibits night work. However, because of the economic needs of many 
families, a cultural legacy of child work among peasants, and lack of 
effective government enforcement mechanisms, child labor rules rarely 
are enforced except in the small formal sector of the economy.
    In mid-September, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 
regarding the worst forms of child labor; most of its provisions 
already were incorporated in the Labor Code.
    There are no reliable figures regarding the number of working 
children, but the Government reports that child labor occurs in both 
urban and rural areas. The latest official figures estimate that 
approximately 161,000 children between 10 and 19 are employed while 
CENIDH estimates that there are approximately 322,000 working children.
    Over 140,000 children are employed in rural areas at coffee, 
tobacco, rice, and banana plantations. In Managua over 6,000 children 
work on city streets, selling merchandise, cleaning automobile windows, 
or begging.
    According to a 1998 UNICEF report, approximately 42 percent of 
children between the ages of 6 and 9 work. A study published in 1996 by 
the National Commission against Child Labor concluded that over 161,000 
children between 10 and 19 years of age work, including approximately 
109,000 employed in rural areas such as coffee, tobacco, rice, and 
banana plantations. The study found that 6,219 children work in urban 
areas as beggars, or selfemployed car washers or parking attendants. 
Comprehensive labor legislation, intended to protect children up to 18, 
prohibits child labor in areas such as mines and garbage dumps, and 
imposes heavy fines for illegal employment. The Ministry of Labor 
established an inspection unit to monitor occupational safety and 
health in the agricultural sector, signed agreements with nightclubs 
and restaurant owners who pledged to comply with labor laws, and issued 
a resolution in 1999 prohibiting employment of minors specifically in 
the free trade zones. However, there have been some exceptions due to 
most families' need of extra income. The 1996 Labor Code authorizes 
children to work under certain circumstances, provided they are no 
younger than 14 years of age and have parental permission.
    Child prostitution is a serious problem. Although national figures 
are not available, a study conducted in Managua in 1998 found that 40 
percent of the 1,200 prostitutes in the city were under the age of 18. 
No numbers were available for other cities, but in 1998 UNICEF reported 
that teenage sexual exploitation had increased in recent years in rural 
areas, border cities, ports, and in Managua.
    The Ministry of Labor has begun to take steps to combat child labor 
(See Section 5). It has signed agreements with nightclubs and 
restaurant owners whereby these establishments pledged to comply with 
child labor laws. In 1999 it issued a resolution specifically 
prohibiting the employment of minors in the FTZ's.
    The Ministry of Family sponsors several programs that target 
working minors. These programs, which cover up to 10,000 children 
nationwide, include childcare services, returntoschool programs, and 
technical and vocational training. The programs also include training 
for parents and teachers. The Ministry of the Family, in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Education, established a program to keep 647 
children off city intersections where they wash windshields. The 
program provides housing for the 75 percent of these children who are 
homeless and schooling for the 60 percent who are school dropouts.
    Despite comprehensive legislation prohibiting child labor, 
structural economic problems have prevented its eradication. The 
Government has been able to make progress in combating child labor in 
the ``formal sector"; i.e., that sector of the economy which is 
regulated by the Government, such as factories, construction, 
restaurants, and nightclubs. Most of the problems exist in the 
``informal sector,'' which is not regulated by the Government. Workers 
in this sector, which is characterized by a lack of an obvious 
employer, include street vendors, windshield washers, parking lot 
attendants, garbage dump scavengers, beggars, prostitutes, and 
agricultural workers.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set through 
tripartite (business, government, and labor) negotiations, and must be 
approved by the Legislative Assembly. A new minimum wage scale took 
effect in August 1999 and, although by law it was to be revisited 6 
months later, has not been adjusted since. In November the Ministry of 
Labor called for new negotiations on the minimum wage. The various 
groups met sporadically, but no new minimum wage had been set by the 
year'' end. Minimum wages vary by sector; monthly rates are as follows: 
Agriculture, $36 (450 cordobas plus food); fisheries, $56 (700 
cordobas); mining, $68 (850 cordobas); industrial manufacture, $48 (600 
cordobas); electric, gas, and water utilities, $72 (900 cordobas); 
construction, $96 (1,200 cordobas); restaurants and hotels, $72 (900 
cordobas); transportation, $72 (900 cordobas); banking, $80 (1,000 
cordobas); community and social services, $56 (700 cordobas); central 
and municipal government (includes health and education employees), $44 
(550 cordobas); and FTZ $64 (800 cordobas). The minimum wage does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. It falls 
below the Government estimate of what an urban family must spend each 
month for a basic basket of goods ($128, or 1,600 cordobas). The 
majority of urban workers earn well above the minimum rates.
    The Labor Code incorporates the constitutionally mandated 8-hour 
workday; the standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 1 
day of rest weekly. The 1996 code established severance pay at from 1 
to 5 months, depending on the duration of employment and the 
circumstances of firing. However, persons fired for cause may be denied 
severance pay through a process that requires employers to demonstrate 
proof of worker misconduct. The Code also established an employer's 
obligation to provide housing to employees who are assigned temporarily 
to areas beyond commuting distance.
    The Labor Code seeks to bring the country into compliance with 
international standards and norms of workplace hygiene and safety, but 
the Ministry of Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security 
lacks adequate staff and resources to enforce these provisions. The 
Code gives workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous 
workplace situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, the Government does not enforce the law adequately. 
There are reports that the country was a source for the trafficking in 
women and children for purposes of prostitution in Mexico. According to 
the reports, procurers from Mexico induce young people to travel there 
on the promise of legitimate employment. Upon their arrival, they are 
sold to the owners of brothels and then forced to work as prostitutes 
to repay their debts. Children are trafficked in Guatemala by organized 
crime rings for the purposes of prostitution. In July 1999, the media 
reported that Nicaraguan girls had been lured to Guatemalan clubs to 
work as dancers and waitresses but upon arrival were forced into 
prostitution.
                               __________

                                 PANAMA

    Panama is a representative democracy with an elected executive 
composed of a president and 2 vice presidents, an elected 71-member 
unicameral legislature, and an appointed judiciary. In September 1999, 
President Mireya Moscoso replaced former President Ernesto Perez 
Balladares. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; 
however, the judicial system is subject to corruption and political 
manipulation.
    Panama has had no military forces since 1989. In 1990 the 
Government created the Panamanian Public Forces, which consist of the 
Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Maritime Service (SMN), 
the National Air Service (SAN), and the Institutional Protection 
Service (SPI). In 1994 a constitutional amendment formally prohibited 
the establishment of a permanent military, although it contains a 
provision for the temporary formation of a ``special police force'' to 
protect the borders in case of a ``threat of external aggression.'' The 
Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), a semiautonomous body with leadership 
appointed by the Supreme Court, is a separate branch of law enforcement 
under the Attorney General's Office, and performs criminal 
investigations in support of public prosecutors. The Ministry of 
Government and Justice oversees the PNP, the SMN, and SAN; the Ministry 
of the Presidency supervises the SPI and the PTJ. Police forces respond 
to civilian authority, have civilian directors, and have internal 
review procedures to deal with police misconduct. There were reports of 
instances of abuse by some members of the security forces.
    The service-oriented economy uses the U.S. dollar as currency, 
calling it the Balboa. Gross domestic product grew by 3.2 percent in 
1999, but growth estimates for 2000 range from 2.3 to 2.8 percent. 
While economists predicted higher growth during the year due to the 
transfer of the Panama Canal and related property, economic benefits 
were not yet evident at year's end. Poverty persists and income 
distribution remains extremely skewed with large disparities between 
rich and poor. Unemployment is estimated at 13.3 percent; however, 
private economists believe that it may be higher.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there continued to be serious problems in several 
areas. Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent 
problem of the prison system; however, there were reports that 
incidents of abuse decreased during the year in one prison. Overall 
prison conditions remained harsh, with occasional outbreaks of internal 
prison violence. Arbitrary detention and prolonged pretrial detention 
are problems. The judiciary is subject to political manipulation, and 
the criminal justice system is inefficient and often corrupt. There 
were complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal 
requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. Police conduct 
towards public protesters improved. The media is subject to political 
pressure, libel suits, and punitive action by the Government. Violence 
against women remains a serious problem. Women hold some high positions 
in Government, including the presidency; however, discrimination 
against women persisted. Discrimination against indigenous people, 
blacks, and ethnic minorities continues to be a problem. Worker rights 
were limited in export processing zones. Urban and rural child labor 
are also problems. Trafficking in persons, particularly Asian and South 
American immigrants, is a continuing problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There was little progress on past cases. Four PNP guards at the 
Tinajitas prison were on administrative duty and awaiting trial in the 
March 1997 beating death of detainee Jose Luis Alvarado at year's end.
    In January 1999, the Supreme Court dismissed the case against the 
PNP personnel responsible for the June 1997 shooting death of Ngobe-
Bugle tribe member Juan Santos Chobra in the community of Puente 
Blanco. The Court ruled that the shooting was accidental after 
reviewing videotaped evidence of the shooting.
    In September 1999, President Moscoso cancelled the pardons granted 
by former President Perez Balladares to 33 former civilian and military 
collaborators of former ruler General Manuel Noriega. One such official 
reportedly was involved in the execution of 11 persons following a 
failed coup attempt against Noriega in 1989. In this specific case, a 
Superior Court confirmed Moscoso's order to cancel the pardon granted 
by former President Perez Balladares. It was unknown whether similar 
cases were pending at year's end.
    In September 1999, the authorities discovered an unmarked grave 
containing two bodies on the grounds of a former military base near 
Panama City. On August 23, Public Ministry authorities stated that one 
set of these remains belonged to leftist leader Heliodoro Portugal. 
Portugal had been reported missing since May 1970, during the early 
stages of the military regime. The identity of the second body remains 
unknown. Long-standing rumors that there are other gravesites scattered 
around the country dating from this period continued to circulate 
during the year. In December the authorities resumed their search for 
remains. At that time, human remains of five individuals were excavated 
from a former military garrison site. The investigation continued at 
year's end. Also in December, President Moscoso announced plans to 
create a ``Truth Commission'' to follow up on such cases.
    On October 15, approximately 60 unknown assailants, widely believed 
to be members of a Colombian armed group, attacked the village of 
Nazaret, near the border with Colombia. One 11-year-old girl was 
killed, and approximately 12 persons were wounded, including 3 members 
of the PNP. The Government had not established firmly responsibility 
for the attack at year's end; however, some observers believe that 
members of the guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) were responsible. Following the attack, two police 
officers in Darien reportedly tortured an Embera Indian suspected of 
aiding Colombian rebel groups (see Section 1.c.).
    There were some unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Hector Gallego Committee for Disappeared Relatives maintains a 
list of 120 persons who disappeared during the military dictatorships 
of 1968-89 and are still unaccounted for.
    FARC guerrillas reportedly kidnaped persons in the Darien region 
along the border with Colombia. In 1999 three individuals were abducted 
and held for ransom; only one had been released by year's end. There 
were reports that the FARC harassed and even killed Darien residents. 
One girl was killed by an armed group in October (see Section 1.a.). 
There were unconfirmed reports that Colombian citizens have been 
kidnaped and then retained in Panamanian territory.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of measures that could 
harm the physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or detainees 
and the public security forces generally performed in a professional 
and restrained manner; however, there were reports of excessive use of 
force and inhuman punishment against prison inmates. There also were 
reports that police used physical violence and psychological threats to 
control detainees during the initial arrest, interrogation, and holding 
phases.
    In December Indian community leader Francisco Olivo complained that 
two police officers in Darien tortured an Embera Indian after he was 
arrested and accused of aiding Colombian rebel groups. The torture 
incident reportedly occurred soon after an October attack on Nazaret 
(see Section 1.a.). Police Director Carlos Bares responded by saying 
that he would order an investigation and would punish anyone found 
responsible. An investigation continued at year's end.
    The 1997 legislation providing the legal basis for the PNP includes 
specific guidelines for use of force, including deadly force; requires 
that police officers respect human rights; and prohibits instigation or 
tolerance of torture, cruelty, or other inhuman or degrading behavior. 
However, there is no follow-on training in the use of force provided to 
the PNP.
    The PTJ and the PNP have offices of professional responsibility 
that act as internal affairs organs to hold officers accountable for 
their actions. Both have staffs of independent investigators as well as 
administrative authority to open internal investigations. In both 
organizations, a defined legal process is followed in which, upon 
completion of the process, the respective director of the PTJ or PNP 
has the final authority to determine the disposition of each case. The 
PNP deputy director and secretary general address human rights problems 
that arise in the police force. The offices of professional 
responsibility are well known in the community, and the rate of 
complaints has remained roughly constant in both offices.
    The PNP Office of Professional Responsibility receives on average 
six complaints per week, of which 30 to 35 percent result in some type 
of punitive action. Penalties include reduction in rank, dismissal, and 
in severe cases, criminal prosecution. By November the authorities had 
dismissed 16 officers for corruption, burglary, and/or bribery. A total 
of 206 other cases were under investigation as of November; 108 cases 
were dismissed; 82 cases were still under investigation.
    The PTJ receives complaints from the public, and officers can make 
anonymous complaints of corruption and other problems. By October the 
PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had conducted 179 
investigations, which resulted in the dismissal of 52 agents. The 
majority of the cases were for mishandling official property such as 
misplacing guns or radios (22 cases), and personal conduct or improper 
behavior when off duty (30 cases).
    In May the PNP disciplinary committee exonerated a sergeant and 
three officers for the March 1999 shooting in Pueblo Nuevo, and 
concluded that they acted in self-defense, and that the victim was not 
a minor as originally reported. According to residents of the 
neighborhood, the victim was lying on the ground in handcuffs at the 
time of the shooting.
    Corruption among police officers also remains a problem. By October 
the PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had dismissed 20 agents 
for corruption. In some cases, PNP and PTJ directors enforced other 
disciplinary measures against officers with proven involvement in 
illicit activities; however, both organizations only react to egregious 
abuses, due to a lack of staff, independence, and institutional 
priority.
    During the year, police generally exercised restraint in their 
treatment of street protesters, despite an increase in the frequency of 
street demonstrations. However, police commonly used tear gas against 
protesters.
    Police arrested and detained children for minor infractions during 
neighborhood sweeps (see Section 5).
    The FARC guerrillas and the paramilitary forces of the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) share a long history of spillover of 
violence from Colombia into the border area on the Darien peninsula, 
including killings, kidnaping, robbery, and various forms of harassment 
of innocent bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
    Despite some technical improvements and some training of prison 
guards during the year, overall prison conditions remained harsh and in 
some cases, threatening to prisoners' health and safety, due largely to 
budget constraints. The current prison system has over 9,018 prisoners 
but an allotted capacity of only 6,893 persons. Most prisons are 
dilapidated and overcrowded. Many of the problems within the prisons 
stem not only from the obvious overcrowding but also from the lack of 
separation of inmates according to the type or severity of the crime 
committed. Medical care is inadequate and sometimes withheld from 
inmates. Tuberculosis, AIDS, and other communicable diseases are common 
among the prison population. The Corrections Department does not have 
an ambulance to take prisoners to hospitals in case of emergencies. 
Over the last 4 years, 10 inmates have been killed and 25 injured due 
to gang violence. In June gang members at La Joya prison stole keys and 
entered the cell block of a rival gang armed with knives, murdering two 
prisoners and wounding another five.
    Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent 
problem of the prison system. At year's end, there were 8 cases open 
with the Public Ministry regarding human rights abuses in the prisons, 
involving 25 civilian custodians and 6 members of the PNP. Pending 
cases include three custodians awaiting trial for abuses committed in 
La Joya prison in 1996 against prisoner Jorge Reyes Alvarez, and PNP 
guards awaiting trial for the beating death of prisoner Jorge Alvarado 
at Tinajitas prison (see Section 1.a.). In another high profile case, 
10 members of the PNP are expected to be tried for beating naked 
prisoners with baseball bats in the (now closed) Modelo prison in 1998. 
The special prosecutor in charge of the 8 cases has handled 13 others 
since 1996. In 1999 six custodians from La Joya each were sentenced to 
40 months in prison for having abused La Joya prisoner Carlos Cisneros 
Naranjo.
    The main prisons in Panama City include La Joya (a maximum-security 
facility), Tinajitas, the Feminine Center (women's prison), and the 
Juvenile Detention Center. Two additional facilities, La Joyita and El 
Renacer, hold inmates generally accused of less serious crimes. In July 
foreign experts found that conditions at El Renacer have improved 
substantially and that the new prison director is attempting to make 
many needed reforms. Conditions at La Joyita remain problematic. The 
notorious island prison colony of Coiba is still in operation. There 
are also prisons of significant size in David and Santiago, and a large 
facility is planned for construction in Divisa in 2001. Small jails 
attached to local police stations around the country sometimes house 
prisoners for the entire length of their sentence. The authorities 
frequently do not address cases of abuse and neglect in these 
provincial jails due to their low profile in the prison system. Prison 
authorities hope eventually to close down these provincial jails and 
house all prisoners in the central jails.
    The General Penitentiary Directorate (DGSP) largely depends on PNP 
officers to supply both internal and perimeter security at all prisons. 
Ideally, civilian corrections officers (or ``custodians'') with 
specialized training are supposed to handle inmates in all prisons, but 
funding constraints have prevented reform. Newly appointed DGSP 
Director Concepcion Corro wants to replace PNP guards with civilians, 
but has been granted only enough funding to train and fill 237 of 2,500 
potential civilian positions. Custodians do handle inmates within La 
Joya, El Renacer, and the central women's prison, which uses only 
female guards. Because prison security rests almost entirely with the 
PNP, tensions arise between PNP officers and their civilian directors. 
In addition, PNP officers are untrained for prison duty and generally 
find the assignment distasteful, contributing to tension and abuses 
within the prison system. The DGSP does not have authority to 
discipline prison guards with criminal or civil sanctions; only the PNP 
disciplinary board can sanction a PNP agent or a custodian.
    Prison conditions on the island penal colony of Coiba remained 
harsh and dangerous. In January 1998, a prison gang reportedly beheaded 
four prison escapees who belonged to a rival gang. The authorities 
concluded a lengthy investigation, and the case is expected to go to 
trial in 2001. Some of the accused prisoners are detained in the Panama 
City jail, and others are held in a jail in Santiago. The authorities 
have not yet brought anyone to trial in the case of eight murders that 
were discovered in 1998 in which both guards and prisoners have been 
implicated. In June the remains of three individuals were found on the 
nearby island of Jicarita. At year's end, the authorities had not yet 
determined the identity of the remains nor the circumstances of their 
deaths.
    National prison authorities occasionally have discussed plans to 
close Coiba, but at year's end there were no definite plans for a 
shutdown. Although the facility no longer holds the most dangerous 
criminals, it continues to relieve overcrowding elsewhere in the prison 
system. The prison population at the island prison colony was reduced 
to 130 inmates, compared with 361 in 1999; none are pretrial detainees.
    Geographic isolation and lack of communications on Coiba separate 
detainees from their attorneys and cause many to miss trials. Prisoners 
suffer from malnutrition and shortages of potable water. Medical care 
is practically nonexistent; prisoners with AIDS told reporters that 
they are isolated in small cells and that medical attention is provided 
once a year. Escapes from Coiba reportedly are common.
    La Joya is the primary maximum security facility and houses most 
prisoners accused of serious crimes. La Joya has a planned capacity of 
1,250, but houses over 2,000 inmates. Gang violence is a problem. In 
June in La Joya, 22 inmates with AIDS went on a hunger strike to 
protest their lack of access to medical treatment and their need for 
special permits to receive medicine.
    Prison conditions in Colon province also are harsh. The Human 
Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly described the Public 
Prison of Colon as a ``time bomb,'' which fails to provide the most 
basic health needs. The prison frequently has no running water or 
functioning sewage system. The Commission also reported that prisoners 
at the Women's Prison of Colon suffer from overcrowding, semidarkness 
day and night, constantly wet floors, and virtually no health care. 
Colon's main prison, Nueva Esperanza, is under construction and is 
expected to absorb inmates from Colon's women's prison and the 
dilapidated public prison, both of which are scheduled to shut down. 
The new inmates are to be housed in separate sections of Nueva 
Esperanza, where construction was quite advanced at year's end, with 
some of the new cells already outfitted with bunks and toilets. 
However, inmates from the rapidly deteriorating Public Prison 
reportedly were apprehensive about being moved to Nueva Esperanza, 
where their access to the outdoors is expected to be limited. At year's 
end, male prisoners were housed at Nueva Esperanza; approximately 60 
female prisoners are scheduled to be transferred there once 
construction is complete.
    Conditions at women's prisons and at juvenile detention centers 
were noticeably better than at adult male prisons. However, female 
prisoners, especially those in the primary detention area, reportedly 
suffered from overcrowding, poor medical care, and lack of basic 
supplies for personal hygiene. Juvenile detention centers throughout 
the country suffer from inadequate resources to provide for education 
or adequate supervision of children, many of whom spend the majority of 
their time in a bare cell.
    The law and the Criminal Code provide for conditional release 
programs for inmates charged with minor offenses who have served a 
substantial part of their sentence, but this provision has not been 
implemented consistently in practice. A conditional release program was 
part of the organizational reforms that authorities introduced in July 
1998. During the year, the DGSP provided information in a more timely 
manner to the President for her signature to allow such conditional 
releases. The Government released some 800 inmates by year's end. The 
release program helped to relieve pressure on the overcrowded prisons.
    Accusations by the media of corruption within the DGSP and its 
parent organization, the Ministry of Government and Justice, declined 
during the year. A criminal complaint filed in June 1999 by former 
National Penitentiary Director Enriqueta Davis against then-Minister of 
Government and Justice Mariela Sagel never was submitted to court.
    The Government generally allows prison visits by independent human 
rights monitors. However, the authorities arrange appointments ahead of 
time, and monitors generally speak to prisoners in the presence of 
guards or administrators. Prisoners may not feel comfortable speaking 
freely under such conditions, and they have expressed fear of 
retaliation if they complain. Contrary to the previous year, there were 
no reports that officials from the Ombudsman's office had trouble 
gaining access to prisons. Justicia y Paz, the Catholic Church's human 
rights watchdog group, brings prison abuses to the attention of the 
authorities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that arrests must be carried out with a warrant issued by 
the appropriate authorities, and the Government generally respected 
this provision. Previously, the authorities often violated the 
provision that suspects are to be brought promptly before a judge; 
however, this provision was enforced more strictly during the year. 
Exceptions are permitted when an officer apprehends a person during the 
commission of a crime, or when disrespect by an individual towards an 
officer prevents the officer from carrying out his duty. The law 
requires the arresting officer to inform the detainee immediately of 
the reasons for arrest or detention and of the right to immediate legal 
counsel, to be provided to the indigent by the State (see Section 
1.e.).
    The Constitution also provides for judicial review of the legality 
of detention and mandates the immediate release of any person detained 
or arrested illegally. The Constitution prohibits police from detaining 
suspects for more than 24 hours without bringing them before a judge. 
Contrary to previous years, the authorities did not violate often the 
24-hour time limit by several days. Under law the preliminary 
investigation phase may last 8 days to 2 months, and the followon 
investigation phase another 2 to 4 months, depending on the number of 
suspects. The courts frequently grant extensions of these limits, 
leaving the accused in detention for a long period without having been 
charged formally. The law permits these extensions; however, many legal 
authorities (including court officials) criticized judges for excessive 
use of this measure.
    Extended pretrial detention continued to be one of the most serious 
human rights problems, due in part to the elaborate notification phase 
in criminal cases. According to government statistics, the number of 
pretrial detainees increased slightly to 4,851, or about 58 percent of 
the prison population. This proportion is roughly the same as 1999, 
when 59 percent of prisoners were still awaiting trial. The average 
period of pretrial custody was 16 months, and pretrial detention in 
excess of the maximum sentence for the alleged crime was common. For 
example, a man recently released from La Joyita Prison had spent 4 
years in jail for a crime with a maximum sentence of 6 months. A legal 
mechanism exists to hold the Government financially accountable in 
cases where a detainee spends more than 1 year in jail but subsequently 
has all charges dismissed at a preliminary hearing. The dismissal must 
be either because the act of which the detainee was accused is not 
ruled a crime or because there is no evidence to link the suspect to 
the crime. Although this redress procedure is not complicated, few 
former detainees have employed it.
    Legal alternatives to prison exist but are not implemented widely. 
Options such as house arrest have been used in some cases involving the 
elderly or minors, but require that the defendants have access to and 
understanding of their legal options.
    The Constitution prohibits exile; there were no reports of forced 
exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible to 
corruption and outside influence, including manipulation by other 
branches of government.
    The President appoints nine Supreme Court magistrates to 10-year 
terms, subject to Legislative Assembly ratification. In July 1999, the 
Assembly passed a law that created an additional chamber to the Supreme 
Court, allowing then-President Perez Balladares to appoint three 
additional Supreme Court Justices before leaving office. However, in 
October 1999, the Assembly approved a proposal by the new Moscoso 
Administration to repeal the law.
    The Supreme Court magistrates appoint appellate (Superior Tribunal) 
judges, who, in turn, appoint circuit and municipal court judges in 
their respective jurisdictions. Judicial appointments are supposed to 
be made under a merit-based system, but the top-down appointment system 
lends itself to political tinkering and undue interference by higher-
level judges in lower-level cases in which they often have no 
jurisdiction.
    The Attorney General appoints the superior and circuit level 
prosecutors. Previously, the Attorney General also appointed the 
Director and Sub-Director of the PTJ, but a 1998 law transferred this 
power to the Supreme Court, and requires Supreme Court approval of 
their removal from office. The same law also gave these two officials 
the power to name other PTJ officials without consulting the Attorney 
General. Opposition and media critics charged that this law increased 
the influence of the Supreme Court over criminal investigators, removed 
the generally positive oversight of the Attorney General, and made 
cooperation between prosecutors and the police much more difficult. On 
April 24, the Supreme Court approved Attorney General Jose Antonio 
Sossa's request to dismiss Director Alejandro Moncada of the PTJ, and 
Sossa did so the following day. Tensions between the Attorney General 
and the PTJ under its new director did not completely abate, although 
they appeared to have lessened by year's end.
    At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges, or 
``corregidores,'' who exercise jurisdiction over minor civil and 
criminal cases and who hold wide powers to arrest and to impose fines 
or jail sentences of up to 1 year. This system has serious 
shortcomings: Defendants lack adequate procedural safeguards; 
administrative judges outside of Panama City are usually not attorneys; 
many have not completed secondary education; and some engage in corrupt 
practices. In practice, appeal procedures are nonexistent. Affluent 
defendants tend to pay fines while poorer defendants go to jail, which 
contributes to prison overcrowding.
    In 1998 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loaned the 
Government $18.9 million to reform the judicial system; the Government 
contributed another $8.1 million to the program. The loan is being used 
at national and local levels to improve conditions in the court system, 
including better information management, revision of judicial 
procedures, and training of personnel. The loan also includes the 
construction of two ``model courts'' in San Miguelito and David, which 
are to hold offices for judges, prosecutors, and the PTJ in one 
building. The IDB's database linking prison population data with 
prosecutors and the courts, which is intended to facilitate the 
systematic release of prisoners who have served time beyond their 
potential maximum sentence but still are awaiting trial, was completed 
by year's end. Coordination between the IDB and the Government has 
improved with the 1999 appointment of Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Mirtza Franceschi de Aguilera. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has 
approved a second phase of the project and listed funding for the 
project in its budget request.
    The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have the 
right to counsel, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to 
refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be 
tried only once for a given offense. If not under pretrial detention, 
the accused may be present with counsel during the investigative phase 
of the proceeding. Judges can order the presence of pretrial detainees 
for the rendering or amplification of statements, or for confronting 
witnesses. Trials are conducted on the basis of evidence presented by 
the public prosecutor. Under limited circumstances, the law permits 
trials without the accused being present. The Constitution and the 
Criminal Procedure Code provide for trial by jury at the defendant's 
election, but only in cases where at least one of the charges is 
murder.
    The Constitution obliges the Government to provide public defenders 
for the indigent. However, many public defenders are appointed late in 
the investigation, and the prosecutor may have already evaluated the 
bulk of the evidence and made a decision to recommend trial or the 
dismissal of the charges. Public defenders' caseloads remained 
extremely high, averaging some 600 cases per attorney per year, 
compared with 550 cases in 1999. Only 3 new public defenders have been 
hired since 1992, making a total of 38 nationwide, with a similar 
number of assistants. This heavy workload undermined the quality of 
representation, with many prisoners meeting their public defender for 
the first time on the day of trial.
    In July 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a law popularly known as the 
``Faundes Law,'' which requires judges and other public officials to 
retire at age 75.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home, private papers, and telephonic communications, and the Government 
generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were 
complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal 
requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. The authorities may 
not enter private residences except with the owner's permission, or by 
written order from the appropriate authority for specific purposes. 
These may include entry to assist the victims of crime or disaster, or 
to conduct lawful health and safety inspections. The authorities may 
not examine private papers and correspondence, except as properly 
authorized by competent legal authority, and in the presence of the 
owner, a family member, or two neighbors.
    Although the Constitution prohibits all wiretapping, the Government 
maintains that wiretapping with judicial approval is legal, and that 
the Attorney General may authorize a wiretap when confronted with 
probable cause in a serious crime. Under the guidelines established by 
1994 antinarcotics legislation, the Public Ministry may engage in 
undercover operations, including ``videotaping and recording of 
conversations and telephonic communications.'' The Supreme Court has 
not issued a final ruling on whether wiretapping is constitutional, but 
it remains an established practice.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, the media is subject to 
political pressure, and the Government used libel laws to pressure 
journalists.
    There is an active and often adversarial press and a broad range of 
print and electronic media outlets, including foreign newspapers, radio 
and television broadcasts, and cable stations. Six national daily 
newspapers, 4 commercial television stations, 2 educational television 
stations, and approximately 100 radio stations provide a broad choice 
of informational sources; all are privately or institutionally owned. A 
June 1999 law prohibits newspapers from holding radio and television 
concessions, and vice versa. While many media outlets took identifiable 
editorial positions, the media carried a wide variety of political 
commentaries and other perspectives, both local and foreign. There is a 
noticeable concentration of control of television outlets in the hands 
of close relatives and associates of former President Perez Balladares, 
who is a member of the largest opposition party.
    Panamanian and foreign journalists worked and traveled freely 
throughout the country. A 1978 law requires directors and deputy 
directors of media outlets to be citizens.
    Under ``gag laws'' dating from the military dictatorship, the 
Government had legal authority to prosecute media owners and reporters 
for criminal libel and calumny. A special executive branch authority 
had discretionary powers to administer the libel laws, which provided 
for fines and up to 2 years in prison. Under the statute, opinions, 
comments, or criticism of government officials acting in their official 
capacity are exempted specifically from libel prosecution, but a 
section of the law allows for the immediate discipline of journalists 
who show ``disrespect'' for the office of certain government officials. 
In December 1999, President Moscoso ratified the Legislative Assembly's 
decision to eliminate these gag laws, improving the legal status of the 
media. However, legal actions against many journalists remained 
pending, and vestiges of the former gag laws still provide a means for 
penalizing journalists. Ombudsman Italo Antinori stated that there were 
at least 40 cases of journalists who had been accused of defamation.
    Attorney General Jose Antonio Sossa ordered the arrest of El Siglo 
newspaper editor Carlos Singares on two occasions during the year for 
libel. Frontpage articles in El Siglo had accused Sossa of illicit 
activities, but the newspaper presented little proof to back up its 
allegations. President Moscoso defused the first arrest attempt, but 
upon the second arrest order Singares was jailed for 8 days. During his 
detention, he was held with approximately 50 common prisoners. While 
Singares was in jail, a court sentenced him to 20 months in prison for 
criminal libel against former President Perez Balladares. Singares 
appealed the conviction, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
    In August police surrounded the homes of three journalists from La 
Prensa in an attempt to force them to testify in a criminal libel case 
filed against them by Attorney General Sossa; the police left after the 
journalists agreed to testify.
    On July 14, a court sentenced Jean Marcel Chery, a reporter for the 
daily newspaper Panama America, to 18 months in jail or a fine of 
$1,800 for criminal libel; Chery had reported a woman's allegations 
that police robbed her of $33,000 during a search of her apartment. 
Chery appealed, and her appeal was pending at year's end.
    In 1998 then-PNP Director Jose Luis Sosa used the libel laws to 
bring charges against law professor and former Moscoso adviser Miguel 
Bernal for statements that criticized the PNP for allowing the 
decapitations of prisoners on Coiba Island (see Section 1.c.). In 
November 1999, there was a preliminary hearing on Sosa's charges, but 
no trial date was set by year's end. Bernal requested that the judge 
accept 37 witnesses; however, the judge rejected 34 of them. Bernal 
appealed this decision, which was pending at year's end.
    Libel charges against La Prensa journalist Herasto Reyes filed by 
then-President Perez Balladares, after Reyes published a story in 
August 1998 accusing the administration of trying to cover up a 
government embezzlement scandal, still were pending at year's end.
    In another 1998 case, a prosecutor acting on behalf of Attorney 
General Sossa used the libel laws to charge La Prensa journalists 
Gustavo Gorriti and Rolando Rodriguez with a ``crime against the honor 
of the authorities'' for a story accusing the Attorney General of 
accepting dubious checks in his unsuccessful 1994 campaign for a seat 
in the Legislative Assembly. Subsequent press reports suggested that 
the story was erroneous. The charges remained pending at year's end. 
Gorriti is facing six criminal libel cases.
    In October a superior court magistrate sentenced former President 
Guillermo Endara to 18 months in jail for libel and slander against 
Minister of Canal Affairs Ricardo Martinelli, the former Director 
General of the Social Security Institution. The magistrate suspended 
the sentence on the condition that former President Endara not commit 
any other crime. Endara had not appealed the ruling at year's end.
    On July 31, the Legislative Assembly passed legislation that limits 
access by citizens to specific information about international 
agreement negotiations and national security, to administrative files 
within the Solicitor General's office, and to information about such 
matters as private citizens' health, political leanings, marital 
status, police or prison records, and bank accounts. The measure took 
effect on August 2. The Solicitor General's office indicated that these 
restrictions already existed in practice, but were codified by the new 
law. Nevertheless, some legal experts challenged this interpretation 
and the media harshly criticized the measure. A Special Rapporteur from 
the Organization of American States also criticized the law during a 
September visit to the country. In November the Legislative Assembly 
amended Article 70 of the Solicitor General's Organic Law that 
regulated press access to files. The amendment states that the 
confidential classification of a given piece of information must be 
established objectively and pursuant to the conditions contained in the 
current laws, in order to prevent public officials from denying the 
release of information under the excuse of limited access. President 
Moscoso had not signed the amendment at year's end.
    The Electoral Tribunal must approve election polling results before 
publication. During the year, the Government alleged that the newspaper 
El Panama America commissioned Gallup polls that were rigged to portray 
the Government negatively. In April 1999, the Tribunal had fined the El 
Panama America $10,000 for failing to follow the approval procedure 
before printing Gallup poll results.
    The press laws provide for the establishment of a censorship board. 
The board monitors radio transmissions and has the authority to fine 
stations that violate norms regarding vulgar and profane language.
    In July Bishop Romulo Emiliani left the Darien region following 
anonymous death threats; he had criticized publicly Colombian 
paramilitaries, guerrillas, and drug traffickers.
    The law provides for academic freedom, which generally was 
respected in both public and private universities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice. No authorization is needed 
for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative 
purposes is required. Throughout much of the year, police showed 
restraint and professionalism while monitoring large protests by 
students, political activists, prisoners, and workers. While police 
commonly used tear gas against protesters, unlike the previous year, 
police generally did not break up public demonstrations with birdshot, 
rubber bullets, beatings, or other abusive treatment. However, in June 
and July, students and workers protested government policy by blocking 
traffic for several hours on a major thoroughfare and by throwing rocks 
at the police; on those occasions, the police responded with tear gas, 
rubber bullets, and water hoses laced with chemical irritants. Injuries 
and arrests at other demonstrations were minimal but protesters 
nevertheless complained about abuse at the hands of the police.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Citizens have the 
right to form associations and professional or civic groups. New 
political parties must meet strict membership and organizational 
standards in order to gain official recognition and participate in 
national campaigns. In February the Government refused to recognize a 
homosexual rights organization as a nongovernmental organization (see 
Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, although recognizing 
Catholicism as ``the religion of the majority of Panamanians,'' 
provides for free exercise of all religious beliefs, provided that 
``Christian morality and public order'' are respected. The Government 
generally respects religious freedom in practice, and there is a broad 
diversity of religions. The Constitution prohibits clerics from holding 
public office, except as related to social assistance, education, or 
scientific research. The Constitution dictates that Catholicism be 
taught in public schools, although parents have the right to exempt 
their children from religious instruction.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government 
enforced exit permit requirements for foreigners who overstayed their 
initial visas. A 9:00 p.m. curfew for unaccompanied minors in the 
Panama City area remains in effect although enforcement generally is 
poor.
    The law provides for granting refugee status in accordance with the 
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. In 1998 President Perez Balladares signed a decree granting 
protection to all persons entering the country due to ``state 
persecution based on race, gender, religion, nationality, social group, 
or political opinion.'' The decree grants 2 months of temporary 
protection to displaced persons in the case of a large influx; the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized this provision, 
on the grounds that it puts persons at risk for forced repatriation 
within a few weeks of entering the country, without analysis of their 
possible refugee status. However, in practice this has not occurred. 
For example, the Government has not forcibly repatriated displaced 
Colombians, and many Colombians have lived in the country for years 
without formal refugee status. A small number of Colombians were 
granted asylum during the year. The Government generally cooperates 
with the office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. However, the Government generally is reluctant to 
classify displaced Colombians as refugees, and therefore has opposed a 
permanent UNHCR presence in the country, although the UNHCR regularly 
visited border areas to aid displaced Colombians.
    Large groups of displaced persons periodically flee violence in 
Colombia by crossing the border into Panama. In December 1999, some 800 
Colombians fled violence in the Colombian town of Jurado and settled in 
the Darien town of Jaque. Since their arrival, the Government has 
cooperated with the Catholic Church and the U.N. High Commission for 
Human Rights to provide these displaced persons with humanitarian 
assistance. By the end of the year, some 200 Colombians remained in 
Jaque, while others returned to Colombia voluntarily or migrated 
elsewhere in Panama. In January President Moscoso granted provisional 
refuge to nearly 400 Colombian peasants who had fled fighting between 
guerrillas and the Colombian Navy.
    The Government has offered Colombians the chance to participate in 
a voluntary repatriation program in coordination with the Government of 
Colombia, and many agreed to return. The Government worked with the 
UNHCR and the Catholic Church to provide displaced Colombians with 
food, medical care, and access to public services, including schools 
and clinics. The Government provided these services in Jaque and other 
areas of the Darien. However, many displaced Colombians living along 
the remote Darien border area were beyond the reach of organized 
assistance from the Government, the UNHCR, or the Church.
    There were reports early in the year that the police set up a small 
number of improvised explosive devices in close proximity to their 
stations to use against possible attacks by armed Colombian groups; 
however, there were no subsequent reports of the devices or of their 
use.
    Aside from large groups of displaced persons, aliens are also 
picked up in the Darien in small groups. These immigrants are usually 
Colombian, but many Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and even Asians and 
Africans have been detained. All but 15 of a group of some 150 aliens 
detained in the Darien town of La Palma were deported or returned 
voluntarily to Colombia, despite protests by the Catholic Church that 
some of the Colombians in the group should be afforded refugee status.
    Colombian migration, whether political or economic, has drastically 
increased pressures on local populations in the Darien and caused the 
displacement of Panamanian citizens. In addition, the Government 
suspects that Colombian migration conceals or attracts the presence of 
armed Colombian groups in the Darien Region. The effects of Colombian 
migration are also evident in Panama City and Colon, where large 
populations of Colombians have settled.
    There were no other reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution; however, throughout the year, 
there were unconfirmed reports that the police along the border, on an 
ad hoc basis, required Colombians to return to Colombia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
Government, and citizens freely exercised this right in the 1999 
general elections. The Constitution provides for a representative 
democracy with direct popular election by secret ballot of the 
President, two vice presidents, legislators, and local representatives 
every 5 years. The independent Electoral Tribunal arranges and 
supervises elections. While the Constitution provides for independent 
legislative and judicial branches, the executive dominates in practice. 
The Government respected the rights of its citizens to join any 
political party, propagate their views, and vote for candidates of 
their choice.
    In May 1999, Arnulfista presidential candidate Mireya Moscoso 
defeated Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Martin Torrijos 
and Christian Democratic Party candidate Alberto Vallarino, winning 
44.8 percent of the popular vote. Domestic and international observers 
characterized the elections as generally free and fair; however, 
several local contests were marred by reports of vote buying. The PRD 
won 34 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the Arnulfistas, 18; 
Solidarity, 4; the National Liberal Party, 3; MOLIRENA, 3; Democratic 
Change, 2; MORENA, 1; the Christian Democratic Party, 5; and the Civic 
Renewal Party, 1. During President Moscoso's first year in office, she 
maintained a one-vote majority in the Legislative Assembly through her 
Arnulfista Party members' coalition with other parties. However, on 
September 1, the coalition realigned, and the President's party no 
longer controls the legislature.
    There are no legal barriers to participation by women, members of 
minorities, or persons of indigenous descent, but they generally are 
underrepresented in government and politics. However, women's 
participation has increased in recent years. Mireya Moscoso is the 
country's first female president. Women hold 7 of 71 Legislative 
Assembly seats; a woman served as the Assembly's first vice president 
in 1999-2000, and another woman holds this position for the 2000-2001 
legislative season. Three women hold cabinet positions, and a woman is 
the director of the Public Registry. Two female judges sit on the 
Supreme Court, one of whom was elected Chief Justice in October 1999. 
In May 1999, an indigenous person served as President of the 
Legislative Assembly from September 1999 until August.
    The Government provides semi-autonomous status to several 
indigenous groups in their homelands, including the Kuna Yala, Ngobe-
Bugle, Embera Wounaan, Kuna de Madungandi, and Wargandi reserves. There 
are two Kuna legislators in the Legislative Assembly, one Ngobe, one 
part-Ngobe, and one Embera. Locally, tribal chiefs govern each reserve; 
they meet in a general congress at regular intervals. Neither the 
Madugandi nor the Embera-Wounaan reserve has its own dedicated 
legislators, but each has a separate governor. The Government continued 
the process of demarcating electoral districts within a new reserve 
created for the NgobeBugle. May 1999 elections allowed many Ngobe-Bugle 
to choose their own local representatives in these newly created 
electoral districts.
    The law prohibits discrimination against any social, religious, or 
cultural group; however, naturalized citizens may not hold certain 
categories of elective office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights organizations, including both religious and secular 
groups, operated without government restrictions. These organizations 
carried out a full range of activities, including investigations and 
dissemination of their findings. Organizations generally had access to 
government officials while conducting investigations.
    The office of Human Rights Ombudsman was created in 1996 and began 
to handle cases in 1998. The office receives 15 to 20 complaints daily, 
but does not have authority to investigate violations involving the 
administration of justice. Human Rights Ombudsman Italo Antinori, the 
first person to fill the position, sparred with the Perez Balladares 
Government constantly but reduced his public profile after the 1999 
election of President Moscoso. Antinori's term runs until June 2004.
    On December 27, President Moscoso announced her intention to create 
a commission to investigate crimes committed during the 1968-89 
dictatorship.
    In February Minister of Government and Justice Winston Spadafora 
denied a petition by the Association of New Men and Women, an informal 
gay rights organization, to register as a nongovernmental organization. 
Human Rights Ombudsman Antinori publicly supported Spadafora's 
decision.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits either special privileges or 
discrimination on the basis of race, birth status, social class, sex, 
religion, or political views. However, societal prejudices persist. 
Cases of discrimination are difficult to prove, and legal remedies for 
victims are complicated, time-consuming, and costly. There were some 
unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women continued to be a serious 
problem. The 1995 Family Code criminalized family violence (including 
psychological, physical, or sexual abuse) but convictions are rare 
unless a death occurs. The PTJ registered 610 cases of domestic 
violence through September, compared with 451 through June 1999. The 
PTJ also registered 408 cases of rape and 102 cases of attempted rape 
through September, compared with 514 cases of rape and 135 cases of 
attempted rape in 1999. The Center for the Development of the Woman 
estimated that victims report as few as 20 percent of sexual assaults 
to judicial or law enforcement authorities. A widely acknowledged 
characteristic of rape is that it frequently occurs in the home. The 
Foundation for the Promotion of the Woman, among other women's advocacy 
groups and government agencies, operated programs to assist victims of 
abuse, and to educate women on their legal rights.
    Trafficking in women for forced labor and forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment also is a threat to the equal status of women in 
society. According to a report by the Latin American Committee for the 
Defense of Women, in 1995, the latest year statistics were available, 
about 70 percent of female government employees reported having endured 
sexual harassment in the workplace--42 percent by their immediate 
supervisors and 18 percent by more senior supervisors. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many women are propositioned for sexual favors 
at the time of their initial job interview. A bill to criminalize 
sexual harassment failed to pass the legislature in 1995, and further 
legislation has not been introduced.
    The 1995 Family Code recognizes joint or common property in 
marriages. However, insufficient resources hampered government efforts 
to enforce the code's provisions effectively. According to Supreme 
Court Justice Mirtza de Aguilera, there should be 80 family judges; 
however, only 20 have been appointed due to lack of resources.
    The Constitution mandates equal pay for men and women in equivalent 
jobs, but wages paid to women are on average 20 percent lower and 
increase at a slower rate. There are credible reports of irregular 
hiring practices based upon age and ``appearance.'' A 1998 law 
reiterates protections laid out in the Constitution and prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex.
    In 1998 the Government created the Ministry of Youth, Women, 
Children, and Family Affairs. The Ministry is largely a consolidation 
of departments previously operating in other government ministries, and 
its activities have not attracted a great deal of public attention. A 
number of private women's rights groups concentrate on disseminating 
information about women's rights, countering domestic abuse, enhancing 
employment and other skills, and pressing for legal reforms.
    Children.--Minors (under 18 years of age) represent 48 percent of 
the population. Education is compulsory through the equivalent of 9th 
grade, but children do not always attend school due to traditional 
attitudes, the lack of transportation, and insufficient government 
resources to enforce the requirement. The problem is most extreme in 
the Darien province and among indigenous groups. The Government 
furnishes basic health care for children through local clinics run by 
the Ministry of Health. A central children's hospital in Panama City 
operates on government funds as well as private donations.
    The Superior Tribunal for Minors and Superior Tribunal for Families 
are judicial authorities charged with overseeing the protection and 
care of minors. The Minister of Youth, Women, Children, and Family 
Affairs acts much like an ombudsman, and the office proposes and 
reviews laws and monitors government performance. Through September the 
PTJ registered 130 cases of child abuse, compared with 171 in all of 
1999. Neglect of children is a problem. Malnutrition and inadequate 
medical care are generalized problems that are most severe among rural 
indigenous groups. Rural and urban child labor are problems (see 
Section 6.d.).
    Juvenile courts continue to report a high incidence of juvenile 
delinquency in major urban areas. The authorities report a continued 
increase in such crimes as drug trafficking, armed robberies, 
kidnappings, car thefts, and murders that are attributed to juveniles. 
Youth participation in criminal gangs is an increasing problem. Police 
arrested and detained children for minor infractions during 
neighborhood sweeps.
    People with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Education is responsible 
for educating and training disabled minors, while the Ministry of 
Youth, Women, Children, and Family Affairs protects the rights of 
disabled adults. Disabled children traditionally have been separated 
out from the general population; however, on February 4, the 
Legislative Assembly passed a law that requires schools to integrate 
children with special needs into the student body.
    The Department of Labor is responsible for placing workers with 
disabilities in suitable jobs. Placement remains difficult despite a 
1993 executive order granting tax incentives to firms that hire 
disabled employees. Disabled persons also tend to make only the minimum 
salary, notably less than employees without disabilities.
    The 1998 municipal building code for Panama City requires that all 
new construction projects include handicapped accessible features, with 
fines from $100 to $500 for noncompliance. In 1999 a national law was 
passed with similar requirements for new construction projects, but it 
is not yet clear whether the law is to be enforced. Awareness of 
handicapped issues has increased over the past 5 years, and commercial 
establishments increasingly provide and enforce handicapped parking 
spaces. However, basic services such as sidewalks and handicapped 
accessible bathrooms are largely unavailable.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution protects the ethnic identity 
and native languages of indigenous people, requiring the Government to 
provide bilingual literacy programs in indigenous communities. 
Indigenous people have legal rights and take part in decisions 
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of 
natural resources. Indigenous people number approximately 194,000 
persons (8 percent of the population) and have the same political and 
legal rights as other citizens. The Government has passed legislation 
over the years setting aside indigenous reserves for the country's 
native groups, including the Embera-Wounan, Ngobe-Bugle, and Kuna. The 
Ministry of Government and Justice in Panama City maintains the low-
profile Office of Indigenous Policy. Federal law is the ultimate 
authority on indigenous reserves, but local groups are allowed a great 
deal of local autonomy. For example, the Government recognizes 
traditional indigenous marriage rites as the equivalent of a civil 
ceremony. Despite legal protection and formal equality, indigenous 
people generally endure relatively higher levels of poverty, disease, 
malnutrition, and illiteracy than the rest of the population. 
Discrimination against indigenous people, although generally not overt, 
is widespread.
    The Indigenous Affairs Commission of the Legislative Assembly, 
which was created in 1995, sponsored bills during the year to protect 
intellectual property rights, set up regulations for artisan fairs, and 
construct a health center. The Commission also sponsored a law that 
created the new 190-acre Kuna Wargandi reserve.
    Though their population suffers from poverty and malnutrition, Kuna 
leaders have had the most success enforcing their territorial 
boundaries and maintaining their cultural integrity. There are two Kuna 
legislators, (one was President of the 1999-2000 Legislative Assembly); 
and they have more financial resources than the other groups. Other 
indigenous groups have not succeeded in using their autonomy to 
preserve their culture or develop economic independence. Most live in 
extreme poverty and isolation. Illiteracy among indigenous groups is at 
almost 50 percent, while the figure is only 10 percent among the 
population as a whole.
    Since indigenous populations infrequently master Spanish and are 
unfamiliar with the country's legal system, they often misunderstand 
their rights and fail to employ legal channels when threatened. The 
problem is exacerbated by government inattention to indigenous issues. 
For example, the EmberaWounan in the Darien have been moved out of 
their reserves in increasing numbers due to encroachment by settlers, 
loggers, and Colombian immigrants. The Ngobe also are under threat due 
to the isolation of their reserves, encroachment by settlers, and 
generalized poverty. Indigenous workers consistently do not receive the 
basic rights provided by the Labor Code, such as minimum wage, social 
security benefits, termination pay, and job security. Even when working 
in close proximity of each other, indigenous laborers in the country's 
sugar, coffee, and banana plantations work under poorer conditions than 
their nonindigenous counterparts. Indigenous migrant workers are 
unlikely to be provided with housing or food, and their children are 
much more likely to work long hours of heavy farm labor than non-
indigenous children.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially 
diverse, and minority groups generally have been integrated into 
mainstream society with overall success. However, discrimination 
against the country's newer immigrants, especially Chinese, often is 
overt. The ethnic Chinese community is estimated to be about 120,000 
persons. Cultural differences and language difficulties hinder and may 
prevent many Chinese immigrants from fully integrating into mainstream 
society. In addition, Panamanians often resent Chinese immigrants for 
their perceived indifference towards the culture of their adopted 
country and their perceived clannish behavior. Racial slurs directed at 
Asians are used openly among the general population, and substantial 
numbers of Panamanian-resident Chinese frequently are treated as 
secondclass citizens. On the other hand, second and third generation 
Chinese are seen as distinct from recent immigrants, and generally are 
accepted in society. These established Chinese generally do not want to 
be associated with the recent arrivals from China.
    In addition to Chinese immigrants, Middle Eastern and Indian 
residents also suffer from racially motivated discriminatory treatment. 
All three groups operate much of the country's retail trade, 
particularly in urban areas. Legal and illegal immigrants, especially 
Chinese, are accorded fewer legal protections than are citizens for 
their trade activities. A constitutional provision reserving retail 
trade to Panamanian citizens is not enforced in practice; however, 
immigrants legally cannot own their businesses, and sometimes encounter 
bureaucratic difficulties in practicing their professions.
    Racism against blacks occurs, although it generally is expressed in 
more subtle terms. Blacks are conspicuously absent from positions of 
political and economic power. The country's white elite successfully 
marginalizes citizens with darker skin through preferential hiring 
practices in the private sector and manipulation of government 
resources in the public sector.
    Antillean blacks, often identifiable by dress and speech pattern, 
are a particular target for racial slurs and poor treatment by citizens 
and by Spanish-speaking blacks. Their geographic clustering in the 
economically depressed province of Colon and poorer neighborhoods of 
Panama City heightens their isolation from mainstream society. Black 
Canal workers traditionally commanded significantly higher financial 
resources compared with blacks elsewhere in society, but many have 
retired or emigrated and there is some anecdotal evidence that the rest 
are being replaced by white personnel. Mainstream political elites 
generally are unconcerned by the economic issues of black populations 
and a concomitant rise in drug use, crime, and gang violence. Colon, 
the country's second largest city, suffers from a conspicuous lack of 
government services. Indifference among the general population is a 
major impediment to change.
    Although such practices are illegal, clubs and restaurants often 
discriminate against black and indigenous individuals by denying them 
admission. In 1999 students protesting in front of Panama City's most 
popular nightclubs brought public attention to the issue. A draft bill 
to expand and support the Constitution by penalizing cases of 
discrimination for reasons of race, birth, social class, gender, and 
ideology failed midway through the year, but another bill was being 
prepared to penalize establishments that deny entry based on race.
    Racial discrimination against all ethnic groups is evident in the 
workplace, where light-skinned persons are represented 
disproportionately in management positions and jobs that require 
dealing with the public (such as bank tellers and receptionists).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers have the right 
to form and join unions of their choice, subject to the union's 
registration by the Government. A 1995 labor code reform package 
significantly increased workers' ability to establish unions. It 
streamlined the accreditation and registration process for unions, and 
established the minimum size at 40 workers. If the Government does not 
respond to an application within 15 days, the union automatically gains 
recognition and is accorded all rights and privileges under the law. 
The package also addressed a longstanding concern of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) by allowing labor leaders to keep their union 
positions if fired from their jobs.
    Approximately 10 percent of the total employed labor force is 
organized. There are over 250 active unions, grouped under 48 
federations and 7 confederations representing approximately 80,000 
members in the private sector. Neither the Government nor political 
parties outwardly control or finance unions; however, the Government 
and political parties do exercise political, ideological, or financial 
influence over some unions. The labor sector traditionally supports the 
Democratic Revolutionary Party.
    The 1994 Civil Service Law permits most government workers to form 
public employee associations and federations and establishes their 
right to represent members in collective bargaining with their 
respective agencies. It also provides a small core of civil servants 
with the right to strike, bargain collectively, and evade summary 
dismissal, except for those in areas vital to public welfare and 
security, such as the police and health workers. However, the law has 
proven insufficient to protect the country's 150,000 public workers, 
because only a small percentage are members of the civil service and 
therefore enjoy job security. Public workers are not allowed to form 
unions. The ILO's Committee of Experts has observed for some years that 
the prohibition of public servants' associations is inconsistent with 
the country's obligations under ILO Convention 87, but no changes have 
been made.
    The law governing the autonomous Panama Canal Authority prohibits 
the right to strike for its 10,000 employees, but does allow unions to 
organize and to bargain collectively.
    In October the authorities detained, then immediately released, 
union leaders following protests by the SUNTRACS union.
    Union organizations at every level may and do affiliate with 
international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
provides most workers, including all private sector workers, with the 
right to organize and bargain collectively, and unions exercise it 
widely. The law protects union workers from antiunion discrimination 
and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities. 
The Ministry of Labor has mechanisms to resolve complaints against 
antiunion employers. The Civil Service Law allows most public employees 
to organize and bargain collectively and grants some of them a limited 
right to strike; however, 130,000 public sector workers do not have the 
right to bargain collectively or to strike. While the right to strike 
applies to some 10,000 civil servants, it does not apply to the 
approximately 140,000 other government workers. The Labor Code 
establishes a conciliation board in the Ministry of Labor to resolve 
labor complaints and provides a procedure for arbitration. In March 
1999, the Supreme Court ruled that an article of the Labor Code that 
obligated private sector strikers to submit to binding arbitration 
after a given period was unconstitutional.
    Employers commonly hire temporary workers to circumvent onerous 
labor code requirements for permanent workers. Temporary workers are 
excluded from social security benefits, job security, and vacation 
time. Labor law requires companies to submit copies of all labor 
contracts for permanent workers to the Labor Ministry for review to 
ensure compliance and requires the Labor Ministry to conduct periodic 
inspections of the work force. The Labor Ministry may levy fines 
against companies not in compliance with the law. However, these 
measures have proven ineffective in practice. The practice of blank 
contracts is, according to union sources, becoming more widespread.
    Over the past 5 years, the Government has issued cabinet decrees 
restricting labor activity in export processing zones (EPZ's). Current 
EPZ legislation provides for collective bargaining with 
``representatives of employees'' but makes no specific mention of trade 
unions. It requires mandatory arbitration of disputes; and it allows 
for the participation of an unrepresentative worker delegate in the 
tripartite (government, labor, and industry) arbitration commission. A 
strike may be considered legal only after 36 workdays of conciliation 
are exhausted; if this requirement is not met, striking workers may be 
fined or fired. A 1998 ILO ruling noted that this regulation does not 
mention arbitration or specify procedures to resolve disputes in the 
courts, and that the Government should amend the EPZ labor regulations 
to conform with international norms; however, the Government has not 
made any changes in response to the ruling. Minimum wage provisions do 
not apply in the EPZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children, and it 
generally does not occur; however, trafficking in women for forced 
labor and forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under 
14 years of age with some exceptions, and also prohibits the employment 
of children under age 15 if the child has not completed primary school. 
However, a Government report estimates that 27,000 children between the 
ages of 12 and 14 work. Children under age 16 legally cannot work 
overtime, and those under age 18 cannot work at night. Children between 
the ages of 12 and 15 may perform light farm or domestic work, with the 
authorization of the Labor Ministry, as long as it does not interfere 
with their schooling. The Labor Code provides that children between the 
ages of 14 and 16 may work 6-hour a day shifts that do not exceed 36 
hours a week. The Ministry of Labor enforces these provisions in 
response to complaints and may order the termination of unauthorized 
employment. The Government acknowledges that it is unable to enforce 
some child labor provisions in rural areas, due to insufficient staff. 
In May the Government ratified ILO Conventions 138 and 182 establishing 
the minimum age to work and prohibiting the worst forms of child labor.
    The Permanent Committee Against Child Labor asserts that 11 percent 
of all children between the ages of 10 and 17 are working or actively 
are seeking employment. Most of these children, both rural and urban, 
are believed to be working at their parent's insistence. Some of these 
children may be providing a substantial part of their family income.
    Child labor violations occur most frequently in rural areas, during 
the harvest of sugar cane, coffee, bananas, and tomatoes. Farm owners 
usually pay according to the amount harvested, leading many laborers to 
bring their young children to the fields to help with the work. In many 
small rural communities, the entire able-bodied population participates 
in a harvest, and parents are not willing to leave their children 
behind unattended. Many children also are involved extensively in 
subsistence agriculture producing coffee and sugar; they work with 
their families or are employed by independent plantations.
    The problem of child labor in agricultural areas appears to fall 
most heavily on indigenous families, who often are forced to migrate 
out of their isolated reserves in search of incomegenerating 
activities. These frequent migrations not only interrupt schooling, but 
also leave the family vulnerable to sometimes unscrupulous contractors. 
The Government claims that it is unable to enforce child labor 
provisions in rural areas due to insufficient staff, such as in the 
coffee and banana plantations near the border with Costa Rica, where 
government resources are especially scarce. However, the lack of 
enforcement also can be attributed to widely held beliefs that 
indigenous persons are accustomed to poverty and hard work. In April 
the Minister of Labor suggested that child labor in the sugar cane 
fields was a ``cultural tradition among the indigenous'' and that 
children cutting sugar cane received more food during harvest time; 
these comments led to a series of critical newspaper editorials. A 
series of press reports during the year that exposed primarily 
indigenous child labor in sugar cane fields led to a series of letters 
to the editor from the public. Children in banana plantations also face 
difficult conditions (see Section 6.e.).
    Urban supermarkets employ an estimated 1,500 children who bag 
groceries for tips. Despite the requirements of the Labor Code, some of 
the children are as young as age 9, and many of them work late hours. 
Some supermarket managers claim that the children actually are not 
employed by their firm, despite the fact that ``baggers'' conform to 
schedules, wear uniforms, and must comply with company codes of 
conduct. Urban child labor also includes domestic workers, street 
vendors, and car washers. The Government has demonstrated little 
interest in reducing the general problem of urban child labor, and has 
been unwilling to challenge the larger supermarket chains, where large 
numbers of children work. Urban child labor problems also include 
children working as street vendors or performers, washing cars, and 
running errands for businesses or local criminal groups.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the 
Government enforces this provision (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes 
minimum wage rates for specific regions and for most categories of 
labor. The minimum wage ranges from $0.80 per hour to $1.50 per hour, 
depending on the region and sector. This wage is not sufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most 
workers formally employed in urban areas earn the minimum wage or 
above. However, because unemployment is relatively high at 11 to 13 
percent, an estimated 39 percent of the population work in the large 
informal sector and earns far below the minimum wage. This is 
particularly the case in most rural areas, where unskilled laborers 
earn $3 to $6 per day, without benefits; the Government does not 
enforce labor laws in most rural areas. In December 1999, a commission 
composed of representatives from government, the private sector, and 
labor convened to negotiate an increase in the minimum wage. The 
commission failed to reach consensus by the mandated date, and 
accordingly, in July responsibility for setting the new minimum wage 
was passed to the President, who issued a decree that raised the 
minimum wage by 13 percent, effective August 1. Public sector workers 
do not fall under the Labor Code and do not always receive the minimum 
wage.
    The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 48 hours and 
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period weekly.
    As is general practice in the country's public offices after 
elections, newly elected politicians and appointees began dismissing 
public workers immediately upon taking office to free up positions for 
loyal followers. The numbers of those dismissed were impossible to 
confirm. Despite ILO protest, public workers do not benefit from union 
protection or Labor Code standards. They were excluded from the most 
recent increase in the minimum wage. The Government has indicated that 
it would consider increasing their wages in 2001, if feasible.
    The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing health and 
safety standards and generally does so. The standards are fairly broad 
and generally emphasize safety over long-term health hazards, according 
to organized labor sources. Inspectors from both the Labor Ministry and 
the occupational health section in the Social Security Administration 
conduct periodic inspections of hazardous employment sites and respond 
to complaints. Both agencies suffer from budget constraints and 
experience difficulty attracting qualified personnel and resources. 
Construction workers and their employers are notoriously lax about 
conforming to basic safety measures, usually resulting in several 
deaths a year. In rural areas, the most severe oversight in basic 
safety measures occurs in the banana industry, where poisoning by 
chemical agents is a recurrent issue. Workers have complained of 
sterility and more recently of adverse skin conditions as a result of 
exposure to the chemicals. In several plantations, indigenous workers 
are not provided with shelters, sanitary or cooking facilities, or 
fresh water; they also did not have machetes or gloves for their work. 
Complaints of health problems also continued in the cement and milling 
industries.
    The law protects from dismissal workers who file requests for 
health and safety inspections. Workers also have the right to remove 
themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety 
hazard without jeopardizing their employment. They generally are not 
allowed to do so if the threat is not immediate, but may request a 
health and safety inspection to determine the extent and nature of the 
hazard.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits trafficking in 
women and children; however, trafficking remains a problem. The Code 
provides for prison sentences of 2 to 4 years for the promotion or 
facilitation of the entry to or exit from the country of a person for 
the purposes of prostitution. In some circumstances, the penalty is 
increased to 6 years. The country is a transit point for aliens seeking 
to reach the United States, some of whom are trafficked into indentured 
servitude. There were reports of women being trafficked to Israel for 
purposes of prostitution. Prosecutions are rare. The authorities held 
several persons in custody for trafficking; they remained in prison 
awaiting trial at year's end. Corruption, legal technicalities, and 
lack of resources contribute to the Government's inability to combat 
the problem fully. Traffickers frequently bribe or evade local law 
enforcement officials.
    Trafficking in women for sexual purposes occurs in the country, but 
the extent of the practice is unknown. Public prosecutors are 
investigating a case of Panamanian women smuggled into Israel in 1999 
to work in brothels. Smugglers deprived the women of their money and 
their passports. Some of the women apparently were aware that they were 
traveling to work in the sex industry, others were not. The case was 
before a criminal court at year's end; one hearing was held during the 
year.
    An estimated 30,000 aliens transit the country annually, generally 
posing as tourists. The majority of aliens transiting Panama originate 
in Ecuador and Peru, but a significant and increasing number come from 
India and China. Their travel is facilitated by a network of alien 
smugglers, travel agents, hotels, and safehouses. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that illegal aliens transiting through the country are 
subject to frequent hardship. They commonly are deprived of adequate 
food and shelter. Chinese aliens are particularly vulnerable to poor 
treatment, and ultimately those trafficked for the purpose of forced 
labor are coerced into working off their debt, which may be as high as 
$30,000, as indentured servants. The Government does not conduct 
educational campaigns to warn of the dangers of trafficking, and there 
are no programs to aid victims.
                               __________

                                PARAGUAY

    Paraguay is a constitutional republic with an executive branch and 
a bicameral legislature. The President is the Head of Government and 
cannot succeed himself. The bicameral Congress is made up of a 45-
member Senate and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The Colorado Party 
has a small majority in both houses of Congress; however, factional 
differences within the party result in shifting alliances depending 
upon the issue. President Luis Gonzalez Macchi's ``National Unity 
Government'' was weakened in February when the Liberal Party withdrew 
from the Government, claiming that the President's Colorado Party 
refused to share power with its coalition partners. On May 18, members 
of two army units and a group of National Police officers loyal to 
former General Lino Oviedo attempted to overthrow President Gonzalez 
Macchi. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority of 
the military remained loyal to the Government. President Gonzalez 
Macchi declared and Congress ratified a controversial and unpopular 
state of exception on May 19, in response to the coup attempt; he 
lifted it on May 31. The Government used the state of exception to 
imprison those it suspected of involvement in the coup attempt and to 
limit public meetings and demonstrations. Although the Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary, and the Supreme Court continued 
a reform process, the courts continued to be subject to pressure from 
politicians and others.
    In general the military no longer plays an overt role in politics; 
the attempted coup was an exception to this practice. However, many 
citizens remained concerned about possible erosion of the military's 
apolitical status. Nonetheless, during the attempted coup in May, all 
but two groups within the armed forces remained loyal to the 
constitutional order. The national police force has responsibility for 
maintaining internal security and public order; while it is nominally 
under the authority of the presidency, in practice it reports to the 
Ministry of the Interior. The civilian authorities generally maintain 
effective control of the security forces. Members of the security 
forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Paraguay has a market economy with a large informal sector. The 
formal economy is oriented toward services, with less than half of the 
$7.8 billion gross domestic product resulting from agriculture and 
industry. Over 40 percent of the population are engaged in agricultural 
activity, and approximately 10 percent of all families depend on cotton 
farming. Wealth continues to be concentrated, with both urban and rural 
areas supporting a large subsistence sector. Hydroelectric power and 
agricultural commodities (soybeans, cotton, lumber, and cattle) were 
the most important export items. The economy grew by approximately 0.5 
percent in 1999 but experienced zero real growth during the year. 
Annual per capita income was approximately $1,700.
    The Government's human rights record remained generally poor, and 
there continued to be serious problems. The principal human rights 
problems included extrajudicial killings; torture and abuse of criminal 
suspects, prisoners, and military recruits; and extremely poor prison 
conditions. Arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy pretrial detention, 
a general weakness within the judiciary, and infringements on citizen's 
privacy rights also were problems. The Government at times restricted 
freedom of the press. Following the May coup attempt, the Government 
arrested journalists and destroyed two radio stations; several 
journalists were threatened. The Government restricted freedom of 
assembly, and police used force to disperse protesters on several 
occasions, sometimes severely injuring citizens. Violence and 
discrimination against women, abuse of children, discrimination against 
the disabled and indigenous people, and incomplete protection of worker 
rights also were problems. There were instances of forced labor. Child 
labor and trafficking in women and girls also are problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police and 
military were responsible for some extrajudicial killings.
    On January 8, police killed 3 persons while attempting to evict 400 
landless peasants from a ranch that they had taken over. Nine policemen 
were injured during the incident.
    In December in Itakyry, police shot and killed 10 men suspected of 
robbing an armored vehicle. One of the suspects, slightly wounded but 
alive when the police transported him to a local medical center, was 
dead upon arrival, with eight bullet holes in his body. At year's end 
the police were conducting an investigation.
    No further information was available regarding the disposition of 
extrajudicial killings from previous years, including the following 
cases: Jose ``Coco'' Villar, whom police killed in June 1999; Guillermo 
Jara Ramirez, whom antinarcotics police killed in July 1999; and 
Fernando Aristides Gutierrez and Marcial Torres, recruits killed during 
their military service.
    At least eight recruits died in questionable circumstances during 
the year, including 14-year-old Pedro Centurion, whom the military 
allegedly conscripted into service with false documents at 13 years of 
age against his wishes. In September he was shot and killed; the 
military claimed that he shot himself by accident. It was discovered 
later that Centurion was in fact an Argentine citizen. Human rights 
monitors, including a support group for families of military recruits, 
report that 104 recruits, most of whom were underage, were killed or 
died in accidents since 1989 while fulfilling their mandatory military 
service. Although military law requires that recruits be at least 18 
years of age to serve in the armed forces (or 17 in the year of their 
18th birthday), only an estimated 20 percent of those serving during 
the year met that requirement, and over 30 percent were 15 or younger.
    In November the Government proposed an agreement to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding the deaths of 14-
year-old military recruits Cristian Nunez and Marcelino Gomez. Military 
officers abandoned the two boys in the inhospitable Chaco region during 
a training exercise in 1998. According to the agreement, the Government 
accepted responsibility for the deaths of the boys.
    The March 1999 assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argana, 
which has been attributed widely to allies of then-president Raul Cubas 
Grau, led to political protests in which the police and civilian 
supporters of President Cubas fired on student demonstrators, killing 7 
and injuring over 100. The Gonzalez Macchi Government made little 
progress in bringing those responsible to justice. Three suspects were 
convicted in the assassination; others remained at large. The 
authorities charged and imprisoned a number of suspects for the 
shootings of demonstrators in the plaza following the assassination, 
but the courts have not convicted any of them, and few have been 
released from confinement. As a result, many of those charged remain in 
legal limbo, with their political rights limited, although their 
involvement with the crimes never has been confirmed.
    Former army commander Lino Oviedo, who played a prominent role in 
the downfall of the Cubas Government in 1999, and whose whereabouts 
were unknown after he fled Argentina (where he had received asylum) in 
December 1999, was arrested in Brazil in June and remains in prison in 
Brasilia. Several extradition requests for Oviedo are at various stages 
in the Brazilian justice system. He faces charges stemming from his 
alleged involvement in the March 1999 killing of Vice President Argana 
and seven antigovernment protesters. Two individuals with long criminal 
records, suspected of having participated in the Argana assassination 
and who were imprisoned in a federal police facility in downtown Buenos 
Aires, escaped from the jail in September. In November the authorities 
captured one of them in Ciudad del Este; at year's end he awaited trial 
in Asuncion. The other was thought to be hiding in Brazil.
    Authoritarian regimes ruled the country until 1989, when dictator 
Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown by General Andres Rodriguez, who was 
elected President later that year. In 1996 an appellate court affirmed 
the convictions for human rights abuses of five Stroessner-era 
officials (former police Investigations Director Pastor Coronel and 
police officers Lucilo Benitez Santacruz, Agustin Belotto Youga, Camilo 
Almada Morel, and Juan Aniceto Martinez). Pastor Coronel died in 
detention in September.
    The 1998 arrest of former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet 
in the United Kingdom and his subsequent return to Chile drew renewed 
attention to extrajudicial killings and other abuses that occurred in 
Paraguay under the Stroessner regime. There were renewed allegations 
that Stroessner cooperated in Operation Condor, a regional plan to 
eliminate leftists. One human rights activist who was a political 
prisoner during that time has filed cases with Spanish judge Baltasar 
Garzon, who was preparing the case against Pinochet, and has provided 
him with documents from Paraguayan archives that he claims implicate 
General Stroessner in Operation Condor. There was no progress during 
the year on Operation Condor cases.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture as well as cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment; however, torture 
(primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of convicted 
prisoners and other detainees continued. A human rights nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), the Committee of Churches, reported several cases 
of police torture and other abusive treatment of persons, including 
women and children, designed to extract confessions, punish escape 
attempts, or intimidate detainees. The Attorney General's office and 
the Committee of Churches compiled numerous examples of police abuse.
    In May during the state of exception several of the persons 
arrested reported that they were tortured during their detention. Some 
of these persons reported that former Interior Minister Walter Bower 
witnessed and encouraged the beatings of suspects in three unrelated 
cases. Bower was not charged with any crime related to these 
accusations; however, he was removed from his position in October. 
Press reports also tied him to the torture of eight peasants in 
Concepcion in March; police reportedly beat them in Bower's presence 
after they were arrested for illegally chopping down trees.
    Police used force to disperse protesters on several occasions, 
sometimes seriously injuring civilians (see Section 2.b.). Police also 
beat at least one person, a labor union leader, during a strike in June 
(see Section 6.a.).
    Violence erupted several times during the year when police removed 
squatters from lands they occupied. For example, on May 10 and 11, over 
400 police officers tried to remove squatters from a ranch in Caazapa 
using tear gas. Some shots were fired, and peasants were armed with 
Molotov cocktails, machetes, and scythes.
    In addition there were several allegations of mistreatment of 
military recruits by noncommissioned and commissioned officers. 
Recruits commonly charged that the military does not give them enough 
to eat and forces them to hunt wild animals or steal cattle to kill for 
food. In one case, a 15-year-old recruit, Cesar Francisco Pereira, 
reported that he was forced to fight another recruit by two sergeants 
who wagered a can of beer on the outcome. When Pereira lost, he was 
pistol-whipped by Julio Cesar Alarcon, the sergeant who lost the bet, 
and spent a month in a clinic recovering. Many recruits have claimed 
that they were tortured or beaten while fulfilling their mandatory 
service obligations.
    Prison conditions are extremely poor. Mistreatment of prisoners is 
a serious problem. Overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions were 
the most serious problems affecting all prisoners. Tacumbu prison, the 
largest in Asuncion, was built to hold 800 inmates but houses over 
1,500. Other regional prisons generally hold about three times more 
inmates than originally planned.
    Security is another problem in the prison system. There are 
approximately 120 guards for over 1,500 prisoners at Tacumbu prison, 
and 3 inmates were killed during the year by other inmates. At the 
Asuncion women's prison, Buen Pastor, there have been several reported 
rapes of prisoners by their guards, although laws governing prisons 
forbid male guards in the women's prisons. Conditions in the women's 
prison are better than at Tacumbu, with less overcrowding and a 
generally safer environment. There is a separate prison for juveniles.
    The Congressional Human Rights Commission has criticized the 
prisons for their poor nutritional standards. Prisons generally serve 
one meal a day, and prisoners seldom get vegetables, fruit, or a meat 
protein source, unless they have individual means to purchase them. 
Prisons have separate accommodations for well-to-do prisoners, which 
ensures that those with sufficient means receive far better treatment 
than other prisoners. Pretrial detainees are not held separately from 
convicted prisoners.
    The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions 
by human rights organizations. Members of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross had access to the detained supporters of Oviedo who 
were arrested in March 1999 and to those arrested in May.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are persistent problems. The Constitution prohibits detention 
without an arrest warrant signed by a judge and stipulates that any 
person arrested must appear before a judge within 24 hours to make a 
statement. The police can arrest persons without a warrant if they 
catch them in the act of committing a crime but must bring them before 
a judge within 24 hours. However, the authorities often violated these 
provisions, and the recent introduction of new penal and criminal 
procedure codes, which are not yet well understood by prosecutors and 
police, has exacerbated the problem.
    Following the May 18-19 coup attempt, police detained journalists 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Following the assassination of Vice President Argana and the 
killing of student protesters in March 1999, authorities arrested over 
45 persons in connection with these cases. Many of those arrested were 
well-known political figures, including legislators allied with the 
former Government. There was little evidence presented to support the 
charges against most of them, and most of the accused were held without 
bail, leading some observers to question whether due process had been 
observed. At year's end, many of those detained still remained in jail, 
and at least 10 prominent suspects who had been remanded to house 
arrest had not yet been cleared of the charges against them and 
therefore remained in an uncertain legal status.
    Pretrial detention remains a serious problem; 91 percent of persons 
in prison were held pending trial, many for months or years after their 
arrest. While the law encourages speedy trials, the Constitution 
permits detention without trial until the accused completes the minimum 
sentence for the alleged crime, which often occurs in practice. A bail 
system exists for most crimes, and judges have discretion over it. 
Judges frequently set relatively high bail, and many accused persons 
are unable to post bond. In March the Supreme Court, the Public 
Ministry, and a judicial working group took steps to reduce the large 
number of pretrial detainees but achieved only modest results. The 
Supreme Court and many criminal court judges also make quarterly visits 
to the prisons to identify and release improperly detained individuals.
    The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does 
not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, judges often are pressured by 
politicians and other persons whose interests are at stake. There were 
allegations that members of the judiciary who issued arrest warrants 
against the Oviedistas following the events of March 1999 were 
pressured to do so by politicians who opposed Oviedo. While there are 
credible reports of political pressure affecting judicial decisions, 
the judiciary is not allied with any one political group.
    The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and 
magistrates, based upon recommendations by the magistrate's council. 
There are five types of appellate tribunals: Civil and commercial, 
criminal, labor, administrative disputes, and juvenile. Minor courts 
and justices of the peace fall within four functional areas: Civil and 
commercial, criminal, labor, and juvenile. The military has its own 
judicial system.
    The judicial system remains relatively inefficient; however, the 
1999 enactment of new penal and criminal procedure codes is expected to 
improve the judicial system's efficiency over time. The judiciary 
continues to suffer from insufficient resources. There is also a large 
backlog of cases. The Constitution stipulates that all defendants have 
the right to an attorney, at public expense if necessary, but this 
right often is not respected in practice. Many destitute suspects 
receive little legal assistance, and few have access to an attorney 
sufficiently in advance of the trial to prepare a defense. In Asuncion 
for example, there are only 26 public defenders available to assist the 
indigent, and only 102 nationwide, although 25 new positions are 
planned. In practice, public defenders lack the resources to perform 
their jobs adequately.
    The new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code entered fully into force 
in March and replaced the antiquated 1914 code. It provides the legal 
basis for the protection of fundamental human rights. The new code 
includes procedures for an oral and accusatorial system, as well as a 
faster and more transparent criminal trial process. If implemented 
effectively, these reforms could improve the credibility of the 
judicial system and reduce the number of persons in pretrial detention.
    Enactment of the new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code has 
introduced gradually oral proceedings. A prosecutor is responsible for 
bringing charges against accused persons within 180 days. Defendants 
and the prosecutor can present written testimony of witnesses as well 
as other evidence. All interested parties have access to all documents 
reviewed by the judge, and defendants can rebut witnesses. Defendants 
enjoy a presumption of innocence. The judge alone determines guilt or 
innocence and decides punishment. During the pretrial phase, the judge 
receives and may request investigative reports. The accused often 
appears before the court only twice: to plead and to be sentenced. 
Defendants have the right to appeal. If the sentence is appealed, an 
appeals court reviews the verdict. The law provides for appeals to the 
Supreme Court if constitutional questions arise.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. More than 45 
supporters of former General Lino Oviedo were arrested after the 
killings of Vice President Argana and the student protesters in March 
1999, and many remained in jail at year's end. They assert that they 
are being detained because of their political opposition to President 
Gonzalez Macchi (see Section 1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--At times the Government infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. While the Government and its security forces generally did not 
interfere in the private lives of citizens, human rights activists 
claimed that local officials and police officers abuse their authority 
by entering homes or businesses without warrants and harassing private 
citizens. The Constitution provides that the police may not enter 
private homes except to prevent a crime in progress or when the police 
possess a judicial warrant. There were allegations that the Government 
occasionally spied on individuals and monitored communications for 
political and security reasons. There were allegations of the forced 
conscription of underage youth (see Section 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice during most of the year; however, 
there were several exceptions during the state of exception in May and 
following the vice presidential election in August.
    The print and electronic media are independently owned; however, 
some newspapers, radio and television stations are closely tied to 
political parties, factions of those parties, or business interests. 
The media commonly criticized the Government and freely discussed 
opposition viewpoints.
    Following the coup attempt of May 18-19, the Government arrested 
journalists, and police destroyed two radio stations. During the coup 
attempt, Radio Asuncion, whose owners, Miguel and Adriana Fernandez, 
had been linked to Oviedo, broadcast appeals to the public to support 
the uprising. Early in the afternoon of May 20, as many as a dozen 
uniformed officers of the Paraguayan National Police entered Radio 
Asuncion's studios, where they destroyed some broadcast equipment and 
stole other items, effectively dismantling the station, and detained 
both the owners. Radio Asuncion was unable to resume operations and was 
off the air at year's end. The Government also detained Juan Carlos 
Bernabe of Radio Nanawa. On June 2, the authorities released Bernabe 
and the Fernandezes.
    Radio 970 in Asuncion, which the Government similarly accused of 
supporting the coup attempt while it was in progress, reported being 
threatened with closure in the days following the uprising. Senator 
Francisco Jose de Vargas said during a public session of the Senate 
that he had requested that President Gonzalez Macchi send a helicopter 
to bomb the transmission tower of the station during the May 18-19 
incidents because it was ``abetting the insurrection.''
    Also after the coup attempt, under the decree implementing the 
state of exception, President Gonzalez Macchi ordered the detention of 
Hugo Ruiz Olazar, editor of the Asuncion daily newspaper ABC Color and 
local correspondent for Agence France Presse and El Clarin of Buenos 
Aires, on suspicion of having participated in planning the coup 
attempt. Police maintained surveillance outside the newspaper, 
monitoring movements to and from the building in an evident attempt to 
capture Ruiz. He was never arrested and returned to his position at ABC 
after the state of exception was lifted.
    In addition several journalists were threatened around the time of 
the vice presidential election on August 13. On the evening of August 
15, a reportedly drunken mob of several dozen Colorado Party supporters 
surrounded the studios of the country's leading station Radio Nanduti, 
threw stones and bottles, and threatened to storm the building. During 
the election campaign, Radio Nanduti's owner and leading commentator, 
Humberto Rubin, had been mildly critical of the Colorado Party and a 
prominent Colorado political family. Although the station called the 
police and also broadcast appeals for assistance, the police took more 
than an hour to arrive and disperse the crowd. Some windows were 
broken, but no one was reported injured. Then-Interior Minister Walter 
Bower later telephoned station owner Rubin on the air to offer 
apologies for the slow response.
    On December 19, Brazilian journalist Mauri Konig of the O Estado do 
Parana newspaper was beaten with chains and severely injured after 
photographing a police station in Alto Parana department, near the 
border with Brazil. Konig reported that at least one of the three men 
who beat him was wearing a police uniform, and a pickup truck 
reportedly used by his assailants was linked to several police 
officials. At year's end, the authorities had made no arrests in the 
case.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of all citizens to peaceful assembly, and the 
Government generally respected this right in practice during most of 
the year; however, before and during the state of exception in May the 
Government restricted this right. Police used gunfire to disperse 
protesters on several occasions, sometimes severely wounding civilians.
    In 1997 the Government amended a law regulating demonstrations in 
Asuncion to further restrict areas where demonstrations may take place 
but expanded slightly the hours in which they may be held. Union groups 
were the most vocal opponents of the modifications. The law requires 
that organizers notify the Asuncion police 24 hours before any rally in 
the downtown area. The police may ban a protest but must provide 
written notification of such a ban within 12 hours of receipt of the 
organizers' request. The law permits a police ban only if another party 
already has given notice of plans for a similar rally at the same place 
and time. In addition the law prohibits public meetings or 
demonstrations in front of the presidential palace and outside military 
or police barracks. This law does not apply to religious processions.
    In March in San Pedro police removed a roadblock erected by 
peasants. During the altercation six persons were shot. However, police 
deny that they shot the peasants, claiming that they had only rubber 
bullets. Police also beat at least one person, a labor union leader, 
during a strike in June (see Section 6.a.).
    On April 3, dozens of police in riot gear prevented members of the 
UNACE faction of the Colorado Party from holding a meeting to discuss 
what position their party should take in the upcoming internal party 
elections. Police allegedly violently forced members to leave the area 
of the UNACE office and stopped members in cars from completing their 
trip. Party leader Luis Villamayor complained that the action violated 
the Constitution.
    The Government restricted freedom of assembly during the state of 
exception imposed in late May after the coup attempt. The Government 
prohibited public gatherings of UNACE followers during the state of 
exception and required other groups holding meetings or demonstrations 
first to receive authorization from the police. The police retained the 
right to forbid any meeting and to demand identification from anyone 
participating in a meeting or demonstration.
    Other political demonstrations and rallies occurred during the 
year, generally without major incidents. Labor unions continued to 
demonstrate for better working conditions, and peasant organizations 
closed roads on several occasions to bring attention to the needs of 
the rural population.
    The Constitution provides for the right of all citizens to free 
association, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Government requires that all religious groups be registered with the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, but imposes no controls on these 
groups, and many informal churches exist.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens may travel within the 
country with virtually no restrictions, and there are no restrictions 
on foreign travel or emigration. There were no travel restrictions 
during the state of exception. The alleged coup plotters are not 
allowed to leave the country and must sign in with the Justice Ministry 
once a month.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for the granting of 
asylum; however, there are no established provisions to grant asylum or 
refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
The Immigration Department determines each request on a case-by-case 
basis in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Relations and 
Interior and the nongovernmental Committee of Churches. The issue of 
the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens have the right and ability to change their government 
through democratic means. Multiple parties and candidates contest the 
country's leadership positions. Three parties are represented in the 
Congress. The Constitution and the Electoral Code mandate general 
elections every 5 years, voting by secret ballot, and universal 
suffrage. Debate in Congress is free and frank. The Congress often 
rejects the executive branch's proposals.
    Three major parties and several smaller political parties are 
active. Competing factions within the parties are distinguished by the 
personal ambitions of their leaders, not by policy differences. The 
opposition's power increased as a result of the changes brought about 
by the 1992 Constitution and the subsequent election of a civilian 
president and an opposition-controlled congress. President Gonzalez 
Macchi's ``National Unity Government'' was weakened in February when 
the Liberal Party withdrew from the Government, claiming that the 
Colorado Party refused to share power with its coalition partners. The 
president of the Liberal Party was elected Vice President in August and 
took office in September. International observers from the Organization 
of American States characterized the election as free and fair. This 
was the first national election won by the opposition in almost 90 
years. Interim gubernatorial elections that were scheduled for June 
were delayed because of a court challenge by the Colorado Party and 
were rescheduled for March 2001.
    On May 18, members of two groups of the armed forces and some 
National Police officers loyal to former General Lino Oviedo attempted 
to overthrow President Gonzalez Macchi. Two cavalry units led by some 
former military officers and politicians took over the major cavalry 
bases in and around Asuncion and threatened to overthrow the 
Government. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority 
of the military remained loyal to the Government. However, following 
the coup attempt President Gonzalez Macchi declared and the Congress 
ratified a controversial and unpopular state of exception on May 19 and 
lifted it on May 31.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government and politics; however, in practice they are 
underrepresented. There are 9 women in Congress (7 of 45 senators and 2 
of 80 national deputies), and there is 1 woman in the Cabinet. The new 
Electoral Code requires that, in their internal primaries, 20 percent 
of each party's candidates for elective office be women. Although women 
are represented in the judicial system as judges and prosecutors, there 
are no women on the Supreme Court.
    Members of indigenous groups are entitled to vote, and the 
percentage of indigenous people who exercised this right has grown 
significantly in recent years; however, members of indigenous groups 
are underrepresented in government and politics. The inhabitants of 
some indigenous communities report being threatened and prohibited from 
fully exercising their political rights.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several human rights groups operate, including the Committee of 
Churches (an interdenominational group that monitors human rights, 
investigates refugee claims, and provides legal assistance), Tekojoja 
(a group dedicated to the protection of children's rights), and SERPAJ 
(a group that defends conscientious objectors and provides legal 
assistance to those with grievances arising from military service). In 
1999 32 NGO's, civil organizations, and trade unions officially formed 
the Paraguay Human Rights Coordinator (CODEHUPY). The Government did 
not restrict the activities of any human rights group or advocates; 
however, it has a mixed record in cooperating with or responding to 
recommendations from such groups.
    The 1992 Constitution mandates that Congress name a human rights 
ombudsman through whom citizens could press claims against the state; 
however, the Congress has yet to do so. The Director General of Human 
Rights, located in the Ministry of Justice and Labor, chairs the 
National Commission on Human Rights. The Commission sponsors seminars 
to promote human rights awareness. The Director General's office has 
access to the congressional, executive, and judicial authorities. It 
does not have subpoena or prosecutorial power but may forward 
information concerning human rights abuses to the Attorney General for 
action. It also serves as a clearinghouse for information on human 
rights and has trained thousands of educators in human rights law.
    The office of the Attorney General's Special Adviser on Human 
Rights has been extremely active in pursuing justice against human 
rights abusers from the Stroessner regime. Although the position has 
little real authority, the Adviser is a strong spokesman for the human 
rights community and the rights of the disenfranchised and uses his 
position to identify and publicize human rights abuses by the 
Government. During the year, the Special Adviser heard complaints from 
many citizens regarding alleged human rights violations and sponsored 
several conferences on different human rights themes.
    On October 23, Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Esteban Aguirre and 
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights representative Roberto Cuellar 
signed a cooperative agreement between the Government and the San Jose-
based Institute. Under the terms of the agreement, the Inter-American 
Institute is to provide assistance in the fields of human rights 
education, political participation, and access to justice.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Although the Constitution and other laws prohibit discrimination, 
certain groups, such as indigenous people, faced significant 
discrimination in practice.
    Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved 
sexual and domestic abuse, which is both widespread and vastly 
underreported. Spousal abuse is common. Although the new Penal Code 
criminalizes spousal abuse, it stipulates that the abuse must be 
habitual before being recognized as criminal, and then it is punishable 
only by a fine. Thousands of women are treated annually for injuries 
sustained in violent domestic altercations. Between January and 
September, the Secretariat of Women's Affairs registered 426 cases of 
violence against women. According to press reports published between 
January and August, nearly 60 percent of the cases of violence against 
women were rape cases. The authorities were able to detain the alleged 
attacker in less than 10 percent of those cases.
    According to a 1995-96 national poll on reproductive health, 14 
percent of women reported that they were abused physically at some 
point in their lives. Most observers believe that this number 
understates the reality. According to women's rights activists, 
official complaints rarely are filed or when filed soon are withdrawn 
due to spousal reconciliation or family pressure. The Secretariat of 
Women's Affairs chairs a national committee, made up of other 
government agencies and NGO's, which developed a national plan to 
prevent and punish violence against women. Under the plan, an office of 
care and orientation receives reports on violence against women and 
coordinates responses with the National Police, primary health care 
units, the Attorney General's office, and NGO's. However, in practice, 
these services are available only in Asuncion, and women living 
elsewhere in the country rarely benefit from them. The Secretariat also 
conducts training courses for the police, health care workers, 
prosecutors, and others.
    The Women's November 25th Collective, an NGO, operates a reception 
center where female victims of violence can receive legal, 
psychological, and educational assistance. No shelters for battered and 
abused women are available outside the capital of Asuncion.
    In July 1999, an IACHR report stated that in 1998 one case of rape 
was reported to the press every 3 days. During the first 4 months of 
that year, there was one case of rape reported each day. There are no 
specialized police units to handle complaints involving rape.
    Most women imprisoned reportedly were detained for assault, 
including murder, that they committed following domestic violence.
    The law prohibits the sexual exploitation of women, but the 
authorities do not enforce the prohibitions effectively, and 
trafficking in women is a problem. Prostitution by adults is not 
illegal, and exploitation of women, especially teenage prostitutes, 
remains a serious problem. Law enforcement officials periodically stage 
raids on houses of prostitution, and raids on two brothels in June 
confirmed that teenage prostitutes were working in both locations. A 
ring of traffickers sending women and teenage girls to Buenos Aires 
under the guise of working as domestic servants was uncovered during 
the year (see Section 6.f.).
    Recognizing that a majority of women in the workplace face sexual 
harassment, several unions have sponsored an ongoing campaign against 
it. Sex-related job discrimination continues to be common and widely 
tolerated. The Secretariat of Women's Affairs occasionally sponsors 
programs intended to give women free and equal access to employment, 
social security, housing, ownership of land, and business 
opportunities.
    Women have much higher illiteracy rates than men, with an estimated 
16 percent of rural women illiterate compared with about 10 percent of 
rural men. In addition, maternal mortality rates are high, and as many 
as 65 percent of such deaths are related to poor medical care. Several 
groups work to improve conditions for women, including Women for 
Democracy, which is active in civic and electoral education. Other 
groups include SUMANDO, an NGO that promotes educational reform and 
voter participation in elections; and SEFEM, which focuses on women and 
public policy and the participation of women in local development.
    Children.--The Constitution protects certain children's rights and 
stipulates that parents and the state should care for, feed, educate, 
and support children. The population is very young, with 41 percent 
under the age of 15, and 60 percent under the age of 20. Boys and girls 
are entitled to equal treatment in education and health care. However, 
female access to education is lower, particularly in rural areas. The 
educational system does not provide adequately for the educational 
needs of the population. However, in 1998 the educational system was 
changed to make elementary school education compulsory through the 
eighth grade, with plans to extend it through grade nine, although the 
Government lacks the money to implement the changes. Families pay a fee 
to cover each school's administrative expenses and must purchase books, 
uniforms, and other supplies for their children's use.
    Abuse and neglect of children is a problem. Children 14 and older 
are treated as adults for purposes of arrest and sentencing. According 
to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children (some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17 
work, many in unsafe labor conditions (see Section 6.d.). According to 
a study by a local NGO, many of the children who work on the streets 
suffer from malnutrition, lack of access to education, and disease. 
Some employers of the estimated 11,500 young girls working as domestic 
servants or nannies deny them access to education and mistreat them.
    Sexual exploitation of children also is a problem. According to the 
Attorney General's office, there are approximately 200 complaints per 
month regarding the mistreatment and sexual abuse of minors. In the 
city of Encarnacion, the authorities arrested a man for selling 
pornographic images of young girls over the Internet.
    Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The Government has ordered that all military officers responsible 
for recruiting ensure that all conscripts meet the legally minimum 
mandated requirement age of 18 for military service. However, there 
were many reported violations, including allegations of military 
recruiters forcing underage youths to join units and providing them 
with false birth certificates and other documentation to show them to 
be of age. The military took no significant disciplinary action against 
those responsible for underage recruits. Poor families often knowingly 
send underage children to the armed forces for economic reasons.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for equal 
opportunity for persons with disabilities and mandates that the State 
provide them with health care, education, recreation, and professional 
training. It further requires that the State formulate a policy for the 
treatment, rehabilitation, and integration into society of disabled 
persons. However, the Congress never has enacted legislation to 
establish such programs or provide funding for them. Many persons with 
disabilities face significant discrimination in employment; others are 
unable to seek employment because of a lack of accessible public 
transportation. The law does not mandate accessibility for the 
disabled, and the vast majority of the country's buildings, both public 
and private, are inaccessible.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides indigenous people 
with the right to participate in the economic, social, political, and 
cultural life of the country; however, the indigenous population, 
estimated at 75,000 to 100,000, is unassimilated and neglected. Low 
wage levels, long work hours, infrequent payment (or nonpayment) of 
wages, job insecurity, lack of access to social security benefits, and 
racial discrimination are common. Weak organization and lack of 
financial resources limit access by indigenous people to the political 
and economic system. Indigenous groups relied primarily upon 
parliamentary commissions to promote their particular interests. The 
Constitution also protects the property interests of indigenous people, 
but these rights still are not codified fully. The Constitution allows 
Public Ministry officials to represent indigenous people in matters 
involving the protection of life and property.
    Lack of access to sufficient land also hinders the ability of 
indigenous groups to progress economically and maintain their cultural 
identity. This is made worse by insufficient police and judicial 
protection from persons encroaching on their lands.
    The Government's National Indigenous Institute (INDI) has the 
authority to purchase land on behalf of indigenous communities and to 
expropriate private property under certain conditions to establish 
tribal homelands. However, there have been significant allegations of 
wrongdoing within INDI, and in June a former INDI director was 
sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment for embezzlement. Furthermore, many 
indigenous people find it difficult to travel to the capital to solicit 
land titles or process the required documentation for land ownership. 
In August a group of indigenous people who had established a squatters' 
settlement on the edge of a highway were attacked by hooded men 
presumed to be ranch hands from a nearby property, in an attempt to 
dislodge them.
    Significant problems facing the indigenous population also include 
lack of shelter and medical care, economic displacement resulting from 
other groups' development and modernization, and malnutrition. Scarce 
resources and limited government attention resulted in little progress 
in dealing with these problems. However, there were individual small 
successes that benefited indigenous people, including the successful 
pursuit in the courts in February and in July by members of the Enxet 
group of compensation for the forced labor and unlawful firing of some 
of its members (see Section 6.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution allows both private 
and public sector workers (with the exception of the armed forces and 
the police) to form and join unions without government interference. 
The Constitution contains several provisions that protect fundamental 
worker rights, including an antidiscrimination clause, provisions for 
employment tenure, severance pay for unjustified firings, collective 
bargaining, and the right to strike. Approximately 121,000, or 15 
percent, of workers are organized in approximately 1,600 unions.
    In general unions are independent of the Government and political 
parties. One of the country's three labor centrals, the Confederation 
of Paraguayan Workers (CPT), traditionally was aligned closely with the 
ruling Colorado Party, but these ties appear to be loosening.
    All unions must be registered with the Ministry of Justice and 
Labor. The registration process is cumbersome and can take several 
months. Employers who wish to oppose the formation of a union can delay 
union recognition further by filing a writ opposing it. However, 
virtually all unions that request recognition eventually receive it. 
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, bans binding 
arbitration, and prohibits retribution against strikers and leaders 
carrying out routine union business; however, employers often took 
action against strikers and union leaders. Voluntary arbitration 
decisions are enforceable by the courts, but this mechanism still is 
employed rarely. Senior Labor Ministry officials are available to 
mediate disputes.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts has 
noted deficiencies in the application of certain conventions ratified 
by the Government. These include conventions dealing with minimum wage, 
abolition of forced labor, minimum age of employment, freedom of 
association, equal remuneration, and employment policy. The ILO 
specifically criticized regulations requiring a minimum of 300 workers 
to form a union as inconsistent with international norms regarding the 
freedom of association.
    There were numerous strikes by members of all three worker centrals 
and smaller unions. Many of these were related to the firing of union 
officials, management violations of a collective contract, management 
efforts to prevent the free association of workers, or demands for 
benefits such as payment of the minimum wage or contribution to the 
social security system. A general strike called for 2 days in late June 
only lasted 1 day, and was observed rigorously only by bus drivers, 
after several had their buses burned or their windshields smashed for 
initially defying the strike. Some violence also occurred during the 
month-long strike by Sitrande, the national electric utility workers' 
union, including reported acts of sabotage by union members. The 
workers went on strike to protest the privatization of the utility 
company.
    There were unconfirmed allegations of several cases of intimidation 
and violence against union members during the year. In one case during 
a June transportation strike, union members and police clashed 
violently and one union leader was seriously injured.
    Unions are free to form and join federations or confederations and 
during the year were affiliated with and participated in international 
labor bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining, and this provision is respected in 
practice. The number of negotiated collective contracts continued to 
grow, surpassing 100 contracts by the end of the year. However, they 
were still the exception rather than the norm in labor-management 
relations and typically reaffirmed minimum standards established by 
law. When wages are not set in free negotiations between unions and 
employers, they are made a condition of individual offers of 
employment.
    The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, the 
firing and harassment of some union organizers and leaders in the 
private sector continued. Union organizers sometimes are jailed for 
their role in leading demonstrations. Fired union leaders can seek 
redress in the courts, but the labor tribunals have been slow to 
respond to complaints and typically favored business in disputes. The 
courts are not required to order the reinstatement of workers fired for 
union activities. As in previous years, in some cases where judges 
ordered the reinstatement of discharged workers, the employers 
disregarded the court order with impunity. There are a number of cases 
in which trade union leaders, fired as long as 6 years earlier, have 
not yet received a decision from the courts.
    The failure of employers to meet salary payments also frequently 
precipitated labor disputes. Principal problems included bottlenecks in 
the judicial system and the inability or unwillingness of the 
Government to enforce labor laws. There were also complaints that 
management created parallel or ``factory'' unions to compete with 
independently formed unions. There were several cases of workers who 
chose not to protest because of fear of reprisal or anticipation of 
government inaction.
    The union representing workers in Antelco, the state-run telephone 
provider, asserts that a new privatization law violates the conditions 
of a collective agreement between the Government and the bargaining 
unit by reducing the amount paid to workers who would be fired after 
the company is sold. The workers organized a strike in response to the 
privatization law.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced labor, including that performed by children; however, cases of 
abuse of national service obligations occurred (see Section 6.d.). 
There were reports of conscripts forced to work as servants or 
construction workers for military officers in their residences or 
privately owned businesses. There also were allegations of forced 
conscription of underage youths (see Section 5). Apart from the abuse 
of national service obligations, the authorities appear to enforce the 
law effectively; however, trafficking in women and girls also is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    It is a common practice for families who cannot afford to raise a 
child, most often a daughter, to send her to relatives or colleagues, 
where she may be expected to work in exchange for room, board, and 
access to education. Sometimes these girls, who can be as young as 5 
years old, are abused by those charged with providing for them.
    In February and July, courts ordered ranch owners to pay 
compensation to members of the Enxet indigenous group for forced labor 
and unlawful firing of some members (see Section 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Director General for the Protection of Minors in the 
Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor 
laws. Minors between 15 and 18 years of age may be employed only with 
parental authorization and cannot be employed in dangerous or unhealthy 
conditions. Children between 12 and 15 years of age may be employed 
only in family enterprises, apprenticeships, or in agriculture. The 
Labor Code prohibits work by children under 12 years of age, and all 
children are required to attend elementary school through the eighth 
grade.
    In general the Government does not have the resources to enforce 
minimum working age regulations. According to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children 
(some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17 work, many in unsafe 
conditions. Recent studies indicate that 42 percent of these children 
began working by the age of 8, and some 37 percent do not attend 
school. According to a study by a local NGO, some 6,000 children and 
adolescents work in the streets of Asuncion, of whom a third are under 
10 years of age. Thousands of children in urban areas, many of them 
younger than 12 years of age, are engaged in informal employment such 
as selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many of 
the children who work on the streets suffer from malnutrition, lack of 
access to education, and disease. Some employers of the estimated 
11,500 young girls working as domestic servants or nannies deny them 
access to education and mistreat them. Employers sometimes file false 
charges of robbery against those who seek to leave domestic jobs and 
turn them over to the police. In rural areas, it is not unusual for 
children as young as 10 years of age to work beside their parents in 
the field. Local human rights groups do not regard families harvesting 
crops together as an abuse of child labor.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and generally 
it is enforced effectively; however, there were allegations of forced 
conscription of underage youths and trafficking in girls for forced 
prostitution (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The executive, through the 
Ministry of Justice and Labor, has established a private sector minimum 
wage sufficient to maintain a minimally adequate standard of living for 
a worker and family. The minimum salary is adjusted whenever annual 
inflation exceeds 10 percent and was approximately $195 (680,162 
guaranies) per month at year's end. However, the Ministry is unable to 
enforce the minimum wage, and most analysts agree that 50 to 70 percent 
of workers earn less than the decreed minimum. The Labor Code requires 
that domestic workers be paid at least 40 percent of the minimum wage 
and allows them to work up to a 12-hour day.
    The Labor Code allows for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours (42 
hours for night work), with 1 day of rest. The law also provides for an 
annual bonus of 1 month's salary and a minimum of 6 vacation days a 
year. The law requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the 
standard. However, many employers violate these provisions in practice. 
There are no prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime. Workers in 
the transport sector routinely stage strikes to demand that their 
employers comply with the Labor Code's provisions on working hours, 
overtime, and minimum wage payments.
    The Labor Code also stipulates conditions of safety, hygiene, and 
comfort. The Ministry of Justice and Labor and the Ministry of Health 
did not effectively enforce these provisions, due in part to a lack of 
inspectors and other resources.
    Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that 
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued 
employment, but they may not do so until such conditions are recognized 
formally by the Ministries of Justice and Labor and Health. Although 
there are laws intended to protect workers who file complaints about 
such conditions, many employers reportedly took disciplinary action 
against them.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no specific legislation to 
prevent trafficking in persons, and there were sporadic reports of 
trafficking of women and girls for sexual purposes. In August the press 
reported that a trafficking ring had been uncovered that sent women and 
young girls to Buenos Aires, Argentina, under the guise of working as 
domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution. In one 
prominent case, two girls escaped from an Argentine brothel in April 
and returned to their homes. The authorities brought charges against a 
number of Paraguayans under laws criminalizing the forced prostitution 
of a minor, but at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine 
television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes 
working in greater Buenos Aires and discovered a number of undocumented 
Paraguayan women and girls working there as virtual slaves, held as 
prisoners offering their services as prostitutes in exchange for their 
clothing, room, and board.
                               __________

                                  PERU

    Peru is a multiparty republic with a dominant executive branch that 
for most of the year used its control of the legislature and the 
judiciary to the detriment of the democratic process. In May President 
Alberto Fujimori won a third 5-year term in elections that 
international and domestic observers judged to be significantly flawed; 
however, in November the Fujimori administration collapsed, leading to 
a significant opening in the area of political rights. In June the 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a 
high level delegation visited the country to discuss the strengthening 
of democratic institutions. The visit resulted in talks sponsored by 
the OAS, which began in August and included members of civil society, 
the Government, and the political opposition. In August President 
Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance gained a majority in Congress after more 
than a dozen elected legislators changed their affiliation from 
opposition parties to Peru 2000. Charges of corruption against 
presidential advisor and de facto head of the intelligence service 
Vladimiro Montesinos led President Fujimori to announce on September 16 
that he intended to hold new national elections in April 2001, in which 
he would not be a candidate. On November 22, President Fujimori sent 
his resignation to Congress from Japan, where he remained at year's 
end. Congress refused to accept his resignation and instead voted to 
remove him from office for ``moral incapacity.'' The President of 
Congress Valentin Paniagua of the Popular Action Party succeeded to the 
presidency on November 22. He announced that he would uphold 
legislation allowing for new presidential and congressional elections 
in April 2001, and he accelerated the implementation of democratic 
reforms initiated in the OAS-sponsored talks. In November the Congress 
restored three judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, and it resumed 
its work. The Tribunal had ceased to function in 1997, when Congress 
removed three of its judges for opposing President Fujimori's intent to 
seek reelection. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is inefficient, subject 
to corruption, and was for most of the year easily controlled by the 
executive branch. By year's end, the Government had taken steps to 
implement important judicial reform measures.
    The police and military share responsibility for internal security. 
In October Congress passed legislation, based on agreements made in the 
OAS talks, to dismantle the National Intelligence Service (SIN), and 
the Government took action to do so in that same month. The capture or 
death of several remaining terrorist leaders marked continuing progress 
in eliminating the still lethal threat posed by the terrorist group 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). In February the Government eliminated 
the last remaining emergency zones that covered over 5 percent of the 
country's territory and restored constitutional protections, including 
freedom of movement and of assembly, throughout the country where they 
previously had been suspended. Civilian authorities generally maintain 
effective control of the security forces; however, there were 
allegations that some members of the security forces who were loyal to 
Montesinos, were undermining civilian control of the military. In 
November President Paniagua appointed a new Defense Minister who 
retired dozens of officers, many of whom allegedly were tied to 
Montesinos. Members of the security forces committed serious human 
rights abuses.
    The Government has implemented major economic reforms, transforming 
a heavily regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The Government 
continued to privatize state enterprises but did not meet its target of 
selling those remaining by the end of the year. Inflation remained in 
the single digits, and economic growth reached 3.6 percent. Per capita 
gross domestic product is estimated at $2,060. Major exports include 
copper and other minerals, fishmeal, and textiles. The unemployment 
rate is estimated at 9.5 percent; underemployment remains around 45 
percent. More than one-half of the economically active population work 
in the informal sector. The poor constituted approximately 54 percent 
of the population; about 15 percent of the population live in extreme 
poverty.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas, and 
serious problems remain; however, following the change of 
administration in November, the Paniagua administration took steps to 
implement important democratic reforms, including some which improved 
the exercise of civil and political rights, and to address allegations 
of corruption surrounding the former intelligence services and other 
government officials. Members of the security forces committed 
extrajudicial killings and tortured, beat, and otherwise abused 
persons. Impunity remained a problem. Lack of accountability within the 
armed forces, particularly regarding counter-terrorist operations, 
continued to be a problem. Overall prison conditions remained poor and 
were extremely harsh in maximum security facilities. Arbitrary arrest 
and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, lack of due process, and 
lengthy trial delays continued to be problems. Despite extensive 
changes to reduce the executive dominance over the judiciary, at year's 
end problems persisted, including the general inefficiency of the 
system. At year's end, the Government was preparing to return to the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
from which it had withdrawn in 1999. The Government inhibited freedom 
of speech and of the press, and journalists faced harassment and 
intimidation and practiced self-censorship; however, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) noted significant improvements after President 
Fujimori announced the disbanding of the intelligence forces. There 
were some limits on freedom of assembly, although political rallies 
occurred frequently and most were not impeded. The authorities at times 
sought to hinder the operations of human rights monitors. Violence and 
discrimination against women were widespread. Violence against children 
and discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, and racial 
and ethnic minorities remained problems. Labor advocates argue that 
labor laws and practices restrict collective bargaining rights and the 
freedom of association. Child labor remained a problem.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman expanded its operations to 15 offices 
throughout the country. The ad hoc Pardons Commission completed its 
work after having reviewed over 3,000 cases of alleged wrongful 
conviction by military courts, and recommended and obtained pardons in 
481 cases. During the year, the Justice Ministry's Human Rights 
Commission approved an additional 32 pardons recommended previously by 
the ad hoc Commission. After taking office, the Paniagua administration 
reconstituted the ad hoc Commission, which at year's end had 
recommended 33 new pardons and was preparing to review additional cases 
left over from the previous administration. The Terrorism Division of 
the superior court traveled to remote areas outside Lima and dismissed 
300 longstanding arrest warrants on terrorism charges.
    Sendero Luminoso terrorists were responsible for killings, torture, 
and numerous other abuses.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings; however, security forces 
committed several extrajudicial killings.
    On March 1, police from the Northern Special Services Division 
reportedly detained Alejandro Damian Trujillo Llontop in Lima. 
Trujillo's father filed a complaint through the National Police 
inspector's office and then with the prosecutor. Police denied making 
any arrests on March 1. On May 8, officials informed the family that an 
unidentified body of a 25-year-old man had been found on March 2 on the 
beach in Callao, and delivered to a morgue in Ica. Medical tests showed 
that the man had been beaten before dying on or about March 1; he 
subsequently was identified as Damian Trujillo. In April the victim's 
family filed a case against the National Police, including charges of 
crimes against humanity and forced abduction. In August the prosecutors 
charged the 10 officers who arrested Llontop with his death, and in 
September the judge overseeing the case ordered their arrest. The trial 
was underway at year's end.
    On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public 
intoxication. Diaz's wife, who was with him at the time of the arrest, 
arrived later at the police station to pick up her husband; the police 
told her that he was resting. Around 11 p.m., the police informed the 
wife that Diaz had died, and that his corpse was in the local hospital. 
The prosecutor in Tacna opened a murder investigation, and in June the 
provincial attorney filed charges of torture against policemen Victor 
Pachas Mamani and Carlos Laqui (see Section 1.c.). The policemen filed 
a motion to transfer the case to the military courts, but the Supreme 
Court assigned jurisdiction to a civilian court in October. The case 
was pending at year's end. According to reports from Amnesty 
International (AI), the director of a Tacna human rights organization 
representing the interests of the victim and his family received death 
threats (see Section 4). Human rights groups continue to represent the 
Diaz family.
    On November 27, police stopped taxi driver Carlos Lopez Flores in 
Ayacucho and accused him of involvement in narcotics trafficking. 
Eyewitnesses reported that they saw three ununiformed policemen beat 
and shoot Lopez. Lopez died 3 days later. The Public Minister's office 
was investigating the case in December, after a complaint was filed 
against the three police officers for torture and murder. NGO's 
reported that the officers had not been arrested by year's end.
    Although military service is no longer mandatory, mistreatment of 
military recruits continued to be a problem and resulted in four 
reported deaths (see Section 1.c.).
    In June 18-year-old Jose Luis Poma Payano voluntarily joined the 
Air Force and began service in Lima. He returned home in November and 
told his parents that members of the Air Force had abused him 
physically. On November 10, Poma's parents requested that military 
officials investigate. The military responded that they would 
investigate, and that Poma would not be harmed further. However, Poma 
was shot and killed upon his return to the base that day. The Air Force 
indicated that his death was a suicide. Poma's parents requested a full 
investigation, including an exhumation of his body for further 
examination. At year's end, prosecutors were investigating the case.
    In July military officials accused recruit Ronald Enrique Pena 
Garcia of stealing radio equipment and placed him in solitary 
confinement. Pena told his parents that military personnel tortured him 
during his detention, including submerging his head in water and 
burning him with cigarettes. Pena died on August 11 from a bullet 
wound. His father filed a complaint with the Human Rights Ombudsman, 
and the investigation was pending at year's end.
    On September 9, army recruit Lenin Castro Mendoza returned to the 
army base in Cerro de Pasco. To punish him for being intoxicated, an 
officer beat him and kicked him in the throat while he was laying in 
his bunk. Castro was taken to a nearby emergency room, where officials 
pronounced him dead on arrival. Police investigated the incident and 
concluded that the officer inflicted the injuries that lead to Castro's 
death. In September police sent the case to the military court in 
Huancayo.
    In December Mario Fernandez Sanchez died at a hospital in Lima due 
to injuries which were allegedly the result of torture by military 
officials. Prior to this incident of alleged torture, military 
officials reportedly tortured Fernandez both physically and 
emotionally, which drove him to desert his military base. He was 
brought before a military court in Concepcion to stand trial for 
desertion, where officers reportedly beat and tortured him again. His 
family filed a complaint with the Public Ministry and accused the 
military of torture. A prosecutor in Huancavelica had begun an 
investigation at year's end.
    There were no developments in the 1999 case of Carlos Yauri, who 
died under suspicious circumstances 5 months into his military service. 
With the support of a local NGO, the Huaraz province prosecutor 
investigated and requested the military prosecutor expedite an 
investigation into the case.
    No new information was available on several cases of recruits who 
died during their military service in recent years, including the cases 
of Juan Salazar Cayetano and Juan Espinoza Rodriquez.
    At least two prisoners died during unrest in prisons during the 
year. Celso Ponce Torres died in a riot at Yanamayo prison in February. 
A fellow inmate reportedly struck him in the head during the violence. 
One prisoner died in violent riots at Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho 
prison in the same month (see Section 1.c.).
    In February five peasants died after armed confrontations with 
landowners on land they occupied in Villa El Salvador.
    In July six bank security guards died in a fire that erupted during 
confrontations between police and protesters in Lima (see Section 
2.b.).
    In June the press reported that peasants had discovered a mass 
grave no older than 10 years containing the remains of 8 to 12 bodies 
in the area of Colcabambla, Huacavelica. According to NGO's, the grave 
site is located along a trail used frequently by army patrols and 
terrorist columns in the 1980s and early 1990s. An investigation headed 
by the provincial prosecutor was underway at year's end. 
Representatives from the Human Rights Ombudsman's office observed that 
a series of irregularities in handling of evidence had compromised the 
forensic integrity of the investigation.
    The case of Pablo Pascual Espinoza Lome, a jailed inmate killed in 
January 1999 by prison guards, remained pending. The courts had not 
reached a verdict because the Supreme Court had not ruled on a motion 
by prison guard Marcial Pirez, who originally had been acquitted of 
violating the 1998 antitorture law, which requested that the Court 
nullify a lower court's decision to sentence him to 4 years in prison.
    Charges against four prison officials for aggravated abuse of 
authority and crimes against humanity in the November 1999 death of 
Esteban Minan Castro remained pending at year's end. Minan Castro died 
after Tambo de Mora penitentiary guards reportedly used tear gas to 
subdue him and put him into solitary confinement after he had allegedly 
violated prison rules.
    There were no developments in the cases of Tito Mariluz Dolores, 
Ronny Machaca Flores, and Jose Antonio Palacios Garcia, all of whom 
died in police detention in 1999.
    The Chincha criminal court brought charges of torture against 
policemen Edwin Alfredo Saravia Torres, Marco Antonio Carrasco, and 
Julian de la Cruz Huyarote for the June 1999 death of Mario Clemente 
Guillen Mendez, who allegedly hanged himself after being detained by 
police. The case was pending at year's end.
    In the case of Carlos Arrellano Mallqui, who died in police custody 
in 1998 in Ancash, the Supreme Court assigned jurisdiction to a 
military court. The military court did not render a decision by year's 
end.
    There was no progress made in the investigation of the four 
soldiers suspected of robbing and killing Genaro Julca Bula and Alberto 
Aponte in 1998.
    There was no progress in the case of Mariel Barreto, a military 
intelligence (SIE) agent whose dismembered and decapitated body was 
found in 1997. The Government had promised an exhaustive investigation 
into her death in 1998.
    Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 17 persons during the year in 
the course of over 100 acts of violence.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In the case of Walter Munarriz Escoba, who disappeared in March 
1999 after being taken into police custody in Huancavelica, the 
provisional prosecutor brought formal charges against and ordered the 
detention of National Police captain Roberto Gastiaburu Nakada, Ensin 
Claudio Gutierrez Valasquez, and Adolfo Angeles Ramos. The prosecutor 
subsequently charged policemen Gunter Cuaresma Ramos and Percy 
Salvatierra Laura with torture and requested a 15-year sentence. The 
case still was pending at year's end.
    No information was available regarding the status of Ernesto Rafael 
Castillo Paez, who disappeared in 1990. In 1997 the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights ordered the Government to compensate his family 
and to punish the police officers responsible for his death.
    In November the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman released an 
official report on approximately 4,000 persons who have disappeared 
since 1980 in the war against terrorism. The Ombudsman's report noted 
that the Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru (MRTA) rebels abducted a 
majority of victims, who were mainly indigenous peasants. In 1995 
Congress passed a law granting amnesty to members of the security 
forces responsible for abuses committed in the war against terrorism. 
To date few members of the security forces have been held accountable 
for their role in disappearances. A report released in June by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) repeated the IACHR's 
previous calls for the amnesty law to be repealed. By year's end, the 
Government had not acted on this recommendation. In December President 
Paniagua directed the Justice Ministry to create a working group that 
would include members of NGO's, religious leaders, and government 
officials to make recommendations on the establishment of a truth 
commission that would hear evidence on disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman 
or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal 
treatment by the security forces continued to occur, and the Human 
Rights Ombudsman and NGO's contend that it continued to be widespread. 
Torture most often takes place during the period immediately following 
arrest. The incidence of torture is high during police detention in 
part because families are prohibited from visiting suspects while they 
are held incommunicado, and attorneys have only limited access to them 
(see Section 1.d.).
    Such abuse is particularly common in police cells operated by the 
National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) and in detention 
facilities on military bases, where terrorism and treason suspects 
normally are held. Psychological torture and abuse, which result from 
the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more 
characteristic of the prisons.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's reported 35 cases of 
aggravated torture by security forces. The majority of cases involved 
incidents of police brutality and beatings during detention.
    On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public 
intoxication and allegedly tortured him before killing him (see Section 
1.a.). A prosecutor filed charges against the arresting officers and 
the case was pending at year's end.
    In August three police officers in Chinga, Ica, detained Luis 
Enrique Rojas Vasques on suspicion of his involvement in a robbery. 
They handcuffed, beat, and threatened him with torture if he did not 
confess to the robbery. They also threatened him with death if he filed 
a complaint against them. The police also allegedly discovered drugs on 
the victim, but NGO lawyers claim that the drugs were planted. Rojas 
filed a complaint against the three officers for torture and abuse of 
authority. In October the local prosecutor dropped the charges of 
torture. The charges of abuse of authority still were pending at year's 
end.
    In December AI released a report reviewing the facts and status of 
21 cases of alleged torture in the past 2 years. Supported by a large 
number of NGO's, AI called on the Government to stop impunity in cases 
of torture; to try all such cases in civilian, rather than military, 
courts; and to apply the 1998 legislation against torture to all 
security force members implicated in cases of torture. AI called for 
more aggressive prosecution of torture cases, noting that since the 
1998 legislation passed, only two perpetrators have been sentenced 
using the instruments provided in that law. Twenty persons have been 
charged under this law, including several cases of police brutality. 
However, after initial investigations in four cases, prosecutors either 
decided not to charge the alleged perpetrators with torture or dropped 
all pending charges. In several other cases, prosecutors filed charges 
on lesser offenses and sought milder sentences than required under the 
antitorture law. In a number of cases in the AI study, appeals or other 
legal action still were pending. A few of the cases were under review 
by the Supreme Court, which would rule on military or civilian 
jurisdiction. In three cases the accused perpetrators had been arrested 
and were awaiting trial.
    In April military officials allegedly arrested Amador Carmen 
Canchaparan on charges of working with the armed opposition and took 
him to a military base in Huanuco department. There members of the army 
reportedly tortured him by submerging his head in water, beating him, 
and applying electrical shocks in order to force him to confess. The 
officials then threatened Canchaparan with death if he brought charges 
against them. On May 2, authorities charged officials at Yanag military 
base with torture and abuse of authority. The prosecutor opened a 
preliminary investigation into the alleged abuses. The victim remained 
in custody at year's end, and was being investigated for committing or 
conspiring to commit terrorist acts.
    On May 25, journalist Fabian Salazar alleged that SIN officers 
broke into his office the previous evening, bound him, confiscated 
video tapes of government officials that implicated them in corruption, 
and sawed his arm to the bone. The Government appointed an ad hoc 
prosecutor to investigate Salazar's claims. Salazar fled the country in 
June before he was able to provide his testimony, and the investigation 
was suspended. Salazar subsequently petitioned the IACHR to 
investigate. The Government offered to investigate the case again, but 
Salazar refused, claiming that the Government was biased. While there 
were a number of inconsistencies in Salazar's account, and even critics 
of the Government and journalists suspect that he may have exaggerated 
his claims, a full investigation never was conducted.
    There continued to be a public perception that the armed forces 
operate with impunity in the war against terrorism; however, President 
Paniagua made changes in the military command that human rights 
activists noted as a sign of increased civilian control over the 
military. Prior to these changes, the Fujimori administration had 
asserted greater control over the military leadership in order to 
reduce the military's loyalty to former de facto SIN director Vladimiro 
Montesinos. The new attorney general began conducting investigations 
into corruption by former military officers.
    Human Rights groups criticized the manner in which police 
controlled protests on July 28, noting that they purposely fired tear 
gas into crowds at close range, seriously injuring some protesters who 
were hit by the cartridges. There were also reports that police used 
undue force in arresting protesters and that they beat protesters while 
in detention (see Section 2.b.).
    In the case of Huber Mendez Barzola, whom police detained in March 
1999 on suspicion of terrorism and allegedly stripped naked, beat, and 
sodomized with a metal chain weapon in police custody, the Supreme 
Court upheld the sentence of policemen Oscar Italo Flores Montanez, 
Carlos Palacios Soto, and William Saenz. In November 1999, a court had 
found Palacios Soto and Flores Montanez guilty of torture, sentenced 
them each to 6 years in prison, and fined them about $650 (2,000 
soles). The court reduced Saenz's sentence to 3 years in jail and a 
fine of about $150 (500 soles).
    In the 1998 case of Pedro Tinta Vera, whom police arrested in Lima 
on charges of aggravated terrorism, allegedly tortured, and to whom 
they neglected to provide medical treatment, prosecutors filed charges 
in October 1998 against police officers Domingo Arnaldo Gil, Guillermo 
Osorio, and Ricardo Loli for the crime of torture, and a judge ordered 
their arrest. In June a superior court judge suspended the arrest 
warrant against the officers but issued an order to appear at the 
Court. By year's end, the trial had not begun.
    In the case of Antero Espinoza Alzamora, whom police detained and 
allegedly beat in April 1999, the prosecutor in Piura had opened an 
investigation but did not file charges. In the 1999 case of Catalino 
Daga Ruiz and Bernardo Daga Ruiz, whom police arrested on suspicion of 
robbery, then allegedly beat, took to a cemetery, and buried up to 
their necks, the victims filed torture and illegal entry charges, and 
the prosecutor began an investigation.
    There were no updated reports on investigations and judicial 
proceedings on charges of torture or abuse of authority against members 
of the National Police in several cases brought to the public's 
attention in 1999: Jesus Natividad Roman Portocarrero, arrested in 
Piura in March; Mario Jimenez Roque, arrested in Pasco in April; Julio 
Armando Uribe, arrested in Moquergua in July; Moises Paco Mayhua, 
arrested in Puno in August; and Victor Valle Cabello, detained in Pasco 
in September.
    In 1999 a special prosecutor charged several naval officers under 
the antitorture law for allegedly torturing Raul Teobaldo in 1998. 
Personnel from the Aguaytia Naval Base detained and allegedly tortured 
Andahua by beating him, applying electric shocks, and sodomizing him, 
in order to force him to sign a confession indicating that he was a 
terrorist. However, the court issued an arrest warrant in 1999 against 
Julio Spencer Guido Davalos, on a much lesser charge of committing 
bodily harm. In January the Supreme Court ruled that the civilian 
courts had jurisdiction over the case. In September the prosecutor 
concluded that Andahua was the victim of torture and filed charges of 
torture against the implicated military officers. The trial had not 
begun as of year's end.
    No progress was made in the case of the 1998 beating and torture of 
Pablo Waldir by policeman Elmer Perez Arna.
    In October 1999, an Ayacucho court acquitted a policeman in the 
1998 case of torture that led to the death of Lucas Huaman Cruz. In 
November 1999, the Supreme Court prosecutor filed a motion to nullify 
the Ayacucho court's decision. The Supreme Court had decided to hear 
arguments on the case, but still had not taken action on the case by 
year's end.
    In the 1997 case of Leonor La Rosa, a military intelligence (SIE) 
officer who was beaten and tortured by four of her colleagues (and who 
now resides in Sweden), the Supreme Council of Military Justice awarded 
La Rosa approximately $1,500 (5,250 soles) as an indemnity in 1999. La 
Rosa's attorney considered the amount seriously inadequate, since she 
is a paraplegic as a result of the torture. The IACHR continued to 
facilitate a settlement between La Rosa and the Government.
    In addition to beatings, common methods of torture and other 
inhuman or degrading treatment included electric shock, water torture, 
asphyxiation, and the hanging of victims by a rope attached to hands 
tied behind the back, and, in the case of female detainees, rape. 
Common forms of psychological torture included sleep deprivation and 
death threats against both detainees and their families. Interrogators 
frequently blindfolded their victims during torture to prevent them 
from identifying their abusers. In some cases, the Government took 
action to investigate and prosecute security force personnel charged 
with torture, but impunity persisted. Crowded dockets and disputes over 
civilian or military jurisdiction contributed to long delays in legal 
proceedings in cases where officers were charged under the 1998 
antitorture law. At year's end, the cases of several officers whom the 
authorities had charged under the legislation were still pending a 
verdict.
    As in previous years, NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman received 
complaints that the military beat or otherwise mistreated some members 
of the military service. Mistreatment of military recruits continued to 
be a problem and resulted in several deaths (see Section 1.a.). The 
authorities failed to resolve a number of cases of torture and 
mistreatment from previous years, including the cases of Jaime Palacios 
Sanche and Elvis Lopez Tuya.
    On February 12, the army dropped tear gas from helicopters and used 
the force of gusts from helicopters to disperse squatters who had 
settled in Villa El Salvador.
    There continued to be credible reports that Sendero Luminoso was 
also responsible for acts of torture, including cases that resulted in 
death (see Section 1.a.).
    Prison conditions are poor and extremely harsh in maximumsecurity 
facilities, especially those operating at high altitudes. Low budgets, 
severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and poor nutrition and health 
care are serious problems within the prison system. Prison guards and 
fellow inmates routinely victimized prisoners. Corruption is a serious 
problem among poorly paid prison guards, many of whom participate in 
sexual abuse, blackmail, extortion, narcotics and weapons sales, and 
the acceptance of bribes in exchange for favors that ranged from 
providing a mattress to arranging an escape. Since prison authorities 
do not supply adequate bedding and budget only about $0.75 (2.5 soles) 
per prisoner per day for food, the families of prisoners typically must 
provide for these basic needs. In high-security prisons, female inmates 
are allowed to see their children once a week. In prisons that house 
only common criminals, such as Lima's Chorrillos women's prison, 
children 3 years of age and younger live with their jailed mothers.
    Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure hamper efforts to 
improve the living conditions of prison inmates. There are 28 prisons 
in the country that held approximately 27,305 prisoners during the 
year. At Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho men's prison, the country's 
largest, more than 6,000 prisoners live in a facility built to 
accommodate 1,500 persons. Inmates have only intermittent access to 
running water; bathing facilities are inadequate; kitchen facilities 
are unhygienic; and prisoners sleep in hallways and common areas due to 
lack of cell space. Illegal drugs are abundant in many prisons, and 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are reportedly at near-epidemic levels. 
Detainees held temporarily while awaiting arraignment in Lima are not 
allowed outside for fresh air and have restricted access to bathrooms. 
At year's end, the Government was preparing to implement new 
regulations regarding prisoners' access to visitors and prisoners time 
outside of cell.
    In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published a report on prison 
conditions and administration, which highlighted many serious 
shortcomings, including a shortage of trained medical personnel, 
unreliable legal representation for prisoners, and insufficient numbers 
of social workers. The Ombudsman and the IACHR have reported that the 
Government fails to supply enough lawyers, medical staff, or 
psychologists to service the prison system, resulting in serious 
problems for treatment and adequate legal counsel. The Ombudsman noted 
that the operating philosophy in the prison system is one of punishment 
rather than rehabilitation. Roughly half of all prisoners performed 
some form of voluntary work, and only 28 percent participate in some 
kind of educational activity.
    According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in 
Tarata, Tacna, seriously violates international norms and standards, 
particularly with respect to its isolation and high altitude. Located 
at an altitude of about 14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing 
temperatures and oxygen-thin air have unavoidably detrimental effects 
on prisoner health. The prison can be reached only after an all-night 
bus ride from the nearest population center, limiting inmates' contact 
with family. Hospital care is 8 hours away by overland transportation. 
Face-to-face consultations by inmates with their attorneys are rare. To 
relieve some of the isolation, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), and to a lesser extent the Government, fund a monthly 
visit by families to inmates. In 1998 the International Federation of 
Human Rights, as well as visiting members of the IACHR and the 
Ombudsman, called on the Government to shut the prison down.
    There were a number of protests and hunger strikes in various 
prisons, including the high security prisons at the Callao Naval 
Station and Yanamayo. In February prison inmates rioted and took over 
Yanamayo prison for roughly a week before authorities reestablished 
control. Conflicts between prisoners resulted in one death and several 
injuries. A wave of prison protests followed all over the country, 
including in Lima's Lurigancho prison, where security forces intervened 
to reestablish control. One prisoner died in the violence at 
Lurigancho, and over 40 prisoners were injured either by fellow inmates 
or by the security forces who acted to restore order. The Human Rights 
Ombudsman asked prison authorities to allow his staff to visit the 
prison following the riots, but was denied such access until after the 
riots ended. Some prison protests in Lima continued in September, 
October, and November, resulting in minor injuries but no reported 
deaths. Imprisoned Sendero Luminoso leaders began a hunger strike in 
December.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors, including the ICRC. For most of the year, prison authorities 
did not grant representatives of the Human Rights Ombudsman access to 
the military prisons; however, that practice began to change under the 
Paniagua administration. Members of the Ombudsman's office were allowed 
to visit the naval facility in Callao in December (see Section 4). 
During the year, the ICRC performed 115 visits to prisons, detention 
facilities, and juvenile detention facilities, visiting a total of 
3,061 prisoners. The ICRC also visited seven prisoners in custody at 
the maximum security naval base facility in Callao every 2 months.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The Constitution, Criminal Code, and 
antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention process. The 
Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless 
the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However, the Organic 
Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a person for 
any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must arraign 
arrested persons within 24 hours, they often violate this requirement. 
In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, arraignment must 
take place within 30 days. Military authorities must turn over persons 
they detain to the police within 24 hours; in remote areas of the 
country this must be accomplished as soon as practicable. However, the 
authorities often disregard this requirement. In December Congress 
passed legislation allowing the authorities to detain suspects in 
investigations of corruption for up to 15 days without arraignment. The 
law also permits authorities to prohibit suspects under investigation 
of corruption from traveling.
    In February the President suspended all remaining emergency zones 
and restored the constitutional protections in those areas. Previously, 
the Government suspended constitutional protections against arbitrary 
arrest and detention in emergency zones, and security forces did not 
need an arrest warrant in order to detain a suspect.
    Police may detain terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of 
15 days, and hold them incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason 
suspects, who are handed over automatically to military jurisdiction, 
may be held incommunicado for an additional 30 days. When suspects are 
held incommunicado, the authorities prohibit families from visiting 
suspects, and attorneys have access to them only during the preparation 
and giving of sworn statements to the prosecutor.
    By year's end, the special terrorism division of the superior court 
dismissed 300 arrest warrants of the estimated 5,228 persons still 
subject to detention orders. These cases involved many who were forced 
against their will to participate in terrorist activities during the 
internal conflict, or who were accused falsely of links with terrorist 
groups. In 1998 the Human Rights Ombudsman called on the Government to 
rescind all outstanding detention orders that were more than 5 years 
old, and to cancel all orders that did not comply with legal 
specifications.
    By year's end, the Government had approved 65 pardons recommended 
by the ad hoc Pardons Commission and the Justice Ministry's Council on 
Human Rights, which evaluated and recommended pardons for persons 
convicted of terrorism, bringing the grand total to 546 pardons (see 
Section 1.e.).
    Detainees have the right to a prompt judicial determination of the 
legality of their detention and adjudication of habeas corpus 
petitions; however, according to human rights attorneys, judges 
continued to deny most requests for such hearings. In Lima and Callao, 
detainee petitions for habeas corpus are restricted severely, because 
under a 1998 executive branch decree issued as part of the war on 
crime, only 2 judges are able to hear such petitioners, instead of the 
40 to 50 judges in previous years, thereby significantly delaying 
justice. In December the Paniagua administration restored the number of 
judges able to hear habeas corpus petitions to its original level as 
part of the restructuring of the court system. Judges rarely allow the 
unconditional release of suspected terrorists, even if there is 
insufficient evidence to bring a case against them, despite 1993 
amendments to antiterrorism laws that gave lower court and superior 
court judges the power to do so. As a result, persons charged with 
terrorism sometimes must wait until their cases have been reviewed and 
dismissed by the Supreme Court before they are freed. This process can 
last more than a year.
    In December figures from the National Penitentiary Institute (INPE) 
showed that approximately 46 percent of a total prison population of 
27,305 had been sentenced. Over 50 percent of the prison population 
remained in Lima; of these prisoners, 74 percent remained unsentenced. 
The June IACHR report and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights report in 
July both expressed concern about the large number of unsentenced 
prisoners. The problem of prisoners who have served their terms and 
still have not been released continued. In December President Paniagua 
committed the Ministry of Justice to assess procedures for reviewing 
cases with pending sentences. By year's end, the Justice Ministry had 
recommended better ways to track the status of prisoners in the penal 
system.
    In 1998 the Catholic Bishops' Social Action Commission called for 
implementation of a system that would allow first-time detainees to 
post bail. According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and 
trial in civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averages between 26 and 
36 months. Those tried by military courts on treason charges generally 
do not have to wait more than 40 days for their trial; however, since 
trial procedures in military courts are largely devoid of due process 
protections, the speed with which trials are concluded offers little 
benefit to the defendants involved. Once trials have concluded, 
prisoners have to wait long periods before receiving their sentences.
    According to two human rights organizations, police routinely 
detain persons of African descent on suspicion of having committed 
crimes, for no other reason than the color of their skin, and rarely 
act on complaints of crimes against blacks (see Section 5).
    The Constitution does not permit forced exile, and the Government 
respects this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is 
inefficient, subject to corruption, and easily controlled by the 
executive branch. As a result, public confidence in the judiciary 
remains low. In November the Government abolished an executive 
commission of the judicial branch and an executive commission of the 
Public Ministry. The duty of these commissions was to reform the 
judiciary; however, its members regularly ruled in favor of the 
executive branch under the Fujimori administration, compromising the 
independence of the judicial system and furthering the executive's 
control of it.
    Previous attempts to reform the judiciary did little to restore its 
independence from the executive, and the lack of a fully functioning 
Constitutional Tribunal overshadowed procedural improvements. In 
November Congress restored to the Constitutional Tribunal three judges 
whom Congress removed in 1997 after they had opposed the application of 
a law allowing President Fujimori to seek a third term. This had 
paralyzed the court's ability to rule on any constitutional issues for 
lack of a quorum. Other serious problems affecting the judiciary 
included the curtailment of the authority of the National Council of 
Magistrates (CNM) to investigate, discipline, and remove judges, the 
continuing large number of provisional judges in the court system, and 
the transfer of jurisdiction of sensitive cases to courts more inclined 
to rule in the Government's favor.
    Throughout most of the year, roughly 80 percent of the country's 
approximately 1,700 civilian judges were provisional appointments, 
meaning that they had received temporary appointments that did not 
correspond to their rank, including 21 of the 33 judges on the Supreme 
Court. In some cases, the judges were assigned independently and 
without having gone through the proper channels for training. Critics 
charged that since these judges lacked tenure, they were more 
susceptible to outside pressures.
    Working with opposition and civil society representatives in the 
OAS democratization dialog (see Section 3), the Government began taking 
steps designed to restore the judiciary's independence from the 
executive. In October Congress passed legislation that eliminated 
eligibility of provisional judges to hold administrative positions, 
such as posts on the National Elections Board (JNE) or the CNM. In 
November the Paniagua Administration began a comprehensive review of 
the court system, including the assignment of judges and prosecutors. 
By year's end, the Government had reassigned hundreds of provisional 
judges and prosecutors to positions more appropriate to their actual 
rank. Several provisional judges and prosecutors resigned or were 
removed from their positions permanently and were not reassigned.
    The Government's reliance on untenured, provisional and temporary 
judges was demonstrated when the executive commission of the judicial 
branch created two specialized chambers of the Supreme Court in 1998. 
These chambers, staffed by provisional and temporary judges, assumed 
control over tax, customs, and narcotics crimes previously under the 
jurisdiction of the tenured judges of the Lima superior court. This 
practice enabled the executive branch to supervise closely such cases 
as that of Baruch Ivcher, his family, and associates (see Sections 2.a. 
and 2.d.). In December the Supreme Court eliminated these two 
specialized courts. In the same month, evidence emerged that showed how 
former intelligence advisor Montesinos improperly influenced cases 
through provisional judges on the Supreme Court and through the 
Attorney General, who was also a provisional appointee. The majority of 
implicated officials have either resigned or been suspended, and 
several investigations into corrupt judicial practices were underway at 
year's end.
    There is a three-tier court structure that consists of lower and 
superior courts and a Supreme Court of 33 judges. In November the 
Constitutional Tribunal resumed its mandate to rule on the 
constitutionality of congressional legislation and government actions; 
the National Judiciary Council tests, nominates, confirms, evaluates, 
and disciplines judges and prosecutors; and the Judicial Academy trains 
judges and prosecutors.
    The justice system generally is based on the Napoleonic Code. In 
civilian courts criminal cases move through three distinct phases. 
First, in a lower court a prosecutor investigates cases and submits an 
opinion to the examining judge, who determines whether there is 
sufficient evidence to issue an indictment. If there is, the judge 
conducts all necessary investigations and prepares and delivers a case 
report to the superior court prosecutor. Second, the superior court 
prosecutor reviews the lower court decision to determine if formal 
charges should be brought and renders an advisory opinion to another 
superior court, where a three-judge panel holds an oral trial. All 
criminal case convictions in civilian courts must proceed to a third 
phase, where the Supreme Court hears appeals and confirms or rejects 
the previous sentences. All defendants have the right to be present at 
their trial. Defendants also have the right to counsel; however, the 
public defender system often fails to provide indigent defendants with 
qualified attorneys.
    Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts have 
the power to sentence and are required to pass judgment within 10 days 
of a trial's opening. Defendants may then appeal their sentences to the 
Superior Military Council, which has 10 days to make its decision. A 
final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice, 
which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the Superior Military 
Council and Supreme Council levels, a significant number of judges are 
active-duty line officers with little or no professional legal 
training.
    In December 1999, Congress abolished the classification of acts of 
extreme violence such as criminal gang activity, homicide, kidnaping, 
and the use of explosives as aggravated terrorism. Under new law, such 
cases are designated as ``special terrorism'' and jurisdiction over 
such crimes falls under the civilian courts. In October Congress 
disbanded the SIN, including the National Intelligence Directorate for 
Social Peace and Safety, which had investigated such crimes.
    While simple terrorism cases for civilians are tried in civilian 
courts, cases of treason, which is defined as being a terrorist leader 
or participating in a terrorist group's attack or activities, for 
civilians are tried only before military courts. Human rights groups 
and legal experts charge that the vaguely worded definitions of certain 
crimes in the antiterrorism statutes often lead military judges to 
issue sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed. Moreover, 
defendants in treason cases who are found not guilty by a military 
court may be remanded to a civilian court for a second trial on 
terrorism charges based on the same facts.
    Human rights groups and legal experts strongly criticize the power 
of the military courts to try civilians in cases of treason or 
aggravated terrorism and the powerlessness of the civilian judicial 
system to review military court decisions. In 1997 Gustavo Adolfo Cesti 
Hurtado, an insurance broker who had retired from military service 13 
years earlier, was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to 
prison by the military justice system in a complicated case involving, 
in part, alleged insurance fraud in a military purchase of helicopters. 
When a civilian court approved a habeas corpus petition and ordered the 
military court to release Cesti, the military court not only refused to 
do so, but also charged the civilian judges with usurpation of power 
and sought to have them reassigned. The case was brought before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which rejected a government 
motion to dismiss it. The Court ruled in September 1999 that the 
Government had violated the American Convention on Human Rights, and 
ordered that the habeas corpus petition be honored and that the 
reparations stage be initiated in order to compensate the victim. In 
November 1999, the authorities released Cesti from military prison; 
however, Cesti's legal status remained unresolved at year's end, 
pending a request from the Government to the Inter-American Court for 
further clarification of its ruling.
    In August the case of Lori Berenson, who was tried for terrorism by 
a military tribunal without sufficient guarantees of due process, was 
transferred to the civilian courts pursuant to a Military Supreme Court 
review based on new evidence. At year's end, a civilian prosecutor was 
investigating to determine if charges should be brought.
    Proceedings in these military courts--and those for terrorism in 
civilian courts--do not meet internationally accepted standards of 
openness, fairness, and due process. Military courts hold treason 
trials in secret. Such secrecy is not required legally, but in some 
cases the courts deem that circumstances require it. Defense attorneys 
in treason trials are not permitted adequate access to the files 
containing the State's evidence against their clients, nor are they 
allowed to question police or military witnesses either before or 
during the trial. Some military judges have sentenced defendants 
without even having notified their lawyers that the trials had begun. 
Since the creation of the special military courts in 1992, 747 
civilians have been sentenced for treason or aggravated terrorism, and 
by year's end 180 civilians still had cases pending. In December the 
Minister of Justice created a commission charged with reviewing the 
laws governing the military justice system.
    The Council of Magistrates (CNM), established by the 1993 
Constitution, regained many of its original functions in December. A 
March 1998 law had transferred the CNM's power to investigate and 
dismiss Supreme Court judges and prosecutors to the executive 
commissions of the judicial branch and the Public Ministry, 
respectively, both of which were controlled by strong allies of 
President Fujimori. Critics pointed to this action as a further example 
of executive branch control of the judiciary. A September 1998 law 
partially restored the CNM's powers, while leaving the Public Ministry 
in charge of determining whom the CNM could investigate.
    Responding to OAS dialog recommendations, in November the 
Government and opposition agreed to establish a transitory judicial 
council, with all the legal powers of the CNM, in order to restore full 
power to the CNM, including sanctioning and ratification of judges and 
magistrates. The council is expected to work for 90 days reviewing laws 
and regulations put in place by the executive commission since 1998. 
Three judges and three jurists, appointed by consensus within the OAS 
dialog, compose the council. Since it began operating on December 6, 
the council has dismissed judges, reinstated others judged to have been 
unfairly discharged, and returned to lower courts judges who were 
serving provisionally in higher courts.
    The first class of judges that the CNM selected was scheduled to 
graduate in the fall; however, their nominations to judgeships were 
delayed by the restructuring that resulted from the OAS talks. The 
Academy continued its in-service training program for judges and 
magistrates, which consists of a few hours of classes each week during 
the first year, and practical training during the second. The Academy's 
training program, originally scheduled to last 6 months but later 
extended to 2 years, was strongly criticized as further prolonging 
reliance on provisional and temporary officials, who are more 
susceptible to manipulation by the executive.
    In June 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled 
against the Government in the case of four Chileans convicted of 
treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The 
Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process 
rights provided by the American Convention on Human Rights and ruled 
that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction. It also ruled that 
military authorities held the suspects too long in pretrial detention; 
and that defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and 
did not have sufficient time to review the case. The Court directed the 
Government to provide the four with new, civilian trials.
    Subsequently, the Supreme Court delegated to the Supreme Military 
Council the final decision regarding enforcement of the Court's 
decision. The Council ruled that it could not grant the Chileans new 
civilian trials because laws passed after signing the Convention 
required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism.
    However, the Government refused to accept the Inter-American 
Court's jurisdiction in cases involving terrorism, including the case 
of the Chileans, because laws passed after signing the Convention 
establishing the Court required military trials in cases of treason and 
aggravated terrorism. The Government's decision to withdraw from the 
Court's jurisdiction in these cases effectively restricted citizens' 
constitutional rights to seek redress in the hemisphere's preeminent 
international tribunal. The Court continued to process pending cases 
and stated that the Government could not withdraw immediately from the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. In August the Government agreed to 
discuss the full integration of the country into the Inter-American 
human rights system, and the issue was discussed as a priority in the 
OAS-sponsored dialog. At year's end, the Government was preparing to 
return to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
    In the civilian jurisdiction, a specialized terrorism division of 
the superior court tries cases. The division is based in Lima, but its 
judges travel to the provinces as needed. During the year, judges from 
this court traveled around the country to hear several hundred cases of 
persons with old warrants outstanding for terrorism charges. Of these, 
judges found 300 persons innocent and ordered the suspension of their 
warrants. Human rights NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman noted that 
this addresses the concerns of those who considered themselves 
innocent, but who feared coming forward for an abbreviated and unfair 
trial. However, approximately 5,000 warrants remain in effect (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The ad hoc Pardons Commission, which consisted of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman as chairman, the Minister of Justice, and President 
Fujimori's representative Father Hubert Lanssiers, ended its work on 
December 31, 1999. The Commission's mandate was to consider 
applications of those who believed themselves to be accused unjustly of 
terrorism. By the end of 1999, 3,056 of a total of 3,878 persons 
accused of these crimes had applied for clemency, and 481 had received 
the Commission's recommendation for pardon. A December 1999 law 
assigned the Commission's functions to the Justice Ministry's National 
Human Rights Council. Between January and November, the Council 
recommended (and President Fujimori granted) 32 pardons. After the 
Paniagua Government took office in November, the Government established 
a new ad hoc Pardons Commission that had by year's end recommended 33 
additional pardons that were granted, bringing the total to 546. At 
year's end, the new Commission continued to review petitions not 
previously recommended. NGO's advocated that the new commission expand 
its review to include all convictions and sentences rendered by 
military courts, but by year's end, the Government had not made a 
decision on the matter.
    There was no congressional action on the Human Rights Ombudsman's 
1999 recommendation for legislation for monetary compensation of 
innocent persons released through the Pardon Commission's program. The 
matter was added to the agenda of the OAS talks in October, but 
Congress had not taken any action by year's end.
    The Extrajudicial Conciliation Law, which Congress passed in 1998, 
was to have made conciliation a mandatory first step in most civil 
cases by January; however, due to administrative and other delays, 
partial implementation of the law was not scheduled to begin until 
January 2001 in Trujillo, and is scheduled to begin in Lima and Calloa 
in March 2001, expanding progressively to other cities during the year.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and 
MRTA members charged with terrorism are not considered to be political 
prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires security forces to have a 
written judicial warrant to enter a private dwelling; however, NGO's 
indicate that this requirement is not always observed in practice. In 
February the Government eliminated emergency zones that covered 
approximately 5 percent of the country. Prior to that constitutional 
protections, including freedom of movement and other due process 
guarantees, had been suspended in those areas.
    In the past, the Human Rights Ombudsman and human rights NGO's 
received complaints regarding the forced conscription of young men, 
including minors, by security forces as part of the constitutionally 
mandated system of compulsory 2-year military service. A law went into 
effect in January that makes military service voluntary and prohibits 
the practice of forced conscription. Registration for military service 
remains obligatory for men aged 18 and older. The President retains the 
authority to decree the reestablishment of mandatory service. The Human 
Rights Ombudsman monitors implementation of the law to ensure that the 
military abides by it, since past efforts to prohibit forced 
conscription did not prevent it.
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to private 
communication, but the media, politicians, some government officials, 
and private individuals continued to report that the Government 
violated this right. The case of former SIE agent Luisa Margarita 
Zanatta Muedas, who fled the country in 1998, after allegedly providing 
information regarding SIE wiretapping operations, remained pending at 
year's end. In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman recommended that the 
Government pardon Zanatta, that the Public Ministry investigate the 
wiretapping, and that Congress broaden the investigation conducted by 
its committee on defense. By year's end the Government had not taken 
action on those recommendations.
    In May the IACHR recommended that the Inter-American Court hear the 
wiretapping case filed by opposition Congresswoman Anel Townsend and 13 
journalists. They charged that the Government had violated their 
constitutional right to privacy and sought civil damages. The Supreme 
Court had dismissed the charges in 1998. The congressional Committee on 
Defense, Intelligence, and Internal Order conducted a summary 
investigation of the charges in 1999. The investigation not only 
exonerated the intelligence services and security forces, but concluded 
that the aggrieved journalists had wiretapped themselves and 
recommended that they be charged with having fabricated and 
disseminated false information that tainted the honor of the military. 
Having exhausted their domestic resources, the journalists took their 
case to the IACHR in November 1999.
    Opposition politicians continued to report credible incidents of 
wiretapping and surveillance. Although high-level government officials 
denied government involvement in any of these incidents, there was 
little effort to investigate the allegations. In 1999 presidential 
candidate Luis Castaneda Lossio accused David Pinedo Torres of being a 
SIN agent and charged that Pinedo was surveilling him. The case against 
Pinedo was dropped during the year, as was the case against Castaneda 
for detaining Pinedo.
    Reports of forced conscription by the MRTA (most of whose surviving 
members are jailed) and the greatly weakened Sendero Luminoso terrorist 
groups diminished significantly. However, Sendero Luminoso continued to 
coerce indigenous people to join its ranks (see Section 5).
    During the year, the Ombudsman's office received isolated 
complaints of abuses committed by family planning personnel. 
Allegations first arose in 1997 that a number of health workers in 
public hospitals and family planning clinics administered by the 
Ministry of Health had induced female patients to opt for sterilization 
by promising them food or another type of good or service, or by not 
providing them with complete information about available alternatives. 
In a 1999 report, the Ombudsman recommended that family planning 
practitioners provide all clients with complete information about 
alternatives available to them, that they pressure no client into using 
any particular contraceptive method, and that if a patient chose 
sterilization, that the patient be afforded a 72-hour waiting period 
during which to consider that option. The Ombudsman also recommended 
that the Ministry integrate men fully into its family planning program, 
thereby disseminating reproductive and contraceptive information more 
equitably across gender boundaries. The Ministry of Health accepted the 
Ombudsman's report and implemented many of his recommendations.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and press; however, in practice the Government 
inhibited the full exercise of these freedoms for most of the year. 
Manipulation of opposition journalists through the judicial system and 
the use of government advertising revenues to influence reporting in 
print and broadcast media were serious problems. Human rights groups 
contend that government harassment of and alleged attacks against 
journalists also were problems. As a result, much of the media, 
especially the financially vulnerable broadcast television networks, 
practiced self-censorship. Many in the press regard the Fujimori 
administration's harassment of the media as a key reason for his 
victories in presidential elections. Following the establishment of the 
OAS dialog in August and the deactivation of the SIN in October, the 
climate of press freedom improved. Television stations began to show 
more balanced political coverage and allowed opposition views to be 
presented. Tabloids that were suspected of being financed by the SIN 
discontinued publication, and the remaining tabloids changed their 
coverage to nonpolitical reporting.
    The press represents a wide spectrum of opinion, ranging from left-
leaning opposition views to those favoring the Government. In the 
greater Lima area alone, there are 20 daily newspapers, 7 television 
stations, 65 radio stations, and 3 news channels on 2 commercial cable 
systems. There are numerous provincial newspapers and radio stations. 
The Government owns one daily newspaper, one television network, and 
two radio stations, none of which has a particularly large audience.
    Several international press groups, including the Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ), the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), 
and Freedom House, as well as the OAS, reported various cases and types 
of press harassment and accused the Government of being responsible for 
some of it. The CPJ named former President Fujimori as one of the 
world's ``Top Ten Enemies of the Press'' for the second year in a row. 
In October the media advocacy group Prensa Libre issued a report in 
which it cited numerous instances of surveillance and harassment of 
journalists, which it attributed to the Government and intelligence 
services. The group also noted limitations on access to airtime for 
opposition candidates, as well as a defamation campaign against the 
political opposition and independent journalists in tabloid newspapers 
allegedly funded by the Government.
    Media outlets can, and do, criticize the Government; however, under 
the Fujimori administration, they risked reprisal through the loss of 
government advertising (often a major source of revenue), libel suits, 
or other judicial action on apparently unrelated issues. The Fujimori 
administration filed lawsuits against owners or managers of many 
antigovernment media outlets whose content appeared to depend as much 
on political as much as legal criteria. Incidents such as the high-
profile 1997 loss by television owner Baruch Ivcher of his station and 
his citizenship (see Section 2.d.), TV Channel 13's co-owner Genaro 
Delgado-Parker's loss of his station in 1999, and the February seizure 
of Radio 1160's transmitters and sound equipment restricted press 
freedom and encouraged journalists and media owners to practice self-
censorship.
    The limitations on press freedom were particularly evident during 
the election campaign season that dominated the first half of the year, 
when broadcast television tilted heavily in favor of the Government and 
against the opposition in its news coverage and public affairs 
programming. On March 8, a month before the first round of voting, the 
OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Santiago Canton, 
noted his concern and that of the IACHR over freedom of expression in 
the electoral process. On June 4, shortly after the final round of 
elections, the IACHR issued a statement describing the violations of 
freedom of expression. It specifically noted government pressure on the 
media to suppress coverage of and sale of airtime to opposition 
candidates, and government financing of pro-government tabloid papers 
that harassed opposition candidates and supporters.
    The Government agreed to address freedom of the press issues as 
part of the OAS democracy talks, and in August the OAS dialog, 
established a working group to resolve former television owner Baruch 
Ivcher's Peruvian nationality, revoked by executive order in 1997, and 
to examine ways to resolve disputed ownership claims over Channel 2 and 
Channel 13. In October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's 
citizenship and did so in December (see Section 2.d.). In early 
December, Ivcher returned to the country and regained control of 
Channel 2. Several days later, Delgado-Parker regained control of 
Channel 13. By year's end both stations were providing independent 
political reporting and analysis.
    Journalists and media outlets also have been intimidated 
physically. According to the National Journalists Association (ANP), 
there were many cases of media harassment by the National Police and 
the military, and by local political and commercial organizations. The 
ANP reported 104 cases of journalist harassment through August, of 
which 61 percent were in the provinces and two-thirds involved 
violence.
    The CPJ reported that in April an unidentified person fired shots 
at journalist Hernan Carrion, who directs a daily news program in 
Chimbote. Carrion requested protection from the provincial authorities, 
but continued to receive threatening phone calls following his 
continued criticism of the Government on his program. At the same time, 
the Government told the owner of the radio station that broadcasts 
Carrion's program to resubmit tax papers or be charged a substantial 
fee. The station suspended Carrion's program, asserting that it was for 
his own protection.
    The Fujimori administration and its supporters used libel laws to 
suppress criticism of political leaders or offices. In August the pro-
government newspaper Expreso and the director of the National Reserve 
Bank (who is the executive chairman of Expreso) filed a libel suit 
against Carlos Hildebrandt, the director of opposition newspaper 
Liberacion and an outspoken critic of the Government, and a journalist 
who wrote an article criticizing the management of Expreso. The 
plaintiffs sought monetary damages amounting to $1 million, a sum that 
appeared designed to bankrupt Liberacion. The case was pending at 
year's end. In another August incident, the Government's intellectual 
property rights administration filed a libel complaint against the 
majority owner of a web site specializing in publishing investigative 
reports critical of the Government on an unrelated matter.
    In August the pro-government weekly news magazine Gente filed a 
libel suit against cable television news channel Canal N; Hugo Guerra, 
a senior editor of El Comercio (Canal N's parent newspaper); and 
opposition journalist Gustavo Gorriti for describing Gente as having 
ties to the intelligence service and the Government. Gente withdrew the 
lawsuit on September 20, 4 days after President Fujimori's September 16 
announcement calling for new elections and the deactivation of the SIN.
    The political opposition, press organizations, and rights groups 
charged that the Government used improper influence over the judiciary 
to intimidate and harass the press. Government manipulation of the 
legal system in these cases is difficult to prove, and in some cases, 
genuine legal disputes may have occasioned the lawsuits against media 
outlets. Opposition or independent media seem to encounter a 
disproportionate number of legal difficulties, including prosecution on 
tax issues, compared to media outlets that are uncritical of or 
favorable to the government in their coverage. Prominent cases included 
a March lawsuit filed by minority shareholders against leading daily 
newspaper El Comercio shortly after the paper exposed a massive 
signature forgery scheme used to register one of President Fujimori's 
electoral parties. In the El Comercio case, an investigation was opened 
despite the fact that the statute of limitations on the alleged crime 
of fraud had expired. The case was closed in July after stockholders 
reached an agreement on the matter.
    In April a judge ordered the seizure of the printing press used to 
print opposition newspapers Liberacion and Punto Final as part of a 
bankruptcy proceeding. In a similar action, a judge ordered the seizure 
of bank accounts and real estate belonging to Editora Correo, a company 
that publishes a chain of independent papers in the provinces and whose 
shareholders also have a financial interest in a leading Lima tabloid 
newspaper Ojo. For several months thereafter, Ojo cut back 
substantially on its previously independent political coverage and 
later stopped publishing editorials.
    Journalists continued to be intimidated by potential criminal 
prosecution when the Government leaves charges against them pending. By 
year's end, prosecutors had not closed their case for falsification of 
official documents against Guillermo Gonzalez, director of the NGO 
Prensa Libre, who broke a 1999 story on government wiretapping of 
opposition political candidates. In May the IACHR issued a 
recommendation that charges against him be dismissed for lack of 
evidence.
    Throughout the electoral process, a number of tabloid newspapers 
made character assaults on opposition candidates in what appeared to be 
a coordinated campaign to tarnish President Fujimori's political 
opponents and critical members of the press. Intelligence agents 
allegedly orchestrated this campaign. The six tabloids that carried 
such attacks had almost identical headlines and text, and similar text 
also appeared on the Internet.
    Suspicious infrastructure problems also seemed to plague opposition 
or independent media outlets during the election campaign and 
immediately thereafter, and some suggested that it was a form of 
harassment against the press. In one incident in February, an 
electrical failure prevented Radio Miraflores, a Lima opposition radio 
station, from reporting on a provincial tour by opposition candidate 
Luis Castaneda Lossio. In May a similar electrical outage prevented 
Canal N from broadcasting a rally for opposition presidential candidate 
Alejandro Toledo. At the height of the campaign period, from March to 
May, the Institute for Press and Society, an organization advocating 
press freedom, suffered systematic attacks on its e-mail system.
    In July the Government limited a cable news channel's helicopter's 
access to the downtown Lima area by banning all civilian aircraft from 
flying below 9000 feet over the city. This occurred only days before a 
large-scale protest against President Fujimori's inauguration ceremony 
was to take place. Critics assert that this prohibited the media from 
monitoring the protests. CPJ noted that in September the Government 
prohibited flights over downtown Lima, which according to the Committee 
to Protect Journalists was a measure promulgated to prevent news 
agencies from providing aerial news coverage of protests after a 
scandal involving former de facto SIN head Vladimiro Montesinos became 
public. The Government stated that the flight restrictions were 
necessary for public security during the inauguration and protests.
    In May Fabian Salazar, a former Channel 2 employee and associate of 
Baruch Ivcher, and a collaborator for opposition newspaper La 
Republica, alleged that agents from the SIN broke into his office and 
tortured him by sawing his wrist to bone (see Section 1.c.). This 
occurred after he had received a videotape that he claimed compromised 
high government officials. A full investigation into the matter never 
was conducted.
    The Government does not censor books or publications, films, plays, 
or limit access to the Internet.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities 
generally respect this right in practice; however, police used force to 
disrupt protests during the year, injuring several protesters. The law 
does not require a permit for a public demonstration; however, 
organizers must inform the political authority (Prefecto) about the 
kind of demonstration and its location. Permission may be denied only 
for reasons of public safety or health. Municipal authorities usually 
granted permission for demonstrations.
    Major demonstrations and political rallies were common throughout 
the year. Most were peaceful; however, in some cases, police and 
demonstrators clashed. In those instances, police usually use water 
cannons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. In February over 
3,000 labor union, student, and opposition political party 
representatives protested unfair election conditions. When several 
protesters carrying sticks and throwing rocks confronted police, police 
used a powerful water cannon and tear gas to disperse the marchers. The 
police briefly detained a number of protesters who were throwing rocks 
and attempting to destroy private property.
    On April 9, election day, nearly 100,000 persons gathered in Lima 
to celebrate the fact that President Fujimori had not won an absolute 
majority in elections. The event continued into the early morning of 
April 10, when protesters, led by Peru Posible leader and presidential 
candidate Alejandro Toledo, marched on the presidential palace. Police 
dispersed them with tear gas. Clashes between protesters and police 
were reported throughout the major cities. Some protesters sustained 
minor injuries.
    During the period between April 9 and May 28, when second round 
presidential elections were held, Toledo led rallies and protests 
around the country. In mid-April a large protest in central Lima 
resulted in significant damage to the National Board of Elections (JNE) 
office building from rocks thrown by protesters, who were believed to 
be members of the Civil Construction Union. Several injuries were 
reported.
    On July 26-28, approximately 100,000 persons gathered in Lima from 
all parts of the country to protest the inauguration of President 
Fujimori. On July 26 and July 27, these demonstrations were peaceful, 
with no confrontations. However, on July 28, the protests became 
violent. Small groups of protesters clashed with police at different 
points of a security perimeter formed to protect politicians and 
visiting dignitaries attending the inauguration. Unidentified 
individuals set fire to the National Bank building and the Justice 
Ministry and caused hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage during a 
day of confrontations that left six bank security guards dead from a 
fire. Police used tear gas and water cannons, and charged several 
persons with arson. The authorities also charged protest organizers for 
damage. Protest organizers alleged that government agents infiltrated 
the protests and set the fires. Police officials alleged that extremist 
groups used the protest as a pretense to provoke violence. Human rights 
groups allege that police prohibited human rights observers from 
entering the area of the violent protests to document the events, and 
that police used excessive force to control demonstrators (see Section 
1.c.). The police maintained that they acted in order to ensure the 
safety of those attending the inauguration.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman continued to promote dialog between 
protest groups and police on basic rules of conduct. Monitors from the 
Ombudsman's office served as official observers to ensure adherence to 
these rules by police and protesters alike. The Ombudsman's office 
reported that these measures reduce significantly tensions and the 
level of arbitrary arrests, while diminishing the risk of damage to 
public and private property. According to the Ombudsman, with some 
exceptions, groups were able to express their opinions publicly, while 
the National Police generally maintained order in a lawful manner.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman worked with groups of protesters to 
inform authorities of their activities and work out rules of conduct 
prior to the protests against President Fujimori's inauguration in 
July. However, during large-scale demonstrations on July 28, the 
authorities and demonstration organizers failed to agree on ways to 
reduce the likelihood of confrontations and violence.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
authorities generally respect this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, the Catholic Church receives preferential treatment from the 
State. Although the Constitution establishes the separation of church 
and state, it also acknowledges the Catholic Church as ``an important 
element in the historical, cultural, and moral development'' of the 
nation. The preferential status accorded to Roman Catholicism in public 
life is apparent in the special treatment and tangible benefits the 
Church receives from the State, including remuneration to certain 
clergy and church personnel, and tax exemptions on clergy salaries and 
real estate holdings. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in primary and 
secondary schools is mandatory. Conversion to other religions is 
permitted, and missionaries are allowed to enter the country and 
proselytize. By law, the military may hire only Catholic clergy as 
chaplains and Catholicism is the only recognized religion of military 
personnel.
    In April 1998, the President issued an executive order that 
established basic Catholic religion courses for all public and private 
primary school students. Religion teachers must be approved by the 
bishop presiding over the local diocese. Most schools devoted 1 hour a 
week to such study. Parents who do not wish their children to 
participate in the prescribed religion classes must submit a written 
request for an exemption to the school principal. Non-Catholics who 
wish their children to receive a religious education in their own 
particular faith are usually free to organize such classes during the 
weekly hour allotted by the school for religious education, but must 
supply their own teacher. The Freedom of Conscience Institute 
(PROLIBCO), an NGO that favors the strict separation of church and 
state and opposes the preferential treatment accorded to the Catholic 
religion, opposes the requirement for Catholic teaching in the school 
curriculum and claims that the alternatives made available to non-
Catholic parents violate the constitutional protection of the privacy 
and confidentiality of persons' convictions and beliefs.
    PROLIBCO and other religious groups legal had challenged the 
mandatory teaching of Roman Catholicism, but in October the Supreme 
Court dismissed their claim. PROLIBCO maintains that the ruling was 
issued in an irregular manner and without prior notice to its lawyers. 
PROLIBCO claims that the financial subsidies and tax benefits that the 
Government provides to the Catholic Church and its clergy are far more 
widespread and lucrative than publicly acknowledged. PROLIBCO also has 
alleged discrimination against non-Catholic groups who must pay import 
duties and a sales tax on Bibles brought into the country. At year's 
end, PROBLICO was preparing to take its case to the IACHR.
    Sendero Luminoso rejects religion and in the past has threatened 
and intimidated religious workers.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of free movement; however, passengers on public transportation and 
drivers in private vehicles may be checked at control points throughout 
the country. Until February the Government suspended the right of free 
movement in emergency zones, which had covered approximately 5 percent 
of the country in 1999, and travelers, including human rights monitors, 
could be prohibited from traveling to those areas. The Government 
eliminated all emergency zones in February.
    There are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel or 
emigration; however, the authorities legally can restrict persons with 
pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges against them from 
leaving the country. Repatriates, both voluntary and involuntary, are 
not treated differently from other citizens.
    The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship; however, 
according to the Nationality Law, naturalized Peruvians can lose their 
citizenship for, among other reasons, committing crimes against the 
State, national defense, and public security, as well as for reasons 
that ``affect the public interest and the national interest.'' Critics 
believe it was the Nationality Law that provided the Government with 
the legal basis for its 1997 invalidation of the citizenship through 
naturalization of Israeli-born television owner Baruch Ivcher. However, 
the Government claimed that its decision was based upon irregularities 
in Ivcher's original naturalization petition 13 years earlier. In 
October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's citizenship and 
subsequently did so (see Section 2.a.).
    Sendero Luminoso occasionally interrupts the free movement of 
persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper Huallaga 
Valley.
    Political violence in the 1980's and early 1990's resulted in the 
internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from their 
original homes, and massive migration. Most families migrated to Lima 
or to one of several other department capitals. This movement created 
problems which, for the most part, remain unresolved despite continued 
efforts by the Government and NGO's to address them.
    According to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human 
Development (PROMUDEH), since 1995 the Program for the Repopulation and 
Development of Emergency Zones (PAR) has supported the return of 
between 450,000 and 600,000 displaced persons. The PAR has assisted 
thousands of these persons to returned to their homes; however, the PAR 
and NGO's agree that the majority of displaced persons have not 
returned permanently to their original communities due to various 
factors, including economic changes and social ties.
    Despite governments and NGO efforts, many displaced persons lack 
basic documentation, such as birth certificates and voter registration 
cards. The Government established a PAR office to provide documentation 
that can be used both to request PAR assistance to return to one's 
community of origin and to apply for a national identity card. In 1999 
the Government conducted a national registration drive to provide 
displaced persons with identity documents, which are required for a 
variety of social and other government services, and to register them 
to vote in the April national elections. According to NGO's and 
election monitors, this program was successful in reaching millions of 
voters across the country.
    Another unresolved problem related to the displaced persons are 
pending arrests warrants against approximately 5,000 such persons, who 
fall into the category of ``requisitoriados''--persons who were forced 
to join terrorist groups and who were accused falsely of voluntarily 
joining such groups and continue to have outstanding detention orders 
against them. Judges from the special Terrorism Court traveled from 
Lima and dismissed 300 such warrants during the year (see Section 
1.d.). The pending legal status of such persons, along with the fact 
that the majority of these individuals speak only Quechua, increases 
their vulnerability and reduces even further their capacity for 
economic and social integration into urban areas.
    Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous people to join its 
ranks during the year, which resulted in further internal displacement. 
There is also a large population of indigenous Ashaninkas who have 
faced not only a terrorist threat, but also the encroachment of oil 
exploration companies on their tribal lands (see Section 5).
    The law includes provision for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in granting 
asylum and refugee status and recognizes the Catholic Migration 
Commission as the official provider of technical assistance to refugees 
and applicants for asylum. The Commission also advises citizens who 
fear persecution at home and seek asylum abroad. The Government 
recognized 24 persons as new refugees during the year. There were 
approximately 756 refugees in the country. Refugees are allowed to live 
and work without restrictions and can apply for naturalization. The 
status of refugees is reviewed annually. The question of first asylum 
did not arise.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government; however, serious problems in the process of elections held 
in April and May, including questions about President Fujimori's 
constitutional eligibility to be a candidate, the registration of 
candidates, allocation of Government resources to influence voters, and 
intimidation of the opposition, led domestic and international 
observers to call attention to the flawed nature of the process and to 
question the validity of election results and the state of democracy in 
the country. In September President Fujimori announced that he would 
exercise his constitutional power to convoke new national elections, to 
be held in April 2001, and in which he would not be a candidate. In 
November Congress removed President Fujimori for ``moral incapacity,'' 
and President of Congress Valentin Paniagua succeeded to the 
presidency. Voting is by secret ballot and mandatory for all citizens 
between the ages of 18 and 70. Members of the armed forces and the 
police, as well as felons, are ineligible to vote. The law bars groups 
that advocate the violent overthrow of the Government from 
participating in the political process.
    The Constitution establishes three bodies to administer elections: 
the National Board of Elections (JNE); the National Office of Electoral 
Processes (ONPE); and the National Registry of Identification and Civil 
Affairs (RENIEC). The JNE sets the legal parameters and rules on 
election-related disputes and challenges. ONPE administers elections 
and the RENIEC issues election identity documents. Many complaints 
about the elections centered around the executive branch's dominance of 
the JNE and ONPE, and their inability to administer elections in an 
unbiased manner. In October and November, Congress passed legislation 
that allowed the Government to appoint new leadership for these 
institutions. By year's end, ONPE had a new director who had replaced 
over 100 of the organization's 180 permanent employees; 4 of 5 
magistrates of the JNE also were replaced. In December Congress 
approved the creation of multiple district representation for electing 
members to Congress, which was designed to provide more specific 
geographic representation.
    The Constitution stipulates that the President can be elected to a 
term of 5 years and may be reelected for one additional successive 
term. On December 27, 1999, President Fujimori announced his candidacy 
for a third term, on the grounds that he had completed only one full 
term under the 1993 Constitution. On December 31, 1999, the JNE 
dismissed 18 objections filed by opposition groups, political parties, 
and other civic groups who argued that a third term would be 
unconstitutional; the JNE claimed that it rendered its decision on 
technical grounds. The Human Rights Ombudsman subsequently stated that 
the JNE's decision did not correspond to constitutional law, but that 
because the Constitution vested the JNE with the final decision on 
electoral matters, citizens had to respect the JNE's decision.
    The undermining of the Constitutional Tribunal by congressional 
action in 1997 (see Section 1.e.) set the stage for Fujimori's ability 
to seek a third term. Constitutional challenges to Fujimori's candidacy 
for a third successive term rested largely on a series of controversial 
actions taken by the executivedominated Congress. In 1996 Congress 
passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation, which declared President 
Fujimori's 1995 victory as his first under the 1993 Constitution. In 
1997 opponents of the law challenged its constitutionality, but the 
Constitutional Tribunal was unable to obtain the six of seven votes 
needed to overturn the law. Congress subsequently voted to remove three 
members of the Tribunal who had announced their nonbinding opinion that 
the law could not apply to Fujimori, leaving the Tribunal effectively 
unable to rule on any constitutional issues for lack of quorum.
    In the April 9 elections, in accordance with the 1997 election law, 
10 registered political parties presented 120-candidate slates for 
Congress, and 9 parties presented presidential candidates; the Peru 
2000 alliance presented President Fujimori as a candidate. Local NGO's, 
the Human Rights Ombudsman, and international groups monitored the 
electoral campaign and the first round of elections. These groups 
enjoyed access to electoral institutions and government officials. 
However, there were attacks in pro-government media against some of 
these groups at various points in the campaign (see Section 2.a.). At 
the Government's invitation, the OAS sent observers for the April 9 
elections. OAS observers also worked with local electoral institutions 
in preparations for the second round runoff, but none of the observer 
groups fielded monitors for the May 28 runoff elections because of the 
Government's unwillingness to postpone the election date so that vote 
tabulation software could be tested.
    International and domestic observers viewed the general elections 
on April 9 and presidential runoff elections on May 28 as significantly 
flawed. Conditions for free and fair elections fell short of 
international standards. Several factors created a seriously flawed 
electoral process: disagreement over the legitimacy of President 
Fujimori's candidacy for a third consecutive term; complaints by 
opposition candidates of unfair campaign conditions that favored pro-
government candidates; lack of public confidence in electoral 
institutions; and lack of transparency in vote tabulation and 
reporting. Although the Government took steps to improve the electoral 
environment, they were insufficient to ensure a level playing field.
    Preelection conditions heavily favored government candidates. 
Several groups of electoral observers reported that government 
resources were used to the benefit Fujimori's candidacy and others in 
his coalition. There were credible reports that military and police 
personnel worked on behalf of the pro-government candidates. The NGO 
Transparencia filed 170 formal complaints regarding use of government 
resources; the Public Ministry dismissed all but 2 of the complaints. 
In one case, prosecutors dismissed a complaint that employees of a 
public welfare and nutrition service distributed pro-government 
campaign literature. In another, the national tax authority conducted a 
surprise audit of one of the opposition candidate's businesses.
    The JNE refused to investigate opposition complaints in many of 
these cases, stating that it did not have the resources or mandate to 
investigate. When the JNE or the Public Ministry did investigate, 
charges frequently were dismissed for lack of evidence. Only after 
repeated complaints from electoral observers did the JNE pledge to 
investigate use of government land for pro-government party paintings 
and signs. The President also issued a nationwide executive order 
against use of government resources. However, these measures were 
adopted too late in the campaign to overcome a widespread impression of 
preferential treatment enjoyed by the Peru 2000 alliance.
    The preelectoral period also lacked impartiality and effectiveness 
in the administration in some significant areas. In late February, the 
newspaper El Comercio reported that a member party of the President 
Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance had falsified over 1 million voter 
signatures in its registration drive. Accounts by 4 participants in the 
scheme detailed a large operation in which over 400 persons 
participated. The group allegedly worked for 1 month in a building 
behind the offices of pro-government legislator Oscar Medelius. Others 
accused of involvement included Peru 2000 official Luis Navarrete and 
Peru 2000 Secretary General Daniel Chuan. ONPE, the JNE, and the 
Attorney General pledged to investigate the allegations. ONPE concluded 
that the JNE had jurisdiction, and in March ONPE sent the JNE its 
report, along with the forged documents in question. In April the JNE 
deferred to the special prosecutor appointed to investigate the case. 
The JNE also ruled that Congress would have jurisdiction over 
legislatorselect with alleged links to the scandal. In July Congress 
absolved the legislators linked to the forgery scandal.
    In June the prosecutor filed charges against the witnesses who had 
exposed evidence implicating government employees, and who had 
themselves participated in the falsified signatures scheme. In 
September a judge dismissed charges against the informers, while the 
National Council of Magistrates opened an investigation against ONPE 
director Jose Portillo for allegedly investigating the case improperly. 
In October a judge ruled that no crime had been committed because 
official documents had not been falsified. However, the CNM removed 
Portillo from office.
    Opposition candidates did not receive equal access to broadcast 
television station news coverage, and the pro-government tabloid press 
conducted smear campaigns against them (see Section 2.a.). The JNE 
claimed that it could not intervene because media laws did not give it 
authority to dictate programming on privately owned television 
stations. Formal complaints by candidates to the JNE often were 
dismissed for lack of evidence. Beginning in late March, broadcast 
television stations provided broadcast time to opposition candidates, 
but these spots were usually not aired during peak viewing hours. 
Though the opening reflected a government response to electoral 
observer criticism, the measure came too late to reverse the ill 
effects that opposition candidates had suffered from earlier lack of 
media access. Throughout the campaign, broadcast television coverage 
favored President Fujimori.
    The April 9 elections were largely peaceful, and millions of 
citizens participated as voters, election workers, political party 
observers, and election monitors. Over 31,000 volunteers affiliated 
with local NGO's worked as poll monitors. International monitors found 
no specific instances of fraud during the polling.
    However, there were widespread irregularities in the voting and 
vote tabulation processes. Observers cited illegal propaganda in or 
around polling areas as the most common irregularity. They also 
reported irregularities in voting materials, such as premarked ballots 
and some missing the name of the leading opposition candidate as a 
choice. Observers reported several instances of attempted intimidation 
of political party observers by police and military officials demanding 
their names and identification documents. Several hundred voting sites 
reported that more ballots were cast than the number of voters who had 
signed in. (Under the electoral law, the authorities count the extra 
votes unless the number of ballots exceeds the number of registered 
voters at that site.)
    Several problems marred the vote tabulation and computation. 
Several vote tabulation centers did not open until late in the day. 
There were problems with the computer systems used to count the vote, 
and ONPE was unable to conduct a successful simulation of its data 
collection and tabulation process until shortly before polls closed. 
Although observers and party monitors were allowed to watch the 
computation at ONPE and regional collection centers, the systems used 
did not allow for independent verification of the results.
    ONPE presented only partial results of the presidential returns on 
April 9, and an inexplicable delay in the computation created 
widespread allegations that politicians or others influenced the count. 
Election day exit polls and quick counts by the NGO Transparencia and 
polling firms showed that no candidate had won over 50 percent of the 
vote and that a runoff would be necessary. Electoral authorities 
released additional election results on April 12, and announced that it 
was ``mathematically impossible'' for any of the candidates to have won 
the first round. The next day officials confirmed definitively that 
there would be a second round. Final official results of the first 
round presidential elections were declared on April 28. Electoral 
monitors concluded that the vote tabulation and announcement process 
lacked transparency and created a lack of confidence in the official 
results.
    After the announcement that no presidential candidate had won in 
the first round, the Government negotiated with second place candidate 
Alejandro Toledo and the OAS regarding measures to improve electoral 
conditions. Several working groups formed by the Human Rights 
Ombudsman, ONPE, the OAS, and the political parties worked to address 
access to the media and media coverage, reform of ONPE's vote 
tabulation computer programs, and training of electoral personnel. 
While these groups made significant progress, the OAS sought 
postponement of the second round election to test ONPE's voting data 
computer programs.
    Toledo withdrew from the race 10 days before the May 28 runoff, 
citing unfair electoral conditions and the Government's refusal to 
postpone the elections at the OAS's request. However, the JNE rejected 
his petition to remove his name from the ballot, and Toledo urged his 
supporters to purposely spoil their ballots in protest. On May 28, 
according to ONPE's unverifiable results, President Fujimori won 51 
percent of the popular vote. Toledo won 17.68 percent of the votes and 
29.93 percent were spoiled ballots of null. Observers, with the 
exception of one group, refused to monitor the vote, and Toledo and 
other opposition groups charged that the results were fraudulent.
    Definitive results from congressional elections were not released 
until May 12, which also raised questions about the validity of those 
results. The JNE ratified the congressional results the same day, 
despite a number of pending challenges, including some claiming fraud. 
On April 12, initial returns had indicated that no party had won a 
controlling majority; however, in subsequent result announcements, 
there were significant changes in the results that favored pro-
government candidates. There were, moreover, many changes of party 
affiliation that drew many representatives elected from opposition 
party lists to the pro-government coalition in Congress. By the time 
the new Congress was sworn in on July 24, nearly a dozen legislators 
elected on opposition slates had changed parties to join the Peru 2000 
alliance, which gave it a majority in the 120-seat unicameral Congress. 
There were widespread allegations of bribery, blackmail, and other 
illegal and questionable practices; however not all party affiliation 
changes were necessarily the result of illegal actions. For example, 
the promise of a position as committee chair or the potential of being 
able to help a regional constituency was a factor cited by some who 
changed party affiliation. However, circumstantial evidence suggests 
that questionable practices were used in a number of instances. Luis 
Caceres Velasquez was declared ineligible for Congress due to a 
previous felony conviction. After he declared his intent to change from 
an opposition to the government party, the Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction and the JNE gave him back his seat. Edilberto Canales, 
implicated in a vote buying scandal, changed alliances and his legal 
problems were settled. Jorge Polack, who complained that he had been 
harassed by criminal legal proceedings because of antigovernment views 
broadcast on his radio station, had charges against him dropped after 
he changed his membership to the ruling party.
    There were also widely reported irregularities in ONPE's tabulation 
of preferential votes for individual Congressional candidates. Several 
parties alleged that ONPE employees had been bribed to alter voting 
results. The Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to 
investigate these allegations. In June JNE officials declared that 
Congress would be responsible for investigating newly elected 
legislators who allegedly benefited from manipulated results. On July 
6, Congress approved a report that found 31 ONPE data entry officials, 
several regional ONPE center managers, and ONPE's information chief 
responsible for altering voting returns. The report concluded that five 
legislators representing government and official parties who benefited 
from the altered vote bore no responsibility. A television news program 
reported that of the 30 congressional candidates who benefited from 
alteration of the individual preferential vote count, 10 eventually 
were elected. By year's end, none of these elected legislators had been 
investigated for violating election laws.
    In June the OAS General Assembly discussed the country's elections. 
OAS election monitoring mission head Eduardo Stein reported that the 
elections had been carried out in accordance with international 
standards. The OAS foreign ministers concluded that ``the credibility 
of both the process and the outcome of those elections has been 
undermined by persisting reports of irregularities'' and agreed to send 
OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy to Peru to establish a dialog on reforming the country's 
democratic institutions.
    The OAS mission met with government officials, members of the 
opposition, and civil society representatives in late June and 
developed 29 recommendations grouped in 5 categories: (1) ensuring 
judicial independence; (2) freedom of expression and the media; (3) 
electoral reforms; (4) supervision and balance of powers among the 
executive branch and congress; and (5) measures to strengthen 
congressional oversight, reforms to the intelligence and military 
services. Although opposition and some civil society groups continued 
to call for new elections, the OAS delegation noted that the OAS 
General Assembly mandate explicitly precluded discussion of new 
elections. However, delegates of the OAS added that local figures were 
not precluded from continuing to advance new elections.
    The OAS dialog began in August. At the opposition's insistence, the 
Government agreed to form four working groups to address priority 
issues including the return to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the reestablishment of the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
resolution of Baruch Ivcher's nationality and ownership of television 
stations 2 and 13 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.), and the reorganization 
of the intelligence services.
    In September Moral Independence Front party leader Fernando Olivera 
presented a videotape showing opposition legislator-elect Alberto Kouri 
taking a $15,000 payment from then-de facto intelligence service chief 
Vladimiro Montesinos. The video showed Montesinos presenting Kouri with 
a contract committing him to switch party alliances. Montesinos was 
recorded remarking that he was aiming for a pro-government majority of 
at least 70 seats. When asked about the transaction, Kouri claimed that 
the money was a personal loan. Congress formed a committee to 
investigate Kouri and suspended him for 120 days. Kouri left the 
country when he learned of the investigation.
    The airing of the tape also apparently influenced President 
Fujimori to announce on September 16, that there would be new national 
elections in which he would not be a candidate. He later appointed a 
special prosecutor to investigate Montesino's role in illegal 
activities. By year's end, the investigation had expanded to include 
investigation into his role in money laundering, illegal arms sales, 
narcotics trafficking, and bribery of public officials. Montesinos fled 
the country in October in order to avoid prosecution in these matters.
    On November 22, President Fujimori sent his resignation to Congress 
from Japan, where he remained at year's end. Congress refused to accept 
his resignation and instead voted to remove him from office for ``moral 
incapacity.'' The President of Congress Valentin Paniagua of the 
Popular Action Party succeeded to the presidency on November 22. He 
announced that he would uphold legislation allowing for new 
presidential and congressional elections in April 2001, and he 
accelerated the implementation of democratic reforms initiated in the 
OAS-sponsored talks.
    By November participants in the OAS talks had agreed upon, and 
Congress had ratified, amendments to the Constitution that would end 
the term of the President and Congress in July 2001, thereby making new 
elections possible. The OAS dialog also produced agreement on 
deactivating the SIN, with provisions for including a civil society 
member in the executive branch's oversight commission and for creating 
a bipartisan congressional oversight committee.
    The OAS dialog drew to a close after Paniagua assumed the 
presidency in November. Congress approved and the Paniagua 
administration continued to implement many of the OAS recommendations. 
By year's end, the Government made significant legal and electoral 
reforms (see Section 1.e.).
    Legal actions against potential opposition candidates for 
congressional campaigns removed some of them from eligibility for 
public office. In 1999 Congress passed a law prohibiting candidacies 
for certain offices such as president or congress by anyone who had 
served in high office and had been charged with a crime against the 
State. In effect this law presumes the guilt of any persons charged but 
not convicted of a crime and removes the right to compete for office. 
This law disqualified former Labor Minister Jorge Mufarrech and 
Representative Beatrice Merino from standing as candidates. Congress 
annulled the law in October.
    Women and some minorities participate actively in government and 
politics, although they are under-represented in both fields. From 
August to November, the president and three vice presidents of Congress 
were women. In December Congress amended the electoral law to include 
provisions requiring parties to include at least 30 percent of 
candidates on their slates to be of each sex; previously the level was 
25 percent. At year's end there were 26 women in the 120-seat Congress. 
One of 15 cabinet ministers and several vice ministers are women, as 
are 3 of the 36 judges of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General. 
In conjunction with the year's election campaign, four women's 
organizations sought to identify female candidates, promote women's 
interests, increase the number of female voters, prepare a woman's 
political agenda, and train women who were elected to office.
    Citizens of Asian descent hold numerous leadership positions in 
government; former President Fujimori is of Japanese descent and one 
recent president of the Council of Ministers was of Chinese descent.
    Several members of Congress have mixed ancestry, and a recent Vice 
President was a Quechua speaker, as was a recent Minister of 
Transportation and Communications. However, it is rare for indigenous 
people, who make up more than one-third of the population, to hold high 
public offices. The Afro-Peruvian minority, unofficially estimated at 3 
to 5 percent of the total population, is not represented in the 
leadership of any branch of the Government. There are three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    In general the Government permitted numerous NGO's dedicated to 
monitoring and advancing human rights to operate freely; however, the 
authorities at times sought to hinder the operations of human rights 
monitors, including harassment of members of the National Human Rights 
Coordinator.
    Military commanders often did not grant access to local and 
international human rights monitors to investigate alleged abuses on 
military bases. However, by year's end, this policy began to change 
under the Paniagua administration. In December members of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman's office were granted access to the naval military 
prison in Callao for the first time ever.
    Government, military, judicial, and police officials, as well as 
some members of Congress publicly accused NGO's and the IACHR of being 
overprotective of criminals and terrorists to the detriment of victims. 
These statements at times created a hostile environment for human 
rights groups but did not appear to hamper their ability to carry out 
their work. For much of the year, communication between the human 
rights community and the military ranged from strained to nonexistent. 
However, dialog between the NGO human rights community and civilian 
authorities improved significantly with the opening of the OAS 
sponsored dialog in August (see Section 3). By year's end, human rights 
organizations and the Government were represented in a number of the 
working groups which were examining legal reforms and pursuing the idea 
of a truth commission to examine past human rights abuses. Human rights 
community members reported that the Paniagua administration had 
initiated improvements in government-civil society relations, including 
the appointment of several former NGO leaders to his cabinet.
    Most human rights NGO's are independent, thorough, and generally 
objective. The National Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora), 
established in 1985, provides an umbrella organization for 60 human 
rights NGO's. The Coordinadora does not politicize its positions on 
human rights issues, although its constituent members may do so in 
their own names. A number of other human rights groups associated with 
the Catholic Church or with government institutions operate on the 
margins of the Coordinadora.
    The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, created in 1993, receives 
funds from the Government and foreign governments and is considered an 
independent and effective institution for bringing citizens justice. 
The Ombudsman has investigative independence and the ability to inform 
the public of his conclusions and recommendations. However, the office 
has no enforcement mechanism other than moral suasion. Because of its 
reputation and role in society, the Ombudsman's office was asked to 
join in the OAS dialog to address the problems of the election and the 
ongoing process of democratization. The Ombudsman's office issued 
reports throughout the year on the elections, freedom of the press, the 
activities of the ad hoc Pardons Commission, the situation of 4,000 
unresolved disappearance cases, and an annual report on the overall 
human rights situation, among others.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman has a legal mandate to monitor prison 
facilities. However, until December, Ombudsman representatives 
continued to be denied access to the military prison in Callao (see 
Section 1.c.).
    In July the IACHR published a report updating its 1998 factfinding 
mission. Although the Government welcomed the Commission's recognition 
of action it had taken, such as the creation of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman's office and the abolition of faceless judges, the report 
concluded that the Fujimori administration continued to reject the 
Commission's call to return to the Inter-American Court (see Section 
1.e.). The IACHR report also noted the existence of impunity, 
restrictions on the freedom of expression, significant problems 
regarding the free practice of political freedoms and flawed elections, 
and the subjugation of the other branches by the executive branch under 
the Fujimori administration. In addition, the report stated that the 
significant problems that occurred during the electoral process were 
the ``foreseeable outcome of several years in which the arbitrary will 
of the Government has prevailed over the law and democratic 
institutions.''
    Human Rights Watch and other groups reported on harassment or 
attacks on human rights workers. Among such attacks were telephonic 
threats against Jesus Agreda Paredes, who investigated the death of a 
detainee in police custody, and death threats against members of the 
Legal Defense Institute. NGO's reported that such harassment and 
threats dropped significantly after the Paniagua administration took 
office in November.
    In July 1999, the Government announced its decision to withdraw 
from the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights after the Court determined that the Government failed to provide 
due process in the case of four Chileans convicted of treason by a 
military tribunal. Members of the OAS dialog discussed with the 
Government terms for its return to the Court beginning in August. By 
year's end, legislation approving a return to the Court's jurisdiction 
had been approved by committees and was waiting for a plenary vote, and 
the Government was preparing to return to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction.
    At least two human rights organizations reported theft of their 
documentation during the year. On November 1, burglars stole computers 
and other documentation that the Human Rights Commission collected 
regarding human rights violations. On November 4, armed burglars broke 
into the office of the NGO Peace and Hope in Lima. The burglars held a 
security guard at gunpoint while they removed information from 
computers. In both cases burglars did not take valuable items or 
machines. AI alleged that the burglaries were organized by the SIN, and 
that their objective was to intimidate the human rights community. 
Police investigations had not identified those responsible by year's 
end.
    There were no reports of Sendero Luminoso hampering the work of 
human rights monitors.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and 
specifically prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, race, 
sex, language, religion, opinion, or economic condition. Nevertheless, 
discrimination against women, the disabled, indigenous people, and 
racial and ethnic minorities continued, although progress is being made 
in a number of areas. In December Congress passed legislation that made 
racial discrimination a crime.
    Women.--Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and 
sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls, continued to be 
a chronic problem. Such abuses are aggravated by insensitivity on the 
part of law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female 
victims of abuse. A 1999 Population Council study estimated that 80 
percent of women surveyed were beaten by their husbands. Human rights 
organizations believe a large number of domestic violence cases remain 
unreported. Nationwide in 1998 there were 27,935 complaints of domestic 
abuse (77 percent for violence and 23 percent for psychological abuse). 
Although official figures for the number of arrests and convictions in 
abuse cases are unavailable, NGO sources contend that the vast majority 
of reported cases do not result in formal charges due to fear of 
retaliation from the accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in 
pursuing a complaint. In addition, legal and physical protection is 
limited by delays in legal processes, ambiguities in the law, and lack 
of alternative shelter and income for victims.
    The 1997 domestic violence law gives judges and prosecutors the 
authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning to 
the family's home. The law also authorizes the victims' relatives and 
unrelated persons living in the home to file complaints of domestic 
violence. Whereas previously victims of domestic violence had to have a 
specialist in legal medicine certify their injuries and had to pay for 
the report, the new law eliminated the required fee and stipulated that 
the report may be prepared by any health professional. In March Human 
Rights Watch called on the Government to improve legislation on 
domestic violence by eliminating mandatory conciliation sessions 
between victims and abusers, and by providing law enforcement and 
social service providers with training to improve their sensitivity to 
victim's needs.
    In March 1999, PROMUDEH created the Women's Emergency Program to 
call attention to the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing 
women and children who were victims of violence. The program received 
approximately 9,000 cases during the year. PROMUDEH continued its 
public education campaign to sensitize government employees and the 
public on domestic violence.
    According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, many women 
complain that police officers react indifferently to charges of 
domestic violence, even though the law requires all police stations to 
receive such complaints. The Ministry of Women's Advancement and Human 
Development, with NGO assistance, educates police about domestic 
violence and trains officers in all police stations in processing 
domestic violence cases. The Ministry also runs over 30 facilities, 
staffed entirely by women, that bring together in one place 
representatives of all government institutions--police, prosecutors, 
counselors, and public welfare agents--to which abused women might have 
recourse.
    According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims complain 
that court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately delved into 
their past sexual histories. They also accused judges of looking more 
favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the rape and of 
believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her attacker.
    In 1999 Congress responded to an appeal from the Human Rights 
Ombudsman and amended the Criminal Code to provide greater protection 
to victims of sexual violence. The amendments eliminated provisions 
that had allowed rapists and other sexual predators the opportunity to 
avoid prosecution if they reached a private settlement with their 
victims. In addition, the Ombudsman recommended rescinding the 
provision that specifies that, in cases of sexual abuse of victims over 
14 years of age, only victims themselves may file a complaint; in 
November, the Government rescinded that provision of the law. Many 
victims are afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual abuse, 
particularly in cases where the perpetrators were police officers.
    In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published an updated report on 
sterilization without informed consent of women in public hospitals and 
family planning clinics, and the Government took action on some of its 
recommendations during the year (see Section 1.f.). Acting on the Human 
Rights Ombudsman's findings, clinics implemented procedures to insure 
that patients are fully apprised of their options and their 
consequences. There were isolated complaints regarding this problem 
during the year.
    The Constitution provides for equality between men and women, and 
the 1995 amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, as well as other 
laws relative to marriage, divorce, and property rights, prohibit 
discrimination against women. Racial and sexual discrimination in 
employment advertisements or announcements of educational training 
opportunities is prohibited; however, it continues to occur in 
practice. In 1998 Congress removed the police rank of health-care 
professionals in police hospitals and accorded them civilian status 
only. Since over 80 percent of such professionals are women, the Human 
Rights Ombudsman challenged the constitutionality of the new law and 
its implementing regulations, on grounds of discrimination. The 
Superior Court of Lima ruled against the Ombudsman, who then appealed 
to the Supreme Court. By year's end, the Supreme Court had determined 
that the workers were stripped improperly of their police rank but had 
not made a decision concerning damages. In 1999 the Congress passed 
legislation protecting pregnant women against arbitrary firing.
    Traditional assumptions and misconceptions often impede access by 
women to leadership roles in both the public and private sectors. 
Because of societal prejudice and discrimination, women historically 
have suffered disproportionately from the country's pervasive poverty 
and unemployment. ``Mibanco,'' a program supported by the Government 
and a consortium of NGO's, represents an effort to improve women's 
ability to generate income by providing credit to small businesses 
started by enterprising women. More than 60 percent of its clients are 
women.
    Children.--The Government provides free, compulsory education 
through secondary school. Education is generally available throughout 
the country. However, approximately 6 percent of children between the 
ages of 6 and 12, and 17 percent of adolescents between the ages of 12 
and 17, either never have attended school or have abandoned their 
education. Among children and adolescents who live in poverty or 
extreme poverty, the corresponding figures are 47.7 percent for 
children under 5 years old, 51 percent for children ages 5 to 9 years 
old, and 49.9 percent for children age 10 to 14. School nonattendance 
is highest in rural and jungle areas and affects girls more than boys. 
In 1998 Congress amended the Child and Adolescent Code to provide 
pregnant school-age girls with the right to begin or continue attending 
school. The law also provided for regional offices to enforce 
children's rights.
    The Children's Bureau of the Ministry of Women's Advancement and 
Human Development coordinates child and adolescent related government 
policies and programs. The National Initiative on the Rights of the 
Child is the largest NGO of its kind and coordinates the work of 27 
groups concerned with the problems of children throughout the country.
    At the grassroots level, 1,010 Children's Rights and Welfare 
Protection Offices receive and resolve complaints ranging from physical 
and sexual abuse to child support, abandonment, and undetermined 
guardianship. Provincial or district governments operate some 55 
percent of these offices, while schools, churches, and NGO's run the 
remaining 45 percent. Law students staff most of the units; only the 
offices in the wealthiest districts of the country have professionally 
trained lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. When these offices 
cannot resolve cases, officials typically refer them to the local 
prosecutors' offices of the Public Ministry. Settlements adjudicated by 
these offices are binding legally and have the same force as judgments 
entered by a court of law.
    Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children are 
serious problems. It is estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of 
mistreatment and abuse cases are reported, since many persons believe 
that such problems belong within the family and should be resolved 
privately. Nonetheless, in Lima alone, at least 400 rapes of minors are 
reported annually.
    According to the 1993 Census, 69.6 percent of children 6 to 17 
years old lived in poverty. Of these, roughly half live in rural areas. 
Of all children and adolescents under 17 years of age, 20 percent live 
in extreme poverty. In 1996 the infant mortality rate was 43 per 1,000. 
However, this figure masks wide regional disparities: it is 30 per 
1,000 in urban areas, compared with 62 per 1,000 in rural areas. 
Approximately 26 percent of children under age 5, and 48 percent of 
children ages 6 to 9, suffered from chronic malnutrition. In those 
homes where the mother has a low level of education, as many as 50 
percent of the children suffer from chronic malnutrition, and 114 per 
1,000 die from preventable causes before they reach age 5.
    According to a study by the National Institute of Statistics, 
children who live in poverty are less likely to reach high levels of 
education. The study indicated that approximately 75 percent of 
children not living in poverty attend school through the high-school 
level, whereas, only 43 percent of children living in poverty reach 
high school. Children living in poverty average only 4.5 years of 
education, compared to 9.3 years for children living above the poverty 
line. Only 1.2 percent of children living in extreme poverty attain 
university-level education, compared with 25.6 percent of children who 
live above the poverty line.
    Street crime committed by children and adolescents, including 
robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, is often gang-related. 
According to a 1998 congressional commission study, gangs carry out 75 
percent of all acts of vandalism, 29 percent of assaults, and 23 
percent of robberies. The majority of these crimes are committed under 
the influence of drugs and alcohol, and their underlying causes are 
unemployment, nonattendance at school, and difficult family 
relationships.
    In 1999 the Government repealed a series of measures that had been 
used to reduce street crime, including prosecuting 16- to 18-year-old 
criminal gang members in military courts and sentencing those convicted 
to no less than 25 years in adult prisons.
    As many as 1.9 million children work to help support their 
families. Of this total, some 500,000 children are under the age of 14, 
while 700,000 are between the ages of 15 and 17 (see Section 6.d.).
    Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police 
enforce such laws, there continued to be reports that minors work in 
the sex trade.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that severely 
disabled persons have ``the right to have their dignity respected and 
to be provided by law with protection, care, rehabilitation, and 
security.'' In 1998 comprehensive legislation established the National 
Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities and specified 
the rights, allowances, programs, and services that should be provided 
for the disabled. The statute prohibits discrimination, mandates that 
public spaces be barrier-free and that buildings be architecturally 
accessible, and provides for the appointment of a disability rights 
specialist in the Human Rights Ombudsman's office. However, in practice 
the Government devotes little attention and resources to the disabled, 
and they remain economically and socially marginalized.
    The Government does not allocate sufficient funds to make genuine 
integration of the disabled into the economy possible. According to the 
National Coordinator of the Association of Disabled People, the 
Government allocates an annual budget of approximately $250,000 (1 
million soles) to integrate the disabled into the economy. Although the 
law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, it is vague regarding 
the source of funds to pay for the human assistance, technological 
support, and environmental adaptations that often are necessary to 
enable disabled workers to be productive. As a result, disabled 
individuals and the private agencies serving them generally must rely 
on public charity and on funding from international organizations.
    The 1993 census counted 288,526 disabled persons, or 1.3 percent of 
the population; however, the Ministry of Health and the Pan American 
Health Organization estimate that the actual number of disabled persons 
could be as high as 3 million, or 13.8 percent of the population.
    It is difficult for many disabled persons to obtain insurance 
coverage because carriers typically believe that a severe disability 
necessarily increases a person's vulnerability to accidents and 
illnesses.
    Although construction regulations mandate barrier-free access by 
persons with physical disabilities to public service buildings, no 
effort has been made to implement this provision. Nor do accommodations 
exist, such as accessible polling stations, interpreters for the deaf 
in government service offices, and Braille or recorded versions of the 
Constitution, which would facilitate the participation of the disabled 
in the basic processes of democracy and citizenship. The Government 
made efforts to make voting easier for disabled persons in the April 
and May elections, although there were many complaints about inadequate 
access. In November the Human Rights Ombudsman's office announced a 
program to facilitate voter education and access for the handicapped 
for elections scheduled for April 2001.
    According to officials of the Institute for Social Security, less 
than 1 percent of severely disabled citizens actually work. Among those 
who do, many have been channeled into a restricted number of 
occupations traditionally assumed to be ``suitable'' for the disabled, 
such as telephone switchboard operation and massage, in the case of the 
blind. Some private companies have initiated programs to hire and train 
the disabled, and a private foundation provides small loans to the 
disabled for the purpose of starting their own businesses. 
Nevertheless, disabled persons faced discrimination by potential 
employers. For example, the statute governing the policies and 
procedures of the judicial branch specifically prohibits the blind from 
serving as judges or prosecutors, a discriminatory provision that the 
National Judiciary Council has interpreted to apply to all persons with 
disabilities. In 1998 SEDAPLA, Lima's water utility, dismissed all its 
blind switchboard operators, ostensibly as part of a nondiscriminatory, 
across-the-board cost-cutting measure. However, the chief advocate for 
the disabled in Congress reported that all the blind operators 
immediately were replaced by younger, sighted recruits. The disabled 
only recently have begun to organize and demand equal rights and 
opportunities as a minority.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination based 
on race and provides for the right of all citizens to speak their 
native language; however, the large indigenous population still faces 
pervasive discrimination and social prejudice. Many factors impede the 
ability of indigenous people to participate in, and facilitate their 
deliberate exclusion from, decision making directly affecting their 
lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. 
According to indigenous rights groups, the provisions in the 1993 
Constitution and in subsequent implementing legislation regarding the 
treatment of native lands are less explicit about their inalienability 
and unmarketability than were earlier constitutional and statutory 
protections. Pervasive discrimination and social prejudice intensify 
feelings of inferiority and second-class citizenship. Many indigenous 
people lack such basic documents as a birth certificate or a voter's 
registration card that normally would identify them as full citizens 
and enable them to play an active part in society.
    Persons of indigenous descent who live in the Andean highlands 
speak Aymara and Quechua, which are recognized as official languages. 
They are ethnically distinct from the diverse indigenous groups that 
live on the eastern side of the Andes and in the tropical lowlands 
adjacent to the Amazon basin. A 1998 regulation stipulating that all 
school teachers be certified initially caused fears that uncertified 
indigenous teachers would lose their jobs, and that the continued use 
of Aymara and Quechua as languages of instruction, as well as the very 
survival of indigenous cultures, had been put in jeopardy; however, due 
to the unwillingness of many certified teachers to work in rural areas, 
uncertified Aymara and Quechua-speaking teachers continue to work.
    The native population of the Peruvian Amazon, estimated at between 
200,000 and 300,000 persons, faces pervasive discrimination and social 
prejudice. In accordance with local culture and traditions, most of the 
native communities have a spiritual relationship with their land, and 
the concept of land as a marketable commodity is alien to them. 
Nevertheless, according to the director of the Human Rights Ombudsman's 
Native Communities Program, the only right still statutorily set aside 
for this native population with respect to its land is that of 
``unassignability,'' which prevents the title to such lands from being 
reassigned to some nonindigenous tenant by right of tenure. However, 
the marketing and sale of the lands are no longer prohibited.
    Many other factors also contribute to the marginalization of 
indigenous people in society. Poor transportation and communications 
infrastructure in the highlands and in the Amazon jungle region makes 
political mobilization and organization difficult. The geographic 
isolation of much of the indigenous population and the centralization 
of government action in Lima further limit the access and participation 
of indigenous people in society.
    In many jungle areas, encroachment on native lands comes from a 
variety of sources, including colonists and coca growers, terrorists, 
and business interests in search of exploitable natural resources. For 
example, there are approximately 25 oil exploration fields and numerous 
gold mining operations on indigenous lands in the Amazon region. The 
45,000 Aguaruna and the 5,000 Huambisa people, who inhabit the area 
near the Peru-Ecuador border are only two of many indigenous groups 
that complain about intolerable living conditions and inaccessible 
public services. In the same region, along the Pastaza River, the 4,700 
Achuar people live in 36 communities, only 12 of which have title to 
their land. In addition, the Achuar are fighting an incursion by oil 
exploration and drilling interests, as well as against a government-
sponsored influx of colonists. Title to land does not include mineral 
or other subsoil rights; this condition leads to conflicts between 
mining interests and indigenous communities. Such encroachment often 
can damage the environment and negatively affect the health of the 
native people. About 20 indigenous groups in the Amazon Basin have 
requested communal reserves to hunt game, which is allowed under the 
law, but the Government took no action on this request.
    The two principal NGO's that represent the interests of the native 
population of the Peruvian Amazon are the Inter-Ethnic Association for 
the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) and the Confederation 
of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP). Both organizations joined 
the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples, an umbrella body that 
coordinates the activities of the country's indigenous population. Both 
AIDESEP and CONAP are critical of the 1995 land law, which permits 
Amazonian land to be bought and sold if no one is living on it or 
otherwise making use of it. However, CONAP believes that mining and 
other development operations are inevitable and, therefore, wants 
native communities to share appropriately the benefits of that 
development. AIDESEP remains opposed to territorial encroachments by 
government, commercial, and other interests.
    Although indigenous rights advocates protest the low priority 
assigned by the Government to the socioeconomic condition of indigenous 
people and the lack of consultation regarding matters affecting their 
welfare, the Human Rights Ombudsman believes that the Government's 
attitude has changed. The Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission, 
formed in November 1998, is working to fulfill its mandate to 
coordinate all available state services to meet the needs of indigenous 
people better. The Commission, which is chaired by the Ministry of 
Women's Advancement and Human Development, has among its members 
officials from a variety of relevant ministries as well as four 
representatives of the indigenous peasant population in the highland 
and coastal areas and the native population of the Amazon jungle. In 
1999 Congress created an Indigenous Affairs Committee; however, the 
Committee was largely inactive during the year.
    Sendero Luminoso continued to be a leading violator of the rights 
of indigenous people. Isolated primarily along the Ene River in Junin 
department, Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous Ashaninkas 
to join its ranks, which resulted in further internal displacement in 
this region.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In December Congress passed 
legislation that made racial discrimination a crime. The minority 
population includes several racial minorities, the largest of which are 
persons of Asian and African descent. Afro-Peruvians, who tend to be 
concentrated along the coast, often face discrimination and social 
prejudice, and they are among the poorest groups in the country.
    Afro-Peruvians generally do not hold leadership positions in 
government, business, or the military; however there are three Afro-
Peruvian members of Congress. Both the navy and the air force are 
widely believed to follow unstated policies that exclude blacks from 
the officer corps. The law prohibits employment advertisements in the 
newspapers from specifying the race of the candidates sought, but 
employers often find discreet ways to relegate blacks to low-paying 
service jobs. The law prohibits various forms of discrimination by 
retail establishments against prospective customers. However, the law 
has not deterred significantly discriminatory practices. In one 
reported case, a foreign diplomat and his family were denied membership 
to a prestigious Lima social club because of race.
    According to two organizations specializing in the rights of 
persons of African descent, police continue to detain persons of 
African descent on suspicion of having committed crimes, on the basis 
of their skin color. Similarly, police rarely act on complaints of 
crimes against Afro-Peruvians. Afro-Peruvians are portrayed 
unflatteringly by the entertainment industry as individuals of 
questionable character.
    Although Peruvians of Asian descent historically have suffered 
discrimination, their social standing has improved markedly during the 
past decade, as the country has sought to emulate Asia's earlier 
economic growth and as the Asian community achieved financial success. 
In addition to former President Fujimori, who is of Japanese descent, 
many other persons of Asian descent hold leadership positions in 
business and government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide 
for the right of association; however, worker rights advocates claim 
that the laws are overly restrictive. About 5 percent of the total work 
force of 8.5 million belong to organized labor unions. More than half 
of all workers participate in the informal sector of the economy. 
Workers are not required to seek authorization prior to forming a trade 
union, nor can employers legally condition employment on union 
membership or nonmembership. However, groups including the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) assert that 
laws promulgated by the Fujimori administration in 1992, as well as 
provisions included in the 1993 Constitution, fail to protect the 
rights of workers to form unions. Labor rights advocates claim that 
many workers are reluctant to organize due to fear of dismissal.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) indicated that several 
aspects of the labor law are not consistent with the international 
standard of freedom of association. The ILO specifically criticized a 
provision that permits businesses to employ youth workers between the 
ages of 16 to 25 as up to 30 percent of the workforce; workers in this 
age bracket are precluded from union membership and participation. The 
ILO requested modifications to the laws that regulate the right to 
strike, including a requirement that a majority of workers in an 
enterprise, regardless of union membership, must vote in favor of any 
strike.
    Unions represent a cross section of political opinion. Although 
some unions traditionally have been associated with political groups, 
the law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political, 
religious, or profit-making activities. The several union leaders who 
ran for Congress in the April elections all did so in their own names, 
without official union sponsorship. Nevertheless, some union activists 
who run for public office receive unofficial backing from their unions.
    The main union confederations have criticized the Employment 
Promotion Act, amended in 1995 and 1996, for restricting the rights of 
workers, including the freedom of association. Unions also complain 
that the law eliminates the right of dismissed workers to compulsory 
reinstatement if they prove that employers dismissed them unjustly. In 
practice, the legislation allows companies to offer financial 
compensation instead of reinstatement. Although the law prohibits 
companies from firing workers solely for their involvement in union 
activities, this provision has not been rigidly enforced. In practice, 
the legislation continued to have a negative impact on the right of 
association by making it easier for companies to fire workers involved 
in union activities. There is no legal protection against employer 
interference in trade unions.
    The Peruvian General Workers' Union (CGTP) and other labor groups 
held several general strikes throughout the country during the year. 
According to press accounts, one strike in August drew support from 
civil service workers, health providers, and construction workers, as 
well as support from a broad range of religious and social 
organizations and opposition politicians. In September a work stoppage 
culminated in protest marches around the country, including a large 
gathering of up to 20,000 persons in downtown Lima. The Government took 
no actions to prevent the strikes or reprimand participants.
    On July 25, unknown persons broke into the headquarters of the 
United Worker's Center (CUT) and stole printed material and other items 
just before the Four Quarters March. The ICFTU noted that the police 
refused to register the CUT's complaint or begin an investigation. 
Moreover, the ICFTU asserted that police officers attempted to 
infiltrate union and other demonstrators who were planning the march.
    Confrontations in Lima between union-affiliated protesters and 
police occurred in several different instances. In some cases these 
confrontations were reportedly provoked by protesters who burned tires, 
threw rocks, and tried to destroy public and private property. Police 
action resulted in injuries in several cases.
    In August medical workers undertook a 2-day strike to protest low 
wages and working conditions. In November the Paniagua administration 
met with labor leaders in the health care sector to try to resolve 
wages and benefit related complaints. The Paniagua administration 
leaders also met with union leaders from the education sector to 
discuss their long standing grievances.
    There are no restrictions on the affiliation of labor unions with 
international bodies. Several major unions and labor confederations 
belong to international labor organizations such as the ICFTU, the 
international trade secretariats, and regional bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution recognizes the right of public and private sector workers 
to organize and bargain collectively; however, it specifies that this 
right must be exercised in harmony with broader social objectives. 
Labor regulations provide that workers may form unions on the basis of 
their occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory. The 
regulations prohibit probationary, apprentice, and management employees 
from union membership. The law does not prohibit temporary employees 
from joining a union, but they cannot join the same union as permanent 
workers.
    According to the regulations, union officials must be active 
members of their union, but the number of individuals each union may 
designate as ``official'' is limited, as is the amount of time they may 
devote to union business on company time. The Labor Code requires 
employers to reinstate workers or compensate financially those whom 
companies have fired. It is illegal to fire workers for union 
activities, though reports from labor activists indicate that this is a 
common practice.
    To become an official collective bargaining representative, a union 
must represent at least 20 workers. Representatives may participate in 
collective bargaining negotiations and establish negotiating 
timetables. Management negotiating teams cannot exceed the size of 
union teams, and both sides are permitted to have attorneys and 
technical experts present as advisers.
    Proposals for a strike require secret ballot approval of a majority 
of all workers in a company, whether union members or not; labor 
activists find the requirement to be onerous. A second vote must be 
taken, if petitioned by at least 20 percent of the workers. However, 
labor rights advocates complain that many workers are reluctant to 
participate even in secret ballots, due to fear of employer 
retaliation, particularly since a full list of workers who attend 
meetings in which such ballots are taken must be submitted to 
management. Strikes can only be called in defense of labor rights. 
Unions that employ workers in public services deemed essential by the 
Government are further restricted from striking.
    In November the ILO's Committee of Freedom of Association issued a 
report in response to allegations of antiunion discrimination. It 
recommended that the Government enact and enforce legislation 
protecting workers from dismissal on account of membership in a union 
or participation in union activities.
    The labor movement criticizes the amended Employment Promotion Law, 
which it asserts makes it easier for employers to dismiss employees and 
thereby to impede the right of workers to bargain collectively. There 
are no legal restrictions that prevent unions from negotiating for 
higher levels of worker protection than the baseline standards provided 
for by law.
    Labor regulations permit companies unilaterally to propose 
temporary changes in work schedules, conditions, and wages, and to 
suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days, if obliged 
to do so by worsening economic circumstances or other unexpected 
negative developments, provided that they give their employees at least 
15 days' notice of such changes. However, worker rights advocates 
allege that, in practice, few employers respected this provision. If 
workers reject an employer's proposed changes, the Ministry of Labor is 
required to resolve the dispute based on criteria of ``reasonableness'' 
and ``economic necessity.'' Whether the changes proposed by employers 
in such instances are upheld in full or in part, employers are required 
to adopt all possible measures, such as the authorization of extra 
vacation time, in order to minimize the negative economic impact on 
their employees.
    In December the Paniagua administration established a national 
labor council to promote dialog among business, labor, government, and 
international organizations. The dialog focused on discussing reforms 
to legal provisions regarding dismissal policies and collective 
bargaining rights.
    Although a conciliation and arbitration system exists to resolve 
management and labor disputes, union officials complain that their 
proportionate share of the costs of arbitration often exceeds their 
resources. In addition, union officials claim that, as the law 
prohibits temporary workers from participating in the same union as 
permanent workers, companies have resorted to hiring workers on 
temporary, personal services contracts to prevent increases in the 
number of union members. Although the law restricts the number of 
temporary workers hired to 20 percent of a company's work force, worker 
rights advocates allege that this quota rarely is respected. Employers 
deny that they are biased against unions, and argue that the labor 
stability provisions of the legislation have made long-term commitments 
to workers too expensive.
    Special regulations aimed at giving employers in export processing 
and duty free zones a freer hand in the application of the law provide 
for the use of temporary labor as needed, for greater flexibility in 
labor contracts, and for setting wage rates based on supply and demand. 
As a result, workers in such zones have difficulty in unionizing, 
although worker rights advocates admit these zones are few in number 
and do not contribute substantively to labor's unionizing difficulties.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of 
forced labor during the year. The law specifically prohibits forced or 
bonded labor by children. Forced labor previously was found in the gold 
mining industry in the Madre de Dios area; however, the changing nature 
of the industry and government efforts to regulate it seem to have 
addressed the problem. During the year, the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines reported that the number of registered dredging companies fell, 
while informal operations continued. NGO sources and the ILO reported 
in 1999 that mechanization largely has replaced manual labor, and the 
Ministry of Labor inspection programs helped deter illegal child labor 
in this industry. According to the ILO, PROMUDEH, and the Ministry of 
Labor, there were no reports of forced child labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Child and Adolescent Code of 1992 governs child and 
adolescent labor practices. The legal minimum age for employment is 14. 
However, children between the ages of 12 and 14 may work in certain 
jobs to help support their families if they obtain special permission 
from the Ministry of Labor and certify that they also are attending 
school. In certain sectors of the economy, higher minimums are in 
force: age 14 in agricultural work; age 15 in industrial, commercial, 
or mining work; and age 16 in the fishing industry. Certain types of 
employment are prohibited, such as work underground; work that involves 
the lifting and carrying of heavy weights; work where the child or 
adolescent is responsible for the safety of others; night work; or any 
work that jeopardizes the health of children and adolescents, puts at 
risk their physical, mental, and emotional development, or prevents 
their regular attendance at school. The ILO and NGO's report that child 
labor remained a problem nationwide, and especially in the informal 
sector.
    Human and labor rights groups criticized the modification of the 
Child and Adolescent code, passed in August, that maintained the 
current minimum age for work at 12 years old (with permission), and 
argued that it contradicts international guidelines on the minimum age 
of child workers.
    The Constitution provides for compulsory, free education through 
secondary school. Nevertheless, largely because of widespread poverty, 
approximately one-third of all school-age children and adolescents work 
during daytime hours rather than attend classes, and only a few of them 
attend classes at night.
    Many children are pressed to help support their families from a 
very early age by working in the informal economy, which escapes 
government supervision of wages and working conditions. Other children 
and adolescents work either in formally established enterprises, or as 
unpaid workers at home, or at times in the sex trade (see Section 5).
    Adolescent workers must be authorized to work and must be 
registered unless they are employed as domestic workers or as unpaid 
family workers. Adolescents may only work a certain number of hours 
each day: 4 hours for ages 12 through 14, and 6 hours for ages 15 
through 17. Adolescent employment must be remunerated in accordance 
with the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice, the Child 
and Adolescent Code provisions are violated routinely, especially in 
the informal sector. Child and adolescent laborers work long hours in 
the agricultural sector. Many other children are at times reportedly 
employed in dangerous occupations or in high-risk environments, such as 
gold mining, garbage collection, loading and unloading produce in 
markets, and brick making, or work in stone quarries and fireworks 
factories, among others.
    In recent years, government surveys have estimated the number of 
child and adolescent workers at anywhere from 500,000 to 1.9 million. A 
1996 government study found that 8 percent of the work force is between 
the ages of 6 and 14 (see Section 5). Child and adolescent labor tends 
to be seasonal, with the highest survey statistics reported during 
school vacation periods.
    There were two allegations of child labor in the informal gold 
mines of Madre de Dios department in during the year. The authorities 
investigated the incidents and intervened with the families involved.
    The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded 
labor by children, although there are laws which prohibit this practice 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides that 
the State promote social and economic progress and occupational 
education. It states that workers should receive a ``just and 
sufficient'' wage to be determined by the Government in consultation 
with labor and business representatives, as well as ``adequate 
protection against arbitrary dismissal.''
    In March the Government raised the statutory minimum wage to $117 
(410 soles) a month, which is not considered sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. That year the 
Government estimated the poverty line to be about $45 (157 soles) a 
month per person. According to some estimates, as much as half the work 
force earns the minimum wage or below.
    The Constitution provides for a 48-hour workweek, a weekly day of 
rest, and an annual vacation. In addition, it prohibits discrimination 
in the workplace; however, it continued to be a problem in practice. 
The labor code provides for a 48 hour work week for women. Labor 
advocates state that workers have been pressured to work longer hours 
to avoid dismissal.
    While occupational health and safety standards exist, the 
Government lacks the resources to monitor firms or enforce compliance. 
Labor advocates continued to argue that the Government dedicated 
insufficient resources to enforce existing legislation. The Ministry of 
Labor employs a force of 100 inspectors to carry out unannounced visits 
throughout the country. When firms are found to be in violation of the 
law, the Government sanctions them with fines or, in some cases, 
closure. In cases of industrial accidents, the level of compensation 
awarded to the injured employee usually is determined by agreement 
between the employer and the individual involved. The worker does not 
need to prove an employer's culpability in order to obtain compensation 
for work-related injuries. No provisions exist in law for workers to 
remove themselves from potentially dangerous work situations without 
jeopardizing their continued employment. The Ministry of Labor 
continued to receive worker complaints and intervened in hundreds of 
cases.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons. In November 1999, the Government 
adopted legislation that criminalized alien smuggling, which is defined 
as promoting, executing, or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of 
persons from the country. Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits 
and sanctions activities of those who would obtain benefits from 
prostitution, such as pimping. Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse 
of minors, and illegal employment are enforced and could be used to 
sanction traffickers in persons. Available information suggests that 
trafficking in persons to, from, within, or through from the country is 
not a significant problem.
                               __________

                         SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

    Saint Kitts and Nevis is a multi-party, parliamentary democracy and 
a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Constitution provides the 
smaller island of Nevis considerable self-government under a premier, 
as well as the right to secede from the Federation in accordance with 
certain enumerated procedures. The Government comprises a prime 
minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor 
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of 
state, with largely ceremonial powers. In national elections held on 
March 6, Denzil Douglas of the ruling St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party 
remained Prime Minister; his party won 8 of 11 seats in the 
legislature. The judiciary is independent; however, intimidation of 
witnesses in high-profile, drug-related cases is a problem.
    Security forces consist of a small police force, which includes a 
50-person Special Services Unit that receives some light infantry 
training, a coast guard, and a small defense force. The forces are 
controlled by and responsive to the Government. There were occasional 
allegations of abuse by the police.
    The mixed economy is based on sugar cane, tourism, and light 
industry. Most commercial enterprises are privately owned, but the 
sugar industry and 85 percent of arable land are owned by a state 
corporation. In 1998 and 1999, hurricanes caused an estimated $450 
million damage, affecting over 85 percent of the houses and buildings, 
greatly reduced sugar production, and caused significant losses in the 
tourism industry. However, during the year, construction, small 
manufacturing, and the services sector registered some improvement. Per 
capita gross domestic product remained about $7,000 in 1999.
    The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however, 
there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison conditions, apparent 
intimidation of witnesses and jurors, government restrictions on 
opposition access to government-controlled media, and violence against 
women were the principal problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture or other 
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the 
authorities observe this prohibition in practice. However, there were 
occasional allegations of excessive use of force by the police, 
particularly during the annual Carnival celebration or other special 
events. The police force conducts its own internal investigation when 
complaints are made against members.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners suffer from severe 
overcrowding and poor food, and security is lax. These conditions have 
contributed to riots in the past, although none has occurred since 
1994. The prison, built in 1840, was designed to accommodate 60 inmates 
but houses over 100 prisoners. A prison on Nevis houses 20 inmates. 
Female inmates are segregated from male prisoners; however, there are 
no separate facilities for juveniles.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects 
this provision in practice. The law requires that persons detained be 
charged within 48 hours or be released. If charged, the police must 
bring a detainee before a court within 72 hours. Family members, 
attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees regularly.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, intimidation of witnesses and potential 
intimidation of jurors in high-profile, drug-related cases threatened 
this traditional independence. The Government is exploring the 
possibility of a program to protect witnesses, judges, and jurors 
through the Caribbean Community.
    The court system comprises one high court and four magistrate's 
courts at the local level, with the right of appeal to the Eastern 
Caribbean Court of Appeal. Final appeal may be made to the Privy 
Council in the United Kingdom. Free legal assistance is available for 
indigent defendants in capital cases only.
    The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime must 
receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these requirements 
generally are observed. In the latter part of the year, approximately 
29 persons were being held on ``remand'' (detention pending trial or 
further court action). The length of remand varies according to offense 
and charges; persons may be held for days, weeks, or months.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law requires 
judicially issued warrants to search private homes.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and, for the most part, the 
authorities respected these provisions in practice.
    There are no daily newspapers; each of the major political parties 
publishes a weekly or biweekly newspaper. A third weekly newspaper is 
nonpartisan. The publications are free to criticize the Government and 
do so regularly and vigorously. International news publications are 
readily available.
    The Government owns the only radio and television station on St. 
Kitts, and these media generally did not adequately publicize rallies 
and other events held by opposition parties. A Trinidadian company 
manages the station; however, the Government appoints three of its five 
board members. There is a religious television station and a privately 
owned radio station on Nevis.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. Political parties 
organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings during the March 
election campaign without government interference.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests 
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There 
were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government by peaceful means, and citizens exercise this right in 
practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. A vigorous multi-party political system exists, in which 
political parties are free to conduct their activities. All citizens 18 
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. Despite 
some irregularities, orderly general elections were held in March.
    The Legislative Assembly has 11 elected seats; 8 for St. Kitts and 
3 for Nevis. The Government holds 8 of the 11 seats; opposition parties 
hold the other 3 seats. In the March elections, Douglas' St. Kitts and 
Nevis Labour Party won all eight seats on St. Kitts; the People's 
Action Movement (PAM) lost the one seat it had held. The Concerned 
Citizens Movement won two of the three Nevis seats; the Nevis Reform 
Party won the remaining one. The island of Nevis has considerable self-
government, with its own premier and legislature.
    In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, the Nevis 
Island Assembly in 1996 initiated steps towards secession from the 
Federation, the most recent being a referendum in August 1998 that 
failed to secure the required two-thirds majority for secession. 
However, the matter of secession remained open, and in October the 
newly appointed opposition leader publicly stated his desire to have 
``two separate governments.''
    Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
political opinion or affiliation, the former opposition party PAM 
alleges widespread employment discrimination by the St. Kitts and Nevis 
Labour Party against public sector employment of persons perceived to 
be PAM supporters. PAM alleged that the ruling party dismissed or 
demoted many PAM supporters from their jobs in order to replace them 
with its own supporters. The Government acknowledged that it had 
withheld pension benefits from opposition members of Parliament voted 
out of office but asserted that it had paid pension benefits to those 
entitled to them.
    There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation 
of women in leadership roles in government or political parties. There 
are 3 women in the Cabinet, 3 of 4 magistrates are women, the court 
registrar is female, and 7 of 20 permanent secretaries are female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights 
groups have been formed. There were no requests for investigations or 
visits by international human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place 
of origin, birth out of wedlock, political opinion or affiliation, 
color, sex, or creed, and the Government generally respects these 
provisions in practice.
    Women.--According to a government official, violence against women 
is a problem, but many women are reluctant to file complaints or pursue 
them in the courts. Despite this reluctance, there were publicly 
reported cases of both domestic violence and rape, and a few 
convictions. There is no legislation addressing domestic violence.
    The role of women in society is not restricted by law but is 
circumscribed by culture and tradition. There is no overt societal 
discrimination against women in employment, although sectoral analyses 
suggest that women do not yet occupy as many senior positions as men. 
The Bureau of Women's Affairs, under the Ministry of Health and Women's 
Affairs, is active in promoting change in the areas of domestic 
violence, poverty, health, institutional mechanisms to advance the 
status of women, and leadership positions for women. Since 1997 the 
Bureau has also been active in training the police and school guidance 
counselors on issues of domestic violence, sexual crimes, and child 
abuse.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare and has incorporated most of the provisions of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation. The 
law mandates compulsory education up to the age of 16; it is free and 
universal.
    People with Disabilities.--Although there is no legislation to 
protect the disabled or to mandate accessibility for them, the 
Government and the Constitution prohibit discrimination in employment, 
education, and other state services.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions. The law 
permits the police, civil service, and other organizations to have 
associations that serve as unions. The major labor union, the St. Kitts 
Trades and Labour Union, is associated closely with the St. Kitts and 
Nevis Labour Party and is active in all sectors of the economy. There 
is also a newly active teachers' union, a union representing 
dockworkers in the capital city, and two taxi drivers' associations.
    The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well 
established and respected in practice. Restrictions on striking by 
workers who provide essential services, such as the police and civil 
servants, are enforced by established practice and custom, but not by 
law. There were no major strikes during the year.
    Unions are free to form federations or confederations and to 
affiliate with international organizations. The islands' unions 
maintain a variety of international ties.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions 
are free to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for 
union members. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination but does not 
require employers found guilty of such action to rehire employees who 
were fired for union activities. However, the employer must pay lost 
wages and severance pay. There is no legislation governing the 
organization and representation of workers, and employers are not 
legally bound to recognize a union, but in practice employers do so if 
a majority of workers polled wish to organize. Collective bargaining 
takes place on a workplace-by- workplace basis, not industrywide. The 
Labor Commissioner mediates all types of disputes between labor and 
management on an ad hoc basis. However, in practice few disputes 
actually go to the Commissioner for resolution. If neither the 
Commissioner nor the Ministry of Labor are able to resolve the dispute, 
the law allows for a case to be brought before a civil court.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids slavery and forced labor, and they do not occur in practice. 
While neither the Constitution nor the law specifically address bonded 
labor, it has not been a problem in practice.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1966 Employment of Children Ordinance outlaws slavery, 
servitude, and forced labor, and prescribes the minimum legal working 
age, which is 14 years. The Labor Ministry relies heavily on school 
truant officers and the community affairs division to monitor 
compliance, which they do effectively. The law mandates compulsory 
education up to the age of 16. Although the law does not specifically 
address bonded labor, it has not been a problem in practice (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates for various 
categories of workers, such as domestic servants, retail employees, 
casino workers, and skilled workers, were last updated in 1994, and 
manufacturing sector wages were revised in 1996. The minimum wage 
varies from $56.18 (EC$ 150) per week for full-time domestic workers to 
$74.91 (EC$ 200) per week for skilled workers. These provide a barely 
adequate living for a wage earner and family; many workers supplement 
wages by keeping small animals such as goats and chickens. The Labor 
Commission undertakes regular wage inspections and special 
investigations when it receives complaints; it requires employers found 
in violation to pay back wages. The Government provides unemployment 
benefits to workers who lose their jobs temporarily or permanently.
    The law provides for a 40- to 44-hour workweek, but the common 
practice is 40 hours in 5 days. Although not required by law, workers 
receive at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law provides 
that workers receive a minimum annual vacation of 14 working days. 
While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the 
Factories Law provides general health and safety guidance to Labor 
Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety 
conditions. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments 
without jeopardy to continued employment; inspectors then investigate 
such claims, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to 
their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons.
    An ``economic citizenship'' program allows foreign investors to 
purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures involving cash 
inflows ranging from $200,000 (EC$540,000) to $285,000 (EC$770,000). 
This program reportedly has facilitated the illegal immigration of 
persons from China and other countries to North America where, in some 
instances, criminal organizations that provided the funds to such 
persons force them to work under conditions similar to bonded labor 
until their debt is repaid.
                               __________

                              SAINT LUCIA

    Saint Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member 
of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Government is composed of a prime 
minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. A Governor 
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of 
state, with largely ceremonial powers. In general elections in 1997, 
the Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) defeated the incumbent United 
Workers Party (UWP), gaining 16 of 17 seats in the House of Assembly. 
Dr. Kenny Anthony of the SLP assumed the prime ministership from the 
UWP's Dr. Vaughan Lewis. The judiciary is independent.
    The Royal Saint Lucia Police is the only security force and 
includes a small unit called the Special Services Unit (which has some 
paramilitary training) and a coast guard unit. They are controlled by 
and responsive to the Government. There were occasional allegations of 
abuse by the police.
    The economy is based on tourism and on the export of bananas, which 
represent the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings. Saint 
Lucia is diversifying its economy into other types of agriculture, 
light manufacturing, and construction. Unemployment, estimated at 21 
percent, remains a source of potential instability. Per capita gross 
domestic product for 1999 was provisionally estimated at $3,648.
    The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however, 
there were problems in a few areas. The major problems included an 
extrajudicial killing by police; occasional credible allegations of 
physical abuse of suspects or prisoners by the police; very poor prison 
conditions; some censorship; long delays in trials; and recurring 
domestic violence against women. Child neglect and abuse are problems. 
On December 31, a deadly attack on parishioners in a Catholic church, 
although believed to be an isolated act by disturbed persons, raised 
concerns about religious tolerance.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, there was one extrajudicial 
killing by police.
    On November 19, police shot and killed an escaped prisoner, Alfred 
Harding, who was jailed on charges of armed robbery and attempted 
murder. Harding, a Barbadian national, had escaped from prison in that 
country and also escaped from prison in Castries in July 1999. The 
police reported that he was killed while trying to flee, armed with an 
ice pick; some witnesses contradicted police reports and said that the 
police shot the prisoner after recapture, while he was subdued and held 
on the ground. Human rights groups criticized the police action as an 
example of the use of excessive force by police. The Minister for Home 
Affairs stated that an international group would be invited to conduct 
an impartial investigation; results still were pending at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there 
were no reports of such abuse. However, human rights groups assert that 
the police occasionally use excessive force.
    In July 1999, when the police recaptured escaped prisoner Alfred 
Harding (see Section 1.a.), they detained him in chains and shackles 
and kept him continuously in solitary confinement amid the general 
prison population. He filed a court case asserting that his rights were 
violated, but he was held in this manner until his human rights case 
was decided. In August the High Court awarded him $9,250 (EC$25,000) in 
compensation, stating that prison authorities were wrong in keeping him 
in shackles and solitary confinement for so long.
    Prison conditions are very poor. The island's only prison, built in 
the 1800's to house a maximum of 101 prisoners, was subject to severe 
overcrowding with over 340 inmates. The prison's conditions, 
overcrowding, and lengthy trial delays led to a prison riot in June 
1997; prisoners set fires that destroyed over half of the antiquated 
prison. The inmates asserted that the fires were part of a protest for 
improved prison conditions. Following the fires, the authorities 
transferred about 250 inmates to a factory shell outside the capital 
and stationed the paramilitary Special Services Unit at the prison. The 
prison since has been repaired, the majority of prisoners have been 
returned to the prison, and the Special Services Unit has ceased 
guarding the prison.
    Following the riots, the Government invited Penal Reform 
International (PRI), a London-based nongovernmental organization, to 
study the prison and make recommendations. Its recommendations included 
the release of prisoners awaiting trial for minor offenses and the 
introduction of noncustodial alternatives as a sentencing option. As a 
result of the PRI report, the authorities selected a new superintendent 
of prisons who took over in February 1998, established a permanent 
Complaints Board composed of prominent citizens to meet every month to 
hear prisoners' complaints, hired 24 new prison officials, and made 
some limited improvements to the facility. Despite these measures, 
inmates made another attempt to burn down the main prison facility in 
September 1998 but caused only limited damage. According to the 
superintendent, both the 1997 and the 1998 incidents of unrest occurred 
prior to the start of a new session of the High Court when prisoners on 
``remand'' (detention pending trial or further court action) discovered 
that their cases were not on the published list of cases to be heard. 
At any given time, there may be 100 or more prisoners on remand who 
have been denied bail and are awaiting trial.
    The Government started the groundwork for a new $17 million (EC$50 
million) prison in the more remote eastern part of the island in 1998. 
It was scheduled for completion during the year, but progress was 
delayed and officials expect it to be completed in 2001.
    The Government maintains a separate facility for women and in 
September there were 11 female prisoners. Conditions in the women's 
facility are somewhat better than those at the men's prison. Detained 
juveniles are held in the same facility as women.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government adheres 
to the constitutional provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest or 
imprisonment and require a court hearing within 72 hours after 
detention. However, the authorities frequently have held prisoners for 
years on remand after charging them (there is no constitutional 
requirement for a speedy trial). At the time of the 1997 prison riot, 
about 160 of the prisoners were on remand. For example, two foreign 
nationals, a Ghanaian and a Nigerian, have been held on remand since 
1996. These individuals are detained for immigration violations, 
pending resolution of who is to pay the expense of their deportations.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    There are two levels of courts: Courts of summary jurisdiction 
(magistrate's courts) and the High Court. Both levels have civil and 
criminal authority. The lower courts accept civil claims up to about 
$1,850 (EC$5,000) in value and criminal cases generally classified as 
``petty.'' The High Court has unlimited authority in both civil and 
criminal cases. All cases can be appealed to the Eastern Caribbean 
Court of Appeal. Cases may be appealed to the Privy Council in London 
as the final court of appeal.
    The Constitution requires public trials before an independent and 
impartial court and, in cases involving capital punishment, provision 
of legal counsel for those who cannot afford a defense attorney. In 
criminal cases not involving capital punishment, defendants must obtain 
their own legal counsel. Defendants are entitled to select their own 
legal counsel; are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court; and 
have the right of appeal. The authorities observe both constitutional 
and statutory requirements for fair public trials.
    However, the court system continued to face a serious backlog of 
cases. In the latter part of 1998, the magistrate's courts had a 
backlog of over 6,000 cases. Following an official study, in July 1999, 
the Government hired a new director of public prosecutions and provide 
him an assistant to attempt to speed up the trial process and reduce 
the backlog. His work and the flow of cases through the court system 
continue to be hampered by a shortage of magistrates and resources, and 
the backlog likely has not diminished. Previously, the Government had 
invited a team of justices from Australia to conduct a study and to 
make recommendations for reducing the backlog. The team issued a report 
(the Bauer report) in 1998. At year's end, the Government still was 
reviewing the report's recommendations.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanctions.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, some censorship is 
practiced. In September a representative of a small foreign publishing 
house arrived in the country from Martinique with a number of books. 
Customs authorities seized 57 of them under a law that bans certain 
books. The authorities returned 37 of the books but kept the others for 
further review. The publisher questioned the banning and confiscation 
as a violation of freedom of speech. A number of the books seized were 
on religion or religious themes (see Section 2.c.).
    There are five privately owned newspapers, two privately owned 
radio stations, and one partially government-funded radio station. They 
carry a wide spectrum of political opinion and are often critical of 
the Government. The radio stations have discussion and call-in programs 
that allow persons to express their views. The two local television 
stations also are owned privately and cover a wide range of views. In 
addition there is subscription cable television service, which provides 
programming from a variety of sources.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. The law requires permits for public meetings 
and demonstrations if they are to be held in public places, such as 
streets, sidewalks, or parks. The police routinely grant such permits; 
the rare refusal generally stems from the failure of organizers to 
request the permit in a timely manner, normally 48 hours before the 
event.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. However, 
a number of the books customs authorities seized in September were on 
religion or religious themes, including titles such as The Egyptian 
Book of the Dead, The Greater Key of Solomon, The Lost Books of the 
Bible, and The Ancient Mysteries of Melchizedek (see Section 2.a.).
    On December 31, two men alleged to be members of the Rastafarian 
movement attacked a Sunday Mass in a Catholic Church. They killed a 
nun, set the priest on fire, and wounded 12 other persons. At year's 
end, the authorities brought charges of murder and arson against the 
two men, and the investigation continued. Rastafarian leaders 
criticized the attack, and Archdiocese representatives criticized what 
they termed ``an atmosphere of intolerance'' and a ``callous disrespect 
for authority'' in the country. The Government criticized the attack as 
the work of mentally disturbed persons who underscored the plight of 
``impoverished and marginalized youth'' alienated from societal norms.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests 
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There 
were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim 
to refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and exercised 
that right in 1997 when the SLP defeated the UWP, which had governed 
with only one interruption since 1964. The SLP won 16 of 17 seats, 
campaigning on a platform of job creation and economic diversification 
and appealing explicitly to women and younger voters. In response to 
concerns about the size of the SLP's parliamentary majority, Prime 
Minister Anthony publicly emphasized that the Government would make 
efforts to reach out to the opposition to ensure that the country's 
democratic traditions were not undermined by the small size of the 
parliamentary opposition. The 1996 merger of smaller parties--the 
Concerned Citizens' Movement, the Saint Lucia Freedom Party, and the 
Citizens' Democratic Party--into the SLP left the country with only two 
major political parties. The Governor General, who had been affiliated 
with the UWP, stepped down following the elections. He was replaced by 
Pearlette Louisy.
    Under the Constitution, general elections must be held at least 
every 5 years by secret ballot, but may be held earlier at the 
discretion of the government in power. Two members of the Senate are 
independent, appointed by the Governor General.
    There are no legal impediments to participation by women and 
minorities in government and politics; however, they are 
underrepresented. Two of the 13 members of the Cabinet are women, as is 
the Governor General.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally does not restrict international or 
nongovernmental investigations of alleged violations of human rights. 
In some cases it has requested international organizations to 
investigate possible abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution does not address discrimination specifically; 
however, government policy is nondiscriminatory in the areas of 
housing, jobs, education, and opportunity for advancement. There are no 
legal restrictions on the role of women or minorities.
    Women.--There is increased awareness of the seriousness of violence 
against women. The Government does not prosecute crimes of violence 
against women unless the victim presses charges. If the victim chooses 
for any reason not to press charges, the Government cannot bring a 
case. Charges must be brought under the ordinary Civil Code. In 1997 
the Government established a family court to hear cases of domestic 
violence and crimes against women and children.
    The police force conducts some training for police officers 
responsible for investigating rape and other crimes against women, but 
there is no special unit that handles crimes against women. Police and 
courts enforce laws to protect women against abuse, although police are 
hesitant to intervene in domestic disputes, and many victims are 
reluctant to report cases of domestic violence and rape or to press 
charges.
    The 1994 Domestic Violence Act allows a judge to issue a protection 
order prohibiting an abuser from entering or remaining in the place 
where the victim is. It also allows the judge to order that an abuser's 
name be removed from housing leases or rental agreements, with the 
effect that the abuser would no longer have the right to live in the 
same residence as the victim.
    The Saint Lucia Crisis Center for women was established in 1988 in 
Castries, the capital; a second opened in the southern town of Vieux 
Fort in January 1999. These centers monitor cases of physical and 
emotional abuse and help clients deal with such problems as incest, 
alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, nonpayment of child support, 
custody, and visitation rights. The Crisis Center has publicized the 
plight of battered women and has protested the rare deaths of women who 
were victims of domestic violence. The organizers continued to work to 
establish a shelter for battered women and homeless girls; however, no 
progress had been made at year's end. The Crisis Center reports that 
the number of new cases declined since the establishment of the family 
court because women can seek help in two places. Some secondary schools 
address the problems of sexual harassment and battering in their 
curriculum topics.
    Women's affairs come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Health, Human Services, Family Affairs, and Women. The Minister is 
responsible for protecting women's rights in domestic violence cases 
and preventing discrimination against women, including ensuring equal 
treatment in employment.
    Children.--Since independence, successive governments have given 
high priority to improving educational opportunities and health care 
for the nation's children. Education is free and compulsory from age 5 
through 15. However, only about one-third of primary school children 
continue on to secondary schools, and the drop-out rate from primary to 
secondary school is higher for boys than for girls. Government clinics 
provide prenatal care, immunization, child health care, and health 
education services throughout the island.
    A broad legal framework exists for the protection of children 
through the Criminal Code, the Children and Young Persons Act, the 
Family Court Act, the Domestic Violence Act, and the Attachment of 
Earnings Act. Although the Government adopted a national plan of action 
in November 1991 for the survival, protection, and development of 
children, it still has not fulfilled this program by implementing 
effective programs. The Saint Lucia Crisis Center reported that the 
incidence of child abuse remains high. There were reports of abandoned 
children at times roaming the streets with no organized, fully 
functioning safety net or adequate supporting institutions to assist 
them. There are no specific laws enacted to cover foster care, 
adoptions, and child welfare social services.
    People with Disabilities.--No specific legislation protects the 
rights of the disabled, nor mandates provision of access to buildings 
or government services for them. There is no rehabilitation facility 
for the physically disabled, although the Health Ministry operates a 
community-based rehabilitation program in residents' homes. There are 
schools for the deaf and for the blind up to the secondary level. There 
is also a school for the mentally retarded.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution specifies the right 
of workers to form or belong to trade unions under the broader rubric 
of the right of association. Most public sector employees are 
unionized; about 20 percent of the total work force is unionized. 
Unions are independent of government and are free to choose their own 
representatives in often vigorously contested elections. There are no 
restrictions on the formation of national labor federations. In 1994 
several of the major unions formed an umbrella grouping called the 
Industrial Solidarity Pact.
    Strikes in both the public and private sectors are legal, but there 
are many avenues through collective bargaining agreements and 
government procedures that may preclude a strike. The law prohibits 
members of the police and fire departments from striking. Other 
``essential services'' workers--water and sewer authority workers, 
electric utility workers, nurses, and doctors--must give 30 days' 
notice before striking.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, and 
some have done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--On January 11, 
the Registration Status and Recognition of Trade Unions and Employer 
Organizations Act entered into effect. Unions have the legal right to 
engage in collective bargaining, and they fully exercise this right. 
Although union representatives have reported attempts by the Government 
and other employers to undermine this process, the new law is viewed 
widely as prounion, and it has resulted in increased organizational 
activity by unions.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and there 
are effective mechanisms for resolving complaints. It also requires 
that employers reinstate workers fired for union activities.
    Labor law is applicable in the export processing zones (EPZ's), and 
there are no administrative or legal impediments to union organizing or 
collective bargaining in those zones. However, in practice many firms 
resist union efforts to organize in the EPZ's, but there has been some 
progress because of the new law.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. 
While there is no specific prohibition of forced or bonded labor by 
children, there were no reports of such practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--While the Children and Young Persons Act permits a minimum 
legal working age of 14 years, education legally is required through 
age 15. Ministry of Labor officials are responsible for enforcing the 
law. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws. The 
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Wages Regulations (Clerks) 
Orders, in effect since 1985, set out minimum wage rates only for 
clerks. These office workers receive a legislated minimum wage of about 
$300 (EC$800) per month. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide 
a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but some 
categories of workers receive more than the legal minimum for clerks, 
which is used only as a guide for setting pay for other professions.
    There is no legislated workweek, although the common practice is to 
work 40 hours in 5 days. Special legislation covers hours that shop 
assistants, agricultural workers, domestics, and young people in 
industrial establishments may work.
    Occupational health and safety regulations are relatively well 
developed. The Labor Ministry periodically inspects health and safety 
conditions at places of employment under the Employees' Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1985. The Ministry enforces the act through 
threat of closure of the business if it discovers violations and the 
violator does not correct them. Workers are free to leave a dangerous 
workplace situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were 
trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                    SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

    St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a multiparty, parliamentary 
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime 
minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly compose the 
Government. The Governor General, appointed by the British monarch, is 
the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers. During the 
spring, divisive general strikes were settled only because Prime 
Minister Sir James F. Mitchell, whose New Democratic Party (NDP) had 
won an unprecedented fourth term in June 1998 by a slim margin, agreed 
to resign, with elections to be held by March 31, 2001. On October 27, 
Mitchell resigned, and Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian, replaced 
him. The judiciary is independent.
    The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the 
country, includes a coast guard and a small Special Services Unit (SSU) 
with some paramilitary training, that is often accused of using 
excessive force. The force is controlled by and responsive to the 
Government, but police continued to commit some human rights abuses.
    St. Vincent has a market-based economy. Much of the labor force is 
engaged in agriculture. Bananas are the leading export and a major 
source of foreign exchange earnings. However, the banana industry is 
declining, and the growing tourism sector is becoming the leading 
earner of foreign exchange. Unemployment is estimated to be 35 percent, 
and the 1999 per capita gross domestic product was approximately 
$2,550.
    The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however, 
there were problems in a few areas. The police SSU was accused of an 
extrajudicial killing. Other principal human rights problems continued 
to include occasional instances of excessive use of force by police, 
the Government's failure to punish adequately those responsible for 
such abuses, poor prison conditions, and an overburdened court system. 
Violence against women and abuse of children also were problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In March the police SSU shot and killed David Browne as they were 
taking him into custody for building a shack on the grounds of a 
secondary school. The police said he sustained an accidental but fatal 
shot to the temple when he resisted arrest. Human rights activists 
called for an inquiry and claimed that the police SSU used excessive 
and injudicious force leading to the death.
    On December 14, 1999, a police antidrug patrol shot and killed 
Junior Harry, who they said was fleeing while the patrol conducted a 
search for narcotics in buildings near the town of Barrouallie. A 
police spokesman said that Harry was armed with a shotgun. Although the 
authorities planned to hold an inquest to establish whether police used 
excessive force, there was no information as to the results of any such 
inquiry.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, regional 
human rights groups have noted that a high percentage of convictions 
are based on confessions. One human rights group believes that some of 
these confessions resulted from unwarranted police practices, including 
the use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure, 
and failure to inform properly those arrested of their rights.
    There is no independent review board to monitor police activity and 
to hear public complaints about police misconduct. Human rights 
advocates recommend such a board to protect the rights of citizens who 
complain about police misconduct.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prison buildings are antiquated and 
overcrowded, with one holding an average of 300 inmates in a building 
designed for 75, which results in serious health and safety problems. 
An inmate who wishes to speak with his lawyer must do so by written 
correspondence, and the authorities sometimes monitor and censor such 
correspondence.
    In July 1999, prisoners rioted and seized control of the prison, 
protesting poor conditions and treatment. The Government acceded to a 
number of the prisoners' demands; however, conditions did not change 
significantly. In the spring, prisoners again demonstrated, and the 
Government appointed a former SSU commander as the new Superintendent 
of Prisons. Local human rights activists have acknowledged that he has 
tried to improve internal communications and training for prison 
personnel. However, the Government has not implemented any of the 
recommendations made by a Commission of Inquiry following the July-
August 1999 disturbances.
    In August identified prisoners whipped another prisoner, burned him 
with acid, and cut a piece of his ear off with a knife. The assaulted 
inmate asserted that this action was carried out as punishment when he 
had not supplied them with drugs after he had been released earlier 
from jail. Prison officials asserted that police failed to respond to 
arrest the inmates who had tortured and mutilated this prisoner.
    Prison officials expressed frustration with the lack of resources, 
proper training, personnel, and progress in securing a new facility. 
The jail is in the center of the capital city with low walls that are 
accessible to passers-by. Prison guards are known at times to 
collaborate with prisoners in corrupt and illegal practices. Some 
guards have been disciplined for engaging in sexual acts with inmates. 
Reportedly, guards also supply drugs and other contraband or stand by 
while rough, abusive, or inhuman prison punishment is meted out either 
by fellow prisoners or other guards.
    There is a separate section for female inmates in the prison.
    Conditions are inadequate for juvenile offenders. There is a small 
facility for delinquent boys; however, it is not financed by the 
Government and depends upon donations. As a result, it is in disrepair 
and only houses a small number of boys. Youngsters may be charged and 
convicted as criminals from the age of 8. In such cases, youngsters may 
then be jailed with older criminals. Although separate legal statutes 
exist for youthful offenders, there are no separate magistrates, 
prosecutors, or procedures to handle such cases.
    The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that persons detained for criminal offenses must receive a 
fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court. Although 
there are only two official magistrates, the registrar of the High 
Court and the presiding judge of the family court effectively serve as 
magistrates when called upon to do so. While this practice reduced the 
backlog, complaints continue regarding police practices in bringing 
cases to court. Some defense attorneys claim that this has caused 6- to 
12-month delays in preliminary inquiries for serious crimes.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent and impartial court, and the judiciary is independent in 
practice.
    The judiciary consists of lower courts and a High Court, with 
appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and final appeal to the 
Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There are three magistrates, as 
well as one magistrate who serves only the family court.
    The Constitution provides for public trials. The court appoints 
attorneys for indigent defendants only when the defendant is charged 
with a capital offense. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven 
guilty and may appeal verdicts and penalties. There is a large backlog 
of pending cases. In January a fire destroyed offices with records in 
the magistrates' court. The family court handled some cases, but the 
backlog increased. The court reopened in September with 1 day per week 
set aside to handle an increasing workload of drug-related cases. The 
court docket may average 55-60 cases a day, when reasonably only 5 to 7 
may be heard, adjudicated, or disposed.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and 
seizure or other government intrusions into the private life of 
individual citizens, and there were no reports of such abuses.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice.
    There are two major newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan 
publications; all are privately owned, and most are openly critical of 
the Government's policies. There were no reports of government 
censorship or interference with the operation of the press. However, 
individual journalists believe that government advertising, a 
significant source of revenue, sometimes is withheld from newspapers 
that publish articles that are less than favorable to the Government.
    The lone television station in St. Vincent is privately owned and 
operates without government interference. Satellite dishes are popular 
among those who can afford them. There is also a cable system with 
mainly North American programming that has over 300 subscribers. The 
Government controls programming for the government-owned radio station.
    The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests 
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There 
were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim to 
refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government through 
regularly scheduled free and fair elections. St. Vincent has a long 
history of multiparty parliamentary democracy. During the June 1998 
election, the ruling New Democratic Party won a slim 1-seat majority (8 
of 15) in Parliament, despite losing the popular vote by a 55 to 45 
percent margin to the opposition Unity Labour Party (ULP). Calling this 
outcome an ``overt manifestation of rejection by the public'' of Prime 
Minister Mitchell's Government, the ULP made claims of election fraud 
and demanded new elections.
    The Prime Minister refused the ULP demand and instead proposed a 
constitutional review to consider possible amendments, such as a 
provision for proportional representation. Lingering dissatisfaction 
led to thousands of persons participating in rallies and strikes in 
April and May calling for the Prime Minister's resignation. A rally by 
the Organization in Defense of Democracy, comprised of leading private 
and public sector unions, said new elections should be held immediately 
and threatened ``a total shutdown of the country'' on May 3. After 
mediation by regional figures, the Prime Minister and his ruling NDP 
signed a six-point agreement known as the Grand Beach Accord, which 
confirmed that the Prime Minister would resign by January 2001 and call 
early elections before March 31, 2001. On October 27, Mitchell resigned 
and was replaced by Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian. In November 
leaders of the three political parties signed a ``Code of Conduct'' 
intended to govern the campaign period. It includes a pledge of equal 
time on local radio and other electronic media and an agreement not to 
incite or encourage violence.
    There are no legal impediments to women's full participation in 
politics or government; however, they are underrepresented. There is 
only one woman in Parliament, as a member of the opposition.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press often comment 
on human rights matters of local concern. The St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA) monitors government and 
police activities, especially with respect to treatment of prisoners, 
publicizing any cases of abuse. The Government generally is responsive 
to public and private inquiries about its human rights practices.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law 
regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government adheres to 
this provision.
    Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence, 
remains a major problem. The Government took legislative steps to 
address this problem through the Domestic Violence/Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act (1994) and the more accessible Domestic Violence 
Summary Proceedings Act (1995). Both laws provide for protective 
orders, as well as occupation and tenancy orders; the former only is 
accessible through the High Court, but the latter can be obtained 
without the services of a lawyer in family court. Since passage of the 
laws, the SVGHRA has conducted numerous seminars and workshops 
throughout the country to familiarize citizens with their rights under 
these acts. Increasing numbers of women are coming forward with 
domestic violence complaints.
    Depending on the magnitude of the offense and the age of the 
victim, the punishment for rape is generally 10 or more years in 
prison.
    A 1995 amendment to the Child Support Law allows for payments 
ordered by the courts, even when notice of an appeal has been filed. 
Previously, fathers who had been ordered to pay child support could 
appeal decisions and not pay while the appeal was being heard. This 
resulted in a huge backlog of appeal cases and effectively reduced the 
number of mothers and children receiving support payments. There is a 
family court in the capital city of Kingstown with one magistrate. 
According to the SVGHRA, because there is only one bailiff to service 
all the country, summonses often are not served on time for cases to be 
heard as scheduled in court.
    The Ministry of Education, Women's Affairs, and Culture has a 
women's desk that assists the National Council of Women with seminars, 
training programs, and public relations. The minimum wage law specifies 
that women should receive equal pay for equal work.
    Marion House, a social services agency established by the Catholic 
Church in 1989 and staffed by four trained counselors and three foreign 
volunteers, provides counseling and therapy services.
    Children.--Education is not compulsory, but the Government states 
that it investigates cases in which children are withdrawn from school 
before the age of 16. Although the Government has played a more 
prominent role in legislating health and welfare standards since 
independence, the infant mortality rate is still very high. One 
underlying cause is the large number of children born to teenage 
mothers.
    The Domestic Violence Summary Proceedings Act provides a limited 
legal framework for the protection of children. Nevertheless, reports 
of child abuse remain high and are on the increase. The Social Welfare 
Office is the government agency responsible for monitoring and 
protecting the welfare of children. The police are the enforcement arm; 
the Social Welfare Office refers all reports of child abuse to the 
police for action.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation 
addressing persons with disabilities, and the circumstances for 
disabled individuals are generally difficult. Most severely disabled 
persons rarely leave their homes because of the poor road system and 
lack of affordable wheelchairs. The Government partially supports a 
school for the disabled which has two branches. A separate, small 
rehabilitation center treats about five persons daily.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides citizens 
the right to form unions and to organize employees, and the Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Act allows the right to strike. Employers 
often ignore the constitutional provisions that provide for union 
rights, and claim that they have a constitutional right not to 
recognize a trade union. However, some employers seek a good industrial 
relations environment and cooperate with trade unions.
    In April and May, thousands of persons, including members of 
leading private and public sector unions, participated in rallies and 
strikes calling for the Prime Minister's resignation (see Section 3). 
Other than these, there were no major strikes during the year.
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined the International Labor 
Organization in 1997 and assumed all its obligations for enforcement of 
labor standards.
    Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are no 
legal obstacles to organizing unions; however, no law requires 
employers to recognize a particular union as an exclusive bargaining 
agent. Some companies offer packages of benefits with terms of 
employment better than, or comparable to, what a union normally can 
obtain through negotiations. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination 
by employers. Generally effective mechanisms exist for resolving 
complaints. The authorities may order employers found guilty of 
antiunion discrimination for firing workers without cause (including 
for participation in union activities) to reinstate the workers or give 
them severance pay.
    According to press reports in August and September, seven workers 
at the East Caribbean Group of Companies (ECGC--an agricultural 
manufacturing concern)--six of whom were executive members of a newly 
formed, government-registered ECGC Workers Union--were fired for 
``undisclosed reasons'' following a 2-day sick-out. Shortly thereafter, 
Labor Minister Jerry Scott intervened in an attempt to resolve the 
matter, but the ECGC board refused to reinstate the workers. Instead, 
they provided fired workers with a severance package that included a 
statement that these workers had conspired to close down the company.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The 
Government does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by 
children, but there were no reports that it occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law sets the minimum working age at 16 years of age, 
although a worker must be 18 years of age to receive a national 
insurance card. The labor inspection office of the Ministry of Labor 
monitors and enforces this provision, and employers generally respect 
it in practice. The age of leaving school at the primary level is 15 
years; when these pupils leave school, they usually are absorbed into 
the labor market disguised as apprentices. There is no known child 
labor except for children working on family-owned banana plantations, 
particularly during harvest time, or in family-owned cottage 
industries. The Government does not prohibit specifically forced or 
bonded labor by children, but there were no reports that it occurred 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, 
which were last promulgated in 1989. They vary by sector and type of 
work and are specified for several skilled categories, including 
attendants, packers, cleaners, porters, watchmen, and clerks. In 
agriculture the wage for workers provided shelter is $0.82 (EC$2.25) 
per hour; skilled industrial workers earn $7.36 (EC$20) per day, and 
unskilled workers earn $3.68 (EC$10) per day. In many sectors the 
minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family, but most workers earn more than the minimum. 
The Wages Council, according to law, should meet every 2 years to 
review the minimum wage, but it has not met since 1989.
    There is no legislation concerning the length of the workweek; 
however, the general practice is to work 40 hours in 5 days. The law 
provides workers a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks.
    According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning 
occupational safety and health is outdated. The most recent 
legislation, the Factories Act of 1955, has some regulations concerning 
only factories, but enforcement of these regulations is ineffective. 
Workers enjoy a reasonably safe working environment; however, the trade 
unions have dealt with some violations relating to safety gear, long 
overtime hours, and the safety of machinery. There were some reports of 
significant visual deficiency by visual display unit workers, and some 
reports of hearing impairment by power station and stone crushing 
employees. It was not clear under present legislation whether workers 
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger 
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically 
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons 
were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                SURINAME

    After over a decade of predominantly military rule, Suriname 
installed a freely elected Parliament and inaugurated a democratically 
chosen president in 1991. After free and fair elections in May, the new 
51-member National Assembly elected Ronald Venetiaan of the National 
Party of Suriname (NPS) as President in August with the necessary two-
thirds majority required by the Constitution; he replaced Jules 
Wijdenbosch of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Venetiaan had 
previously served as President in 1991-96. The Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary, and previous disputes over appointees by 
the former president were alleviated when the appointees in question 
resigned from the judiciary; by year's end, the judiciary appeared to 
be acting independently.
    The armed forces are responsible for national security and border 
and immigration control; they are under the control of the civilian 
Minister of Defense. Civilian police bear primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of law and order; they report to the Ministry of 
Justice and Police. The first Venetiaan Government had reformed the 
military in 1995-96 by purging military officers and supporters of 
former dictator Desi Bouterse, who ruled the country in the 1980's. 
Although in the May elections Bouterse's party won 10 seats in the 
National Assembly, 1 of which he occupies, the party's influence within 
the military has declined steadily. Members of the security forces 
continue to commit some human rights abuses.
    The economy depends heavily on the export of bauxite derivatives. 
Unregulated gold mining is an increasingly important economic activity 
that highlights a lack of land rights for indigenous and tribal people, 
and it has a serious environmental impact. The Government and state-
owned companies employ over half the working population. Overall 
economic conditions deteriorated during the year, and estimated gross 
domestic product declined by approximately 4 percent. The inflation 
rate was 82 percent, compared with 113 percent in 1999. Per capita 
annual income was about $1,000.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, serious problems still remain in some areas. Police 
mistreat detainees, particularly during arrests; guards abuse 
prisoners; and local detention facilities remain overcrowded. The 
judiciary suffers from ineffectiveness and a huge case backlog. There 
was some harassment and media self-censorship, and societal 
discrimination against women and indigenous and tribal people persists. 
Violence against women and trafficking in women and girls are problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    While there have been no recent reports of political killings, the 
Government has not addressed past abuses, and they continue to be a 
focus of concern. The authorities have not taken action against prison 
guards who allegedly beat a prisoner to death in 1993. Late in the 
year, the Government began an investigation into the December 1982 
executions by the Bouterse regime of 15 opposition leaders; there has 
yet to be an investigation into the 1986 massacre of civilians at the 
village of Moiwana.
    In December 1997, the Wijdenbosch administration appointed a 
``committee to establish the framework for a commission to investigate 
past human rights abuses.'' Human rights groups, which had been 
pressing since 1995 for an independent human rights commission to 
investigate violations committed during the 1980's, neither were 
informed nor consulted prior to the establishment of the committee. 
Moreover, the chairman of the committee was reportedly a member of 
Bouterse's team of legal advisers; his appointment raised questions 
regarding the objectivity of the group's work. Although the committee's 
report was presented to the former President in September 1999, the 
Government did not release its contents or recommendations. In view of 
the human rights record of the Bouterse regime, many of whose members 
participated in the Wijdenbosch Government, human rights organizations 
remained concerned about the potential for a deterioration of civil 
liberties.
    After the elections, there were calls for the new Government to 
investigate the December 1982 murders before the 18-year statute of 
limitations expired in December. In October the Court of Justice began 
hearings on the murders in response to a request from relatives of the 
victims. Bouterse's lawyer sought to postpone the hearings, but the 
court denied his request. The court heard testimony from the victims' 
relatives, human rights activists, and the prosecutor's office, which 
had not yet made any investigation into the killings. Previously, 
Bouterse himself had requested an investigation, after the victims' 
relatives asked a Dutch court to prosecute him in that country. 
Following an order from the Court of Justice, an examining judge called 
for a full investigation into the 1982 murders, including the actions 
of 36 suspects.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    However, the new Government has yet to take any action to 
investigate allegations of some disappearances that occurred under 
previous regimes.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman treatment or 
punishment, but human rights groups continue to express concern about 
official mistreatment and have documented cases of police mistreatment 
of detainees, particularly during arrests, and guard abuse of 
prisoners.
    Prison conditions are poor. There are three state prisons and 
several detention facilities at police stations, where arrestees are 
detained until they appear before a judge for trial. Human rights 
activists are concerned about conditions in the prisons and especially 
about conditions in local detention facilities. They report that the 
jails are overcrowded, that guards mistreat prisoners, and that medical 
care and living conditions are inadequate. Police officers, who are not 
trained in prison work, serve as the jailers at local detention 
facilities, a situation that human rights groups assert contributes to 
the abuses.
    Women's jail and prison facilities and conditions are, in general, 
better than the men's facilities and conditions. There is a wing of an 
adult prison for boys under age 18 who have committed serious crimes. 
Juvenile facilities for boys between the ages of 11 and 18 within the 
adult prison were adequate; educational and recreational facilities 
were provided.
    In February 1999, the human rights group Moiwana '86 issued a 
report that accused prison officials at two of the federal prisons of 
using electrical shocks to discipline prisoners. The report further 
asserted that different ethnic groups receive different forms and 
degrees of punishments. Prison officials denied the accusations, and 
the Government took no investigative action. Moiwana '86 did not pursue 
the issue further.
    The completion of a new prison and renovation of existing jails 
have reduced somewhat the problems and improved overall health and 
safety conditions. However, the older jails remain seriously 
overcrowded, with as many as four times the number of detainees for 
which they were designed. In addition these older prisons are 
unsanitary. At police stations, guards allow detainees no exercise and 
only rarely permit them to leave their cells. Detainees and human 
rights groups also complain about inadequate prison meals, although 
families are permitted and encouraged to provide food to incarcerated 
relatives. Local detention facilities remain overcrowded.
    Since 1996 Moiwana '86 has monitored the condition of prisoners. 
Representatives of the group report that in general they have access to 
prisoners and receive cooperation from prison officials on routine 
matters. Moiwana '86 and the police cooperated to develop a detention 
officer training program for police guards working at the local 
detention facilities. The program consists of lectures given at the 
state prison to both guards and prisoners.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally respect 
these provisions in practice. However, delays have caused prisoners who 
appeal their sentences to remain in prison until a ruling is reached on 
their appeal, even if they have served the full term of their original 
sentence. Lawyers have filed complaints, but the problem has not been 
resolved.
    The law provides that the police may detain for investigation for 
up to 14 days a person suspected of committing a crime for which the 
sentence is longer than 4 years. During the 14-day period, the law also 
permits incommunicado detention, which must be authorized by an 
assistant district attorney or a police inspector. Within the 14-day 
period, the police must bring the accused before a prosecutor to be 
charged formally. If additional time is needed to investigate the 
charge, a prosecutor may authorize the police to detain the suspect for 
an additional 30 days. Upon the expiration of the initial 44 days, a 
judge of instruction may authorize the police to hold the suspect for 
up to 120 additional days, in 30-day increments (for a total of 164 
days), before the case is tried. The judge of instruction has the power 
to authorize release on bail, but that power is used rarely, if ever.
    Pretrial detainees, who constitute a large percentage of inmates, 
routinely are held without being brought before a judge. They often are 
held in overcrowded detention cells at local police stations. Of those 
held in police custody or detention cells, a steadily growing number 
already had been convicted but not yet placed in prisons.
    The military police continued to observe the requirement to hand 
over to the civil police civilians arrested for committing a crime in 
their presence. The military police continued to maintain 
responsibility for control of the country's borders and airports, but 
it no longer investigated civilian crimes.
    The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced exile; 
however, it is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary, an ongoing dispute between the previously 
sitting judges and a new slate appointed by the former Government 
severely damaged the concept of an independent judiciary. However, the 
change in government led to the resignations of the disputed judges. 
The new Government appointed an acting president of the Court of 
Justice and named the Solicitor General to act also as Attorney 
General. As a result of the conflict, the effectiveness of the civilian 
and military courts still was limited in practice, but at year's end, 
the judiciary appeared to be acting independently.
    The judicial system consists of three lower courts and an appeals 
court, which is called the Court of Justice; there is no Supreme Court. 
In July 1998, President Wijdenbosch named a new President of the Court 
of Justice and Prosecutor General without consulting with, and over the 
objections of, the sitting justices. Most legal authorities interpret 
the Constitution to require that consultation, and the members of the 
court refused to recognize the named President of the court or 
Prosecutor General. In spite of the continued objections, President 
Wijdenbosch named additional justices without consultation in December 
1998. In May 1999, the appointed President of the Court of Justice 
first swore in himself, and then he swore in the new justices. With the 
change in Government, the President of the Court and other disputed 
judges resigned. The 1987 Constitution calls for the establishment of 
an independent constitutional court. Although the previous Government 
did not take any steps to set up such a court, at year's end the 
Venetiaan Government was assembling a group of judges to sit on the 
court.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial in 
which defendants have the right to counsel if needed. The courts assign 
lawyers in private practice to defend indigent prisoners and pays 
lawyers from public funds. However, the court-assigned lawyers usually 
only appear at the trial, if they appear at all. The courts must, and 
in practice do, free a detainee who is not tried within the 164-day 
period. In one instance, a court levied a fine against the Government 
for failing to release detainees as directed by the court. Trials are 
before a single judge, with the right of appeal. Due to the conflict 
over the legitimacy of the president of the Court and the justices, 
there is a large backlog in the judicial system.
    Military personnel generally are not subject to civilian criminal 
law. A soldier accused of a crime immediately comes under military 
jurisdiction, and military police are responsible for all such 
investigations. Military prosecutions are directed by an officer on the 
public prosecutor's staff and take place in separate courts before two 
military judges and one civilian judge. The military courts follow the 
same rules of procedure as the civil courts. There is no appeal from 
the military to the civil system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy. 
The law requires warrants for searches, which are issued by quasi-
judicial officers who supervise criminal investigations. The police 
obtain them in the great majority of investigations. There have been 
complaints of surveillance of human rights workers by members of the 
military police and the division of central intelligence. There is 
still a threat of forced resettlement of indigenous populations due to 
the granting of timber and gold concessions (see Section 5).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights; however, in practice there were reports of 
intimidation and harassment.
    The parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition criticize the 
Government freely. Some media members continue to practice some self-
censorship because of the history of intimidation and reprisals by 
certain elements of the former military leadership.
    The Wijdenbosch Government publicly reprimanded radio stations and 
newspapers for their negative coverage of protest demonstrations that 
took place in May 1999. Although the Government threatened to censor 
the press, it ultimately took no action, and there continued to be 
reports unfavorable to the Government.
    In April one of the two daily newspapers, De West, was firebombed 
one night. At year's end, the incident remained under investigation.
    On July 24, a group of Bouterse supporters harassed and attempted 
to beat a journalist outside the National Assembly. The journalist was 
known to be critical of Bouterse, and the attack took place the first 
day Bouterse occupied his new seat in the Assembly. The police 
intervened, but the Bouterse supporters threatened to find the 
journalist anywhere in the country.
    The two daily newspapers, five television stations, and most of the 
radio stations are owned privately. Two television stations and two 
radio stations are owned publicly. Four companies provide cable 
television, which includes international channels. Two companies, one 
private and one public, offer unrestricted access to electronic media.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. However, in response to a series of public 
demonstrations in May 1999, the Government announced that it intended 
to begin enforcing a 1930's law requiring a permit to hold a public 
demonstration or gathering. After the announcement, in late July 1999, 
the authorities detained two opposition leaders for demonstrating 
without a permit but quickly released them. Subsequent public marches 
were allowed to proceed without permits.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may change their residence and 
workplaces freely and may travel abroad as they wish. Political 
dissidents who emigrated to the Netherlands and elsewhere during the 
years of military rule are welcome to return. Few of them have chosen 
to do so, generally for economic reasons. Citizenship is not revoked 
for political reasons.
    Although it is possible for persons to be granted refugee status 
under special circumstances, there are no provisions in the law for 
granting asylum or refugee status in accordance with the standards of 
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not 
arise. There were no reports of forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for this right, but in the past the 
military prevented its effective exercise. Although the military twice 
has transferred power to elected civilian governments following coups, 
2000 marked the second time since independence from the Netherlands in 
1975 that one elected government succeeded another in accordance with 
constitutional provisions. The Government is still in the process of 
institutionalizing democratic, constitutional rule.
    The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with the 
citizens and provides for the right to change the government through 
the direct election by secret ballot of a National Assembly of 51 
members every 5 years. The National Assembly then elects the President 
by a two-thirds vote. If the legislature is unable to do so, as was the 
case both in the 1991 and 1996 national elections, the Constitution 
provides that a national people's assembly, composed of Members of 
Parliament and regional and local officials, shall elect the President.
    The Constitution provides for the organization and functioning of 
political parties. Many parties and political coalitions are 
represented in the National Assembly. After the May elections, 
President Venetiaan formed a cabinet from members of the New Front 
coalition, comprised of the NPS, a predominantly Creole party; the 
Progressive Reform Party, a predominantly Hindustani party; the 
Suriname Labor Party, a political wing of the largest labor union; and 
Pertjaja Luhur, a predominantly Javanese party.
    There are historical and cultural impediments to equal 
participation by women in leadership positions in government and 
political parties, and they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. In the past, most women were expected to fulfill the roles of 
housewife and mother, thereby limiting opportunities to gain political 
experience or position. Participation by women in politics (and other 
fields) generally was considered inappropriate. While women have made 
limited gains in attaining political power in recent years, political 
circles remain under the influence of traditional male-dominated 
groups, and women are disadvantaged in seeking high public office. In 
the May elections, voters elected nine women to the National Assembly, 
compared with six who held seats in the previous assembly, and the 
Assembly appointed a woman as vice chairperson. The Cabinet includes 
one woman as Minister of Foreign Affairs, another as Minister of 
Internal Affairs, and a third as Deputy Minister of Social Affairs.
    Although the Constitution prohibits racial or religious 
discrimination, several factors limit the participation of Maroons 
(descendants of escaped slaves who fled to the interior to avoid 
recapture) and Amerindians in the political process. Most of the 
country's political activity takes place in the capital and a narrow 
belt running east and west of it along the coast. The Maroons and 
Amerindians are concentrated in remote areas in the interior and 
therefore have limited access to, and influence on, the political 
process. Voters elected the first Amerindians to the National Assembly 
in 1996. After the May elections, there are eight Maroons and one 
Amerindian in the National Assembly. There are no Maroons or 
Amerindians in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases; 
however, government officials generally are not cooperative or 
responsive to their views. There have been complaints of surveillance 
of human rights workers by members of the military police and the 
division of central intelligence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and laws, with the exception of ethnic marriage 
laws, do not differentiate among citizens on the basis of their ethnic 
origins, religious affiliations, or other cultural differences. 
However, in practice several groups within society suffer various forms 
of discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The law does not 
differentiate between domestic violence and other forms of assault. The 
Government has not addressed specifically the problem of violence 
against women. According to a national women's group, victims continue 
to report cases of violence against women and complain of an inadequate 
response from the Government and society to what appears to be a trend 
of increasing family violence. Although the police have been reluctant 
to intervene in instances of domestic violence, a national women's 
group noted that police attitudes have improved significantly as a 
result of training conducted in 1999.
    There are no specific laws to protect women against trafficking and 
sexual exploitation. Prostitution is illegal; however, the police lack 
the resources to enforce these laws effectively. There were credible 
reports of trafficking in women for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Women have the right to equal access to education, employment, and 
property. Nevertheless, social pressures and customs, especially in 
rural areas, inhibit their full exercise of these rights, particularly 
in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Women experience economic 
discrimination in access to employment and in rates of pay for the same 
or substantially similar work. The Government has not made specific 
efforts to combat economic discrimination.
    The National Women's Center is a government agency devoted to 
women's issues; there is also a women's policy coordinator. Their 
effectiveness is limited severely by financial and staffing 
constraints. The principal concerns of women's groups are political 
representation, economic vulnerability, violence, and discrimination.
    Children.--School attendance is free and compulsory until 12 years 
of age, but some school-age children do not have access to education 
due to a lack of transportation, facilities, or teachers. There is no 
legal difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or 
health care services, and in practice both are treated fairly equally. 
Both students and parents complained about the Government's decision to 
double enrollment fees for public school, which occurred both in 1999 
and 2000. Children face increasing economic pressure to discontinue 
their education in order to work.
    The Government allocates only limited resources to ensure 
safeguards for the human rights and welfare of children. There are 
continuing reports of malnutrition among poor children, but it is 
difficult to quantify the extent of the problem. In the capital, where 
most of the country's population is concentrated, there are several 
orphanages and one privately funded shelter for sexually abused 
children. Elsewhere, distressed children usually must rely on the 
resources of their extended families. There were credible reports of 
hospitals refusing to hand newborns over to their mothers until 
hospital bills were paid in full, sending them instead to a state 
facility. The Government denied that such refusals occurred and stated 
that there was no such policy; one human rights group continued its 
investigation into the matter.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children; 
however, some children are exploited sexually, and there were credible 
reports of trafficking in girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). 
The legal age of sexual consent is 14; however, it is not enforced 
strictly, and the Asian Marriage Law lowers the marriage age for 
children of Asian descent to 12 years for girls and 15 years for boys. 
Otherwise, one must be 31 years old to marry without parental 
permission.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws concerning disabled 
persons and no provisions for making private or public buildings 
accessible to them. There are also no laws mandating that they be given 
equal consideration when seeking jobs or housing. However, there are 
some training programs for the blind and others with disabilities. In 
practice disabled persons suffer from discrimination when applying for 
jobs and services.
    Indigenous People.--The Constitution affords no special protection 
for, or recognition of, indigenous people. Most Amerindians and Maroons 
suffer a number of disadvantages and have only limited ability to 
participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, 
and natural resources. The country's political life, educational 
opportunities, and jobs are concentrated in the capital and its 
environs, while the majority of Amerindians and Maroons live in the 
interior. Government services in the interior became largely 
unavailable, and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the 
1986-91 domestic insurgencies; progress in reestablishing services and 
rebuilding the infrastructure has been very slow.
    The Government appointed the Consultative Council for the 
Development of the Interior in September 1995. This council, provided 
for in the 1992 peace accords that formally ended the insurgencies, 
includes representatives of the Maroon and Amerindian communities. 
However, the Government did not consult with representatives of these 
communities about the granting of gold and timber concessions on 
indigenous and tribal lands. Early in the year, the Widjenbosch 
Government made an attempt to grant some land rights to indigenous 
people. Tribal leaders rejected the proposal, asserting that it was too 
weak. In November the new Government's Minister of Natural Resources 
met with tribal leaders and promised to work with tribal authorities 
toward a solution regarding land grants.
    Organizations representing Maroon and Amerindian communities 
complain that small-scale mining operations, mainly illegal Brazilian 
gold miners, dig trenches that cut residents off from their 
agricultural land and threaten to drive them away from their 
traditional settlements. Mercury runoff from these operations also 
contaminates and threatens traditional food source areas.
    Maroon and Amerindian groups continued to cooperate with each other 
in order to exercise their rights more effectively. Two summits, or 
``gran krutus,'' bringing together Maroon and Amerindian tribal 
leaders, have been held, the most recent in September 1996. During 
these summits, indigenous leaders reiterated their demands for the 
right to participate in decisions concerning the use of natural 
resources on land they claim as their own and for greater autonomy from 
the Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution protects the right 
of workers to associate and to choose their representatives 
democratically. Nearly 60 percent of the work force is organized into 
unions, and most unions belong to one of the country's six major labor 
federations. Unions are independent of the Government but play an 
active role in politics. The small Labor Party historically has been a 
very influential force in government.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Civil servants 
have the right to strike, and strikes in both the public and private 
sectors are common as workers try to secure wage gains to protect their 
earning power from inflation.
    There are no restrictions on unions' international activities.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights, and the authorities 
respect them in practice. Collective bargaining agreements cover 
approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Bauxite industry workers 
are organized, but gold miners are not. The law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination by employers, and there are effective mechanisms for 
resolving complaints of such discrimination. Employers must have prior 
permission from the Ministry of Labor to fire workers, except when 
discharging an employee for cause. The Labor Ministry individually 
reviews dismissals for cause; if it finds a discharge unjustified, the 
employee must be reinstated.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to 
occur. However, there were credible reports of trafficking in women and 
girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children, and such practices generally are not known to 
occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years; 
however, the Ministry of Labor and the police enforce this law only 
sporadically. Children under 14 years of age work as street vendors, 
newspaper sellers, or shop assistants. Working hours for youths are not 
limited in comparison with the regular work force. School attendance is 
compulsory until 12 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children, and there were no reports of such practices, 
although trafficking of girls for prostitution does occur (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage 
legislation. In October 1999, civil servants were granted a tax-free 60 
percent pay increase for those with the lowest wages, a 55 percent 
increase for middle wage earners, and a 50 percent increase for the 
highest wage earners. Including that pay increase and a cost of living 
allowance of about $12 (Sfl 30,000), the lowest wage for civil servants 
is about $40 (Sfl 102,000) per month. This salary level makes it very 
difficult to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. Government employees, who constitute approximately 50 percent 
of the work force of 100,000, frequently supplement their salaries with 
second or third jobs, often in the informal sector. The President and 
Council of Ministers set and approve civil service wage increases. 
Civil service and other wages are not keeping pace with inflation.
    Work in excess of 9 hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular 
basis requires special government permission, which is granted 
routinely. Such overtime work earns premium pay. The law requires one 
24-hour rest period per week.
    A 10- to 12-member inspectorate in the Occupational Health and 
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing 
legislated occupational safety and health regulations. Resource 
constraints and lack of trained personnel preclude the division from 
making regular inspections of industry. Accident rates in local 
industry do not appear to be high, and the key bauxite industry has an 
outstanding safety record. However, there is no law authorizing workers 
to refuse to work in circumstances they deem unsafe. They must appeal 
to the inspectorate to declare the workplace situation unsafe.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The only laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons are old ``white slavery laws'' that are 
enforced only rarely.
    There were credible reports of trafficking in women and girls for 
prostitution. Women and girls from the interior are brought to the 
capital city and also to various gold mining locations in the interior. 
Several clubs in the capital also are known for recruiting women from 
Brazil and the Caribbean. There were credible reports of individuals 
using the country as a transit point to transport Brazilian women to 
Europe and the United States for purposes of prostitution.
    In addition alien smuggling organizations use the country as an 
intermediate destination to smuggle Chinese nationals, including women 
and girls, to the United States, where frequently they are forced into 
bonded-labor situations.

                               __________

                          TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

    Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a 
parliamentary democracy in which there have been free and fair general 
elections since independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. A 
bicameral parliament and a prime minister govern the country. 
Parliament elects a president, whose office is largely ceremonial. In 
elections on December 11, voters returned the ruling United National 
Congress (UNC) party led by Prime Minister Basdeo Panday to power with 
19 seats in the 36-member Parliament. A 12-member elected House of 
Assembly handles local matters on the island of Tobago. The judiciary 
is independent but inefficient.
    The Ministry of National Security controls the police service and 
the defense force, which are responsive to civilian authority. An 
independent body, the Police Service Commission, makes all personnel 
decisions in the police service, and the Ministry has little direct 
influence over changes in senior positions. Police and prison guards 
committed some abuses.
    Oil and natural gas production and related downstream petrochemical 
industries form the basis of the market-based economy. The service 
sector is the largest employer, although continued industrialization 
has created many jobs in the construction industry. Agriculture, while 
contributing only 2 percent to gross domestic product, remains an 
important employer, both at the subsistence and commercial level. 
Although per capita income is approximately $5,700 annually, 12.5 
percent unemployment contributes to a skewed income distribution, which 
has not improved despite economic growth of 6.7 percent. Government 
efforts to address this problem by further diversification into 
manufacturing and tourism have been only partially successful.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, police and guard abuse 
of prisoners, poor prison conditions, long delays in trials, and 
extensive violence against women remain problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In the December 31, 1999, murder of politician Hanraj Sumairsingh, 
which some thought might have had a political motivation, the police 
arrested and charged a member of Jamat al Muslimeen, a radical group. 
However, bribery and corruption were believed to be motives behind the 
killing.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them; however, there were credible 
reports of police and prison personnel abusing prisoners in incidents 
that involved beating, pushing, and verbal insults.
    A 1999 ruling permits corporal punishment for certain crimes, 
including aggravated assault, rape, deliberate shooting, and robbery 
with violence. During the year, the courts sentenced 5 persons to 
corporal punishment (ranging from 5 to 10 birch strokes) in addition to 
prison terms. The law also was changed to increase the corporal 
punishment for rape from 15 strokes to 20.
    Prison conditions at the women's prison and two of the three men's 
prisons meet minimum international standards. However, conditions are 
worse in the Port of Spain prison, which dates from the 1830's. It was 
designed for 250 inmates but houses about 1,000. Diseases such as 
chicken pox, tuberculosis, AIDS, and other viruses spread easily, and 
prisoners generally must purchase their own medication. Overcrowding is 
a problem for the entire prison system, which housed 4,700 inmates in 
prisons built to accommodate 1,800. A new maximum security prison 
opened in 1998 houses about 850 prisoners, but it is not yet fully 
functional. With an eventual capacity of 2,100, this prison is expected 
to help alleviate the problem.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally 
observes this prohibition.
    A police officer may arrest a person either based on a warrant 
issued or authorized by a magistrate or without a warrant when the 
officer witnesses commission of the alleged offense. For less serious 
offenses, the authorities typically bring the accused before a 
magistrate within 24 hours; for indictable offenses, the accused must 
appear within 48 hours. At that time, the magistrate reads the charge 
and determines whether bail is appropriate. Magistrates may deny bail 
to violent or repeat offenders. If for some reason the accused does not 
come before the magistrate, the case comes up on the magistrate's 
docket every 8 to 10 days until a hearing date is set. The courts 
notify persons of their right to an attorney and allow them access to 
an attorney once they are in custody and prior to any interrogation. 
However, the authorities do not always comply with these standards. 
Allegations of corruption among justices of the peace also raised 
concerns about compliance; the Government pledged to dismiss and 
prosecute any justice found to have violated these standards (see 
Section 1.e.).
    The Minister of National Security may authorize preventive 
detention in order to prevent actions prejudicial to public safety, 
public order, or national defense, and the Minister must state the 
grounds for the detention. A person detained under this provision has 
access to counsel and may have the detention reviewed by a three-member 
tribunal established by the Chief Justice and chaired by an attorney. 
The Minister must provide the tribunal with the grounds for the 
detention within 7 days of the detainee's request for review, which 
shall be held ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' following receipt 
of the grounds. There have been no reports that the authorities abused 
this procedure.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process. 
After the Chief Justice warned in 1999 that the executive branch was 
encroaching upon judicial independence, the Government appointed two 
independent commissions to review the issue. A Commonwealth commission 
concluded that the judiciary was not threatened by the Attorney 
General's involvement in judicial administration; however, a law 
association group recommended that executive requests should be handled 
by the Prime Minister, not the Attorney General.
    The court system consists of a court of appeal, a high court, and a 
magistrate's court. A criminal offense first is sent to a magistrate's 
court for a preliminary inquiry to determine if it can be heard before 
a magistrate without a jury. If the magistrate determines that the 
offense is a serious one, it is referred to the High Court, where it is 
heard before a judge and jury. All civil matters are heard by the High 
Court. Appeals can be filed with the local court of appeal and 
ultimately to the Privy Council in London. There is considerable 
support for abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and establishing a 
Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, to serve as 
the final court of appeal.
    An October decision of the Privy Council ruled that all death row 
prisoners throughout the Caribbean have a right to be heard before its 
Mercy Committee, which can stay death sentences. The Council decided 
that prisoners should be given access to all material put before the 
Mercy Committee. In addition procedures followed by the Mercy Committee 
now can be subject to judicial review.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an 
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right. All criminal 
defendants have the right to an attorney. In practice the courts 
sometimes appoint attorneys for those persons charged with indictable 
offenses (serious crimes) if they cannot retain one on their own 
behalf. The law requires a person accused of murder to have an 
attorney. An indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney 
for cause and obtain a replacement.
    Despite serious efforts to improve the judiciary, severe 
inefficiency remains in many areas. Several criminal cases were 
dismissed due to judicial or police inefficiency. Despite significant 
progress, lengthy trial delays remain a serious problem.
    The Government continued to take steps against corruption in the 
criminal justice system. Over a 2-year period, the authorities charged 
at least 80 persons with various offenses after a presidential 
commission's investigation found collusion among justices of the peace, 
bailiffs, and police officers in the granting and fixing of bail. The 
Government revoked the licenses of 25 justices of the peace. However, 
at year's end, the charges brought against these individuals were still 
before the court. Only one of those indicted as a result of the 
commission's inquiry had come to trial. In that case, a court convicted 
one of the justices of the peace and sentenced him to 4 years' 
imprisonment.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. An independent press and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
    The three major daily newspapers freely and often criticize the 
Government in editorials. Widely read weekly tabloids tend to be 
extremely critical of the Government. All newspapers are privately 
owned. The two local television newscasts, one of which appears on a 
state-owned station, are sometimes critical of the Government but 
generally do not editorialize.
    Over the past several years, the Media Association of Trinidad and 
Tobago and the Publishers' Association have expressed concern about 
media treatment and access to the Government. For its part, the 
Government sometimes charges unfair treatment by the media, which the 
press views as unwarranted criticism. When the Prime Minister labeled 
Ken Gordon, head of a major media corporation, a ``pseudo-racist'' for 
editorials about the rise of the ruling UNC party, Gordon filed suit 
for libel. In November a court found the Prime Minister guilty of libel 
and ordered him to pay damages to Gordon.
    A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films that it 
considers to be against public order and decency or contrary to the 
public interest. This includes films that it believes may be 
controversial in matters of religion or race, or that contain seditious 
propaganda. In practice films rarely are banned.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. The police routinely grant the required advance 
permits for street marches, demonstrations, or other outdoor public 
meetings. In 1998 the Government amended the Summary Offences Act to 
put greater controls on holding public rallies. The amendments require 
that permits for public meetings and rallies be applied for 48 hours in 
advance instead of 24 hours, and make it an offense to hold a public 
meeting without a permit under the guise of conducting an exempted 
religious, educational, recreational, or sports function. In practice 
the amendments have not restricted unduly public meetings, 
demonstrations, or exempted events. One planned political youth 
demonstration was postponed when the police denied a permit due to 
concerns about size and safety.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Registration or other 
governmental permission to form private associations is not required.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    In October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that 
prohibits acts that offend or insult another person or group on the 
grounds of race, origin, or religion, or which incite racial or 
religious hatred. In November Parliament passed a separate bill that in 
part removed certain legal provisions interfering with the religious 
practices of the Spiritual Shouter Baptist and Orisa faiths.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    There is no provision for persons to claim or be classified as 
refugees or asylum seekers; the Ministry of National Security's 
Immigration Division handles any such requests on a case-by-case basis. 
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Parliamentary elections are held at intervals not 
to exceed 5 years. Elections for the 12-member Tobago House of Assembly 
are held every 4 years. The Constitution extends the right to vote to 
citizens as well as to legal residents at least 18 years of age who are 
citizens of other Commonwealth countries.
    In the 1995 general elections, the former opposition UNC and the 
ruling People's National Movement (PNM) each won 17 seats in the 36-
member Parliament. The National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) won 
two seats and joined with the UNC to form a new government. Basdeo 
Panday became the country's first Prime Minister of East Indian 
descent. The PNM is primarily but not exclusively Afro-Trinidadian; the 
UNC is primarily but not exclusively Indo-Trinidadian. In general 
elections in December, voters returned Prime Minister Panday and his 
UNC party to power with a 19-seat majority. The PNM won 16 seats and 
the NAR 1 seat. Election observers noted that the elections were 
wellorganized, peaceful, free, and fair. Several recounts were 
requested and proceeded without incident. By year's end, opposition 
challenges to election results in two districts had not yet been 
decided.
    There are no specific laws that restrict the participation of women 
or minorities in government or the political parties. Women hold many 
positions in the Government and political party leadership but are 
still under-represented. Four of 36 elected members of the House of 
Representatives and 9 of 31 appointed Senators are women, with 2 women 
serving as ministers. Prime Minister Panday appointed the first woman 
to serve as Attorney General; she since has moved to the position of 
Minister of Education. Prime Minister Panday also appointed the first 
female acting Prime Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. While government officials are cooperative, the 
Government has bitterly attacked Amnesty International's criticism of 
prison conditions and due process. An independent Ombudsman receives 
complaints relating to governmental administrative issues and 
investigates complaints of human rights abuse. The Ombudsman can make 
recommendations but does not have authority to force government offices 
to take action.
    The Government sought to curtail appeals by death row inmates to 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee. In 1999 it withdrew from the IACHR following 
its required 1-year notice. The Government also withdrew from the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, but reacceded with the reservation that the U.N. Committee 
would not have jurisdiction over death penalty cases.
    The Government's moves were prompted by a Privy Council ruling that 
failure to execute a condemned prisoner within 5 years of sentence 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Constitution. To meet this 5-year deadline, the Government established 
time limits for appeals to courts and human rights bodies. Local 
appeals are now disposed of within an average of 16 months compared 
with the previous average of 7 years.
    The Government asked the IACHR and the U.N. Committee each to agree 
to dispose of petitions within 8 months. According to the Government, 
both bodies responded that they could not provide such assurances. The 
Government stated that the conflict between a binding Privy Council 
ruling and its obligations to the human rights organs had to be 
resolved in favor of the Constitution and the Privy Council. The 
Government indicated that it would execute condemned prisoners who have 
exhausted all their appeals and have unresolved petitions pending more 
than 8 months before one of the human rights bodies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions 
for fundamental human rights and freedoms for all without 
discrimination based on race, origin, color, religion, or sex. In 
October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that makes 
discrimination illegal on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, 
marital status or disability. It also establishes a commission to 
investigate cases of alleged discrimination and a tribunal to judge 
complaints.
    Women.--Physical abuse of women continued to be an extensive 
problem. There has been increased media coverage of domestic abuse 
cases and signs of a shift in public opinion, which held that such 
cases were a private matter. The Government has taken action to improve 
aid to victims. Murder, rape, and other crimes against women are 
reported frequently; 30 percent of all female homicide victims were 
believed to have been killed by their husbands or lovers. Rape, spousal 
abuse, and spousal rape are criminal offenses. The 1991 Domestic 
Violence Act was intended to facilitate court-issued restraining orders 
to protect victims and extended protection to common-law relationships, 
a frequent form of marital union. However, some observers say that the 
number of restraining orders issued has not increased at the rate 
expected since the enactment of the law. The establishment of a 
community police division improved police responsiveness to reports of 
domestic abuse, but some police officers are reported to be 
unsympathetic or reluctant to pursue such cases, resulting in 
underreporting of crimes of violence against women. There were more 
than 4,000 complaints of spousal abuse during the year; police handled 
an average of 9 cases a day that led to reports by victims, with the 
actual incidence of such abuse considered to be much higher. Two 
government ministries, operating independently, direct the 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run most of the country's 
social programs addressing domestic violence, including five shelters 
for battered women. A rape crisis center offers counseling for rape 
victims and perpetrators on a voluntary basis. A government-sponsored 
hot line receives about 300 calls per month.
    In 1999 a new Domestic Violence Act came into effect. That law 
strengthened provisions of the 1991 law and allows easier access for 
police in instances of domestic violence. Parliament approved 
amendments to the Sexual Offences Act that broaden the definition of 
sexual offenses, increase the punishment for such crimes, and require 
the police to keep a register of sexual offenders.
    Many women hold positions in business, the professions, and 
government, but men tend to hold the most senior positions. There is no 
law or regulation requiring equal pay for equal work; during the year, 
a bill containing such provisions was introduced into Parliament, but 
no action was taken on it.
    The Division of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Culture and 
Gender Affairs is charged with protecting women's rights in all aspects 
of government and legislation. Several active women's rights groups 
also exist.
    Children.--The Government's ability to protect children's welfare 
is limited by a lack of funds and expanding social needs. Education is 
free and compulsory through primary school. Some parts of the public 
school system seriously fail to meet the needs of the school age 
population due to overcrowding, substandard physical facilities, and 
occasional classroom violence by gangs. There is no societal pattern of 
abuse directed at children. The Domestic Violence Act provides 
protection for children abused at home. Abused children are usually 
placed with relatives if they are removed from the home. If there is no 
relative who can take them, there are several government institutions 
and NGO's that accept children for placement.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legislation that 
specifically enumerates or protects the rights of disabled persons or 
mandates the provision of access to buildings or services, although 
NGO's lobbied Parliament to pass such legislation. The lack of access 
to transportation, buildings, and sidewalks is a major obstacle for the 
disabled. The Government provides some public assistance and partial 
funding to a variety of NGO's which, in turn, provide direct services 
to disabled members or clients.
    Indigenous People.--Members of a very small group in the population 
identify themselves as descendants of the original Amerindian 
population of the country. They maintain social ties with each other 
and other aboriginal groups and are not subject to discrimination.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Various ethnic and religious 
groups live together peacefully, generally respecting one another's 
beliefs and practices. However, at times racial tensions appear between 
Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. Each group comprises about 40 
percent of the population. The private sector is dominated by Indo-
Trinidadians and people of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian descent. 
Indo-Trinidadians also predominate in agriculture. Afro-Trinidadians 
tend to find employment in disproportionate numbers in the civil 
service, police, and military. Some Indo-Trinidadians assert that they 
are excluded from equal representation in the civil service due to 
racial discrimination. Since Indo-Trinidadians constitute the majority 
in rural areas and Afro-Trinidadians are in the majority in urban 
areas, competition between town and country for public goods and 
services often takes on racial overtones.
    In 1996 there were reports that several popular recreational clubs 
refused entry to Afro-Trinidadians and dark-skinned Indo-Trinidadians. 
The reports led to criticism of racism by the local press, and the 
Government pledged to implement a law banning racial discrimination in 
entry policies for private clubs. However, the Government has not yet 
taken such action.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1972 Industrial Relations Act 
provides that all workers, including those in state-owned enterprises, 
may form or join unions of their own choosing without prior 
authorization. Union membership has declined in recent years, with an 
estimated 25 to 30 percent of the work force organized in 19 active 
unions. Most unions are independent of the Government or political 
party control, although the Sugar Workers' Union historically was 
allied with the UNC. The Prime Minister formerly was president of the 
Sugar Workers' Union.
    The law prohibits antiunion activities before a union is registered 
legally, and the Ministry of Labor enforces this provision when it 
receives a complaint. A union also may bring a request for enforcement 
to the Industrial Court. All employees except those in ``essential 
services,'' which include the police and many other government 
employees, have the right to strike.
    The Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and 
provides for grievance procedures if needed. A special section of the 
Industrial Court handles mandatory arbitration cases. Arbitration 
agreements are enforceable and can be appealed only to the Industrial 
Court. Most observers consider this court to be impartial; it consists 
of government, business, and labor representatives.
    Unions freely join federations and affiliate with international 
bodies. There are no restrictions on international travel or contacts.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Industrial 
Relations Act establishes the right of workers to collective 
bargaining. The Ministry of Labor's conciliation service maintains 
statistical information regarding the number of workers covered by 
collective bargaining agreements and the number of antiunion complaints 
filed.
    The Industrial Court may order employers who are found guilty of 
antiunion activities to reinstate workers and pay compensation, or it 
can impose other penalties including imprisonment. When necessary the 
conciliation service also determines which unions should have senior 
status.
    There are several export processing zones (EPZ's). The same labor 
laws apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not 
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, but there were no 
reports that it was practiced. There were also no reports of forced or 
bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum legal age for workers is 12 years. Education 
is compulsory through primary school. Children from 12 to 14 years of 
age may work only in family businesses. Children under the age of 18 
legally may work only during daylight hours, with the exception of 16- 
to 18-year-olds, who may work at night in sugar factories. The 
probation service in the Ministry of Social Development and Family 
Services is responsible for enforcing child labor provisions, but 
enforcement is lax. There is no organized exploitation of child labor, 
but children are seen begging or working as street vendors. The 
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1998 Minimum Wages Act 
established a minimum wage of about $1.10 (TT$7.00) per hour. The 
minimum wage is not sufficient to support a worker and family, but most 
workers earn more than the minimum. The Ministry of Labor enforces the 
minimum wage regulations.
    The Minimum Wages Act also established a 40-hour workweek, time- 
and-one-half pay for the first 4 hours of overtime on a workday, double 
pay for the next 4 hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays, 
holidays, and off days, the act also provides for double pay for the 
first 8 hours and triple pay thereafter. Daily rest periods and paid 
annual leave form part of most employment agreements.
    The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets requirements for 
health and safety standards in certain industries and provides for 
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Industrial Relations 
Act protects workers who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor 
regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions. If it is determined 
upon inspection that hazardous conditions exist in the workplace, the 
worker is absolved for refusing to comply with an order that would have 
placed him or her in danger.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there are no laws that 
specifically address trafficking in persons, the illegality of such 
acts is covered broadly in a variety of legislation dealing with 
kidnaping, labor conditions, pimping and prostitution, slavery, and 
indentured servitude. There were no reports of persons being trafficked 
to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                                URUGUAY

    Uruguay is a constitutional republic with an elected president and 
a bicameral legislature. In November 1999, voters elected Senator Jorge 
Batlle of the Colorado party President, and he assumed office on March 
1. In legislative elections in October 1999, the left-of-center Broad 
Front coalition won approximately 40 percent of the vote in a four-
party race, thus constituting the largest congressional bloc. The two 
traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos, which collaborate 
in a coalition-style arrangement, together control over half of the 
seats in the legislature. The judiciary is independent.
    The Interior Ministry administers the country's police departments 
and the prison system and is responsible for domestic security and 
public safety. The military is responsible for external security within 
the prison system. The civilian authorities exercise effective control 
over the security forces. The police at times committed human rights 
abuses.
    The economy is a mixture of private and state enterprises and is 
heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry. The leading 
exports are meat, leather, and rice. The Government respects private 
property rights. The unemployment rate was estimated at 14.4 percent in 
November. The economy shrank by between 0.5 and 1 percent during the 
year, following a decline of 3.2 percent in 1999. Annual per capita 
income was about $6,348 in 1999.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means 
of dealing with individual instances of abuse. However, there were 
problems in some areas, principally instances of police abuse and 
mistreatment of detainees, poor prison conditions, and delays in the 
justice system. Court cases sometimes last for many years, resulting in 
lengthy pretrial detention. In August the President created a Peace 
Commission to clarify what happened to about 160 persons who 
disappeared for political reasons during the 1973-85 military 
dictatorship. Violence against women and societal discrimination 
against women and the black minority are problems. In September the 
police arrested the leader of a small neo-Nazi group.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    The 1986 Amnesty Law prohibits criminal prosecution of members of 
the security forces who perpetrated extrajudicial killings, torture, 
and other abuses during the 12 years of military rule in 1973-85. 
However, some victims and relatives of victims had success using the 
civilian courts to seek redress.
    In the case initiated in 1999 by the widow of a criminal suspect 
who in 1998 died under suspicious circumstances while in police 
custody, the court dismissed charges against the principal suspect. 
Although an appellate court ordered the trial court to investigate the 
causes of the criminal suspect's death, the judge and prosecutor 
shelved the investigation.
    The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice was pending in the 
case of 12 former political prisoners and their families who sued the 
Government for damages suffered as a result of their imprisonment, 
torture, and in three cases death in custody during the military 
dictatorship. Although in 1998 a trial-level court ordered the 
Government to pay each plaintiff approximately $93,600 (1.17 million 
pesos) in damages, an appellate-level court later reduced this award to 
approximately $16,850 (210,600 pesos) per person for 11 of the cases 
and $23,640 (295,500 pesos) for the other case. The plaintiffs have 
appealed the appellate court's decision to the Supreme Court of 
Justice.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    Although the 1986 Amnesty Law required the Government to 
investigate the fate of those citizens who were detained and who then 
disappeared during the dictatorship, the first three administrations 
following the return to democracy consistently refused to do so. During 
the year, the new Government for the first time undertook such an 
effort.
    On August 9, President Batlle created a Peace Commission in order 
to clarify the fate of the approximately 160 Uruguayans believed to 
have disappeared for political reasons during the dictatorship (115 in 
Argentina, 36 in Uruguay, 6 in Chile, and 2 in Paraguay). The 
Commission was charged with receiving and analyzing information 
relevant to the disappeared persons. It is to prepare individual 
summaries of its conclusions as to the fate of each person and to 
recommend legal measures that the Government should adopt to compensate 
the families of the victims and resolve the victims' legal status, such 
as by declaring them legally dead. The Commission consists of six 
members appointed by the President and operates under the supervision 
of the office of the President. One retired military officer told the 
press that ``hundreds'' of current and retired officers serving during 
the period of military rule had adopted a pact of silence with regard 
to the disappearances. Although the Commission was created for an 
initial mandate of 120 days, in early December its mandate was extended 
for an additional 4-month period.
    Shortly after taking office, President Batlle personally intervened 
to resolve one of the most high-profile cases of a disappeared person, 
that of the granddaughter of Argentine poet Juan Gelman. By combining 
information provided by Gelman with information obtained from other 
sources, Batlle succeeded in locating the young woman, who had been 
born in captivity in Uruguay to Gelman's daughter-in-law and adopted by 
an Uruguayan family after her mother died in prison.
    Since the 1986 Amnesty Law precludes criminal actions against 
suspected participants in human rights violations during military rule, 
some persons have sought justice in non-Uruguayan courts. In March 
1999, Sara Mendez filed papers in an Argentine court formally accusing 
five present and former members of the Uruguayan military with the 1976 
kidnaping of her infant from her Buenos Aires home. The case remained 
pending in Argentine courts and, during the course of the year, Mendez 
gave testimony on several occasions. A DNA sample taken in May from a 
young man believed possibly to have been Mendez' kidnaped son indicated 
that he was not related to Mendez. An Italian prosecutor continued to 
investigate charges brought in an Italian court in 1999 against four 
present and former members of the military and one police officer 
accused of responsibility in the disappearance of eight Italian-
Uruguayan dual nationals.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners, 
but the police continued at times to commit abuses. On occasion such 
abuse resulted in forced confessions (see Section 1.d.).
    The judicial and parliamentary branches of government are 
responsible for investigating specific allegations of abuse. An 
internal police investigative unit receives complaints from any person 
concerning possible noncriminal police abuse of power, but it is 
understaffed and only can issue recommendations for disciplinary 
action. While the courts seldom convicted and punished law enforcement 
officials for such abuse in the past, such prosecutions were occurring 
more frequently. In the first 5 months of the year, the authorities 
prosecuted approximately 40 police officers for a variety of crimes, 
typically involving corruption, excessive use of force, or theft of 
suspects' property. They brought homicide charges against one officer, 
who shot and killed a neighbor who had a dispute with the officer's 
brother-in-law.
    Police officers charged with less serious crimes may continue on 
active duty; those charged with more serious crimes are separated from 
active service until a court resolves their cases. A 1999 Ministry of 
Interior study reported that courts had investigated or convicted 179 
police officers, and that 117 of these cases were linked directly to 
the exercise of their jobs. The 1995 Public Security Law requires a 
proportional use of force by the police and the use of weapons only as 
a last resort, in accordance with U.N. codes regarding the use of 
force.
    Some torture victims and relatives of victims continued to use the 
courts to seek redress for their grievances. A group of 12 former 
political prisoners (and their survivors) appealed the decision of an 
appellate court to reduce the award made by a trial court for the 
damages that they suffered due to their imprisonment and torture (see 
Section 1.a.).
    Conditions in prisons for the approximately 4,450 prisoners remain 
poor but not life threatening. A 1997 legislative human rights 
commission report criticized the ``excessive use of force and abuse of 
authority'' by prison guards and officials, and stated that sanitation 
and health standards in the prison system were ``unacceptable.'' This 
report reflected the work of a previous commission that in 1996 
published a report to the Government citing overcrowding, lack of staff 
training, corruption, and physical violence as problems. Prisoners 
often find that they must supplement prison provisions with bedding, 
medicines, and toiletries brought by friends or relatives. According to 
press reports and a study conducted by SERPAJ, a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), HIV-positive inmates sometimes received inadequate 
medical treatment. There were several incidents of prisoner unrest 
during the year, including at least one hunger strike in which several 
hundred prisoners demanded better prison conditions, but none were as 
serious as the incidents of unrest that occurred in 1999.
    Female prisoners are held in separate facilities from male 
prisoners; most are held in a women's prison in Montevideo. Some 
provincial prisons have separate facilities for their small number of 
female prisoners. In general conditions for female prisoners are 
significantly better than for male prisoners, in large part because of 
the small number of female inmates.
    Minors are held in institutions operated by the National Institute 
for Minors (INAME). The most controversial aspect of the 1995 Public 
Security Law would allow the Government to put minors with a record of 
violent crimes in adult prisons if INAME has no room in its own 
institutions. Even though the law stipulates that minors would occupy 
separate facilities within the prisons, human rights groups adamantly 
opposed this provision. As a result, INAME has decided that it will not 
send minors to adult prisons. Juvenile offenders are separated 
according to their gender, age, and the severity of their crime. Those 
juveniles who commit serious crimes are incarcerated in juvenile 
detention centers, which resemble traditional jails and have cells. 
Conditions in these facilities are generally better than those in 
ordinary jails, in part because they are less crowded. Juvenile 
offenders who pose less of a threat to society are placed in halfway 
house facilities, oriented toward rehabilitation, in which a group of 
offenders lives together with adult counselors. These facilities 
provide educational, vocational, and other opportunities, and the 
juvenile offenders are able to enter and leave without restriction.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors, 
although prisoner unrest, as well as the requirement to route all such 
requests through the Ministry of Interior, at times caused delays.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
requires the police to have a written warrant issued by a judge before 
making an arrest, and the authorities generally respect this provision 
in practice. The only exception is when the police apprehend the 
accused during commission of a crime. The Constitution also provides 
the accused with the right to a judicial determination of the legality 
of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain the 
legal grounds for the detention. In June the President signed a new law 
that obligates police officers to inform individuals of the reason for 
their arrest. Police may hold a detainee incommunicado for 24 hours 
before presenting the case to a judge, at which time the detainee has 
the right to counsel. It is during this 24-hour period that police 
sometimes abuse prisoners, occasionally resulting in forced confessions 
(see Section 1.c.).
    A 1980 law stipulates that police confessions obtained before a 
prisoner appears before a judge and attorney (without the police 
present) have no validity. Further, should a prisoner claim that he has 
been mistreated, by law the judge must investigate the charge.
    If the detainee cannot afford a lawyer, the courts appoint a public 
defender. If the crime carries a penalty of at least 2 years in prison, 
the accused person is confined during the judge's investigation of the 
charges unless the authorities agree to release the person on bail 
(which seldom happens). As a result, as of mid-year approximately 73 
percent of all persons incarcerated were awaiting a final decision in 
their case (compared with 68 percent in mid-1999). However, this 
proportion used to be 90 percent; declines in recent years are due to 
the Government's efforts to improve the functioning of the criminal 
justice system. Because of the slowness of the judicial process, the 
length of time prisoners spend in jail before the judge issues a 
verdict may exceed the maximum sentence for their crime. The 
uncertainty as to how long one will be imprisoned is a factor creating 
tension within the country's prisons.
    The Government does not use forced exile as a means of punishment.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the 
work of the lower courts. A parallel military court system operates 
under a Military Justice Code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme 
Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military 
justice applies to civilians only during a state of war or 
insurrection.
    Trial proceedings usually are based on written arguments to the 
judge, which are not made public routinely. Only the prosecutor and 
defense attorney have access to all documents that form part of the 
written record. The courts introduced oral argument in 1990, but 
individual judges use it at their option. Most judges choose to retain 
the written method, a major factor slowing the judicial process. There 
is no legal provision against self-incrimination, and judges may compel 
defendants to answer any question they pose. Either the defense 
attorney or the prosecutor may appeal convictions to a higher court, 
which may acquit the person of the crime, confirm the conviction, or 
reduce or increase the sentence.
    A 1997 law to reform and modernize the Criminal Code provides for 
more oral argument by prosecution and defense attorneys, less 
investigative responsibility for judges, and is expected to accelerate 
the pace of criminal trials. Although the law was to take effect in 
1998, budget constraints have resulted in repeated postponement of its 
implementation, and it is not scheduled for implementation until 2004.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, but the authorities may abridge 
these rights if persons are deemed to be inciting violence or 
``insulting the nation.''
    All elements of the political spectrum freely express their 
viewpoints in both print and broadcast media.
    Montevideo has 5 daily newspapers and 9 important weeklies; there 
are also approximately 80 other weekly and a few daily newspapers 
throughout the country. Montevideo has one government-affiliated and 
three commercial television stations. There are about 150 radio 
stations, 25 television stations, and 250 cable television stations in 
the country.
    A 1989 law stipulates that expression and communication of thoughts 
and opinions are free, within the limits contained in the Constitution, 
and it outlines methods of responding to ``inexact or aggravating 
information.'' The law calls for 3 months' to 2 years' imprisonment for 
``knowingly divulging false news that causes a grave disturbance to the 
public peace or a grave prejudice to economic interests of the State'' 
or for ``insulting the nation, the State, or their powers.'' The 
authorities use this law intermittently to set and enforce certain 
limits on freedom of the press.
    Human rights activists and journalists have alleged that state 
enterprises such as the telephone and electric companies on occasion 
have withheld advertising from independent media that are critical of 
the Government and have favored media friendly to the Government with 
extensive paid advertising.
    In February Nery Colombo, a former local official seeking 
reelection, shot and killed journalist and radio station owner Julio 
Cesar da Rosa, after the latter suggested in a broadcast that the 
former was unfit to run for public office. Colombo committed suicide 
immediately after the killing. On the night of May 2, unknown 
assailants shot at journalist and political activist Julio Cesar 
Sanchez Padilla while he was driving his car. Sanchez was not injured, 
and the authorities were unable to identify the perpetrators of, or a 
motive for, the attack.
    In August the press association criticized the newspaper 
distributors' union for a 1-day refusal to distribute one newspaper 
(see Section 6.a.).
    The national university is autonomous, and the authorities respect 
academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    In May, as in prior years, thousands of persons marched in memory 
of the persons who disappeared during the rule of the dictatorship.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government grants refugee status in accordance with the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. The Government grants asylum only for political crimes as set 
forth in the 1928 Treaty of Havana, the 1889 Treaty of Montevideo, and 
the 1954 Caracas Convention. The Government cooperates with the office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government grants 
first asylum in cases in which a refugee's claims are verified by the 
UNHCR. The Government works actively with international organizations 
in the provision of temporary protection to refugees from Colombia.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The country is a multiparty democracy with 
mandatory voting for those 18 years of age or older, and there are no 
suffrage restrictions regarding race, sex, religion, or economic 
status. The Colorado party, the National (Blanco) party, the Broad 
Front coalition, and the New Space party are the four major political 
groupings.
    Women and minorities are under-represented in politics and 
government. None of the 13 cabinet ministers are women, and only 3 of 
30 senators and 13 of 99 deputies are women. There are no female 
justices on the Supreme Court. There has never been a black 
parliamentarian or cabinet-level official except in July when, for the 
first time, an Afro-Uruguayan elected as an alternate deputy 
substituted in legislative sessions for an absent deputy for 
approximately 10 days.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views.
    In August the President created a Peace Commission to clarify what 
happened to the persons who disappeared for political reasons during 
the 1973-85 military dictatorship (see Section 1.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on race, 
sex, religion, or disability. Despite these provisions, discrimination 
against some groups exists.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious problem. A 
1999 Ministry of Public Health study projected that within 5 years, 
domestic violence would constitute the second most prevalent threat to 
public health, after traffic accidents. In a 1997 poll of 545 urban and 
suburban households, 47 percent of respondents reported physical or 
psychological abuse from their partners, with 23 percent reporting 
severe abuse. The law provides for sentences of 6 months to 2 years in 
prison for a person found guilty of committing an act of violence or of 
making continuing threats to cause bodily injury to persons related 
emotionally or legally to the perpetrator. The Montevideo city hall's 
hot line for victims of domestic violence received about 4,500 
complaints during the year, compared with 5,975 complaints in 1999. 
Persons calling the hot line are provided counseling, free legal 
advice, and may be referred to NGO's that can provide further social 
services. A new law signed in June increased sentences for rape and 
certain other sexually related crimes. The Criminal Code covers spousal 
abuse and spousal rape, although criminal charges rarely are initiated 
for those crimes. Similarly, although the law prohibits sexual 
harassment in the workplace, few complaints are ever filed under this 
provision.
    The Government has established an office of assistance for victims 
of domestic violence that trains police how to resolve complaints of 
violence against women. A directorate within the Ministry of Interior 
instituted a public awareness campaign about domestic violence and 
founded community assistance centers where abuse victims receive 
information and referrals to government and private organizations in 
their area that aid abused women. Both the Ministry of Interior and 
NGO's operate shelters in which abused women and their families can 
seek temporary refuge.
    Women enjoy equality under the law but face discrimination stemming 
from traditional attitudes and practices. The work force exhibits 
segregation by gender. Women, who make up almost one-half the work 
force, tend to be concentrated in lower paying jobs. Women's salaries 
average two-thirds those of men, a figure that reflects gradual 
improvement in recent years with respect to pay equity. In 1999 about 
60 percent of the students at the public university were women. Women 
often pursue professional careers but are underrepresented in 
traditionally male-dominated professions. In 1997 the Government 
approved regulations to implement a 1989 law for equality in the 
workplace that had previously gone unenforced, and it formed a national 
commission for workplace equality that includes representatives from 
the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education and Culture, chambers 
of commerce, and the umbrella labor organization. However, there never 
have been any cases brought under the new regulations. There were 13 
female cadets enrolled in the Air Force Academy's 75-member student 
body, representing nearly a doubling of the female enrollment since 
1999. Four female cadets are expected to receive commissions as pilots 
or navigators in the air force during the year. The Army Military 
Academy has 27 female cadets, out of a total enrollment of 
approximately 225. The Naval Academy admitted its first female cadet 
during the year.
    A small institute in the Ministry of Education coordinates 
government programs for women. There are a number of active women's 
rights groups, and many of their activities remained centered on 
followup to the platform of action of the 1995 U.N. Conference on 
Women.
    Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting 
children's rights and welfare, and it regards the education and health 
of children as a top priority. An institute in the Ministry of Interior 
oversees implementation of the Government's programs for children but 
receives only limited funding for programs. An estimated 40 percent of 
children under the age of 5 live in the poorest 20 percent of homes. 
The Government is attempting to extend proper health care and education 
to them with the help of UNICEF. The Government provides free, 
compulsory primary and secondary education, and 95 percent of children 
complete their primary education. Girls and boys are treated similarly. 
Free education is available through the undergraduate level at the 
national university.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Minors under the 
age of 18 are not subject to criminal trial but receive special 
treatment with special judges and, when sentenced, stay in institutions 
run by the National Institute for Minors for the period determined by 
the judge. The INAME-run institutions emphasize the rehabilitation of 
minors. INAME maintains an extensive network of programs, including 
shelters for at-risk children. INAME also operates a confidential hot 
line for children who are victims of domestic abuse.
    A draft Code of the Child, intended to bring the law into 
compliance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, was introduced into the new legislative session during the 
year. The previous legislative session ended before a prior version of 
the bill could be enacted into law.
    People with Disabilities.--A national disabilities commission 
oversees implementation of a 1989 law on the rights of the disabled. 
Although the law mandates accessibility for disabled persons only to 
new buildings or public services, the Government is providing access to 
a number of existing buildings. The law reserves 4 percent of public 
sector jobs for the disabled. There is no governmental discrimination 
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision 
of other state services. The country has a generally excellent mental 
health system and an interest in the rights of persons with mental 
disabilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's black minority, 
estimated at 5.9 percent of the population, continues to face societal 
discrimination. A government study conducted in 1996-97 found that the 
unemployment rate for blacks was 1.5 times the rate for whites. The 
National Institute of Statistics found that blacks earn an average of 
20 percent less than whites who perform the same job. According to a 
recent study published by Mundo Afro (an NGO), the illiteracy rate 
among black women is twice the national average, and the percentage of 
black women who have pursued higher education is one-third the rate in 
the population at large. According to the same study, one-half of Afro-
Uruguayan women work as household domestics. Blacks are practically 
unrepresented in the bureaucratic and academic sectors.
    Religious Minorities.--Isolated neo-Nazi elements have carried out 
occasional, limited attacks and activities since 1997. Law enforcement 
authorities have responded vigorously to such activities. In August 
1999, an intensive police investigation resulted in the arrest of eight 
members of a very small neo-Nazi group suspected of creating racist and 
anti-Semitic Internet websites. The authorities charged five of the 
suspects with subversive association; two also were charged with 
inciting hate or violence towards a particular group. Pending the 
court's final decision in the case, the defendants were released after 
serving approximately 3 months of imprisonment, the minimum statutory 
penalty for first offenders in cases of this nature. In September the 
police arrested and charged with inciting racial hatred the leader of 
another small neo-Nazi group believed responsible for pro-Nazi 
propagandizing.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that laws 
should promote the organization of trade unions and the creation of 
arbitration bodies; however, there is almost no legislation concerning 
union activities. Unions traditionally organize and operate free of 
government regulation. Civil servants, employees of state-run 
enterprises, and private enterprise workers may join unions. An 
estimated 15 percent of the work force is unionized. Labor unions are 
independent of political party control but traditionally have 
associated more closely with the Broad Front, the leftist political 
coalition.
    The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike, and 
there were numerous strikes during the year. The Government may legally 
compel workers to work during a strike if they perform an essential 
service which, if interrupted, ``could cause a grave prejudice or risk, 
provoking suffering to part or all of the society.'' In June the 
umbrella labor confederation PIT/CNT organized a 1-day general strike. 
In December the PIT/CNT organized a second 1-day general strike to 
protest the Government's 5-year austerity budget proposal.
    In August after the newspaper El Pais printed a story reporting on 
high costs charged by the newspaper distributors' union, the union 
refused to distribute El Pais for 1 day in protest. The union asserted 
that it was being blamed for the demise of newspapers, while the press 
association called the protest an assault on freedom of the press.
    There are mechanisms for resolving workers' complaints against 
employers, but unions complained that these mechanisms sometimes were 
applied arbitrarily. The law generally prohibits discriminatory acts by 
employers, including arbitrary dismissals for union activity. Unions 
maintain that organizers are dismissed for fabricated reasons, thus 
allowing employers to avoid penalty under the law.
    There are no restrictions on the right of unions to form 
confederations or to affiliate with international trade union groups; 
however, the one national confederation has chosen not to affiliate 
officially with any of the world federations. Some individual unions 
are affiliated with international trade secretariats.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining between companies and their unions determines a number of 
private sector salaries. The executive branch, acting independently, 
determines public sector salaries. There are no laws prohibiting 
antiunion discrimination, but a 1993 executive decree established fines 
for employers engaging in antiunion activities. The law does not 
require employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities. 
However, in cases of legal challenges by union activists, courts tend 
to impose indemnization levels that are higher than those normally paid 
to dismissed workers.
    Union members continued to file claims of discrimination with the 
Ministry of Labor, which has a labor commission that investigates all 
claims. In 1999 there were 16 claims of antiunion discrimination 
submitted to the Ministry of Labor. (The Ministry's mediation service 
received a total of 353 laborrelated complaints that year, of which it 
successfully mediated 307 cases and failed to resolve 31 cases; 15 
remained open at the end of that year. Nearly half of all complaints 
related to workers' wages.) While there was no specific information on 
the antiunion discrimination complaints, most were resolved through 
rehiring the employee with full rights or compensation of the employee 
(without being rehired). Most complaints are resolved within a few 
months, but a few cases remained unresolved at year's end. Labor unions 
have complained that some businesses have encouraged formation of 
worker cooperatives, which serve to reduce their labor costs. Although 
such cooperatives do not necessarily affect workers' social insurance 
and other public benefits, they can reduce workers' job security and 
result in a loss of seniority. They also weaken the power of trade 
unions and of collective bargaining.
    All labor legislation fully covers workers employed in special 
export zones. There are no unions in any of these zones, but the few 
workers in these zones are not in traditionally organizable 
occupations.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The 
law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Child Labor Code protects children; the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the law. Some 
children work as street vendors in the expanding informal sector or in 
the agrarian sector, which generally are regulated less strictly and 
where pay is lower; however, illegal child labor is not a major 
problem. By law minors under the age of 14 may not be granted 
permission to work, and this is enforced in practice. Minors between 
the ages of 14 and 15 are granted permission to work only in extremely 
rare circumstances and even then usually only to work with other 
members of their families. Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 require 
government permission to work, and such permission is not granted for 
dangerous, fatiguing, or night work.
    Permission to work is only granted to minors who have completed 9 
years of compulsory education or who remain enrolled in school and are 
working toward completing the period of compulsory education. A total 
of 95 percent of children complete primary school education, which is 
free and compulsory. Controls over salaries and hours for children are 
more strict than those for adults. Children over the age of 16 may sue 
in court for payment of wages, and children have the legal right to 
dispose of their own income. In conjunction with an NGO, in March INAME 
began a pilot program to pay families $83 (1,000 pesos) per month to 
parents who take their children off the streets and send them to 
school. This amount approximates what a child might earn working on the 
street. On December 8, the Government created a National Committee for 
the Eradication of Child Labor, which is to create a national action 
plan to combat it.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the 
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor 
effectively enforces a legislated minimum monthly wage which is in 
effect in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry adjusts the 
minimum wage whenever it adjusts public sector wages. The minimum wage, 
which was set in January at about $86 (1,060 pesos) per month, 
functions more as an index for calculating wage rates than as a true 
measure of minimum subsistence levels, and it would not provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The vast majority of 
workers earn more than the minimum wage.
    The standard workweek is 48 hours in industry and 44 hours in 
commerce, with a 36-hour break each week. The law stipulates that 
industrial workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of 
48 hours and that workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation 
after a year of employment.
    The law protects foreign workers and does not discriminate against 
them. However, in order to receive official protection, the companies 
that employ foreign workers must report them as employees. Many 
workers--both native and foreign--work off the books and thus forfeit 
certain legal protection.
    The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforces legislation 
regulating health and safety conditions in a generally effective 
manner. However, some of the regulations cover urban industrial workers 
more adequately than rural and agricultural workers. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves from what they consider hazardous or 
dangerous conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically 
addressing trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that 
persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                               __________

                               VENEZUELA

    Venezuela is a republic with an elected president and a unicameral 
congress. The Constitution, which entered into effect on December 30, 
1999, also provides for a ``Citizen Power'' branch of government, which 
includes the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor, and the Controller 
General, and an ``electoral power''--the National Electoral Council 
(CNE). On July 30, voters reelected President Hugo Chavez Frias of the 
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). The MVR also won 92 seats in the 165-
member legislature. According to international observers, the year's 
general elections were generally free and fair; however, there were 
localized technical problems and irregularities, and the process 
leading to the elections was a controversial and difficult one. The 
date for the elections originally was set for May 28, but as that date 
approached it became increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to 
organize the elections adequately. Constant changes to the voter 
database--which both the opposition and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) alleged were intended to offer electoral advantage to President 
Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to complete programming of the 
electronic voting machines or carry out other necessary steps. The 
Supreme Court ordered a delay and gave responsibility for setting the 
new date to the National Legislative Committee (a panel serving as the 
country's legislature pending election of the National Assembly). The 
civilian judiciary is legally independent; however, it is highly 
inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and judges are subject to influence 
from a number of sources.
    The security apparatus includes civilian and military elements, 
both accountable to elected authorities. The Interior and Justice 
Ministry controls the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), which conducts 
most criminal investigations, and the State Security Police (DISIP), 
which is primarily responsible for investigating cases of corruption, 
subversion, and arms trafficking. The Defense Ministry controls the 
General Directorate for Military Intelligence, which is responsible for 
collecting intelligence related to national security and sovereignty. 
The National Guard, an active branch of the military, has arrest powers 
and is largely responsible for guarding the exterior of prisons and key 
government installations, maintaining public order, monitoring 
frontiers, conducting counterdrug operations, and providing law 
enforcement in remote areas. It also supplies the top leadership for 
various state and municipal police forces, which fall under the 
authority of the respective state governors or municipal mayors. The 
Metropolitan Police is the main civilian police force in and around 
Caracas. There was continued controversy during the year over the use 
of the armed forces in traditionally nonmilitary roles in government 
and society, including the appointment of military officers to high-
ranking government positions. Some 70,000 members of the military 
continued to participate in a public works program begun in 1999, 
including conducting a census of the unemployed; providing medical care 
to the needy; renovating schools, playgrounds, and medical care 
centers; and removing garbage. At year's end, 3 of the 14 members of 
the President's Cabinet, including the Minister of Defense, were either 
active or retired career military officers, as were the presidents of 
the major state-owned corporations Petroleos de Venezuela, CITGO, and 
Corporacion Venezolana de Guyana. There are also a number of military 
officers in high and mid-ranking government positions in agencies 
responsible for social development, public works, and finance. Both 
police and military personnel were responsible for human rights abuses 
during the year.
    The country has abundant natural resources, and its per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) is $4,302. However, income is distributed 
unevenly with approximately 80 percent of the population living at or 
below the poverty line, which is $1,986 per capita. Oil accounted for 
27 percent of GDP, 53 percent of government revenues, and 84 percent of 
the country's exports during the year. Nonoil exports also are 
dominated by natural resources, with some basic refining. Iron, 
aluminum, steel, and petrochemical products together comprise nearly 
half of the country's nonoil exports. The vast majority of all natural 
resource extraction and production is done by entities owned and 
operated wholly or in part by the Government. During the year, the 
economy began to recover from its deepest recession in 10 years as oil 
prices increased from historic lows to the highest prices since the oil 
crises of the 1970's. Growth for the year is estimated at 3.2 percent; 
the economy contracted by 6.1 percent in 1999.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor in some areas; 
although there were improvements in some areas, serious problems 
remain. During the year, the police and military committed 
extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects at an increased rate. 
Excessive use of deadly force by police and security forces was a 
serious problem; over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in 
shootouts with the police during the first 8 months of the year. 
Investigations continued into the forced disappearances of criminal 
suspects by the security forces. Torture and abuse of detainees 
continued, and the Government failed to punish police and security 
officers guilty of abuse. While overcrowding was reduced in some 
prisons, prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to 
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff, violence, and 
overcrowding in some prisons so severe as to constitute inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention increased. Lengthy 
pretrial detention, and corruption and severe inefficiency in the 
judicial and law enforcement systems also were problems. The Government 
struggled to implement the Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP), 
which required a major shift from a secretive inquisitorial system to 
an open adversarial system; however, there were successes including a 
reduction in the number of prisoners who had not been convicted of a 
crime. The authorities suspended a number of judges for incompetence or 
corruption. The December 1999 Constitution established civilian trials 
for soldiers accused of abuses and committed the Government to the 
rulings of international courts. Security forces committed illegal 
searches. Concern over freedom of the press increased, and some critics 
charged that the Government intimidated the media. Self-censorship was 
reportedly widespread. Concern over freedom of association increased, 
due in part to a Supreme Court ruling that could limit the legal rights 
of some associations. The Government described some refugees as 
``displaced persons in transit'' and restricted their ability to 
request asylum. The new Constitution created a national Ombudsman, who 
repeatedly and frankly advocated for the respect of human rights. 
Violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children, 
discrimination against the disabled, and inadequate protection of the 
rights of indigenous people continue to be problems. Concern over labor 
rights increased, and on December 3, voters approved a referendum to 
``overhaul'' union leadership. Child labor persisted, and there were 
reports of trafficking in children for forced labor. Killings due to 
vigilante justice increased significantly.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of targeted political killings; however, the security forces 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal 
suspects, at significantly increased levels. The Venezuelan Program of 
Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), a highly respected human 
rights NGO, documented 170 extrajudicial killings from October 1999 
through September, compared with 101 killings from October 1998 to 
September 1999. The killings involved summary executions of criminal 
suspects, indiscriminate or excessive use of force, and death resulting 
from mistreatment while in custody. According to PROVEA, state police 
forces other than the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 82 
killings; the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 25 killings; the 
PTJ, 25 killings; the National Guard, 9 killings; the municipal police 
forces, 8 killings; the army, 6 killings; the DISIP, 4 killings; and 
other security forces, 11 killings. These figures reflect a range of 
killings in very different situations committed by organizations with 
varying levels of control and responsibilities. The majority of the 
killings were attributed to various state and municipal police forces 
that report to local officials and usually have little training or 
supervision. Excessive use of deadly force was a problem; according to 
the Government, over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in shootouts 
with the police during the first 8 months of the year. There are 
reports that police fire on criminal suspects who disobey orders to 
halt. Many politicians contributed to a climate of official acceptance 
of the excessive use of force when, during the national election 
campaign, they employed slogans such as ``bullets for the underworld'' 
and ``the only good criminal is a dead criminal.''
    The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity, 
as the Government rarely prosecutes such cases. The police often fail 
to investigate crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues and 
characterize incidents of extrajudicial killings as ``confrontations,'' 
even when eyewitness testimony and evidence strongly indicate 
otherwise. In addition, the civilian judicial system still is 
struggling to implement the new Organic Criminal Procedures Code and, 
in the meantime, remains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt (see 
Section 1.e.). In the small number of prosecutions in which the courts 
convict perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and other abuses, the 
sentences issued are frequently light, or the convictions are 
overturned on appeal. The December 1999 Constitution established that 
trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be 
held in civilian courts; however, the provision does not apply to 
military trials for cases that predate the new Constitution (see 
Section 1.e.). Unlike common criminals, members of the security forces 
charged with or convicted of crimes rarely spend much time in prison.
    Red de Apoyo, an NGO, reported that on January 6, the Yaracuy state 
police detained Jaime Hilarion Palima and Richard Lucambio on a city 
street in San Felipe. Hilarion's and Lucambio's bodies were found 5 
days later on a river bed and a highway, respectively. The case was 
under investigation at year's end.
    On April 8, the Metropolitan Police fired indiscriminately at a 
group of individuals who had just seen them shoot and kill a suspected 
criminal, and also killed one of the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares. 
The police also tortured another witness, Donis Ramirez (see Section 
1.c.). The case was under investigation at year's end.
    On June 30, the Metropolitan Police arrested Ronny Tovar, age 17, 
Francisco Mister, age 14, and Luis Hernandez, age 21, in their homes. 
Witnesses heard shots and saw the bodies of the three young men being 
taken from the scene in a police vehicle. The bodies later were 
recovered, and the case was under investigation at year's end.
    Security forces committed some killings in prisons; however, the 
majority of the 338 inmate deaths during the year resulted from gang 
confrontations, riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe 
conditions in prison facilities (see Section 1.c.).
    The authorities continued to investigate allegations of human 
rights violations by the military and security forces sent to Vargas 
state in December 1999. The forces were sent to restore order after an 
outbreak of looting following heavy rains, which triggered flooding and 
landslides that killed an estimated 20,000 persons. Witnesses claim 
that military and security forces beat, detained, and killed alleged 
criminal suspects and other individuals between December 19 and 
December 25, 1999 (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 4). On May 22, 
Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel stated that confirmed cases of 
these abuses were ``numerous and important.''
    For example, on December 25, 1999, National Guard Corporal Lorenzo 
Badillo Cano shot and killed Luis Bastardo as he celebrated the 
Christmas holiday on a street in La Guaira. The Prosecutor General, 
with the cooperation of the PTJ and the National Guard, successfully 
prosecuted Badillo, who pled guilty to murder and, on September 6, was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison, less than the 15 to 25 years 
established by law. The authorities also are investigating four 
disappearance cases from the same time period in Vargas (see Section 
1.b.).
    There were no prosecutions for the June 1999 death of Jhon Linares, 
who was detained by the Metropolitan Police and later was found dead 
from three bullet wounds at the hospital, or Oswaldo Blanco, who died 
in February 1999 due to abuse by the National Guard.
    At year's end, the trial of a police officer for the February 1999 
death of Angel Castillo Munoz was ongoing. Castillo died when Sucre 
state police broke up a peaceful student demonstration; he was hit in 
the head by a rubber bullet and fell unconscious into an area saturated 
by tear gas. Police reportedly continued to fire, despite students' 
attempts to surrender, resulting in a delay of medical care to the 
injured students.
    The PTJ made no progress in the investigation of the May 1998 
killings of Carlos Alberto Colmenares Garcia, Richard David Palacios 
Garcia, and Avelino Rafael Vega, who died after the Sucre municipal 
police opened fire on their car. There has been no further 
investigation into the January 1998 killings of Harold Michael Zambrano 
Gonzalez and Arturo Jose Hernandez Ramirez by the Metropolitan Police.
    There was no further information on the appeal by the prosecution 
of a court's 1999 decision to exonerate a PTJ member implicated in the 
1995 execution-style killing of 21-year-old Hector Rojas, despite 
evidence of the officer's guilt.
    On August 4, a court convicted two National Guardsmen and one 
prison guard and sentenced them to terms ranging from 15 to 30 years in 
prison for the 1996 deaths of 25 inmates in a fire started by prison 
guards at La Planta prison.
    In March the victims' families and the Government reached an out-
of-court settlement in the case of the 1992 killings of at least 63 
prisoners at Catia prison.
    In November 1999, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
the Government accepted its responsibility in 44 cases of extrajudicial 
killings by security forces during and after the civil unrest of 
February-March 1989, in which some 300 alleged extrajudicial killings 
were committed. The Government also agreed to compensate the families 
of the victims and to identify and punish those responsible; however, 
during the year there was considerable disagreement regarding 
compensation, and an agreement had not been reached at year's end. The 
Committee of Family Members of Victims of the Unrest had referred a 
total of 45 cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) in 1995. In 1991 a police officer was found guilty of one 
killing, but the courts released the officer from prison 1 year later. 
In October 1997, the IACHR called on the Government to investigate this 
case, provide compensation to the victim's family, and bring to justice 
those responsible for the death. By year's end, the Government had 
complied partially; it had investigated and made a payment, but it had 
not punished any of those responsible.
    Mob lynching of supposed criminals increased significantly due to 
the public's perception of increased impunity resulting from the 
difficult implementation of the COPP. The victims were almost always 
known criminals who preyed on residents of poor neighborhoods. Between 
October 1999 and September, PROVEA recorded 22 lynchings and 107 
attempted lynchings, compared to 2 lynchings and 24 attempted lynchings 
between October 1998 and September 1999. Vigilante groups known as 
``brigadas'' continued to operate.
    b. Disappearance.--The December 1999 Constitution prohibits forced 
disappearance, obliges an individual to disobey an order to carry out a 
disappearance, and provides for the prosecution of the intellectual 
author of the crime. There were no reports of targeted political 
disappearances; however, there were reliable reports of persons who 
disappeared after being detained by the security forces at the end of 
1999.
    The authorities are investigating allegations that the military and 
security forces carried out forced disappearances of alleged criminal 
suspects and other individuals in Vargas state during a crackdown on 
looters in December 1999. On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers 
separately arrested Oscar Blanco Romero and Marco Monasterio without 
explanation, in their homes in Caraballeda, Vargas state. Following the 
filing of habeas corpus petitions, the army made a formal response in 
which they acknowledged detaining the men but stated that they were 
immediately turned over to the DISIP. The DISIP first stated that they 
had no agents in the area at the time, then reversed that position, but 
stated that they did not have Blanco and Monasterio in detention.
    On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers beat and arrested Jose 
Rivas Fernandez on a city street in Caraballeda, Vargas state, 
according to reliable reports. The army command states that it did not 
detain Rivas. On December 23, 1999, DISIP agents seized Roberto 
Hernandez Paz in his uncle's home in La Guaira, Vargas state. The uncle 
subsequently heard Hernandez plead to the security agents and a gunshot 
coming from the family's garden. Neighbors witnessed the injured victim 
being placed in a DISIP vehicle and driven away. The DISIP stated that 
it did not arrest Hernandez. Neither individual had been located at 
year's end; investigations into both cases continued.
    The Government's investigation of the Vargas cases has been slow 
and disorganized, and charges have been filed in only one case (see 
Section 1.a.). The investigating team has been changed three times, 
with each new team starting a new inquiry afresh. The Government has 
been unable to compel the cooperation of the DISIP. In response to a 
request to provide photographs of the agents who operated in Vargas at 
the time of the disappearances, the DISIP supplied an album that 
included photographs of retired agents, deceased officers, and 
prisoners. Prosecutors also are investigating whether DISIP agents 
broke any laws when they visited army paratroopers and asked questions 
about army officers who had served in Vargas in December 1999. Since 
investigation of the paratroopers is the responsibility of the 
Prosecutor General and the army, the possibility that DISIP agents were 
engaged in witness intimidation is under investigation. Human right 
groups called for obstruction of justice charges to be brought against 
the DISIP to compel its cooperation.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The new Constitution prohibits torture and the holding of 
detainees incommunicado, provides for the prosecution of officials who 
instigate or tolerate torture, and grants victims the right to 
rehabilitation. Under the COPP, detainees have the right to a judicial 
determination of the legality of their detention within 3 days, a 
reduction from the previous 8-day period that human rights groups 
argued was the principal time in which detainees were tortured (see 
Section 1.d.); however, the security forces continue to torture and 
abuse detainees physically and psychologically. Credible human rights 
groups report that this abuse most commonly consists of beatings during 
arrest or interrogation, but there have been incidents when the 
security forces used near suffocation and other forms of torture that 
leave no telltale signs. Most victims come from the poorest and least 
influential parts of society.
    PROVEA documented 429 cases of torture, beatings, and other abuse 
from October 1999 through September, compared with 424 cases from 
October 1998 through September 1999. According to PROVEA, the 
Metropolitan Police of the Caracas federal district were responsible 
for 94 of the reported incidents; other state police forces were 
responsible for 147 incidents; the National Guard, 93 incidents; the 
municipal police forces, 58 incidents; the DISIP, 22 incidents; the 
army, 9 incidents; and the PTJ, 6 incidents. In April 1999, human 
rights NGO's presented a report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture 
in which they documented 120 torture cases since 1987 that they have 
investigated and reported to the Prosecutor General and the National 
Human Rights Commission, but that still have not been investigated 
fully by the Government.
    Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continues because the 
Government does not ensure the independent investigation of complaints 
needed to bring those responsible to justice. In addition to lack of 
vigor by the judiciary, the fact that the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine is part of the PTJ also contributes to a climate of impunity, 
since its doctors are unlikely to be impartial in their examinations of 
cases that involve torture by members of the PTJ. Very few instances of 
torture have resulted in convictions.
    On March 1, according to Red de Apoyo, the Zulia state police 
arrested Jose Matheus in his home and accused him of involvement in a 
kidnaping. The police held Matheus incommunicado for 11 days and 
severely beat him and tortured him psychologically.
    On April 8, the Metropolitan Police tortured and threatened to kill 
Donis Ramirez if she spoke to the authorities. Ramirez had seen the 
police fire indiscriminately at a group of individuals who had just 
witnessed them shoot and kill a suspected criminal, also killing one of 
the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares (see Section 1.a.).
    There was no prosecution for the August 1999 torture of Juan de la 
Cruz Bravo by the PTJ in Guasdualito. Bravo, who had been accused of 
murder, allegedly was drugged, beaten, and subjected to electrical 
shock. There was also no prosecution for the March 1999 beating of 
Andres Flores by the Metropolitan Police.
    No action ever was reported against some 50 Baruta municipal police 
officers who attacked residents of the poor working class Caracas 
suburb of Petare in December 1997, injuring 43 persons. There was no 
reported progress from the criminal court investigation or the internal 
investigation by the chief of the Baruta municipal police.
    The police used tear gas and pellet guns against peaceful 
demonstrators, resulting in some injuries (see Section 2.b.).
    In the Colombian border area where some constitutional protections 
had been suspended since 1994, the National Guard and army acted with 
near impunity until the suspension of the protections was lifted in 
1999. Complaints against the security forces in this area subsequently 
decreased. The Support Network for Justice and Peace has documented 
many human rights abuses in this region by amassing detailed witness 
testimony. There has been no resolution of the border area cases from 
1995, in which members of the military, in separate incidents in 
reaction to guerrilla attacks, tortured 23 rural workers near Cararabo 
and 19 peasant farmers in La Victoria, both in Apure state. The 
investigations into these incidents continued at year's end.
    Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to 
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff and National 
Guard members, violence, and overcrowding in some prisons so severe as 
to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. During the year, the 
prison population decreased to 84 percent of capacity, due to the 
implementation of the COPP. However, because of the poor distribution 
of inmates, approximately 40 percent of prisoners still are housed in 
seriously overcrowded facilities.
    The Government failed to provided adequate security in prisons, 
resulting, according to PROVEA, in 338 deaths and 1,255 injuries from 
violence in jails from October 1999 through September 2000--a decrease 
from a total of 390 deaths and 1,695 injuries from violence between 
October 1998 and September 1999. The majority of the 338 inmate deaths 
resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence, especially during clashes 
between rival gangs, riots, fires, and generally unsafe conditions in 
prison facilities. Many others died as a consequence of poor sanitary 
conditions, poor diet, and inadequate medical care. Security forces 
committed a small number of the killings in prisons. Prisoners also had 
false expectations with respect to the benefits of the COPP, which 
resulted in increasing levels of tension and violence. Funding for 
prisons remained extremely low, preventing significant improvement in 
most penitentiaries.
    Inmates often have to pay guards as well as each other to obtain 
necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the 
prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, only about 30 
percent of inmates consume it. Most prisoners get their food from their 
families, by paying prison guards, or in barter with other prisoners. 
Many inmates also profit from exploiting and abusing others. This 
problem is exacerbated by the absence of a rational system of prisoner 
classification: convicted murders and rapists are housed with 
unsentenced first-time petty offenders. Gang-related violence and 
extortion is fueled by the substantial trafficking in arms and drugs 
that occurs in the prisons.
    Female prisoners are detained in separate prisons, where conditions 
generally are better than those in the men's facilities. Security 
forces and law enforcement authorities often detain minors together 
with adults; however, separate facilities exist for juveniles. Because 
reform institutions are filled to capacity, hundreds of children 
accused of infractions are confined in juvenile detention centers where 
they are crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once a day, and 
forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.
    On August 31, the prison emergency, which had been declared on 
September 30, 1999, was ended, and the Interinstitutional Commission 
managing it was disbanded. Despite resistance from the Catholic Church 
and NGO's, the Government sporadically used the National Guard, 
normally charged with guarding the outside of the prisons, to maintain 
internal control of the prisons.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
COPP provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, 
the security forces routinely continued to arrest and detain citizens 
arbitrarily at an increased rate.
    There continued to be arbitrary detentions by the Metropolitan 
Police of the federal district of Caracas, the DISIP, municipal police 
forces, the National Guard, and the PTJ--especially during anticrime 
sweeps in impoverished sections of major cities. The authorities 
detained persons during the sweeps for up to 2 days while they checked 
criminal records; most were released without charges. PROVEA documented 
8,981 persons detained in sweeps from October 1999 through September, 
an increase from the 6,236 persons detained in sweeps from October 1998 
through September 1999.
    Amnesty International reported that in September, police in 
Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered persons, who were 
held incommunicado for 2 days without food or drinking water (see 
Section 5).
    In December 1999, security forces arbitrarily detained suspected 
looters in Vargas state (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 4).
    The COPP states that a person accused of a crime cannot be 
incarcerated during criminal proceedings unless that person is caught 
in the act of committing a crime, or a judge determines that there is a 
danger that the accused may flee or impede the investigation. Under the 
previous system, the police could hold persons without an arrest 
warrant for up to 8 days, and in many cases, the police abused 
detainees physically and psychologically during that period and 
illegally held them incommunicado (see Section 1.c.). The law provides 
for the right to a judicial determination of the legality of the 
detention within 72 hours. Persons accused of crimes must be brought 
before a judge within 24 hours of arrest or be freed pending charges. 
In early March, the Government announced that pretrial hearings would 
be held on weekends to allow the authorities to process detainees in 
accordance with the COPP's provisions, rather than release suspected 
criminals. In no case can the detention of a person accused of a crime 
exceed the possible minimum sentence for the crime committed, nor can 
it exceed 2 years. Confusion over the new code still exists, and 
arbitrary arrests continue to be common. Prison officials often 
illegally demand payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial 
proceedings. Those who are unable to pay often are forced to forgo 
their hearings.
    Before the COPP came into effect in 1999, roughly 70 percent of 
prisoners had not been convicted of a crime because, under the old 
procedural code, most criminal defendants were incarcerated rather than 
granted provisional liberty while their prosecutions were pending. In 
addition, the slow and secretive inquisitorial justice system of the 
old code had led to an inefficient, overwhelmed, and corrupt justice 
system, which resulted in cases languishing an average of 4 to 5 years 
in the courts, during which time the accused usually remained in jail. 
Under the COPP, prisoners accused of petty crimes who have not been 
convicted but already have served 2 years or the minimum sentence 
possible for that crime (whichever is lesser) are to be released if 
they pass a psychiatric examination. During the year, approximately 
9,000 prisoners were released under the new provisions and benefits 
provided by the law. There were approximately 14,200 prisoners at 
year's end, 45 percent of whom have not been convicted of a crime--a 
decrease from 57 percent in 1999.
    Prisoners carried out protests to demand that the Government 
expedite the review of the cases of inmates who might benefit from the 
COPP's provisions. While there were still some prisoners who had not 
been convicted but already had served 2 or more years in prison, 
prisoners also had false expectations with respect to the benefits of 
the COPP, which resulted in tension and violence (see Section 1.c.).
    Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judiciary is legally 
independent; however, it is highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt, 
and judges are subject to influence from a number of sources, including 
the executive branch.
    The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the 
court of final appeal; the Prosecutor General, who provides opinions to 
the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and brings public employee 
misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or 
accused persons to the attention of the proper authorities; the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice, which manages the national police 
force, oversees the prisons, and files complaints in criminal courts; 
and the executive directorate of the magistrate, which oversees the 
lower courts as well as the selection and training of judges. The lower 
court system includes district and municipal courts as well as trial 
and appeal courts that deal with civil and criminal matters.
    Both the old code and its 1999 replacement, the new Organic Code of 
Criminal Procedures, provide for the right to a fair trial and consider 
the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the 
old secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence was 
ineffective in the justice system, which became overburdened, 
inefficient, and corrupt under a paper-intensive, costly, and time-
consuming judicial process. Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined, 
and susceptible to political influence. The COPP introduced for the 
first time open, public trials with oral proceedings and verdicts by 
juries or panels of judges. This new adversarial system of justice 
gives practical effect to the presumption of innocence and eliminates 
the secret stage of trial that had existed in the previous system. It 
also establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation 
agreements, a statute designed to clear the overburdened justice system 
of simple cases and minor offenses. Lengthy delays in trials were still 
common, although there has been some improvement.
    The Government continued to struggle to implement the COPP, which 
required a major shift in the fundamental concept of how justice is 
carried out, the legal procedures involved, and the respective roles of 
the police, the judge, and the lawyers. The police no longer may detain 
persons arbitrarily for up to 8 days and now must work under the 
supervision of a prosecutor; judges have ceased to be investigators and 
are now arbiters of law; and prosecutors and defense attorneys confront 
one another in open court. For the second year, open, oral trials took 
place around the country despite a shortage of trained personnel and 
resources. The COPP's successful implementation over the long term is 
expected to require further progress, including increased training for 
police and lawyers and a significantly increased number of prosecutors 
and defenders to handle the workload.
    The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an 
attorney; however, there are not enough public defenders to handle the 
caseload. The Executive Directorate of the Magistrature (DEM), which 
replaced the Judicial Emergency Commission, reported that there are 
approximately 275 public defense attorneys for the entire country.
    The Government ended the Judicial Emergency created in 1999 to 
bring about reform of the judicial system; however, significant 
attempts to reform the judicial system continued. During the year, the 
DEM--which oversees the selection, training, and discipline of judges--
removed 100 judges from office based on charges of incompetence or 
corruption and suspended an additional 350 judges. Suspended judges 
continued to receive salaries; however, some observers charged that 
their right to appeal was restricted. The Government announced that it 
expected to hold the first competitive examinations for judicial 
vacancies, a process established under the COPP, in January 2001 in 
Miranda and Vargas states. Judges with pending cases against them were 
not eligible to take the examinations, and judges who had been 
reprimanded had points deducted from their scores.
    In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with the 
independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the President 
telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina, and asked 
him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend a judge handling a 
politically sensitive libel case against editor Pablo Lopez Ulacio (see 
Section 2.a.). In August Molina resigned, claiming that he lacked the 
political support needed to continue his duties.
    The military courts implemented a similar reform of the military 
justice system and are making the transition to the new system. The 
December 1999 Constitution established that trials for military 
personnel charged with human rights abuses would be held in civilian 
courts; this represented a fundamental change in human rights policy. 
However, the provision does not apply to military trials for cases that 
predate the new Constitution. Human rights NGO's expressed concern that 
the Supreme Court's selection of military judges from a list of 
candidates provided by the Minister of Defense links the careers of 
military judges to the high command, making them more responsive to the 
views of their military leaders and influencing them to act slowly in 
cases in which the military is implicated. As a result, military judges 
trying human rights cases that predate the new Constitution can be 
subject to improper influence, and offenders might evade punishment for 
extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary 
interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however, 
the security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Security 
forces often conducted searches of homes without warrants, especially 
during anticrime sweeps in impoverished neighborhoods. There were no 
complaints during the year by human rights NGO's of illegal wiretapping 
by the security forces.
    In April DISIP announced that it had dismissed some 50 agents for 
engaging in illegal wiretapping of other government agencies. In July 
during a dialog the DISIP held with the national Ombudsman's office and 
NGO's about a proposed restructuring of the National Intelligence 
System (which was not carried out at year's end), the agency stated 
that it had files on 1 in every 19 citizens (or 520,000 individuals).
    During the campaign for the July 30 elections, DISIP agents 
searched offices of an opposition governor, despite a 1999 promise by 
President Chavez that the DISIP would not be used for political 
operations (see Section 3).

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and while the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice, some media critics charge that the 
Government intimidates the media and report that self-censorship is 
widespread. Individuals and the media freely and publicly criticize the 
Government; however, concern over freedom of the press increased during 
the year. A provision in the December 1999 Constitution states that all 
persons have the right to ``timely, truthful, and impartial'' 
information, without censorship. This ``truthful information'' article 
has raised concerns among many in the domestic and international media 
that it could be used by the Government to censor or intimidate the 
press. In April the governor of Apure state issued a decree requiring 
``true information'' within the state. There were immediate protests, 
and the governor withdrew the decree. Also in April, officials of the 
National Electoral Council stated that the Council was considering 
possible regulations governing the publication of political polls. 
There were strong protests from the media, and no regulation or 
legislation ever was proposed formally.
    There were numerous allegations of inappropriate government 
pressure against the media. In January the DISIP questioned two 
reporters from the daily El Nacional about articles they had written 
about beatings and extrajudicial killings in Vargas in December 1999 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). A subpoena was issued that required one 
reporter to name her sources. She was threatened with imprisonment or 
fines for noncompliance; however, no action was taken against her when 
she refused to provide the information. In May the television program 
24 Hours, hosted by Napoleon Bravo on the Venevision station, was 
canceled. Bravo charged that government pressure was to blame; 
government and network officials denied the accusation. Individual 
journalists and editors have reported receiving intimidating or 
threatening phone calls.
    The Constitution also provides for the ``right to reply'' for 
individuals who believe they are portrayed inaccurately in media 
reports. President Chavez demanded a right to reply on several 
occasions. However, certain individuals named by the President in his 
weekly national radio show have complained that they have not been 
granted the right to reply.
    In September a court dismissed a long-running criminal defamation 
suit against a journalist and editor of the monthly magazine Exceso. 
The Inter-American Press Association had protested the case, in which 
it was alleged that a businessman who was the subject of a critical 
article in Exceso used improper influence over the judiciary to 
retaliate against the magazine. A separate criminal defamation suit, 
against weekly newspaper La Razon, continued at year's end; the 
International Committee to Protect Journalists has protested this case. 
On July 8, a judge ordered Pablo Lopez Ulacio, the editor of La Razon, 
placed under house arrest for failure to appear in court to answer 
libel charges brought against him by Tobias Carrero Nacar, a 
businessman and friend of President Chavez. In the spring, La Razon 
published articles that alleged that Luis Miquilena, president of the 
National Legislative Committee (CLN), had influenced improperly 
insurance contracts to Carrero. The DEM sanctioned the judge who issued 
the house arrest order, and he eventually recused himself from the 
case. In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with 
the independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the 
President telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina, 
and asked him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend the judge 
(see Section 1.e.). Lopez was released from house arrest after 1 week; 
however, a new arrest order was issued, and Lopez went into hiding. 
Because of the lengthy process and considerable legal costs, both 
lawsuits have been interpreted by some observers as examples of the use 
of criminal defamation or libel lawsuits, or the threat of such 
lawsuits, to intimidate journalists and discourage investigative 
journalism.
    There were no reports of government-sponsored attacks on 
journalists; however, several journalists were assaulted physically or 
verbally for what appear to have been political motives. Some observers 
assert that President Chavez's aggressive rhetoric in criticizing the 
media as having portrayed him unfairly has contributed to a climate of 
intimidation and hostility toward the media that encourages such 
attacks. At one presidential press conference in Maracay in March, 
reporters refused to ask President Chavez questions in protest of what 
one termed ``the President's constant attacks against the media.'' 
During a May 1 campaign march by President Chavez, some partisans 
attending the campaign chanted slogans that characterized reporters as 
``traitors'' and ``enemies,'' pushed or hit journalists, and attempted 
to destroy their equipment. President Chavez later condemned these 
assaults. In February anonymous leaflets were distributed throughout 
the Caracas subway that criticized journalists as ``enemies of the 
revolution'' and named certain prominent journalists.
    In September 1999, government officials complained that 
international media coverage of events was unfair, and some made 
allegations of ``an international media conspiracy.'' Also during that 
month, a small group of activists occupied the offices of the 
Associated Press in protest of the news service's supposed 
antigovernment stance. A regional radio station alleged that state 
security agents searched its offices in what the radio viewed as an 
effort to intimidate.
    Instances of bomb threats--and on two occasions in December 1999, 
discoveries of small explosive devices in or near newspaper buildings--
have contributed to what some journalists have called ``a climate of 
intimidation'' of the media. In February the Venezuelan Press 
Association publicly commented on the deteriorating situation for press 
freedom in the country.
    There is no statutory censorship. The Government has tools to 
influence the press, such as licensing requirements for journalists, 
broadcast licensing concessions for television and radio stations, and 
lucrative public sector advertising. However, in practice, the media 
environment is free and open, although some journalists believe that 
self-censorship is becoming more widespread. Few newspapers regularly 
publish editorials that reflect the view of the newspaper, but signed 
articles on opinion pages carry abundant and varied perspectives, often 
highly critical of the Government. Radio and television stations do not 
broadcast overt institutional political opinions, although opinion and 
talk shows are common.
    A 1994 law requires practicing journalists to have journalism 
degrees and be members of the National College of Journalists. These 
requirements are waived for foreigners and for opinion columnists, on 
the grounds of tolerance of free speech. Media owners challenged the 
law in November 1995, but the Supreme Court still had not ruled on this 
matter at year's end.
    Print and electronic media are independent. There are state 
television and radio stations whose directors are named by the 
President but whose broadcast policies are autonomous. The Government 
financed and published the newspaper The President's Post during the 
first 6 months of the year. The President has a weekly call-in radio 
show on state-run Radio Nacional. At the President's discretion, his 
speeches or other public appearances may be declared a ``national 
broadcast.'' All television and radio stations are required by law to 
preempt scheduled programming and transmit the national broadcasts in 
their entirety (on occasion, 2 or more hours) instead. A documentary-
style ``news program,'' varying in length from 5 to 15 minutes, 
produced by the President's staff, began airing in June. The program, 
which focuses heavily on the activities of the President and the 
Government, is produced one or more times a week. It is broadcast 
before regularly scheduled evening news programs. Like the national 
broadcasts, by law every television station must broadcast these 
programs.
    The International Association of Broadcasting and domestic media 
figures criticized provisions of a telecommunications law enacted in 
June. The parts of the law related to broadcast content and frequency 
concessions were particularly controversial. Article 209 establishes 
that the President, ``when he judges it convenient to the interests of 
the nation, or when required for reasons of public order or security, 
can suspend telecommunications broadcasts, in conformity with the 
Constitution.'' Some observers believe that this article might allow 
the suspension of media broadcasts for vague and arbitrary reasons.
    In April Monsignor Baltazar Porras, the president of the Roman 
Catholic Episcopal Conference of Venezuela (CEV), publicly criticized 
the Government regarding a lack of electoral transparency, growing 
social instability, and the supra-constitutional activities of the CLN. 
Following these criticisms, the press reported that DISIP videotaped a 
Mass said by Monsignor Porras. The Director of DISIP immediately 
apologized, the agent was suspended, and the national Ombudsman's 
office opened an investigation of the incident. Bishops also reported 
receiving telephone threats during the CEV's assembly. In October the 
governor of Merida state announced that he had made a formal request to 
the public prosecutor to begin a criminal investigation of Monsignor 
Porras for alleged financial irregularities relating to the Church's 
administration of a publicly funded hospital. Because Monsignor Porras 
has criticized the Government, some observers interpreted the 
investigation as retaliation for that criticism.
    There is no state censorship of books, films, or other media 
products. Internet access is completely free and uncontrolled.
    The Government traditionally has respected academic freedom; 
however, there have been isolated allegations that individual 
professors at state universities have been removed or warned of 
possible removal from their academic positions because of outspoken 
political views.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. Public meetings, including those of 
all political parties, generally are held unimpeded. The Government 
requires permits for public marches but does not deny them for 
political reasons.
    The December 1999 Constitution prohibits the use of firearms to 
control peaceful demonstrations; however, as in previous years, some 
demonstrations turned violent and were quelled by security forces. 
According to PROVEA, no persons were killed, but 139 persons were 
injured during demonstrations from October 1999 through September, 
compared with 2 persons killed and 77 injured from October 1998 through 
September 1999. The student and teaching sectors carry out the largest 
number of protests, and the security forces quell the majority of their 
demonstrations.
    On April 5, residents of Cojedes state protested threats by the CLN 
to remove Governor Alberto Galindea for alleged financial 
irregularities. The protests in San Carlos and Tinaquillo turned 
violent, and the National Guard and state police intervened with tear 
gas. Approximately 18 persons were wounded and affected by tear gas; 
the state legislative assembly building was destroyed.
    On November 5-6, students in Merida protested the death of a fellow 
student under suspicious circumstances at the hands of the police. The 
protest became violent and security forces sent tanks, 350 soldiers, 
and 150 police to stop the demonstration. Police detained 18 persons.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice; professional and academic 
associations generally operate without interference. However, on 
November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) Nongovernmental 
organizations that receive funding from foreign governments or whose 
leaders are not Venezuelan are not part of ``civil society'' and 
therefore may not represent Venezuelan citizens in court or bring their 
own legal actions; (2) Religious organizations are not part of civil 
society and are subject to the same restrictions; and (3) The 
Government has an obligation to ensure that NGO's are ``democratic in 
nature'' and therefore that the internal elections of nonprofit groups 
(such as for boards of directors) can be regulated by the National 
Electoral Council. While there is ambiguity as to how the ruling is to 
be implemented, NGO's, labor unions, and other members of civil society 
expressed serious concerns about the ruling. The national Ombudsman's 
office questioned the constitutionality of the ruling and argued that 
it was up to civil society itself to define its members, not the 
Government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, on the condition that the practice of a religion does not 
violate public morality, decency, and the public order, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Each local church must register with the Directorate of Justice and 
Religion in the Ministry of Interior and Justice in order to hold legal 
status as a religious organization and to own property. The 
requirements for registration are largely administrative. However, some 
groups have complained that the process of registration is slow and 
inefficient. Foreign missionaries require a special visa to enter the 
country, which is obtained through the Ministry. Missionaries are not 
refused entry generally, but many complain that the Government often 
takes months or years to process a request.
    In 1964 the Government and the Holy See signed a concordat that 
underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church 
and provides government subsidies to the Church, including to its 
social programs and schools. Other religious groups are free to 
establish and run their own schools, but they do not receive subsidies 
from the Government.
    On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that religious 
organizations are not part of civil society and that their legal rights 
therefore were restricted (see Section 2.b.).
    On several occasions, leaders of the Roman Catholic Church were 
monitored or threatened by state agents for political reasons (see 
Section 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of citizens and legal residents to travel within the country and to go 
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these rights. 
However, the Government can suspend the freedom to travel, as it did 
from June 1994 to July 1995. The Government also restricts foreign 
travel for persons being investigated for criminal activities. For 3 
weeks in December 1999 and in January, the security forces sometimes 
restricted movement in and out of the areas hardest hit by the floods.
    The Constitution recognizes and provides for the right to asylum 
and refuge and mandates the passage of an organic law to codify this 
right. However, there is no domestic legislation regarding 
determination of refugee status, the procedure or criteria to be 
applied, and no independent organization to handle asylum requests 
exists. In the absence of any such legislation, the Government 
established an Interministerial Technical Commission (CTI) in 1999 to 
address cross-border movements and allows the Venezuelan Bishops' 
Conference to coordinate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in assisting refugees. In 1999 there were a total of 188 
persons in the country who had been granted refugee status. 
Approximately 100 individuals filed asylum claims during the year; 
however, the CTI did not rule on any requests.
    The Government in theory provides first asylum. However, in August 
500 Colombians entered the country following a paramilitary attack in 
the La Gabarra-Tibu area of Colombia. The Government provided 
humanitarian aid but, in coordination with the Colombian Government, 
quickly repatriated all of the Colombians. The Government determined 
that the Colombians were not refugees but ``displaced persons in 
transit.'' This term does not exist in international humanitarian law, 
and its use appeared to be designed to avoid the Government's 
international obligations to ``refugees.'' The accelerated procedures 
adopted by both governments for the return of the Colombians limited 
their opportunity to seek asylum, despite the intention previously 
stated by some members of these groups to different NGO's and the 
UNHCR.
    A similar episode occurred in June 1999, when some 3,500 Colombians 
entered the country in 3 waves following a paramilitary offensive in 
the Catatumbo area of Colombia. These individuals also were termed 
``displaced persons in transit,'' and quickly repatriated in 
coordination with the Colombian Government. There are reports that some 
of those returned subsequently were killed by paramilitary forces in 
Colombia. There were no other reports of the possible forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to change 
their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. The Constitution provides for the direct election of the 
President and unicameral National Assembly, as well as of state 
governors, state legislative councils, and local governments. Political 
parties organize, and their candidates are allowed freely to run for 
office and to seek the support of voters. The President has extensive 
powers; however, the legislature appoints the members of the Supreme 
Court, the National Electoral Council, and the so-called Citizen Power 
consisting of the Prosecutor General, Ombudsman, and Controller 
General.
    At President Chavez's behest, the National Constituent Assembly 
(ANC) decreed general elections in order to ``relegitimize'' 
authorities elected under the (now-defunct) 1961 Constitution. The new 
Constitution, which went into effect on December 30, 1999, replaced the 
previous bicameral legislature with a unicameral body, and membership 
in the former could not simply be carried over to the latter.
    The CNE, whose members were appointed on a temporary basis by the 
ANC at the end of December 1999, organized the elections. In making 
these appointments the ANC, citing an earlier Supreme Court decision 
acknowledging that it had ``super-constitutional'' powers, made no 
attempt to apply even in spirit the procedures set forth in the new 
Constitution regarding civil society participation in the selection 
process. This unilateral selection by the ANC (which easily approved a 
slate provided by its leadership) of the members of the CNE was 
criticized widely by the political opposition, media, and NGO's. These 
groups also criticized similar measures taken by the ANC in choosing 
its replacement body--the National Legislative Committee, as well as in 
making interim appointments to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power. 
The CLN was an unrepresentative 21-member panel given responsibility in 
January for serving as the country's legislature pending election of 
the National Assembly. The CNE invited representatives from the 
campaign teams to participate in their work.
    Elections were scheduled by the ANC for May 28 for every elected 
office in the country; more than 35,000 candidates ran for some 6,000 
offices. On March 28, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court 
dismissed two suits that challenged the constitutionality of the 
election law and consequently the scheduled date of May 28 for the 
elections. However, as the scheduled date approached, it became 
increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to organize them 
adequately. Constant changes to the voter data base--which both the 
opposition and NGO's have alleged were intended to offer electoral 
advantage to President Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to 
complete programming of the electronic voting machines or carry out 
other necessary steps.
    Faced with the prospect of a chaotic and highly contested election, 
the CNE decided at the last minute to serve as a friend of the court in 
a pending suit by two NGO's before the CNE seeking delay of the 
election. On May 25, the Supreme Court ordered the delay and gave 
responsibility for setting the new date to the CLN. This decision also 
gave the Controller General oversight powers over the CNE.
    The members of the CNE resigned following the delay, after the CLN 
formally requested their resignations. After some initial reluctance 
the CLN agreed that a ``national roundtable,'' on which some of its 
members and representatives of civil society would sit, would choose 
the new Council. That new Council included nonpartisan civil society 
members, including its president. Observers generally agree that the 
new National Electoral Council, chosen by the CLN on June 3, organized 
the elections in a competent and fair way.
    The CLN set the date for the elections at July 30. It also decreed 
that, for practical reasons, those elections would be limited to 
president of the republic, national and state legislators, governors, 
and mayors, with election of municipal and parish councils to be held 
on October 1. The CLN noted that July 30 was the earliest date by which 
even the smaller-scope elections it had now decided on could be held, 
as the new CNE had to redo almost all the preparatory work of its 
predecessor. The CLN also noted that to include municipal and parish 
councils in the July 30 vote would triple the number of candidates and 
offices and, for organizational reasons, would postpone the vote for 
several months and further prolong the country's period of 
constitutional transition. Citizens, including many members of the 
opposition and media, generally regarded these arguments as valid. 
However, leading presidential challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas 
criticized the decision of the CLN to split the elections and hold the 
first component on July 30, a decision that he alleged was intended to 
put him at a disadvantage. In July a confidential report by the 
Controller General was leaked to the press; the report identified 
deficiencies in the work of the CNE.
    During the election campaign, DISIP agents carried out searches of 
the offices of the opposition governor of Merida state, despite the 
fact that, upon taking office in 1999, the Chavez Government declared 
that the DISIP and other intelligence agencies no longer would be used 
for domestic political purposes. While the stated reason for the 
operations was to gather evidence for corruption investigations, the 
timing of the searches gave the impression of political harassment.
    On July 30, voters reelected President Chavez with 59 percent of 
the vote. His challengers, Francisco Arias Cardenas and Claudio Fermin, 
received 38 percent and 3 percent respectively. Chavez's supporters won 
a majority (92 seats) in the 165-seat National Assembly, although not 
the two-thirds majority required to pass most important pending 
legislation. His supporters also won half the governorships. The 
Organization of American States and observers from various countries 
were of the opinion that, despite some technical irregularities, the 
vote was generally free and fair. A limited number of voting machines 
failed to accept ballots or otherwise broke down, and there was 
disorganization at some polling places, but in the opinion of observers 
these were localized problems. Standard backup procedures for voting 
machine failure, such as placing ballots in sealed boxes for later 
manual counting or processing by functioning voting machines, were 
followed. However, some of the losing candidates alleged fraud. For 
example, Arias maintained, among other things, that voting machines 
were programmed to undercount votes received by him. He and other 
disappointed candidates were pursuing existing administrative and 
judicial remedies at year's end. Losing candidates for several 
governorships alleged that fraud or irregularities affected the outcome 
of the voting. The CNE investigated these allegations, ordered recounts 
in some cases, and determined that the disputes were valid in several 
states, in which it ordered partial revotes. The CNE's follow-up work 
to the July 30 elections continued at year's end.
    On December 3, voters participated in elections for municipal and 
parish councils and voted on a controversial referendum on labor issues 
(see Section 6.a.).
    In December the President and the National Assembly replaced the 
interim appointees to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power in a 
process that was criticized by the political opposition, the media, and 
NGO's, who argued that the procedures set forth in the new Constitution 
regarding civil society participation in the selection process were not 
followed. The Ombudsman and others challenged the selection procedure 
in the courts; however, the appointments were made and the new 
officials took office in December, despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court had not yet ruled on the legal challenge.
    In November the National Assembly passed an ``enabling law'' that 
gave President Chavez the authority to legislate by decree on selected 
issues related to the economy, reorganization of government ministries, 
and crime. However, only one law had been passed using these new powers 
by year's end.
    Women and nonwhites participate fully in government and politics; 
however, they remain under-represented in senior leadership positions 
and national elective office. The National Assembly's Family, Women, 
and Youth Committee promotes political office-holding opportunities for 
women. In the July 30 elections, women won 20 seats as deputies in the 
165-seat legislature. In August President Chavez named 3 women to his 
14-member Cabinet as Ministers of Labor, Trade, and Environment. In 
December President Chavez appointed Adina Bastidas as vice president.
    Indigenous people traditionally have not been integrated fully into 
the political system due to their limited knowledge of politics, low 
voter turnout, geographic isolation, and fewer economic and educational 
opportunities. During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of 
the Amazonas state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in 
registering to vote. The Yanomami argued that the Government's slowness 
in providing national identity cards, which are required to register to 
vote, was infringing on their right to suffrage. The Supreme Court 
ruled against the group's request for an exception to be made to the 
registration deadline, and they were unable to vote in the July 30 
elections. The group of Yanomami subsequently was able to register, and 
they voted in the December municipal elections. The new Constitution 
reserved three seats in the National Assembly for indigenous people, 
and these seats were filled in the July 30 election. There are no 
indigenous members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups generally operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases.
    In January President Chavez criticized a report by PROVEA on the 
human rights violations in Vargas state as ``suspicious and 
superficial'' and said that the NGO's refusal to name the witnesses on 
which the report was based was irresponsible. The President later 
pledged to investigate the abuses and met with the victims' families, 
and the Government invited the IACHR to make an on-site visit to the 
country, which had not taken place at year's end.
    On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that NGO's that receive 
funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not Venezuelan 
are not part of ``civil society'' and therefore may not represent 
Venezuelans in court or bring their own legal actions (see Section 
2.b.).
    A fundamental change in the Government's own human rights bodies 
was made when the December 1999 Constitution created the position of 
``Defender of the People'' (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman is responsible 
for compelling the Government to adhere to the Constitution and laws 
and, together with the Prosecutor General and Controller General, makes 
up the Citizen Power branch of government. Throughout the year, the 
country's first Ombudsman, Dilia Parra, repeatedly and frankly 
advocated for the respect of human rights and assisted investigations 
of abuses by acting as a liaison between complainants and the 
Prosecutor General. Despite a limited budget, the Ombudsman's office 
established branches and public attention centers in all 23 states. On 
December 20, in a process that some observers charged was 
unconstitutional, the National Assembly named attorney German Mundarain 
as the new Ombudsman to replace Parra (see Section 3). The new 
Constitution also obliges the Government to make amends to the victims 
of human rights violations and commits it to implement decisions of 
international bodies on individual cases of abuse.
    Human rights groups remained concerned about the Chavez 
administration's lack of a human rights agenda and a lack of support 
for the national human rights agenda formulated by the previous 
Government in a July 1997 symposium with NGO's. Unlike the previous 
year, President Chavez did not meet with NGO's to discuss human rights 
issues. The Government continued to fail to support the National Human 
Rights Commission created by former President Rafael Caldera in 1996 as 
a mechanism to coordinate the Government's human rights programs and to 
serve as a forum for dialog with NGO's. Despite the commission's 
paralysis, NGO's have developed good relationships with specific 
government bodies such as the Ministry of Education to develop 
educational materials on human rights, and the Foreign Ministry to 
discuss the resolution of existing human rights cases against the 
Government in international courts.
    The Defense Ministry's human rights office expanded its staff from 
one to three officials and continued to carry out training courses as 
part of the armed force's curriculum. The Defense Ministry continued to 
reject the validity of NGO reports of alleged human rights violations 
by the armed forces and remained unwilling to provide evidence to 
refute the charges, citing confidentiality regulations.
    Following the July 30 elections, the National Assembly established 
an Interior, Justice, Human Rights, and Constitutional Guarantees 
Committee.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1999 Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of politics, age, race, sex, creed, or any other condition, and 
the law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, or 
disability. However, the Government does not protect women adequately 
against societal and domestic violence, ensure the disabled access to 
jobs and public services, or safeguard adequately the rights of 
indigenous people. Amnesty International reported that in September 
police in Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered 
persons, who were held incommunicado for 2 days without food or 
drinking water (see Section 1.d.). The family of one of the detainees 
filed a formal complaint with the Public Ministry.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and women face 
substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to rape 
and domestic violence. Domestic violence against women is very common 
and has been aggravated by the country's economic difficulties. A total 
of 14,683 cases of domestic violence were reported to the authorities 
in 1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available. 
According to local monitors, the police generally are unwilling to 
intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely prosecute 
those accused of such abuse. In addition, poor women generally are 
unaware of legal remedies and have little access to them. On January 1, 
the 1999 Law Against Violence Toward Women and Children came into 
force. The PTJ opened the division against violence to accommodate its 
provisions. This law requires the police to receive reports of domestic 
violence and obligates hospital personnel to advise authorities of 
abuse.
    The law makes rape extremely difficult to prove, requiring at a 
minimum medical examination within 48 hours of the violation. A 
provision in the Penal Code provides that a man guilty of rape can 
avoid punishment if, before sentencing, he marries the victim. Few 
police officers are trained to deal responsibly with rape victims. In 
1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available, the 
police received 7,426 reports of sexual crimes, of which over 3,600 
were cases of rape. However, women's organizations assert that such low 
figures do not accurately portray the problem of rape and sexual 
assault. They claim that many victims do not report the incident or 
press charges due to societal pressure and their own feelings of guilt. 
There were reports that a number of rapes were committed in Vargas 
state in December 1999 during the lawlessness that followed the 
flooding.
    In 1996 the National Women's Council (which was reorganized during 
the year and renamed the National Institute for Women), an agency of 
the presidency with representation from the Ministries of Justice, 
Education, Family, Health, and Labor, prepared a manual on violence 
against women and children, which includes information on where the 
victims might obtain assistance. There are a number of NGO's concerned 
with domestic violence, sex education, and economic discrimination. 
However, the recommendations of these groups have not been implemented 
widely by the police or other concerned governmental agencies.
    Sexual harassment in the workplace is a common problem.
    There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain for purposes 
of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Women and men are legally equal in marriage. Women account for 
roughly half the student body of most universities and have advanced in 
many professions, including medicine and law. In June the Government 
announced its intention to allow women to attend military academies and 
serve in expanded roles as officers in the armed forces; however, this 
had not occurred by year's end. Women gradually have surmounted many of 
the barriers to their full participation in political and economic 
life; nonetheless, they still are underrepresented in the higher ranks 
of labor unions and private industry and, on average, earn 30 percent 
less than men.
    The 1999 Constitution provides for sexual equality in exercising 
the right to work. The Labor Code specifies that employers must not 
discriminate against women with regard to pay or working conditions, 
must not fire them during pregnancy or for a year after giving birth, 
must grant them unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth 
of a child and 12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of 
unpaid leave if they legally adopt children under 3 years of age. 
According to the Ministry of Labor and the major labor federation, 
these regulations are enforced in the formal sector, although social 
security payments often are delayed.
    Children.--Government expenditures on education, health, and social 
services increased during the year due to an improved economy and a 
larger government budget. While the law provides for universal free 
education, about one-third of the Ministry of Education budget was 
dedicated to post-secondary education, leaving both primary and 
secondary education chronically underfunded. According to UNICEF, only 
75 percent of eligible children enter the first grade. During the year, 
some 500,000 children attended school for the first time when the 
Government prohibited registration fees. However, the 2000 annual 
report of the Community Centers for Learning (CECODAP) stated that 
500,000 children are not eligible to receive government assistance, 
including public education, because their births are not documented 
properly. In 1998 the Government attempted to remedy this problem by 
adopting a new regulation that requires hospitals to register the 
births of all children; during the year, the Government sent mobile 
teams into poor neighborhoods to register minors.
    According to CECODAP's study, an estimated 500,000 children, most 
under the age of 5, have an average of 2 episodes of gastroenteritis a 
year, a sickness that is the ninth leading cause of death in the 
country. According to a 1999 study by the National Nutrition Institute, 
23 percent of children under the age of 15 have a nutritional deficit. 
Approximately 76 percent of minors live in poverty. These conditions 
contribute to the increase in preventable diseases that are leading 
causes of infant mortality. Children living in Vargas state suffered 
the effects of the flooding in that area, particularly with regard to 
sanitation and schooling.
    An increase in poverty has raised the level of stress within 
families and led to a rise in the number of abandoned children and to 
more child abuse. A 1994 survey by the National Institute for Minors 
determined that 206,000 children were involved in illicit activities, 
principally begging but also petty theft, prostitution, and drug 
trafficking. Some 40,000 children were exploited sexually, according to 
a 1994 study.
    The authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to 
cope with the phenomenon of street children by continuing to impose 
curfews for unsupervised minors. Children's rights advocates claim that 
curfews permit the police to act arbitrarily in detaining persons who 
have committed no crime. Because reform institutions are filled to 
capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions are confined in 
juvenile detention centers (see Section 1.c.).
    In October 1997, Amnesty International reported past incidents in 
which minors were subjects of extrajudicial killings and abuse, as well 
as deficiencies in law and practice with regard to the detention of 
children. For example, security forces and law enforcement authorities 
often detain minors together with adults (see Section 1.c.). In April 
Congress passed the Organic Procedural Law on Adolescents and Children 
(a criminal code); however, observers expressed concern over the slow 
implementation of the law's provisions.
    Reports of child abuse are rare due to a fear of entanglement with 
the authorities and ingrained attitudes regarding family privacy. The 
overburdened judicial system, although very slow, generally ensures 
that in most situations children are removed from abusive households 
once a case has been reported. However, public facilities for such 
children are inadequate and have poorly trained staff.
    Children's rights advocates criticized the Government's efforts to 
reunite children and parents who had been separated in the flooding in 
Vargas state. At year's end, some 12 months after the natural disaster, 
some children still were separated from their families. CECODAP 
estimates that there are 120 children in refugee centers who have not 
yet been returned to their families. The national Ombudsman's office is 
investigating whether some of these children may have been trafficked. 
There were also reports of trafficking in children from other South 
American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids 
(see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The physically disabled have minimal 
access to public transportation, and ramps are practically nonexistent, 
even in government buildings. According to local advocates, the 
disabled are discriminated against in many sectors, including 
education, health care, and employment.
    A 1993 comprehensive law to protect the rights of the disabled 
requires that all newly constructed or renovated public parks and 
buildings provide access for the disabled. The law also forbids 
discrimination in employment practices and in the provision of public 
services. However, the Government has not made a significant effort to 
implement the law, to inform the public of it, or to try to change 
societal prejudice against the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Although the law prohibits discrimination based 
on ethnic origin, members of the country's indigenous population 
frequently suffer from inattention to and violation of their human 
rights. Many indigenous people are isolated from modern civilization 
and lack access to basic health and educational facilities. High rates 
of cholera, hepatitis B, malaria, and other diseases plague their 
communities. There are approximately 316,000 indigenous people in 27 
ethnic groups.
    The Constitution provides for special laws governing ``the 
protection of indigenous communities and their progressive 
incorporation into the life of the nation.'' Nonetheless, local 
political authorities seldom take account of the interests of 
indigenous people when making decisions affecting their lands, 
cultures, traditions, and allocation of natural resources. As farmers 
and miners intrude on their habitats, indigenous communities are 
threatened by deforestation and water pollution. Few indigenous people 
hold title to their land, but many do not want to since most indigenous 
groups reject the concept of individual property and want the 
Government to recognize lands traditionally inhabited by them as 
territories belonging to each respective indigenous group.
    At year's end, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a lawsuit 
filed by environmental and indigenous organizations challenging a 1997 
decree that permitted the expansion of legal mining activities in the 
Imataca forest reserve. The groups charged that only Congress can 
change the nature of the reserve, that there was an inadequate public 
review process prior to the change, and that expanded mining activities 
would affect adversely the health of the Warao, Arawako, Karina, 
Akawaio, and Pemon indigenous communities that inhabit the Imataca 
watershed area. In November 1997, the Supreme Court ordered the 
Government not to issue any new mining concessions in the Imataca 
reserve until the court ruled on the constitutionality of the 
presidential decree. In 1999 President Chavez said that he planned to 
enact a new law to regulate the use of the reserve and that the 1997 
decree would be annulled, but at year's end no action had been taken.
    The controversy over infrastructure development and the maintenance 
of traditional indigenous lifestyles is most evident in Bolivar state, 
where the Pemon continued to protest the building of power lines that 
export electricity to Brazil through Canaima national park. On July 20, 
a total of 55 of the 58 Pemon communities affected by the power lines 
signed an agreement under which the Government pledged, among other 
commitments, to establish a commission for the demarcation of native 
lands and to create a development fund for indigenous people. However, 
many Pemon remain highly skeptical of the Government's willingness and 
ability to comply with the accord's provisions.
    The Yanomami, among the most isolated of the indigenous people, 
have been subject to persistent incursions into their territory by 
illegal gold miners. The miners have introduced not only new diseases 
but social ills as well. In December 1996, a number of human rights 
organizations, acting on behalf of the Yanomami community of Haximu, 
petitioned the IACHR in connection with the 1993 massacre of 16 members 
of the community by Brazilian miners. The petition alleged that the 
Government failed in its obligation to protect the Yanomami and to seek 
appropriate punishment of the killers, who were released by the 
Brazilian authorities after 3 months' detention. In May 1998, the 
Government agreed to work with the NGO's under IACHR mediation to 
resolve the case. In late 1999, an out-of-court settlement was reached 
under which the Government pledged, among other commitments, to provide 
better security and to carry out health care projects in the area.
    During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of the Amazonas 
state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in registering to 
vote (see Section 3).
    Since 1998 hundreds of members of the Warao indigenous group have 
migrated from their traditional homelands in the swampy Orinoco delta 
region to the capital of Caracas where they live in the streets, 
selling their traditional crafts and begging. The Warao say that 
flooding and petroleum exploration have eroded their traditional means 
of survival, which are fishing and horticulture. In addition, many 
Warao no longer want to or no longer possess the knowledge required to 
survive in their traditional manner. However, the Caracas city 
government and the Metropolitan Police have maintained a policy of 
forcing the Warao to return to the delta by rounding them up and 
loading them onto buses. In 1998 they returned, on average, groups of 
100 Warao, at least 15 times. Many of the Warao return to Caracas, 
citing lack of jobs and money in the delta and their ability to receive 
approximately $225 (130,000 bolivars) per week in handouts in Caracas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and labor law 
recognize and encourage the right of workers to organize; however, 
concerns over labor rights increased during the year. According to the 
new Constitution, all workers, without prejudice or previous 
authorization, have the right to form freely unions that they believe 
can help them defend their rights and interests, as well as to join--or 
decide not to join--these organizations in accordance with the law. The 
Constitution provides that these organizations are not subject to 
intervention, suspension, or administrative dissolution, and workers 
are protected against any discrimination or measure contrary to this 
right. Additionally, labor organizers and leaders may not be removed 
from their positions during the period of time and under the conditions 
that they exercise their leadership functions. However, Articles 23 and 
95 of the 1999 Constitution, which provide for freedom of association, 
are contradicted by Article 293, which gives the National Electoral 
Council the authority to administer the internal elections of labor 
confederations, in violation of the Government's commitments to 
Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
charter. On December 3, a referendum was held that was followed by the 
resignation of the leaders of the country's major labor union 
confederation.
    At year's end, labor law pursuant to the 1999 Constitution had not 
yet been drafted. The existing comprehensive 1990 Labor Code extends 
the right to form and join unions of their choosing to all private and 
public sector employees (except members of the armed forces). The code 
mandates registration of unions with the Ministry of Labor, but it 
reduces the Ministry's discretion by specifying that registration may 
not be denied if the proper documents (a record of the founding 
meeting, the statutes, and membership list) are submitted. Only a judge 
may dissolve a union, and then only for reasons listed in the law, such 
as the dissolution of a firm by agreement of two-thirds of the 
membership.
    The ILO repeatedly has expressed concerns that the Organic Labor 
Act violates freedom of association by requiring a high number of 
workers (100 workers) to form self-employed workers' trade unions and a 
high number of employers to form employer trade unions (10 workers). 
The ILO also notes that the long and detailed list of duties entrusted 
to workers' and employers' organizations and the requirement that 
foreign workers must be in residence for more than 10 years in order to 
hold trade union offices also are in violation of the Convention on 
Freedom of Association.
    In early March, the National Legislative Committee passed a decree 
that suspended collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector 
for 180 days (see Section 6.b.) and suspended internal labor leadership 
elections for the same period of time. On July 14, the CNE prohibited 
labor leadership elections until February 2001. In late March, the CLN 
passed a decree that violated the Campesino Federation's right to 
associate freely by intervening in the federation's right to hold 
internal elections, embargoing federation property, and placing it in 
the custody of the national Ombudsman.
    One major union confederation, the Confederation of Venezuelan 
Workers (CTV), three small union confederations, and a number of 
independent unions operate freely. About 20 percent of the national 
labor force is unionized. The CTV represents most of the unionized 
workers and has a membership of 800,000 workers. The CTV is especially 
strong in the public sector. The CTV's top leadership includes members 
of several political parties, but the majority are affiliated with one 
of the traditional parties, Democratic Action (AD) or the Christian 
Democrats (COPEI). The CTV and the AD traditionally have influenced 
each other.
    On December 3, the Government held a public ``workers referendum'' 
to consider the ``overhaul of union leadership'' and the ``suspension'' 
of union officials. International labor authorities, including the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the ILO, declared 
the referendum to be a violation of freedom of association and an 
unacceptable government intervention in organized labor affairs. The 
fact that the referendum included the participation of all registered 
voters on an issue affecting independent labor organizations was viewed 
as particularly offensive to international labor standards and the 
right of freedom of association. A CNE spokesman defended the 
participation of all registered voters, observing that all citizens 
``are workers or related to workers.'' The Public Prosecutor and 
Ombudsman both declared the measure unconstitutional as violations of 
freedom of association and the Government's international agreements, 
as provided for in the 1999 Constitution, and recommended that the 
Supreme Court do the same; however, the Court ruled in favor of moving 
forward with the referendum.
    In the referendum voters were asked to approve an ``overhaul of 
union leadership in 180 days, under a special law drafted by the 
electoral council, in accordance with the principles of term limits and 
universal, direct and confidential suffrage'' in accordance with the 
Constitution and to suspend ``the function of union officials'' during 
that time. Approximately 65 percent of those citizens who voted 
approved the question. The CNE later announced that voter turnout was 
23 percent.
    On December 6, the CTV leadership voluntarily resigned and was 
replaced by a transitional committee consisting of a broad spectrum of 
labor and civil society representatives that included individuals 
connected with the CTV as well as other labor organizations not 
traditionally aligned with the CTV. Following this change in 
leadership, the parties involved began to prepare for discussions on 
reforming the country's labor union structure.
    On September 3, President Chavez announced the creation of the 
``Bolivarian'' Worker's Force (FTB) as a new labor federation allied 
with the ruling MVR to displace, or at least compete with, the CTV. 
President Chavez said that the FTB was preparing an ``all out war'' to 
``demolish'' the CTV. Seats on the new ``transitional committee'' 
heading the CTV had been set aside for members of the FTB.
    The new Constitution and the comprehensive 1990 Labor Code 
recognize the right of all public and private sector workers to strike 
in accordance with conditions established by the law, which still was 
being drafted at year's end. However, public servants may strike only 
if the strike does not cause ``irremediable damage to the population or 
to institutions.'' Replacement workers are not permitted during legal 
strikes. The Labor Code allows the President to order public or private 
sector strikers back to work and to submit their dispute to arbitration 
if the strike ``puts in immediate danger the lives or security of all 
or part of the population.'' During the year, most strikes were brief 
and occurred among government employees such as petroleum workers, 
health workers in public hospitals and clinics, firefighters, teachers, 
and transportation workers. In mid-October, the main petroleum workers' 
union, FEDEPETROL, held a successful 4-day strike against the state oil 
company PDVSA and persuaded the Government to concede to strikers' 
demands for a 30-month contract. The strike was settled through 
tripartite negotiations, which included the active participation of 
then-Vice President Isaias Rodriguez, who noted the ``historic role'' 
of labor leaders in gaining benefits for workers.
    There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor 
organizations, and many union organizations are active internationally; 
however, a November Supreme Court ruling regarding the legal abilities 
of NGO's that receive funding from foreign sources potentially could 
restrict the international affiliations of union organizers (see 
Section 2.b.).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--According to 
the December 1999 Constitution, all public and private sector workers 
have the right to voluntary collective bargaining and to arrive at 
collective bargaining agreements, without any additional requirements 
other than those established by the law. The Constitution provides that 
the State is to ensure development of collective bargaining and to 
establish conditions favorable to collective relationships and the 
solution of labor conflicts. The 1990 Labor Code stipulates that 
employers must negotiate a collective contract with the union that 
represents the majority of their workers. The ILO repeatedly has 
expressed concerns that this provision restricts freedom of association 
and in March requested that the Government amend it so that ``in cases 
where no union organization represents an absolute majority of workers, 
minority organizations may jointly negotiate a collective agreement on 
behalf of their members.'' The code contains a provision stating that 
wages may be raised by administrative decree, provided that the 
legislative body approves the decree.
    The law also prohibits employers from interfering with the 
formation of unions or with their activities or from stipulating as a 
condition of employment that new workers must abstain from union 
activity or must join a specified union. The 1999 Constitution 
prohibits measures that ``alter the sanctity and progressiveness'' of 
labor rights and worker benefits, declares labor rights to be 
irrevocable, and provides that ambiguities regarding the application or 
interpretation of norms are to be applied in the manner most favorable 
to the worker.
    Ministry of Labor inspectors hear complaints regarding violations 
of these regulations and traditionally have been able to impose a 
maximum fine of twice the monthly minimum wage for a first infraction. 
Under the 1999 Constitution, union officials have special protection 
from dismissal. Under the 1990 Labor Code, if a judge determines that 
any worker was fired for union activity, the worker is entitled to back 
pay plus either reinstatement or payment of a substantial sum of money, 
which varies according to his years of seniority.
    The right to bargain collectively was violated in early March, when 
the National Legislative Committee passed a decree that suspended 
collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector for 180 days 
(see Section 6.a.). On July 14, the CNE extended the decree until 
October 15.
    Labor law and practice are the same in the sole export-processing 
zone, located in Punto Fijo, as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1990 Labor Code 
states that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will,'' 
and such practices generally are not known to occur. Apart from the 
general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law does not prohibit 
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices 
generally are not known to occur; however, there were reports of 
trafficking in children (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1990 Labor Code and the Tutelary Law for Minors 
contain provisions to protect children from exploitation in the 
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and the National Institute for Minors 
enforce child labor policies effectively in the formal sector of the 
economy but less so in the informal sector, in which an estimated 1.2 
million children work. According to UNICEF, approximately 47 percent of 
children are in the labor market, and work in agriculture, as artisans, 
in offices, and in the services sector.
    Primary school education is compulsory, free, and universal (see 
Section 5). However, 64 percent of children leave school before the 
ninth grade. In a 1996 survey of working children conducted by the 
National Institute for Minors, 45 percent of those polled stated that 
they were not in school. The actual figure is probably much higher 
considering that those who stated that they attended school also 
reported that they worked on average 7-1/2 hours per day, 4 to 7 days a 
week.
    The 1990 Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14 
to work only if the National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry 
grants special permission. It states that children between the ages of 
14 and 16 may not work without the permission of their legal guardians. 
Minors may not work in mines or smelters, in occupations that risk life 
or health, that could damage intellectual or moral development, or in 
public spectacles. The 1999 Constitution prohibits adolescents from 
working at jobs that will affect their development, protecting them 
from economic and social exploitation.
    Those under 16 years of age must by law work no more than 6 hours a 
day or 30 hours a week. Minors under the age of 18 may work only 
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The estimated 1.2 million 
children who work in the informal sector, mostly as street vendors, 
generally work more hours than the total permitted under the law. In 
the National Institute for Minors survey of working children, half the 
children worked both morning and afternoon, and 64.5 percent worked 6 
or 7 days a week. The Government's Central Office of Statistics and 
Information reports that 12 percent of the country's children between 
the ages of 10 and 17 are working, have worked at some time, or are 
seeking work. Of that number, approximately 70 percent work in the 
informal sector of the economy. Less than 300,000 of children who work 
in the informal sector have permits.
    Apart from the general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law 
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but 
such practices generally are not known to occur; however, there were 
reports of trafficking in children (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1999 Constitution provides 
workers with the right to a salary that is sufficient to allow them to 
live with dignity, and provides them and their families with the basic 
material, social, and intellectual necessities. The Constitution 
obliges the State to provide public and private sector workers with an 
annually adjusted minimum wage, using the cost of the basic basket of 
necessities as a reference point. The monthly minimum wage is $206 
(142,000 bolivars) in the private sector for urban workers and $170 
(118,000 bolivars) for rural workers, effective May 1.
    Total take-home pay in the private sector, the product of a 
presidential decree, was at least equal to that received by public 
sector minimum wage workers. Fringe benefits are added to these minimum 
figures; they vary with the worker's individual circumstances but in 
general increase wages by about one-third. However, even with these 
benefits, the minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Unions point out that a 
worker's income is often less than the cost of a family's basic monthly 
food basket, estimated by the Center for Documentation and Analysis for 
Workers in August at $308 (212,205 bolivars). The basic basket, which 
includes medical care, transportation, clothing, and housing, in 
addition to food, stood at $905 (624,413 bolivars) for August.
    Under the 1990 Labor Code, minimum wage rates are set by 
administrative decree, which the legislature may suspend or ratify but 
may not change. The law excludes only domestic workers and concierges 
from coverage under the minimum wage decrees. The Ministry of Labor has 
enforced minimum wage rates effectively in the formal sector of the 
economy, but about one-half of the population works in the informal 
sector where labor laws and protections generally are not enforced.
    The 1999 Constitution also stipulates that the workday may not 
exceed 8 hours daily or 44 hours weekly and that night work may not 
exceed 7 hours daily or 35 hours weekly. Managers are prohibited from 
obligating employees from working extraordinary hours, and workers also 
have the right to weekly time away from work and annual remunerated 
vacations. Some unions, such as the petroleum workers, have negotiated 
a 40-hour week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours daily, 10 hours weekly, 
or 100 hours annually, and may not be paid at a rate less than time-
and-one-half. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these 
standards in the formal sector.
    The 1999 Constitution provides for secure, hygienic, and adequate 
working conditions; however, the authorities have not yet promulgated 
regulations to implement the 1986 Health and Safety Law, which is not 
enforced. The delay is due largely to concern that the law provides 
penal sanctions against management when violations of health and safety 
occur and that there is ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a 
violation. The 1990 Labor Code states that employers are obligated to 
pay specified amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly 
salary) to workers for accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless 
of who is responsible for the injury.
    The code also requires that workplaces maintain ``sufficient 
protection for health and life against sickness and accidents,'' and it 
imposes fines ranging from one-quarter to twice the minimum monthly 
salary for first infractions. However, in practice Ministry of Labor 
inspectors seldom close down unsafe job sites. Under the law, workers 
can remove themselves from dangerous workplace situations without 
jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The new Constitution prohibits 
trafficking in persons, and this provision was codified in legislation 
during the year. There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain 
for purposes of prostitution. The national Ombudsman's office is 
investigating whether some of the children separated from their parents 
in the flooding in Vargas state may have been trafficked (see Section 
5). There also were reports of trafficking in children from other South 
American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids. 
The ease with which fraudulent government documents of nearly all types 
are obtained contributed to the trafficking problem. The Government's 
efforts to prevent trafficking are the responsibility of the Prosecutor 
General's family protection directorate (which also handles 
prosecutions) and the National Institutes for Women and Minors. NGO's 
such as CECODAP also are involved in activities to combat trafficking.

                               APPENDIXES

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            APPENDIX A.--NOTES ON PREPARATION OF THE REPORTS

    We base the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on 
information available from all sources, including American and foreign 
government officials, victims of human rights abuse, academic and 
congressional studies, and reports from the press, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) concerned with 
human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make reference in most 
reports to, the role of NGO's, ranging from groups within a single 
country to those that concern themselves with human rights worldwide. 
While much of the information that we use is already public, 
information on particular abuses frequently cannot be attributed, for 
obvious reasons, to specific sources.
    By law we must submit the reports to Congress by February 25. To 
comply with this requirement, we provide guidance to U.S. diplomatic 
missions in July for submission of draft reports in September and 
October, which we update at year's end as necessary. Other offices in 
the Department of State provide contributions, and the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor prepares a final draft. Because of 
the preparation time required, it is possible that yearend developments 
may not be reflected fully. We make every effort to include reference 
to major events or significant changes in trends.
    We have attempted to make these country reports as comprehensive as 
space will allow, while taking care to make them objective and as 
uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have 
given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency 
despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to 
varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in 
political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding 
human rights practices in specific countries.
    It is often difficult to evaluate the credibility of reports of 
human rights abuses. With the exception of some terrorist 
organizations, most opposition groups and certainly most governments 
deny that they commit human rights abuses and often go to great lengths 
to conceal any evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses 
to specific abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise 
prevented from reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals 
and groups opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful 
incentives to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments 
similarly distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups. 
We have made every effort to identify those groups, for example, 
government forces or terrorists, that are believed, based on all the 
evidence available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where 
credible evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why it is not 
available. Many governments that profess to oppose human rights abuses 
in fact secretly order or tacitly condone them or simply lack the will 
or the ability to control those responsible for them. Consequently, in 
judging a government's policy, it is important to look beyond 
statements of policy or intent in order to examine what in fact a 
government has done to prevent human rights abuses, including the 
extent to which it investigates, brings to trial, and appropriately 
punishes those who commit such abuses. We continue to make every effort 
to do that in these reports.
    To increase uniformity, the introductory section of each report 
contains a brief setting, indicating how the country is governed and 
providing the context for examining the country's human rights 
performance. A description of the political framework and the role of 
security and law enforcement agencies with respect to human rights is 
followed by a brief characterization of the economy. The setting 
concludes with an overview of human rights developments in the year 
under review, mentioning specific areas (for example, torture, freedom 
of speech and press, discrimination) in which abuses and problems 
occurred.
    We have continued the effort from previous years to expand 
reporting on human rights practices affecting women, children, and 
indigenous people. We discuss in the appropriate section of the report 
any abuses that are targeted specifically against women (for example, 
rape or other violence perpetrated by governmental or organized 
opposition forces, or discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section 
5, we discuss socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence against 
women, children, or minority group members; and the efforts, if any, of 
governments to combat these problems.
    To obtain more information on governmental policies on the welfare 
of children, readers may wish to consult ``The State of the World's 
Children 2000,'' published by the U.N. Children's Fund. The report 
provides a wide range of data on health, education, nutrition, rates of 
infant mortality, and mortality under 5 years of age in 193 countries, 
as well as information on the degree of progress that these countries 
are making in reducing the key mortality rate for persons under age 5.
    The following notes on specific categories of the report are not 
meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each category but to provide 
definitions of key terms used in the reports and to explain the 
organization of material within the format:
    Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Includes killings in 
which there is evidence of government instigation without due process 
of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition 
groups; also covers extrajudicial killings (for example, deliberate, 
illegal, or excessive use of lethal force by the police, security 
forces, or other agents of the State whether against criminal suspects, 
detainees, prisoners, or others), as well as killings committed by 
police or security forces in operations or while in the performance of 
their duties that resulted in the death of persons without due process 
of law (for example, mistargeted bombing or shelling or killing of 
bystanders); excludes combat deaths and killings by common criminals, 
if the likelihood of political motivation can be ruled out (see also 
Section 1.g.). Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due 
to official negligence are covered in detail in Section 1.c.
    Disappearance.--Covers unresolved cases in which political 
motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found 
or perpetrators have not been identified; cases eventually classed as 
political killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered 
also are covered in the above category, while those eventually 
identified as arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary 
Arrest, Detention, or Exile.''
    Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Defines torture as an extremely severe form of cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or at the 
instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with specific 
intent to cause extremely severe pain or suffering, whether mental or 
physical. Concentrates discussion on actual practices, not on whether 
they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical and other 
force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading. Covers prison conditions, including information based on 
minimum international standards, and deaths in custody due to 
negligence by government officials.
    Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which 
detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody 
without charges or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary 
judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether, 
and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
    Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Describes briefly the court system 
and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether 
trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in 
the category above); includes discussion of ``political prisoners'' 
(political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and 
imprisoned essentially for political beliefs or nonviolent acts of 
dissent or expression, regardless of the actual legal charge.
    Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to 
noninterference by the State; includes the right to receive foreign 
publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed 
under ``Freedom of Speech and Press;'' includes the right to be free 
from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion 
and involuntary sterilization, but does not include cultural or 
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are 
addressed in Section 5.
    Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--An optional subsection for use in describing 
abuses that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed 
conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from 
excessive use of force, for example, by police in putting down 
demonstrations, or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted 
killing is discussed in Section 1.a.). Also includes abuses against 
civilian noncombatants. For reports in which use of this section would 
be inappropriate, that is, in which there is no significant internal 
conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces (which 
herein is defined as a form of extrajudicial killing) is discussed in 
Section 1.a.; nonlethal excessive force in Section 1.c.
    Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms 
exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes 
discussion of academic freedom.
    Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the 
ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to 
exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations, 
professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or 
affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The 
right of labor to associate, organize, and bargain collectively is 
discussed under Section 6, Worker Rights (see Appendix B).
    Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the constitution or laws 
provide for the right of citizens of whatever religious belief to 
worship free of government interference and whether the government 
respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious 
documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign 
clergy and whether religious belief affects membership in a ruling 
party or a career in government.
    Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, 
and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement; 
``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural 
disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of 
the Refugee Act of 1980, that is, persons with a ``well-founded fear of 
persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their 
country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.
    Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their 
Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of 
political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to 
change the laws and officials that govern them; assesses whether 
elections are free and fair.
    Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental 
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether 
the government permits the free functioning of local human rights 
groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings 
on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to 
reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the 
government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities 
(including foreign human rights organizations, international 
organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights 
developments in the country.
    Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, 
or Social Status.--Contains a subheading on Women, Children, and People 
with Disabilities. As appropriate, also includes subheadings on 
Indigenous People, Religious Minorities, and National/Racial/Ethnic 
Minorities. Discrimination against groups not fitting one of the above 
subheadings is discussed in the introductory paragraph(s) of Section 5. 
Addresses discrimination and abuses not discussed elsewhere in the 
report, focusing on laws, regulations, or state practices that are 
inconsistent with equal access to housing, employment, education, 
health care, or other governmental benefits for members of specific 
groups. (Abuses by government or opposition forces, such as killing, 
torture and other violence, or restriction of voting rights or free 
speech targeted against specific groups would be discussed under the 
appropriate preceding sections.) Discusses societal violence against 
women, e.g., ``dowry deaths,'' wife beating, rape, and government 
tolerance of such under the subheading on women. Discusses the extent 
to which the law provides for, and the government enforces, equality of 
economic opportunity for women. Discusses violence or other abuse 
against children under that subheading. Discusses female genital 
mutilation, which is most often performed on children, also under that 
subheading.
    Worker Rights.--See Appendix B.

                               __________

                APPENDIX B.--REPORTING ON WORKER RIGHTS

    The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires 
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that 
internationally recognized worker rights include ``(A) the right of 
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a 
minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable 
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are 
discussed in each report in a final section under the heading ``Worker 
Rights.'' A final category, listed as (F), addresses trafficking in 
persons. The discussion of worker rights considers not only laws and 
regulations but also their practical implementation, taking into 
account the following additional guidelines:
    A. ``The right of association'' has been defined by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers 
and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing 
without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and 
rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to 
join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations; 
and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative 
authority.
    The right of association includes the right of workers to strike. 
While strikes may be restricted in essential services (that is, those 
services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal 
safety, or health of a significant portion of the population) and in 
the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate 
guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned (for 
example, machinery for mediation and arbitration; due process; and the 
right to judicial review of all legal actions). Reporting on 
restrictions affecting the ability of workers to strike generally 
includes information on any procedures that may exist for safeguarding 
workers' interests.
    B. ``The right to organize and bargain collectively'' includes the 
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and 
settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against 
interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion 
discrimination. Governments should promote machinery for voluntary 
negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations. 
Reporting on the right to organize and bargain collectively includes 
descriptions of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place 
and the extent to which unions, both in law and practice, are 
effectively protected against antiunion discrimination.
    C. ``Forced or compulsory labor'' is defined as work or service 
exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the 
person has not volunteered. ``Work or service'' does not apply in 
instances in which obligations are imposed to undergo education or 
training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of rights or privileges 
as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted the following from its 
definition of forced labor: compulsory military service; normal civic 
obligations; certain forms of prison labor; emergencies; and minor 
communal services. Forced labor should not be used as a means of (1) 
mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; (2) 
racial, social, national, or religious discrimination; (3) political 
coercion or education, or as a punishment for holding or expressing 
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established 
political, social, or economic system; (4) labor discipline; or (5) as 
a punishment for having participated in strikes. Constitutional 
provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work do not violate 
this right so long as they do not take the form of legal obligations 
enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle of ``freely 
chosen employment.''
    D. ``Minimum age for employment of children'' concerns the 
effective abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for 
employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental 
development of young people. ILO Convention 182 on the ``worst forms of 
child labor,'' which has been ratified by over 60 countries, identifies 
anyone under the age of 18 as a child and specifies types of employment 
as ``the worst forms of child labor.'' Worst forms of labor include 
slavery, debt bondage, forced labor, forced recruitment into armed 
conflict, child prostitution and pornography, involvement in illicit 
activity such as drug production or trafficking, and ``work which, by 
its nature, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely 
to harm the health, safety or morals or children.'' ILO Convention 182 
permits employment of children between the ages of 16 and 18 in what 
the convention describes as an ``unhealthy environment,'' if adequate 
protective measures have been taken.
    E. ``Acceptable conditions of work'' refers to the establishment 
and maintenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that 
provides for minimum working standards, that is, wages that provide a 
decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not 
exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified 
annual paid holiday; and minimum conditions for the protection of the 
safety and health of workers. Differences in the levels of economic 
development are taken into account in the formulation of 
internationally recognized labor standards. For example, many ILO 
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their 
scope and coverage. They also may permit countries a wide choice in 
their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling 
countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified 
exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve 
the higher levels specified in such standards. However, it should be 
understood that this flexibility applies only to internationally 
recognized standards concerning working conditions. No flexibility is 
permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic principles contained 
in human rights standards, that is, freedom of association, the right 
to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, 
and the absence of discrimination.
    F. ``Trafficking in persons'' is defined as all acts involving the 
recruitment, harboring, provision, or obtaining of a person (man, 
woman, or child) for labor or services, through the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary 
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Sex trafficking is 
defined as an act in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, 
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act 
has not attained 18 years of age. Reporting describes legal 
prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which the government 
enforces these prohibitions; the extent of trafficking in persons to, 
from, within, or through the country, other geographic regions or 
countries affected by the traffic; and aid or protection available to 
victims.

                               __________


                                                   APPENDIX C--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
                                       [See Appendix D for a description of the various Human Rights Conventions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             COUNTRY               A     B   C    D    E    F    G    H    I    J    K    L    M    N    O    P    Q    R    S    T    U    V    W    X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afganistan                         p              p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                                  s    p    p
Albania*                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Algeria                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Andorra                                                     p    p         p                                                                p         p
Angola                                  p              p    p    p              p         p         p    p    p    p              p         p         p
Antigua & Barbuda                  p    p    p    p    p    p    p              1    p    p    p              p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Argentina                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Armenia                                           p         p    p         s                   p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Australia                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Austria                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Azerbaijan                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
Bahamas                            p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p              p    p              p    p    p         p
Bahrain                                 p         p         p    p                   p    p    p                                  p    p         p    p
Bangladesh                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
Barbados                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p         p
Belarus                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Belgium                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Belize                             1    p    p    p    p    p    p                   1    p    s    p    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Benin                              2    p    p         p    p    p                        p    s    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Bhutan*                                                     p    p                             s                                            p         p
Bolivia                            p         p    s    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Bosnia & Herz.                     p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Botswana                           1    p    p         p    p    p                   1    p    p    p         p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Brazil                             p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Brunei*                            1                        p    p                   1                                            p    p              p
Bulgaria                           2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Burkina Faso                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Burma                              p    p    p    p         p    p    s         s                                                           p         p
Burundi                                 p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Cambodia                                p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Cameroon                           p    p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Canada                             p         p    p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Cape Verde                              p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p
Cen. African Rep.                  2    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
Chad                                    p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Chile                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
China                                             p         p    p              p              p    s    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
 Hong Kong                         p              p                             p              p                                            p    p    p
 Macau                                            p                   p              p         p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p
  (to 12-19-99)
 Macau                                            p                                            p                                                 p    p
  (from 12-20-99)
China                                             p
 (Taiwan only)*                    p              p                        p    p         p    s    s
Colombia                           s    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Comoros                                 p    p         p    p    p                        p    s                                  p    p    p    s    p
Congo, Dem.                        p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p
 Rep. of
Congo,                             2    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
 Republic of
Costa Rica                              p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Cote D'Ivoire                      2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Croatia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Cuba                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p                             p    p    p    p    p    p
Cyprus                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Czech Republic                     2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Denmark                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Djibouti                                p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p                   p    p              p    p    p         p
Dominica                           p    p    p         p    p    p              1    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p
Dom Republic                       p    p    p    s    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p
Ecuador                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Egypt                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
El Salvador                             p         p         p    p              s    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Equatorial                                                  p    p                                  p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
 Guinea
Eritrea                                 p    p         p    p    p                        p                                  p              p         p
Estonia                            2    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Ethiopia                           p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Fiji                               p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p              p    p                        p         p
Finland                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
France                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p
Gabon                                   p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Gambia*                            1              p         p    p                   1         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
Georgia                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Germany                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Ghana                              2    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Greece                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Grenada                            1    p    p    1    p    p    p              1    1    p    s    p    p              p         p    p    p         p
Guatemala                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Guinea                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Guinea-Bissau                           p              p    p    p                        p    s    s    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
Guyana                             1    p    p         p    p    p                   1    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Haiti                              2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p                   p         p
Holy See                                                    p    p                             p              p    p              p    p              p
Honduras                                p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Hungary                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Iceland                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
India                              p    p         p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                                  p    s    p
Indonesia                               p    p         p    p    p              p         p    p                             p              p    p    p
Iran                               s    p         p         p    p    s              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              s    s              p
Iraq                               p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                   p              p         p
Ireland                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    s    p
Israel                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
Italy                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Jamaica                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p
Japan                                   p    p         p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
Jordan                             p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Kazakhstan                                   p    p         p    p                             p              p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Kenya                                   p              p    p    p                        p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Kiribati*                          1                        p    p              1    1              1    1         1                                  p
Korea, Dem.                                       p         p    p                                  p    p                        p                   p
 Rep. of*
Korea, Rep. of                                    p         p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Kuwait                             p    p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Kyrgyzstan                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Laos                                    p         p         p    p    p         p    p         p    s    s                        p    p    p         p
Latvia                             2         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Lebanon                            p    p         p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
Lesotho                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p         p
Liberia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s         s    s    p    p    s    s    p    p              p    p    p         p
Libya                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Liechtenstein*                                    p         p    p         p                   p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Lithuania                          s    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Luxembourg                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Macedonia, F.Y.R.O.                2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Madagascar                         p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p         p
Malawi                             p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Malaysia                                p         p    p    p    p                   p    p                                  p              p         p
Maldives*                                         p         p    p                             p                                  p    p    p         p
Mali                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Malta                              p    p    p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Marshall Islands*                                                                                                                                     p
Mauritania                         p    p    p              p    p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p              p    p              p
Mauritius                          p    p              p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
Mexico                             p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p
Micronesia*                                                 p    p                                                                p    p              p
Moldova                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
Monaco*                            p              p         p    p                             p    p    p    p                        p    p         p
Mongolia                           p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p         p
Morocco                            p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    s    s    p    p    p
Mozambique                                   p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p         p    p              p         p    p    p
Namibia                                 p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p
Nauru*                                                                                                                                                p
Nepal                              p              p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p                   p              p    p    p
Netherlands                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
New Zealand                        p    p         p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Nicaragua                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p
Niger                              p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Nigeria                            p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
Niue                                                                                                                                                  p
Norway                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Oman*                                   p                   p    p                                                                p    p              p
Pakistan                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p                                  s    s    p         p
Palau                                                       p    p                                                                p    p              p
Panama                             s    p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Papua                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p              p    p         p              p         p
 New Guinea
Paraguay                                p    p    s    p    p    p              p         p    s    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Peru                                    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
Philippines                        p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    s    p    p    p    p
Poland                             2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Portugal                           2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Qatar                                   p                   p    p                             p                                  p              p    p
Romania                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Russia                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Rwanda                                       p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
Samoa*                                                      p    p                                            p    p              p    p    p         p
San Marino                              p    p         p    p    p         p         p    p         p    p                   p    p    p              p
Sao Tome                                     p         p    p    p                             s    s    s    p    p              p    p    s    s    p
 & Principe
Saudi Arabia                       p    p         p         p    p                   p    p    p                                  p         p    p    p
Senegal                            2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Seychelles                         2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         1    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Sierra Leone                       p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
Singapore                               p         p    p    p    p    p              p                                                      p         p
Slovak Republic                    2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Slovenia                                p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Solomon Islands                    p    p                   p    p              p    p         1         1    p    p              p    p              p
Somalia                                 p                   p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p                                  p
South Africa*                      p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         s         p    p    p    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Spain                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Sri Lanka                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p                   p              p    p    p
St. Kitts                          1    p    p         p    p    p              1    1    p                                       p    p    p         p
 & Nevis*
St. Lucia                          p    p    p    1    p    p    p              1    p    p    p                                  p    p    p         p
St. Vincent*                       p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p         p
Sudan                              p    p              p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p    p                             s    p
Suriname                           2    p    p         p    p    p              1    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p
Swaziland                          1    p    p         p    p    p              p    1    p    p              p    p              p    p              p
Sweden                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Switzerland                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Syria                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                        p                   p
Tajikistan *                            p    p         p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Tanzania                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
Thailand                                p                   p    p              p         p         p    p                                  p         p
Togo                               2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Tonga*                             1              p         p    p              1    1    1    p                                                      p
Trinidad                           p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p                        p         p
 & Tobago
Tunisia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Turkey                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    s    s    s    p    p         p              p    p    p
Turkmenistan                       p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Tuvalu*                            1                        p    p              1    1              1         p    p                        p         p
Uganda                             p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
Ukraine                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
United Arab Emir.                       p                   p    p                        p    p                             p    p    p              p
United Kingdom                     p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p
United States                      p              p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    s         p    s         s    s    s    p    s
Uruguay                            s    p    p    p    p    p    p              s         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Uzbekistan                              p         p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
Vanuatu*                                                    p    p                   1                                            p    p    p         p
Venezuela                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
Vietnam*                           p              p         p    p                             p    p    p                        p         p         p
Yemen                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Zambia                             p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
Zimbabwe                           1    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P = Party.
S = Signatory.
* designates a non-ILO member.
1 = Based on general declaration concerning treaty obligations prior to independence.
2 = Party to 1926 Convention only.


                              ----------                              


          APPENDIX D.--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

    A -- Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of 
September 25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
    B -- Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO 
Convention 29).
    C -- Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
    D -- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of December 9, 1948.
    E -- Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO 
Convention 98).
    F -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War of August 12, 1949.
    G -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
    H -- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
    I -- European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
    J -- Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
    K -- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 
September 7, 1956.
    L -- Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June 
25, 1957 (ILO Convention 105).
    M -- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
    N -- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
December 16, 1966.
    O -- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of December 16, 1966.
    P -- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 
1952.
    Q -- Protocol Relating to the Status Of Refugees of January 31, 
1967.
    R -- American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
    S -- Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
    T -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
    U -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
    V -- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women of December 18, 1979.
    W -- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
    X -- Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.

                               __________


                                                                                APPENDIX E.--SELECTED U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FY2000 ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
                                                                                                            [BA $ thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                              Export                        Peace
                                                           DA/DFA       CSD         ESF       IMET       FSA        SEED     INCLE\1\      MRA       NADR     Control     ATA       CT      Corps        FMF        PKO         Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Allocations:
Africa
Angola, Luanda.........................................      5,096      4,900          --        --         --         --          --         --     3,096        --        --        --        --          --         --        13,092
Benin, Cotonou.........................................      3,826     10,058          --       356         --         --          --         --        --        --        --     1,950        --          --     16,190
Botswana, Gabonone.....................................         --         --          --       479         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           479
Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou..............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,915          --         --         1,915
Cameroon, Yaounde......................................         --         --          --       189         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,923          --         --         3,112
Cape Verde, Praia......................................         --         --          --       123         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,159          --         --         1,282
Central African Republic, Bangui.......................         --         --          --       103         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           103
Chad, N'Djamena........................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --       622        --        --        --        --          --         --           722
Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Kinshasa............        830      8,980          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         9,810
Cote D'Ivoire, Abidjan.................................         --         --          --        22         --         --          --         --     1,600        --     1,600        --     2,731          --         --         4,353
Djibouti, Djibouti.....................................         --         --          --       163         --         --          --         --       746        --        --        --        --          --         --           909
Eritrea, Asmara........................................      4,694       4133          --        27         --         --          --         --       500        --        --        --        --          --         --         9,354
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa..................................     12,439     27,299          --       152         --         --          --         --       250        --        --        --        --          --         --        40,140
Gabon, Libreville......................................         --         --          --        47         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,460          --         --         2,507
Gambia, The, Banjul....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,509          --         --         1,509
Ghana, Accra...........................................     22,381     15,220          --       450         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,728          --         --        40,779
Guinea, Conakry........................................      8,634      9,930          --       179         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,548          --         --        21,291
Guinea-Bissau, Bissau..................................         --         --          --        22         --         --          --         --        99        --        --        --       173          --         --           294
Kenya, Nairobi.........................................     21,503      8,370          --       422         --         --          --         --        37        --        37        --     3,520          --         --        33,852
Lesotho, Maseru........................................         --         --          --        86         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,957          --         --         2,043
Liberia, Monrovia......................................      4,140      2,552          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,692
Madagascar, Antananarivo...............................     12,916      4,050          --       160         --         --          --         --       494        --       494        --     1,914          --         --        19,534
Malawi, Lilongwe.......................................     19,048     11,356          --       345         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,716          --         --        32,465
Mali, Bamako...........................................     22,370     12,876          --       270         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,576          --         --        38,092
Mauritania, Nouakchott.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       461        --        --        --     1,539          --         --         2,000
Mauritius, Port Louis..................................         --         --          --        79         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            79
Mozambique, Maputo.....................................     37,569     11,450          --       178         --         --          --         --     3,840        --        --        --     1,212          --         --        54,249
Namibia, Windhoek......................................      7,237      4,002          --       175         --         --          --         --       485        --        --        --     2,285          --         --        14,184
Niger, Niamey..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,173          --         --         2,173
Nigeria, Lagos.........................................     20,500     17,000      20,000       525         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      10,000         --        68,025
Rwanda, Kigali.........................................      9,820      6,300          --       164         --         --          --         --       285        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,569
Sao Tome, Principe.....................................         --         --          --        45         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            45
Senegal, Dakar.........................................     17,153      6,400          --       764         --         --          --         --        55        --        55        --     2,762          --         --        27,134
Seychelles, Victoria...................................         --         --          --        72         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            72
Sierra Leone, Freetown.................................         --        500       1,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,000
Somalia, Mogadishu.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,400        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,400
South Africa, Pretoria.................................     32,979     13,188          --       904         --         --          --         --     1,133        --     1,133        --     2,284          --         --        50,488
Swaziland, Mbabane.....................................         --         --          --       105         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           105
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam................................     14,322      9,500          --       167         --         --          --         --        89        --        89        --     2,206          --         --        26,284
Togo, Lome.............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,683          --         --         1,683
Uganda, Kampala........................................     29,544     19,468          --       247         --         --          --         --        18        --        18        --       276          --         --        49,553
Zambia, Lusaka.........................................     16,000     15,228          --       137         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,432          --         --       33,7974
Zimbabwe, Harare.......................................      6,926      5,200          --       286         --         --          --         --     1,152        --        --        --     1,710          --         --        15,274
REDSO/ESA/GHAI.........................................     17,360      6,900          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,260
PEGO/ATRIP.............................................     12,004         --       2,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,004
Sahel Regional.........................................      8,085        200          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,285
West Africa Regional...................................      7,200      9,900          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        17,100
SADC/ISA...............................................     23,907         --       1,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,907
Other AFR Regional.....................................     38,650     35,838          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        74,488
Education for Development and Democracy (EDDI).........      9,855        200      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        20,055
Africa Regional Democracy Fund (ARDF)..................         --         --       6,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       6,000--
Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI)..................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP).....................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     16,654        16,654
Africa Crisis Response Initiatve (ACRI)................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     20,000        20,000
East Africa Regional Fund (EARF).......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Safe Skies for Africa Initiative (SSK).................         --         --       2,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,000
Countries in Transition Fund (CIT).....................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
Regional ATA Training--Africa..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Africa...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    177,127        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       177,127
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Africa..........................................    446,988    280,998      62,500     7,543         --         --          --    117,127    16,352        --     3,426        --    52,341      10,000     36,654     1,090,513
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
East Asia & Pacific
Burma, Rangoon.........................................         --      3,000       3,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,500
Cambodia, Phnom Penh...................................         --      3,550      10,000        --         --         --          --         --     2,580        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,130
China, Beijing.........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,458          --         --         1,458
Fji, Suva..............................................         --         --          --        78         --         --          --         --        79        --        79        --        --          --         --           157
Indonesia, Jakarta.....................................     53,050     18,950      23,000        --         --         --          --         --       197        --       197        --        --          --         --        95,197
Laos, Vientiane........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --       4,000         --     1,486        --        --        --        --          --         --         5,486
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.................................         --         --          --       740         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           740
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar..................................         --         --       6,000       512      6,000         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,578          --         --        14,090
Papua New Galnea, Port Moresby.........................         --         --          --       177         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,441          --         --         1,618
Philippines, Manila....................................     22,500      7,200          --     1,415         --         --          --         --     3,258        --     1,258     2,000     1,738       1,437         --        37,548
Samoa, Apia............................................         --         --          --        85         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,242          --         --         1,327
Solomon Islands, Honiara...............................         --         --          --        53         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       991          --         --         1,044
Thailand, Bangkok......................................         --         --          --     1,730         --         --       3,000         --     2,370        --     1,150        --     1,198          --         --         8,298
Vanuatu, Republic of, Port Vila........................         --         --          --        63         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,251          --         --         1,314
Viet-Nam, Hanoi........................................      1,250      1,500          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,000        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,750
Other Asia Regional....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia (AERA)..........     11,750      1,000       5,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        17,750
East Asia and Pacific Environment Initiatives..........     15,000         --       3,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        18,500
Asia Regional Democracy Fund (Asia RDF)................         --         --       3,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
South Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty............         --         --      14,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,000
Regional Security......................................         --         --         250        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           250
Migration/Refugee Assistance--East Asia & Pacific......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     14,485        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,485
East Timor.............................................         --         --      25,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --      8,500        33,500
China NGO (Tibetan Culture)............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Regional Women's Issues................................         --         --       2,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,500
Regional--KEDO.........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --    55,307        --        --        --        --          --         --        55,307
Regional ATA Training--East Asia & Pacific.............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Kiribati...............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,055          --         --         1,055
Micronesia & Palau.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,609          --         --         1,609
Tonga..................................................         --         --          --       103         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,114          --         --         1,217
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, East Asia & Pacific.............................    103,550     35,200      95,750     4,956      6,000         --       7,000     14,485    66,277        --     2,684     2,000    14,675       1,437      8,500       357,830
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
Russia & Independent States
Armenia, Verevan.......................................         --         --          --        --    102,550         --          --         --       300        --        --        --     1,418          --         --       104,268
Azerbaijan, Baku.......................................         --         --          --   --31,968        --         --         607        100         7        --        --        --        --      32,575
Belarus, Minsk.........................................         --         --          --        --      8,489         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,489
Georgia, Tbilisi.......................................         --         --          --       409    108,533         --          --         --        27        --        --        --       318       3,000         --       112,287
Kazakstan, Almaty......................................         --         --          --       567     44,826         --          --         --     1,081     1,050        31        --     2,186       1,500         --        50,160
Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek....................................         --         --          --       358     30,064         --          --         --       385        --       385        --     1,246       1,000         --        33,053
Moldova, Chisinau......................................         --         --          --       487     50,436         --          --         50        50        --        --     1,654     1,250          --     53,877
Russia, Moscow.........................................         --         --          --       717    186,631         --          --         --     4,125     4,125        --        --     3,898          --         --       195,371
Tajikistan, Dushanbe...................................         --         --          --        --      9,926         --          --         --        50        50        --        --        --          --         --         9,976
Turkmenistan, Ashgabat.................................         --         --          --       313      6,195         --          --         --       235       235        --        --     1,360         600         --         8,703
Ukraine, Kiev..........................................         --         --          --     1,338    174,154         --          --         --     1,256     1,090       166        --     2,739       3,250         --       182,737
Uzbekistan, Tashkent...................................         --         --          --       547     20,042         --          --         --        63        --        63        --     1,724       1.750         --        24,126
Regional Export Control................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       300       300        --        --        --          --         --           300
Regional FSA...........................................         --         --          --        --     55,998         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        55,998
Regional ATA Training--Russia & NIS....................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Russia & the Independent States.................         --         --          --     4,736    829,812         --          --         --     8,479     7,000       652        --    16,543      12,350         --       871,920
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
Europe
Albania, Tirana........................................         --         --          --       646         --     32,000          --         --     1,135        --     1,135        --        --       1,600         --        35,381
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Saraevo........................         --         --          --       601         --    100,000          --         --       405        --       405        --        --          --     51,271       152,277
Bulgaria, Sofia........................................         --         --          --     1,000         --     32,000          --         --       560       560        --        --     1,785       4,800         --        40,145
Croatia, Zagreb........................................         --         --          --       514         --     36,200          --         --        --        --        --        --        --       4,000         --        40,714
Cyprus, Nicosia........................................         --         --      14,950        --         --         --          --         --     1,576       310     1,266        --        --          --         --        16,526
Czech Republic, Prague.................................         --         --          --     1,441         --         --          --         --     1,335       540       795        --        --       6,000         --         8,776
Estonia, Tallinn.......................................         --         --          --       789         --         --          --         --       565       265        --        --       664       4,000         --         6,018
Greece, Athens.........................................         --         --          --        25         --         --          --         --        15        --        15        --        --          --         --            40
Hungary, Budepest......................................         --         --          --     1,398         --         --          --         --       430       430        --        --        --       6,000         --         7,828
Ireland, Dublin........................................         --         --      23,525        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        23,525
Latvia, Riga...........................................         --         --          --       749         --         --          --         --       420       420        --        --       997       4,000         --         6,166
Lithuania, Vilnius.....................................         --         --          --       750         --         --          --         --       730       730        --        --       996       4,400         --         6,876
Macedonia, Skopje......................................         --         --          --       504         --     30,000          --         --     1,263       335       928        --       810          --         --        32,577
Malta, Valletta........................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --       375       375        --        --        --         450         --           925
Poland, Warsaw.........................................         --         --          --     1,670         --         --          --         --     1,751       891       861        --     2,100       8,000         --        13,521
Portugal, Lisbon.......................................         --         --          --       656         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           656
Romania, Bucharest.....................................         --         --          --     1,093         --     35,000          --         --       505       505        --        --     2,128       6,000         --        44,726
Slovakia, Bratislava...................................         --         --          --       633         --         --          --         --       200       200        --        --     1,528       2,600         --         4,961
Slovenia, Ljubljana....................................         --         --          --       579         --         --          --         --       375       375        --        --        --       2,000         --         2,954
Turkey, Ankara.........................................         --         --          --     1,554         --         --          48         --       872        --       872        --        --          --         --         2,474
Yugoslavia, Belgrade (Serbia)..........................         --         --          --        --         --     25,000          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        25,000
OSCE Regional..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Partnership for Peace..................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Regional ESF...........................................         --         --      21,139        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        21,139
Regional SEED..........................................         --         --          --        --         --     85,470          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        85,470
Kosovo.................................................         --         --          --        --         --    164,800          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     33,375       198,175
Montenegro.............................................         --         --          --        --         --     42,500          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         42500
Regional ATA Tralning--Europe..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Europe...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    171,329        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       171,329
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Europe...........................................         --         --      59,614    14,702         --    582,970          48    171,329    12,512     5,935     6,277        --    11,008      53,850     84,646       990,679
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
Near East
Algeria, Algiers.......................................         --         --          --       115         --         --          --         --       146        --       146        --        --          --         --           261
Bahrain, Manama........................................         --         --          --       216         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           216
Egypt, Cairo...........................................         --         --     727,267     1,006         --         --          --         --       909        --       909        --        --   1,300,000         --     2,029,182
  Egypt Supplemental...................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      25,000         --        25,000
Israel, Tel Aviv.......................................         --         --     949,056        --         --         --          --     60,000        57        --        57        --        --   1,920,000         --     2,929,113
  Israel--Wye..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --   1,200,000         --     1,200,000
Jordan, Amman..........................................         --         --     149,500     1,679         --         --          --         --     2,241        --       730        --     1,535     150,000         --       304,955
  Jordan--Wye..........................................         --         --      50,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      74,715         --       124,715
  Kuwait, Kuwait City..................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        35        --        35        --        --          --         --            35
Lebanon, Beirut........................................         --         --      15,000       582         --         --          --         --     1,282        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,864
Morocco, Rabat.........................................      7,250      3,000          --       904         --         --          --         --       631        --       531        --     2,271       1,500         --        15,456
Oman, Muscat...........................................         --         --          --       230         --         --          --         --     2,683        --     1,686        --        --          --         --         2,913
Tunisia, Tunis.........................................         --         --          --       906         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --       3,000         --         3,906
UAE....................................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       930        15       915        --        --          --         --           930
Yemen, Sanaa...........................................         --         --          --       125         --         --          --         --     2,183        --       947        --        --          --         --         2,308
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Near East................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    108,250        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       108,250
Multinational Force and Observers......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     15,902        15,902
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --        450           450
North Africa Trade and Investment......................      1,000         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,000
Regional ATA Training--Near East.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       140        --       140        --        --          --         --           140
Middle East Democrary Fund (MERDF).....................         --         --       6,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,000
Iraq Opposition........................................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
Middle East Multilaterals..............................         --         --       4,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,000
Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC)................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
West Bank/Gaza.........................................         --         --      85,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        85,000
West Bank/Gaza--Wye....................................         --         --     400,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       400,000
U.S.-North Africa Partnership..........................         --         --       5,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         5,000
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Near East.......................................      8,250      3,000   2,410,823     5,763         --         --          --    168,250    11,137        15     6,076        --     3,806   4,674,215     16,352     7,301,596
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
South Asia
Afghanistan, Kabul.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     3,000        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
Bangladesh, Dhaka......................................     31,063     14,836          --       456         --         --          --         --       185        --       185        --       998          --         --        47,538
India, New Delhi.......................................     28,700     22,750          --       480         --         --          --         --     1,014       285       729        --        --          --         --        52,944
Maldives Islands, Male.................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           100
Nepal, Kathmandu.......................................      9,900      7,000          --       216         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,775          --         --        18,891
Pakistan, Islamabad....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --       3,250         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,250
Sri Lanka, Colombo.....................................      3,250        300          --       203         --         --          --        394        --       394        --        --        --          --      4,147
Migration/Refugee Assistance--South Asia...............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     33,074        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        33,074
Regional ATA Training--South Asia......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
South Asia Anti-Trafficking............................      1,000         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,000
South Asia Regional Programs...........................         --         --       3,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
South Asia Energy & Environment........................      7,600         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         7,600
South Asia Regional Democracy Fund (SARDF).............         --         --       8,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,000
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, South Asia......................................     81,513     44,886      11,000     1,455         --         --       3,250     33,074     4,593       285     1,308        --     2,773          --         --       182,544
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Regional Allocations:
Western Hemisphere.....................................
Antigua-Barbuda........................................         --         --          --       113         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         515         --           628
Argentina, Buenos Aires................................         --         --          --       740         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         450         --         1,190
Bahamas, Nassau........................................         --         --          --       112         --         --       1,000         --        --        --        --        --        --          50         --         1,162
Barbados, Bridgetown...................................         --         --          --        71         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          55         --           126
Belize, Belize City....................................         --         --          --       161         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,277         100         --         1,538
Bolivia, La Paz........................................     25,538      7,583          --       548         --         --     158,000         --        --        --        --     2,865        --          --    194,534
Brazil, Brasilia.......................................      8,490      2,900          --       223         --         --       5,000         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,613
Chile, Santiago........................................         --         --          --       499         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           499
Colombia, Bogota.......................................         --         --          --       900         --         --     894,429         --     2,071        --     2,071        --        --          --         --       897,400
Costa Rica, San Jose...................................         --         --          --       280         --         --       1,900         --        --        --        --        --       501          --         --         2,681
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo......................      6,800      3,300          --       487         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     3,501         400         --        14,488
Ecuador, Quito.........................................     11,720        550          --       518         --         --      21,200         --     1,011        --        11        --     2,358          --         --        37,357
El Salvador, San Salvador..............................     19,508     10,495          --       523         --         --       3,000         --        80        --        80        --     2,004          --         --        35,610
Grenada, St George's...................................         --         --          --        47         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         165         --           212
Guatemala, Guatemala City..............................     13,150      7,810      20,000       225         --         --       3,000         --        --        --        --        --     3,334          --         --        47,522
Guyana, Georgetown.....................................      3,200        200          --       168         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       802         100         --         4,470
Haiti, Port-au-Prince..................................         --         --      60,000       222         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,367         300      3,800        65,689
Honduras, Tegucigalpa..................................     12,633      7,400          --       548         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     4,075          --         --        24,656
Jamaica, Kingston......................................      7,810      3,357          --       461         --         --         800         --        --        --        --        --     2,290         500         --        15,218
Mexico, Mexico City....................................      9,462      4,400          --       865         --         --       4,071         --         1        --         1        --        --          --         --        18,799
Nicaragua, Managua.....................................     14,450      7,932          --       194         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,405          --         --        24,981
Panama, Panama City....................................      3,500         --          --       117         --         --       4,000         --        --        --        --        --     1,795          --         --         9,412
Paraguay, Asuncion.....................................      5,175         --          --       210         --         --          --         --       740        --       740        --     2,925          --         --         9,050
Peru, Lima.............................................     27,902      7,000          --       455         --         --      80,000         --     1,020        --        20        --        --          --         --       116,377
Suriname, Paramaribo...................................         --         --          --       102         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       889          --         --           991
Trinidad and Tobago, Port-of-Spain.....................         --         --          --       132         --         --       2,100         --        --        --        --        --        --         250         --         2,482
Uruguay, Montevideo....................................         --         --          --       326         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           326
Venezuela, Caracas.....................................         --         --          --       384         --         --       4,200         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,584
Central American Regional Development..................      8,200      3,150          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        11,350
Latin America Regional (LAC)...........................     33,792     14,080          --        --         --         --       8,793         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        56,665
Migration/Refugee Assistance--Western Hemisphere.......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     16,456        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,456
Administration of Justice/ICITAP.......................         --         --       6,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,500
Regional ATA Training--Western Hemisphere..............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
St. Kitts--Nevis.......................................         --         --          --        67         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --        125           192
St. Lucia..............................................         --         --          --        79         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         165         --           244
St. Vincent & Grenadines...............................         --         --          --        52         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       125          --        177
Dominica...............................................         --         --          --        58         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         150         --           208
Eastern Caribbean......................................        540         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,289          --         --         2,829
Western Hemisphere Regional Democracy Fund (WRDF)......         --         --      27,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        27,000
Peru/Ecuador Peace.....................................         --         --      11,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        11,000
OAS/IADB Demining......................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,903        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,903
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Western Hemisphere..............................    211,870     80,157     124,500     9,890         --         --   1,191,493     16,486     6,826        --     2,923        --    34,677       3,450      3,800     1,683,149
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Total Regional Allocations.............................    852,171    444,241   2,764,187    49,045    835,812    582,970   1,201,791    580,752   126,186    13,235    23,346     2,000   135,823   4,755,302    149,952    12,478,232
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Global Programs........................................    358,089    280,207      28,000       765         --         --     120,550     41,873    89,594     1,295     7,654        --   108,246      32,995         --     1,060,319
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Other Foreign Operation Accounts.......................
Export-Import Bank--Loan Subsidy.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       756,064
Export-Import Bank--Administrative Expenses............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        54,900
Export-Import Bank--Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies...         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --      (15,000)
OPIC--Administrative Expenses..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        34,934
OPIC--Net Offsetting Collections.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     (108,776)
OPIC--Credit Funding...................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        23,842
Trade and Development Agency...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        43,833
Development Credit Authority...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       [3,000]
IDA--Int. Disaster Assistance..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       227,014
Micro/Small Enterprise--Subs...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
Micro/Small Enterprise--Admin..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           500
Urban/Environment Credit--Subs.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
Urban/Environment Credit--Admin........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,990
USAID Operating Expenses...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       518,960
USAID OIG Operating Expenses...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,950
IAF--Inter-American Foundation.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       [4,981]
African Development Foundation.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --      [14,345]
ERMA...................................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        12,452
Treasury Technical Assistance..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
Debt Restructuring.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       123,000
IBRD--Global Environment Facility (GEF)................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        35,800
IDA--International Development Association.............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       771,290
MIGA--Mutilaterial Investment Guarantee Agency.........         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,000
IDB--Inter-American Development Bank (Ord. Cap.).......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        25,611
Asian Development Bank.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        13,728
Asian Development Fund.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        77,000
African Development Fund...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       127,000
African Development Bank...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,100
EBRD--European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel.......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        35,779
Inter-American Investment Corporation..................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,000
MDB Arrears............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [104,000]
IO&P--International Organizations and Programs.........         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       188,300
Assistance to Plan Colombia--FY 2000...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --   [1,018,500]
Balkans/Southeast Europe Supplemental..................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [250,875]
Debt Restructuring (HIPC)..............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [210,000]
ESF--Wye...............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [450,000]
FMF--Grant--Wye........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --   [1,375,000]
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Other Foreign Operation Accounts................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     3,004,771
========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================
 
Grand Total, FY 2000 Foreign Operations................   1,210,260   724,448   2,792,187    49,810    835,812    582,970   1,322,341    622,625   215,780    14,530    31,000     2,000   244,069   4,788,297    149,952    16,543,322
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ INCLE allocations include funds appropriated for Plan Colombia.

                 APPENDIX F.--56th UNHRC VOTING RECORD

  Resolutions Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its Fifty-
                             Sixth Session

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Method of        Agenda
    Year/No.               Title               adoption \1\       item
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000/1           Strengthening of the       without a vote            4
                  Office of the United
                  Nations High
                  Commissioner for Human
                  Rights.
2000/2           Question of Western        without a vote            5
                  Sahara.
2000/3           The use of mercenaries as  roll-call vote            5
                  a means of violating       [35/11/5]
                  human rights and
                  impeding the exercise of
                  the right of peoples to
                  self-determination.
2000/4           Situation in occupied      roll-call vote            5
                  Palestine.                 [44/1/6]
2000/5           The right to development.  without a vote            7
2000/6           Question of the violation  roll-call vote            8
                  of human rights in the     [31/1/19]
                  occupied Arab
                  territories, including
                  Palestine.
2000/7           Human rights in the        roll-call vote            8
                  occupied Syrian Golan.     [31/1/19]
2000/8           Israeli settlements in     roll-call vote            8
                  the occupied Arab          [50/1/1]
                  territories.
2000/9           Question of the            without a vote           10
                  realization in all
                  countries of the
                  economic, social and
                  cultural rights
                  contained in the
                  Universal Declaration of
                  Human Rights and in the
                  International Covenant
                  on Economic, Social and
                  Cultural Rights, and
                  study of special
                  problems which the
                  developing countries
                  face in their efforts to
                  achieve these human
                  rights.
2000/10          The right to food........  roll-call vote           10
                                             [49/1/2]
2000/11          Human rights and           roll-call vote           10
                  unilateral coercive        [36/9/7]
                  measures.
2000/12          Human rights and extreme   without a vote           10
                  poverty.
2000/13          Women's equal ownership    without a vote           10
                  of, access to and
                  control over land and
                  the equal rights to own
                  property and to adequate
                  housing.
2000/14          Racism, racial             without a vote            6
                  discrimination,
                  xenophobia and related
                  intolerance.
2000/15          Situation on human rights  without a vote            9
                  in the Democratic
                  Republic of the Congo.
2000/16          Human rights situation in  roll-call vote            9
                  southern Lebanon and       [51/1/1]
                  west Bakaa.
2000/17          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                  in Iraq.                   [32/0/21]
2000/18          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in Afghanistan.
2000/19          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in Equatorial Guinea and
                  assistance in the field
                  of human rights.
2000/20          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in Burundi.
2000/21          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in Rwanda.
2000/22          Cooperation with           without a vote            9
                  representatives of
                  United Nations human
                  rights bodies.
2000/23          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in Myanmar.
2000/24          The Situation of human     without a vote            9
                  rights in Sierra Leone.
2000/25          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                  in Cuba.                   [21/18/14]
2000/26          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                  in the Federal Republic
                  of Yugoslavia (Serbia
                  and Montenegro), the
                  Republic of Croatia and
                  Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2000/27          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                  in the Sudan.              [28/0/24]
2000/28          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                  in the Islamic Republic    [22/20/11]
                  of Iran.
2000/29          Hostage-taking...........  without a vote           11
2000/30          Human rights and           roll-call vote        11(f)
                  terrorism.                 [27/13/12]
2000/31          Extrajudicial, summary or  without a vote        11(b)
                  arbitrary executions.
2000/32          Human rights and forensic  without a vote           11
                  science.
2000/33          Implementation of the      without a vote        11(e)
                  Declaration on the
                  Elimination of All Forms
                  of Intolerance and of
                  Discrimination Based on
                  Religion or Belief.
2000/34          Conscientious objection    without a vote        11(g)
                  to military service.
2000/35          Draft optional protocol    without a vote        11(a)
                  to the Convention
                  against Torture and
                  Other Cruel, Inhuman or
                  Degrading Treatment or
                  Punishment.
2000/36          Question of arbitrary      without a vote           11
                  detention.
2000/37          Question of enforced or    without a vote           11
                  involuntary
                  disappearances.
2000/38          The right to freedom of    without a vote           11
                  opinion and expression.
2000/39          Human rights in the        without a vote           11
                  administration of
                  justice, in particular
                  juvenile justice.
2000/40          The incompatibility        without a vote           11
                  between democracy and
                  racism.
2000/41          The right to restitution,  without a vote           11
                  compensation and
                  rehabilitation for
                  victims of grave
                  violations of human
                  rights and fundamental
                  freedoms.
2000/42          Independence and           without a vote           11
                  impartiality of the
                  judiciary, jurors and
                  assessors and the
                  independence of lawyers.
2000/43          Torture and other cruel,   without a vote        11(a)
                  inhuman or degrading
                  treatment or punishment.
2000/44          Traffic in women and       without a vote           12
                  girls.
2000/45          Elimination of violence    without a vote           12
                  against women.
2000/46          Integrating the human      without a vote           12
                  rights of women
                  throughout the United
                  Nations system.
2000/47          Promoting and              roll-call vote           11
                  consolidating democracy.   [45/0/8]
2000/48          Human rights of migrants.  without a vote        14(a)
2000/49          International Convention   without a vote        14(a)
                  on the Protection of the
                  Rights of All Migrant
                  Workers and Members of
                  Their Families.
2000/50          Tolerance and pluralism    14
                  as indivisible elements
                  in the promotion and
                  protection of human
                  rights without a vote.
2000/51          Human rights of persons    without a vote           14
                  with disabilities.
2000/52          Rights of persons          without a vote           14
                  belonging to national or
                  ethnic, religious and
                  linguistic minorities.
2000/53          Internally displaced       without a vote           14
                  persons.
2000/54          Violence against women     without a vote           14
                  migrant workers.
2000/55          Human rights and mass      without a vote           14
                  exoduses.
2000/56          Working Group on           without a vote           15
                  Indigenous Populations
                  of the Sub-Commission on
                  the Promotion and
                  Protection of Human
                  Rights and the
                  International Decade of
                  the World's Indigenous
                  People.
2000/57          Working Group of the       without a vote           15
                  Commission on Human
                  Rights to elaborate a
                  draft declaration in
                  accordance with
                  paragraph 5 of General
                  Assembly resolution 49/
                  214 of 23 December 1994.
2000/58          Situation in the Republic  roll-call vote            9
                  of Chechnya of the         [25/7/19]
                  Russian Federation.
2000/59          Question of draft          without a vote           13
                  optional protocols to
                  the Convention on the
                  Rights of the Child on
                  involvement of children
                  in armed conflict and on
                  the sale of children,
                  child prostitution and
                  child pornography.
2000/60          Abduction of children      without a vote           13
                  from northern Uganda.
2000/61          Human rights defenders...  roll-call vote        17(b)
                                             [50/0/3]
2000/62          Promotion of the right to  roll-call vote           17
                  a democratic and           [30/17/6]
                  equitable international
                  order.
2000/63          Human rights and human     roll-call vote           17
                  responsibilities.          [22/21/10]
2000/64          The role of good           roll-call vote           17
                  governance in the          [50/0/2]
                  promotion of human
                  rights.
2000/65          The question of the death  roll-call vote           17
                  penalty.                   [27/13/12]
2000/66          Towards a culture of       without a vote           17
                  peace.
2000/67          Status of the              without a vote        17(a)
                  International Covenants
                  on Human Rights.
2000/68          Impunity.................  without a vote           17
2000/69          Fundamental standards of   without a vote           17
                  humanity.
2000/70          Enhancement of             without a vote           17
                  international
                  cooperation in the field
                  of human rights.
2000/71          United Nations Decade for  without a vote        17(c)
                  Human Rights Education.
2000/72          Adverse effects of the     roll-call vote           10
                  illicit movement and       [37/16]
                  dumping of toxic and
                  dangerous products and
                  wastes on the enjoyment
                  of human rights.
2000/73          Composition of the staff   roll-call vote           18
                  of the Office of the       [35/17/1]
                  United Nations High
                  Commissioner for Human
                  Rights.
2000/74          Regional cooperation for   without a vote           18
                  the promotion and
                  protection of human
                  rights in the Asian and
                  Pacific region.
2000/75          Effective implementation   without a vote           18
                  of international
                  instruments on human
                  rights, including
                  reporting obligations
                  under international
                  instruments on human
                  rights.
2000/76          National institutions for  without a vote           18
                  the promotion and
                  protection of human
                  rights.
2000/77          The protection of United   without a vote           18
                  Nations personnel.
2000/78          Situation of human rights  without a vote           19
                  in Haiti.
2000/79          Situation of human rights  without a vote           19
                  in Cambodia.
2000/80          Advisory services and      without a vote           19
                  technical cooperation in
                  the field of human
                  rights.
2000/81          Assistance to Somalia in   rights without a         19
                  the field of human.        vote
2000/82          Effects of structural      roll-call vote           10
                  adjustment policies and    [30/15/7]
                  foreign debt on the full
                  enjoyment of all human
                  rights, particularly
                  economic, social and
                  cultural rights.
2000/83          Work of the Sub-           without a vote           16
                  Commission on the
                  Promotion and Protection
                  of Human Rights.
2000/84          Defamation of religions..  without a vote            6
2000/85          Rights of the child......  without a vote           13
2000/86          Human rights and thematic  without a vote           18
                  procedures.
2000/87          Establishment of a         roll-call vote           15
                  Permanent Forum on         [43/0/9]
                  Indigenous Issues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In the case of a vote, the figures in brackets represent: votes in
  favour/votes against/abstentions


                               __________


                                  APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part I]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Cuba            China (No Action)               Iran               Democ.
                             COUNTRY                              --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    97   98   99  2000  95*  95*   97   99  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00    99      '00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA (15)
  Algeria........................................................   A   --   --    --    Y    N    Y   --   --    Y   --   --    A   --      --      --
  Burundi........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    A      --       Y
  Cameroon.......................................................  --   --   --    --    Y    N   --   --   --   --   --   --    A   --      --      --
  Djibouti.......................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
  DROC...........................................................   N    N    N    --   --   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    N   --       Y      --
  Liberia........................................................  --   --    A     N   --   --   --    A    A   --   --    Y    A    N       Y       Y
  Libya..........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
  Madagascar.....................................................   A    A    A     N   --   --    Y    Y    Y    A    A    A   --    A       Y       Y
  Mauritius......................................................  --   --    A     A    A    A   --    A    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Niger..........................................................  --   --    N     N   --   --   --    A    Y   --   --    A   --    N       Y       Y
  Nigeria........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
  Senegal........................................................  --    A    A     A   --   --   --    A    A   --    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
  South Africa...................................................   N    N    N    --   --   --    N    N   --    A    A    A    A   --       Y      --
  Swaziland......................................................  --   --   --     A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
  Zambia.........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
  Botswana.......................................................  --    A    A     A   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
  Congo-B........................................................  --    N    N     N   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    N    Y    N    N       Y       A
  Morocco........................................................  --    A    Y     Y   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Rwanda.........................................................  --    N    N     A   --   --   --    N    A   --    A    Y   --    Y       Y       A
  Sudan..........................................................  --    N    N     N    Y    N   --    Y    Y   --    N    N    N    N       Y       A
  Tunisia........................................................  --    A    N     N   --   --   --    A    A   --    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
========================================================================================================================================================
Asia (12)
  China..........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       A       A
  India..........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Indonesia......................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Japan..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Korea..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A      --       Y
  Malaysia.......................................................   A    N   --    --    Y    N    Y   --   --    N    N   --    N   --      --      --
  Pakistan.......................................................   A    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       A
  Qatar..........................................................  --   --    N     A   --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --    N    N    N       Y       A
  Saudi Arabia...................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
  Syria..........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
  Thailand.......................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    A   --      --      --
  Vietnam........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
  Bangladesh.....................................................   A    A    A     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Bhutan.........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    N    N    N    N       Y       A
  Nepal..........................................................   A    A    A     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    A    A    N    N       Y       Y
  Philippines....................................................   A    A    A     A    N    A    A    A    A    A    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Sri Lanka......................................................   A    A    N     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC (11)
  Argentina......................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y   --   --    A    A    A    Y    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
  Brazil.........................................................   A    A   --     A    A    A    A   --    A    Y    Y   --    Y    Y      --       Y
  Colombia.......................................................   A   --    A     A    A    A    Y    Y    N    A   --    N    N    A       Y       Y
  Costa Rica.....................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --      --      --
  Cuba...........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       A       A
  Ecuador........................................................   A    A    Y     A    N    Y    A    A    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Guatemala......................................................  --    A    A     Y   --   --   --    A    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Mexico.........................................................   A    A    N     A    A    A    A    A    A    Y    A    A    A    A       Y       Y
  Peru...........................................................  --    A    N     N    Y    N   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
  Uruguay........................................................   Y   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --    A   --       Y       A
  Venezuela......................................................  --    A    N     N    A    A   --    Y    Y   --    Y    N    N    N       Y       Y
  Chile..........................................................   Y    A    Y     Y    A    A    N    A    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  El Salvador....................................................   Y    Y    A     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO. (5)
  Czech Repub....................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y   --   --    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Latvia.........................................................  --   --    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Poland.........................................................  --    Y    Y     Y    N    Y   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Romania........................................................  --   --    Y     Y    N    Y   --    A    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Russia.........................................................   A    N    N     N    N    N    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    A    A    N       Y       Y
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG (10)
  Belgium........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --      --      --
  Canada.........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  France.........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Germany........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Italy..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Norway.........................................................  --   --    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Portugal.......................................................  --   --   --     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --   --    Y    Y    Y      --       Y
  Spain..........................................................  --   --   --     Y   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --    Y    Y      --       Y
  UK.............................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  US.............................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
  Luxembourg.....................................................  --    Y    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
========================================================================================================================================================
  Yes............................................................  12   13   16    17    9   11   10   12   14   16   17   17   20   18      40      45
  No.............................................................   5    9   13    14   11    9    9   13   16    6    6   10   16   12       0       0
  Abstain........................................................   9    7    6     8    6    6    6   10    8    4    6    9   14   10       2       4
========================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
  Yes............................................................  19   16   21    21   22   20   27   22   22   26   23   23   --   22      51      45
  No.............................................................  10   19   20    18   22   21   17   17   18    7   14   16   --   20       0       0
  Abstain........................................................  24   18   12    14    9   12    9   14   12   19   16   14   --   11       2       8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
**Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
Y = Yes.
N = No.
A = Abstain.
C = Agreed to by consensus.
-- = Absent.






                                  APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part II]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Iraq                    Sudan                     FRY              Chech
                              COUNTRY                              -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     97   98   99   GA  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00     '00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICA (15)
  Algeria.........................................................   A   --   --    A   --     C  --   --    N   --     C  --   --    Y   --         --
  Burundi.........................................................  --   --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --   **   --   --   --   --    Y          Y
  Cameroon........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    A   --         --
  Djibouti........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  DROC............................................................   Y    A    A   --   --     C   A     C   N   --     C   A    Y    A   --         --
  Liberia.........................................................  --   --    Y   --    A   --   --     C  --   **   --   --    Y   --    Y          A
  Libya...........................................................  --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Madagascar......................................................   A    A    A   --    A     C   A     C  --   **     C   A    Y    Y    A          N
  Mauritius.......................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y   **   --   --    A    Y    Y          Y
  Niger...........................................................  --   --    A   --    A   --   --     C  --    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Nigeria.........................................................  --   --   --    A    A   --   --   --    A    A   --   --   --    Y    A          A
  Senegal.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  South Africa....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y   --     C   Y     C   Y   --     C   Y    A    Y   --         --
  Swaziland.......................................................  --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    A   **   --   --   --    A    Y          A
  Zambia..........................................................  --   --   --    Y    A   --   --   --    A   **   --   --   --    Y    A          Y
  Botswana........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Congo-B.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A   --    A     C   A   **   --    A    A    A    A          N
  Morocco.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A   --    A     C   N   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Rwanda..........................................................  --    A    Y   --    Y     C   A     C  --   **   --    A    Y   --    Y          Y
  Sudan...........................................................  --    A    A    N    A     C   N     C   N    A   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Tunisia.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
========================================================================================================================================================
Asia (12)
  China...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
  India...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
  Indonesia.......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Japan...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Korea...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Malaysia........................................................   A    A   --    A   --     C   A   --    A   --     C   Y   --    Y   --         --
  Pakistan........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Qatar...........................................................  --   --    A   --    A   --   --     C   N    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Saudi Arabia....................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Syria...........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Thailand........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Vietnam.........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    A   --         --
  Bangladesh......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Bhutan..........................................................   A    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Nepal...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    A    Y    A          A
  Philippines.....................................................   A    A    Y    A    Y     C   A     C   A   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Sri Lanka.......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   A    Y    Y    Y          A
========================================================================================================================================================
GRULAC (11)
  Argentina.......................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Brazil..........................................................   Y    Y   --    Y    Y     C   Y   --    Y   **     C   Y   --    Y    Y          A
  Colombia........................................................   Y   --    Y    Y    Y     C  --     C   Y   **     C  --    Y    Y    Y          A
  Costa Rica......................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Cuba............................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
  Ecuador.........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Guatemala.......................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Mexico..........................................................   Y    A    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    A     C   Y    A    Y    Y          A
  Peru............................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Uruguay.........................................................   Y   --   --    Y   --     C  --   --    Y   --     C  --   --    Y   --         --
  Venezuela.......................................................  --    A    Y    Y    A   --    Y     C   Y   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
  Chile...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  El Salvador.....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
========================================================================================================================================================
E. EURO. (5)
  Czech Repub.....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Latvia..........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Poland..........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Romania.........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Russia..........................................................   Y    A    Y    Y    A     C   Y     C   Y    A     C   A    N    N    N          N
========================================================================================================================================================
WEOG (10)
  Belgium.........................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
  Canada..........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  France..........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Germany.........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Italy...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Norway..........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Portugal........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Spain...........................................................  --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    Y    Y          Y
  UK..............................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  US..............................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
  Luxembourg......................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
========================================================================================================================================================
  Yes.............................................................  18   18   26   33   25     C  20     C  30   --     C  23   28   43   32         20
  No..............................................................   0    0    0    1    0     C   5     C  13   --     C   0    1    1    1          5
  Abstain.........................................................   8   11    9   13   14     C   4     C   6   --     C   6    6    7    6         13
========================================================================================================================================================
Final CHR Vote
  Yes.............................................................  31   32   35   --   32     C  31     C  --   28     C  41   46   --   44         25
  No..............................................................   0    0    0   --    0     C   6     C  --    0     C   9    1   --    1          7
  Abstain.........................................................  22   21   18   --   21     C  16     C  --   24     C  12    6   --    8         19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
**Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
Y = Yes.
N = No.
A = Abstain.
C = Agreed to by consensus.
-- = Absent.

      
                               __________

           APPENDIX H.--UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

                                Preamble

    Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

    Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people,

    Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have 
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

    Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly 
relations between nations,

    Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and 
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom,

    Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

    Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of 
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

    Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, 
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1

    All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

    Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of an kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.

    Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

    Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.

Article 4

    No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

    No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

    Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before 
the law.

Article 7

    All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

    Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

    Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

    1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public 
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

    2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race, 
of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the 
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.

Article 12

    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state.

    2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country.

Article 14

    1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution.

    2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

    1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

    2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be 
denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

    1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and 
at its dissolution.

    2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.

    3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

    1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others.

    2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

    Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.

Article 19

    Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.

    2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

    1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

    2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country.

    3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

    1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.

Article 23

    1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to 
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment.

    2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay 
for equal work.

    3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of 
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection.

    4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.

Article 24

    Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

    1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.

    2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

    1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at 
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education 
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made 
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to 
all on the basis of merit.

    2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
peace.

    3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children.

Article 27

    1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural 
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits.

    2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.

Article 28

    Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.

Article 29

    1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible.

    2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

    3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

    Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein.

Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948

 0(this material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without 
          permission; citation of this source is appreciated.)

                                   -